Datasets:

haritzpuerto

/

the_pile_00_PhilPapers

like 0

ISSN 1799-2591 Theory and Practice in Language Studies, Vol. 1, No. 7, pp. 811-820, July 2011 © 2011 ACADEMY PUBLISHER Manufactured in Finland. doi:10.4304/tpls.1.7.811-820 © 2011 ACADEMY PUBLISHER Deixis Category as Favorable Syllabus Materials -A Critical Study in Sudan Practical Integrated National English Mustafa Shazali Mustafa Ahmed Nile Valley University, P.O. Box1843, Khartoum, Sudan Email: [email protected]. Abstract-Having synthesized many findings of studies that have recently been conducted on Sudan Practical Integrated National English (SPINE); having tried to move linguistic pragmatics to the area of applied linguistics, the researcher found that these studies' findings have unanimously attributed SPINE problems only to typing errors and the use of Sudanese culture to teach English language. By comparing random selected materials from both SPINE the current syllabus and the READERS an earlier English syllabus, the researcher attempts in this paper to provide general framework of using deixis as a pragmatic inference as a helpful item in deciding and revitalizing the syllabus materials writing process which is considered as the most important stage of curriculum development. Considerable number of studies in syllabus design have viewed language learning through the 'subject' or knowledge offered by the given materials, how these materials account for ways in which teachers and learners interact with each other, how materials develop problem-solving abilities, and to what extent materials can transmit to the learners attitudes and values presented in the syllabus texts . The present study, however, investigated four aspects in both the aforementioned syllabi. Those are the number of paragraphs in each syllabus, the mechanism of sentence functional perspective, error and mistakes, and the structuring of deixis category in the two mentioned syllabi. The study has arrived at that it would be possible for English language syllabus designers in general to predict, and for SPINE designer in particular to have predicted proximate guides of what the EFL students will learn if the mentioned areas are seriously considered. Index Terms-deixis, materials, curriculum development I. INTRODUCTION Deixis in English is represented by person pronouns, demonstratives, tense, specific time and place adverbs like now', here', and other features of grammar held tightly to the circumstances of utterance. Deixis or indexical expressions' lie within the border of pragmatics and semantics. To put it another way, pragmatics' main function is to catch the evasive meaning of language which cannot be traced in a truth – conditional semantics as pointed out by (Levinson,1983, P. 58) in following examples: 1/ John Henry Mc Cavity are six feet tall and weigh 200 pounds. 2/ John Henry Mc Cavity are six feet tall. 3/ I am six feet tall and weigh 200 pounds. 4/ I am six feet tall. It is clear from the above examples that if (2) and (4) are valid inferences from (1) and (3) they must be said by the same speaker, that is to say the speaker who describes John' and the speaker I'. Here (Levinson, 1983) relates logic' to contexts of utterance. Because sentences as indicated by (Francis & Dinesen 1967, P 360) always underlie different propositions on different occasions. Levinson (1983) also indicates that the reference in the above sentences will be valid only if the speaker index and the time index are tied together. It becomes clear from this approach that sentences in their abstract can be glossed as vague and meaningless, and do not express specific propositions at all. There are only utterances in specific contexts that negotiate definite states of affairs. One of the aspects by which Levinson draws a clear cut boundary between sociolinguistics and pragmatics is the category of social deixis. To put it another way he restricts this category of deixis to the study of facts that lie in the scope of structural studies of linguistic systems. He also shows that it disambiguates the social identities and the relation between participants. He adds that such following examples can be true only if they are indeed identical to the individual who is the mother of Napoleon and false otherwise. 1/ I am a mother of Napoleon. 2/ Eliza de Rambling was the mother of Napoleon. 3/ you are the mother of Napoleon. II. A BRIEF REVIEW LITERATURE THEORY AND PRACTICE IN LANGUAGE STUDIES © 2011 ACADEMY PUBLISHER 812 Making use of a philosophically oriented deixis, the writer of this paper conceives a pedagogically oriented aspect of deixis whose potential meaning could help reconcile between what is called the structural syllabus and the notional syllabus. Potential meaning defined by Holliday, quoted in (Widdowson, 1979, P.249), as that the form itself contributes to the meaning process. Here, it is better to pedagogically perceived (Ariel's,2008, P.343) three forces behind grammar, namely, cognition, socio -cultural norms and pragmatic inferences. It is also important to pedagogically contemplate (Cooren's, 2010) logic of configuration that is as he mentioned can be found in any type of interaction, a debate, a dialogue, a conversation, etc. He mentioned that arguing for or against something consists of implicitly staging figures that are suppose to support the position one is putting forward regarding specific topic. He shows that those figures can be facts, principles, persons, traditions, institutions, expertise, knowledge, documents etc and interactants in a given conversation usually animate or ventriloqualize those figures explicitly or implicitly. Here it better also to mention (Mustafa's, 2011, P. 68) conceptualization of presupposition inference and how it motivates language users to fit in their ideas in order to extend and adjust the discourse the interlocutors are in. It can be said that both Cooren's mentioned figures and Mustafa's notion of presupposition as a mechanism that generates and extends the discourse by relatively bringing the necessary support may include the notion of deixis categories and they should fully be regarded in the selection of syllabus writing of materials. The paper also makes use of (Kaplan's, 1989) two sorts of indexical which are' character' (or linguistic meaning), and' content'. Using these two conceptions in teaching process, teachers could easily help their students differentiate between for example the word 'I' in the sentence' I am a female' knowing that it has a single character (or linguistic meaning), but it may also have different contents in different contexts. A. Person Deixis It looks for the encoding of the role of participants or pronouns and their associated predicate agreements in the speech event. That is speaker's reference to himself (first person), speaker's reference to one or more addressees (second person); and the encoding of reference to persons and entities which are neither speakers nor addressees of the utterance in question (third person). Levinson (1983) symbolizes for first person (+s) which means speaker's inclusion; and for second person (+A), which indicates addressee's inclusion. And for third person (-S, -A) which means speaker's and addressee's exclusion since this third type does not refer to any participant role in the speech event. For example the pronoun 'we' has a potential for ambiguity i.e. between exclusive 'we' which (excludes the hearer) and the hearerincluding (inclusive) 'we'. He further states that deictic usage of this centre appears in pronouns, vocatives and greetings. But although pronouns are commonly used not deictically, there are some natural uses which cannot easily be captured. Example of that is provided by (Fillmore, 1971) of the editorial we' of the New Yorker. That is although it takes plural verb agreements (thus we are not we am), it appears in the proceeding text of the same editorial with reflexive singularity in phrases like for ourself'. Another example is provided by Levinson of the hostess who announces in an air – flight something like the following: You are to fasten your seat-belts: He indicates that in order for someone to understand such utterance, there must be a distinction of speaker from source of information, and the addressee from the target. Levinson further shows that person role is marked in many ways. He shows that title and proper names often come in two sets. One is used in address as vocative in second person usage. Example of this is the following: Hey you, you just scratched my car with your Frisbee: And the other way is used in reference (i. e referring to individuals in third person role). Example of this type is the following. The truth is, Madam, nothing is as good nowadays. He also provides an example of proper names in a situation of a mother who says to the father in the presence of the little Billie something like the following. Can Billie have an ice-cream Daddy? In the above example, he notes that there must be clear-cut distinction between addressee and hearer. He further states that where face to face is lost e.g. I am Joe Blogs, language instead tends to introduce itself e. g. in a phone conversation this is Joe Blogs. B. Time Deixis Time deixis encodes point and spans relative to the time at which an utterance is spoken. An essential point to be mentioned here is (Fillmore's, 1975) classification of time into coding time CT' (the time at which the speaker produces in his\her utterance). And receiving time RT' of the addressee to the particular code or message. It is important to note that time deixis is central for texts to be meaningful since language always wears its time'. Therefore, the word now', for example, can be glossed as the time at which the speaker is producing the utterance containing it that is the notion of Coding Time CT'. Time deixis can also interact with cultural measurements of time in non deictic way. For instance today' can be considered as the diurnal span including CT, Yesterday', however, can be conceived as the diurnal span preceding the diurnal span that includes CT (Levinson, 1983, P. 75). He proceeds to show that in the application of next' to cylindrical names of days an ambiguity may arise. For instance next Thursday', can either be referred to as the Thursday of the week that succeeds the week that includes CT', or that Thursday that first follows the CT'. THEORY AND PRACTICE IN LANGUAGE STUDIES © 2011 ACADEMY PUBLISHER 813 Complexities also may arise in this deictic centre of time in the usages of tense, time adverbs, and other time deictic morphemes. For instance (Levinson, 1983) states that in letter writing, or pre-recording of media programmed that a decision has to be made of the time, whether Coding Time CT', or receiving one (to be projected in the addressee RT). (Fillmore's, 1975) examples illustrate this phenomenon. This programmed is being recorded today - --Wednesday April 1 s t, to be relayed next Thursday. This programmed was recorded last Wednesday April I s t, to be relayed today. As noted above, deictic time adverbs like now', then', soon', recently' so on, can be conceived pragmatically by the given span including CT. (Harris, 2005) shows how temporal adverbs help support students' memory and reduce tense shifting. Harris' experiment shows that 45% of the sentences given to the tested students were recalled with shifts in the verb tense and this shift appeared to be due to lack of temporal adverbs. Harris' study concludes that verb tenses either the present, past, future, present perfect, past perfect, or future perfect tenses are relatively meaningless without a temporal deictic context. This time span as indicated by (Levinson, 1983) may be the instance associated with the production of the morpheme itself as in the gestural usage in (1) or perhaps in the interminable period indicated in (2). 1/ Pull the Trigger now. 2/ I' m now working on a ph. D C. Place Deixis Place deixis is concerned with the encoding of spatial locations relative to the location of the participants in the speech event. Examples of this proximal deictic place and distal one can be conceived in demonstratives this' and that' and deictic adverbs 'here' and there'. This category of deixis always incorporates a covert time deixis element, while the converse is not true (Levinson, 1989, P. 58). Places as physical entities can deictically be identified in relation to the location of the participants at the time of speaking as in the following examples. It s two hundred yards away. Kabul is four hundred miles west of here. D. Discourse Deixis Discourse (or text) deixis primarily concerns the expressions within some utterance to refer to some portion of the discourse that contains that utterance. Therefore, discourse deixis has a sense of reference being anchored to its location of the current utterance. For instance utterance initial anyway' seems to indicate that the utterance which contains it is not addressed to the immediate preceding discourse, but to one or more steps back (Levinson 1989, P. 85) Levinson also made a clear-cut distinction between discourse deixis and what is called anaphora'. He relates a pronoun in the former to a linguistic expression (or chunk of discourse). Anaphoric expressions always relate the pronoun of the same entity as a prior linguistic expression. Older rhetoricians divide discourse in four types indicated by (Davidson, 1964, P.39) as exposition, description, narration, and argument. (Levinson, 1983) assumes that utterance initial usages of 'but', 'therefore', 'in conclusion', 'to the contrary', 'still,' 'however', 'anyway', 'well,' 'besides', 'actually' all in all,' 'so', 'after all' etc, can pragmatically be interpreted as having discourse communicative values. This can be done as how the utterance contains them is considered as actual response to, or a continuation of some portion of the prior discourse. That is prior explaining, describing, narrating, and arguing which are considered as intricate issues when selecting for example particular materials for particular syllabi or pedagogical teaching situations and learning activities should be considered. E. Social Deixis Social deixis always encodes aspects of social relationship between speakers and addressees, and the social distinctions that are relative to participants' roles in speech event. This social relation in every language has specific spatiotemporal, socio-political, and cultural dimensions which are intuitively employed by the interlocutors of that particular language to show their presuppositions and the dimensions of the discourse they have been involved in. Here arises the following questions; does social deixis category with that sense allow syllabus designers to materialize English syllabus on a different culture? To what extent have evidencebased practices of English language syllabi of non -natives synthesized that issue of deixis? How to identify 'best practices' or scientifically based methods on this linguistic aspect? How do syllabus designers encourage classroom educators to use the research findings of this linguistic field? However, this category of deixis in English language is best glossed by Brown and Levinson (1978) as the language structure which contains social identities of participants and their relations. (Levinson, 1983) provides an example on polite' pronouns and title of address and honorifics show that they cannot be treated unless social deictic values are available. He also states that all social deixis and most aspects of discourse deixis lie beyond the scope of a truth – conditional semantics. He restricts the study of social deixis to the study of facts within the scope of structural studies of linguistic system. He further points out two kinds of socially deictic information in languages around the world. That is relational and absolute and he quotes (Irvine, 1979) and (Fillmore, 1975) for further details. Deixis category is considered as essential part in pragmatic interpretation. The basic five categories of deixis has one deictic centre which includes the central person (speaker).The central time (when the speaker produces the utterance).The central place (where the speaker's location at CT). Discourse centre is the point which the speaker is currently at in the production of his utterance. Social centre is the speaker's social status and rank to which the rank or status of the addressee or referents is relative. It is worth noting that these five categories of deixis, mentioned above, should be considered as having one deictic centre which anchored upon the speaker at CT. They also help identify the referents of referring expressions through its special THEORY AND PRACTICE IN LANGUAGE STUDIES © 2011 ACADEMY PUBLISHER 814 or temporal relationship with the situation of the utterance (Harford & Healy, 1993, P. 64). Referring expressions as indicated by (Searle 1969:P. 27) are expressions that serve to identify any thing; process, event or any other kind of individuals. They provide answers to questions who? What? Which? And they are known by their functions. The conception of proposition on the other hand has been conceived as any aspect of the meaning of the stretch of language, whether derived from what is actually said, or from what hearers assume or infer. Many other linguists define it as that part of the meaning of the utterance which describes some state of affair. So it can be said that both primary deixis (exospheric deixis), and secondary deixis (endophoric deixis) serve the context surrounding an utterance and the contextual use of deictic expressions in a particular utterance. That is deixis categories help specify the referring expressions of any written or spoken discourse and this reason which makes deixis categories revitalize English language syllabi materials. III. METHODOLOGY A content analysis design is employed for this study through carefully counting paragraphs and specifying deictic expressions of two paragraphs in some texts taken randomly from Sudan Practical Integrated National English (SPINE). It is an integrated series of six textbooks for the use of both the basic level where book 1,2,3, are taught from grade five to grade eight, and in the secondary level where book 4, 5, 6 , are taught from the first year to the third final year . The study attempts to show how far deixis categories help text linguistics which is considered as an analysis of texts that extends beyond the traditional concept of sentence level and considers the communicative constraints of the situation. Counting paragraphs and specifying deictic expressions of two paragraphs are also followed in some texts taken from new method READERS an earlier Sudanese school curriculum by Michael West. Randomization process is conducted by numbering both types of the books serially to assign the units of SPINE and the Lessons of the READERS. The process of randomization ends by selecting SPINE Book 2 (Unit 3), and READERS book 2, (Lesson 3) from a random table. The main hypothesis of this study is that deixis categories help launch and sustain the foreign language learners' written and spoken discourse. Deixis categories are not fully considered upon the design of SPINE series. The aforementioned hypotheses have been raised by the following questions: 1. Does deixis category as syllabus materials help expand students' learnability? 2. Piecing together findings from a number of studies is a system usually used by organizations and professionals to collect and synthesize research–based practices. Do the writers of SPINE materials consider the latest issue of linguistic pragmatics and what is currently synthesized on deixis category as an important element in discourse analysis theory? IV. DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURE An unobtrusive observation (syllabus documentary analysis) was applied to Sudan Practical Integrated National English which is currently being taught and the syllabus of READERS which has earlier been taught in Sudan. Four aspects were investigated in both types of syllabuses. The number of paragraphs in each book, functional sentence perspective or topic-comment relation, errors and mistakes, and how far deixis categories have adequately been selected by the designers of SPINE. The ultimate aim is to provide a scientific base for considering and moving research on linguistic pragmatics to practice which in this case may be syllabus design and curriculum studies. V. RESULTS A. The Number of Paragraphs Counting the number of the paragraphs in SPINE book 2,3 and the paragraphs in READERS 2,3, the researcher has come to a frightening conclusion, that is, if considering the number of words and the length of READERS paragraphs, it can be decidedly said that the paragraphs in READER 2,3 alone equals the whole paragraphs of the SPINE series. This can proportionally be illustrated in the following table. TABLE 1 SHOWS A PROXIMATE GUIDE OF PARAGRAPHS IN SPINE2, 3 AND READERS 1, 2 SPINE 2 SPINE3 READER 2 READER3 17 96 160 180 The READERS according to what is written in their blurb constitute a seven-year course starting at the Primary School Level and are the result of carefully graded word – count. Accompanying these are Companions providing word lists and additional exercises, and composition books designed to teach how to deal in speech and writing with the material already encountered in reading. In Sudan the seven READERS were taught in the Intermediate Level which was constituted of three years and which was cancelled and been replaced by adding two additional classes to the Basic Level to become eight years rather than six years. English language teaching now begins from the fifth year of the Primary. As the above table shows that the number of paragraphs in the READERS is more than SPINE paragraphs and this is a serious indication lessening or preventing Sudanese students from exposing to the many varieties of the English Language. Exposure to the language here is a materially thought of category which should be fully regarded when THEORY AND PRACTICE IN LANGUAGE STUDIES © 2011 ACADEMY PUBLISHER 815 designing school English syllabuses as exactly done by the materials writers of READERS. It has been observed that the paragraphs of the READERS are longer and more cohesive and coherent than SPINE paragraphs. B. Functional Sentence Perspective (Connor 1999, P.80) illustrates that Prague School of Linguistics was the first to show how the presentation of information in whole texts should be studied along with the formal structures of sentences, such as a subjectpredicate relation. (Connor, 1999) shows in western IndoEuropean Languages such as English, new information of one sentence in most texts becomes the topic or the old information of the next sentence. That is, new information is always introduced at the end, in the predicate. This topic – comment relation which been adequately considered in the READERS, has been severely violated in SPINE. The following are two paragraphs taken in turn from SPINE 2 (unit3) and READER 2 (Lesson 3.). Example 1: (Taken from SPINE 2, unit3, lesson 5). John is British. He comes from Britain. He is tall. He has got green eyes and straight hair. He is quiet and gentle, but sometimes he is very funny. Everyone likes him because he is very kind The Unit has only three paragraphs and a dialogue for reading. The unit consists of twelve lessons. The rest of it is designed from tasks based activities and exercises ranging between ' Look and sing', 'Choose and write', 'Answer the questions,' and 'Fill in the blanks. Every paragraph of the three ones is a separate unit describing individuals, Alex lives in Nigeria, John from Britain, and Hajj Ibrahim and Hajj Musa are going to the market .The sentences following the topic sentence are not the type of functional sentence perspective mentioned earlier. Example 2 :( Taken from READER 2, Lesson 3). Prospero put down his book. He called Ariel." Bring the King and Antonio here," he said." My plan is ready."Then Prospero stood up. He went out of the house. He looked to see where Ferdinand was. He looked to see where Miranda was, and what she is doing. Ferdinand and Miranda were sitting on a load of wood talking to each other. It has been observed that in all of the READERS texts the comments or the new information of one sentence always becomes the topic or the old information of the next one and this coincides with (Connor's, 1999, P.80) conception of topiccomment relation. (Johnson, 1977, P.18) urged that at paragraph level, English course should teach the student not only to write cohesive texts, consisting of sentences which grammatically follow on from each other. He also recommends other type of sentences that follow on from each other on the level of sense as well as grammar. The texts of the READERS are that kind of texts which incorporate both types of Johnson's notions. Those texts have a high quality of novelty that satisfies the aforementioned four types of discourse mentioned earlier. C. Error and Mistakes in Spine Having synthesized twenty M.A theses conducted in Spine, the writer of this paper found that all of them have come to the same conclusions which SPINE main problem lies in typing mistakes (see the appendixes).There are also some grammatical errors in SPINE 6 in which the designers of the course have replaced the present participle with the gerund .The questions arises here what if these errors and mistakes are rectified? Will the educational authorities still keep SPINE as a national syllabus in Sudan? Will the problem of SPINE materials writing be renegotiated seriously in order to restore to the Sudanese students the much language that has unintentionally stolen from them? D. Deixis Category and Syllabus Materials The writer of this paper thinks that the potential value of each text selected as a syllabus material is to provide services of both learnability and teachability for both the student and the teacher as syllabus decisionmakers in classroom implementation which is considered as the last and crucial stage of curriculum development. The ability to learn and teach English language texts requires drawing a text contours or let us name it as text geography and this can clearly be done by identifying the text's indexical words which are deictic expressions, deictic markers, and deictic words and the pro forms such as 'so' and 'do'. Even the English 'Tense' itself can be conceived as deictic. (Cormrie, 1976) states that 'tense' is described as situationalexternal-time and this description gives it a deictic sense since it locates the time of a situation relative to the situation of the utterance. 'Aspect' is described by (Cormrie, 1976) as situationalinternal time of a verb showing a specific time distinction. What makes a paragraph smooth and interesting is the ability of the writers to gain variety by using different structures and different modifiers. The varied sentence structures can be conceived in forms such as the sentence types whether it is a simple, complex, compound or compound complex. The verbal whether it is a participle phrase, a gerund or an infinitive also add to the components of the paragraph variety. What gives the forms their spirit is the deixis category. That is deixis category is overlapped between all the mentioned forms. The interpretation of the indexical words should be glossed in relation to the speaker's location or the deixis centre. (Prabhu, 1987) argues that students' internal linguistic competence increases if the teacher abstract from any piece of language its meaning besides deploying abstracted structures that have already been formed in the teaching of new grammatical forms. For the system development (Prabhu, 1987) illustrates that every instance of deployment should constitute a step in the further development of those structures. In deploying abstracted structures, teachers need to make use of deictic expressions found in the texts or the selected materials. Abstracting structures appears in presenting vocabulary, asking questions, presenting and practicing structures, etc and all these need deixis centre to be identified by both teacher and student. If deictic expressions adequately manipulated, this will help sustain learning process and THEORY AND PRACTICE IN LANGUAGE STUDIES © 2011 ACADEMY PUBLISHER 816 make text itself a pragmatic visual aid that helps much in the process of teaching. Deixis can provide input for noticing language forms and meanings. It is generally acknowledged that acquisition involves a number of processes such as noticing and reasoning and hypothesizing. (Oxford, 1990) quoted in (Hedge, 2000) divides reasoning and hypothesizing in reasoning deductively, analyzing contrastively, translating, and transferring, structuring and restructuring, and automatzing. By the term 'noticing' it is meant that language features has to be noticeable for the learners. For example they should firstly know that 'don't' used in English language to express negation, and then they can work out on the relationship between meaning and form. What makes the process of language acquisition and language learning one entity, the researcher thinks, is deixis category. Deixis serves both the form (the structural form of syllabus materials) and the meaning (functional/notional materials that incorporating communicative properties). Deixis category, the researcher believes, can however, support proponents of the argument which claims that the work on notional syllabuses should best be seen as means of developing the structural syllabus rather than replacing it (see Widdowson, 1979, P. 249). Materials writing process helps increase or decrease the use of this deixis centre. That is if the designers of a syllabus have selected much different materials, this will increase the chance of using more deictic expressions. For example, READER (7) as a whole is a story which is called 'Dead Man's Rock'. The text is so arranged that the meanings of new words can probably be guessed either from the context or by analysis of the word itself. The five deixis categories are proven to be found and this helps facilitate the process of teaching and learning of the READERS' written and spoken discourses. Discourse is to coherently make sense of what is said or read, to understand speakers or writers who communicate more than they say, and the ability to take part in that complex activity which is called conversation . The present study sees the functions of discourse analysis can easily be dealt with by the producer of the utterance and the interpreter of it only if this deixis category is well illustrated in the written or spoken discourses. The second paragraph of READER 2, Lesson 3, can be taken as an example to illustrate how personal deixis category leads the process of discourse analysis Ferdinand loved Miranda. Miranda loved Ferdinand. They loved each other. That was Prospero's plan. Prospero meant Ferdinand and Miranda to love each other. He wanted Ferdinand to marry Miranda. He meant Ferdinand to be king of Naples, and Miranda to be the queen. The underlined deictic expressions help learners notice, narrate, explain, describe and argue about what is going on in the first paragraph. For example the demonstrative 'that' has dual roles of a grammatical form and of a communicative property. The learner thus may feel secure and enjoy both the prior and the coming discourse since s/he has been given pragmatic restrictions or deictic contours to help him/ her proceed successively through the text. The teacher can also make sense of these deictic contours to develop the ability of asking questions. The questions that may be developed here like the following: Did Ferdinand really love Miranda? Did Miranda really love Ferdinand? Who wanted Ferdinand to marry Miranada? What was Prospero's Plan? -If Prospero's plan succeed, who is going to be the king / and who's going to be the queen? In what place they are going to be king and queen? The compared paragraph is taken from the SPINE 2, Unit 3, Lesson 5, comes as follows: Hajj Ibrahim and Hajj Musa are going to the market. They are carrying their baskets. They want to do some shopping. Hajj Ibrahim wants to buy some meat, eggplants, onions, potatoes and bananas. Hajj Musa is going there to buy some fish, okra, cucumber, and grapefruit. The underlined deictic expressions do not narrate, explain, describe or argue anything at all in the first paragraph. There are only few uses of personal deixis. This may lessen the teacher's ability of asking questions and student's answers will all be about Hajj Ibrahim and Hajj Musa. Paragraphs in SPINE2 are short and they do have scattered ideas, and this has lessened the teacher's ability of using deixis category appropriately. VI. CONCLUSION The literature on writing syllabus materials concentrate mainly in the types of syllabuses and whether for example the particular syllabus is notional , structural, task –based or ESP one. (Widdowson, 1979, P.249) see that notional syllabus is no more than a means of developing the structural syllabus since writing materials cannot be defined as forms or functions. The present paper is, however, arrived at the importance of person, place, and time deixis categories in the process of designing materials which is considered as a crucial element in designing English language syllabi in general. The paper has tried to set forth significant policies and inputs of syllabus design. It has been proven that the English language teachers teach deixis in linguistic patterns that have been identified by (Connor, 1996, P.47-50) as textual Meta discourse and interpersonal discourse. Meta discourse are text connectives (e.g. first, next, however, but), code glosses (e.g. x means y), illocution markers (e.g. to sum up, to give example), Narrators (e.g. according to x). By interpersonal meta discourse Connor (ibid) meant the validity markers (hedges e.g. might, perhaps), (emphatics e.g. clearly, obviously), (attributors e.g. according to x), attitudes markers (e.g. surprisingly, it is fortunate that), commentaries (e.g. you may not agree on that, dear reader, you might wish to make the last section first). Reviews (Connor, 1996) said should contain indicators that an earlier text is being repeated or summarized (e.g. so far we have assumed). Previews THEORY AND PRACTICE IN LANGUAGE STUDIES © 2011 ACADEMY PUBLISHER 817 on the other hand usually contain indicators that a later stage of text is being anticipated (e.g. we show below). (Morrow, 1977, P.14) defines text as 'stretch of language that is organized in some way to form a coherent whole'. He claims that the idea of text is an important one in language teaching. The present study has also reached to that SPINE series has not been built on the idea of text, while the READERS syllabus has. Chomsky's idea of competence which is the native speaker's intuitive knowledge of his language should seriously be considered and fully assigned when designing English syllabi for non natives by involving professional natives in the stages of curriculum development. Those developmental stages are ends/means specification, program implementation. That is natives should participate as needs analysts, methodologists, materials writers, and as teacher trainers to safeguard an appropriate English language curriculum for non natives speakers of English language. A unique part of native speakers' competence is their unconscious use of indexical words, and this intuitive knowledge of the indexical words may, however, help positively in writing syllabus materials for non natives. APPENDIXES TABLE (1) SHOWS MISTAKES IN SPINE (2) IN GENERAL: No Error Type of mistakes Unit Lesson Page Correction 1 oak spelling 1 11 56 look 2 garage spelling 2 13 60 garage 3 Tell Who it is? punctuation 3 5 70 Tell who... 4 Tell Who it is? punctuation 3 5 70 Tell who it is 5 the marled Spelling/ articles 3 9 77 market 6 ....are in a day? tense 4 4 92 ...are there 7 ....are in half an hour? tense 4 4 92 ...are there in a day? 8 ...are in a minute? tense 4 4 92 ...are there in a minute? 9 ...are in a lesson tense 4 4 92 ....are there in a lesson? 10 Six five punctuation 4 4 92 six five 11 Antarctica spelling 4 10 104 Antarctica 12 thinning spelling 4 11 105 thin 13 bold spelling 4 11 105 bald 14 Himalayas spelling 5 11 129 Himalayas TABLE (2) SHOWS MISTAKES IN SPINE (3) THE PUPIL'S BOOK IN GENERAL No Error Type of mistakes Unit Lesson Page Correction 1 the market articles 4 2 91 market 2 Ladies and gentlemen punctuation 4 4 94 Ladies and gentlemen. 3 The Red sea punctuation 4 6 99 The Red Sea 4 The great wall of China punctuation 4 6 99 The Great Wall of China 5 Cold wind cool down the clouds agreement 4 8 103 Cold winds cool down the clouds 6 Emirates spelling 4 13 119 Emirates Faculty of Chemistry 7 faculty punctuation 4 13 119 Faculty of Chemistry 8 "Guest of the day" punctuation 4 13 120 "Guest of Day" 9 Deck punctuation 5 2 125 deck 10 Bones spelling 5 3 127 honest 11 Turkish spelling 5 3 127 Turks 12 Desert spelling 6 2 157 dessert 13 Goalie spelling 6 2 158 garlic 14 sewing machine spelling 6 3 161 sewing machine 15 Can me..... Punctuation 6 7 179 Can me.... 16 Breath Spelling 6 8 181 breathe 17 Gradually Spelling 6 11 189 gradually 18 Rootles Spelling 6 11 189 noodles 19 The Sea view Punctuation 6 11 189 The Sea View 20 Racquets Spelling 6 11 190 racquets or rackets THEORY AND PRACTICE IN LANGUAGE STUDIES © 2011 ACADEMY PUBLISHER 818 TABLE (3) SHOWS MISTAKES IN SPINE (4) IN GENERAL: No Error Type of mistakes Unit Lesson Page Correction 1 bamboo spelling 1 2 5 bamboo 2 exercise spelling 1 2 8 exercise 3 Iron sheet Spelling 1 2 8 sheet iron 4 Tea tab Spelling 1 3 11 Tea table 5 refrigerator Spelling 1 4 13 refrigerator 6 filling cabin Spelling 4 13 13 filing cabinet 7 factories Spelling 1 5 14 factories 8 joint Spelling 1 9 27 join 9 vinegar Spelling 2 3 38 vinegar 10 bandage Spelling 2 3 38 bandage 11 sleeves spelling 2 5 44 sleeves 12 greyhound spelling 2 6 48 greyhound 13 ingest spelling 2 10 59 longest 14 paragraph spelling 2 10 60 paragraph 15 sentences Spelling 2 1 60 sentences 16 question Spelling 2 10 60 Question 17 hampered Spelling 2 11 60 happened 18 Joni Spelling 2 12 64 Jane 19 OREDER Spelling 3 3 72 ORDER 20 want Spelling 3 5 76 wasn't 21 weak Spelling 3 9 86 week 22 school Spelling 4 6 109 school 23 Conner Spelling 4 10 126 Corner 24 country side Spelling 4 12 134 countryside 25 home work Spelling 5 2 143 homework 26 cigarettes Spelling 5 2 143 cigarettes 27 February Spelling 5 5 154 February 28 Natal Spelling 5 6 158 Natal 29 Michael Spelling 5 6 159 Michael 30 tiding Spelling 5 6 16 tidings 31 confirmed Spelling 5 8 165 confirmed 32 round about Spelling 5 8 166 roundabout 33 vocation Spelling 6 1 180 vacation 34 holly Quran Spelling 6 8 207 Holy Quran TABLE (4) SHOWS MISTAKES IN SPINE (5) IN THE PUPIL'S BOOK IS IN GENERAL No Error Type of mistakes Chapter Page Correction 1 Family society and community Punctuation 1 1 Family, society and community 2 Doubled Letters With verbs Punctuation 1 9 Doubled Letters with Verbs 3 The Life of a mechanic punctuation 2 21 The Life of a Mechanic 4 First, it is situated near a big market which makes it easy for... punctuation 2 22 First, it is situated near a big market, which makes it easy for... 5 Women Issues and concerns Punctuation 1 37 Women Issues and Concerns 6 Arch, for example is both.... Punctuation 3 38 Bear, for example, is both. 7 Bare, for example is both, nutritious drink and good for satisfying thirst Punctuation 3 38 Bare, for example, is both nutritious drink and good for satisfying thirst 8 Al Nada Girls secondary School Punctuation 3 39 Al Nada Girls' secondary School 9 breath Spelling 5 69 breathe THEORY AND PRACTICE IN LANGUAGE STUDIES © 2011 ACADEMY PUBLISHER 819 TABLE (5) SHOWS ERRORS IN SPINE (6) IN THE PUPIL'S BOOK IS IN GENERAL No Error Type of error Chapter Page Correction 1 The Gerund as a Noun and Adjective in-form 5 73 The Gerund as a Noun 2 Increasing amount in-form 5 73 'Increasing ' is present participle not a gerund. 3 Surprising number in-form 5 73 'Surprising' is present participle not a gerund 4 Exciting idea in-form 5 73 'Exciting' is present participle not gerund. 5 aging parents in-form 5 73 'Aging' is present participle not gerund. 6 The Gerund can be used as a noun or adjective in-form 5 73 The gerund can be used as a noun but not as an adjective. 7 welcoming smile in-form 5 74 'welcoming' is present participle not a gerund 8 ....situation in-form 5 74 The in –form that precedes (excuse) must be present participle. 9 .....situation in-form 5 74 The in-form that precedes (situation) must be present participle. 10 ...results in-form 5 74 The in-form that precedes (results) must be present participle 11 ....experience in-form 5 74 The in-form that precedes (experience) must be present participle. 12 ....number in-form 5 74 The in-form that proceeds (nimbler) must be present participle. 13 surds Spelling 8 126 swords 14 so he tired Spelling 10 169 so he was tired REFERENCES [1] Ariel , M.(2008) . Pragmatics and Grammar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [2] Brown, P. and Levinson, S.( 1978). University in Language Usage: Politeness Phenomena. In E.Goody (ed.) Questions and Politeness: Strategies in Social Interaction. Cambridge: Cambridge University. [3] Cormier, B. (1976). Aspect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [4] Connor, U. (1996). Contrastive Rhetoric. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [5] Cooren F.(2010). Figures of Communication and Dialogue: Passion, Ventriloquism and Incarnation in Intercultural Pragmatics Vol. 7 No.1. Walter de Gruyter. [6] Davidson, D.(1964). Concise American Composition and Rhetoric. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. [7] Fillmore, C. J. (1971). Toward a Theory of Deixis. The PCCLLU Papers (Department of Linguistics, University of Hawaii), 3.4., 219-41. [8] Filmore, C.J.(1975). Santa Graz Lectures on Deixis. Mimeo, Indiana University Linguistics Club. [9] Francis, D.S. J.Dinneen. (1967). An Introduction to General Linguistics: New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. [10] Harris, R. (2005). Deixis in memory for Verb tense. Web Transcription Tool.. :linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/50022537173800388 [11] Hedge, T. (2000). Teaching and Learning in the Language Classroom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [12] Harford, J. and Heasely, B. (1993). Semantics: a Course book. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [13] Irvine J. T.(1979). Formality and Informality in Speech Events. American Anthropologist, 81.4.773.99. [14] Johnson, k (1971). Why are Foreign Students Incoherent. In Holden, S. (ed.) English for Specific Purposes. Modern English Publications. LDT. [15] Kaplan, David (1989): ―Demonstratives,‖ in J. Alma, H. Wet stein, and J. Perry (eds.), Themes from Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 481–563. [16] Levinson, S. C. (1983). Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [17] Morrow, k. (1971). Authentic Texts and ESP. In Holden, S. (ed.) English for Specific Purposes. Modern English Publications LDT. [18] Mustafa Shazali. (2011). Presupposition as a Pragmatic Inference – Toward a New Conceptualization of the Term in International Journal of Business and Social Science. Vol. 2, No. 2 . U.S.A: Centre for Promoting Ideas [19] Oxford, R. L. (1990). Language Learning Strategies: What Every Teacher Should Know. Boston, Mass: Heinle&Heinle. [20] Prabhu, N.S. (1987). Second Language Pedagogy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. [21] Searle, J. R. (1969). A Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [22] Widdowson H. G, (1979). Explorations in Applied Linguistics. Oxford: oxford University Press. Mustafa Shazali Mustafa Ahmed was born in a small town (Abu-Hamad) in northern Sudan in 7/10/1963. He has studied the preliminary, Intermediary and secondary in small town (Atabra). He got his bachelor degree from Atabra College of Education (English language education) in 1987. He got his M. A (1994) and his Ph. D (2004) from the University of Khartoum in Sudan in English language. He has been positioned in many academic posts. He has undertaken the responsibility as a Dean of Islamic and Arabic studies for temporary times. A Coordinator and a permanent member in the graduate Council of Nile Valley University in the period (19941999). Now He is the Head of English Department and a member of the Graduate College/ English Committee. He has some local and International publications. Some of these publications are the following: (1) English Language as a Requirement Course for THEORY AND PRACTICE IN LANGUAGE STUDIES © 2011 ACADEMY PUBLISHER 820 Information Studentsin the journal of English Language Teaching vol .2, No. 3, September 2009Canadian Centre of science and Education. (2) Educational Research Contents and Objectives: An Empirical Study on the Schools of River Nile State – Sudan. Published in IJBSS on January 22, 2011 Vol. 2 No. 2 Available in http://www.ijbssnet.com/current.html (3) Presupposition as a Pragmatic Inference –Toward a New conceptualization of the Term. Published in IJBSS on march 22, 2011. Vol.2. No. 7. ( Available in http://www..ijbssnet.com/current.html). (4) Factors Hampering Scientific Research in Sudan University – With Reference to problem formulation and Hypotheses. Published in IJHSS in April, 2011. Vol. 1, No 4, (Available in http://www.ijhssnet.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=85&Itemid=9 Dr. Mustafa Shazali Mustafa Ahmed is a member in Association of Sudanese Teachers of English.

Julius Nyerere's Philosophy of Education: Implication for Nigeria's Educational System Reforms by Francis Diana-Abasi Ibanga [email protected] Department of Philosophy, Federal University of Calabar Cross River State, Nigeria. Abstract Julius K. Nyerere's philosophy of education is one of the most influential and widely studied theories of education. Policy-makers have continued to draw from it for policy reengineering. In this paper, the Nigerian educational system is examined in the light of the philosophy. This approach is predicated on the informed belief that there are social and historical commonalities between Nigeria and the society of Nyerere's philosophy. To this end, it is argued that the philosophy holds some important lessons for Nigeria's education. For this reason, there is need to inject some doses of its principles in the body polity of education in Nigeria. Therefore, the paper identifies three areas where the principles of the philosophy can be practically invaluable for Nigeria, i.e., school financing, curricula development and entrepreneurial education, in and an the final analysis, the paper identifies the linkage between national philosophy of education and national developmental ideology; and argues that a national philosophy of education of any country must be embedded in the national development ideology which the country's philosophy of education must drive. Key Words: Nyerere, Nigeria, Philosophy of Education, Tanzania, Ujamaa, Self-reliance, Development 109 Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.9, no.3, June 2016 Introduction Education has been defined in two broad ways. On the one hand, education has been defined as the process by which a society, through certain formal and informal institutions, deliberately transmits its cultural heritage from one generation to another. George Kneller and Julius Nyerere belong to this school of thought. On the other hand, education has been defined as the process of constant reconstruction of experience, rather than transmission of past values, in order to make it more meaningful and capable of solving present problems. John Dewey and Aristotle belong to this school of thought. These two definitions have their merits and limitations. For instance, as a method of "transmission" education often lead to indoctrination with past mistakes; and as a method of "reconstruction" education often lead to unhealthy materialism. From time immemorial, education has remained a vital tool used by the State to perpetrate its values and develop itself. This is to say, that by employing the instrumentality of education the State has been able to achieve its national development objectives, which traditionally include poverty reduction, disease control and prevention, transmission of national values, literation of the citizenry, and general socio-economic progress. Despite these lofty mandates entrusted on educational system generally, some States have remained backward and stagnated. The blames of the backwardness is often heap on education. For there is a saying, that a State is only as developed as its education. The role of education in national development cannot be overstated. The stage of development attained by a country is analogous to its state of education. National development is appraised in terms of mental and physical indices. It is education that bequeaths the psychological attitudes and physical skills which enable the citizenry to bring about national transformation. A poorly developed and/or maintained educational system cannot bring about the needed transformation. The development and maintenance of any educational system is a policy issue. It is philosophy of education that provides us with deep and wide-ranged approach to understanding educational issues and problems (Oshita, 2011). The interplay of education and philosophy can, and do, have positive influence on development. While education exposes us to array of information regarding the posture development should take, it is philosophy that teaches us to maintain open and critical mind in the midst of diverse ideas (Oshita, 2011). In Nigeria, the capacity of the country's educational system to bring about the desired development has been hampered by problems and issues. A lot of studies have been embarked upon to determine these issues and problems. One of the key issues identified by scholars is education financing. Funding is a critical aspect for educational development to occur. It is funds that are used to develop the human and physical infrastructure of the educational system. The criticality of education financing can be abstracted from the recommendation of UNESCO that 26% of annual budget of developing countries should be devoted to educational development. Cordelia Nwagwu (2011) reports that due to dwindling revenues, Nigerian government has continued to spend less than 3% of the country's GDP on education. Godwin Azenabor (2005) notes that: 110 Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.9, no.3, June 2016 Owing to inadequate funding, education in Nigeria has undergone tremendous changes for the worst. The astronomical expansion coupled with dwindling resources and under-funding have led to deterioration in institutional facilities and services. Poor funding militates against effective curriculum development (p.15). Funding of educational institutions in Nigeria seems to be pegged against the colonial system. Ukeje and Aisiku (1982) notes, that during the colonial administration, colonial government usually gave stipends to schools. This grant was usually meagre due to the fact that those schools were run by missionaries. But that policy of meagre grant has continued even with the takeover of schools by government in the 1970s. This problem of poor funding has contributed immensely to falling standards of education in the country. Another major problem militating against educational development in Nigeria is the problem of irrelevant curricula. This problem is historical; and it is due to the fact that the present system of Nigeria was inherited from colonialism with insignificant modification. Curriculum is the foundation document of any system of education. The curriculum streamlines the values and culture of that society. But in Nigeria, as Azenabor (1999) observes, the curricular in Nigerian schools, to a large extent, follow alien patterns of European countries; thus, Nigerians who are the recipients of the foreign models are alienated from their own culture because the education does not find meaning in the context of their culture. And because these curricula were designed to address cultural issues peculiar to those countries, Nigerian students who study them become redundant and alienated from the society upon graduation. Other issues and problems that undermine the Nigerian educational system are: poor quality of teachers, examination malpractice, brain-drain syndrome, deteriorated infrastructures, industrial unrest, cultism; supervisory failures, quota system syndrome, conflict and terrorism, and political interference (Francis, 2015; GCPEA, 2014; Ibanga, 2014; Aluede, Idogho & Imonike, 2012; Ndifon & Ndifon, 2012; Nwadiani, 2011; Otokunefor, 2011; Nwagwu, 2011; Ajani & Ekundayo, 2008; Azenabor, 2005; Azenabor, 1999; Ekpo, 1996). It is therefore in consideration of these issues and other related subjects that this paper seeks to examine the Nigerian educational philosophy and system in the light of Julius Nyerere's philosophy of education. The goal is to analyze Nyerere's philosophy of education and see if it holds any relevance for Nigerian educational system. This study is important because, as Azenabor (1999) notes, "periodic and constant examination of issues, problem and prospects of educational system of any country serves as a constant reminder to educational planners" (p.68). This study is also significant because it contributes to the debate regarding what form or posture Nigeria's educational system should assume. 111 Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.9, no.3, June 2016 A Brief History of Education in Nigeria There is balanced of opinions among historians of education that formal education in Nigeria evolved from three influences – traditional/indigenous, Islamic and Christian. The three educational backgrounds aimed at moulding moral and virtuous persons who were also equipped with necessary skills and aptitudes to contribute to the development of the society as a whole. History of education is as old as the earliest human being. The traditional educational system in the country is therefore as old as the founding of various tribes and ethnicities that make up the political entity called Nigeria. In fact, man is known as one of the beings with a strong instinct to preserve and perpetuate his values – to achieve this, he devised various schemes by which he can transmit his ideas and values to a successor generation. Man is also a social animal by nature. He is from birth curious about his environment – therefore he has strong desire to explore the environment and learn more about it. Human being also has strong desire towards self-preservation – he wants to be around the earth as long as possible. To achieve this, he explores nature and seeks knowledge from others which he can use to achieve his goal. Hence, the Annang have a saying: ese 'se idet k' ibuot agwo efat, one learn social ethos and lifestyle from others. These features characterised the traditional society and influenced the educational system it adopted – and by extension it is the reason for formal education today. Traditional educational system was aimed at equipping individuals and members of the community with the necessary skills, knowledge and attitudes that would help them function effectively in the society. In other words, the system aimed to prepare individuals to acquire vocational skills for daily living and to train them in morals. In later development, since the society had accumulated this knowledge through experience and the sayings of the ancestors, therefore, they needed to transfer this knowledge to successor generations. To attain these goals, the traditional educational system employed folklore narrated by elderly members of the community as well as taboos, dance, songs, etc. From these means and stories, good morals and virtue were impacted. In terms of vocal training, the child was either made an apprentice to an artisan or learned vocation from his parents. (Girls in particular were not sent out to learn trade but rather learned from their mothers). This was the system of education that was in vogue in Nigeria until the advent of Western and Islamic educational systems. Islamic educational system was the first non-indigenous educational system introduced in the country. Kazeem and Balogun (2013) note, that Islamic education in Nigeria is as old as the advent of the religion in the country – because Islam is practiced simultaneously with its own form of education. They further state that Islamic education is made to go together with Islamic religion because without the former the later cannot be understood. It is through Islamic education that the teachings and values of Islamic religion can be propagated. In addition, the educational aspect of Islam is seen as a form of worship which makes the practice of the religion complete (Khalid, 2016). 112 Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.9, no.3, June 2016 Mkpa (2016) states that Islamic education was first introduced in the country through the ancient Kanem-Borno Empire between 1085 and 1097 when the King of Kanem, Umne Jilmi embraced Islam and became zealous of its learning. From there the religion and its educational system spread to other parts of northern and southwest Nigeria mainly through the activities of traders from the Middle East. Mkpa (2016) also states that Islamic education brought with it Arabic learning which was the language of the Quaran. The jihad of Usman Dan Fodio in 1804 furthered Islamic religion and its educational system and opened it up for women to access. Khalid (2016) avers that the jihad led to proliferation of Islamic schools in the north and southwest. Abdullahi Bayero, returning from Mecca in 1934, opened a school for training of Islamic teachers in Arabic language, arithmetic and other Islamic subjects as well as English language (Mkpa, 2016). As the religion became more firmly established and spreading from the north to the southwest, Quaranic schools were opened in the premises of mosques and in the houses of Mallams. By 1913 there were 19,073 Quaranic schools with an enrolment of 143,312 pupils (Ukeje & Aisiku, 1982). The Quaranic schools were organized into Makarantar Yara (Nursery), Tittibiri (Elementary) and Adult stages – whereby at Makarantar Yara stage the child is trained in memorising ayats of the Quaran, at the Tittibiri stage he is trained in the alphabet and grammar of Arabic language and at Adult stage he is introduced to other subjects of Islamic education, such as poetry, logic, rhetoric, jurisprudence, algebra, theology, etc (Fafunwa, 1974). The purpose of Islamic education in the country was "to produce a good character and righteous man, he who worship Allah the creator and acts according to the dictates of Shariah" (Kazeem & Balogun, 2013). The purpose was also to raise Islamic teachers who would spread the religion and its values. But also Islamic education, at a higher level, was also aimed to produce men who are versed in the sciences, medicine, engineering, mathematics, jurisprudence, etc (Kazeem & Balogun, 2013). To achieve this, Islamic education (not at the higher level) used methods of indoctrination and imitation. Western educational system was the last to be introduced into the country; and it was a mixture of secular and Christian scholarship. According to Ukeje and Aisiku (1982), Western education began in Nigeria in 1842 with Wesleyan Missionary Society in Badagry. This was followed with the entrance of the other missionary societies into the geographical space that was later known as Nigeria. As noted by Ukeje and Aisiku (1982) "the missionary societies founded schools whenever and wherever they established stations" – as a means of proselytising. The school system varied as each mission operated own educational system until it was standardised into infant, primary and secondary categories following the introduction of the Nigeria education code in 1926. Later, the university system was introduced into the country beginning with the establishment of Higher College, now Yaba College of Technology, in 1932. The establishment of the Yaba College followed the introduction of three-tier system of education in the country by E.R.T. Hussey in 1930 which divided up the educational system into elementary, middle and higher levels (Ukeje & Aisiku, 1982). 113 Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.9, no.3, June 2016 It is noteworthy that when Western education was introduced into the country by Christian missionaries the goal was to raise Christian individuals with good moral character. They also aimed to raise individuals who would be able to propagate the Gospel. As a result grammar schools were opened where students were taught English grammar, Christian religious knowledge and arithmetic – so that they could read the bible and also able to communicate with the white missionaries whom they were to serve as messengers. When colonial government later made in-road into the educational system it was for their need for colonial administrative support and to train elites who would be used in the indirect rule system. From thence the Western educational system gradually shifted its focus from training merely grammarians to training individuals who could serve as clerks, secretaries, teachers, messengers, interpreters, etc. Technical colleges were later opened to train individuals who could work in factories and mines as artisans. However, the activities of the nationalists (who returned from their schooling overseas) forced them to develop educational plan which focused on national development. Today the goals and strategies of Nigerian education system have changed following political independence. These goals and strategies are documented in the National Policy on Education (NPE) 2004. From the brief account above, it could be observed that with the possible exception of traditional educational system, the foreign educational systems introduced into the country were not focused on development of the Nigerian society. Rather, they were focused on developing the religion that brought it; and later the colonialists used it as a means of entrenching their indirect rule system. Islamic educational system focused primarily on producing good Muslim individuals, who could recite the Quaran at least and live the values of Islam. As Bidmos (2014) notes, Islam believes that: The rationale for education of man revolves around the purpose of creation which means the assignment divinely decided for man... and that if the major assignment for man is to serve God, his preparation i.e education must take cognizance of both the service and the one to be served God (p.22). In the same vein, Western educational system aimed principally at raising Christian individuals who could read and teach the bible as well as live Christian values. For as the Bible says: By these, my son, be admonished: of making many books there is no end; and much study is weariness to the flesh. Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God, and keep his commandment; for this is the whole duty of man (Eccl. 12.12-13: KJV). 114 Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.9, no.3, June 2016 Now, if the whole duty of man is to serve God, his preparation, that is, education must be geared towards a service to God. That is to say, education aimed at physical and social development of the society is not definitely encouraged in Christian religion as it is condemned as worldly. Here again the Bible derides geocentric development: I wanted to see what was worthwhile for men to do under heaven during the few days of their lives. I undertook great projects: I built houses for myself and planted vineyards. I made gardens and parks and planted all kinds of fruit trees in them. I made reservoirs to water groves of flourishing trees. Yet when I surveyed all that my hands had done and what I had toiled to achieve, everything was meaningless, a chasing after the wind; nothing was gained under the sun (Eccl. 2.3-6,11: NIV). This could have been the reason Western (Christian) educational system did not place premium on the development of the society. Their emphasis on rather developing the moral character of the individuals in accordance with Christian doctrines can be linked to their doctrines of afterlife and contemptuous temporality of the earth, as it is evident in these biblical verses: In my father's house are many rooms; if it were not so, I would have told you. I am going there to prepare a place for you. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come back and take you to be with me that you also may be where I am (John 14.2-3: NIV). And: Do not love the world or anything in the world... The world and its desires [shall] pass away, but the man who does the will of God lives forever (I John 2.15,17: NIV). In the light of these, each of them either attempted to either Islamize or Christianize the individual. They did not come to raise great minds particularly because of the prejudice held by some western philosophers – Hume, Kant, Hegel, etc – that the black intellect was incapable of philosophic and lofty thinking. Hence, they sought to make African assimilate either Arabic or European lifestyles as the case were. Traditional system of education was stagnated because of its inability to develop a more systematic method of learning, and because of its inability to develop a lettering system. It was also limited because it was a closed system – as a result it could not adopt and domesticate foreign concepts that were relevant to it. This problem can be linked to its method of indoctrination which made it to see anything not derived or fitted into the ancient and traditional pattern as irrelevant, aberrant and moral affront. 115 Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.9, no.3, June 2016 The traditional system, like Islam and Christian systems, placed premium on transmitted ideas rather than on experimental knowledge, reflection and reconstruction of experience. The major credit of the traditional educational system is that it did not hold racial-bias prejudice held by Western thinkers and it focused it activities to the development of the physical environment rather than heaven – at least its doctrine of reincarnation encouraged the people to create and bequeath a better world to the future since they will always come back to live in it. The Purpose of Education in Nigeria Education, whether it is formal or informal, has a purpose. The purpose and goal of education in Nigeria is contained in the Section I of the National Policy on Education (NPE) 2004. According to the document, "no policy on education, however, can be formulated without first identifying the overall philosophy and goal of the nation" (NPE, 2004, p.1). This therefore means that the purpose of education in Nigeria is to serve as the vehicle towards achieving the national goals and philosophy of Nigeria. As outlined in the NPE 2004, the national goals and philosophy of Nigeria are as follows: (a) To live in unity and harmony as one indivisible, indissoluble, democratic and sovereign nation found on the principles of freedom, equality and justice. (b) To promote inter-Africa solidarity and world peace through understanding. (c) To build a free and democratic society. (d) To build a just and egalitarian society. (e) To build a great and dynamic economy. (f) To build a land full of bright opportunities for all citizens. To achieve this goal, education in Nigeria therefore must be directed towards: (a) The inculcation of national consciousness and unity. (b) The inculcation of the type of values and attitude for the survival of the individual and the Nigerian society. (c) The training of the mind in the understanding of the world around. (d) The acquisition of appropriate skills and the development of mental, physical and social abilities and competences as equipment for the individual to live in and contribute to the development of the society. In consequence, education has to be oriented toward inculcating the following values: (a) Respect for worth and dignity of the individual. (b) Faith in man's ability to make rational decisions. (c) Moral and spiritual principle in inter-personal and human relations. (d) Shared responsibility for the common good of society. (e) Promotion of the physical, emotional and psychological development of all children. (f) Acquisition of competencies necessary for self-reliance. 116 Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.9, no.3, June 2016 Tanzania's Development Ideology Chris Akpan (2009) argues that to understand a person's ideas and conceptions, we must understand the component parts but we cannot understand the parts unless we understand the whole. To understand Nyerere's philosophy of education we have to first understand the underpinning ideology of the society from which the philosophy evolved and to which it belongs. Every philosophy is a product of the culture and history of the society of the philosopher (Chimakonam, 2015; Ozumba, 2015). Every philosophy is time-bound and culture-specific, tailored to address the ills of that particular society in the first instance and that of the global community by extension. For this reason, Kwame Nkrumah argues that: When we study a philosophy which is not ours, we must see it in the context of the intellectual history of which it belongs, and we must see it in the context of the milieu in which it was born. That way we can use it in the furtherance of the cultural development and in the strengthening of our human society (p.55). Now, it is important to note that during the formulation of Nyerere's educational philosophy, Tanzania was an African society whose national philosophy and developmental goal were based on the policy of socialism and self-reliance enshrined in Ujamaa and popularise in the Arusha Declaration of 1967. And Nyerere's educational philosophy was designed to serve as the instrument to achieve these socialist goals. We have said that we want to create a socialist society which is based on three principals: equality and respect for human dignity; sharing of the resources which are produced by our efforts; work by everyone and exploitation by none. We have set out these ideas clearly in the National Ethics; and in the Arusha Declaration and earlier documents we have outlined the principles and policies we intend to follow (Nyerere, 1982, p.239). The doctrine of socialism, according to Nyerere, was to build a society in which all members have equal rights and opportunities; a socially harmonious society in which all live without suffering or imposing injustice, being exploited, or exploiting; and in which all have a gradually increasing basic level of material welfare (Sheikheldin, 2015). This is a direct antithesis to capitalism which emphasizes individualism, competition, might and mindless mobilization of material resources. And the doctrine of capitalism, in this wise, necessarily leads to exploitation. In the context of Ujamaa, socialism emphasizes the need to mobilize human resources for self-reliant development. This means a reliance on the human self rather than relying on material resources. In fact, Nyerere was quoted as stating that "the development of a country is brought about by people, not money. Money, and the wealth it represents, is the result and not the basis of development" (See Kassam, 2000). Nyerere saw money only in terms of instrumentality, a means to desired end and not as an achievement, a goal. 117 Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.9, no.3, June 2016 It is only a developed self that can use the money or material resource to further develop the self for the self. (The self here should only be understood within the context of Ujamaa which emphasizes communal living). The notion of anthropocentric development seems to be the development philosophy of the African; for in Annang a proverb states: "agwo adi imọ, affọn ikpu ikpu", human being rather than material possession is the real wealth. Tanzania socialism also aimed to develop a particular quality of life which is people-centred. It attached commitment to the belief that there are more important things in life than amassing riches, and that pursuit of wealth clashes with things like human dignity and social equality, the latter will be given priority 'for the purpose of all social, economic and political activity must be man.' It is only through the development of people rather than things that people's true freedom and human dignity can be preserved. The development of roads, buildings and agricultural production, and so forth are regard only as tools of development. 'A new road extends a man's freedom only if he travels on it' (Kassam, 2000, p.3). To this end, the focus of development was rightly put on the rural areas where a vast majority of the citizenry lived. The commitment to socialist and self-reliant ideology required participation of the people in the entire developmental process. And for this to happen, the people must live together in a cooperative basis. To achieve this goal, education became a veritable tool. For as Nyerere put it: The education provided by Tanzania for the students of Tanzania must serve the purpose of Tanzania. It must encourage the growth of the socialist values we aspire to (Nyerere, 1982, p.252). Julius Nyerere's Philosophy of Education Nyerere's philosophy of education is contained in his post-Arusha policy directive on education which was issued in March 1967 (Kassam, 2000). It was entitled "Education for Self-Reliance." It analyzed the system and attitude of education as they evolved in Tanganyika and then went on to demand an educational revolution which was intended to address the needs and social objectives of Tanzania. According to Yusurf Kassam, Nyerere's philosophy of education "has some parallels with Mahatma Gandhi's 'basic education' proposal, particularly in relation to the introduction of productive work and self-reliance in schools, as well as a 'radical restructuring of the sociology of school knowledge'" (Kassam, 2000, p.3). Nyerere's educational philosophy was designed to address the defects in the existing educational system which was inherited from the colonialists. 118 Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.9, no.3, June 2016 Some of the structural problems of the then existing educational system was that it promoted attitude of inequality, intellectual arrogance, and individualism among those who entered the school system. Moreover, the system breed the notion that education was only synonymous with formal schooling; laid too much emphasis on paper qualification which was obtained by passing written examinations; divorced the students from the society; and breeds among the students contempt for blue collar work. The education which the formal school system provided in Tanzania was the opposite of the nature and needs of the Tanzanian society. Nyerere argued that the educational system Tanzania inherited from the colonialists "was not designed to prepare the young people for the service of their own country; instead it was motivated by a desire to inculcate the values of the colonial society and to train individuals for service of the colonial state" (Nyerere, 1982, p.273). The colonial administration's interest in education stemmed from the need for local clerks and junior officials. To address this problem, Nyerere evolved a philosophy of education based on Ujamaa which encapsulates the cultural philosophy and need of the people. According to him: [Education] must also prepare young people for the work they will be called upon to do in the society which exists in Tanzania – rural society where improvement will depend largely upon the efforts of the people in agriculture and in village development. This does not mean that education in Tanzania should be designed to produce passive agricultural workers of different level of skills who simply carry out plans or directions received from above. It must produce good farmers; it has also to prepare people for their responsibilities as free workers and citizens in a free and democratic society, albeit a largely rural society. They have to be able to think for themselves, to make judgments on all issues affecting them (Nyerere, 1982, p.240-1). Nyerere educational philosophy was designed not to produce robots but human beings endowed with critical and creative thinking capabilities. This was the stark opposite of the educational philosophy bequeathed by the colonial administration – which was intended to produce passive individuals. Moreover, Nyerere's educational philosophy also proposed for organizational restructuring in the areas of curriculum, school organisation and administration, as well as enrolment and admissions. In the area of curriculum, Nyerere argued that the school curriculum must deemphasize formal examinations, which merely assess the students' ability to learn facts. 119 Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.9, no.3, June 2016 We should not determine the type of things children are taught in primary schools by the things a doctor, engineer, teacher, economist, or administrator needs to know. Most of our pupils will never be any of these things. We should determine the types of things taught in the primary schools by the things which the boy or girl ought to know – that is, the skills he ought to acquire and values he ought to cherish if he, or she, is to live happily and well in a socialist and predominantly rural society, and contribute to the improvement of life there... The implication of this is that the education given in our primary schools must be a complete education itself. It must not continue to be simply a preparation for secondary school... Similarly, secondary schools must not be simply a selection process for the university, teachers college, and so on. They must prepare people for life and service in the villages and rural areas of this country (Nyerere, 1982, p.245-6). Nyerere argued that what the majority of citizens needed was epistemic capacities in history, values, civic ordinances and some skills necessary to earn a living. He argued that eventually most people would earn living from self-employment, while a few will be on government wage bill. To this end, the education Tanzania needed was that which was capable of preparing the citizens to become self-reliant. Above all, graduates should be able to fit into and serve the community from which they come. Therefore Nyerere queried: Is there any reason why students at such institutions should not be required as part of their degree or professional training to spend at least part of their vacations contributing to the society in a manner related to their studies.... For example, the collection of local history, work on the census, participation in adult education activities, work in dispensaries, etc, would give students practical experience in their own fields (Nyerere, 1982, p.252). In the area of school enrolment, Nyerere proposed that the primary school age should be raised from 5 or 6 years to 7 years so that the student could be older and more responsible on leaving school. This aspect of Nyerere educational philosophy at that time was praiseworthy for the fact that life expectancy at the time was considerably higher than what is obtainable today. And for students who would be involved in physical work, age maturity was indeed important. In summary, Nyerere's philosophy of education was designed to achieve the purpose and goals of Tanzania. The philosophy conceptualized the goal of the nation's curricula and the method to achieve those goals. In fact, Nyerere's philosophy of education was basically a system of method of achieving the national goals of Tanzania. One of such goals was to inculcate the spirit and consciousness of socialism into the Tanzania student. Two, the philosophy was to aid prepare the Tanzanian student for a life in a rural albeit agro-based economy. 120 Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.9, no.3, June 2016 Three, the philosophy de-emphasized paper qualification rather it recommended that the student contribution to community development should form part of the sessional assessment of the student. Four, it showed how agro-based educational institution could be functional and independent of external grants. These are some of the basic tenets of Nyerere's philosophy of education – a philosophy formulated after rigorous critique of the colonial educational philosophy Tanzania inherited at independence. Nyerere's Philosophy of Education: Lessons for and Relevance to Nigeria Educational System To determine any possible relevance of Nyerere's educational philosophy to Nigeria educational system, it is important to first of all reiterate that Nyerere's educational philosophy was based on the cultural context of Tanzania and was directed to address the needs of Tanzania at the time. Despite this fact, there are a number of principles which it articulated that transcend and outlive the time and social context of Tanzania. To begin, it is important to consider the following facts. One, Nyerere's educational philosophy was based on the social, economic and political system of Tanzania which was essentially socialist. Two, Tanzania was predominantly a rural population whose basic economic activity revolved round agriculture. Three, Tanzania had very few schools which were unable to welcome more than 80 per cent of those who wanted enrolment (Nyerere, 1982). Four, the two colonies that formed Tanzania were colonized by Britain that also bequeathed a colonial education legacy to them. These are the social facts that underpinned Nyerere's philosophy of education. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that though Nigeria and Tanzania may share similar cultural history (particularly pre-colonial historical affinity), the social conditions of today's Nigeria are not the same as that of Tanzania which inspired Nyerere's philosophy of education. One, Nigeria operates a capitalist economic and socio-political system. Two, Nigeria economy is urban and petro-based rather than rural and agro-based. (Although recent rebasing of the economy indicates that agriculture contributes more to the GDP than does Petroleum). Three, Nigeria has millions of educational institutions as compared to Nyerere's Tanzania. These are some of the areas where there are differences of social context. However, both Nigeria and Tanzania inherited their educational system from the colonial Britain. Having highlighted the differences and similarities in social milieu of Nigeria and Tanzania, therefore, we can see the kind of students Nyerere's educational philosophy was to prepare would find it difficult to live in the contemporary Nigeria. Nevertheless, there are some lessons from Nyerere's philosophy of education which are relevant to Nigerian educational system reforms. First, the system of education in Nigeria should be designed to serve the interest of Nigeria first and foremost. To achieve this will require a total overhaul of the curricula in our schools. Azenabor rightly observes that: 121 Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.9, no.3, June 2016 Our [Nigeria] educational system naturally leads to unemployment because the products are not trained to generate jobs independently. We introduce foreign courses that are redundant and unproductive into our schools curricula just because they are being offered in Western countries... Education is supposed to prepare one for life in his society, but the Nigerian Educational System divorces the pupil from the society in which it is supposed to prepare them (Azenabor, 1999, p.70). To stem this problem, our curricula must be re-designed to reflect our cultural identity and our social, economic as well as political needs. This means our educational system must be re-orientated from being a corridor to obtain meal ticket, to institution that is capable of moulding morally incline human character who is capable of standing on his own. Two, to mitigate the problem of funding of our educational institutions, programmes should be designed that will make our schools to be financially independent. This means the government must be ready to stop meddling in the administration of the school; therefore it should grants academic freedom especially to the universities. School autonomy also means that government shall no longer spoon-feed the schools. School autonomy further translates into financial autonomy in terms of revenue generation, financial administration and financial sustainability. Our school, from primary through secondary to tertiary levels, must begin to be self-reliant. Schools must, in fact, become communities – and communities which practices the precept of self-reliance. ...This means that all schools, but especially secondary schools and other forms of higher education, must contribute to their own upkeep; they must be economic communities as well as social and educational communities. Each school should have, as an integral part of it, a farm or workshop which provides the food eaten by the community, and makes some contribution to the total national income (Nyerere, 1982, p.147). Kolawole Ogundowole (2007) observes that self-reliancism is not merely the ability of a people to control their resources and consequently their socio-economic destiny but it "demands of all and sundry competence, dedication, confidence, national awareness, and above all, originality, inventiveness and creativity which are necessary facts for self-respect and self-realisation" (p.26). Designing and planning our educational system to be selfsustaining holds the capacity to radically address the problem of funding which has bedevilled our educational system for too long. Nyerere's philosophy of education therefore offers us readily available concepts to rejig our school funding model. Three, to solve the problem of unemployable graduates viz. unemployed graduates Nyerere's educational philosophy should be used as a guide, in re-engineering Nigeria educational system towards enabling it prepare students to be self-reliant through engaging in agricultural enterprises and other entrepreneurial activities. Bassey Ubong (2011) is right in suggesting that: 122 Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.9, no.3, June 2016 African, nay developing countries, should have a philosophy of education that produces persons that can stand on their own after school.... There is an urgent need for a reorientation towards education for self-reliance rather than education for job-seeking. All schools should have their curricula to reflect a reasonable dose of entrepreneurship (p.108). The form of entrepreneurship we recommend here is agro-based entrepreneurship. Engagement in agricultural activities will promote urban agriculture but it will also draw the graduates and students out of the cities; so the new philosophy should also provide guide towards preparation of students for rural living. This would even de-populate our already crowded cities. And it would also create jobs among our unemployed graduates and school leavers. Conclusion This study will be incomplete without making the following observation that it will be delusional to assume that the notions distilled and presented here are in any way exhaustive. It is important to recognize the fact that there is room for improvement in the study. It is also important to recognize that there may lay within Nyerere's philosophy of education far more transcending and fundamental values than I have been able to observe. However, I want to assert that the implication of Nyerere's educational philosophy for Nigeria may hold equally true to some other countries, particularly African countries south of the Sahara and countries of the Caribbean. Finally, the article discusses the implications of Nyerere's philosophy of education for Nigeria. It highlights the characteristic features of the philosophy and analytically model how those properties can be deployed to re-engineer the Nigerian educational system towards serving the need of the country. Even though Ubong (2011) argues that "Nigeria does not really have a definite national philosophy of education" (p.107); from the study we have seen that there is an urgent need for Nigeria to revisit the "existing" educational philosophy of the country to make it become consistent with the country's needs. The overall structure and superstructure of a country's "national philosophy on education can positively or negatively affect virtually all aspects of life and all sectors of the nation." (Ubong, 2011, p.108). The need to revise the methods and goals of teaching and learning in our schools cannot be overemphasized. Curricula are meant to act as the engine of any educational system, Nigeria curricula should be redirected to reflect our indigenous values and serve our needs. This is one of the major lessons to learn from Nyerere's philosophy of education. Education for Nigeria must be founded on locally made indigenous philosophy of education of Nigeria. Philosophy of education is the bedrock of any educational system. Moreover, there is need to rethink our national goals in the light of the current realities; and develop a national development ideology and philosophy of development for the country for the first time. As seen from our study, education is a vehicle design to drive development. The World Bank (2002) states that education is fundamental to nation building and social development. 123 Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.9, no.3, June 2016 As Osunde and Omoruji (2011) note, without education development leaps on one leg; for education serves as instrument to fight against poverty, disease, ignorance, backwardness. Education and development go hand in hand. Without national development ideology for a country, their philosophy of education can be said to be incomplete or at least castrated. This may be the reason Bassey Ubong and C. O. Oladapo argue that Nigeria does not have a national philosophy of education. Indeed, philosophy of education must be embedded in development ideology. National philosophy of education is design to drive the development ideology of the country. It is therefore very important for Nigeria to urgently develop an indigenous national philosophy for the country to drive development. References Ajayi, I. A. and Ekundaya, H. T. (2008) "The Deregulation of University Education in Nigeria: Implication for Quality Assurance", Nebula, Vol. 5, No. 4. Akpan, C. O. (2009) "The Hermeneutical Approach to African Philosophy", Andrew F. Uduigwomen (Ed.), From Footmarks to Landmarks: On African Philosophy (2nd ed,). Lagos: Obaroh & Ogbinaka Publishers Ltd. Aluede, O., Idogho, P. O. and Imonike, J. S. (2012) "Increasing Access to University Education in Nigeria: Present Challenges and Suggestions for the Future", The African Symposium: An Online Journal of African Educational Research Network, Vol. 12, No. 1. Azenabor, G. (1999) "The Nigerian Educational System: Problem and Prospects", The Nigerian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 17, No.1&2. Azenabor, G. (2005) Sustainability of University Education in Nigeria: A Philosophical Discourse on Problems and Revival Strategies. Lagos: Onosomegbowho Ogbinaka Publishers Ltd. Bidmos, M. A. (2004) Islamic Education in Nigeria – Its Philosophy and Research Methods. Lagos: Panaf Publishing. Chimakonam, J. O. (2015) "The Criteria Question in African Philosophy: Escape from Jingoism and Afrocentrism", Jonathan O. Chimakonam (Ed.), Atuolu Omalu: Some Unanswered Question in Contemporary African Philosophy. Maryland: University Press of America. Ekpo, S. (1996) Juvenile Delinquency in Nigeria. Ikot Ekpene: Development Universal Consortia. Fafunwa, B. (1974) History of Education in Nigeria. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. Francis, D. A. I. (2015) "Solving the Problem Poor Quality of University Graduates in Nigeria – A Proposed Holistic Approach", British Journal of Education, Vol. 3, No. 7. GCPEA (2014) Education Under Attack. New York: Global Coalition to Protect Education Against Attacks (GCPEA). 14 June 2014 http://www.protectingeducation.org Ibanga, D. A. (2014, November 27) "Training Teachers as Place Managers: Towards Improving Safety and Security on School Campuses in Nigeria", Paper presented at the Colloquium on Contemporary Issues in Education, Arts, the Social Sciences, and Sciences in Honour of Toyin Falola At the Tai Solarin University of Education, IjebuOde, Ogun State, Nigeria. 124 Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.9, no.3, June 2016 Kassam, Y. (2000) Julius Kambarage Nyerere. Paris, UNESCO: Internal Bureau of Education. Kazeem, S. A. & Balogun, K. Y. (2013, Nov) "Problems Facing Islamic Education: Evidence from Nigeria", Journal of Educational and Social Research, Vol. 3, No. 9. Khalid, S. (2016) "Karatun Allo: The Islamic System of Elementary Education in Hausaland", Gamji 22 Jan. 2016 <http://gamji.com/article6000/news6032.htm Mkpa, M. A. (2016) "Overview of Educational Development: Pre-colonial to Present Day", Online Nigeria 22 Jan. 2016. <http://onlinenigeria.com/education/?blurb=534. National Policy on Education 2004. Abuja: Federal Ministry of Education, Nigeria. Ndifon, C. O. & Ndifon, R. A. (2012) "Public Examinations in Nigeria and Punishing Malpractice: Human Rights Perspective", British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences, Vol. 5, No. 2. Nkrumah, K. (1964) Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology For Decolonisation And Development with Particular Reference to the Africa Revolution. New York: Monthly Review Press. Nwadiani, M. (2011) "Educational Planning and the Challenges of Development in Nigeria", Francis C. Okafor (Ed.), Critical Issues on Nigeria's Development: Environment, Economy and Social Justice. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. Nwagwu, C. C. (2011) "Contemporary Challenges in the Management of the Nigerian Education System", Francis C. Okafor (Ed.), Critical Issues on Nigeria's Development: Environment, Economy and Social Justice. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. Nyerere, J. (1982) "Education for Self-Reliance", A. Babs Fafunwa and J. U. Aisiku (Eds.), Education in Africa: A Comparative Study. London: George & Unwin. Ogundowole, E. K. (2007) "Inexhaustibility of Self-Reliancism", University of Lagos Inaugural Lecture Series. Lagos: University of Lagos. Oshita, O. O. (2011) "Philosophy of Education and National Development", A. F. Uduigwomen and Karo Ogbinaka (Eds.), Philosophy of Education: An Analytical Approach. Lagos: Joja Educational Research and Publishers Ltd. Osunde, U. & Omoruyi, F. E. O. (2011) "Education: A Key to Poverty Alleviation and Development in Nigeria", Francis C. Okafor (Ed.), Critical Issues on Nigeria's Development: Environment, Economy and Social Justice. Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. Otokunefor, T. (2011) "Why Nigerian Universities Produce Poor Quality Graduates", Alpha Education Foundation Educational Monograpg Series, No. 3. Ozumba, G. O. (2015) "The Transliteration Question in African Philosophy", Jonathan O. Chimakonam (Ed.), Atuolu Omalu: Some Unanswered Question in Contemporary African Philosophy. Maryland: University Press of America. Sheikheldin, G. H. (2015) "Üjamaa: Planning and Managing Development Scheme in Africa, Tanzania as a Case Study", The Journal of Pan African Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1. The Holy Bible, King James Version (KJV) The Holy Bible, New International Version (NIV). Colorado: International Bible Society. The World Bank (2002) Constructing Knowledge Societies: New Challenges for Tertiary Education, Directions in Development. Washington, D. C.: World Bank. Ubong, B. (2011) "National Philosophies of Education and Impact on National Development", Journal of Educational and Social Research (Special Issue), Vol. 1, No. 2. Ukeje, O. and Aisiku, J. U. (1982) "Education in Nigeria", A. Babs Fafunwa and J. U. Aisiku (Eds.), Education in Africa: A Comparative Survey. London: George Allen & Unwin (Publishers) Ltd. 125 Africology: The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.9, no.3, June

journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2014 | doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 <UN> brill.com/jmp JOURNAL OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY Tina Rulli is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, Davis. Previously, she was an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University (2013-2014). Prior to that she was a postdoctoral fellow at the National Institutes of Health Clinical Center Bioethics Department (2011-2013). She received her PhD from Yale University in 2011. 1 In the United States, safe havens are locations where parents can abandon unharmed infants without criminal penalty. Preferring a Genetically-Related Child Tina Rulli Assistant Professor, University of California, Davis [email protected] Abstract Millions of children worldwide could benefit from adoption. One could argue that prospective parents have a pro tanto duty to adopt rather than create children. For the sake of argument, I assume there is such a duty and focus on a pressing objection to it. Prospective parents may prefer that their children are genetically related to them. I examine eight reasons prospective parents have for preferring genetic children: for parent-child physical resemblance, for family resemblance, for psychological similarity, for the sake of love, to achieve a kind of immortality, for the genetic connection itself, to be a procreator, and to experience pregnancy. I argue that, with the possible exception of the pregnancy desire, these reasons fail to defeat a duty to adopt a child rather than create one, even assuming that we do have some leeway to favor our own interests. Keywords adoption – biological – genetic – parenthood – rescue – procreative ethics Imagine that you have just decided to become a parent. You learn that the local fire station, a safe haven, has received a newborn in need of a family.1 You are aware of the research showing that early infant adoptions pose little risk regarding the infant's psychological health and potential for emotional 2 doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 | Rulli journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 2 Linda van den Dries, Femmie Juffer, Marinus H. van Ijzendoorn, Marian J. BakermanKranenburg, 'Fostering Security? A Meta-Analysis of Attachment in Adopted Children,' Children and Youth Services Review 31 (2009), pp. 410–421. This meta-analysis of 39 studies of attachment in adopted children showed no difference in secure attachments between nonadopted children and children adopted before the age of 12 months. Adoptees, of all ages, show no increase in disorganized attachment compared to nonadopted children when self-report measures are included. See Marinus H. van ijzendoorn, Femmie Juffer, and Caroline W. Klein Poelhuis, 'Adoption and Cognitive Development: A MetaAnalytic Comparison of Adopted and Nonadopted Children's iq and School Performance,' Psychological Bulletin 131 (2005), pp. 301–316. This meta-analysis of 62 studies showed no difference between adopted children and nonadopted environmental peers in iq. For children adopted before 1 year old, there were no delays in school achievement, p. 312. Likewise, there is no difference between adopted and nonadopted infants in infant temperament; see W.B. Carey, W.L. Lipton, & R.A. Myers, 'Temperament in adopted and foster babies,' Child Welfare 53 (1975), pp. 352–350; for mental and motor functioning, see R. Plomin & J. DeFries, Origins of individual differences in infancy: The Colorado Adoption Project (Orlando, fl: Academic Press, 1985); for communication development, see L.A. Thompson, & R. Plomin, 'The sequenced inventory of communication development: An adoption study of two-and three-year-olds,' International Journal of Behavioral Development 11 (1985), pp. 219–231. Studies showing differences have received a disproportionate amount of attention. Van den Dries, et al., 'Fostering Security,' p. 417, suggest a publication bias for adoption studies showing difference. Some studies show a possible higher incidence of behavioral problems of adoptees in the middle childhood and adolescent years. For a thorough discussion of these studies, see D.M. Brodzinsky, D.W. Smith & A.B. Brodzinsky, 'Chapter Four: Infant-Placed Adopted Children,' Children's Adjustment to Adoption: developmental and clinical issues (Thousand Oaks, ca: Sage Publications, 1998), pp. 34–50. The significant but small variance revealed in such studies, especially given a variety of methodological concerns, must not be overemphasized, p. 40. It is likely that "group differences between adopted and nonadopted children are accounted for by a small percentage of adoptees whose adjustment is much more deviant than the majority in the sample," p. 44. Most importantly, these differences are temporary, disappearing by age 15, p. 42. Finally, "... virtually all studies reported suggest that the majority of adoptees are well within the normal range of functioning," p. 44. See also J.J. Haugaard, 'Is Adoption a Risk Factor for Development of Adjustment Problems?' Clinical Psychology Review 18 (1998), pp. 47–69. Haugaard, critiquing the above-mentioned literature, concludes that current scientific research does not support the notion that adoption is a risk factor for adjustment problems. attachment.2 The urgent need for placement and the lack of administrative costs allow for the baby's adoption with few additional hurdles or financial burdens. You can adopt this child, who will otherwise face a life of uncertainty in various institutions or foster homes. Or you can decline and bring a new child into the world instead. What does morality have to say about the choice in this Safe Haven case? Is there a duty to adopt rather than create a child? 3Preferring a Genetically-Related | doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 3 Although, see Peter Mercurio, 'We Found Our Son in the Subway,' New York Times: Opinionator, February 28, 2013. <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/we-found-our-son-in -the-subway/>Last accessed June 12, 2014. 4 Thomas Søbirk Petersen defends a variation of the duty to adopt, which narrowly targets prospective parents using assisted reproductive technologies to create children, in 'The Claim From Adoption,' Bioethics 16 (2002), pp. 353–375; Daniel Friedrich, 'A Duty to Adopt?' Journal of Applied Philosophy 30 (2013), pp. 25–39. Arguing against, see Travis Rieder, 'Procreation, Adoption, and the Contours of Obligation', Journal of Applied Philosophy, forthcoming. 5 My focus is solely on unrelated adoptions-adoption of children who are not previously a part of one's family. Unrelated adoptions contrast with intrafamilial adoption, where one might adopt a child who is already a member of the extended family (and potentially genetically related to oneself). I focus on unrelated adoptions, in part, because this is the more challenging case. If there is a duty to adopt unrelated children, an argument for a duty to adopt related children will be easier. The real world is rarely like Safe Haven.3 Adoptions take time and they cost money. But even if these costs were not at issue, many people would prefer not to adopt. They prefer to have a genetically-related child (genetic child). What moral significance does this preference have? The stakes for this question are high, for there is a strong case for a pro tanto duty to adopt.4 A pro tanto duty is a genuine duty, but one that can be defeated by other considerations. In what follows, I often drop the pro tanto qualifier, though it is implied; the defeasibility of the duty to adopt is the main concern of this paper, for many people believe that a deeply held preference for genetic children could defeat the duty to adopt. This objection is so important that I think arguments for the duty to adopt cannot get off the ground without first considering it. I will show that the reasons people have for preferring a genetic child generally fail to defeat a putative duty to adopt children. In Section One, I motivate the existence of a duty to adopt. I describe the plight of children in need of adoption; their situation is similar in many ways to familiar cases in which a duty to rescue is generated. Despite a strong case for a duty to adopt, I concede that we have moral options, i.e. permissions to favor our own interests to some extent in determining what we ought to do. Our interests may defeat a duty to rescue, and likewise, the duty to adopt, when they rise to the level of a project: when they have non-trivial, non-negative value and concern interests that have central significance in our lives. With the projects standard in place, I focus on my main question: is the preference for a genetic child sufficient to defeat a duty to adopt?5 In Section Two, I examine common reasons for preferring a genetic child over an adopted child. I conclude that, with one possible exception, these reasons are either too trivial, presuppose the value of the 4 doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 | Rulli journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 6 For example, more than 85,000 women undergo in vitro fertilization each year despite its time and cost burdens often comparable to or even greater than those of adoption. See Bedford Stem Cell Research Foundation, <http://www.bedfordresearch.org/politics/ humanembryo.php?item=womenivf_overview>, last accessed June 13, 2014. 7 usaid, unicef, and unaids, Children on the Brink 2004: A Joint Report on Orphan Estimates and A Framework for Action, 2004, p. 4, <http://www.unicef.org/publications/index_22212 .html>. Determination of an adoptability statistic is fraught with controversy. See Elizabeth Bartholet, 'International Adoption: Thoughts on the Human Rights Issues,' Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 13 (2007), pp. 151–203; see Johanna Oreskovic and Trish Maskew, 'Red Thread or Slender Reed: Deconstructing Prof. Bartholet's Mythology of International Adoption,' Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 14 (2008), pp. 71–128. The problem is part empirical: 45 million births go undocumented each year in the developing world. A child's legal status is in some countries unclear. For a critique of this debate, see Richard Carlson, 'Seeking the Better Interests of Children with a New International Law of Adoption,' New York Law School Law Review 55 (2011), pp. 1–67. Carlson summarizes: "... the argument seems mainly one of splitting hairs about how many millions of 'orphans' there are in the world. ... the number of children who might be well served by the opportunity for adoption greatly exceeds the number of adoptions that are being processed," p. 52–53. genetic connection in question, are constrained by plausible, normative parental requirements, or fail to distinguish adopted children from genetic ones. I concede that some women's desire to experience pregnancy may defeat the duty to adopt. This potential exception is recognized in saying that generally reasons to prefer a genetic child fail to defeat a duty to adopt. This finding is important. There are many other obstacles to adopting a child that could defeat a duty to adopt. Adoptions are oftentimes expensive and logistically complicated. Many adoptions may involve older children who have been neglected or abused, presenting special needs for their adoptive families. Yet most people do not think they would be morally required to adopt but for these costs-they believe they have a protected interest in having genetic children.6 I argue that, generally, this belief is false. I conclude by emphasizing that the remaining objections to a duty to adopt are based on socially contingent and eliminable factors. For these reasons, the duty to adopt is pressing and relevant. Section One: A Duty to Adopt Worldwide, there are at least 16.2 million documented orphans-children who have lost or been relinquished by both parents.7 Eight million children are in orphanages or institutions. Possibly 100 million others live on the street and 5Preferring a Genetically-Related | doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 8 Elizabeth Bartholet, 'International Adoption: The Human Rights Position,' Global Policy 1 (January 2010), pp. 91–100, at p. 95. 9 Ibid. The latter children are unparented; but not all of the children fit this description either. Some children are currently parented, though their parents desire or are compelled to relinquish them. They are children in need of new parents. Yet not all of the children in question need new parents, for some children, though they have biological parents, have never been parented by them or anyone else. My selection of terminology reflects the fact that these children do not have parents in any adequate normative sense. 10 See Elizabeth Bartholet, 'International Adoption: The Child's Story,' Georgia State University Law Review 24 (2008), pp. 333–79, at p. 15; Mental Disability Rights International, Hidden Suffering: Romania's Segregations and Abuse of Infants and Children with Disabilities (2006). Available at: <http://www.mdri.org/mdri-reports-publications.html> (hereafter, mdri Report); Human Rights Watch Death by Default: A Policy of Fatal Neglect in China's State Orphanages (1996), available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/ 1996/01/01/death-default>; The Dying Rooms, Kate Blewett and Brian Woods (Lauderdale Productions, 1995), a documentary film for television about Chinese state orphanages. abc News reported on the "concentration camp like conditions" of Romanian orphanages in early 1990. This caused widespread outcry and concern. Since then, it has been claimed that Romania has improved the situation for orphans. See C.H. Zeanah, C.A. Nelson, N.A. Fox, A.T. Smyke, P. Marshall, S.W. Parker & S. Koga, 'Designing research to study the effects of institutionalization on brain and behavioral development: The Bucharest Early Intervention Project,' Development and Psychopathology 15 (2003), pp. 885–907, at p. 895. Other accounts raise doubts. abc wrote a brief follow-up article. See 'Inhumane Conditions For Romania's Lost Generation,' June 8, 2010 <http://abcnews .go.com/2020/story?id=124078&page=1> Last accessed June 13, 2014. 11 See Barbara Tizard & Jill Hodges, 'The Effect of Institutional Rearing on the Development of Eight Year Old Children,' Journal of Child Psychology & Psychiatry 19 (1978), pp. 99–119, at p. 99; Barbara Tizard & Judith Rees, 'The Effect of Early Institutional Rearing on the are unaccounted for.8 An umbrella term for these children in need of parental care is elusive. Not all of them are technically orphans, as some have living parents who have relinquished, abandoned, or neglected them.9 Despite the problematic terminology, for ease of exposition, I will refer to them all as "orphans" or "children in need of parents." The desperate need of children without stable parental care is undeniable. Many lack basic nutrition and medical care. They are the helpless victims of neglect and abuse. In the worst cases, children lose their lives in these conditions; confined to cribs and beds, they perish without proper medical treatment or the loving touch of a caretaker.10 Yet even in "better" institutions and foster care in developed nations, children suffer emotional and psychological harm. Institutions and foster care fail to provide the stability necessary for healthy psychological development. Children in such situations are at a significant disadvantage in regard to forming secure personal attachments.11 6 doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 | Rulli journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> Behavior Problems and Affectional Relationships of Four-Year-Old Children,' Journal of Child Psychology & Psychiatry 16 (1975), pp. 61–73; mdri Report, which asserts that even the newer, improved institutions pose grave threats to children's well-being; Susan W. Parker and Charles A. Nelson, 'The Impact of Early Institutional Rearing on the Ability to Discriminate Facial Expressions of Emotion: An Event-Related Potential Study,' Child Development 76, no. 1 (Jan/Feb, 2005), pp. 54–72. For a discussion of the harms to children in foster care in the United States, see Elizabeth Bartholet, Nobody's Children: Abuse and Neglect, Foster Drift and the Adoption Alternative (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000). 12 Human Rights Watch, My So-Called Emancipation: From Foster-Care to Homelessness for California Youth, 2010, p. 1. Available at < http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/05/12/my-so -called-emancipation>. 13 This example is a modification of Peter Singer's Shallow Pond in 'Famine, Affluence and Morality,' Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (Spring 1972), pp. 229–243 [revised edition]. Often, they do not learn the life-skills necessary to care for themselves as adults. Up to 20 percent of young adults who are too old for the foster care system in the u.s. will become homeless.12 In short, we face a problem of great magnitude-there are millions upon millions of children in need of parents-and severity-they lack the parental care essential for healthy development and well-being. Yet, many of us are capable of providing for these children through adoption. The situation echoes a structurally similar case. Railroad:13 Your route to work takes you across the railroad tracks. Today, as you approach the tracks, you notice a small child who has gotten her foot caught in them. A train will be coming by any moment now. The child risks losing her leg (possibly even her life) if you do not get out of your car and pull her from the tracks. Surely, you are morally required to rescue her! A moral innocent is in need of a critical benefit-the saving of her leg-which you can provide for her. We believe that there is a duty to rescue when we can provide critical benefits to others who stand to lose them, especially (though not exclusively) when the cost to us is minimal. Cases involving children are especially compelling. They are uniquely vulnerable in their inability to advocate for themselves and in their dependence upon others to improve their life prospects. A child in need of parents poses a situation similar in most morally relevant aspects to Railroad. In addition to the material hardship many children without parents endure, the psychological harms severely impact their longterm well-being. Most importantly, many people who could adopt them might provide them with exactly what they so critically lack-a stable, loving family. 7Preferring a Genetically-Related | doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 14 Though adoption is not intuitively a case of "easy" rescue, adoption is a one-time rescue. Adoptive parents are not rescuing their children each time they benefit them. See Tina Rulli, 'The Unique Value of Adoption,' in F. Baylis and C. McLeod, (eds.), Family-Making: Contemporary Ethical Challenges (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 109–28, at pp. 122–23. Further, for those who want to become parents, adoption in a case like Safe Haven poses minimal additional morally relevant costs. 15 Liam Murphy, 'The Demands of Beneficence,' Philosophy & Public Affairs 27 (1999), pp. 251–91. Though the various costs in adopting children are not always minimal, they are surely nothing close to the costs a child without a family bears. If there is a duty to rescue in Railroad, then there is a strong case for a duty to adopt. The crucial question is whether the higher costs of adoption undermine the analogy between the orphan problem and Railroad. The Safe Haven case minimizes the contingent costs of adoption.14 The rest of this paper investigates a putative remaining cost. Before proceeding, however, I pause to recognize some other important differences between the two cases. They do not undermine a duty to adopt. For example, Railroad has one victim and one rescuer whereas there are many children in need of parents and many prospective adopters. These many numbers cases typically indicate a social or institutional problem. Then perhaps the difference between the cases is not just that of numbers but of kind: the orphan problem is a large-scale social problem that we all face, not a unique emergency encounter of one individual. Some may argue that social problems require institutional solutions and not remediation through individuals' duty to rescue. Yet, if in Railroad the child's peril was the result of a social-institutional failure- say, inadequate public safety protocols caused the child's predicament-this fact would not justify a bystander's failure to provide rescue. Likewise, though poverty and lack of reproductive autonomy for women may be a root cause of child relinquishment or abandonment worldwide, crucial improvements in these areas are no substitutes for the rescue of children. There are children now who need parents. They cannot wait for these social or institutional improvements. Acknowledging that there are institutional obligations to address a problem does not entail the absence of an individual's duty to rescue in Railroad or to adopt a child. The duty to adopt may be threatened in another way. Some many numbers cases allow people to fairly distribute the burdens of rescue among themselves. Liam Murphy defends a Cooperative Principle for obligations of beneficence involving many rescuers.15 One is morally required to do a fair share, and no 8 doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 | Rulli journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 16 Murphy concedes that the principle does not apply when the many rescuers and victims are spatially proximate. See 'The Demands of Beneficence,' p. 291. This concession challenges the plausibility of his principle altogether; he must explain why the spatial proximity between rescuer and rescuee is morally relevant to the Cooperative Principle. See Singer, 'Famine, Affluence and Morality,' and Peter Unger, Living High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). Further, Michael Ridge argues that it is unfair to would-be beneficiaries that they should shoulder the burdens of noncompliance alone. Everyone has a duty to pick up a fair share of the slack of noncompliance, which will demand that each do more than Murphy concedes. See 'Fairness and Non-Compliance,' in B. Feltham and J. Cottingham (eds.), Impartiality and Partiality: Morality, Special Relationships and the Wider World (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 194–223. 17 See footnotes 10, 11, and 12. 18 Those who are not obligated to adopt children may have obligations to support adoptive families. They may help shoulder some of the financial burden of adoption and parenting. Such social obligations might be grounded in general obligations of beneficence, more, of what would be required of each person if everyone complied with his or her duties. Presumably, there are more prospective adopters than children in need of adoption. If everyone did what they ought to, a fair share of each duty would fall far short of adoption. Murphy's principle faces several challenges.16 But foremost, the Cooperative Principle is inapplicable to the orphan problem; it is not sensitive to important features of the situation. Though, traditionally, parenting is shared between two people, the parental resource is not otherwise easily divisible among a large number of people. Children need familiar, stable, and dedicated caretakers, not a loose association of people sharing the duties. The documented inadequacies of institutional care support this claim.17 In this way, the orphan problem is unlike other collective social problems-such as famine or global poverty-where the critically needed resources are divisible. This is in part because those resources are liquid; they are easily converted into cash. Thus, the burdens can be distributed among a large group of agents. In contrast, the parental resource-a bundled resource of long-term commitment, time, effort, and emotional care, in addition to financial resources-is nonliquid. We cannot purchase the parental resource and we cannot evenly divide it among society's members. Some individuals will have to parent orphaned children. The Cooperative Principle, which assumes the possibility for fair shares, is ill-equipped to address the orphan problem. This is not to deny the relevance of social obligations to address the orphan problem.18 I will touch on such obligations at the end of the paper. The point is 9Preferring a Genetically-Related | doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> though a duty to provide financial support to orphans and adoptive families would need to be balanced against a duty to provide financial support to other people in desperate need. I am not claiming that they take priority over other people whose needs might generate duties to rescue requiring financial support. Alternatively, the social obligations might be generated by children's human right to be loved. See S. Matthew Liao, 'The Right of Children to Be Loved,' The Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (2006), pp. 420–440, for a defense of children's right to be loved and the correlative obligations of all people to support them. Liao advocates a multi-parent, coadoption scheme, p. 438. Such a scheme is compatible with, and perhaps supported by, the arguments offered here; were it to prove successful in providing children with the physical and emotional resources they need, then it would be one way in which people (especially those who cannot or will not raise a child on their own) could discharge a duty to adopt. 19 "Moral options" were coined (though not advocated for) by Shelly Kagan in The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). For Kagan, an option is a permission to fail to promote the good. Samuel Scheffler calls options "agent-centered prerogatives." See The Rejection of Consequentialism, revised ed. 2003 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982). that the social nature of the orphan problem, and the fact that it involves great numbers of people, does not undermine its analogy to the Railroad case. It does not undermine a pro tanto duty to adopt. Many believe that even if there is a duty to adopt, it will be defeated by the important preference for genetic children anyway. My primary aim in this paper is to explore this particular putative cost of adoption-the sacrifice of the genetic relationship. To make this exploration possible, I assume there is a pro tanto duty to adopt children. It is commonly agreed that the cost to agents that would defeat the duty to rescue need not equal the value of the good that could be provided by rescue. We have some leeway to favor our own personal interests against what would otherwise be required of us by morality. That is, we have moral options.19 We have a moral option when a personal interest is capable of defeating a pro tanto duty to adopt. I will assume we have moral options, for it would greatly stack the deck in favor of the duty to adopt to deny them. For all that, not just any personally valued project or interest will defeat the duty to adopt. The interests capable of defeating what I'll call "high-stakes duties," like the duty to rescue, where a critical life good is at stake, must have positive, nontrivial value independent of an agent's subjective valuation of them. We don't think that I, being the sole witness to a horrible car accident, have the option to play an engrossing video game on my cell phone instead of calling 911. Even though I'd rather not ruin my beloved designer shoes, I am 10 doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 | Rulli journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 20 For a similar discussion, see Kagan, The Limits of Morality, p. 231. 21 See Kagan, The Limits of Morality, or Samuel Scheffler, The Rejection of Consequentialism. Yet, it is debatable whether even projects can ground options in rescue cases. See for instance Peter Unger's Bob's Bugatti case in Living High and Letting Die, p. 136–39. 22 Kagan, The Limits of Morality, p. 241. 23 For more on projects, see Bernard Williams, 'Persons, Character and Morality,' in Moral Luck (Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 1–19, at pp. 12–14. 24 Projects are not only a standard for option-grounding interests; the appeal to the importance of agent projects grounds the argument for the existence of moral options in the first place. Options-advocates argue that a defensible conception of morality must provide some protection for agent projects against the demands of morality. Note that a defensible conception of morality that allows for such valuable projects need not sanction projects of trivial or negative value. required to trudge into a wading pool to pluck a drowning toddler out of the water. The trivial agent interests in these cases cannot compete with the good of rescue. This is true no matter how much the agent may value the trivial good in question.20 We are often required to help people even if it goes against our own preferences or interests to do so. It is thought that the interests that could defeat high stakes duties are those tied to our important life projects, plans, and pursuits.21 The interests must have "some central significance in the agent's life."22 Projects have lasting experiential impact on a person that colors her perspective or alters the quality or character of her future experiences.23 In short, the interests that might support an option in high-stakes cases must meet a significance standard, rising to the level of a project.24 Acceptance of the moral options framework just outlined is a favorable concession to the opponent of a duty to adopt. However, if moral options exist in order to protect one's own life projects and goals from the demands of morality, then many people who do not want to have children at all might have the option to not adopt. After all, having a child is an expensive, long-term commitment to a needy person that could presumably hinder the projects of many agents who do not desire to become parents. Given the acceptance of moral options, the adoption duty may fall primarily on the shoulders of prospective parents. For them the comparative baseline for assessing the burden in adopting is having and raising an adopted child as compared to having and raising a genetic child. My opponent will argue that sacrificing a preference for genetic children is also too costly. This constitutes the primary question of my inquiry: does the preference to have a genetic child defeat a duty to adopt instead? 11Preferring a Genetically-Related | doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 25 Recent philosophical work on the moral significance of the genetic relationship has focused primarily on the significance of this relationship for children. David Velleman argues that knowing one's biological origins and being intimately familiar with one's genetic parents is essential to self-knowledge and a healthy self-identity. See 'Persons in Prospect II: The Gift of Life,' Philosophy & Public Affairs 36 (2008), pp. 245–266; 'Family History,' Philosophical Papers 34 (2005), pp. 357–78. Sally Haslanger has taken Velleman to task on this matter, appealing to evidence that self-knowledge and self-identity have a variety of sources in addition to knowledge of biological kin. See 'Family, Ancestry and Self: What is the Moral Significance of Biological Ties?' Adoption and Culture 2 (2009), pp. 107–108. As to the value of procreation for parents: Christine Overall briefly discusses and dismisses putative reasons to procreate that arise out of the concern for preserving the genetic link between parent and child. Indeed, she remarks that emphasis on the genetic link has problematic "eugenicist" overtures. See Why Have Children?: The Ethical Debate (Cambridge: mit Press, 2012), pp. 61–63. 26 See, for example, this handout 'Smart Comments to Stupid Adoption Comments,' for adoptive families, prepared by Adoptive Families of the Capital Region, Inc. Available at http://adoptivefamilies.homestead.com/smart_reponses_1-09_handout.pdf, Last Accessed June 13, 2014. This is one of many such examples of the "why don't you look alike" microaggression that adoptive families frequently experience. 27 Indeed, adoptive parents who "pass" as genetic parents are often "complimented" in the same way. See, for example, 'Your Son Looks Just Like You!' Adoptive Families Circle, available at <http://www.adoptivefamiliescircle.com/blogs/post/adopted_children _look_like_parents/>, Last Accessed June 13, 2014. Section Two: Reasons for Preferring a Genetic Child In what follows, I survey the reasons prospective parents may offer as grounding an option to procreate rather than adopt.25 With one possible exception, I argue that these reasons fail to ground an option against a duty to adopt. The reasons are either too trivial, presuppose the value of the genetic connection in question, are inappropriate in a normative parental context, or fail to make a relevant distinction between genetic and adopted children. To have a Child Who Looks Like me-Physical Resemblance Children tend to look like their parents. People commonly treat this parentchild physical similarity as having normative value. "Why don't you look like your parents?" as any adopted child knows, is not an innocent question but a challenge to one's "real" family membership. As such, prospective adoptive parents are often asked "But don't you want your children to look like you?" or "Aren't you curious about what your own children would like?"26 On the other side, new genetic parents are frequently complimented with the observation that the child looks like them.27 If one doubts the normative status given to 12 doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 | Rulli journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 28 This example is simplified for clarity. Sharing family resemblance is more complex than merely standing in the "looks like" relation. A family resemblance might skip a generation: so one's genetic child might bear a family resemblance, though she doesn't look in particular like oneself, but rather like her genetic grandmother. Or one might get a facial scar; but this doesn't mean she then desires her child also to have such a scar. Only certain traits, as I will elaborate on below, count as family resemblances. Thanks to Steve Campbell for these examples. physical resemblance, one need only imagine the case of a single, new mother, estranged from the biological father. Would anyone dare to tell her that her newborn child looks like the father? For all that, the desire for a child who shares my physical traits is too trivial to ground the permission to procreate rather than to adopt. The parenting experience is not significantly impacted by parent-child physical resemblance. Fulfillment of a desire for resemblance does not arise to the level of a project. To insist that this preference could compete with the moral good achievable through adoption is to value mere physical appearance well beyond its worth. The dismissal of this preference is justifiably quick, but it is worth mentioning for all the attention people give to parent-child physical similarity. There is another way to understand the desire for a child who looks like oneself. A person P might want a child who has the features possessed by P, or P might want the child to stand in the "looks like" relation to P. Here's an analogy: I might want my child to live where I live, viz. in Washington d.c. I'd want her to live in d.c. even though I'm moving to Denver. Or I might want my child to live where I live, to stand in the "lives near me" relation. So if I move to Denver, I would desire for her to live in Denver too. Likewise, I may want a child to have my look-this specific look. Or I may want to stand in the "looks like" relationship with her-to share family resemblance-regardless of what my specific look is. While, as I've argued, a desire for one's child to have one's look is too trivial to ground an option, perhaps this disambiguation offers us a charitable interpretation of a preference for parent-child physical similarity. What one really desires is family resemblance.28 To have a Child who Shares a Family Resemblance In an illuminating exploration of family resemblance, Charlotte Witt writes: Family resemblances are part of a family's mythology, and they serve various purposes: bonding family members, explaining behavior, assigning blame. ... Family resemblances are used liberally and inexactly to refer to appearance, mannerisms, character traits, and habits-both positive and 13Preferring a Genetically-Related | doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 29 Charlotte Witt, 'Family Resemblances: Adoption, Personal Identity, and Genetic Essentialism,' in S. Haslanger and C. Witt (eds.), Adoption Matters: Philosophical and Feminist Essays (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 135–44, at pp. 141–42. 30 Ibid. 31 In contrast, Velleman treats the value placed on family resemblance as grounded in a deep human need. See 'The Gift of Life,' p. 259. 32 Dorothy Roberts, 'The Genetic Tie,' University of Chicago Law Review 62 (Winter 1995), pp. 209–73, at p. 237. 33 Ibid. negative. Family resemblances are relational properties which are biological/social hybrids; they exist only as part of a family mythology and hence are social, but the myth tells a story of genetic inheritance, and hence they are biological.29 Our notion of family resemblance includes physical resemblance as an important component because, as Witt importantly observes, the dominant conception of family resemblance is as biologically, genetically grounded. Physical similarity signifies this connection. Perhaps, then, a desire for a child who looks like oneself is really a desire for family resemblance. Construed this way, the desire is not so obviously trivial, for there is symbolic power in looking like a family. Can the desire for family resemblance justify the genetic preference? The answer lies in a deeper interrogation of the family resemblance concept. As Witt remarks, judgments of family resemblance "... are not straightforwardly descriptive or observational. They are complex judgments made within a community, and they reflect community norms."30 This observation is critical. We should not assume our conception of family resemblance is natural or fixed.31 Our concept of family resemblance, and thereby the importance of physical resemblance fitting the concept, is a cultural, social product. As such, the degree of predictability in physical resemblance between family members, as well as the import placed on resemblance, varies across ethnicities and cultures. Dorothy Roberts, critiquing White America's emphasis on the genetic tie, states that such reproductive reliability is not expected in the Black American community because of the hybrid of genetic backgrounds that constitute the Black "race."32 Roberts illustrates: "We are used to 'throwbacks'-a pale, blond child born into a dark-skinned family, who inherited stray genes from a distant white ancestor. ... We cannot expect our children to look just like us."33 Roberts claims that Black Americans place less importance on genetically-based resemblance. Ethnic and racial resemblance among group members supersedes family resemblance. 14 doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 | Rulli journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 34 'Family, Ancestry and Self,' p. 103 35 Ibid. This point is a generalization of Haslanger's own compelling personal example. 36 Ibid. Haslanger argues that family resemblance is one social schema among many. Social schemas "tell us, among other things: Who you are allowed to look like? Who are you allowed to be like?" 37 This could be achieved by comparing an existing child's physical traits to those expected in a genetically, pre-screened embryo. This example highlights two important points: first, how much we value family resemblance is culturally contingent, and second, what counts as family resemblance is culturally specified. But the critical point is not that these are socially contingent facts-for that alone does not undermine their putative moral importance-rather, conceptions of family resemblance are normative. We will count as family resemblances only those fitting our own normative conception of family. Sally Haslanger, writing on the significance of the biological relationship, explains, " ... what similarities are salient is largely a matter of context, and some socially significant similarities are allowed to eclipse others that may be more deeply important."34 So for instance, our conception of family resemblance can accommodate differences in gender (a girl can resemble her father) but not differences in race (a black child does not so easily resemble her white mom in the relevant way, even though there may be physical similarities).35 The discrepancy is evidence of our presupposition that there is a way in which a family should be formed.36 In the latter case the genetic conception of family blocks the possibility for family resemblance when it appears that a genetic connection is lacking. And so the genetic bias in the socially constructed family resemblance schema is apparent. But here's the worry: if a bias toward a genetic conception of family informs our normative notion of family resemblance, then one cannot appeal to the desire for family resemblance to justify our interest in the parent-child genetic relationship. This gets the order of explanation the wrong way. We value family resemblance just because it is a physical marker of the "deeper" genetic connection between parent and child, for suppose we could predict a stronger physical, familial resemblance between some parents and some adopted child than with a potential genetic child.37 It's hard to imagine that the prospective parents, with the family resemblance preference, would then choose the adopted child. What they really prefer is the deeper grounds through which this physical similarity is achieved, i.e. the genetic basis. As such, an appeal to family resemblance presupposes a genetic conception of family, and thus the genetic connection, as normative. We cannot presuppose the value of the genetic connection in our argument for why it is valuable. This begs the question. 15Preferring a Genetically-Related | doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 38 This discussion is in Neil Levy and Mianna Lotz, 'Reproductive Cloning and a (Kind of) Genetic Fallacy,' Bioethics 19 (2005), pp. 232–50, citing Brenda Almond, 'Family Relationships and Reproductive Technology,' in U. Narayan & J.J. Bartkowiak (eds.), Having and Raising Children: Unconventional Families, Hard Choices, and the Social Good (University Park, Penn: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999), pp. 103–118. 39 Discussed in Levy and Lotz, 'Reproductive Cloning,' p. 237; see Michael Tooley, The Moral Status of the Cloning of Humans,' Monash Bioethics Review 18 (1999), pp. 27–49. 40 Levy and Lotz, 'Reproductive Cloning,' p. 237. It is worth noting, as a social construct, our notion of family resemblance could be adapted to include more broadly the kind of resemblance that adopted children bear to their adoptive families. It may already include certain traits that are not exclusively genetically explained, such as mannerisms, body language, facial expressions, behavior, speech patterns, accents, interests, hobbies, and so on. If we reorder the implicit norms informing our conception of family resemblance, we can make space for the way in which adopted children share the symbolic bond that resemblance, a family way, signifies. For Psychological Similarity with my Child I've been focusing on physical traits, but the more compelling reason to favor a genetic child may be out of hope for parent-child similarity in personality, temperament, and talents-a psychological similarity. As Brenda Almond explains, parents may want a genetic child like themselves in order to share their "... attitudes, appraisals, interests, tendencies, common qualities of character, a common Weltanschauung – a characteristic way of looking at the world."38 Similarly, Michael Tooley, discussing an advantage of genetic cloning, claims that psychological similarity between a parent and clone child would allow the parent to better assume the child's point of view. "So it would seem that there is a good chance both that such a couple will find childbearing a more rewarding experience, and that the child will have a happier childhood through [being] better understood."39 Psychological similarity between parents and cloned children may facilitate mutual understanding. For the same reasons, one might argue in favor of genetic parenthood over adoption as offering a better chance of parent-child psychological similarity and, thus, of a shared point of view and mutual understanding. Some of these claims made on behalf of genetic heritability easily over-stretch the bounds of common sense. As Neil Levy and Mianna Lotz note, it is highly doubtful that genes play a significant role in determining one's Weltanschauung.40 Nor does parent-child psychological similarity obviously increase mutual understanding, as Tooley claims. Sally Haslanger keenly notes: "... people with certain biological predispositions are actually not well-suited to parent others with 16 doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 | Rulli journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 41 Haslanger, 'Family, Ancestry and Self,' p. 108. 42 Though this is not necessarily the case. One could imagine an adoption scheme that matched adoptive parents to children based on probability of, as well as already developed, shared psychological traits. 43 This concern applies to the desire for physical resemblance, as well. But given that preference's triviality, it is not necessary to raise this further argument there. 44 By "acceptable range" of traits, I mean to indicate that parents may permissibly have inflexible preferences about their children having morally bad traits, for instance. 45 Almond, 'Family Relationships and Reproductive Technology,' fn. 38. those same dispositions but actually create powerfully dysfunctional family systems."41 The claims made in favor of parent-child psychological similarity must be reasonably tempered. Even so, Almond and Tooley describe, generally, the kinds of reasons why people may desire psychological similarity with their child. Genetic relatedness should increase the probability of parent-child psychological similarity over adoption, on the whole.42 Given this is desirable to some people, could it ground an option to favor genetic procreation over adoption? An option-grounding interest or preference against a duty to adopt must rise to the level of a project; it must impact one's important life plans or goals. The preference must not only be strong, for, as discussed above, subjective importance alone is not enough to ground an option. The preference must be centrally related to one's projects. In the context of parenthood, specifically, we seek an interest that would be centrally important to aspects of one's parenting experience. How does the preference for psychological similarity fare? The difficulty in establishing an option to favor psychological similarity is in describing a preference central enough to meet the projects threshold, but flexible enough to meet a plausible normative requirement for parental preferences.43 Parental preferences for traits children might have (within an acceptable range) must be flexible.44 Genetic reproduction merely provides an increased probability of parent-child commonalities over adoption. Genetic children may turn out to not share one's "attitudes, appraisals, interests, tendencies, common qualities of character ..."45 Thus, parental preferences about such things must be held with an attitude of acceptance or accommodation; the good parent should not be frustrated or disappointed if the preference goes unsatisfied. A preference may be flexible in this way because it is not strongly held or because the preference can be satisfied in a variety of ways. Consider the alternative. A set of prospective parents deeply desire a child who is musically talented, as they are. This desire is strong and important to them; they would experience significant disappointment in having a child who had no musical inclinations or talent. They imagine going to their child's music 17Preferring a Genetically-Related | doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> recitals, starting a family ensemble, and funding their child's education on a prestigious music scholarship. Now, imagine that their genetic child turns out to be musically ungifted. Their central preference for a musical child is frustrated. Even if they shield their child from this disappointment (which is increasingly doubtful the more central the preference is), they allow it to impact their enjoyment of the parenting experience. Of course, they still love their child. But there is a deep part of them that wishes the parenting experience had been different. They wanted a child who could share their musical gifts, and this child cannot. In the worst case, the child is the knowing victim of their disappointment. Such a case reminds us that strong preferences about our children's personality and talents must be held with flexibility. Becoming a parent is, in part, about raising an independent, autonomous person who may defy our expectations and have his own interests. We must allow our children to become and to be their own people. Though parents play a crucial role in shaping their children's values and interests, they must be able to find parental satisfaction in the variety of ways their children may turn out. One might object: we need not have flexible preferences to be unconditionally accepting of our children. We all strongly desire that our children are healthy, that they not suffer from debilitating diseases. But despite this strong, central desire, we would fiercely love our child should she have a debilitating disease. Our parental love can be unconditional and accepting even when strong central preferences are subverted. Perhaps, then, our strong preferences about our children's personality traits and talents can be appropriately accepting. However, there are important differences between wanting our child to be healthy and wanting our child to have some subjectively-valued psychological trait or talent, e.g. to be musical. A lack of musical talent, for instance, is not an objective badness in a person's life. Though it might be nice to have (i.e. it is valuable), lacking it is not dis-valuable in the way illness is. However, suffering from disease is objectively bad for a person. Disappointment that one's child is unhealthy can be grounded in recognition of this objective badness for her, whereas disappointment that one's child is not musically talented is a matter of one's own subjective dis-valuation. As such, the grounds for disappointment in the health case are in part for the sake of the child who suffers. It is aimed at the illness, at misfortune, not at the child. Moreover, illness is a condition to be supported and compensated for by an attitude of protection, extra care, and empathy. In the musicality case, the grounds for disappointment are directed at the child. Even when this "deprivation" is viewed impersonally-e.g. one says 18 doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 | Rulli journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> "well, it's not your fault! You just didn't get your father's musical genes!"-one expresses disappointment in the child. Being musically run-of-the-mill isn't seen as grounds for extra love and care. The child is simply different in an undesired way. Strong preferences about our children's personality traits are importantly different from strong preferences about our children's health; the object of disappointment in the case that the preferences are frustrated differs. Disappointment, grounded in rigid parental preferences, toward a child for a non-objectively dis-valuable "lack" or difference is not compatible with the accepting attitude of a good parent. We should doubt the claim that one can both hold a preference for parentchild psychological similarity as central to one's life, while also maintaining a properly flexible attitude with this preference. If a central value or project in one's life is not attainable, it's hard to imagine one will not suffer disappointment. For if it is central, then one cares deeply that this preference is satisfied. What could it mean to have a central preference that one will not feel disappointment in not satisfying? The requirement that this preference also be flexible, however, is in deep tension with the centrality of the preference, for flexibility requires that one not be disappointed if the preference goes unsatisfied. Therefore, it is empirically, if not also conceptually, difficult to imagine a preference for psychological similarity that could be both central and meet a plausible normative requirement of flexibility. This is reason enough to doubt there is a moral option to favor procreation in the face of a duty to adopt for the sake of increased parent-child psychological similarity. But there is further reason to doubt that there is a moral option in the case, even granting for the moment that there can be a central but flexible psychological similarity preference. Take a standard example of when there is a moral option. There is some pro tanto duty to act in a certain way, but there is a moral permission not to because performing the duty threatens a central interest. In the standard case, with regard to this central interest, performing the duty and exercising the option are opposed: performing the duty will make protecting the central interest difficult or nearly impossible, whereas exercising the option to not perform the duty will protect the interest. But in the case of satisfying the preference for parent-child psychological similarity, the duty to adopt and the putative option to procreate are not opposed in this way. This weakens the case for a moral option. Adopting a child gives rise to a non-negligible probability of having a child who is psychologically similar to oneself. Procreating increases that probability, generally, though it leaves a non-negligible probability of a child who is psychologically dissimilar to oneself. That is, performing the duty does not result in near certain frustration of the interest in psychological similarity; and exercising the option 19Preferring a Genetically-Related | doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 46 Plato, Symposium, in Complete Works, ed. J.M. Cooper & D.S. Hutchinson, trans. Alexander Nehamas & Paul Woodruff (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), pp. 457–505, 206–206b. 47 Plato, Symposium, 207–207d. to procreate does not result in near certain satisfaction of the preference. Thus, the agent-reasons in favor of the option (procreation in this case), against strong moral reasons favoring a pro tanto duty (to adopt), are weakened by the less than certain likelihood of bringing about the preference. This provides further doubt in the already dubious argument for a permission to favor procreation over adoption for the sake of psychological similarity. I have given two arguments that support skepticism about the psychological similarity preference defeating a duty to adopt. First, the flexibility of an appropriate parental preference for psychological similarity undermines the centrality of the preference, thus undermining an option. Second, even with such a preference, the mere probable nature of the options available to the agent undermines the strength of reasons favoring a moral option to not adopt. For Love and Immortality Two other potential reasons for valuing procreation arise in Plato's Symposium. Socrates recounts the words of the wise woman Diotima: In a word, then, love is wanting to possess the good forever. ... In view of that, how do people pursue it if they are truly in love?46 Answering her own question, Diotima: It is giving birth in beauty, whether in body or in soul. ... Now, why reproduction? It's because reproduction goes on forever; it is what mortals have in place of immortality. ...47 The themes of love and immortality are intertwined in Diotima's account. They represent distinct desires, and so I will address each of them in turn. For two people in love, having a child may be the most natural expression of their commitment to one another. To many, it feels as though a love so abundant should inevitably give rise to another being intimately connected to the relationship with whom to share the surfeit of love. A child is a natural product of their love, the literal product of their coming together. But she is also a powerful symbol of their romantic relationship and commitment to one another, physically manifesting the new life they have made together. 20 doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 | Rulli journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 48 This is not a claim about what constitutes the romantic relationship; rather it is a claim about what is valuable about it, which could be shared by different accounts of the relationship. However, not all accounts may agree with my claim. 49 Overall also discusses the immortality reason for procreation in Why Have Children, p. 61. A child, as a symbol of her parents' love, reflects what is valuable about that love: what is deep, real, and important. Romantic love is grounded in two people's mutual commitment to moral values, shared love of pastimes, common memories, compassion, and commitment to one another. A child is the product and reflection of this love when she is nurtured in the couple's shared values and common commitments. Of course, adopted children are wonderful candidates for this role. Orphaned children are literally waiting for this overflowing resource of romantic love turned parental. Adoptive parents consider their children their own because they are the people who will grow and flourish in their shared commitment based on love and common values. Indeed, it would be uncharitable to interpret the symbolic union argument as placing ultimate importance in actual physical union-where the child must be the physical product of two merging bodies. For, arguably, what is most valuable and enduring about the romantic relationship is shared values and commitments, which do not depend on biological connectedness.48 Relatedly, though it is striking when a child looks like the perfect mix of her parents, with mom's blue eyes and dad's brown skin, insisting on this mix of physical traits as the ultimate symbol of romantic union reduces the otherwise rich romantic union account to a desire for physical resemblance. For a child to be a physical symbol of their union, she need not literally come from them; rather she embodies their union because she is some body who is the beneficiary of this surfeit of romantic love. The romantic love objection, when most favorably interpreted as a concern for enduring values and not for literal physical connectedness or for replication of physical traits, does not favor a genetic child over an adopted one. Diotima exclaims that reproduction is the way to immortality for mortals- that through reproduction, we can live on forever. Many people see children as extensions of themselves, as a way of transcending their own finite lives. The desire for immortality through reproduction is recast at the collective, cultural level. Having children may fulfill a promise to one's ancestors, paying respect to one's cultural, religious, and ethnic heritage. We may believe we have a duty, not just a permission, to carry on our lineage.49 Much like the argument from romantic love, the immortality argument in favor of procreation appeals to the desire to transcend the confines of an individual life, i.e. to 21Preferring a Genetically-Related | doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 50 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point. 51 Niko Kolodny, 'Which Relationships Justify Partiality?: The Case of Parents and Children,' Philosophy & Public Affairs 38 (2010), pp. 37–76. Kolodny's goal is to explain partiality principles through resonance between the reasons one has toward another person in discrete encounters and the reasons one has in a history of encounters with that person, p. 50. extend what is good about love or life beyond a natural lifespan. It purports to achieve these aims symbolically, in a child. We may transcend our own individual finitude by parenting a person of the next generation as heir to our projects, values, commitments, traditions, and customs. Similarly, familial and cultural legacies endure via knowledge, values, and customs. If one owes it to one's ancestors to continue the family, one owes them a bearer of their particular customs, beliefs, language, and so forth. But if this is the way to vicarious immortality (for individuals, families, or cultures), it fails to favor creation over adoption. Adopted children are no less inclined than are non-adopted children to assume, celebrate, and carry on their families' customs, speak their families' language, and endorse their families' beliefs. In fact, if the desire is interpreted as one for actual genetic immortality, procreation is quite a disappointment. For each successive generation of my genetic offspring will share an exponentially smaller portion of my genetic make-up: my children will share half my genes, their children will share a quarter of them, and their children only one-eighth, and so on.50 Genetic procreation is no means to genetic immortality at all. Interpreting the desire for immortality as a desire for an ongoing lineage of culture, values, and traditions is a more charitable account of this desire. But much like the romantic love argument, this does not favor a genetic child over an adopted one. The Genetic Connection is Valuable for its Own Sake I've investigated instrumental reasons for which parents might prefer the genetic connection with their child (genetic connection, for short). But might they just prefer the genetic connection for its own sake? If this connection has important moral significance, then it might ground a moral option against the duty to adopt. The challenge is to motivate the claim that the genetic connection is valuable for its own sake without simply begging the question against one who would deny it (and vice versa). Niko Kolodny's novel account of partiality principles through the resonance relationship may explain the basis for this putative intimate connection arising from genetic similarity and identity.51 22 doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 | Rulli journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 52 Ibid. p. 47. 53 Ibid. p. 43. 54 Kolodny, pp. 55 and 61, does not believe that the Genetic Claim can provide a full account of parental (and filial) responsibilities because it fails to explain the parental obligations adoptive parents have to their children. Rather, it might be part of a full explanation for reasons of partiality between parents and children. He treats the Genetic Claim as an important limit case for testing his theory of partiality, p. 62. Though the claim is strong, investigation of the claim is warranted given the persistent intuition that genetic ties matter. 55 Ibid. p. 70. Kolodny states that resonance is the relationship that holds between our responses when one has "reason to respond to some X in a way that is similar to the way that one has reason to respond to its counterpart in another dimension of importance, but that reflects the distinctive importance of the dimension to which X belongs."52 To illustrate, Kolodny claims that there is a resonance relationship between the natural and moral emotions. His feeling of anxiety (natural emotion) over his child's poor health resonates with his feeling of resentment (moral emotion) toward her negligent doctor. Resentment shares the same valence as anxiety but reflects what is distinctive about the moral domain; namely, it is an agent-directed emotion.53 Kolodny thinks resonance may explain the Genetic Claim: the claim that a child, as the product of two adults' gametes, provides the adults with reasons of parental partiality toward it.54 Kolodny aims to explain genetic partiality-the grounds for special concern and responsibilities between genetic parent and child. Yet we are seeking an explanation and justification for the genetic preference-the permission to favor bringing about a genetic child to parent rather than adopting. A case for genetic partiality alone won't get us everything we need, for it only explains partiality between parent and child given that both exist. But the account may be helpful for our purposes insofar as it explains why the genetic connection is valuable for its own sake. If we can establish its value, then we can assess whether a preference for this good defeats a duty to adopt. Kolodny begins with the kind of special concern individuals have for their selves over time.55 Personal identity for Kolodny is at least partially based on a continual biological process between a self at one time and at another. This continuous biological process is the basis for special self-concern. Next Kolodny rehearses the fact that a genetic child is the result of biological processes that have their origin in the parent (viz. the mother), and these processes are governed by both parents' genetic codes. Kolodny speculates there is enough similarity between my concern for myself based on biological 23Preferring a Genetically-Related | doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 56 Ibid. p. 71. Kolodny characterizes his account as tentative, as "doubly speculative conjecture" given that it assumes egoistic concern in the base case and an extreme form of the resonance relationship. 57 There are alternative explanations of the dominant intuition in the Baby Swap case, including one that identifies the gestational relationship between mother and child as the grounds for partiality. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. The case could be modified to involve a surrogate pregnancy, however, and I imagine that many would still hold that there are grounds for partiality to one's genetically-related child. Agreement on this point is not central to my argument; the above is a concession I make to Kolodny's view, showing that even if a genetic partiality account is granted, this does not entail a significant genetic preference. 58 Kolodny recognizes but does not resolve the tension here (p. 68, fn. 41). He claims the genetic relationship does not give us reasons of partiality beyond those generated by a historical relationship between parent and child. But he recognizes that prior to having a continuity and my concern for a person who is or was biologically connected to me in a similar way to establish resonance between the attitudes in each. That is, "I have reason to respond to my relationship to my genetic child in a way that is similar to the way in which I have reason to respond to my relationship to myself at other times, but which reflects the distinctive dimension of importance to which the latter belongs."56 In valuing my own genetic, biologically-based identity, one can infer my special valuing of those people who are similarly connected to me. Kolodny provides a novel account of genetic partiality that captures what is at the heart of the claim that the genetic connection is valuable for its own sake. Moreover, some degree of genetic partiality is plausible and intuitive. Consider, for instance, the case of two sets of parents on their way home from the delivery room at the hospital. Their genetic children have been accidentally swapped. Both sets of parents are equally wonderful candidates for raising children. Yet, most people would think the parents have gone home with the wrong child. Further, we think they are justified in preferring their genetic child. They have reasons of partiality toward their genetic child, and Kolodny's account can explain this. The Baby Swap case pulls in favor of genetic partiality.57 This should make my opponent happy: for in accepting genetic partiality and Kolodny's account, we can identify the value in the genetic connection, and from here we might establish an option-grounding preference for this connection. But now a major concern arises. If the genetic connection is grounds for partial concern, without further qualification, this has problematic implications for families with both biological and adopted children (from hereon, mixed families).58 Simply put: if genetic partiality is justified, may someone 24 doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 | Rulli journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> relationship many think there is some reason to favor the genetic relationship. Thus, it seems, on his account, that the genetic relationship does give us reasons that cannot be explained by the historical relationship. favor her genetic children over her adopted children? Might she bestow them with extra benefits? I will assume an affirmative answer to these questions is both unintuitive and reprehensible. We do not think there is good reason for differential treatment of one's biological and adopted children. Then someone who asserts a claim to genetic partiality will want to block this conclusion. More specifically for our purposes, someone who advocates the value of the genetic connection, in order to ground a genetic preference, will want to block this conclusion. My opponent might claim the following: while the value of the genetic connection may allow us to prefer to create a new child rather than adopt a stranger's child, once we have children, they are equally our children regardless of whether they are genetically connected to us or not. We have reasons for partiality to all of our children-equally held-based on some other distinct grounds. This more inclusive account of the parent-child relationship is stronger than and outweighs any genetic connection. But that doesn't mean that the genetic connection isn't valuable. In the Baby Swap case it is grounds for partiality, and this shows that it has value. Likewise, my opponent may say, prior to having children, it can be grounds for a strong genetic preference. Getting out of my concern this way, however, trivializes the value of the genetic connection to a significant degree. My opponent will need the genetic connection to have strong, non-trivial value in order for a preference for this connection to ground an option in the face of the duty to adopt. But this is highly doubtful for the value of the genetic connection cannot ground partiality within a mixed family. It does not differentiate the reasons, rights, responsibilities, or preferences someone has vis-à-vis his genetic child from those held vis-à-vis his adopted child. But then the preference for the genetic connection at best rises to the level of an interest rather than a project, for though it may have non-trivial value, it falls short of having any wider impact on or importance regarding the parental experience. But recall: an option-grounding interest must meet the project's standard to defeat a high-stakes duty, such as the duty to adopt. The preference for a genetic connection with one's child, though perhaps non-trivial, fails this standard. The Value of Creating a Child Perhaps what people value in having a genetic child is partaking in the creation of another human being. This does not involve a preference for a genetic 25Preferring a Genetically-Related | doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 59 There is an important exception: in some states in the u.s., if a same sex couple uses art to create a child, the partner who does not contribute a gamete to the creation of the child must adopt the child. This parent is both a procreative and adoptive parent. See Julie Crawford, 'On Non-Biological Maternity, or "My Daughter is Going to Be a Father!",' in F. Baylis and C. McLeod, pp. 168–81. 60 See Onora O'Neill, 'Begetting, Bearing and Rearing,' in O. O'Neill and W. Ruddick (eds.), Having Children: Philosophical and Legal Reflections on Parenthood (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 25–40; Rivka Weinberg argues that the parental responsibilities are not easily transferred from creators, i.e. gamete donors, to others, because gametes are morally hazardous materials. See 'The Moral Complexity of Sperm Donation,' Bioethics 22 (2008), pp. 166–78. relationship with the child, but rather for the usually associated activity of procreation. Typically, a parent who adopts a child does not partake in this activity.59 Might the desire to participate in the creation of a child ground an option to do so? The candidate desire must not be solely to create a child but to raise a child of one's creation because the desire to be a mere creator of human beings does not permit a person to procreate, even setting aside the possibility to adopt instead. People are not morally permitted to merely create children; if they desire to create a child, they must also intend to responsibly raise that child (or at least, to ensure reasonably that the child is responsibly raised by someone else).60 Likewise, absent parents' lives are not more valuable for having merely participated in the creation of another human being. We would not give the slightest praise to the father who bragged about having many offspring if he had never actually met or cared for any of them. It is raising the child, being a parent to the child, that has value for a person. But the desire to raise a child will not distinguish between procreation and adoption. My opponent must argue that the desire to create a child, which has no option-grounding value on its own, takes on option-grounding significance when combined with the desire to raise a child. I've argued extensively that neither a preference for genetic relatedness nor for being a procreator can do the requisite work. The burden is on one who would push this argument. The Value of Pregnancy Alternatively, some people may desire a biological, bodily connection to a child through procreation. Specifically, a woman may have a strong preference to carry her child in her body. Again, this is not a preference for a genetic relationship with the child per se, but for the usually attendant gestational connection or experience. If a preference to experience pregnancy can defeat 26 doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 | Rulli journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 61 It would also, presumably, justify an option to carry a child from a donor egg, against a duty to adopt, other things being equal. 62 See Van den Dries, et al., 'Fostering Security?' pp. 410–421. In infant adoptions, there is no difference in "psychological adjustment and coping behavior" between first-time adoptive parents and first-time biological parents. See R. Levy-Shiff, O. Bar, & D. Har-Even, 'Psychological adjustment of adoptive parents-to-be,' American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 60 (1990): 258–267. There is no significant difference with regard to mother-child attachment. See L. Singer, D.M. Brodzinsky, D. Ramsay, M. Steir, & E. Waters, 'Mother-infant attachment in adoptive families,' Child Development 56 (1985): 1543–1551. 63 Friedrich makes this point in 'A Duty to Adopt?' p. 31. a duty to adopt, then it will still count as a reason to have a genetic child insofar as genetic procreation is the easiest way for most women to experience pregnancy.61 Is the experience of being pregnant with one's child significant enough to ground an option to procreate rather than adopt? Advantages of pregnancy may include a gestational bond between mother and child and the unique experience of pregnancy for its own sake. The gestational bond, however, though unique, is not the only means for forming a close mother-child bond. Mother-child attachment in infant adoptions occurs readily, and there is no difference in the quality of attachment.62 Adoptive parents do not sacrifice an emotional connection with their children. Another possibility is that pregnancy allows one to experience parenthood from the beginning of the child's life. Adoptive parents typically miss out on the birth of the child and oftentimes greater portions of the child's infancy or childhood. Clearly, it can be very important for a parent to wish to be present for those moments of her child's life and to desire to experience those stages of parenthood. This preference does not favor procreation per se over adoption. Early infant adoption allows parents to experience all but the first moments of the child's life. In this case, the parent misses out on a very small portion of the child's life. This loss must be put into context. A parent of a child has a lifetime of moments for which to be present.63 A parent is no less a parent to a child because she was not present for certain moments of that child's life. Put in the proper context, the desire to be present for certain moments of a child's life could hardly favor procreation over infant adoption. Then perhaps the desire is to experience pregnancy itself. The experience of carrying and nurturing nascent human life inside one's body is profound. A woman may desire to know what this feels like, and to experience quickening and the process of giving birth. Adoptive mothers miss out on this experience, which appears to some to be a great sacrifice. A balanced portrait of the value of the pregnancy experience must include mention of the comparative advantages of adoption, as well as pregnancy's 27Preferring a Genetically-Related | doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 64 R. Levy-Schiff, O. Bar and D. Har-Even, 'Psychological Adjustment of Adoptive Parents To-be,' pp. 258–267. 65 Ibid. 66 Ali S. Khasan, Louise C. Kenny, Thomas M. Laursen, Uzma Mahmood, Preben B. Mortensen, Tine B. Henriksen, Keelin O'Donoghue, 'Pregnancy and the Risk of Autoimmune Disease,' ploS one 6 (2011). doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019658. 67 For maternal mortality rates by nation, see: < https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/ the-world-factbook/rankorder/2223rank.html >. Last accessed June 12, 2014. 68 10–25 percent of clinically recognized pregnancies end in miscarriage. <http://www .americanpregnancy.org/pregnancycomplications/miscarriage.html>. Last accessed June 12, 2014. 69 'Depression Among Women of Reproductive Age,' Center for Disease Control and Prevention, <http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/Depression/>. Last accessed June 12, 2014. 70 Due to the many costs involved in pregnancy, Anca Gheaus argues pregnancy is not an intrinsically desirable experience. Though pregnant women do receive the benefits of significant drawbacks. There are advantages of adoption over pregnancy: "during the pre-adoptive or expectant period, adoptive parents expressed more satisfaction with their marriages and social support. Adoptive mothers were less depressed and had a greater sense of moral and familial self."64 On the whole, adoptive parents adjust well to the pre-adoption period, while biological parents have more problems related to pregnancy, self-image, and depression.65 Adoptive parents adjust well, if not better, than biological parents to the period leading up to a child's homecoming. Furthermore, pregnancy brings with it many, often serious risks. At the least, pregnancies can be uncomfortable for women, inducing nausea, fatigue, headaches, and a host of other discomforts. Worse yet, they can be harmful: pregnancy-related illnesses include gestational diabetes, pre-eclampsia, and a possible link to the onset of autoimmune disorders.66 Pregnancy causes permanent, often undesired changes to a woman's body (including to her feet, ribcage, breasts, and stomach). In some cases, a woman may be bed-ridden for several months to protect her pregnancy. In the most severe cases, delivery of the child can prove life-threatening.67 All pregnancies are at risk of miscarriage, which involves lasting emotional costs to the prospective parents.68 There are post-pregnancy complications as well. Many women endure physical trauma during delivery, which requires follow-up care or surgery. Postpartum depression occurs in up to 19 percent of women.69 For many women, pregnancy is not a pleasant experience at all, and for some, it is a dangerous prospect. Not all women desire to experience pregnancy for these very reasons.70 Consideration of the true costs of pregnancy should temper the interest for many. I imagine, however, even with full recognition of the burdens inherent 28 doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 | Rulli journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> increased attention and care, these are direct responses to offset pregnancy's costs. Pregnancy is similar to illness or disability and is net costly. See 'The Right to Parent One's Biological Baby,' The Journal of Political Philosophy 20 (2012), pp. 432–455, at p. 448. 71 The claim is not that all women would agree to this conception nor conform to it, but that some particular woman may permissibly view herself in this way. For examples of narratives in which women conceive of pregnancy as important to their self-conception as women, see Amy Mullin, Reconceiving Pregnancy and Childcare: Ethics, Experience, and Reproductive Labor (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 31. 72 Mullin cautions against over-emphasizing the uniqueness of pregnancy. She compares chosen pregnancies with other consciously undertaken projects, both intellectual and physical. Her arguments simultaneously serve to defend the status of chosen pregnancy as a project (in the sense of a chosen undertaking). See Reconceiving Pregnancy, pp. 46–55. 73 This does not entail that one has a moral permission to experience pregnancy even if she does not intend to parent the child (she will give it up for adoption by suitable parents). For one, Gheaus says that the beneficial aspects of pregnancy are contingent upon the assumption one will raise the child. It is doubtful that pregnancy itself is intrinsically valuable, given that it is net costly without the desire to be a parent. See 'The Right to Parent One's Biological Baby,' p. 448. Further, there is a plausible prima facie responsibility to raise the child one creates; see fn. 60. Regardless, these concerns fall outside the scope of this paper, which focuses on permissions to procreate rather than adopt for prospective parents, not permission to merely procreate. 74 Does this gestational exclusion apply to men? Some men may have the strong desire to experience pregnancy with their partner. Heterosexual men may inherit the exemption in pregnancy, some women may still strongly desire to have this experience. Many of the most deeply meaningful activities involve considerable risk or are net costly. For some women, the experience of pregnancy might fit the conception of a project. To deny someone this experience may be to deny (what she takes to be) a foundational experience of being a woman.71 That is, pregnancy could greatly impact her conception of her life, its purpose, and the distinct character or shape of her life experiences. A desire for the pregnancy experience is not trivial and is not easily substitutable.72 The interest in pregnancy may arise to the level of a project. Thus, for some women, there may be an option to create rather than to adopt the child she will parent.73 A woman who strongly desires the pregnancy experience may have moral permission to create a child rather than adopt for one of the children she would bring into her family. This exemption would allow her to partake in the particular and un-substitutable experience of pregnancy. Once she has had this experience, the grounds for this moral exemption from a duty to adopt disappear, for she has now had the pregnancy experience.74 The pregnancy exception is recognized by stating that the preference for a genetic child generally fails to defeat a pro tanto duty to adopt. 29Preferring a Genetically-Related | doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> from the duty to adopt if their female partners have an option-grounding reason to experience pregnancy. But some men with this strong desire do not have female partners who feel the intense desire for pregnancy. Could the male interest alone ground an option? (Of course, the female partner would have to be open to experiencing pregnancy. The male interest alone couldn't require her to experience it.) The option for men to experience pregnancy through their partner will depend upon whether men's vicarious experience of pregnancy is sufficiently unique, intimate, and un-substitutable. This is because the force of the pregnancy interest is grounded in the deeply personal nature of the experience of carrying a life inside one's body. Men are excluded from this exact experience-though they may still experience their partner's pregnancy as deeply personal. Is this vicarious experience sufficiently unique, intense, and life-changing? Does this experience have a counterpart in adoption-expectancy that can adequately provide a substitute? These are, in part, empirical questions, which I leave open for further investigation. 75 In 2007, domestic adoptions in the u.s. of children under the age of two comprised 24 percent of all unrelated, domestic adoptions. See National Council for Adoption, 'Adoption Factbook V,' E.A. Rosman, C.E. Johnson, and N.M. Callahan (eds.) (2011), p. 4. Approximately 40 percent of international adoptions involve children under the age of one, p. 29. Of course, the percentage of children available for adoption who are infants may not be the same as the percentage of adopted children who are infants; we lack concrete adoptability statistics. See fn. 7. Possibly, younger-aged children are overrepresented in the pool of children who are actually adopted. Conclusion The reasons for wanting a genetic child do not defeat a pro tanto duty to adopt children instead, with a possible exception. These reasons are too trivial, presuppose the value of the genetic connection, are inappropriate in a normative parental context, or fail to make a relevant distinction between genetic and adopted children. A promising candidate for a onetime exception may be grounded in a woman's strong desire to experience pregnancy. I have focused on the essential differences between procreation and adoption, as isolated by the Safe Haven case. The real world is more complicated than the Safe Haven scenario. Full argument for a duty to adopt must take into account these additional complexities and other potential costs in adoption. Adoptions in the real world are often financially expensive and logistically difficult. Further, Safe Haven involves infant adoption, yet the majority of adoptions may involve older children.75 Prospective adopters interested in infant children often face a lengthy waiting time. Additionally, childhood adjustment issues correlate with increased exposure of a child to pre-adoption 30 doi 10.1163/17455243-4681062 | Rulli journal of moral philosophy (2014) 1-30 <UN> 76 M.H. van ijzendoorn and Femmie Juffer, 'The Emanuel Miller Memorial Lecture 2006: Adoption as Intervention. Meta-Analytic Evidence for Massive Catch-up and Plasticity in Physical, Socio-emotional, and Cognitive Development,' Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 47 (2006), pp. 1228–45. 77 For instance, in Russia, children must be available for domestic adoption for six to eight months prior to international adoption. Since the early months of a child's life are critical to healthy development, there is strong reason to reconsider this policy. 78 Liao's arguments, in 'The Right of Children to be Loved,' support the idea that each of us has obligations to promote policies and institutional arrangements that make it easier for those who have the duty to adopt to do so. See p. 435. 79 This paper has had a long gestation period, and I have received feedback from many people, some of whom I have surely, though unintentionally, failed to mention. My gratitude goes to the following people for their comments or support for the paper by assigning it in their classes: Melina Bell, Steve Campbell, Ben Chan, Richard Yetter Chappell, Stephen Darwall, Michael Della Rocca, Luke Gelinas, Sally Haslanger, Rob Hughes, Shelly Kagan, Shen-yi Liao, Carolyn McLeod, Joe Millum, Thomas Pogge, Travis Rieder, Sun-Joo Shin, Zoltan Szabo, Gilad Tanay, Candace Upton, as well as the participants at the Alliance for the Study of Adoption and Culture 2010, the Mountain-Plains Philosophy Conference 2010, the Virginia Philosophical Association Conference 2010, and the Yale Working Group in Moral Philosophy 2010. trauma, which in turn correlates with age.76 These facts about adoption practices may constitute the most promising challenges to a duty to adopt. They warrant closer empirical and philosophical examination. Yet, these costs in adopting are the result of socially-contingent barriers to adoption. They are features of our particular institutional structures and social norms. Though no less real, many, if not most, of them can be changed. We could provide financial support through generous tax credits and low-interest loans to adoptive families struggling with adoption. We could reduce the time to adopt children so that children are placed at an earlier age in adoptive families-both benefiting prospective parents anxious to start their families and children who are increasingly endangered the longer they are without a stable home. This would increase the number of currently adoptable infants.77 We do not have to accept these nonessential burdens in adoption as permanent features of our world. We could-and one might argue we should- remove these costly obstacles to adoption.78 Many people may have a duty to adopt rather than procreate, and many more may acquire such a duty with changes to our child welfare institutions and practices. I've shown that this duty to adopt children is not generally defeated by a preference for genetic children. In fact, many of the deep interests people have in wanting a genetic child can be wholly satisfied by adopted children.

Reflections published in 1922. 2. See Ayer, 1946, p. 32. 3. For Schlick see his 1959, pp. 87f; for Waismann see his 1965, pp. 329-333. . 4. See Carnap, 1928, section 67. 5. See Ogden and Richards, 1930, pp. 124-'5. 6. Published in 1935. An English translation did not appear until 1959. 7. For Berlin see his 1938-39, pp. 233-4; for Church see his 1949. 8. See Ayer, 1946, p. 95. 9. See Ayer, 1946, p. 102. 10. Reprinted in Quine, 1976. 11. See Ayer, 1969. 12. See Ayer, 1973, pp. 211-35. ( References Ayer, A. J. (1940) The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, Macmillan, London. --(1946) Language, Truth andLogic, 2nd edn, Gollancz, London. -* -. ( 1954) Philosophical Essays, Macmillan, London. -- ( 1968) The Origins of Pragmatism, Macmillan, London. -* - (1969) Metaphysics and Common Sense, Macmillan, London. -- (1973) The Central Questions of Philosophy, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London. , --. (1984) Freedom and Morality, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Berlin, I. (1938-39) 'Verification', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 39, 225-48. Carnap, R. (1928) Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, Weltkreis, Berlin. Eng. \trans. as The Logical Structure of the World, by R. George, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967. Church, A. ( 1949) 'Review of A. J. Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic', journal of Symbolic Logic, 14, 52-53. Lewis, C. I. (1929) Mind and the World Order, C. Scribner's and Sons, New York. Ogden, C. K. and Richards, I. A. (1930) The Meaning a/Meaning, 3rd edition, Kegan Paul, London. Popper, K. R. (1935) Logik der Forschung, J. Springer, Wien. Eng. trans. as The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson, London, 1959. Quine, W. V. 0. (1973) TheRoots of Reference, Open Court, La Salle. --* (1976) The Ways of Paradox, revised and enlarged edn, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. Schlick, M. (1959) 'Positivism and Realism', in A. J. Ayer (ed.), Logical Positivism, Free Press, Glencoe, pp. 82-107. Waismann, F. (1965) The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy, ed. R. Harre, Macmillan, London. Wittgenstein, L. (1922) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. by C. K. Ogden, Kegan Paul, London. * 34 2 Austrian Origins of Logical Positivism 1 Barry Smith _/ The rise of scientific philosophy It was in 1922 that Moritz Schlicka German physicist-cumphilosopher of aristocratic manners and conservative opinions arrived in Vienna. He had been invited to take up the chair of philosophy 'with special reference to the history and theory of the inductive sciences' that had been created for another physicist-cum-philosopher, Ernst Mach, in 1895. Mach himself had previously served for almost thirty years as professor of experimental physics in Prague, and it will be important in what follows to remember that Prague was still to some extent a German city and a centre ofintellectual activity almost no less important than Vienna herself. The lines of communication between the two former Imperial-Royal capital cities2 were still strong, and the same figures were often, at different times, prominent in each. The two cities shared also the characteristically . Austrian predilection nurtured, certainly, by the culture of the coffee house for forming clubs, societies, and discussion groups.3 Austrian cultural life was indeed to a striking extent a matter of 'schools', 'movements' and 'circles of contemporaries', and one might pause to reflect on the degree to which such schools and movements have determined the artistic, intellectual and political world we inhabit today. Thus consider, in no particular order, the Vienna psychoanalytic movement, the Zionist movement founded by Theodor . Herzl, the 'new Viennese school' of composition around* Arnold Schonberg, the school of linguists and psychologists around Karl Buhler, the school of Austrian economics founded by Carl Menger in 35 Austrian Origins 1871 and evolving, by degrees, into the circle around Ludwig von Mises and the young Friedrich von Hayek in the 1920s. Or consider the 'Prager Kreis' of novelists and critics around Max Brod, Felix Weltsch and Franz Kafka; or the Prague linguistic. circle of Roman Jakobson, Jan Mukafovsky and Nikolai Trubetskoy; or the so-called Louvre circle, a discussion group of adherents of Brentanian philosophy meeting fortnightly in the Cafe Louvre in Prague, to which the young Franz Kafka also belonged.4 * Schlick, too, had his regular Thursday evening discussion circle. This comprised above all a group of mathematicians around Hans Hahn, himself a former student of Mach, and including Kurt Godel, Gustav Bergmann, Karl Menger (son of the economist Carl) and Schlick's own assistant Friedrich' Waismann. The Schlick circle included also Philipp Frank, another former student of Mach based principally in Prague (where he had succeeded Einstein in the chair of physics); and it included also Herbert Feigl, Viktor Kraft, Rudolf Carnap, and a sociologist-cum~philosopher, proletarian in manner and socialist in his opinions, 5 by the name of Otto N eurath. Carnap is, apart from Schlick himself, the single native German on this list, and it is indeed remarkable to consider the 7 extent to which not merely logical positivism but also the exact or scientific philosophy of which it formed a part was and is a characteristically Austrian phenomenon. One thinks in this connection not only of Mach, but also of another Prague figure of an earlier generation, Bernard Bolzano. Bolzano was on the one hand a priest and social reformer, author of one of the last social utopias (Vom besten Staate); but he was also a notable mathematical logician and philosopher of science, though his contributions in these fields were unfo1 tunate!y largely ignored until after his death.. One thinks of Ludwig Boltzmann, hero of Wittgenstein and contemporary of Mach* in Vienna; and indeed one thinks of Wittgenstein himself, of Ludwik Fleck, Karl Popper, Michael Polanyi, Paul Feyerabend, Wolfgang Stegmiiller and Imre Lakatos all of them Austrians (orAustro-Hungarians) who have, for better of worse, done much to determine the shape of the philosophy of science as we know it today.6 Here it is perhaps Ludwik Fleck who deserves most mention. Fleck was born in 1896 in Lemberg (Lw6w), capital of Galicia on the eastern fringes of the Empire. He was the author of 36 --------- Austrian Origi,ns some 200 scientific papers in the areas of medicine and microbiology.7 But he was also the author of a longer, philosophical work, published in 1935, entitled Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. Introduction to the Doctrine of Cognitive Style and of the Thought-Collective. This work is of interest first of all because, as a contribution to the nascent discipline of 'sociology of science', it anticipates and perhaps even served to inspire some of the !}OW so influential ideas of Thomas Kuhn (who in fact contributed a preface to the English translation of the work). But it is of interest also, as we shall see below, because Fleck was one of a number of Lemberg-based philosophers and philosophically-minded scientists and mathematicians who were to become associated, in different ways, with the developments in scientific philosophy that were taking place to the west and Lemberg will, like Prague, have a quite special role to play in the story that follows. , The native German philosophers who have made serious contributions to exact philosophy or to the philosophy of science in the modern sense are, in contrast, remarkably few, and of these - .one thinks particularly of Hans Reichenbach and Carl Hempel it can often be asserted that the .true flowering oftheir thought and influence has occurred through formal or informal collaboration with their Austrian teachers or contemporaries.8 Of quite specific interest for our own purposes is the fact that so many of these philosophers, as also of the sympathetic philosophically-minded German scientists one thinks in particular of Kurt Grelling and of the Gestalt psychologists Wolfgang Kohler and Kurt Lewin were based in Berlin, where the 'Society for Empirical Philosophy' was * established in 1928 as a counterpart to the Schlick circle in Vienna .. Philosophy and politics Ayer himself arrived in Vienna in late November of 1932, spending a protracted honeymoon of just over three months in Austria before returning to Oxford to write Language, Truth and Logi,c. The Schlick circle was at this time at the very height of its activity. It had already organised its first two international conferences, and at the first of these, held in Prague in 1929, 37 Austrian Origins had distributed copies of its manifesto, the 'Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung' or 'Scientific Conception of the World'. This was written, effectively, by Neurath, with Carnap and Hahn (and to a lesser extent other members of the circle) serving merely to temper some of Neurath's wilder flights of fancy. The patrician Schlick, to whom the manifesto was dedicated, was less than satisfied with the* result. This Was first of all because he was not taken by the conception of the circle as a 'movement' of any sort, favouring a more modest and more narrowly scientific approach: Schlick hated everything that smacked of agitation, was against it all: 'It is not necessary for us to agitate: that we can leave to the political parties: in science we say what we have found, we hope to say the truth; and if it is the truth, then it will win out.' (Haller and Rutte, p.31) But it was also because he was distressed by the political tone of the piece, and more specifically by those portions which suggested some sort of alignment of logical positivism with socialism and with the movement for workers' education in Vienna at the time. The circle had already, by 1932, taken over with the group around Reichenbach in Berlin the journal Annalen der Philosophie, renaming it Erkenntnis. And it had published some six volumes of its series of Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, including works by Richard voh. Mises (brother of the economist Ludwig), and by Carnap, Schlick, Neurath and Philipp Frank, together with a peculiar work, entitled On the Biology of Ethics: Psychopathological Investigations of GuiltFeelings and the Formation of Moral Ideals: A Contribution on the Essence of the Neurotic Human Being, by a certain Otto Kant.9 Ayer himself, who attended the weekly discussion meetings of the circle and a .course of university lectures given by Schlick on the philosophy of science, seems not to have been troubled by the puzzle as to why it should have been Austria, specifically, that witnessed such a. peculiar flowering of scientific philosophy. His autobiography does . however contain one remark on what Ayer saw as the political role of the group around Schlick: The members of the Vienna Circle, with the notable 38 I Austrian Origins exception of Otto Neurath, were not greatly interested in politics, but theirs was also a political movement. The war of ideas which they were waging against the Catholic church . had its part in the perennial Viennese conflict betwe<Jl the socialists and the clerical reaction. (1977, p.129) A thesis along these lines has indeed been argued quite seriously by the Viertnese historian Friedrich* Stadler, who provides us with a great mass of documentation to support his case. Stadler suggests that we see the University of Vienna in the interwar period as split jnto 'two camps': on the one side, in the realm of scientific philosophy, there dominated democratic (enlightenment, liberal, socialist) tendeiicie§; OI). the other side there was a spectrum of almost all forms of anti-democratic feeling, from neo-romantic conservatism to fascist-totalitarian outgrowths. Thus it is tempting to see the philosophical life as part of the fierce party-political Kulturkampf of the time, between* the bourgeois camp and the workers' movement. (1979, p.42) The idea that the flowering of scientific phit~ophy in Austria can be accountedfor by regarding the Schlic circle as a manifestation .of Austrian socialism, or of anti-de *calism, seems however to be at best the product of a certain sort of over-tidy wishful thinking. Why, one might ask, did socialist anti"clericalism not lead to similar phenomena in France, or Spain, or Italy? And how is .such a thesis to cope with the fact that so few important Austrian philosophers of science, and so few of the members of the Vienna circle N eurath, Hahn and * Carnap constituting here the principal exceptions ,...... were of socialist persuasion?10 Neurath was, it must be admitted, the most vocal and the most ardently propagandistic of the group around Schlick. It was Neurath's conspicuous advocacy of crackpot schemes for 'international planning for freedom' and for an ~economy in kind' as a substitute for prices andmarkets 11 which dissuaded Hayek from making overtures to the group after his interest had been sparked by his friend and fellow member of the Mises circle Felix Kaufmann. And as the case of Schlick himself surely makes clear, 12 it would be overly simplistic to see the circle in particular or Viennese scientific philosophy in general 39 I I. I I ..... Austrian Origins as in any sense a part of the Austrian socialist movement. How, then, are we to explain the fact that, as far. as achievemen.t and wider influence is concerned, scientifically oriented philosophy of science was the dominant branch of philosophy in Austria? A more subtle answer to this question, deriving from the work of the Hungarian philosopher J. C, Nyiri, 13 might read as follows. On the one hand one can point to ihe fact that, while the Austrian Empire was the equal of Germany in the cultural field, it lagged behind its richer and more developed neighbour to the west in the spheres of intellect and science. The Habsburg Empire had witnessed a relatively late process of urbanisation, bringing also a late development of those libetal habits and values which would seem to be a necessary presupposition of the modern, scientific attitude. It therefore lacked .institutions and traditions of scientific research of the *sort that had been established and cultivated in Germany throughout the nineteenth century. On the other hand, as the more .liberal and enlightened ways began to be established in ' . Austria -* effectively in the . second. half of the nineteenth century ........ the desire to enjoy the various trappings of a *. jnodetn; erilighteried culture made itself strongly felt. The Austrians were not, however, in a position to summon forth * ".the ineap.s to create serious and reputable institutions and traditj.ons of science in. the narrow sense. This, as Nyiri puts it, created 'a vacuum which the theory of a practice so attractively * pursued elsewhere could then fill' 14 a thesis illustrated partiCl\larly clearly by the case of Mach, whose lack of funds for serious experiments in physics seems to have constrained him tq turn .. instead to the (cheaper) fields of physiology and * .psycholi>gy, and. to the work in history and philosophy of science which occupied him especially at the end of his life. An account along these lines is supported' further by pointing to the absence in the Empire .of any entrenched national philosophy of the Kantian or *Hegelian sort. This implied that, when the Jime came for the establishment of a modern and scientifically inspired philosophy in Austria, there was very little of substance against which the new philosophical developments had to compete. Catholic Austria was indeed largely free 'of the influence of German (Protestant) idealist metaphysics, 15 an influence which has done so much to thwart the development of exact philosophy in Germany itself. This 40 ' Austrian Origins was not least in virtue of the fact that the works of both Kant and Hegel, as notorious effluvia of the French revolution, were for a time induded in the Papal index of prohibited books; Their place was taken by a peculiarly superficial form of scholasticism-larded, here and there, with bitS of Leibniz and Herbart, but still quite liter3.ny an inheritance of the middle ages. The canons and textbooks of this doctrine were imposed upon the. institutions of learning> throughout the Empire, a state of affairs which was to end only with the educational reform& after 1848, leaving the way clear for more positive developments, some of which willbe considered below. This is of course in contrast to the German case, where the strength of the idealist metaphysics had derived in no small part from the fact that it was closely associated with the development both of German nationalistic feeling and of the German nation itself. Kant, Hegel, Fichte and Schelling came thereby to occupy an entrenched position in German thought and feeling (comparable, perhaps; to the position of Catholicism in contemporary Poland or in the Irish Republic) . At no time was philosophy rooted in this way in the structure. of the AustHan state,' An Empire which was at bestan accidental compromise, a dynastic convenience of the Habsburg family itself, seemed indeed to be lacking in' all potential for legitimation on the plane ofphilosophy.16 The primary legitimacy of the Empire was seen as lying much rather in its role as the last bulwark of Catholic Christianity against the expansionist powers of Russia and Turkey to the east. There is however a further reason for the absence in Austria of a counterpart to German idealist metaphysics. For the Austrians, similar in this respect to the English and the Scots, have tended to react with derisory suspicion in the face of 'metaphysical systems' (when, that is to say, these are put forward as* the constructions of man). This may explain also why those native German philosophers who have favoured painstaking argument and *careful empirical work over grandiose speculation have to an extent been able to find a receptive audience in Austrian universities. 17 41 I ' Austrian Origins TheNeurath-Haller thesis Much of the previous section consisted in the attempt to provide an explanation of developments in the intellectual or cultural. sphere by appeal to underlying social or econõic factors. (as the relative predominance of the coffee house m Austria might be made understandable by pointing to the long-standing shortage of adequate housing in the major cities . of.the Empire). Explanations of this kind have been found tempting both by Marxist thinkers and also by advocates of the new 'economic .approach . to human behaviour'. 18 Where, however, we are dealing with complex movements of thought and doctrine, they would seem to be at best only partial. For they cannot give us jnsight into the precise intellectual content of the. movements in question. Why did the Austrians' initial substitute for true scientific development take precisely these (alternatively phenomenalist and physicalist) forms, rather than those? What is to account for the peculiarhlend of British empiricism *and Russellian. logic which provided .. the basic framework within which, in their various ways, the members of the Schlick circle would operate? Clearly, and for all the dominance of schools and movements in any particular case, it can only be by pointing to the influence of specific individuals that we shall provide truly satisfactory answers to questions such as these. And there are a number of candidate individuals whodoimmediately come to mind, including Boltzmann whose vision of a unitary science made itself felt not only among physicists but also in the wider intellectual community in Vienna-and Wittgenstein whose Tractatus exerted a not inconsiderable influence on both Schlick and Carnap in precisely the formative years of the Vienna Circle. We may presume, reasonably, that no social or economic explanation of the genius of Boltzmann or Wittgenstein (or Godel, .or Einstein) would be forthcoming. Yet it would, on the other hand, be insufficient* for our purposes to look at individuals in abstraction from the wider social and institutional context in which they worked. For the individual will himself have been shaped by his surrounding culture, and his ideas will at least to some extent have been, determined thereby, whether.positively, through absorption, or negatively, through critical reaction. Moreover, these ideas will be able to take root in this surrounding culture only to the 42 I j Austrian Origins ? ) extent that they strike a congenial chord in the thinking of those to whom they are addressed. Hence also an individual of genius will have a greater opportunity to influence the thinking of others to the extent that he has an oratorical or p~dagogical talent. Longevity, too, may play a not insignificant role. But further: a body of thought that is promulgated from a number of distinct centres and in such a way as to attract the representatives of a number of different disciplines will, other things being equal, have a greater chance of becoming influential; for it will have the opportunity to make an impression on the thinking of different members of its audience by degrees, by appealing simultaneously to their several competing interests. Most importantly, however, an individual, even an individual of genius, is able to exert an influence upon his contemporaries only to the extent that there are institutions ~hich can facilitate the dissemination of his ideas. Hence there is a need, in regard to our own specific problem, to provide a mixed explanation, one that makes room both for social and *economic factors of the kind so far considered and also for the serendipitous role of individuals. A remarkably forceful and coherent explanation along these lines has been provided, ironically ~nm.J.gh, by the much-maligned Otto Neurath in the section labelled 'Prehistory' of the Vienna Circle manifesto already mentioned above, and I .shall here deal in turn with each of the four main components in Neurath's account. I. The fact that Vienna provided especially fertile soil for the development of the scientific C0,9._ception is, Neurath argues, 'historically understandable' first . of all as a consequence of the growth of liberalism in Vienna in the second.half of the nineteenth century. Indeed he claims that liberalism was in this period: ** the dominant political current ~n Vienna. Its world of ideas stems from * the enlightenment, from empiricism, utilitarianism and the free trade movement of England. In Vienna's liberal movement, ~cholars of world renown occupied leading positions. Here an anti"metaphysical spirit* was cultivated, for instance, by men like Theodor Gomperz (who translated the works of J S. Mill), and by Suess, Jodi 43 Austrian Origins and others. (Neurath, 1973, p. 301, translation amended slightly) This liberal atmosphere fostered also, Neurath telfs us, the development in Austria of scientifically oriented popular education --.,. leading eventually .to the school reform movement of the 1920s in which* Wittgenstein, *perhaps inadvertently, participated. II. Mach, too, was a product of this Viennese liberal enlightenment, which was as it were compressed, in Austria, into the short span of a few decades. His formative years as * student and 1:rivatdozent were spent in Vienna, where. his political attitudes ~ subsequently. to reveal themselves in his activities as Rector oft.he still unified University of Prague were also shaped .. These same attitudes then manifested themselves also, Neurath suggests, in Mach's philosophy of science,. and specifically in his attempt to 'purify' empirical science of metaphysical notions: We recall his critique of absolute space which made him a forerunnerofEinstein, his struggle against the metaphysics of the thing-in-itself and of the conceptof substance, and his investigations of the construction of the concepts cif science from ultimat~ elements, namely, sense data. (Neurath, 1973, p. 302) The influence of Mach and of his successor Boltzmann, Neurath nciw argues, !makes it understandable' whythere was in Vienna 'a lively dominant interest in th~ epistemological and logical problems that are linked with the foundations of physics' (Neurath 1973, p.302). This influence was, certainly, of lasting importance, despite the fact that, after only six years as professor in Vienna, Mach was forced by ill-health to retire. Thus Hayek, for example, reports that he and his contemporaries on arriving in Vienna to take up their studies in the immediate post-war years 'found in Mach almost the only arguments against a metaphysical and mystificatory attitude' such as was manifested by the dominant philosophers in the University at the time: from Mach one was then led on to Helmholtz, to Poincare 44 **~.*.'.'.'i****.*.**. t/ Austrian Origins . to* similar thinkers, and of cour~, *for those who went into *the matter systematically such as my friend Karl Popper, to all the natural scientists and philosophers of the period. (Hayek, 1960, p.421) The quite special importance of Mach for the Vienna Circle itself can be seen in the fact that they gave the name 'Verein Ernst Mach' to the,public lecture society which they founded, as *a supplement to their other activities, in 1929. Iii. Neurath mentions also a number of Viennese social thinkers, from both the Marxist and the non-Marxist camps, who had 'served consciously in the spirit of the enlightenment' in the late nineteenth century.19 Above all he mentions the work of Carl Menger; .pointing out that 'in the sphere of political economy, too, a rigorously scientific method was cultivated by the *school of marginal utility' which Menger had founded in 1871. Menger's methodological individualistic doctrines, especially as developed by Mises and by Hayek, can indeed be seen as standing in opposition to German historicist * and collectivist doctrines in the sphere of economics in a way that parallels the opposition <if, say, Bolzano or Mach to Kant and Hegel. Moreover, these doctrines constitute a synthesis of liberal political and economic ideas with the affirmation of the importance of scientific rigour of just the sort that is required by Neurath's thesis~20 IV. Apart from' Mach; however, the most important individual philosopher mentioned by Neurath in his account of the Viennese prehistory of logical positivism is Franz Brentano. The ground was cleared for the endeavours of the Vienna Circle in the direction of a reform of logic and of a concern with problems of foundations also, as Neurath himself puts it, 'from quite another quarter': through Frãz Brentano (professor of philosophy ... from 1874 to 1880, later Dozent in the philosophical faculty). As a *Catholic priest Brentano had an understanding for scholasticism; he started directly from the scholastic logic and from Leibniz's endeavours to reform logic,. while leaving aside Kant and the idealist system-philosophers. Brentano and his students showed time and again their understanding of 45 Austrian Origins men like Bolzano and others who were working towards a rigorous new foundation oflog!c (Neurath, 1973, p.302) Brentano, too, was marked by the Austrian liberalism of the nineteenth century (thus for example he played an instrumental role in commissioning the young Sigmund Freud who had been for a time a devoted admirer ofBrentano's work to translate one of the volumes in the already mentioned Gomperz edition of the works of Mill21 ). Of Brentano's students, Neurath mentions in particular Alois Hofler (18531922), who had organised numerous discussions on Brentanian perspectives in logic and foundations under the auspices of the. Philosophical Society at the University of Vienna, a forum in which, as Neurath puts it, 'the adherents of the scientific world conception were strongly represented'.22 Neurath mentions also 'Alexius von Meinong, a member of Brentano's Viennese Circle from 1870-1882 and later professor in Graz, whose theory of objects has certainly some affinity to modern theories of* concepts'. (Neurath is presumably referring here to the similarities pointed out also by Carnap ~ between Meinong's work on higher order objects and Carnap's Logical Structure of the World. 23) He mentions also Meinong's pupil Ernst Mally, who had been one of the first Austrians to work on t.he logic of Whitehead and Russell and would later play a seminal role in the development of deontic logic. Brentano, for all his scholastic background, was not only sympathetic to a rigorously scientific method of philosophy; he shared with the logical positivists also a certain antimetaphysical orientation24 and his work involves the use of methods oflanguage an,,alysis similar, in some respects, to those developed later by philosophers in England. The distinguished Graz philosopher Rudolf Haller has indeed argued that it makes sense to point to these features which were shared in common not only by Brentano and the logical positivists but also by thinkers as diverse as M.ach and Wittgenstein as constituting what might be called a 'typically Austrian philosophy'.25 Hailer's writings on the history of Austrian philosophy26 have not merely extended and clarified the Neurath interpretation; they have also contributed to our understanding of Germañlanguage philosophy as a whole. 46 Austrian Origins For Haller has shown that it is possible to distinguish within this whole a coherent alternative to *the speculative idealisms predominant in. Germany proper. But now, if this NeurathHaller thesis can be accepted, it follows that the Vienna Circle itself comes to be linked, via Brentano, to Catholic scholasticism. Indeed one could go further and point to the method of communal philosophical argument ofphilosophising by means of a sometimes ritualised process of discussion as something that is shared, not merely by Brentano and the medieval schoolmen, but also by Schlick, with his Thursday evening discussions, and indeed by Wittgenstein in his cell in Cambridge. * The Neurath-Haller thesis .is not without its problems however. Thus it seems that in the actual discussions of the Vienna Circle the works of Meinong or Hofler or Mally to say nothing of the medievals were hardly mentioned, and Brentano himself was discussed only because his work on ethics was chosen by Schlick as a special object of criticism. The thesis has been attacked most especially by the Viennese sociologist.left, which of course cannot stomach the idea that the 'two camps' of Catholic reaction and progressive socialist neopositivism should become confused together in the way described. Friedrich Stadler, in particular, has suggested that ~in contrast to the picture of the typical Austrian philosopher painted by Neurath and Haller the influence of logical positivistideas, or of scientific philosophy in general, was in fact rather small, at least as concerns the official life of Vienna University in the period 1918-38. What predominated, both in lecture courses and in dissertation topics, was rather the history of philosophy of a.rather old~fashioned sort, dealing in Kant, Schopenhauer, Spinoza, Plato, Nietzsche. The circle around Sch.lick can be seen from this point of view to have consisted largely of philosophical outsiders or cranks, of individuals who would in fact be taken seriously only sometime later and only without the boundaries of Austria herself. What is important for our purposes, however, is not the education of the inter-war generation in Vienna, the gener~ ation which would come of age in the period (say) 1939-45. Rather, we are interested in those intellectual currents which had shaped and determined the thinking of specific members of the generation already mature in the inter-war period, and in particular given rise to such schools as the Schlick and Mises 47 Austrian Origi,ns circles. And to pick out such currents it will not suffice simply to examine the sheer numbers of lectures or dissertations on different themes-for this is to ignore just those differences of quality, achievement and wider influence which are here allimportant. The school of Franz Brentano Franz Brentano (1838-1917) was born in Marienberg, near Boppard on the Rhine, of a distinguished Italian-German family whose forbears included Clemens Brentano, Carl von Savigny and Bettina von Arnim. He studied in Berlin under the .Aristotle scholar Adolf Trendelenburg, and later in Wiirzburg, where he took holy orders in 1864 and where, from 1866, he taught philosophy. In part as a result of difficulties in accepting the dogma of Papal infallibility, Brentano withdrew from the priesthood in .1873 and this necessitated also a withdrawal from Wiirzburg. In 1874 he was appointed professor of philosophy in Vienna, where he taughtfor some twenty years with great success; Brentano movedtmFlorence in 1896 and from there to Zurich in 1915, where he died two. years later. 27 Brentano remained a quite singularly powerful figure in Austrian philosophy even when, for technical reasons connected with his marriage as an ex-priest, he was forced to resign his chair in 1880. It is one of the tragedies of Austrian philosophy that, due to the repeated interventions of the Emperor, Brentano was not re-appointed to a professorial post in Vienna after his marriage, despite the fact that, year after year, his re-election to such a post was carried unico voco by the faculty itself. Brentano remained in Vienna as a mere Privatdozent until 1895. He was thereby able to exert his influence in Vienna as a teacher, but his students and disciples were largely forced to turn elsewhere in order to pursue their philosophical careers. Had Brentano been able truly to establish himself and his school in the University of Vienna, then it seems clear that the philosophy of Austria in this century would have been significantly different. It may, therefore, have been a somewhat ironic consequence of the Emperor's veto of Brentano's appointment in the name of Christian propriety, that he thereby left the way clear in Vienna for just such 48 Austrian Origi,ns positivistic and atheistic movements of thought as were promulgated by Schlick and his circle in the 20s and 30s .. Another consequence was that Brentanian ideas came to predominate in other centres of learning both within and without the Empire. Thus centres of Brentanian or of Brentano-inspired thought were established particularly in Prague and in Lemberg, and Brentano's students held chairs also in Graz and Czernowitz, as well as in Berlin, where Stumpf, formerly in Prague, was professor in the University for over thirty years. Brentano's influence was not restricted to philosophers. Among those who came under his spell were also a number of important thinkers in the Church, as well as such figures as T. G. Masaryk, later President of the Czechoslovak Republic. What is most remarkable about .Brentano, however, is the extent to which his most important philosophical heirs Kasimir Twardowski in Lemberg, Christian von Ehrenfels and Anton Marty in Pr~gue, Carl Stumpf in Prague and Berlin, as well as Meinong and Husserl-have distinguished themselves by the power and originality of their thinking, which amounted in each. case to a more or less radical transformation of Brentanian ideas. 28Moreover each had influential students of his own, to the extent that, leaving aside certain exclusively Anglo-Saxon developments, a table ofBrentano's students and of his students' students would come close to embracing all of the most important philosophical movements of the twentieth century, Twardowski (1866-1938) was born in Vienna and took his* PhD under Brentano with a dissertation on Descartes in 1892. After a short period as Privatdozent in Vienna he moved to Lemberg in 1895. On the basis of work on logic and psychology inspired by Brentano (and due in no small part to his own brilliance as a teacher), he then went on to establish almost single-handedly a tradition of exact philosophy in Poland which was to include all of the important figures of the Polish philosophical renaissance of the first decades of the present century. 29 Thus present at different times in Lemberg and falling under Twardowski's influence were, inter alia, the historian Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz, the phenomenologist and aesthetician Roman Irigarden, the logicians St. Lesniewski, Jan Lukasiewicz and Tadeusz Czei:owski, the. already mentioned Ludwik Fleck,30 as well as philosophers later sympathetic to the 49 Austrian Origins Vienna logical empiricist movement such as Tadeusz Kotarbinski and Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz.31 Members of the circle around Twardowski were gradually transplanted to Warsaw, where Le8niewski, especially, was domina,nt, and it was from there that contacts with the Vienna Circle were initiated in the spring of 1930 by Alfred Tarski. Carnap in turn visited Warsaw in November of that year. He gave lectures to the Warsaw Philosophical Society and had discussions with Lesniewski, Kotarbinski and Tarski, at just about the time when Tarski himself was developing his semantic conception of truth.32 Ehrenfels (1859-1932), professor in Prague for more than thirty years, was above all responsible, together with his student Max Wertheimer, for initiating that _revolution in psycl;iological research which is associated with the concept of Gestalt, a revolution to which contributions were made also by Ehrenfels' teacher Meinong in Graz and subsequently by Buhler in Vienna.33 Meinong's followers would go on to establish a school of Gestalt psychology that is still influential in Italy today, and not least in the former Imperial-and-Royal Port City of Triest. The group around Buhler (to which incidentally the yo:ing Karl Popper belonged), promulgated a naturalistic philosophy of Gestalten similar, in many respects, to the work of Stumpf. Buhler's student Egon Brunswik, especially, was to make importantcontributions to this Vienna Gestalt psychology before allying himself with the neopositivist movement newly transplanted to America and serving as one of the advisory editors to the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science founded by Neurath in 1938. Marty (1847-1914) was a native of Switzerland who, following the example of his teacher Brentano in Wiirzburg, took holy orders in 1870. He was professor, successively, in Czernowitz and Prague, and was responsible for applying Brentano's ideas in the areas of linguistics and the philosophy of language, where his writings anticipated a number of aspects of contemporary work on linguistic universals. Marty played a role also in the early developmentofBrentanian ideas on language in the direction of a theory of speech acts,34 and exerted an influence in this respect both on Buhler and his followers in Vienna and also on Jakobson and other members of the Prague linguistic circle. The philosophical atmosphere in Prague in the first decades of the twentieth century had of course been determined to no 50 Austrian Origins small extent by the work of physicists such as Mach, Einstein and Frank. Yet it is clear that Marty, Stumpf, Ehrenfels and other Breritanians as well as phenomenologically-oriented psychologists such as Ewald Hering played a no less important role in determining the scientific orientation of Prague philosophy. Moreover, whilst the two groups were doctrinally at loggerheads, particularly over the theory of relativity itself, which Brentano charged with incoherence, there were examples Of amicable collaboration across this doctrinal divide: Thus Einstein was to be a, life-long friend of Wertheimer,35 and also of Marty's student and assistant Hugo Bergmann, who was in tum a close friend of Franz Kafka and had done much to encourage the latter to attend the philosophy lectures ofEhrenfels, Marty and other Brentanists as part of his studies in the German University. Bergmann had also initiated Kafka* into the mysteries of the already mentioned Brentanist discussion group in Prague. Initially, as Bergmann writes, the group had called itself:the 'Louvre Circle' after the Louvre coffeehouse where we used to gather. Later on, we got together in the drawing-room of my then mother-in-law, Berta Sohr-Fanta, where Einstein was a frequent visitor when we were reading Hegel's 'Phenomenology of the Spirit'. I scarcely remember whether Einstein took part in these readings. Yet I well " recall a popular lecture he held before this .score of nonphysicists on the special theory of relativity. (Bergmann, 1974, p.389) Bergmann himself was_ the author of books on Brentano's concept of evidence and on the philosophy ofBolzano, dealing especially with the latter's logic and philosophy of mathematics. On the other hand however he was the author of a volume on The Controversy Concerning the Law of Causality in Contemporary Physics, dedicated 'In memory of my teacher Anfon Marty' and described by Einstein in his Foreword to the book as 'promoting the best in our present-day attempts at merging physical and philosophical thought'.36 Stumpf(l848-1936) was born in the village ofWiesentheid in Lower Franconia (Bavaria) from where he moved to the University of Wurzburg in 1865. In 1866 he began a close collaboration with Brentano which extended across the period 51 Austrian Origi,ns 1866. to 1874 when Brentano left for Vienna. Stumpf himself was professor in Wilrzburg from 1873, before leaving for Prague in 1879 and going on from there to Halle in 1884, where he would serve for a time as teacher and colleague of Husserl. After a period in Munich, Stumpf was called in 1894 to serve as professor of philosophy in Berlin with the explicit task of establishing there an institute of psychology. It was in this institute that his most important students and collaborators-Wertheimer, again, but also Wolfgang Kohler, Kurt Koffka and Kurt Lewin would establish the so-called Berlin school of Gestalt psychology. Stumpfs influence on his Gestaltist students was two-fold. On the one hand he gave them a rigorous training, especially in the philosophical foundations of psychology37 echoing in this respect the work of his own teacher Brentano. And on the other hand he conveyed to them an understanding of and a respect for philosophy as a scientific enterprise in its own right as a science of the most general properties (both material and psychological) of what is real. Philosophy therefore stands to the physical and psychological sciences in much the same relation as, say, logic to the sciences of language. This philosophical background was indispensable to the initial successes of. the Gestaltist enterprise as a research programme in psychology. Indeed it seems quite generally to have been those thinkers who have had powerful convictions as to the importance of philosophy as a discipline in its own right who have exerted the strongest influence on developments in science proper, as contrasted with, say, the thinkers of the Vienna Circle, who saw philosophy as very much an inferior aid to science. The Vienna Circle has in fact given rise to almost no truly creative developments in the extra-philosophical sphere: even the early work of Godel seems hardly to have been affected by the efforts of Schlick et al., and Gode!'s later philosophy was, notoriously, closer to the metaphysics of a Leibniz or a Husserl than to the anti-metaphysical attitudes of his erstwhile Viennese contemporaries. The Stumpfian Naturphilosophie led to a quite particular concern with the problem of demarcation of the sciences, inspiring Stumpfs student Kurt Lewin, in his study of the different concepts of identity presupposed by the different sciences, to develop the notion of 'genidentity' for example of two successive states of a single organism or physical system 52 Austrian Origi,ns a notion which was then adopted by Carnap in his works in logic. The same theme of demarcation of the sciences was taken up by Schlick in one of his earliest philosophical writings (1910), and the fact that other early publications of Schlick, too, are devoted to markedly Stumpfian themes, taken together with the respectful refeqences to Stumpf in Schlick's General Theory of Knowledge,38 may suggest that there was some influence of Stumpf during the time (1900-1904) when Schlick was studying physics in Berlin. This hypothesis is to some extent supported by the fact that the Berlin Philosophical Faculty was in those days still not divided into separate faculties for the Naturand Geisteswissenschaften. Perhaps the clearest illustration of the close links between scientific philosophy in Berlin and Vienna is provided by the case of the Austrian novelist Robert Musil. Musil studied under Stumpf in Berlin from 1903 to 1908, writing his doctorate on the philosophy of Mach. 39 He enjoyed friendly contacts in this period with Gestalt psychologists such as Kohler and von Allesch, and Gestaltist ideas make themselves felt at a number of places in Musil's novel The Man Without Qualities. Musil was indeed tempted, on completing his studies in Berlin, to accept an invitation from Meinong to serve as his assistant in Graz. But he enjoyed contacts with the positivists, also, and particularly with Richard von Mises in whose home in Berlin he was a regular guest. N eurath, too, studied in Berlin in the early years of the century, and so also, from 1906 to 1908, did Ludwig Wittgenstein. For our purposes here, however, it is the manifold links between the Berlin Gestalt theorists and a later generation of scientific philosophers in Berlin that will be of importance. Thus we know that Kurt Lewin was involved with Carnap and Reichenbach in the earliest efforts to cultivate a tradition of scientific philosophy in Germany, and both he and Kohler actively participated in the discussions of the Reichenbach group in Berlin.40 Lewin's paper on the transition from Aristotelian to Galilean modes of thought in biology and psychology was published in the first volume of Erkenntnis, and a paper by Kohler on Boltzmann appeared in volume two of the same journal. Kohler's book on Physical Gestalten at Rest and in the Stationary State: An Investigation in Natural Philosophy ( 1920), an attempt to show that the Gestalt structures given in experience and in the world of organic matter are present also 53 l Austrian Origins in the purely physical realm, was greeted by many of the neopositivists as a substantive contribution to just that 'unity of science' which they themselves were advocating in their philosophical writings. Positivist philosophy had until this time largely as a result of the efforts of Mach and his British empiricist predecessors been associated with the doctrines of elementarism, 1Vith the view that the ultimate constituents of reality and of experience are 'elements' or 'atoms'. Thus, Carnap's new Viennese phenomenalism, too, started out from the view that reality can be understood as a 'meaningless complex' of sensory elements,41 a development that was stimulated also by certain logically atomistic implications of the new logic of Whitehead and Russell, as also by the work of Wittgenstein. Carnap however, under the influence of Wertheimer and Kohler, saw that there were reasons to reject this elementarist view. Thus he took as the basis of his system in The Logical Structure of the World not elements but necessarily unanalysable 'instantaneous total experiences'42 (though the Gestaltists could rightly object that even this concession ignores the fact that our experiences are organised structurally not only within each instant but also across time). Ayer, too, was sensitive to the Gestaltist challenge, as is shown by his remark in Language, Truth and Logic to the effect that 'our empiricism is not logically dependent on an atomistic psychology, such as Hume and Mach adopted, but is compatible with any theory whatsoever concerning the actual characteristics of our sensory fields' ( 1936, p.122). 43 A special role in the attempts by the Austro-German logical positivists to come to terms with the Gestaltist challenge was played by a series of papers by Kurt Grelling and Paul Oppenheim, the first of which, on 'The Concept of Gestalt in the Light of Modern Logic' was published in volume seven of Erkenntnis in 1938.44 The paper was designed to defend the Gestaltist position against (not entirely unjustified) charges that much of the then current talk of psychological and other sorts of 'wholes not reducible to the sums of their parts' was either meaningless or inherently confused. The aim of the paper was therefore 'to suggest definitions which accomplish the following: when the concepts thus determined are appropriately inserted into sentences which appear characteristic of the Gestalt theorists, these sentences turn out neither trivial nor empty of sense'.45 54 Austrian Origins Oppenheim was an example of that rare breed, a philosophically-minded banker, rich enough to pay philosophers to serve as his co-authors in a series of works in the philosophy of science published in the period 1938 to 1978. One of the first such ventures was his paper with Grelling on Gestalt. He collaborated also, inter alia, with Hempel a peculiar volume entitled The Concept of Type in the Light of Modern Logic ( 1936), an analysis of the work on human typology of psychologists such as Lewin, Kretschmer, and Jaensch and with Nicholas Rescher again on the 'Logical Analysis of Gestalt Concepts' as well as writing a series of books and papers of his own on the demarcation and 'natural order' of scientific disciplines and on the 'static and dynamic laws of the formation of scientific concepts'. *. Husserl (1859-1938), whose unequalled influence on the philosophy of continental Europe in the twentieth century needs no commentary, was responsible for transforming Brentano's 'descriptive psychology' into his own somewhat more ambitious-sounding enterprise of 'phenomenology'. Like so many others, Husserl was won for philosophy by the power of Brentano's thinking and teaching. As he himself put it in 1932: 'Without Brentano I should have written not a single word of philosophy.' The superficial view of the relations between phenomenology and the logical positivists has long centred around Carnap's attack in the second volume of Erkenntnis on the 'metaphysical nonsense' of Heidegger's Sein und Zeit. Thus it has been readily assumed that phenomenology as a whole appeared to Carnap and his associates as just another example of the bad old metaphysics which the Vienna positivist movement was out to vanquish.46 The two camps were, certainly, at odds with each other in central points of doctrine. Thus it was the phenomenologist Roman Ingarden who presented one of the first formulations of the now familiar criticism of the Vienna circle verifiability criterion of meaning that the criterion is itself meaningless by its own lights at the Prague World Congress of Philosophy in 1934.47 When one look~ more closely, however, one sees that there are a number of respects in which Schlick and his circle were influenced by Husserl's phenomenology, even if only in the sense that, as in the case of the Gestaltist movement, phenomenology provided a substantive and influential group of problems 55 Austrian Origins which the positivists felt called upon to solve (or at least to do away with, by whatever means). As has often been noted, the very project of phenomenology . the project of basing philosophy on a painstakingly ~~eq~ate description of what is given in experience precisely as 1t 1s given can be regarded simply as a more comprehensive and radical version of phenomenalism in the traditional sense, so th~t Hermann Liibbe, for example, finds no difficulty in assertmg that 'Ernst Mach and other critical empiricists, regardless of their "positivism", belong in the tradition of phenomenology'.48 The two strands of Austrian positivist philosophy were indeed at one stage so closely intertwined that Husserl could be considered as a potential successor to Mach in the chair in Vienna.49 Guido Kung, more recently, has defended the view that there are quite specific parallels between Husserlian phenomenology and the project of 'explication' that is defended by Carnap in his The Logical Structure of the World. A view of this sort was indeed advanced already in 1932 by Ernst Polak, a student of Schlick in Vienna, in a clearly Wittgenstein-inspired dissertation entitled Critique of Phenomenology by Means of Logic. The sense of phenomenology, according to Polak, 'is logic (grammar in the most general sense), clarification of what we mean when we speak; its results are tautologies; its findings not statements, but explications' (1932, p.157). As is seen from Wittgenstein's own repeated employment of the terminology of 'phenomenology', particularly around 1929, it is primarily in regard to the problem of the synthetic a priori, of an 'intermediary between logic and physics', that Husserl's thinking is crucial to the development of Austrian positivi~m. Husserl's account of the synthetic a priori is indeed no less important to the Vienna circle than that of Kant, 50 for where K~nt sees th~ realm of the synthetic a priori as residing in the relauvely restncted and practically inaccessible sphere of transcendental consciousness, Husserl claims that there is a directly accessible a priori dimension in the entire range of everyday experience so that vastly more propositions turn out to be synthetic and a priori on Husserl's view than on that of Kant, including such homely examples as 'nothing can be both red and green all over' to which the logical positivists devoted a gre~~ ~ea! of their attentions.51 From the standpoint of the pos1t1V1sts, of course, synthetic a priori propositions do not and 56. Austrian Origins cannot exist: all true propositions are either tautologies oflogic or contingent truths relating to matters of fact. From the Husserlian perspective, in contrast, there are entire disciplines of synthetic a priori truths, including the discipline of phenomenologyand it is fascinating to observe the extent to which the positivists are driven to unsupported claims as to the 'logical' character of Husserl's theses in the face of the quite evidently extra-logical or 'material' character of his examples. Brentano and scientific philosophy Our conclusion, then, is that European logical positivism is a part of the exact philosophical. heritage of Brentano. More specifically, it is a reflection of the interplay of the intellectual and institutional influence of Brentano and his school with developments in logic and in the philosophy of physics inspired by Russell and Wittgenstein and by Mach and his successors in Vienna and Prague. What, precisely, are the implications of a view of this sort? It suggests first of all as I hope has become clear from the foregoing that one needs to look again, and more closely, at the relationship between logical positivism on the one hand and Gestalt theory and phenomenology on the other. But still more importantly it suggests that there may be benefits to be gained from the examination of Brentano's own conception of philosophy and of its relations to the different sciences. Brentano is, clearly, a somewhat paradoxical figure. We have already referred above to Kurt Lewin's paper on the transition from 'Aristotelian' to 'Galilean' modes of thought in modern science. This paper is an echo of a much earlier piece by Brentano entitled 'Auguste Comte and the Positive Philosophy',52 in which Brentano expounds Comte's doctrine of the 'phases' of philosophical development from the fictive and anthropomorphic thinking of theological and metaphysical philosophy to the scientific thinking of that modern 'positive' philosophy which seeks to establish the 'general laws governing the connections between facts'. Brentano had already three years earlier set forth the fundamental elements of this scientific mode of philosophising very much in. the spirit of Comte in the twenty-five 'Habilitation Theses' which he defended in Wiirzburg in 1866. The 57 Austrian Origins most influential of these theses, which was chosen by Richard von Mises as a motto for his textbook on positivism, reads as follows: 'Vera philosophiae methodus nulla alia nisi scientiae naturalis est.' (The true method of philosophy is none other than that of the natural sciences.)53 Brentano held indeed that the method of the natural sciences is common to all the sciences, so that he is, in this respect at least, an advocate of the unity of science. Thus also he is critical of the view of the German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey according to which the so-called Geisteswissenschaften or human or moral sciences would somehow call for a special method of understanding or Verstehen, as* opposed to the 'explanation' of the natural sciences. The first of Brentano's theses is a repudiation of (German) metaphysics as a whole: Philosophia neget oportet; scientias in speculativas et exactas dividi posse; qilod si non recte negaretur, esse earn ipsam jus non esset (Philosophy must protest against the division of the sciences into the speculative and the exact, and the justification of this protest is what justifies its own existence), a view which sits neatlyand bravelyalongside the second thesis: Philosophia et eos, qui earn prmc1p1a sua a Theologia sumere volunt, et eos rejicere debet, qui, nisi sit supernaturalis revelatio, earn omnem operam perdere contendunt. (Philosophy must protest against the presumption of taking its principles from theology and against the assertion that it is only through the existence of a supernatural revelation that a fruitful philosophy becomes possible.) Brentano in fact went so far as to protest against the view that universities should contain faculties of theology, precisely because theology cannot live up to the standards of science proper. What, then, were these standards? Briefly, we can say that Brentano was an empiricist in the Aristolelian sense. The thirteenth of his theses reads: 'Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius fuerit in sensu, nisi intellectus ipse.' (Nothing is in the 58 . Austrian Origins intellect which. was not previously in the senses, except the intellect itself.)54It is in this sense that we are to understand the title ofBrentano's masterpiece, the Psychology from an Empi,rical Standpoint of 1874. Brentano took empiricism to ~mp.Iy th~t there are in fact two sources of knowledge: what 1s given m intuition, i.e. in outer and inner perception, and what is given through the logical analysis of concepts. Most importantly, however, he differed from empiricists sμch as Hume or Mach, in his belief that truly scientific knowledge, a knowledge of general laws, is possible on these two pillars as basis. Scientific induction is understood by Brentano as the process of establishing general laws starting from the ?bservation of particular facts as opposed to that other kmd of induction which attempts to use given particular facts merely as a starting point for predicting other particular facts. Scientific induction is therefore not, as it was for Hume and Mach, a matter of habit. The intuition of lines and points, and of ourselves as intuiters of lines and points; gives us knowledge of the concepts of geometry. The combination of this intuiμon with processes of deductive reasonin? may then lead t? evident, insightful laws in the geometncal sphere. And this same combination ofintuition and deduction can be employed to yield the basic concepts and associated evident laws also in qther spheres of sci~ntific investig~tiõ .. But it is necessary t? start in each case with a mode of mtmt1ve knowledge that is predsely appropriate to the relevant objects of.investig~tion, just as they are given in experience. Brentano 1s accordmgly opposed, in his understanding of the properly scientific method, to the attitude of reductionism so characteristic of the later positivist proponents of physicalism and related doctrines. One might, now, be tempted to suppose that Brentano's talk of 'intuition', 'evidence' or 'insightfulness' is entirely alien to the tradition of Viennese positivism. Many of the positivists' critical writings are indeed devoted to the attempted refutation of claims made on behalf of intuition as a means of gaining knowledge in favour of the (public, scientific, repeatable) 'observation' for which the positivists themselves had opted. Schlick, too, in chapter two of his General Theory of Knowledge, criticises what he takes to be Brentano's (and Stumpfs and Husserl's) views concerning intuition and evidence. If, however, one looks more closely at Schlick's own theory of 59 AU5trian Origins 'observation statements', one discovers that he has himself presupposed precisely the views that he had earlier criticised. 55 For Schlick, in contrast to a relativist such as Neurath, believes that there are foundations for knowledge, that is, that there are statements which are self-evident, i.e. not such as to derive their evidence from some other sphere. The process of understanding such statements is therefore 'at the same time the process of verifying them; I grasp their meaning at the same time as I grasp their truth'. 56 Such observation statements are therefore like simple tautologies in that our knowledge of their truth is immediate, so that there is no room for our being deceived. But they differ from tautologies in that they supply us with 'genuine knowledge of reality'. Schlick's own preferred example of an observation statement is '[There is] yellow here now'. As Chisholm points out however, if this statement is to be immune to deception then it can involve noreference to any external yellow sens um, but must involve reference only to our own present way of experiencing, so that it might best be rendered 'I amappeared-to-yellowly'. But now, as Chisholm shows, this is to imply that Schlick's observation statements belong to the class of statements expressing experiences which are immediately evident in precisely the Brentanian sense. The Brentanian method of intuition and deduction is, be it noted, prior to experimentation in the familiar sense. Brentano held that, while experimentation may occasionally lead to new or more adequate intuitions, it must none the less be the case that a properly experimental science can arise only when its basic concepts and laws have been established by intuition and deduction in tlie way suggested. For the experimental scientist who has not first established the nature of the entities with which he deals is in a certain sense experimenting in the dark. Measurement for measurement's sake and the blind formulation of purely functional correlations may, by accident, lead to predictions of future particular facts. But it cannot lead to the kind of deductive luminosity which, as Brentano insisted, is the hallmark of a scientific law in the fullest sense. There is of course much in the above brief statement of Brentano's position that is in need of further clarification. What has been said should however suffice to establish one central feature of Brentano's thinking, namely his high 60 * Austrian Origins estimation of the importance and of the powers of scienceto the extent that he saw science as embracing philosophy itself as a proper part. And it is perhaps this vision of the great unita? edifice of science which did most to colour the thought of his Austrian successors. Notes l. I should like to thank Heiner Rutte, Karl Schuhmann, Peter Simons, Jan Wolenski and also the editor for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. . . 2. While Vienna and Budapest were the twm Imperial-and-Royal (k.u.k.) capitals of the Habsburg Empire as a who!~, the ruler of the non-Hungarian Imperial-Royal (k.~.) part ~f the Empire ~as at one and the same time Emperor of Austna and Kmg of Bohemia. 3 These were often dedicated to no one single area of interest, refl~cting the unofficial ~nterdis~iplinary et~os of Austrian uni.ver~ity education in the period m question (See Smith 1981 for some md1cations of the workings of this ethos in the speci~c case of K,afka) 4. See, again, Smith 1981, which also contams _some d1scuss1on ~f the ways in which Brentanian ideas may have mfluenced Kafka s writings. 5. See Haller and Rutte, 1977, p. 25. . . . 6. Another native Austrian who deserves mention m this connection might be Edmund Husserl'. author inter alia of impor~ant early works in the philosophy_ of logic ~nd lai:guage. ?ne might mention also Hayek, himself a d1st~nt cousm ?fW1t.t~enstem, who was the author not only of now familiar works m põ1t1cal economy but also of a Mach-inspired treatise on the foundations of psycholõy (1952a: the initial draft dates from arou.nd 1~20), as also ofa work m the history and philosophy of the sooal sciences (~ 952b). ?r one might mention the Hungarian philosoph~r .a.nd sooal theonst Karl Mannheim, regarded by many as the m1t1ator of the so-called 'sociology of knowledge'. , . . . 7. For a bibliography of Flecks "'.ntmg~ see Schnelle, 1982. 8. This thesis can be extended, with a pmch of salt, even to th~ case of Frege, whose importance for logi~ was in no small part established through the mediation ofWittgenstem (as also, of course, through the work of Russell, Carnap, and others). The thesis _applies also to the case of Hermann Wey!, whose philosophy of science was strongly influenced by the work of Husserl, and Reichenb~ch.' too, was a student of Husserl in the period 1914-15. _The thmkmg_ of other German philosophers in the area of the philos~phy of soence, for example that of Wilhelm Ostwald or õ N atorp, Rickert and the lesser Neo-Kantians has, in contrast, been nghtly forgotten. 9. A compl~te list of the publications of the circle is given in S~ulez, pp. 346f, which also contains other useful supplementary matenal on 61 Austrian Origins the wider Austrian background of the Vienna positivists. 10. ]. C. Nyiri has indeed argued that there is a conservative and trãitionalist cl!rrent running through the whole of Austrian philosophy of saence. See his 1986. 11. See Neurath, 1973; esp. chs.5, 8 and 11. 1.2 .. on Schlick's political opinions see, again, the interview with Hemnch Neider: Schlick was a man who had no sympathy at all for politics and the state; he w~s a liberal in _the old sense, for whom the fire brigade and the pohce were admitted as at best a necessary evil. Otherwise one did not need the state at all. (Haller and Rutte, 1977, p. 24) 13. See especially his just-mentioned essay of 1986, by which the present paper has been heavily influenced. 14. Ny!ri, 1986, p. 143. . 15. See. Haller, 19~6, and the references there given. . 16: ~eiler, 1986, 1s a strong statement of this thesis, and of its 1mphcauons for a? .1-!nderstanding of the peculiarities of Austrian philosophy. For cntiasms of the thesis see Grassl and Smith, 1986. 17. K. ~:Reinhold, on ~he other hand, was an Austrian renegade metaphysman who fled Vienna for Weimar. (What is said in the text should not, of cours~, be taken to imply that there is a complete absence of metaphysical system-building in Austria (or indeed in England and Scotland): system-builders of the worst and most unreadable kind have indeed come to dominate in the University of Vienna itself in recent decades.) 18. See Grassl, 1986, for further references. , 19. Neurath, 1973, p. 303. A comprehensive discussion of this aspect of the de~elopmertt of positivism in Austria is provided by Stadler, 1982, which deals also with the social and political attitudes of Mach. 20. Menger's 'exact method' in economics in fact manifests a number of parallels to ~he method of Franz Brentano in philosophy, and ther~ were considerable reciprocal influences between the Menger arcle on the one hand and the Brentano school on the other. See the papers collected in Grassl and Smith (eds.), 1986. 21. The vo.lu~e in q~es.tion is a collection of Mill's writings on female emanapat10n, socrahsm and Plato. It is worth mentioning here also th.at Brenta?o was no less .r~sponsi?I~ _tha? Mach ~or th~ strong reception of t~e 1d~as of the BntISh empmasts m Austria. Th1sis seen for e~ample m his ?wn w?rk on Reid, and on the psychology of Hamilton and the Mills, Bam and Spencer; and it is seen also in the work of Meinong on Hume or in the work of Husserl on Locke and Berkeley. 22. T~e Philosõhical Society published also Hi)fler's Prefaces and Introductions to Classical Works on Mechanics (189.9), as well as works of Bolzano (edited by Hofler in 1914 and by Hahn in 1921). 23. See especially section 3 of Carnap, 1928. 24. More than 100 pages of his On Knowledge (1925) are devoted to 62 Austrian Origins a critique of Kant entitled 'Down With Prejudices! A Warning to the Present in the Spirit of Bacon and Descartes to Free Itself from All Blind A Priori'. 25. Compare also Rutte, 1977, and Bergmann; 1967, esp. pp .. 4ff. 26. Collected as Haller, 1979; see also his 1981 and the (in>many .respects definitive) essay of 1986. 27. Further details of Brentano's life are given in ch. I of Rancurello, 1968. 28. It is for this reason that it is preferable to speak not of 'Brentanian philosophy' but of 'Brentano-inspired philosophy' or of the 'descendants' and 'heirs' of Brentano. 29. Twardowski's move to Lemlierg is significant: in Lemberg, 'as in Cracow, under liberal Austrian rule, Poles were allowed to go to their own universities and to be taught by their own lecturers and professors, while in other parts of partitioned Poland they were engaged in a most savage struggle for national and economic survival' (Jordan, 1945, p. 39: this passage not included in the reprint). On Twardowski's thought and influence,~especially in the field of logic, see Dambska, 1978. 30. Fleck's relations to Polish Bre.ntanism have recently been made the object of a special study by Thomas Schnelle, 1982. 31. Ajdukiewicz studied with Husserl in Gottingen from 1912 to 1914. 32. Carnap, 1963, p. 31. 33. On the early history and philosophy of Gestalt psychology, see Smith (ed.), 1987. 34. See Smith 1984 and also the papers collected in Mulligan (ed.), forthcoming. 35. The two were colleagues in Berlin and retained their contacts when both had emigrated to America. See the chapter 'Albert Einstein and Max Wertheimer: A Gestalt Psychologist's View of the Genesis of the Special Relativity Theory' in Miller, 1984. All four of the Berlin Gestalt psychologists Wertheimer, Kohler, Koffka and Lewin had an interest in physics. 36. Bergmann, 1929, p .. 395 of translation. 37. See Ash, 1982, pp. 30-62 for an extensive treatment of this matter, and of the political machinations in favour of the new 'scientific philosophy' which led to Stumpfs appointment in Berlin. 38. See Schlick, 1925, pp. 23, 154, 157, 373 of the translation. 39. See Musil, 1908; the work is highly critical of Mach in particular and of positivistic philosophy of science in general, so that it would be wrong to describe Musil himself as an advocate of positivist ideas: see Mulligan and Smith, 1987. 40. Carnap, 1963, pp. 14, 30. . 41. Thus Koffka could write at the close of his Principles of Gestalt Psychology: If there is any polemical spirit in this book, it is directed not against persons but against a strong cultural force .in our present civilisation for which I have chosen the name positivism. If positivism 63 ,": \ Austrian Origins can be regarded as an integrative philosophy, its integration rests on th~ dogma that all events are equally unintelligible, irrational, meamngl.ess'. pu~ely f~ctual". Such an integration is, however, to my way of thmkmg, 1dent1cal with a complete disintegration. (Koffka, 1935,pp.684£) 42. See Carnap, 1963, p. 16, and compare his 1928, pp. 109, 122 of the translation. * 43. A similar thesis as to the compatibility of positivism and Gestalt theory was defended also by R. von Mises, 1939, ch.22. The Gestalt problem played ~ important role in the thinking of Gustav Bergmann, as also m the workofEino Kaila (see his 1979), a Finnish thinker who is one of the four foreign philosophers (neither Austrian nor German) mention,ed in the Appendix to the Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung as 'sympathetic to the Vienna circle' or to the 'scientific world-conception'. * 44. The remaining two papers - 'Logical Analysis of "Gestalt" as "Functional Whole"', and 'A Logical Theory of Dependence' were scheduled to appear in volume 9 of Erlunntnis in 1939 an issue not distr!buted due to war conditions. These two papers, tog°ether with an E.nglish translation of the earlier work and a commentary by P. M. Simons, have now been published in Smith (ed.), 1987. 45. Grelling and Oppenheim, 1938, p. 211. * 46. This point of view is belied, at least to some extent, by the fact that Carnap, having earlier studied under Frege in Jena, participated for a term in Husser_1's seminar in Freiburg, before going to Vienna in 1925 at the suggestion of Schlick. He was later invited by Frank to come to Prague, where he held a chair in 'natural philosophy' for four years from 1931. 47. See Ingarden, 1936. 48. Liibbe, 1960, p. 91 of translation. The. affinities between Machian positivism and early phenomenology are illustrated clearly by the case of Alexander Pfander, senior member of the Munich school of phenomenologists, whose early thinking is heavily influenced by that of Mach. 49. Sommer, 1985, p. 13. . 50. On Wittgens~~i~ and phenomenology in general, see Spiegelberg, 1968. On pos1t1V1sm, Husserl and the a frriori, see Delius, 1963, ch.I, and also Visser, 1979. Smith, 1986, contains a more detailed elaboration of the early Husserlian notion of the a frriori. . 51. Such examples were drawn, too, from the domain of economics, as is s?own above all by the writings on economic methodology of Felix Kaufmann (for example his 1937). Kaufmann, a devo!ee õ Husserl ~ho belonged to the fringes of both the Schlick and Mises circles, published not only on the foundations of economics and on the philosophy oflaw and mathematics, but also on the found- . ations of science in general. 52. See Brentano, 1869. Brentano's piece itself echoes J. S. Mill's Auguste Comte and Positivism of 1865, and Brentano laments at the beginning of the work the extent to which the new ideas. of positive 64 Austrian Origins philosophy developed in France and England had remained almost unnoticed by his German contemporaries. ~ 53. This is thesis IV. See Brentano, 1929, pp. 137ff. 54. The caveat 'nisi intellectus ipse' wafadded by Leibniz. 55. My present remarks are indebted to Chisholm's important study of Schlick and Brentano, published in 1982. c 56. Schlick, 1934, trans. p. 385; quoted by Chisholm, 1982, p. 152. References Ash, M. G. (1982) The Emergence of Gestalt Theory: Experimental Psychology in Germany, 1890-1920,, Dissertation, University of Harvard. Ayer, A. J. (1936) Language, Truth and Logic, Gollancz, London. - (1977) Part of my Life, Collins, London. Berghel, H., et al. (eds.) (1979) WiUgenstein, the Vienna Circle and Critical Rationalism, Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna. Bergmann, G. (1967) 'Logical Positivism', as repr. in' The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism, University of Wiscoñin Press, Madison *and London, pp.1-16. Bergmann, H. ( 1929) Der Kampf um das Kausalitatsgesetz in der jungsten Physik, Vieweg, Braunschweig; Eng. trans. as 'The Controversy concerning the Law of Causality in Contemporary Physics', in Cohen and Wartofsky (eds.), 1974, pp. 395-462. -- (1974) 'Personal Remembrances of Albert Einstein', in Cohen and Wartofsky (eds.), 1974, pp. 388-94. Brentano, F. (1869) 'Auguste Comte und die positive Philosophie', Chilianeum. Bliitter fur katholische Wissenschaft, Kunst undLeben, N.F., 2, 15-37. Repr. in Brentano, Die vier PhasenderPhilosophie, Meiner, Hamburg, 1968, pp. 99-133. -- (1874) Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt, Duncker, Leipzig. Eng. trans. by A. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell and L. L. McAlister as Psychology from an Empirical Viewpoint, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1973. -- ( 1925) V ersuch uber die Erkenntnis; Meiner, Leipzig. - ( 1929) Ober die Zukunft der Philosophie, Meiner, Leipzig. Carnap, R. (1928) Der logische Aufbau der Welt, Weltkreis, Berlin; Eng. trans. by Rolf George, The Logical Structure of the World, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967. . - (1963) 'Intellectual Autobiography', in P.A. Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, Open Court, La Salle, pp. 3-43. Chisholm, R. M. (1982) 'Schlick on the Foundations of Knowing', in R. Haller (ed.), Schlick und Neurath ~ Ein Symposium (Grazer Philosophische Studien, 16117), Rodopi, Amsterdam, 1982, 149-58. Cohen, R. S. and Wartofsky, M. W. (eds.) (i974) Logical and Epistemological Studies in Contemporary Physics, Reidel, Dordrecht/ Boston. Dambska, I. (1978) 'Frañois Brentano et la Pensee philosophique en Pologne: Casimir Twardowski et son Ecole', in Chisholm and 65 Austrian Origins Hall~r (eds.), Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos (Grazer Philosophische Studzen, 5), Rodopi, Amsterdam, 117-30. Deli~s, H. (~.963) Unt~rsuchungen zur Problematik der sogenannten synthetzschen Satze apnorz, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Gottingen. Fleck, L. ( 19~5) __ Entstehung _und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache. Eznfuhrung in dze Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv, Schw~be, Basel; Eng. trans. by T. J. Trenn and R. K. Merton, Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London. Grassl, W. (_1986) 'Markets and Morality: Austrian Perspectives on the Economic Approach to Human Behaviour', in Grassl and Smith (eds.), pp. 139-81. Grassl, W. and Smith, B. (1986) 'A Theory of Austria', in Nyiri (ed.), pp. 11-30. Grassl, W. and Smith, B. (eds.) (1986)AustrianEconomics: Historical and P~ilosophical Background, ~room Helm, London and Sydney. Grel~mg, K. and Oppenheim, P. (1937/8) 'Der Gestaltbegriff im L.1chte der neuen Logik',Erkenntnis, 7, 211-25; Eng. trans. by P. M. Simons as 'The Concept of Gestalt in the Light of Modern Logic' in Smith (ed.), 1987. ' Haller, R. (1979) Studien zur iisterreichischen Philosophie, Rodopi, Amsterdam. - ( 1981) 'Wittgenstein and Austrian Philosophy' in Nyiri (ed.) pp 91-112. : , . -- (1986) 'Zur Historiographie der osterreichischen Philosophie' in Nyiri (ed.), 41-53. ' Haller, .. R .. and ~utte, H. (1977) 'Gesprach mit Heinrich Neider: Personhche Ermnerungen an den Wiener Kreis' Conce"tus J 2142. ' r ' ' Hayek, F. A. von ( 1952a) The Sensory Order. An Inquiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. -- (I 952b) The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason, Free Press, Glencoe. -- (1966) 'Diskussionsbemerkungen iiber Ernst Mach und <las sozialwissenschaftliche Denken in Wien', in Symposium aus Anlass ~es 50. Todestages von Ernst Mach, Ernst-Mach-Institut, Freiburg I.Br., pp. 41-4. Hempel, C. G. and Op~.enheim, P. ( 1936) Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen Logzk, A. W. S!)thofrs Uitgeversmij, Leiden. Ingar?en, R .. (1,936) 'Der logis~~sche Versuch einer Ne~gestaltung der Philosoph1e , Actes. d~ ~III-zem_e C?ngres international de Philosophie ii. ~~ague 1934, Com1te d Orgamsauon de Congres, Prague, pp. 203Jordan,_ Z_. (1945) The Development of Mathematical Logic and of Logical Posz~zvism_ in Poland between the Two Wars, Oxford University Press (Polish Science and ~earning, no. 6), Oxford; partially reprinted in S. McCall (ed.), Polish Logic 1920-1939, .Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1967, pp. 346-97. Kaila, E. (1979) Re~lity and Experience. Four Philosophical Essays, ed. by R. S. Cohen, Reidel, Dordrecht/Boston/London. 66 Austrian Origins Kaufmann, F. (1937) 'Do synthetic propositions a priori exist in economics?', Economica, N.S.4, 337'-42. Koffka, K. (1935) Principles of Gestalt Psychology, Kegan Paul, Trench and Trubner, London. ' Kohler, W. (1920) Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationiiren Zustand. Eine naturphilosophische Untersuchung, Vieweg, Braunschweig. Kung, G. (1975) 'The Phenomenological Reduction as Epoche and as Explication', The Monist, 59, (\3-80. Liibbe, H. (1960) 'Positivismus und Phanomenologie. Mach und Husserl', in H. Holling (ed.), Beitriige zur Philosophic und Wissenschaft. Wilhelm Szilasi zum 70. Geburtstag, Francke, Munich, pp. 161-84; Eng. trans. in T. Luckmannn (ed.), Phenomenology and Sociology, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1978, pp. 90-118. Miller, A. I. (1984) Imagery in Scientific Thought: Creating 20th-Century Physics, Birkhauser, Boston/Basel/Stuttgart. Mises, R. von (1939) Kleines Lehrbuch des Positivismus, Von Stockum and Son, The Hague; Eng. version trans. by R. G. Newton and]. Bernstein as Positivism: A Study in Human Understanding, Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1951. Mulligan, K. (1986) 'Exactness, Description and Vagueness: How Austrian Analytic Philosophy was done,' in Nyiri (ed.), 86-97. Mulligan, K. (ed.) (forthcoming) Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics. The Philosophy and Theory of Language of Anton Marty, Nijhoff, Dordrecht. Mulligan, K. and Smith, B. (1987) 'Mach and Ehrenfels: Foundations of Gestalt Theory', in Smith (ed.). Musil, R. (1908) Beitrag zur Beurteilung der Lehren Machs, Dissertationsverlag Carl Arnold, Berlin; Eng. trans. by K. Mulligan with an Introduction by G. H. von Wright, On Mach's Theories, Philosophia, Munich and Vienna, 1982. Neurath, 0. (with R. Carnap and H. Hahn) (1929) Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis, Wolf, Vienna; Eng. trans. as 'The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle', in Neurath, 1973, pp. 299-318. The translation lacks the biographical supplement: see Soulez (ed.)., pp. 105ff. Neurath, 0. (1973) Empiricism and Sociology, ed. by M. Neurath and R. S. Cohen, Reidel, Dordrecht. Nyiri, J. C. (1986) 'The Austrian Element in the Philosophy of Science', in Nyiri (ed.), pp. 141-6. - (ed.) (1981) Austrian Philosophy: Studies and Texts, Philosophia, Munich. -- (1986) From Balzano to Wittgenstein: The Tradition of Austrian Philosophy, Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna. Polak, E. ( 1932) Kritik der Phi.inomenologie durch die Logik, Dissertation, University of Vienna. Rancurello, A. C. (1968) A Study of Franz Brentano. His Psychological Standpoint and His Significance in the History of Psychology, Academic Press, New York and London. Rutte, H. (1977) 'Positivistische Philosophie in Osterreich. Nachwort 67 Austrian Origins zum Gesprach mit Heinrich Neider', Conceptus, 1, 43-56. Schlick, M. (1910) 'Die Grenze der naturwissenschaftlichen und philosophischen Begriffsbildung', Vierteljahrsschrift fur wissenschaftliche Philosophie und Soziologie, 34, 121-42; Eng. trans. in Schlick, 1979, vol.I, pp. 25-40. -(1925) Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre, 2nd edn, Springer, Berlin; Eng. trans. by A. E. Blumberg as General Theory of Knowledge, Springer, Vienna/New York, 1974. - (1934) 'Ober das Fundament der Erkenntnis', Erkenntnis, 4, 7999; Eng. trans. in Schlick, 1979, vol.2, pp. 370-87. - (1979) Philosophical Papers, vol. I (1909-1922) and vol.2 (192536), ed. by H. L. Mulder and B. F. B. van de Velde-Schlick, Reidel, Dordrecht/Boston/London. Schnelle, T. (1982) Ludwik Fleck -Leben und Denken. Zur Entstehung und Entwicklung des soziologischen Denkstils in der yvissenschaftsphilosophie, Hochschulverlag, Freiburg. Smith, B. (1981) 'Kafka and Brentano: A Study in Descriptive Psychology', in Smith (ed.), Structure and Gestalt. Philosophy and Literature in Austria-Hungary and Her Successor States, John Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp. 113-61. -- (1984) Ten Conditions on a Theory of Speech Acts', Theoretical Linguistics, 11, 311-30. - (1986) 'Austrian Economics and Austrian Philosophy', in Grassl and Smith (eds.), pp. 1-36. - (1987) 'Gestalt Theory: An Essay in Philosophy', in Smith (ed.). Smith, B. (ed.) (1987) Foundations of Gestalt Theory, Philosophia, Munich and Vienna. * Sommer, M. (1985) Husserl und der fruhe Positivismus, Klostermann, Frankfurt. Soulez, A. (ed.) (1985) Manifeste du Cercle de Vienne et autres ecrits, P.U.F., Paris. , Spiegelberg, H. (1968) 'The puzzle of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Phanomenologie (1929-?)', American Philosophical Quarterly, 5, 24456, with supplement in journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 13, (1982), 296-99. Stadler, F. (1979) 'Aspekte des gesellschaftlichen Hintergrunds und Standorts des Wiener Kreises am Beispiel der Universitat Wien', in Berghel et al. (eds.), pp. 41-59. -- (1982) Vom Positivismus zur 'Wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung'. Am Beispiel der Wirkungsgeschichte von Ernst Mach in Osterreich von 1895 bis 1934, Locker, Vienna and Munich. Visser, H. (1979) The Empiricists' New Clothes: A Viennese Fairy Tale by Hans Hans', in Berghel et al. (eds.), pp. 225~30. * Weiler, G. (1986) 'What is Austrian about Austrian Philosophy?', in Nyiri (ed.), pp. 31-40 68 ~ I 3 Ayer and the Philosophy of Science Mary Hesse Positivism and scientific meaning Positivism is a recurrent phenomenon in the history of science, but less so in the history of philosophy, where it quickly develops from the search for a firm grounding for knowledge to a scepticism about all knowledge, and thence to the revival of metaphysics in one form or another. This philosophical progression can be seen in the way logical positivism in the philosophy of science has developed in the last fifty years into a philosophical reaction back to all kinds of metaphysics: about realism, about natural kinds, about causes, about laws and necessity. During that time, Professor Ayer has been properly critical of the more extravagant metaphysical fashions. While modifying several of his radical theses in Language, Truth and Logic, he has remained reasonable, dear and full of good sense in his subsequent discussions of problems in philosophy of science. His problems have been technical philosopher's problems rather than those of science itself. In the last sentence of LTL he says that the philosopher 'must become a scientist' in 'deploying the logical relationships of these hypotheses and defining the symbols which occur in them ... if he is to make any substantial contribution towards the growth *Of human knowledge' .1 Later, however, he has come to treat philosophical problems as independent of those of the special sciences. In this paper I shall therefore talk as much aboutLTL and its structure and influence as about its author's later work in philosophy of science. But first let me say something about the

Speech Acts: The Contemporary Theoretical Landscape Daniel W. Harris, Daniel Fogal, and Matt Moss* May ,  Speech-act theory was born of a central insight: language is a medium for many kinds of action, but its superficial uniformity tends to mask this fact. Consider (): () He should be here by now. The point of uttering () could be to assert that someone should be here by now, to command someone else to get him, to assign blame for his lateness, to threaten, to act out a role in a play, to lodge a formal complaint, and so on. Without a clear understanding of these and other kinds of speech act, we would have no hope of understanding how humans use language. Nor would we have much hope of understanding the many activities in which speech plays a central role. This is why speech-act theory has become essential to so many areas within philosophy and the cognitive and social sciences. Unless we say otherwise, we will use 'speech act' to refer to illocutionary acts. This is a category first singled out by J. L. Austin (; ). There is no theoryneutral way of saying what makes for an illocutionary act, but it is relatively uncontroversial that paradigm cases include asserting, requesting, commanding, questioning, promising, testifying in court, pronouncing marriage, placing someone under arrest, and so on. In singling out illocutionary acts for theoretical attention, Austin distinguished them from locutionary acts, which are mere utterances of meaningful expressions, and perlocutionary acts, which are acts of producing effects *To appear in New Work on Speech Acts, a volume edited by Daniel Fogal, Daniel Harris, and Matt Moss for Oxford University Press. Thanks to Elmar Unnsteinsson for helpful feedback on this draft. We find early articulations of this insight in Austin's discussion of the descriptive fallacy (, –), in Grice's theories of speaker meaning and implicature (; ; ), in early versions of metaethical expressivism (Ayer, ; Hare, ; Stevenson, ), and in various guises in the work of Wittgenstein-most poetically, perhaps, in his comparison of linguistic expressions to a collection of handles whose functions are heterogeneous, but that "all [look] more or less alike. (This stands to reason, since they are all supposed to be handled.)" (Wittgenstein, , §).  that are causally downstream from illocutionary acts. Two utterances of () may be utterances of the very same sentence with the very same semantic properties. Yet, on one occasion, the utterance may constitute a complaint, on another, a mere observation. This raises the central question of speech-act theory: what makes it the case that an utterance constitutes an illocutionary act of a given kind? Answers to this question-i.e., theories of speech acts-have proliferated. Ourmain goal in this chapter is to clarify the logical space into which these different theories fit. We begin, in §, by dividing theories of speech acts into five families, each distinguished from the others by its account of the key ingredients in illocutionary acts. Are speech acts fundamentally a matter of convention or intention? Or should we instead think of them in terms of the psychological states they express, in terms of the effects that it is their function to produce, or in terms of the norms that govern them? In §, we take up the highly influential idea that speech acts can be understood in terms of their effects on a conversation's context or "score". Part of why this idea has been so useful is that it allows speech-act theorists from the five families to engage at a level of abstraction that elides their foundational disagreements. In §, we investigate some of the motivations for the traditional distinction between propositional content and illocutionary force, and some of the ways in which this distinction has been undermined by recent work. In §, we survey some of the ways in which speech-act theory has been applied to issues outside semantics and pragmatics, narrowly construed.  What Makes for a Speech Act? The Five Families . Convention One of the two theories of speech acts to be articulated in postwarOxford is conventionalism, which originates in thework of J. L. Austin (; ; ). According to Austin, an illocutionary act is a "conventional procedure" whose performance is a matter of behaving in accordance with a collection of "felicity conditions", which are themselves a matter of localized social conventions. Violating some of these felicity conditions, as in making a promise that one doesn't intend to fulfill, results in an infelicitous act-i.e., a performance that is normatively defective in some way. Violating other felicity conditions, as one would do in attempting to pronounce a couple married without possessing the required status of an officiant, results in a "misfire"-i.e., nonperformance, a failed attempt to perform the act. In illustrating his theory, Austin focuses on highly ritualized examples of illocutionary acts, such as officiating a marriage ceremony, christening a ship, and willing property (, )-acts whose performance is impossible outside the context of established customs, social institutions, or legal frameworks. Nonetheless, his conventionalist  analysis is intended to apply to all illocutionary acts. To perform an illocutionary act, according to Austin, requires first being in a context in which the convention is in effect, and then acting in accordance with it. Although conventionalism makes sense of ritualized and institutionalized acts like marriage, it struggles with the illocutionary acts that make up our basic communicative repertoire, including asserting, asking questions, and making requests. Unlike marriage, asserting, asking, and requesting needn't be performed relative to the "jurisdiction" of any particular set of institutions or conventions: it is possible to assert and ask questions across international borders, but not to marry or testify in court, for example. And whereas the nature of marriage varies widely between societies, so that marriage is, at best, a loose cluster concept, asserting, asking, and requesting seem to be part of humans' cross-cultural toolkit for social interaction (even if the means of performing them vary between languages). It is also striking that every known human language includes clause-types whose function is to perform assertion-like, question-like, and request-like acts (Zanuttini et al., ), suggesting that their presence in our illocutionary repertoire is not itself a matter of convention. And whereas there are societies in which marriage ceremonies last years and involve complex exchanges of property, it is difficult to imagine rituals of this kind being necessary to, say, ask what the weather is like. It is therefore tempting to recognize a category of communicative illocutionary acts that function in a different, and less conventional way, than the essentially conventional illocutionary acts on which Austin focused (Bach and Harnish, , chs.–). Considerations like these have led most contemporary conventionalists to hold that the conventions that define acts like asserting, questioning, and requesting are linguistic conventions, rather than social conventions of the kind emphasized by Austin. To assert p, on this view, is to produce an utterance that conforms to the linguistic conventions for asserting p in the language being used; mutatis mutandis for asking, requesting, and so on. A view of this kind seems to be widely assumed, though it has less often been explicitly defended. An influential defense of linguistic conventionalism-albeit a version that incorporates elements from various competing views to be described below-can be found in Searle's  book, Speech Acts. The most notable recent defense can be found in Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone's  book, Imagination and Convention, which tackles many of the standard objections that have been raised against Searle and other earlier conventionalists. Linguistic conventionalism faces a variety of serious challenges. One major challenge is to account for semantic underdetermination-the fact that the speech act one performs is rarely, if ever, fully determined by the linguistic meanings of the For some objections to conventionalism, see Bach and Harnish (); Davidson (a); Harris (); Starr (); Strawson (); Unnsteinsson ().  expressions one uses to perform it. Consider (): () Can you lend me a hand tomorrow? In uttering (), for example, a speaker may be requesting the addressee's help, or merely asking whether it will be available. The content of () will vary depending on who the addressee is, the flavor of the modal 'can', and whether the speaker is using 'lend me a hand' with its idiomatic sense or (in the macabre case) with its unidiomatic, fully compositional sense. The linguistic conventions governing () would seem to be neutral between these forces and contents; if so, something other than conventions will have to do thework of determining particular answers on particular occasions. Analogous points can be made about a wide range of linguistic expressions, and all (or nearly all) natural-language sentences, even when they are being used to perform direct and literal speech acts. Many have therefore given the speaker's intentions a role to play in determining what is said with an utterance. When indirect and nonliteral speech acts are considered, the case against conventionalism seems even more pressing (Bach and Harnish, ). Lepore and Stone mix two strategies for responding to these worries. First, they argue that many alleged instances of illocutionary acts, including those involving metaphor, insinuation, and many cases of indirect speech, should not be considered illocutionary acts at all, since there can be no well-defined conditions for successfully communicating by means of them. There is no clear proposition p such that communication would succeed if one were to take Romeo to be asserting p in uttering 'Juliet is the sun', for example, and many cases of indirect speech seem to face the same issue. In effect, Lepore and Stone hold that these phenomena are better understood as perlocutionary acts rather than as illocutionary acts: the speaker's goal is not to communicate a specific content, but merely to cause an open-ended chain of thoughts in the addressee. Lepore and Stone's second strategy is to draw on recent work in dynamic semantics, discourse representation theory, and discourse coherence theory in order to argue that many purported instances of semantic underspecification and indirect speech actually arise from complex but convention-governed interactions between utterances and discourse contexts. Due to the hitherto-unappreciated complexity of contexts and linguistic conventions, Lepore and Stone argue, many more speech acts turn out to be amenable to conventionalist treatment than had previously been thought. Their contribution to this volume, which we'll discuss in §, applies this strategy to indirect speech acts. Bach (, ); Carston (); Heim (); Kaplan (); King (, ); Michaelson (); Neale (, , ); Schiffer (, ); Sperber and Wilson (). Lepore and Stone (). This argument's prototype is given in Lepore and Stone (), which is influenced by Davidson (b).  . Intention The other classical theory of speech acts is intentionalism, which Paul Grice began to develop in parallel to Austin's views while they were both at Oxford in the 's. The central claim of intentionalism is that performing a communicative illocutionary act is a matter of producing an utterance with a special sort of intention, normally called a 'communicative intention', a 'meaning intention', or an 'm-intention'. The nature of communicative intentions is a matter of debate, but the crucial idea is that performing a communicative act is a matter of producing an utterance intending both (a) for one's addressee to have a specified response, and (b) for one's addressee recognize to that this response is intended. One virtue of this view is that it correctly predicts a three-way distinction among the success conditions for speech acts. To succeed in performing an illocutionary act requires merely producing an utterance with a communicative intention; nothing on the part of the addressee is required. To succeed in communicating via one's act requires that the addressee recognize what kind of response one is trying to produce. Actually producing this response, on the other hand, constitutes a further kind of perlocutionary success. According to a simple intentionalist account of assertion, for example, asserting p requires uttering something with a communicative intention for one's addressee to believe p. Communication happens when the addressee recognizes that this is what one intends. Actually convincing them of p is another matter. Different kinds of communicative act are distinguished, on this view, by the different kinds of responses that they are intended to have. To direct someone to φ-to request or command that they φ, for example-is to communicatively intend for them to respond by φing (or by forming an intention to φ). Questions, according tomost intentionalists, comprise a subcategory of directives whose aim is for the addressee to respond by answering. Although intentionalists have typically focused on these three categories, other kinds of communicatively intended responses are easy to think of, and Grice considered some others. Most of this picture is already visible in Grice's early work on speaker meaning (; ; ), though Grice avoids most of the vocabulary of speech acts, which he seems to have regarded as proprietary to Austin's competitor view. Later intentionalists, including Strawson (), Schiffer (, ch.), and Bach & Harnish (), show how to translate Grice's ideas into the standard terminology of speech-act theory, construct detailed taxonomies of illocutionary acts by carving up the different kinds of responses at which they're aimed, and extend Grice's views in some other ways. No intentionalist claims that this view applies to all of what Austin called illocutionary acts. One can't get married or testify in court just by speaking with  certain intentions, for example; various cultural or institutional background conditions must also obtain. Intentionalists typically argue that, unlike these constitutively conventional acts, communicative illocutionary acts needn't be performed relative to any particular cultural or institutional background (Bach and Harnish, , chs.–). All that is required to perform an assertion or a request, or to successfully interpret one, on this view, is that one be a creature with an advanced capacity to represent other agents' mental states. It is therefore open to intentionalists to hold that the categories of speech acts in which they're interested are natural kinds-defined in terms of cognitive endowments shared by nearly all humans- unlike the localized and contingent social kinds on which Austin focused. Partly for this reason, intentionalism has been an influential view among anthropologists, cognitive ethologists, and cognitive scientists who study the psychological underpinnings and evolutionary origins of language and communication. An influential kind of objection to intentionalism accuses it of being too unconstrained, in part because it minimizes the role of linguistic convention in limiting which speech acts can be performed. A simple worry of this kind stems from the accusation of Humpty Dumptyism: it seems to follow from intentionalism, as just stated, that any utterance can be used to perform any kind of speech act, so long as the speaker has the requisite intentions. But, according to the critics, we can't say anything we choose with any words we please; the conventions governing the expressions we use place strict constraints on what we can use them to mean (see, e.g., Searle ; ). Intentionalists typically respond to this line of thought by pointing out that, at least if we are rational, what we intend is constrained by what we believe. You can't rationally intend to eat an entire herd of cattle today because the possibility of doing so is ruled out by your beliefs. Likewise, if you think it is impossible to communicate the entire content of the Pentagon Papers with a wink of an eye, you can't rationally form a communicative intention to do so. On this view, one's appreciation of linguistic conventions constrains which speech acts one can perform by constraining what one can rationally intend to get across by speaking. The idea that communication requires advanced mindreading capacities is an empirical prediction that some have sought to falsify. For example, the fact that three year olds can use language but routinely fail explicit false belief tasks was widely thought to pose a potential counterexample (e.g., Breheny ) until new experimental methods suggested that infants detect others' goals and false beliefs much earlier (Carey, ; Carruthers, ; Onishi and Baillargeon, ; Tomasello, ). Some autistic adults pose a similar problem, and a similar dialectic has emerged (for a summary, see Goldman ). On the other hand, some accounts of both the phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of human language hold that advanced mindreading capacities play a crucial role (Bloom, ; Hacquard, ; Scott-Phillips, ; Tomasello, ). These views sit nicely with intentionalism. Csibra (); Moore (, MS); Scott-Phillips (); Sperber (); Sperber and Wilson (); Tomasello (). On this response to Humpty-Dumpty worries, see Donnellan (); Grice (); Neale ().  Of course, it does follow from intentionalism that speakers can sometimes perform speech acts that bear no conventional relationship to the expressions they utter. Given the existence of indirect and nonliteral speech acts, most intentionalists take this to be a welcome consequence of their view. The counterintuitive corollary is that it is also possible for a speaker to perform speech acts that bear no conventional relationship to the expressions they utter, even if they don't intend to speak indirectly or non-literally, provided that they are sufficiently delusional or irrational. If a speaker comes to mistakenly believe that 'it's warm in here' is, according to local conventions, a good way to assert that it's cold in here, then they can indeed do so. The best response available to the intentionalist may be that, although it is indeed unintuitive to say that such speakers are performing the predicted assertions, that is what a hearer would have to interpret them as doing in order for communication to take place. And, indeed, if the hearer is aware of the speaker's delusion, this may very well happen. Supposing that an illocutionary act is that which must be correctly interpreted in order for communication to succeed, intentionalism seems to make the right predictions in such cases. A final noteworthy consequence of intentionalism is that that communicative illocutionary acts turn out not to be essentially linguistic in nature or form. Grice makes it clear that by 'utterance', he means any observable behavior, linguistic or otherwise, that can serve as a vehicle for speaker meaning. This includes linguistic utterances, but also various other kinds of behaviors, as several of his original case studies demonstrate. Consider Grice's example of drawing a "picture of Mr. Y [displaying undue familiarity to Mrs. X] and show[ing] it to Mr. X" in order to mean "that Mr. Y had been unduly familiar" (, ). There is no convention at work here, but merely a loose iconic relationship between the picture and its subject matter, which the "speaker" exploits in order to guide Mr. X to a correct hypothesis about their communicative intention. But for an intentionalist, the speaker here is performing essentially the same kind of communicative act as they would have if they had said, 'Mr. Y has been unduly familiar with Mrs. X'. What distinguishes the two cases is merely the kind of evidence that the speaker offers of their communicative intentions. Semantics, on this view, can be thought of as the study of a system by which language users encode richly structured, but merely partial evidence of their communicative intentions (Neale, , ; Schiffer, ; Sperber and Wilson, ). This view has interesting consequences for the nature of assertion, among other acts. For, although we can continue to use 'assertion' to denote communicative acts performed with language, this would make the category somewhat theoretically uninteresting. If 'assertion' picks out a natural kind, then it is a kind that brings together both linguistic and nonlinguistic acts that are united by the sorts of intentions with which they're performed.  . Function The family of viewswe'll call 'functionalism' is easiest to understand as an alternative to intentionalism. Both perspectives maintain that a speech act is characterized by the effect that it is the act's purpose to have. But whereas intentionalists think that a communicative act's purpose derives from the intention with which it was performed, functionalists think that a speech act at least sometimes has a purpose that derives from some other, less agential source. For example, Millikan () argues that, in at least some cases, the properties of a speech act are a matter of its proper function, and that a given kind of speech act acquires its proper function through a process akin to natural selection. Millikan holds that causing belief is the proper function of certain assertions. Assertions will have this function because prior iterations have caused similar beliefs, and, crucially, these past successes have played a crucial causal role in their reproduction. Millikan argues that these functions attach to grammatically individuated utterance-types, such as clause types: Thus, a proper function of the imperative mood is to induce the action described, and a proper function of the indicative mood is to induce belief in the proposition expressed. (, ) Millikan's view is complicated by the fact that she also bases her theory of convention around the notion of proper function. Her theory could therefore be categorized as a compromise between intentionalism and a version of conventionalism: what defines a speech act is its purpose, which may derive from either the intention or the convention (i.e., proper function) behind it, or perhaps some complex combination of the two. However, since Millikan leaves open the possibility that an act-type's proper function may have been selected for not just during the languagelearning process but also during biological evolution-it may be, for example, that the functions of certain grammatical features are innate and universal to humans- her version of conventionalism differs from most of the others on the market. Building on Millikan's influence, a related version of functionalism about communicative acts has developed around the study of signaling games in the theory of replicator dynamics. As in both Grice's and Millikan's theories, this view takes communication to be a way of influencing others' thoughts or actions. We can think of each instance of potential communication as a signaling game in which a sender performs an action and a receiver responds in some way. By making minimal assumptions about agents' shared interests and capacities to replicate behaviors that have tended to serve those interests in the past, one can show, by means of precise Replicator dynamics is the study of evolutionary processes using the theory of iterated games. For an overview of applications to communication, see Harms (a); Skyrms ().  game-theoreticmodels, that they will reach equilibria in which senders reliably produce advantageous responses in receivers. This can be seen as a theory of linguistic convention, and as a theory of how different kinds of illocutionary act, which function to reliably produce different kinds of effects in addressees, could enter a population's repertoire. However, as in Millikan's theory, replicator-dynamic models abstract away from questions about whether the kind of replication in question is a kind of learning or a kind of biological evolution. For this reason, such models have become important tools in the study of animal communication (see, e.g., Bradbury and Vehrencamp , ch.). The fact that functionalist models of communication have been applied to organisms varying in sophistication from bacteria to humans gives rise to interesting questions. For example: what are the conditions in which signals with different kinds of illocutionary force can be said to exist in signaling systems of this kind? Millikan (; ) argues that simple organisms and their signaling systems (as well as, e.g., the human autonomic nervous system) should be understood in terms of "pushmi–pullyu representations", which "at the same time tell what the case is with some part of the world and direct what to do about it" (, ). Similarly, Harms (b) argues that only a kind of "primitive meaning", with no differentiation between assertoric and directive force, can emerge in populations of psychologically unsophisticated organisms. Are bacteria communication and human communication really so similar that both can bemodeled in the sameway? There are some concrete reasons to think not. In order to have a certain communicative function, a signal-type must have a history of differential reproduction. But humans often communicate with novel signal types. Most linguistic utterances, which involve sentences never before uttered, give us one kind of example. It may be that this problem can be solved by showing how sentences' proper functions are determined compositionally from the proper functions of their sub-sentential parts. However, nonlinguistic communicative acts, indirect speech acts, and speech acts performed with context-sensitive vocabulary seem to be improvisational and dependent on humans' rich cognitive capacities in ways that resist this treatment. In the right context, it is possible to use a sentence to implicate something that it has never been used to implicate before, for example, and a gradable adjective (e.g. 'tall') can be used in context to literally and directly express a novel property (tall, by the standards of themarathon runners in this race). Criteria for distinguishing assertoric and directive force in iterated signalingmodels are proposed by Blume and Board (); Franke (); Huttegger (); Zollman (). Murray and Starr (this volume) use work in the functionalist tradition to draw fine-grained distinctions between kinds of illocutionary force. This is whatMillikan suggests in her discussion of "semantic mapping functions" (Millikan, , ch.).  This suggests that human communication is thoroughly infused greater flexibility than functionalist models can account for. In practice, many theorists have therefore sought to combine functionalist and intentionalist models, with the former accounting for animal communication and perhaps some simple cases of human communication, and the latter accounting for flexible and cognitively demanding instances of human communication. . Expression We'll use the label 'expressionism' for another family of views that have often been advocated as less intellectually demanding alternatives to intentionalism. Theories of this kind are based on the idea that performing a speech act is fundamentally a matter of expressing a state of mind, and that different kinds of illocutionary acts express states of different kinds. Expressionism is a close relative of intentionalism, since it grounds the properties of illocutionary acts in facts about speakers' mental states. Whereas intentionalists categorize speech acts in terms of the psychological responses they are intended to produce in addressees, however, expressionists categorize speech acts in terms of the different kinds of states in the speaker's mind that they express. So, for example, whereas a simple intentionalism will say that a speech act is an assertion because it is performed with the intention of getting the addressee to form a belief, a simple expressionism will say that an act counts as an assertion because it is an expression of the speaker's belief. Several arguments for preferring expressionism over intentionalism rest on the premise that intentionalism over-intellectualizes the performance of speech acts by requiring speakers to have complex, higher-order thoughts. Some have doubted that such complex cognitive states are necessary for language use, or that they are present in many human language users. Others have argued that intentionalism's rich psychological commitments obscure important points of contact between speech acts and closely related categories of communicative action. Green (b) argues that expressionismmakes better sense of the continuities between illocutionary acts, on one hand, and behaviors that are expressive of thought in less controlled or voluntary ways, on the other. In a similar vein, Bar-On () argues that expressionism does better than intentionalism at explaining the continuities between human communication and the kinds of less cognitively sophisticated communication em- E.g., Green (b); Millikan (); Scott-Phillips (). Note that the term 'expressionism' should not be confused with 'expressivism'. Although some versions of expressivism assume that speech acts are individuated by the kinds of mental states they express, so that, for example, moral claims are distinguished from factual assertions by the fact that they express non-cognitive states of mind rather than beliefs, other versions of expressivism have been constructed to fit with other theories of illocutionary acts. We'll say more about this in §§–.  ployed by our non-human ancestors. The crucial ingredient in any version of expressionism is the relation of expressing a state of mind. Different versions of expressionism cash out this relation in different ways. Some accounts of the expressing relation are epistemic. According to Davis's account (; ), to express a thought is to do something in order to indicate-i.e., to give strong but defeasible evidence-that one has the thought. Pagin () articulates an alternative epistemic relation between assertions and thought contents that he calls 'prima facie informativeness'. Green (b) combines expressionism with intentionalism in holding that performing a speech act is a matter of intentionally and overtly making one's thoughts manifest, but argues that it is also possible to express mental states in ways that don't presuppose intentional control. Other expressionist accounts have been spelled out in terms of relations that are causal rather than epistemic in nature (Rosenthal, ; Turri, ), including some who have appealed to the idea that it is the proper function of certain behaviors to express certain kinds of thoughts, thus blurring the lines between functionalism and expressionism (Bar-On, ; Green, b). More often, the idea that it is the role of speech to "express thought" has been presented as a platitude or as a pretheoretic datum, without a serious attempt to elucidate the notion of expressing involved (e.g. Devitt , §.; Fodor et al ). One additional challenge for expressionism is to find a different kind of thought to individuate each theoretically interesting kind of speech act. It is a commonplace among expressionists that assertions express beliefs (or, alternatively, knowledge; see Turri ). But what about other kinds of speech act? One methodological tactic for answering this question revolves around Moore's paradox. Assertions of sentences of the form xp, but I don't [believe/know] that py, such as () and (), are always infelicitous in some way, although their contents are neither contradictory nor necessarily false. () I have two hands, but I don't believe that I have two hands. () I'm doing philosophy, but I don't know that I am doing philosophy. Some have argued that infelicity of this kind arises because, for example, someone who uses () literally would be expressing a belief that they have two hands (with the first conjunct) while also reporting that they lack this belief (with the second conjunct). So, although the content of a Moore-paradoxical assertion is not contradictory, there is clearly something irrational about performing such an assertion. For a rejoinder to Bar-On's line of thought, see see (Scott-Phillips, , §.), who argues that human communication is discontinuous with all known non-human communication precisely because of the role played by communicative intentions. E.g. Black (); DeRose (, ); Green (a); Rosenthal (); Slote (); Turri  The subsequent line of thought is that we may be able to use variations on Moore's paradox to diagnose the mental states expressed by other kinds of speech act. For example, Condoravdi and Lauer () argue that sentences of the form xφ, but I don't want you to φy, such as (), are Moore-paradoxical. () Take the train, but I don't want you to take it. Partly on the basis of this evidence, Condoravdi and Lauer conclude that the speech acts we canonically perform with imperatives are expressions of "effective preference", which they take to be a species of desire. Expressionism is sometimes preferred to intentionalism on the grounds that, by removing the addressee from the picture, it can account for speech acts that lack an addressee (e.g. Davis , ). However, this feature can also be a bug. Removing the addressee from the picture is problematic because a single utterance sometimes seems to be used to perform two distinct speech acts with distinct addressees. To use a slightly silly example, imagine a harried Wall-Street trader shouting 'sell!' while holding a phone to each side of his face-one connecting him to stock broker A, who handles his Apple stock, and the other connecting him to stock broker B, who handles his Google stock. A plausible description of what is going on here would be that the trader is telling A to sell his Apple stock and telling B to sell his Google stock-two distinct directives, aimed at different addressees, performed by means of a single utterance. Although this case is somewhat artificial, a variety of real-world analogues are possible. Egan () considers distributed readings of multiple-addressee assertions and directives in which a different content is expressed relative to each addressee, for example. It is quite plausible that a similar phenomenon is at work when a political satirist manages to come across as endorsing a policy to a right-wing audience while simultaneously mocking that audience and the proposal to a left-wing audience. The same sort of phenomenon is frequently exhibited by politicians and other public figures when they employ dogwhistles-speech acts that communicate a literal meaning to the public while also communicating somemore controversial message to a subset of the public who are in the know. The most obvious accounts of these and other highly nuanced communicative phenomena draw on the resources of intentionalism: one can perform two speech acts addressed to two audiences with a single utterance because one can communicatively intend to affect two addressees in different ways at the same time. Jennifer (); Unger (); Williamson (). The origins of this way of thinking about Moore's paradox can be found in the late work of Wittgenstein (e.g. , §§ff.). Of course, proponents of each of the other families of views about speech acts have proposed alternative accounts of Moore's paradox as well, and so it is controversial whether Moore's paradox gives any support to expressionism as such.  Saul (this volume) gives roughly this kind of account of what she calls 'overt dogwhistles'. In a similar vein, Elisabeth Camp (this volume) argues that insinuation is a speech act that is made possible by communicators' highly nuanced appreciation of one another's beliefs, intentions, and commitments. Any version of expressionism or functionalism that wishes to avoid appealing to intentionalist resources will have to say what is going on in such cases. In practice, many expressionists and functionalists do appeal to speakers' intentions, if only to explain what makes such cases so much more sophisticated than run-of-the-mill speech (Green, b; Millikan, ). . Norm A final family of theories holds that speech acts are fundamentally normative phenomena. An influential version of this idea holds that the act of asserting is constitutively normative-that at least part of whatmakes an act an assertion is that the act is governed by a special epistemic norm. Although normative accounts of assertion have been around for decades (Dummett, ; Unger, ), the view has recently been revived and influentially defended by TimothyWilliamson (), who argues that the knowledge norm is the constitutive norm of assertion. () the knowledge norm One must: assert p only if one knows that p. (Williamson, , ) It is important to separate out two claims here. First, it is relatively uncontroversial that assertion is governed by some epistemic norm or other. We subject speakers to warranted criticism for saying things that they don't believe, that aren't true, for which they lack evidence, or that they don't know. It is tempting to think thatMooreparadoxical claims of the form xp, but I don't [believe/know/have evidence] that py are not merely infelicitous, but normatively defective-a point thatWilliamson uses to defend the knowledge norm. Much of the debate about norms of assertion has revolved around whether the norm of assertion should be formulated in terms of knowledge, belief, truth, justification, or some other notion. Proponents of some version of the knowledge norm include Adler (); Benton (, a,b); DeRose (); Engel (); Hawthorne (); Reynolds (); Schaffer (); Stanley (); Turri (, ); Unger (); Williamson (, ). Others have argued, instead, that knowledge is governed by norms of knowledge-transmissibility (Garía-Carpintero, ; Hinchman, ; Pelling, ), belief (Bach, ), rational belief (Douven, , ), reasonable belief (Lackey, ), supportive reasons (McKinnon, ), justification (Kvanvig, , ), evidenceresponsiveness (Maitra and Weatherson, ), epistemic certainty (Stanley, ), and truth (MacFarlane, ; Weiner, ). For overviews of this literature, see Weiner () and Pagin (, §.).  A second, much more controversial claim is that being subject to an epistemic norm of this kind is what makes an act an assertion-i.e., that there is a constitutive norm of assertion. Few of Williamson's arguments seem to bear on this issue, and few others in the literature on knowledge norms have taken it up either. But, for the purpose of understanding the nature of speech acts, this is the crucial issue. After all: an intentionalist, conventionalist, functionalist, or expressionist could agree that assertion is governed by an epistemic norm, but could argue that this follows from their particular account of assertion, together with broader facts about the norms governing social interaction more generally. Certain normative consequences follow from Searle's () accounts of various speech acts, for example, but he holds that this is a consequence of the conventions governing speech acts' sincerity conditions. Likewise, an intentionalist might argue that assertion is governed by an epistemic norm because it is governed by the maxim of quality, which is just one manifestation of Grice's cooperative principle, which governs all cooperative activities. On this view, arguments over the formulation of the knowledge norm might best be understood as arguments over which formulation of the maxim of quality follows from the cooperative principle. Asecondworry about the idea that assertion is constituted by an epistemic norm is that it is hard to see how such an account would extend to other speech acts. How, for example, wouldwe fill in the gaps in ()–() in order to give constitutive accounts of questioning, requesting, and advising? () One must: ask someone whether q only if ... () One must: request that someone ψ only if ... () One must: advise someone to ψ only if ... Noattempt has beenmade to answer these questions, or to saywhatwould count as a general theory of speech acts in the spirit of an epistemic-norm account of assertion. However, the idea that we should treat assertion as theoretically disjoint from other speech acts is bizarre. As McGlynn puts the point, knowledge-norm accounts of assertion threaten to repeat themistake that speech-act theory was founded in order to address, since they ignore "the worry that many philosophers had fetishized the speech act of assertion, and ignored all the rest" (, ). This presumably plays a role in explainingwhy interest in epistemic-normaccounts has been stronger among epistemologists than among philosophers of language or linguists. The idea of reducing the norm of assertion to a Gricean maxim has been suggested by Cappelen (); Goldberg (); Montgomery (); Sosa (). Benton () argues that this sort of reduction fails. Ball () argues that the normative properties of speech acts follow from their naturalistic properties by giving an account that draws on both Grice's and Millikan's ideas about speech acts.  A different kind of normative account is built around the idea that performing a speech act is, fundamentally, a matter of doing something that gives rise to certain rights (or entitlements) and obligations (or commitments). An influential defense of this idea is due to Brandom (; ; ), who argues that to assert p is to do something that entitles participants in the conversation to make a characteristic range of p-related inferences and responses, and that commits the speaker to justify p and related claims going forward. MacFarlane (; ) defends a similar account, on which asserting p is understood in terms a public commitment to p's truth as assessed in the context of utterance as well as a commitment to retract p should it come to light that p is not true relative to a new context of assessment. Although Brandom and MacFarlane ignore speech acts other than assertion, Kukla and Lance () and Lance and Kukla () have developed a related, normative treatment of a range of other illocutionary acts, and several authors have argued that normatively rich accounts of speech acts can help us to understand speech acts of urgent social concern. Kukla () draws on an account of this kind in order to argue that a speaker's social status can contravene their intentions, altering their act's illocutionary force-for example, by demoting it from a command to a request. Lynn Tirrell has used a normative pragmatic framework to understand the hate speech that typifies the buildup to acts of genocide (). In a series of papers, Mary Kate McGowan has argued that a wide range of speech acts, including regular communicative acts but also pornography and hate speech, should be understood as having "covert exercitive force": they change what is permissible in a norm-governed social activity going forward (; ; a; b; ; this volume). How should we understand the claim that speech acts of a given kind enact norms? This could be a fundamental fact about the speech act-part of what makes it the kind of speech act it is. Brandom, MacFarlane, and Kukla & Lance clearly wish to be understood in this way, and so their theories must be understood as competing with the other accounts of speech acts outlined here. A deflationary alternative would be to concede that the speech acts in question sometimes, normally, or even always have the effect of enacting normative facts, but to hold that this is a mere consequence of some not-essentially-normative account of the speech act itself, together with facts about the wider normative scene in which speech acts are situated. Promising, for example, would seem to be a norm-enacting speech act Brandom says that his theory of assertion "is largely a footnote to Sellars' [] seminal discussion of ...endorsement" (, fn.). Sellars can also be seen as a major influence on functionalist theories. For an discussion of Sellars' differing influences on Millikan and Brandom, see Millikan , ch.. Krifka () also endorses a commitment-theoretic account, of illocutionary force, but without fleshing out the foundational details.  if any is, since a felicitous promise is characterized by the creation of what is often called a "promissory obligation"-the speaker's obligation to keep the promise. Theories that take speech acts to be fundamentally norm enacting would seem to have a head start on explaining this phenomenon. However, there are alternative options. In Searle's (, ch.) influential account of promising, which serves as the template for his account of other illocutionary acts, enacting new commitments is indeed part of what it is to make a promise. However, for Searle, this outcome of promises is, like the rest of his theory of speech acts, ultimately a matter of linguistic convention. Likewise, an intentionalist, a functionalist, or an expressionist could hold that promissory obligation results from the expectations that tend to result from successfully coordinating one's intentions with others-a view that can be made to fit with a range of normative theories (see, e.g. Norcross ; Scanlon ; , ch.). Likewise, the commitments engendered by assertion might be understood as consequences of intentionalism plus Grice's cooperative principle: roughly, asserting p commits one to justify p, and to retract p should its falsity come to light, because it would be uncooperative to intend for one's actions to produce a belief in p if one did not undertake commitments of this kind.  Discourse Context and Conversational Score Much recent work on speech acts, including most of the work collected in this volume, is based on the idea that conversations are organized around contexts. In the technical sense at issue here, contexts are shared and evolving representations of the state of play in a conversation that both shape the qualities of speech acts and are in turn shaped by them. Following Lewis (), it has become common to discuss context through the metaphor of "conversational score". Just as the activities in a baseball game are dictated by the current state of its score-the current inning and number of runs, outs, balls, strikes, etc.-a conversation's score dictates how context-sensitive expressions can be used and interpreted. And just as plays in a baseball game function to change one or more elements of the score, moves in a language game-i.e., speech acts-function to change the state of the context. Several authors have defended similar lines of thought aimed at showing that the normativity of both speech acts (and, in some cases, also thoughts) is not among their fundamental features (Ball, ; Boghossian, ; Glüer, ; Glüer and Wikforss, ; Wikforss, ). Contexts, thus conceived, have traveled under various aliases: "common ground" and "context set" (Stalnaker, , ), "discourse context" (Stalnaker, ), "scoreboard" (Lewis, ), "files" (Heim, , §..), "conversational record" (Thomason, ), "information structure" (Roberts, ), "information state" (Veltman, ) , "conversational state" (Starr, ms, ), and so on.  . Score and the Five Families Score-theoretic accounts of speech acts are sometimes treated as an alternative to the five families of theory discussed in §. In fact, however, talk of context and conversational score has been variously interpreted so as to be compatible with theories of all five kinds. As a result, many debates in contemporary semantics and pragmatics appear to be framed in terms of shared assumptions about conversational score, but this framing often masks foundational disagreements. According to one influential view, originating with Stalnaker (), the context of a conversation reduces to the shared propositional attitudes of its participants. To perform a speech act is to do something with an intention of changing these shared attitudes. This amounts to a version of intentionalism that substitutes shared, public mental states for the private ones that Grice took to be the targets of speech acts. In her contribution to this volume, Craige Roberts articulates a detailed theory of this kind that accounts for assertions, questions, and directives. Roberts follows Stalnaker in taking assertions to be aimed at adding their content to the common ground-the set of propositions that the participants in a conversation commonly accept for the purposes of the conversation. Questions and directives aim to alter other components of the context, each of which reflects participants' publicly shared goals. A directive's aim is to add to the addressee's domain goals-the perhaps extraconversational goals to whose satisfaction participants are publicly committed. The aim of a question is to make it the new question under discussion (QUD)-the question that it is currently the participants' conversational aim to answer. Roberts' version of intentionalism resembles Grice's, except that the roles he assigns to beliefs and intentions are, for her, played by the interlocutors' shared information and goals. At this level of abstraction, Roberts agrees with Portner (; ; ), who argues that assertions are proposals to change the common ground, questions are proposals to change the QUD, and directives are proposals to change the ToDo List, which he thinks of as the "public and interactional" counterpart to agents' desires or intentions, just as common ground is the public and interactional counterpart to their beliefs (, ). It's easy to see that a functionalist about speech acts can adopt a similar approach by positing the same components of context, grounded in the same way in agents' propositional attitudes. The difference would be that what makes it the case that an utterance of a certain kind is a speech act of a certain kind is that, in at least some Although Stalnaker often frames his view as a version of intentionalism-including in his piece for this volume-he sometimes instead refers to speech acts as "proposals" to change the context without further cashing out this talk of proposals in terms of the speaker's intentions. And in at least one place, he expresses doubt about whether every such proposal to change the context must be intended to change the context in the way proposed (, ).  cases, utterances of that kind have the proper function of changing the context in a given way. Each of the foregoing views presupposes psychologism about context-the view that facts about context are somehow grounded in facts about the mental lives of the participants in a conversation. But there are several alternative conceptions of the metaphysics of conversational score. For example, Brandom argues that speech acts "alter the deontic score, they change what commitments and entitlements it is appropriate to attribute, not only to the one producing the speech act, but also to those to whom it is addressed" (Brandom, , ). On this view, facts about score are deeply normative, and may float free of participants' opinions about what the score is. In their contributions to this volume, both McGowan and Camp argue that at least some components of the score must be objectively normative in this sense. McGowan's reason is that an objective notion of score is needed to make sense of covert exercitives-speech acts that change permissibility facts in ways that may go unacknowledged by the participants in a conversation. Camp argues that a normative account of score is needed to make sense of the way in which insinuation can give rise to unacknowledged commitments on the part of the speaker. Camp also argues that at least some aspects of the score are "essentially linguistic", in that "the kind of commitment one undertakes by an utterance depends in part on the language game in which it is generated" (p.XX). This idea presents another sort of alternative to psychologism about context. On this conventionalist approach, conversational score is the product of the conventions governing either language use itself or social interaction more broadly. This way of thinking is suggested by Lewis's () analogy with baseball score. The fact that baseball involves both balls and strikes is due to nothing deeper than the conventions of baseball. Perhaps the fact that contexts include both, say, a common ground and a To-Do List is similarly due to nothing deeper than the conventions governing our language games. Imagine that, halfway through a baseball game, everyone involved is overcome by a collective delusion: although the home team has scored only two runs, everyone comes to commonly believe that they have scored three. Nonetheless, this delusion would not make it the case that a third run has been scored. There are objective, mind-independent facts about what a baseball game's score is at a given moment. These facts are determined by the conventional rules governing the kinematics of baseball-the rules by which games may unfold over time-together with facts about what has already taken place in the game. In principle, everyone could be wrong about the score. According to DeVault and Stone (), we should understand conversational score as being "objective and normative" in just this sense. For a lucid comparison of Brandom's views to those of orthodox dynamic semanticists, see Nickel ().  Conversational score is determined by the rules of language, together with the fact that certain other moves have been made up until now in the discourse. Although participants should attempt to track the score with their shared attitudes, the score is not just whatever interlocutors take it to be. The chief advantage of this conception of score, according to DeVault and Stone, is that it allows us to make better sense of discourses that turn on the participants' confusion about what has already taken place in a conversation. A conventionalist approach to conversational score fits nicely with dynamicsemantic approaches to sentence meaning. On views of this kind, the meaning of a sentence is its context-change potential-a function that determines a unique output context for every context in which the sentence can be felicitously uttered. On this view, provided that participants are speaking literally, the series of past conversational moves together with the semantics of the language being spoken would fully determine the score at a given moment. This is the sort of system that DeVault and Stone () present, and that Lepore and Stone (; this volume) defend. At the center of their approach is an attempt to respond to a serious problem for conventionalist approaches built around conversational score, stemming from the observation that the context of a conversation often seems to evolve in ways that aren't wholly governed by convention. Some aspects of conversational score can be manipulated by means of indirect speech acts, whose content and force seemingly aren't a matter of convention. Lepore and Stone reply that these supposedly non-conventional speech acts fall into one of two categories. Some aren't really illocutionary acts at all: since it's impossible for interlocutors to agree on the precise way in which many indirect speech acts are intended to update the score, they mustn't be attempts to do so. On the other hand, some genuine examples of indirect speech acts should be understood as semantically encoded. In their essay for this volume, Lepore and Stone develop this approach by giving a dynamic-semantic treatment of the indirect-request reading of sentences like 'can you pass the salt?'. On their view, this sentence has a reading on which its semantic value is a context-change potential that specifies two successive updates to the context, the first a question and the second a request. If an account of this kind can be generalized tomake sense of other indirect speech acts, conventionalismwill Note, however, that the connection between dynamic semantics and conventionalism about conversational score is somewhat loose. An intentionalist could adopt dynamic semantics, taking each sentence's context-change potential to be evidence of how a speaker who used the sentence literally would be intending to affect the context. Likewise, conventionalism about context does not, strictly speaking, entail dynamic semantics: a static semantics could be paired with pragmatic rules governing the kinematics of score, but these pragmatic rules could be construed as ultimately a matter of social convention. The latter option would depend on some explanation of why we should distinguish the semantic conventions from the pragmatic conventions, but the position is a coherent one.  have answered one of its most significant objections. Further challenges lurk, however. One way for it to become common ground that there is a goat in the room is for someone to assert that there is a goat in the room; another way is for a goat to wander into our midst and for us all to notice it (and notice each other noticing it, etc.). Importantly, each of these events can influence the future of the conversation in similar ways. For example, either event licenses the use of a pronoun ('it', or perhaps 'he' or 'she') to discuss the goat. Roberts (; ; ) argues that this is no coincidence: definite noun phrases are sensitive to facts about the context, but don't care whether the context got that way by linguistic or nonlinguistic means. Roberts thus advocates a kind of "dynamic pragmatics" on which the rules by which conversational score evolves is largely a matter of pragmatic, rather than semantic, factors. Other defenders of dynamic pragmatics include Karen Lewis (; ; ), Portner (; this volume), and Stalnaker (; this volume). Stalnaker's contribution to this volume, in particular, is aimed at challenging both conventionalist theories of context and dynamic approaches to semantics; he argues that we should "represent the structure of discourse in a way that is independent of the linguistic mechanisms by which the purposes of the practice of discourse are realized" (p.XX). . Speech-Act Taxonomy and The Structure of Contexts Theories of speech acts that are spelled out in terms of context or conversational score suggest the following approach to taxonomizing speech acts: identify the components of context (score) that we have reason to posit, identify the different ways in which those components can be manipulated by speaking, and individuate speechact categories in terms of these different ways of manipulating the different components of score. As we have already seen, Roberts and Portner each pursue a version of this strategy to account for the difference between assertions, questions, and directives. But of course, these aren't the only three interesting categories of speech act. There are also various other categories, and there are apparently also sub-categories within these categories. The latter point is most obvious in the case of the speech acts that we tend to perform with imperative sentences, which include distinct subcategories of directives, such as requests and commands, as well as weaker, non- Influential early statements of this idea include Carlson (); Cohen and Perrault (); Gazdar (); Hamblin (); Heim (, ); Kamp (); Lewis (); Stalnaker (). The idea is now too widespread to comprehensively cite, though some influential recent contributions that focus on the nature of communicative acts include Beaver (); Condoravdi and Lauer (); Farkas andBruce (); Ginzburg (); Gunlogson ();Murray ();Murray and Starr (MS); Portner (, , ); Roberts (, ); Starr (ms, , ); Thomason (); Veltman (); Yalcin (, ).  directive acts, such as permissions, acquiescences, wishes, and disinterested advice. () Bring me my scepter! command/order () Pass me the hammer. request () Have a cookie. permission/offer () (Go ahead:) Eat the rest of my sandwich. acquiescence () Get well soon! wish () Take the six train. disinterested advice/instruction Various strategies for drawing these distinctions have been pursued. One idea is that the different uses of imperatives involve different kinds of indirect speech acts either in addition to or instead of themain speech act. Condoravdi and Lauer () defend a version of this view on which imperatives literally encode an expression of desire, and on which various flavors of directive force arise due to features of the context. Harris () argues that imperatives encode neutral directive force, but follows Schiffer () in thinking that both individual flavors of directive force and non-directive uses result from indirect speech acts that communicate the reason for which the speaker expects the addressee to act. von Fintel () and Charlow (this volume) argue that some indirect-speech-act account must be correct, without supplying one. Portner (; ) defends a different pragmatic account of imperatives' illocutionary variability. On his view, imperatives are always used to update the addressee's To-Do List, but each To-Do List contains different sub-lists corresponding to the different kinds of reasons that agents have for acting. Whereas a command proposes an update to the part of the To-Do List that corresponds to the addressee's duties, a request proposes an update to the part of the To-DoList that corresponds to the speaker's desires. In his contribution to this volume, Portner further elaborates this picture by distinguishing the To-Do Lists that represents interlocutors mutual commitments from those that publicly represent their individual commitments. In effect, this gives Portner a way ofmodeling the idea that whereas directive acts (such as requests and commands) propose coordination on a new shared commitment on the basis of the speaker's preferences, weak uses of imperatives (e.g. permissions and Stalnaker (this volume) suggests that the same issues arise for declaratives, and that what what many philosophers think of as assertions should be thought of as an epistemically distinctive sub-genre of what Stalnaker categorizes as assertions.  acquiescences) propose coordination on a new shared commitment on the basis of the addressee's preferences. The most prominent semantic account of the illocutionary variability of imperatives has been defended by Kaufmann (), who argues that imperatives are deontic modals whose presuppositional contents force them to be used performatively. Just as the flavor of a deonticmodal depends on the ordering source relative towhich it is interpreted, the kind of speech act one performs by uttering an imperative depends on the operative ordering source (and perhaps also on other contextual parameters as well). In her contribution to this volume, Roberts splits the difference Portner's and Kaufmann's views: imperatives denote properties rather than modals, and they are used to propose shared goals (a view similar to Portner's), but, like deontic modals, imperatives' semantic values are parameterized to a modal base and ordering source, allowing them to be used with different forces. In their contribution to this volume, Murray and Starr take a different kind of approach to the illocutionary variability of the three major clause types. They individuate speech acts at two distinct levels of abstraction and defend different kinds of theory about how individuation works at each level. At the more abstract level, Murray and Starr are conventionalists: each major clause type (declarative, interrogative, and imperative) is governed by a linguistic convention according to which uttering a clause of a given type results in a distinctive kind of context update. When it comes to finer-grained distinctions within each of these broad categories, Murray and Starr are functionalists. They argue that the particular illocutionary force of a speech act is a matter of how updating the context functions to affects interlocutors' private mental states. Although all literal speech acts performed using imperatives update the dimension of context that represents interlocutors joint preferences, doing so may have the function of changing interlocutors' private mental states in different ways, and their illocutionary force is a matter of this function, which arises from a selection process akin to those posited by, e.g., Millikan () and Skyrms (). A wide range of different kinds of context update have been posited in the semantics and pragmatics literature, and it is an open question whether all of these should be thought of as illocutionary acts. There are several interesting borderline cases. For example: one early argument for extending Stalnaker's model of common ground came from Irene Heim (; ), who argues that a variety of data about anaphora motivates positing a stock of discourse referents in as a component The idea that imperatives are deontic modals in disguise has also been defended by Han (); Lewis (). Charlow (; ; this volume) also posits a close connection between deontic modals and imperatives, but with the twist that he is an expressivist about deontic modals, so that his view might better be described as one that uses the resources of a theory of imperatives to understand the nature of modals, rather than the other way around.  of the context. On Heim's view, the semantic values of definite noun phrases are determined, in part, by facts about the discourse referents currently on file in the context. On the other hand, part of the semantic role of indefinite noun phrases is to establish new discourse referents. In uttering 'A dog ate my homework', for example, a speaker not only contributes some information about the fate of their homework; they also establish a new discourse referent that may help to determine the semantic value of future definite noun phrases. From the fact that indefinites are, on this view, used to change the context in a distinctive kind of way, should we conclude that indefinites are used to perform a distinctive kind of illocutionary act? An affirmative answer would seem to follow from some versions of the idea that kinds of illocutionary act just are kinds of context update (e.g. Gazdar ), but more nuanced ways of drawing principled distinctions between illocutionary updates and other kinds of updates may also be available (e.g. Murray ). A related set of questions arises from ways of conveying information that are unlike assertion in various respects. Take the following examples. () a. Tony, who is a linguist, often says 'ah ha' when listening to others. b. Tony is a linguist. () a. My sister is coming to town. b. I have a sister. () a. É-hó1tåhéva-H Sandy -win-dir Sandy 'Sandy won (I witnessed).' (Murray, , :) b. I have direct evidence that Sandy won. () a. I'm in a bit of a hurry. Is there any way we can settle this right now? [to a cop after being pulled over for speeding] (Pinker et al., ) b. I am willing to bribe you not to write me a ticket. In uttering ()a, one normally conventionally implicates a propisition that could be paraphrased with ()b. Conventionally implicating a proposition is normally a way of informing one's interlocutors about it (Potts, , §..). In uttering ()a, one normally presupposes a proposition that could be paraphrased with ()b. Presupposition is often explicated by saying that an utterance that presupposes p is felicitous only if p is already in the common ground. However, presupposed contents Heim explicitly construes her theory of context as an extension of Stalnaker's in her dissertation (, ch., §§.–.). For related views, each of which can be understood as positing similar components of context, see (Groenendijk and Stokhof, , ; Kamp, ; Kamp and Reyle, ; Kattunen, ).  that aren't already common ground are often accommodated (Lewis, ; Roberts, a), so that ()a can be a way of informing others that one has a sister. By virtue of the semantic rules governing evidential particles in Cheyenne, a speaker who utters ()a would normally convey the content of ()b. In uttering ()a, one would normally be insinuating something that could be paraphrased as ()b. However, each of these ways of informing differs from asserting in being less direct and harder to respond to in some ways. One can't disagree with any of these contributions by saying 'wrong' or 'that's false', for example, and they otherwise resist being referred to with propositional anaphora, as in 'that's very interesting'. Some have tried to account for these phenomena by complicating their theories of conversational score in various ways. For example, Murray () argues that, in addition to adding its content to the common ground, a successful assertion updates the score by establishing a propositional discourse referent for its content, allowing it to be anaphorically picked up by propositional anaphora. Not-at-issue contributions to common ground, such as those made via conventional implicatures, presuppositions, and evidentials, differ in that they fail to establish discourse referents. Camp (this volume) pursues a similar account of insinuation and other communicative strategies that she describes as "off-record". She distinguishes between the common ground, which is roughly as Stalnaker describes it, and the conversational record, which is an objective record of prior conversational contributions, and whose state is (at least largely) determined by linguistic conventions. Whereas a normal, literal, direct, and linguistically encoded assertion, if successful, both adds its content to the common ground and registers itself on the conversational record, not-at-issue contributions such as ()b–()b may be added to the common ground without making it onto the record, and insinuated contents like ()b can be communicated via a roughly Gricean mechanism despite neither becoming common ground nor registering on the conversational record. This not only explains why insinuated content can't be the target of propositional anaphora; it also explains why the speaker can often get away with denying that skillfully insinuated content was intended at all, even after having successfully communicated it to the addressee. Another area where various novel ways of manipulating contexts have been posited is the literature on expressivism. One way of framing the project of expressivism is to say that when a speaker utters declarative sentences containing expressions of a certain kind-for example, normative expressions-the speech acts that On the idea that some speech acts can be understood in terms of addressee-directed communicative intentions but not in terms of context-directed communicative intentions, see also (Harris, , ch.).  they perform aren't normal assertions, but something else. For example, Hare () argues that declarative sentences containing moral terms are used to perform special kinds of acts of recommendation, commendation, and condemnation, rather than assertion. On the contemporary scene, the obvious move is to develop expressivism into the view that certain expressions are used to update contexts in ways that differ from regular (i.e. 'factual') assertions. Recent years have seen an explosion of theories of this kind. In his contribution to this volume, Seth Yalcin argues that it is a mistake to view these theories as trafficking in claims about illocutionary force, at least if 'illocutionary force' is understood in the same sense that speech-act theorists have traditionally been interested in. More broadly, Yalcin distinguishes the illocutionary force of a speech act from what he calls its dynamic force. By the latter, he means just the sort of force that we've been discussing in this section: the characteristic effect of an act on the context. But Yalcin argues that this notion of force is distinct from illocutionary force as traditionally conceived. The two notions belong to two kinds of theories that describe conversation at different levels of abstraction. Illocutionary force belongs to a level at which we aim to characterize the extra-linguistic uses to which speech is put. Dynamic force, on the other hand, characterizes conversation at a level of abstraction that "prescinds from the question what exactly the conversational state is taken by the interlocutors to be characterizing, and from the question what the speaker might be aiming to do, extra-linguistically speaking, by adding certain information to that state" (p.XX). Yalcin's is a heterodox view; most proponents of context-change accounts of speech acts have taken their theories to be in competition with alternative theories of illocutionary force. Moreover, several others have given rather different answers to the question of how facts about context relate to facts about interlocutors' beliefs, plans, and other private mental states. As we have seen, Murray and Starr (this volume) argue that changes to context have the function of causing changes to interlocutors' private mental states. Harris (, ch.) argues for the more tradi- Influential early statements this idea can be found in Ayer (); Hare (); Stevenson (, ); Wittgenstein (). For an overview, see Schroeder (, ch.). Austin alludes to these early noncognitivists as some of the main precursors to his development of speech-act theory (, –). For treatments of deontic modals and other normative talk, see Charlow (, ); Ninan (); Pérez Carballo and Santorio (); Starr (b); Willer (). For treatments of epistemic and/or probability modals, see Swanson (); Veltman (); Willer (, ); Yalcin (, , ). For treatments of indicative and counterfactual conditionals, see von Fintel (); Gillies (, ); Starr (). Roberts (this volume) is particularly explicit about this, as areGazdar () andLevinson (). Although Stalnaker admits that his theory of assertion characterizes a wider family of speech acts than some others have referred to as 'assertion', he has also said that his theory "is an account of the force of an assertion" (, –).  tionally Gricean view that speech acts are aimed primarily at changing addressees' private mental states, with changes to the context being a downstream consequence in at most some special cases. And Camp (this volume) argues that a full appreciation of the range of speech acts we perform requires us to distinguish between those that change the objective context, those that change the intersubjective context, and those that change only interlocutors' private mental states. How best to understand the relationship between contexts and interlocutors' minds is thus an open and important theoretical question.  Force and Content According toAustin, we should "distinguish force andmeaning in the sense inwhich meaning is equivalent to sense and reference, just as it has become essential to distinguish sense and reference within meaning" (, ). Similarly, Searle argues that we should distinguish between an illocutionary act and the act of expressing a proposition at its core. For Austin and Searle, these are distinctions between two levels of abstraction at which we may individuate speech acts. A locutionary or propositional act is a speech act individuated only in respect of its content, and illocutionary force is the extra ingredient bridging the gap from sense and reference to the full illocutionary act. Some distinction of this kind is now widely taken for granted, though different theories draw it in different ways. There are two influential reasons for thinking of the illocutionary force of a speech act as something that can be abstracted away from its content. One is that the two components can apparently vary independently. Assertion is something that can be done with any proposition, and a given proposition can apparently serve as the content of various other illocutionary acts as well. For example, one can assert, suppose, deny, promise, and command that Fido will fetch his stick, and one can also ask whether Fido will fetch his stick. All of these acts plausibly have the same propositional content, but involve doing different things with this content. In a similar vein, it has sometimes been claimed that trios of sentences such as the following can be used to perform literal and direct speech acts that have the same content but that differ only in force. () Fido will fetch his stick. () Will Fido fetch his stick? () Fetch your stick. [addressed to Fido] E.g. Katz (); Searle (, , ); Searle and Vanderveken ().  Some support for this idea comes fromdata about cross-force propositional anaphora. The following example is naturally described by saying that Ann asserts a proposition, Bob asks a polar question whose content is the same proposition, and Ann points this out. () Ann: Fido will fetch his stick. Bob: Will Fido fetch his stick? Ann: That's what I just said. Similar data suggests that the contents of speech acts can also serve as the contents of a variety of intentional mental states. () Ann: Dogs are better than cats. Bob: That's what I [think/believe/hope]. It is also sometimes possible to coordinate speech-act reports, suggesting that the speech acts being reported share contents. () Ann claimed, but Bob merely suggested, that dogs are better than cats. () Judy asked whether, and John confidently asserted, that you will be at dinner tonight. A second kind of argument for the force–content distinction stems from the idea that semantic composition acts only on contents, not on speech acts. This view originates with Frege (), whose Begriffsschrift notation separates force from content by representing force with the vertical judgment stroke '|' and content with the the horizontal content stroke '-', along with everything that follows it. Importantly, Frege's syntax allows for only one judgment stroke per sentence; it is only contentdenoting expressions that can recursively combine. The idea that speech acts have a single force but arbitrarily complex contents has proven influential, as has the related idea that sentences can be factored, for the purposes of semantics, into a component that expresses their content (sometimes called a 'sentence radical') along with a component that determines the illocutionary force with which they can be literally uttered (a 'mood marker' or 'force indicator'). Both of these arguments for the force–content distinction have recently faced challenges from a range of angles. An initial challenge comes from evidence about It is notably harder to find analogous data suggesting that directive acts can have the same contents as assertions or polar questions. Davidson (a); Grice (); Hare (); Lewis (); Sadock (); Searle (, , , ); Starr (ms, ).  the semantics of non-declarative clauses, which purports to show that interrogative and imperative clauses don't express propositional contents at all. This is most intuitive in the case of wh-interrogatives, such as (), for which there is no plausible propositional semantic value. () Who loves the funk? Semanticists now widely believe that an interrogative's semantic content is a set of propositions (or a property that these propositions share). Intuitively, the propositions in question are the possible or actual answers to the question that the interrogative encodes. For example, the semantic value of () might be identified with the set of propositions p such that, for some agent x, p is the proposition that x loves the funk. Similarly, several authors have argued that imperatives' semantic contents aren't propositions but some other kind of semantic object, such as addressee-restricted properties or actions. By undermining the idea that, for example, assertions, questions, and directives can have the same content, these views undermine one of the motivations for drawing a content-force distinction. Still, a modified force–content distinction is viable. For example, Gazdar () argues that whereas the (not-necessarilypropositional) content of a literal and direct speech act is just the semantic content of the sentence uttered, the speech act's illocutionary force is supplied by a pragmatic "force-assignment rule" that maps this content to a way of updating the context. In their contributions to this volume, Stalnaker, Roberts, and Portner defend views that incorporate versions of this dynamic-pragmatic take on the force–content distinction. Further problems lurk, however. One is that, as Starr (a; ms) has pointed out, imperatives can be conjoined and disjoined, both with other imperatives and with declaratives. Moreover, any such combination can be the consequent of a conditional. () Fix me a drink and make it a double. () Mow the lawn and I'll wash the car. () Play a waltz if the mood is right. See, e.g., Gazdar (); Groenendijk and Stokhof (); Hamblin (, ); Karttunen (); Roberts (). Barker (); von Fintel and Iatridou (ms); Hausser (, ); Portner (, , ); Roberts (b, ); Zanuttini et al. (). Even Frege () argues that non-declarative sentences express non-propositional contents (i.e., incomplete thoughts that lack Bedeutungen). There remain some interesting reasons to think that polar questions have propositional contents; see Farkas and Bruce (); Gunlogson ().  () If you're an egalitarian, how come you're so rich? () If we only have enough money to buy one book, put back Naked Lunch or I'll put back Waverly. Examples like these undermine the traditional force–content distinction in several ways. First, there seems to be no simple answer to the question of whether, in using a mixed imperative-declarative sentence literally, one would be performing an assertoric act or a directive act. Rather, the speech acts involved appear to be complex hybrids of the two. Second, and relatedly, there is seemingly no way to factor out the force-marking components of sentences like these from their contentexpressing components. Both of these observations suggest that conjunction, disjunction, and conditionalization can act on speech acts' forces and not merely their contents. Third, several authors have argued that the speech acts we perform with conditional imperatives and conditional interrogatives, such as () and (), must be thought of not as questions and directives with conditional contents, but as conditional questions and conditional directives. In uttering (), for example, one does not request for a conditional to be made true; rather, such a speech act would be satisfied only if the addressee enters a conditional state of mind–something like a contingency plan. These observations have led several theorists to adopt techniques from dynamic semantics. Some have taken clauses to be context-change potentials: the meaning of any clause is an operation on contexts, but clauses of different kinds manipulate different components within contexts. This is the view that both Murray and Starr and Lepore and Stone advocate in their contributions to this volume, for example. Others have identified clausal semantic values with the cognitive instructions they give to addressees: the meaning of every clause is modeled as a condition on addressees' mental states, but clauses of different kinds instruct addressees to change mental states of different kinds. Either of these views allows for complex meanings to be recursively defined out of simpler meanings without first separating out the parts responsible for force from those that encode content. See, e.g., Edgington (; ; ); von Fintel (ms); Charlow (this volume); Krifka (). Charlow (this volume) and Starr (a; ms) argue that these data pose insurmountable challenges to views on which imperatives denote properties. Charlow (this volume) marshalls further evidence, in the form of sentences in which quantifiers outscope imperative operators (e.g., 'everyone take [his/her/their] seat'), to object to Kaufman's view that imperatives are deontic modals. Like Krifka's () related argument that quantifiers sometimes outscope question operators, these data further undermine the standard, Fregean abstraction of force from content. See also Asher and Lascarides (); Condoravdi and Lauer (); Farkas and Bruce (); Gunlogson (); Krifka (); Murray (); Murray and Starr (MS); Starr (ms, ); ?. Charlow (, this volume); Harris ().  A modified force–content distinction may still be salvageable in light of these views. Speech acts of different kinds-and the meanings of the sentences that encode them-can be understood in terms of different kinds of effects that they have on either contexts or addressees'minds. Whereas the force of a speech act is amatter of which component of the context (or mind) it operates on, its content is a matter of the contribution that it makes there. For example, although Charlow () represents the semantic values of both declarative and imperative clauses as properties of agents' minds, declaratives (and so, the assertions they encode) place conditions on the doxastic components of minds whereas imperatives (and so, the directives they encode) place conditions on their planning components. Complex sentences that combine declarative and imperative clauses encode more complex properties of minds that may place conditions on both doxastic and planning components. So, some sentences encode speech acts whose forces are hybrids of assertion and direction, and whose contents are difficult to disentangle from their forces. In his contribution to this volume, Peter Hanks has defended amuchmore radical rejection of the force–content distinction than anything we've discussed so far. OnHanks' view, the force of a speech act is determined by the very relation that unifies its propositional content. Recall ()–(): () Fido will fetch his stick. () Will Fido fetch his stick? () Fetch your stick. [addressed to Fido] Bracketing tense and aspect, the contents of these sentences have the same components: Fido, the relation of fetching, and Fido's stick. But, Hanks points out, a proposition is something over and above its components. A proposition must be unified in some determinate way, and distinct propositions may consist of the same parts unified in different ways; this is why the proposition that Fido fetches his stick is distinct from the proposition that Fido is fetched by his stick. Hanks argues that the differences in the speech acts we would perform with literal utterances of ()– () consists of differences in the ways in which their parts are unified. Assertions are acts of predicating propositional components of one another; questions are acts of asking whether the components of propositions are connected in certain ways; directives are acts of ordering a propositional component (normally, the addressee) to have a certain property. On this usage, predicating, asking, and ordering are different kinds of combinatory acts-different ways of forming propositions from their For similar views, see Harris (); Murray (); Starr (ms, ). Hanks' paper builds on ideas that he has defended elsewhere-e.g., Hanks (, , , ).  components. Hanks posits an analogous suite of combinatory mental acts to explain the difference between believing a proposition, wondering whether it is true, and desiring for it to be true. On this view, there is nothing like a force–content distinction: speech acts of different kinds differ solely in having different kinds of content. One challenge for Hanks is to draw more fine-grained distinctions between kinds of speech acts within his three broad categories, such as the distinction between requests and commands. Another important challenge to Hanks' view is developed by Green (this volume), who argues that we can't do without at least some combinatory acts-some forms of predication, say-that are force neutral. In using a declarative sentence in the context of pretense, or to suppose a proposition for the sake of reductio, or as the antecedent of a conditional, for example, one doesn't assert the proposition expressed, but one does express a unified proposition.  Applied Speech-Act Theory Speech-act theory has always been driven by issues that extend beyond the study of language and communication. Austin's earliest deployment of his theory of performative utterances took place in the context of a debate with John Wisdom about the problem of other minds, for example (Austin, ). Work on expressivism- early versions of which Austin (; ) mentions as a precursor to his theory of speech acts-aims to solve big philosophical problems about the metaphysics and epistemology of normativity. Grice's original pitch for his theory of implicature was that it could be used as a tool for countering certain views put forward by ordinary-language philosophers, both in the philosophy of perception () and in semantics and the philosophy of logic (). Debates between the five families of speech-act theory have often turned on the question of which theory is best able to fit meaning and intentionality into a naturalistic worldview. Speech-act theory has continued to be a versatile philosophical tool, particularly in the philosophy of law and social and political philosophy. Consider the philosophy of law. It is tempting to think of the creation of laws as a kind of speech act. But several considerations have led philosophers to think that legislative speech acts are special, and, in particular, that their properties cannot be grounded in speakers' intentions: they are performed by legislatures rather than For related concerns, see Hom and Schwarz (); Reiland (, ); Stokke (). E.g., Bar-On (); Green (b); Lewis (); Schiffer (); Scott-Phillips (); Sellars (, ); Skyrms (, ); Tomasello (). H. L. A. Hart is one of only three philosophers whom Austin cites by name in How to do Things with Words (, n), and was one of the earliest philosophers to apply Austin's ideas (Hart, , ).  individual speakers, it is a democratic imperative that the law be public, andwhereas the usual pragmatic mechanisms for interpreting speech acts depend on cooperativity, legal contexts are adversarial (Marmor, , ; Poggi, ). These and other considerations have led some to conclude that we should avoid intentionalist accounts of legislative speech acts, opting instead for views on which the properties of these acts are determined by linguistic convention alone ("textualism") or by some combination of convention and legal principles or the purposes to which laws are put ("purposivism"). Others have argued that some role for speakers' intentions in fixing the properties of legislative speech acts is both workable and unavoidable. In social theory, speech acts have been of interest for the roles they play in the construction of various social entities and institutions. This idea is already present in the early work of Searle (, §.) and Bach and Harnish (, appendix), and Searle has developed some of the connections in his influential work on social construction (Searle, , ). Austin's ideas have also been a significant influence on Judith Butler's influential view that gender is a performative social construct (; see also Salih ). Certain categories of speech act have also held special interest for ethicists and political philosophers. A large literature has grown up around the nature of lying, for example, and some have argued that the distinction between lying and misleading is not merely of normative interest, but is also a useful diagnostic for distinguishing what speakers say from what they merely implicate. In a similar vein, much work has gone into understanding the nature of promises, not just because promises and other commitment-engendering speech acts are held to play a special role in normative ethics and political philosophy, but also because this role is sometimes held to demand a deeply normative theory of the speech act itself. A particularly rich application of speech-act theory has centered around a cluster of issues pertaining to freedom of speech. The central insight of this work is simple and compelling: many of the traditional defenses of liberal free-speech protections depend on the assumption that the function of speech is to express beliefs and share information. But the founding insight of speech-act theory is that speech Scalia () influentially defends textualism. An influential version of purposivism has been defended by Dworkin (). For an overview of the space of options and related issues, see Marmor (). E.g. Elkins (); Marmor (, ); Neale (ms). On the idea that the lying–misleading distinction can serve as a guide to the saying–implicating distinction, see, e.g., Adler (); Michaelson (); Saul (). For overviews of the literature on lying, see Mahon (); Stokke (). For an overview of the literature on the nature of promises, see Habib (). Habermas (; ) and (Raz, ) defend deeply normative accounts of a variety of speech acts on the grounds that they play an essential role in democratic institutions.  does much beside this, sometimes in ways that are easy to miss. To varying extents, recognition of this point is already baked into most legal systems, which don't grant everyone an equal right to issue commands, for example, and which don't protect incitations to violence and disorder. But speech-act theorists have argued that the upshots of this line of thought have not been fully appreciated. For example, MacKinnon, Langton, Hornsby, and others have developed an influential case against free-speech protections for pornography, on the ground that, if we take seriously the idea of pornography as speech, this speech should be understood as constituting illocutionary acts of silencing and subordinating women. Related considerations have been brought to bear on hate speech. McGowan's contribution to this volume builds on her previous arguments that certain forms of speech, including some hate speech, can change societal norms in pernicious ways as a matter of their illocutionary force. Waldron () argues, in effect, that publicly displayed hate speech works via a pair of indirect speech acts, issuing a threat aimed at its targets and a covert rallying cry to like-minded bigots. A closely related and rapidly expanding literature deals with slurs and other pejorative expressions. Here two debates converge. One debate, which dovetails with debates about hate speech, concerns the nature of the derogation or harm that seems to be consistently accomplished by the use of slurs. A second debate concerns the nature of the linguistic mechanisms by which slurs accomplish their derogative effects. Although some have argued that the derogative function of slurs can be understood as an aspect of their semantic contents, most have located the effect in some orthogonal semantic or pragmatic dimension of their use, invoking presupposition, conventional implicature, or some variety of expressive meaning. Camp () argues that slurs should be understood as devices for performing two speech acts at once-one neutral act of predicating a property of group membership, and another of casting their targets in a hateful perspective. In his contribution to this volume, Nunberg effectively agrees with this dual-speech-act view, but denies that we need to appeal to any special semantic mechanism in order to explain how these speech acts are performed. Slurs, he argues, are native to the dialects of hateful and oppressive groups; to use a slur is to mark oneself as hateful, either by virtue of belonging to one of these groups, or by means of a kind of manner implicature that See, e.g., Hornsby ();Hornsby andLangton (); Langton (, );MacKinnon (, ); Maitra (). See also Stanley () for applications of the idea of silencing to political speech, and Murray and Starr (this volume) for a functionalist account of silencing. McGowan (, , a,b, ). See also Tirrell's () work on hate speech and the Rwandan Genocide. For several other recent philosophical contributions to the literatures on free speech, censorship, hate speech, and related topics, see the essays in Maitra and McGowan (). For overviews of the slurs literature, see Hom () and Nunberg (this volume).  affiliates one with the group. Nunberg's account is interesting not just as a purely pragmatic theory of slurs, but also as a case study in how the philosophy of language can benefit from some of the explanatory resources of sociolinguistics. Another rich area of applied speech-act theory deals with speech that is less than fully cooperative-a genre that many theorists have idealized away. For example, McKinney () argues that some false confessions constitute what she calls "extracted speech"-speech acts performed unintentionally and against the speaker's will, and that are made possible by felicity conditions that have been set up and exploited in ways that serve interrogators' interests. Stanley () argues that some propaganda can be understood as involving a special kind of not-at-issue speech act, whereby the propagandist surreptitiously changes the conversational score in a way that bypasses interlocutors' consent. Several contributions to this volume develop related themes. Camp and McGowan both use uncooperative speech to build on contemporary theories of conversational score and not-at-issue content. Langton's contribution explores strategies for blocking pernicious not-at-issue contributions that have a tendency to be sneakily accommodated against some interlocutors' interests. In her contribution, Jennifer Saul argues that although some dogwhistles work by being understood in overtly differentways by different audiences, others are covert: they function by activating hearers' prejudices in ways that are outside their conscious awareness. And because these speech acts rely on unconscious, arational psychological mechanisms, they can be performed unintentionally-for example, when a newscaster unwittingly repeats a politician's covertly prejudiced buzzword. Each of these essays both highlights some of the ways in which speech-act theory can be applied to help us better understand kinds of speech that are of urgent social concern, while also showing how these applications can give us new reasons for revising or enriching our theoretical outlooks.  Speech Act Theory as an Integrated Conversation Speech-act theory has often proceeded as a series of separate conversations-one pertaining to foundational issues about the nature of communication and illocutionary force, another centered around technical and empirical issues in the semantics of non-declarative clauses, and another centered around social, moral, and political issues arising from normatively important or problematic kinds of speech. We believe that each of these conversations can succeed only when they are selfconsciously taken to be strands within a single, broader conversation about the nature and uses of speech acts. Applied speech-act theory that is not grounded in current technical, empirical, and foundational developments deprives itself of new For a similar pragmatic account, see Bolinger ().  resources and datapoints. Work on the semantics of non-declaratives that floats free of both foundational underpinnings and practical applications risks superficiality. Work on foundational issues that proceeds independently of technical, empirical, and applied issues will be overly speculative. All three conversations must proceed in parallel and with attention to what is happening in the others, if any of them can hope to get us closer to the truth. The essays collected here exemplify this integrative approach to speech-act theory, and we hope that they will inspire more work of a similar kind. References Adler, J. (). Lying, deceiving, or falsely implicating. Journal of Philosophy, ():–. Adler, J. (). Belief 's Own Ethics. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Asher, N. and Lascarides, A. (). Logics of Conversation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. Austin, J. L. (). Other minds. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, :– . Austin, J. L. (). How to do Things with Words. The Clarendon Press, Oxford. Austin, J. L. (). Performative-constative. In Caton, C. E., editor, Philosophy and Ordinary Language, pages –. University of Illinois Press, Urbana. Austin, J. L. (). Performative Utterances. In Urmson, J. O. and Warnock, G. J., editors, Philosophical Papers, chapter , pages –. Oxford University Press, Oxford, second edition. Ayer, A. J. (). Language, Truth and Logic. Gollancz, London. Bach, K. (). Thought and Reference. Oxford University Press. Bach, K. (). Intentions and demonstrations. Analysis, :–. Bach, K. (). Applying pragmatics to epistemology. Philosophical Issues, :–. Bach, K. and Harnish, R. M. (). Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. Ball, B. (). Speech acts: Natural or normative kinds. Mind & Language, ():–. Bar-On, D. (). Origins of meaning: Must we 'go gricean'? Mind and Language, ():–. Barker, C. (). Imperatives denote actions. In Guevara, A. A., Chernilovskaya, A., andNouwen, R., editors, Proceedings of Sinn and Bedeutung , chapter . MIT Working Papers in Linguistics. Beaver, D. (). Presupposition and Assertion in Dynamic Semantics. CSLI, Stanford, CA. Benton, M. (). Two more for the knowledge account of assertion. Analysis, :–. Benton, M. (a). Assertion, knowledge, and predictions. Analysis, :–. Benton, M. (b). Knowledge Norms: Assertion, Belief, and Action. PhD thesis, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ. Benton, M. (). Gricean quality. Noûs, :–. Black, M. (). Saying and disbelieving. Analysis, ():–. Bloom, P. (). How Children Learn the Meanings of Words. MIT Press. Blume, A. and Board, O. (). Language barriers. Econometrica, ():–. Boghossian, P. (). The normativity of content. Philosophical Issues, :–. Bolinger, R. (). The pragmatics of slurs. Noûs, Online First. Bradbury, J. W. and Vehrencamp, S. L. (). Principles of Animal Communication. Sinauer Associates, Sunderland, MA, second edition. Brandom, R. (). Asserting. Noûs, ():–. Brandom, R. (). Making it Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press. Brandom, R. (). Articulating Reasons. Harvard University Press. Breheny, R. (). Communication and folk psychology. Mind and Language, ():–. Buchanan, R. (). A puzzle aboutmeaning and communication. Noûs, ():–. Butler, J. (). Gender Trouble. Routledge. Camp, E. (). Slurs as dual-act expressions. In Sosa, D., editor, Bad Words. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Cappelen, H. (). Against assertion. In Brown, J. and Cappelen, H., editors, Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, pages –. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Carey, S. (). The Origin of Concepts. Oxford University Press.  Carlson, L. (). Dialogue Games: An Approach to Discourse Analysis. Number  in Synthese Language Library. D. Reidel, Dordrecht, The Netherlands. Carruthers, P. (). The Architecture of Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought. Oxford University Press. Carston, R. (). Thoughts and Utterances: The Pragmatics of Explicit Communication. Blackwell. Charlow, N. (). Restricting and embedding imperatives. In Aloni, M., Bastiaanse, H., de Jager, T., and Schulz, K., editors, Logic, Language, and Meaning: Selected Papers from the th Amsterdam Colloquium. Springer. Charlow, N. (). Logic and semantics for imperatives. Journal of Philosophical Logic, :–. Charlow, N. (). Prospects for an expressivist theory of meaning. Philosophers' Imprint, ():–. Charlow, N. (). Decision theory: Yes! truth conditions: No! In Charlow, N. and Chrisman, M., editors, Deontic Modality, pages –. OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford, UK. Cohen, P. R. and Perrault, C. R. (). Elements of a plan-based theory of speech acts. Cognitive Science, :–. Condoravdi, C. and Lauer, S. (). Imperatives: Meaning and illocutionary force. In Pinõn, C., editor, Empirical Issues in Syntax and Semantics : Papers From the Colloque de Syntaxe et Sémantique à Paris , pages –. Csibra, G. (). Recognizing communicative intentions in infancy. Mind and Language, ():– . Davidson, D. (a). Moods and performances. In Margalit, A., editor, Meaning and Use. D. Reidel, Dordrecht. Davidson, D. (b). Whatmetaphorsmean. In Sacks, S., editor, On Metaphor, pages –. University of Chicago Press, Chicago. Davis, W. (). Speaker meaning. Linguistics and Philosophy, ():–. Davis, W. (). Meaning, Expression, and Thought. Cambridge University Press. DeRose, K. (). Epistemic possibilities. Philosophical Review, :–. DeRose, K. (). Assertion, knowledge, and context. Philosophical Review, :–. DeVault, D. and Stone, M. (). Scorekeeping in an uncertain language game. In Schlangen, D. and Fernández, R., editors, Brandial : Proceedings of the th Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialogue, volume , pages –. SemDial, University of Potsdam. Devitt, M. (). Ignorance of Language. Oxford University Press. Donnellan, K. S. (). Putting humpty dumpty together again. Philosophical Review, ():–. Douven, I. (). Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility. Philosophical Review, :–. Douven, I. (). Assertion, bayes, and moore. Philosophical Studies, :–. Dummett, M. (). Frege: Philosophy of Language. Duckworth. Dworkin, R. (). Law's Empire. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Edgington, D. (). Do conditionals have truth conditions? Critica, ():–. Edgington, D. (). The mystery of the missing matter of fact. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, :–. Edgington, D. (). On conditionals. Mind, ():–. Egan, A. (). Billboards, bombs, and shotgun weddings. Synthese, ():–. Elkins, R. (). The Nature of Legislative Intent. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Engel, P. (). In what sense is knowledge the norm of assertion? Grazer Philosophische Studien, :– . Farkas, D. F. and Bruce, K. B. (). On reacting to assertions and polar questions. Journal of Semantics, :–. von Fintel, K. (). Restrictions on Quantifier Domains. PhD thesis, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Amherst, MA. von Fintel, K. (). Counterfactuals in a dynamic context. In Kenstowicz, M., editor, Ken Hale: A Life in Language, pages –.MITPress, Cambridge, MA. von Fintel, K. (ms). How to do conditional things with words. Unpublished Manuscript. von Fintel, K. and Iatridou, S. (ms). A modest proposal for the meaning of imperatives. In Arregui, A., Rivero, M., and Salanova, A. P., editors, Modality Across Semantic Categories. OxfordUniversity Press. Fodor, J. A., Bever, T. G., and Garrett, M. F. (). The Psychology of Language: An Introduction to Psycholinguistics and Generative Grammar. McGrawHill. Franke, M. (). On assertoric and directive signals and the evolution of dynamic meaning. International Review of Pragmatics, :–. Frege, G. (). Begriffsschrift, eine der Arithmetischen Nachgebildete Formelsprache des Reinen Denkens. Louis Nebert, Halle. Frege, G. (). Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophischeKritik, :–. Garía-Carpintero, M. (). Assertion and the semantics of force-markers. In Bianchi, C., editor, The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction, pages – . CSLI, Stanford, CA.  Gazdar, G. (). Speech act assignment. In Joshi, A. K., Weber, B. L., and Sag, I. A., editors, Elements of Discourse Understanding, pages –. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. Gillies, A. S. (). Counterfactual scorekeeping. Linguistics and Philosophy, ():–. Gillies, A. S. (). Iffiness. Semantics and Pragmatics, ():–. Ginzburg, J. (). The Interactive Stance: Meaning for Conversation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Glüer, K. (). Dreams and nightmares: Conventions, norms, and meaning in davidson's philosophy of language. In Kotatko, P., Pagin, P., and Segal, G., editors, Interpreting Davidson, pages –. CSLI, Stanford, CA. Glüer, K. and Wikforss, Å. (). Against content normativity. Mind, :–. Goldberg, S. (). Disagreement, defeat, and assertion. In Christensen, D. and Lackey, J., editors, The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Goldman, A. (). Theory of mind. In Margolis, E., Samuels, R., and Stich, S., editors, Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, pages –. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Green, M. (a). Moorean absurdity and showing what's within. In Green, M. and Williams, J. N., editors, Moore's Paradox: New Essays on Belief, Rationality, and the First Person, chapter , pages – . Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Green, M. S. (b). Self-Expression. Oxford University Press. Grice, H. P. (). Meaning. The Philosophical Review, ():–. Grice, H. P. (). The causal theory of perception. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, :–. Grice, H. P. (). Utterer's meaning, sentencemeaning, and word-meaning. Foundations of Language, ():–. Grice, H. P. (). Utterer's meaning and intention. The Philosophical Review, ():–. Grice, H. P. (). Logic and conversation. In Cole, P., editor, Syntax and Semantics : Pragmatics. Academic Press. Grice, P. (). Studies in the Way of Words. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. Groenendijk, J. and Stokhof, M. (). Studies on the Semantics of Questions and the Pragmatics of Answers. PhD Dissertation, Institute for Logic, Language, and Computation (ILLC), University of Amsterdam. Groenendijk, J. and Stokhof, M. (). Dynamicmontague grammar. In Kálmán, L. and Pólos, L., editors, Logic and Language. Akadémiai, Budapest. Groenendijk, J. and Stokhof, M. (). Dynamic predicate logic. Linguistics and Philosophy, :–. Gunlogson, C. (). True to Form: Rising and Falling Declaratives as Questions in English. Routledge. Habermas, J. (). Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns, Band I: Handlungsrationalität und Gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung. SuhrkampVerlag, Frankfurt am Main. Habermas, J. (). On the Pragmtics of Communication. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Habib, A. (). Promises. In Zalta, E. N., editor, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring  Edition). <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr/entries/promises/>. Hacquard, V. (). Bootstrapping attitudes. In Snider, T., editor, Proceedings of SALT , pages –. Hamblin, C. (). Questions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, :–. Hamblin, C. L. (). Mathematical models of dialogue. Theoria, :–. Hamblin, C. L. (). Questions in montague english. Foundations of Language: International Journal, ():–. Han, C. (). The Structure and Interpretation of Imperatives: Mood and Force in Universal Grammar. PhD thesis, University of Pennsylvania. Hanks, P. (). The content-force distinction. Philosophical Studies, :–. Hanks, P. W. (). Structured propositions as types. Mind, :–. Hanks, P. W. (). First-person propositions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, :–. Hanks, P. W. (). Propositional Content. Oxford University Press. Hare, R. M. (). The Language of Morals. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Harms, W. F. (a). Information and Meaning in Evolutionary Processes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. Harms, W. F. (b). Primitive content, translation, and the emergence of meaning in animal communication. In Oller, D. K. and Griebel, U., editors, Evolution of Communication Systems: A Comparative Approach,TheVienna Series inTheoretical Biology, chapter , pages –. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. Harris, D. W. (). Speech Act Theoretic Semantics. PhD Dissertation, City University of New York Graduate Center. Harris, D. W. (). Intentionalism versus the new conventionalism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy, ():–. Hart, H. L. A. (). The asctiption of responsibility and rights. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, :–.  Hart, H. L. A. (). Definition and theory in jurisprudence. The Law Quarterly Review, :–. Hausser, R. (). Surface compositionality and the semantics of mood. In Searle, J., Kiefer, F., and Bierwisch, M., editors, Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics, pages –. Reidel, Dordrecht. Hausser, R. (). The syntax and semantics of english mood. In Kiefer, F., editor, Questions and Answers, pages –. Reidel, Dordrecht. Hawthorne, J. (). Knowledge and Lotteries. Oxford University Press. Heim, I. (). The Semantics of Definite and Indefinite Noun Phrases. PhD Dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherst. Heim, I. (). File change semantics and the familiarity theory of definiteness. In Bäuerle, R., Schwarze, C., and von Stechow, A., editors, Meaning, Use and Interpretation of Language, pages – . de Gruyter, Berlin. Heim, I. (). Features on bound pronouns. In Harbour, D., Adger, D., and Bejar, S., editors, PhiTheory: Phi-Features across Modules and Interfaces. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Hinchman, E. (). Assertion, sincerity, and knowledge. Noûs, :–. Hom, C. (). Pejoratives. Philosophy Compass, ():–. Hom, C. and Schwarz, J. (). Unity and the frege– geach problem. Philosophical Studies, ():–. Hornsby, J. (). Speech acts and pornography. Women's Philosophical Review, :–. Hornsby, J. and Langton, R. (). Free speech and illocution. Legal Theory, ():–. Huttegger, S. M. (). Evolutionary explanations of indicatives and imperatives. Erkenntnis, :– . Kamp, H. (). A theory of truth and semantic representation. In Groenendijk, J., Janssen, T., and Stokhof, M., editors, Formal Methods in the Study of Language, Part , volume , pages –. Mathematical Centre Tracts, Amsterdam. Kamp, H. and Reyle, U. (). FromDiscourse to Logic. Kluwer, Dordrecht. Kaplan, D. (). Afterthoughts. In Almog, J., Perry, J., and Wettstein, H., editors, Themes from Kaplan, pages –. Oxford University Press. Karttunen, L. (). Syntax and semantics of questions. Linguistics and Philosophy, :–. Kattunen, L. (). Discourse referents. In McCawley, J. D., editor, Syntax and Semantics : Notes from the Linguistic Underground, pages –. Academic Press. Katz, J. J. (). Language and Other Abstract Objects. Rowman & Littlefield, Totowa, NJ. Kaufmann, M. (). Interpreting Imperatives. Springer. King, J. C. (). Supplementives, the coordination account, and conflicting intentions. Philosophical Perspectives, . King, J. C. (). Speaker intentions in context. Noûs, ():–. Krifka, M. (). Quantifying into question acts. Natural Language Semantics, :–. Krifka, M. (). Embedding illocutionary acts. In Roeper, T. and Speas, M., editors, Recursion: Complexity in Cognition, Studies in Theoretical Psycholinguistics, chapter , pages –. Springer. Kukla, R. (). Performative force, convention, and discursive injustice. Hypatia, (). Kukla, R. and Lance, M. (). 'Yo!' and 'Lo!': The Pragmatic Topography of the Space of Reasons. Harvard University Press. Kvanvig, J. L. (). Assertion, knowledge, and lotteries. In Greenough, P. and Pritchard, D., editors, Williamson onKnowledge, chapter , pages –. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Kvanvig, J. L. (). Norms of assertion. In Brown, J. and Cappelen, H., editors, Assertion: New Philosophical Essays, pages –. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Lackey, J. (). Norms of assertion. Noûs, ():– . Lance, M. and Kukla, R. (). 'leave the gun; take the cannoli': The pragmatic topography of secondperson calls. Ethics, ():–. Langton, R. (). Speech acts and unspeakable acts. Philosophy and Public Affairs, :–. Langton, R. (). Sexual Solipsism. OxfordUniversity Press, Oxford. Lepore, E. and Stone, M. (). Against metaphorical meaning. Topoi. Lepore, E. and Stone, M. (). Imagination and Convention. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Levinson, S. (). Pragmatics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. Lewis, D. K. (). Convention: A Philosophical Study. Harvard University Press. Lewis, D. K. (). General semantics. Synthese, (/):–. Lewis, D. K. (). A problem about permission. In et. al., E. S., editor, Essays in Honour of Jakko Hintikka. D. Reidel, Dordrecht, The Netherlands. Lewis, D. K. (). Scorekeeping in a language game. Journal of Philosophical Logic, ():–. Lewis, K. (). Understanding Dynamic Discourse. PhD Dissertation, Rutgers University. Lewis, K. (). Discourse dynamics, pragmatics, and indefinites. Philosophical Studies, ():–. Lewis, K. (). Do we need dynamic semantics? In Burgess, A. and Sherman, B., editors, Metasemantics. Oxford University Press.  MacFarlane, J. (). What is assertion? In Brown, J. and Cappelen, H., editors, Assertion, pages –. Oxford University Press. MacFarlane, J. (). Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications. Oxford University Press. MacKinnon, C. (). Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, chapter . Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. MacKinnon, C. (). Only Words. Harvard University Press. Mahon, J. E. (). The definition of lying and deception. In Zalta, E. N., editor, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter  Edition). <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win/entries/lyingdefinition/>. Maitra, I. (). Subordinating speech. In Maitra, I. and McGowan, M. K., editors, Speech and Harm, pages –. Oxford University Press. Maitra, I. and McGowan, M. K., editors (). Speech and Harm: Controversies over Free Speech. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Maitra, I. andWeatherson, B. (). Assertion, knowledge, and action. Philosophical Studies, ():– . Marmor, A. (). Interpretation and Legal Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Marmor, A. (). The pragmatics of legal language. Ratio Juris, :–. Marmor, A. (). Introduction. In Marmor, A. and Soames, S., editors, Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Marmor, A. (). The Language of Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. McGlynn, A. (). Knowledge First? Palgrave Macmillan. McGowan, M. K. (). Conversational exercitives and the force of pornography. Philosophy & Public Affairs, ():–. McGowan, M. K. (). Conversational exercitives: Something else we do with our words. Linguistics and Philosophy, ():–. McGowan, M. K. (a). On silencing and sexual refusal. Journal of Political Philosophy, ():–. McGowan, M. K. (b). Oppressive speech. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ():–. McGowan, M. K. (). On 'whites only' signs and racist hate speech: Verbal acts of racial discrimination. In Maitra, I. and McGowan, M. K., editors, Speech and Harm, pages –. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. McKinney, R. (). Extracted speech. Social Theory and Practice, ():–. McKinnon, R. (). The Norms of Assertion: Truth, Lies, and Warrant. Palgrave Macmillan. Michaelson, E. (). This and That: On the Semantics and Pragmatics of Highly Context-Sensitive Terms. PhD thesis, University of California, Los Angeles. Michaelson, E. (). The lying test. Mind and Language, ():–. Millikan, R. G. (). Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories. MIT Press. Millikan, R. G. (). Proper function and convention in speech acts. In Hahn, L. E., editor, The Philosophy of Peter F. Strawson, The Library of Living Philosophers, pages –. Open Court, LaSalle, Illinois. Millikan, R. G. (). Language: A Biological Model. Oxford University Press. Montgomery, B. (). In defense of assertion. Philosophical Studies, ():–. Moore, R. (). Meaning and ostension in great ape gestural communication. Animal Cognition, ():–. Moore, R. (MS). Gricean communication and cognitive development. Unpublished Manuscript, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology. Murray, S. E. (). Varieties of update. Semantics and Pragmatics, ():–. Murray, S. E. and Starr, W. B. (MS). The structure of communicative acts. Unpublished Manuscript, Online at <https://www.dropbox.com/s/ctfstqvplrdqs/TheStructure-of-Communicative-Acts.pdf?dl=>. Neale, S. (). This, that, and the other. In Bezuidenhout, A. and Reimer, M., editors, Descriptions and Beyond, pages –. Oxford University Press. Neale, S. (). Pragmatism and binding. In Szabó, Z. G., editor, Semantics versus Pragmatics, pages –. Oxford University Press. Neale, S. (). Heavy hands, magic, and scenereading traps. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, ():–. Neale, S. (ms). Textualism with intent. Unpublished Manuscript. Nickel, B. (). Dynamics, brandom-style. Philosophical Studies, ():–. Ninan, D. (). Two puzzles about deontic necessity. In Nickel, B., Yalcin, S., Gajewski, J., and Hacquard, V., editors, New Work on Modality, pages –. MIT Working Papers in Linguistics. Norcross, A. (). Act-utilitarianism and promissory obligation. In Scheinman, H., editor, Promises and Agreements: Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. Onishi, K. and Baillargeon, R. (). Do -montholds understand false beliefs. Science, :–. Pagin, P. (). Information and assertoric force. In Brown, J. and Cappelen, H., editors, Assertion, pages –. Oxford University Press.  Pagin, P. (). Assertion. In Zalta, E. N., editor, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter  Edition). URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win/entries/assertion/>. Pelling, C. (). Assertion and the provision of knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly, :–. Pérez Carballo, A. and Santorio, P. (). Communication for expressivists. Ethics, ():–. Pinker, S., Nowak, M., and Lee, J. (). The logic of indirect speech. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, ():–. Poggi, F. (). Law and conversational implicature. International Journal for the Semiotics of Law, :– . Portner, P. (). The semantics of imperatives within a theory of clause-types. InWatanabe, K. andYoung, R., editors, Proceedings of SALT . CLC Publications. Portner, P. (). Imperatives and modals. Natural Language Semantics, :–. Portner, P. (). Permission and choice. In Grewendorf, G. and Zimmermann, T., editors, Discourse and Grammar: From Sentence Types to Lexical Categories. Mouton de Gruyter. Potts, C. (). The Logic of Conventional Implicatures. Oxford University Press. Raz, J. (). The Morality of Freedom. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Reiland, I. (). Propositional attitudes and mental acts. Thought, :–. Reiland, I. (). review of propositional content by peter hanks. Philosophical Review, :–. Reynolds, S. L. (). Testimony, knowledge, and epistemic goals. Philosophical Studies, ():–. Roberts, C. (). Demonstratives as definites. In van Deemyer, K. and Kibble, R., editors, Information Sharing, pages –. CSLI. Roberts, C. (). Uniqueness in definite noun phrases. Linguistics and Philosophy, :–. Roberts, C. (). Context in dynamic interpretation. In Horn, L. and Ward, G., editors, The Handbook of Pragmatics, pages –. Blackwell. Roberts, C. (). Pronouns as definites. In Reimer, M. and Bezuidenhout, A., editors, Descriptions and Beyond, pages –. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Roberts, C. (). Information structure in discourse: Toward an integrated formal theory of pragmatics. Semantics and Pragmatics, :–. Roberts, C. (a). Accommodation in a language game. In Loewer, B. and Schaffer, J., editors, A Companion to David Lewis, pages –. WileyBlackwell, Oxford, UK. Roberts, C. (b). Conditional plans and imperatives: A semantics and pragmatics for imperative mood. In Brochhagen, T., Roelofsen, F., and Theiler, N., editors, Proceedings of the th Amsterdam Colloquium, pages –. Roberts, C. (). Speech acts in discourse context. In Fogal, D., Harris, D., and Moss, M., editors, New Work on Speech Acts, Oxford, UK. Oxford University Press. Rosenthal, D. M. (). Intentionality. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, :–. Sadock, J. (). Toward a Linguistic Theory of Speech Acts. Academic Press. Salih, S. (). On judith butler and performativity. In Lovaas, K. E. and Jenkins, M. M., editors, Sexualities and Communication in Everyday Life, chapter , pages –. Sage. Saul, J. (). Lying, Misleading, and What is Said: An Exploration in Philosophy of Language and in Ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Scalia, A. (). A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Scanlon, T. M. (). Promises and practices. Philosophy and Public Affairs, ():–. Scanlon, T.M. (). What We Owe Each Other. Cambridge University Press. Schaffer, J. (). Knowledge in the image of assertion. Philosophical Issues, :–. Schiffer, S. (). Meaning. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Schiffer, S. (). Indexicals and the theory of reference. Synthese, ():–. Schiffer, S. (). Intention-based semantics. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, ():–. Schiffer, S. (). The Things We Mean. Oxford University Press. Schroeder, M. (). Noncognitivism in Ethics. Routledge, Oxford and New York. Scott-Phillips, T. (). Speaking Our Minds: Why Human Communication is Different, and How Language Evolved to Make it Special. Palgrave Macmillan. Searle, J. (). What is a speech act? In Black, M., editor, Philosophy in America, pages –. Allen and Unwin, London. Searle, J. (). Austin on locutionary and illocutionary acts. The Philosophical Review, ():–. Searle, J. (). Speech Acts. Cambridge University Press, London. Searle, J. (). A taxonomy of illocutionary acts. In Gunderson, K., editor, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, volume VII of Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, pages –. University of Minnesota Press. Searle, J. (). The Construction of Social Reality. The Free Press, New York. Searle, J. (). Making the Social World. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.  Searle, J. and Vanderveken, D. (). Foundations of Illocutionary Logic. Cambridge University Press. Sellars, W. (). Some reflections on language games. Philosophy of Science, ():–. Sellars, W. (). Empiricism and the philosophy of mind. In Feigl, H. and Scriven, M., editors, The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, volume  ofMinnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, pages –. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. Skyrms, B. (). Evolution of the Social Contract. Cambridge University Press. Skyrms, B. (). Signals. Oxford University Press. Slote, M. (). Assertion and belief. In Dancy, J., editor, Papers on Logic and Language, pages –. Keele University Library, Keele. Sosa, D. (). Dubious assertions. Philosophical Studies, :–. Sperber, D. (). Metarepresentations in an evolutionary perspective. In Sperber, D., editor, Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective, pages –. Oxford University Press. Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (). Relevance: Communication andCognition. Blackwell, Oxford,  edition. Stalnaker, R. (). Assertion. In Cole, P., editor, Syntax and Semantics , pages –. Academic Press, New York. Stalnaker, R. (). On the representation of context. Journal of Logic, Language, and Information, ():– . Stalnaker, R. (). Context and Content. Oxford University Press. Stalnaker, R. (). Context. Context and Content. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Stanley, J. (). Knowledge and Practical Interests. Oxford University Press. Stanley, J. (). Knowledge and certainty. Philosophical Issues, :–. Stanley, J. (). The ways of silencing. The New York Times. Stanley, J. (). How Propaganda Works. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Starr, W. (a). Conjoined imperatives and declaratives. In Proceedings from Sinn and Bedeutung . University of Edinburgh. Starr, W. (ms). A prference semantics for imperatives. Unpublished Manuscript. Starr, W. B. (). Conditionals, Meaning and Mood. PhD thesis, Rutgers University. Starr, W. B. (). Mood, force, and truth. Protosociology, :–. Starr, W. B. (b). Dynamic expressivism about deontic modality. In Charlow, N. and Chrisman, M., editors, Deontic Modality. Oxford University Press. Stevenson, C. L. (). The emotivemeaning of ethical terms. Mind, ():–. Stevenson, C. L. (). Ethics and Language. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. Stokke, A. (). Lying, deceiving, and misleading. Philosophy Compass, ():–. Stokke, A. (). review of propositional content by peter hanks. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Strawson, P. F. (). Intention and convention in speech acts. The Philosophical Review, ():– . Swanson, E. (). The application of constraint semantics to the language of subjective uncertainty. Journal of Philosophical Logic, ():–. Thomason, R. H. (). Accommodation, meaning, and implicature: Interdisciplinary foundations for pragmatics. In Philip. R. Cohen, J. M. and Pollack, M. E., editors, Intentions in Communication, chapter , pages –.MIT Press, Cambridge,Mass. Tirrell, L. (). Genocidal language games. InMaitra, I. and McGowan, M. K., editors, Speech and Harm, pages –. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. Tomasello, M. (). Origins of Human Communication. MIT Press. Turri, J. (). Epistemic invariantism and speech act contextualism. Philosophical Review, :–. Turri, J. (). The express knowledge account of assertion. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ():–. Turri, J. (). Knowledge and the norm of assertion. Synthese, :–. Unger, P. (). Ignorance: A Case for Skepticism. Oxford University Press. Unnsteinsson, E. (). A gricean theory of malaprops. Mind and Language, forthcoming. Veltman, F. (). Defaults in update semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, ():–. Waldron, J. (). LawandDisagreement. OxfordUniversity Pressx, Oxford, UK. Weiner, M. (). Must we know what we say? Philosophical Review, :–. Wikforss, Å. (). Semantic normativity. Philosophical Studies, :–. Willer, M. (). Dynamics of epistemic modality. Philosophical Review, ():–. Willer, M. (). Dynamic thoughts on ifs and oughts. Philosophers' Imprint, ():–. Willer, M. (). An update on epistemic modals. Journal of Philosophical Logic, Online First. Williamson, T. (). Knowing and asserting. Philosophical Review, :–. Williamson, T. (). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press. Wittgenstein, L. (). Philosophical Investigations. Blackwell, Oxford. Yalcin, S. (). Epistemic modals. Mind, ():–.  Yalcin, S. (). Bayesian expressivism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, ():–. Yalcin, S. (). Epistemic modality de re. Ergo, ():–. Zanuttini, R., Pak, M., and Portner, P. (). A syntactic analysis of interpretive restrictions on imperative, promissive, and exhortative subjects. Natural Language & Linguistic Theory, ():–. Zollman, K. J. S. (). Separating directives and assertions using simple signaling games. The Journal of Philosophy, ():–. 

The New LeDoux: Survival Circuits, and the Surplus Meaning of 'Fear' Raamy Majeed University of Auckland Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming) ABSTRACT: LeDoux's (1996) pioneering work on the neurobiology of fear has played a crucial role in informing debates in the philosophy of emotion. For example, it plays a key part in Griffiths's (1997) argument for why emotions don't form a natural kind. Likewise, it is employed by Faucher and Tappolet (2002) to defend pro-emotion views, which claim that emotions aid reasoning (de Sousa 1987, Damasio 1994). LeDoux, however, now argues that his work has been misread (2012, 2016, 2017, 2019). He argues that using emotion terms, like 'fear', to describe neuro-cognitive data adds a "surplus meaning": it attributes phenomenal properties to survival circuits which they don't possess. This paper aims to explore LeDoux's new proposal, and examine the potentially devastating consequences that ensue for the aforementioned views. I end by addressing the worry that these lessons are conditional on LeDoux's own higher-order theory of emotional consciousness being true. KEYWORDS: emotion; consciousness; fear; LeDoux; natural kinds; attention 1. Introduction Neuro-cognitive data concerning the way the brain processes and responds to threat, especially LeDoux's pioneering work outlined in The Emotional Brain: The Mysterious Underpinnings of Emotional Life (1996), has played a crucial role in informing debates in the 1 philosophy of emotion. Much of the philosophical draw here centres on what this data tells us about the neurobiology of emotion, especially how the brain generates fear. LeDoux's work has proved relevant because he is often credited with discovering that the amygdala is the "source" of fear. Two clarifications. First, as I understand it, this claim is not intended to convey that the amygdala is merely one of the causal factors that contribute to fear. Rather, the claim is something more substantial, i.e. the amygdala is the central underlying causal mechanism responsible for fear. Second understood this way, the claim should not be taken literally. As LeDoux (2016) clarifies, brain functions are to do with brain systems, involving neural circuits, not brain areas. (The talk of brain areas is a hangover from the time when we could only study brain functions based on the effects of brain lesions in specific areas). So claims about the "source" of fear are best understood as claims about the neural circuitry that generate fear. Thus understood, current neurocognitive data, including that of LeDoux, is said to provide us with good empirical grounds to suppose that the neural circuitry that generate fear concern subcortical regions of the brain, especially the amygdala. Another feature of relevance concerns the different ways in which the brain generates fear. Here LeDoux's work is understood to have demonstrated that there are in fact two distinct neural circuits involved in generating fear responses: (i) a thalamus-to-amygdala circuit, which bypasses the cortex, is 'quick and dirty', and occurs without the conscious experience of the stimulus, and (ii) a thalamus-to-cortex-to-amygdala circuit, which is slow, and occurs with the conscious experience of the stimulus. These interpretations of LeDoux's findings, and similar interpretations of other neuro-cognitive data concerning 2 the amygdala, have seeped into the philosophical literature, and are employed to further various theoretical ends. Perhaps this is most evident in the evolutionary developmental approach to emotion pioneered by Griffiths (1997). In brief, Griffiths reads the existence of the quick and dirty route to emotion-generation as evidence for what the psychologist Tomkins (1962) described as "affect programs": roughly, an innate neural circuitry, passed down from our ancestors, possibly having certain mechanisms in common with some other animals, and which are responsible for our emotional responses. Drawing on the work of Ekman (1972, 1 1973, 1980), Griffiths uses this notion of affect programs to argue both for the existence of basic emotions and against the idea that the things picked out by our vernacular category of emotion form a natural kind. Very roughly, basic emotions are those generated by affect programs, and 'emotions' don't refer to a natural kind for it picks out cognitively complex emotions and certain kinds of social pretences, as well as the basic emotions generated by the affect programs.2 LeDoux's work has also found a new lease on life in recent arguments for the proemotion thesis: the view that emotions aid practical reasoning. There are a series of distinct views which fall under the pro-emotion umbrella, but most share the assumption that emotions aid reasoning by modulating attention. The original proponents of this view, e.g. de Sousa (1987) and Damasio (1994), argue that emotions help with decision-making by In earlier work, Griffiths (1997) relies on various neuro-cognitive data on threat circuitry but 1 doesn't cite LeDoux, whereas he makes explicit reference to LeDoux (1996) in subsequent work, e.g. see Griffiths (2002, 2004a). For Griffiths, complex emotions, roughly, are those that involve responding in "a more 2 cognitively complex way to more highly analyzed information" (2002: 394). 3 drawing our attention to some response-options over others. This hypothesis has wellknown problems, a major one being that it arguably doesn't stand up to empirical scrutiny. Similar, though crucially distinct, pro-emotion theses, however, have been 3 proposed, and with empirical backing. In their survey paper, Faucher and Tappolet (2002), for instance, point to a series of findings, including LeDoux (1996), to argue that emotions, in particular fear and anxiety, modulate our attention of visual stimuli, and do so in ways that might aid certain developmental ends. The trouble is, such philosophical implications of the neuro-cognitive data possibly stem from a misunderstanding. In recent work, LeDoux (2012, 2016, 2017, 2019) argues that this data has been misread owing to the way scientists talk about their research. He takes his own work as an example: In retrospect, I now believe that it was a mistake to use the expression "fear system" to describe the role of the amygdala in detecting and responding to threats, and also erroneous to talk about fear stimuli and fear responses in this context. (LeDoux 2016: 36) Crucially, the mistake stems not from new and contradicting empirical findings, but rather from the way scientists talk about, and sometimes conceptualise, the existing data. In particular, it stems from using mental state terms to describe the function of brain circuits, which in turn inflicts the data with a "surplus meaning": roughly, the attribution of The majority of critiques focus on Damasio, e.g. see Evans (2002), Dunn, Dalgleish, and Lawrence 3 (2006), Gerrans (2007), Linquist and Bartol (2013), and Bartol and Linquist (2015). But see Ransom (2016) for a challenge directed specially at de Sousa. Also see AUTHOR (XXXX) for a discussion of the differences between de Sousa and Damasio's proposals, as well as a brief response to Ransom. 4 psychological properties to these circuits which they don't posses. With respect to the neural circuitry that deals with threat, describing it as a "fear system" suggests (incorrectly) that it is the same as the circuitry that underly the conscious experience of fear. Philosophers who typically take conscious experience to be an essential component of emotion, then, seem to be committing an error when they rely on LeDoux, and similar empirical research, to proffer their preferred theories of emotion. This paper aims to 4 investigate this error. In what follows, I disentangle the neuro-cognitive data which is at the heart of LeDoux's diagnosis from the broader revisionist project, i.e. of reframing scientific terminology, which he offers as a remedy (§2). I then reapply the lessons from the data, free of the erroneous readings, to two areas where they have proved crucial: the debate on whether emotions form a natural kind (§3), and pro-emotion views which state that emotions aid reasoning by modulating attention (§4). Finally, I end by addressing the worry that these lessons are conditional on LeDoux's own higher-order theory of emotional consciousness being true (§5). 2. The Surplus Meaning of 'Fear' The view that emotional experience is essential to emotion is the assumed view in current 4 philosophy, e.g. see Deonna and Teroni (2012), but is also prevalent amongst scientists, including Freud (1915), Clore (1994), Frijda (1999), Russell (2003) and Barret (2009). For a rival view, see Prinz (2004). 5 LeDoux's recent work on rethinking the emotional brain can be summed up as follows. The use of emotion terms to describe various brain systems attributes to these systems psychological properties which they don't possess; in particular, it attributes to them the conscious subjective feelings that typically accompany our emotional responses. Fear is a central example. Describing the defensive survival circuitry which triggers our threat responses as "fear circuits" attributes to them, amongst other things, the conscious, subjective feelings of fear. This is misleading because, though the survival circuitry influences our conscious feelings of fear, the circuitry that underly such feelings is something altogether distinct. One way to correct this is to reserve emotion terms for subjective feelings. Note that there are four distinct claims being made here, which are all part of LeDoux's revisionary project: (i) a claim about a misunderstanding in the literature, (ii) the related empirical claim about what justifies this reading, (iii) a diagnosis of what causes the misunderstanding, and (iv) a recommendation for how to preempt future misunderstanding. Consider the example of fear: The vernacular meaning of emotion words is simply too strong. When we hear the word 'fear', the default interpretation is the conscious experience of being in danger, and this meaning dominates. For example, although I consistently emphasized that the amygdala circuits operate nonconsciously, I was often described in both lay and scientific contexts as having shown how feelings of fear emerge from the amygdala. Even researchers working in the objective tradition sometimes appear confused about what they mean by fear. (LeDoux 2017: 303) 6 The neurobiological account of how the brain processes threat, as outlined in LeDoux (1996) and elsewhere, concerns how certain defensive survival circuits in the brain respond to threatening stimuli. (i*) This account is read by philosophers and many in the scientific community as an account concerning the emotion fear, where 'fear' picks out, amongst other things, the conscious feeling of fear. (ii*) This reading, however, is problematic because although the threat circuitry modulates the kinds of fearful feelings we experience, actual conscious experiences of fear are caused by a distinct neural system. For example, the cortical circuits, which give rise to the subjective feelings of emotion, need not always be activated when the threat circuitry triggers its defensive responses. (iii*) The misreading stems from the way LeDoux, as well as others, describe the threat circuity: employing terminology like the "fear system" inflicts the neuro-cognitive data with a surplus meaning, i.e. we treat the system not just as that which triggers our defensive responses but also the subjective feeling of fear. (iv*) A way to avoid this confusion is to reserve the term 'fear' for the conscious feeling of fear. LeDoux (2012, 2016) is at pains to note that this revisionist project aims not to redefine or explain emotions but to provide a way to move forward in a scientific study of our survival circuitry without incurring the aforementioned kinds of confusion. Nevertheless, in future work, he also appears to endorse a stronger position: "subjective emotional experience, the feeling, is the essence of an emotion" (LeDoux and Hoffman 2018: 67). The former is a pragmatic position about scientific practice, whereas the latter, intended or not, amounts to a substantive metaphysical hypothesis. Both claims are important and worthy of attention but will be kept aside, as the the philosophical implications which we will be concerned with in this paper can be brought out by simply 7 focussing on claims (i), (ii) and (iii). The philosophical confusions that result from misreading the empirical data are best seen by example, which will be the topic of the next two sections, but for the remainder of this section, let me say a bit more about the data itself and how it has been misread. In very simple terms, the data is misread because it doesn't speak to emotional experience while it is interpreted as doing just this. Now, there are well-known reasons why we think that third-person scientific methodology cannot give us direct access to firstperson introspectable conscious experience. The problem that concerns us is not anything 5 near as grand. The problem for us isn't that we cannot directly read off claims about emotional experience from neuro-cognitive data, but that the specific data in question doesn't give us anything resembling even a third-person science of emotional experience. To elaborate, LeDoux accepts that verbal reports give us adequate means to study conscious experience: "the hallmark of conscious states in humans is that they can be reported" (2016: 149). The problem is that the neural circuitry that underly our emotional responses are distinct from those responsible for our emotions experiences, which we can measure by verbal reports. In the case of fear, this problem isn't really new. As LeDoux (2016) notes, the scientific press, e.g. Nature, Science, Wired, Scientific American and Discover, have all recently run stories which counter what they suppose to be orthodoxy, viz. that the amygdala is the source of fear - where 'fear' is intended to mean the feeling of fear. Based on findings by Feinstein et al (2013), fear, they report, can be experienced by a subject with bilateral amygdala damage. These reports, however, only have the shock-value they do on the basis See Nagel (1974), Jackson (1982) and Chalmers (1995).5 8 of the surplus reading; when we suppose that the survival circuits that underly our threat responses, and for which the amygdala plays a key role, are also what constitutes the feeling of fear. What LeDoux is at pains to convey is that what these reports assume to be orthodoxy itself rests on a misunderstanding. The surplus reading of the old empirical literature is mistaken because the survival circuits that trigger our defensive responses come apart from the neural circuitry that underly the conscious feeling of fear. The new findings, e.g. by Feinstein et al (2013), strengthens, rather than undermines, this. For LeDoux (2017), the main reason to suppose that these circuitries come apart has to do with the fact that it accounts for a whole host of puzzles in the field: 1) The feelings of fear don't correlate well with measures of behavioural and physiological defence responses.6 2) Patients with damage to the amygdala don't manifest the physiological defence responses but still feel fear.7 3) Threats processed unconsciously still trigger the amygdala and activate the defence responses even when the subject lacks the feeling of fear.8 4) The feeling of fear is not tied to a single subcortical circuit.9 LeDoux (2016), LeDoux and Brown (2017), and LeDoux and Hoffman (2018).6 See Feinstein et al (2013) but also Anderson and Phelps (2002) for a discussion of the relationship 7 between the amygdala and subjective experiences more broadly. Ohman (2002), Tamietto and Gelder (2010), and Bornemann et al (2012).8 LeDoux (2016, 2019), and LeDoux and Brown (2017).9 9 5) Drug discovery based on the defence responses of animals comes up with medications that are more likely to alter behavioural tendencies than the feelings of fear.10 These findings undercut the presupposition that the amygdala, and survival circuits more broadly, are the main source of the conscious feeling of fear. One further point to note is that they do so without the need to assume a positive theory of what in fact underlies the conscious experience of fear. As we shall see in the final section, LeDoux does offer a positive account of emotional consciousness, which strengthens the existing reasons for a separation between survival circuits and those which underly the feelings of fear. Nevertheless, the proceeding philosophical implications of LeDoux's recent work can be drawn out without the need to buy into his more controversial views concerning emotional consciousness. 3. The Natural Kind Debate In his seminal book, What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories, Griffiths (1997) argues that emotions don't form a natural kind. As Griffiths (2002) explains, this matters because philosophers of emotion often take as their aims the genesis, development and consequences of a 'typical' emotion. If emotions don't form a natural kind, these projects are doomed from the onset for there won't be any such thing as a typical emotion. See LeDoux and Pine (2016), Pine and LeDoux (2017), and Fanselow and Pennington (2018) for a 10 critique. 10 Griffiths's argument for this controversial position is broken into two parts. In the first part, he develops a "psychoevolutionary" approach to emotion, and in the second he provides an exposition of the notion of natural kinds at play in the natural sciences. Let us take each in turn. In part one, Griffiths puts more meat on the bones of the the psychoevolutionary approach to emotion he develops earlier (1990), which he takes to be Darwinian in conception. Here, and in future work, he draws on Darwin (1859, 1872), but more so on the Darwin-inspired work on the facial expression of emotion developed by Ekman (1972, 1973, 1980), to defend the existence of Tomkin's affect programs: "short-term, stereotypical responses involving facial expression, autonomic nervous system arousal, and other elements. The same patterns of response occur in all cultures and homologues are found in related species" (Griffiths 1997: 8). Griffiths, following Ekman, sometimes refers to these responses as 'basic emotions', and following Ekman's list, takes them to include anger, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise and disgust.11 While Tomkins regarded affect programs as being hypothetical, Griffiths, along with Ekman, endorses a realist position which rests on an argument from abduction. In brief, affect program responses possess certain characteristics: they are both complex and coordinated, occur very quickly after the stimulus is registered, and are typically involuntary. These features can be best explained by the existence of "a single neural program that is triggered by the stimulus and controls the various elements of the Ekman's (1999) updated list includes 16 basic emotions.11 11 unfolding response" (pg. 84). In subsequent work (2004a), Griffiths cites LeDoux (1996) in support for there being a neural basis for the affect programs concerning fear.12 The other significant development in part one concerns the contrast between basic emotions and other kinds of responses that fall under the vernacular category of emotion. These include more cognitively-involving emotions or what he laters calls "complex emotions" (2002), e.g. jealousy, and various forms of social pretences, like love. Crucially, Griffiths argues that these kinds of responses don't share enough similarities to be unified under one emotion banner. For example, whilst the affect program responses may affect complex emotions, these two kinds of responses come apart: affect programs can be triggered sans the complex emotions, and vice versa. The affect programs, ergo, can't be said to underly all of the kinds of things picked out by our ordinary emotion terms. In part two, Griffiths develops what he takes to be the notion of natural kinds at play in the natural sciences: kinds which are useful for explanation and induction. This notion of natural kinds is distinct from that employed in metaphysics, i.e. the kinds of things which 'carve nature at its joints'. Instead, drawing on Goodman (1954) and Boyd (1991), Griffiths endorses a "theory view" of kind terms, the basic idea being that our categorisation of things into kinds aims to locate "projectable properties", roughly a Or more accurately, Griffiths takes LeDoux (1996) to have confirmed a twin-pathway 12 neurobiological account of fear, where the first pathway lends support for the existence of affect programs concerning fear. 12 "cluster of correlated properties and that we can offer some defeasible justification for extrapolating those correlations" (Griffiths 2004b: 906).13 Natural kinds in this sense are supposed to be domain specific. A natural kind in nosology, for example, might not offer the kinds of property clusters that would allow for induction and explanation in physics. That said, much of Griffiths's discussion of the natural kinds that should be at play in psychology, and thereby of relevance for an investigation into emotion, is informed by the notion in evolutionary biology. To elaborate, according to Griffiths, "the purpose of categorization in the sciences is to group together things which resemble one another in many different ways because of some underlying, similarity-generating mechanism" (1997: 16). It is the existence of such shared underlying mechanisms that offer (defeasible) justification for extrapolation. Moreover, a possible way to facilitate research into these underlying mechanisms is to categorise things using the notion of evolutionary homology (shared ancestry) in contrast to analogy (shared function). In more detail: A homologue is "The same organ in different animals under every variety of form and function." (Owen, 1843: 374), a definition interpreted since Darwin to mean that these organs are descended from a common ancestral form. Analogies are cases where two unrelated structures resemble one another because natural selection has adapted them for the same ecological role. (Griffiths 2002: 396) In later work, Griffiths (2004b) opts to use Brigandt's (2003) term 'investigative kinds' in order to 13 distance his account from other notions of natural kinds. See Hacking (2007) for an overview of the various conceptions of natural kinds. 13 For example, the wings of a fruit bat are analogous to those of a pigeon, as the resemblances between them are a product of being adapted for the same ecological role, viz. work amongst branches. However, these wings aren't homologous with each other because they don't result from the same ancestral form. What is important to note here is that contra classifications based analogy, those based on homology are 'deep'. Despite superficial differences, even when the function has been transformed, there is more convergence in the underlying mechanisms. For this reason, Griffiths argues that natural kinds should be classified on the basis of homology not analogy, for only the former provide us with resemblances of an underlying (causal) mechanism which is crucial for scientific explanation and induction. This holds true for natural kinds in evolutionary biology, but also for such kinds in psychology, and thereby informs the psychoevolutionary approach to emotion spelt out earlier. On the basis of parts one and two, Griffiths goes on to argue that only affect programs should count as natural kinds, as only they can be grouped together on the basis of having homologous traits. Moreover, since the other things referred to as 'emotion' can't be grouped together on the basis of homology, nor have a shared basis in basic emotions which do have such a basis, emotions, i.e. as a whole, don't form a natural kind. That is, while some emotion types, e.g. 'fear', might form natural kinds, the category 'emotion' doesn't. There is, it turns out, no such thing as a typical emotion. 14 Griffiths's final conclusion is stronger: he runs together the idea that emotions don't form a 14 natural kind with the claim that the category of emotion should be eliminated. As several commentators have observed, eliminativism is a far more controversial position, which is not entailed by his overall argument, e.g. see Solomon (1999). I turn to this issue at the end of the section. 14 How much this should prove a threat to a philosophy of emotion depends on whether it shares the same subject-matter as the psychoevolutionary approach to emotion. It is at this very juncture that the surplus meaning of emotion terms threatens the discourse. Philosophers, as we noted, tend to view the subjective experience of an emotion as being either the essence or an essential component of an emotion. Lessons from Griffiths's extended Darwinian approach to emotion, then, need only take hold if his account speaks to this concern. All philosophical responses to Griffiths, as far as I can tell, assume that it does. Nevertheless, the textual evidence for this is shaky at best. 15 Part of the problem is that the psychoevolutionary approach to emotion neglects the phenomenology of emotion. The other is that when Griffiths does mention emotional experience within the context of this approach, his position isn't entirely consistent: i) Emotion feelings and cognitive phenomena such as the directing of attention are obvious candidates to be added to this list [of affect program responses]. (Griffiths 1997: 77) ii) The output of perceptual systems is a mental event, a perception, whereas that of the emotion system is behavioral. (Griffiths 1997: 94) iii) The affect program theory can (and should) incorporate emotional feelings either as an additional element of the program or as the perception of the physiological elements of the program. (Griffiths 1997: 121) Griffiths (1997), then, seems to be wavering between three distinction positions on how emotional feelings stand with respect to the coordinated set of changes that constitute the See Deonna and Teroni (2012: §2) for a sample. 15 15 affect program responses. Roughly, these feelings are (i) relevant, (ii) irrelevant or (iii) essential features of our affect program responses. At face value, the lesson is that Griffiths doesn't hold a consistent view on emotional feelings vis-a-vis affect programs. A more charitable reading has it that emotional feelings aren't the primary explanatory targets of the psychoevolutionary approach to emotion, which seeks to draw on neuroscience and evolutionary biology to offer a psychological science of the emotions. Insofar as the sciences are in the business of studying third-person accessible physiological and behavioural responses, as opposed to first-person accessible phenomenally conscious experiences, the neglect is understandable. Nevertheless, it does little address the present concern, i.e. whether Griffiths's position should inform a philosophy of emotion. The reason to suppose that it does stems from the assumption made by Griffiths that these physiological and behavioural responses coincide with the phenomenology of emotion. This is evident from the third position, but also from the way he draws on Ekman to develop his account of affect programs: The psychoevolutionary theory describes a set of well-defined physiological responses that can be used to create a new classification of emotional responses. Ekman and his coworkers call the responses they have isolated fear, anger, joy, surprise, disgust and sadness. They use these traditional labels because the new categories coincide more or less well with the occurrent, phenomenologically salient instances of these traditional categories. I shall refer to these six categories as the affect-program responses. (Griffiths 1990: 189, my italics) Both Ekman and Griffiths assume that the physiological responses that are a part of the affect programs coincide with emotional feelings. On this assumption, empirical 16 discoveries about affect programs do have implications for a philosophy of emotion. However, whether the assumption itself is justified is a different matter. One important lesson from LeDoux's recent work is that this assumption is now found to be incorrect. The threat circuitry, which concerns the amygdala and is responsible for the affect program responses, comes apart from the subjective experiences of emotion. Though the neural circuitry that trigger these responses can affect our subjective experiences and alter them in various ways, the conscious experience of emotion is grounded in a different neural circuitry. The upshot is that discoveries about affect programs don't generalise to emotional feelings. The point can also be made in another way. It is plausible that both Ekman and Griffiths, in their discussion of affect programs, take 'fear' to refer to a property cluster, which includes the conscious experience of fear, as well as our defensive responses generated by the survival circuits. Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, Griffiths also assumes 'fear', like other kind categories, can only be categorised using such property clusters if the properties in question co-occur due to an underlying causal mechanism. (Recall, the purpose of categorisation is to allow extrapolation from observed to unobserved instances, which is justified only if the properties co-occur due to such shared mechanisms). It is precisely this assumption which is now shown to be false. While phenomenological and physiological properties associated with fear do typically co-occur, they result from distinct causal mechanisms, which in turn means that we can no longer group things together as 'fear' on the basis of such property clusters. As a result, we can no longer justifiably suppose that discoveries about the affect programs that control our defensive responses hold for the conscious experience of fear as well. 17 On either way of making the point, Griffiths's discussion of affect programs is subject to a surplus meaning. In using emotion terms to describe these responses, e.g. 'basic emotions', the affect program responses are read as having psychological properties they don't have, viz. the conscious experience of emotion. Philosophers have engaged with 16 Griffiths on the basis of this surplus meaning. However, if the neuro-cognitive data on offer by LeDoux is on the right track, this surplus meaning is also seen to be unfounded. There are at least two lessons to draw from this. First, and perhaps most pressingly, what Griffiths takes be the contender for a natural kind, and worthy of a science of emotion, i.e. affect programs, is something that is only indirectly related to emotional experience. So philosophers who take such experience to be essential to emotion shouldn't look to the psychoevolutionary approach to emotion to underpin their metaphysics. This lesson should be both surprising and alarming, as it tells us that more than twenty years of philosophical discussion generated by Griffiths's influential work, What Emotions Really Are, is off the mark. This is not to say that philosophers have nothing to learn from the psychoevolutionary approach. Here is the second lesson. Griffiths's argument for the category 'emotion' not forming a natural kind centres on there being distinct kinds of emotion types; some that involve affect programs and others which don't. He argues that only some emotion types, i.e. those constituted by affect program responses, form natural kinds. However, we can now make the case against any given type of emotion being a natural kind - including basic emotion types. Take fear. It is plausible that the vernacular Scarantino's (2018) defence of basic emotions qua affect programs takes the lessons from 16 LeDoux's recent work into account by forgoing the need for such emotions to have phenomenal properties. 18 category of fear picks out various affect program responses, as well the conscious feelings of being afraid. Since the mechanisms that underly these two kinds of phenomena come apart, there is no guarantee that all things picked out by the term 'fear' will share a mechanism which offers justification for extrapolation. The upshot is that though affect programs concerning fear still plausibly form a natural kind, we can no longer unequivocally say that fear itself is a natural kind. Perhaps this is more grist to Griffiths's mill. Despite arguing that basic emotions are natural kinds, Griffiths (1997) claims that a future psychological science should ultimately get rid of the category 'emotion'. (The category creates confusion because it refers to things which are natural kinds, as well as things which aren't). If no emotions form a natural kind, not even basic emotions, then such a position is indeed warranted. We may have a science of affect programs, but we can no longer have a science of emotion. Nevertheless, it is also hard not to see this as a reductio of Griffiths's whole approach. Though Griffiths thinks that a future science can make do without the vernacular category of emotion, he does think that there is something picked out by this category, which forms a natural kind and is worthy of a science of emotion, viz. basic emotions. It is for this reason that the psychoevolutionary approach is an approach to emotion. However, if even basic emotion types don't form a natural kind, the link between the approach and what it claims to investigate is severed. We can have a science of affect programs, which we do already, but this can no longer provide an empirical basis for a psychology of emotion. If we want a scientifically robust approach to emotion itself, this must be found elsewhere. 19 4. The Pro-Emotion Debate According to Jones (2006), a new consensus is emerging from both philosophy and psychology, which replaces the old dogma that emotions (only) hinder reasoning for the thesis that they, as a matter of fact, can aid practical reasoning. On this rival view, emotions are said to be "clever design solutions to the problem of making fast decision in response to practical problems posed by the natural and social worlds: we perceive a danger and fear immediately primes us to take protective action" (Jones 2006: 3). Precisely how emotions aid decision-making is hypothesised by both de Sousa (1987) and Damasio (1994), which has to do with how emotions modulate attention. On both accounts, emotions help us make decisions promptly by highlighting some options as relevant, whilst eliminating others from consideration. Emotions, on these accounts, aren't the sole drivers of what to choose, but rather narrow the scope of what is considered by our rational faculties. In Damasio's words, emotions act as "biasing devices" which bias us in favour of some options at the expense of others (pg. 174). The claim that emotions aid decision-making, especially in the specific ways spelt out by de Sousa and Damasio, arguably, doesn't hold up to empirical scrutiny. Nevertheless, 17 there appears to be something right in the idea that emotions meet certain evolutionary ends by modulating attention. In their survey article, Faucher and Tappolet (2002) review the empirical data, from both psychology and neuroscience, in support of this idea. One major criticism is that the original hypotheses are vague, and none of their disambiguations 17 are plausible in light of either the cited or new empirical data, e.g. see Evans (2002), Gerrans (2007), Colombetti (2008), Bartol and Linquist (2015), and Ransom (2016). 20 Though they take their survey to lend support for de Sousa's hypothesis, they acknowledge that the data considered underdetermines his thesis in certain respects: de Sousa claims that the emotions' function is to direct our attention. More precisely, he suggests that emotions determine a) what information is processed, b) what inferences are drawn, and c) what options are considered in deliberation. The data we have considered concern only the first part of this tripartite thesis. (Faucher and Tappolet 2002: 127) It is my view that Faucher and Tappolet discuss an even more restricted thesis than is let on by this qualification. While de Sousa, as well as Damasio, hypothesise that emotions aid decision-making by helping us choose which course of action to take, the hypothesis considered in the survey holds that emotions, in particular fear and anxiety, direct our attention to certain visual stimuli. For several reasons, this is a much more modest hypothesis than that originally ascribed to pro-emotion views. First, nowhere is there a claim about emotions actually aiding practical rationality. Rather, the hypothesis explored, i.e. that emotions modulate attention, if true, points in favour of a possible route by which emotions might aid reasoning. Second, it is not that emotions modulate attention wholesale, but rather particular kinds of negative emotions do, namely fear and anxiety. Third, the effects of emotion on attention are restricted to the domain of visual stimuli. These considerations suggest a much more restricted hypothesis than those typically on offer by pro-emotion camps. Nevertheless, this more restricted thesis, though it doesn't quite establish a pro-emotion thesis, let alone a consensus, can be cited in support of it, 21 and crucially, isn't undermined by sceptical challenges to the original pro-emotion positions. My cause for contention here isn't with the empirical data, nor in the way it is used to support the more restricted thesis. Rather, it concerns how we are to interpret the restricted thesis itself, especially in relation to de Sousa's pro-emotion thesis. The worry is that this is precisely an instance where the surplus meaning of 'fear' threatens to muddy the waters of what can be concluded on the basis of empirical data. In brief, the restricted thesis holds that fear and anxiety modulate our attention of visual stimuli. The neuro-cognitive data cited in favour of this thesis concern the effects of threat circuitry on attentional phenomena, which suggests that we should interpret 'fear' and 'anxiety' in the thesis as the physiological responses associated with these emotion labels. However, the proemotion thesis owing to de Sousa seems to be one about how emotional experiences aid practical reasoning. The only way we can read the neuro-cognitive data as supporting de Sousa's thesis, then, is if we interpret the restricted reading as having a surplus meaning: 'fear' and 'anxiety', which modulate attention, refer to the conscious experience of fear and anxiety. The upshot is that there is a faulty inference from the neuro-cognitive data to de Sousa's hypothesis, which appears to be a product of the surplus meaning of emotionterms used to spell out the restricted thesis. Let us look at this charge more closely. To start with, de Sousa, I take it, assumes that emotions are conscious phenomena. This is not made explicit, but several points carry in favour of this interpretation. First, this is the way he is usually interpreted in the philosophical literature; plausibly owing to the deep-seated nature of the assumption that emotions are, at least typically, conscious phenomena. (Given the prevalence of this 22 assumption, at the very least, we would expect de Sousa to provide us with a caveat if he means something else). Second, this is something that appears to be born out of de Sousa's metaphysics. de Sousa is typically read as endorsing a perceptual theory of emotions, which holds that emotions are, or somehow are akin to, perceptions, e.g. to fear Fido is to perceive danger. Such perceptual theories of emotion tend to be derived on the basis of an analogy between emotion and perpetual experience. For instance, in emphasising the importance of this analogy, Tappolet notes that "emotions and perceptual experiences share many important features, such as phenomenal qualities." (2016: xii). Since perceptual theories are derived in this way, it stands to reason that plausible versions have emotional experiences as their explanatory target. Third, de Sousa argues for his thesis solely on the basis of armchair reasoning, which renders it plausible that he is, at least partially, relying on phenomenological evidence when he describes emotions as determining the "salience" of response-options. Such evidence can only have emotional experiences as the subjects of their explanans. Now consider the neuro-cognitive data Faucher and Tappolet think lends support for de Sousa's hypothesis. This includes several findings on emotional phenomena, attentional phenomena, and the connection between the two. The problem manifests itself regarding the first of these findings. Faucher and Tappolet begin their survey on emotions by citing LeDoux's findings which he now describes as being mistaken: "the amygdala has been tagged as the hub of the emotion of fear" (LeDouX 1996: 168). This assumption that the amygdala underlies fear is central to their exploration of the connection between emotion and attention. The implicit reasoning, which results from this assumption, and informs this part of their survey, goes something like this: 'LeDoux etc. show that 23 amygdala is responsible for fear. Other findings show that amygdala modulates attention. Inference: fear modulates attention'. For example, they cite LeDoux in support of the claim that "Efferents projections of the amygdala to the cortical structures explain how fear can influence cognitive processes" (pg. 125). Such examples scatter their discussion. In fact, Faucher and Tappolet make six intermediary conclusions on the basis of their survey of the neuro-cognitive data. These conclusions establish various links between the amygdala and attention, but the ensuing discussion is carried out as one where 'fear' directs our attention. The inferences drawn here are not problematic in and of themselves. The conclusions about fear and its effects on attention are unproblematic so long as we remain clear that by 'fear' here, we mean either the threat circuitry or the physiological responses to which they give rise. What's problematic is when we read 'fear' in this context as also involving the conscious feeling of fear. This is what makes the inference fallacious. The surplus meaning of fear threatens Faucher and Tappolet's survey at two levels. First, it threatens the discussion of the restricted thesis. In discussing the actual empirical findings themselves, Faucher and Tappolet are often careful to make qualifications that pre-empt the problematic readings. For instance, they note that "we will review some recent evidence showing that cerebral structures, traditionally thought to be part of the emotional network, might contribute to attentional function" (p. 123, my italics). Likewise, elsewhere they make connections between emotional responses and attention whilst staying clear of talking about emotions simpliciter. However, confusion still results from how this discussion of the neuro-cognitive data is to be viewed in the context of their overall survey. Before considering the neuro24 cognitive data, Faucher and Tappolet evaluate psychological data in favour of the restricted thesis. Here they consider emotional stroop tasks, probe detection tasks etc, where it is explicit that their target is not emotional responses, but the conscious experience of emotion itself: [T]he data we considered suggest strongly the emotion of fear, as experienced by normal subjects, involves attentional bias toward three stimuli of the same kind observed in pathological cases. (Faucher and Tappolet 2002: 120, my italics) The psychological data and the neuro-cognitive data, then, seem to be about two distinct phenomena, and nowhere is this flagged in their discussion. Consequently, the ensuing discussion, which proceeds on the basis of both kinds of data, is confusing for we are left without knowing what the "emotional phenomena" are that is supposed to be related to attention. At the second level, the surplus meaning of fear threatens the discussion of how the restricted thesis supports de Sousa's pro-emotion hypothesis. As noted, de Sousa takes emotions to be conscious phenomena, which means we can only extrapolate from the restricted thesis to a discussion of this more general hypothesis by deploying the problematic interpretation of the restricted thesis. This results in not just the threat of a surplus meaning, but of the fallacious inference itself: 'the amygdala underlies our threat circuitry, and also modulates attention, therefore, fear modules attention.' It is hard to see how something like this isn't going on when Faucher and Tappolet draw their survey to a 25 close: "The conclusion is that de Sousa's hypothesis is on the right track with respect to fear and anxiety" (pg. 135). The aim of this section isn't to undermine pro-emotion views , or even to offer a 18 critique of de Sousa's view in particular. The point was to see how the surplus meaning 19 of 'fear' might influence discussions of certain pro-emotion views. That said, one obvious lesson to draw is that, contra Faucher and Tappolet, the neuro-cognitive data concerning our defensive survival circuitry doesn't support de Sousa's hypothesis. Another is that to the extent to which such data can be utilised to support pro-emotion views, they can only be employed to support views that hold that threat circuitry modulates attention, and thereby possibly plays a role in resolving various practical problems. We find the underpinnings of such a view in LeDoux himself. Very roughly, the threat circuitry raises our vigilance, i.e. we become more attuned to our sensory environment, focussing on present dangers and being alert for future ones, whilst lowering our threshold for additional defensive responses (2016: 44-5). What we can't do, however, is establish a 20 close link between such neuro-cognitive data and the pro-emotion theses espoused in the Nothing I have said here undermines behavioural data from psychology, which explains some 18 other ways "felt" emotions can both positively and negatively affect decision-making. For example, the Appraisal Tendency Framework successfully links appraisal processes specific to certain emotions with different judgement and choice outcomes. See Lerner et. al. (2015) for an overview. E.g. it may be the case that the survival circuits modulate emotional experiences, which in turn 19 modulate attention. But here the key part of the pro-emotion hypothesis - that emotional experiences modulate attention - is supported by the behavioural, as opposed to neuro-cognitive, data. Also see Prinz (204: 202) for a pro-emotion view which explicitly rejects the idea that 'emotions' 20 need to be felt to modulate attention in ways that foster survival. 26 philosophical literature; views which assume that emotions qua conscious phenomena are what modulate attention and thereby aid practical reasoning. This is not to say that such views cannot have a basis in neuroscience. One positive lesson is that if we are to insist on defending such views, we should shift our focus from the survival circuitry, which concern the amygdala, to those that actually underly the subjective feelings of emotion. 5. Neurobiological Theories of Emotional Consciousness The case made by LeDoux for a separation between the survival circuitry which processes and responds to threat and that which constitute the conscious experience of fear is tied to his assumptions about the latter. For this reason, there is a worry that the lessons which we can draw on the basis of this separation are conditional on LeDoux's own account of emotional consciousness being true. This worry is made especially acute owing to the prima facie viability of rival neurobiological accounts of emotional consciousness. If any of these rival accounts prove correct, this threatens to undermine the philosophical implications of LeDoux's recent work. In this final section, I address this worry. LeDoux's positive account of emotional consciousness is fleshed out in LeDoux (2016), and developed further in LeDoux and Brown (2017) and LeDoux (2019). As is made clear by LeDoux and Brown, while it is traditional to view cognitive states of consciousness as arising from a different brain system from that which generates conscious feelings, on their account both phenomena are grounded in the very same system. For example, on some key traditional views, e.g. Panksepp's (1998, 2016), the conscious 27 experience of fear is constituted by subcortical regions of the brain. By contrast, on their view, while these regions can modulate emotional feelings by providing nonconscious inputs that alter the kinds of feelings we have, the actual conscious feelings themselves are constituted by a different system: the cortical regions of the brain that also underly the conscious experience of external stimuli. This they dub a neuro-cognitive account of emotional consciousness, for "a general network of cognitions underlies both cognitive and emotional states of consciousness" (pg. 69). Moreover, they draw on this to inform their preferred account, i.e their higher-order theory of emotional consciousness.21 According to higher-order theories of consciousness more broadly, first-order representations, say a perceptual representation of an external stimulus, don't suffice for consciousness. In addition to having a first-order representation, one must also be aware of it to have a conscious experience of the external stimulus. (Note: this not to say that one 22 needs to be aware that one is aware of the first-order representation). This state of being aware of the first-order representational state is the higher-order state, which is crucial for consciousness. LeDoux and Brown offer a high-order theory not of consciousness in general, but of emotional consciousness. Moreover, they draw on the aforementioned 23 assumption about brain systems to explain how such a higher-order theory might be implemented at the neurobiological level. On their account, first-order states e.g. perceptual representations of external stimuli, are associated with the prefrontal cortex, whereas higher-order states concern the See the Global Workspace Theory, e.g. Baars (2005), Dehaene (2014), and Naccache (2018), for a 21 different neuro-cognitive account. E.g. see Rosenthal (2005), Carruthers (2005), and Lau and Rosenthal (2011).22 A general theory is provided in LeDoux (2019).23 28 representation of these first-order states by 'cortically based general networks of cognition' (GNC). More specially, "subcortical circuits are not responsible for feelings, but instead provide lower-order, nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences by cortical circuits" (pg. 1). The same is assumed to be true on the higher-order theory of emotional consciousness. What differentiates emotional experiences from other kinds of experiences here are the inputs that are processed by the cortical areas; not the processing systems themselves. 24 This neuro-cognitive approach to emotional consciousness has at least two plausible rivals: what LeDoux and Hofmann (2018) call the "neuro-Darwinian" and the "neuroJamesian" approaches. For those who subscribe to the former, e.g. Panksepp (1998, 2016), 25 emotional feelings arise from amygdala-centred subcortical circuits, which we have inherited from our animal ancestors and are highly preserved amongst mammals. By contrast, advocates of the latter, e.g. Damasio (1994) and Craig (2009), assume that such feelings result from activity in the body-sensing circuits in the neocortex (somato-sensory and/or insula areas), e.g. those triggered when threat activates the amygdala circuits. In more recent work, Damasio has shifted his emphasis from cortical to subcortical bodysensing areas in the brainstem. The key difference between these approaches and 26 LeDoux's is that they take the traditional line, viz. that emotional consciousness is a product of neural circuits distinct from those that underly other kinds of conscious experience. Which of these accounts is correct is an empirical matter. For LeDoux, the fact Also see Brown, Lau and LeDoux (2019) and LeDoux (2019)24 They also mention a neuro-behaviourist position, which I shall leave aside for it forgoes realism 25 about subjecting feelings for an eliminativist position. E.g. see Damasio et al. (2013) and Damasio and Carvalho (2013).26 29 the the neuro-cognitive account does a better job of explaining various puzzles in the field, provides abductive grounds to prefer it over these rival accounts. This is often 27 supplemented by other considerations, e.g. against the neuro-Jamesian approach, LeDoux and Hofmann note that while the body-sensing subcortical and cortical "circuits clearly represent body states, convincing evidence that these representations are the main causes of emotional experiences is lacking" (2018: 68).28 Let us now turn to addressing the present worry, i.e. that the lessons we explored in the previous sections are conditional on LeDoux's own theory of emotional consciousness being true. We now see that there are two ways of disambiguating this worry: the lessons are conditional on the neuro-cognitive approach, or they are conditional on the higherorder theory of emotional consciousness, where the neuro-cognitive approach gives us an account of how the theory is implemented at the neurobiological level. However, we don't need to assume either to draw out our lessons. What we require is not a positive thesis about the sub-regions of the brain that give rise to conscious feelings, but rather a negative thesis about which regions don't. In particular, what we require is a rejection of the traditional line: that conscious feelings are constituted by subcortical circuits which include the amygdala. Fear is a case in point. The survival circuits that involve the amygdala, and trigger our defensive affective program responses, aren't what constitute the conscious experience of fear. Subsequently, while the affect programs may indirectly shape the kinds of fearful feelings we have, empirical findings concerning this circuitry can't directly inform a See page 9.27 See LeDoux (2016: 133-138, 2019: §53, §64-65) for an extended discussion.28 30 philosophy of emotion - where we understand emotion to be a conscious phenomenon. Likewise, defensive survival circuits, including the activation of the amygdala, plausibly play a role in modulating attention of threatening stimuli. Nevertheless, for the same reason as before, we can't take this as a data point to bolster pro-emotion views which hold that emotion qua conscious feelings play a role aiding practical reason by drawing our attention to salient features of the environment. This is to say nothing of what in fact constitutes the conscious experience of emotion. Rather, the lessons from this paper stand or fall depending on how much we should look to the traditional neurobiological conception of emotional consciousness to inform a philosophy of emotion. LeDoux's body of work, both old and new, strongly suggests that we should look elsewhere. 29 Many thanks to Alex Grzankowski, as well as two referees for this journal, for their comments on 29 the draft. I am also grateful to audience members at the Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience Seminar at the University of Glasgow and the New Directions in Emotion Workshop at the University of Manchester for their helpful comments. 31 References Anderson, A. K and Phelps, E. A (2002). 'Is the human amygdala critical for the subjective experience of emotion? Evidence of intact dispositional affect in patients with amygdala lesions'. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 14(5):709–720. Baars, B. J (2005). 'Global workspace theory of consciousness: Toward a cognitive neuroscience of human experience'. Progress in Brain Research 150:45–53. Barret, L. F (2009). 'Variety is the spice of life: A psychological construction approach to understanding variability in emotion'. Cognition and Emotion 23:1284-1306. Bartol, J. and Linquist, S. (2015). 'How do Somatic Markers Feature in Decision Making?' Emotion Review 7(1):81-89. Bornemann, B., Winkielman, P., and van der Meer, E. (2012). 'Can You Feel What You Do Not See? Using Internal Feedback to Detect Briefly Presented Emotional Stimuli'. International Journal of Pschyophysiology: Official Journal of the International Organization of Psychophysiology 85:116-124. Boyd, R. (1991). 'Realism, Anti-foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds'. Philosophical Studies 61:127–148. Brigandt, I. (2003). 'Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminitivism'. Philosophy of Science 70:1305–1316. Brown, L. , Lau, H., and LeDoux, J. E. (2019). 'The Misunderstood Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness'. Trends in Cognitive Science 23(9): 754-768. Carruthers. P. (2005). 'Consciousness: Essays from a High-Order Perspective'. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 32 Chalmers, D. J. (1995). 'Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3):200–219. Clore, G. (1994). 'Why Emotions Are Never Unconscious'. In The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions, eds. P. Ekman and R.J Davidson. New York: Oxford University Press: 285-90. Colombetti, G. (2008). 'The Somatic Marker Hypotheses, and What the Iowa Gambling Task Does and Does not Show'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59: 51-71. Craig, A. D. (2009). 'How do you feel - now? The anterior insula and human awareness'. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 10:59-70. Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. New York: Putnam, and London: Vintage. Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., and Tranel, D. (2013). 'Persistence of Feelings and Sentience After Bilateral Damage of the Insula'. Cerebral Cortex 4:833-846. Damasio, A. R. and Carvalho, G. B. (2013). 'The Nature of Feelings: Evolutionary and Neurobiological Origins'. Nature Reviews Neuroscience 14:143-152. Darwin, C. (1859/1964). On The Origin of Species: A Facsimile of the First Edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Darwin, C. (1872/1965). The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. Reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Dehaene, S. (2014). Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering how the brain codes our thoughts. New York: Viking Press. Deonna, J. A. and Teroni, F. (2012). The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction. London and New York: Routledge. 33 de Sousa, R. B. (1987). The Rationality of Emotion. Cambridge and London: MIT Press. Dunn, B. D., Dalgleish, T. and Lawrence, A. D. (2006). 'The Somatic Marker Hypothesis: A Critical Evaluation'. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews 30: 239–71. Ekman, P. (1972). 'Universals and Cultural Differences in Facial Expressions of Emotions'. In Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, ed. J. Cole. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press: 207-283. Ekman, P. (1973). Darwin and Facial Expression. New York: Academic Press. Ekman, P. (1980). 'Biological and cultural contributions to body and facial movement in the expression of emotions'. In Explaining Emotions, ed. A. O. Rorty. Berkeley: University of California Press. Ekman, P. (1999). 'Basic Emotions'. In Handbook of Cognition and Emotion, eds. T. Dalgleish and M. Power. Chichester: John Wiley and Sons, Co.:45–60. Evans, D. (2002). 'The Search Hypothesis of Emotions'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53(4):497-509. Fanselow, M. S. and Pennington, Z. T. (2018). 'A return to the psychiatric dark ages with a two-system framework for fear'. Behaviour Research and Therapy 100:24-29. Faucher, L. & Tappolet, C. (2002). 'Fear and the focus of attention'. Consciousness and Emotion 3(2):105-144. Feinstein J. S, et al. (2013) Fear and panic in humans with bilateral amygdala damage. Nature Neuroscience 16(3):270–272. Freud, S. (1915). 'The Unconscious'. In The Standard Edition of the Complete Pyschological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol 14, ed. J. Strachey. London: The Hogarth Press:161-215. 34 Frijda, N. H. (1999). 'Emotions and Hedonic Experience'. In Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology, eds. D. Kahneman, E. Diener, & N. Schwarz. New YorkRussell Sage Foundation:190-210. Gerrans, P. (2007). 'Mental Time Travel, Somatic Markers and "Myopia for the Future" '. Synthese 159:459–74. Goodman, N. (1954). Fact, Fiction and Forecast (1 ed.). London: Athlone Press, University of London. Griffiths, P. E. (1990). 'Modularity, and the psychoevolutionary theory of emotion'. Biology and Philosophy 5(2):175-196. Griffiths, P. E. (1997). What Emotions Really are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. Chicago and London: Chicago University Press. Griffiths, P. E. (2002). 'Is emotion a natural kind?' In Thinking About Feeling: Contemporary Philosophers on Emotions, ed. R. C. Solomon. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press: 389-417 Griffiths, P. E. (2004a). 'Toward a "machiavellian" theory of emotional appraisal'. In Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality, eds. D. Evans & Pierre Cruse. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press: 89-106 Griffiths, P. E. (2004b). 'Emotions as natural and normative kinds'. Philosophy of Science 71(5):901-911. Hacking, I. (2007). 'Natural kinds: Rosy Dawn, Scholastic Twilight'. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 61:203-239. Jackson, F. (1982). 'Epiphenomenal qualia'. Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136. 35 Jones, K. (2006). 'Quick and Smart? Modularity and the pro-emotion consensus'. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32(5S):3-27. Lau, H. and Rosenthal, D. M. (2011). 'The higher-order view does not require consciously self-directed introspection: Response to Malach'. Trends in Cognitive Science 15(11):508–509. LeDoux, J. E. (1996). The Emotional Brain. New York: Simon and Schuster. LeDoux, J. E. (2012). 'Rethinking the emotional brain'. Neuron 73:653–676 LeDoux, J. E. (2016). Anxious: Using the Brain to Understand and Treat Fear and Anxiety. New York: Viking. LeDoux J. E, and Pine, D.S. (2016). 'Using neuroscience to help understand fear and anxiety: A two-system framework'. American Journal of Psychiatry 173(11):1083–1093. LeDoux, J.E (2017). 'Semantics, surplus meaning, and the science of fear'. Trends in Cognitive Science 21(5): 303-306. LeDoux, J. E (2019). The Deep History of Ourselves: The Four-Billion Year Story of How We Got Conscious Brains. New York: Viking. LeDoux, J. E, and Brown, R. (2017). 'A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness'. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA, 114: E2016-E2025. LeDoux, J. E., and Hoffman, S. G (2018). 'The subjective experience of emotion: a fearful view'. Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 19:67–72. Lerner, J. S., Li, Y., Valdesolo, P., and Kassam, K. S (2015). 'Emotion and Decision Making'. Annual Review of Psychology 66:799-823. Linquist, S. & Bartol, J. (2013). 'Two Myths about Somatic Markers'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64(3):455-484. 36 Naccache, L. (2018). 'Why and how access consciousness can account for phenomenal consciousness'. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 373 (1755). Nagel, T. (1974). 'What is it like to be a bat?' Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50. Ohman, A. (2002). 'Automaticity and the amgydala: nonconscious responses to emotional faces'. Current Directions in Psychological Science 11:62-66. Owen, R. (1843). Lectures on the Comparative Anatomy and Physiology of the Vertebrate Animals, Delivered at the Royal College of Surgeons in 1843. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans. Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective Neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press. Panksepp, J. (2016). 'The cross-mammalian neurophenomenology of primal emotional affects: from animal feelings to human therapeutics'. Journal of Comparative Neurology 524:1624-1635. Pine, D.S. and LeDoux, J.E. (2017). 'Elevating the Role of Subjective Experience in the Clinic: Response to Fanselow and Pennington'. American Journal of Psychiatry 174(11): 11211122. Prinz, J. (2004). Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ransom, M. (2016). 'Why Emotions Do Not Solve the Frame Problem'. In Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence, ed. V. C. Müller. Springer: 353-365. Rosenthal D. M (2005). Consciousness and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Russell J. A. (2003): 'Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion'. Psychollogical Review 110:145-172. 37 Scarantino, A. (2018). 'Are LeDoux's Survival Circuits Basic Emotions Under a Different Name?' Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences 24: 75-82. Solomon, R. C. (1999). 'Review of What Emotions Really are: The Problem of Psychological Categories'. Philosophical Review 108 (1):131. Tamietto, M. and de Gelder, B. (2010). 'Neural bases of the non-conscious perception of emotional signals'. Nat Rev Neurosci 11(10):697-709. Tappolet, C. (2016). Emotions, Value, and Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tomkins, S. S. (1962). Affect, Imagery, Consciousness. New York: Springer.

KANTIAN THEMES IN THE ELEPHANT MAN (forthcoming in Film and Philosophy) Finding films that embody at least some elements of the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant is not too difficult. Others have written on the ways in which films as diverse as High Noon and Hotel Rwanda can be used in ethics classes to explain various aspects of Kant's ethics.1 In what follows, I will try to make the case that David Lynch's The Elephant Man is one of the best films to use for both introducing and sympathetically understanding Kant's moral philosophy. The film does not merely focus on duty, or the tensions that can arise between consequentialist and deontological approaches to ethical decision making. It also helps us understand Kant's views on moral worth, friendship, and the value of rationality and personhood. In addition, it contains aspects which can help us critically examine the limits and overall plausibility of a Kantian ethical framework. Finally, it is a terrific film that most students have not yet had the opportunity to see, so introducing them to it offers the possibility of both aesthetic and moral enrichment.2 The Elephant Man is the story of a "poor wretch" named John Merrick, who is afflicted with a horribly disfiguring disease. His disfiguration is so severe that Merrick is relegated to appearing in a freak show as the "Elephant Man." Set in the Victorian era, the story follows Merrick's journey from abused side-show attraction to pampered international celebrity. This transformation occurs primarily through the efforts of Doctor 2 Frederick Treves, who rescues Merrick from an exploitative barker and provides him with a more humane home within his hospital. While under the doctor's watchful care, it becomes clear that Merrick is actually intelligent and literate, and his life is ultimately transformed by the opportunities Treves offers him for engaging with society as a celebrity rather than an outcast. In the course of the narrative, Merrick overcomes many setbacks and eventually achieves a relatively happy and fulfilling life, but no cure for his condition is possible and his health continues to decline. The film ends with Merrick's decision to end his own life by sleeping horizontally for the first time, a choice that he knows will bring about his death, due to the nature of his condition. The film is based on the real-life story of Joseph Merrick, who lived from 1862 to 1890. There's some controversy regarding what medical condition the actual man suffered from, with experts debating whether he had Proteus syndrome, Neurofibromatosis, or some combination thereof. The real Merrick was indeed taken in and looked after by a doctor names Frederick Treves, and some of the other key plot points in the film are based on actual events in Merrick's life, but as you might expect, other scenes (and their chronology) are fictionalized for dramatic effect. Directed by David Lynch, it was only his second film (the first being the avant-garde milestone Eraserhead, which came out in 1977). Lynch managed to go from that surreal cinematic experiment to directing an all-star Hollywood melodrama because Mel Brooks liked Eraserhead and was willing to give Lynch the chance to make a bigger and more mainstream film. We should be thankful he did, as The Elephant Man is a remarkably beautiful and emotionally powerful film. I've found this film very useful for teaching Kant to undergraduate students, and here I'll explain why I take the film to be a particularly valuable resource. There are some aspects which are quite obviously Kantian, perhaps too obvious to be worth mentioning (such as the tag line for the film: "I am not an animal, I am a human being!", which echoes Kant's important moral distinction between rational agents and the rest of the animal world). Yet the film is Kantian in spirit is several interconnected ways, some of them obvious and some more subtle. 3 My discussion is hence divided into three broad sections, with some overlap (which shouldn't be surprising given Kant's rather systematic tendencies). The essay will begin with Kant's ideas on valuing persons as ends in themselves, and indicate how they resonate in The Elephant Man. It then considers how Kant's prioritization of rationality over sentience and his emphasis on the importance of intention can both also be seen in the film. I will conclude by showing how the depiction of Merrick's death at the end of the film leaves us with a challenge for Kantian ethics, given Kant's bold and uncompromising prohibition of suicide. Ends in themselves Now I say that the human being and in general every rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its discretion; instead he must in all his actions, whether directed to himself or also to other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time as an end. (Groundwork, 4:428, p.35)3 Kant repeatedly contended that being morally good involves recognizing others as "ends in themselves." It is always wrong to treat others solely as a means to our ends – to use them for one's purposes without regard to their own goals and interests is never morally permissible. Though Kant did not use these terms, his moral theory went a long way to explaining the wrongness of exploitation and objectification. The Elephant Man offers us a moving tale of exploitation. John Merrick (John Hurt) is clearly exploited by the obvious villains of the film (by Bytes the carnival barker, and by the night porter) but the movie also raises the question of whether he is equally exploited by those who appear to do good. In particular, it explores the possibility that his doctor (Freddie Treves, played by Anthony Hopkins) and that doctor's supervisor (Carr Gomm, played by John Gielgud) end up exploiting Merrick while attempting to aid and protect him. 4 The film highlights the possibility of a parallel exploitation in a number of ways. Consider the juxtaposition of Treves's presentation of Merrick to his medical colleagues and students with Bytes's sideshow performance. Both are similarly theatrical, involving curtains and spotlights, and both clearly involve the presentation of Merrick as an object to be studied rather than a man to be respected. (Note also Treves's casual remark about the reproductive organs of Merrick.) Bytes (who refers to Merrick as his "treasure") is aware of the similarity between himself and Treves, repeatedly reminding Treves that "we understand one another." The suggestion raised by the film is that, despite their very real differences in character and background, both men are guilty of viewing Merrick as a valuable object at times rather than a person. As the film progresses, this theme recurs. Towards its end, we see Merrick attend the theater for the very first time, and no doubt we are supposed to share his joy at finally 5 being able to witness this spectacle. At the same time, though, the camera lingers over the moment in which Merrick is introduced to the audience and it is quite clear that he has become the spectacle: their applause gives a bittersweet feeling to the whole sequence. While this scenario is surely preferable to the horrible exploitation he experienced early on, there's the suggestion that, given his condition, a life in which he would not be regularly viewed as a curious object is perhaps impossible. Several other sequences which touch on the theme of exploitation are worth mentioning. There is one scene in which Nurse Mothershead reprimands Treves, arguing that Merrick's new life has resulted in him "being stared at all over again." (This is after Treves has allowed a series of celebrities and other important social figures to visit with Merrick in the hospital.) Treves is moved to soul-searching, saying: "I've been thinking about Mr. Bytes... I'm beginning to believe that Mr. Bytes and I are very much alike... It seems that I've made Mr. Merrick into a curiosity all over again." Now don't get me wrong, it is pretty clear that Treves is a good guy in this film, and I'm not trying to suggest we should think otherwise. Rather, I'm pointing out that this good guy, like most real people, is a pretty complex character, and the film delicately explores the ways in which such a good person might nonetheless end up exploiting another human being. In particular, the film offers up a thoughtful consideration of how a doctor might inadvertently end up exploiting a patient.4 6 Rationality Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a will. (Groundwork, 4:414, p.24) For Kant, it is our capacity for rational agency that makes us deserving of respect. It is only because one can reason that one can be free, and it is only through reason that one can both determine what is moral and choose to act accordingly. Creatures that lack this capacity do not, according to Kant, deserve our direct moral consideration. Now this aspect of Kant's ethics is highly controversial, and I don't intend to defend the sharp line he draws between rational beings and the rest of the world.5 I do believe that there is something plausible about his emphasis on the importance of rationality for morality, and that the film helps make clear exactly why such a connection is plausible. Let's consider some particular scenes. The most famous lines of the film: "I am not an animal. I am not an elephant. I am a human being!" echo the Kantian theme that humans are distinct in their importance and uniquely deserving of a certain form of treatment. In the scene in which they appear, Merrick has been taunted, chased, and herded (like an animal) into a restroom in an underground train station. Consider also how, very early in the film, we see Treves operating on the victim of an industrial accident. Foreshadowing the role that reasoning will play in this film, he comments: "Abominable things these machines. One can't reason with them." (Admittedly this is a 7 pretty minor line in a minor scene, but it is interesting to consider Lynch's intentions here: he's a very careful filmmaker, after all, and most lines in a Lynch film feel deliberate in their placement.) There's an additional sequence in which Treves is talking to a colleague about Merrick and says "the man is an imbecile probably from birth... the man is a complete idiot... I pray to God he's an idiot". The thought being that an idiot would be incapable of realizing the horror of his situation – it takes the ability to reason and reflection to recognize the tragedy of Merrick's life. Of course, even if Merrick had been an "idiot" his life in the carnival was undoubtedly an unpleasant one, but as Kant pointed out rational agents are capable of both pleasures and pains that are unavailable to creatures that cannot reason. There is something especially horrifying about a thinking, reasoning and thus self-aware creature being submitted to such exploitation and suffering. Perhaps the most crucial scene in the film comes when Treves is interviewing Merrick for Carr Gomm (John Gielgud), and it appears to Gomm that Merrick is simply parroting pre-prepared responses. However, once they leave the room they hear Merrick continue on with a biblical passage that Treves did not teach him. This moment convinces both of them that Merrick is in fact a human being capable of significant reasoning – he's not an imbecile, and his capacities had been woefully underestimated. Kant would, of course, have emphasized the importance of this moment – in seeing that Merrick can think and reflect, we come to view him in a different light. We seem him as a person rather than an unfortunate creature. He acquires a kind of dignity not available to creatures incapable of reason. Intention and Moral Worth A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, nor because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself and, regarded for itself, is to be valued incomparably higher than all that could merely be brought about by it in favor of some inclination and indeed, if you will, of the sum of all inclination. (Groundwork, 4:394, p.8) Kant, as a deontologist opposed to consequentialism, argued one's intention is crucial in determining the morality of an action, which has no moral worth unless it is done from the proper motive. This is true regardless of how beneficial the consequences 8 of the act might be. The Elephant Man raises this issue of proper intention at several junctures. When Nurse Mothershead is told by Treves that she didn't show Merrick much "loving kindness" when he first arrived, she angrily replies that she showed him "care and practical concern." One way of interpreting her comments here is to see her as making a Kantian point: she may not have had a strong inclination to help Merrick (i.e., her natural inclinations and emotions were those of repugnance rather than warmth) but she recognized her duty to help and she did her duty simply because it was the right thing to do. Kant's writings on friendship and love are relevant here. Kant was quite wary of emotionally-based bonds generally (of the sort which might spring from "loving kindness"), and deemed such "pathological" friendships risky, due to their tendency to generate bonds of loyalty that interfere with the strict impartiality demanded by morality. Instead, he promoted a rather reserved relation that is based more on rational respect for the other than emotional inclinations: Friendship, through the sweetness which approximates a fusion into one person, is at the same time something so tender, that if it is left to rest upon feelings, and if this mutual communication and surrender are not underlaid with principles or with rules which prevent such mutual intimacy and limit such mutual love by rules of respect, then it is not for a moment secure against breaches. [...] But at all events the love in friendship cannot be emotion, because emotion is blind in its option and evaporates in the sequel." (Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, sec. 471, pp.137-8)6 Thus, by Kant's lights, Treves' swipe at Nurse Motherhead for her initial reserve was rather off the mark. 9 Perhaps the most relevant scene regarding proper intention is the one in which Treves wonders whether he has exploited Merrick and explicitly asks: "What was it all for? Why did I do it? Am I a good man, or a bad man?" His wife reminds him of all the good he has done for Merrick, but of course that is beside the point. Treves knows his actions have had good consequences; this, however, isn't enough to convince him (or us) that he has necessarily been morally good. In suggesting that the film doesn't simply give Treves a moral "pass", I differ from others who have argued that we can safely conclude Treves is not immoral because he did not utilize Merrick solely as a means.7 I think both the film and Kant's ethical views are more nuanced than such a categorical diagnosis implies. When the film ends, we surely have a good opinion of Treves, but we are left with the nagging thought that his motives may not have always been particularly pure. This issue of whether one can ever really know one's true motives was a key concern of Kant's: In fact, it is absolutely impossible by means of experience to make out with complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action otherwise in conformity with duty rested simply on moral grounds and on the representation of one's duty. [...] for we like to flatter ourselves by falsely attributing to ourselves a nobler motive, whereas in fact we can never, even by the most strenuous self-examination, get entirely behind our covert incentives, since, when moral worth is at issue, what counts is not actions, which one sees, but those inner principles of actions that one does not see. (Groundwork, 4:407, pp.19-20) The film encourages us to share Kant's concern here and to consider whether we, too, are perhaps guilty of a self-flattery that obscures our darker motivations. This isn't to say that either the film or Kant is promoting moral skepticism, rather I take both to be emphasizing instead the complexity of our psyches and the great difficulty (not impossibility) of moral purity.8 The End Someone feels sick of life because of a series of troubles that has grown to the point of despair, but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. [...] It is then seen at once that a nature whose law it would be to destroy life itself by means of the same feeling whose destination is to impel toward the furtherance of life would contract itself and would therefore not subsist as nature; thus that maxim could not possibly be a law of nature and, accordingly altogether opposes the supreme principle of all duty. (Groundwork, 4:422, p.32) 10 There is at least one important respect in which The Elephant Man is quite unKantian: most viewers take the presentation of Merrick's suicide at the end of the film to be a sympathetic one.9 It is presented as a noble choice given the decline and suffering Merrick knows he will soon otherwise endure. This is quite clearly a perspective on suicide that Kant rejected. Notoriously, he argued instead that one is never morally permitted to commit suicide, even if such an act would end great suffering. As he put it: "Misery gives no man the right to take his life."10 This is because he held that suicide necessarily involves using one's freedom for the intentional negation of the self, but that very self is the source of one's freedom and one's capacity for morality, and both exist so that we may respect our selves and live with the honour due to a rational being. Accordingly, any act which purposefully removes that possibility for self respect cannot be morally acceptable. (This is different from a situation in which one might sacrifice oneself in battle. Kant claimed that in such a case there is usually a degree of fate or lack of choice that makes such an act permissible.11) Kant's views on suicide are justifiably controversial, and philosophers disagree over exactly how to interpret his somewhat scattered and problematic remarks on the topic.12 I share the view of most that he's simply wrong on this issue. Indeed, Kant's claim that one violates one's rational nature in performing suicide seems particularly wrongheaded when someone faces a future where that very rational nature is likely to decline along with one's physical health, and I presume this may well have been the case for Merrick.13 In addition, while perhaps hardline Kantians cannot place much weight on promoting happiness and avoiding pain in their theorizing about morality, the rest of us are inclined to recognize that ending one's life might be morally justifiable due to the unnecessary suffering suicide can prevent (suffering both to the individual in question, and to the loved ones who would suffer because he or she continues to suffer). In contrast to Kant, consider the Stoic philosopher Seneca's remarks on the moral permissibility of suicide: For mere living is not a good, but living well. Accordingly, the wise man will live as long as he ought, not as long as he can. He will mark in what place, with whom, and how he is to conduct his existence, and what he is about to do. He always reflects concerning the quality, and not the quantity, of his life. As soon as there are many events in his life that give him trouble and disturb his peace of mind, he sets himself free. And this privilege is his, not only when the crisis is upon him, but as soon as Fortune seems to be playing him false; then he looks about carefully and sees whether he ought, or ought not, to end his life on that account. He holds that it makes no difference to him whether his taking-off be natural or self-inflicted, whether it 11 comes later or earlier. He does not regard it with fear, as if it were a great loss; for no man can lose very much when but a driblet remains. It is not a question of dying earlier or later, but of dying well or ill. And dying well means escape from the danger of living ill.14 In Seneca's writings we have the very sensible suggestion that to choose to leave the living while one is still flourishing, rather than to cling to life regardless of the decline that will inevitably ensue, can rightly be seen as an act of courage rather than cowardice.15 I take it as an additional virtue of The Elephant Man that it presents us with an eloquent and moving presentation of a suicide that seems not only morally permissible but perhaps even morally praiseworthy in its dignity. As I hope is clear, the ending of the film provides copious food for thought, and is quite useful for motivating discussion regarding both the specific issue of the ethics of suicide but also the more general question of the extent to which we can appropriate the insights of a great systematic philosopher like Kant without accepting the "entire package", so to speak. Philosophers and students of philosophy will disagree about these questions, of course, but I know of no better stimulus for engaging reflection and debate on these and the other issues I've canvased than Lynch's remarkable cinematic presentation of the tale of John Merrick. Acknowledgments: Thanks to Aaron Smuts, Dan Shaw, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks also to the many students who have discussed the film with me over the years. Notes 1 A brief discussion of Kantian themes in High Noon can be found at the University of Newcastle Philosophy and Film database: http://libguides.newcastle.edu.au/. Hotel Rwanda is discussed in the context of Kantian ethics by Dan Shaw in Morality at the Movies: Reading Ethics Through Film (Continuum, 2012). The only other discussion I have found connecting Kantian ethics with The Elephant Man is a blog post by Alex Hoyt (http://neuro-active.com/nomatter/?p=89 ). The analysis offered is sensible and similar in some respects to my own, though it is also rather brief, and surprisingly Kant's emphasis on proper intention as it manifests in the film is not considered (nor are many of the scenes I go on to discuss). There is also a teaching resource involving Kant and The Elephant Man offered by BFI Education and TES Connect(http://www.tes.co.uk/teaching-resource/The-Elephant-Man-KS5-RE-6369127/). The outline of discussion points offered there (authored by Amar Ediriwira) is rather schematic and focuses primarily on the issue of valuing someone as an end. Neither document attempts the level of detailed analysis and discussion offered here. 12 2My goal here is to explore Kantian philosophical themes, so I will not devote much attention to discussion of stylistic aspects of the film, but this should not be taken as implying that the style of this film is not noteworthy. While perhaps more conventional and less "Lynchian" than many of his other films, it has its share of uniquely expressive shots, striking imagery, and atmospheric sound design. For more on what might be said to constitute "Lynchian", see David Foster Wallace's terrific essay on Lost Highway, "David Lynch Keeps His Head", Premiere, Sep. 1996. Available online at: http://www.lynchnet.com/lh/lhpremiere.html A nice brief discussion of the sensual aesthetics of the film can be found in Justine Smith's essay "The Elephant Man and the Sensual Experience of Form Great Monsters of the Screen" in Sound in Sight: http://www.soundonsight.org/great-monsters-the-elephant-man-and-the-sensual-experience/ Analyses which consider both the Victorian setting of the film and the ways in which The Elephant Man inhabits (while commenting on) the genre of melodrama can be found in Allister Mactaggart's The Film Paintings of David Lynch: Challenging Film Theory (Intellect Books, 2010), and "Viewing the Elephant Man" by William E. Holladay and Stephen Watt (PMLA Vol. 104 Issue 5 1989 pp. 868-881). 3 This and future references to Kant's Groundwork in the text refer to the following edition: Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy), translated and edited by Mary Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 1998). 4 I'll return to this issue of the complexity of our intentions in the third section of this paper. 5 For a persuasive argument that Kant (and Kantians) go too far in tying the dignity of humanity solely to reason, see Cora Diamond's "The Importance of Being Human", Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, Vol. 29, March 1991, 35-62. 6 Immanuel Kant, Ethical Philosophy, translated by James W. Ellington (Hackett Publishing Company, 1983). 7 Alex Hoyt makes this sort of point at http://neuro-active.com/nomatter/?p=89. 8 In general my goal here has been to present Kant's position sympathetically (for pedagogical purposes), but it is worth noting that very effective objections have been raised to Kant's argument that moral worth should hinge on duty rather than inclination (feeling). Michael Stocker's "The Schizophrenia of Moral Theory" (The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 73, No. 14, Aug. 12, 1976,4 53-466) is one powerful statement of such a complaint. My own views are very much in line with Stocker's. 9 Helpful comments from an anonymous referee mention included another aspect of the film which can plausibly be interpreted as anti-Kantian in spirit: at one point Merrick states that his life is full because he knows he is loved, not because simply he's been dutifully looked after. 10 Lectures on Ethics (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant), edited by Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind, translated by Peter Heath, (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 27:373, p.147 11 Cf. Lectures on Ethics, 27:372, pp.146-117. 12 For a insightful reconstruction and qualified defense of Kant's views on suicide, see Michael J. Cholbi's "Kant and the Irrationality of Suicide", History of Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 2, Apr., 2000. 159176. 13 For Kantian-inspired defenses of suicide that operate along these lines see David Velleman, "A Right of Self-termination", Ethics, vol. 109, no. 3, 1999, 606-628; Michael Cholbi, "A Kantian Defense of Prudential Suicide", Journal of Moral Philosophy, vol.7, 2010, 489-515. 14 Seneca, Moral Letters to Lucilius, Letter 70: "On the Proper Time to Slip the Cable". Available online at: http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Moral_letters_to_Lucilius/Letter_70 15 This is not to deny that suicide under other conditions may well be cowardly.

&4+5  1   &            !" # $ % ! " "&  '"()*)+",*-" ). )/0)123 .4.56 1 3  & 7 448 ""4.4.56 +9 " :!"- ;9"  "<"  = '      = '" (  Ethics, Policy & Environment, 2015 Vol. 18, No. 2, 123–146, http://dx.doi.org/1070519 © 2015 Taylor & Francis Climate Change and Justice: A NonWelfarist Treaty Negotiation Framework ALYSSA R. BERNSTEIN Philosophy Department, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, USA ABSTRACT Obstacles to achieving a global climate treaty include disagreements about questions of justice raised by the UNFCCC's principle that countries should respond to climate change by taking cooperative action "in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions". Aiming to circumvent such disagreements, Climate Change Justice (2010) authors Eric Posner and David Weisbach argue against shaping treaty proposals according to requirements of either distributive or corrective justice. The USA's climate envoy, Todd Stern, takes a similar position. In this article I explain the practical and theoretical drawbacks of Posner & Weisbach's welfarist (utilitarian) perspective and propose an alternative. I show that their arguments fail to rule out John Rawls's non-utilitarian, political conception of international justice and human rights, the Law of Peoples. On this basis I develop a conception of climate justice that highlights implications of some of Rawls's principles and adds a principle for determining fair shares of climate-treaty-related benefits and burdens. I propose this conception as a moral framework for negotiating a treaty that would promote human welfare consistently with requirements of justice, and I argue that a treaty proposal satisfying these requirements could best satisfy Posner & Weisbach's own feasibility criteria. Among the obstacles to achieving a global climate treaty are disagreements about questions of corrective and distributive justice, such as those involved in discussions about how to interpret a particularly important idea in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1992: the principle that countries should respond to climate change by taking cooperative action 'in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions' (abbreviated as 'CBDR' or as 'differentiation'). Eric Posner and David Weisbach (2010), authors of Climate Change Justice, aim to remove those obstacles in order to avert the tragedy that could result from failure to achieve a global climate treaty. They argue that the negotiators should not shape treaty proposals to meet requirements of distributive or corrective justice, but should instead focus on practical matters such as comparing proposed mitigation measures with regard to aggregate global costs and benefits, and creating incentives sufficient to ensure that all countries will join the treaty. Correspondence Address: Alyssa R. Bernstein. Ellis Hall 202, Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701, USA. Email: [email protected], [email protected] D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 124 A. R. Bernstein According to Posner and Weisbach, treaty proposals should be efficient and feasible. More specifically, they should satisfy two criteria: the economic requirement of global optimality1 and the pragmatic constraint of International Paretianism, which the authors define thus: 'all states must believe themselves better off by their lights as a result of the climate treaty' (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, p. 6).2 They argue also that all countries (and in particular all 'major emitting countries') have obligations to join a climate agreement and not to free-ride (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, pp. 181–183). They base their conclusions on a type of welfarism.3 Posner and Weisbach's arguments appear to provide support for a position taken recently by the United States' Special Envoy for Climate Change, Todd Stern, on the question of how to interpret CBDR. Stern advocates a forward-looking climate treaty, as explained below. Similarly, Posner and Weisbach oppose using principles of corrective justice, which are backward-looking, to design a climate treaty. Here I critically analyze their arguments and propose an alternative, a non-welfarist moral framework for the climate treaty negotiations. Posner and Weisbach focus their attention mainly on the difficulties of designing an international climate treaty. I agree with them about the need for such a treaty;4 taking this as given, I focus as they do on the question they think 'may be the most difficult': that of how the burdens of mitigation or abatement measures should be distributed (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, p. 3). States disagreeing with each other on this question have invoked various principles of justice. According to Posner and Weisbach (2010, p. 4), the central arguments about justice are vulnerable to serious objections of principle; furthermore, because their proponents fail to give due consideration to pragmatic or feasibility constraints, they threaten to derail a climate agreement and thus to hurt the nations and people who are pressing those very arguments. I agree with Posner and Weisbach when they say that the challenge is to construct a treaty that is both feasible and ethical, promoting the welfare of people all over the world consistently with the requirements of justice (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, pp. 4–5). However, I disagree with their welfarist theoretical approach to this problem5 and with their conception of distributive justice.6 There are practical as well as theoretical drawbacks to Posner and Weisbach's welfarist approach to these issues and, more generally, to basing the climate treaty negotiations ultimately on welfarist, utilitarian, or other consequentialist moral principles. Since the negotiations are authorized by international law and are further developing it by creating new legal obligations, they should be conducted in accordance with the principles grounding the rights and obligations of the negotiating states, including those they have in the negotiation process and would have under the treaty. The negotiations should be based on a political conception of justice that can be the focus of an overlapping consensus, the need for which has been emphasized recently by prominent philosophers criticizing the position of Posner and Weisbach (Jamieson, 2013, p. 467; Nussbaum, 2013, p. 485). An example of a political conception of justice is John Rawls' conception of the moral basis of a just international order, the Law of Peoples (presented in Rawls, 1993, 1999).7 Its principles are formulated to apply to international law and practice, and it can be the focus of an overlapping consensus. As I explain below, it is a conception of distributive justice in the broader of the two senses of the term ('distributive justice') that Rawls distinguishes, but not in the narrower sense used by Posner and Weisbach; for this reason among D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 A Non-Welfarist Treaty Negotiation Framework 125 others, their arguments against allowing principles of distributive justice to constrain treaty negotiations fail to apply to the Law of Peoples. Below I briefly develop a political conception of climate justice based on the Law of Peoples, and argue that it has both theoretical and practical advantages over welfarism as a moral framework for the climate treaty negotiations. I use arguments informed by the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (on social and international cooperation for the common good) and Immanuel Kant (on moral agency, obligation, and cosmopolitanism).8 I use some of Rawls' concepts and arguments, emphasize climate-change-relevant implications of some of the principles of the Law of Peoples, and add a principle for determining fair shares of climate-treaty-related benefits and burdens. I contend that this political conception of climate justice is appropriate to serve as a moral framework for the climate treaty negotiations.9 Treaty proposals should satisfy the requirements of its principle for determining fair shares of the costs and other burdens of mitigation and adaptation measures. No treaty proposal justifiable on welfarist grounds should be considered globally optimal unless it is consistent with this political conception of justice. A treaty proposal that satisfies its requirements can also satisfy Posner and Weisbach's treaty criteria of International Paretianism and feasibility, indeed better than proposals justifiable only in terms of welfarism, as I argue below. 1. Obstacles to Achieving a Global Climate Treaty A major obstacle to achieving an agreement at the climate treaty negotiations in Lima, Peru (in December 2014) was what participants and commentators referred to as the 'differentiation' issue (Taraska & Vogel, 2014). Two months prior to the Lima conference, the United States' Special Envoy, Todd Stern, referred to this issue in a speech, saying that 'the most important' obstacle concerns how to interpret CBDR, which is 'the core principle asserted by developing countries'.10 The UNFCCC says that developed countries need to 'take immediate action' and should 'take the lead in combatting climate change' while allowing poorer countries to develop and acknowledging that 'their energy consumption will need to grow.' Although in Lima the negotiators finally agreed upon a text, the issue is expected to arise again at the negotiations in Paris in December 2015 (Taraska & Vogel, 2014). In his speech, Stern opposed the idea that the 1992 categorization of countries should be included in the new agreement because climate change is the developed countries' fault: 'that approach isn't going to advance the ball because developed countries don't accept that worldview, and because descending into that kind of debate at this stage is the last way to find common ground.' To insist on basing the new agreement 'in form or content on immutable 1992 categories' would be 'a deal-breaker,' he declared; instead of using a 'backwards-facing structure,' it is necessary to 'build our new agreement looking forward, to reflect the economic, political and environmental realities of the next decade and beyond.' Stern's position appears justifiable when considered within the welfarist framework advocated by Posner and Weisbach. However, as I explain next, this framework has theoretical, moral, and practical drawbacks, while the political conception of climate justice has corresponding advantages. Later I will return to the disagreement about differentiation, and suggest that the political conception of climate justice provides appropriate guidance for resolving this issue. D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 126 A. R. Bernstein 2. Posner and Weisbach's Welfarist Perspective Despite the title of their book, Climate Change Justice, Posner and Weisbach (2010, p. 5) argue that considerations of (in)justice should not shape a climate treaty: Many people argue that the climate treaty should reflect principles of corrective and distributive justice. They treat climate negotiations as an opportunity to solve some of the world's most serious problems-the admittedly unfair distribution of wealth across northern and southern countries, the lingering harms of the legacy of colonialism, and so forth. We reject this approach. They contend that a climate treaty should meet neither requirements of corrective justice11 nor requirements of distributive justice.12 They favor 'a forward-looking, welfarist approach to the problem of climate change that satisfies pragmatic constraints' and 'takes the state system seriously by respecting International Paretianism' (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, p. 191). Posner and Weisbach's (2010, p. 192) central contention is that it would be 'a cruel irony if the consequence of justice-related arguments were to doom the prospects for an international agreement-and thus to create exceedingly serious risks to human welfare, above all in poor nations'. They argue that if distributive justice is the goal, it is necessary to recognize that pursuing this goal through a climate treaty may not be the best way of redistributing wealth from rich countries to poor ones; but if climate harm mitigation is the goal, the best way to pursue it is by agreeing to a treaty that stipulates the 'globally optimal' abatement plan (as determined by aggregation of benefits and costs across countries), 'even though that is not what is optimal for poor states,' if the treaty can get ratified and survive pressures to cheat (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, pp. 97–98). They also think it likely that states believing they will be harmed relatively less by climate change will either agree only to limited abatement requirements, or else agree to more demanding requirements only on condition that they receive 'side payments;' and that these payments 'may go from poor to rich, at least in part' (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, pp. 84–85). Despite objections from perspectives of corrective and distributive justice, Posner and Weisbach would favor such side payments if they were necessary in order to induce the richer countries to agree to a treaty stipulating the globally optimal abatement plan. 3. Deontology versus Welfarism Posner and Weisbach do not contend that their treaty criteria are requirements of justice, and they argue against using requirements of justice as criteria for an acceptable climate treaty. My own view is that a climate treaty should satisfy robust requirements of justice, since it will set the terms for global cooperative mitigation and adaptation efforts that will significantly affect our planet's entire human population, directly and indirectly, from the present into the indefinite future. These cooperative efforts may cause or permit destruction of nations as well as other harms to individual human beings: at stake are fundamental and vital interests of states as well as of the people whom they represent; these interests include survival and security. Therefore the parties to the negotiations (representatives of D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 A Non-Welfarist Treaty Negotiation Framework 127 states) should be able to justify their proposals, to each other as well as to the people whom they represent, by reference to a reasonable conception of justice that they all can endorse. Such a conception would be the focus of an overlapping consensus.13 This means that a treaty proposal justified in its terms could be offered in the belief that it is not unjust, and with the reasonable expectation that those to whom it is offered will not find any good reason to reject it as unjust. The parties to the negotiations should offer each other only treaty proposals that are justifiable by reference to such a conception of justice, that is, by appeal to public reason. The arguments offered by Posner and Weisbach to justify their criteria for a climate treaty are based on a welfarist ethical conception, which is a type of consequentialist theory. Consequentialism refers to a set of ethical theories holding that the rightness or wrongness of acts or policies depend on their consequences. Consequentialist theories are teleological; in ethics, 'teleology' refers to the evaluation of conduct in relation to the end or ends it serves, realizes, or helps to constitute. In this article I use the term 'deontology' to refer to non-teleological conceptions of morality or justice. A moral framework for the climate treaty negotiations may be either teleological or deontological, depending on the character of the moral principles on which it is based. Consequentialist teleological theories define right conduct or policies as those that produce the outcomes that are best, or that create or increase or promote what is good; first they identify what is good, and from this they derive conclusions about the right thing to do (the best means to the end). Deontological theories are non-consequentialist in the sense that they start with the concepts that are fundamental to morality and justice (such as obligation, duty, voluntary consent, agreement, cooperation, fairness), and on this basis draw conclusions about what outcomes, goals, and interests people may reasonably consider good and how people with different interests can cooperate on fair terms. Posner and Weisbach do not argue for welfarism, nor do they assume that everyone worldwide endorses it (nor only the members of the academic community, whether worldwide or only in the USA). As they acknowledge, proponents of other conceptions of ethics, morality, and justice, whether religious or secular (which they group together under the term 'deontological approaches') reject consequentialist conceptions including welfarism (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, p. 8). Furthermore, Posner and Weisbach (2010, p. 173) say that for their purposes they need not make fine-grained distinctions between ethical theories. They use the term 'ethical' to cover social and political justice. I contend that for their purposes it is necessary to distinguish carefully between (a) political conceptions of justice, (b) comprehensive moral doctrines, and (c) partially theorized ethical conceptions such as their own welfarism; it is also necessary carefully to distinguish (as they do not) between (d) Rawls' Law of Peoples, which is a political conception of justice providing principles to guide cooperation among states, and (e) the conceptions of global distributive justice advocated by Rawls' critics, some of whom are self-avowedly anti-statist.14 Although they aim to balance 'the cosmopolitan view that people around the globe matter, not just people in one's neighborhood or nation,' with 'the practical realities and benefits of a state system,' and although they acknowledge the existence of nations as 'a basic constraint on ethical arguments,' Posner and Weisbach (2010, pp. 6, 173) argue that 'climate change is a problem because it hurts people, not because it hurts countries.' Yet among the many ways climate change may hurt people is that it may damage or destroy economic, social, cultural, and political institutions and practices. According to Rawls, D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 128 A. R. Bernstein utilitarian (including welfarist) arguments for the international as well as domestic legal obligations and rights of states are inadequate (Rawls, 2001, pp. 80–134; 1999, p. 40). Utilitarians acknowledge this inadequacy when they endorse deontological arguments for such obligations,15 as do Posner and Weisbach (2010, pp. 178, 182–183) when arguing against free-riding and in favor of the view that states are obligated to cooperate.16 According to Posner and Weisbach, a feasible treaty proposal is one that meets the International Paretianism condition. This condition states that all states must believe themselves better off as a result of the climate treaty, 'by their lights' (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, p. 6). Many people reject welfarism or, more broadly, consequentialist or teleological comprehensive doctrines about ethics and justice, and instead conceive their state's interests in terms of other secular or religious cultural values. Such people may see little reason to accept Posner and Weisbach's arguments or to agree to treaty proposals justifiable only on welfarist grounds. However, proposals that are justifiable in terms of the public reasons specified by a political conception of justice can be the focus of an overlapping consensus and thus may meet the International Paretianism condition. Some of the drawbacks of Posner and Weisbach's position emerge from reflection on the presuppositions of the climate treaty negotiations. An analysis of the idea of treaty obligations, sketched in the next subsections, reveals reasons why the parties to the negotiations should offer each other only treaty proposals that are justifiable by public reasons, and why proposals not meeting this criterion are not feasible. 3.1. Treaty Obligations If treaties create binding obligations (in the sense that a state's becoming party to a treaty entitles the other parties to expect that state to comply with the terms of the treaty, despite self-interested reasons to do otherwise, unless it has a legitimate excuse; to object to non-compliance; and to employ appropriate forms and amounts of pressure to ensure compliance or penalize non-compliance), then treaty proposals must meet the condition of being appropriate contents for obligations of that kind. Treaty proposals fail to meet this condition if the addressee of the proposal would not agree to the proposed terms of cooperation (whether due to reasonably regarding them as inconsistent with the point of the cooperation, or inconsistent with their own fundamental interests as they understand them), unless pressured to do so or unless lacking relevant information or comprehension. Treaty proposals can meet the condition only if they do not conflict with states' fundamental interests, but instead serve their common good. 3.2. The Common Good If states regard cooperation structured by a treaty as necessary for securing or furthering their own fundamental interests, then all states cooperating for this reason can share a common good, namely, the furthering of their respective fundamental interests by means of the treaty. Treaty proposals can serve this common good only if the addressees can accept them as binding, and parties to treaty negotiations cannot accept a treaty proposal as binding if it conflicts with the point of the cooperation, which is to serve their common good (including the fundamental interests of each and every state). Justifications offered in terms of public reasons should be acceptable to all parties willing to cooperate on fair terms. D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 A Non-Welfarist Treaty Negotiation Framework 129 3.3. Public Reasons Parties willing to cooperate on fair terms aim to avoid offering proposals that (a) can reasonably be rejected by the addressee due to conflict with its fundamental interests or with the common good, or that (b) would undermine the addressee's ability, or conflict with its rights, to participate in the cooperation (in this case, to participate in the negotiations and sign a treaty); or that (c) cannot be justified as serving the common good except by presupposing the truth of a comprehensive doctrine that is controversial among the parties. This three-part condition can be met by proposals justifiable in terms of a political conception of international justice endorsable by all of the parties in common. Such a conception can be developed by analyzing the idea of legitimately governed states cooperating fairly, as does Rawls: his Law of Peoples provides a moral basis for the rights and obligations of states, including their obligations to secure the basic human rights recognized in international law. Posner and Weisbach neither offer nor cite any welfarist or other utilitarian conception of these rights and obligations, and any such conception would be problematic, for reasons corresponding to the distinctive theoretical and practical advantages of a political conception of climate justice, as I indicate below. 4. A Political Conception of Climate Justice The political conception of climate justice here proposed endorses the principles of Rawls' Law of Peoples, emphasizes climate-change-relevant implications of some of them, and adds a principle for determining fair shares of climate-treaty-related benefits and burdens. In The Law of Peoples, Rawls (1999, p.37) proposes eight principles as specifying the fundamental rights and duties of decent political societies, which he calls 'peoples' (as distinct from 'states,' which refers to states that do not meet the criteria of decency).17 The principles of the Law of Peoples are the following: (1) Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples. (2) Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. (3) Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. (4) Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention. (5) Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense. (6) Peoples are to honor human rights. (7) Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. (8) Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime. These principles establish equality among peoples by ascribing the same fundamental rights and duties to them all. Rawls contends that the eight principles, if interpreted in the way he advocates, are fair to all peoples, and that they, together with his criteria for a decent society and his list of basic human rights, provide appropriate content for the foundation charter of a reasonably just system of international law. D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 130 A. R. Bernstein The Law of Peoples focuses mainly on questions concerning basic human rights in relation to the moral basis, content, and limits of the rights of peoples. It provides rationales for the limitation of both a state's right to wage war and a state's right of internal sovereignty, as found in international law since World War II. Rawls' overarching goal is a world in which ethnic hatreds leading to nationalistic wars will have ceased (Rawls, 1999, pp. 6–7). Participants in fair cooperation must, logically, be agents that are both capable of cooperating on fair terms and motivated to do so. If there can be a just international order, then it must be possible for states to have such a capacity and such a motivation, which means that it must be possible for them to be reasonable as well as rational agents. Any state meeting Rawls' criteria for decency (that is, any political society that is legitimately governed and non-expansionist, i.e., any people, as Rawls understands 'people') can be such an agent. It is possible for political societies to meet the criteria of decency; some present and past societies have met them. And it is plausible that, under certain realistically possible conditions, societies meeting these criteria would tend to act reasonably, as Rawls argues in the Law of Peoples (1999, pp. 25–30, 124–127). The eight principles of the Law of Peoples are fair in the sense that decent societies regarding themselves and each other as free and equal, behind a veil of ignorance,18 would not have any reason to reject them.19 As regards freedom, if a political society is capable of acting for reasons, then it is free in a certain sense. If it is independent, then it is free in another sense: it is not obligated to obey any other political society. If it makes and follows its own laws and policies, then it is free in a further sense: it is self-determining. As Rawls conceives peoples, they are political societies that are both capable of acting for reasons (as understood above) and independent. His position, which I endorse, is that self-determination, duly constrained by appropriate conditions, is an important good for a people, and that international law should not ascribe to peoples unlimited rights of self-determination and independence. Rawls assumes that all peoples have an interest in receiving from all other peoples a proper respect and recognition of their equality. Here, equality means equality of status as peoples entitled to the same rights as other peoples under international law. Rawls thinks that when seeking fair principles, it is appropriate to start from a baseline of equality in this sense. He argues that no utilitarian principle would be preferred by peoples (i.e., the trustees representing them) behind the veil of ignorance, since none would be prepared to count, as a first principle, the benefits for another people as outweighing the hardships imposed on itself. The trustee of each people, i.e., the party representing it in the original position,20 will aim to preserve their society's equality and independence; and by insisting on equality among peoples, these trustees rule out any form of the principle of utility. Whatever rights peoples are to have in relation to each other, these rights must be the same for them all, and must be secure: they must not be contingent in the ways that rights grounded in a utilitarian conception of justice would be contingent (Rawls, 1999, p. 40). I endorse this argument, and I agree with Rawls that justice restricts permissible means for promoting good consequences. Parties to treaty negotiations are obligated to respect basic human rights. Any legitimately governed society undertakes to secure at least certain basic rights for all of the individual human beings under its government. Human rights would be secured universally if all states became decent political societies, i.e., peoples, and if all decent societies formed an association and together followed the Law of Peoples, thus constituting what Rawls D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 A Non-Welfarist Treaty Negotiation Framework 131 calls a 'Society of Peoples.' A Society of Peoples can include peoples that are not liberal democracies, partly because the list of basic human rights appropriate for the foundation charter of a Society of Peoples does not include all of the basic rights of citizens of liberal democracies.21 The basic human rights can be justified either as belonging to a liberal political conception of justice (as a proper subset of the rights and liberties secured to all free and equal citizens) or as belonging to a conception of a well-ordered associationist society.22 They can be affirmed by all, not only by liberals or Westerners; as Rawls says, the basic human rights are not 'politically parochial' (Rawls, 1999, p. 65).23 Some of the concerns of non-Annex I countries24 (for example, that the UNFCCC be observed, and that the principle of CBDR be followed, and that parties to treaties be recognized as having equal standing under international law) can be expressed in terms of principles #1–3 of the Law of Peoples, others in terms of principles #6 and #8. From these principles one can draw implications regarding access to resources to fulfill basic human needs (including global climatic conditions necessary for the possibility of fulfillment of these needs). Societies may lack the means to meet the criteria of decency; such 'burdened societies' may lack material and/or technological resources, human capital and know-how, and/or the requisite political culture (Rawls, 1999, pp. 90, 105–113). Clearly, climate change may worsen conditions in some burdened societies, and may cause some previously decent societies to become unable to fulfill their people's human rights.25 A climate treaty must aim to ensure the material preconditions necessary so that all societies may meet the criteria of decency. Every state must, if it is able, take at least the steps such that not taking them would be inconsistent with being committed to this aim. Beyond this, states should each bear their fair share of the costs of the necessary climate change mitigation and adaptation measures.26 5. Practical Implications of the Political Conception of Climate Justice If all parties to the climate treaty negotiations were to acknowledge and respect the basic moral constraints set by the political conception of climate justice, this would reduce their conflicts and make it easier for them to agree about which policy proposals would assign fair shares of the costs and other burdens involved in the necessary measures for reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation to climate change. Below I offer some general guidelines for evaluating climate change treaty proposals in accordance with these basic moral constraints. Then I consider how the concerns of all sides to the disputes about CBDR (common but differentiated responsibilities) can be expressed in terms of, or in relation to, the political conception of climate justice, and how it can help lead to reconciliation and agreement on a treaty. State representatives should ask the following questions when evaluating treaty proposals: (1) Would the proposal be consistent with the eight principles of the Law of Peoples (or with a justified qualification of one or more of its principles)? (2) Would the proposal... (2.1) ... allow progress toward a Society of Peoples, or D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 132 A. R. Bernstein (2.2) ... increase the likelihood of it or open up more ways to it? In general, when deliberating about what the content of a treaty should be, it is necessary to identify the relevant morally required and permissible goal(s) and the morally permissible means to them, and then to consider which of these means would be most effective and efficient as well as politically feasible in the current situation.27 In relation to climate change, one morally required goal is to prevent global average temperature from rising to the point of causing inundation of the territories of island nations and sea-level coastal nations, since no party to the negotiations whose country would be devastated under higher global average temperatures can agree to measures allowing this; to do so would conflict with the commitment to secure the human rights of the country's people, and also would conflict with recognition of the country's status as a party to the negotiations entitled to equal rights under international law.28 If it is not possible (given the limited time available, and given the political realities),29 to bring all of the parties to agree on the morally required goal, then there is no choice but to agree on a goal that comes as close as possible in the current situation to the morally required goal. Setting the less satisfactory goal (perhaps 2 degrees Centigrade) in the climate treaty might be necessary for securing conditions that may permit achieving the more satisfactory goal (perhaps 1.5 degrees Centigrade) by other means, including policies that can be implemented at various levels of government or by nongovernmental organizations, commercial corporations, and individuals. There may be various morally permissible means to the agreed goal that could be sufficiently effective and efficient. Morally permissible means would involve fair distribution of the benefits and burdens associated with mitigating and adapting to climate change;30 the means chosen must be as fair as possible in the current situation. Legitimate concerns of negotiating parties can be articulated either in the terms provided by the political conception of climate justice or consistently with it. All negotiating parties should use this framework for determining appropriately justified answers to the questions at issue. Consider first the concerns voiced by the US representative to the UNFCCC. According to US Envoy Stern,31 all countries have 'common responsibilities in regard to climate change,' but 'what we need to do must be differentiated according to our own circumstances and capabilities.' The two 1992 categories-Annex I (developed countries) and Non-Annex I (developing countries)-were originally distinguished on the basis of countries' material circumstances, which have changed in the intervening years, dramatically in some cases; therefore 'once we have made sure that the material interests ... of developing countries are fully protected ... then there is no justification' for using the 1992 categories. To do so in an agreement that will take effect nearly three decades after 1992 and will govern climate diplomacy in future decades 'would be inimical to ambition and would undermine the political cohesion we need to build an effective and durable climate system going forward.' Stern rejects the idea that the 1992 categorization of countries was based on their pre-1992 historical responsibility and was intended to remain so based, and implicitly argues that, given constantly changing circumstances, such a basis for the categorization would have been neither fair nor wise.32 The Lima agreement says that the 2015 treaty should reflect 'the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in light of different national D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 A Non-Welfarist Treaty Negotiation Framework 133 circumstances.' This wording differs slightly from the wording in the UNFCCC. During the Lima negotiations, many participants argued that the developed countries must acknowledge their disproportionate historical and moral responsibility for causing climate change as well as for persisting deep inequalities due to past colonization; and that omission of the phrase 'differentiated responsibilities' from the text of the agreement would erode the mutual trust and confidence necessary for successful cooperation in responding to climate change.33 My view is that justice requires powerful states to refrain from unreasonably hard bargaining. It also requires that countries conceive their national interests not merely in terms of minimizing economic costs to themselves and increasing or preserving their own power, but also in terms of building the kinds of mutually respectful, trusting relationships necessary for cooperation to achieve a stably peaceful and just international order. Voluntary cooperation on the basis of mutually acknowledged commitment to shared goals and principles is required because respect for national sovereignty precludes proceeding otherwise. Differentiation (CBDR) should be retained, but with qualifications acknowledging countries' changed material circumstances, on condition that the material interests of poorer countries (at least those necessary for fulfilling the basic human rights of their populations) be fully protected. When considering whether to preserve the 1992 categorization of countries,34 the negotiators should consider what principle to guide judgment regarding cases of this kind35 they would endorse if they were behind a veil of ignorance depriving them of knowledge of which country they represent. 6. Fair Shares The climate treaty negotiators should aim to ensure the material and other preconditions for the independence, self-determination, and stability of legitimately governed states, so that they can secure at least the basic human rights. Every state must, if it is able, take at least the steps such that not taking them would be inconsistent with being committed to the aim of ensuring the material preconditions necessary so that all societies may meet the criteria of decency. Beyond this, states should each bear their fair share of the costs of the necessary mitigation and adaptation measures.36 A number of alternative approaches to determining fair shares of climate-treaty-related benefits and burdens have been developed in the academic literature. Four of the most prominent approaches can be combined and revised so as to yield a principle that is compatible with the political conception of climate justice. Here I present this fair-shares principle, and in the next section I apply it to two policy proposals. Within the space constraints of this article I cannot fully discuss or defend this principle. My aim here is merely to indicate how the political conception of climate justice can be developed so as to guide and constrain policy deliberations. According to the approach taken by sufficientarians, since distributive justice gives every person a claim to a sufficient quantity of certain goods to provide for basic needs, a climate treaty should impose no sacrifice on the indigent. According to the prioritarian view that progressivity is a requirement of distributive justice, the less well off one is, the less one should be required to contribute to the production of any given good, so the wealthy should contribute more than the poor to the mitigation of global warming. There are various versions of both the sufficientarian view (to which I will refer as the D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 134 A. R. Bernstein 'sufficiency principle') and the prioritarian view (to which I will refer as the 'priority principle'); for present purposes I will use a version of the priority principle formulated by Derek Parfit and a version of the sufficiency principle formulated by Robert Huseby (2010). Parfit distinguishes the idea that equality is to be valued and sought for its own sake, as intrinsically valuable, from the priority principle, which he formulates as follows: 'Benefiting people matters more the worse off these people are.'37 According to Huseby, It is, in itself, bad if a person is not sufficiently well off. It is worse the farther from a sufficient level a person is (and especially bad if a person's basic needs are unmet), and worse the more people that are not sufficiently well off. (Huseby, 2010, p. 180) Huseby favors regarding the means to subsistence or the satisfaction of basic human needs as a minimal sufficiency threshold ('insufficiency below subsistence level is morally more urgent than insufficiency above it'), and argues for the following maximal threshold: 'people are sufficiently well off if their welfare level gives them a reasonable chance of being content' (Huseby, 2010, p. 182). He argues that we should give absolute priority to those below the maximal sufficiency threshold (over those above it), and as regards those below this threshold, we should prioritize between them by taking into account 'both how many people can be benefited, and how far from the threshold these people are;' those below the minimum threshold should be given special concern and strong priority (Huseby, 2010, pp. 184–185).38 According to a human rights perspective developed in the academic literature, the greenhouse-gas-absorptive capacity of the atmosphere is something to which each human being has an equal right.39 Insofar as any human rights perspective is grounded in arguments that are neutral between deontological and teleological justifications of human rights, it may avoid conflict with the Law of Peoples and the political conception of climate justice.40 Simon Caney (2010, p. 165) presents his human-rights-centered analysis of the impacts of climate change as grounded in arguments that are neutral in this sense.41 According to the due care approach advocated by Richard W. Miller, climate policymakers should ensure fairness by employing a Rawlsian veil of ignorance. Miller emphasizes both that all who emit greenhouse gases must undertake to mitigate the harmful side-effects that they jointly create, and that those who consider adopting mitigation and/ or adaptation policies must take into account the harmful side-effects, such as thwarted opportunities, that may result from these policies. Fair burden allocation would, he contends, 'give priority to the gravest combined burdens of climate danger and climate mitigation that people suffer, to grave burdens that more people suffer and to grave burdens that are readily relieved' (Miller, 2010, p. 105). In order to facilitate impartial deliberation about particular policies, policymakers and negotiators should utilize a Rawlsian veil of ignorance (Miller, 2010, pp. 33, 74).42 As I interpret Miller's proposal, the policymaker's job would be to promote human welfare (construed in terms of human rights and their preconditions, as understood within the framework of the Law of Peoples) by considering, behind a veil of ignorance, how any proposed policies compare to each other on Miller's first two criteria: (1) the gravest combined burdens of climate danger and climate mitigation that people suffer, and (2) grave burdens that more people suffer. If the policies seem equally bad, then the choice is to be made by applying the third criterion (grave burdens that are readily relieved). D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 A Non-Welfarist Treaty Negotiation Framework 135 Miller's proposal can be combined with a revised form of Huseby's sufficiency principle (which includes a limited priority principle). I will refer to this combination as the Huseby-Miller principle. Huseby (2010, pp. 185–186) emphasizes the compatibility between his principle of sufficiency and the view that people should be treated with equal respect and concern. He holds that the moral equality between persons justifies 'equal rights and liberties, (formal) equality of opportunity, access to health care etc.,' and that the principle of sufficiency requires such 'background conditions' (Huseby, 2010, p. 186). The Law of Peoples does not rely on equally strong assumptions,43 but a weaker form of Huseby's sufficiency principle44 would be consistent with the Law of Peoples. So would a priority principle limited by incorporation into the revised form of Huseby's sufficiency view. 7. Evaluation of Policy Proposals: Two Examples Huq and Richards (2014) have proposed a global fossil fuel extraction levy to pay for loss and damage from climate change.45 They write that although 'such a levy makes perfect legal and moral sense,' there are 'technical issues to be ironed out,' and a key challenge is 'how to have a globally-applied levy take into account the equity principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities at the heart of the UNFCCC.' One way to do so, they suggest, is to establish a process allowing less-developed countries to apply for permission to opt out of contributing the levy to the international loss and damage mechanism so that they can instead use it for domestic mitigation or adaptation. This forward-looking proposal has several advantages from the perspective of the Huseby-Miller principle. Negotiating parties guiding their deliberative reasoning by asking the questions required by this principle might well opt for such a proposal, unless a better one were available. This comparative judgment would have to take into account the probable consequences of this proposed policy when implemented in the context of other policies in the actual circumstances.46 Paula Casal (2012, pp. 419–433) contends that an extraction-only tax would impose greater costs on the least fortunate than her proposed alternative, namely, global progressive environmental taxation (see also Casal, 2011a, pp. 307–327, 2011b, pp. 353–365). She advocates 'starting with oil use' and then broadening the tax base by taxing either use or ownership of a wide range of resources, depending on the consequences (for pollution reduction and poverty reduction) of either type of resource taxation (Casal, 2011b, pp. 357–358, 358; see also 2011a, pp. 320, 323, 327). Casal's proposal for global progressive environmental taxation has features that are attractive from the perspective of the Huseby-Miller principle. However, her proposal addresses two large categories of problem, pollution and poverty, and is not tailored to solve the narrower problem of how best (for purposes of agreement on a climate treaty in December 2015) to determine fair shares of the costs of implementing the necessary mitigation and adaptation policies. While she may be right that parties in a Rawlsian original position (which she construes, as does Thomas Pogge, as representing all of the individuals in the world, not as representing peoples) would be less likely to endorse an extraction-only tax, despite the possibility of later compensation for the less fortunate, and would be more likely to endorse a broader tax base that 'spreads the bets and lowers the risks' (Casal, 2011b, p. 359), this argument does not fit comfortably into the framework of the political conception of climate justice. This argument also leaves open the questions of (a) whether this type of tax on global resources D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 136 A. R. Bernstein must be included in the 2015 climate treaty, or could be implemented independently of it or on the basis of it (World Resources Forum, 2013), and (b) whether parties representing peoples behind a veil of ignorance would (or the actual parties to the current climate negotiations should) endorse such a proposal over an alternative according to which countries determine their own voluntary contributions to a Green Climate Fund to be used for financing the implementation of mitigation and adaptation policies worldwide.47 8. Corrective Justice and the Climate Treaty Negotiations A conception of corrective justice must be backward-looking, unlike the political conception of climate justice. US Envoy Stern advocates a forward-looking climate treaty, and Posner and Weisbach likewise oppose using backward-looking principles of justice to design a climate treaty. They emphasize the urgent importance of reaching agreement on a climate treaty by December of 2015; for this reason, they contend, the negotiators should not undertake to achieve corrective justice by means of the treaty. They doubt that there remains enough time to settle the controversies by arriving at answers to the difficult philosophical as well as legal questions about the assignment of individual and collective moral responsibility, as well as about appropriate penalties, that are raised by the demands for corrective justice.48 And they point out that it would be an ironic and momentous tragedy if efforts to achieve corrective justice, made on behalf of poorer and more vulnerable countries, derailed the climate negotiations, thus bringing about (by obstructing efforts to prevent) great harm to these countries. In arguing that the climate treaty should comply with the (forward-looking) political conception of climate justice, I am not rejecting any requirements of corrective justice for which others have argued.49 The political conception of climate justice provides support for some claims of corrective justice. Moreover, fulfillment of the requirements of the former would in effect fulfill requirements of the latter to a significant extent. By endorsing the political conception of climate justice, states would acknowledge (at least implicitly) that much international conduct has been gravely unjust, egregiously violating the principles of the Law of Peoples. Fulfillment of the duty of assistance specified in the Law of Peoples would greatly improve conditions in countries that have been subjected to unjust invasions or colonialist or imperialist exploitation. While I agree with Posner and Weisbach about the urgent importance of achieving a climate agreement by December, I contend that the primary objective must be to achieve, as soon as possible, a climate treaty that satisfies the requirements of the political conception of climate justice to the extent possible within the relevant time-frame. To achieve such a treaty would be to secure essential preconditions for a just global Society of Peoples, as well as preconditions for achievement of the goals of sufficientarian, prioritarian and egalitarian advocates of distributive justice (in the narrow sense of this term). 9. Distributive Justice Posner and Weisbach (2010, p. 76) provide only a vague and ambiguous description of a Rawlsian conception of distributive justice, which they criticize.50 The description applies equally well to the positions taken by some of Rawls' critics, in particular, Charles Beitz D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 A Non-Welfarist Treaty Negotiation Framework 137 and Thomas Pogge. For this reason the criticisms that Posner and Weisbach direct toward Rawls fail to apply to his own view. Nowhere in their book do Posner and Weisbach cite either Rawls' 1993 article on the Law of Peoples or his 1999 book.51 Moreover, they use the term 'distributive justice' to refer only to equalization of material conditions, whether done for the sake of increasing aggregate welfare or for other reasons.52 This is the way the term is used by some of Rawls' most prominent critics. To think that this is the only meaning of 'distributive justice' is to overlook the difference between the broader and narrower senses of the term that Rawls distinguishes (Rawls, 2001, pp. 42, 122). In the narrower sense, only questions of distribution of wealth and income53 are questions of distributive justice (Rawls, 2001, pp. 42, 122). In the broader sense, both (a) the question of which principles should guide creation and reform of the basic institutions (legal and political as well as economic) of a single society, and (b) the question of which principles should guide creation and reform of international laws and institutions, are questions of distributive justice. If one thinks that all questions of justice that concern laws and political, social, and economic institutions must be either questions of distributive justice in the narrow sense or else questions of corrective justice (concerning rectification of past wrongs or crimes), then one is missing a large category of important questions about justice. These include many questions about the rule of law and basic rights that are among the fundamental questions of distributive justice addressed in the Law of Peoples. 10. Conclusion Above I have argued that Posner and Weisbach's welfarist approach to climate treaty negotiation has theoretical, moral, and practical drawbacks, while the political conception of climate justice has corresponding advantages and is an appropriate framework for the climate treaty negotiations.54 Since this conception of climate justice is based on the Law of Peoples, which is a political conception of international justice and human rights that can be the focus of an overlapping consensus, and since the proposed fair-shares principle is consistent with the Law of Peoples and endorsable by proponents of several of the main approaches to determining fair shares, there is reason to think that the political conception of climate justice can, like the Law of Peoples, serve as a basis for international cooperation freely undertaken, willingly continued, and long-enduring despite the great cultural and political differences between countries. This is not true of the welfarist approach advocated by Posner and Weisbach. They declare that for their purposes they can 'bracket the largest debates' between deontological conceptions of justice and other conceptions such as their own welfarism, and that their position is 'broadly compatible with most deontological claims' (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, p. 172). However, in giving short shrift to deontological conceptions of justice and offering little discussion or defense of welfarism (their own definition of which is brief and vague),55 Posner and Weisbach neglect to distinguish between the Law of Peoples and the positions taken by its critics, cannot see the great value of Rawls' political conception of international justice, and do not notice that the arrows of criticism they themselves aim at the Law of Peoples do not reach their intended target. Therefore they fail to consider the need for a political conception of climate justice on which there can be an overlapping consensus. D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 138 A. R. Bernstein Today the United States and most, if not all, other states acknowledge constraints of justice applying to international relations, even though they disagree about what distributive justice may require as regards redistribution of wealth. These states must, on pain of logical inconsistency, acknowledge the implications of the principles of international justice that they already (purportedly) endorse; otherwise they would not actually endorse them. These implications include: • Commitment to international peace and the rule of international law. • Commitment to refrain from acting in ways that would render impossible, or would obstruct, the development of a peaceful global order of legitimate states freely cooperating in accord with international law. • Commitment to contribute to efforts to prevent states from losing the material preconditions for fulfilling the basic human rights of their populations and sustaining legitimate political institutions. These implications set a condition for an acceptable climate treaty: it must be possible for negotiators to propose it to each other, and to accept it freely, consistently with the above commitments. A treaty negotiated within the framework of the political conception of climate justice would meet this condition, but a welfarist treaty of the kind advocated by Posner and Weisbach would not. Humanity can no longer take for granted that the natural ecological and climate systems on which our lives depend will continue to function as they did throughout history prior to the era of industrial economies reliant on fossil fuels (indeed, these systems have already changed dramatically, as is widely known although not universally admitted). The crisis of climate change is clear, and we need a moral framework for dealing with it: one that can help us to find common ground, build mutual trust and confidence, create enduring structures for cooperation, and make progress toward the goal of a stably peaceful and just international order that facilitates sustainable development.56 The political conception of climate justice offered above is such a framework. Acknowledgements I delivered a precursor of this article ('Climate Change and Global Justice: A Critique of V. Zanetti, E. Posner, and D. Weisbach') at the Georgia State University conference, Global Justice and International Law, September 2012. I thank Andrew Altman, Jean-Cassien Billet, Ruediger Bittner, Gillian Brock, Martin Carrier, Francis Cheneval, Candice Delmas, Frank Dietrich, Christie Hartley, Kristen Hessler, Maria Kronfeldner, Lukas Meyer, Richard W. Miller, Thomas Pogge, George Rainbolt, Anna Stilz, Kok-Chor Tan, Adam Toon, and Veronique Zanetti for comments or discussions of topics relating to that paper. For especially valuable written comments on this article, I thank Jeppe von Platz and Allen W. Wood (both of whom commented on more than one draft), and for helpful written comments on a draft I thank also Austin Babrow, Samuel Freeman Alfred Lent, Elijah Millgram, and two anonymous reviewers for this journal. I am grateful to Stela Goldenstein, former Secretary of the Environment of São Paulo, Brazil, for correspondence regarding the position taken by U.S. Envoy Stern. For all of their work as the guest editors of this special journal issue, I thank Idil Boran and Kenneth Shockley. I am especially grateful to my husband, Todd Shannon Bastin, for helping me think through my arguments for this paper and helping enable me to write it (sine quo non). D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 A Non-Welfarist Treaty Negotiation Framework 139 Disclosure statement No potential con!ict of interest was reported by the author. 1 An 'optimal' climate treaty 'reduces emissions to the extent that the cost of reducing emissions a little bit more is equal to the benefit of reducing emissions a little bit more; in economic terms, the marginal costs equal the marginal benefits,' taking into consideration the lowest cost emissions reductions wherever they may be worldwide and counting 'all of the harms from climate change' (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, p. 56). 2 More recently Posner and Weisbach have reaffirmed their central contention. They argue that a feasible climate treaty would be 'designed so that all states consider themselves better off than in the status quo,' and that achieving such a treaty in the near future requires focusing on how to 'reduce carbon emissions at an acceptable cost,' since '[e]ven if Americans were to take seriously the ethical arguments of philosophers, it seems unlikely that many of them would be persuaded that a climate treaty should impose disproportionate burdens on the US, and likewise for people in other rich countries' (Posner & Weisbach, 2013, pp. 355, 358). 3 Posner and Weisbach's welfarism is a conception of the fundamental ethical considerations that should guide policymaking, according to which policymakers should aim to maximize welfare or well-being: 'Welfarists seek policies that maximize people's well-being, defined variously as their subjective sense of well-being, satisfaction of desires or preferences, or satisfaction of certain objective parameters' (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, p. 171). Posner and Weisbach (2010, p. 8) neither specify a particular interpretation of welfare nor exclude non-humans: 'The welfarist approach approves of acts that increase the welfare of relevant people (and possibly animals)'. Posner and Weisbach (2010, p. 217, n. 7) say that utilitarianism is a form of welfarism; however, as these terms are normally used, welfarism is a form of utilitarianism. 4 While agreeing with Posner and Weisbach about the need for a climate treaty, I agree also with Dale Jamieson: 'Most action on climate change will take place within regions, within countries, within communities, and in the hearts and minds of individuals' (Gutting & Jamieson, 2015). 5 John Broome (see Broome, 2012), too, takes a welfarist approach to questions of justice and ethics in relation to climate change. However, his particular arguments differ from those offered by Posner and Weisbach. 6 In this article I focus on the topic of distributive justice, but later I briefly return to the topic of corrective justice. 7 Much of the academic work on global justice published in the last several decades has engaged with the central ideas of John Rawls' conceptions of domestic and international justice. 8 My interpretation of Rousseau is informed by the work of Joshua Cohen (see Cohen, 2010) as well as the work of John Rawls (see Rawls, 2007b). My interpretation of Kant's political philosophy is presented in Bernstein, 2008a, 2009, 2013, 2014. 9 Although in this article I will refer to this conception as 'the political conception of climate justice,' I do so only for convenience (instead of using the longer phrase, 'a political conception of justice appropriate to serve as a moral framework for the climate treaty negotiations'). I claim neither that it is the sole possible formulation of a reasonable political conception of climate justice nor that all questions of climate justice can be adequately addressed by it. 10 This and all quotations of Stern are from Stern, 2014. D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 140 A. R. Bernstein 11 'According to corrective justice, if one person harms another person, the first person should provide a remedy, such as cash, to the victim' (Posner & Weisbach, 2010, p. 100). 12 According to Posner and Weisbach (2010, pp. 96–98), distributive justice requires reducing poverty and giving priority to the poorest and most desperately needy. 13 For discussion of the idea of an overlapping consensus, see Rawls (1993/1996/2005, pp. 133–172; 1999, pp. 32, 172–174; 2001, pp. 32–38). 14 Among the most prominent critics of Rawls' Law of Peoples are Charles Beitz, Martha Nussbaum, Onora O'Neill, and Thomas Pogge. For an explanations and rebuttals of their criticisms, see Bernstein# 2007a2012c2012d2012e2012f2012g2012h. 15 Compare Rawls' analysis of the political philosophy of John Stuart Mill: see Rawls, 2007a, pp. 307–308, 313. 16 In economics, free riders either consume more than their fair share of a common resource, or pay less than their fair share of the cost of a common resource; in relation to public goods more generally, free riders benefit without doing their fair share to generate or maintain the good. 17 Rawls discusses the idea of a people in Rawls, 1999, pp. 4, 17, 25–27, 34–37, 44–45, 111–113. 18 Rawls discusses the idea of the veil of ignorance in Rawls, 1999, pp. 30–33, 43, as well as in Rawls, 1993/1996/2005, pp. 24–27 19 I explain the argument justifying the eight principles in Bernstein, 2012g. 20 Rawls explains the idea of the original position with its veil of ignorance in Rawls, 1999, pp. 10, 17, 26, 30–33, 39–42, 63, 68–70, 82–83, 115, 140, as well as in Rawls, 1993/1996/2005, pp. 304–310. The original position is a theoretical device used in a type of thought experiment for testing the fairness of principles for organizing political and economic cooperation. Different versions of the original position (and of the veil of ignorance) are appropriate for answering different moral and political questions. In the Law of Peoples Rawls uses a version of the original position in order to test proposed principles of international justice. He characterizes it by various stipulations. For example, each of the parties in the original position is responsible for the fundamental interests of a decent society (either liberal or not), and they are behind a veil of ignorance that deprives the parties of knowledge of any particulars about their society, such as the size of its territory, its level of economic development, its natural resources, its population, or how powerful it is as compared to other societies. The principles that would be chosen unanimously by these parties behind the veil of ignorance would serve the fundamental interests of every people and would secure basic human rights globally if all peoples were to establish a Society of Peoples based on these principles. 21 See Bernstein, 2006, 2007b. 22 An associationist form of society 'sees persons first as members of groups-associations, corporations, and estates' (Rawls, 1999, p. 68). 23 Moreover, they 'do not depend on any particular comprehensive religious doctrine or philosophical doctrine of human nature' (Rawls, 1999, p. 68). 24 Regarding the categorization of countries, the UNFCCC implements the concept of CBDR by creating several classes of parties through the annexes. Annex I includes the wealthier OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) States, as well as the former Eastern Bloc States 'undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.' Annex II includes only the OECD States. 'By omission, therefore, all remaining parties are developing countries. At several junctures ... the UNFCCC D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 A Non-Welfarist Treaty Negotiation Framework 141 makes further special provisions for "least developed countries" and "small island States"' (Guruswamy, 1997/2012, p. 225). 25 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2014. 26 Again, what states' representatives in the climate treaty negotiations can reasonably and plausibly commit their state to do may depend on their state population's political will and on realistic expectations about the likelihood of reshaping it to a sufficient extent within the time available. 27 To change current conditions so as to approach more closely the ideal of the Society of Peoples would require not only that burdened societies be assisted (and perhaps also compensated), but also that other states failing to meet the criteria of decency (e.g., those with oppressive governments) be reformed. Significant changes such as these are not likely to happen in time for the climate treaty meeting scheduled for December of 2015. The most that could be done is to take certain initial necessary steps toward making such changes. Does the climate treaty negotiation provide a uniquely valuable opportunity for some countries to ensure that such steps get taken by other countries? If some countries believe that it does, then they may refuse to agree to a climate treaty unless other countries take such steps; but if the other countries refuse to take such steps, then it may be impossible to reach agreement on a climate treaty. In order to avoid this outcome, the negotiators should interpret and use the above questions with these contingencies in mind. 28 On this topic, Sovacool et al. misinterpret Rawls. See their remarks about Tuvalu in Sovacool, Sidortsov, and Jones, 2014, p. 34. 29 Suppose a country's representative claims that it is significantly unlikely that her country's population or legislature would accept a climate treaty incorporating a requirement of justice grounded in the Law of Peoples, and there is sufficient evidence supporting this claim. In this case it would be necessary to aim for an agreement that would approach fulfillment of the relevant requirement of justice as closely as possible (given the current contingent constraints) and would leave open, or would open up, a way to fulfill that requirement of justice more completely in the future. 30 Below I discuss fair shares of costs and other burdens. 31 As above, all quotations of Stern are from Stern, 2014. 32 'China is not just the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, it is the second largest historic emitter. Nearly every decade, the world emits more than all the CO2 we emitted before 1970. A number of non-Annex 1 countries are at this point among the world's wealthiest. Dozens have higher per capita income than the low end of Annex 1 countries' (Stern, 2014). 33 See, e.g., Priest, 2014, and Embajada de Brasil, 2014. 34 A reason to doubt that the 1992 categorization of countries was based on their pre-1992 historical responsibility, and was intended to remain so based, is provided by the summary of the UNFCCC's remedial objectives offered in Guruswamy, 1997/2012, p. 222: '[The third remedial objective is that] climate change policies and laws should be based on equity and in accordance with the principle of CBDR [art. 3(1)]. This principle recognizes that only international cooperation will help to resolve a problem of the magnitude of climate change, but that in responding to the problem different states have different social and economic conditions that affect their response capabilities. CBDR also incorporates the equitable notion that industrialized countries, which have [notice the tense of this verb] the largest share of historical emissions of GHGs, should take the first actions to ameliorate the problem. It deserves emphasis, however, that in the UNFCCC developing countries accepted their "common" responsibility for addressing climate change. The UNFCCC refers to the CBDR of all States, and does not define such responsibilities as the sole and exclusive obligation of industrialized countries.' D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 142 A. R. Bernstein 35 The question is whether treaty negotiators who have the authority to change a previously agreed legal categorization should preserve it, despite relevant circumstances having changed so as to render the previous categorization unwise in terms of efficiency. 36 What states' representatives can reasonably and plausibly commit their state to do may depend on their state population's political will and on realistic expectations about the likelihood of reshaping it to a sufficient extent within the time available. 37 Huseby is my source for Parfit's version of the priority principle: Huseby, 2010, p. 185, quoting from p. 213 of Parfit, 1997. Regarding sufficiency, Huseby (2010, p. 179) explains that it is 'a telic principle (i.e., one directed toward an end or ideal) according to which we can evaluate outcomes based on a limited amount of information concerning especially the number of individuals and their welfare levels.' He formulates the principle as he does in order to evade an objection (raised by Paula Casal): that defenders of the sufficiency principle hold that principles of equality and priority have no place in distributive ethics (Huseby, 2010, p. 180, n. 6). Casal distinguishes between a positive thesis, according to which 'it is important that everyone has enough,' and a negative thesis, which 'denies that either equality or priority has any role to play "at least above some critical threshold"' (Huseby, 2010, p. 179, quoting Casal, 2007, pp. 298–299). The version of the principle of sufficiency defended by Huseby implies the negative thesis. 38 Huseby (2010, p. 185) emphasizes that these priority rules apply only 'between the sufficiency lines' and that 'what counts is not the value of benefits, but the disvalue of shortfalls.' 39 Some writers argue on the basis of human rights for equal per capita shares of the capacity of the atmospheric sink. This group includes: Agarwal and Narain, 1991; Jamieson, 2001; Meyer, 2000; Singer, 2002. Henry Shue (1999/2010, p. 108), for example, argues that everyone should have 'enough for a decent chance for a reasonably healthy and active life of more or less normal length,' and that it is 'unfair not to guarantee everyone at least an adequate minimum' when circumstances are such that 'some people have less than enough for a decent human life, other people have far more than enough, and the total resources available are so great that everyone could have at least enough without preventing some people from still retaining considerably more than others have.' Shue's position can plausibly be construed as implying a human right to emit greenhouse gases up to the level of subsistence: Toft & Hargrove, 2013, p. 221. This position is open to the criticism that while there is a right to secure access to the means to a decent life, fulfilling the latter right does not necessarily require greenhouse gas emissions, since economies can be based on renewable resources instead of fossil fuels: Hayward, 2009, pp. 432–433. The UN does not (to my knowledge) recognize climate-specific human rights, but its Human Rights Council emphasizes that climate change impacts basic rights such as the rights to life, to adequate food, to water, to health, and to adequate housing; it also impacts the self-determination of some peoples, including those living in low-lying island states: Human Rights Council, 2009, pp. 8–13, 20, 24. 40 A conception of human rights grounded in a comprehensive moral doctrine (whether religious or secular) would conflict with the Law of Peoples if it justified a different list of human rights. However, if the lists overlap, then these rights simply have two justifications, and the rights on both lists can be justified in Rawlsian terms to people who do not endorse the comprehensive doctrine. 41 Insofar as the human rights on which Caney bases his policy evaluations (rights to life, health, and subsistence) are included in Rawls' list, his approach may be compatible with the Law of Peoples and with the political conception of climate justice. Caney's (2010, pp. 166–169) formulations of the human rights to life, health, and subsistence appear to be fully compatible with the Law of Peoples, although his conception of global distributive justice conflicts with Rawls': see Caney, 2005b, and Bernstein, 2012a–2012b. 42 At least two different stages of decision-making would be necessary because applying the third criterion (grave burdens that are readily relieved) would require full knowledge about the relevant empirical facts and particulars, including knowledge of the context of other policies in which this particular policy would get enacted. If the first stage of decision-making must take place behind a veil of ignorance, then D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 A Non-Welfarist Treaty Negotiation Framework 143 the veil must be lifted to some extent for the second stage. Compare what Rawls says about his two principles for a just democratic society: 'The principles of justice are adopted and applied in a four-stage sequence' (Rawls, 2001, p. 48; see also pp. 112–114, 172–174). 43 The Law of Peoples does not presuppose that people can be content only in liberal societies of one kind or another, nor that people living in decent non-liberal societies cannot be content. 44 This would be a sufficiency principle like Huseby's, but omitting his strong assumption about the conditions (probably) necessary for contentment and instead including a weaker assumption to the effect that living in a decent society is necessary for contentment. 45 This is one of various proposals for taxing natural resources. Another proposal, which has been widely discussed, is the Global Resources Dividend proposed by Thomas Pogge (2002, pp. 202–221). 46 For this reason it seems that following Miller's suggestion for using a veil of ignorance would require raising the veil either once (fully, i.e., making all information available) or else more than once (by degrees). Raising the veil by degrees seems necessary. 47 In 2011 the Green Climate Fund was designated as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, in accordance with Article 11 of the Convention. 'The fund will pursue a country-driven approach and promote and strengthen engagement at the country level through effective involvement of relevant institutions and stakeholders' (Green Climate Fund, 2015). 'While the Governing Instrument of the GCF states that developed countries will provide the bulk of GCF financial inputs, the Board decided to allow for flexibility in resourcing. Initially, it will only accept grants from the public and private sector, paid-in public capital contributions and concessional public loans. Over time, it may attract other forms of finance from the private or philanthropic sector, including from institutional investors, as well as from alternative sources (for example new taxes or levies from which funding might be raised for the GCF)' (Overseas Development Institute, 2014, p. 4). 48 For discussions of philosophical issues relevant to corrective justice, see, e.g.: Caney, 2005a, pp. 747– 775; Gardiner, 2011, pp. 399–437; Garvey, 2008, pp. 66–80; Meyer, 2013, pp. 597–614; Miller, 2010, pp. 95–96; Moellendorf, 2009, pp. 106–131. 49 Neither am I here endorsing any specific demands for corrective justice applied to the climate treaty. 50 Posner and Weisbach (2010, p. 76) write: 'perhaps the obligations of nations should be determined by invoking John Rawls' idea of a "veil of ignorance": What principles of justice would reasonable people select if they were deprived of information about their own circumstances, including the nation in which they find themselves? Very plausibly, people would choose principles that would require those in rich countries to give a great deal to those in poor countries, especially if the latter are at serious risk.' The endnote attached to the last quoted sentence, n. 6 on p. 208, does not cite Rawls, but instead Martha Nussbaum and Steve Vanderheiden. Nussbaum is well known as a critic of the Law of Peoples. 51 In support of their description of Rawls' view they cite only writings by two other authors, only one of whom (Nussbaum) has published much about Rawls. When citing Rawls directly (which they do only once, if I'm not mistaken), they refer only to an article he published in 1964, three decades before his publications on the Law of Peoples. 52 Benjamin Sachs' criticism of their use of this term is partly distinct from, but compatible with, the criticism I offer here: see Sachs, 2014, p. 215. 53 In Rawls' conception of a just liberal democratic society, justice as fairness, such questions are governed by the difference principle, which is part of the second of his two principles of domestic social justice: see Rawls, 2001, p. 43. D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 144 A. R. Bernstein 54 Robert Huseby argues that climate justice can be adequately addressed from the perspective of Rawls' theory of international justice, if it is further developed. He proposes adding a ninth principle to the Law of Peoples: 'Peoples recognize that adverse effects of climate change may undermine or threaten to undermine the prospects of most (if not all) peoples and societies to establish and/or maintain internally just or decent well-ordered institutions. This will, by implication, undermine or threaten to undermine the role of The Law of Peoples in regulating and expanding a peaceful and stable Society of Peoples. Therefore, just and decent peoples have an interest in undertaking, and a duty to undertake, the measures necessary to prevent such adverse effects from materializing, and to alleviate them when and where they do materialize' (Huseby, 2013, p. 234). Huseby contends that this amendment 'would only be a first, but crucial, step toward developing more specific schemes for distributing the burdens following from climate change' (Huseby, 2013, p. 242). 55 As Nussbaum (2013, p. 471) points out, '[Posner and Weisbach] do not define deontology, and they offer only a glancing definition of welfarism.' 56 'Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs' (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p. 43). References Agarwal, A., & Narain, S. (1991). Global warming in an unequal world: A case of environmental colonialism. New Delhi: Center for Science and Environment. Bernstein, A. R. (2000). Human rights reconceived: A defense of Rawls' law of peoples. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Bernstein, A. R. (2006). A human right to democracy? Legitimacy and intervention. In R. Martin & D. Reidy (Eds.), Rawls's law of peoples: A realistic utopia? (pp. 278–298). Malden: Blackwell. Bernstein, A. R. (2007a). Human Rights, Global Justice, and Disaggregated States: John Rawls, Onora O'Neill, and Anne-Marie Slaughter. American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 66(1), Reprinted in S.V. Hicks & D.E. Shannon (Eds.), The Challenges of Globalization: Rethinking Nature, Culture, and Freedom (pp. 87–111). Oxford: Blackwell. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.2007.00499.x. Bernstein, A. R. (2007b). Justifying universal human rights via Rawlsian public reason. Archiv für Rechts und Sozialphilosophie, 108, 90–103. Bernstein, A. R. (2008a). Kant on rights and coercion in international law: Implications for humanitarian military intervention. Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik, 16, 57–98. Bernstein, A. R. (2008b). Nussbaum versus Rawls: Should feminist human rights advocates reject the law of peoples and endorse the capabilities approach? In P. Des Autels & R. Whisnant (Eds.), Global feminist ethics (pp. 117–137). New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Bernstein, A. R. (2009). Kant, Rawls, and cosmopolitanism: Toward perpetual peace and the law of peoples. Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik, 17, 3–50. Bernstein, A. R. (2012a). Caney, Simon. In D. Chatterjee (Ed.), Encyclopedia of global justice (pp. 100–102). Berlin: Springer. Bernstein, A. R. (2012b). Climate justice. In D. Chatterjee (Ed.), Encyclopedia of global justice (pp. 144–149). Berlin: Springer. Bernstein, A. R. (2012c). Law of peoples. In D. Chatterjee (Ed.), Encyclopedia of global justice (pp. 635–639). Berlin: Springer. Bernstein, A. R. (2012d). Moral cosmopolitanism. In D. Chatterjee (Ed.), Encyclopedia of global justice (pp. 711–717). Berlin: Springer. Bernstein, A. R. (2012e). Original position. In D. Chatterjee (Ed.), Encyclopedia of global justice (pp. 786–790). Berlin: Springer. Bernstein, A. R. (2012f). Political cosmopolitanism. In D. Chatterjee (Ed.), Encyclopedia of global justice (pp. 857–863). Berlin: Springer. Bernstein, A. R. (2012g). Second original position. In D. Chatterjee (Ed.), Encyclopedia of global justice (pp. 979–983). Berlin: Springer. D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 A Non-Welfarist Treaty Negotiation Framework 145 Bernstein, A. R. (2013). War as means to peace? Kant on international right. Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik, 21, 237–259. Bernstein, A. R. (2014). The rights of states, the rule of law, and coercion: Reflections on Pauline Kleingeld's 'Kant and cosmopolitanism'. Kantian Review, 19(2), 233–249. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S136941541400003X. Broome, J. (2012). Climate matters: Ethics in a warming world. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company. Caney, S. (2005a). Cosmopolitan justice, responsibility, and global climate change. (pp. 747–775). Leiden Journal of International Law In S. M. Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson, & H. Shue (Eds.), Climate ethics: Essential readings (pp. 122–145). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Caney, S. (2005b). Justice beyond borders: A global political theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Caney, S. (2010). Climate change, human rights, and moral thresholds. In S. M. Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson, & H. Shue (Eds.), Climate ethics: Essential readings (pp. 163–177). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Casal, P. (2007). Why sufficiency is not enough. Ethics, 117(2), 296–326. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/510692. Casal, P. (2011a). Global taxes on natural resources. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 8(3), 307–327. Casal, P. (2011b). Rejoinder to Pogge and Steiner. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 8(3), 353–365. Casal, P. (2012). Progressive environmental taxation: A defence. Political Studies, 60(2), 419–433. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00924.x. Cohen, J. (2010). Rousseau: A free community of equals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Embajada de Brasil. (2014). Declaración del Embajador José Antonio Marcondes de Carvalho Subsecretario General de Medio Ambiente, Energía, Ciencia y Tecnología: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores BRASIL en la Sesión Ministerial del ADP Bonn. 06 de junio de 2014. Retrieved 29/12/2014 from http://www.perubrasil.com/system/embajadabrasil/gallery_sub_article.asp?codigo = 510&status = 17. Gardiner, S. M. (2011). A perfect moral storm: The ethical tragedy of climate change. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Garvey, J. (2008). The ethics of climate change: Right and wrong in a warming world. London: Continuum. Green Climate Fund. (2015). Background. Retrieved on 01 February 2015 from http://www.gcfund.org/about/ the-fund.html. Guruswamy, L. D. (1997/2012). International environmental law in a nutshell. St. Paul, Minnesota: Thomson Reuters. Gutting, G., & Jamieson, D. (2015). What can we do about climate change? New York Times. Retrieved from www.opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com. Hayward, T. (2009). Human rights versus emissions rights: Climate justice and the equitable distribution of ecological space. Ethics and International Affairs, 21. Human Rights Council. (2009). Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the relationship between climate change and human rights. [A/HRC/10/61]. Retrieved from http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Press/AnalyticalStudy.pdf. Huq, S., & Richards, J. -A. (2014). Big oil must pay for climate change harm to world's poorest. RTCC News. Retrieved from http://www.rtcc.org/2014/12/04/big-oil-must-pay-for-climate-change-harm-to-worldspoorest/#sthash.29Cd2ZlL.dpuf. Huseby, R. (2010). Sufficiency: Restated and defended. Journal of Political Philosophy, 18(2) Huseby, R. (2013). Climate Change, Sustainability, and Environmental Ethics. Environmental Ethics, 35(2). doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics201335219. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. (2014). Climate change 2014: Synthesis report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 151 pp. (Here cited as required. Retrieved from https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/). Jamieson, D. (2001). Climate change and global environmental justice. In P. Edwards & C. Miller (Eds.), Changing the atmosphere: Expert knowledge and global environmental governance (pp. 287–308). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Jamieson, D. (2013). Climate change, consequentialism, and the road ahead. Chicago Journal of International Law, 13, 439–468. Meyer, A. (2000). Contraction and convergence: The global solution to climate change. Cambridge, UK: Green Books. Meyer, L. H. (2013). Why historical emissions should count. Chicago Journal of International Law, 13, 597–614. D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01 5 146 A. R. Bernstein Miller, R. W. (2010). Globalizing justice: The ethics of poverty and power. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moellendorf, D. (2009). Global inequality matters. New York: Plagrave Macmillan. Nussbaum, M. C. (2013). Climate change: Why theories of justice matter. Chicago Journal of International Law, 13, 469–488. Overseas Development Institute. (2014). The green climate fund. Retrieved on 01 February 2015 from http:// www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/9376.pdf. Pogge, T. (2002). World poverty and human rights. Malden, MA: Polity Press. Posner, E. A., & Weisbach, D. (2010). Climate change justice. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Posner, E. A., & Weisbach, D. (2013). International paretianism: A defense. Chicago Journal of International Law, 13, 347–358. Priest, M. (2014). 'Dead rat' deal saves Lima climate summit. Australian Financial Review. Retrieved from http://www.ipe.net.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Dead-rat.pdf. Rawls, J. (1993). The law of peoples. In S. Freeman (Ed.), John Rawls: Collected papers (pp. 529–564). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rawls, J. (1993, rev. 1996, 2005). Political liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Rawls, J. (1999). The law of peoples. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rawls, J. (2001). Justice as fairness: A restatement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rawls, J. (2007). Lectures on Mill. In S. Freeman (Ed.), John Rawls: Lectures on the history of political philosophy (pp. 251–316). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rawls, J. (2007b). Lectures on Rousseau. In S. Freeman (Ed.), John Rawls: Lectures on the history of political philosophy (pp. 191–248). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Sachs, B. (2014). The relevance of distributive justice to international climate change policy. Ethics, Policy & Environment, 17(2), 208–224. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2014.926085. Shue, H. (1999). Global environment and international inequality. International Affairs, 75(3), 531–545, As reprinted in S.M. Gardiner, S. Caney, D. Jamieson & H. Shue (Eds.), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (pp. 101–111). Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.00092. Singer, P. (2002). One world. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Sovacool, B. K., Sidortsov, R. V., & Jones, B. R. (2014). Energy security, equality, and justice. New York: Routledge. Stern, T. D. (2014). Seizing the opportunity for progress on climate: Remarks of October 14, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/s/climate/releases/2014/232962.htm. Taraska, G., & Vogel, J. (2014). Outcomes of the Lima climate negotiations: Essential steps toward an international climate agreement. Retrieved from https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/ news/2014/12/18/103534/. Toft, K. H., & Hargrove, E. C. (2013). The human rights approach to climate change. Environmental Ethics, 35(2). doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics201335218. World Commission on Environment and Development. (1987). Our common future. New York: Oxford University Press. World Resources Forum. (2013). Resource efficiency, governance and lifestyles – WRF 2013 Davos meeting report. Retrieved from http://www.wrforum.org/wrfpublicationspdf/wrf-2013-davos-meeting-report/. D ow nl oa de d by [A ly ss a B er ns te in ] a t 1 5: 47 2 6 N ov em be r 2 01

! ! An Essay on the Ancient Ideal of 'Enraonar' Enric Trillas1, María G. Navarro2 1 European Centre for Soft Computing, Mieres (Asturias) 2 Instituto de Filosofía, CSIC Email: Enric [email protected]; María G. Navarro [email protected] Abstract 'Reasoning' can be considered a general concept that, upon speaking, is the 'enraonar', a Catalan word that should not be mistaken with 'explain' nor with 'discuss' which imply more detail, and cover different situations. This article is presented as an essay on the ancient ideal of 'enraonar'. To that end, it is explained in what sense 'enraonar' and reason are one of the most complex phenomena thought has to deal with. Here it is argued that these natural phenomena require a systematic and 'scientific' study, and that without this knowledge computer science cannot simulate people's every-day 'enraonar'. Submitted: 25/05/15. Accepted and published: 22/07/15 © 2014 by theAuthors; licenseeECSC. ThisOpen Accessarticle isdistributedunder the termsof theCreativeCommonsAttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0) Use,distribution,and reproduction in anymedium isallowed,provided theoriginalworkiscited. Issue 1/2015 2341-0183 ! ! 1 Introduction 1.1 In Catalan, there are two words that refer to two concepts that, though they are nearly synonymous, are subtly distinguished in a way that nevertheless affects the understanding of what is said and what is understood: these are "parlar" and "enraonar".1 The slight difference that exists between the two is by no means insignificant: the second has a more restrictive definition than the first, not speaking incorrectly, doing so with a certain order, precision, calm and with the help of minimal but sufficient reasons to explain oneself, and at the same time, to understand and be understood as clearly as possible, to communicate with others in the best possible manner, that is, to "be reasonable". As is the case with other words that start with the morpheme "en", such as "enrajolar", "ennovular-se", "enfilar", "enllaçar", "enamorar"2, etc., "enraonar" indicates a positive activity in ordinary speech. To reason is the general concept that, when done through speech, is to "enraonar", a word not to be confused, for example, with explaining or debating, which impart more detail and refer to distinct situations. Thus, one would say, "The two friends 'enraonan' about the political situation," "The professor explains the lesson," and, "The Parliament debates the bill." There are even books, for example [1], for which it would be appropriate to say that the author 'enraona' to us about the topic", instead of "talks to us about the topic". Aranese makes the same distinction as Catalan between the words "parlar" and "arrasoar", while as far as the authors of this article know, neither Spanish, nor Galician, nor Basque, nor English, nor German, nor French, nor Italian, nor Portuguese have two different words to represent the difference between speaking and "enraonar". However, currently, it seems that Catalan, is losing the nuance between "parlar" and "enraonar", and as the use of "enraonar" diminishes, the word "parlar" is used more and more. Taking into account the right of its speakers, the only ones who can claim ownership of a language, the authors hope that, at least in intellectual speech, the word "enraonar" may be preserved to denote a desire to speak !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 In Spanish, both would be translated as "hablar" [Translator's note: "to speak" in English]. 2 "Embaldosar" [to tile], "nublarse" [to cloud], "ensartar" (or "enhebrar") [to string], "enlazar" [to conect], and "enamorarse" [to fall in love], respectively.! ! ! "intelligently", a desire that we intend to manifest with the title of this article. In order to "enraonar", one must make use of another fundamental verb: to understand. Without understanding and being understood, one may be able to speak, but one cannot "enraonar", to speak in a series of well-founded arguments either to examine something in depth or to try to reach some conclusion, in short, to speak, but on a basis of reason. Otherwise, knowledge will be lacking and what is said will be, in the best of cases, superficial. In order to "understand", it is necessary to get what the speaker wishes to communicate, through voice, gesture, image, or writing. The best syntax, the best possible form of speech, these are very important, but without semantics, without the meaning of the words, without a connection to some reality, there is no way to understand or be understood. In this article we will attempt to start down the road toward understanding linguistic utterances, "what is said", with a certain formal modelling that, even limited to a few elemental subject/predicate statements, may potentially go further and lead to more complex statements [2]. In order to understand, it is necessary to capture the meaning, the use, the words in the language [3], and in modern speech there are a fair number of predicates the use of which allows for mathematical representation [4]. 1. 2 The term "linguistic utterances" refers to real or virtual objects or elements that we will assume to be part of a subset known as the universe of discourse. Only elemental utterances of the subject/predicate type will be considered, that is, in the "x is P" form, where x is the subject in a universe X of discourse, and P is the name of a property p of the elements of X, that is, a predicate acting on X. In general, it can be said that capturing what is understood with "x is P", for all or just some of the x's within X, implies knowing in whole or in part the "behaviour" of P in X, a behaviour that may be static, rigid, or precise, or dynamic, flexible, or imprecise, depending on whether the elemental utterances of "x is P" are grouped, as a consequence of the behaviour of P, in a maximum of two classes or in more than two, respectively. Partial knowledge of the behaviour of P in X means knowing it in a subset of the X universe, that is, in a set we will continue to refer to as X. How does a predicate P act on, behave in, a set X, and how can this action be "represented"? If the behaviour of P helps to group the elements of X, ! ! can it be represented using some relational structure? Is there some binary relationship ≤P, definable in X, that allows us to represent the behaviour of P in X, that is, that reflects the character, either static or dynamic, of P? Elemental subject/predicate utterances are also referred to as "assertions", and since [5], those utterance forms that are interrogatives or exclamations or curses are no longer considered assertions, as the affirmation or negation is not an elemental utterance. Note that in using only some of these linguistic expressions, such as, for example, "I beg you to come on Saturday," "Watch your step!" "Now I would like to eat bread with tomato," etc., it would be quite difficult to express or acquire knowledge; unlike these expressions, when uttering an assertion, the relationship between the subject and predicate enables the capturing of what is meant to be said by the simple fact that something is affirmed about something. In philosophy, perhaps for not having taken too much into account how the affirmation is affected by the fact that "x is P" has to do with the contextual behaviour of P in X that, often and especially when it is dynamic, is of the empirical and observational type, it does not appear that any representation has been considered using a (X, ≤P) structure. Is this a mistake? In any case, not even a majority of assertions are based on definitions, that is, on utterances of the "if and only if" type as far as how P acts on X, but on descriptions (even, the best possible ones) of the behaviour of P in X, nor are more than a fourth of the arguments that people normally make, including philosophers and scientists, formal deductions [6]. Those who do so argue in the same way, with so-called "everyday logic" or "common sense" [7] and, if they wish to "enraonar", they must do so in the best possible way making the best possible use of the information available in each circumstance. In addition, when using the "x is P" elemental utterances, it is implicitly accepted that these have some degree of "truth", that is, that they say something about the action of P on X, and that therefore, they can be understood in terms of how the elements of X satisfy, or do not satisfy, a property p reflecting a certain "reality" that these elements present. The theoretical problem, however, rests in knowing what is understood by a degree of truth, or truthfulness, of an utterance: How can we tell if the degree of truth t (x is P) is 0 (false), is 1 (true), or some other value, without knowing intrinsically "what is" such a degree t? Is there some such intrinsic way to define a "degree of truth" without using "external" considerations? What's more, what sense is there in saying that t (x is P) is 1, or 0, without being able to correlate it with the truth or falsity or other utterances "y is P", with y of X? ! ! If an affirmative answer exists, is it acceptable to simply know the truth, t (x is P) = 1, or the falsity in the case that t (x is P) = 0, of a single element x, that is, in a universe of discourse reduced to a single element x? How can we describe, then, the behaviour of P? Can P of a unitary set {x} really be predicted? If so, the predicate would only be linked to x, and it may be necessary to have imported it previously from some other universe of discourse, perhaps wider and in which its behaviour may have been well known. An intrinsic definition and one of the "mathematical definition" type of the (numerical) degree of truth can only come about if the "truth" is considered a magnitude, and if, therefore, its degrees are functions verifying: 'If x ≤P y, then tP (x) ≤ tP (y), for a function tP: X --> {0, 1}'. There is no other way to consistently and intrinsically introduce a definition of the degrees of truth of an utterance that is only a function of how P acts on X. Therefore, the three-item set (X, ≤P, tP) is a magnitude. 1. 3 A predicate P is "fertile" if, once used in a universe of discourse X according to a relationship ≤P, it migrates or is exported under the name P* to another universe Y, and for which there exists a bijective function f: X ! Y, which allows us to define x ≤P* y " f-1(x) ≤P f--1(y), and thus the two magnitudes (X, ≤P, t) and (Y, ≤P*, tP*) can be considered, with tP*(x) = tP (f-1(x)), for all of x in Y. This is, for example, the case of the predicate "old" in the universe [0, 100] years, which migrates or is exported to the universe (of pure names) [0, 1] with the name "big" and thanks to the bijection f(x) = x/100 that, at the same time and as will be shown in section 3, can serve for the degree of truth told (x) = f(x). Fertility is an important "economic" property, as it both makes it unnecessary to introduce new words and generates synonyms: for example, [in Spanish] the term "persona mayor" ("greater" person [literal]) is often used instead of "persona vieja" (old person), although one wouldn't say "número viejo" (old number) to mean "número mayor" (greater number). Fertility, of course, contributes to the enrichment of natural language. If P only applies to a unitary set {x}, then what fertility can P demonstrate? How can it be exported to other sets? Really, can anything else be said beyond "x is P"? In addition, it mustn't be overlooked that even if ≤P exists but is not a pre- ! ! order, the existence of an exact measurement that perfectly reflects the elemental meaning of P toward X [8] cannot be affirmed, as demonstrated in section 5.3. 1. 4 This is a series of questions that are worth studying as rigorously as possible to find their answers as they affect the basis of how discourses, explanations, questions and narratives are understood. Understanding is essential for the term "enraonar" to assume its full significance beyond just talking: it is, above all, to pursue the philosophical ideal of arriving at clear and distinct ideas about things, to fully know what one wants to say not just in each utterance, but in their chains. Otherwise, there can be no "knowing". Generally, it is necessary to add that "knowing" cannot, under any circumstances, remain anchored to outdated knowledge: it must be taken into account that a lot of knowledge has an expiration date, although it is not known at any given time. For example, who today would be considered a wise person if they maintained that the Sun orbits around the Earth, had an understanding of many diseases from, not to go too far back, just 100 years ago, or hadn't heard of integral and differential calculus introduced by Newton and Leibniz, or antibiotics and how the organism becomes accustomed to them? It is necessary to require both a regular "enraonar" and a general reasoning, to be "rational" [9], as precise as possible in the sense described by [10], that means that for its study it is best not to forego a good measure of mathematical formalism. A combination of the rigid methodology with which science approaches reality and the way philosophy does so in a much more flexible manner, it cannot be overused: what's more, it may even be best to look back to the spirit of precision that was typically the purpose for some thinkers who were close to trends, practically abandoned today, like the "Vienna Circle" [10] as well as the line of dialectical materialism [11], [12]; even though they were universally viewed as often at odds with each other. NOTES 1. The importance of recognizing universe X beyond a simple list of its elements must be cited. For example, if, when one wishes to "enraonar" about the current financial situation in Europe, one does not have a certain knowledge of which are the banks and other "agents" involved, of how the worldwide financial markets act, of their relationships with governments ! ! and how they interact with their local customers, it would be very difficult to talk about all this in a reasonable manner, to "enraonar" about this subject. Knowing the current structure of the universe of the discourse as well as possible is essential. 2. An example of certain pedagogical interest is the following: When at school the students begin to solve a*x = b linear equations, they have to be familiar with what they are "working with", that is, that they are doing this with algebraic expressions of a determined type and that "they are" the universe of discourse in which it is necessary to operate according to calculus rules in relation to, at least, the operations of adding, subtracting and multiplying, which they organize and structure. Thus, when solving a simple equation such as 2(x-1)+3(x+1)=0 (*), first they have to know what 2(x-1) = (2x -2) is, as well as 3(x+1) = (3x +3). Then they will move on to the second step, 2(x-1) + 3(x+1) = (2x-2)+(3x+3) = (5x+1) (**), which is valid for all values of the number x. In the third step, which consists of identifying (*) as 5x+1=0 (thanks to the equivalence of (**)), they must understand that, as it equals 0, the values of x are restricted as, for example, with x=0, the absurd 1=0 is obtained, showing that the equation 5x+1=0, equivalent to (*), is not valid for all values of x. Finally, the fourth step, consisting of isolating the thus-far "unknown" x, x = -(1/5), reaching the solution of the equation (*), that is, the only value of x for which it is satisfied. Lacking this knowledge, the student will "not understand" fully what is happening, even if they get it right, let's say, "mechanically". The knowledge of X and the structural relationships between the elements is basic to being able to answer, step by step and in a reasoned manner, the question: For what values of x is (*) correct? The answer to which is, "Only for the value -1/5." 3. An example of more general interest is that of using probabilities assigned to random events, something that, in order to be accomplished in accordance with probability theory [8], almost universally accepted today, it is necessary to know that the universe of discourse constructed by the random events must have been previously structured in the form of Boolean algebra. Otherwise, not all of the results of this theory can be used, and, for example, it may be the case that a property as important as that of that, given two events A and B, their union A ∪ B and intersection A ∩ B are also given may not be verified, which means the addition law cannot be used: ! ! Prob (A ∪ B) + Prob (A ∩ B) = Prob (A) + Prob (B), which is, in many cases, essential to being able to calculate probabilities and which comes from the lattice law (A ∪ B) ∪ (A ∩ B) = A ∪ B. Analogously, the law Prob (Ac) = 1Prob (A) can only be used if it is certain that Ac is an event and that both Boolean laws A ∪ Ac = X y A ∩ Ac = ∅ apply, that is, that {A, Ac} is a perfect classification, or partition, of the universe of discourse. 4. Although they are seldom cited, it must be stated that this article is mainly inspired by the references [13], [14], [15], [16], and, above all, [17]. 2 What has to be understood by 'x is P', if x belongs to X? 2. 1 As stated above, knowing the universe of discourse X is essential: if it is not taken into account, it cannot be known to which objects or elements predicate P applies. For example, if P = odd and X = the bell towers (of a determined place), it's clear that we won't know what "x is odd" means, unless a definition, or at least, a description as specific as possible, has been introduced of what is meant by an "odd bell tower", otherwise to what happens if X = a set of natural numbers. It goes without saying that if an attempt is made to apply P = cacambú to a well-known universe, it would be necessary to describe what is meant by "cacambú". Even with a predicate as well-known as P = Rosemary, and a subject as well-known as x = pencil, one could hardly state literally that "this pencil is rosemary", where the contrary is the case if X is a set of field herbs. The pair (X, P) is, therefore, basic: it is necessary to know what is being said of which things. Another example comes to us from the ancient Greek world, with the set X of the "inhabitants" of Olympus and the predicate P = god; however, the monotheistic case in which X is a unitary set and P = God is more difficult. In the first case, there is even a hierarchy, an order, among the gods; in the second there is a singular "being" which may have been reached through a second abstraction based on the previous one and different, that came about through talking about the god Zeus of Olympus. Also similar is the case of the "elements" +∞ and -∞ in the real number line, both introduced so that the successions of real numbers would have a limit. Now, a notable difference between "God", "+∞", and "-∞" is that the latter concepts are added to the number line according to a definition that is in a clear relationship of consistency with the other elements of the number line, and therefore, the real number line, R, can be distinguished from the extended ! ! real number line R* = R∪ {+∞, -∞}. It must be noted that the real number line is an abstract entity introduced, thanks to various equivalencies, based on the axioms of Peano for the natural numbers. Extending R to R* is not essentially different from other extensions like that of considering the imaginary number i =+√-1, and with it, extending the real field R to the complex field C of elements to +b*i, constructed theoretically based on wellunderstood properties such as '(1+√-1).(1-√-1)=0'. These are extensions that present a total theoretical coherence with that which is being extended. The example of the proposed concept of "God" is, however, very much singular, and not just because it is only applicable to the unitary set {God}, where it can only intrinsically be stated that "God is God", and whose only element is not, in addition, well known to be "a priori", or at least, sufficiently well described in and of itself. It is not, above all and in a plane of strict rationality, of "pure" reasoning and not experimental, for lack of a systematic, convincing, and as universally accepted as possible proof of existence and uniqueness, that is, a deductive proof that there exists a single x such that x = God, made using non-contradictory axioms that have previously been accepted as such, in a similar manner to how one can prove, based on rational numbers, the existence of new elements that, well defined, are not rational numbers and that in particular include numbers such as √2, which it is easy to prove is not rational, at least in introducing +, i -∞ into R. Note that, contrary to the case of extending the real number line, with "God" Olympus was diminished, or at least, it was transformed and organized again. This is also a theoretically singular concept for lack of a welldeveloped relational algebra between the concepts of "God", "Energy", "Nature", "Living beings", and perhaps also those that "are not alive", which, definitely and in the 13th century, Ramon Llull [18] has tried to do in part, and in a more formal way, Kurt Gödel did the same in the 20th century [19]. 2.2 Setting aside for the moment the possible existence of predicates, or names applicable to a unique element, the fact is that in order to understand well what is meant to be said with an elemental utterance "x is P", how P is applied to all the elements of a determined universe of discourse must be known, that is, to those elements that are of interest and of which everyone can affirm that they "demonstrate" the property p named by P. And beyond that, an established relationship between pairs of utterances "x is P" and "y ! ! is P" that indicate the difference between both utterances as far as the verification of p on the part of x and of y must also be known; a mathematical binary relation in X, ≤P ⊆ X x X, such that (x,y) ∈ ≤P " x ≤P e, indicates that x does not verify p more than y verifies it, and in an understandable way, makes it possible to organize the universe of X in terms of P. An idea in line with the concept that "enraonar" inserts into X a certain "order", "hierarchy", or "classification", that makes it possible to understand the discourse thanks to the use of P; thus, X goes from being "amorphous" to being organized by the structure or graph (X, ≤P). The predates are concepts that are as general as could be applied to any universes, both to those with no previous known structure and others that already have one; these are the cases, respectively, of "red" applied to a sheet of paper, and of "probable" applied to events already organized in Boolean algebra. For example, and with a predicate as common as P = full, applied to glasses that contain a liquid, little can be understood of what is meant by "this glass is full of liquid" if we do not know how to distinguish whether a glass is empty or more full than another one. In fact, we would not venture beyond considering glasses "full" in which there is no room for even one more drop of liquid and "not full" those in which a single drop can still fit, something that in common usage is not the case and that has to do with ordinary perceptive possibilities. Common language, backed by common sense, allows for a flexible use of predicates, and unless we limit ourselves to dealing with strictly mathematical concepts such as "even" or "odd", we can say little about the term "enraonar" in the way people do [20]. It must be mentioned, however, that some mathematical concepts can be taken into account that are not precise; this is the case, for example, of the "round number" [7], an imprecise concept that applies to those natural numbers that, when decomposed into prime factors, consist of few different factors but elevated to relatively large exponents or powers with respect to their bases: thus, the number 26.38 can be said to be round, but not the number 2.5.7.13.17. Naturally, the question that is made evident immediately is, which are the two numbers that can be considered round is the rounder of them? Which of the numbers x =26..38 and y = 211.39.58 is more round? This requires knowledge of whether it is x ≤R y, or y ≤R x, that is, it is necessary to "define", or at least, "describe", what is meant by "x is less round than y", without excluding that there may be pairs of elements that are not comparable as round. On the other hand, when it comes to a precise ! ! predicate, rigid or not graduable, the relationship ≤P is simply converted into the identity =P = ≤P ∩ ≤P-1; for example, the numbers 5 and 7 are equally odd, as well as not even and equally prime. Naturally, a single universe X is potentially subject to the simultaneous action of diverse predicates, among them those that may be formed based on two others previously acting on X, such as, for example, the predicate P and Q defined as 'x is P y Q' = (x is P) and (x is Q), an expression with two copulative conjunctions that are formally different, as the first (y) affects the predicates, and the second (y) the utterances, somewhat similar to how the "product" of numeric functions is defined based on the product of numbers: (f. g) (x) = f(x).g(x), for all arguments x that apply; thus, if the functions f and g, is f(x) = 2 and g(x) = 5 are known, the new function f. g has a value of 10 in the same point x : (f. g) (x) = 2. 5. Other utterances are analogous, such as "x is P or Q", "x is NOT P", and "If x is P, then y is Q', which are defined analogously to the above for P and Q. Note that the utterances "x is NOT P" and "x is not P" can be considered identical if both are defined as the negation of (x is P); this is how "is NOT" and "is not" are identified. 2.3 It is worth noting that, at least in ordinary language, with each predicate P and in order to utilize it correctly on X, it is necessary to do so simultaneously with an antonym of the same. How could we affirm that "John is tall" without knowing that "Peter is short", or vice versa? How do we know of the rich without knowing of the poor? How do we recognize what is cold without recognizing what is hot? This bipolarity is also present in the case of rigid predicates, although often, it is with the greatest antonym of all, the negation. For example, in mathematics, a rigid predicate in the interval X = [0,10] is P = "less than or equal to 4", which applies to all numbers within [0, 4] and does not apply to its complement (4, 10]. None of its antonyms are used to understand it because they are not needed, as with its negation P' = "greater than 4" (which applies to the numbers in (4, 10]) is sufficient. It isn't that there are no antonyms to this (not only that, [2], they can be calculated!), but they are not used because [0, 10] is already perfectly classified between [0, 4] and (4, 10]. Instead, with the imprecise predicates of language, antonym implies the negation but not the other way around and they rarely coincide; thus, with "the glass is full", the antonym "the glass is empty" implies the negation "the glass is not full", but not ! ! reciprocally. With this, anyone can make the hypothesis that, if Pa is an antonym of P, ≤Pa = ≤-1P, con x ≤-1P and y ≤P x. While the double negative (P')' does not always coincide with P, the double antonym (Pa)a always coincides with P; the opposition between linguistic terms shows the symmetrical property and the importance given to symmetry in science is well known [21], [22]. What does not immediately exist is an antonym of negation, as P' is not a linguistic term, but there is the negation of an antonym (Pa)'. For example, if P = tall, it is true that (Pa)' = not short, but (P')a = (not tall)a does not immediately exist in the language, and in any case, it would be necessary to introduce it. Of course, though it may exist, (Pa)' is not a linguistic term. Another example, this in the case of mathematics, comes from the concept of the "transcendent" real number, difficult to capture without previously understanding that of the "algebraic" real number, which, in reality, is its negation because the two sets "transcendent numbers" and "algebraic numbers" are complementary sets on the real number line. This is an example of an irregular antonym, that is, when negation and antonym coincide. 3. True and false 3.1 The concepts of true and false, one an antonym of the other, have not only not being well defined, but they have been the cause of many discussions, [23], [24]. Setting aside a subject as unclear as what is the "Truth" with a capital T, in any case it seems that the adjectives true and false must refer to some relationship between utterances and reality. Only utterances can be described as true or false; for example, it may be that "John is not rich" can be qualified as true or false, but "rich" definitely cannot be, as it is not an utterance but rather a predicate. In the following, the concept of "true" is identified in an operational way to a magnitude that quantifies the "truth", in lowercase, previously shown in a qualitative way by the elemental utterances "x is P". If the behaviour of predicate P is represented by a relationship ≤P, in which 'x is not more P than it is y' " x ≤P y, then with the relational structure (X, ≤P), can be considered functions tP: X ! [0, 1], verifying: a) If x ≤P y, then tP (x) ≤ tP (y) b) If m ∈ X is a minimal element for a ≤P, that is, there is no element z ∈ X ! ! such that z ≤P m, then tP (m) = 0. c) If M ∈ X is a maximal element for ≤P, that is, there is no z ∈ X such that z ≤P m, then tP (M) = 1. These functions, which are measures [8], are called "degrees or values of truth" of the utterances "x is P", and the degree of truth of "x is P" is usually identified with the number tP (x). If x is minimal, then it is said that "x is P" is totally false, and if y is maximal, then "y is P" is totally true. In this way, the concept "true" is represented by magnitudes (X, ≤P, tP), and, of course, the "axioms" a, b, and c do not determine a unique measurement tP; in each case, it will be necessary to choose a one based on additional specific and reasonable conditions. For example, if X is the numeric interval [0, 10] and P= large, in order to determine "one" measure tP of the utterances "x is large", the following hypotheses can be accepted (leaving out the tP and simplifying the notation to just t): 1. 10 is totally large, and 0 is totally not large 2. x ≤P y " x ≤ y, that is, "x is less large than y" coincides with "x is smaller than y" in the order of the interval [0, 10]. 3. If it can be said that "x is large", and if y > x, then it can also be said that y is not less large than x, Which means the corresponding sizes t can be defined as these t functions: [0, 10] ! [0, 1] such that: 1*. t(0)=0, t(10) = 1 2*. If x < y, then t(x) ≤ t(y), that is, the growing functions that go from point (0, 0) to point (10, 1) of the Cartesian plane. The simplest example comes from the function t(x) = x/10, if it can be supposed that its growth must be linear; in the case of having to suppose a quadratic growth, the function t(x) = x2/100 can be taken. Additionally, and if, for example, it is t(x) =0.8 and y>x, as this implies t(y)≥ t(x)=0.8, then, and according to 3, y is not less large than what x is. That is, 3 is now satisfied thanks to 1* i 2*. Note that when X is reduced to a single element x, si ≤P exists, what remains is the unitary relationship {(x, x)}, which has neither maximals nor minimals, unless it is accepted that x is simultaneously minimal and maximal. Therefore, either t(x) does not exist, or t(x) = 0 =1, which is absurd, we are left in the "agnostic" position of not being able to say whether "x is P" is true or false, only able to say that it has no truth value, that there is no magnitude with X = {x} representing the "true" predicate. This is unless, ! ! naturally, a different definition is adopted for the truth value of x, a definition that, in a way, would have to be "artificial", as, in any case, it would have to come from considerations outside the use of P on X = {x}. For example, if x is in some way similar to an element y of Y, a universe in which the action of predicate Q is represented by the magnitude (Y, ≤Q, tQ), if tQ (y) =1, that is, y is a prototype of Q, it may be possible to transfer Q to {x} and say that "x is Q" is true. With this, the "leap" to affirming that in X = {x} everything or almost everything can be predicated, it doesn't seem at all strange. 3.2 It's easy to prove that the relationship =P = ≤P ∩ ≤P-1 is of equivalence if and only ≤P is reflexive and transitive, that is, a pre-order. We say that a predicate is rigid when =P is an equivalence and generates a quotient set X/=P that has a maximum of two classes, and as a result, t has a maximum of two values. If these values are only 0 and 1, then we say that the predicate is classical or bivalued; of course, in this case, the quotient may consist of a single class and then t will only have a value of either 0 or 1: all utterances "x is P" will be either true or false. If the quotient has two classes, one will be of elements x such that "x is P" is true, and the other of elements y such that "y is P" is false. It should be noted that, in cases where they exist, t is constant in the classes of equivalence and that, therefore, the maximum number of different values of t coincides with the number of classes of the quotient X/=P : If x, and are in the same class of equivalence, it is the case that x =P y " x ≤P y & y ≤P x => t(x) ≤ t(y) & t(y) ≤ t(x) => t(x) = t(y). NOTE. In the example above using "large", there is a single minimal or minimum (0), a single maximal or maximum (10), and as 'x≤y&&&y≤x&"&x=y', the equivalence classes consist of a single element. Thus, both the quotient set has the same number of elements as [0, 10], and t has this number of values as a maximum. 4. The case when speakers do not understand the predicate in the same way In any "intelligent" conversation, the understanding of what each of the speakers says is crucial; otherwise, it would turn into a bunch of nonsense and noone could understand anything. "Enraonar" means understanding ! ! what the other speaker wants or is trying to say, and sometimes the difficulty arises that the speakers don't reach exactly the same conclusion based on a predicate P in a universe X. A way to keep "enraonant" (talking) consists of seeking out a minimal common understanding for the concepts being discussed; at the end of the day, reaching the agreement to limit themselves to "enraonar" about the things about which they have a mutual understanding. If there are two speakers involved and each of them understands P on X through (X, ≤P1) and (X, ≤P2), respectively, then it may be that the intersection ≤P1∩ ≤P2 is empty, or that it does not exist. In the former case, the possibility that they can understand each other is nonexistent or very small, but in the second and when they have a minimum common "meaning", given by ≤P = ≤P1∩ ≤P2, understanding is possible if both are in agreement in limiting themselves to understanding P on X for (X, ≤P) and leaving the non-empty difference ≤P i - ≤P aside. Note that if the two relationships ≤P i (i =1,2) are pre-orders, the reflexive properties of both imply that their intersection is not empty. Of course the same can be said if instead of two speakers there are three, four or however many (Autor, 2009), and yet, the more speakers there are, the more reduced the intersection of the corresponding relationships may be. If the two speakers previously understood the truth of the utterances "x is P" by different degrees of truth, t1P y t2P, then it is possible for them to understand the "common" truth using the function tP (x) = min (t1P (x), t2P (x)), for all of x in X, with which every utterance "x is P" is assigned a degree of truth that is the minimum of what each speaker has assigned to it on their own. The new function tP is a degree of truth, as it verifies: x ≤P y " x ≤P1 y & x ≤P2 y => t1P(x) ≤ t1P(x) & t2P(x) ≤ t2P(x) => tP (x) = min (t1P (x), t2P (x)) ≤ min ( t1P (y), t2P (y)) = tP (y), that is, understanding is obtained using the magnitude (X, ≤P, tP). In this way, the two speakers can arrive together at a minimum common understanding, even if each one, on their own, may come to something that goes further. In a way, it can be said that the confronted magnitudes, (X, ≤P1, tP1) and (X, ≤P2, tP2), have been consensually compacted into (X, ≤P, tP), which guarantees the speakers a minimum possibility of understanding each other. They, however, must decide previously whether, even giving up some possible conclusions each, they wish to understand each other. ! ! 5. The risk of only considering 'true' through grades It must be noted that every degree t brings about, with its values in the unity interval, a linearization that cannot always be convenient: If x and y can be incomparable with respect to P, on the other hand, one of the two numbers t(x), t(y) will always be greater than the other. What was incomparable becomes comparable. Once t is known in, X it can be considered a new binary relationship ≤t, defined as x ≤t y " t(x) ≤ t(y), which is obviously reflexive and transitive, that is, with which the structure (X, ≤t) is of a pre-ordered set, even if (X,≤P) was not. As far the linear or total character of the numeric order ≤ of [0, 1], the new relationship ≤t is also linear. From x ≤P y => t(x) ≤ t(y) " x ≤t y, it follows that ≤P ⊆ ≤t , that is, the new relationship ≤t is wider than the old one ≤P, and as the new one is always linear and the old one cannot be in all cases, in general the prior inclusion is strict, that is, the difference set ≤t - ≤P will not usually be empty. When this difference is empty, that is, if ≤P = ≤t, it is said that the measure t "perfectly reflects" the use of P in X. This is the case, for example, of P = large in [0, 10] with t(x) = x/10, which is a strictly growing function with which it is immediate that as ≤P = ≤ (the linear order of the interval), and also ≤t = ≤, t perfectly reflects the use of "large". Therefore, in cases in which ≤P is strictly contained in ≤t , that is, that ≤t - ≤P ≠ ∅, to consider the predicate "true" just because of its t degree "extends" what is meant to be said with it. This always happens when ≤P is not linear, when there are elements x, y of X that are not comparable under the relationship ≤P, that is, for which neither x ≤P y, nor y ≤P x. As, given the size of X, it is often difficult to be able to completely know the relationship ≤P, it is common to work directly with ≤t, once a t is supposed based on the partial information gathered on ≤P. In these cases, it must be taken into account that, when considering the linear graph (X, ≤t) instead of (X, ≤P), the "meaning" of P must be expanded; the predicate will seem to say more than it really says. The structure of X given by the use of the predicate is what determines whether its characteristic of "true" can be contemplated solely through whatever degree that, necessarily, will organize X in a linear manner. At this point it may be helpful to remember the anecdote of that famous label that appeared at M.I.T., "Lord, make the world stable, linear and Gaussian." The ! ! world, just as it is not always stable and Gaussian, is not always linear either, although often linear models are very useful, but not everything can be resolved with rules of threes, not by a long shot. Seeing the predicate P through a numeric degree of truth tP can often result, at least, semantically dangerous, because it may appear that predicates more of the elements of X than it really predicates; this is why the function tP must always be "designed" very carefully based on the maximum information that can be obtained based on the behaviour of P on X. For example, in the case of the predicate "large" in [0, 1], to take tP(x) = 0, if 0≤ x ≤ 0.7 ; tP(x) =1, if 0.7 < x ≤ 1, means confusing the predicates "large" and "strictly larger than 0.7", that is, just considering the numbers that are above 0.7 to be large, and, therefore, to see a predicate that is usually imprecise as a precise predicate. 6. Final Notes 6. 1 The primary objective of this article is to show that without capturing the meaning of the predicates used, that is, without knowing, even partially if not completely, the relational structure, or graph, (X,& ≤P),&when X is not reduced to a single element, it becomes difficult to be able to say that an elemental utterance "x is P" has been well understood. It goes without saying that it is not enough to know the "meaning" of an elemental utterance, but a few must be known, one must be able to compare them with each other in terms of how they comply with the property named by the predicate P, something that, if it is perhaps known intuitively, an attempt must be made to show here in a reasoned manner. The second objective of this article is to shine a light, dim as it may be, on the truth or falsity of elemental utterances. This is an aspect that, once the concept of degrees of truth is introduced, it's important to realize what it implies that there is not one single way to assign the adjectives true or false to utterances, which seems to cast doubt on the possibility that something universal called the "Truth" may exist, and that one can truly "enraonar" and not just speak. The characteristic that an utterance presents as "true" has to do with the context in which it is made: for example, in a universe with few elements, a generally imprecise predicate in a large universe can appear to be quite precise. This is the case of "old" if it predicates three people aged, respectively, 20, 30, and 90. ! ! This is something that certainly is not essentially distinct from the assignment of a probability of an event: By conducting the "experiment" of throwing a dice and asking what is the probability of obtaining the result "5", there is no unique answer but rather an "it depends": if the die is perfect and thrown as carefully as possible, there is no doubt that the probability of obtaining any of the numbers 1 to 6 is 1/6, but often dice will have imperfections, or may be weighted. For example, if the die is weighted such that out of every 10 throws the "6" comes up seven times, the probability of obtaining "6" will be 7/10, and therefore, for the rest of the numbers from 1 to 5, they'll be split up under 1 – 7/10 = 3/10; therefore to each of them can be attributed a probability of (3/10)/5 = 3/50, and "obtaining a 5" can be assigned the probability of 3/50 = 0.06, quite a bit smaller than the "ideal" 1/6 ~ 0.17. Therefore, the answer to the question "what is the probability of obtaining a 5 when throwing a dice once?" depends at the very least on prior information or conditions on the dice that it is necessary to know in order to respond with reason. It also depends, obviously, on the surface it falls upon: it would be different if falling on a sandy surface, for example. Something similar occurs with the adjective "true"; thus, in the example using "large" in the interval [0, 10], the utterance "5 is large" is true with a degree f(5), if f is a function between [0, 10] and [0, 1], which is strictly growing and verifies f(0) = 0 and f(10) = 1. If there are additional conditions allowing for f to be linear, then if f(x)= x/10, and f(5) =5/10 = 0.5, but if these conditions demand that f be quadratic, it will be f(x)&=&x2/100, and then the result will be f(5) = 25/100 = 0.25, two values between which there exists a significant difference: the second is half of the first. To determine a degree of truth requires, beyond knowing ≤P, also knowing additional conditions of a contextual type. To apply the adjective true to an elemental utterance requires information on the corresponding context. 6. 2 In terms of finding the degree of falsity, t*, once the degree of truth t is known, and when dealing with concepts that are antonymous or opposite to each other, a symmetry s: X!X can be used [13], and t*(x) = t(s(x)) can be taken. For example, accepting that the degree to which, in [0, 10], "'x is large' is true", is t(x) = x2/100, all that needs to be done is to take s(x) = 10 – x (which, obviously, is a symmetry in [0, 10], because it verifies s(0)=10, s(10)=0, and s(s(x))=x), in order to obtain t*(x) = t(10-x) = (10-x)2/100. Thus, for example, the degree to which 5 is large is t(5) = 0.25, and the degree to ! ! which it is small is also t*(5) = 0.25. Note that if it were t(x) = x/10, it would be t(5)= 0.5, and with t*(x) = t(10-x), it would also be t*(5) = 0.5. In a case in which ≤P is not linear such as ≤large, which coincides with the order of the interval, then it would be necessary to use a symmetry well aligned to the increases and decreases of ≤P in the interval. One example is the predicate "near 4", because ≤P is not the order ≤ of [0, 10], and because the previous symmetry does not yield the antonym "far from 4", but rather the predicate "closer to 6" [8]. 6. 3 The quotient set X/=P, which consists of the classes [x] = {y ∈ X ; y =P x}, and as it is partially ordered by the binary relationship, [x] ≤P* [y] "x ≤P y, if and only ≤P is a pre-order [1], it facilitates a non-numerical "measure" (and even less always linear) defined by t(x) = [x], which perfectly reflects the behaviour of P and X, as it is x ≤P y " [x] ≤P* [y] " t(x) ≤P* t(y) " x ≤t y: ≤P = ≤t . This is an "abstract" t: X ! X/=P, and therefore, and unlike what happens with the previous numerical measures, two incomparable elements under the relationship of the predicate must not need, necessarily, comparable measures (degrees of truth). The measures defined in 3.1 can be generalized such that both them and the above can result in particular cases. It is sufficient to take, as the range of t values and instead of [0,1] or X/=P, a partially ordered set (L, <) with a minimum 0 and a maximum 1, such that t: X ! L, verifies the axioms a, b, and c from 3.1. These are (abstract) measures that make it possible to consider the degrees of truth in a qualitative way and that hold certain interest in fields like Taxonomy. An example is given by taking L = C, the set of complex numbers a+ib; complex measures are often considered in Science. 6. 4 A comment is warranted with respect to some aspects related to the branch of study that the philosophers call "Pragmatics". In order to "enraonar", first the "speakers" must chain their elemental utterances "x is P", y is Q", etc., using the connectors called "logical constants", such as, for example, the different forms of negation, conjunction, disjunction, and conditionals, ! ! with those that form linguistic expressions, this so that, from a pragmatic point of view, in the end the speakers themselves will be the ones who determine how each logical constant works so that the relationship of the final expression with reality is produced without betraying that of its constituent parts, that is, that only based on the elemental components can the truth of the final expression be affirmed. The debate between the intuitionists [25] and the pragmatists [26] centred around what a logical constant is and how it works, demonstrates the difficulty of determining how to preserve, in each case, the truth, the relationship with reality. This is something difficult due, in large part, to the fact that in order to make a discourse that is not incoherent, the speakers attempt to "enraonar" using some connections between utterances and some transitions between premises or data and conclusions that preserve the truth; doing so, their objective is not very distinct from the pragmatic objective of making connections and transitions that "can be judged", which are, finally and for inferential effects, really "what is said". It should be added that neither the logical constants nor the reasoning frameworks represent properties of the elements of the universe of discourse, but that only through them can what constitutes the current inferential practice be arrived at. To reason, and therefore, to "enraonar", speakers make those chains of elemental utterances that they intuitively believe are "valid canons" of argumentation [27]; they do this in part through the logical constants and reasoning frameworks whose dynamism and flexibility allow for discourse. Definitely, these are aspects that, moving forward, the authors will attempt to analyze with some care. In order to do so, particularly, it is necessary to see both how the relationships ≤P and Q , ≤P or Q , ≤Q if P , etc. can be "constructed" based on the initial ≤P and ≤Q as the form in which they originate, and ordinary typical reasoning frameworks can be represented, such as the "Approximate Modus Ponens", If P, then Q; P* approaches P: Q* approaches Q, with the condition that if P = P* , then Q* = Q. Only on this basis is it possible to establish coherently the possible degrees t(x is P and Q), t(x is P or Q), etc., as well as t(Q* approaches Q) based on the degrees t(If P, then Q) and t(P* approaches P), once what is meant to be said by affirming that "In universe X, a predicate approximates another predicate" is made clear. ! ! 6. 5 A predicate P is "meaningless" in X when the relationship ≤P is empty, it has no element: ≤P=∅. Of course if P is meaningless in X there can be no degree of truth tP perhaps beyond what the value 0 assigns to all elements of X. That P is meaningless in X does not mean at all that it has to be in any other universe of discourse, for example, "yellowish" is meaningless in a universe where all elements are totally black, but it would not be in one in which there are elements of diverse colours with shades of yellow. In the first case, the only degree of truth that can be assigned is tP (x) = 0 for all x ∈ X: no element is yellowish. In the second, there may be different functions tP obtained according to, for example, the percentage of yellow it is possible to appreciate in the elements of X. When ≤P ⊆ {(x,x) ; x ∈ X}, that is, ≤P is in part, or all, the principal diagonal of the Cartesian product X x X, then it can be said that P is "almost meaningless" in X. If X is a set of pairs of socks between sizes 36 and 43, then P = size 40 is almost meaningless in X, because it can only be applied to those pairs of size 40 and no other pair. Although to choose a pair of socks P is important, knowing that "this pair of socks is size 40" says very little about the socks; it only describes one of their characteristics and it does not do so with others such as colour, elasticity, pressure of the elastic band, type of weave, sweat, etc., that are usually important when choosing them. 6. 6 Although in passing and only at a glance, we must also consider the case in which the universe of discourse is reduced to a single element, and an attempt is made to demonstrate that this is a singular case in which the characteristic of true or false of the only utterance therefore possible cannot be affirmed, but has to be done through non-intrinsic considerations. This is because the adjectives true and false are, essentially, of a relational character; it is difficult to apply them to isolated utterances, and what's more, it is necessary to do so only in families (non-unitary) of isolated utterances that everyone can compare at least qualitatively. These are cases in which, if the relationship ≤P is reflexive, the quotient set X/=P is isomorphic to the set X, as [x] = {x}. That is, these are cases that are deeply lacking conceptually and for which the assignment of a degree of truth t is quite rare as it is impossible to go further than 'x ≤P x => t (x) = t(x)'. Of course there are very particular situations, such as that of the name ! ! "God" applied to a unitary set {Dios}, in which the meaning, of existence, has to necessarily come as a given due to considerations of an external order, but not considerations that are structural, intrinsic, and belonging to the use of the predicate. These are cases that could be referred to as "metaphysical", that cannot be represented using magnitudes. It seems, then, that they are exempt from strict scientific control, and the study and justification of their "meaningful characteristic" can only correspond to philosophy or theology, which are really the fields where they are considered and which, therefore and in order to justify themselves, have to find for them the corresponding conditions of contextual validity. Otherwise, philosophy or theology may not move beyond more or less literary exercises with no direct and real relationship with "reality"; there could hardly be "philosophical or theological problems" with fertile solutions, that is, applicable outside of them as occurs with mathematical solutions. However, this does not imply that some such philosophies or theologies cannot demonstrate higher ideals of knowledge, although, when it comes to something as important today as the scientific knowledge that necessarily must form part of the "general knowledge", they can hardly take into account the expiration date on knowledge, which is extremely important for seeing and interpreting the modern world and society. 6.7 Be that as it may, today philosophy, just like science or technology, requires control methods for its reasoning processes and for the validity of its results, and this even though such methods, rather than quantitative, may be, and may plausibly be, qualitative, some methods of control for those that, perhaps and with what has been stated here, may come across some ideas upon which to base a model. Note that even in the extreme case of a universe of discourse as a unique element, the "behavior" of any predicate would have to be represented based on contextual conditions that come from other universes, which would imply, in the end, a return to some relational structure. It is quite possible that in the discourses upon which analysis must be realized of an essentially qualitative form, some more could be said about "x is P" based on considerations of an external order that would often be of an analogical type, that is, for similarity to other conceptual environments; with this, the controlled exportation of the knowledge involved in other universes of discourse doesn't seem easy and it will have to be done very ! ! carefully. This is the case, for example, of wanting to "enraonar" in legal terms, about abortion based on concepts belonging to a few determined and particular religious conceptions about the freedom of women, and in general, of how they believe the family and society should be. In a way, the different conceptions of the "truth" have been presented from philosophy, they have made the humanistic sciences separate themselves from the classical conception of the "truth" as in a well-controlled correspondence between the understanding and the thing. Basing decisions on reason is something necessary but not sufficient; the fact is that not doing so is fairly common, either for a lack of all the information necessary, or because the information is not sufficiently trustworthy. The fact that many of the linguistic terms and frameworks of reasoning used are imprecise and/or uncertain, approximate, shows that even the safest types of reasoning cannot be fully trusted, the deductive type, as it is represented in classical logic [28], where it is modelled using precise algebraic structures such as, for example, Boolean algebra. In any case, some type of control is needed over conjectural and/or analogical reasoning, which are typical of ordinary or common-sense reasoning [29], [17] as [30] attempts to illustrate. This is not to mention the important role they play in human decision-making, emotions, feelings, prior beliefs, desires, fears, and why not spell it out: fanaticism. As [31] clearly explains, in order to improve both the lives of human beings, as well as the very stability and favourable evolution of how and where they live (human societies and the planet Earth), to accompany reason with a healthy dose of scepticism cannot be considered an indulgence; or even to accompany it with a certain scepticism of our own scepticism. It bears repeating that, in this sense, we still do not sufficiently understand either the very phenomenon known as "reason", or the processes that intervene when making decisions. 7. Conclusion With all that has been stated here, it remains evident that there is still much work to be done in order to study "all" the predicates, whether through magnitudes or through other algebraic and systematic methods. Yet still a door remains open just a little so that, to "enraonar", we can also "enraonar" without too many prior concepts insufficiently understood, understanding well, and to whatever extent possible, all the linguistic terms used. It must not be forgotten that today, both the language like "enraonar" and ! ! reasoning are some of the most complex phenomenon thinkers face, natural phenomena that, like all such things, require systematic study of the "scientific" type, without the knowledge of which computer science, for example, could hardly well-simulate the human act of "enraonar". To situate ourselves, how can the workings of the human brain and the thinking process, in particular, be studied without using either scientific terms or the methodologies typical of neurophysiology? Just as the natural phenomenon of "thinking", when it is produced in the realm of the human brain, it is not directly observable in everyday life, "reasoning", one of its direct consequences, manifests itself in diverse ways that are directly observable, and among which to "enraonar" is the most common. Thought may only be well understood scientifically when the current neurophysiology studies manage to find out, with certainty on the brain neuron systems level, its "natural" genesis and function, and meanwhile, those who are not specialists in this branch of science must limit ourselves to developing studies of the non-experimental type, humbly remembering Wittgenstein's assertion, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." [32]. As far as reasoning is concerned, studies conducted in formal frameworks still provide interest and certain potential fruitfulness, in which mathematical methodology can be used, like in the case of [20], and that can be fertile ground for computational sciences, and in any case, can also help improve our understanding of the phenomenon of "reason". Therefore, this article cannot, and will not, go further than to hint at a possible path to start down with a new theoretical and formal focus, as far as it's possible to go, toward "enraonar". It should not be seen, then, as any more than a first step in this direction. Acknowledgments The part of this article which belongs to the first author is partially supported by the 'Foundation for the Advancement of Soft Computing' (Mieres, Astúries), and the MICINN / TIN 2011-29827-C02-01. The portion corresponding to the second, is supported by the FFI2013-42935-P and! FFI2013-46361-R projects. ! ! References 1.! J.M. Terricabras, 1998, Atreveix-te a pensar, Edicions La Campana. 2.! E. Trillas, M.G. Navarro, 2013, On the Pragmatic Roots of the Logical Constants and the Schemes of Reasoning (work in progress). 3.! L. Wittgenstein, 1983, Investigacions Filosòfiques, Laia. 4.! E. Trillas, 2009, A Model for the Meaning of Predicates. In 'Views on Fuzzy Sets and Systems from Different Perspectives' (Ed. R. Seising): 175-205, Springer-Verlag. 5.! G. Frege, 1892, On Concept and Object, In Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (Eds: P. Geach i M. Black), Basil Blackwell. 6.! J.F. Sowa, 2000, Knowledge Representation, Brooks/Cole. 7.! E. Trillas, C. Alsina, J.M. Terricabras, 1995, Introducción a la lógica borrosa, Ariel. 8.! E. Trillas, 2013, Reflexions sobre Ciència i Magnitud, forthcoming in Festschrift in honor to Dr. Jaume Agustí, edited by IIIA/CSIC. 9.! A. Pradera, E. Trillas, 2002, A Reflection on Rationality, Guessing, and Measuring, In Proceedings IPMU (Annecy): 777-784. 10.!K. Menger, 1974, Morality, Decision, and Social Organization: Toward a Logic of Ethics, Reidel. 11.!G. Bodiou, 1964, Théorie dialectique des probabilités (englobant leurs calculs classique et quantique), Gauthier-Villars& Cie. 12.!S. Lupasco, 1947, Logique et contradiction, PUF. 13.!E. Trillas, C. Moraga, S. Guadarrama, S. Cubillo, i E. Castiñeira, 2007, Computing with Antonims, In Forging New Frontiers (Eds. M. Nikravesh et altri), Vol I: 133-154, SpringerVerlag. 14.!E. Trillas, 2006, On the Use of Words and Fuzzy Sets, 'Information Sciences', 176(11): 14631487. 15.!E. Trillas, C. Alsina, 1999, A Reflection on What is a Membership Function, 'Mathware & Soft Computing', 6: 201215. 16.!G. De Cooman, 1991, Evaluation Sets and Mappings. The Order-Theoretic Aspect of the Meaning of Properties, Introduction to the Basic Concepts of Fuzzy Set Theory and Some of its Applications (Ed. E. Kerre), 159213. 17.!E. Trillas, 2013, An Algebraic Model of Reasoning to Support Zadeh's CwW, final draftECSC (to send upon request). 18.!A. Fidora, C. Sierra (Eds.), 2011, Ramon Llull: From the Ars Magna to Artificial Intelligence, IIIA/CSIC. 19.!H. Wang, 1990, Reflections on Kurt Gödel, MIT Press. 20.!E. Trillas, 2012, A Model for 'Crisp Reasoning with Fuzzy Sets, 'International Journal of Intelligent Systems', 27: 859-872. 21.!L.M. Lederman, Ch.T Hill, 2006, La simetría y la belleza del universo, Tusquets Editores. 22.!E. Trillas, R. Seising, 2015, On Meaning and Measuring: A Philosophical and Historical View, 'Ágora-Papeles de Filosofía', to appear June/July. 23.!B. Russell, 1912, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 24.!M. Glanzberg, Truth, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (Ed.) URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/truth/>. 25.!M. Dummett, 1997, Elements of Intuitionism, Oxford University Press. 26.!R. Brandom, 2008, Between Saying and Doing, Oxford University Press. 27.!S. Haack, 1978, Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge University Press. 28.!E. Trillas, I. García-Honrado, 2013, ¿Hacia un replanteamiento del cálculo ! ! proposicional clásico?, 'Ágora-Papeles de Filosofía', 32/1: 7-25. 29.!E. Trillas, 2012, A Model for 'Crisp Reasoning' with Fuzzy Sets, 'International Journal of Intelligent Systems', 27: 859-872. 30.!E. Trillas, G. Triviño, C. Moraga, 2013, Weighting the Support the Conjectures Inherit from the Premises (in progress). 31.!B. Russell, 1928, Sceptical Essays, W.W.Norton, Inc. 32.!L. Wittgenstein, 1981, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Laia. !

OJH Volume 1 (2019) ISSN 2612-6966 Open Journal of Humanities Open Journal of Humanities ISSN 2612-6966 Publisher Universitas Studiorum S.r.l. Casa Editrice Scientifica via Sottoriva, 9 46100 Mantova (MN), Italy P. IVA IT02346110204 tel. (+39) 0376 1810639 www.universitas-studiorum.it International Scientific Committee Carla Carotenuto, Università degli Studi di Macerata (Director) Gabriella Cambosu, Università degli Studi di Cagliari Clementica Casula, Università degli Studi di Cagliari Matteo De Beni, Università degli Studi di Verona Federica De Iuliis, Università degli Studi di Parma Francesca Dell'Oro, Université de Lausanne (Switzerland) Sonia Gambino, Università degli Studi di Messina Carmela Giordano, Università degli Studi di Napoli "L'Orientale" Alberto Jori, Università degli Studi di Ferrara Valetina Laviola, Università degli Studi di Napoli "L'Orientale" Giovanni Lupinu, Università degli Studi di Sassari Chiara Melloni, Università degli Studi di Verona Michela Meschini, Università degli Studi di Macerata Mario Negri, Università IULM Erika Notti, Università IULM Isotta Piazza, Università degli Studi di Parma Paola Pontani, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Daniela Privitera, Middlebury College at Mills, San Francisco (USA) Riccardo Roni, Università degli Studi di Urbino "Carlo Bo" Marco Sabbatini, Università degli Studi di Pisa Sonia Saporiti, Università degli Studi del Molise Domenico Scalzo, Università degli Studi di Urbino "Carlo Bo" Edoardo Scarpanti, Accademia Nazionale Virgiliana Marco Stoffella, Università degli Studi di Verona Editorial and Publishing Committee Ilari Anderlini Giannella Biddau Luigi Diego Di Donna Edoardo Scarpanti Open Journal of Humanities (OJH) is a peer-reviewed electronic Scientific Journal, which is devoted to the field of Humanities. OJH will be published three times a year, and will be distributed online with a full Gold Open Access policy, without any embargo period, through a Creative Commons License (CC-by 4.0), according to scientific best practices. Peer-reviewing process for OJH is normally operated on a "double blind" basis, for each proposed article, and is conducted by external referees and by members of OJH's Scientific Committee. Both the reviewer and author identities are concealed from the reviewers, and vice versa, throughout the review process. Received articles will be made anonymous by our Editors, before Peer-reviewing process. Accepted topics of OJH include the whole field of Humanities, and namely: Anthropology, Archaeology, Arts (Visual Arts, Architecture), Classics, Philology, Philosophy, Law and Politics, Linguistics, Literature, Sociology, Economics. Corrispondent scientific classification in Italy covers the following fields (cf. D.M. 855/2015): Area 10 "Scienze dell'antichità, filologico-letterarie e storico-artistiche"; Area 11 "Scienze storiche, filosofiche, pedagogiche, psicologiche"; Area 12 "Scienze giuridiche"; Area 13 "Scienze economiche e statistiche"; Area 14 "Scienze politiche e sociali". Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 149 The moral philosophy of nature: Spiritual Amazonian conceptualizations of the environment Luis Gregorio Abad Espinoza Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca Abstract It is well known the harmful effects that savage capitalism has been causing to the environment since its introduction in a sphere in which a different logic and approach to nature are the essential conditions for the maintenance of the ecosystem and its complex relations between humans and non-human organisms. The amazon rainforest is a portion of the planet in which for thousands of years its human dwellers have been interacting with nature that it is understood beyond its physical condition. Thus, to what extent Amazonian's approaches to nature could be considered as a moral philosophy through which the way of conceptualizing nature and its non-human denizens enhances the continuity of life and the intimate relations between entities? To answer this question, I will explore the cosmological system of the Shuar of the Ecuadorian Amazon with whom I lived for 5 months between July and November 2018, and thereby elucidate the spiritual relations that this society has with the metaphysical domain of nature. Keywords: Shuar, Ecuador, Amazonia, human-non-human relations, nature-culture dichotomy, cosmology, waterfalls. Emphasizing nature's agency and its relations with humans among the Shuar The Shuar are an Amazonian society who are part of the Jivaro ethnic group that number roughly 85.000 persons Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 150 and are spread between Ecuador and Peru. This group can be divided in two main branches: the Candoa sub-family, including the Shapra and Candoshi, and the Jivaro proper, including the Shuar, Achuar, Aguaruna, Huambisa, and Shiwiar (Taylor 2001). The present article is mainly concerned with a research which I carried out among the Shuar who live in the communities of Tawasap, Yawintz and Wawaim which are located in Morana Santiago province of the Ecuadorian amazon. The natural environment of the Amazon is a place where relations between entities go far beyond the mere physical realties in which they are immersed. "All things hang together" (Naess 1989: 36), thereby whichever activity undertaken by humans whether harmless as human-non-human relations among the Shuar or harmful as the capitalist market will always confront to a nature with its own intentionality and not an inert object. Indeed, the Shuar could teach us that dwelling in nature is not only an utilitaristic pursuing to attain the necessary conditions for their subsistence, but to dwell within it is to deeply immerse themselves in a sphere where all beings can be connected by the essential elements of this anthropomorphic nature. In this sense, we must emphasize the intentionality of naturès beings who are dwelling and interacting in a natural environment by which since mythical times provide the raison d'être of humans who are physically related to them in the biosphere and metaphysically related in the process of reciprocal sharing of spiritual energy.1 1. These relations that I call "reciprocal", contrast with the classic predatory mode of relation that Descola (1992, 1996) attributed to the Jivaroan societies. In his analysis, he argued that unlike the Tukanoan soOpen Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 151 Furthermore, the agency of nature ought to not be reduced as a mere cultural construct in which the rational domain of humans imposed its own abstract categories into the irreducible but misconceived natural environment which remains hidden from the shallow conceptualization of it. It is worth noticing that inasmuch this anthropocentric model to approach to the world continues to permeate our way of thought, will be very hard to plunge into other realities or conceptualizations of a more complex world that not only gives room to the human domain and its cultural traits, but also different intentionalities of the non-human domain of nature or supernature will take part in the reciprocal concatenations that exist in the different worlds of the others. Hence, it could be said that for the Shuar there is no natural domain that exists apart from humans, so, nature is not out there as a passive independent matter with no intrinsic value that only serves as a supplier of the resources for their survival. One day when I was walking in the forest with some children who decided to accompany me from Mura2 to the village, we passed across some ants which they quickly recognized as edible, in fact, they started to eat some of them like the chilcieties of eastern Colombia (see, Århem 1990, 1996; Reichel-Dolmatoff 1971, 1976) to whom a reciprocal mode of relation is manifested by a cosmological system in which there is reciprocal chain of interactions between humans and non-humans, namely, a constant exchange and compensation of finite energetic resources is at stake in this cosmology; for the Jivaro, predation is characterized by the total negation of reciprocal feedbacks between humans and non-humans, i.e., when the former consumes the energetic resources of the latter, there is no need of a compensation for this loss of energy. 2. In Shuar "mura" means mountain, and it is a sacred place located in the Twasap community where most of my research took place. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 152 dren of our cities who eat the candies found in some part of the house. In the same way they recognized the edible leaves of certain plants, the sound of the animals and insects and even described the spirits who still roam in Mura, that is, the ancestors who have transformed in butterflies.3 One might say that this approach to nature even for the children is not a trivial one, indeed, in this case the phisicalities of the natural world ought not to be considered as separated from the domain of humans, thereby there are profound interactions between the environment and its non-human dwellers that these are not only known, but perceived and connected with the energy that sustain the life of the universe. Hence, this way of interactions with nature that do not deny the agencies that populate it, are in stark contrast with our conceptions of a somewhat timid different nature. The ontological distinction that exists between our human culture or rational thought and the somewhat mechanical and brute non-human domain of nature, might be considered as an illusory condition of superiority and a some kind of straitjacket in which the radical abstractions of nature and all its denizens warrant the arbitrary, unethical and predatory approach to the matter that must be tame and take advantage of it for the final conquest and victory of the civilization and progress. Some of the features of this abstract conceptualization of the world are well described by Descola who argues that: 3. For the Shuar most of the living and non-living beings are considered persons (aents) and possess a soul (wakan). According to some informants when a human die, his/her soul leaves the body to temporary dwell in different non-human entities like butterflies, animals and trees. I think that this is the reciprocal sharing of energy by the organisms in the ecosystem that I discussed above. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 153 Typical of western cosmologies since Plato and Aristotle, naturalism creates a specific ontological domain, a place of order and necessity where nothing happens without a reason or a cause, whether originating in God (such as Spinoza's famous 'Deus sive Natura' ) or immanent to the fabric of the world ('the laws of nature') (1996: 88). This specific domain which is situated essentially apart from us, and therefore the phenomena that occur or the things which are part of this kingdom, owe their existence and development to a principle extraneous both to chance and to the effects of human will (Rosset 1973). It could be argued that the history of our Western philosophy, in particular since the Ionian natural philosophy, the domain of nature shifted from being the sensible physical nature with all its attributes, diversity and richness that the classic mythical thought conceived as a profound and meaningful anthropomorphic order; to the somewhat universal abstract principle or the basic stuff of all things that the philosophical logos as a new hegemonic way of understanding the world permeated our conceptualizations of it and therefore supplanted the mythical thought and its complexity (Arntzen 1999, 2003). Furthermore, it is worth emphasising the sad truth of the development of naturalism in our civil society, thus, nowadays naturalism, far from being represented by the classic Spinoza's natura naturans and natura naturata, i.e., the former (nature naturing) which is to be understood as the will and power of God to whom all things whether living or not are caused by him; moreover the latter (nature natured) represents all the processes, chains and connections between the objects and the means of comprehending them which are guided by God (1910: 24). It seems that God as an almighty ruler of the world has been dismissed by a more personal and Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 154 irresponsible power that is located no more in a metaphysical omnipresent force, but in a concrete and physical organ that we call brain and whence comes the superior thought that separates us from other entities like animals. In addition, our alleged superiority that places us on the tip of the rational iceberg, segregates the other entities of the natural environment in the cumbersome brute chamber that remains congealed by our scientific knowledge which treats this passive realm as a laboratory to undertake the modern experiments acting like a theistic predatory force. In this respect, following the words of Ingold referring to the so-called rationalistic treatment of nature: Enlightenment thought has proclaimed the triumph of human reason over a recalcitrant nature. As a child of the Enlightenment, neoclassical economics developed as a science of human decision-making and its aggregate consequences, based on the premise that every individual act in the pursuit of rational self-interest (1996: 25). Needless to say, according to our western mode of thought, i.e., the radical individualism which more or less permeates the way in which we conceive the "good", or the wellbeing that must be attained at the expense of the others and their environment, is the core of our existence in the world, that is to say, technological evolution has provided us the hedonistic satisfaction to supposedly be the sole masters of the world, or to put it otherwise, the Midasian transformation of the green forests in a river of black noxious oil which is pumped by giant tubes, hence, the green cake becomes a dead polluted desert and the pockets of the few become the tentacles of the octopus that suffocate the world with its black ink of contamination. Moroever, like other territories in the world, Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 155 the Amazonian landscape is increasingly threatened by this unsustainable logic of the market that continues to perpetuate the whims of the mechanical Cartesian dualism. Thus, as Christopher Tilley baldly argues: The neoliberal-capitalistic Western conception of landscape is that of a surface or volume like any other, open for exploitation and everywhere homogeneous in its potential exchange value for any particular project (1994: 21). It seems that the selfish economic rationality that pervades in our mechanical naturalist cosmology, strengthens the dualistic conception of our way of being in the universe, that is to say, unlike most of the tribal societies in the world who approach to nature like a home that needs to be in intimate relation with them to provide the necessary conditions for a cyclical process of dwelling in which humans as well as non-humans are part of the entire ecosystem which is enhanced and therefore maintains its equilibrium by these complex relations of entities (see, Rappaport 1979, 2000); Western approaches to nature remain encapsulated in the exclusive bunkers of science and technology that dictate the rules to penetrate the obscure and timid domain of nature, thus, this kind of depredation ought to be understood as an aggressive harassment that remains unpunished for the alleged silent of the timid victim. This supposed silence of nature is well described by Christopher Manes who argues that: Nature is silent in our culture (and in literate societies generally) in the sense that the status of being a speaking subject is jealously guarded as an exclusively human prerogative (1995: 43). Moreover, putting a thorny fence to separate the cultural domain and the natural one is a dangerous business that not Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 156 only prevents us to look broader and deeper to different ways to approach to nature, but this radical dualism thoroughly obscures the two-sided interrelationships which exist between people to whom the environment it is to be lived, perceived and above all provides the affordances (Gibson 1979), that influence and shape the way in which these societies adjusts and interacts with their environment. The importance of the moral values that most of the tribal societies like the Shuar attribute to the whole nature which they conceptualize beyond our rigid categories; must be "taken seriously", as Viveiros de Castro (2011) argues to conceive animism as an ontology whose complexity and seriousness is a matter of extrasensory interactions, indeed, he convincingly puts it: The anthropologist's idea of seriousness must not be tied to the hermeneutics of allegorical meanings or to the immediative illusion of discursive echolalia. Anthropologists must allow that "visions" are not beliefs, not consensual views, but rather worlds seen objectively: not worldviews, but worlds of vision (and not vision only-these are worlds perceivable by senses other than vision and are objects of extrasensory conception as well) (Ibid.: 133). As a result, I may argue that the relations that the Shuar have with their natural environment are far from being only visual perceptions of their world, instead their deep immersion in nature is attained by all their senses which are interrelated with the entities of the environment and their senses as well. Furthermore, an ecological anthropology must not neglect the non-passive role that nature plays in shaping the perceptions of the entities who are encompassed by it, in addition, dwelling in the rainforest means to be absorbed in a world where humans and non-humans walk, jump, fly and crawl Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 157 down the storms, the sunlight and the dark of the night which provide the conditions for life in a jungle where to live means interaction and socialization between the human and non-human spheres. Namely, both spheres are not radically separated by the cultural or natural illusory fences as Val Plumwood has argued regarding our Western dualism: Nature/culture dualism distorts the way we can represent agency in the land, obliging us to view it as either pure nature or as a cultural product, not nature at all, thus hyperseparating nature and culture and representing nature as an absence of the human. Hyperseparation and homogenization lead us to classify the land as pure nature or 'wilderness,' in ways that obscure its continuity with and dependency on culture, and erase the human stories interwoven with it, specially those of its indigenous people. On the other side, conceiving a place according to the opposite homogenized pole of culture has the same distorting result because nonhuman influences and creativities must be erased or reduced (2006: 141). Conversely, Shuar's conceptualizations of nature place the human domain in an ontological sphere which is not exclusive only to humans, indeed, non-humans are part in a reciprocal metaphysical intercommunication where humanity represents an elementary category through which all entities regardless their external and internal differences are intimately related by a primordial past. Hence, unlike a radical naturalism which puts a fence to hyper separate the cultural and natural domain and thereby it polarizes both spheres as though they were ontologically different; Shuar's metaphysics neither discriminate nor put a boundary among entities who are part of a natural environment whose spiritual energy is shared by them. The moral philosophical conceptions of nature of this cosmology have deep ecological implications Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 158 in challenging Western contemporary ecology which obscures most of the native's conceptualizations of nature giving room only to the rigid categories of science. For instance, about this issue the philosopher Arne Naess clearly writes: Many of those who emphasize the tremendous breadth of ecology tend, simultaneously, to limit it somewhat. They conceive of it as a natural science or use primarily examples characteristics of natural science. As long as one retains current concepts of nature instead of Spinoza's Natura or other broad, profound concepts of nature, the placement of ecology within the framework of natural sciences favors the shallow ecological movement (1989: 39). The shallowness of certain ecological movements stem from their own philosophical Western conceptions of nature which scientifically try to seize the natural environment as though it were a mass physically composed by molecules, nutrients and nature's beings whose conservation must be understood as a naturalization of an environment in which the relations with its human denizens are denied. Indeed, native's profound interactions with their environment are thoroughly obscured by the scientific precepts of ecology which give no room to the complex cosmological system of the natives which according to the words of Tzama: "It goes beyond science".4 Whereas a debate between two logics of nature is at stake here, I think that it is important to give room to Shuar's moral philosophical approaches to nature which during my fieldwork surprised me the most. Moreover, I will try to describe and analyze some rituals, myths and stories which in my opinion enclose a very profound moral message that teaches us how this society not only interact with nature but mostly respect it. 4. Conversation with Tzama, Mura, Tawasap community, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, 25 August 2018. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 159 Natemamu and kata the stone of fertilization One of the most important rituals undertaken by the Shuar is natemamu, namely, the consumption of natem5 by the communities held once a year. It is important to note that only the communities of Tawasap and Wawaim celebrate this ritual on January 5th and 6th the former and in the end of November the latter. It could be possible that the community of Yawintz does not celebrate this because of the nearby location to Tawasap and Mura which is the sacred place where this ritual is held each year, in fact, as Nawech has argued: "I think that the reason why here in Yawintz we do not celebrate the ritual is for the far away distance of the waterfalls".6 In this respect, unlike Tawasap which has a sacred place like Mura and Wawaim which has a hill where Nawech's father Sharimiat prepare the ritual and moreover the waterfalls are in the nearby; the nearest "twin" waterfalls are located almost 10 km away from Yawintz and therefore it is difficult to get there by foot. Unfortunately, I had not the opportunity to participate in the rituals owing to my departure from the field to Italy in the second week of November, however, the procedures of natemamu were described to me in Mura where a sacred circle in whose underground have been buried the ancestors of these people is the place where the ritual is held and in which men and women take part to be baptized by the power of kata7 or stone of fertilization. 5. A sacred plant also called ayahuasca (Banisteriopsis caapi), through which a decoction is prepared to attain the supernatural realm. 6. Conversation with Nawech, Yawintz community, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, 7 July 2018. 7. The word kata in shuar means penis, moreover, it is interesting to note that according to Tzama this stone has been handed down from generaOpen Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 160 This peculiar stone which has a form of a big penis is situated in the middle of the circle where is leaned on a piece of trunk near a mortar and pestle to grind tobacco and a pilche or tsapa.8 Furthermore, it seems that natemamu in Mura differs to other celebration of this ritual in the different communities, that is to say, because of the presence of kata this ritual acquires an interesting connotation which emphasizes the role of fertility, gender interrelations and the process of life which is sustained by the incorporation of natural elements that afford the interconnection between realms which foster a good biological and spiritual growth and reproduction of the entities involved. The words of Tzama are important to describe the interesting procedures of the ritual: Here in the circle men and women must sit down on kata to be baptized, then we give men tobacco that they must snuff and we shower the women with ground manioc. Thus, in this way men always will be men and women always will be women.9 It is worth noticing that in this ritual a special role is attributed to certain elements of nature such as the plants of tobacco and manioc and kata which according to the informants this stone encloses too much power. "That stone is extremely powerful"10 one day Sharian told me when he was visiting Mura to talk with his nephew Tzama. Moreover, tobacco is tion to generation and thereby he did not know exactly how much time it has been there. 8. Traditional receptacle made of the gourd of the mate tree (Crescentia cujete). 9. Conversation with Tzama, Mura, Tawasap community, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, 30 August 2018. 10. Conversation with Sharian, Mura, Tawasap community, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, 13 October 2018. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 161 conceived as a plant of male's virility and manioc as a plant of female's fertility whose power must be assimilated by men and women not only for their biological reproduction, but also for the emphasizing of their gender roles that foster the sociocultural continuity and division of labour of this society. Fig. 1. The ritual circle and "kata" the stone of fertilization. It might be said that there could be a connection between the reproduction of manioc by the intervention of women who beg Nunkui11 for her help in a kind of cooperation between the terrestrial realm and the chthonian realm that provide 11. Nunkui is a mythical being who provides to this society the growth and abundance of the staple crops. Nevertheless, women must respect certain ritual conditions like the chanting of anent or sacred chants in their gardens to beg to this supernatural being for the fertility of the soil and good growth of the tubers. For different accounts of the Jivaroan societies about Nunkui, see, Karsten (2000 [1935]: 112-119); Harner (1972: 70-76); Pelizzaro (1978); Brown (1986: 105-132) and Descola (1994: 192-220). Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 162 the conditions for a fertile soil and a good reproduction and growth of the tubers; and the fertility of women which depends on the assimilation of the fertilizing properties of manioc that has been obtained by women ritual contributions and reciprocal collaborations with Nunkui. Namely there is a cyclical process of reciprocal physical and metaphysical collaborative interactions which in the first case goes from a terrestrial human intervention to a chthonian non-human one, and in the second case from a chthonian non-human intervention to the human terrestrial one. What about the spiritual power of the big and heavy stone kata? This stone of fertilization ought to be understood as a mere physic inanimate object according to the abstract scientific representations of the world; or as a more profound entity whose power goes beyond the physical and detached perception of it? What anthropologists must do to take seriously a conception of an inanimate object that is beyond our way of understanding and approach to nature which are devoid of any profound conceptions of its agency or spirituality? I think that the problem here is our own perception of nature which is pervasively imbued by scientific radical abstractions of it, thus, to surmount this thorny fence that prevents us a broader and deeper view of the worlds of the others, we must challenge the stark naturalism which arbitrary removes us from the natural environment and its non-human denizens. "The whole is greater that the sum of its parts." (Naess 1995a: 241), this conception of the world is what Arne Naess calls gestalt ontology, namely, the spontaneous experiences of reality and intimate perceptions of concrete things that persons and other conscious beings have with the world; these Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 163 perceptions of the world are considered as more profound than those of abstract scientific representations of it (Ibid). In this sense, the profound spiritual perceptions of nature that the Shuar manifest in a ritual where a somewhat trivial stone is intimately connected with humans, could teach us that the perceptions and relations with this "inanimate" object transcend the brute physical condition of the stone, thereby, the scientific abstractions of nature conceive only certain aspects of it, i.e., the detached physical attributes of nature that obscure the intimate metaphysical relations with it. Furthermore, as Naess has argued to the impossibility of Western positivists anthropologists to understand the gestalts of the natives to whom a stone is more than a simple hard stone conceived by the former, thus, for the anthropologists would be an illogical absurdity to conceive an inert object as a spirit (1989: 61). In this respect, the philosopher convincingly puts it: European anthropologists did not often achieve an experience of the shared gestalts of foreign cultures. Natives were 'alogical'. Gestalt thought furnishes the key to communication between dissimilar cultures. Verbal deterioration of gestalts ('a stone is a stone!') implies deterioration of the culture. This is also true of our own culture (Ibid.: 61). It seems that for the Shuar living and non-living beings are profoundly interconnected beyond their own phisicalities, for instance, a stone that could appear as a simple stone by an outsider, could enclose a powerful essence that cannot be appreciated if one continues to be trapped in a naturalist prison whether it be culturalist or materialist which silences and denies nature's agency and the intimate perceptions of it. In this sense, as kata the stone of fertilization, the waterfalls Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 164 play an important spiritual role among this society, therefore I will describe an interesting ritual where this element of nature is approached respectfully and wisely for a profound connection with the supernatural. The imploring chants before the sacred waterfalls The Jivaro, people of the sacred waterfalls is the name of Michael Harner's book published in 1972, as we can note in the title the waterfalls appear to be a sacred place according to this society. Nevertheless, the book only shallowly explores the complex relations that the Shuar have with the waterfalls for their ritual activities, let alone their profound interactions with these sacred places which unfortunately nowadays are facing the harmful mechanistic logic of nature that Western naturalism has been promoting since its devastating immersion in the heart of the Amazon. Be that as it may, the waterfalls continue to be considered as sacred and important places where the encounter with the supernatural sphere can be attained, however, it seems that in the past the sacred aspects of the waterfalls were more emphasized than today, thus, this aspect is well described by Nawech who remembers an anecdote of his early childhood: I remember that when I was a child, my grandmother used to tell us that we needed to go to the waterfalls only for ritual purposes. For instance, when the boys went to bath on the waterfalls my grandmother used to say: "It will come a big storm! thanks to those guys who do not respect the waterfalls!12 12. Conversation with Nawech, Yawintz community, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, 13 July 2018. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 165 According to the informant the waterfalls must be approached carefully and with respect, in fact, these are regarded as pure places where one could receive the power of arutam13 respecting the ritual conditions and practices that this society undertakes in these spiritual places. It is important to note as Tzama perfectly explains that the purity and cleanness of sacred places such as the waterfalls are one of the most important elementary conditions for the arutam visions: Arutam does not appear in whichever place, he could only appear in clean and sacred places such as waterfalls and mountains, these places are our sacred temples. Only if you are worthy and have consumed sacred plants you can encounter him in these places.14 The comparison between sacred places and temples could help us to better understand the importance of these natural places among the Shuar. That is to say, as in a temple one must approach with vehemence to pray and worship a God or any powerful being; to approach to the waterfalls these people chant anent or sacred chants before the waterfalls because these natural places represent the door to encounter 13. According to most of the informants in the communities who continue to follow the ancestral religion, they consider arutam as the most powerful being or energy who can appear in visions, moreover is considered as a God, the father or creator of the Shuar and everything. Nevertheless, only the ones who have undertaken certain ritual procedures and have consumed sacred plants are worthy to receive its power. According to Harner (1962: 260-264, 1972: 135-143) arutam is the "ancient specter" soul that appear in visions, but only in special conditions like the ones described above. In my opinion, it could be possible that being arutam the most powerful entity, was not difficult for the Shuar to more or less equate it to a kind of God, but not the Christian God of course. 14. Conversation with Tzama, Tawasap community, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, 18 October 2018. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 166 arutam as long as one has respected the ritual procedures to be intimate engaged with the supernatural sphere. At this point I will describe an interesting ritual activity that I had the opportunity to attend in the ayahuasca waterfall which is situated roughly 1 hour by foot from the Wawaim community.15 This was a very exciting but tiring trip that we undertook from Yawintz to Wawaim, moreover, leaving aside the time spent on the pickup to cross the harsh and gravelly paths of the Amazon to reach Nawech's father community. When me and Nawech's family arrived at Wawaim, we needed to go by foot on a muddy and difficult terrain to reach the hill in which Sharimiat was waiting us to bring us to the Ayahuasca waterfall where he intended to undertake the ritual. After we have taking a very good lunch made of fish, meat and manioc, that is to say, the traditional ayampaco16 and the classic manioc beer nijamanchi or chicha; we prepared ourselves to walk through the deep jungle to finally arrived on the astounding waterfall where Sharimiat, who had brought a pot of tobacco began to chant the sacred anent before the waterfall and its persisting "sound of rushing water" (Harner 1968), the translation of the chant is described as follows: I am begging you Grandfather17 Crying Suffering 15. This ritual took place in the ayahuasca waterfall, Wawaim community, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, 1 September 2018. 16. Traditional Shuar dish made of fish, onion, spices and cover with a leaf of a plant called bijao. 17. It is worth noting as has been addressed in the chant, that in Shuar the word apachiru that means grandfather, is interchangeable to the word arutam. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 167 Imploring Please come to the waterfalls18 (repeat several times) Although Sharimiat is 90 years old, nonetheless, his voice did not break during the chanting of this anent whose repetition was accompanied by the suffering tone of his voice which seemed a sentimental melodious begging to arutam whose presence is closely connected to the waterfalls. Furthermore, after the conclusion of the chant a row made of boys, Nawech and his family in which I included myself was formed before the waterfall where Sharimiat one by one gave tobacco to be snuffed. After everybody had snuffed tobacco, Nawech wielding a lance began to undertake the ritual greeting anemamu19 towards the rushing water of the waterfall to obtain the power of arutam who had been summoned. It is worth noticing that in this case only tobacco was used to undertake the ritual and therefore must be emphasized that the consumption of natem or maikiua20 are considered better to encounter arutam in visions, however, this must not be considered a problem for the appreciation of the procedures of the ritual in which the profound relations that this society has with this element of nature is at stake. 18. Anent chanted by Sharimiat in the Ayahuasca waterfall, Wawaim community, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, 1 September 2018. 19. Anemamu is a ritual greeting in which a couple of men talk each other with a loudly voice wielding a lance in a somewhat menacing way. In the past the Shuar used this greeting when a man for the first time met other man and therefore wanted to know who he was or if he was not an enemy. For a detailed description of this ritual greeting, see, Karsten (2000 [1935]: 219-222). 20. A sacred plant (Brugmansia arborea) which is considered the most powerful to reach the desired arutam's vision quests. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 168 Fig. 2. Sharimiat chanting before the Ayahuasca waterfall. The subtle procedures of this ritual might show us that a waterfall which for an outsider may be a place for sightseeing or even for a fresh bath in its calm waters or a somewhat violent shower under the rushing water; for this society is a sacred place where its profound and sensible attributes are far from being understood by a shallow naturalist or scientific representations of it, in fact, Shuar's phenomenological perceptions of a waterfall ought to be understood as a complex interrelations of sensible qualities where different feelings decoded by the senses grasp the deep engagement that they have with this natural element. In this sense, as Naess puts it: Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 169 "A joyful experience of nature is partially dependent upon a conscious or unconscious development of a sensitivity for qualities" (1989: 51). In fact, this society experiences its engagement with the waterfalls as manifold profound sentiments that go from feelings of suffering and pain during the chants to feelings of joy and strength when arutam's power has been obtained. Fig. 3 Nawech during the ritual One might say that this profound engagement with nature which emphasizes the spiritual dimension of it is in stark contrast with the Western mechanic logic of nature in which the exclusive anthropocentric domain of humans denies any Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 170 non-human's intentionality and therefore coercively silences its metaphysical dimension. This aspect is emphasized by Arntzen who rightly points out: Human's relationship to the land as spiritual and meaningful in itself is not a historical stage that has been overcome in the Western tradition, but a condition of human's relating to the world that this tradition has largely suppressed (2003: 45). The suppression of the profound spiritual and moral values regarding the natural environment obliges us to rethink our own concepts of nature which are pervasively permeated by the Western "rational" logic whose rooted values impose to the natures of the others the commoditization and destruction of their own being in their world. In addition, the moral Shuar's approach to nature may not be considered only as a daily life conception, but as the next example will show us, it seems that this is ontologically rooted and conditioned since mythical times. The noble jaguar in the deep of the Tayos caves In my opinion the myth that I will discuss here has a deep moral connotation regarding the relations that this society has with one of the most feared and appreciated but unfortunately in danger of extinction animals. Namely, the jaguar represents the mighty predatory power of the jungle, moreover, his image is one of the most important arutam's visions by which the Shuar acquire this powerful source of spiritual energy. Thus, one day when I asked to Nawech about the famous Tayos caves21 in which in the past the Shuar used to go there to hunt the tayos birds (Steatornis caripensis) much 21. Tayos caves are located in Morona Santiago province. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 171 appreciated for their meat and their bones that were used for making ornaments (see, Karsten 2000 [1935]: 66-67 and Stirling 1938: 110); he began to remind his youth in the military service when during a mission where he had to build paths through the jungle and control the border near Peru; he visited a Shuar's community who according to him used to live in traditional way, i.e., they were barefoot and dressed traditional clothes. Moreover, he asked to them how to get to the Tayos caves and therefore they told him the right direction to arrive there, thus, when he arrived near the caves he saw two very big holes where he and his companions threw some stalks inside and as a result a lot of tayos birds came out like bats.22 After Nawech finished to recount his adventures in the military service, he also remembered a myth about these caves that his grandfather and father used to narrate: In olden times there were tayos birds in abundance, mostly the small ones were more appreciated for their fatty meat. One day a group of persons went to hunt these birds, so, they tied a liana with some stalks which functioned like a ladder to climb down in the deep of the caves. Among the group of persons there was a man who was hated by the others, thus, when all of them were inside the deep of the caves they hunted a lot of tayos and filled all their changuinas (bags) with them. All the group with his filled bags began to climb up the liana leaving the hated man down on the cave, at one point when they arrived up they cut the liana and the poor man remained alone in the deep of the cave. Given that the group had abandoned him alone, this shuar did not know how to do to go out the dark cave, how could he climb such a height which was very rocky? So, this man all the time was crying desperately because he could do nothing inside there. Moreover, it passed a lot of time maybe months or even years since this man had been left inside the cave, 22. Conversation with Nawech, Yawintz community, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, 27 October 2018. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 172 thus, the tayos used to fly above the man and pooped on his head, then given that the tayos pooped too much his head had peeled! One day the man had fell asleep on the sand of the cave, then a jaguar appeared to him in a dream and said to him: "hi brother! when I will go shouting, you must touch and follow the footprints that I leave! you must follow me because I will go out in a river which is the exit!" so, when he woke up and heard the jaguar's voice: "hmm! hmm! hmm! hmm! hmm! hmm!" then he touched the sand and found the jaguar's footprints, therefore the tired, naked and dirty man began to walk through the dark paths of the cave touching and following the footprints. At one point, after a very long walk the jaguar's voice disappeared! thus, he arrived in a place where it seemed that there was a light which crossed a river "Guangos" in fact, even today people still believe that this is the exit of the cave which ends in the river! Then given that he saw this light he dived in the water and went out in a big pond where he swam a lot to cross to the other side to finally see the jungle, moreover he arrived just in the place where he used to go hunting. Then he arrived at home alive but very tired and with his head peeled due to the very long time in which he stayed inside the cave. At his home his relatives thought that he had died, thus, when they saw him after all of this time they began to cry and organized a big celebration with a lot of dancing and food in honour of his return. This sad myth teaches us how selfish, envious and evil can be the people, look how these persons left alone this man in the cave! they had no compassion of him! from this myth people's envy and selfishness came.23 It is important to emphasize that the moral message that this myth conveys regards the selfishness and evilness of certain people who led themselves by hatred without no feelings of compassion to their fellows. Furthermore, the loneliness and desperation of the man to find a way to go out from this dark cave were finally relieved by a dream in which a non-human be23. Conversation with Nawech, Yawintz community, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, 27 October 2018. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 173 ing whose kindness and mercy had helped him to escape from his doomed fate. Indeed, the jaguar whose power represents the most powerful arutam's energy or even the dangerous power of a shaman who can transform in this fierce and predator animal; was the only entity who in this myth saved the dying man to escape from the deep of the Tayos caves. "I believe that mythology, more than anything else, makes it possible to illustrate such objectified thought and to provide empirical proof of its reality" (Lévi-Strauss 1969: 11). In this sense, the proof of the reality of this myth stems from the empirical condition of the jaguar of being an entity whose supernatural power can be understood not as a metaphorical projection of its power that this society undertakes in visions, but as an ontological relation with this entity whose power is spiritually and morally assimilated during the visions or dreams in the case of the myth. Thus, as in the myth the man followed the footprints and voice of the jaguar who led him to the exit of the cave and thereby helped and gave him the force to finally arrive to the jungle and encounter his family; in Shuar's post mythical life, the image and voice of this animal in visions function as the metaphysical conditions for the configuration of the paths that these people will follow during their lives. Then one might say that nature's beings are not only physical entities whose importance depend on humans' classifications of them, to the contrary, non-human beings are deeply immersed in the worlds of humans as the latter are deeply immersed in the worlds of the former. In this sense, according to Naess gestalt ontology as an intimate perception of nature considers "so-called mythic thought is gestalt thought" (1989: 61), in addition, he claims: "If the gestalts rather than their fragments are identified as the Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 174 contents of reality, mythic thought then characterises contents which are largely unavailable in our culture" (Ibid.). That is to say, these contents are the complex spiritual dimensions of the Shuar's mythic thought and cosmology in which profound conceptualizations of nature permit the reciprocal concatenations between humans and non-humans in their natural environment. Moreover, the next peculiar story seems to enclose a deep eco philosophical message regarding the protection of the Amazon rainforest. Nujank: the guardian of the Amazon rainforest One might say that when we talk about Western influence in the Amazon, probably the first thing that comes to our mind is colonialism and its devastating consequences to the natural environment and its denizens. Fortunately, not all the people from the West have embraced the harmful logic of nature by which this is treated as a mean for exploitation to attain the never-ending development of civilization. In this sense, the story that I will narrate here was told to me by Tzama one evening in Mura where the darkness of the hut was only illuminated by a candle and therefore different kind of insects and a dog whose name is Simba were roaming around it accompanying us all the time. According to the informant the events of this story occurred roughly 100 or 150 years ago in the Shuar's territories where a married couple of Europeans arrived in the jungle. The woman was pregnant, thereby she had given birth a child in the middle of the jungle where there was a great storm which made the waters of the rivers rise24: 24. Conversation with Tzama, Mura, Tawasap community, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, 12 August 2018. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 175 This great current is called "Nujank" and for this reason the tribal leader of the community named the child Nujank. When he was born his umbilical cord was cut and buried in the earth because for each umbilical cord of a child born a new tree would grow according to the ancestral traditions. Then the tribal leader said to the couple that it is better that they return to their home with their child because the dream had come to an end. When Nujank grew up and became a young man, he wanted to know where he was born, thereby he asked to his parents about his story when he was a small child. Then his mother told him the truth and hence he packed up his luggage and went in the deep jungle to discover what had grown from his navel. When he arrived in the community he met a very old man and asked to him: "where I was born? what happened to my navel?" and the old men said to him: "you need to cross that small river and on the other side you will find a very big white tree, this is the tree of your navel!" then Nujank was very happy and crossed to the other side of the river and finally found a very beautiful big tree. He was so excited that he embraced the tree and said to him: "you are my brother!" thus, he looked up and saw that all the trees were embraced by their branches. So, in looking up all these similar trees embraced, he became so excited and began to cry, thereby he said: "now all the trees are the brothers of my brother, for this reason I will call them my brothers" Then he came back to the community and said to the old man: "what can I do to protect these trees?" and the old man said to him: "go to the city and tell to the white men to stop eating and destroying nature, tell to them to stop felling the trees because to fell a tree is like felling the children's navel who are not yet born, is like killing them from the inside, that is, for each tree that they are felling they are killing the lives of the future generations" Thus, Nujank was so astonished that he went to the city to protect the Amazon rainforest and fight against the powerful companies and people that were destroying it. At one point, the police men or militaries attacked him, but while he was still alive he gave to the man that severely wounded him a letter that he had on his pocket. Before he died he said to this man: "please! take this letter to this community" so, the man felt so bad that they had killed a man who was unarmed and only fought for the protection of the forest, thereby he took the Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 176 letter and travelled to the community to give it. In the letter the final words of Nujank said: "thank you for teaching me the value of the trees, I will spend my life in protecting the Amazon rainforest and if I die will be for this reason" This is what our grandfathers used to narrate about the story of Nujank.25 Fig. 4. The trees of the rainforest. It is important to note how a different, respectful and sustainable logic of nature could be embraced by Western people as in the case of Nujank who understood well the meaningful and profound conception of the forest whose protection and conservation depend whether on the people who dwell with25. Conversation with Tzama, Mura, Tawasap community, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, 12 August 2018. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 177 in it and on the people, who understand its importance for the sustaining of life. Moreover, even if he grew up somewhere in Europe where the predatory naturalist approach to nature was born and moreover took more force during the industrial revolution and colonialism; Nujank was very curious to know where he was born and what happened to his navel which had been buried in the earth as the traditional Shuar's practice. Thus, he prepared himself for a long trip to the place where he was born and where he would find a big tree that after all this time had been growing from the earth in which his navel had been buried. It is worth noticing that the traditional practice of burying the umbilical cord in the earth is still undertaken among the contemporary Shuar though in a less degree than in the past. For instance, according to Tzama: "In the Tawasap community we still cut the umbilical cord of new-borns and buries it in the earth mostly in the ant holes where a new tree will grow".26 Furthermore, contrary to the Achuar who bury the placenta instead of the umbilical cord and therefore consider the former as a house in which the soul of the deceased could re-occupy (Descola 1994: 121); the Desana of eastern Colombian Amazon though they bury both27 (Reichel-Dolmatoff 1971: 140), nonetheless, it seems that like the Shuar they attribute 26. Conversation with Tzama, Mura, Tawasap community, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, 29 August 2018. 27. It is interesting to note that according to Karsten's observations among the Shuar; both the umbilical cord and the placenta are buried in the earth lest that the dogs or other animals could eat them and thereby could be harmful for the child's life (2000 [1935]: 180). Nevertheless, it seems that he did not find any cosmological attribution to the placenta or umbilical cord. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 178 special symbolic and metaphysical characteristics to the umbilical cord. In this respect, Reichel-Dolmatoff writes about the connection that the umbilical cord has with Ahpikondía which is for the Desana a kind of paradise: Primordial placenta was united by an umbilical cord to Ahpikondía, and this idea is expressed even in current belief according to which all human beings are connected during their lives by means of an umbilical cord running invisibly through the rivers and liking the individual to Ahpikondía (1971: 57). Interestingly even if the Shuar do not endow to the placenta any cosmological or mythological attributes; they nonetheless conceive the umbilical cord as a connection between the earthly life of human beings and the primordial celestial life in which both realms were connected by the liana28 and thereby all entities were intercommunicated and interconnected. "With the umbilical cord all of us are connected with the cosmos"29 one day Tzama told me. Thus, it seems that the association between the umbilical cord and the trees which grow from the earth where the former has been buried; goes beyond any symbolic representation which tries to depict the mythical connection between the earth and the sky. In fact, I think that the connection between these spheres is ontologically related and represented by the elements of nature which try to bridge the gap between the realms whose communication had been interrupted by the misdeeds of primordial times. The interconnection between these elements may be described as follows: 28. In mythical times the earth and the sky were connected by a vine through which all entities could communicate. For a description of the myth see, Karsten (2000 [1935]: 370-371) and Descola (1994: 69). 29. Conversation with Tzama, Mura, Tawasap community, Morona Santiago, Ecuador, 3 September 2018. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 179 Fig. 5. Interconnection of the elements of nature for the communication between the spheres. In (fig. 5) we can see how different elements of nature take part in human and non-human relations according to the Shuar's cosmological system which emphasizes the communication between the spheres even in post mythic times. For instance, on the left side of the figure we can see the primordial liana who was the essential condition for the full communication between beings, indeed, when this was cut off the connection between the celestial realm and the earthly one was interrupted. Nevertheless, during post mythic life the Shuar can surmount this interruption by the consumption of natem or the sacred liana located in the middle of the figure, however, this liana can only provide a partial communication between humans and non-human beings, thereby is less effective than the primordial one. The parallel between the Shuar and the Barasana of eastern Colombia is striking regarding the Banisteriopsis caapi vine and its homology with the umbilical cord for the connection with primordial times. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 180 For instance, according to Christine Hugh-Jones: Indians do actually say that the river system of the earth is a yagé vine connecting longhouse communities to the ancestral east in the same way as an umbilical cord: they say that when the vine is cut for use, the scar this leaves is a navel (1979: 230). Moreover, it is worthy to note that the umbilical cord and the tree located on the right side can be understood as the cyclical intercommunication that human beings have with the cosmos during their physical existence; though this communication is constant, this goes beyond the concrete representations of human and non-human communication of the other two elements. The story of Nujank describes very well the cosmological and moral connotations of the trees which grow from the earth where the umbilical cord had been buried, namely when Nujank looked up to the sky he could appreciate how a big tree had grown from his umbilical cord and which he had named his brother; was embraced with all similar trees, thereby he called all these trees his brothers. Thus, he fulfilled his destiny to protect the forest from the predatory values of its own culture that he had rejected and hence he had embraced the deep spiritual values which had been taught to him by the so-called primitives of the jungle. Moreover, the profound moral message that Nujank's story tries to convey, is that nonetheless he had died by the hands of the people who coercively supressed nature's voice and rights, that is to say, imposing the harmful predatory logic of civilization over the natural environment of the others; his fight to protect the Amazon rainforest might be considered as a rethinking of our own noxious logic to approach to nature and the emOpen Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 181 brace of a more sustainable, moral and spiritual approach to it which really cares about the future generations and the continuity of all nature's beings lives. Some reflections from the lungs of the world During my fieldwork in the Amazon jungle, many things came to my mind regarding our life in the metropolis and the hyper consumerist and polluting societies in which we are forced to live. When I say that we are forced, I am intending that it is almost impossible to make a radical change in our paths of progress and even survival that we are used to follow in a world where it seems that there is no room to other possible worlds. Be that as it may, even Pope Francis in many of his discourses has strongly restated the failure of the Western mode of development and his struggle to awake the masses and hence to rethink to our own Western values. I think that it is not enough to rethink about our rooted cosmologies, but nonetheless it is the first step to have a deeper and broader view in other possible worlds, that is, the tools of ethnographic research could help a lot to plunge into these different worlds and therefore being immersed in other realities in which our ontological categories are from being universal and useful to understand what is beyond our physical and mechanical world and its realities. Living among the Shuar, I could realize that our lives in the metropolis are guided by an intolerant clock which does not accept any delay in the mechanic paths of our destiny, that is, our physical life in the universe is subjected by the seeming transcendental rules of the market which give no room to different approaches to the world or ways of conceptualizing Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 182 it that could undermine the illusory democracy which hides the oppressing modern apparatus of the states. It seems that if we try to break the chains which are suffocating the planet and its denizens; a strong sense of loneliness will overwhelm our existence segregating our human condition into a jail in which the other species are forced to stay. This sense of segregation is not only physically perpetuated given that our presence is seen as something weird, fool or even at the limits of madness because we are rejecting the whole cosmological Western precepts which control the entire world, likewise, this segregation is also spiritually perpetuated because our existence is only considered in isolation with the whole world and its entities who share a nature that has been destroyed by the same logic which forces to put ourselves as the only rulers of what seems to be outside us. The dichotomization of body and spirit is not dissolved by a more profound conception of our existence, instead this is disintegrated by an abstract force which is represented in the institutions that we try to promote or even die for them. In fact, what we follow in our lives are the models that have been written to guide our existence to the paths of progress in which only "humans" may unequally partake the pieces or even micro pieces of what has been tamed and exploited for the only sake of the few who decide what is the "good" to be blindly followed. Perhaps the reader may ask what these words have to do with the conclusion of this article? What do I try to convey in this conclusion? It is worth it a moral commitment to defy our own apparently rooted values? In my humble opinion, what I intended to show throughout these pages is that a thoroughly different world exists in a natural environment Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 183 which is resisting the cannibalistic logic of the moderns, thus, the anthropomorphic nature of the Shuar challenges our seeming scientific logic of what it seems to be nature to us, thereby it seems that a trivial perception of what is beyond its physical features does not do justice to the profound interactions that a society has with non-humans in a complex natural environment which encloses different realities that are ontologically shared by its denizens. Furthermore, the different realities in which the Shuar are immersed ought to be considered as concatenations between ontological levels and non-human entities that provide the meaningful paths of life in the world and cosmos. Hence, for this society the physical realities of life must not be regarded as false or a lie, and thereby only the supernatural sphere must be considered as the real representation of the world (Harner 1972: 134).30 In fact, as we could see throughout the pages of this work, for the contemporary Shuar both realties are connected, namely one could not attain the supernatural sphere without follow certain rules and restrictions in the physical sphere, in addition, what one could see in a vision represent a metaphysical reality which its representation derives from the physical world. In this sense, both realties are interconnected by the ontological juxtaposition and jump of entities which travel between different spheres of reality in a constant external and internal transmutation. I think that this conceptualization of the world could allow us to rethink about the rigid categories which guide our existence in the universe, indeed, 30. It is worth noting that Harner's interpretations of the Shuar's conceptions of the realities was also questioned by Descola (1994: 100). Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 184 this society continues to resist the persisting influence of Western values that destroyed their natural environment and therefore fostered the loss of most of their traditional way of life. Nevertheless, the Shuar struggle for their profound engagement with nature that provides to them a sphere where the physical life of humans and non-humans can be maintained, moreover, is in this sphere that a communication with the supernatural is possible, i.e., in post mythic times a deep relation with nature is the only way to analogically attain the communication of primordial times. In this respect, following the words of Eduardo Khon, the relations that humans have with non-human beings in the different spheres of reality: "Can tell us about how that which lies "beyond" the human also sustains us an makes us the beings we are and those we might become" (2013: 221). In this sense, according to the Shuar what lies beyond the human not only sustain their physical lives in their environment, but non-human entities with their intentionalities help and guide the somewhat unstable human condition to metaphysically build its destiny and hence to physically reproduce what has been revealed during the intimate encounter between the permeable ontological spheres. From the lungs of the world we can better appreciate what is the meaning of life in a spiritual and profound sense, that is to say, our own existence depends and it is guided by a powerful source of energy that the natural environment encloses, moreover, even if one may argue that nature is separated from us and hence it is an independent domain in which the natural laws reign; how can we explain the Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 185 relations that we have with it even in the plights of climate change and natural disasters which we are facing nowadays? So, it seems that the Western logic of nature which tries to obscure its complexity and makes the other worlds invisible or savage to our eyes, does not take into account the force which is beyond its perception or perhaps tries to ignore it. However, nature gives us the possibility to look for other ways to approach to it, in fact, since the beginning of humankind we could choose the paths to be related with it and therefore adapt ourselves not in a passive medium in which we imprinted our superiority among the other entities; but in a sphere where humans are only a part of a more complex concatenations of beings who share a natural environment which is beyond its physicality. In this sense, Shuar's moral philosophy of nature could teach us that an "anthropology beyond the human" (Kohn 2013) is not only possible to think, but it is highly necessary to promote for a better valorisation of more sustainable ecological approaches to nature which ensure the full richness and diversity of life-forms on the earth (Naess 1995c: 464) both humans and non-humans. At this point, one might question my argument by which these complex and profound interactions with the natural environment could be considered as a moral philosophy and a more sustainable and spiritual way to approach to nature. In addition, one might think that I am trying to idealize or even essentialize Shuar's conceptualizations of their relations with non-humans, hence, as much as utopic my argument might seem I think that our Western ethnocentrism does not permit to take serious other possible Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 186 relations with the non-human kingdom that could prevent the collapse of the entire ecosystem in which our rationalities are not capable to grasp the different dimensions of what we call simply nature. Moreover, there is a big difference between a logic of nature that has been coercively imposed and a logic that has been passively adopted without resistance. For instance, in one article Descola (2005: 33) has argued that in the mid-seventies he had the opportunity to give several lectures to the leaders of the Shuar Federation (FICSH) to warn them of the harmful consequences to the environment that the massive program of cattle-ranching launched by the Federation years before could cause. Moreover, it seems that the Shuar proceeded with the program until they finally realized that the forest began to disappear, and the soil were irreversible damaged. Thus, the French anthropologists concluded that the Shuar did not avail to their profound knowledge of the environment which has been build up generation after generation given that this knowledge was mainly practical, non-reflexive, non-objectifiable, and thus non-applicable to new contexts where it might have proven useful (Ibid.). Furthermore, even if Descola's conclusion could seem plausible in a context in which the Western market values have been apparently assimilated by the Shuar; I think that the assimilation of these values passed through a process of imposition in which a predatory logic of nature had been masked by the deceiving modern progress which could have seemed attractive to the Shuar who wanted to join the institutions of the State and thus increase their possibility of being heard by the latter to foster their rights. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 187 Indeed, I think that it is not that they knowledge is only practical and non-reflexive, but this is reflexive inasmuch their conception of being in the environment does not encounter other conceptions which are part of other systems of rationalities that conceive the natural environment as a segregated commodity. For instance, is not the same to throw away in the jungle a bag made of fibres and a bag made of plastic, that is, the first one is produced by the Shuar that know very well its materials which are obtained from nature with no industrial intervention; but the things are way different with the plastic bag which is made by heavy technological interventions in nature that extract a natural resource that had been underground for millennia, hence, when the Shuar for the first time saw a plastic bag they did not realize what was behind the apparent innocuous plastic which has been one of the many causes for the destruction of the Amazon rainforest. One may say that if it were for the Shuar and for other Amazonian societies, the oil would still be underground, and a great part of the rainforest would be much less destroyed and probably the planet would be much less polluted. In fact, one cannot deny in this case how harmful can be a radical different approach to nature when is imposed into the worlds of the others in which the relation with nature is not an economic one but a cosmic one. Indeed, as Naess has argued that most of the approaches to nature in the world could be compatible with nature, namely, only the Western approaches promoted by industrialized countries are against it (1995b: 398), thus, the only thing that remain to ask is which logic is wrong according to nature? Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 188 References Århem, K. 1990. "Ecosofía makuna." In Correa, F. ed. La selva humanizada: ecología alternativa en el trópico húmedo colombiano. Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología. 106-126. Århem, K. 1996. "The Cosmic Food Web: Human-nature relatedness in the Northwest Amazon." In Descola, P. and Gísli, P. eds. Nature and society: Anthropological perspectives. London/New York: Routledge. 185-204. Arntzen, S. 1999. "Is Presocratic Philosophy of Nature a Source of ManNature Dualism?" In Boudouris, K. and Kalimtzis, K. eds. Philosophy and Ecology. Vol. II. Athens: Ionia Publications. 22-31. Arntzen, S. 2003. Cultural Landscape and Approaches to Nature – Ecophilosophical Perspectives. Norway: Telemark University Collage. Brown, M. 1986. Tsewa's gift: magic and meaning in an Amazonian society. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press. Descola, P. 1992. "Societies of nature and the nature of society." In Kuper, A. ed. Conceptualizing societies. London: Routledge. 107-126. Descola, P. 1994. In the Society of Nature: A native ecology in Amazonia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Descola, P. 1996. "Constructing natures: Symbolic ecology and social practice." In Descola, P. and Gísli, P. eds. Nature and society: Anthropological perspectives. London/New York: Routledge. 82-102. Descola, P. 2005. "Ecology and Cosmological Analysis." In Surrales, A. and Hierro, G.P. eds. The Land Within: Indigenous Territory and the Perception of Environment. Denmark: IWGIA. 22-35. Gibson, J. 1979. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Harner, M. 1968. "The Sound of Rushing Water." Natural History 77/6: 28-33; 60-61. Harner, M. 1972. The Jivaro, people of the sacred waterfalls. Garden City: Doubleday, Natural History Press. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 189 Hugh-Jones, C. 1979. From the Milk River: Spatial and Temporal Processes in Northwest Amazonia. New York: Cambridge University Press. Ingold, T. 1996. "The optimal forager and economic man." In Descola, P. and Gísli, P. eds. Nature and society: Anthropological perspectives. London/ New York: Routledge. 25-44. Karsten, R. 2000 [1935]. La vida y la cultura de los Shuar. Quito: Abya-Yala. Kohn, E. 2013. How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology Beyond the Human. Berkeley: University of California Press. Lévi-Strauss, C. 1969 The Raw and the Cooked. New York: Harper & Row. Manes, C. 1995. "Nature and Silence." In Oehlschlager, M. ed. Postmodern Environmental Ethics. Albany: State University of New York Press. Naess, A. 1989. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. Naess, A. 1995a. "Ecosophy and Gestalt Ontology." In Sessions, G. ed. Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First Century. Boston/London: Shambhala. 240-245. Naess, A. 1995b. "The Third World, Wilderness, and Deep Ecology." In Sessions, G. ed. Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First Century. Boston/ London: Shambhala. 397-408. Naess, A. 1995c. "Deep Ecology for the Twenty-Second Century." In Sessions, G. ed. Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First Century. Boston/ London: Shambhala. 463-468. Pelizzaro, S. 1978. Nunkui. Sucua (Ecuador): Centro de documentación e investigación cultural shuar, Mundo shuar, Series F, No 8. Plumwood, V. 2006. "The concept of a cultural landscape." Ethics and the Environment 11/2: 115-150. Rappaport, R. 1979. Ecology, Meaning and Religion. Berkeley: North Atlantic Books. Rappaport, R. 2000 [1968]. Pig for the Ancestors: Ritual in the Ecology of a New Guinea People. Long Grove, Illinois: Waveland Press, Inc. Open Journal of Humanities, 1 (2019) issn 2612-6966 190 Reichel-Dolmatoff, G. 1971. Amazonian Cosmos: The Sexual and Religious Symbolism of the Tukano Indians. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Reichel-Dolmatoff, G. 1976. "Cosmology as ecological analysis: a view from the rain forest." Man 2/3: 307-318. Rosset, C. 1973. L'anti-nature: Eléments pour une Philosophie Tragique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Spinoza, B. 1910. Ethics. London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. Stirling, M. 1938. Historical and ethnographical material on the Jivaro Indians. Smithsonian Institution Bureau of American Ethnology, Bulletin 117. Washington. Taylor, A.-C. 2001. "Wives, Pets, and Affines: Marriage among the Jivaro." In Rival, L. and Whitehead, N. eds. Beyond the Visible and the Material: The Amerindianization of Society in the Work of Peter Rivière. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 45-56. Tilley, C. 1994. A Phenomenology of Landscape. Places, Paths and Monuments. Oxford: Berg Publishers. Viveiros de Castro, E. 2011. "Zeno and the Art of Anthropology: Of Lies, Beliefs, Paradoxes, and Other Truths." Common Knowledge 17/1: 128-145.

International Journal of Robotics and Automation (IJRA) Vol. 4, No. 1, March 2015, pp. 63~72 ISSN: 2089-4856  63 Journal homepage: http://iaesjournal.com/online/index.php/IJRA Making Humanoid Robots More Acceptable Based on the Study of Robot Characters in Animation Fatemeh Maleki*, Zeinab Farhoudi** * Departement of Animation, Tehra Art University, Tehran, Iran ** Departement of Computer Engeniering, Science and Research Branch of Azad University, Tehran, Iran Article Info ABSTRACT Article history: Received Jun 7, 2014 Revised Sep 7, 2014 Accepted Oct 2, 2014 In this paper we take an approach in Humanoid Robots are not considered as robots who resembles human beings in a realistic way of appearance and act but as robots who act and react like human that make them more believable by people. Regarding this approach we will study robot characters in animation movies and discuss what makes some of them to be accepted just like a moving body and what makes some other robot characters to be believable as a living human. The goal of this paper is to create a rule set that describes friendly, socially acceptable, kind, cute... robots and in this study we will review example robots in popular animated movies. The extracted rules and features can be used for making real robots more acceptable. Keyword: animation characteristic emotional humanoid social Robots Copyright © 2015 Institute of Advanced Engineering and Science. All rights reserved. Corresponding Author: Fatemeh Maleki Tehra Art University and Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran Email: [email protected] 1. INTRODUCTION Walt Disney says, "When people laugh at Mickey Mouse, it's because he's so human; and that is the secret of his popularity." Although the characters in any animation could be objects, toys, plants, or animals, but most of the time, regarding the story, they are not themselves but considered as a humans to audience's conception. Mickey Mouse is not a mouse but a human with tail, big ears and mouse-like face. Besides to these facts about identity of characters, a character has a face of object, animal, human, etc. If we focus on robot characters in animation movies sometimes they are considered as moving objects without any feelings but some other even including robots without humanoid faces and bodies, show emotions and react in a way that their audience believe them as a characters being familiar with for years [1-9]. In 2012, Disney lab developed a humanoid robot which has the capability of playing catch and juggling (Disney Research). Besides the scientific and engineering aspects of the robot such as artificial intelligence, face detection and mechanics, it has also interesting animations after failure and missed catches such as a shoulder shrug, shaking the head, and looking down [1]. This animation gives some characteristics to it (Figure 1).  ISSN: 2089-4856 IJRA Vol. 4, No. 1, March 2015 : 63 – 72 64 Figure 1: The juggling robot Russel and Norvig utter four possible goals to pursue in artificial intelligence: 1) Systems that think like humans. 2) Systems that think rationally. 3) Systems that act like humans 4) Systems that act rationally [2]. To make a humanoid robot may not necessary mean to make a perfect and realistic robot: perfect in acts perfect in face, and perfect in emotional faces. Not being perfect makes it more possible to be different among others and that is what exists between human beings and forms the difference, characteristics and identity. Some features can be defined, and point is to decrease and increase some features in different robots to give them identity and make them more accepted by people. Although the shape and mechanics of motion is a matter but more is the acts and reactions. Considering the animation Gagarin (1961) or the movie I, Robot (2004), all the caterpillars look alike and all the robots has the same appearance, but different acts and reactions of the main characters make them accepted as more look alike human. The how's of implementation of this differences can be discussed in technical topics, there could be many ways such as assigning a factor to some features or assigning factors to learning aspects that can be set for each robot specifically. To find out what can help toward the goal of making believable robots and extract the rules for design,act and emotional reaction we will study famous robot characters in some long animation movies including: Robots (2005), WALL-E (2008), Megamind (2010), The Incredibles (2004), Pinocchio3000 (2004), Meet the Robinsons (2007), 9 (2009), Coraline (2009), Treasure planet (2002), Jimmy Neutron: Boy Genius (2001), Astroboy(2009), Iron Giant (1999), Castle in The Sky (1986). This study can be useful in social and emotional robot study fields, and also can be used in helping children diagnosed with autism as " Children diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorders can find communication with others difficult. However, their relationship with machines is another story completely. Because of predictability and reduced external stimuli to process, technology often attracts children with autism. They find computers and other technological devices comforting, motivating, and engaging when it comes to areas like social interaction and communication." (Beyond.com) Dr Karen Guldberg, from the University of Birmingham's School of Education's Autism Centre for Education and Research hopes they're right. She was quoted in The Daily Mail as saying, "We have been looking at how technology can support pupils with autism to communicate more effectively." She adds, "Pupils and teachers are experimenting with the robots and other technologies in a developmental way and they are showing significant benefits for the classroom." (Beyond.com) We will study robots in animation, some even may not be realistic but accepted as a friendly character, to export ways for making emotional and social robots. Considering all realistic characters animated with motion capture, sometimes they have gain less success due to suffering from a theory called The Uncanny Valley proposed in 1970 by Masahiro Mori [4]: He envisioned people's reactions to robots that looked and acted almost human. In particular, he hypothesized that a person's response to a humanlike robot would abruptly shift from empathy to revulsion as it approached, but failed to attain, a lifelike appearance. This descent into eeriness is known as the uncanny valley. IJECE ISSN: 2088-8708  Making Humanoid Robots More Acceptable Based on the Study of Robot Characters in ... (Fatemeh Maleki) 65 Figure 2. Incredible in contrast with The Polar Express, as it is seen the uncanny valley is more sensed in The Polar Express with more realistic characters than in Incredible. 2. PATHIC FEEDBACK In this section we study the robot characters' acts and reaction and study it in specific parts of facial, body, sound and characteristics. 2.1 FACIAL EXPRESSION This part studies the interactions and emotions shown on face of robot. 2.1.1 EYES Eyes are of great importance in facial and emotional expression. This part talks about different shapes of eyes in characters although not realistic but with feelings and will discuss the aspects considered in eyes' or eyelids' and eyebrows' movement to give feeling to them. a) Ligh Eyes In WALL-E (2008) many of reactions are induced by Eva's light eyes. Eva has a simple light board, with eyes drawn on it. The advantages of this would be:  faster reaction when mechanical limitations exist.  more flexible and asymmetric reaction can be implemented. Figure 3. Eva (WALL.E, 2008) When the size of robot increases and we get less involved in its facial emotions, just two circles or just two light points are used, for example in Astroboy (2009) there is a robot that has just two shining circles as its eyes and ZOG, a friendly robot with a large body and very small head has just two spheres as its eyes.  ISSN: 2089-4856 IJRA Vol. 4, No. 1, March 2015 : 63 – 72 66 Figure 4. ZOG (Astroboy, 2009) Another example of light eyes can be sweeper robots in WALL-E (2008), that light board shows the eyes' current form. b) Telescopic eyes Many robots in animations have two cylinders as their eyes. Iron Giant (1999), 9 (2009), Meet the Robinsons (2007), Treasure Planet (2002), Robots (2005) are examples of these animations. Using telescopic eyes give lower view angle to the visitors to diagnose the robots current eyes' form, so it can be a good trick to just concentrate on implementation of they appear in frontal view. The characters mentioned all has lower and upper lids or spiral lids to cover some parts of eyes and give emotions to them. Characters Eyes in 9 (2009) has dark circle inside as iris but in Iron Giant (1995) the robot has no iris but when it is needed to show the direction of look, two center lights in the eyes move to corners of the circles of eyes. Figure 5. Iron Giant (Iron Giant ,1995) Figure 6. 9 (9, 2009) It remains unknown why we generate spontaneous eye blinks every few seconds, more often than necessary for ocular lubrication. Because eye blinks tend to occur at implicit breakpoints while viewing videos, we hypothesized that eye blinks are actively involved in the release of attention [5]. This is a great finding to be used in robots not just make them regularly blink or just blink when a change in direction of the look is applied on eyes. c) With eyeballs A cute example is the servant robot in Astroboy (2009) which has eyes with eyeballs. Pinocchio in Pinocchio3000 (2004) also has eyeballs. It is important to note these kind of balls are used in a not realistic look that is similar to the robot's caricatured faces. IJECE ISSN: 2088-8708  Making Humanoid Robots More Acceptable Based on the Study of Robot Characters in ... (Fatemeh Maleki) 67 Figure 7: Kismet Robot (source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kismet (robot)) No eyes AUTO a character in WALL-E (2008) which is inspired by HAL in 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968) has just a central red light. A destructor robots in Megamind (2010) and 9 (2009) also have a central circle that attracts attention. In Iron Giant (1995) when the robot turns out from a good humanlike robot to just a defensive robot, the head is hidden and again a central circle is the main point of attention. The hat robot in Meet the Robinsons (2007) also has one LED semi-eye. These robots are all considered as machines and bad characters so it seems that placing a single light as the robots eyes should be avoided due to shared negative view of audience about it. In Monsters, Inc. (2001), a character named Mike also has one eye but the eye has emotions shown by eyelid and eyebrow and eyeball resembling real eye. In Coraline (2009), the Other Mother and Other Father has button eyes in normal size head but the emotions are shown by eyebrows and other facial expressions.  ISSN: 2089-4856 IJRA Vol. 4, No. 1, March 2015 : 63 – 72 68 Figure 8: Auto (WALL.E, 2008) Figure 9: hat (Meet the Robinsons ,2007) Figure 10: robot (9, 2009) Figure 11: button Eye mother vs real mother ( Coraline, 2009) 2.1.2 MOUTH Lips has important role in making character believable. Sometimes we even look directly on the speaker's lips. Applying lip sync is very important. In cases where the mechanical speed of mouth has limitations display boards or even colored display boards can be used to show the lips form. For the second step the try could be on the whole body movement since in fact lip sync in not just about lips movements on voice but the whole body including face and hands. Mouth are important in communicating children with autism too, as Dirk Neumann [6], et. al say: People with autism are impaired in their social behavior, including their eye contact with others, but the processes that underlie this impairment remain elusive. We combined high-resolution eye tracking with computational modeling in a group of 10 high-functioning individuals with autism to address this issue. The group fixated the location of the mouth in facial expressions more than did matched controls, even when the mouth was not shown, even in faces that were inverted and most noticeably at latencies of 200–400 ms. Comparisons with a computational model of visual saliency argue that the abnormal bias for fixating the mouth in autism is not driven by an exaggerated IJECE ISSN: 2088-8708  Making Humanoid Robots More Acceptable Based on the Study of Robot Characters in ... (Fatemeh Maleki) 69 sensitivity to the bottom-up saliency of the features, but rather by an abnormal top-down strategy for allocating visual attention.( Dirk Neumann, et. al, 2006) The lips of extraterrestrial characters in Jimmy Neutron: Boy Genius (2001) and also the two robots who arrest Jim Hawkins in Treasure planet (2002), have display board as their mouth, but since they are not designed to be good characters the Display board just show sound waves. Figure 12: space creatures (Jimmy Neutron ,2001) Figure 13: robots (Treasure planet, 2002) Some robots may have a simple mechanical separate jaw as in Astroboy (2009). 2.3 BODY LANGUAGE AND ROBOT'S EXPRESSION we considered facial part and facial expression in the previous section, another important thing that can define someone's characteristics is body language, they way one acts and use head, legs, hands for doing a work or showing emotions. 2.3.1 DESIGN Some robots in animations such as Robots (2005), Meet the Robinsons (2007), Castle in the Sky (1986) or Omnidroid robot in The incredible (2004) have arms, legs and necks more like rubber hose animation with simple flowing curves and without articulations, but it may seem hard to be implemented that needs to control many small motors' rotation. In Robots (2005) the spring character near gate has no legs, but the exaggerated springlike movement of his body gives him a great funny appealing characteristic, this model can be used where the making of legs and humanlike walking can be postponed or ignored but also want to make a robot with characteristics. In Megamind (2010) and Jimmy Neutron: Boy Genius (2001) consequently a fish with a robot body and some extraterrestrial characters exists that are robots mixed of a life real beings that have robotic body. Not all the time the body parts should be integrated as Eva in WALL-E(2008), robot in Iron Giant (1995), Jimmy's dog in Jimmy Neutron: Boy Genius (2001), and a robot that can hold his head in hand in Robots (2005) can propose the idea of unconnected body parts. Unusual body proportion can also make weak and unusual actions be more easily accepted by visitors and also giving characteristics to the robot. Orrin in Astroboy (2009) has no legs and has a little hump which matches his character and also make it cute proposing different types of body design.  ISSN: 2089-4856 IJRA Vol. 4, No. 1, March 2015 : 63 – 72 70 Figure 14: minion (Megamind ,2010) Figure 15: orrin (Astroboy, 2009) 2.3.2 ACTION Overlaying of actions is an important thing in human beings life, we close the dresser's door but before finishing it turn our head back ready to walk away from it. People sometimes do some actions while doing another action that may not be necessary for a robot to do all actions together, for example we may frown while lifting a heavy thing or some may take their tongue tip out while concentrating on doing some precise work. Defining some unnecessary set of actions for doing some works can also help us give robots special characteristics, different sets for different robots. It is also related to Body Language studies, closing eyes while slow talking can show pleasure. In Megamind (2010) the robot bows near the sitting man while talking to him, this may appear unnecessary for a robot that can increases his volume, but this body language and set of actions can have psychological effect on the visitor. As another example of set of actions, in Robots (2005) two robots whisper, holding hand in front of mouth and look forward instead of looking at each other, meant to show the conversation is done hidden. In 9 (2009), one character says, "follow me" and accompany it by his hand movement. Deaf-community sign language also can be studies and be a great source to be used. A robot that talks and also moves its hands according to the speech can have better effect. In Iron Giant (1995), the robot put his hand under the chin. Setting a robot to do this or nodding while what the speaker says takes too long can have positive effect on the speaker. 2.3.2.1 IMPORTANCE OF BETWEEN As like the speed of uttering a sentence can have different meanings, the speed and also change in speed of doing an action can also make it more natural. An example of importance of change of speed instead of actions with regular speed is in Jimmy Neutron: Boy Genius (2001) when the robot dog converts to just a loud speaker phone, his head start to rotate steadily clockwise and counter-clockwise like a radar antenna. In WALL-E (2008), in a special shot that Eva is still a robot with no feelings, Eva starts laughing, although her laugh's sound, body movement and eyes shape are all so natural but we still feel her as a robot. The reason of this may be due to that the laugh follows another action suddenly without any action IJECE ISSN: 2088-8708  Making Humanoid Robots More Acceptable Based on the Study of Robot Characters in ... (Fatemeh Maleki) 71 connecting them. Trying to show a robot more believable defining some actions between two opposite emotional actions can help to decrease this feeling. Sometimes the robot may do nothing, in Iron Giant (1995), when the robot is free and bored he starts to open and close a car's door slowly and repeatedly. Defining some actions to be done while free and idle can make the robots appear more than just robots. Using animation tweleve principals is another point as Breeman,"We proposed to apply principles of traditional animation to make the robot's behavior better understandable. Examples from our user-interface robot iCat were given to illustrate this idea." (van Breeman, 2004) 2.3.2.2 ANIMATION PRINCIPLES OF ACTION Utilizing of animation principles can also help the robot to have a more acceptable movements, both considering the physics and exaggerations in it and also considering the psychology of body language that is the people are familiar with those exaggerated movements in body by watching many animations. Breeman studies applying of 12 animation principles such as Squash and stretch, Anticipation, Straight Ahead Action and Pose-to-Pose , Follow Through and Overlapping Action, Slow In and Slow Out, Arcs, Secondary Action , Timing, Exaggeration, Solid Drawing and Appeal on robots. (Breeman, 2004) The acceptance of user-interface robots as "social friend" depends among others on the ability of the user to understand the robot's behavior − to understand what it is doing and thinking. Body gestures are a natural channel to communicate this. Traditionally, the control of robotic body parts is carried out by feedback control loops. This results, however, in rather machine-like behavior that does not reveal much about what the robot is doing or thinking. (Breeman, 2004) 2.4 ROBOT EXPRESSIONS BY VOICE AND SOUND A robotic sound cliché may be so familiar in our minds, what makes a robotic sound so robotic? Regular pitch and unchanging speed of talking can be two important causes that reflect no excitement or feeling in voice. Speech Synthesis field can be used to convert text to speech, as in WALL-E (2008) AUTO's voice was produced by a text-to-speech program called MacInTalk (IMDB) [9]. The other step would be utilizing Natural Language Processing field's achievements to give different pitch and speed to same sentences in different situations. Besides scientific studies and efforts in producing voices for robots that can show the emotions, adding some features to a special robot, such as pronouncing a special expression more frequent or with a unique attracting pitch can make it cute and more believable. In WALL-E (2008), the cockroach has a sound heard when moving, although in real life that sound may not be heard, this can give the idea of adding some unnecessary sound to some robot's actions to form sort of characteristics to them, and this also can help the visitors to become familiar with that sound, let them guess in later times what the robot is doing or going to do, letting them feel that they know the robot. 3. CHARACTERISTICS Can a robot have a photo in a pose that shows the characteristics of it the best? This may be done by set of actions solution that we proposed earlier. In Robots (2005), there is a robot that does many actions while getting angry or when crying he cry in an exaggerated way opening mouth and shaking body, these actions are not necessary to cry or get angry but defines that robot's special character. B.E.N. a robot in Treasure Planet (2002), that has lost most of his memory in the main part of story, has a special character that talks too much. This can lead to the idea of a making a robot saying some of logical inferences done in its processor loudly, beginning with expressions like, "Well, I think" or "It seems that..." Saying some random quotations that may even do not match the situation also is another suggestion. As we mentioned before, Not being perfect makes it more possible to be different among others and that is what exists between human beings and forms the difference, characteristics and identity. Although robots use social learning and but to make them appear different some features can be defined and then decreasing and increasing some features in different robots can give them identity and make them more accepted by people. Although their knowledge are at the same level. 3.1 AGE Age and sex can be defined too. Eva in WALL-E (2008) is female, some shown by the story and some by voice. Besides to voice, color and texture also can help by designing female robots lighter and smoother than male robots. The female robots in 9 (2009) have lighter color with smoother texture.  ISSN: 2089-4856 IJRA Vol. 4, No. 1, March 2015 : 63 – 72 72 Implementing different kind of walking is hard since it is still a challenge to make a robot walk, but adding some visual features or special voice can be used to show age in robots. 3.2 ACCESSORIES, PETS, INTEREST In WALL-E (2008), when WALL-E, the robot, forgets everything and loses his character he shows not interest to what he was interested in before. Defining some interests for a robot by expressing a sentence or exclamation sound or having it all the time can be a feature to be added to a robot. The robot in Castle in the Sky (1986) who has plants on his shoulder is different and do a different job, although the body shapes are all the same. Number One, a robot in 9 (2009) always have a cane with himself completing his character. Besides actions and robot body design, accessories or a pet can help a lot in introducing it. In Robots (2005), robots have accessories such as mustache or earrings. The cockroach that always follows WALL-E robot in WALL-E (2008) has a role in the robot's identity too. Omnidroid robot in The Incredibles (2004) is more a machine than a robot but have ancestors that can propose the idea of family of robots with differences in sizes or cloths and accessories. 4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK Based on the study of robot characters in animation we extracted features to to be implemented in robots make them are more acceptable. Features in appearance, actions, and accessories can give characteristics and identity to robots but with less effort to resembling precisely to human beings. Animations chosen in this study were also made for adults. Future studies with concentration on the robots that are designed to interact with children can be suggested, this needs a separate study since children conceptions are different and they diagnose a moving object as robot, animal or human in a different way. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like to thank Dr. Mohammad Reza Hosnaee for his encouragement, Farrokh Yekdaneh whose interest in combining robotics and animation subjects encouraged us and Dr. Fatemeh Hosseini Shakib for her sincere devote to promote animation studies in Art University of Tehran and for her help on Uncanny Valley subject. With special thanks to Disney research team who worked on the robot able to play catch and juggling. REFERENCES [1] Kober, Jens; Glisson, Matthew; Mistry ,Micheal. Playing Catch and Juggling with a Humanoid Robot, Disney Research, 2012. [Online]. Available at http://www.disneyresearch.com/project/juggling_robot/ [Accessed 13 January 2013] [2] Russell, Stuart; Norvig, Peter. Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach ,3rd Edition, 2009 [3] Beyond.com, NAO Robots Reach and Teach Autistic Children , http://www.beyond.com/articles/nao-robots-reachand-teach-autistic-children-11957-article.html, last access 3/27/2014 [4] Mori, M. (1970/2012). The uncanny valley (K. F. MacDorman & N. Kageki, Trans.). IEEE Robotics & Automation Magazine, 19(2), 98–100. doi:10.1109/MRA.2012.2192811 [5] Nakanoa, Tamami; Katoc, Makoto; Moritoc, Yusuke; Itoid ,Seishi; Kitazawaa ,Shigeru. Blink-related momentary activation of the default mode network while viewing videos, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, December 24, 2012 [6] Dirk Neumann, et. al ,Looking you in the mouth: abnormal gaze in autism resulting from impaired top-down modulation of visual attention, Social Cognitive & Affective Neuroscience ,Volume 1, Issue 3, Pp. 194-202, 2006 [7] van Breemen, A.J.N. Bringing Robots To Life: Applying Principles of Animation To Robots, CHI2004, Vienna, 2004. [8] Disney Research. http://www.disneyresearch.com/project/juggling_robot/ [Accessed 13 January 2013] [9] IMDB, MacInTalk , [Online].Available at http://www.imdb.com/name/nm3050831/ [Accessed 13 January 2013]

Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 susanne bobzien 4 Stoic Logic1 Stoic logic is in its core a propositional logic. Stoic inference concerns the relations between items that have the structure of propositions. These items are the assertibles (axiômata). They are the primary bearers of truth-values. Accordingly, Stoic logic falls into two main parts: the theory of arguments and the theory of assertibles, which are the components from which the arguments are built. 1. sayables and assertibles What is an assertible? According to the Stoic standard definition, it is a self-complete sayable that can be stated as far as itself is concerned (S. E. PH II 104). This definition places the assertible in the genus of self-complete sayables, and so everything that holds in general for sayables and for self-complete sayables holds equally for assertibles. Sayables (lekta) are items placed between mere vocal sounds on the one hand and the world on the other. They are, very roughly, meanings: 'what we say are things, which in fact are sayables' (DL VII 57). Sayables are the underlying meanings in everything we say or think; they underlie 1 This chapter is a modified and much shortened version of Bobzien (1999b), where more details and more textual evidence on all the topics treated here can be found, accessible for readers without Greek or Latin. Other useful and fairly comprehensive treatments of Stoic logic are Frede (1974) and Mates (1953) (although the latter is outdated in part). Still worth reading are also Kneale and Kneale (1962), Ch. 3. The surviving textual evidence on Stoic logic is collected in FDS. There are two collections of articles: Brunschwig (1978) and Döring and Ebert (1993). 85 Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 86 susanne bobzien any rational presentation we have (S. E. M VIII 70). But they generally also subsist when no one actually says or thinks them.2 The Stoics hold further that of sayables some are self-complete (autotelê), others deficient (ellipê). Deficient are those which have an unfinished expression, e.g.: 'writes', for we ask: who? Self-complete are those which have a finished expression, e.g.: 'Socrates writes' (DL VII 63). Self-complete sayables include assertibles, questions, inquiries, imperativals, oaths, invocations, assertible-likes, puzzlements, curses, and hypotheses (DL VII 65–8). Of these, besides the assertibles, only the hypotheses and imperativals seem to have been considered in the context of logic in the narrow sense; that is, the logic of inference.3 What marks off assertibles from other self-complete sayables is that (i) they can be stated (ii) as far as they themselves are concerned. Assertibles can be stated, but they are not themselves statements. They subsist independently of their being stated, in a similar way in which sayables in general subsist independently of their being said. This notwithstanding, it is the characteristic primary function of assertibles to be stated. On the one hand, they are the only entities we can use for making statements: no statements without assertibles; on the other, assertibles have no other primary function than their being stated. A second account determines an assertible as that by saying which we make a statement (DL VII 66). 'Saying' here signifies the primary function of the assertible: one cannot genuinely say an assertible without stating it. To say an assertible is more than just to utter a sentence that expresses it. For instance, 'If Dio walks, Dio moves' is a complex assertible, more precisely a conditional, that is composed of two simple assertibles, 'Dio walks' and 'Dio moves'. Now, when I utter the sentence, 'If Dio walks, Dio moves', I make use of all three assertibles. However, the only one I actually assert is the conditional, and the only thing I genuinely say is that if Dio walks, Dio moves. 2 Cf. Barnes (1993), (1999), M. Frede (1994a), Schubert (1994). For an alternative view, see LS. 3 Cf. Barnes (1986) on Stoic logic of imperatives and Bobzien (1997) on Stoic logic of hypotheses. Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 87 Thus understood, phrase (i) of the definition ('can be stated') suffices to delimit assertibles from the other kinds of self-complete sayables. What is the function of phrase (ii) 'as far as itself is concerned'? It isn't meant to narrow down the class of assertibles further, but to preempt a misinterpretation: the locution 'can be asserted' could have been understood as potentially excluding some items which for the Stoics were assertibles. For two things are needed for stating an assertible: first, the assertible itself, and second, someone to state it. According to Stoic doctrine, that someone would need to have a rational presentation in accordance with which the assertible subsists. But many assertibles subsist without anyone having a corresponding presentation. In such cases, one of the necessary conditions for the 'statability' of an assertible is unfulfilled. Here the qualification 'as far as the assertible itself is concerned' comes in. It cuts out this external condition. For something's being an assertible it is irrelevant whether there actually is someone who could state it. There is a further Stoic account of 'assertible'; it suggests that their 'statability' was associated with their having a truth-value: an assertible is that which is either true or false (DL VII 65). Thus truth and falsehood are properties of assertibles, and being true or false – in a nonderivative sense – is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for something's being an assertible. Moreover, we can assume that one can only state something that has a truthvalue. Assertibles resemble Fregean propositions in various respects. There are, however, important differences. The most far-reaching one is that truth and falsehood are temporal properties of assertibles. They can belong to an assertible at one time but not at another. This is exemplified by the way in which the truth-conditions are given: the assertible 'It is day' is true when it is day (DL VII 65). Thus, when the Stoics say, '"Dio walks" is true', we have to understand '. . . is true now', and that it makes sense to ask: 'Will it still be true later?' For the assertible now concerns Dio's walking now; but uttered tomorrow, it will concern Dio's walking tomorrow, and so on. This 'temporality' of (the truth-values of) assertibles has a number of consequences for Stoic logic. In particular, assertibles can in principle change their truth-value: the assertible 'It is day' is true now, false Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 88 susanne bobzien later, and true again tomorrow. The Stoics called assertibles that (can) change their truth-value 'changing assertibles' (metapiptonta). Most Stoic examples belong to this kind. 2. simple assertibles The most fundamental distinction among assertibles (analogous to the modern one between atomic and molecular propositions) was that between simple and non-simple ones. Non-simple assertibles are composed of more than one assertible (see Section 3). Simple assertibles are defined negatively as those assertibles which are not non-simple. There were various kinds of simple and non-simple assertibles. We are nowhere told the ultimate criteria for the distinctions. But we should remember that the Stoics weren't after giving a grammatical classification of sentences. Rather, the classification is of assertibles, and the criteria for their types are at heart logical. This leads to the following complication: The only access there is to assertibles is via language; but there is no one-to-one correspondence between assertibles and declarative sentences. One and the same sentence (of a certain type) may express self-complete sayables that belong to different classes. Equally, two sentences of different grammatical structure may express the same assertible. How then can we know which assertible a sentence expresses? Here the Stoics seem to have proceeded as follows: Aiming at the elimination of (structural) ambiguities, they embarked upon a programme of regimentation of language such that the form of a sentence would unambiguously determine the type of assertible expressed by it. The advantage of such a procedure is that once one has agreed to stick to certain standardizations of language use, it becomes possible to discern logical properties of assertibles and their compounds by examining the linguistic expressions used. Now to the various types of simple assertibles.4 Our sources provide us (i) with three affirmative types: predicative or middle ones, catagoreutical or definite ones, and indefinite ones; and (ii) with three negative types: negations, denials, and privations (DL VII 69–70, S. E. M VIII 96–100). Each time the first word of the sentence indicates to what type a simple assertible belongs. 4 Cf. also Ebert (1993), Brunschwig (1994). Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 89 Examples of the predicative (katêgorika) or middle assertibles are of two kinds: 'Socrates sits' and '(A) man walks'. They are defined as assertibles that consist of a nominative 'case', like 'Dio', and a predicate, like 'walks' (DL VII 70). The name 'middle' is based on the fact that these assertibles are neither indefinite (they define their object) nor definite (they are not deictic) (S. E. M VII 97). Assertibles of the type '(A) man walks' are extremely rare in Stoic logic. The definite (hôrismena) or catagoreutical (katagoreutika) assertibles have in their standard linguistic form a demonstrative pronoun as subject expression.5 A typical example is 'This one walks'. They are defined as assertibles uttered along with deixis (S. E. M VIII 96). What do the Stoics mean by 'deixis'? In one place, Chrysippus talks about the deixis with which we accompany our saying 'I', which can be either a pointing at the object of deixis (ourselves in this case) or a gesture with one's head in its direction (Galen PHP II 2.9–11). So ordinary deixis seems to be a non-verbal, physical act of indicating something, simultaneous with the utterance of the sentence with the pronoun. How are definite assertibles individuated? The sentence (type) by which a definite assertible is expressed does clearly not suffice for its identification: Someone who utters the sentence 'This one walks' pointing at Theo expresses a different assertible from the one they would assert pointing at Dio. However, when I now utter 'This one walks', pointing at Dio, and then utter the same sentence again tomorrow, again pointing at Dio, the Stoics regarded these as two statements of the same assertible. Thus, one way to understand the individuation of definite assertibles is to conceive of a distinction between, as it were, deixis type and deixis token: a deixis type is determined by the object of the deixis (and is independent of who performs an act of deixis when and where): same object, same deixis. By contrast, deixis tokens are the particular utterances of 'this one' accompanied by the physical acts of pointing at the object. Hence, there is one assertible 'This one walks' for Theo (with the deixis type pointing-at-Theo), one for Dio (with the deixis type pointing-at-Dio), and so forth. But how then does a definite assertible differ from the corresponding predicative one – for example, 'This one walks' (pointing at Dio) 5 On definite assertibles, see also Denyer (1988). Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 90 susanne bobzien from 'Dio walks'? Are they not rather two ways of expressing the same assertible? Not for the Stoics. We know from a passage on Chrysippus' modal theory that in the case of the assertibles, 'Dio is dead' and 'This one is dead' (pointing at Dio) uttered at the same time one could be true, the other not (Alex. In Ar. An. pr. 177.25– 178.4). For the latter assertible is said to be false while Dio is alive but destroyed once Dio is dead, whereas the former simply changes its truth-value from false to true at the moment of Dio's death. The reason given for the destruction of the definite assertible is that once Dio is dead the object of the deixis, Dio, no longer exists. Now, for an assertible destruction can only mean that it ceases to subsist, and hence no longer satisfies all the conditions for being an assertible. And this should have something to do with the deixis. So perhaps in the case of definite assertibles, statability becomes in part point-atability, and Stoic point-at-ability requires intrinsically the existence of the object pointed at. This is not only a condition of actual statability in particular situations – as is the presence of an asserter; rather, it is a condition of identifiability of the assertible, of its being this assertible. The indefinite (aorista) assertibles are defined as assertibles that are governed by an indefinite particle (S. E. M VIII 97).6 They are composed of one or more indefinite particles and a predicate (DL VII 70). Such particles are 'someone' or 'something'. An example is 'Someone sits'. This assertible is said to be true when a corresponding definite assertible ('This one sits') is true, since if no particular person is sitting, it isn't the case that someone is sitting (S. E. M VIII 98). The most important kind of negative assertible is the negation (apophatikon). For the Stoics, a negation is formed by prefixing to an assertible the negation particle 'not:', as for instance in 'Not: Diotima walks'. In this way an ambiguity is avoided regarding existential import in ordinary language formulations, such as 'Diotima doesn't walk': 'Diotima doesn't walk' counts as an affirmation, which – unlike 'Not: Diotima walks' – presupposes for its truth Diotima's existence (Apul. De int. 177.22–31, Alex. In Ar. An. pr. 402.8–12).7 Stoic negation is truth-functional: the negation particle, if added to true 6 On indefinite assertibles, see also Crivelli (1994). 7 Cf. A. C. Lloyd (1978a). Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 91 assertibles, makes them false; if added to false ones makes them true (S. E. M VIII 103). Every negation is the negation of an assertible; namely, of the assertible from which it has been constructed by prefixing 'not:'. Thus 'Not: it is day' is the negation of 'It is day'. An assertible and its negation form a pair of contradictories (antikeimena): Contradictories are those 〈assertibles〉 of which the one exceeds the other by a negation particle, such as 'It is day' – 'Not: it is day'. (S. E. M VIII 89) This implies that an assertible is the contradictory of another if it is one of a pair of assertibles in which one is the negation of the other (cf. DL VII 73). Of contradictory assertibles, precisely one is true and the other false. The Stoics also prefixed the negation particle to non-simple assertibles in order to form complex negations. The negation of a simple assertible is itself simple; that of a non-simple assertible non-simple. Thus, the addition of the negative doesn't make a simple assertible non-simple. The negation particle 'not:' isn't a Stoic connective (syndesmos), for such connectives bind together parts of speech and the negation particle doesn't do that. A special case of the negation is the so-called super-negation (hyperapophatikon) or, as we would say, 'double negation'. This is the negation of a negation, for instance, 'Not: not: it is day'; it is still a simple assertible. Its truth-conditions are the same as those for 'It is day' (DL VII 69). The second type of negative assertible, the denial (arnêtikon), consists of a denying particle and a predicate. An example is 'No-one walks' (DL VII 70). This type of assertible has a compound negative as subject term. Unlike the negation particle, this negative can form a complete assertible if combined with a predicate. The truthconditions of denials have not been handed down, but they seem obvious: 'No-one φ's' should be true precisely if it isn't the case that someone φ's. Denials must have been the contradictories of simple indefinite assertibles of the kind 'Someone φ's'. Finally, the privative (sterêtikon) assertible is determined as a simple assertible composed of a privative particle and a potential assertible, like 'This one is unkind' (DL VII 70, literally 'Unkind is this one', a word order presumably chosen to have the negative element at the front of the sentence). The privative particle is the alpha privativum 'α-' ('un-'). Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 92 susanne bobzien 3. non-simple assertibles Non-simple assertibles are those that are composed of more than one assertible or of one assertible taken twice (DL VII 68–9) or more often. These constituent assertibles are combined by one or more propositional connectives. A connective is an indeclinable part of speech that connects parts of speech (DL VII 58). An example of the first type of non-simple assertibles is 'Either it is day, or it is night'; one of the second type is 'If it is day, it is day.' Concerning the identification of non-simple assertibles of a particular kind, the Stoics took what one may call a 'formalistic' approach. In their definitions of the different kinds of non-simple assertibles they mention the characteristic propositional connectives, which can have one or more parts, and determine their position in (the sentence that expresses) the non-simple assertibles. The place of the connectives relative to (the sentences expressing) the constituent assertibles is strictly regulated in such a way that the first word of the assertible is indicative of the type of non-simple assertible it belongs to, and – mostly – the scope of the connectives is disambiguated. Non-simple assertibles can be composed of more than two simple constituent assertibles (Plut. St. rep. 1047c–e). This is possible in two ways. The first has a parallel in modern logic: the definition of the non-simple assertible allows that its constituent assertibles are themselves non-simple. An example of such an assertible is 'If both it is day and the sun is above the earth, it is light.' The type of non-simple assertible to which such a complex assertible belongs is determined by the overall form of the assertible. Thus the above example is a conditional. The second type of assertible with more than two constituent assertibles is quite different. Conjunctive and disjunctive connectives were conceived of not as two-place functors, but – in line with ordinary language – as two-or-more-place functors. So we find disjunctions with three disjuncts: 'Either wealth is good or 〈wealth〉 is evil or 〈wealth is〉 indifferent' (S. E. M VIII 434). All non-simple assertibles have their connective, or one part of it, prefixed to the first constituent assertible. As in the case of the negation, the primary ground for this must have been to avoid ambiguity. Consider the statement p and q or r. Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 93 In Stoic 'regimented' formulation, this becomes either Both p and either q or r. or Either both p and q or r. The ambiguity of the original statement is thus removed. Moreover, like Polish notation, the Stoic method of prefixing connectives can in general perform the function that brackets have in modern logic. Avoidance of ambiguity may also have been behind the Stoic practice of eliminating cross-references in non-simple assertibles. Thus, where ordinary discourse has 'If Plato walks, he moves', the Stoics repeated the subject term: '. . . Plato moves'. The truth-conditions for non-simple assertibles suggest that the Stoics weren't aiming at fully covering the connotations of the connective particles in ordinary language. Rather, it seems, the Stoics attempted to filter out the essential formal characteristics of the connectives. Leaving aside the negation – which can be simple – only one type of non-simple assertible, the conjunction, is truth-functional. In the remaining cases, modal relations (like incompatibility), partial truth-functionality, and basic relations like symmetry and asymmetry, in various combinations, serve as truth-criteria. For Chrysippus we know of only three types of non-simple assertibles: conditionals, conjunctions, and exclusive-cum-exhaustive disjunctive assertibles. Later Stoics added further kinds of non-simple assertibles: a pseudo-conditional and a causal assertible, two types of pseudo-disjunctions, and two types of comparative assertibles. Possibly, the main reason for adding these was logical, in the sense that they would allow the formulation of valid inferences which Chrysippus' system couldn't accommodate. A certain grammatical interest may also have entered in. The conjunction (sumpeplegmenon, sumplokê) was defined as 'an assertible that is conjoined by certain conjunctive connective particles; for example, 'Both it is day and it is light'' (DL VII 72). Like modern conjunction, the Stoic one connects whole assertibles: it is 'Both Plato walks and Plato talks', not 'Plato walks and talks'. Unlike modern conjunction, the conjunctive assertible is defined in such a way that more than two conjuncts can be put together on a par (cf. Gellius XVI 8.10). The standard form has a two-or-more part Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 94 susanne bobzien connective: 'both . . . and . . . and . . . . . .'. The truth-conditions, too, are formulated in such a way as to include conjunctions with two or more conjuncts: a Stoic conjunction is true when all its constituent assertibles are true, and otherwise false (S. E. M VIII 125, 128); it is thus truth-functional. The conditional (sunêmmenon) was defined as the assertible that is formed with the linking connective 'if' (DL VII 71). Its standardized form is 'If p, q'. In Chrysippus' time, the debate about the truth-conditions of the conditional – which had been initiated by the logicians Philo and Diodorus – was still going on.8 There was agreement that a conditional 'announces' a relation of consequence; namely, that its consequent follows (from) its antecedent (ibid.). Under debate were what it is to 'follow' and the associated truthconditions. A minimal consensus seems to have been this: the 'announcement' of following suggests that a true conditional, if its antecedent is true, has a true consequent. Given the acceptance of the principle of bivalence, this amounts to the minimal requirement for the truth of a conditional that it must not be the case that the antecedent is true and the consequent false – a requirement we find also explicitly in our sources (DL VII 81). It is equivalent to Philo's criterion. Chrysippus offered a truth-criterion that differed from Philo's and Diodorus' (Cic. Acad. II 143, DL VII 73, Cic. Fat. 12). It was also described as the criterion of those who introduce a connection (sunartêsis) (S. E. PH II 111); this connection can only be that which holds between the antecedent and the consequent. The requirement of some such connection must have been introduced to avoid the 'paradoxes' that arose from Philo's and Diodorus' positions. In the truth-criterion itself, the connection in question is determined indirectly, based on the notion of conflict or incompatibility (machê): a conditional is true precisely if its antecedent and the contradictory of its consequent conflict (DL VII 73). Consequently, the example 'If the earth flies, Axiothea philosophises' – which would be true for both Philo and Diodorus – is no longer true. It is perfectly possible that both the earth flies and Axiothea doesn't philosophise. For a full understanding of Chrysippus' criterion, we need to know what sort of conflict he had in mind. But here our sources offer little 8 For Philo's and Diodorus' logic, see Bobzien (1999b). Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 95 information. Some later texts state that two assertibles conflict if they cannot be true together. This confirms that the conflict is some sort of incompatibility. It is historically inappropriate to ask whether Chrysippus intended empirical, analytical, or formal logical conflict, given that a conceptual framework which could accommodate such distinctions is absent in Hellenistic logic. Still, we can be confident that what we may call formal incompatibility would have counted as conflict for Chrysippus: Assertibles like 'If it is light, it is light' were regarded as true (Cic. Acad. II 98) – presumably because contradictoriness was the strongest possible conflict between two assertibles. Equally, some cases that some may describe as analytical incompatibility were covered: for instance 'If Plato walks, Plato moves' was regarded as true. And it seems that some instances of cases of what we might label 'empirical incompatibility' were accepted by some Stoics: so conditionals with causal connections of the kind 'If Theognis has a wound in the heart, Theognis will die' were probably considered true (S. E. M VIII 254–5). On the other hand, the connection expressed in divinatory theorems ('If you are born under the Dog-star, you won't die at sea') seems to have been an exception. Chrysippus denied that such theorems would make true conditionals, but held that they would make true (indefinite) negations of conjunctions with a negated second conjunct (Cic. Fat. 11–15).9 Some Stoics introduced two further kinds of non-simple assertibles, grounded on the concept of the conditional (DL VII 71–4). Both were probably added only after Chrysippus. The first, called 'pseudoconditional' (parasunêmmenon), is testified at the earliest for Crinis and has the standardized form 'Since p, q'. The truth-criterion for such assertibles is that (i) the 'consequent' must follow (from) the 'antecedent', and (ii) the 'antecedent' must be true. The second kind is entitled 'causal assertible' (aitiôdes) and has the standard form 'Because p, q'. The name is explained by the remark that p is, as it were, the cause/ground (aition) of q. The truth-condition for the causal assertible adds simply a further condition to those for the pseudo-conditional; namely (iii), that if p is the ground/cause for q, q cannot be the ground/cause for p, which in particular implies that 'Because p, p' is false. 9 Cf. Bobzien (1998), Ch. 4.2. Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 96 susanne bobzien The Greek word for 'or' (ê) has several different functions as a connective particle, which are distinct in other languages. It covers both the Latin aut and the Latin vel, and also both the English 'or' and the English 'than'. It plays a role as a connective in at least three different types of non-simple assertibles. The early Stoics seem to have concentrated on one type of disjunctive relation only: the exhaustive and exclusive disjunctive relation, called 'diezeugmenon', here rendered 'disjunction'. This is the only disjunctive that figures in Chrysippus' syllogistic. It is defined as 'an assertible that is disjoined by the disjunctive connective "either", like "Either it is day or it is night"' (DL VII 72). The disjunctive connective could take more than two disjuncts, and there are examples of such disjunctions (S. E. PH I 69). Thus, the connective was 'either . . . or . . . or . . . . . .' with its first part ('either') prefixed to the first disjunct. One source presents the truth-conditions for disjunctions as follows: . . . (i) all the disjuncts must be in conflict with each other and (ii) their contradictories . . . must be contrary to each other. (iii) Of all the disjuncts one must be true, the remaining ones false. (Gellius XVI 8.13) Here, first a non-truth-functional criterion is given ((i) and (ii)); this is followed by a truth-functional criterion (iii). I take (iii) to be an uncontested minimal requirement as we had it in the case of the conditional. For it certainly was a necessary condition for the truth of a disjunction that precisely one of its disjuncts had to be true, but most sources imply that this was not sufficient. The truth-condition they state is stricter and typically involves the term 'conflict' already familiar from the conditionals. It is a conjunction of the two conditions (i) and (ii). First, the disjuncts must conflict with each other; this entails that, at most, one is true. Second, the contradictories of the disjuncts must all be contrary to each other; this ensures that not all of the contradictories are true, and hence that at least one of the original disjuncts is true. The two conditions combined mean that 'necessarily precisely one of the disjuncts must be true'. As in the case of the conditional, a full understanding of the truth-criterion would require one to know what kind of conflict the Stoics had in mind. Some Stoics distinguished two kinds of a so-called pseudodisjunction (paradiezeugmenon) (Gellius XVI 8.13–14). Regarding Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 97 their standard form, most examples are formed with 'either . . . or . . .' or, occasionally, just with '. . . or . . .'; some have more than two pseudo-disjuncts. Thus, the two types of pseudo-disjunctions seem indistinguishable in their linguistic form from disjunctions (and from each other). Their truth-criteria are simply the two halves of the truth-condition for the genuine disjunction. One kind is true if its pseudo-disjuncts conflict with each other, which entails that, at most, one of them is true. The other is true if the contradictories of its pseudo-disjuncts are contrary to each other, which entails that at least one of the pseudo-disjuncts is true. As mentioned previously, the Greek word for 'or' serves another purpose: that of the English word 'than'. Accordingly, we sometimes find a further kind of non-simple assertible discussed in the context of the disjunctives, the comparative assertible, formed by using a comparative (diasaphêtikos) connective.10 Two types are known (DL VII 72–73), with the connectives 'It's rather that . . . than that . . . ' and 'It's less that . . . than that . . .'. These are two-part connectives, again with the characteristic part prefixed to the first constituent assertible, thus allowing the identification of the type of assertible. The truth-conditions have not survived. The definition of the non-simple assertibles implies that they take any kind of simple assertibles as constituents, and that by combining connectives and simple assertibles in a correct, 'well-formed' way, all Stoic non-simple assertibles can be generated. But apparently this isn't so: non-simple assertibles that are composed of simple indefinite ones raise special problems. Unlike the case of definite and middle assertibles, one can conceive of two different ways of linking indefinite ones. First, following Stoic formation rules to the letter, by combining two simple indefinite assertibles into a conjunction or a conditional, one obtains assertibles like the following: If someone breathes, someone is alive. Both someone walks and someone talks. According to Stoic criteria these would be true, respectively, if 'Someone is breathing' and 'Not: someone is alive' are incompatible and if 'Someone (e.g., Diotima) walks' is true and 'Someone (e.g., 10 Cf. Sluiter (1988). Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 98 susanne bobzien Theognis) talks' is true. However, complex assertibles with indefinite pronouns as grammatical subject more commonly tend to be of the following kind: If someone breathes, that one (he, she) is alive. Someone walks and that one talks. Here the truth-conditions are different, since the second 'constituent assertible' isn't independent of the first. In fact, we find no Stoic examples of the first type of combinations of indefinite assertibles but quite a few of the second (e.g., DL VII 75; 82). It was explicitly dealt with by the Stoics and it seems that the terms 'indefinite conjunction' and 'indefinite conditional' were reserved for it. In order to express the cross-reference in the second 'constituent assertible' to the indefinite particle of the first, 'that one' (ekeinos) was standardly used. The Stoics were right to single out these types of assertibles as a special category. Plainly, the general problem they are confronted with is that of quantification. The modern way of wording and formalizing such statements, which brings out the fact that their grammatical subject expressions do not have a reference ('For anything, if it is F, it is G') didn't occur to the Stoics. We do not know how far they 'understood' such quantification as lying behind their standard formulation; but we know that they suggested that sentences of the kind 'All S are P' be reformulated as 'If something is S, that thing is P' (S. E. M XI 8–9). The Stoic accounts of assertibles reveal many similarities to modern propositional logic, and there can be little doubt that the Stoics attempted to systematize their logic. However, their system is quite different from the propositional calculus. In particular, Stoic logic is a logic of the validity of arguments, not a system of logical theorems or logical truths. Of course, the Stoics did recognise some logical principles which correspond to theorems of the propositional calculus. But, although they had a clear notion of the difference between metaand object language, logical principles that express logical truths were apparently not assigned a special status, different from logical meta-principles. A survey of the principles concerning assertibles may be useful. First, there is the principle of bivalence (Cic. Fat. 20), which is a logical meta-principle. Then, corresponding Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 99 to logical truths, we find:  a principle of double negation, expressed by saying that a double-negation (Not: not: p) is equivalent to the assertible that is doubly negated (p) (DL VII 69)  the principle that all conditionals that are formed by using the same assertible twice (like 'If p, p') are true (Cic. Acad. II 98)  the principle that all disjunctions formed by a contradiction (like 'Either p or not: p') are true (S. E. M VIII 282) Moreover, some Stoics may have dealt with relations like commutativity and contraposition via the concepts of inversion (anastrophê) and conversion (antistrophê) of assertibles (Galen Institutio logica VI 4). Inversion is the change of place of the constituent assertibles in a non-simple assertible with two constituents. Commutativity could thus have been expressed by saying that for conjunctions and disjunctions, inversion is sound. In a conversion, the two constituent assertibles are not simply exchanged, but each is also replaced by the contradictory of the other. The Stoics seem to have recognized that conversion holds for conditionals; that is, they seem to have accepted the principle of contraposition (cf. DL VII 194). Finally, regarding the interdefinability of connectives, there is no evidence that the Stoics took an interest in reducing the connectives to a minimal number. For the early Stoics, we also have no evidence that they attempted to give an account of one connective in terms of other connectives, or that they stated logical equivalences of that kind. 4. modality11 As the previous sections have illustrated, the Stoics distinguished many different types of assertibles, which were generally identifiable by their linguistic form. In addition, the Stoics classified assertibles with respect to certain of their properties which weren't part of their form. The most prominent ones, after truth and falsehood, were the modal properties possibility, necessity, impossibility, and non-necessity. Two further such properties were plausibility and 11 Cf. Bobzien (1986), (1993), and (1998), Ch. 3.1. Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 100 susanne bobzien probability (DL VII 75–6): An assertible is plausible (pithanon) if it induces assent to it (even if it is false); an assertible is probable or reasonable (eulogon) if it has higher chances of being true than false. Stoic modal logic is not a logic of modal propositions (e.g., propositions of the type 'It is possible that it is day' or 'It is possibly true that it is day') formed with modal operators which qualify states of affairs or propositions. Instead, their modal theory was about nonmodalized propositions like 'It is day', insofar as they are possible, necessary, and so forth. The modalities were considered – primarily – as properties of assertibles and, like truth and falsehood, they belonged to the assertibles at a time; consequently, an assertible can in principle change its modal value. Like his precursors in Hellenistic logic, Philo and Diodorus, Chrysippus distinguished four modal concepts: possibility, impossibility, necessity, and non-necessity. The Stoic set of modal definitions can be restored with some plausibility from several incomplete passages (DL VII 75, Boeth. Int. II 234.27–235.4). We can be confident that these definitions were Chrysippus' (cf. Plut. St. rep. 1055df). Like the modal notions of Philo and Diodorus, they fit the four requirements of normal modal logic that (1) every necessary proposition is true and every true proposition possible; every impossible proposition is false and every false proposition non-necessary; (2) the accounts of possibility and impossibility and those of necessity and non-necessity are contradictory to each other; (3) necessity and possibility are interdefinable in the sense that a proposition is necessary precisely if its contradictory is not possible; and (4) every proposition is either necessary or impossible or both possible and non-necessary: A possible assertible is one which (A) is capable of being true and (B) is not hindered by external things from being true; an impossible assertible is one which (A') is not capable of being true 〈or (B') is capable of being true, but hindered by external things from being true〉; a necessary assertible is one which (A'), being true, is not capable of being false or (B') is capable of being false, but hindered by external things from being false; a non-necessary assertible is one which (A) is capable of being false and (B) is not hindered by external things 〈from being false〉. In the cases of possibility and non-necessity, two conditions (A and B) have to be fulfilled. In the cases of necessity and impossibility, one Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 101 of two alternative conditions has to be satisfied (A' or B'), leading to two types of necessity and impossibility. The first parts of the definitions (A, A') are almost identical with Philo's modal definitions. The second parts (B, B') feature 'external things' which must or must not prevent the assertibles from having a certain truth-value. We have no examples of such external things, but they should be external to the logical subject of the assertible. For instance, things that prevent truth should include ordinary, physical hindrances: a storm or a wall or chains that prevent you from getting somewhere. The accounts leave us in the dark about another aspect of the hindrances; namely, when they need to be present (or absent). Knowledge of this is essential for an adequate understanding of the modalities. One text (Alex. In Ar. An. pr. 177–178) suggests that for the possibility of an assertible, the requirement of absence of hindrances covers present-plus-future time – relative to the utterance of the assertion. For we learn that for Chrysippus 'Dio is dead' is possible (now) if it can be true at some time; equally, that 'this one is dead [pointing at Dio]', which is impossible, wouldn't be impossible (now) if, although being false now, it could be true at some later time. If one reads 'can be true' as short for Chrysippus' requirement 'is capable of being true and not prevented from being true', it seems that an assertible is possible for Chrysippus if (A) it is capable of truth, and (B) there is some time later than now when it will not be hindered from being true. For instance, 'Sappho is reading' is Chrysippean possible, as long as Sappho isn't continuously prevented from reading from now on. Correspondingly, an assertible falls under the second part of the definiens of the impossible if (B') it is capable of being true, but is from now on prevented from being true – as in the above example, if Sappho were suddenly struck by incurable blindness or died. Chrysippean necessity of the second type (B') would require continuous prevention of falsehood; non-necessity, at least temporary absence of such prevention. 5. arguments The second main part of Stoic logic is their theory of arguments. Arguments (logoi) form another subclass of complete sayables (DL VII 63); they are neither thought processes nor beliefs, nor linguistic expressions; rather, like assertibles, they are meaningful, incorporeal Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 102 susanne bobzien entities (S. E. PH III 52). However, they are not assertibles, but compounds of them. An argument is defined as a compound or system of premisses and a conclusion (DL VII 45). These are self-complete sayables, standardly assertibles, which I shall call the 'component assertibles' of the argument. The following is a typical Stoic argument: P1 If it is day, it is light. P2 But it is day. C Therefore, it is light. It has a non-simple assertible (P1) as one premiss and a simple assertible (P2) as the other. The non-simple premiss, usually put first, was referred to as 'leading premiss' (hêgemonikon lêmma). The other premiss was called the 'co-assumption' (proslêpsis). It is usually simple; when it is non-simple, it contains fewer constituent assertibles than the leading premiss. It was introduced by 'but' or 'now', and the conclusion by 'therefore'. It was the orthodox Stoic view that an argument must have more than one premiss. A passage in Sextus defines 'premisses' and 'conclusion': the premisses of an argument are the assertibles that are adopted by agreement for the establishing of the conclusion; the conclusion is the assertible established by the premisses (S. E. M VIII 302). A difficulty with this account is that it seems that something only counts as an argument if the premisses – at the very least – appear true to the discussants. This rules out arguments with evidently false premisses such as reductions to the absurd and arguments with premisses the truth of which isn't (yet) known, such as arguments concerning future courses of actions. Difficulties like these may have given rise to the development of the Stoic device of hypothesis and hypothetical arguments: the Stoics thought that occasionally one must postulate some hypothesis as a sort of stepping-stone for the subsequent argument (Epict. Diss. I 7.22). Thus, one or more premisses of an argument could be such a hypothesis in lieu of an assertible; and it seems that hypothetical arguments were arguments with such hypotheses among their premisses. These were apparently phrased as 'Suppose it is night' instead of 'It is night' (Epict. Diss. I 25.11–13). They could be agreed upon qua hypotheses; that is, the interlocutors agree – as it were – to enter a non-actual 'world' built on the relevant assumption, but they Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 103 remain aware of the fact that this assumption and any conclusions drawn hold only relative to the fact that this assumption has been made.12 The most important distinction among arguments is that between valid and invalid ones. The Stoic general criterion was that an argument is valid if the corresponding conditional formed with the conjunction of the premisses as antecedent and the conclusion as consequent is correct (S. E. PH II 137). If the assertible 'If (both P1 and . . . and Pn), then C' is true, then the argument 'P1; . . . Pn; therefore C' is valid. It seems that the criterion for the correctness of the conditional was the Chrysippean one: An argument is valid provided that the contradictory of the conclusion is incompatible with the conjunction of the premisses (DL VII 77). Thus, the Stoic concept of validity resembles our modern one (see also the end of Section 6). But one should recall that the conditional has to be true according to Chrysippus' criterion, which isn't necessarily restricted to logical consequence. This brings out a shortcoming of the Stoic concept of validity, since what is needed is precisely logical consequence. It is unfortunate to have the same concept of consequence for both the antecedent-consequent relation in a conditional and the premisses-conclusion relation in an argument. In any event, the concept of conflict seems too vague to suffice as a proper criterion for validity. In addition to validity, the Stoics assumed that arguments had the properties of truth and falsehood. An argument is true (we would say 'sound') if, besides being valid, it has true premisses; it is false if it is invalid or has a false premiss (DL VII 79). The predicates of truth and falsehood are here based on the truth of assertibles but are used in a derivative sense. The relevance of truth and falsehood of arguments is epistemic: Only a true argument warrants the truth of the conclusion. Since the concept of truth of arguments is based on that of truth of assertibles, and the latter can change their truth-value, so can arguments. For instance, the argument given above will be true at daytime but false at night. It seems that arguments with premisses that did (or could) change truth-value were called 'changing arguments' (metapiptontes logoi) (Epict. Diss. I 7.1). 12 Cf. Bobzien (1997). Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 104 susanne bobzien The Stoics also assumed that arguments could be possible, impossible, necessary, and non-necessary (DL VII 79). These modal predicates, too, would be used in a derivative sense. With Chrysippus' modal accounts, a necessary argument would then be one that either cannot be false or can be false but is hindered by external circumstances from being false, and similarly for the three remaining modalities. 6. syllogistic13 More important for logic proper are the divisions of valid arguments. These are based primarily on the form of the arguments. The most general distinction is that between syllogistic arguments or syllogisms and those called 'valid in the specific sense' (perantikoi eidikôs). The latter are concludent (i.e., they satisfy the general criterion of validity), but not syllogistically so (DL VII 78). Syllogisms are, first, the indemonstrable arguments; and second, those arguments that can be reduced to indemonstrable arguments. The indemonstrable syllogisms are called 'indemonstrable' (anapodeiktoi) because they are not in need of proof or demonstration (DL VII 79), given that their validity is obvious in itself (S. E. M II 223). The talk of five indemonstrables alludes to classes of argument, each class characterized by a particular basic argument form in virtue of which the arguments of that class are understood to be valid. Chrysippus distinguished five such classes; later Stoics, up to seven. The Stoics defined the different kinds of indemonstrables by describing the form of an argument of that kind. The five Chrysippean types were described as follows (S. E. M VIII 224–5; DL VII 80–1). A first indemonstrable is an argument that is composed of a conditional and its antecedent as premisses, having the consequent of the conditional as conclusion. The following is an example: If it is day, it is light. It is day. Therefore it is light. A second indemonstrable is an argument composed of a conditional and the contradictory of its consequent as premisses, having 13 For a detailed discussion of Stoic syllogistic, see Bobzien (1996). Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 105 the contradictory of its antecedent as conclusion; for example: If it is day, it is light. Not: it is day. Therefore not: it is light. A third indemonstrable is an argument composed of a negated conjunction and one of its conjuncts as premisses, having the contradictory of the other conjunct as conclusion; for example: Not: both Plato is dead and Plato is alive. Plato is dead. Therefore not: Plato is alive. A fourth indemonstrable is an argument composed of a disjunctive assertible and one of its disjuncts as premisses, having the contradictory of the remaining disjunct as conclusion; for example: Either it is day or it is night. It is day. Therefore not: it is night. A fifth indemonstrable, finally, is an argument composed of a disjunctive assertible and the contradictory of one of its disjuncts as premisses, having the remaining disjunct as conclusion; for example: Either it is day or it is night. Not: it is day. Therefore it is night. Each of the five types of indemonstrables thus consists – in the simplest case – of a non-simple assertible as leading premiss and a simple assertible as co-assumption, having another simple assertible as conclusion. The leading premisses use all and only the connectives that Chrysippus distinguished. The descriptions of the indemonstrables encompass many more arguments than the examples suggest, and this for three reasons. First, in the case of the third, fourth, and fifth indemonstrables, the descriptions of the argument form provide for 'commutativity' in the sense that it is left open which constituent assertible or contradictory of a constituent assertible is taken as co-assumption. Second, the descriptions are all given in terms of assertibles and their contradictories, not in terms of affirmative and negative Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 106 susanne bobzien assertibles. In all five cases, the first premiss can have any of the four combinations of affirmative and negative assertibles: for instance, in the case of the first and second indemonstrable (if we symbolize affirmative assertibles by p, q, negative ones by 'not: p', 'not: q'): if p, q if not: p, q if p, not: q if not: p, not: q. Combining these two points, we obtain four subtypes under the first and second descriptions of indemonstrables and eight in the case of the third, fourth, and fifth (i.e., thirty-two subtypes in all). The third reason for the multitude of kinds of indemonstrables is the fact that the descriptions, as formulated, permit the constituent assertibles of the leading premisses to be themselves non-simple. And indeed, we have an example that is called a second indemonstrable and that is of the kind: If both p and q, r; now not:r; therefore not: 〈both p and〉 q. In addition to describing the five types of indemonstrables at the meta-level, the Stoics employed another way of determining their basic forms; namely, by virtue of modes (tropoi). A mode is defined as 'a sort of scheme of an argument' (DL VII 76). An example of the (or a) mode of the first indemonstrable would be: If the first, the second; now the first; therefore the second. It differs from a first indemonstrable in that ordinal numbers have taken the place of the antecedent and consequent of the leading premiss, and the same ordinals are re-used where the antecedent and consequent assertibles recur in co-assumption and conclusion. A mode is syllogistic when a corresponding argument with the same form is a syllogism. It seems that the modes, and parts of modes, performed at least three functions in the Stoic theory of arguments. First, the modes functioned as forms in which the different indemonstrables – and other arguments – were propounded (S. E. M VIII 227). If, for instance, one wants to propound a first indemonstrable, the mode provides a syntactic standard form in which one has (ideally) to couch it. When employed in this way, the modes resemble argument forms: the ordinals do not stand in for particular assertibles; rather, their function resembles that of schematic letters. So, any argument that is propounded in a particular syllogistic mode is a valid argument, but the mode itself isn't an argument. The logical Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 107 form presented by a syllogistic mode is the reason for the particular argument's formal validity. In this function, the modes can be used to check the validity of arguments. In the two other ways in which modes and ordinal numbers are employed, the ordinals seem to stand in for assertibles and the modes are used as abbreviations of particular arguments rather than as argument forms. Thus, in the analysis of complex syllogisms (discussed later in this section), for purposes of simplicity and lucidity, ordinals may stand in for simple assertibles, in the sequence of their occurrence in the argument (S. E. M VIII 235–7). And in the so-called mode-arguments (logotropoi), the constituent assertibles are given in full when first occurring, but are then replaced by ordinal numbers, as in the following: If it is day, it is light. Now the first. Therefore the second (DL VII 77). In which respects then are all and only the indemonstrables basic and evident? We can infer from the presentation of the types of indemonstrables that their validity is grounded on their form. We can also list some ways of being basic and evident which Chrysippus cannot have had in mind. First, it seems that Chrysippus was not entertaining the idea of minimizing connectives (see Section 3, p. 99). Second, Chrysippus cannot have been concerned to minimize the number of types of indemonstrables: for, with the help of the first thema, second indemonstrables can be reduced to first ones (and vice versa), and fifth to fourth ones (and vice versa), and this can hardly have escaped his attention. Third, Chrysippus seems not to have aimed at deducing the conclusions from premisses of the minimum possible strength. For any conclusion one can draw from a first or second indemonstrable (with a leading premiss 'If p, q'), one could also draw from a corresponding third indemonstrable (with a leading premiss 'Not: both p and not:q'). The extra requirement in the truth-criterion for the conditional – compared with the negated conjunction – i.e., the element of conflict, seems irrelevant to the conclusions one can draw. What could have been Chrysippus' positive criteria for choosing the indemonstrables? In the indemonstrables – and consequently in all syllogisms – all and only the Chrysippean connectives ('and', 'if', Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 108 susanne bobzien 'or') and the negation ('not') are used to construct non-simple assertibles. Among these non-simple assertibles, Chrysippus distinguished a particular class entitled 'mode-forming assertibles' (tropika axiômata). These were apparently conditionals, disjunctions, and negations of conjunctions. All indemonstrables have as leading premiss such a 'mode-forming assertible', and perhaps the deductive power of the indemonstrables was thought to be somehow grounded on these. Perhaps the thought was that the validity of the indemonstrables could not reasonably be doubted, because understanding the mode-forming premisses implies knowing the validity of the corresponding forms of the indemonstrables. (Understanding 'Not: both p and q' implies knowing that if one of them holds, the other doesn't; understanding 'If p, q' implies knowing that (i) if p holds, so does q, and (ii) if q doesn't hold, neither does p; and so on.) This kind of criterion would, for instance, fail the following candidate for indemonstrability, although it is simple and evident in some way: p, q, therefore p and q. It wouldn't rank as an indemonstrable since understanding p doesn't imply knowing that if q then 'p and q'. The situation is complicated by the fact that Chrysippus also recognized fifth indemonstrables with several 〈disjuncts〉 (S. E. PH I 69). They are of the following kind: Either p or q or r Now, neither p nor q Therefore r. Their form obviously differs from that of the fifth indemonstrables as given above. Such arguments cannot be reduced to some combination of indemonstrables, and this could be why Chrysippus regarded them as indemonstrables. However, as the name implies, he did not introduce them as 'sixth indemonstrables'; rather, they are a special version of the fifth – that is, they are fifth indemonstrables. If we take this seriously, we have to revise our understanding of the fifth indemonstrable. We should assume that the leading premiss in a fifth indemonstrable has two or more disjuncts, and that the 'basic idea' which one grasps when one understands the disjunctive connective is 'necessarily precisely one out of several' rather than '. . . out of two'. As a consequence, one also has to modify one's Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 109 understanding of the co-assumption: its description 'the contradictory of one of its disjuncts' becomes a special case of 'the contradictory of one or more of its disjuncts', the added possibility coming down to 'the conjunction of the negation of all but one of them'. Such co-assumptions were standardly expressed with 'neither . . . nor . . .' (e.g., S. E. PH I 69). In some Latin authors we find lists of seven basic syllogisms which may be of Stoic origin (e.g., Cic. Topics 53–57; Martianus Capella IV 414–421). The lists vary slightly from one source to another, but the first five types always correspond closely to Chrysippus' indemonstrables. Perhaps the sixth and seventh types were intended to have pseudo-disjunctions as leading premisses, but the texts are unclear on this point. Not all Stoic syllogisms are indemonstrables. Non-indemonstrable syllogisms can be more complex than indemonstrables in that they have more than two premisses, but they can also have just two premisses. For example, in our sources we find Stoic nonindemonstrable syllogisms of the following kinds: If both p and q, r; not r; p; therefore not:q. If p, p; if not:p, p; either p or not:p; therefore p. If p, if p, q; p; therefore q. The Stoics distinguished and discussed several special cases of syllogisms, both indemonstrable and non-indemonstrable. First, there are the indifferently concluding arguments (adiaphorôs perainontes), such as: Either it is day or it is light. Now it is day. Therefore it is day. (Alex. In Ar. Top. 10.10–12) This argument is of the kind: Either p or q; p; therefore p. The name of these arguments is presumably based on the fact that it is irrelevant for their validity what comes in as second disjunct. Often mentioned in tandem with the indifferently concluding arguments are the so-called duplicated arguments (diaphoroumenoi logoi) (Alex. In Ar. Top. 10.7–10). It seems that their name rests on the fact that their leading premiss is a 'duplicated assertible'; that is, Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 110 susanne bobzien composed of the same simple assertible, used twice or several times (cf. DL VII 68–9). The standard example is: If it is day, it is day. Now it is day. Therefore it is day. It is a special case of the first indemonstrable. A third type of syllogism was those with two mode-forming premisses; that is, arguments composed of two mode-forming assertibles as premisses and a simple assertible as conclusion: our examples are of this kind: If p, q; if p, not:q; therefore not:p. The following is a Stoic example: If you know you are dead, you are dead. If you know you are dead, not: you are dead. Therefore not: you know you are dead. (Orig. Contra Celsum VII 15) It is likely that the Stoics distinguished further types of syllogisms (Alex. In Ar. An. pr. 164.27–31). Arguments of all these kinds were syllogisms. And, since all syllogisms are either indemonstrable or can be reduced to indemonstrables, these arguments, too – if they are not indemonstrables themselves – should be reducible to indemonstrables. The Stoic expression for reducing arguments was to analyze them into indemonstrables (DL VII 195). What is the purpose of such an analysis? It is a method of proving that certain arguments are formally valid by showing how they stand in a certain relation to indemonstrables. This relation between the argument-to-be-analyzed and the indemonstrables is basically either that the argument is a composite of several indemonstrables, or that it is a conversion of an indemonstrable, or that it is a mixture of both. The analysis was carried out with certain logical meta-rules, called 'themata', which determined these relations. They were argumental rules; that is, rules that can only be applied to arguments. They reduce arguments to arguments, not (say) assertibles to assertibles. Our sources suggest that there were four of them (Alex. In Ar. An. pr. 284.13–17; Galen PHP II 3.188). We know further that the Stoics had some logical meta-rules, called 'theorems', which were relevant for the analysis of arguments (DL VII 195; S. E. M VIII 231). Since the themata were regarded as sufficient Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 111 for the analysis of all non-indemonstrable syllogisms, the function of some of the theorems was presumably to facilitate the analysis. Stoic analysis is strictly an upwards method (to the indemonstrables) rather than a downwards method (from the indemonstrables). Analysis always starts with a given non-indemonstrable argument, and with the question whether it can be analyzed into indemonstrables by means of the themata. There are no signs that the Stoics ever tried to establish systematically what kinds of formally valid nonindemonstrable arguments could be deduced or derived from their set of indemonstrables with the themata. Related to this point is the fact that Stoic analysis was carried through with the arguments themselves, not with argument forms – although, of course, the analysis depends precisely on the form of the arguments. This appears to imply that analysis had to be carried out again and again from scratch, each time the (formal) validity of a non-indemonstrable argument was in question. But this need not have been so: the Stoics seem to have introduced certain meta-rules, which would state that if an argument is of such and such a form, it is a syllogism or can be analysed into indemonstrables in such and such a way (S. E. PH II 3 together with Orig. Contra Celsum VII 15.166–7). Moreover, sometimes the modes were employed in order to facilitate the reduction; that is, ordinal numbers were used as abbreviations for constituent assertibles (S. E. M VIII 234–6). Such abbreviation brings out the form of the argument and makes it easier to recognize which thema can be used. How did Stoic analysis work in detail?14 How were the themata and theorems applied to arguments? Let us look first at the first thema: When from two 〈assertibles〉 a third follows, then from either of them together with the contradictory of the conclusion the contradictory of the other follows (Apul. De int. 191.6–10). The wording of the rule leaves the premiss order undetermined. It can be presented formally as: (T1) P1, P2 |P3 P1, ctrd P3 |ctrd P2 14 Warning: On the following pages the discussion gets a little more technical. Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 112 susanne bobzien 'ctrd' stands for 'contradictory', '|-' for 'therefore'; P1, P2 . . . mark places for assertibles. In an application of the rule, the argumentto-be-analysed would occupy the bottom line, the syllogism into which it is analysed the top line. For instance, if we have a nonindemonstrable argument of the kind p; not:q; therefore not: if p, q this can be reduced to a first indemonstrable of the kind If p, q; p; therefore q by employing the first thema as follows: When from 'p' and 'if p, q' 'q' follows (this being the indemonstrable), then from 'p' and 'not: q' 'not: if p, q' follows (this being the non-indemonstrable argument). Or formalized: If p, q; p |q (T1) p; not:q |not: if p, q Whenever this procedure leads to one of the five indemonstrables, the argument-to-be-analysed is a syllogism. Application of the rule to all possible kinds of simple non-indemonstrable arguments leads thus to the reduction of syllogisms of four further types. As we will see, the first thema can also be employed several times in the same reduction, or in combination with one or more of the other rules of analysis. It is helpful to consider the meta-rule known as a 'dialectical theorem' before discussing the remaining three themata: When we have (the) premisses which deduce some conclusion, we potentially have that conclusion too in those premisses, even if it isn't expressly stated. (S. E. M VIII 231) This theorem presumably did the same work as the second, third, and fourth themata together. Plainly, as it stands, it doesn't fully determine a method of analysis. It is only a general presentation of a principle. But a passage in Sextus (S. E. M VIII 230–8) illustrates how the analysis works, by applying it to two arguments. In the second example, the analysis is carried out first with the mode of the argument, then by employing the argument itself. Let us look at the former, which begins by presenting the mode of the argumentto-be-analysed: Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 113 For this type of argument is composed of a second and a third indemonstrable, as one can learn from its analysis, which will become clearer if we use the mode for our exposition, which runs as follows: If the first and the second, the third. But not the third. Moreover, the first. Therefore not: the second. For since we have a conditional with the conjunction of the first and the second as antecedent and with the third as consequent, and we also have the contradictory of the consequent, 'Not: the third', we will also deduce the contradictory of the antecedent, 'Therefore not: the first and the second', by a second indemonstrable. But in fact, this very proposition is contained potentially in the argument, since we have the premisses from which it can be deduced, although in the presentation of the argument it is omitted. By combining it with the remaining premiss, the first, we will have deduced the conclusion 'Therefore not: the second' by a third indemonstrable. Hence there are two indemonstrables, one of this kind If the first and the second, the third. But not: the third. Therefore not: the first and the second. which is a second indemonstrable; the other, which is a third indemonstrable, runs like this: Not: the first and the second. But the first. Therefore not: the second. Such is the analysis in the case of the mode, and there is an analogous analysis in the case of the argument (S. E. M VIII 235–7). The general procedure of reduction with the dialectical theorem is then as follows: take any two of the premisses of the argument-tobe-analysed and try to deduce a conclusion from them, by forming with them an indemonstrable. Then take that 'potential' conclusion and look whether by adding any of the premisses, you can deduce another conclusion, again by forming an indemonstrable. (The old premisses are still in the game and can be taken again, if required, as is plain from Sextus' first example: S. E. M VIII 232–3.) Proceed in this manner until all premisses have been used at least once and the last assertible deduced is the original conclusion. In that case, you have shown that the argument-to-be-analysed is a syllogism. Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 114 susanne bobzien Thus, the dialectical theorem turns out to be a rule for chainarguments by which a complex non-indemonstrable is split into two component arguments. The theorem should suffice to analyse all composite arguments; that is, all arguments with any of the following as underlying or 'hidden' structures. (A triangle gives the form of a simple two-premiss argument with the letter at the bottom giving the place of the conclusion. P1 . . . Pn give the places of the premisses; C that of the conclusion of the argument-to-be-analysed; P∗n that of a premiss that is a 'potential conclusion' and hence doesn't show in the argument-to-be-analysed. The type of argument-to-be-analysed has been added underneath each time.) Type (1) (three premiss arguments) P1 P2 P3* P4 C P1, P2, P4 |C The argument in the above quotation, for instance, is of this type. Type (2) (four premiss arguments) type (2a) type (2b)P1 P5* P6* P4 C P3 P2 P5* P6* C P1 P2 P3 P4 P1, P2, P3, P4 |C Expansions of these types are gained by inserting two-premiss arguments into the original argument in such a way that their conclusion is one of the formerly unasterisked premisses. These Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 115 conclusions then count as 'potential'; that is, do not appear in the argument-to-be-analysed; they accordingly get an '∗'. As is clear from Sextus' first example of analysis (S. E. M VIII 232–3), the dialectical theorem also covers inferences in which the same premiss is implicitly used more than once, but occurs only once in the original argument. The most basic type of these is: Type (3) P3* P2* C P1 P2 P1, P2 |C Sextus' first example, which is of the kind 'If p, if p, q; p |q', is of this type. A more complex case is: Type (4) P4* P5* C P1 P2 P1* P3 P1, P2, P3 |C Again, all expansions and variations of these types, and moreover all their combinations with Type (1), can be analysed by repeated use of the theorem. If one takes together the first thema and the dialectical theorem, with their help all non-indemonstrable Stoic syllogisms of which we know can be analysed into Stoic indemonstrables. Next are the second, third, and fourth Stoic themata. Formulations of the third thema have survived in two sources (Simp. Cael. 237.2–4; Alex. In Ar. An. pr. 278.12–14). The second and fourth are not handed down. However, a tentative reconstruction of them and of the general method of analysis with the themata is possible since Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 116 susanne bobzien there are a number of requirements that these three themata have to satisfy:  The second, third, and fourth themata together should cover the same ground as the dialectical theorem.  The themata have to be applicable, in the sense that by using them one can find out whether an argument is a syllogism.  They have to be simple enough to be formulated in ordinary Greek.  The second thema, possibly in tandem with the first, must reduce the indifferently concluding arguments and the arguments with two mode-premisses.  The third and fourth themata should show some similarity or should be used together in some analyses (Galen PHP II 3.188). The following is a reconstruction that satisfies these requirements.15 One source presents the third thema thus: When from two 〈assertibles〉 a third follows, and from the one that follows 〈i.e., the third〉 together with another, external assumption, another follows, then this other follows from the first two and the externally co-assumed one. (Simp. Cael. 237.2–4) Thus, like the dialectical theorem, the third thema is a kind of chain-argument rule which allows one to break up a complex argument into two component arguments. Or formally: (P1, P2, . . . give the places for non-external premisses; E, E1, E2 . . . for external premisses; C for the conclusion of the argument-to-be-analysed). P1, P2 |P3 P3, E |C P1, P2, E |C For the analysis of arguments with more than three premisses, one needs an expanded version of the third thema in which one of the component arguments has more than two premisses. One obtains this if one modifies Simplicius' version in such a way that the second component argument can have more than one 'external premiss'. The expanded version then runs: 15 This reconstruction is based on Bobzien (1996). For alternative reconstructions, see Mueller (1979), Ierodiakonou (1990), Mignucci (1993). Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 117 When from two assertibles a third follows, and from the third and one or more external assertibles another follows, then this other follows from the first two and those external(s). Or formalized: (T3) P1P2 |P3 P3, E1 . . . En |C P1, P2, E1 . . . En |C There are two types of composite arguments the reduction of which isn't covered by the third thema: first, those in which there are no 'external' premisses, but instead one of the premisses used in the first component argument is used again in the second component argument; second, those in which both a premiss of the first component argument and one or more external premisses are used in the second component argument. I conjecture that the remaining two themata covered these two cases. They hence could have run: When from two assertibles a third follows, and from the third and one (or both) of the two another follows, then this other follows from the first two. Formalized: (T2) P1, P2 |P3 P1, (P2,) P3 |C P1, P2 |C And: When from two assertibles a third follows, and from the third and one (or both) of the two and one (or more) external assertible(s) another follows, then this other follows from the first two and the external(s). Formalized: (T4) P1, P2 |P3 P3, P1, (P2,) E1 . . . En |C P1, P2, E1 . . . En |C Each of the second to fourth themata thus has a typical kind of argument to which it applies; but they can also be used in combination or more than once in one reduction. Going back to the types of arguments distinguished when discussing the dialectical theorem, one can see that arguments of Type (1) take the third thema once; those of Types (2a) and (2b) take it twice. More complex ones – without implicitly multiplied premisses – take it more often. Arguments of Type (3) take the second thema once; those of Type (4) take the fourth and third each once. More complex arguments may take combinations of the second, third, and fourth themata. Occasionally, the first Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 118 susanne bobzien thema is needed in addition. Taken together, the second, third, and fourth themata cover precisely the range of the dialectical theorem. How were the themata applied? Before I describe the general method of analysis, here are a few examples. First, take again the second example from the Sextus passage (S. E. M VIII 230–8). The argument-to-be-analysed is of the following kind: If both p and q, r; not:r; p |not:q. It has three premisses and takes the third thema once. By simply 'inserting' this argument into the thema we obtain: When from two assertibles [i.e., If both p and q, r; not:r] a third follows [i.e., not: both p and q (by a second indemonstrable)] and from the third and an external one [i.e., p] another follows [i.e., not: q (by a third indemonstrable)] then this other [i.e., not: q] also follows from the two assertibles and the external one. Or, using the formalized thema: If both p and q, r; not:r |not:both p and q Not:both p and q; p |not:q (T3) If both p and q, r; not:r; p |not:q We obtain examples of the use of the second thema from some of the special types of non-indemonstrable arguments. Indifferently concluding arguments like: Either p or q; p |p use the second thema once and reduce to one fourth and one fifth indemonstrable: Either p or q; p |not:q Either p or q; not:q |p (T2) Either p or q; p |p Syllogisms with two mode-premisses like those of the kind: If p, q; If p, not:q; therefore not:p Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 119 take the first thema twice, the second once and reduce to two first indemonstrables. The analysis works again step by step from the bottom line (a) to the top line (d): (d) p; if p, not:q |not:q (T1) (c) If p, q; p |q p, q |not: if p, not:q (T2) (b) If p, q; p |not: if p, not:q (T1) (a) If p, q; If p, not:q |not:p The general method of analysis into indemonstrables by themata appears then to have worked as follows: In a very first step, you check whether the argument-to-be-analysed is an indemonstrable. If so, it is valid. If not, you next try to choose from the set of premisses of the argument-to-be-analysed two from which a conclusion can be deduced by forming an indemonstrable with them. If the argument-tobe-analysed is a syllogism, this conclusion, together with the remaining premiss(es) (if there are any), and/or one or both of the premisses that have been used already, entails the original conclusion – either by forming an indemonstrable or by forming an argument that by use of the four themata can be analysed into one or more indemonstrables. Next you see whether one of the remaining premisses plus this conclusion yields the premisses to another indemonstrable (in which case you apply the third thema); if there are no remaining premisses, or none of them works, you find out whether one of the premisses already used in the first step is such a premiss (in which case you apply the second or fourth thema). If the second component argument thus formed is an indemonstrable too, and all premisses have been used at least once and the last conclusion is the original conclusion, the analysis is finished, the argument-to-be-analysed a syllogism. If not, the same procedure is repeated with the argument which isn't an indemonstrable (i.e., the second component argument, which has the original conclusion as conclusion); and so forth until the premisses of the second component argument imply the original conclusion by forming an indemonstrable with it. If at any point in the analysis no indemonstrable can be formed, the first thema might help: namely, if the negation of the conclusion would produce a premiss you need; that is, a premiss that together with one of the available premisses makes up a pair of premisses for an indemonstrable. If at Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 120 susanne bobzien any step the application of none of the themata leads to two premisses that can be used in an indemonstrable, the argument is not a syllogism. This method of reduction is practicable and easy. All one has to know is the themata and the five types of indemonstrables, plus those four types of simple arguments which can be reduced to indemonstrables by the first thema. The number of steps one has to go through is finite; they are not very many, even in complex cases. The method appears to be effective. Stoic syllogistic is a system consisting of five basic types of syllogisms and four argumental rules by which all other syllogisms can be reduced to those of the basic types (DL VII 78, cf. S. E. PH II 156–7; 194). The Stoics didn't explicitly claim any completeness for their system, but their claim of the reducability of all non-indemonstrable syllogisms can be taken as a statement of completeness of sorts. It is also plausible to assume that the Stoics endorsed some pretechnical notion of syllogismhood, and that the indemonstrables plus themata were understood to 'capture' this notion; perhaps also to make it more precise. This leaves us with the problem of how we can find the independent Stoic criteria for syllogismhood; that is, how we can decide which features of the Stoic system preceded their choice of logical rules and which are simply a result of their introducing these rules. However, there is little evidence about what was the Stoic pretechnical notion of syllogismhood, and we cannot hope to decide whether the Stoics achieved completeness on their own terms. All we can do is determine some features of the Stoic system that are relevant to its completeness. The Stoic system shared the following condition of validity with modern semantic interpretations of formal logic: It is necessary for the validity of an argument that it isn't the case that its premisses are true and its conclusion is false. Accordingly, it is a necessary condition for formal validity (i.e., syllogismhood) that no syllogism or argument of a valid form has true premisses and a false conclusion. To this we can add a couple of necessary conditions for Stoic syllogismhood which are not requirements for formal validity in the modern sense, and which show that the class of Stoic syllogisms can at most be a proper subclass of valid arguments in the modern sense. First, there is a formal condition which restricts the class of syllogisms not by denying validity to certain arguments, but by denying Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 121 the status of argumenthood to certain compounds of assertibles: The Stoic concept of argument is narrower than that of modern logic in that an argument must have a minimum of two premisses and a conclusion. Stoic syllogistic considers only arguments of the form  |A in which  is a set of premisses with at least two (distinct) elements. Stoic syllogistic doesn't deal with arguments of the forms |A A |B or  |-. There is also no one-to-one correspondence between valid arguments and logically true conditionals. Such a correspondence exists only between a proper subclass of the latter – those which have the form 'If both A and B and . . . , then C' – and valid arguments. Second, there is a restriction of validity through the requirement of non-redundancy of the premisses: An argument is invalid owing to redundancy if it has one or more premisses that are added to it from outside and superfluously (S. E. M II 431). For cases of non-indemonstrable arguments, one may interpret the clause 'from outside and superfluously' as meaning that there is no deduction in which this premiss, together with the others of the argument, entails the conclusion. The requirement of non-redundancy means that the following kinds of arguments count as invalid: p; q; therefore p If p, q; p; r; therefore q although they are valid in all standard propositional calculi. We can now show that the Stoic system of syllogisms captures the pretechnical elements of syllogismhood as determined by the requirements stated. First, no oneor zero-premiss arguments are reducible, since every indemonstrable has two premisses; and every thema can be applied only to arguments with two or more premisses. Second, redundant arguments cannot be reduced: The indemonstrables have no 'redundant' premisses, and the themata require that all premisses of the argument-to-be-analysed are components of the indemonstrables into which it is analyzed – either as premiss or as negation of a conclusion. So far then, at least, Stoic syllogistic coincides with what may have been their pretechnical notion of syllogismhood. Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 122 susanne bobzien 7. arguments valid in the specific sense Finally, we come to the second group of valid arguments distinguished by the Stoics, those called 'valid in the specific sense' (DL VII 78–9). The surviving information on these arguments is sparse and many details are under dispute. At least two subclasses were distinguished. One was the subsyllogistic arguments (hyposyllogistikoi logoi), another was the arguments named 'unmethodically concluding' (amethodôs perainontes); there may have been others. The Stoics held that all valid arguments were constructed by means of the indemonstrable syllogisms (ibid.). If we take this at face value, the validity of the specifically valid arguments may have been justified by the validity of syllogisms. One would expect this justification to vary from subclass to subclass. Subsyllogistic arguments differ from the corresponding syllogisms only in that one (or more) of their component assertibles, although being equivalent to those in the syllogism, diverge from them in their linguistic form (Galen Institutio logica XIX 6). Examples are of the following type: 'p' follows from 'q'; but p; therefore q instead of a first indemonstrable. We may assume that the reason why subsyllogistic arguments weren't syllogisms was that they didn't share their canonical form. This distinction displays an awareness of the difference between objectand meta-language: A conditional is indeed not the same as a statement that one assertible follows from another. The validity of a subsyllogistic argument may have been established by constructing a corresponding syllogism and pointing out the equivalence. The following is a Stoic example for an unmethodically concluding argument: You say that it is day. But you speak truly. Therefore it is day. (Galen Institutio logica XVII 2) This isn't a syllogism. It is neither an indemonstrable nor can it be reduced to one, since it contains no non-simple assertible as component. What was the reason for the validity of such arguments? Perhaps they were dubbed 'unmethodically concluding' because there Cambridge Companions Online © Cambridge University Press, 2006 Stoic Logic 123 is no formal method of showing their validity; but even then their validity should have been justified somehow – and if we take the remark at DL VII 79 seriously, these justifications should have involved some suitably related syllogisms. But we have no direct evidence that suggests a way of detecting 'corresponding syllogisms', as in the case of the subsyllogisticals. Several other arguments were considered valid by some Stoics; some of these may have counted as specifically valid arguments. First, the single-premiss arguments (monolêmmatoi): The orthodox Stoic view was that arguments must have at least two premisses. However, Antipater admitted single-premiss arguments, and he presumably regarded at least some as valid. If we trust Apuleius, Antipater adduced arguments like the following: You see. Therefore you are alive. (Apul. De int. 184.16–23) What reasons he had for admitting these, we are not told. It is unlikely that Antipater proposed that they were syllogisms. For they are not formally valid. Antipater may have regarded them as unmethodically concluding, perhaps with a nonexplicit assumption of the kind 'If someone sees, that one is alive.' Second, there are the arguments with an indefinite leading premiss and a definite co-assumption mentioned previously in the context of non-simple assertibles. A typical example is: If someone walks that one moves. This person walks. Therefore this person moves. Despite the similarity, this isn't a straightforward first indemonstrable. How did the Stoics justify their validity? Presumably by referring to the truth-conditions of the leading premiss. Since its truth implies the truth of all subordinated assertibles, one can always derive the particular conditional one needs ('If this one walks, this one moves') and thus form the needed syllogism – in this case, a first indemonstrable. This relation between the indefinite conditional and the corresponding definite ones may have counted as an implicit assumption by which validity was justified (but which, if added, wouldn't make the argument formally valid).

E L I N O R M A S O N (corresponding to what I call the objective, the subjective, and the pro‐ spective)but argues that prospectivismuses the primary sense of 'ought'. 27. Prichard, "Duty and Ignoranceof Fact," p. 93. 28. Graham, " InDefenseof Objectivismabout MoralObligation," pp. 91‐92. 29. Prichard, "Duty and Ignorance of Fact," p. 94. 3o. Prichard, "Duty and Ignorance of Fact," p. 94. 31. Zimmerman, Living with Uncertainty, pp. 13‐14. 32. Hudson, "Subjectivization in Ethics," p. 224. 33. Lockhart, Moral Uncertainty and Its Consequences. See also Sepielli, "What to Do WhenYou Don't KnowWhat to Do";andBykvist, "How to do Wrong Knowingly and Get Away with It," pp. 35‐36. 34. Graham, " In Defense of Objectivism about Moral Obligation." This strategy is also suggested by Bykvist, "How to do Wrong Knowingly andGet Away with It," pp. 35‐38; Portmore, Commonsense Consequen‐ tialism, pp. 15 ‐16;andDriver,Consequentialism,p. I 25.Smart says that what is right is what would actually produce best consequences ("An Outline ofaSystemofUtilitarianEthics," p.47) andyet that one ought to dowhat would maximize probable benefit [p. 12),but he does n o t defend the divergence in concepts here. 35. For more on this see Mason, "Objectivism and Prospectivism about Rightness," pp. 17‐19. in B. Eggleston and D. Miller (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Utilitarianism (Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 199‐219. C H R I S H E A T H W O O D IO Subjective theories of well-being T H E T O P I C O F W E L L B E I N G Classical hedonistic utilitarianism makes the following claims: that our fundamental moralobligation is to make the world asgoodaswe can make it [consequentialism); that the world is made better just when the creatures in it are made better off (welfarism); and that creatures are madebetteroff just in case they receivea greaterbalance of pleasure over pain (hedonism). The third of these claims is essen‐ tially a theory of well-being. Other forms ofutilitarianism make use of different accounts of well-being, but whatever the version of util‐ itarianism, well-being appears in the foundations. Thus a complete examinationof utilitarianism includes a study of well-being. Wecan get at o u r topic in morefamiliar ways aswell, and our topic is of interest independently of the role it plays in utilitarian theory. We can get at o u r topic by taking n o t e of some obvious facts: that some livesgobetter thanothers; that some things that befall us in life aregood, andothersbad; that certain things are harmfulto peopleand others beneficial. Each of these facts involves the concept of well‐ being, or welfare, or ofa life goingwell for the person living i t . Many other familiar expressions ‐ 'quality of life', 'a life worth living', 'the good life', ' in one'sbest interest', 'What's in it for me?' ‐ involve the same notion. We thus make claims about well-being all the time. Suchclaims naturallygive rise to aphilosophical question: What is it that makes a life go well or badly for the person living it? Our question is n o t the perhapsmore familiar question: What sorts of things tend to cause people to be better or worse off? It is interest‐ ing to investigate whether people's lives are made better by, say, Thanks to PaulBowman, Ben Bradley,BenEggleston,EdenLin , DaleMiller,andIason Raibley. I 9 9 2.00 C H R I S H E A T H W O O D winning the lottery, spending less time on the internet, or having children. But these are n o t the sorts of questions that philosophers of well-being ask. If your life would be made better by winning the lottery, this is due to the effects that winning the lottery would have on other features of your life, such ason your ability to pay for college or on the sorts of vacations you could take (and the value of these latter things might similarly lie wholly in their effects). But in the philosophy of well‐being, we are trying to figure ou t what things are in themselves in our interest to have.We are asking, that is, what things are intrinsically good or bad for people, as opposed to what things are merely instrumentally good or bad for people. No r is our question: What things make the world intrinsically better orworse? The philosophicalquestion of welfare is the question of what things are intrinsicallygoodforpeople,andothersubjectsofwelfare.But we also make claims about what things are goodperiod, or good "from the point of view of the Universe."I For example, some people believe that it is good in itself when somethingbeautiful exists, even when no one will ever observe it . Whether or n o t this view is correct, philoso‐ phers of well‐beingare n o t askingabout this kindofvalue. But it is easy to confuseit withwell-being,because the clearest exampleofsomething that makes the worldbetteris someone'8havingthingsgobetterfor him or her.The claim that it is goodwhen things go well for someone is n o t trivial, however.The easiest way to see this isto notice that it mayhave exceptions. It may fail to be a good thing, for example, when wicked people are well-off,perhaps it would bebetter if they were badly off. Finally,our questionisnot:What sort of lifemakesfor amorallygood life? It seems that we can easily imagine someone leading a morally upstanding life that turns out to beof no benefit to her. But even if we became persuaded, through philosophical argument, that this is n o t possible, perhaps because moral virtue is its own reward, it still seems that beingwell-off and beingmoralare distinct phenomena. It hardly needs arguingthat the question of what makes aperson's life go well is important. First, the question is just inherently inter‐ esting, andworth studying in its own right, even if answering it were relevant to no other important questions. It alsohas obviouspractical implications: mos t of us w a n t to get a good life, and knowing what one is might help us get one. Aside from these direct reasons to be interested, our topic is relevant to many of the m o s t important ques‐ tions we aspeople face. Most obviously, it is relevant to our moral Subjective theories of well-being 2 0 1 obligations. This isofcourse true if utilitarianism istrue, but it isno less t r u e otherwise.Foron any plausiblemoral theory, the effects that an a c t would have on the welfare of people and other animals is at least one morally relevant consideration.Utilitarianismstands out in claiming that well‐being is the only basic morally relevant factor. Well-being also matters for politics. When deciding which political systems, institutions, and laws we ought to adopt, one obviously relevant factor is how well people will fare under the possible schemes. Well-being relates also to justice. O n e kind of justice, for instance, involves distributing welfare according to desert. The con‐ cept of well-being is also tied upwith many virtues and vices, moral and non-moral. For example, a considerate person is one who fre‐ quently considers the interests of others, while a selfish person does this insufficiently. A personwho can delay gratification for the sake ofher long-term interests is aprudent person [this iswhy 'prudential value' is yet another synonym for 'well-being'). Welfare is probably also conceptually connected to each of the following phenomena: love, empathy, care, envy, pity, dread, reward, punishment, compas‐ sion, hatred, and malice. Seeing the connections that the concept of welfare has to other concepts can even help us to identify the very concept we mean to be asking about in the first place. SUBJECTIVE V S . OBIECTIVE T H E O R I E S O F W E L L B E I N G The distinction One way to begin answering the question of what makes a person's life go well for him or her is simply to produce a list of things whose presence in our lives seems to make them better. Here is an incom‐ plete list of some possibilities: enjoyment freedom happiness being respected knowledge health achieving one's goals 2 0 2 C H R I S H E AT HWOOD friendship gettingwhat one wan ts beinga goodperson being in love creative activity contemplating important questions aesthetic appreciation excelling atworthwhile activities Most or all of these have opposites that are intuitively bad, but to keep things simpler, wewill focus on the good things. Something interesting about our list above is that all of the items on it are things that mos t people enjoy, and wan t in their lives.They are things we have positive attitudes toward (or, in some cases, they just are positive attitudes). This raises a question that is among the deepest andmos t central to thephilosophicalstudyofwell-being: Are the things on the list above good solely in virtue of the positive attitudes that we have toward them, or do they benefit uswhether or n o t wehave these attitudes toward them.2 AsSocratesmight have p u t the question: Do we wan t these things in our lives because it is good to have them, or is it good to have them in our lives becausewe wan t them?2 This is essentially the question ofwhether well-being is objective or subjective. Subjectivists maintain that something can benefit a person only if he wants i t , likes i t , or cares about i t , or it otherwise connects up in some important way with some positive attitude of his. Objectivists deny this, holding that at least some of the things that make our lives better do so independently of our particular interests, likes,and cares. What do we mean by 'positive attitude'? We mean to include attitudes of favoring something, wanting i t , caring about i t , valuing i t , believing it valuable, liking i t , trying to get i t , having it asagoal, being fond of i t , being for i t , having an interest in i t , and the like. Philosophers call these 'pro-attitudes'.3 No t all subjective theories of well-being hold that all the attitudes just listed are relevant to well‐ being.A particular subjective theory will oftensingle o u t one of them asthe pro-attitude that is required for a personto bebenefitted. In thenex t section,wewil l survey someof theparticularvarieties of subjective theory; in theremainderof this section,wewil l lookatwhat is perhaps the mos t important reason for preferring the general Subjective theories of well-being 203 subjective approachaswell asacentral reason for preferring anobjec‐ tive theory. In the process of doing this, we wi l l further clarify the distinctionbetweensubjective andobjective theories ofwell-being. Generalconsiderations in support of subjectivism Perhapsthema inreason to think that the subjectiveapproachisright is that there is a strong, widely shared intuition that suggests that the subjective approach is correct. This intuition is expressed in a fre‐ quently quoted passage by the philosopher Peter Railton: It does seem to me to capture an important feature of the concept of intrinsic value to say that what is intrinsically valuable for a person m u s t have a connectionwithwhat hewouldfind in somedegree compellingor attractive, at least if hewere rational and aware. It would be an intolerably alienated conceptionof someone'sgood to imagine that it might fail in any suchway to engage him." Many share Railton's intuition. If we do, and if our evaluative intu‐ itionsare aguide to the truthabout value, then this gives us reasonto think that the subjective approach to well-being is the correct one. For Railton's intuit ion seems to be more or less just another way of putting the subjective approach. If this sounds question-begging against the objectivist, a related way for the subjectivist to support her View is to elicit a similar intuition,but about aparticular case. This might seem less question‐ begging. Here is sucha case: Henry readsaphilosophybook that makesanimpressiononhim.Theauthor defends anobjective theory of well-being that includesmany of the items on our sample list above. Henry wants to ge t agood life, and sohe goes about trying to acquire these things. Forexample, to increasehisknowledge‐ one of the basic, intrinsic goods of life, according to the author ‐ Henry reads a textbook on entomology and acquires a vast knowledge of insects. Henry finds,however, that thisnew knowledge,asheputs i t , "doesnothingforme." Hepursuedit only becausethe author recommendedi t ,andhecanmuster no enthusiasmforwhat hehas learned,or for the fact that hehaslearnedit.Hein noway cares that hehasall this newknowledge,andhe neverwi l l care. It has no practical application to anything in his life,and it neverwill. N ow ask yourself: Was Henry benefittedbygaining this v a s t knowl‐ edge of entomology? The subjectivist expects that your judgment wil l 204 CHR I S H E AT H W O O D bethat, no,Henrywas no t benefitted.If so, this supports subjectivism over objectivism about well-being. For objectivists who affirm the intrinsic value of knowledge are committed to saying that Henrywas in fact benefittedby gaining this knowledge. Objectivists who do n o t include knowledge on their list avoid this particular counterexample, but they will postulate other intrinsic goods, such as, say, freedom. The subjectivist will then ask us to imagine a new case: a case of someone who dutifully increases her share of the putative good ‐ perhaps she moves to a state with fewer lawsrestrictingher freedom ‐ but who finds that she just doesn o t care about having this new allegedgood, and that it does n o t get hermy thing else that she cares about, wants, or likes. Because the putative good in question is objective ‐ i.e., it bears no necessary connection to positive attitudes on the part of asubject who has it ‐ it wil l alwaysbe possible for it to leave some people cold. If we share the intuition that suchpeople receive no benefit when they receive the allegedgood,we have acounterexample to the objective theory in question. Some putative goods on the list above are no t objective. Consider happiness, or at least one kindof happiness:beinghappyabout some‐ thing in your life, such asyour job. Beinghappy about your job does bear a necessary connection to a positive attitude of yours, because being happy about your job is one such attitude. Being happy about your job canno t leaveyou cold, since the very attitude ofbeinghappy about your job is an attitude of finding something to some degree compellingor attractive. Thus we cannot construct a case analogous to the case ofHenryabout the putative goodof beinghappy.This will n o t help objectivists, of course, since a theory that claims that the single, fundamentalhumangood is beinghappy is asubjective rather than anobjective theory. Other putative goods on the list above are clearly objective. Knowledge, if an intrinsic welfare good, is an objective one because it need n o t connect up in any way with our pro-attitudes. Note that this is true even though knowledge is {at least in part) amental state. Thus it is amistake to understand the objective‐subjective distinc‐ tion asit is used in the philosophy of well-being asinvolvingmerely the distinctionbetweenstatesof theworldandstates ofmind.To bea subjectivist about well-being, it is n o t enough to holdthat well-being is wholly determined by subjective states, or mental states. It has to be the right kindof subjective state ‐ a "pro" or "con" mental state. Subjective theories of well-being 205 Further clarificationofthe distinction It is worth makinga further clarification about subjectivism. Aswe noted earlier, a Socratic way to think of subjectivism about well‐ being is as the view that things are good for people in virtue of the prõattitudes they take toward those things. We also said that the theory that happiness is the good is a subjective theory. Bu t consider someone who, while very happy about many things, never stops to consider her own happiness, and so never takes up any proor con‐ attitudes toward i t . If the Socratic way ofunderstandingsubjectivism is literally correct, then the happiness theory wi l l count as a form of objectivism. For, as this example illustrates, it is possible on this theory for something (namely, being happy) to be good for someone without her taking upany pro-attitudes toward that thing. Oneway to t r y to handle this is to reject the Socratic understand‐ ingof subjectivism ast o o narrow, and to hold that a theory is subjective just in case it implies the following: that something is intrinsically good for someone just in case either [ i j she has a certainpro‐ attitude toward it, or (ii) it itself involves a certain prõattitude of hers toward something. This criterion counts the happiness theory as a subjective theory because, on the happiness theory, the only thing that is intrinsically good for people is athing ‐ their beinghappy about something‐ that itself involves their own pro-attitudes toward something {their being happyabout something just isapro-attitude towardsomething).This wil l be our official understanding of subjectivism about well-being. Correspondingly, objectivism about well-being is the v iew that at least one fundamental, intrinsic human good does not involve any pro-attitudes on the part of the subject. General considerations in support of obiectivism One motivat ion for being anobjectivist about well-being is that it just soundsplausible to say that things likefreedom,respect, knowl‐ edge, health, and love make our lives better. But we have to be careful. Subjectivists can agree wi th this plausible thought, since they know that mos t people havepro-attitudes toward these things, . or at least that these things cause m o s t people to havepro-attitudes (such ashappiness or enjoyment) toward other things. Thus when 206 C H R I S H E A T H W O O D these people get the things on the list above, their liveswi l l bemade better even according to subjectivism. To p u t it another way, sub‐ jectivists hold that the things on this list are typically instrumen‐ tally good for usto have,andhope to fully account for their intuitive value in this way. However,some objectivistswil l continue to insist that the value of at least some such items is intrinsic and attitude‐independent. In support of this, they might offer the following kind of argument against subjectivism. It beginsby imaginingsomeonewho hasbizarre interests, or, perhaps more effectively, base or immoral interests. Thus, john Rawls "imagine[s] someone whose only pleasure is to coun t blades of grass in . . . park squares and well-trimmed lawns."S G.E.Moore compares "the state of mind of adrunkard, when he is intensely pleasedwith breaking crockery" to "that of amanwho is fully realisingall that is exquisite in the tragedy of KingLear."6As an example of a morally corrupt interest, we can imagine a pedophile engagingin the immoral activities hevery muchwants to beengaging in. Finally, Thomas Nagel has us "[s]uppose an intelligent person receives abrain injury that reduces him to the mental condition of a contented infant, and that such desires asremain to himare satisfied byacustodian, sothat heis free fromcare." Nagelclaims that "[s]uch adevelopment would bewidely regardedasasevere misfortune, n o t only for his friends and relations, or for society, but also, andprimar‐ i ly, for the person himself . . .He is the one wepity, though of course hedoes n o t mindhis condition."7 According to the objection, subjective theories are committed to the following: that Rawls's grass-counter can get a great life by doing nothingmore thancountingbladesofgrass allday; that, solongasthe amo u n t of pleasure is the same between the tw o cases, it is just as well, in terms of howgood it makes your life, to break crockery while drunk as it is to appreciate great art; that it is, at least considered in itself, agreat good for the pedophile when hemolests children,and that the brain-injuryVictimhas in fact sufferednomisfortune,solong asthe desires that remain to him are well enough satisfied. But, the argument continues, surely claims suchasthese are implausible.One kindof evidence for this maybethat wewould n o t w a n t someonewe love, suchasour o w n child, to livealife likeany of the lives imagined here.We can avoid these putatively implausible claims by including objective elements into our theory of well‐being, such as that Subjective theories of well‐being 207 exposure to great ar t is intrinsically good for people orthat engaging in immoralactivities is intrinsically bad for people. To these objections, some subjectivists [includingRawls himself) "bite the bullet." They think that, onreflection, such lives in fact can be good for the people living them. After all, these activities are just the sorts of activities they w a n t to be doing, and likedoing. This may beeasier to swallowwhenwe remindourselves that accepting sucha claim does n o t commit one to the View that these lives are morally good, or that they manifest excellence, or that they are good in other ways that are distinct from their being beneficial to those living them. One's ultimate View concerning such cases, and concerning the considerations above in support of subjectivism, will help determine where one stands on this mo s t important philosophical question of well-being: whether to accept asubjective or an objective theory. Before discussing specific kinds of subjective theory, it is worth mentioningathird option, onewewi l l n o thave space toexplorehere: a hybrid of subjectivism and objectivism. According to the hybrid theory, well-being consists in receivingthings that (I) the subject has some pro-attitude toward (or that otherwise involvepro-attitudes on the par t of the subject) and that (2)have some value, orspecial status, independentof theseattitudes.One's lifegoes betterno t simplywhen one gets what one wants or likes, but when one is wanting or liking, and getting, the right things. These might include some of the things on ou r list above. It is very muchworth investigating the extent to which the arguments andconsiderations discussedin this essayapply to hybrid theories ofwell‐being.8 V A R I E T I E S OF SUBJECTIVISM On one popular taxonomy, there are three ma in kinds of theory of well-being: hedonism, according to which pleasure or enjoyment is the only thing that ultimatelymakes a lifeworth living; the desire theory, according to whichwhat is ultimately in aperson's interest is getting what he wants, whatever it is; and vobiectiVism,accordingtowhichat least someofwhat intrinsicallymakesour lives better does sowhether or no twe enjoy it orw a n t it.9 208 C H R I S H E A T H W O O D Wehave already discussed objectivism (and it is discussed in greater depth in the ne x t chapter). The desire theory is the paradigmatic version of the subjective approach to well-being. Hedonism is often also classified asasubjective theory, though, aswewi l l see, this issue is somewhat complicated. In what remains, we wi l l introduce and briefly explore hedonism, includinghow to classify i t , and conclude with a lengthier treatment of the desire theory of welfare. Along the way, we wi l l briefly discuss t w o kinds of subjective theory that may or may n o t be covered by the above taxonomy: eudaimonism, the View, often associated with hedonism, that well‐being consists in happiness,and the aim achievement theory, the view, often associ‐ ated with the desire theory, that successfully achieving our aims is what makes our lives gowell. A related subjective theory, which we will n o t have space to discuss, appeals n o t to the subject's desires or aims, but to the subject's values.IO Hedonism Hedonism is among the oldest of philosophical doctrines still dis‐ cussed and defended today, dating back to the Indian philosopher Carvaka around 600 BCE and the Greek philosopher Aristippus around400 BCE.II The notions that suffering is badfor the one suffer‐ ing and enjoyment good for the one getting it are intuitive raw data that any plausible theory of well‐being mu s t accommodate. Hedonism is controversial largely because it claims that nothing else is of fundamental intrinsic significance to howwell ou r lives go. In ordinary language, the te rm 'hedonist' connotes adecadent, self‐ indulgent devotion to the gratification of sensual and gastronomic desires. But it is no part of the philosophical doctrine of hedonism that this is theway to live.Hedonismis n o t the egoistic view that only one's ow npleasuresandpains shouldconcernone, andhedonistsoften emphasize the greater reliability,permanence,andfreedomfrompain‐ ful side effects of intellectual, aesthetic, andmoralpleasures. The mos t popular argument, historically speaking, for hedonism about well-being appeals to a theory of humanmotivation knownas psychologicalhedonism."According to psychologicalhedonism, the only thing that anyone ever desires for i ts o w n sake is his own pleasure (ignoring pain here for brevity). Thus, whenever a person desires something other than his o w n pleasure, he desires it as a Subjective theories of well-being 209 means to his o w n pleasure. The argument from psychologicalhedon‐ ism uses this psychological claim as a premise in establishing the conclusion that the only thing that is intrinsically good for someone is his ownpleasure.To move from this premise to this conclusion, the argument requires the additional, often suppressed premise that only what aperson desires for i t s own sake is intrinsically good for him. This argument is almost universally rejected nowadays, even by hedonists.I3 N o t only does the sweepinggeneralizationof psycholog‐ ical hedonism seem too simplistic, the second premise ‐ that only what apersondesires for i t s ownsake is intrinsicallygood for him ‐ is evidently an abandonment of hedonism as the fundamental truth about well-being andamo v e to the desire theory. This raises the question of just what relation pleasure has to our pro-attitudes, and this, in turn, bears on the question of whether hedonismshould count as an objective or asubjective theory. There are t w o main views of the nature of pleasure. On the felt-quality theory, pleasure is a single, uniform sensation or feeling, in the same general category as itch sensations or nauseous feelings (only pleasant!). On the attitudinal theory, pleasure fundamentally is, or involves,anattitude‐ aprõattitude thatwecan takeuptowardother mental states, like itches and nauseous feelings, or states of the world. It would seem that whether hedonismqualifies asanobjectiveor a subjective theory depends on which generalapproachto the nature of pleasure is correct. If a felt-quality theory is true, andpleasure is just one feeling among others, a feeling one may or may no t care about, want, or like, then pleasure, if good, would seem to bean objective good, andhedonismanobjective theory ofwell‐being. But if pleasure is instead a pro-attitude, or essentially involves some pro-attitude, then pleasure, if good, would seem to be a subjective good, and hedonismasubjective theory ofwell‐being. It is important to recog‐ nize that the issuehere is n o t merely one of taxonomy. I f hedonismis anobjective theory, then i t , like other objective theories, is commit‐ ted to the perhaps counterintuitive idea that something some people may find in no way attractive, or that in no way connects to any positive attitudes of theirs, is nonetheless of benefit to them. If hedonism is a subjective theory, it avoids this implication. If hedonism is a subjective theory, due to pleasure's being explain‐ able in terms of somepro‐attitude,does it remainadistinctive theory, 1 2 C H R I S H E A T H W O O D theory, a life on the experience machinewil l be in many ways worse than anordinary life, in whichmany desires about the externalworld are satisfied. The desire theory of welfare thus appears to avoid the experience‐machine objection. Perhaps the earliest discussion of the desire theory of any depth is found in Henry Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics, though it may have been endorsed centuries earlier by Thomas Hobbes and also Baruch Spinoza.22 It gained prominence in the twentieth century with the rise of welfare economics and decision theory, where pref‐ erence theories of well-being or uti l i ty are often simply assumed. Economists may be motivated to assume the theory because it is thought to make well‐being easier to measure than it would be on hedonism, since our desires are thought to berevealed through our choices, especially in free markets. Others have been motivated to accept the desire theory rather than anobjective theory because they believe the former to fit better with a naturalistic worldview. Objective theories that posit more than one basic good also face a problem concerning how to compare goods of very different kinds. Monistic theories like the desire theory avoid this. Today the desire theory is oftenregardedasthe leadingtheory ofwell‐being, especially among utilitarians.23 Another putative attraction of the desire theory is that it very straightforwardly conforms to the intuition, introduced earlier, that what is intrinsically good for a person mu s t besomething he or she finds to some degree compelling or attractive. For to desire some‐ thing, whatever else it is, is surely to find it to some degree compel‐ ling or attractive. As the theory that mo s t clearly conforms to this intuit ion and as the theory that makes use of what is perhaps the fundamental pro‐attitude, the desire theory is the paradigmatic sub‐ jective theory of well‐being. The simplest version of the desire theory ofwelfare claims that the satisfaction of any of one's actualdesires is intrinsically good for one. This unrestricted, actualist theory is seldom defended. Perhaps the mos t common departure from it counts only the satisfaction of intrinsic desires, or desires for things for their o w n sakes, rather than for what they might lead to.24 When we get what we merely instrumentally want, it is natural to suppose that this is, at best, of mere instrumental value. Subjective theories of well-being 213 Philosophers have considered man y other restrictions, such as restrictions to self‐regarding desires (or desires about oneself),25 global desires (or desires about one's whole life],26 and second-order desires (or desires about one's desires).27 Some of thesew i l l comeup whenwe discuss objections to the desire approach, towhich wenow tu rn . If what's good for us is what we want, then whatever we want is good for us. But surely we sometimes wan t things that t u r n o u t to be no good for us. The mos t common kind of case involves ignorance. For example, I mighthavea desire to eat some food, no t knowingthat it wi l l cause a severe allergic reaction in me, or I might w a n t to see some band perform in concert, n o t knowing that they wi l l perform terribly. The desire theory seems to imply, mistakenly, that satisfy‐ ing these ill‐informeddesires is in my interest. The lesson that many philosophers draw from such cases is that well-being is connected n o t to our actual desires but to our idealized desires.28 These are the desires we would have if we knew all the relevant facts, were appreciating them vividly, were making no mis‐ takes in reasoning, and the like. The idealized‐desire theory of well‐ being can claim that it is no benefit to me to eat the allergenic food or attend the badconcert because I would no t havewanted these things if I knew the relevant facts andwere appreciating themvividly. Some may hold ou t hope that the move to idealized desires can solve other problems aswell. Perhaps it can provide a solution no t only to cases of desires basedonmistakenbeliefs and the like,but to other sorts of putatively defective desire. Recall the earlier cases of the people who desire to count blades of grass, to break crockery while drunk, or to abuse children. Some desire theorists might be tempted to claim that satisfying these desires is of nobenefit because no one Who knew all the relevant facts, was appreciating them viv‐ idly, was making no mistakes in reasoning, e t c . would desire such things. But one has to be careful. This move r un s the risk of turning the desire theory in to anobjective theory ofwell‐being in subjectivist clothing. It is n o t open to idealized-desire theorists to claim that part of what it is to be idealized is to desire the right things, that is, the things it is good to get no ma t t e r your desires. That is closet objecti‐ vism. The conditions of idealization m u s t bestated in value‐neutral terms, andwithout referenceto things thatwere identifiedv ia abelief in their objective welfare value. 2124 C H R I S H E A T H W O O D Returning to the original objection of putatively defective desires, it is actually n o t obvious that it succeeds in the first place.29Consider the case of the allergenic food. I desire to eat i t , n o t knowing that it will make me sick. The objection claims that the actualist desire theory is committed to saying that it is nonetheless in my interest to satisfy this desire. But consider t w o things wemight have in mind whenwe say that it is in my interest to satisfy some desire.Wemight meanthat it is in my interest al l things considered‐ that is, takingall the effects of satisfying the desire into account. Or we might mean merely that it is good in itself ‐ intrinsically good ‐ to satisfy the desire. The objection assumes, plausibly, that it is n o t in my interest al l things considered to satisfy my desire to eat the food. But the actualist desire theory can accommodate this. For if I satisfy my desire to eat the food, thiswil l causemanyof my otheractualdesires ‐ desires n o t to bein pain,desires to playgolf, etc. ‐ to befrustrated. Al l that the actualist desire theory is committed to is the claim that it is goodin itselfformeto satisfymy desire to eat the food. But this claim is n o t implausible. Intuitively, ignoringtheeffects, it is good for meto get to eat this food I very muchwant to eat. Thus, moving to an idealized theory may be less well-motivated than it originally appears. It also brings with it new problems. One family of problems concerns the concept and process of idealiza‐ tion.3° Another problem is that it is possible for what I would wan t under idealconditions to be totally uninteresting, or even repugnant, to me asI actually am. But idealized theories of well-being are sup‐ posed to tell uswhat's good for usasweactually are." The second objection that we wil l consider has been called the "scope problem" for desire theories." The following example by Derek Parfit illustrates the problem: Suppose that I meet a stranger who haswhat is believed to be a fatal disease. My sympathy is aroused, and I strongly w a n t this stranger to be cured. We never mee t again. Later, unknown to me, this stranger is cured. On the Unrestricted Desire-Fulfilment Theory, this event is good for me, and makesmy lifegobetter.This is n o t plausible.Weshould reject this theory.33 James Griffin offers adiagnosis: The breadthof the [desire] account, which is its attraction, is also its greatest flaw .. . It allows my utility to bedetermined by things that ...dono t affect my life in any way at all. The trouble is that one's desires spread themselves Subjective theories of well-being 215 sowidely over the world that their objects extend far outside the bound of what, with any plausibility, one could take astouching one's well-being.34 A common response to this problem is thus that the desire theory should berestricted to coun t only desires that are about one's own life, or about oneself.35 According to another proposal, we should count only those desires that are also among ou r aims or goals (thus the aim achievement theory).36 Both of these proposals seem to handle Parfit's case. Parflt's desire that the stranger be cured is n o t about Parfitor his life. No r is it ana imofhis, sincehetakes nosteps to t r y to achieve i t .Thus each theory agrees that Parfit's life ismade no better when the stranger is cured. But these restrictions may exclude too much. Consider the com‐ mon desire that one's t e am win. I do no t mean a team one plays for ‐ desires about suchateammight count asdesires aboutone's own life, and may qualify asaims ‐ but a t eam one roots for from a distance. Such desires are certainly not about oneself, and presumably n o t about one's own life either. And that one's t e am win is n o t typically among one's aims or goals; mos t of us know we have no power over whether our team wins. Thus theories that exclude non-self‐ regarding desires and desires that are no t aims imply, implausibly, that peoplereceivenobenefitwhen their desire that their t e amwin is satisfied. An alternative solution to the scopeproblem takes its cue from the detail that Parfit'sstranger iscuredunbeknownst tohim.Perhaps the proper scope of the desire theory excludes desires the satisfaction of which we are unaware." This theory gets the right result both in Parfit's case and concerning the desire that one's team win. But it is n o t clear that it gets to the heart of the initial worry. Here ishow T. M. Scanlon presents the initialworry: Someone might have adesire about the chemical composition of some star, about whether blue was Napoleon's favorite color, or about whether Julius Caesar was anhonestman.But it wouldbe oddto suggest that the well-being of apersonwho has such desires is affectedby these facts themselves?"3 Scanlon thinks that satisfyingsuch desires is of no benefit evenwhen one is aware that the desires are satisfied. I leave it to the reader to decide whether this is right.Readers may also wish to reconsider the original objection. Some desire theorists maintain that the best reply 216 C H R I S H E A T H W O O D is to "bite the bullet" in the first place, andmaintain that Parfit's life is made better when the stranger is cured, even if only a little b i t . " The third and final problem for desire theories that we wil l con‐ sider is the problem of changing desires. Our desires change over time. When the desires concern what's going on at the t ime of the desire, this may beno problem. Eachnight of the week, Iwan t some‐ thing different for dinner. In this case of changing desires, the desire theory implies that what's good for me is to get the different meal I wan t each evening. But some of our changing desires concern what goes onat asingle time. Suppose I want, for years, to goskydiving on my fortiethbirthday.But asthe day approaches, my interests change, and I become strongly averse to doing this. Probably the mos t common reactionto this case wil lbethat it is in my interest to satisfy my present desire n o t to go skydiving on my fortieth birthday at the expense of frustrating my past desires to go skydiving. (This is assuming that I wi l l n o t later regret n o t having gone skydiving ‐ that I wil l n o t havepersistent desires in the future to have done it.)And this reaction seems right no ma t t e r how longheld andstrong the past desires to goskydivingwere. This suggests that, to determine what benefits aperson, we ignore her past desires.40 However, other cases might suggest that we should take into account past desires. We tend to think that we ought to respect the Wishes of the dead ‐ for example concerningwhether andwhere they willbeburied.Onenaturalview is that wedothis for their sake ‐ that is, for their benefit. If that's right, then the desire theory should coun t at least somepast desires.On the other hand,many find it absurd that aperson can bebenefitted or harmed after he is dead. If that's right, thenwemus t findanother explanation for whywe should respect the wishes of the dead, assuming that we should. If past desires canbe ignored, this suggests the view that the desire theory coun t only desires forwhat goes on at the t ime of the desire.As R. M. Hare, a proponent of this View, puts i t , the theory "admits only now‐for‐now and then‐for-then preferences," to the exclusion of any now-for‐thenor then‐for-now preferences.41 But, asbefore, this might seem to exclude too much. For suppose that I do in fact strongly regret, for years, n o t having gone skydiving onmy fortieth birthday. If so, perhaps it was in my interest to force myself to go skydiving, despite my strong aversion to it at the time, for the sake of satisfying the "then‐for-now" desires I would come to Subjective theories of well-being 217 have. If that's right, this suggests a surprising asymmetry: the desire theory of well-being should ignore future-directed desires but count present‐ andpast‐directed desires. However the problem of changing desires is ultimately resolved, it poses questions that any subjective theory ofwell-being mus t grapple with. C O N C L U S I O N The notion of well-being plays some part in answering most, and perhaps even literally all, moralquestions. Yet there is no consensus amongphilosophers concerningwhich general kindof theory ofwell‐ being is correct, or which specific version of any general k ind is best. Fortunately, we do not have to know which theory of well-being is correct in order to come to responsible answers to many of themoral questions that involvewell-being. For certainkindsofact are harmful and others beneficialonal l of the theories ofwell‐being that wehave considered. We can thus know that such acts are wrong or right on these bases Without having to know precisely what well-being consists in. Still, a full accounting of the act's moral s ta tus would require the correct account of well‐being. N O T E S . Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics,p. 420. . See Plato,Euthyphro, 1 0 a . . Nowell‐Smith, Ethics, pp. 111‐113. . Railton, "Facts andValues," p.9. . Rawls,A Theory of Justice, p. 432. G.E.Moore, Ethics,pp. 237‐238. . Nagel, "Death," p.77. . On hybrid theories, see Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp . 501‐502,‐ Kagan, "Well‐Being asEnjoying the Good"; andHeathwood, "Welfare," pp. 652~653. 9. Parfit,Reasons andPersons,p. 493. I O . See, e.g., Raibley, "Well‐Being and the Priority of Values",andTiberius and Plakias, "Well‐Being," § 3. I I . Madhava Acharya, Sarva‐Dars'ana-Samgraha, pp . 2‐11,and Diogenes Laertius, Lives and Opinions, pp. 81‐96. . 1 2 . See Epicurus, Extant Remains; Bentham, IPML, chapter I (pp. 11‐16); and (.8. Mil l , Utilitarianisrn, chapter 2 (Collected Works, vol. x, 218 13. I4 . 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 2 0 . 2.1. 2 2 . 23. 24. 25. 16. 27. 28. 29. 3o. 31. 32. C H R I S H E A T H W O O D pp. 209‐226). See also Aristotle, NicomacheanEthics,book x, chapter 2 (pp. 184‐185); andDiogenes Laértius, Lives andOpinions, pp. 89~9o. See Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics,book 1,chapter 4, §§ 1 ‐ 2 . Feldman,Pleasure and the GoodLife, chapter 4. Spencer, The Principlesof Psychology, § 125 (vol. 1,pp. 280‐281];Brandt, A Theory of the Good and the Right, p. 38; and Heathwood, "The Reductionof Sensory Pleasure to Desire." Heathwood, "Desire SatisfactionismandHedonism." I.S.Mill, Utilitarianism,CollectedWorks, vol. x, p.21r. G.E.Moore,Principia Ethica, § 47 (pp. 77‐79}. Nozick,Anarchy, State, and Utopia,pp. 44‐45. See Railton, "Naturalism and Prescriptivity," p. 170; Crisp, "Hedonism Reconsidered," §5(pp.635‐642); andFeldman,"WhatWeLearnfromthe ExperienceMachine" for discussions of and/or replies to the experience‐ machine objection. Feldman,What Is This ThingCalledHappiness!criticizes life-satisfaction theories of happinessanddefends ahedonistic theory, aswell ascriticizes and defends, respectively, the corresponding versions of eudaimonism. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, and Ethics, chapter 6 defends a life‐ satisfaction account of happiness and a corresponding eudaimonistic theory of welfare. See alsoHaybron,The Pursuit of Unhappiness. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, book I, chapter 9, § 3 (pp. 109‐ I I 3); Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 30; and Spinoza, Ethics, par t I n , prop. 9 (pp. 499‐500)‐ SeeSumner,Welfare, Happiness, andEthics,p. I I 3; Shaw,Contemporary Ethics,p. 53; andHaybron, The Pursuit of Unhappiness,p. 3. Sidgwick, TheMethodsofEthics,p. 109;andvonWright, The Varietiesof Goodness, pp. 103‐104. Sidgwick, TheMethodsofEthics,p. I 12;andOvervold, "Self-Interest and GettingWhat YouWant." Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, pp. 111 ‐ 112; Parfit, Reasons and Persons,pp. 497‐498; andCarson, Value and the GoodLife, pp. 73‐74. Railton, "Facts and Values," p. 16,and Kraut, "Desire and the Human Good," p. 40. Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, pp. 11 0 ‐ 1I r,and Brandt,A Theory of the Goodand the Right, p. 247. Heathwood, "The Problemof DefectiveDesires," pp. 491‐493. Sobel, "Full-InformationAccounts ofWell‐Being"; andRosati, "Persons, Perspectives, and Full InformationAccounts of the Good." Griffin, Well-Being, p. r 1; see Railton, "Facts and Values," p. 16 for a possible solution. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, andEthics,p. I 35. 33‐ 34. 35‐ 36. 37‐ 38. 39' 40. 4 I . Subjective theories of well-being 219 Parfit,Reasons andPersons,p. 494. Griffin, Well-Being, pp. 16‐17. Overvold, "Self-Interest and Getting What Yo u Want"; and Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 494. Scanlon, What WeOwe to EachOther, pp. 119‐121. Heathwood, "Desire Satisfactionism andHedonism," pp. 547 ‐551 ; and Sumner, Welfare, Happiness, andEthics,pp. 127‐128. Scanlon, What WeOwe to EachOther, p. 114. Lukas, "Desire Satisfactionism and the Problemof Irrelevant Desires." Brandt,A Theory of the Goodand the Right, pp. 247‐253. Hare,Moral Thinking, pp. 101‐103.

Social and Moral Philosophy Faculty of Social Sciences University of Helsinki Finland Marginal participation, complicity, and agnotology: What climate change can teach us about individual and collective responsibility Säde Hormio ACADEMIC DISSERTATION To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Helsinki, for public examination in Auditorium XII, University main building, on 16 December 2017, at 10 am. Helsinki 2017 Arundhati Roy quote reprinted with the kind permission of Penguin Books Ltd. ISBN 978-951-51-3873-6 (nid.) ISBN 978-951-51-3874-3 (PDF) Unigrafia 2017 Abstract Although the basic mechanism is simple ― we burn too much fossil fuels ― the result, climate change, is a very complex phenomenon. The science is complex, the implications are complex, and the number of agents involved in creating the harm is simply vast. I argue that climate change is not a problem just for states and international bodies, but also for individuals as they are members and constituents of collectives and groups of different types. Despite the complexity of the situation, there are three different possible sources of moral responsibility for individuals in relation to climate change harms: direct responsibility (individuals qua individuals), shared responsibility as members (individuals qua members of collective agents), and shared responsibility as constituents (individuals qua constituents of unorganised collectives). No individual will be responsible for climate change as such, but they can be responsible for increasing the risk of serious harm to others, for example. Accounts that deny individual responsibility fail to either take our interdependent reality seriously or fail to understand marginal participation (or in the case direct responsibility, fail to appreciate the nature of the climate change phenomenon). I argue that we must take complicity into account to understand climate change as an ethical problem. Complicity is a form of liability, but not necessarily culpability: it can be blameworthy or partially blameworthy, sometimes coming under just agent-regret. Most of our emissions take place within certain structures. Individual responsibility cannot be discussed in isolation from the collective settings that we are all embedded in. Individuals can be complicit in climate change harms, either as members of collective agents (e.g. as citizens of states or employees of a corporation) or as constituents of unorganised collectives (e.g. as consumers or polluters). With collective agents the link between the individual and the collective outcome is a participatory intention, and in unorganised collectives it is a quasiparticipatory intention. The potential of individual actions to help bring about an outcome gives an additional reason to take action in cases of marginal participation. I deny that you can place obligations, putative or actual, on unorganised collectives, although you can hold the constituents of unorganised collectives blameworthy in the backward-looking sense under certain conditions. However, I grant that it can be useful to discuss unorganised collectives in some cases, as it can help us to appreciate the different structures and systems that we are part of, and how we are complicit in upholding and recreating these. Although I focus on individual complicity, I do not deny the obligations of collective agents. However, nation-states, governments, and international bodies are not the only relevant collective agents in climate ethics: other collective agents, such as corporations, matter also and can have obligations concerning making sure that their activities are as carbon-neutral as possible. Climate change presents a challenge to our moral psychology and information processing capacities. Institutional collective agents with the capacity to process a lot of information have greater obligations to know about climate change than individuals. Institutions can affect the information and knowledge that we have, which in turn affects our control and our options, and thus can act as an excusing condition for blame. An example of the above, manufacturing doubt, is an important issue and some corporations are implicated in this. The corporations that have engaged in lobbying against climate regulation through creating and disseminating misleading information have acquired themselves additional obligations to mitigate climate change and compensate for the harm they have caused. Even so, the ethical claims can only be understood by individual members of these collective agents because only they can feel the pull of moral claims. In cases involving collective agents we could distinguish between what one must possess in order to be capable of making moral claims (i.e. moral agency conditions), and what it means to have the ability to exhibit such claims through one's conduct. I argue that while only individual moral agents can do both, collective agents can do the latter. The moral claims collective agents can exhibit through their conduct is an emergent property of the moral claims that the (key) members of the collective make in their roles, combined with the ethos of the organisation. Individual direct responsibility is limited to relatively wealthy individuals and their luxury emissions. This individual direct responsibility or duty is to not to increase the probable risk of serious harm – deprivation of fundamental capabilities – to other people, at least as long as we can do so at a less than significant cost to ourselves. Offsetting is not a reliable way to meet this duty, but rather we need to look at the emissions from our lifestyle choices (within the available infrastructure), in contrast to questioning each individual purchase and consumer choice. Individual direct duties related to avoiding climate change harms are not prior to our shared duties, i.e. the duties we have as members or constituents of collectives. Solutions aimed purely at the individual level will be both insufficient and inefficient. Climate change cannot be solved without collective entities stepping up to their obligations, and collective entities will not do so unless enough of their members push for it (or another collective entity makes them comply through legislation, for example). Shared responsibility qua members of collective agents is thus the key individual responsibility, and it presses especially on those occupying key positions within key collective agents. Saying that, our shared responsibility qua constituents of unorganised collectives has the potential to be decisive in whether some action is taken or not, either through a set of actions that can signal certain acceptance or support, or as a form of political support from the grass roots. Acknowledgements My supervisors, Arto Laitinen and Pekka Mäkelä, have not only supported me, but also more importantly believed in me, and I owe my gratitude to them. I have had many enlightening conversations with both, and feel very lucky to have them to test my ideas on. Writing a monograph is solitary work and the comments by Arto and Pekka were essential in helping me pull all the strands together. They are not only terrific philosophers, but also generous with their time. Thank you for not letting me off easily. I would also like to thank Caterina Marchionni for being a dream Custos, efficiently guiding me towards the public defence, and for being a friend. She sets an example of how to combine philosophical excellence with a humble attitude and a curious mind. The arguments in the thesis benefited from the detailed and insightful comments by the preexaminers Holly Lawford-Smith and Bill Wringe. I am very grateful for the time they have spent pouring over the pages of my monograph. I also would like to thank John Broome for agreeing to act as my Opponent in the public defence, for which I feel very honoured. I would like to thank Olli Loukola and Arto Siitonen for helping me to get started on my PhD journey. I owe special thanks to the Emil Aaltonen Foundation for giving me my first grant, and the Finnish Cultural Foundation and the Kone Foundation for subsequent grants. I have also had the pleasure of working in two projects, one with Olli and Simo Kyllönen; the other with Aki Lehtinen, Simo, and Alessandra Basso. When I began my postgrad studies and knew next to nothing about working in the academic world I was lucky to have Pilvi Toppinen as my first roommate at Metsätalo. She kindly explained to me how things work, as well being an excellent person to discuss books, music, and everything else with. I have since had the pleasure of sharing a room with Johanna Ahola-Launonen, Simo, Cate, Emrah Aydinonat, Tomi Kokkonen, and Samuli Reijula, all congenial and enjoyable colleagues. In general, the best part about working at the University of Helsinki are the wonderful colleagues. For excellent peer support and fun lunchtimes, in addition to the colleagues already mentioned, I would like to thank especially Marion Godman, Tarna Kannisto, Anssi Korhonen, Jaakko Kuorikoski, Aino Lahdenranta, Juhana Lemetti, Michiru Nagatsu, Ville Paukkonen, Päivi Seppälä, Ninni Suni, Teemu Toppinen, Sanna Tirkkonen, Susanne Uusitalo, and Vilma Venesmaa. I would also like to thank Timo Airaksinen, Heta Gylling, Ilpo Halonen, Kristian Klockars, Uskali Mäki, and Raimo Tuomela. Furthermore, I would like to thank all my colleagues and all other philosophers that I have had enjoyable discussions and debates at seminars, reading groups, workshops, and conferences with, both in Finland and abroad. There are simply too many names to mention, but you know who you are and I appreciate you all. I first encountered philosophy in high school. Without the enthusiastic and inventive teaching of Juha Eerolainen at Etu-Töölön lukio, I would have probably ended up studying something else altogether. I am glad that my introduction to philosophy was so imaginative and I dedicate this thesis to his memory. I would also like to thank the excellent teachers that I had during my undergraduate years at the University of Stirling, especially Duncan Pritchard, Peter Sullivan, Michael Brady, and Matthew Elton. They encouraged me to pursue a Master's degree and although it took me many years to take up on that advice I am grateful that they did. Thank you is also in order for the inspiring colleagues I got to work with during my NGO years. I learnt the most while working for Oxfam GB and my horizons were widened by the insightful work done by many of the people there, including, but not limited to, Audrey Bronstein, Gina Hocking, Jo Lyon, Sandy Ruxton, and Sue Smith. My extended family has been my greatest support and I want to thank them all from the bottom of my heart. I owe special thanks to John who has been my rock. He has also enabled me to combine work with having a family. Our amazing kids, Kaius and Aaron, were both born during the PhD process. I love you all immensely. Helsinki, November 2017 Contents Chapter 1 – Introduction: Responsibility in an age of global interdependence .................................... 1 1.1 The perfect moral storm ............................................................................................................ 5 1.2 The concept of responsibility .................................................................................................... 9 1.3 Ethics for a collective age ........................................................................................................ 20 1.4 Uncertainties and risks ............................................................................................................. 25 1.5 Central arguments ..................................................................................................................... 29 Chapter 2 – The complexity of climate change and assigning direct individual responsibility ......... 33 2.1 The five main branches of climate ethics .............................................................................. 35 2.2 The storm rages on ................................................................................................................... 37 2.3 It is not my fault or is it? ........................................................................................................ 42 2.4 Individual harm ......................................................................................................................... 51 2.5 What could the direct responsibility of individuals mean in practice? .............................. 57 Chapter 3 – Responsibility of collective agents........................................................................................ 69 3.1 Collective agency and the responsibility of organised collectives ...................................... 70 3.2 Collective obligations and distributing collective responsibility......................................... 81 3.3 Manufacturing doubt ................................................................................................................ 94 Chapter 4 – Unorganised collectives .......................................................................................................102 4.1 Not quite a beach rescue ........................................................................................................104 4.2 Putative collectives and the (im)possibility of their obligations .......................................110 4.3 Identifying relevant collectives ..............................................................................................118 Chapter 5 – Marginal participation and complicity for collective harms ...........................................129 5.1 Marginal participation and overdetermination ...................................................................131 5.2 Positional and relational conception of individual accountability ...................................139 5.3 Complicity and participatory intentions ..............................................................................145 5.4 Climate change complicity and quasi-participatory intentions .........................................155 Chapter 6 – Complicity for climate change as a structural injustice ...................................................169 6.1 Criticism against Kutz's account ...........................................................................................170 6.2 The potential of an individual act .........................................................................................177 6.3 Climate change as a structural injustice ...............................................................................183 Chapter 7 – Knowledge, ignorance, and climate change responsibility .............................................194 7.1 Responsibility and ignorance .................................................................................................196 7.2 Psychological factors ..............................................................................................................204 7.3 Knowledge and misinformation in an institutional setting ...............................................209 7.4 Summary and concluding remarks .......................................................................................217 Appendix The six foundations of morality ..........................................................................................223 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................................227 Chapter 1 – Introduction: Responsibility in an age of global interdependence Our inability to live entirely in the present (like most animals do) combined with our inability to see very far into the future makes us strange in-between creatures, neither beast nor prophet. Our amazing intelligence seems to have outstripped our instinct for survival. Arundhati Roy, 'Listening to Grasshoppers' (2009: x) [P]oorly-understood feedback processes make us vulnerable to surprises. Some of these processes could be very powerful. The arctic methane hydrates, for instance, form a vast reservoir of methane, and if a significant fraction of them was to be released, the earth might become uninhabitable. Human-induced global warming, then, could possibly start a chain of events that could lead to the extinction of civilization or even of humanity. This is a remote possibility, but it exists. John Broome (1992, pp. 15-16) The topic of my thesis is individual and collective responsibility for collectively caused systemic harms, with climate change as the case study. Can an individual be responsible for these harms, and if so, how? Furthermore, what does it mean to say that a collective is responsible? A related question, and the second main theme, is how ignorance and knowledge affect our responsibility. I will discuss uncertainties and introduce the concept of agnotology,1 explaining the different ways these are important for climate change responsibility. My aim is to show that despite the various complexities involved, an individual can have responsibility to address climate change, and that there are three potential sources for such responsibility. I believe that looking at climate change within this framework brings new insights into the current lively discussions on climate ethics, and could also take forward the debate over what exactly collective responsibility amounts to. I will position my own work mainly in juxtaposition with four recent works: Christopher Kutz (2000) Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age, Iris Marion Young (2011) Responsibility for Justice, Tracy Isaacs (2011) Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, and Elizabeth Cripps (2013) Climate Change and the Moral Agent: Individual Duties in an Interdependent World. Collectives come in all shapes, sizes and shades. At the micro level, where the basic dynamics of joint action are discussed, we have two people going out for a walk together. At the other end of 1 The term originates from Robert N. Proctor's work in the 1990s. He (in Proctor and Schiebinger 2008) describes agnotology as "[a] missing term to describe the cultural production of ignorance (and its study)". David Magnus (2008, p. 250) describes it as "the construction of ignorance" and "a strategy that can be utilized". I discuss corporate-funded agnotology campaigns against climate change science in chapter three. 2 the spectrum, we have the collective of humanity (or even of earthlings). Philosophers have written about the responsibilities of both of these and everything in between. Large collectives play a greater role in our lives than ever before, making moral questions about collective responsibility urgent. Collectives can be cut up in many ways, but the distinction between collective agents and unorganised collectives is the crucial one when it comes to this thesis. With collective agents I refer to integrated, structured, organised collectives that have a shared goal or purpose, a mission, an ethos, and which often also come with differentiated roles and hierarchy. Unorganised collectives, on the other hand, are a set of people who are picked out by some factor. The question I will ask is: can an individual be responsible for climate change harms, and if so, how? The answer will be very different depending on which collectives the individual can be argued to be a member or a constituent of, and if these collectives are collective agents or not. To highlight how the responsibility of individuals in agential groups is different from those in unorganised ones I will use members to refer to individuals within collective agents and constituents to refer to individuals that make up unorganised collectives. Throughout, I will defend an account of moral responsibility where relationships form the basis for morality. This account balances between individualism and communitarism, succumbing to neither extreme. While our relationships are brought to the ethical fore, acknowledging the essentially social basis of morality does not erase individual agency. What we as individuals are responsible for can have two meanings: what we as individuals qua individuals are responsible for, and what we as individuals qua members or constituents of collectives are responsible for. The first sense I will call direct responsibility and the second shared responsibility. In addition, collective agents can have collective obligations or collective responsibility regarding climate change. In this thesis I will defend the view that despite the complexity of climate change, individuals can bear responsibility for climate change harms, and that there are three potential sources for this responsibility: direct responsibility (individuals qua individuals), shared responsibility as members (individuals qua members of collective agents), and shared responsibility as constituents (individuals qua constituents of unorganised collectives).2 No individual is responsible for climate change as such, but they can be responsible for things like increasing the risk of serious harm to others. With some individuals all three sources will apply, while with others none will apply. For relatively wealthy individuals (regardless of whether they live in the Global North or the Global South) at least one ― but more often all sources ― apply. I will argue that most of our responsibility flows from the shared sources, i.e. from collective action within collective agents and social structures. 2 I do not mean to employ 'source' as a technical term in this context, rather, it is employed as a heuristic term. 3 Complicity is an association, participation, or involvement in a wrongful act or a collectively caused harm. While traditionally the focus of complicity literature has been on what counts as contributing to another agent's wrongful act, I will follow Kutz (2000) in extending it to mean harms we bring about together. Complicity can arise from our cultural and legal practices that link agents to harm caused by other agents, or from unintended harms caused together. Kutz (pp. 1-3) observes that we live in a morally complicated world, where we are associated with regrettable, sometimes reproachable, things through our social, economic and political associations and institutions. His examples include buying a table made out of timber from a rainforest, owning stock in a company that does business in a country where political opposition is not tolerated, or being a citizen of a nation which is happy to launch reckless bombing attacks against terrorists in another country. Our reactions to these relations to harms mediated by other agents range from discomfort to guilt. I will argue that most people in the Global North and some in the Global South are complicit in climate change harms qua constituents of unorganised collectives, as well as very often also qua members of collective agents. Both of these sources come under shared responsibility, which I will argue is the primary source our climate change responsibility (although many of us also bear direct responsibility). My main arguments are: • Climate change is not a problem just for states and international bodies, but also for individuals as members and constituents of collectives and groups of different types • We must take complicity into account to understand climate change as an ethical problem • There are three potential sources for individual responsibility for climate change harms: direct responsibility (individuals qua individuals), shared responsibility as members (individuals qua members of collective agents), and shared responsibility as constituents (individuals qua constituents of unorganised collectives) • States and international bodies are not the only relevant collectives in climate ethics: other collective agents, such as corporations, matter also • In cases involving collective agents we could distinguish between what one must possess in order to be capable of making moral claims (i.e. moral agency conditions), and what it means to have the ability to exhibit such claims through one's conduct. While only individual moral agents can do both, collective agents can do the latter. The moral claims collective agents can exhibit through their conduct is an emergent property of the moral claims that the (key) members of the collective make in their roles, combined with the ethos of the organisation • Institutions can affect the information and knowledge that we have, which in turn affects our control and our options, and thus can act as an excusing condition for blame 4 • An example of the above, manufacturing doubt, is an important responsibility issue regarding climate change and some corporations are implicated in this • Risk affects our climate change responsibility: while the risks are probabilistic, our responsibility is based on likelihoods along with the expected value of an outcome • Moral responsibility is always relational and positional, and it can be either individual or shared. I will argue throughout this thesis that moral complicity should not be ignored and that it is the key to unlocking some of the moral mysteries around responsibility in the global interconnected world. The actions of individuals matter even in overdetermined3 outcomes where our participation is marginal, and they can be deemed morally praiseworthy or blameworthy. While complicity is all about individuals caught in complicated institutional structures and social patterns, collective responsibility also has a much more robust sense. At the other end of the spectrum we have the collective responsibility of collective agents. Corporations are the standard example of these collective agents, and I will argue that they should also be brought into climate ethics debates. What we need to concentrate on is the relational nature of morality and human activity. Due to our complicated social and economic structures, we might be involved in collective actions that we do not approve or even know of. Therefore the line between what we are and are not responsible for is not always clear, and that it can further be blurred by institutional and social practices. Questions of responsibility cannot be resolved without reference to our relations to others, or to the institutions that are part of our social world that is more interconnected and interdependent than it has ever been. While the importance of the local and regional should never be underestimated (which by itself is already relational), a lot of human activities are deeply international or have international aspects, be it in science, trade, finance, politics, culture, information, or sports.4 3 I use overdetermined here in a looser sense than the traditional definition of causal overdetermination where a single observed effect is determined by multiple causes at once, out of which any alone could be enough to account for the effect. My use of the term draws from Derek Parfit's (1986[1984]) and Kutz's (2000) use of the term in cases where an individual's action makes no difference to the normative properties of an event, for example, when 1,000 people cause some harm, but it would have had the same end result if just 950 had participated. 4 The vast majority of humanity is organised into nation-states that co-operate together bilaterally, or through various multinational or international organisations such as the United Nations and its numerous affiliated programmes, funds, and specialised agencies; or the European Union or the African Union. In addition there are international trade agreements, the World Trade Organization, IMF, World Bank, global brands, multinational corporations like ExxonMobil and Komatsu Limited, outsourced manufacturing in countries with cheaper labour, currency transactions, international banking and investments, international aid flows and cash transfers. Other examples include large international non-governmental agencies such as Médecins Sans Frontières or Save the Children, news channels that are watched around the world, globally popular internet sites. There are also globally recognised musicians and actors, artists whose paintings travel around the world, books like Pinocchio and The Little Prince that get translated to over 250 languages; Olympic Games, world championships, boxing matches watched by millions; innovations or viral videos that cross borders within days or hours; international scientific journals and conferences, research visits, the high mobility of researchers; joint projects between nations, the International Space Station, and so on and so forth. 5 Communication technology makes international engagement easier and human co-operation has taken radically new forms and dimensions in the past century, especially in recent years. With the invention of the internet and mobile technology many of us are connected in ways not even thought possible just a lifetime ago.5 Climate change is not just international, it is inescapably global. That is one of the reasons why it is so problematic as a harm that requires an urgent solution and response. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to the problems posed by climate change and other collectively caused harms, as well as to offer some background for how individual and collective responsibility have been traditionally conceptualised in ethics, and what questions these concepts give rise to. The chapter begins with an overview of climate change as a harm (section 1.1), before discussing the literature on individual moral responsibility (section 1.2), followed by collective responsibility (section 1.3). What uncertainties mean for climate ethics and moral philosophy is discussed next (section 1.4). I will wrap the introductory chapter with a summary of the central arguments of the coming chapters (section 1.5). 1.1 The perfect moral storm The earth's climate is changing at an unprecedented pace. We are witnessing temperature changes that used to take thousands of years now taking place within mere decades. These rapid changes are caused by us humans. The word anthropogenic used in conjunction with climate change signals that climatic changes, such as rising global temperatures and increased extreme weather events, result from human activities. The expert consensus on the role of humans as the driving force behind 5 While it took approximately twelve days to send a message from London to New York in 1852 and 73 days to Sydney, with the international postal service itself a marvel of human co-operation, the invention of the telegram reduced the time to mere minutes some twenty years later (Roberts 2012). In the early 1990s telefaxes were the cutting edge way to send images and messages across distances, but they were soon overtaken by the expansion of the internet. Video calls and instant messaging have revolutionised the ways in which many of us can now stay in touch with distant relatives and friends, and the ways in which we can work with people across oceans. It is not uncommon anymore that one's colleagues are located in another town or country or even continent, with technology enabling daily communications regardless of the physical distance. Saying this, it is important to note that some of us are much more interconnected than others: there are vast gaps between the urban rich and the rural poor in most countries in terms of travel and other international opportunities, and the gaps are even wider internationally. Access to technology varies also: while 88.1% of people in North America use the internet, only 31.2% of the people in Africa have access to it (Internet World Stats 2017). While internet penetration varies widely worldwide, the trend is clearly towards a more technologically interconnected world. The internet has also in many ways shortened the gap between urban and rural, both in good and in bad. New opportunities have opened up for people to connect with like-minded people regardless of their geographical location, and the internet has brought new opportunities for participation in politics and civil society, sometimes also in job markets. Readily available images of wealth can give the rural poor in the Global South unrealistic expectations about higher standards of living if only they would leave their villages for towns, cities, or foreign countries. Extremists and constructive grass-roots civil society organisations alike have an easier time to get organised thanks to social media. 6 climate change is overwhelming (Cook et al. 2013).6 Human influence concerns both the changes that are already noticeable, such as shrinking glaciers and rising sea levels, as well as changes projected far into the future. The Arctic is melting in front of our eyes and satellites. Rapidly rising Arctic temperatures are very likely already linked to recent extreme weather events around North America, Europe and Asia (Carrington 2016). According to the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report, in large parts of Europe, Asia and Australia the probability of heatwaves has already more than doubled due to human influence on the climate, while the number of cold days and nights has decreased on the global scale (IPCC 2013, p. 5). All of this can have devastating consequences on food security. While scientists have reached a consensus over the anthropogenic cause of climate change and awareness of the problem has permeated media and policy discussions, emissions continue to rise. Progress in mitigation has been painstakingly slow.7 Even the modest advances originating from the Paris Agreement are now looking less promising with the possibility of the USA pulling out of the treaty under the new administration, or at least not taking any action to support it.8 In general, hostility towards climate science is visible in the USA, the biggest polluter in the world in historical terms, and currently the second biggest polluter after China.9 As we still do not fully understand all feedback mechanisms or know all the tipping points, our climate might become unstable much sooner than previously thought. The longer meaningful mitigation action is delayed, the less likely it is that catastrophic consequences can be averted. Very worryingly, climate scientists are nearly unanimously now saying that unless we see significant changes in policy, we are on course for a world that is four degrees warmer by the end of this century (World Bank 2012). Meanwhile, a two degree increase is still the standard in political debates. Two additional degrees might not sound like much, but the difference could decide the survival of human civilization as we know it.10 To give some examples (from Marshall 2014, pp. 239- 6 97% or more of actively publishing climate scientists agree that global warming over the past century is extremely likely due to human activities. The greater the climate expertise among those surveyed, the higher the consensus on human-caused global warming, going up as far as 100% (Cook et al. 2016). 7 Although it should be noted that there are over 1,200 climate change or climate change-relevant laws worldwide, which represents a twentyfold increase in the number of climate laws and policies within the last twenty years; in 1997 there were just 60 such laws in place (Nachmany et al. 2017). 8 McKinnon (2016, p. 212) notes that even if all countries abided by the Paris Agreement and achieved the reductions laid out in the intended nationally determined contributions, average temperatures are likely to rise 2.7―3.5% by the end of this century. This will damage food production and security, as well as increase conflict and disease. 9 The USA is arguably still the biggest polluter, as it consumes many of the products that China produces, so the emissions from a lot of manufacturing is outsourced to China. 10 Professor John Schellnhuber, founding director of the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research and chair of the German Advisory Council on Global Change, said in a conference in 2013 held on the risks of a four-degree warmer climate to Australia that "the difference between two and four degrees is human civilization" (quoted in Marshall 2014, p. 241). Another example is cryo-scientist Lonnie Thompson who studies melting glaciers. He included the following sentences as his first paragraph in a 2010 paper (p. 153): "Climatologists, like other scientists, tend to be a stolid group. We are not given to theatrical rantings about falling skies. Most of us are far more comfortable in our laboratories or gathering data in the field than we are giving interviews to journalists or speaking before Congressional 7 242) the four degrees is a global average, so July in the Mediterranean region could be up to nine degrees warmer than today. There would be a high risk that forests, including the Amazon, could burn down. Crop yields would be severely affected. The Greenland ice sheet, and most likely also the Western Antarctic ice sheet, would melt completely leaving two thirds of the world's major cities covered by water due to rising sea levels. Not only that, the changes could happen faster than previously predicted: we could reach the four-degree point by the 2070s (although as early as by mid-century is also a possibility), making climate change not a problem mainly for future generations but also for many of us alive today. Moreover, there is no guarantee that temperatures would level off at this point due to further powerful feedback mechanisms and tipping points. The World Bank (2012), among many others, has concluded that even with a four degree warmer world there is so much uncertainty that we cannot assume that human societies could adapt sufficiently and in time, and thus such an increase in temperature must be avoided. Climate ethics tries to illuminate and provide answers to the moral questions and dilemmas that anthropogenic climate change gives rise to. Stephen M. Gardiner (2006, 2011, 2016) has described climate change as "a perfect moral storm". The components of this storm are four-fold: global, intergenerational, ecological, and theoretical.11 Gardiner's central concern is that unless we understand exactly what kind of a problem climate change is, and the many complexities involved, we will not be able to find any real solutions to it. He argues that what we are dealing with is essentially an ethical failure: anthropogenic climate change is a profoundly moral problem, despite it usually being framed in mainly scientific or economic terms in the dominant discourses. While climate change impacts are global, the power imbalances between rich and poor nations mean that the polluters might not pay: emissions are largely due to the activities of a handful of industrialised nations that have been largely successful in delaying action. Climate change is an inherently intergenerational issue, because even if all carbon dioxide emissions were to be stopped today, most aspects of climate change would persist for hundreds of years. To give some examples, due to cumulative emission, seas will continue to warm for centuries, and 15 to 40 per cent of emitted CO2 will continue to contribute to warming for more than a millennium (IPCC 2013, pp. 25-26). If an enormous alien ship would swipe up all humans (and our roughly one billion cows) tomorrow and take us to a galaxy far, far away ― therefore effectively putting a stop to our emitting actions ― the impacts of climate change would continue to unfold committees. Why then are climatologists speaking out about the dangers of global warming? The answer is that virtually all of us are now convinced that global warming poses a clear and present danger to civilization". Thompson cited the joint letter from 255 members of the National Academy of Sciences published in Science magazine on 7 May 2010, calling for the integrity of science to be respected after political assaults on climate scientists. 11 The ecological storm was added to the metaphor as an independent storm only recently when Gardiner (in Gardiner and Weisbach 2016) split the theoretical storm into two separate storms (ecological and theoretical); in earlier works (2006, 2011) he spoke of three storms. 8 and feedback mechanisms would still kick in. In ecological terms the impacts go far beyond the human species, as other animals and plants are affected by changing habitats. Entire ecosystems are put in jeopardy. Finally, the storm is also theoretical, as many of our existing theories (whether philosophical, political, or economic) are not set up to deal with issues that span over hundreds of generations, involve major scientific uncertainties, or affect the entire Earth. I would like to argue that an additional important aspect of the theoretical storm is that climate change is an overdetermined problem in the sense that the actions of any one individual do not causally determine the outcome or make a difference to its normative properties; no individual action is necessary or sufficient for global average temperatures to increase, or for the effects that this will have on agriculture or human habitation, for example. In fact, in an overdetermined situation a person's contribution to the outcome can be causally minuscule, even completely negligible.12 Marginal participation is problematic for traditional accounts of attributing responsibility in which an agent's causal contribution forms the basis of their responsibility: if an individual does not make a difference to the outcome of an act, then she is not responsible for the outcome. Some philosophers thereby argue that it is wrong to ascribe responsibility for climate change to individuals: there is no basis for individual moral obligations because our individual acts are neither necessary nor sufficient for climate change to proceed, nor are our mundane carbon-emitting acts intended to cause harm. They conclude that only states can have obligations to do something about climate change. This line of argumentation is interesting not just from the point of view of climate ethics, but also when we look into other collectively caused harms and discuss what principles we can employ to ascribe moral responsibility for them. I will start by describing causal and normative responsibility, concentrating on individual moral responsibility in the next section, before turning to collectives in section 1.3. Before proceeding, it should be noted that although it is clear that climate change is harmful, the concept of what constitutes a harm is far from simple. Harm is an impairment, but of what? If we adopt a counterfactual account of harm, someone is harmed if their level of well-being becomes lower than it otherwise would have been.13 Seana Shiffrin (2012) argues that standard models of harm that rely on making either counterfactual or historical comparisons are unsatisfactory, and that we should instead adopt a more will-oriented account of harm. She (p. 361) suggests that an account of harm should encompass at least physical injuries, many physical and mental disabilities, incidents of pain, death, the failure or ruin of certain sorts of important projects and relationships, some 12 Although there is debate on this in relation to climate change, see the discussion in section 2.4. I discuss marginal participation at length in chapter five. 13 We therefore would need to determine the level of well-being someone would have had had the harmful event not taken place. A big problem for this kind of purely counterfactual understanding of harm is presented by the nonidentity problem, see end of section 2.4. 9 losses, and some material inabilities, as well as things such as reasonable fear and grief, or rendering one passive to a mentally or physically intimate experience. With climate change, defining harm is difficult both at the individual level and at the policy level. For example, Katie McShane (2017, p. 137) gives the example that salinity intrusion in the Sathkira district of Bangladesh is not just about the economic loss of diminished rice production and increased costs of healthcare due to disease, things that policy-makers and researchers usually concentrate on. What should also matter for our assessment is "how it is affecting people's ability to look after their neighbours and families, their anxiety about the future for their children and their communities, the social cohesion of and justice within communities, and so on".14 In general, we need to distinguish between suffering harm and mere loss in order to give priority to harm (Francis 2017, p. 142). However, I will not attempt to contribute to this important debate in this thesis. Instead, I will utilise a broad concept of harm where to suffer harm is to have your interests affected in a negative manner. Serious harm is such an effect on your fundamental interests and capabilities (see section 2.3). Climate change puts ecosystems under severe stress and threatens basic lifesupporting functions. It is a threat to agriculture through increased climate-extremes such as heatwaves, droughts, and floods, while increasing sea levels can make many currently populous areas uninhabitable. These are just a few examples of how climate change is a serious risk to human survival itself. 1.2 The concept of responsibility What I am after in this section is to clarify what we mean by responsibility and associated notions, and to defend an idea of blame as protest. To lay groundwork for the arguments to come, I will first separate causal and legal responsibility from moral responsibility. I then discuss classic aspects of responsibility, namely voluntariness and control (ignorance is reserved for chapter seven). I will take a look at what moral judgements are by discussing deliberation and reactive attitudes, before explicating the account of blame that I will utilise in the thesis. I will round off the section by offering some terminological clarifications that are helpful in understanding the notion of complicity employed in chapters five and six. The idea of moral responsibility assumes moral agency: a hurricane or a tsunami cannot be held morally responsible for the destruction it causes, although human beings can be held morally responsible for the socio-political, economic, and cultural factors behind why so many people died 14 Her overall argument is that we should adopt a broader understanding of loss and damage when it comes to climate policy, as it should encompass both loss of or damage to something that is valuable, and losses and damages that are relevant when considering harmfulness. 10 when the hurricane or tsunami hit (e.g. poor local infrastructure). While our causal power and intentions are central to how we view our own actions, putting too much emphasis on individual causal linkages can derail the discussion on responsibility for climate change and other such complex harms. After all, "causal responsibility has no necessary normative implications" (Isaacs 2011, p. 14). A causal relationship holds between something that happens (or exists) and the thing that gave rise to it. A cause is partly or wholly responsible for the occurrence of an effect that depends on it. Causal responsibility does not need to come with an attached ascription of moral responsibility. To use Fischer and Ravizza's (1993, p. 5) famous example, when your kitten accidentally breaks a vase, she is causally responsible for the event just as much as your human guest who broke the vase on purpose. Both played a causal role in shattering the vase. Yet while animals and humans both can be held causally responsible, only human behaviour can be morally blameworthy or praiseworthy.15 The same distinction holds for robots that assemble cars and the human workers in the same factory (although animals are absolutely nothing like robots and too many philosophical accounts have treated them as machines). While the industrial robot, or a bird that flew through the open window and broke the vase, can be causal agents, they cannot be moral agents. Causation does not even need agency: dissolved volatile gases in the magma chamber start the process that causes a Plinian volcanic eruption (like the one that in turn caused the destruction of Pompeii). Yet it would not make sense to talk about the volatile gases as agents in any philosophically meaningful sense connected to moral responsibility. Thus, causal responsibility is clearly not sufficient for moral responsibility, but in the standard understanding of moral responsibility it is considered necessary. This view is challenged by cases of overdetermination, which I will discuss in detail in later chapters. Moral and legal responsibility are both normative responsibility. Although our legal practices tend to track moral practices, the two can come apart. A classic example is a bad friend, one that for example tells his friend's secret to others. While being a bad friend is not illegal and we do not send people to prison for it, it is considered morally wrong, or at least socially undesirable, depending on the context. On the other side of the coin, not all laws can withstand ethical scrutiny, but rather reflect the prevalent norms and prejudices of a society at a given time, like laws that try to ban and criminalise consensual sex between adult men. Still, at the heart of legal arguments lay fundamentally ethical claims that the courts and judges try to weigh. Laws are constantly tested and interpreted in different ways by lawyers and their parameters are explored in controversial cases. Laws are also rewritten from time to time, as they change with the times and the legislators, although progress is 15 I accept the general idea of animals not being moral agents, but with some reservations: many people accept pets as part of their families and also expect good behaviour from them, using not just carrots and sticks, but emotional appeals also. Importantly, animals do reciprocate, and act with guilt or shame when they know they have done something they should not have. Animals obviously have inner lives and respond to emotional reasons. A bird that flew in through the open window and broke the vase would perhaps work better in the example instead of the kitten. 11 usually slow. This slowness also protects laws from being just a whim of the moment, the deliberation required tends to eliminate the worst injustices, in democracies with active civil society at least. This is not to deny the impact that money and power can have on the law, for example, in the form of corporate lobbying. In addition, even the best laws cannot on their own prevent injustices from taking place at the law enforcement level. Normative responsibility covers also responsibility for self and social norms such as etiquette and role responsibility. This kind of social responsibility can overlap with moral and legal responsibility. Take the bad friend, again. Telling a secret is breaking a promise and going against behaviour that is usually socially sanctioned (gossiping can also be encouraged, but usually breaking the trust of your best friend, for example, is frowned upon, so there are always lines to be crossed). Legal practices are influenced by social norms. Juridically, responsibility relationships can be created through contracts, promises, appointments, assignments, and so forth. Obligations in the social realm are created by promises and role expectations. Special duties or obligations, whichever one prefers to call them, are owed to some person or a subset of persons, in contrast to natural duties that are argued to be owed to all persons simply because they are persons (Jeske 2014). Special duties include duties we have as family members, friends and citizens, or duties towards those people to who we have made some sort of commitments or promises. We owe special duties to someone (individual or collective) because of who they are and the relationship we have with them. For example, a parent owes special duties of care towards their child. Aristotle set out the classic conditions for responsibility in Book III of Nicomachean Ethics. A virtuous character shows through in the agent's conception of good and in the ways he is disposed to behave in particular circumstances: the agent decides the appropriate course of action based on the circumstances. The agent is blameworthy or praiseworthy for an action (or a character trait) if and only if the action (and/or disposition) is voluntary. For an action or a trait to count as voluntary it must originate from the agent and the agent must not be ignorant about what he is doing or causing. In contrast, involuntary actions that excuse from responsibility take place under compulsion or are done due to ignorance. I will discuss the epistemic condition, i.e. acting under ignorance, in chapter seven. Here I focus on the control condition: what does it mean that something originates from the agent and is not done under compulsion? If an action originates from an external cause and the agent does not contribute anything to it, it counts as compulsory. Aristotle likens it to being carried by the wind.16 Truly involuntary acts in this sense are therefore limited and rare. The distinction between voluntary and involuntary is more 16 "[T]hat is compulsory of which the moving principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who is acting or is feeling the passion, e.g. if he were to be carried somewhere by a wind, or by men who had him in their power." Nicomachean Ethics III.1 1110a1-4. 12 subtle than just seeing if the action is done because of coercion, an external force of some kind, like somebody wielding a weapon or blackmailing you. Aristotle argues that whether an act is voluntary or involuntary ultimately depends on the context. If the circumstances are such that an agent has to choose between bad alternatives, i.e. they compel him to do something he would otherwise not do, the action is mixed: it is voluntary in the sense that the agent chose to do the act and his body put the causal chain in motion, but involuntary in the sense that in the abstract he would not have chosen to do it.17 In other words, he realises that the action was not ideal, there would have been counterfactually better alternatives, but under the circumstances it was the best choice. But what does it mean to say that an agent was in control of his action, i.e. that it was not done under compulsion? An addict could be thought to be not in control of their behaviour in a relevant way to be held responsible for their actions. What counts as compulsion: when an alcoholic drinks, can they stop; when a drug addict robs a store to get his next fix, is he responsible for his actions? The control condition of moral responsibility could be argued to be about being reason-responsive, and addicts are frequently offered as paradigm cases of humans who lack this, along with psychopaths. Addicts and psychopaths differ in their agency: while psychopaths lack the capacity to respond to moral emotions, addicts are responsive to moral reasons, but their addiction makes them weak-willed (Uusitalo 2015, p. 87).18 The control condition could be blocked by mind control via drugs or hypnosis, far-fetched examples that philosophers love to utilise. Psychopaths, on the other hand, could be argued to not be in control in the relevant way, or they could be argued to not be moral agents in the relevant sense.19 I lean towards the latter option, as moral reasoning does not work without moral emotions (Haidt 2012). Fischer and Ravizza (1998) make a distinction between regulative control (alternative possibilities, i.e. other actions are available to the agent) and guidance control (what actually happens in the causal sequence leading to an agent's action). When an agent 17 "But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils or for some noble object (e.g. if a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having one's parents and children in his power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death), it may be debated whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary. Something of the sort happens also with regard to the throwing of goods overboard in a storm; for in the abstract no one throws goods away voluntarily, but on condition of its securing the safety of himself and his crew any sensible man does so. Such actions, then, are mixed, but are more like voluntary actions; for they are worthy of choice at the time when they are done, and the end of an action is relative to the occasion. Both the terms, then, 'voluntary' and 'involuntary', must be used with reference to the moment of action. Now the man acts voluntarily; for the principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in such actions is in him, and the things of which the moving principle is in a man himself are in his power to do or not to do. Such actions, therefore, are voluntary, but in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose any such act in itself." Nicomachean Ethics III.1 1110a4-19. 18 Susanne Uusitalo argues that addictive action is not compulsive in the sense that addicts simply lose control over their action. An addict getting his fix is not akin to someone coercing someone else by force. Instead, feeding your addiction involves planning, even when the behaviour is habitual, as you need to settle the how, where and when of getting your desire for a given substance fulfilled. Deliberately undergoing withdrawal in order to lower tolerance is common, and Uusitalo argues that this is a clear example of deliberation and being able to carry out your intentions, i.e. being reason-responsive. Alfred Mele (1995) distinguished between degrees of compulsion. 19 Julie Driver (2015) has recently argued that while psychopaths might not be moral agents and are not morally responsible, they can nonetheless be morally appraisable or answerable to others. 13 has alternative actions available to her, she has regulative control over her action, whereas for guidance control you do not need to have other actions available. According to Fischer and Ravizza, guidance control is what is required for moral responsibility. Moral responsibility thus results from what actually happens in the causal sequence leading to an action, not what could have happened, but did not take place (Yaffe 2000). As we can see, there are no simple answers to what it means to be in control of one's actions, and the debates are ongoing in the moral responsibility literature. Bernard Williams (1993, p. 55) identified four basic elements of any conception of responsibility: cause (bringing about a state of affairs), intention (whether or not it was intended), state (whether the agent was in a normal state of mind at the time), and response (what the agent should do in response). He argued that we need different conceptions of responsibility in different circumstances, and we do this by varying the emphasis we give to each of the four elements and the interpretation we give of them. The four follow "from some universal banalities" (pp. 55-56): Everywhere, human beings act, and their actions cause things to happen, and sometimes they intend those things, and sometimes they do not; everywhere, what is brought about is sometimes to be regretted or deplored, by the agent or by others who suffer from it or by both; and when that is so, there may be a demand for some response from that agent, a demand made by himself, by others, or by both. Wherever all this is possible, there must be some interest in the agent's intentions, if only to understand what has happened [---] it must be a possible question how the intentions and actions of an agent at a given time fit in with, or fail to fit in with, his intentions and actions at other times. Under any social circumstances at all, that is a question for other people who have to live with him. What is interesting to note for the present purposes is that he (pp. 63-64) argues that in current moral philosophy there is a tendency to over-emphasise our intentions and the quality of our wills, even though "the responsibilities we have to recognise extend in many ways beyond [--] what we intentionally do" (p. 74). It is a familiar fact that if you acted unintentionally that does not "in itself, dissociate that action from yourself" (p. 54). Climate change is, of course, a harm that people did not intend to cause. This is part of the reason why some authors want to discuss only prospective collective obligations that are free from blame, but I will resist this move. While it has become quite common these days to separate responsibility that has a backwardlooking sense associated with praise and blame, and a forward-looking one that is associated with duties and obligations, my thesis is interested in both retrospective and prospective responsibility.20 20 Neuhäuser (2014) traces the concept of forward-looking (collective) responsibility back to Max Weber, Hans Jonas, Hannah Arendt, Larry May, Iris Marion Young, and David Miller. Miller (2007) distinguishes between the responsibility we bear for our actions and decisions (outcome responsibility), which is essentially backward-looking responsibility, and the responsibility we could have to aid those in need (remedial responsibility), essentially forward-looking. Outcome responsibility asks how far agents can reasonably be appraised or blamed for creating a certain outcome, whereas remedial responsibility begins with victims and asks who should help them, without the latter necessarily having any causal links to bringing the harm about. 14 When we look into the past to see how something came to be, we are not doing this just to assign praise or blame (guilt, fault), but also to just understand how it came to be. In cases of accidents, for example, trying to piece the causal puzzle together helps us to see how such things might be avoided in the future. By understanding the reasons that led to the accident and by assigning responsibility, we are looking to see if there are things that could be done differently to prevent such things happening again. We might not want to blame anyone, but we need to try to understand the things that led to the unwanted state of affairs if we hope to reduce the chances of it happening again (or to reduce the negative impacts). Conversely, when something has produced good results and outcomes, it is also useful to try to recognise the causes and to duplicate best practises or maintain and strengthen existing good practices through praise and adequate resource allocation. Here again the directions blend together. Of course, it can be illuminating sometimes to discuss the directions separately. Even so, I think we need both past and future responsibility if we are to make sense of climate change responsibility. This is a point I will discuss in detail in chapter six. The standard line of argument is that to qualify as a moral agent, one must be able to deliberate between actions and possible outcomes and then choose between them. Agents must not only have the ability to make choices, but also to act in the world (Peeters et a. 2015, p. 124). A prominent recent moral theory, contractualism, suggests that "moral judgments apply to people considered as possible participants in a system of codeliberation" (Scanlon 1988, p. 167).21 Conditions and stages that make participation of this kind impossible can therefore render moral praise and blame inapplicable, for example "for people acting in their sleep, victims of hypnosis, young children, people suffering from mental illness, and so on" (p. 173). He elaborates (p. 174): This general capacity for critically reflective, rational self-governance is not specifically moral, and someone could have it who was entirely unconcerned with morality. Morality does not tell one to have this capacity, and failing to have it in general or on a particular occasion is not a moral fault. Rather, morality is addressed to people who are assumed to have this general capacity, and it tells them how the capacity should be exercised. The most general moral demand is that we exercise our capacity for self-governance in ways that others could reasonably be expected to authorize. More specific moral requirements follow from this. Thus when my one-year-old hits me painfully on the head with a toy, I do not express any anger or resentment towards him, and I do not start questioning if he bears ill will towards me. A toddler that young is still learning about the reactions of other and what hurts. This is not to deny that 21 One of the advantages that I find Scanlon's theory has over other contractualist theories is that we are not imagining ourselves having to defend our principles purely in the abstract, but instead to other individuals. These individuals can be particular others (even if they are imaginary); they do not need to be completely abstract people within universal claims. 15 children can manifest attitudes of good or ill will, but we take an objective view of their attitude, rather than a participant's view. Because we are aware of the cognitive and affective limitations of small children, we prevent them from participating in characteristically adult relationships in society. A toddler is not expected to be the best friend or confidant of an adult, any more than he is expected to be able to exercise good judgement in a public role.22 Children and adults with intellectual disabilities are standardly cited as examples of agents who nevertheless do not qualify as moral agents: they do not lack moral standing, but we do not evaluate them the same way we do moral agents, and we do not expect as much of them (Erskine 2003, p. 6). Naturally there are differences in degree involved; a ten-year-old can be expected to act with much more deliberation than a one-year-old, and some intellectual disabilities are less severe than others. If morality is addressed to people who have the general capacity of critically reflective, rational self-governance, we should exercise this capacity in moral decision-making. This is why it cannot be mechanical; it cannot involve simply following some moral guidebook. If you follow any ethical text to a t, you are side-lining your moral agency, you are making a decision not to use it: you are following a moral guidebook blindly and thus your morality is mechanical.23 Mechanical morality is not exempt from blame: if you have the capacity for morality, you should exercise it. But what does it mean that we blame or praise someone? Peter Strawson (1962, p. 66) argued very influentially in his essay Freedom and Resentment that reactive attitudes such as blame, resentment, gratitude, guilt, love and forgiveness are manifestations of morality itself: "What is wrong to forget is that these practices, and their reception, the reactions to them, really are expressions of our moral attitudes and not merely devices we calculatingly employ for regulative purposes. Our practices do not merely exploit our natures, they express them." He (pp. 48-55) underlines that our reactive attitudes are natural human reactions towards the good or ill will (or indifference) of others towards us as displayed in their actions and attitudes. They are important for us, as they help to constitute our relationships with others: what we demand and expect of others in terms of their intentions and 22 Kutz (2000, p. 28) writes that "our attribution of an incompetent will to such agents is just the projection of ourselves into a certain type of relationship with them. We see them not as accountable subjects but as the objects of understanding, treatment, or education." He rejects Scanlon's (1988) reading of Strawson's theory as one where accountability rests only on the internal will of an agent (similar reading is also offered by Yaffe 2000). Instead Kutz argues that external affiliations of the agent matter also: warranted responses depend on "a certain understanding of the nature of the relationship between agent and respondent" (p. 29). Strawson makes a distinction between participant and objective views and Kutz (2000, p. 28) argues that our attitudes towards children are a blend of these. Therefore although children can manifest attitudes of both good will and hostility, our objective view includes awareness of the cognitive and affective limitations of children, and "our attribution of an incompetent will to such agents is just the projection of ourselves into a certain type of relationship with them." I will discuss Kutz's use of Strawson in chapter five. 23 Mechanical morality is also involved when self-driving cars are presented with a dilemma over who to try to save: the child who ran into the road or the passengers in the car. The to-swerve-or-not-to-swerve decision is, of course, not taken after deliberation by the car (which is not a moral agent); it is programmed into the software, and the moral agency and the deliberation that went into the programme code can be traced back to the engineers. The rules have been chosen beforehand, although the system does not need to follow them blindly, as there can be learning algorithms involved, thus complicating the question of agency (thank you to Pekka Mäkelä for pointing this out). 16 attitudes towards us.24 An action is viewed differently depending on if it was meant maliciously or if it was an accident.25 I touch upon the possible origins of moral intuitions and feelings in the appendix. But for now I want to explore a little bit more what blame is. The debate on what blame amounts to is very much alive in moral philosophy and there is no consensus on the matter, with cognitive, emotional, conative, and functional accounts of blame all on offer (Tognazzini and Coates 2016). How to judge when a response is appropriate is yet another matter (Clarke, McKenna and Smith 2015). I will make no attempt to cover this literature here, but will introduce an account that is helpful for understanding the later chapters of the thesis. The standard reading of Strawson is that blame is an emotional response. In contrast, T. M. Scanlon (2008) has influentially argued that blame should be understood as a form of moral judgement. According to him, blame is more than an evaluation of someone's character. It should also not be construed as a disapproval, as a mild form of sanction. Rather, to blame someone, "is to take that action to indicate something about the person that impairs one's relationship with him or her, and to understand that relationship in a way that reflects this impairment" (pp. 122-123). Our relations with other people are at the centre of this account, but in a different way than in Strawson's. Scanlon (p. 128) applauds Strawson for understanding blame and other reactive attitudes as essential components of relationships, and for being able to account for why the content of blame can vary, i.e. different standards in different relationships. However, he argues that Strawson's view fails to explain why blame can vary depending on the actual outcome in cases of moral outcome luck. With moral outcome luck, Scanlon (pp. 125-126) refers to situations where there is only some degree of negligence on the part of an individual, but if they have bad luck with the circumstances (like a child runs in front of their car), the end result can turn out to be disastrous. While in Strawson's account the blame is a reaction to the attitude to others that is manifested in the blameworthy agent's conduct, in Scanlon's it is "a revised understanding of our relations with a person, given what he or she has done" (p. 150), a judgement that one's relationship with the blameworthy person has been impaired, that the attitudes one holds toward that person have changed. He (p. 128) thus proposes that "to claim that a person is blameworthy for an action is to claim that the action shows something about the agent's attitudes toward others that impairs the relations that others can have with him or her." Viewing blame only as attitudinal responses would 24 Note that in arguing that reactive attitudes help to constitute our relationships with others, Strawson does not argue that they somehow constitute moral responsibility itself, or even the practice of holding people responsible. 25 Similar to Strawson, for Émile Durkheim (in Pickering 2014, p. 79), moral judgements are spontaneous: "[Moral] judgments are imprinted on the conscience of the normal adult. We find them ready-made within us, and in most cases without our being aware of having actually formed them in a conscious, let alone scientific or methodical way. Man's reaction, when confronted with a moral or immoral act, is spontaneous, even unconscious, apparently stemming from the very depths of his nature. It is a type of instinct which causes us to praise or blame, without there being any other possible alternative. This is why moral conscience is so often envisaged as a kind of voice which is heard within us, even though we are for the most part unable to say what it is or whence it derives its authority." 17 leave our account of blame too thin, as blame also "involves a suspension, in varying degrees and in varying ways, of one's readiness to enter into these more specific relations, and suspension also of the friendly attitudes that signal a readiness to do so" (p. 143). As blame is not simply a negative evaluation of a person, but instead "a particular understanding of our relations with him or her", praise is not the opposite of blame, but rather gratitude is (p. 151). Anyone can make a judgement of blameworthiness, but the content of blame depends essentially on the relations between the agents (p. 145).26 What is an appropriate response in a given situation therefore depends "on the person's exact relation to the blameworthy action and the attitudes it reveals" (p. 146). Hence, in cases of moral luck, the causal outcome, i.e. the bad outcome that was partly down to luck and partly down to fault, "multiplies the significance of his fault" (p. 150). In other words, the significance of the blameworthy person's negligence is increased for those people affected by it through bad luck. While philosophers such as Scanlon and Sher (2006) have criticised the notion of blame as an emotional response,27 Angela M. Smith (2013) argues that these accounts leave out what is essential to blame, namely its function as a moral protest. In doing so, she invokes Pamela Hieronymi's (2001) understanding of resentment as a protest. Hieronymi's (p. 546) suggestion is that [A] past wrong against you, standing in your history without apology, atonement, retribution, punishment, restitution, condemnation, or anything else that might recognize it as a wrong, makes a claim. It says, in effect, that you can be treated in this way, and that such treatment is acceptable. That-that claim-is what you resent. It poses a threat. In resenting it, you challenge it. If there is nothing else that would mark out that event as wrong, there is at least your resentment. Blame as protest means that you resent the way you have been treated by someone, and challenge the claim that is implicit in the wrongdoer's behaviour, namely that you, the person who has been wronged, is not deserving of moral respect (Smith 2013, p. 42). Blame thus "embodies a disposition to repudiate, to take some kind of stand against, a certain presumption implicit in the wrongdoer's 26 Scanlon (2008, p. 145) makes the following distinction between blame and being blameworthy. To claim that a person is blameworthy "is to claim that his action indicates something about that agent's attitudes toward others that impairs his relations with them." To blame someone, on the other hand, "is to hold attitudes toward him that differ, in ways that reflect this impairment, from the attitudes required by the relationship one would otherwise have with the person." The more distant we are from a person, the more detached and impartial our point of view becomes, meaning that blame can amount to a mere attitude of disapproval or a negative evaluation (p. 146), i.e. without emphasis on the effect on our relations. 27 In fact, Sher argues that emotional responses are not even required for blame, as we can blame someone we love without feeling any negative emotions towards them. In his view, blame is based on a desire-belief pair. Scanlon, on the other hand, concentrates on how the judgement of blame centres on the meaning of what someone did and how this impairs your relationship with them. For a concise treatment on the differences between the accounts, see Tognazzini and Coates 2016. 18 behaviour: the presumption that he or she has a right to treat others in objectionable ways" (p. 36).28 Smith therefore suggests a modified version of Scanlon's account of blame, one that makes use of Scanlon's interpretation of what is involved in judging someone blameworthy (having attitudes that impair the agent's relations with others), but that adds an explanation of how blaming someone is an additional step.29 To blame someone is thus not only to hold them blameworthy, but also to challenge the false moral claim in their conduct and to register one's protest towards it by modifying one's intentions, attitudes, and expectations towards them (pp. 42-43). On Smith's (p. 41) account, while reactive attitudes are probably by far the most common way of registering moral protest and demanding moral acknowledgement from others, they do not exhaust the ways of morally protesting.30 An interesting feature of this account is that while the primary target is "the false moral claim implicit in the behavior of a wrongdoer", and the aim is that the wrongdoer recognises this, there can also be a secondary aim of gaining moral recognition of the false claim from the wider moral community (p. 44). A blame towards past wrongdoers, now already dead, can make sense as a protest understood in this way. The example that Smith offers is holding southern slaveholders blameworthy for historical wrongs committed in the United States, and how this "current blame embodies a desire for moral acknowledgement or recognition". She writes (pp. 44-45): When we blame antebellum slaveholders, then, I think we should say that the desire in this case is for a continued acknowledgement, on the part of the moral community, of the horrible wrongs that were committed against particular members of our community in the past. By continuing to blame these distant wrongdoers rather than simply judging them blameworthy, we, as it were, sustain and reiterate our moral protest of this treatment of our fellow citizens. I think this idea captures something important about collective responsibility for past wrongdoings. Active blame as protest seems especially salient when the wrong committed continues to reverberate to the present day, like in how the effects of slavery are still being felt today. The situation will be more complicated with climate change, but we will get to that later. In addition, I will suggest in section 3.1 that the concept of blame as moral protest can also be applied to collective agents. 28 She suggests (p. 42, fn.7) that Adam Smith gestures towards this kind of view in Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759, II.iii.11). 29 "The Moral Protest Account: To blame another is to judge that she is blameworthy (i.e., to judge that she has attitudes that impair her relations with others) and to modify one's own attitudes, intentions, and expectations toward that person as a way of protesting (i.e., registering and challenging) the moral claim implicit in her conduct, where such protest implicitly seeks some kind of moral acknowledgement on the part of the blameworthy agent and/or on the part of others in the moral community." (Smith 2013, p. 43). 30 "After repeated disappointments, for example, I may have lost my ability to feel anger towards an unreliable friend, yet I may still protest his treatment of me by cutting off relations with him. In doing this, and doing this in protest of his latest let-down, I make clear that I blame him, even if my predominant feeling is one of sadness." (Smith 2013, p. 41). 19 A few more clarifications regarding terminology are required before we move on. Culpability is about being at fault. It is an important notion especially in legal theory, as it describes the degree of a guilty agent's blameworthiness. In moral philosophy it means that the agent deserves blame and is guilty. Although I employ the term "culpable ignorance" in chapter seven, I will use blameworthy in my thesis when referring to culpability. In contrast, liability is a legal term that does not necessarily imply blameworthiness, and it is also employed in moral philosophy. An agent can be held liable for something that was outside their control or done by someone else, for example, a parent could be held liable for the negligent damage caused by their underage child. The way Kutz employs complicity could be classified as a version of liability. While some authors make a distinction between responsibility and accountability (for example referring to accountability as liability and responsibility as culpability), I do not employ the terms in this way. I do not imply that they are interchangeable, however. Responsibility is about praise and blame both, and can have backwardand forward-looking meanings (see section 6.3). Accountability, on the other hand, encompasses blameworthy and complicit-without-blame meanings of backward-looking responsibility. Accountability thus is not about forward-looking responsibility, nor is it about praise. I do utilise the term accountability quite a lot in later chapters because one of my main sources uses it: Kutz (2000, pp. 17-18) distinguishes between an internal and an external sense of responsibility, and terms the external sense accountability. The internal sense is about agency conditions for moral responsibility and refers to the psychological competencies one must have to be able to qualify as a moral agent (i.e. the kitten or the industrial robot would not qualify). The external sense (accountability) refers to the normative affiliations and duties of the agent to other surrounding agents. A responsible agent (in the sense of qualifying as a moral agent) is only a suitable candidate for accountability, but not necessarily accountable. Kutz's example is a bank teller who has to empty the cash drawer while being held at gunpoint: the teller is a responsible agent, but not accountable. Accountability therefore is a narrower term than responsibility, and it is fundamentally relational (see section 5.2). I discuss moral agency conditions separately, most notably in section 3.1. I use both responsibility and accountability to refer to backward-looking responsibility, with blameworthiness a separate issue. I will argue in chapter five that climate change makes us susceptible to inhabited evil in relation to future generations, as well as those already vulnerable to climate risks. I will argue in later chapters that while a lot of our responsibility in relation to climate change is based on responsiveness to structural injustices, blame and other reactive attitudes also have their role to play. However, complicity is not akin to culpability, but rather liability, so all our responsibility in relation to climate change is not blameworthy. 20 1.3 Ethics for a collective age The notion of collective responsibility does not sit easily with standard accounts of individual responsibility. As a group-based construct, it places both causal responsibility and ascriptions of praise and blame at the group level, with the source of moral responsibility located in group actions. Smiley (2011) divides the main controversies around the topic into three categories: can collective responsibility be sensibly understood as moral responsibility, how does collective responsibility distribute to individual members, and what is the practical value of ascribing collective responsibility? Classic methodological individualism denies that groups could form intentions, or that groups could be understood as morally blameworthy in the sense required by moral responsibility. More contemporary writers who criticise collective responsibility as a moral construct (along the lines of methodological individualism) acknowledge how collective responsibility can be a useful construct in some cases, but worry about the impact of the lack of full blown mental lives of collectives' on the whole concept (Smiley 2011, pp. 4-7). I wish to separate two lines of debate, as I do not wish to make any deep ontological commitments in this thesis when it comes to collective agency. Namely, I want to divorce the question "does it make sense to discuss collective agents in a holistic manner?" from the question "does it make sense to discuss collectives as moral agents?" (French 1984, Hess 2014). What this means is that there are collective agents, yet moral agency belongs to individuals only. I will discuss this in detail in chapter three. Collective responsibility as a term is given different meanings in the literature. I will defend a hybrid-theory in section 3.1, one that allows that collective agents are real agents, but denies that they are moral agents. They can accrue moral responsibility through their actions and omissions, but moral agency belongs to beings that can reason morally. Therefore, moral responsibility also belongs to the agents, although it can be shared. While collectives can act in a moral way and incorporate moral reasons into their decision-making structure, I maintain that they cannot as collective agents adequately respond to reasons for accepting or rejecting moral principles under particular conditions.31 This is always left to the individual moral agents within these collectives. Thus collective responsibility does not let the individual off the hook: individual responsibility is not a separate or competing notion, rather the two are interlinked. According to the hybrid-view that I will defend, in addition to (or instead of) direct moral responsibility, individuals can have shared moral 31 Moral reasons for action are, of course, different from moral reasons for accepting moral principles. I argue that while collective agents can have the former, they cannot adequately respond to the latter; only individuals can. Therefore collective agents cannot be moral agents, although they can incorporate moral reasons into their decision-making and can be praised or blamed accordingly. 21 responsibility qua members or constituents of collectives, whether the latter is agential or unorganised. This does not mean, though, that my account is reductionist. The myriad ways in which the real (non-moral) agency of the collective affects the options and thinking of the individuals within the collective make the two types of moral responsibility quite different. The way these two interlink and differ forms the core part of my thesis. Collective responsibility is often theorised via collective action or individual action in a collective setting.32 Collective action comes in many varieties. A gang robs a bank. Two people engage in a long passionate kiss. A group of people practice tai chi in a park. Four hotel chefs prepare a meal that is delivered to the guests' room. An army invades a city. NASA sends a shuttle into space. People exit and enter a subway carriage. A group of researchers plan a project that never materialised, as it fails to attract funding. In all these examples a set of people are either acting together or engaged in action that has a collective context or meaning. In most of these cases, with the possible exception of the commuters entering and exiting the subway, the people engaged in the collective action share a goal that can only be obtained through acting together. This is why these kinds of groups could be labelled as goal-oriented collectives (Isaacs 2011, p. 25). When people embrace something as their collective goal, they understand their own contributions and individual actions in the context of the collective goal (p. 38). They might or might not be organised, but in all these cases the people are involved in collective action in order to bring about some shared goal.33 Highly organised groups are the most obvious examples of collective agents. They have decision-making procedures in place and have a core of some kind that can be identified as representing the collective, for example, a board of trustees. Legally recognised organised collectives include corporations, nation-states, governments, non-governmental organisations, sports clubs and professional sports teams, educational institutions, political parties, and art establishments such as theatre groups, among countless other examples. While all these collectives have a structure, they 32 Action is bodily movements: waving a hand, writing a note, running for a bus, singing a song, lifting someone up, saying something. Intentional action differs from unintentional in that it has an end goal. When I wave my hand I do so to attract your attention, but when my eyelid twitches due to a tic I have no end goal that can explain the movement. My act was involuntary and unintended. The movement of the eyelid can be causally explained by myokymia: the involuntary and spontaneous localised muscle contractions that can be brought about by stress, eye strain or allergies, among other things. But you cannot give an explanation for eyelid tics in terms of goals or aims: the movement has none. Intentionality is something that is deliberate: you aim at something, your actions are directed at something, they are about something. Intentional action is often bodily movements in a particular context: I can only high five you in a social context where the gesture means something, otherwise the action is only the palms of our hands touching roughly around the height of our heads, and the meaning and intention would be something else. 33 Kutz (2000, p. 105) distinguishes between ephemeral and institutional groups, only the latter of which "have identity criteria that do not wholly consist in the presence of overlapping participatory intentions" (I will discuss participatory intentions in chapter five). Thus, while it is enough to make me a member of an ephemeral group such as the one that pushes a car out of a snow bank, "I cannot make myself a member [--] of the U.S. Senate by intentionally participating in its deliberations". Not only do the other Senators have to recognise me as a member, I also have to have to have won a majority of the vote in the elections. 22 will diverge in terms of the legal protection they enjoy and the extent to which their activities are regulated by the law. By this, I refer to the extent to which corporations and political parties must conform to regulations in comparison to sports clubs or theatre groups, for example. The latter will, of course, also be subject to certain laws and regulations, but their activities will not usually be as affected by the legal and legislative institutions as corporations are, nor are they given the same protections as corporations are (for example, being given the status of persons in the U.S. law under corporate personhood). A collective can, of course, be highly organised and at the same time without any legal protection, like criminal organisations. Organisation is therefore a good word to refer to groups that are at the most organised end of the collective spectrum and are always collective agents. Collectives that are not organisations but are nonetheless organised groups in a looser sense include families, groups of friends, hobby groups, and such. They have a membership that is more or less defined, and they have some kind of a system for decision-making, although in most cases not systematic in the sense of following a certain set of procedures (it could be as simple as "Mum and Dad decide", or "we will follow Abigail's lead unless Anna has other ideas"). Hierarchies and roles can and do exist within these collectives also but the roles are usually subject to ongoing renegotiation between the members, however unofficially or even unconsciously this process takes place. What these organised collectives have in common is that they usually evolve around personal relationships and often also around common interests. If urgent action was required, this kind of a group should be able to act fast due to the familiarity and overlapping relationships between the members. In contrast, the roles and rules of an organisation are much stricter, which means that when a person acts within such a role, they act differently than they would at home, as they need to take different things into consideration. The more organised the collective, the easier it is to identify it separately from any cohort of its members (Isaacs 2011, p. 24). Isaacs distinguishes between organisations (institutional collectives) and goal-oriented collectives. When a harm is caused where no organised collective entity is the culprit, the perpetrator might still be described as a goal-oriented collective: all that is needed is that there is "a joint goal around the achievement of which a group comes together in solidarity" (Isaacs 2011, p. 25). To give an example of my own, we could have three homophobic individuals who meet each other for the first time while each is angrily watching a pride parade passing by. They end up deciding to beat up a participant and thus share a goal that they regrettably succeed in attaining. They could be described as a goal-oriented collective, even though they just came together. The participants of the pride parade are not an organisation either (although they might for a large part comprise of several overlapping organised collectives, such as activists groups), but they too could be described as a goal-oriented collective: they are involved in joint action (march, parade) to bring about a joint goal (furthering LGBT rights). These kinds of 23 goal-oriented collectives in most cases fall somewhere near the middle of the organised-unorganised spectrum, as it takes advance planning to come together in large numbers. Towards the more unorganised end of the spectrum, the goal could be as simple as making a wave in a stadium when watching a game. Isaacs (2011, p. 40) nicely illustrates how in this kind of a goal-oriented collective, the intentions of members "play an important analytical role in the intentions of the whole": When we intend to do something together, then each of us individually has a commitment to the collective goal and an intention concerning his part of what we intend to do. The intention of each is not, however, a collective intention. It is an individual intention with collective content. These individual intentions with collective content are components of the collective intention. If, for example, we intend to take part in the wave, then each of us intends to take part, namely, when the wave gets to our section, each of us intends to jump up, throw our arms in the air, cheer, and then sit down. And we intend to do this in a coordinated fashion, based on our observations of when it is our turn. Our reason for doing this is to participate in the collective goal of producing a strong wave. If you were attending the game with me and I jumped up, threw my hands in the air, cheered, and then quickly sat down, you would have reason-in the absence of a wave or of the supposition that I was trying to get one started-to wonder what on earth I was doing. In the context of a wave, however, it is quite clear that I intend to participate in the collective action. What is important to note at this point is that collectives come in all shapes and sizes, just as the notion of collectivity comes in degrees. According to Isaacs (2011, p. 48) the greatest gain from acknowledging this is that we get a concept that reflects the range of collective activity and is able to capture a variety of real-life examples, while at the same time being able to be clear about the differences between them with respect to their intentional character. She explains: On one end of the continuum is full collectivity and on the other end is parallel action. At and near the end where there is full collectivity, the combination of factors-much like the structures and mechanisms in organizations-produces a collective intention. No such intention arises in parallel action. The collective intention is neither a simple aggregate of individual intentions nor an individual intention with an irreducibly collective orientation. Rather, it is a state of affairs in which agents understand themselves as members of a collective and in relation to others, aiming as a group for the achievement of a collective goal, intend individually to do their part in the achievement of the collective goal, and mutually understand one another as doing the same. These conditions set the intention for the collective. The organisations and goal-oriented collectives –distinction is not the only one she wants to make, however, as Isaacs (p. 41) also discusses some collectives being tighter on the continuum than others, with the tightness reflected in the strength of the collective intention. When the collective intentions are completely transparent to each participant, we have a tight collective: each participant is aware of the intentions of others (pp. 44-45). In her example (p. 46), two people have a dinner together; 24 "each participant in the collective act has the appropriate understanding of the quite specific collective goal, her respective contributions toward the goal, her intention as contributor to contribute, the intention of her coparticipant to do the same. Under these conditions, they pursue the goal as a unit." These two people are a tight collective. She contrasts this with a looser collective, a group who have a monthly potluck dinner while discussing a book. There is no effort to coordinate what each brings, so the end result varies from one meeting to another. Isaacs labels the group a moderate collectivity: "The lack of specificity of the goal and lack of knowledge about what others will do loosens the collectivity." Collective intention does exist, as the book group intends to have a potluck dinner, although how balanced the selection of foods turns out to be is anyone's guess. Instead, "The outcome is much more the satisfaction of a collective hope than the achievement of a collective goal." Schmid (2009) sets the basic dilemma of collective agency in terms of plural action: actions require agents and so for somebody to qualify as an agent, "there has to be a description under which she intended to do what she did" (p. xiv). But how can we intend anything other than our own actions? I will return to this in chapter five when I discuss Kutz's account. There are also collectives all around us in the wider sense of the term that encompasses various interest groups and people bound together through causal links to something. While these latter groups are not collective agents, they are unorganised collectives that some argue can also bear collective duties and obligations. The collectives that I will discuss for the rest of this section are on the unorganised end of the collective spectrum. What makes these cases collective is context: while the individuals might act independently, they do not act in isolation. That is to say, the individual acts take part in a collective context and their meaning and significance can only be fully captured by analysing the collective level, such as is the case with both climate change and systemic injustices. Thereby collective contexts are also important in affecting and shaping individual moral responsibility in these kinds of cases, even when no collective agents as such are involved. Unorganised collectives are a set of individuals who lack any established group structure, but are nevertheless connected by some common feature, weather that feature is persisting or temporary. Examples of unorganised collectives include different kinds of interest groups and social movements, sets of people who happen to be at a certain place at a certain time, but also groups of people that together cause harm in aggregate. After all, many of the most serious harms brought about collectively are not "the products of concerted action" but rather "the results of a confluence of individual behavior" (Kutz 2000, p. 166). Climate change is the most pressing example of this, but environmental damage that results "from an aggregate of marginal individual contributions" more generally presents the paradigm examples of what Kutz labels "unstructured collective harms" (p. 166). This term can be confusing, though, as although the collectives responsible are unstructured in the sense of being unorganised, the harms are often traceable to structural and systemic issues. I 25 will return to these harms in chapter five, labelling them either structural harms or systemic harms by unorganised collectives, and discuss how Kutz suggests that they can be rooted in individual accountability, either through systemic forms of collective action, or by symbolic considerations of character. In chapter six I discuss structural injustices and how we can be complicit for them. The existing literature on the responsibility of unorganised collectives has centred on the ability of individuals to form a group agent capable of undertaking the action that the situation requires. Debates on this date back to Virginia Held's 1970 article "Can a Random Collection of Individuals Be Morally Responsible", where she argues that passengers on a train carriage (or pedestrians on a street etc.) can be held morally responsible for an omission such as a failure to help the victim of an assault, as long as the action called for is obvious for a reasonable person. Cripps (2013, pp. 49-61) discusses classic beach rescue scenarios (inspired by Held), presenting a continuum of circumstances where individuals who do not necessarily know each other ― and have no established decisionmaking mechanism ― regardless should co-operate to prevent children from drowning. Isaacs (2011, p. 141) offers an account of Bystander Cases where "there is at least one person suffering a harm and at least one person in a position to assist." The person(s) in a position to assist are not responsible in the backward-looking sense for the plight of those in need, so any obligation to assist "does not turn on any prior share in bringing the unfortunate circumstances about." What is common across these kinds of random collectives is that the individuals find themselves in the situation due to nothing more than (bad) luck. The composition of the collection of individuals in these kinds of cases is therefore purely down to matters of geography and timing. I agree with Held, Cripps and Isaacs that their acts and omissions become a question of moral responsibility when there is a pressing need and they are in a position to help someone. However, actions that predictably cause harm in aggregation (like the emissions that cause anthropogenic climate change) take place within a system and things get more complicated then, as I will argue in chapters four and five. Applying the logic of random collectives to climate change does not hold. I will return to this in chapter four when I discuss random and other unorganised collectives. 1.4 Uncertainties and risks Climate change is fertile ground for attacks on science because of the scale of the problem and the uncertainties involved. While the science is clear on the cause of the changes (human activity), it is far less clear about the outcomes of the changes in the climatic system. While this is largely due to our inability to predict what will happen (as that depends mostly on the kinds of mitigation policies we will have), some of it is also down to the vast scale and time-frame of the problem, and the amount of data and knowledge about climate mechanisms that climate models require. The IPCC 26 uses probabilistic estimates to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or a result.34 This is part of what good science is: you do not claim to know for certain something that there is simply not enough evidence about. The Earth's climate is a very complex system, so getting to grips with all, or even most, of its different mechanisms will take time. Therefore, while climate change is an undisputed fact, there is a lot of uncertainty around how the climate responds to these large and rapid changes. This uncertainty has many implications. It is difficult to make policy-decisions related to climate change: the timescale is beyond what we can predict and the science deals in probabilities.35 Not only is it hard to sell the complicated science to a public that is already pushed towards either passive apathy by psychological defence mechanisms, or suspending ignorance by highly misleading campaigns by powerful business elites (see section 3.3), it is also hard to make sense of exactly how much to invest in mitigation and with what measures. This is especially so when the standard economic tools are not fully up to the task (see section 2.2). How to capture uncertainty in scientific models is one issue, how to convey the probabilities to policy makers (Parker 2010) is yet another. These are important topics in their own right, but they fall outside the scope of this thesis. What I am concerned with is how should uncertainty factor in our ethical arguments? As climate ethics is for the most part not about what we as individuals should do, but what we as collectives should do, my question is closely tied with how uncertainty should factor in political debates, with politics understood broadly. One aspect in any political discussion is invariably the economy, how we organise sustaining ourselves and others. Uncertainty and risk is not a topic alien to economists. John Broome (1992, p. 17) illustrates the importance of risk in economic theory when he argues that "what really matters is not the riskiness of the project considered in isolation, but the effect it has on the overall risk we are exposed to." When we reduce the variance in what might happen by reducing our emissions, mitigation acts like an insurance as the future becomes a bit less unsure, and insurance is worthwhile even if the risk does not materialise (1992, pp. 17-18). Broome writes (p. 18): Uncertainty is an inherent part of the problem. Intuitively, it strongly conditions the nature of the problem. In particular, the small chance that global warming might lead to disaster seems, intuitively, to be one thing we ought never to lose sight of. More than anything else, 34 Virtually certain (99–100% probability), very likely (90–100%), likely (66–100%), about as likely as not (33– 66%), unlikely (0–33%), very unlikely (0–10%), and exceptionally unlikely (0–1%). They also employ additional terms when required: extremely likely: (95–100%), more likely than not (>50–100%), and extremely unlikely (0–5%). In addition, the IPCC uses the terms limited, medium, or robust to describe the available evidence; and low, medium, or high for the degree of agreement. Furthermore, different confidence levels can be assigned for a given evidence and agreement statement, but when levels of evidence and degrees of agreement increase, they correlate with increasing confidence, which is expressed using qualifiers very low, low, medium, high, and very high. 35 In general, I find that these things have much more to do with political inaction around climate change than assumptions found in game-theoretical models that have been widely used in climate ethics literature. However, I will not defend this view here. For a critique of applying the logic of the Prisoner's Dilemma to climate change, see Amadae (2016, pp. 224-244). 27 most people are worried by the thought that we are interfering with the natural working of the entire globe, without properly understanding what we are doing. Our lack of knowledge has to be granted a recognized place within the decision-making process. The role of uncertainty is not properly reflected in the political process, however. In a similar vein to Broome, Gardiner (2011, p. 190) observes that "perhaps our greatest uncertainty at the moment concerns how good we are at identifying catastrophic risks. In other words, it is reasonable to believe that our current grasp of the possibilities is seriously incomplete", meaning we have not yet identified all tipping elements that are relevant from the point of view of policy-making. As we are probably ignorant about some major threshold phenomena, and do not know enough about the ones already identified (such as ice sheet disintegration, or the vast methane reserves currently frozen under the seas being released), we could be much closer to experiencing abrupt climate change effects than what is reflected in public knowledge and political agenda. This level of uncertainty has serious implications for the way that politics should be done, but it also points to a worrying thought. Could our great intelligence and scientific prowess have made us too reckless in relation to the vast amount of things that are still unknown to us? Perhaps we have been lulled into a completely false sense of security with regards to climate change and science: instead of it being an incremental and gradually worsening problem, one mainly for future generations, we have already set off a chain of events that will be catastrophic to us as well as them. We could already be past the tipping point. The possibility of a disaster, even if the chance is small (and especially if we cannot really say with much confidence what the chances really are), matters a great deal ethically. I find this to be one of the most underutilised arguments in climate ethics and politics alike. Every year, progress is made in climate science. As the models used by climate scientists have become ever more sophisticated, so have the predictions become more confident with each successive IPCC Report. No doubt many major advances will still be made. Despite this, there will always be an element of uncertainty involved in climate change, no matter how sophisticated climate science will become. This is purely because of the timescale involved. Broome (1992, pp. 10-11) observes how we cannot be expected to be able to imagine what the future looks like with any relevant certainty due to what he terms as "historical uncertainties". Consider all the things that have changed in the past 30 years alone: the internet connected the world, mobile devices became widespread, and social media changed the way we communicate. And these are just the major technological innovations that have changed the way we connect and organise our daily lives. Political changes have been just as significant and far-reaching: the collapse of the Soviet Union, the spread of the neo-liberal free market economy, and the aftermath of the Arab Spring are just some of the recent events that continue to shape our realities. Historical uncertainties make it impossible 28 to predict with any accuracy what human lives will be like in 200 years' time. But it is not only because we do not know how our societies will evolve that making predictions about the effects of climate change on our lives is challenging. As Broome (1992, p. 11) notes, the climate also helps shape history: A feature of historical uncertainty is that it may never be resolved. Not only are we now unable to predict what the effects of climate will be, but historians in the future will never know what many of its effects have been. No doubt the Little Ice Age had a vast influence on human history. But we do not know what would have happened if it had not occurred. So we do not know what its influence was, and we have no idea whether it was for good or harm. Far from this uncertainty being a reason for not making policy recommendations, Broome argues that the uncertainties involved mean that we should tread carefully and err on the side of caution. There are general predictions that we can make fairly safely: The first is simply that the effects of human-induced global warming are very uncertain. [--] this by itself has important consequences for the work that needs to be done. But, more than that, we can say that the effects will certainly be long lived, almost certainly large, probably bad, and possibly disastrous. (Broome 1992, p. 12) When there is a risk of a catastrophe, we should err on the side of caution. Even a small risk of a large catastrophe has more moral significance than a large risk of a small harm. One possible trigger for an all-out catastrophe that we already know about would be the release of methane reservoirs under the artic regions that would make the world uninhabitable (Broome 1992, pp. 15-16). Methane is a far less well-known and discussed greenhouse gas when compared to carbon dioxide, but it is also far more powerful. The likelihood of these kinds of scenarios need not be too great to still give us plenty of reasons to take them very seriously indeed. Broome's words of caution from 25 years ago are given new urgency by the latest research on methane. Unlike the very long cycle of carbon emissions, methane only lasts in the atmosphere for about 12 years. Methane has been responsible for about a fifth of global warming thus far, but it holds the seed for catastrophe, as methane molecules warm the planet roughly 30 times more than CO2.36 While microbial sources are the main culprit (including agriculture, especially rice patties) totalling almost 400 million tons of methane emissions a year, fossil-fuel sources are almost twice as big as previously estimated (about 200 million tons). Climate change has already caused the 36 Global warming refers to how average global temperature rises as a result of greenhouse gas emissions, while climate change refers to the changes in the global climactic system, i.e. to global climate patterns, caused by the increased temperature. 29 conditions on Earth to become wetter and warmer. The truly troubling finding is that this is accelerating the processes that release methane into the atmosphere. (Pearce 2016). What we are facing then is the possibility of a positive feedback loop in which warming leads to the release of more methane and even more warming. With methane molecules being a greenhouse gas 30 times more powerful than carbon dioxide, the potential effects of this feedback loop are truly terrifying. Global warming could be accelerated to a degree previously thought impossible if the vast amounts of methane currently trapped around the Arctic in permafrost on land and under the sea would be released.37 When outcomes like this loom ominously on the horizon of possibility, there is absolutely no defensible reason to wait. If we wait any longer, it might be too late (it might already be too late). We already have very credible scientific evidence that changes are happening at a scale and speed previously unthinkable and we know many of the mechanisms behind these changes. We are the culprits; any appeals to uncertainty are only a tactic for those with economic interests tied to fossil fuels to delay action (I will discuss this in section 3.3). 1.5 Central arguments What is our duty or obligation in given circumstances is a standard question in moral philosophy. It is also a recurring question in climate ethics: what is the duty of an individual in the face of the collectively caused harm of climate change? This is far from the only salient question to ask, however, or indeed even the most important, as I will argue. My main concern could be captured with a plural formulation of the Socratic question 'How should one live?' which Bernard Williams argued is the best place for moral philosophy to start (1985, pp. 4-5).38 I will not aim to give a detailed prescription of anyone's duties related to responding to climate change. I will not aim to even give a prescription of any exact collective obligations. What I aim to do, instead, is to convince the reader that it is warranted to hold most of us in the Global North responsible for climate change, even with all the various complexities involved. When noting how little has been written about the principle of "ought implies can" in relation to collective obligations, Holly Lawford-Smith (2012, p. 453) excuses moral philosophers from their 37 If we are already past the tipping point, our emissions will make no difference in the long run, catastrophe will happen regardless. Broome acknowledged this, but points out that our emissions are still not harmless: they accelerate the speed at which the catastrophe draws closer, and this is harmful. He concludes (2012, p. 78): "If there is to be a catastrophe, the later the better. So even fatalism does not give you a good reason to doubt that your emissions are harmful." Broome's harm argument will be discussed in more detail in chapter two. 38 In the view that I will defend, morality is not socially constructed: it is part of who we are and forever evolving. While my approach is not based on moral facts that are somehow outside the human realm, it is not relativist either: there is a hard core to morality that is formed by the kind of creatures that we are. That is, humans are social creatures that rely on co-operation to survive and on love to flourish. We need each other and we want each other in various ways. While we can nourish each other, we also have the capacity to hurt and oppress each other, and human history as well as the present time has plentiful examples of both. 30 silence because "after all, they deal in individuals and actions", unlike political philosophers who encompass collectives and outcomes. Throughout this thesis, I will take a less lenient view on moral philosophers: I believe our musings should likewise cover collectives and outcomes. The world today is too interconnected to limit the scope of moral philosophy to individual actions and agents alone. I will argue that we cannot get the full picture of individual responsibility unless we look into things we do together and things we cause together. Philosophically the thesis draws from a wide range of literature and brings together some areas of philosophy that previously might have had little cross-pollination, such as collective responsibility and culpable ignorance. I find this inevitable, as the topic at hand demands it. Chapter two begins with a discussion of the different aspects of climate ethics and introduces the main debates within the field. It also critically discusses Walter Sinnott-Armstrong's (2005) argument against assigning individual responsibility for climate change and explains why the argument fails. The possibility of direct responsibility for climate change is the concern for the rest of the chapter. I will deny that individual emissions resulting from our one-off daily choices cause harm, but will argue that individual lifestyle emissions might. I will argue that we can have direct responsibility to mitigate, although this will not be our exclusive, or even (for the vast majority of us) our most important responsibility regarding climate change. I will suggest that our individual direct duty in relation to climate change is to not to increase the probable risk of serious harm – deprivation of fundamental capabilities – to other people, at least as long as we can do so at a less than significant cost to ourselves. The discussion on the complications of talking about direct duties sets the scene for the exploration of individual complicity for collective harms that follows later. Chapter three discusses collective responsibility and collective agents. My view is that certain organised, institutional collectives can be thought of as collective agents, although they are not moral agents. I will suggest that collective obligations distribute to individual members, but often this is not in any straightforward way. I will also argue that nation-states and governments are not the only relevant collective agents when we look at climate change responsibility, but that corporations also have obligations concerning making sure that their activities are as carbon-neutral as possible. Furthermore, corporations that have engaged in lobbying against climate regulation through creating and disseminating misleading information have acquired themselves additional obligations to mitigate climate change and compensate for the harm they have caused. Chapter four discusses unorganised collectives and highlights the problems that we face when we try to discuss their responsibility. The discussion centres on texts by Cripps (2013) and Isaacs (2011). While I agree with Cripps (p. 38) that in situations like climate change there is "an ineliminable collective significance to what we do", I disagree that this can be best explored through the logic of random collectives. I also deny that you can place obligations, putative or actual, on 31 unorganised collectives, although you can hold the constituents of unorganised collectives blameworthy in the backward-looking sense under certain conditions. However, I grant that it can be useful to discuss unorganised collectives in some cases, as it can help us to make better sense of our complicity for collectively caused harms where our participation is marginal. More specifically, it can make us appreciate the different structures and systems that we are part of, and how we are complicit in upholding and recreating these. Chapter five focuses on complicity and offers it as a solution to the problems of the responsibility of unorganised collectives and marginal participation, referring to cases where individual contribution is overdetermined in the sense that no individual's action or omission is necessary or sufficient for the normative properties of a collective outcome. While Isaacs's and Cripps's models offer new ways of looking at collectively caused harms, I find Kutz's (2000) participatory intentions a more fruitful way of trying to get to grips with responsibility for genuinely large-scale, structural problems like climate change. I will argue that not only can we have responsibility in relation to climate change both directly and as members of collective agents, we can also have it as constituents of unorganised collectives. Chapter six answers criticism that has been levelled against Kutz's account and adds two more pieces to the complicity puzzle. I discuss the potential of individual actions to help bring about an outcome, arguing that this will give us an additional reason to take action in cases of marginal participation. An important aspect of climate change responsibility is forward-looking responsibility without blame, something that Young (2011, p. 106) discusses: "Those who participate by their actions in producing and reproducing structural injustice are usually minding their own business and acting within accepted norms and rules. They bear responsibility for unjust outcomes, which they may regret, without being specifically at fault." I therefore suggest that we should combine Young's account on structural injustices with Kutz's account on complicity to get a full picture of climate change responsibility. Chapter seven looks at responsibility and ignorance, including psychological and institutional factors, which have been used to explain inaction. I will argue that institutional collective agents have a lower threshold for culpable ignorance than individual agents. By this I mean that those collective agents with the capacity to process a lot of information have greater obligations to know about climate change than individuals do. I will also argue that when it comes to climate change, there are several obstacles for us assessing the situation in an objective manner. Although the scope of my concerns is wide, I make no claims to offer some definitive account of these issues that will settle ongoing debates. While I believe that there is a lot philosophers can contribute to public debates on ethical issues ― and furthermore that they definitely should attempt to do so ― philosophers cannot claim any exclusive rights over ethical knowledge (nor can anyone 32 else). Besides, research has shown that the diversity of the cognitive tools and abilities of different people outperform groups of experts in accord (Page 2007). Collective wisdom trumps individual excellence, even when the latter is interconnected. More than ever, we need to think and act together to solve not just climate change, but also other structural collective problems that pose real threats to human flourishing, perhaps even to our survival as a species. What, then, can philosophical inquiry contribute to society and to the social sciences, what is it that separates a philosophical inquiry from other sciences and narratives? As Williams observed, "modern life is so pervasively reflective, and a high degree of self-consciousness is so basic to its institutions, that these qualities cannot be what mainly distinguishes philosophy from other activities", citing law, medicine, and fiction as examples (1985, p. 2-3). He does allow, however, that philosophy might be able to make a special use of reflectiveness (p. 2): "What makes an inquiry a philosophical one is reflective generality and a style of argument that claims to be rationally persuasive." My thesis is in the tradition of analytical philosophy which "involves argument, distinctions, and, so far as it remembers to try to achieve it and succeeds, moderately plain speech" (p. xi). G.E.M. Anscombe defined philosophy as "thinking about the most difficult and ultimate questions" (Anscombe et al. 2005, p. ix). If you combine this with reflective generality and arguments that aim to be rationally persuasive, I think you are close to an answer to the kind of contribution philosophy can aim towards. Philosophers these days can draw on a rich literature of thoughts and ideas built over two thousand years. In its own way, philosophy is also group thinking: the ideas of individuals are continuously scrutinised, tested, and improved upon by other philosophers. I am happy to be part of this tradition. I hope to present a coherent argument that is sensitive to both existing philosophical literature and findings from other sciences. In the age of information overflow, insurmountable complexity, and great interconnectivity it is no wonder if truth sometimes seems too plural and facts too multifaceted for anyone to be able to say anything of real importance in moral matters. Despite this, I think the common core of humanity makes ethics and moral philosophy both possible and essential, and issues of individual and shared responsibility urgent. I hope that this thesis adds in its own modest way to the public discourse on how we should live with each other. Chapter 2 – The complexity of climate change and assigning direct individual responsibility The carbon cycle is being perturbed, a warming is occurring, and people will die – but the enormous complexity of the social and physical systems that mediate between the perturbation, the warming, and the deaths makes causal knowledge or attribution extremely difficult or even practically impossible. Dale Jamieson (2015, p. 23) My fundamental point has been that global warming is such a large problem that it is not individuals who cause it or who need to fix it. Instead, governments need to fix it, and quickly. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2005, pp. 343-344) Suppose that it is true that humanity currently lacks the appropriate institutions to deal with global environmental change. What follows? [---] If the attempt to delegate effectively has failed, then the responsibility falls back on citizens again-either to solve the problems themselves, or else, if this is not possible, to create new institutions to do the job. If they fail to do so, then they are subject to moral criticism, for having failed to discharge their original responsibilities. Stephen M. Gardiner (2011, p. 433) Climate change presents us with a cluster of ethical dilemmas. Although there are no easy technical solutions, what we should do is quite clear in view of the science: reduce emissions rapidly (mitigation) and adjust to the changing environment (adaptation). When neither of the two no longer applies, we should arguably try to recompense for the harm (compensation). Mitigation should be the main goal. How exactly to do any of this is, of course, the big question, unsolved both at the realpolitik level as well as at the theoretical level. Distribution of burdens between nations is a major issue in international negotiations and in ethics. However, the distribution of responsibilities presents an even wider ethical challenge when considered from the viewpoint of the responsibility of individuals and collectives, of the responsibility of present and future generations. To give two more examples of some of the main issues related to meeting the climate change challenge, the technology with which we should change our energy production to carbon neutral is a contested issue, as is the extent to which we need to rein in and change our consumption patterns and the way we currently structure our societies in economic terms. 34 Climate ethics looks for answers to moral questions and dilemmas that anthropogenic climate change gives rise to. As a field of practical philosophy it is relatively new, mirroring the timeline the issue entered public consciousness. The pioneers of climate ethics John Broome, Dale Jamieson, and Henry Shue all began publishing on the topic in the 1990s. As a distinct field of philosophical enquiry, climate ethics started to come into its own only around the beginning of this decade.1 The increase in related articles and books has been exponential in the past few years. This chapter explores climate change as an ethical issue and argues that we have a direct responsibility to mitigate, although this will not be our exclusive, or even our most important responsibility regarding climate change. The discussion on the complications of talking about direct duties sets the scene for the detailed exploration of individual complicity for collective harms that follows in later chapters. There, I will argue that not only can we have responsibility in relation to climate change both directly and as members of collective agents, we can also have it as constituents of unorganised collectives. Collective agents and responsibility qua their membership is the topic of chapter three, while unorganised collectives and complicity in structural harms are discussed in chapters four, five and six. But before we get to that, this chapter argues the case for direct responsibility. This responsibility is linked to the kinds of choices and activities that lead to harmful emissions and to how essential they are for human survival and flourishing. Shue (1993) has influentially argued that there is a moral difference between luxury emissions and subsistence emissions, i.e. emissions that are required to satisfy basic human needs.2 Consequently there is a difference between the permissibility of our emissions in terms of the categories they fall under.3 This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.1 present a rough typology of the different branches of climate ethics, along with a brief overview of the main questions in each, to clarify which debates I seek to contribute to with this thesis. Section 2.2 aims to dissect the problem that anthropogenic climate change presents to the world, utilising Gardiner's perfect moral storm metaphor. Section 2.3 critically evaluates Sinnott-Armstrong's argument against individual moral responsibility for climate change. Section 2.4 looks at arguments for ascribing responsibility for harm to individuals as individuals, concentrating on Broome's work. Section 2.5 argues that we can have direct responsibility, but that this is in relation to our lifestyle emissions. Individuals can be held 1 One reason for this could be that philosophers (as many others) hoped that the issue would have generated more political action by now in terms of actual mitigation. For example, Gardiner (2011, p. xv) explicitly states as much: he writes that one of the reasons he resisted making climate ethics his focus at the beginning of his career was that for a long time he "hoped that humanity would quickly rise to the ethical challenge it uncovers", thereby rendering the central message of his philosophical work less urgent. The slowness of (political) progress on the issue has been stupendous even by pessimistic standards. Ideally the need for climate ethics would have been temporary, but sadly this no longer looks feasible. 2 Shue (2014) credits the idea to Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain (1991) who distinguish between 'survival emissions' and 'luxury emissions'. 3 What counts as justifiable emissions is naturally a contested issue, but there are some rather obvious candidates for luxury emissions as I will argue in section 2.5. 35 responsible as individuals, i.e. we can bear direct responsibility for climate change harms. I deny Broome's assertion that offsetting suffices for us to dispense with our duties of justice. Instead, I suggest that accepting individual direct responsibility means that we should make appropriate changes to our lifestyle emissions. 2.1 The five main branches of climate ethics Before we begin, I will separate those active debates in climate ethics that I will be seeking to contribute to in my thesis from those that I will not. To do this, I will present a rough typology of the different branches of climate ethics (along with a brief overview of the main questions in each). Within climate ethics at least five philosophical branches are emerging, each drawing from existing literature, be it in political theory, environmental philosophy, economics, psychology, or collective responsibility. My thesis touches upon all of the categories to some degree, although I do not attempt discuss all of the issues included in them. These categories naturally overlap, and most philosophers contribute to more than one active discourse, with the approaches not necessarily being that distinct.4 Still, I believe that these five branches illustrate the main strands of debate within climate ethics, and therefore help me to set aside those questions that I do not plan to discuss. Questions within the political branch of climate ethics, the first out of the five branches, include the distribution of burdens between nations and international justice (Caney 2005, Moellendorf 2009, Shue 1993, Vanderheiden 2011), human rights (Bell 2011, Caney 2008; 2010, Shue 1996), the role of justice in climate negotiations (Shue 1992, Kortetmäki 2016), intergenerational justice (Gosseries and Meyer 2009, Meyer and Roser 2012), climate change as a tragedy of the commons5 (Johnson 2003), climate justice in a non-ideal world (Heyward and Roser 2016), the role of civil disobedience (Kyllönen 2014), and the distribution of emissions rights (Caney 2012a). Apart from issues directly related with the duties of a citizen in cases of collectively-caused harm, I will not engage with most of the debates in any deep manner (although I touch on intra-generational and intergenerational justice issues). This might seem surprising as I am interested in collective responsibility. Surely nation states are among the most relevant collectives when discussing climate change? I do not deny this, but my interest lies in the interplay of individual and collective 4 There also exists issues that do not necessarily fall into these categories, such as the question mark over current moral philosophy being fit for the purpose of dealing with the climate change challenge (Gardiner 2011, Mulgan 2011): are our theories and tools adequate and enough to deal with climate change responsibility (see section 2.2)? Climate change also concerns other branches of philosophy, such as philosophy of science, and some of those debates, too, have an ethical and/or political dimension, for example, how the uncertainty inherent in climate change science and models should best be conveyed to decision-makers (Parker 2010). 5 Questions around tragedy of the commons form a very wide literature by now and could also come under the other categories. 36 responsibility, not in questions to do with the distribution of burdens or democratic justification (although I will be talking about the need for more participatory and inclusive democracy towards the end of the thesis). The importance of getting corporations on board in mitigation (Hormio 2017a) could come under this category also, but it is something that climate ethics has hardly dealt with so far. I will discuss this in chapter three. The second branch, environmental philosophy, is an obvious branch of climate ethics, with issues including the non-instrumental value of non-human animals (Cripps 2013, Palmer 2011), cultivating environmental virtues (Jamieson 2007), the need for a holistic approach towards climate change (Callicott 2011), deep ecology (Baard 2015), the interplay of social and environmental justice (Vanderheiden 2008), and sustainability (Attfield 2015). Out of the five branches, my thesis contributes the least to this one.6 In climate ethics and economics, the third branch, some of the main themes are discounting rates and the appropriateness of using cost-benefit analysis (Broome 1992, Caney 2009, Davidson 2017, Stern 2007), sustainability and substitutability (O'Neill 2014), the cost of taking mitigation action (Broome 2010), borrowing from the future (Broome 2017, Maltais 2015), carbon trading and offsetting (Spash 2010, Spiekermann 2014a), and the role of ethics in climate policy and economics (Gardiner and Weisbach 2016; Walsh, Hormio and Purves 2017). I have earlier written about substitutability and mitigation (Hormio 2017b) and will recap some of my main points in this chapter (section 2.2). When it comes to psychology and climate ethics, the fourth branch, philosophers have written about individual defence mechanisms (Gardiner 2011, Peeters et al. 2015), can the limits of our cognitive capacities affect our responsibility (Vanderheiden 2016), marring choices (Cripps 2013, Gardiner 2011), and the psychological cost of climate activism (Shahar 2016). Authors from other disciplines have also contributed to the discussion on the psychology of our collective climate denial (Marshall 2014, Stoknes 2015) and the complicated power structures that muddle up the debate (Hansen 2009, Klein 2014). Some of this material will be discussed in chapter seven in relation to complicity and ignorance. The fifth branch, collective responsibility and marginal contributions to climate change, is what this thesis falls under. Many puzzles in climate ethics are about collective responsibility; what it is, 6 The framing of climate change seems to me bit skewed in many public discourses. For example, in media it is often reported under environmental news. Undoubtedly our climate is part of our environment, and furthermore anthropogenic climate change is probably the most serious and wide-ranging environmental harm we are facing today. But the old-fashioned "man versus nature" frameworks do not apply, as the question is not so much about exploiting nature, but effectively undermining the conditions that sustain human life on Earth. We have set in motion global processes that we will not be able to control and which could make a lot of the areas currently populated inhabitable, resulting in millions of climate refugees. We are also jeopardising our ability to produce food, as agriculture could become a guessing game as we lose the stability of our climatic system. These are not the worst-case scenarios either: this is the path we are already on. 37 how we should theorise it, what it means for the individual moral agent. A closely related question is how we should understand responsibility claims stemming from marginal contributions where an individual might not have made a difference. Scholars contributing to these discussions include Broome (2016), Cripps (2013), and Lawford-Smith (2016a). Although operating around moral and political responsibility, many of the questions are ontological at heart: on what can we pinpoint the agency of those collectives that are responsible for emissions, and what does this mean for our practices of holding people and collective entities responsible? Social ontology constructed in a very broad sense also includes questions about the responsibility of these agents, and I draw from this literature. I debate climate change responsibility from the point of view of both collectives and individuals. As my framing is not political, my concern is not with issues such as how to combine climate change action with liberal priorities (Calder and McKinnon 2012). Rather, I am interested in the different collectives that are relevant when looking at climate change and, relatedly, if and how an individual can be said to be responsible for climate change. I will introduce some of the main complexities involved in discussing climate change responsibility in the next section by taking another look at the perfect storm. 2.2 The storm rages on Imagine a philosopher giving lectures on the history of ethics sometime in the near future where the world looks very different from now. Climate change has devastated much of the ecosystems, global average temperatures have risen by some 5 degrees and sea levels by 20 metres. The weather is unpredictable, as is food production, which results in survival bottlenecks. The remaining people are winners in a survival lottery: resources are scarce. Societies function, but the choices people have to make are stark and about life and death. The age of affluence ― when philosophers could start with the assumption that that everyone could survive ― seems positively utopian. This is the set-up of Tim Mulgan's (2011) book Ethics for a Broken World: Imagining Philosophy After Catastrophe. Our current age represents the age of the affluent and Mulgan's piercing criticism centres around people's failure to take action, but also on the failures of philosophers to even properly criticise what went wrong. In current philosophy the good of the individual is sharply separated from the common good. The future philosopher also disappointedly remarks on our failure to translate new theoretical knowledge about climate change into changes in individual behaviour, effectively and fast enough, something that was not even challenged by the affluent age philosophers. (Mulgan 2011, pp. 1-10). In criticising the current way philosophy is practiced, Mulgan wants to draw our attention to how principles of morality are connected to the actual real-life circumstances they are theorised in: only 38 in a world of plenty, however unequally that plenty is distributed, can we afford some of the basic assumptions we currently have. For Gardiner climate change is an ethical tragedy that the global affluent are implicated in. Tragedy seems to be an apt word, as calling climate change something neutral along the lines of "a multifaceted problem" would be a severe understatement that fails to capture what is at stake. In the introduction I noted how Gardiner terms the current situation a "perfect moral storm." He elaborates (2011, pp. 6-7) that a perfect storm involves "the unusual intersection of a number of serious, and mutually reinforcing, problems, which creates an unusual and perhaps unprecedented challenge." The perfect storm of climate change is fundamentally ethical, as without invoking ethical considerations we cannot get very far in discussing why it poses a problem for us, let alone discuss policy options (p. 20). Gardiner, though, is not interested necessarily in blaming anyone. Rather, his goal is to identify the problem as clearly as possible, as only when the problem is spelled out in ethical terms, can we hope to understand the predicament we are in and try to find solutions to making it right. He thus aims for a thorough presentation of the dilemmas involved, with focus on four especially salient aspects of the perfect storm, the main storms that converge to create the perfect storm.7 These four storms are global, intergenerational, theoretical, and ecological. As noted, the first storm is global: compared to poor nations (and poor individuals), affluent nations (and affluent individuals) have an unfair advantage when it comes to deciding what is to be done. This asymmetry of power is made even more jarring due to the fact that the poor are hit disproportionately with the loss of climatic stability (at least in the shortto medium-term projections), while the rich are the cause behind most of the emissions. This global storm has three important characteristics: dispersion of causes and effects (the impact of any particular emission is not felt just at its source but is geographically dispersed), fragmentation of agency (caused by a vast number of individual and collective agents), and institutional inadequacy (a lack of effective system of global governance). (Gardiner 2011, pp. 24-29). As the bulk of this thesis is concerned with fragmentation of agency, I will not discuss it within this section, but will concentrate on the other two characteristics of the global storm. Institutional inadequacy is directly linked to the dispersion of causes and effects. I already noted how climate change mirrors existing global inequalities and taking action on it means having to acknowledge this. Gardiner explains (p. 31): [A]ction on climate change creates a moral risk for the developed nations. Implicitly, it embodies a recognition that there are international norms of ethics and responsibility, and reinforces the idea that international cooperation on issues involving such norms is both possible and necessary. Hence, it may encourage attention to other moral defects of the current global system, such as global poverty and inequality, human rights violations, and so 7 As noted in chapter one, Gardiner (2006, 2011) used to conceptualise the metaphor as three storms, but in his latest work (2016) the ecological storm was added as a separate storm. 39 on. If the developed nations are not ready to engage on such topics, this creates a further reason to avoid action on climate change. In a related vein of argument, according to journalist and author Naomi Klein (2014), what really holds us back from taking action on climate change is that addressing it means that our economic system should be transformed: corporate power needs to be reined in, local economies should be rebuilt, and democracies reclaimed. What both authors share is the view that tackling climate change requires much more than piecemeal solutions. I agree, and that is part of the reason why I discuss climate change responsibility from different angles: collective, individual, and complicity. The second storm is intergenerational: just as there is a serious asymmetry of power between the affluent and poor, there is an even more pronounced asymmetry when it comes to the generations alive today and the generations yet to be born. Gardiner sees this as the most conspicuous of the storms: future generations will be most affected by climate change, yet they cannot influence what is taking place. Carbon dioxide emitted today will take thousands of years to completely neutralise, so the impact of our current emissions will be felt far into the future. This lagging effect means that climate change is a resilient phenomenon not easily reversed, so long-term advance planning is required if we are to stabilise and reduce the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. As our emissions stay around long after we are gone, climate change is a deferred phenomenon: current observable changes are the result of past emissions. Due to the build-up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, even if by magic all energy was turned green overnight, we have already caused rising temperatures in the future. Sustained action over many generations is needed to combat the problem, but because the costs are felt in the present, with the benefits somewhere far in the future, there is the temptation to delay action and procrastinate. This results in intergenerational buckpassing, where each new generation does not "cooperate" by taking action, as it does not gain from it. The generation initiating the indirect reciprocity required to get the mitigation ball rolling would have to make a sacrifice without compensation8 (although the latest research about us being on the trajectory for a four-degree global temperature increase, as discussed in section 1.1, could make this worry obsolete). Gardiner observes that the relatively short timeframes between cycles of democratic elections makes the incentive to invest in mitigation less likely, as substantially deferred impacts and pay-offs are harder to sell to the electorate. Even more worrying is that each year spent doing little or nothing not only passes the problem to future generations, but also makes the problem significantly worse. Mitigation becomes costlier as time goes by and effects accumulate. To give just one example, inaction raises transition costs from carbon-intensive to clean energy, as infrastructure 8 A comparable existing example could be Norway's massive Government Pension Fund (more commonly known as the Oil Fund), where surplus wealth generated from Norway's oil wealth has been deposited since the 1990s, although the fund is not set up for climate change mitigation purposes. 40 choices made today affect the choices of future generations. (Gardiner 2011, pp. 32-39). I will argue later on in this chapter that the intergenerational nature of the problem affects our direct responsibility. For Gardiner the intergenerational storm is the most striking of all. It is in large part what makes climate change such a problem for ethical theories created before modern technology: they are not equipped to deal with the possibility of harms that span over centuries and beyond. The scale of the intergenerational storm is both broad and previously unheard of. Some other issues, most notably nuclear energy, have aspects that are deeply intergenerational (what to do with lethal waste that lasts for hundreds of thousands of years). Also, most forms of oppression could be argued to have long intergenerational effects.9 However, no previous human-generated harm has had such a wide reach so far into the future, compounded by the fundamentally life-threatening nature of the problem. Broome (1992, p. 12) observes: "The effects on climate and sea level, indeed, may fairly be said to be irreversible on the time scale of human history. And this is just the effects on the natural world. The effects on human life, like the effects of the Little Ice Age, will persist through the rest of human history." We are facing a peculiarly new and modern harm: never before have we had to look into intergenerational effects to such an extent. This leads us to the third storm. The third storm is theoretical: we have no robust general theories to guide us in the storm, whether ethical, political, or economic. Our existing theories are underdeveloped in many areas central to tackling climate change, including questions of intergenerational ethics, global justice, and scientific uncertainty. Gardiner argues that we are theoretically inept: we lack the skills and tools required for the task. One example is the use of cost-benefit analysis in deciding between different policy scenarios. Gardiner points out how economic analysis enjoys a predominant position in policy discourse, even though using cost-benefit analysis amounts to self-deception in the context of climate change (Gardiner 2011, pp. 41-42). In this he refers to Broome (1992, p. 19): Since governments must act, research on intergenerational relations must be aimed ultimately at providing guidance on how to act. Nevertheless, I believe it would be wrong to adopt the narrow aim of developing some formula for cost-benefit analysis, which governments could simply apply. I shall not confine myself to deriving a discount rate from current economic theory. The uncertainties of the problem are enough to make that exercise pointless. Cost-benefit analysis, when faced with uncertainties as big as these, would simply be self-deception. And in any case, it could not be a successful exercise, because the issue of our responsibility to future generations is too poorly understood, and too little accommodated in the current economic theory. 9 Examples of the long-lasting effects of past oppression are not hard to come by: differing gender expectations for boys and girls, the events leading to the inception of the Black Lives Matter movement, Māori land issues, to name but a few. In all these examples the oppression took a more severe form in the past but still extends to the current day. The historical roots of the oppression continue to reverberate to this day and have often become embedded in society's structures, which makes them even harder to emancipate from. 41 Broome is right to caution us against looking for some simple formula that would tell us what to do. Discounting presupposes substitutability of natural capital (for example, ecosystem services such as clean drinking water) with other forms of capital (from various material goods to things like education), as well as continuing economic growth. I have argued that therefore as a tool its usefulness is very limited in climate economics due to the timescale and uncertainties involved: [T]he ethical assumptions and normative choices made in the calculations that compare different mitigation options should be made transparent. Policymakers and those who use cost-benefit analyses to guide their decision-making should be made fully aware of what they are comparing. In any case, discretion is required in using cost-benefit analyses. They should never be viewed as neutral tools for policymakers, as normative considerations always come into choosing the discount rate and in deciding whether this can be uniform across different types of capital. (Hormio 2017b, p. 117). Instead of formulas, what is required is public deliberation and democratic decision-making, and we need to be honest about the normative nature of things like setting a discount rate. No one person (or even a few) is qualified to make such value judgements, not even experts. Therefore, when it comes to big public policy decisions with long-term intergenerational consequences, like the ones to do with climate change, I believe that the discount rate should be deliberated publicly. Economists and philosophers can play their part in spelling out the costs and benefits of different mitigation scenarios, including discussing the appropriate moral weight of the risks and uncertainties facing us, but the gains and losses to societies should be debated publicly.10 As Sen (2007, p. 29) cautions, it is "crucial not to reduce important issues of human evaluation, which demand reflection and deliberative social assessment, into narrowly technocratic matters of formulaic calculation." He reminds us that what is really at stake in the debates around discount rates is "social evaluation of gains and losses over time," and that at bottom this is "a deeply reflective exercise and a matter for public deliberation, rather than one for some kind of a mechanical resolution on the basis of some simple formula." 10 Now, how to actually go about this is the big question and I do not have a definite answer. A plausible solution would probably run along the lines of putting together a focus group consisting of experts, policymakers and members of the general public (how to choose among them is no simple question either, but my view in general is that democracy should be made more inclusive, open and participatory for it to work in the current world). The focus group would first of all cover the basic issues involved: the economists would explain discounting and cost-benefit analyses, the philosophers what value judgements go into them. The policymakers further explain each option from their point of view. The discussions and deliberations that follow could even be made available to anyone interested, for example, by putting a video online etc. The focus group comes up with a suggestion and this is then put to public consultation in some way ― there is a period people can submit objections or alternative suggestions. After this, the focus group meets again and comes up with the final rate(s) that will be put forward. This might sound time-consuming, and it would likely be so, but with time best practices would emerge. Note that I am not arguing that we should go through this process for all policy decisions, just the ones that are genuinely large-scale and future-oriented. 42 To return to Gardiner, the final storm is ecological, as animals, plants and ecosystems are affected in different ways (Gardiner 2016, pp. 32-37). The role of nonhuman nature in a flourishing human life is a topic in its own right, while the non-anthropocentric value of nature has been the centre of heated debates for a long time. As human activity now impacts the Earth's climatic stability, new questions about the scope of our responsibility naturally arises. At the same time, existing questions about the relation of humans to the nonhuman world are amplified. Here also our traditional ways of doing ethics can run into problems. For example, as the projected changes will affect different species in different ways (Palmer 2011), any policy or approach adopted could end up aiding some species while harming others, but how should we balance incompatible and incommensurable claims, especially when they encompass the non-human realm (Cripps 2013)? These are important and difficult questions, but I do not attempt to address them in this thesis. If an ethical argument is to have any hope to convince those who do not yet feel the weight of the responsibility we have towards future generations, it has to appeal to their emotions as well, mostly because so many of the self-interested arguments break down in long-term intergenerational matters. This is what books like Mulgan's are essentially doing: through adopting the imaginary viewpoint of future generations, the book aims to invoke a sense of the anger they are justified in feeling towards those alive today.11 Anger is, of course, far from the only relevant emotion: compassion, empathy, concern, motivation, and many others also apply. An alternative view is that there is no problem for ethics and moral philosophy, and that climate change is a problem purely for politics, as the next argument implies. 2.3 It is not my fault or is it? Not everyone accepts that climate change implicates us as individuals in the unfolding ethical tragedy. Sinnott-Armstrong's (2005) argument against individual responsibility for climate change is often quoted in climate ethics, and is possibly the most famous argument against assigning responsibility to individuals (it is discussed by Aufrecht 2011, Cripps 2013, Fragnière 2016, Hiller 2011, Killoren and Williams 2013, Peeters et al. 2015, and Sandberg 2011, among many others). However, while I find that the argument fails on several points, I have not come across any comprehensive accounts presented against it. Therefore I will go through it in some detail in this section as it is directly relevant to my concerns in this thesis. One of Sinnott-Armstrong's (p. 333) starting assumptions is that "the United States has a special moral obligation to help mitigate and adapt to global warming" because it is the main culprit 11 Another recent book taking this route is The Collapse of Western Civilization: A View from the Future by Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway (2014). 43 behind the greenhouse gas emissions and "has the scientific expertise to solve technical problems". Moreover, as a wealthy nation it can afford to spend resources in finding a solution without having to sacrifice meeting the basic needs of its people. However, this does not translate as duty for individual citizens in the USA to enable mitigation and adaptation (Sinnott-Armstrong 2005, p. 333): "While I ought to encourage the government to fulfill its obligations, I do not have to take on those obligations myself." The relation of individual duties and obligation to their collective counterparts forms the core of his enquiry.12 He writes that individual moral obligations are not parallel to government obligations and do not always follow from collective obligations, although sometimes individuals have to fill in when the government fails to do what it should. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that this is not the case with climate change, however. What is an individual supposed to do if the government fails to act on climate change, could she have an obligation to reduce her emissions? Sinnott-Armstrong's purposefully provocative case study focuses on going for a drive just for fun in your gas-guzzling sports car on a sunny Sunday afternoon.13 He asks if the individual has a moral obligation to reduce wasteful driving and his answer is no. While his intuition inclines him to answer in the affirmative, Sinnott-Armstrong cannot find a moral principle to support his moral intuitions. He cautions the reader not to put too much trust in our moral intuitions in cases that are "peculiarly modern" like climate change, as "it operates on a much grander scale than my moral intuitions evolved to handle long ago when acts did not have such long-term effects on future generations" (p. 334). Out of the various moral principles considered and rejected by Sinnott-Armstrong (2005, pp. 334-344), the most relevant ones for my project include three principles about harm and risk.14 I will start with the two about harm. 12 This view seems to share some of its structure with that of David Copp, see chapter 3, section 3.1. 13 Baylor L. Johnson (2003, p. 272) asked similarly two years earlier can someone who understands the problem of global warming and the contribution that cars make to it drive a large gas guzzler in good conscience? He argues, using the Tragedy of the Commons as his platform, that it would be a mistake to view our primary obligation to be to unilaterally reduce our individual burden on the environment. Instead, we should seek a cooperation scheme to address the problem. 14 Some of the other basis that Sinnott-Armstrong rejects for individual moral responsibility in the face of collective failure to act on climate change include Kantian obligation not to treat other persons as means only (harm to others is not part of the plan to drive), virtues (wasteful driving is not vicious), and rule-consequentialism (an act is not always morally wrong even if counterfactually it would be disastrous for everyone to know that everyone is allowed to do it: the individual act of burning too much fossil fuel is harmless by itself, and creates an obligation only for the government to pass regulation that prevents too many individuals from acting in that way). Sinnott-Armstrong also rejects Scanlon's contractualism ("I have a moral obligation not to perform an act whenever it violates a general rule that nobody could reasonably reject as a public rule for governing action in society"), arguing that appealing to reasonable rejection only begs the question of why the rejection is unreasonable. What is required is an account of why this is so. He writes (p. 343) that in contractualism "the test of what can be reasonably rejected depends on moral intuitions." In a footnote (fn. 30, p. 345) he grants that while Scanlon's framework cannot show why an act is morally wrong or used to justify moral judgements, it might be useful as a heuristic and as a tool for overcoming partiality. I find that Sinnott-Armstrong is not giving Scanlon a fair reading here, suggesting that all is underpinned by moral intuitionism only. 44 The harm principle: We have a moral obligation not to perform an act that causes harm to others. (p. 334) The group principle: We have a moral obligation not to perform an action if this action makes us a member of a group whose actions together cause harm. (p. 340) Sinnott-Armstrong (p. 334) denies that driving a gas guzzler for fun causes harm as the "individual act is neither necessary nor sufficient" for climate change, arguing that "global warming will still occur even if I do not drive just for fun. Moreover, even if I do drive a gas guzzler just for fun for a long time, global warming will not occur unless lots of other people also expel greenhouse gases." The innumerable acts of innumerable people together make up the emissions that make a difference to the global temperatures, so to avoid harm would mean that these other actions would need to be halted also. Many philosophers working on climate ethics have followed Parfit (1986[1984]) in utilising aggregate impacts to ascribe responsibility to individuals (Attfield 2009, Cripps 2013, Dower 2011, Hiller 2011, Nolt 2011). This move, appealing to group impacts (i.e. the group principle above), is denied by Sinnott-Armstrong. He (p. 340) thinks it begs the question to assume that it is morally wrong for an individual to perform an act just because it is bad for a group of people to perform acts of this kind. In addition to denying that an individual's emissions cause harm, Sinnott-Armstrong (p. 335) emphasises in many places that the Sunday drive is not meant to cause harm, i.e. there is no intention to harm, and that the act of driving a gas guzzler just for fun is not unusual in any way: "It is not unusual to go for joy rides. Such drivers do not intend any harm. Hence, we should not see my act of driving on a sunny Sunday afternoon as a cause for global warming or its harms." Note that Sinnott-Armstrong's argument is not about the imperceptibility of individual harms; he explicit denies this.15 He admits that some harms can be imperceptible, referring to Parfit's work (in his fn.15). What Sinnott-Armstrong does argue against is appeals to group principle as, according to him, it begs the question and works only when there is the intent to do harm.16 To argue against this line of thinking, one has to either deny the claim that that no harm is done (i.e. argue that the harm principle applies), or deny the emphasis placed on intending harm and the unusualness of the act. The first move is made by John Nolt and John Broome among others, the 15 Sinnott-Armstrong (p. 336) writes that "the point is not that the harm I cause is imperceptible. I admit that some harms can be imperceptible because they are too small or for other reasons. Instead, the point is simply that my individual joy ride does not cause global warming, climate change, or any of their resulting harms, at least directly." 16 Sinnott-Armstrong (in footnote 23, p. 345) references Parfit's The Harmless Torturers when he discusses the immorality of individual acts that fall in a group of acts that collectively cause harm. He argues that this logic does not work with climate change or with his own example as "torturers intend to cause harm. That's what makes them torturers. Hence, Parfit's cases cannot show anything wrong with wasteful driving, where there is no intention to cause any harm." I will discuss The Harmless Torturers and groups of acts that collectively cause harm in chapter five, section 5.1. 45 second will be made by me. Nolt (2011, p. 9) questions the assumption that the effects from individual emissions are negligible and attempts to give a rough estimate of the harm each average American causes in their lifetime in order to get "some sense of the moral significance of our own complicity in a greenhouse-gas-intensive economy". He calculates this to be roughly one billionth of current and near-term emissions, which translates as serious suffering or deaths for two future people.17 Broome's (2012, p. 74) tactic is similar, and he argues that the lifetime emissions of the average individual living in a rich country results in roughly more than six months of healthy human life to be wiped out.18 I will return to these accounts in section 2.4 where harm arising from (an) individual('s) actions is discussed. The alternative move, that is, to deny the emphasis placed on the alleged unusualness of the act, is the one that I will make. In addition, I will argue in chapter five that the emphasis SinnottArmstrong places on the intention to harm (or rather the lack of it) is mostly irrelevant when discussing structurally caused harms like climate change. Instead, in chapter five I will defend an account of complicity for collectively caused harms, where the relation between an individual act and the collective end is expressive or normative: our individual actions can express what we e.g. support or tolerate. Even without complicity for marginal participation, however, I think SinnottArmstrong's argument fails to convince. In short, he places undue emphasis on the explanatory relevance of unusualness. He writes that there are special circumstances in which harm is caused by an act without the act being necessary or sufficient for the harm. I will quote him at some length in what follows, as it will help me to pinpoint where I think he goes astray. Imagine that it takes three people to push a car off a cliff with a passenger locked inside, and five people are already pushing. If I join and help them push, then my act of pushing is neither necessary nor sufficient to make the car go off the cliff. Nonetheless, my act of pushing is a cause (or part of the cause) of the harm to the passenger. Why? Because I intend to cause harm to the passenger, and because my act is unusual. When I intend a harm to occur, my intention provides a reason to pick my act out of all the other background circumstances and identify it as a cause. Similarly, when my act is unusual in the sense that 17 Nolt arrives at this rough figure in the following way. The US accounts for approximately one-fifth of global emissions and that gets divided by the country's population, approximately 300 million. The average American lives to be 80 years old in the time period selected, 1960-2040. The atmospheric CO2 concentration will increase by 133 ppm during this period, based on IPCC predictions. Assuming three generations are alive at any moment, the average global population of 7.5 billion gives us the figure of 2.5 billion people per generation. CO2 emissions will continue to contribute to global warming for at least a millennium, which is 40 generations. 2.5 billion times 40 gives us the figure of 100 billion people affected by the current emissions. If even 4% of those people are harmed (as in suffering and/or dying from climate impacts), then the harm proportional to the emissions of the average American alive today is two future people. (Nolt 2011, 7-9) This is meant to be a conservative estimate and does not include outsourced emissions, for example, like the ones caused by Americans consuming products manufactured in China. 18 Broome's estimate is borrowed from an unpublished paper "Personal and intergenerational carbon footprints" by David J. Frame, where the individual is an average person from a rich country born in 1950 with an estimated 800 tonnes of lifetime emissions. The harm calculation is based on World Health Organization estimates from 2009 regarding disease and death caused by climate change. See Broome 2012, endnotes 1-3 to Chapter 5 on page 195. 46 most people would not act in that way, that also provides a reason to pick out my act and call it a cause. (2005, p. 335)19 According to this view, the unusualness of an act is important for causality, especially in moral cases where Sinnott-Armstrong alleges that it is counterproductive to hold an agent responsible for harms resulting from acts that are usual. The justification he gives for this is consequentialist: If people who are doing no worse than average are condemned, then people who are doing much worse than average will suspect that they will still be subject to condemnation even if they start doing better, and even if they improve enough to bring themselves up to the average. We should distribute blame (and praise) so as to give incentives for the worst offenders to get better. The most efficient and effective way to do this is to reserve our condemnation for those who are well below average. (p. 335) Not taking a stand on the possible psychological merits of this view, I find it a weak moral argument. A comparison to physical cases is offered (p. 335): Why does it matter what is usual? Compare matches. For a match to light up, we need to strike it so as to create friction. There also has to be oxygen. We do not call the oxygen the cause of the fire, since oxygen is usually present. Instead, we say that the friction causes the match to light, since it is unusual for that friction to occur. It happens only once in the life of each match. Thus, what is usual affects ascriptions of causation even in purely physical cases. Aside from the somewhat clumsy comparison to moral cases (ordinary acts are oxygen, unusual ones friction), the account given of causality does not work even in the physical case. What causally relevant factors you should pick out from all the contributing factors depends on what you are trying to explain. Unusualness can be a salient factor in causal explanations if you want to explain something in relation to the ordinary, but it is not some sort of a trump card, as usual things can qualify as causes. The unusualness of the friction might be relevant for the explanation in this particular case, but this does not make unusualness automatically a salient factor in causal explanations in all physical cases, let alone moral ones. The explanatory relevance of a causal factor depends on what is being explained.20 When a light is switched on in a room, the act of flicking on the light switch (and the electric processes it triggers) is the causally relevant factor for explaining the sudden transformation 19 Aufrecht (2011) suggests that this analogy indicates that Sinnott-Armstrong has in mind a threshold model of harm, where changes to weather patterns require a certain threshold of emissions in order to occur. If the total emissions are above the threshold level that cause a harming weather event, my actions have no effect on reducing the harm that this event causes, i.e. it would have taken place even without me. As changes to my personal emissions neither cause nor mitigate the changes to the climate, Sunday driving is morally permissible. If this was the case, then we are dealing with an overdetermined harm and we can be held responsible for such harms also, see chapter five. 20 Thank you to Caterina Marchionni for letting me run my argument through with her to test it. 47 of the room from a dark place into one bathed in light. But this need not be unusual: maybe I am in the habit of continuously switching the lights on and off, on and off, on and off, for hours on end. There is nothing unusual about the flicking in this scenario, yet the flick is still what should be picked out of the causal background if I want to explain the change in the lighting of the room.21 On a kinder reading, the idea in Sinnott-Armstrong is that there are more real causal factors than makes sense to cite in causal talk; thus it is normative what we select as causes. Expectations concerning usualness make a difference to what it makes sense to say; one thing can be usual in one setting and unusual in another setting, and nonetheless be a causal factor in both. Thus, what is unusual in a situation is what is relevant when discussing causation.22 Even so, the direct comparison that is made to moral cases leaves a lot to be desired as far as making for a convincing ethical argument. The usualness or unusualness of an act does not by itself tell us a lot about the warranted responses. It is certainly unusual to push cars with passengers off cliffs (thankfully so), and perhaps it is not unusual for wealthy Americans to go on Sunday joy rides in the present-day USA, although it certainly is unusual on the global scale.23 Now, even if the latter holds (I don't know if it does), the usualness of it is dependent on time and place. Violence against women might not be that unusual in certain places and times, but that does not make it less blameworthy. If, for example, sexual violence becomes a standard tactic in a war situation (as it has in some armed conflicts), it is still morally indefensible, however usual the practice. Maybe Sinnott-Armstrong had in mind with "unusual" something more in line with strange or uncommon, rather than exceptional or rare (although the match comparison, with friction being described as a once-in-a-lifetime event for the match, seems to suggest otherwise). But if this was the case, the argument would still not work. The reason why the act would count as strange and uncommon would now have to be filled in: if the normative work is not done by statistical rareness, then what is it that marks some act as unusual? All our greenhouse gas emissions are contributing causes to climate change. What causes we decide to pick out is, once again, up to what we are trying to explain. The fact that our individual emissions are usual in the sense of being part of the everyday lives of the Global North does not, by itself, tell us anything about the kind of responses that are warranted by those emissions. This is important: just because our individual carbon emitting acts might fall under the mundane end of 21 When it comes even to fires and matches, the explanation does not have to contain any reference to unusualness. Here is one alternative way to describe the same event, this time only with emphasis on the importance of oxygen being present: Oxygen is part of the causal background of fires. The act of striking the match is what causes the match to light up, friction is what occurs when a match is struck, and when oxygen is also present, this results in fire. If you were to strike a match in a vacuum, it would not catch fire because oxygen is missing. 22 I thank Arto Laitinen and Pekka Mäkelä for pushing me on this point. 23 Peeters et al. (2015, pp. 55-56) make a similar observation about the unequal consumption patterns in the world and why Sinnott-Armstrong's consequentialist pragmatic heuristic fails due to this. 48 luxury emissions and warrant no notice from anyone due to their common occurrence at the present moment in history is in itself not an excusing condition. This point will be looked at in finer detail in the chapters that follow. Last but not least, Sinnott-Armstrong denies that responsibility to take action on climate change could be based on the increased risk of harms (p. 337): The risk principle: We have a moral obligation not to increase the risk of harms to other people. In formulating this principle, he refers to Joel Feinberg's argument that fault can exist even without any causal link to the harm if this absence is only a lucky accident. In Feinberg's (1970, pp. 67-69) drunk-driving example, someone is driving under the influence and hits a person with her car. Feinberg argues that while she has caused the harm to the victim, she is not necessarily more at fault with regards to drunk-driving than anyone else who drives after they have drank too much. The people who have driven their cars under the influence, and have not hurt anyone, have simply been luckier than the person who hit the pedestrian. Now, Sinnott-Armstrong grants that even when a drunk driver manages to drive home safely, the behaviour is immoral as it creates a risk of harm to others. There exists therefore a moral obligation not to increase the risk of harm to other people in the drunk driving case. However, he (p. 337) argues that no such responsibility can be ascribed for climate change: "When drunk driving causes harm, it is easy to identify the victim of the particular drunk driver. There is no way to identify any particular victim of my wasteful driving in normal circumstances." However, this is a problem only if we operate with a purely counterfactual account of harm (recall end of section 1.1) and without taking complicity to account. In the wasteful driving scenario, counterfactually there is no way to identify any particular person who would have been saved had you acted otherwise. In contrast, counterfactually you can easily identify the person who would have been saved had you not hit them while drunk driving. What Sinnott-Armstrong therefore has in mind are question of marginal participation, and I will discuss these in section 5.1. The point of Feinberg's example as I read it is that if some action causes the risk of harm and someone engages in this action, she is at fault regardless of whether her particular actions actually cause harm or not, i.e. whether she was morally lucky or not. What matters is that such behaviour increases the risk and with climate change we know that risks will be increased especially for future generations. Just like with Feinberg's example, the relevant group of people who are at fault are all the people who engage in the behaviour that increases the risk of harm to others, so the relevant group is all the people who drive wastefully. It would be a flawed argument to make that the combined emissions of all wasteful drivers increase the risk of harm to no-one, and in any case it would go against science. 49 A more general argument against the risk principle is that it would be unbelievably restrictive: a wide array of morally acceptable activities would be ruled out by it. Water vapour is a greenhouse gas so we should not boil water, humans exhale carbon dioxide when they breathe heavily so exercising is out of the question, to use Sinnott-Armstrong's examples. To rule out such ridiculous results, we can specify that the risk is significant. That move alone gets us nowhere, according to Sinnott-Armstrong (p. 337), as he claims "significant" is just a confusing term that masks the need to specify the real reasons: Defenders of such principles sometimes respond by distinguishing significant from insignificant risks or increases in risks. That distinction is problematic, at least here. A risk is called significant when it is too much. But then we need to ask what makes this risk too much when other risks are not too much. The reasons for counting a risk as significant are then the real reasons for thinking that there is a moral obligation not to drive wastefully. So we need to specify those reasons directly instead of hiding them under a waffle term like "significant". I think this is right, because if 'significant' only has a placeholder-function, we do not even know if it is meant to refer to the type of risk or the statistical likelihood of it. After all, whether or not a risk is ethically significant depends not just on how probable it is statistically, but also on how serious it is. Taking causal action always comes with some risks. Every day at the office I work under a statistically significant risk of getting a paper cut, but a risk like this is easily outweighed by other considerations. Broome (2010) argues what matters with risk is not the likelihood of an outcome, but the expected value of an outcome. A low probability of very serious harm thus outweighs a high probability of small harm (like sustaining paper cuts). The meaning of significance should therefore be spelled out. I will suggest that we could utilise Amartya Sen's (1985, 1999) capabilities approach (that he has developed together with Martha Nussbaum24) to conceptualise what we owe to each other, therefore helping us decide when a risk is too great. Capabilities are freedoms: an individual can achieve various lifestyles and pursue functionings that are valuable to her. Functionings range from basic life-support ones such as nutrition, water, shelter, and freedom from avoidable diseases, to complex activities and personal states, like being able to have meaningful relationships and expressing yourself through art. What a person values doing or being differs from one individual to another, and sometimes from one setting to another, although the elementary functionings are naturally valuable to all due to our biological setup. Capability refers to the different combinations of functionings that are feasible for an individual to achieve. (Sen 1999, p. 75). What these exactly are is to be debated publicly: 24 While Nussbaum (2006) has gone on to suggest a list of capabilities, in this work I follow Sen in leaving the list of functionings and corresponding capabilities undecided. 50 Those who prefer a mechanical index, without the need to be explicit about what values are being used and why, have a tendency to grumble that the freedom-based approach requires that valuations be explicitly made. Such complaints have frequently been aired. But explicitness [--] is an important asset for a valuational exercise, especially for it to be open to public scrutiny and criticism. Indeed, one of the strongest arguments in favor of political freedom lies precisely in the opportunity it gives citizens to discuss and debate-and to participate in the selection of-values in the choice of priorities (Sen 1999, p. 30). I will take harm to mean a threat to our basic capabilities by means of undermining our lifesupporting functionings.25 We could thus re-formulate the principle accordingly: The significant risk principle We have a moral obligation not to increase the probable risk of serious harm – deprivation of fundamental capabilities – to other people, at least as long as we can do so at a less than significant cost to ourselves. When formulated like this, the principle does not fall prey to the criticism laid out earlier: the real reason, probable risk of deprivation of fundamental capabilities, is specified. I believe that this formulation captures what goes wrong with our moral calculations if they find nothing objectionable with acts such as Sunday driving with gas guzzlers for fun. Setting my proposed new principle aside for the moment, Sinnott-Armstrong and I agree that governments have collective moral obligations to fight global warming. Furthermore, even if Sunday drives would violate no moral obligations, he argues (pp. 343-344) somewhat confusingly that it is morally preferable for individuals to not to waste gas, and that attempts to do so should be applauded (presumably for consequentialist reasons). I agree with Sinnott-Armstrong that governments should try to fix the situation quickly and also that they are the collective agents upon whom the majority of the climate change responsibility falls on. I do not dispute that they are the main players. He fails to show, however, how this blocks individual responsibility for climate change, and his arguments against principles based on harm and risk fail. He also fails to take into account that there are other collective agents besides nation-states that are relevant for discussing climate change responsibility, such as corporations. I will discuss corporations in the next chapter. The enduring appeal of Sinnott-Armstrong's example of the Sunday drive is that even though as a philosophical argument it is far from convincing, it captures the essence of the problem that when acting in a certain way seems to make no difference to an outcome, it is hard to see how we might have a reason to refrain from acting in such a way (for such arguments, see Cullity 2015, Hale 25 Utilising the capabilities account is a move also made by Cripps (2013, pp. 7-10). 51 2011, or Johnson 2003; 26 for recent accounts that build upon Sinnott-Armstrong's line of argument, see Killoren and Williams 2013, or Sandberg 2011).27 Or as Avram Hiller (2011, p. 349) puts it, it "encapsulates a lot of common thinking about the effects of small-scale individual actions in a very large world". This is a topic for chapters five and six where I discuss marginal participation at length. On the flipside of the same coin, it is equally hard to see how there can be any point in taking positive action if we think we make no difference (think of cases of altruistic helping with no discernible difference in outcome). Julia Nefsky (2016) has recently argued that even if my act makes no difference with respect to some outcome, it can still play a significant and non-trivial role in bringing that outcome about. She rejects the assumption that helping to bring about an outcome requires making a difference. Even if an individual act cannot, by itself, make a difference between one outcome and another, the reason to do it, regardless, is that it can make non-trivial progress toward a better outcome, or help prevent a bad outcome. Similarly, if by acting in a certain way you might help to bring about a bad outcome (or help to prevent a good one), this can be a reason to refrain from acting in that way. She thus rejects the implication that there is no reason to do something just because it will not make a difference. I will return to this in chapter six, section 6.2. At this stage of my thesis it is an open question whether individual responsibility for climate change can exist and if it does, what form it takes, shared or direct. I will argue for shared responsibility in later chapters, but in the next section, I will first argue that we can also have individual direct responsibility. 2.4 Individual harm While the science is clear about people causing climate change, i.e. it being anthropogenic, it is a contentious issue whether humans can be said to cause harm as individuals, i.e. that they can have 26 Cullity (2015) suggests that the relation of individuals to climate harms might be that the group acts wrongly, although no individual member does. Hale (2011) suggests that any arguments that individuals ought to change their behaviour with regards to consumption of fossil fuels, due to such changes at the individual level having an impact on climate change, are subject to objections of causal and rational impotence. He argues that instead of focusing strictly on consequences, we should think about our complicity in harms, "whether we are justified in Φ-ing in the face of evidence that we will be complicit in bringing about W" (p. 387). On Johnson's view, see footnote 13. 27 Killoren and Williams (2013) argue that we could think that members of industrial society constitute a group agent, and this group agent might be morally obligated to reduce its emissions. "How would that group agent go about fulfilling its obligation? It might use governmental means. For instance, we might create laws that restrict the sale or purchase of gas-guzzling cars; or we might hike gasoline taxes; or we might fund research into alternative fuel sources- etc. These types of actions, when taken by democratic governments, might reasonably be regarded as actions performed by a group agent constituted by democratic citizens. If this is right, then the view we are recommending here is not far from the position that Sinnott-Armstrong ultimately defends." (Killoren and Williams 2013, p. 307). Their notion of group agency is much more permissive than the one by Pettit and List (2011), and therefore potentially metaphysically problematic. See chapters three and four for discussion on moral obligations of groups. Sandberg (2011) also employs the notion of collective obligations, but does not explore what it would amount to at the theoretical level, let alone at the practical level. 52 direct responsibility. We have just seen that Sinnott-Armstrong denies that individual's emissions cause harm. Cripps (2013) agrees with him, although they draw different conclusions from it, and I will discuss her account in chapter four. This section looks at the opposite approach: arguments that ascribe responsibility for climate change harm to individuals as individuals, with Nolt (2011) and Broome (2012) already mentioned. Lawford-Smith (2016a, p. 71) also rejects the claim that individuals don't make a difference when it comes to climate change: while "the single actions of a single individual on a single occasion" might not make a difference, there are many micro-thresholds where they just might. Hiller (2011, p. 352) has argued that the expected harm from individual emissions is not insignificant, and that "it is prima facie wrong to perform an act which has an expected amount of harm greater than another easily available alternative." However, as he bases his argument on Nolt's calculation, I will not deal with it separately.28 Recall Nolt's (2011) calculation that each average American is responsible for the deaths and/or serious suffering of two future people. His motivation for the calculation was to try to tease out the moral significance of individual choices against accounts that assume that individual contributions are negligible. The main criticism against Nolt's approach is that it is too simplistic to calculate the harm caused by an individual by dividing up the total harm, even when we are trying to come up with a crude estimate only. This criticism can take the form of questioning Nolt's assumption that average individual harm is a proportion of the harm caused by all emissions: instead, one would have to compare counterfactually what the total harm would be if one person's emissions would not have been emitted, and the resulting individual impact is likely to be negligible (Sandler 2011). Another approach is to argue for the futility of trying to isolate individual actions from the collective setting they occur in (Schinkel 2011). These arguments are along the lines of complicity and overdetermination discussed in chapter five, where marginal participation will be discussed. The approach that Broome takes is somewhat different, although it starts from the same premise of individuals' emissions causing harm. His argument is that every reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is beneficial. He (2012, p. 74) is in agreement with Nolt in that the emissions of an individual living in a rich country cause serious harm: roughly more than six months of healthy human life will be wiped out by your lifetime emissions, amounting to a few days of healthy life destroyed every year. We are therefore wrong to think that the effects of our actions are negligible: individuals are causing serious harm. Unlike Nolt who calculates the individual share by dividing up the total emissions of a country amongst its citizens, Broome's figure is based on average lifetime emissions. Broome is aware that many will not be convinced by these kinds of estimates, especially because effects are dispersed across the globe and your personal emissions are insignificant 28 For a detailed critique of Hiller's argument, see Maltais 2013. 53 compared to the big picture. The sceptical view runs along these lines (p. 75): "The harm you do to each particular person is minuscule. If you live in a rich country, your contribution over your lifetime to global warming is half a billionth of a degree. Nobody would even notice." Broome's argument is that these harms add up. He asks us to think about the "recipients of harm", i.e. the victims of climate change (pp. 75-76): Each one receives harm from the emissions of billions of people. The amount each receives from each emitter is minuscule and imperceptible. Yet some recipients are already suffering serious harm in total. Some are even being killed by global warming. This shows that adding up vast numbers of minuscule amounts can amount to a serious harm. [---] Still, you might think you cannot be absolutely certain that your emissions do harm. It is true that you cannot be absolutely certain, but it is overwhelmingly likely. There is no significant chance that your emissions do no harm. There is an idea implicit here that from the victim's point of view it is clear that serious harm is being caused, even though to an individual contributor his emissions might seem insignificant.29 The victim's point of view in cases of overdetermination is also central to Kutz's (2000) arguments. I will introduce his model of positional accountability in chapter five and discuss the importance of the victim's point of view there. The harm done by our individual greenhouse gas emissions is determined through the effect it has on the global concentration of these gases in the atmosphere and its development over time (Broome 2016, p. 159). While it is impossible to say with certainty what actual harm our individual emissions will cause, they contribute to the risk of serious harms, and we should not expose other people to harm if this can be avoided.30 From the victim's point of view, individuating the component parts of this harm is not important, what is important is that harm is being done, or at least that there is a risk of harm. 29 This is not to deny that individual emissions lead to actual harms: they do, and Broome (2016, p. 161) is explicit about this: "each person's emissions will lead to actual harm as well as expected harm", although "the actual harm may be only a small part of the expected harm". The various uncertainties involved in climate change makes it impossible for us to say with any certainty which one is bigger, actual or expected harm, so I guess we have to go with the best evidence available and make an educated guess. My point is simply that we cannot hope to pinpoint what kind of harms our individual acts will contribute to, nor do we need to be able to do so for us to be able to assign normative significance to them. 30 Broome (2016, p. 162) does not argue that a risk of harm is an actual harm, as that option seems "plainly false" to him, but that we have a duty not to impose a risk of harm on others (i.e. expected harm). I think his point is mostly terminological here as he (pp. 161-162) does discuss a Feinberg-style case of driving dangerously down a street: luckily you harm no one, but you have imposed a risk on the pedestrians (you have wronged them by putting them in danger). By 'terminological' I mean that it does not seem that Broome wants to deny that expected harm is real harm, he just does not want to call it actual harm. For example, if we have a doctor that gives a medicine that kills with 99% probability, and you are given this medicine but survive, the doctor has still harmed you in a real sense (I owe the example to Arto Laitinen). 54 Note that Broome essentially argues that every action regarding emissions counts.31 While I agree with Broome that an individual's reduction in emissions can be beneficial (especially at this point in time), and that they can cause harm, I will argue that this is the case with regards to what I call lifestyle emissions, rather than every individual choice. Although individuals cannot resolve the climate change challenge by themselves or in isolation, it is in their power nonetheless to do a lot of good. Individual direct duties can thus be derived from the no-harm principle. However, just like Broome, I do not view these as our primary duties, let alone exclusive. After all, most of our emissions are the result of collective ventures or at least take place in a collective context. These are matters to which I will return again and again in the coming chapters. Here I want to concentrate on a different aspect of what Broome is saying, that is, the uncertainty and probability of our actions causing harm. He (2012, p. 76) writes: Greenhouse gas harms people in multifarious ways. Each of them is chancy to some extent. A particular storm will be harmful only if the water rises above the flood defenses. Each increase in the amount of greenhouse gas in the air slightly increases the quantity of rain, but it will be a matter of chance whether the particular quantity of gas you emit this year will be enough to cause a flood on any particular occasion. Your emission increases the likelihood of a flood, but it might not actually cause any particular flood. So it is true that your particular emissions may do no harm in a single event. But during the centuries they are in the air they will have the chance of causing harm on innumerable occasions. It is extraordinarily unlikely that they will do no harm at all. There is no real uncertainty there. This is important: in the long run our current individual emissions will almost certainly cause harm. The very long timeframe is why climate change differs from most other cases of imperceptible effects and moral arguments for difference-making considerations (see for example Kagan 2011 and Harman 2016). My emissions might not make a difference soon, but they almost certainly will make a difference eventually. However, the near certainty of some harm being caused by my emissions is linked to not just the very long timescale involved, but also to the very nature of the changes that are taking place. Climate change is not something that proceeds smoothly and steadily. There are various tipping points involved, such as the melting of glaciers, and once a certain threshold is passed, the effects are accelerated. Therefore, certain emissions can have exponential effects and it is impossible to know when and where those will occur. Because carbon stays in the atmosphere for a long time, it accumulates and the more there is, the more likely it is that tipping points will occur. Evidence point to increase in harm being more than proportional to the increase of greenhouse gases, i.e. the more we emit, the more harm each extra tonne of greenhouse gases causes (Broome 31 Broome (2016, p. 161) argues that "the morality of climate change is simpler than some philosophers have thought", and the assumption that each individual does no harm by her own emissions, coupled with the thought that we nevertheless ought to reduce our emissions, "is an unnecessary difficulty they have brought on themselves". 55 2012, pp. 33-34). As Broome (p. 35) notes, this means that "if we reduce emissions, the first reductions will be the most beneficial, and each further reduction less so." He continues: I make this point as an antidote to the despair or apathy that descends on some people when they contemplate the horror of climate change. They think that nothing they can do as individuals is worth doing. It seems to them that even an individual country can do nothing worthwhile, unless it is a very big one. Only a global agreement can do any good, and a global agreement seems unattainable. They are wrong. Every reduction in emissions is beneficial, and the first reductions are more beneficial than the rest. You do more good if you reduce your emissions while other people are not reducing theirs. Our individual emissions are therefore significant in two ways: every reduction is beneficial at the present moment in history at least, and our individual emissions increase the risk of harm. So far we have discussed the risk of harm, but Broome also discusses actual harm. Cripps (2016, p. 125) has recently argued against Broome that there is "a significant difference between depriving one person of six months of life, and causing the loss of six months of healthy human life spread across so many people that each one loses only the most infinitesimal fraction of a second".32 Her argument is that as "long as we think only qua private individual, there remains the objection that what I do doesn't cause anybody to suffer anything." In response, Broome (2016, p. 162) argues that a "harm is significant when it matters", and that "there is an extremely significant difference between a very small number and zero", as adding up many zeros amounts to nothing, but adding up many small numbers can add up to a big number. I agree with Broome (p. 163) that the imperceptibility of harms can be irrelevant (following Parfit) and is irrelevant from the victim's point of view, but I find that Cripps is right that the reason why this is so has to be spelled out in terms of acting together with others, i.e. in terms of collective action. While I agree with Broome that individual actions to reduce emissions can be beneficial due to the nature of the climate change problem, all our emissions cannot count towards our direct responsibility. This is because many of our emissions are linked to existing infrastructure and/or fall under marginal participation. So in very crude terms we could say that if the calculation holds that more than six months of healthy human life is wiped out by the average person's emissions, maybe only about, say, one to three months can be explained by direct responsibility and the rest will fall under marginal participation discussed in section 5.1. 32 Cripps (2013, pp. 120-121) has similarly argued against Nolt that individual actions do not cause harm by themselves, but are more accurately described as harm ingredients: they need to be brought together in a certain way to cause the overall result. She does allow that if the argument is reformulated to refer to expected consequences such objection does not apply. 56 To recap, this section has looked at accounts that argue that individuals do cause harm as individuals and following Broome, it can be argued that this harm mainly comes in the form of increased risk. The special features of climate change, including the extremely long timeframe and various tipping points, mean that individual emissions can have exponential effects and that in the long run they will almost certainly cause harm. Moreover, any individual mitigation action taken now when mitigation efforts are still completely inadequate on the collective scale is beneficial and you have a genuine chance of doing good with these actions. Individuals can thus be held responsible as individuals, i.e. we can bear direct responsibility for climate change harms. This does not exhaust our responsibility for climate change, but it does matter also.33 Before moving on, one more thing should be mentioned: the non-identity problem (Kavka 1982; Parfit 1982, 1987; Woodward 1986).34 Unlike the rest of this section, it is not about the harm that individuals do, but about the individuals to whom the harm is done to. Or, more accurately, about the apparent contradiction that no individual seems to be harmed. Basically, if our public acts and omissions in the long run result in different people being born in the future, even our most egregious failures to address climate change cannot be said to harm any identifiable individuals: the particular future people would not have existed if we had succeeded in mitigation. So even though they might face very harsh conditions in a hostile climate, they still owe their lives to our failures in climate policy. Who then is being harmed? The non-identity problem in relation to climate change is discussed by Broome (2012, pp. 6164), Cripps (2013, pp. 15-18), and Gardiner (2011, pp. 179-183) among many others, and I will not attempt to summarise the different conclusions that they draw. Instead, I will refer to a recent account by Rivka Weinberg (2016) who argues that since deontological, contractualist, consequentialist, or virtue ethical theories do not determine moral permissibility on the basis of an act's effects on a particular identifiable individual, the non-identity problem can be avoided simply by adopting any of them (p. 4).35 She argues that since the non-identity problem is aimed at narrow person-affecting theories (an act is right or wrong only insofar as it affects an identifiable, particular individual), it does not apply to virtue ethics (character development and practice of virtue), consequentialism (effects of an action on the state of affairs), contractualism, or deontology. Contractualism is interested in how actions affect people regardless of their identity, so it is a wide 33 Broome would agree: he makes no claims that the duty of justice to emit greenhouse gas (private morality) takes any priority over duties of goodness that we have (public morality), see fn. 38. 34 The problem is usually discussed in relation to future generations in general, i.e. it is applicable to any long-term and large-scale public policy decisions. 35 Bill Wringe pointed out that if one adopts a counterfactual account of harm (i.e. someone is harmed by an action if they are worse off than they would have been if that action had not taken place), then the non-identity problem cannot be dismissed easily. This is because the counterfactual account presupposes that we are comparing the well-being of the same individual. See end of section 1.1. for some of the complications around the notion of harm. 57 person-affecting theory.36 Kantian theories give each individual status as an end in themselves and do not permit sacrificing individuals for the sake of the group, so they are individualistic. Still, while narrow in that sense, they are not person-affecting in the way that the non-identity problem would require, as wrongdoing is not determined based on the effects of an act on an a particular individual. Basing the permissibility of acts on principles is what deontology is concerned with, not on the effects and consequences of an act on a particular person. (pp. 103-105). In general, the whole problem rests on mistakes according to Weinberg; existence in itself is not a benefit, and those that are merely hypothetical entities are of no moral relevance, so we should not try to weight the interests of merely possible people over future people. What suffices for my purposes is to note that it is not clear that we need to concern ourselves with the non-identity problem when we discuss climate change, at least if our account of harm is not purely counterfactual (see end of section 1.1). For the rest of this thesis I will not. 2.5 What could the direct responsibility of individuals mean in practice? In the previous section, I introduced Broome's argument for individual direct responsibility concerning climate change harms. In this section, I take the existence of such responsibility as my starting position. My question is: granted that direct responsibility exists, what could it mean in practice for individuals? I will introduce Broome's (2012) argument for offsetting emissions, and look at recent criticism that Lawford-Smith (2016b) has presented against it. I will then discuss a distinction that I find particularly important when it comes to individual responsibility: namely that between lifestyle choices with big impacts in terms of emissions, and individual choices that have a much less certain impact on emissions. I will argue that only the former come under direct individual responsibility, while the latter fall under marginal participation and shared responsibility.37 One thing should be made clear from the start: neither Broome nor I treat an individual's direct duties as their primary duties with regards to meaningful climate change action. Cripps (2016, p. 123) 36 Weinberg's discussion on contractualism centres on Rawls's social contract theory (she presents it in more detail in her 2002 paper). Contractualism can also be understood in a more narrow way, to refer to Scanlon's (1998) contractualism, which is concerned with what we owe to each other. Thereby the non-existence of a future person could only be wrong in terms of the reasons an existing person would have to reasonably reject such a principle (FinneronBurns 2017). According to Finneron-Burns (2016), there is no reason not to include future people in the realm of those to whom we owe justification (merely possible people are not included). Furthermore, a person could reasonably reject a principle that left them with a life barely worth living, even if that principle caused them to exist. Thus the present generations could not justify creating people with lives barely worth living on the grounds that it caused those people to exist. Applying this thought to the climate change scenario, I think we could argue that we could not justify the harsh climate conditions that future people might suffer from by appealing to their existence when their lives could well be barely worth living. Note that Parfit (2011, pp. 217-243) takes a different approach, essentially recommending that Scanlon's contractualism should allow us to appeal to impartial reasons. 37 I will return to the choices that do not add up at the individual level in chapters five and six, and discuss how they do add up at the collective level. 58 claims that for Broome direct individual duties take priority over any duties we have to promote government action on climate change, but this is not the case.38 Cripps (2013, pp. 115-139) argues against holding direct individual duties as a solution to climate change, i.e. against the idea that if each individual does her part, then the combined individual actions result in the outcome required at the collective level.39 "On this reasoning, I should take the train, turn down the central heating, buy local fruit and vegetables, insulate my flat, remain vegetarian, and so on, because what is required (perhaps all that can be asked) of me is that I do what would be my share if we were all doing as we ought." (Cripps 2013, p. 116). In general discussions on what to do to combat climate change, things like heating your home less, taking fewer flights, eating less meat, and switching to cleaner energy sources are often brought up. These actions are not without their merits, as a large part of our emissions come from transportation, food, and housing. What Cripps argues is that instead of measures like these, our primary duty is to try to get our governments and other collective agents to take urgent action on climate change. Broome (2012, pp. 73-74) concurs that it is the duty of us as citizens "to do what you can through political action" in order to get our governments to fulfil their obligation to respond to climate change. I agree, but with the disclaimer that I want to extend our primary duties to trying to bring about collective action in any meaningful form, not just to get our governments to act. It might be hard to find an account by a philosopher where duties to reduce one's individual carbon footprint take centre stage (although Jamieson 2007 and Peeters et al. 2015 might qualify).40 If making my everyday life as green as I can is all that is required of me in the face of the collective failure to act on climate change, then the collective end would need to be such that it is (at least theoretically) achievable through aggregated individual actions alone. Cripps (2013, p. 118) argues that while this might theoretically be a possibility when it comes to mitigation, it is not the same with adaptation and compensation. Furthermore, even if mitigation could theoretically be secured by aggregate individual emission cuts, it would be inefficient and demand a lot from an individual. Again I agree: in the 38 There is no such argument in Broome's work and he explicitly denies such a reading (Broome 2016, p. 163). Broome (2012, p. 66) does, however, discuss why at the individual level duties of goodness could be better promoted by other more cost-effective means such as donating money for treating tuberculosis, while duties of justice require that we must take action to address our individual emissions as they cause harm. But this is not putting individual direct duties above others, it just means that in the private sphere basing duties on promoting goodness might face competing claims: what should I do all things considered? Therefore, the individual sphere is dominated by duties of justice. 39 Another philosopher who warns against treating individual duties as primary moral duties is Sinnott-Armstrong. According to him (2005, p. 344), focusing on government obligations avoids the mistake made by those who think that living their lives as fossil-free as possible is enough: We should not think that we can do enough simply by buying fuel-efficient cars, insulating our houses, and setting up a windmill to make our own electricity. That is all wonderful, but it does little or nothing to stop global warming and also does not fulfill our real moral obligations, which are to get governments to do their job to prevent the disaster of excessive global warming. It is better to enjoy your Sunday driving while working to change the law so as to make it illegal for you to enjoy your Sunday driving. 40 I include Peeters et al. with more hesitation because at times they seem to discuss individual agency more along the lines of complicity, without evoking the vocabulary or referring to complicity literature apart from Parfit. 59 absence of collective-level efforts to change the structures and incentives that support fossil fuels, individual efforts will be inefficient. While Broome (2012, pp. 50-54) argues that an individual's emissions cause harm, he does not base his account of climate change responsibility on this alone, or even for the most part (neither do I). He separates questions about how we should act concerning climate change to the spheres of private morality and public morality, and argues that they are regulated by different principles. Public (government) morality is aimed at making the world a better place and at doing the best thing, so it is regulated principally by duties of goodness (beneficence).41 On the contrary, private morality is regulated by duties of justice, so that is why we should avoid causing harm to others. Duties of justice are owned to particular people or a person by a person, so when an injustice is committed, it is always done to a particular someone. In contrast, duties of goodness are not owed to particular people: when you fail to give someone your money through charitable causes, for example, that person has no right to your money and you do her no injustice by not giving it to her. Our responsibility flows from both of these sources, and one does not cancel out the other.42 Furthermore (pp. 13-14), we cannot meet duties of goodness without collective efforts (such as government regulations) as: [R]educing emissions is not an effective way for a private person to make the world a better place. True, you can as a private person improve the world significantly by reducing your emissions, because your emissions do significant harm. However, you have more effective ways of using your private resources to improve the world. Money that has been spent on hybrid cars and solar panels in northern climates would have done more good if it had been used instead to save lives by treating tuberculosis, or to save people's sight by cataract treatment, or in a number of other ways. Thus the argument is not that given our direct individual responsibility, we should aim to deal with climate change by concentrating on the demands of private morality alone. That would be inefficient and inadequate.43 As Isaacs (2011, p. 140) puts it, with harms like climate change "[i]ndividual solutions fall short, not just because they are akin to attempting to put out a blazing house with a toy water pistol but also because the scale of the issues makes it difficult for an individual to know where to begin to address them." 41 Governments also have a duty of justice to reduce emissions, but Broome (2012, p. 54) argues that their main duty to reduce emissions comes from the duty of goodness. 42 When duties of goodness and justice do come into conflict, duties of justice usually win, according to Broome (2012, p. 53). However, in the climate change scenario he argues that they pull in the same direction. 43 Broome (2016, p. 158) explicitly denies such a reading in a recent paper: "I never thought the world should try to deal with climate change by promoting private morality. That would be hopeless. Far too few of us will respond as we morally should, and those who do will have little effect. An effective response to climate change will have to come from governments, who can use their powers of tax and regulation to influence the behavior of very large numbers of people." 60 Instead, Broome's argument is that morality is more than just about promoting good: morality does not allow you to harm other people.44 Money spent on hybrid cars or solar panels is not money wrongly spent, and we do have a moral duty to reduce our emission, but these duties flow from considerations of justice (avoiding harming others), not from duties of goodness (Broome 2012, p. 14). Reducing emissions is thus both a duty of goodness and a duty of justice (p. 53). Furthermore, even if you did fulfil your own duties of justice (i.e. duties flowing from your direct responsibility), the harms caused by climate change will only be alleviated to a small extent (pp. 73-74): Significant progress can be achieved only by governments, because only governments have the power to get all their people to change their behavior. Governments have the moral duty to respond to climate change, and you as a citizen have a duty to do what you can through political action to get your government to fulfil them. Shared responsibility thus matters also. Broome's model therefore seems compatible with the quest to finding a model of responsibility that can encompass both individual and collective sources of responsibility. But for now, let us concentrate on what the duties of justice demand of us, i.e. what could accepting direct responsibility regarding climate change harms mean for an individual? Climate change harms are caused by our greenhouse gas emissions. These emissions are not accidental, and they are not compensated (at least not currently). The victims are scattered all across the world and, moreover, across numerous generations. Nearly all emission can be categorised into five sectors of economic activity: energy supply systems, transportation, buildings, industry, and AFOLU (agriculture, forestry, and other land use) (IPCC 2014). A significant percentage of all these emissions come from everyday consumption choices: where we live, what we eat, how much we move around, and in what way. Consumption patterns are widely unequal globally: if we were to treat the members of the European Union as a single country, then 70% of world emissions could be accounted for by roughly 10 collective agents (IPCC 2014, p. 113). There are, thus, vast differences between the per capita emissions of an average European, American or Australian, and the average emissions of the average African or Latin American, although we have to remember that there are big differences between these countries also. The rich individuals (and also some of the middle classes) in the Global South are often emitting just as much as the rich individuals and the middle classes in the Global North. Many of our emissions are tied to the available infrastructure: whether public transportation is available, how energy efficient the buildings we occupy are, and so on. Still, there are easy low-cost or no-cost options available that can dramatically change the emissions of someone who is wealthy by global standards. For example, an average American could potentially reduce their direct energy 44 Except in special cases, such as accidents, just punishment, or self-defence (Broome 2012, p. 54). 61 consumption by a quarter through adopting measures such as carpooling to work with another person, maintaining correct tyre pressure, turning down heating, and washing clothes at lower temperatures (Gardner and Stern 2008, p. 20). While acknowledging that every little bit counts when it comes to reducing emissions, measures like these are not what Broome is advocating as part of our duties of justice. What individuals should do in response to the harm their individual emissions cause, according to Broome (2012, p. 79-80), is to offset their emissions. The general idea in offsetting is that we cancel our own greenhouse gas emissions by paying for projects that reduce emissions somewhere else, such as building renewable energy infrastructure and investing in afforestation or reforestation projects. Each of us has a duty to not harm others without compensating the victims, and we will not be able to compensate all the victims individually (duties of justice are owed to particular people). Collective compensation schemes might work, but we do not know how much harm each of us will cause with our emissions, so how much compensation we will actually owe. However, it is much easier to roughly calculate our individual emissions. We cannot live without causing emissions, but the argument goes that we can cancel these out by offsetting. In general, Broome's (pp. 85-95) argument is that offsetting is the most efficient way of fulfilling our duty of justice. When we offset, we ensure that every unit of greenhouse gas that we add to the atmosphere is met with a unit that is subtracted from it. Carbon offsetting involves measures such as reducing deforestation by paying countries to leave their forest untouched, as trees absorb carbon. Another popular offset is to finance through commercial organisations projects that diminish emissions somewhere else in the world (for example, create sources of renewable energy, mostly in the Global South, or install efficient cooking stoves to replace cooking with firewood). Broome is not recommending offsetting to governments, only to individuals as a measure to meet their individual duties of justice. He limits the duty to rich people, as poor people who emit little do no injustice in his view as the harm they cause is small and reciprocal, i.e. they are harmed in turn by the rich people's emissions, only a small fraction of which is reciprocated by the poor (p. 58). Broome notes how current voluntary offsetting schemes are very cheap because only a small fraction of consumers participate in them. The obvious worry with this approach is that the argument for offsetting is empirically vulnerable. As Broome (2016, p. 164) himself notes, his argument is dependent on reputable offsetting companies doing their job, which he can only assume that they do.45 The "reputable"specification is meant to set aside the companies that engage in fraudulent practices. While Broome does not specify how reputable companies are to be recognised, we could, for example, say that 45 I.e. the cost of preventing greenhouse gases getting into the atmosphere being less than the amount of harm it does when it is there. 62 offsetting should only be done through projects that meet the Gold Standard requirements.46 Let us assume that the standard meets its aims in that the projects are genuine. Problems still remain for the offsetting to really be an effectual way in offering genuine cuts to overall emissions. While genuine reductions is one of the Gold Standard's stated aims, it is still difficult to prove that any investments in offsetting really deliver on emission reduction promises, i.e. that the reductions achieved by any given project are additional to what would have happened in the absence of the project. To qualify as a genuine carbon offset, the project cannot be one that would have been undertaken in the business-as-usual scenario. In other words, the investment secured through carbon markets must have been the deciding factor in making the project viable. If carbon credits would be awarded to projects that would have materialised in any case, they do not represent any genuine emissions cuts.47 This all is acknowledged by Gold Standard and the offsetting industry: additionality is the key concept in offsetting, as the whole idea relies on it. However, it is hard to assess counterfactual claims about what would have happened without some project getting funding through carbon markets. This is especially so when you factor in any indirect effects that any projects might have, especially the large-scale ones to do with energy infrastructure. Indirect effects are hard to measure, but even harder to assess through counterfactuals. In addition, the economic efficiency of offsetting has also been called into question, with estimates suggesting that up to half of the price paid for an offset can go to administration and publicity costs (Nordhaus 2014, p. 1140). Projects may also fail, no matter how well-intended and planned they are, so in these cases the reductions promised do not materialise and offsetting has again failed to take place. Furthermore, reductions might also be temporary. The empirical vulnerability goes further than concerns about additionality.48 There is also uncertainty about what the offset project causes, and what the side effects of the emission action is. For example, say that you offset your flight. While the emissions from the actual flight are neutralized, your indirect emissions might not have been (e.g. your support for the airline industry). Your flight could have also arguably infinitesimally increased the probability that a new runway will 46 Gold Standard was established in 2003 by World Wildlife Fund and other international NGOs as "a best practice benchmark for energy projects developed under the UN's Clean Development Mechanism". It caters both for the compliance market linked to international treaties and the much smaller voluntary offsetting market that my and Broome's discussions focus on. It aims to ensure that the projects included deliver genuine emission reductions as well as long-term sustainable development, and monitors outcomes through third party auditing. See www.goldstandard.org for more. 47 With this I refer to projects that would have secured government funding, or funding from private investors, and so would have happened even without the offsetting companies being involved. To give but just one example (from Davies 2007), ClimateCare an award-winning reputable offsetting company distributed 10,000 energy-efficient lightbulbs in a South African township as offsets. However, they soon discovered that an energy company was distributing the same kind of lightbulbs free to customers, including the township that ClimateCare had distributed their bulbs to, so the resulting reduction in emissions would have taken place anyway. 48 Thank you to Kai Spiekermann for pointing this out (personal communication, 2 November 2017). I also owe the examples in the paragraph to him. 63 be built. In addition, perhaps your offset project leads to development in an under-developed region, leading to more emissions overall. When these assessments need to be made over at least 100 years, it becomes almost impossible to know what the offset purchase causes in the end. As Kai Spiekermann puts it, "apart from additionality (where we have to assess a counterfactual), we even struggle to assess what happens in the actual world if we buy the offset."49 If we grant that offsetting is not a reliable way to ensure that every unit of greenhouse gas that we add to the atmosphere is met with a unit that is subtracted from it, could we not just offset our emissions many times over?50 The approach that Broome advocates already encompasses overestimating your emissions to be on the safe side, but this suggestion would entail that we should maybe triple or quadruple that estimate and then offset that amount. In this way, we could feel much safer in assessing that we really have offset our emissions, despite the possible problems of additionality, temporality, and so on. Even if we could come up with such a "safe" multiplier for offsetting our emissions (and we could still afford to offset such a figure), the fact that the costs of offsetting are currently very low (as Broome points out), presents a problem in its own right. Noting how the costs of voluntary offsetting are currently barely noticeable, Spiekermann (2014a, p. 914) argues that "it is likely that the current offsetting practice is only functional because just a small minority of people participate in it, and that it would collapse under full compliance because individuals are unlikely to pay the (much higher) full compliance market price." The problem, however, is not that voluntary carbon offsets are so cheap, but rather that many customers probably buy them for reasons that undermine the efficacy of the scheme. To be more precise, as offsetting is used in marketing carbon-intensive products, such as flights and cars, the motivation of many could well be that I offset my excess emissions in order to have a clear conscience regarding these carbon-intensive purchases, but I do so only as long as the sacrifice is small (p. 925). This kind of motivation would be unstable because increasing offsetting compliance would lead to increased costs, because if more people start offsetting their emissions, opportunities for offsetting will become rarer and the low-hanging fruits will have been picked already. Spiekermann (p. 926) writes: [T]his does not suggest that some offsetting is worse than no offsetting. Any genuine opportunity to reduce net GHG emissions should be welcome, and partial compliance is often better than no compliance. The concern with the offsetting practice is of a different nature. It creates the mistaken impression that offsetting is all we need to solve the problem of GHG emissions, and it sends the misleading signal that the average Western lifestyle does not need to be reformed to mitigate climate change because buying a few cheap offsets is enough. 49 Personal communication, 2 November 2017. 50 I owe thanks to Visa Kurki for suggesting this possibility. 64 I do not mean to argue that offsetting is pointless or that it does no good. I am sure that despite its problems it does some good, and that many, if not most, of the companies and actors involved in the industry are in it for the right reasons. My argument is that as a solution to meeting our duties of justice to do no harm, offsetting is too unreliable a method, as too many uncertainties are involved. Offsetting is thus not a way of avoiding doing harm, or at least not a reliable way. We should try to meet our duty with other measures also, most importantly by reducing our individual emissions. This also involves complications, and I will come to these soon. However, before that I want to look at if the doing-no-harm line of argument is feasible if we allow that we cannot meet it simply by offsetting. If doing no harm through our emissions is a duty that we cannot easily dispense with as Broome argued, then does it become too demanding as a moral principle? Lawford-Smith (2016b) argues against Broome that a duty to do no injustice would be implausible, and instead we can at most have a duty to minimise injustice. She (p. 137) lists a variety of ways in which our ordinary acts can cause harm (for example, by buying products that have sweatshop or child labour used in their supply chain) and notes, that some of them can cause "dual harm, both because it contributes to harm to the environment, workers, children, or animals, and because it produces GHG emissions which will cause further harms to current persons, future generations, non-human animals, and the environment." While not all of these harms will count as injustices, many of them will. "The bottom line is that there's injustice based on harming just about everywhere we look", and most of the time we cannot avoid doing injustice in these ways (p. 138).51 She writes (p. 139): Offsetting matters, but it's not clear how much it matters compared against other duties of justice. Unless we want to throw our hands in the air and concede that when it comes to duties of justice "anything goes," we'll have to offer some moral advice as to what an individual should actually do. In a situation such as many people are currently in, in which they're implicated in many injustices, and in which remedying those injustices is not compossible, or barely compossible, or compossible but only at extraordinarily high cost to the individual which most would judge to be overly demanding, what should they do? The answer is obvious: they should minimize injustice (or avoid injustice entirely by minimizing harm). In response, Broome (2016, p. 165) argues that the fact that we cannot avoiding harming others, to some degree at least, does not affect his conclusion that we should offset our emissions. Broome 51 Lawford-Smith takes her cue from Judith Lichtenberg (2010), who has argues that not harming people can be as demanding as helping them, sometimes even more so. This is because in living our everyday lives, we cause harm in various ways through our humdrum activities, and most of the time we cannot avoid doing it. She gives examples such as buying clothes made in a sweatshop, contributing to emissions through taking showers and using air-conditioning, or owning stock in a company that exploits its workers. 65 seems to allow, though, that the aim of doing no harm could be replaced with the aim of minimising harm. At least he offers no arguments against accepting Lawford-Smith's alternative (all his counterarguments are about offsetting as an effective means to avoid harming others). Broome argues that what Lawford-Smith suggests is in essence this: "You ought to do the least harm you can, compatible with a life worth living" (Broome 2016, p. 165).52 While I am not sure if she would agree with such a formulation, it is certainly more plausible than a duty to commit no injustice by harming others. Recall my suggestion for the significant risk principle from section 2.3: The significant risk principle We have a moral obligation not to increase the probable risk of serious harm – deprivation of fundamental capabilities – to other people, at least as long as we can do so at a less than significant cost to ourselves. This is bit more lenient than what Broome suggests, as it gives more leeway to how demanding such a duty would be, and it is also very close (maybe even similar) to what Lawford-Smith proposes. As long as we are discussing direct responsibility, I would like to stick with my original version,53 as it is formulated as a direct response to Sinnott-Armstrong to show how the principle he rejects could easily be modified to avoid his criticism. In addition, it utilises the language of capabilities that I use when discussing harm.54 I noted earlier in this section how a substantial percentage of our emissions come from everyday consumption choices: where we live, what we eat, how much we move around and in what way. Some of these choices are linked to the available infrastructure: if there is no public transportation available, you will have to use other means to get to work. Although I live in a society with a very high carbon footprint, I am lucky enough to live in a city with a good public transportation network, so it is easy for me to not own a car, which, of course, affects my individual carbon footprint. Similarly, while heating my home is a must, as it is cold in the winter time in Helsinki, the heating is efficient due to the way heat and power production are combined in the city, a structural solution that is beyond my individual control.55 If I lived somewhere else, I could be forced to move around 52 Formulated by Broome in response to Lawford-Smith's criticism; this is how he sums up what she recommends. 53 I formulated the significant risk principle before reading the exchange between Broome and Lawford-Smith. 54 When we come to shared responsibility, a somewhat stronger version might apply, because with shared responsibility for climate change harms it is beyond doubt that we are discussing actual harm, not just increased risk of harm. However, shared responsibility is a complicated phenomenon as we will see in the coming chapters, so I will not attempt to try to formalise what our individual duty as a member of a constituent might be, as these will depend on many things, such as what our role and position is, and what others are doing. Instead, I will defend the Complicity Principle (chapter five). 55 Combined heat and power production (CHP) is a thermodynamically efficient use of fuel. Most buildings in urban areas in Finland are covered by district heating and about 70–80% of this heat is produced with CHP generation, while cogeneration covers almost 80% of industrial heat in Finland (Tynkkynen 2016, p. 32). I should note that electricity 66 by car and to heat my home in a less efficient way. As the available infrastructure is not under the individual's control, emissions resulting from transport and housing mostly fall under shared responsibility. Collective agents are the relevant agents that can implement such changes. However, within the available infrastructure there is still room for manoeuvre. In what follows I will only refer to situations where the individual has more low-carbon alternatives available to her at no significant cost to herself. Some people choose to live in large houses with private pools, while others settle for more modest settings. Not everyone uses public transportation even if the network would be convenient for their commute, preferring to use their own cars instead.56 There are thus what we could call lifestyle choices that have large impacts in terms of emissions, such as in how large a home you and your family live in.57 The impacts are the cumulative effects that these lifestyle choices have on your overall emissions. While many of our consumption choices do not add up at the level of an individual (like taking a flight or a train on your holiday), they add up collectively and come under shared responsibility of unorganised groups (I return to this in chapter five). However, I want to argue that emissions from our lifestyle choices come under direct individual responsibility and that their combined effects harm others even at the level of an individual emitter. There are at least three obvious such lifestyle choices that have large combined effects even at the level of individual emissions. These are how spaciously you choose to live (is one room per person enough, and so on), how you organise your travel in your everyday life, and what is the main protein source in your diet. With lifestyle choices, you make a decision that either leads to many little decisions taken daily (such as what you eat, or how you move about), most of them taken without reflection (you jump into your car or on your bike each morning), or you lock yourself into a certain emissions path (like when you buy or rent a home of a certain size and standard of equipment). Our lifestyle emissions can also act as signals to others as to what norms we are willing to support (when we have the everyday luxury to choose): what in our opinion is the material standard of living that an "average" individual should aspire to? This is naturally stronger with influential people such as celebrities: the material standard of living that many of them advocate on social media, for example, is both unrealistic and unhelpful, even by aspirational standards. But even just among "regular" people, peer pressure is a strong motivator. What is important is that our lifestyle choices affect our overall emissions to a much greater extent than a one-off decision of where to production in Helsinki is still carbon-intensive due to the use of coal power, although there are plans in place to phase these plants out. 56 Again, I am talking only about choices that are easily available for the person, not about someone who drives a car to work because their job requires it, like a salesperson who needs to travel around to take samples to clients. 57 These are to be separated from what Marshall (2014, p. 157) brands as "petty lifestyle changes", such as carrying one's own eco-bags to avoid having to buy plastic bags. 67 take a rare holiday (unless going on frequent holidays is a lifestyle choice of yours, of course).58 Our lifestyle emissions should thus be the basis for our direct responsibilities. To give one detailed example, meat consumption is no insignificant factor in climate change. The livestock sector is estimated to emit 14.5% of all human-induced emissions each year (FAO 2013). Beef and milk account for the majority of emissions, with beef production accounting for 41% of the sector's emissions, and milk production for 19%. The emissions linked to the meat industry comprise mainly of feed production and processing (45%), enteric fermentation i.e. outputs of methane from the animal's digestion process (39%), and manure decomposition (10%). The remainder is attributable to the processing and transportation of animal products. What makes the figure of 14.5% even more important is that approximately 44% of the sector's emissions are methane, the strongest greenhouse gas.59 In fact, the livestock sector emits 44% of anthropogenic methane emissions.60 Recall from chapter one, that while methane lasts in the atmosphere for only about 12 years, it warms the planet roughly 30 times more than CO2. Therefore curbing methane emissions is a powerful way to get more immediate results. Due to this, I will argue that from the point of view of an individual, choosing a vegetarian diet, or reducing meat consumption significantly, is one of the most efficient ways of reducing one's emissions and meeting one's duty of justice.61 I do not argue that we therefore have a duty to do so, I only offer this as an example of a lifestyle change that has big aggregate impacts. 58 For recent arguments that share my general point about the importance of lifestyle choices, see Lawford-Smith (2016a) who argues that we form habits and use heuristics to make decisions in our everyday lives, and Nefsky (2016) who argues that our mitigation obligations might best be described as choosing the low-emission alternative enough over time, rather than view it as an obligation to make such a low-emission choice at every opportunity that one can. 59 Cattle and other ruminant animals (such as buffalo, sheep, and goat) produce methane as part of their digestive process. Microbial fermentation breaks down carbohydrates in their stomach (rumen) into simple molecules that can then be digested by the animals. Methane is a by-product of this process. Poorly digestible, fibrous food causes higher methane emissions, so what feed the cattle get is important also. Non-ruminant species, such as pigs (and humans), also produce methane during digestion but amounts are much lower by comparison. Methane is also released when faeces decompose. This occurs mostly when animal manure is processed and held in liquid form, such as in deep lagoons or holding tanks commonly used in industrial meat production. Source: FAO (2013, p. 20). 60 The livestock supply chain emits 2 gigatonnes of CO2 per annum, which is 5 percent of all anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions; 3.1 gigatonnes (CO2-eq) of CO4 per annum, i.e. 44 percent of anthropogenic methane emissions; and 2 gigatonnes (CO2 -eq) of N2O per annum, i.e. 53 percent of anthropogenic nitrous oxide emissions (FAO 2013, p. 15). 61 Note that I make no claim that lifestyle emissions are completely under your direct influence, I am only discussing the room for manoeuvre. The type of protein you choose to eat will fall under marginal participation (discussed in chapter five) as a one-off decision (at least if you only eat factory-farmed meat), but if you eat meat daily or even several times a week, those decisions will likely increase the risk of serious harms. It is even more so the case if you cook for others and make such decisions on behalf of your family members or have influence over the choices of others in some other way. But the outcome of your decision to turn vegetarian because of the emissions of factory farming is certainly uncertain. Note, however, that my argument about direct mitigation responsibility has centred on responsibility to reduce risks of serious harms. So we should not counterfactually compare the likelihood of making a difference to the emissions of the entire industry through your individual choices, but rather the likelihood of contributing to the sector's methane emissions through eating meat or by not eating meat. By not eating meat such a likelihood is very slim indeed. If you do not eat meat (or dairy products), you do not contribute to the methane emissions from the livestock sector. In any case, there are fewer uncertainties involved when trying to mitigate your emissions through stable lifestyle choices like these, rather than with offsetting. 68 Note that I am talking about luxury emissions, i.e. emissions that we could easily go without. Like Broome, I limit individual direct responsibility to wealthy individuals. Take as an example a poor family that lives in a poor village. They own a goat that provides them with milk and eventually meat, therefore helping them to meet their protein needs. The emissions produced in this case are not luxury emissions and they bear no direct responsibility for climate change. There is a world of difference between this scenario and someone who lives somewhere where food is readily available and plant-based proteins could satisfy most or all of his protein needs. Choosing to eat meat at every available opportunity despite having other options amounts to easily avoidable emissions.62 To recap, I have argued in this section that our individual direct duty in relation to climate change is to not increase the probable risk of serious harm – deprivation of fundamental capabilities – to other people, at least as long as we can do so at a less than significant cost to ourselves. I have also argued that offsetting is too unreliable a method to meet this duty, but that rather we should reduce our individual emissions. More precisely, reducing our lifestyle emissions (in contrast to questioning each individual purchase and consumer choice) is the best way to try to mitigate our emissions. Note that direct duties are not prior to shared duties. The argument so far has only been that we can have direct responsibility also. I turn next to collective agents and shared responsibility we can have as members of these. 62 Some philosophers might disagree with how easily one can change one's habits. For example, according to Southwood (2016), when an agent is too lazy to do something, it is not feasible to claim that he ought to do that something (other than in a hypothetical sense). Chapter 3 – Responsibility of collective agents The increase in greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere [is] having an effect. Our ability to predict that effect is very limited. Rex Tillerson, the former chief executive of ExxonMobil, in his confirmation hearing on 11 January 2017 for US Secretary of State Our ability to 'predict' depends on our ability to figure out how fast humans will switch from fossil fuels to renewable sources. Our ability to 'project' the impacts of a given future scenario, however, is based on physics and chemistry that's been understood since the 1850s. Climate scientist Katharine Hayhoe in response to Tillerson's statement In this chapter I will argue that nation-states and governments are not the only relevant collective agents when we look at climate change responsibility, but that corporations also have obligations concerning making sure that their activities are as carbon-neutral as possible. Furthermore, I will argue that the corporations that have engaged in agnotology campaigns and lobbying against climate regulation have acquired themselves additional obligations to mitigate climate change and compensate for the harm they have caused. What type of knowledge is cultivated and what is suppressed is a factor of many things, including strategies, policies, institutional structures, funding priorities, trade patterns, technologies, and moral and professional imperatives (Schiebinger 2008, pp. 152-158). Agnotology is a term recently coined to describe culturally produced ignorance and its study: the creation of ignorance and doubt, as well as the study of lost and forgotten knowledge (Proctor and Schiebinger 2008). Ignorance can be culturally induced when misinformation is deliberately spread to further some end. This is usually done by large organised collectives, like state propaganda during wartime or lobbying campaigns against regulation by the tobacco and sugar industries. As Londa Schiebinger (2008, p. 152) puts it: "Ignorance is often not merely the absence of knowledge but an outcome of cultural struggles." This type of ignorance is directly relevant to climate change responsibility, as there have been corporate efforts to buy the fossil fuel industry more time in the face of mounting scientific evidence that proves fossil fuels are harmful (section 3.3). Collective agents should be distinguished from other less organised collectives. My view is that certain organised collectives such as nation-states, governments, universities, and corporations can be thought of as collective agents, although they are not moral agents. If we accept the notion of collective responsibility of collective agents, what does this mean for individuals within these 70 collectives? In this chapter, I will suggest that collective moral responsibility distributes to individual members, but often not in any straightforward way. This chapter is comprised of three parts. Section 3.1 discusses the responsibility of collective agents and argues that they are not moral agents, because they are not capable of making moral claims. I will, however, argue that they are able to exhibit moral claims through their conduct. Section 3.2 takes a look at the obligations of collective agents: who holds these obligations and how are they distributed? I will finish the chapter by introducing in section 3.3 a case study of corporate responsibility for climate change harms brought on by the agnotology campaigns of corporations such as ExxonMobil. A brief terminological point before we get started. I will use 'duty' and 'obligation' interchangeably in the text in this and the following chapters, in line with the general tendency in philosophical discourse to do so (Zimmerman 2013). In regular language we often use 'duties' to refer to the responsibilities that arise from our particular roles (be it an official position like a judge or a doctor, or a social role like a parent), and 'obligations' to refer to more general (prospective) responsibility. In philosophy, however, the terms are often synonyms (Zimmerman 2013).1 While their meaning is the same, I prefer to associate duties with individuals and obligations with collectives. However when discussing a particular philosopher, I will use the terminology employed by them. 3.1 Collective agency and the responsibility of organised collectives It is not at all controversial to make the claim that nation-states and governments are relevant actors in addressing climate change, although there are differences is scale and degree: some commentators want to place all the responsibility on these agents, while others hold them accountable to only some of the responsibility. But what kind of actors are collective agents and what does this kind of collective responsibility amount to? One of the biggest debates within collective responsibility literature is if organisations can be said to be moral agents, not just collective agents in either some loose or strict sense. In this section I will discuss questions of collective agency and moral responsibility in relation to climate change, building on the introductory section 1.3. I will concentrate on collective agents that I feel are often largely overlooked when we discuss climate change responsibility, namely corporations. Corporations are subject to legislation, have stated aims (many of which are about turning a profit), codes of conduct, and people within corporations have differentiated roles with usually clear 1 Although there are, of course, many philosophers who make distinctions with them; for example, natural duties and special obligations. 71 chains of command. I will discuss corporations for two reasons: first, they are the paradigm examples in the literature on collective agents and collective responsibility. Second, corporations are agents that are usually ignored in climate ethics, yet 63% of worldwide industrial carbon dioxide and methane emissions from 1751 to 2010 can be traced to just 90 entities, with large corporations like Chevron, ExxonMobil, Saudi Aramco, BP, and Gazprom topping the list (Heede 2014). These corporations were and are huge emitters, so I find that it is important that climate ethics include them in debates about mitigation responsibility. In fact, it is striking how few key players are involved in exploration, development, and production of oil, for example: just ten oil companies produce roughly two-thirds of the world's oil, while China and the US together account for two-thirds of global coal production (Marshall 2014, p. 170). Agents are capable of intentional action, so for a collective to qualify as an agent it needs to have the relevant structure to be able to produce intentional actions (Isaacs 2014, p. 42). An organised collective such as a corporation can be regarded as a unified single agent that involves individual members, constitutive features such as group goals, beliefs, norms, and so on, and sometimes also legal properties and material possessions (Tuomela and Mäkelä 2016, p. 300). Furthermore, corporate intentions and actions are not reducible to the intentions and actions of individual members partly because corporate actions require an appropriate institutional context, as well as "the existence of certain constitutive rules" like an ethos (p. 300). Following Tuomela (2007, p. 15) and Laitinen (2014, p. 218), the ethos consists of the central questions and practical matters that are vital to the purpose of the group (the group's realm of concern) and the answers it has collectively accepted to be its view (intentional horizon). The ethos thus covers the central goals and commitments of the institution. While the ethos determines a group's identity (and is part of what marks its continuation, together with its historical and modal properties), it is in a state of flux to some degree. In any case the ethos of a group is not set in stone, as elements of it may change. Thus a corporation that has a long history of specialising in a particular line of products might change not only what it produces, but also the way it conducts its affairs. When it comes to moral agency, our practice of holding agents responsible includes conditions about possessing rational powers (applying and understanding moral reasons), and being able to control one's behaviour (Wallace 1996, pp. 154-180). The latter has two aspects. First of all, the ability to grasp and apply moral reasons, including being able to apply principles to a variety of situations, utilising concentration and judgement, and grasping the reasons behind justifications. Second of all, an agent must be able to regulate one's behaviour in the light of these reasons, which includes having some control and being able to translate choices into behaviour. Correspondingly, the exempting conditions of moral agency are satisfied when the powers of reflective self-control are missing or partly missing: to lack the power to grasp and apply moral reason, or to lack the power 72 to control and self-regulate behaviour in the light of these reasons, along the lines discussed in chapter one. I would like to add to this list 'the ability to make moral claims' and I will return to this shortly. When it comes to collective responsibility, some argue that a collective can be thought of as a moral agent, while others deny this. The debate is not about collectives being nothing but the sum of their individual parts, but rather about moral agency conditions and the role of intention in this. While I will not discuss collective intentionality, as it is not needed for the purposes of my thesis, I think it is useful to outline some of the main arguments for and against collective moral agency. Peter French (1984) invites us to view certain large organisations like corporations and universities as moral agents.2 Because not every corporate action can be reduced to individual actions (e.g. a board decision might not correspond with any of the individual views of the voting members), it is not always fair to blame individuals for the actions of the corporation. He ascribes large organisations with the following three characteristics: internal decision-making procedures, enforced standards of conduct, and defined roles/stations. Corporate decision procedures, then, along with structures and policies, are what form the basis for corporate agency and collective responsibility.3 The identity of these collectives does not change when individuals join or leave them, and their identities cannot be described simply by an account of all the individuals involved, just as statements ascribing responsibility to them "are not reducible to a conjunction of statements ascribing responsibility to the individuals associated with [them]" (1984, p. 13).4 For French (1979, p. 143), what distinguishes collective moral agents from other collectives is that they have established a way to make decisions and convert these into actions; they have a CID Structure: corporation's internal decision structure. It must include two things: the rules regarding company procedures and policies, usually in the form of a corporate policy statement, and an organisational flow chart, which shows the roles and managerial lines in the corporation. When the CID Structure is operational and properly activated, it "subordinates and synthesizes the intentions and acts of various human beings and mechanisms into a corporate decision" (French et al. 1992, p. 17). It also exposes the corporate character of actions performed by individuals in their roles, and 2 According to French (1984, p. viii), corporations play such a big role in our societies that we must widen our understanding of moral agency to include them: if we do not, we are treating corporations and nations as "mere fictions, figments of the imagination, the moral world's equivalents to the physical world's ghosts and hallucinations." 3 The intentions or quality of the will of any given individual within a corporation are of secondary consideration in French's view. It does not follow that no individual can be blamed and held morally responsible for the action: this is simply a separate matter that should be justified on its own merits. Correspondingly, members can be innocent of a wrongdoing even when the organisation itself is to blame. 4 French et al. (1992, p. 15) further argue that a corporation's identity "is not dependent on particular persons being in particular positions in the corporation." I would like to disagree somewhat, as sometimes the departure of a very charismatic leader can change the identity of the corporation to a degree at least, as when Anita Roddick sold The Body Shop to L'Oréal (an example that I also used in my Master's thesis). 73 allows us to describe why those actions were taken in the first place (French 1979, p. 143).5 It thus helps to illuminate what the corporation is responsible for, and what individuals are responsible for (French et al. 1992, p. 70). If the action causing the harm was a corporate action by the CID Structure standards, then the accompanying blame belongs to the corporation. If, however, someone acts outside the boundaries of their corporate role, then it is the individual who is to blame. Philip Pettit (2007) argues that it is the collectivisation of reason that takes place in organisations that makes them moral agents. To qualify as a moral agent, a system or a group "must display a robust pattern of attitudinal and behavioral rationality" (p. 178), meaning that it holds beliefs about its environment and has desires for how it should be.6 Similarly to French, for Pettit (pp. 177-184) the autonomy of a group agent arises from the fact that sometimes group judgements will be different from the individual judgements of the group members.7 That group decisions can and do differ from the members' aggregate opinion is necessary to ensure consistency in decision making.8 Kirk Ludwig (2016) rejects group agency, and argues that collective agency and collective intentionality can be reduced to interlocking intentions of groups of people.9 Although shared intentions cannot be reduced to aggregates of individual intentions (he employs we-intentions), all we need to analyse collective action with are concepts of individual intentional action. Ludwig (2017, p. 271) argues that "the surface features of legal discourse about corporate agency are misleading" 5 Corporations have their own culture, customs, goals, and history, and employees must grasp these to ensure that their actions are actually corporate. Written documents go only so far in helping to find out what the corporation is really about, and what its established procedures are. The CID Structure forms the "character" of a corporation, tending to foster certain kinds of actions and decisions in line with company policies (French et al. 1992, p. 44). The policies are not just what is written down, but also how the people in power react to violations of the stated policy. This reveals which policies are central to the corporation, and which are mere window-dressing, thus illuminating the company's character. For corporations to be moral agents, they must be able to make non-mechanical and un-programmed decisions, and be able to alter their behaviour in the face of criticism or unexpected outcomes (French et al. 1992, pp. 20-23). 6 An agent has representational states that describe how things are around it, motivational states that identify how it would like things to be, and the capacity to process both of these states so it can intervene when there is a mismatch between the two (List and Pettit 2011). 7 Copp (2007) is another philosopher who employs the voter's paradox as he argues that claims of collective responsibility should be understood as claims about a collective's responsibility. He (p. 369) defends the collective moral autonomy thesis, according to which "a collective entity such as a corporation or a state [can] have an agential moral property even if no member of it has a relevantly corresponding agential moral property", such as forward-looking obligation or backward-looking responsibility. Copp argues that a collective can have a property even if none of its members has precisely that property (some states are democracies, but no person is a democracy), and that a collective can be blameworthy even if no individual member is. Cases like these might not be likely, but they are possible if, for example, all members voted according to rules, but the result was unfair due to a voting paradox (pp. 379-382). Miller (2007) and Mäkelä (2007) have argued against this position. Seumas Miller's (2007) view is individualistic as he rejects "the ascription of either mental or moral properties to collectives per se" (p. 389), and questions how a collective can have obligations without being an (independent) agent. 8 Pettit discusses this point in detail with his "discursive dilemma" example on pages 181-183. Hess (2014, pp. 209-210) offers an example of 'distributed decision making' where individual choices by many employees in a corporation result in piecemeal modifications during implementation. While each modification is "innocuous and rational enough within its own limited sphere", the end result changes the original commitment of the corporation. 9 His account seems very close to that of Bratman's meshing subplans, but for differences, see Ludwig 2016, p. 247-256. 74 and that, contrary to appearances, it can be reduced to its members. More in detail, he (p. 296) argues that: The appearance that corporations are agents in their own right over and above the individual agents who realize them at any time is generated by a number of factors. Corporations are designed for perpetual existence, that is, they are designed so that their organizational forms can persist through changes in the occupiers of the network of status roles through which its activities are sustained. This gives rise to the appearance that corporations must be agents over and above the individuals who realize them at various times. But in fact, at each time, what we say the corporation does is done by those individuals who pull the levers behind the scenes. What persists is a pattern of status roles (which can evolve over time), but this is merely a matter of successive individuals in those roles being brought under the same designation. Presenting an account of collective agents as agents qua individuals, agents that can act but are not agents in the literal sense, Raimo Tuomela and Pekka Mäkelä (2016, p. 300) argue that the "loci of corporate moral responsibility are the group and its members, their attitudes and actions as group members". More precisely, they (p. 304) argue that because even a we-mode group10 [I]s not a full-blown agent with a biological constitution it is not an intrinsically intentional agent (in the relevant sense). As a group, it can only have extrinsically intentional attitudes and mental states, viz. states that have been constructed for and attributed to it, typically by its members, while its members qua private persons normally are capable of intrinsic intentionality. Analogously, we argue that a group qua group cannot, so to speak, be ''intrinsically'' responsible (in the sense individuals are when acting as private persons) for its activities. The group members are capable of having intrinsically intentional mental states, but, strictly speaking, when functioning as group members they only operate on the basis of their extrinsic mental states deriving from the group's ''mental'' states that are comparable with role states in a theater play. Note that the latter are attributed to the group by the members-via their proposals that are collectively accepted by the members as the group's states. In a corporation, power flows downward: the ones higher up in the hierarchy are responsible for the actions at the lower level, while employees at the lower level are answerable for following the orders given. Employees might not be allowed to change the ethos of the organisation directly, although they might induce a change in the corporation's ethos (p. 312).11 Furthermore (p. 314): 10 In a we-mode group, the members act and think in the we-mode, meaning that they are committed to their collectively accepted goal (Tuomela 2007, pp. 128-134). "Roughly speaking, the we-mode is concerned with groupinvolving states and processes that the group itself has at least partly conceptually and ontologically constructed for itself [e.g. building a bridge]. Acting as a group member in the we-mode sense constitutively involves acting for a collectively constructed group reason-the group gives a group member reasons to think, 'emote,' and act in certain ways." (Tuomela 2007, p. 3). 11 Even then, the shareholders are responsible for such changes, because as operational members they "generally have the ultimate power in a business company that has a linear top-down power structure" according to Tuomela and Mäkelä (2016, p. 312). They continue that an organisation's decisions are generally constituted by its leaders' joint decisions. When it acts, the organisation "performs its actions in virtue of its authorized operatives' actions. The operative members may vary from one occasion and task to another, and they may also include non-member operatives. 75 The ultimate core of an organization is constituted on the one hand by its owners (if it has owners in the legal sense) and on the other hand by the positions that constitute it. The owners determine (often via suitable operative members) the ethos (and thus the general content) of the organization, and the position-holders act to achieve and/or maintain it. Some position-holders may in fact have as their task to reformulate the ethos when that is needed. According to the authors, while a collective that can determine its ethos might not be an agent in the literal sense, it can be regarded as a group agent based on its capacity to act as a unit (Tuomela and Mäkelä 2016, p. 304).12 When contrasted with strongly collectivist positions like that of French, the view put forward represents a somewhat individualist position about what collective responsibility amounts to (for my reservations about putting too much emphasis on the notion of individualism in this context, see chapter six, section 6.1). However, it is not individualist in the same way that Ludwig's account is, as Tuomela and Mäkelä deny that statements about collective agents could be reducible to statements about the individuals. While group decisions are different in nature to those made by individual agents, does this just make collective decisions and actions different from those of individuals acting in isolation, or does it furthermore mean that collectives are moral agents? I do not want to make deep ontological commitments in this thesis about the nature of collective agents or collective intentionality. For my purposes, the crux of the disagreement between holists and individualists is not whether it makes sense to discuss collective agents and to assign certain beliefs and intentions to these collectives, as most of the authors agree on this. Rather, it is about the further step that we should allow that collective agents can bear moral responsibility independently of their members.13 On this issue I side with the individualist camp. I see no reason to muddy the waters of moral agency by trying to make the collective a moral agent, when we have other ways of appreciating the collective context and the constraints that individual member's moral agency operates under. One consideration to support strongly collectivist views could be a systematic failure of some kind where no individual did anything wrong but the end result was bad (like in a voting paradox). If the system was set up in a way that allowed for this, it would need amending and the collective could be said to be responsible for the outcome.14 In that sense a collective such as a corporation Not all operatives need to be group members (cf. hired lawyers, cleaners, truck drivers, etc. appropriately authorized for their respective tasks)." 12 Tuomela (2007, p. 251) argues that a group is not literally (ontologically) an agent, but that we are justified in treating it as an agent, as it is capable of acting and having group attitudes. 13 For example French would agree, while Tuomela and Mäkelä disagree (as do Miller and Mäkelä 2005). 14 Copp's example is a tenure committee at a university that ends up denying tenure for a candidate that should have received it because the voting system utilised delivers sub-optimal results. Miller (2007) has argued against Copp's view that what is at question is the unacceptability of the procedure that cannot deliver a just outcome, not the individual judgement of any of the three tenure commitment members. 76 can be thought to be an agent of sorts, responsible for the outcome, but we do have to try to make them human-like agents in granting them moral agency.15 Note that this is not to deny collective moral obligations or moral responsibility, something I will return to shortly. Kendy Hess (2013) might argue that I am conflating two debates: whether corporations are moral agents and whether they are persons. According to Hess, corporations are moral agents because they can take morally relevant information into account, they are capable of moral action, and they have free will and a first person perspective.16 However, while corporations are sophisticated rational and moral agents, they are not persons. In the account that she defends, even highly the sophisticated level of moral agency of corporations does not entail personhood. The criteria she (pp. 333-334) sets out for personhood is to be valuable and vulnerable: the rational agent paradigm found in much contemporary literature fails to take into account that our vulnerability to certain kinds of mental and bodily experiences is what accounts for protections and rights. "Without the possibility of hunger, humiliation, and hatred, it wouldn't really matter whether a person's property rights were acknowledged, her voice heard, her decisions and bodily integrity respected" (p. 333). She thus concludes that corporations do not have a right to privacy, for example, as it does not need it: it is not vulnerable in the way a person is. I agree with some elements of this argument: I believe that our vulnerabilities are as important for our rights as our value as rational agents (and the dignity and worth that it implies). I also agree with Hess that giving corporations legal personhood in some jurisdictions is neither here nor there, and that corporations do not need the kind of protections traditionally reserved for humans (although I would like to add that on some issues they do, like the right to property). Where we disagree is on the point of corporations as moral agents, over and above being rational agents. Hess thinks that they are both, I argue that they are at most only rational agents. She allows that corporations cannot experience things and that they "can neither feel nor fear hatred" (Hess 2013, p. 334). What kind of a moral agent would this be? Essentially one that can take moral considerations into account but does not understand (feel) them. To me, that sounds like a psychopath.17 When a 15 Furthermore, expecting moral agency from corporations could be thought to be unfair to them. Mäkelä (2007, p. 457) does not deny that certain collectives can qualify as agents, but he denies that it would be fair to hold such collective agents "morally responsible in their own right". While it is true that "collectives opting for collectivized reason may end up with collective judgments that are discontinuous with the individual judgments of their members", these collective agents are always under the control of their individual members, a fact that undermines their autonomy (p. 459). Thus due to their constitution, collective agents are such agents that it necessarily would be unfair to hold them morally responsible in their own right; collective agents do not have the kind of intentional control over their actions that being a morally responsible agent requires (p. 465). 16 She offers a more detailed defence of corporate moral agency in Hess 2014, where the basic argument is that corporations should take moral reasons into account because they can, and are thus moral agents. She utilises arguments by French and Pettit to support her view to argue that corporations are agents, as their beliefs, commitments, actions etc. are not identical to those of their members. 17 Legal theorist Joel Bakan (2004) has famously argued that the corporation of the modern world is a pathological institution. 77 human being is blameworthy, the response we would like to see from them is that of remorse, guilt, shame, apology, maybe compensation etc. When a corporation is blameworthy, we might expect an acceptance of guilt and an apology, maybe compensation, but we do not expect guilt and remorse in the same way we expect them from a blameworthy person. It would make no sense: individuals can feel emotions, corporations cannot.18 What we would expect instead is that the corporations make changes to their structure, procedures, and/or strategy to try to avoid repeating mistakes and causing more harm. Maybe we should make a distinction between moral agency and being able to exhibit moral claims through your conduct. Recall the account of blame as a moral protest from chapter one. Angela M. Smith (2013, p. 47) argues that this account "can help us to think more clearly about which capacities are really necessary in order for a creature to qualify as a morally responsible agent": To morally blame is to protest a moral claim implicit in the conduct of others, and thus it is appropriately directed only at creatures that have the ability to make such claims through their conduct. And having such an ability is, arguably, both necessary and sufficient for being a morally responsible agent. Though there is deep disagreement over which capacities, in particular, one must possess in order to be capable of making "moral claims" through one's conduct, it should be common ground among the parties to these disagreements that having the ability to make such claims is a, if not the, essential condition of morally responsible agency. She does not discuss collective agents, but I think it is an interesting idea to see what this account of blame could mean for understanding collective responsibility. Essentially, I am suggesting that in cases involving collective agents we could distinguish between what one must possess in order to be capable of making moral claims (i.e. moral agency conditions), and what it means to have the ability to exhibit such claims through one's conduct. Only individual moral agents can do the former (as well as being able to do the latter), but I want to argue that also collective agents can do the latter. I suggest that the moral claims collective agents can exhibit through their conduct is an emergent property of the moral claims that the (key) members of the collective make in their roles, combined with the ethos of the organisation. After all, corporations can show huge disregard for health or security, for example, through their actions. Imagine a European corporation that has 18 In contrast, Björnsson and Hess (2017, p. 274) argue that collectives are capable of reactive attitudes, and "if certain collectives are capable of agency, then they are also capable of states sufficiently similar to guilt and indignation to satisfy the requirements of moral agency." What really matters, then, "is not whether corporate agents can be exactly like human agents, but whether they can have the properties required for fully fledged moral agency. [---] Though fully fledged moral agency might well require epistemic and motivational capacities and dispositions associated with reactive attitudes and their phenomenal aspects, we see no reason to think that the purely qualitative aspects of the phenomenology of reactive attitudes matter, or that other things than feelings of guilt and indignation might not serve the requisite epistemic or motivational functions in corporate agents." (p. 288). 78 outsourced its manufacturing to a country with poor labour laws in order to cut costs and that actively ignores calls from activists to look into its supply chain where dangerous working conditions are the norm. Would this not be a case of a corporation not showing moral respect to the workers manufacturing its products? And would it not be appropriate for the workers to blame the corporation and protest the way it treats their health and safety as unimportant, and them as dispensable? Due to socio-political realities, the protest must for the most part be carried out on their behalf by people in countries where governments grant workers or citizens more rights. Still, it seems to me that corporations and other organisations could be argued to be able to manifest the kind of moral claims implicit or explicit in their ethos, related to climate change harms and other issues. I should clarify what I think this means for collective responsibility.19 I have just proposed that although corporations are not capable of making moral claims (and do not meet moral agency conditions), they can nonetheless exhibit moral claims that are implicit or explicit in their ethos through their conduct. This means that the workers are justified in blaming the collective. Furthermore, provided that the blame is indeed justified (and not based on some misunderstanding etc.), the collective has a moral obligation to rectify its conduct accordingly. This obligation starts with the collective and is divided downwards. I will discuss possible options of how a collective obligation can be distributed among its members in the next section, where I will also discuss the effect of hierarchy and roles. Although I disagree with Hess's (2013) ascription of moral agency to corporations, I agree with her that the vulnerabilities of persons are as much constitutive of our personhood as our powers and the root to our entitlement to protection. This is why I agree that corporations can have moral obligations but not moral rights: they do not need them (they can and do of course have legal rights, such as the right to property). Note that when I am arguing against the moral agency of collective agents, my objection is different from that of the sceptic in Deborah Tollefsen's (2003, pp. 226-228) argument. According to Tollefsen, collectives (collective agents) have a capacity for moral address, that is, they can understand moral demands and guide their action in the light of these. Her argument is, very roughly, that this is because we can engage in dialogue with collective agents: we address them, we can file complaints about them, and take them to court. She writes that a sceptic will say that we engage in discussion with collectives only because it is made up of individuals with the capacity for moral address. Tollefsen's argument is that this "fails to understand the complex nature of social institutions, the ways in which authority structures and roles transform individual actions into collective actions, and the distinct properties that arise at the collective level" (p. 228). My argument, 19 Thank you to Holly Lawford-Smith for pushing me to say more about this. 79 in contrast, is that collective agents cannot feel moral arguments, although they can take them into account, and without the pull of moral emotions, an agent cannot be a moral agent. However, I agree with Tollefsen that we can engage in a moral dialogue with corporations, but this is because they can exhibit moral claims. Furthermore, these claims are collective moral claims, i.e. they are not necessarily attributable to any individual members, rather they reflect the collective outcome of individuals' deliberation within their roles and under the influence and within the parameters of the ethos of the collective agent. This is why we can and should discuss collective moral responsibility and the obligations of collective agents. If we grant collective responsibility, what does it mean for individuals? R.S. Downie (1969, pp. 50-51) argues that the moral responsibility of collectives always boils down to the moral responsibility of their members. Hence, collectives are not moral agents by themselves. The way in which the moral responsibility of a collective stems from the moral decisions of its individual members might be complex, but it can be traced in the following three ways: the rules of the collective have been created and accepted by individuals; individuals have decided to act as a member of a collective and therefore carry the responsibilities of the role they've accepted; and, lastly, individuals always bring in their own moral qualities to the collective they are part of. Collectives do not by themselves make moral choices, but individuals within them do. Therefore, collectives are not moral agents but the individuals within them are. While I agree with this last part, what an account like Downie's fails to appreciate is the degree to which individual actions and intentions are shaped by the collective setting. What I have in mind is similar to Larry May's (1987) position that is not strictly individualistic or holistic. May (pp. 9-28) believes that an adequate explanation of the actions of collectives cannot be given just by listing all the individual actions involved. However, he disagrees with French that it is the corporations' decision-making processes that make them real moral agents that can act and be held responsible. After all, corporations could not act without individuals acting; rather, they are able to act through linking all the individual actions together into an "incorporating act". May believes that while it is actually individuals that act, corporations can be held responsible for these incorporating acts and their outcomes. This is linked to how individuals think and act differently within collectives than outside them, how collectives can do things that individuals alone could not, and how the structure and traditions of the collective are important in understanding the ways individuals act within them. Still, even though corporations can be held responsible, only individuals are moral agents. The structure of a group is crucial when it comes to morally appraising its actions and behaviour as it plays such an important role in the actions of the group members (May 1987, pp. 2-3). May (p. 9) argues that we should analyse social groups "as individuals in relationships" because individuals in 80 a group cannot usually be understood as acting in isolation from each other. Corporations consist of people, the relationships between them, and the structures among them. Individual people in corporations are interchangeable with other similarly suited people, individuals are not integral for the corporation. The different relationships in groups affect what individuals within them can do. Relationships enable individuals to act in ways they could not act if alone, thus changing the capacities of individuals. Also, these relationships prevent us from reducing the group's intentions and actions to individual aggregate intentions and actions. (May 1987, pp. 12-17; 180). May thinks that French goes too far, though, when he claims that collective agents have a reality independent of their members. Rather, the relations among the group members have a reality that is different from the individuals; the relationships have a distinct ontological status from the individuals in these relationships. French therefore overstates the case for group morality and confuses the independent reality of relationships with independent group reality. May (p. 23) explains: Social relationships have reality in that they structure or unify a group of individual human persons so that these persons can act and have interests in different ways than they could on their own. In this sense social relationships have a reality which is distinct from individual human persons since the relationships are not themselves reducible to psychological, or other, features of individual human persons. May's argument is that it is individuals who remain the only true moral agents, agents capable of acting. In his view, a collective is not an agent that acts, but rather a process through which actions take place. Actions of individual employees that are within the CID Structure can be said to be corporate actions. The agency of a corporation is thus, according to May, best viewed as event agency. Individual actions and decisions are affected and shaped by the CID Structure in various ways, but the individuals still retain the agency and the ability to change the structure, the course, and the behaviour of the corporation. If enough members agree on a radical change of direction, or a completely new CID Structure, it will happen (within the limits of the law). Corporations cannot ever act without human beings acting, and thus can never be as independent an agent as a human is (who can choose to act alone). Corporate actions are, simply put, very complex arrangements of joint and vicarious actions of individuals. A corporation is thus not a fully-fledged person, its actions are vicarious in nature and its agency greatly restricted. This does not mean that its actions are so restricted that they cannot be assessed in moral terms. A corporation can still be blameworthy of its actions, as it is capable of intentional behaviour. It just means that the corporation is not a moral agent in its own right. (May 1987, pp. 43-45; 65; 87-91). Although May's own view of corporate agents might be instrumentalist, I do not think that there is anything that prevents one from accepting his key points while viewing collective agents as 81 real agents, rather than just as useful fictions.20 In my view, while collective agents do not have a reality independent of their members, their ontological status is distinct from the sum total of their members. It is their ethos especially that sets them apart from the individual role-occupiers. One can adopt this line of argument without making further ontological commitments. To recap, my view is that certain organised collectives such as nation-states, governments, universities, and corporations should be thought of as collective agents, although I deny that they are moral agents. Moral agency belongs to individuals who can make moral claims through their actions, although collectives can display these attitudes as well. Still, the myriad ways that the collective setting affects the actions and decisions that are taken within, for, and by the collective agent, mean that we should view the responsibility of collective agents not just as an aggregate of individual actions and decisions. In many ways, the individual actions and omissions cannot be separated from the incorporation acts and the collective processes that they are a part of. Therefore collective responsibility is a concept that is different from individual responsibility. The way it distributes (or not) is discussed next. 3.2 Collective obligations and distributing collective responsibility In this section, I discuss the notion of collective obligations and what this means for individual members, i.e. if and how collective obligations can distribute to members as individual duties. Collective agents such as governments and corporations hold collective obligations regarding climate change mitigation, adaptation, and compensation. I will argue that these moral obligations do distribute to their members. However, things are different when it comes to unorganised collectives, but I will turn to this question in the next chapter. In this section, I discuss the obligations of collective agents only and the shared responsibility of members of these collective agents. Duties and obligations can be moral or nonmoral or both. An obligation of any type "is grounded in the basic issue of what people should be able to rely on" (Williams 1985, p. 185). Obligations represent what we require to be able to live in a society with one another: "Obligation works to secure reliability, a state of affairs in which people can reasonably expect others to behave in some ways and not in others" (p. 187).21 I do not argue that moral duties automatically trump all 20 Saying that, I believe that it might also be possible to apply what May says about collective responsibility to accounts such as Ludwig's or Bratman's. Bratman (2017, p. 50-51) argues that there can be a procedure-based group intention even in the absence of a corresponding shared intention on the part of the individual members. Thereby we do not have to reduce judgements about the responsibility of the collective to judgements only about the responsibility of each participant. In other words, the procedure-based group intentions could ground attributions of responsibility to the group. Thank you to Bill Wringe for pushing me to explicate my view on this matter. 21 An obligation "tries to produce an expectation that through an expectation of" (Williams 1985, p. 187). 82 other considerations.22 Ethical considerations are not exhausted by obligations and duties, with things like virtues and considerations of welfare and justice also mattering (Williams 1985),23 but I concentrate on them. Collective obligations are, simply put, the obligations held by a collective. With collective agents, the situation is relatively straightforward in that it seems uncontroversial to talk about them having obligations (although it is far less clear what they mean in practice).24 Universities have obligations towards their students and staff, the state has an obligation to protect its citizens, governments have obligations to maintain a certain infrastructure in the country, corporations have obligations towards their shareholders and employees, and so on. It is, of course, another issue what kinds of obligations these entities can be said to have and how far they reach. For example, do states have obligations related only to the negative rights of their citizens, or do they also have obligations related to their positive rights (and does the separation make sense in the first place)? There is also a lot of debate about human rights in this context, with an additional question about if humans have rights, does there have to be a corresponding entity that has matching obligations to realise those rights? I do not think that there has to be, but that is a conversation for another occasion. Some obligations, such as not causing harm and assisting those in need, can be attributed to collective agents in a fairly straightforward manner. With other obligations, complications might arise about the identity of the collective over time, such as with rectifying past harms and keeping promises (Collins and Lawford-Smith 2016).25 What we should note is that while it is not controversial to say that collective agents have obligations, it is a matter of much debate what it means for collectives to have obligations, and what those obligations are, especially in moral matters. Putting aside the question of the scope of collective moral responsibility for now, collective obligations are not dependent on individuals: they hold even when individual role-occupiers change. The university has an obligation to educate its students regardless of who sits on its board of trustees or whom it employs as academic staff. The collective obligation thus "transcends the identities of individuals" (Isaacs 2011, p. 132). It is, however, not as simple a matter as professors, lecturers, and other staff fulfilling the university's collective obligation by teaching. Collective obligations do not straightforwardly dictate the requirements of individual role-occupiers, and the obligations of individuals within the organisational context are not exhausted by their role-requirements: the 22 Williams (1985) argues that practical necessity is not peculiar to ethics or to obligations, and furthermore that we should reject the maxim "that only an obligation can beat an obligation" (p. 187). 23 I therefore utilise the terms "morality" and "moral philosophy" in a different way than Williams does; I do not associate them with only moral obligations and demands about a certain untainted voluntariness of an individual's actions, things that he argues against. Rather, I utilise the terms in a looser way that would more fit his idea of the realm of ethics. 24 There is a lot of debate on, for example, what is the relation of individual and collective obligation (e.g. Copp 2007 and Miller 2007). 25 Is it psychological descent, or physical continuity, and so on. 83 requirements of some roles are more well-defined than others (p. 133). Therefore, while it is relatively clear to list the duties of a university porter, it will be less easy to specify how a dean of a faculty fulfils her duties, role-requirements, dictated by the collective obligation. As Isaacs (p. 134) notes, "[t]he more responsibility one has within the collective, the less obvious the specifics are of what one is required to do and how one is required to do it."26 Importantly, the roles that come with more latitude and less clarity about the role-related duties, are according to Isaacs (p. 134) also "precisely the roles that are likely to be most directly responsive to the collective's obligations." Those in power are in a better position to ensure that the collective acts as it ought. This point is very like the claim [--] that those in positions of power in an organization carry a heavier burden of responsibility as individuals because the structures of the organization expand the range of their powers as individuals. We see a notable asymmetry between the more powerful and less powerful roles within an organized collective. To the extent that the manner in which one is to carry out one's role is less defined and as one's power increases, the scope of personal choice within the role also increases. This increase in latitude at the level of personal choice lends further weight to the claim [--] that persons in positions of power ought to be considered more responsible than those who work in the mailroom when an organization fulfills or fails to fulfill its obligations. In the context of collective obligation, individuals' obligations intensify when they have more power and more room for personal choice with respect to how they fulfill their roles. Collective actions require the actions of individuals, and certain individuals are in a better position than others to direct the actions of the collective and to see that the collective's intentional actions are consistent with its obligations as a collective. This is not to say that people in positions of lesser power cannot interfere in significant ways with the fulfillment of collective obligations. Certainly, someone in the payroll office can wreak havoc. But the nature of their duties is clear, so deviations from them are also clear. (Isaacs 2011, p. 134). Thereby "rather than disappearing against the background of collective obligation, individual obligation can take on a heightened importance [because] a collective context empowers and authorizes some individuals so that they can achieve outcomes that they could not otherwise achieve" (p. 135). The relationship of collective obligations and individual role-duties is thus not straightforward even in a collective that fits agency conditions. According to Isaacs, there is also another reason why roles cannot fully capture the relationship between collective and individual obligation: the collective roles could have been set in an amoral way. Isaacs's (p. 136) example is that of a Nazi concentration camp, where the collective context in which actions of individual role-occupiers takes place "increases the range of morally relevant descriptions that apply to an individual's action". She writes that while within the context of their roles the camp worker's may have been doing exactly what was expected of them, but "the collective within which they were functioning in their roles was not just failing to meet its collective moral 26 This could increasingly be the case as automatisation continues to change the nature of many jobs, with robots performing routine tasks. 84 obligations, it was positively violating them in a way that even relatively powerless participants could reasonably be expected to know." There is definitely truth in this, but I worry that Isaacs oversimplifies collective obligations by straightforwardly accepting them to encompass moral considerations. While concentration camps were undeniably evil collective structures, and officials attending to them were acting in deeply unethical ways, most cases are nowhere near this obvious. It is not controversial to claim that collective agents have obligations linked to the purpose they were set up for, but how far their moral commitments extend is a more contested issue. In other words, while collective obligations as such are not contested, collective moral obligations are less straightforward. I do not mean to argue that they do not ever exist ― they do ― but what would be a collective moral obligation of a concentration camp? Such a thing would be an oxymoron and amount to the collective not existing or at least not operating. My point is that collective obligations can be non-moral or even amoral, and when we encounter amoral collectives the ethical pressure, the collective obligation to stop them, for example, comes not from within that collective, but from outside it. Perhaps a better example could be a government agency that serves to oppress its citizens like in a dictatorship. Even then, this blending of moral and other obligations confuses the debate. Take Isaacs's treatment of whistleblowing. According to her (p. 136), "[w]hen a collective has obligations that are not being met, this failure shapes and alters the obligations of individual members as members of the collective". Therefore whistleblowing or something similar might be required (p. 137): When the collective is acting as it ought, individuals who are performing their role-related duties as specified by their job descriptions are doing their part in making sure that the collective meets its moral obligations. Further action is required only when something goes wrong. This may lead some to say that whistle-blowing, or doing anything that takes one beyond the dictates of one's role to ensure that collective moral obligations are fulfilled, is supererogatory. That is, some might claim that actions of this kind are morally laudable, but not required, because they go beyond moral obligation and enter into the realm of the heroic. One reason for not making this claim is that by continuing to do one's job in conditions of collective moral failing, one knowingly contributes to morally wrongful collective action. These contributions themselves are morally wrong. It is morally required, not supererogatory, to cease acting in a morally wrong way. Thus, we may conclude that collective moral obligations sometimes alter the obligations of individual members of organizations beyond the dictates of the members' organizational roles. The source of the moral obligation might be the collective, but it need not be, as it might be something outside of it as well. Let us say that a whistleblower reveals widespread corruption at an institution. It would sound strange to say that the institution is the source for requiring the whistleblower to do as she does. Rather, the source could be the wider professional peer-group and 85 their ethical standards (like those of doctors or lawyers), or it could originate from the wider moral community. This is in contrast to what Isaacs argues (p. 138): It might seem obvious and facile to say that individuals, qua individuals, are obligated not to participate in morally reprehensible collective goals. My specific claim is that the individual obligation is significantly mediated by the collective obligation not to engage in the collective wrongdoing. This points us back to the earlier discussion about the moral qualities that individual behavior inherits when it is undertaken as part of a collective endeavor. Individuals' actions in these collective undertakings do not have the moral character they have in the absence of the larger collective scheme of which they are a part. This brings us close to our other question, namely about whether these collective obligations and responsibility distribute to individuals within the collective? This warrants an exploration also, especially in relation to how and in what way they might be distributed. In organised collectives with clear role definitions executive roles "are defined by their authority to make or contribute to key organizational decisions", whereas employees whose positions are delineated in terms of tasks have less influence as they mostly carry out the daily business of the organisation necessitated by its structures, policies, and the decisions taken by executives (Isaacs 2011, pp. 104-105). The question of whether an individual act can be described as contributing to a collective act will centre on how in line with their role the individual member's act was. If the action or decision taken was in line with the role requirements and demands, then the act can be attributed to the collective as a part of a collective act. If you go rogue, however, you bear individual responsibility, just as I mentioned already in the previous section. These kind of cases that might look like cases of collective responsibility, but are not, should be set aside. The further and more important question is: what is the responsibility of the individual when their act was in line with the role demands? If a corporate act resulted in an oil spill, is an individual employee responsible for an oil spill to some degree at least? In less organised collectives with less institutional features, is collective responsibility the responsibility of all individuals? It is these kinds of questions that this section and the coming chapters seeks to answer. The notion of collective responsibility is sometimes wrongly lumped together with notions like non-distributability and strict liability. When it comes to non-distributability, H.D. Lewis (1948) famously argued that the whole notion of collective responsibility is barbaric, as it allows one person to be held responsible for the actions of someone else. May's (1987, pp. 82-83) response is that this is a category mistake, as real collective responsibility does not make anyone individually responsible; it makes the group responsible. While judgements of collective moral responsibility might make us want to evaluate the responsibility of individuals for their contributions, individuals qua individuals are still not blameworthy for collective actions (Isaacs 2011, p. 60). Those who worry that collective 86 moral responsibility requires holding people responsible for the actions of others fail to realise that "a collective can be responsible without all of its members being responsible" (p. 61), which brings us to strict liability. Strict liability does not differentiate between group members and it does not take into account their varying contributions to the outcome. Feinberg (1970) argues that collective responsibility is a form of strict liability, as it involves non-distributive responsibility, and the group's responsibility cannot be understood by just understanding its members' individual responsibility. However, May (1987, pp. 82-106) argues that Feinberg fails to see that this lack of reducibility does not render individual contributions unimportant. May admits that Feinberg is right in saying that collective responsibility does weaken the contributory fault in the sense that collective responsibility can be assigned to a group even when not every member is at fault. However, collective responsibility does not automatically translate to individual responsibility for every member of the collective, so therefore the fault condition is not significantly weakened. Recall how people have different roles and how they come with different amounts of latitude and power. Isaacs (2011, p. 62) argues that the responsibility of each member could vary: [A]n often overlooked fact is that the collective and its members are not responsible for the same act. Whereas a collective is responsible for the collective act, individual members are responsible for their contributions, and the degree of their responsibility will depend, in part, on the extent to which they share in the collective's goals and act with a view to participating in bringing those goals about. Members of goal-oriented collectives, therefore, are much more likely to be morally implicated in collective wrongdoing because, in at least some of these cases, a commitment to the collective goal and action together with others to achieve that goal is a fundamental part of what it means to be a member of the collective at all. This does not hold true for membership in organizations, particularly in large organizations and particularly for people occupying lower level roles in the organizational hierarchy. Collective responsibility rises out of joint action where members contribute to the actions of others, and there is no reason why specific individual contributions could not be taken into account when assessing responsibility for collective action. I now turn to more forward-looking cases where the collective agents hold obligations. In these cases, how is responsibility distributed within collective agents? In what follows, I will adopt the useful distinction made by Lawford-Smith (2012, pp. 460-463) about four different ways in which obligations of collective agents distribute to their members, depending on what kind of collective good is at stake: Incremental good: When a collective has an obligation to φ, every individual member of the collective has an obligation to take a capacity-relative share in fulfilling (pursuing) the obligation. 87 Joint necessity: When a collective has an obligation to φ, every individual member of the collective has an obligation to take a capacity-relative share in fulfilling the obligation, unless she has the reasonable belief that at least one other member of the collective will not take a capacity-relative share in fulfilling the obligation. Threshold good: When a collective has an obligation to φ, every individual member of the collective has an obligation to take a capacity-relative share in fulfilling the obligation, unless she has the reasonable belief that sufficiently many other members of the collective will take a capacity-relative share such that the collective obligation will be fulfilled. Threshold good with harm: When a collective has an obligation to φ, every individual member of the collective has an obligation to take a capacity-relative share in fulfilling the obligation, unless she has the reasonable belief that sufficiently many other members of the collective will take a capacity-relative share in fulfilling the obligation so that her own contribution would be detrimental to the collective obligation being fulfilled. To flesh these out, I will come up with examples of each. The collective obligation is about an incremental good when each contribution by an individual member makes things a little bit better (provided that the collective outcome in question is fixed in scope and each contribution is an incremental advance towards it). Imagine a project initiated by a local school to get each member of the parents' association to donate a book to fill the near-empty school library that is very modest in size. These parents bear a collective obligation to fill the library with books and each book improves the school library. The distribution of burdens is simple: individual members should do their fair share, unrelated to what their beliefs are about others doing theirs, as each individual contribution counts and makes things better and brings the collective obligation (library full of books) closer to being met. Incremental good is the only type of situation where the distributed obligation is not conditional on beliefs about what others are doing, as every individual member of the collective has an obligation to take a capacity-relative share in fulfilling the obligation. In contrast, in cases of joint necessity, the collective good can only be attained if every member of the collective does their share. No individual member can realise the collective outcome by herself or make an incremental contribution to it by acting in isolation. It takes a crew to sail a ship. To be precise, in my example it takes 77 officers and crew members to sail a large ship that could rescue a passenger that fell off the ship a while earlier. The passenger was taking a morning walk on the deck and due to a faulty railing fell in the sea while looking at dolphins. No-one saw the accident, and the missing passenger and faulty railing were noticed only a few hours later when the ship had already docked. The passenger is hanging onto a piece of driftwood with some help from his new dolphin buddies, waiting to be rescued. Other ships are too far to reach the scene in time, and no other 88 potential sailors are available so all 77 company members must sacrifice their free day at the beach to be able to help. If one of the crew members operating the sails believes that none of the other crew members (or even just one other crew member) are willing to give up their day off, then she is unable to do her share in the rescue. In joint necessity it is not the case that every little helps: others have to get on board as well. When it comes to the level of the individual, every member of the collective has an obligation to take a capacity-relative share in fulfilling the obligation, unless she has the reasonable belief that at least one other member of the collective will not take a capacity-relative share in fulfilling the obligation. The collective obligation will be either met or not met accordingly. Threshold good is similar to the above case in that an individual cannot on her own do her share, but now there are more members available than is required in the minimum scenario. To use the same example again, in this version it still takes a minimum of 77 officers and crew members to sail the ship, but 100 company members are at the beach. It is sufficient that 77 forgo their day off to save the drowning man, so there are 23 members who could stay at the beach, but who could also participate in the collective action. Maybe having a full crew would make things easier on the others, as the ship usually sails with all 100, so it would lessen the burden on any individual company member. So maybe the 23 ought to contribute for that reason, but the important thing is meeting the threshold, i.e. that at least 77 contribute so that the collective action necessary to save the drowning man can be realised. Therefore, from the point of view of an individual member thinking about her obligation, she should contribute unless she knows that a sufficient number of other members will. Sarah is swimming at the beach, hears about the missing passenger, runs to get her sailing gear on, but upon returning sees that 81 members of her company are already ready and about to board the ship. In this case, she acted according to her duties: she was going to contribute, as every individual member of the collective has an obligation to take a capacity-relative share in fulfilling the obligation (unless she has the reasonable belief that sufficiently many other members of the collective will take a capacity-relative share such that the collective obligation will be fulfilled). The situation altered while she was getting ready, so that it is no longer necessary for her to be part of the rescue effort, as enough crew have already joined. Perhaps she should still join to make it less taxing on the others, but the duty is different. Finally, in cases involving a threshold good with harm there is again a surplus of members who could contribute, but additional contributions would not help the cause, but instead hinder it. Let us make the ship different: it still needs 77 company members to sail, but any additional ones will make the ship sail at a considerably slower pace, so that they might not make it in time for the rescue. In this case, as with joint necessity and threshold good, the obligation of each individual member is conditional. Namely, in cases of threshold good with harm she should contribute and take a capacityrelative share in fulfilling the obligation, as long as she does not have the reasonable belief that 89 sufficiently many others are contributing so that her own contribution would cause harm, i.e. push the collective action over the threshold and cause harm. Note that in all but the first case the way the obligation distributes to individual members of the collective agent depends on what others are doing, or more precisely, what we believe that they are doing. "The reason the obligation has to distribute conditional upon beliefs is that there is no action that every member of the collective must actually perform. Some must act, but others must refrain from acting" (Lawford-Smith 2012, p. 462). This does not mean, however, that we are off the hook as long as we reasonably believe that others are not going to do their part, i.e. that the required collective action will not materialise. Regardless of what other members will or will not do, our individual duty remains to either do our part or to reasonably believe that such an action would be futile, as others are not doing theirs. We thus stay alert in a sense. Thereby, unless the collective good is incremental, members of collective agents need to be sensitive to what others will do in order to fulfil the individual obligations that devolve to them (Lawford-Smith 2012, p. 462). Sean Aas (2015, pp. 4-7) has argued that Lawford-Smith's condition on beliefs is both too strong and too weak to capture member obligation. Instead, the doxastic condition should be relaxed to the absence of a belief that others will not do their part, to account for cases where we do not know what others will do (or are likely to do). Additionally, the members should be willing to take action if they become sufficiently certain that other members will do their part, i.e. the members should have the right motivation. I will return to this point in the next chapter with unorganised collectives, as I believe it is more pertinent to questions about their responsibility, rather than that of collective agents. When it comes to collective agents, fulfilling Lawford-Smith's doxastic condition is usually not too taxing, as these collectives are not that diffuse (or at least their parts that the individuals are members of: teams, offices, departments etc.), unlike the collectives that Aas is mostly concerned with. However, I will adopt the amendment that individuals should be willing to act, so the alertness requirement should encompass both being sensitive to what others do and being ready and willing to act if necessary. While Lawford-Smith discusses these categories using examples of small, relatively egalitarian collective agents (the standard subjects in social ontology), I will apply them also to larger and more hierarchical collective agents, such as corporations. With more egalitarian collective agents, such as small businesses, the obligations will distribute along the lines of the original examples. What I suggest is that when the collective agent grows in size and complexity there will be other factors that come into play but that it does not dilute the central idea of, for example, a threshold good (i.e. that a member must act unless enough other members already do). I will return to the complications shortly when I will make a caveat about the content of a collective obligation. 90 I should also make it clear that my view is that even if all the members would be excused from doing their part (for example, all can reasonably believe that others are not doing their share so action at the individual level is futile), it only excuses the individuals, not the collective agent. In other words, the collective obligation does not disappear. Instead, the collective agent should look into other ways of meeting its obligation, or another occasion if the excuses of individuals were merely temporal (i.e. an accumulation of bad luck from the point of view of the collective). Stepping away from collective agents for a moment, climate change in its totality presents a case of threshold good, i.e. individual agents cannot on their own do their share, but there are more agents available than is necessary to secure the common good (stable enough climate).27 This is the overall picture of climate change harm, the all-things-considered viewpoint. The agents who could and should contribute include not just individuals but also collective agents of all kinds. Not everyone has to contribute to respond adequately to climate change (assuming that it is not too late already), but many do. Every individual agent within the collective of humans and the collective agents created by them should try to secure the common good, unless the agent has the reasonable belief that sufficiently many other members of the collective are already taking sufficient action to secure the collective good. Note that I am not arguing that humanity plus the collective agents created by them (let us call this humanity+) forms a collective agent. I am only arguing that humanity+ has a collective good (stable enough climate) at stake that can be saved from destruction only through collective action. The obligation is to save the stable enough climate and to do so, there has to be enough agents willing to take action together. For constituents of unorganised collectives, the relevant individual duties would be interdependent (I will discuss these kinds of duties in chapter five). At the present moment in history, no agent could argue that they can reasonably believe that enough others are already doing their share to mitigate climate change, any more than adapt or compensate. Every agent should thus take a capacity-relative share in securing that goal. What about the obligations of collective agents then (within humanity+)? What category they fall under depends on the agent and what they have done (or have omitted doing) so far. I will make no attempt to present a detailed account of what obligations different collective agents might have in relation to climate change and how these distribute to individual members, as that would be a thesis in its own right. Instead, I will only suggest that in most cases related to climate change responsibility of a collective agent, we are talking about threshold good at the first instance. This is because if the collective agent is not doing enough, or not doing anything, to respond to the climate change challenge, then it is up to individual members within that collective to get the ball rolling, so 27 Why climate change is not an incremental harm will be discussed in section 5.1. 91 to speak. Not everyone has to act, but enough have to take action to make the necessary changes to ways of working.28 When it comes to nation-states, I also agree with Lawford-Smith (2016a, p. 80) that in order for lasting and stable political change we usually need a bottom-up approach, rather than top-down. That is, governments and politicians usually need strong political support from their voters before they can implement large-scale changes, such as those that are required with climate change. This, once again, brings us back to the individual level and the responsibility we share as members of collectives (in this case, as citizens of nation-states). A caveat is in order. With threshold goods, every individual member has an obligation to take a capacity-relative share in fulfilling the obligation, but how to define what this share is if the collective agent has not decided on a particular strategy? After all, the outcome of the corporate agent helping to mitigate climate change can be satisfied in multiple ways, such as reducing emissions, investing in offsetting or green energy, and so on.29 Let us say that given the position of the corporation, or other collective agent in question, all these options are equally good. That is, they require an equal amount of effort and resources and produce similar enough results. Let us further stipulate that the collective agent is both engaged in significantly non-carbon neutral activities and it has the means to act differently. In a case like this, it is not obvious what course of action should be taken at the collective level, but it is still (relatively) clear that some course of mitigation action should be chosen. In a hierarchical collective agent, such as a corporation, there will be key individuals who should set the ball rolling. In most cases, these individuals will be those who hold executive positions. But if these people fail to do what they should, I want to argue that some capacity-relative obligation still falls on the other members. Recall that with threshold goods, when a collective has an obligation to φ, every individual member of the collective has an obligation to take a capacity-relative share in fulfilling the obligation, unless she has the reasonable belief that sufficiently many other members of the collective will take a capacity-relative share such that the collective obligation will be fulfilled. Now, when the collective has not decided what strategy in particular it will take to address its obligation to help mitigate climate change, it should be quite clear to any member that the collective obligation is unlikely to be 28 In some very small collectives, like a business consisting of three people, it will be enough if one member takes action to initiate the changes, but in sizeable collective agents, more than one member is needed. It could mean just a handful of members, maybe even just two or three, or it could mean that hundreds or even thousands of people need to get together. It all depends on the actual situation, including the size and type of the collective agent in question (a middle-sized company, a large international organisation, a government, a small university, and so on and so forth). It also depends on the individual members who take the lead: what is their position? What are their personal qualities? How much power do they have within the collective? Etc. 29 I owe this example to Holly Lawford-Smith, who pushed me to say more about what taking up a capacityrelative share actually might mean in a climate change case and other such "non-obvious cases", i.e. cases not involving small-scale egalitarian group agents. 92 fulfilled.30 They could plausibly demand those in charge to set the strategy and if they do not respond, make the issue known inside the collective (possibly outside it as well to add to the pressure). This would, at this stage, be all that could be demanded of the non-executive members, because in large, hierarchical, non-egalitarian collective agents the content of the collective obligation must be settled before individuals can go about filling taking care of their share. Alternatively, it must be obvious enough, and something that can be started incrementally, so that a group of members can initiate action, thereby making it the de facto choice. Before the content of the obligation is set, the members can only have an obligation to do what they can to make it so that the content of the obligation is set in a sufficient way and within an adequate timeframe. In addition, depending on exactly how hierarchical the collective is, there might also be some members who are completely excluded from having a capacity-related share, for example, members who are relegated to the margins and have little or no real power in terms of their roles. If and when a collective agent has a plan of action in place regarding what is feasible and possible for it to do in response to climate change mitigation (or adaptation and compensation), then the collective obligation can take the form of any of the four types introduced above. In these cases we are also less likely to encounter the problem described in the previous paragraph (I am assuming that the collective agent has done the planning properly and particular roles have been delegated to individuals, thus helping to define a member's part). What the obligation is and how it distributes to individual members depends on the kind of action that is required and on what kind of a collective good is at stake, as well as on the hierarchy and roles within the collective agent in question. If, for example, a collective agent has delegated its obligation to take meaningful mitigation action to a particular team, then the only capacity-relative share that remains for the other members outside that team is to keep an eye on things to the extent that they see that progress is being made (it will fall on executives to ensure that enough progress is made). Maybe the only positive thing about the current climate situation is that, because there is so much to do, there is a lot to choose from in trying to meet one's individual duty as a member of a collective. If the situation changes and climate change becomes the priority it should be, the room for individual manoeuvre to meet one's duty narrows. As Isaacs (2011, p. 47) points out, "The closer the group gets toward meeting its goal, the more constrained will be the options to contribute for the individual who intends to participate in the realization of the group's goal." 30 A further complication would be do the members even know that the collective agent has such an obligation? For the sake of simplicity, I will assume here that the collective agent operates in an environment where it is widely acknowledged that all actors should do what they feasibly can to mitigate climate change, but there are no legal framework or enforcement measures in place. 93 A harm can occur without anyone acting in the wrong way and this is what Isaacs (pp. 99-100) argues is happening with climate change; climate change is a collective harm resulting from "the cumulative impact of parallel individual actions" but it is not the result of wrongdoing on the part of a collective agent. When a collective agent performs a collective action that violates a moral principle, then that action constitutes a collective wrongdoing, i.e. the wrongdoing of a collective agent. However, she argues that this is not the case with climate change (p. 100): [H]umanity's environmental impact on the world is surely harmful. However, it would be a conceptual stretch to claim that it is the work of a collective agent. I draw particular attention to the difference between collective wrongdoing and collective or cumulative harms, because running these together creates confusion when we are attempting to decipher the relationship between individual responsibility and collective wrongdoing. In situations in which collective agency is absent, moral responsibility, if present at all, resides only at the level of individuals. Many cases of cumulative harm have this character-the harm itself occurs only because of the actions of a number of people. Individual contributions to it, taken on their own, might involve no or negligible harm. Environmental harm such as that which has resulted in climate change might be viewed in this way. She thus allow that climate change is a problem that requires a collective solution (as it is a collective or cumulative harm), but denies that it is a collective wrongdoing (as collective agency is required for a collective wrongdoing). While climate change is for a large part the result of the cumulative impact of parallel individual actions, and there certainly is a lot of harm being created collectively, is it really the case that it is purely a case of cumulative harm? I find this implausible. Collectives such as ExxonMobil have arguably also engaged in collective wrongdoing by lobbying against mitigation policy, as I will discuss in the next section. This kind of wrongdoing has (indirectly at least) contributed to the lack of effective mitigation in the United States, maybe also globally, thus causing very serious harm. Many other corporations have engaged in similar lobbying activities, and the think tanks and research institutions they have done this through are also collective agents. Furthermore, innumerable collective agents that could have been more active in mitigation by reducing their own emissions have not done so, arguably causing harm as result. At the very least, they have failed to prevent harm. Examples of such collective agents are not limited to corporations, but include all collective agents that have failed to take adequate action, be they universities, governments, sports clubs, or whatever. Still, saying all of this, it is true that climate change harm considered in its (vast) totality cannot be claimed to be a work of collective agents alone or a collective wrongdoing in the sense that Isaacs employs the term. Climate change is thus best described as a blend of collective wrongdoings and cumulative harm. 94 3.3 Manufacturing doubt I will round off the discussion on collective agents with a case study regarding their responsibility in relation to climate change. While it is obvious that big corporations will have to come on board if global mitigation efforts are to be successful, it is less obvious that they should have further obligations in addition to being made to co-operate through legislation. Legislation, combined with appropriate enforcement measures, is usually the most effective way when it comes to any largescale environmental policy change, but my focus is not on this. Granted that many corporations are huge emitters, are we talking only about opportunities for them to become involved in mitigation efforts, or can we also state that they have a responsibility to do so? I am concerned with the content of corporate obligation: what can corporations be held responsible for and what are the limits to their responsibility? Talking about the responsibility of a corporation to clean up after an oil spill or mining accident, for example, is common, but what exactly is corporate responsibility and does it have a moral aspect? While the accounts given in the business ethics literature do not necessarily differentiate between moral and legal responsibility, and the terminology is used in many ways, it seems that the general idea is to acknowledge that there exists responsibility that the corporation has in addition to simply following the existing rule of law in relation to its actions (Waddock 2004; Werhane 2008, pp. 270271). This responsibility can include many things depending on the account given, from taking its duties towards shareholders seriously (not taking unnecessary business risks) to how the corporation treats its employees (dealing promptly with bullying at the workplace), or how its products affect the environment. Laws appeals to fundamentally moral notions that cannot be reduced to legal terms. Bowie (2013, p. 3) argues that the law therefore "frequently requires corporate conduct to adhere to broad open-ended standard of morality." It is also worth noting that while the law may assign corporations legal personhood, this is not the same as to treat the corporate entity as a moral agent. Linked to section 3.1, I argue that while corporations can be the appropriate target of blame, the moral agency belongs to individual members of them, whether employees or shareholders. If we talk about prospective (forward-looking) responsibility, for example, ensuring that the current and future activities of a corporation are as carbon-neutral or climate-friendly as possible, corporate responsibility that includes some mitigation efforts does not seem too controversial an idea (Hormio 2017a, p. 321). Today, climate change is generally accepted as a global threat, certainly at the scientific and the UN level. There, of course, remain lingering doubts about the issue and sceptical views by lobbyists influence the public opinion. It is easier to grab onto any news that refutes the reality of climate change, as we would all want climate change to just go away. Sadly, the 95 science is close to unanimous at this point: anthropogenic climate change is happening and it is a real threat to us (IPCC, 2014). We should not confuse opinion polls with scientific reality. Anthropogenic climate change has been conceptualised as human rights issue, threatening, for example, the right to life (Caney 2010). The UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution in 2008 stating that "climate change poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to people and communities around the world and has implications for the full enjoyment of human rights." Based on the scale of the threat that climate change poses to human rights alone, I think it is difficult to argue why corporate responsibility should not encompass climate change mitigation when it comes to planning future corporate activities. It would be very reckless not to do so. With the overwhelming scientific consensus and the severity of the threat, the precautionary principle alone should suffice for climate change mitigation to be incorporated into CSR strategies (Hormio 2017a, p. 321). However, this should still be done within the limits of the wider society. In the absence of a binding international emissions treaty and an effective global system, individual corporations can only do so much and the responsibility for creating these falls on nation-states. Emissions treaties and legislation change the business environment, making it more feasible for corporations to invest in clean technology and other mitigation techniques despite the additional costs. Naturally there will be big differences between companies and corporations in terms of the resources and capacities they have to go beyond the minimum (Hormio 2017a, p. 322). In this way their abilities will, to some degree, affect their obligations. Obligations should be something that there is a corresponding capability to fulfil. Arguably a successful business can, for example, afford to compensate their employees more than a business that is just getting by. In the same way, if we have a corporation that has the financial ability to go carbon neutral and such a move would not be detrimental to its competitiveness, then arguably it should do so. This is especially so if its core stakeholders support such a move, although even then we have to keep in mind the wider system that it operates within. My conversation so far has concentrated on what corporations should do from now on; on responsibility to do with the obligation to do something, rather than on responsibility attached to past wrongdoing and making up for that. Can corporations be held morally blameworthy for their past activities and decisions that have contributed to anthropogenic climate change? I believe the answer is in most cases "no" (Hormio 2017a, p. 324). Responsibility to contribute to mitigation efforts based on historical emissions from before the 1970s would either fall within the discretionary category or at least be limited to some degree. First of all, there is the question of adequate knowledge about the issue, about when climate change became general knowledge and the scientific consensus emerged, and the time before the 1970s is well before this time. Second of all, corporations and other businesses before the 1970s were operating in an environment where effectively engaging in 96 climate change mitigation would have been outside their sphere of influence, although there are naturally big differences between corporations over what steps they have taken towards greener business practices. The technology might not have been there yet, or the necessary knowledge, maybe the businesses could not have responded to the developing scientific consensus quickly enough, or costs would have been prohibitive. What to say about the time period between the 1970s and 2000 is trickier, as the scientific consensus was building up and the threat of climate change was discussed by politicians. What is clear is that the landscape has changed a great deal in the past decade or so, making recent inactivity arguably impermissible, so there should probably be some sort of a sliding scale of retrospective responsibility from the 1970s to the current day. Even if we had a suitable sliding scale in place, the full responsibility for contributing to emissions does not fall on the corporations who have done the emitting (Hormio 2017a, pp. 324325). These emissions are part of wider social patterns, such as available infrastructure and technology, political inactivity, international power issues, consumer culture, and so forth. Thereby, while completely ignoring the effects your products and services have on the climate has not been acceptable for a few decades, some limitations always apply to corporate responsibility regarding past emissions. While 63% of worldwide industrial CO2 and methane emissions from 1751 to 2010 can be traced back to just 90 entities, they cannot be held solely accountable for them. Due to the combined failures of nearly all of the actors in the system to act together, the moral blameworthiness for these past emissions cannot fall on the corporations alone: the failure to take sufficient action to curb greenhouse gas emissions is embedded in the system. I believe that here is an exception to this general rule, however (Hormio 2017a, p. 325). Corporations such as ExxonMobil have been actively engaged in climate change lobbying. Corporate-funded agnotology has played a big part in delaying effective climate change mitigation action, especially in the U.S. where climate change scepticism is still widespread among the public. For example, recent nationwide data (Howe et al., 2015) shows that while a growing majority of Americans (63%) now believe that climate change is real, only 47% believe that it is anthropogenic.31 This manufacturing of ignorance is the result of effective and organised lobbying campaigns. While in the beginning the focus was on denying the credibility of the science, these days it seems to be on denying the urgency of taking any meaningful mitigation action. The myths debunked many times over keep reappearing in new white papers masked as credible science (Nuccitelli 2016), and 'sceptical' views on green energy policies are sometimes even backed by noteworthy academic 31 The same study shows that only 42% of Americans believe that the majority of scientists think that global warming is happening. In reality, 97% or more of actively publishing climate scientists agree that global warming over the past century is extremely likely due to human activities. The greater the climate expertise among those surveyed, the higher the consensus on human-caused global warming, going up as far as 100%, see Cook et al. (2016). 97 institutions that receive a lot of money from the fossil fuel industry in return (Franta and Supran 2017). In the age of the internet, the propaganda of the climate change denialists is easily accessible to anyone online, and impacts negatively on the quality of the debate in other countries as well. Historians of science, Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, carefully reconstruct what went on behind the scenes in many lobbyist-generated media storms about science in their 2010 book Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming. The book covers misinformation campaigns from acid rain and the ozone hole to tobacco's links to cancer, and spans four decades, during which the same names keep cropping up. The case study that is of most interest here is the one directed against climate change science. Tobacco industry tactics were employed to spread misinformation about climate change and to give the public the impression that a scientific debate was still ongoing. Due to efficient public relations campaigns, the media began to act as if it was a matter of giving equal weight to arguments from both sides, even though one "side" consisted only of a handful of largely industry-funded scientists. This fringe minority group raised concerns against an overwhelming majority of evidence gathered by everyone else. The goal was to manufacture doubt and buy time – and it worked. It is a common misconception that climate science or even climate policy is something very new. While anthropogenic climate change might not have entered the mainstream public consciousness until the past two to three decades or so, the science dates back to the 19th century and climate change raised interest among politicians in the United States already in the 1960s. President Lyndon Johnson mentioned the effect carbon dioxide and fossil fuels have had on the global atmosphere to Congress in 1965, after having read a report prepared by Roger Revelle. Earlier that year, the President's Science Advisory Committee had asked Revelle, who worked as the director of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, to write about the impacts that carbon dioxide potentially has on the global climate. (Oreskes and Conway 2010, 170-171). Charles David Keeling, a researcher at Scripps, had been measuring carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere continuously since 1958 and he showed that the concentration was rising steadily roughly relative to the amount of fossil fuel burned. The data gathered would later become known as the Keeling Curve. The measurement has been taken at the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii ever since, with Keeling's son Ralph taking over the supervision after his father passed away, providing the longest continuous data on CO2 concentration.32 An example of an influential policy paper that contributed to the political inertia around climate change in the U.S. was the 1983 report Changing Climate: Report of the Carbon Dioxide Assessment Committee by the National Research Council. It gave the politicians the feeling that instead of prompt 32 See scripps.ucsd.edu/programs/keelingcurve/2013/04/03/the-history-of-the-keeling-curve. 98 action and tough decisions, all they needed to do was to fund more research. It comprised of five chapters written by natural scientists and two by economists. The chapters by the natural scientists concluded that human activities had increased carbon dioxide concentration and this would affect ecosystems, the weather, and agriculture. The rapid accumulation of CO2 was seen as a problem and trying to control it through mitigation efforts was the solution. The economists, however, had a different message: we should not do much other than wait and see. The assumption in their models was that serious changes were far off enough to be discountable. The synthesis of the report concentrated on the economists' message and largely ignored the natural scientists. (Oreskes and Conway 2010, 174-183). To discount future utility is a standard practice in economics, but it is problematic applied to climate change policies and other very long-term issues, as it makes normative assumptions, such as future generations being considerably better off than us and natural capital being substitutable by other forms of capital (Hormio 2017b, pp. 104-106). The growth optimism inherent in discounting is made especially problematic by the possibility of a runaway climate change scenario. In any case, side-lining the concerns of the natural scientists in the synthesis report used by policymakers was not accidental, but part of a larger, systemic effort to delay action on climate change, backed by the fossil fuel industry and ideological concerns. As global warming began to gain wider scientific interest and was noticed at the top levels of administration in the U.S. during the latter half of the 1970s, it prompted an increasingly organised and determined response from groups and individuals with either vested interest in the fossil fuel industry, or ideological distaste for any environmental concerns that could bring with them added regulation and government involvement in the market. The fossil fuel industry began concentrated lobbying efforts in the early 1990s. The Global Climate Coalition (GCC) was formed in 1989 to act as a counterforce to IPCC reports, and counted among its members big oil companies, car manufacturers, and industry associations. The GCC spread misleading information about climate change and generally set out to discredit the science and to foster public scepticism about it. This was done to postpone the inevitable (legislation for emission cuts), to protect profits, setting an international treaty back by ten years at least (Union of Concerned Scientists, 2007). Funding climate science sceptics and organising misinformation campaigns were part of the package, along with direct attacks on notable individual climate scientists. The goal was to make it look like a big scientific debate over climate change was ongoing, to fuel controversy where none really existed. Scientific journals and peer-review were sidelined as mainstream media was targeted to spread misinformation and create a feeling of uncertainty and non-urgency around the need to take action on climate change. It worked: while the scientific evidence and consensus grew stronger and stronger, the political momentum on global warming in the U.S. was lost even before the Kyoto Protocol was finalised in 1997. (Oreskes and Conway 2010, pp. 169-215). 99 The tactics deployed by the climate change deniers were the same that the tobacco industry lobbyists had found useful to buy the industry more time in the face of overwhelming scientific evidence linking tobacco to cancer. Many of the main players were the same too, like two distinguished retired physicists Frederick Seitz and Fred Singer. Public relations experts and industry lawyers gave advice to scientists, who then spoke to media. It did not matter that the scientists were not necessarily experts in the field, what mattered was the impression that science was being fought with science. To achieve this goal, any existing scientific uncertainties were exploited and anomalous details in the research were cherry-picked so doubt would remain. Oreskes and Conway describe it as fighting facts by manufacturing a debate. Appeals to journalistic balance were made towards the media, and giving equal weight trumped giving accurate weight to the different sides. (Oreskes and Conway 2010, pp. 5-19). Doubt is crucial to science – in the version we call curiosity or healthy scepticism, it drives science forward – but it also makes science vulnerable to misrepresentation, because it is easy to take uncertainties out of context and to create the impression that everything is unresolved. This was the tobacco industry's key insight: that you could use normal scientific uncertainty to undermine the status of actual scientific knowledge. As in jujitsu, you could use science against itself. "Doubt is our product," ran the infamous memo written by one tobacco industry executive in 1969, "since it is the best means of competing with the 'body of fact' that exits in the minds of the general public." (Oreskes and Conway 2010, p. 34). Climate change deniers cleverly created the appearance of science in their reports. They included charts and graphs and references that made the reports look convincing. However, independent peer-review was missing in the reports by the George C. Marshall Institute and other such think tanks sceptical about climate science, although peer-review is a crucial feature in creating scientifically-approved information in any field to try to cull out misleading or inaccurate data. Furthermore, instead of engaging in standard practices of scientific debate, they engaged in other tactics, such as public petitions, to refute climate change. (Oreskes and Conway 2010, pp. 244-245). Many of the sceptical arguments around climate change were based on purposefully ignoring the evidence, and the public was deliberately misled by denials of scientific knowledge aimed at distorting the public debate (Oreskes and Conway 2010, p. 241). Misinformation and denials are not the exclusive field of corporations.33 The important question to ask is who is disadvantaged and who 33 Agnotology is not only about intentional misinformation campaigns carried out by organisations. In the edited volume Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance (Proctor and Schiebinger 2008), different authors describe various instances of agnotology, ranging from corporate cover-ups and military secrets to sidelining knowledge about female orgasms or ignoring indigenous knowledge about fossils. Ignorance is thus not necessarily just about omissions or passive gaps in knowledge, but can also be actively produced as a response to conflicting interests by political structures and systems of oppression (Tuana 2008, pp. 109-110). In addition to withholding new information or spreading misinformation, this can take the form of suppressing what was once common knowledge. Knowledge can 100 benefits from cultivated and actively sustained ignorance. The different motivations of the academics and public relations agents involved in these campaigns is an interesting question in its own right, but agnotology can also be fostered by nation-states and other institutions. If we stay with the climate change example, many politicians, mainstream and others, have engaged in actions that might not be as systematic as what the GCC was engaged in, but that nevertheless amount to climate change scepticism or denial. Examples can be found easily from political actors in the USA, Australia, and many other countries.34 Oreskes and Conway (2010, pp. 246-247) list work done by journalists who have documented the extent of the efforts that ExxonMobil has taken over the years to support disinformation and doubt about climate change science. The corporation has poured millions of dollars to fund think tanks, quasi-journalistic websites, and even a columnist writing for FoxNews.com. These lobbying tactics taken by ExxonMobil against the Kyoto Protocol (as part of the GCC and independently after it disbanded in 2002) were influential in the USA not signing the treaty. This is not about being blinded by one's bias: climate deniers are aware that their information is false and are thus engaged in straightforward deception. Catriona McKinnon (2016) argues that, given the possibility of runaway climate change if aggressive mitigation action is not undertaken urgently, and given that agnotology creates mistrust between scientists and the public in order to delay such action, a case could be made for emergency measures to prohibit industrial climate denial through legal means. These lobbying efforts are very much ongoing still through various industry-funded think tanks (Boussalis and Coan 2016). The focus seems to have shifted from straightforward climate change denialism to scepticism about the urgency required to take any action. The end result of all the different well-organised agnotology activities is that there are a lot of people who are ignorant of the facts and the state of the scientific evidence in relation to climate change, or at least suspicious of the science despite the overwhelming consensus among climate scientists. These people are therefore partially deprived of the power to decide to act otherwise, to make changes to their also be lost and unlearnt due to it being seen as not relevant or valuable anymore in the light of prevailing structures and practices. Tuana also points out that the epistemic tools we use to study knowledge might not be sufficient to study agnotology. 34 Just as science challenges ignorance, it challenges existing power structures. This is because new scientific knowledge invariably affects the way we view the world. At the minimalist end of the scale, new scientific evidence poses a threat only to the existing way of making science. There is a threat to the funding and egos of the researchers, teachers, and others involved in activities linked to the existing paradigm, even if the practical implication to the rest of the world would be minimal (this applies to philosophy too). At the other end of the scale, new emerging scientific evidence is a threat to existing power structures on a very wide scale, whether political, economic, cultural, or a combination of these. Climate change science arguably falls into this wider end of the scale. It is a threat to such an array of existing power structures that I find it a feat in itself that climate science has managed to gain the foothold it has in the relatively short time span it has existed. Therefore it is no surprise that many strong forces have risen to try to make us conveniently ignorant, or at least confused, again. In any case, agnotology seems the correct term to describe what happened with climate change science and public debate. 101 collective lifestyles, and not be as complicit in such harms. I will return to this in chapter seven, where I will argue that climate denialism can obstruct our autonomy as moral agents. By engaging in these lobbying activities and misinformation campaigns, corporations such as ExxonMobil have stepped outside their normal sphere of influence, wielding their power where they should not, i.e. in public policy and international treaties trying to avert a climate catastrophe. With power comes responsibility. It is a well-established fact that mitigation becomes more costly as years go by and climate change effects add up. These corporations benefitted financially from supporting misinformation campaigns, echoes of which still affect public opinion today, putting their profits over all other concerns. It could be argued that they should pay compensation and that they owe money towards mitigation efforts. (Hormio 2017a, p. 326).35 The corporations involved in the GCC and similar lobbying efforts have, by their past actions, generated retrospective moral responsibility for themselves (to varying degrees) with regards to anthropogenic climate change. They expanded their sphere of stakeholders and their responsibility through their own voluntary actions. This is why it would be justified to demand these corporations pay compensation for their past actions (Hormio 2017a, p. 326). Through their actions, they have created an obligation for themselves to help mitigate climate change. This obligation distributes to their members, including their shareholders. My other main arguments in this chapter have been the following. I have suggested that collective agents such as corporations are real agents, but that they are not moral agents. Moral agency belongs to those who can make moral claims through their actions, and for this you need to feel the pull of moral emotions. Despite this, collective agents can exhibit moral claims that are implicit or explicit in their ethos through their conduct. These claims are collective moral claims because they reflect the collective outcome of individuals deliberating within their roles, and under the influence and within the parameters of the ethos of the collective agent. This is why collective obligation is a concept that is different from individual obligation, although it can distribute to members in various ways. Individual members should be both sensitive to what others do and be ready and willing to act if necessary. The collective obligation does not disappear even if all the members would be excused from doing their part. Instead, the collective agent should look into other ways (or an occasion) of meeting its obligation. So far I have discussed the collective obligations of organised collective agents, regardless of how loose or tight their agency is, as well as the direct duties of individuals as individuals. How and in what way individuals can also be implicated as constituents of unorganised collectives are questions I will turn to next, with the discussion spanning the next two chapters. 35 Arnold (2016) argues that corporate political activity to defeat climate legislation cannot be ethically justified because theories about the legitimate role of corporations in society cannot provide a basis for such lobbying activities. Chapter 4 – Unorganised collectives In focusing only on what governments can do and on what individuals can do as individuals (cutting their own emissions as a matter of justice or lobbying their government as a matter of goodness), there is a danger of neglecting a third possibility. This is what can, and in the climate change case can only, be achieved through collective action at a level at which there is as yet no effective collective agency. Elizabeth Cripps (2016, pp. 123-124) In reality our problem is not one of working out what our individual duties are in an interdependent world, in order that we can 'live with ourselves' in the midst of devastation. Once we realise that in an interdependent world there is strictly speaking no such thing as an individual duty, because there is no such thing as an individual in that sense, our problem becomes one of finding ways to reshape our already collective lives so that we can continue to live with one another. Tom Greaves (2016, p. 349) As a fair collective scheme to deal with climate change is currently lacking, what should an individual do in the face of a collective failure to mitigate climate change? What are her duties? Attempts at creating binding international climate treaties have failed so far, and the hope offered by the Paris Agreement has been dampened by the uncertainty over what the USA will do under their new administration. More egregiously, arguably no state is currently doing as much as they should if we are really to keep the global temperature rise limited to 1.5 degrees Celsius, so we should be interested in what individuals ought to do in the absence of an efficient enough global scheme. The problem of climate change is overdetermined (in a normative sense that I discussed in the first chapter) not just by the harm that is created, but also by the solution that is required. That is, there are more responsible agents (both people and collective agents) that have obligations to mitigate climate change than is needed for a solution to be reached. It only takes some of the agents who have obligations to act on them to mitigate climate change, or to at least avoid the worst impacts (assuming it is not already too late). How many are required to act, I will not try to guess, but it is safe to say that this is not a situation where absolutely all implicated agents must act to bring about mitigation (although probably all or at least most of the biggest agents must be on board). This simply means that the obligation of agents requires them to do what they can to mitigate climate change unless enough has already been done by others. When you add to this the fact that greenhouse emissions are cumulative, and feedback mechanisms and tipping points not well enough understood, it is safe to say that each agent has obligations for a long time to come. Regrettably, climate change is a problem we are stuck with for quite some time. 103 This chapter serves as a middle point in the thesis where individual duties meet collective obligations. Whereas the previous chapter concentrated on the collective obligations of collective agents, this chapter discusses the possibility of collective obligations of putative collective agents, i.e. unorganised collectives, and what results from their failure to act (omissions). The question is important in climate ethics, as collective omissions lead to unmitigated emissions. The vast majority of our emissions are linked to a collective context of one kind or another, and to change these patterns of emissions we will need to change not just structures, but also certain collective patterns of behaviour. Obligations and duties are about what ought to be done now and in the future, i.e. forward-looking responsibility, whereas failing to meet them can result in retrospective backwardlooking responsibility associated with blame (just as meeting your obligations can result in praise). The account of responsibility that I am after will be able to understand responsibility at both individual and collective levels, and explain how the two are interdependent. A few other people have recently presented such accounts, and I stated in the introduction that I will position my own work in juxtaposition with four recent monographs: Christopher Kutz (2000) Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age, Iris Marion Young (2011) Responsibility for Justice, Tracy Isaacs (2011) Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts, and Elizabeth Cripps (2013) Climate Change and the Moral Agent: Individual Duties in an Interdependent World. This chapter will concentrate on the accounts by Isaacs and Cripps, while the next two chapters discuss Kutz and Young. Isaacs (2011, p. 6) develops a two-level theory of moral responsibility, "one that recognizes responsibility at the individual and the collective level".1 Collective responsibility matters because "the collective context provides an essential framework for an adequate normative analysis of individual contributions" (p. 69). Cripps (2013) is similarly interested in the responsibility of both individuals and collectives. She agrees with Sinnott-Armstrong that our climate change related duties are not about what we can do as isolated individuals. However, while for Sinnott-Armstrong our moral duty as individuals is to get governments to take action on climate change, for Cripps it is to bring about collective action where no effective collective agency yet exists.2 I noted in the first chapter how there are three potential sources of individual responsibility when it comes to climate change harms: direct responsibility (individuals qua individuals), shared responsibility as members (individuals qua members of collective agents), and shared responsibility 1 In her view, collective moral responsibility operates on a level distinct from individual moral responsibility. Individual moral responsibility is not a function of collective moral responsibility (or vice versa) and claims about the responsibility of collectives do not entail (or erase) claims about the responsibility of individual members. 2 Peeters et al. (2015, pp. 86-87) criticise Cripps's account for being biased towards individual 'promotional actions' directed at trying to bring about a collective solution: are we really justified in holding such promotional actions to be less 'throw-away' in their character than direct unilateral actions? After all, it is far from obvious that promotional actions really "contribute to a stockpile of impetus for collective change" and are thus more likely "like money put in the bank" rather than "losing bets" (Cripps 2013, p. 148). Peeters et al. argue that this is simply begging the question. 104 as constituents (individuals qua constituents of unorganised collectives). With unorganised collectives that do not qualify as collective agents there can be shared and joint action at the level of the individual constituents. Collective responsibility thus does not need to be based on collective agency: mutual dependency (Cripps) and shared intentions (Kutz, Isaacs, and May) are alternative bases for collective responsibility discussed in this and the next chapter. This chapter will move the debate towards unorganised collectives and the shared responsibility of their constituents.3 This chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by explaining why climate change does not follow the logic of the duties of a random collective of individuals (section 4.1). Next, I deny that you can place obligations, putative or actual, on unorganised collectives, although you can hold the constituents of unorganised collectives blameworthy in the backward-looking sense under certain conditions (section 4.2). However, I grant that it can be useful to discuss unorganised collectives in some cases, as it can help us to make better sense of our complicity for collectively caused harms where our participation is marginal. More specifically, it can make us appreciate the different structures and systems that we are part of, and how we are complicit in upholding and recreating these. Cripps (2013) offers an account of the responsibility of unorganised collectives, although she does not base it on complicity like I do. I will go through her account in some detail (section 4.3), as it is the most comprehensive account of the intersection of individual and collective responsibility offered in climate ethics so far, and therefore directly relevant to my own project. 4.1 Not quite a beach rescue Recall from chapter one how I remarked that the existing literature on responsibility of unorganised collectives has centred on the ability of the individuals to form a group agent capable of undertaking the action that the situation requires. The literature has been inspired by Virginia Held's (1970) argument that a random collection of individuals, such as passengers in a train carriage, can be held morally responsible for failing to help the victim of an assault, as long as the action called for is obvious for a reasonable person. In cases like these, the individuals would have needed to co-operate to prevent the harm and their failure to do so counts as a blameworthy omission. What is common across these kinds of random collectives is that the individuals find themselves in the situation due to nothing more than (bad) luck. The composition of the collection of individuals in these kinds of cases is therefore down purely to matters of geography and timing. 3 Shared intentions explain collective action that in turn can lead to collective responsibility claims, while mutual dependency aims to explain collectively held duties that can lead to collective responsibility claims. The important difference between them is the role that collective intentions play in the accounts: while Kutz, Isaacs, and May base their accounts around them, Cripps denies that collective intentions are necessary for collective responsibility. 105 I will discuss cases offered by Isaacs (2011) and Cripps (2013) and discuss their relevance to climate ethics. Although it is a case of luck which particular individuals find themselves in these situations, I agree with Held, Cripps and Isaacs that their acts and omissions become a question of moral responsibility when there is a pressing need and they are in a position to help someone. However, actions that predictably cause harm in aggregation (like the emissions that cause anthropogenic climate change) take place within a system. I will therefore argue that applying the logic of random collectives to climate change does not hold. Held (1970, p. 476) argues that a random collective can also be held responsible for failing to take the required course of action in cases where the action called for "is obvious to the reasonable person and when the expected outcome of the action is clearly favorable." I will argue in chapter five that certain unorganised collectives (aggregates of individuals) do have responsibilities in relation to climate change, and put forward an account of what the individual duties look like in such cases. As groundwork for that argument, in this section I will explain why the putative groups or unorganised collectives relevant for climate change do not follow the logic of the duties of a random collective of individuals. Cripps (2013, pp. 49-61) discusses beach rescue scenarios, presenting a continuum of circumstances where individuals who do not necessarily know each other ― and have no established decision-making mechanism ― regardless should co-operate to prevent children drowning.4 She argues convincingly that if individuals have a duty to prevent the suffering of others, if she can do so at either minimal or less than significant cost to herself, then it would be implausible to claim that this duty would evaporate just because she would have to act together with others to do so. In other words, in cases where you can save lives at a low cost to yourself it does not make a moral difference if the duty falls on one person or more. Taking her cue from Held and May, she presents the following case (p. 60): Beach rescue A number of unconnected holidaymakers are on a beach when a child starts to drown in the water. Her rescue would require most of them to organize themselves to act together, to drag a lifeboat into the water, row it to her, and to pull her out. Cripps argues that by parallel reasoning, the people who could take action on climate change have a moral duty to do so (p. 61).5 4 She considers several variations of saving-children-from-drowning -cases where the moral duty bearer becomes increasingly collective with each new version of Easy rescue. In doing so, she references the famous puddle-cases by Peter Singer, where a child's life can be easily saved with only a minimal cost to oneself. 5 The people should act together and form a should-be collectivity, namely The Able, see section 4.3. 106 Climate change, however, is fundamentally different from classic beach rescue scenarios: we did not just happen to come across it, we are not some bystanders who should help the drowning victim just because we can. The scenario is more akin to us having thrown the victims into the water and keeping them there as an unintended consequence of something else we have done. Cripps partially recognises this, and in addition discusses cases where too many people use a weak footbridge, putting it in danger of collapsing over the children swimming below (Cripps 2013, pp. 68-74). In such case, the collective result of harm "was reasonably foreseeable by each contributing to it" (p. 71). Cripps (2013, p. 72) notes that climate change is a case where the contribution to harm is not of the all-or-nothing variety, but rather "a matter of doing too much or too little of something". Therefore she offers the following scenario (Cripps 2013, pp. 70-73):6 Footbridge 9 A footbridge is unsafe and children are clearly visible playing in the water below it. There are warning signs on each side of the bridge that it can hold up to four people of an average weight of 70kg. Four people are approaching the bridge and all know this. Each of us can tell by looking at the others that we each have a body-weight around or a little below the average. We all step onto the bridge. However, you, I, and one other person are each carrying 15kg rucksacks and each of us knows this. This pushes our combined weight above the limit. The bridge breaks and the children are harmed. This example is meant to highlight that although only two 15kg rucksacks were needed to push the combined weight above the safe total, all three with these rucksacks are morally responsible for the preventable and predictable harm that ensued (Cripps 2013, p. 74). She goes on to suggest that this is precisely the way that polluters are responsible for climate change or other such environmental harms.7 In contrast, I argue that even this case of a random collective is not an allegory to climate change, as it does not share its basic structure as a moral problem. Let us say that the bridge is the Earth's climate and the excessive amount of greenhouse gases being emitted are represented by the pedestrians on the bridge who are wearing rucksacks (or just too many pedestrians in versions 3-6 of Footbridge). The drowning children are future generations and the young people of today, as well as the poor people that are already affected by climate change. The responsibility is to alert others about the danger and to make people co-operate to avoid harm. To begin with, the harm created by climate change is not just the risk of harm, or harm that will predictably happen in aggregation, but also actual ongoing harm, as climate change harms are taking place already, especially in poorer countries with more frequent droughts and floods. 6 She presents each variation in an abbreviated form that refers to the previous versions, so the actual description of Footbridge 9 from page 73 reads as follows: "As in Footbridge 8 except that you, I, and one other person are each carrying 15kg rucksacks." The description that I present here is an amalgamation of the descriptions of the previous cases. 7 This is the way in which the collective Polluters is meant to be weakly collectively responsible (Cripps 2013, p. 74). I discuss this in section 4.3. 107 Therefore, some of the swimmers would have already been harmed, while the risk of harm increases (not steadily, but with various tipping points). The problem has a very long timeframe, so swimmers that enter the scene in future decades and centuries would also be harmed. They would also have no choice but to be in the water, whereas in Footbridge you could question why these children are playing under an unsafe bridge in the first place, or why their parents are allowing them to do so. More importantly, Footbridge does not address why the people with rucksacks decide to walk on although they are aware of the predictable harm: is it because they do not care, or is it because they feel that they have no choice? Maybe they have tried to warn others of the danger, but to no avail.8 Or maybe (like Sinnott-Armstrong) they feel that what they do as individuals does not matter, as it is the responsibility of some bridge council (government) to fix the problem and makes sure that such rucksack-carrying behaviour becomes illegal. Also, if the bridge was the climate, no one could say for certain when and in what way the bridge will collapse, although they can say that it will collapse with the likelihood of some percentage, giving an opportunity to the charlatans among the crowd to deny the risk/harm to the swimmers in the first place (also, the bridge could collapse incrementally). Finally, the bridge should be one that allows for vehicles also, as various collective agents (cars and other vehicles) would be on it travelling alongside the pedestrians, contributing to the harm in a significant way. The objection is not that we should not use such idealised examples to discuss complicated moral issues such as climate change. Many times this kind of approach is helpful; it is a philosopher's equivalent of a scientist's microscope, the closest our messy moral reality can come to laboratory conditions. The objection is not even that Footbridge fails to consider all relevant matters (although I do find that it simplifies the structure too much as I argued above). The objection is that anthropogenic climate change is not akin to cases where unorganised collectives consisting of isolated random individuals must act together to prevent harm that they will predictably cause in aggregate. Rather, the situation is one where patterns of existing joint action, and collective structures and institutions, set the scene for the actions that in aggregate cause the harm. To fix the situation, it is not enough that just at the moment of danger we co-operate to prevent the harm, but we also need to fix the infrastructure that facilitates the harm being created in the first place. Cripps does acknowledge the need for political action (and possibly creating new collective agents and institutions to meet the climate challenge), but her account cannot explain why the individual agents are in the situation they find themselves in. This is why I think it is unhelpful to 8 The ones who walk over the bridge even though they are aware of the harm/risk might feel hopeless or at least very upset. Cripps does discuss marring choices elsewhere in her book (pp. 169-196), arguing that we should also consider climate change in terms of what it does to us as moral agents. 108 compare climate change responsibility to the logic of responsibility of random collectives: it does nothing to open our eyes to how we can be complicit in harms through structures and social systems. Furthermore, I find that it is neither here nor there that in the footbridge case all the three people with bags are to blame, although only two 15kg rucksacks were needed to push the combined weight above the safe total. This example was meant to highlight the way that polluters are responsible for climate change, but it tells us nothing about the kind of marginal participation involved in pollution. Last but not least, Cripps (2013, p. 61) offers a third allegory for climate change responsibility, that of: Swimming teenagers A number of teenagers, all independently, decide to swim in a small lake. Each jumps in and swims around very flashily. Between them, they cause so much turbulence that a child also (independently) swimming in the lake is put in serious danger of drowning. To rescue her would require cooperation by the teenagers; to avoid putting more children in the same position, turbulence would have to be kept to a lower overall limit. This, I find, comes close to climate change responsibility. However, this no longer seems to be a case of a completely unorganised collective with random individuals, although the example says that all teenagers do what they do independently. Why do they all swim around so flashily? Is it a trend among the local teenagers, or is it something that they were (wrongly) taught in school perhaps? If so, this would be structural issue (these are discussed in chapter six). If it is not a structural issue and the teenagers all independently decided to swim flashily in the small lake at the same time, then I maintain that it is not reflective of the situation we find ourselves in with climate change for the same reasons that Footbridge discussed above was not. Be as it may, my argument remains that the logic of the responsibility of random collectives does not apply to climate change. What is missing from Cripps's analysis are the structures that contribute to and shape our emissions, and her discussion does not deal with questions like why are the polluters in the situation they currently are in. "Rather than consider abstract 'potential collectivities' [---], we should understand actual and concretely potential collectivity as the basic and fundamental condition of all our agency and receptivity, capacity and incapacity" (Greaves 2014, p. 348).9 If we approach polluters as a random collection of individuals, we are failing to look into the structural issues that underpin climate harms. In beach rescue scenarios, my duty to act is down to (bad) luck of circumstances, but this is not the case in climate change: the circumstances prevail because they are systematic and are upheld by structural causes. While in harms caused by unorganised collectives there is no collective intentional 9 Cripps uses the word 'collectivity', the more common word is 'collective'. I will use them interchangeably. 109 project as such to cause harm, there can be numerous systematic intentional collective action patterns and collective endeavours that contribute to just that. Therefore the moral responsibility of unorganised collectives stemming from structural and systematic harms is different from the responsibility that stems from moral luck scenarios. In the case of climate change, the problem is with our carbon-intensive patterns of living, social and financial institutions that have not been designed to deal with global problems with delayed impacts across generations, corporate-funded misinformation campaigns, and the various social psychological processes at play, to name just some of the factors. The important point is that our greenhouse gas emitting actions take place in particular enduring contexts. It is not a situation into which we are thrown. If we approach polluters as a random collection of individuals, we are failing to look into the structural issues that underpin climate harms. After all, it is not a matter of pure luck who bears the responsibility. In my view, the importance of structures is two-fold: the effects of our emissions exacerbate existing injustices (see section 6.3) and our individual emissions partly depend on existing structures. The greenhouse gases that I emit are partly down to personal choices: what I eat, how far from work I live and in what kind of housing, how many flights (if any) I take, how many consumer goods I consume, and so on. However, many of these decisions are already linked to structural constraints: if no public transportation is available, I cannot choose it. If housing is my area is built in a nonenergy efficient way, the chances are that I live in a non-energy efficient way. If the electricity in the national grid is produced in large part by burning coal, I contribute to the burning of coal. Furthermore, others make decisions about how the goods I buy are produced. Realistically, I can only ever have partial knowledge of how carbon-efficiently something is manufactured and what other environmental impacts (let alone social) it has. Corporations and companies make these decisions, although they also face structural constraints. The government under which I live makes a lot of decisions on behalf of its constituents regarding infrastructure, including how energy is produced and transport organised, and also regarding purchasing decisions on a large scale (for schools, hospitals, public offices, and so on). These all affect my overall carbon-footprint and my say in them is in most cases indirect and limited (voting for a representative in elections, hoping that they get elected, and if they do, furthermore hope that they make wise choices). Last, but by no means least, our choices are affected by social and cultural norms, and how these are upheld and renegotiated by all of us would be a thesis in its own right. Importantly, all these emissions take place within pre-existing social structures and systems. Circumstances do not just present themselves to us; they are created and upheld by us. If we include backward-looking assessment of historical injustices and how they have led to certain groups' increased vulnerability to climate change harms, we are more likely to get to the root of the problem, rather than just treating the symptoms. I will return to this at the end of chapter six, 110 where I argue that conceptualising climate change primarily as a structural injustice allows us to appreciate the complexity of the associated responsibility. But for now, I will keep the discussion on the responsibility of unorganised collectives by looking at putative collectives. 4.2 Putative collectives and the (im)possibility of their obligations Isaacs (2011, p. 141) also discusses beach rescue scenarios, labelling them Bystander Cases as "there is at least one person suffering a harm and at least one person in a position to assist". The person(s) in a position to assist are not responsible in the backward-looking sense for the plight of those in need, so any obligation to assist "does not turn on any prior share in bringing the unfortunate circumstances about." She is aware that they do not map directly to climate change, as we are not bystanders in climate change.10 Isaacs thus does not suggest that we can apply the logic of the responsibility of random collectives straightforwardly to climate change. Rather, she suggests that discussing the obligations of such groups can help to clarify what individual duties could be when faced with global challenges such as climate change. The reason Isaacs discusses these cases is to offer "a series of examples in which it becomes increasingly difficult to see what the situation demands and of whom" (p. 141), giving credence to her argument that often "there is much more clarity between obligation and circumstance at the collective level than there is between individual obligation and circumstance when the only reasonable course of action is collective" (p. 153). Isaacs (2011, pp. 142-143) notes how when there is more than one bystander, a particular individual's obligation cannot be directly mapped onto the situation, like when there is more than one person in a position to assist (when only one is required), or when many are suffering a harm and many are in a position to assist. She (p. 143) gives an example: Consider the first kind of case in which one person needs assistance, only one assistant is required, and more than one person is available to help. Though it involves more than one bystander, this case does not demand collective action. As described, only one individual is needed to assist, making it a case of an individual obligation that a number of different people could fulfill. Individual obligation maps neatly onto the situation for each, but only conditionally so. The presence of other potential rescuers affects the obligation of each by making it conditional; if another bystander fulfills the moral obligation to save the drowning child, the others are no longer required to act. However, if no one steps forward to save the child, and the child ends up drowning, then each fails to meet an individual moral obligation. As long as the condition is not met, each person's moral obligation is unambiguous: rescue the drowning child unless someone else does. 10 Isaacs (2011, p. 141) writes: "I'll call these Bystander Cases, even though we may recognize the limits of that idea when we reflect on certain cases, such as global warming, in which some may claim that no one is actually a mere bystander; all are participants." 111 Note that if one of the bystanders does rescue the drowning child, then it does not mean that the others have failed to discharge an individual moral duty to perform the rescue; rather, as the obligation was conditional, it was met (for all). If, on the other hand, no one rescues the child, then each bystander failed to discharge his or her individual moral duty. We could say that that the individual duties are interdependent (Miller 2010, p. 134), but this would still not be a case of joint duties and shared responsibility. In contrast, when a group of bystanders need to co-operate to save lives (and there is a course of co-ordinated action available for them to do so), the moral obligation of each bystander is more ambiguous in the absence of a collective agent. If such an agent would exist, there would be "a clear map between the situation, the required course of action and a collective agent." (Isaacs 2011, p. 144). Nevertheless, when no such agent exists, Isaacs suggests that individual obligation no longer neatly maps onto the situation. Her suggested solution is putative collective obligation. While I allow that it makes sense to discuss the responsibility of putative groups and/or collectives, I reject the notion of obligations of putative groups (potential collectives) put forward by Isaacs, arguing instead that these amount to individual duties qua constituents of unorganised collectives.11 Putative groups, as suggested by Larry May (1992, p. 109), are collectives "in which no formal organization exists, and, as a result, there is no decision-making apparatus". It is a separate issue if a putative group could take action, and this is for the most part linked to if there was enough time and leadership skills available to set up such action, along with existing solidarity and communication opportunities (p. 110). Those who could have developed a structure sufficient to avoid inaction (however loose that structure might be) in time are morally responsible as a group. Thus according to May, the set of individuals who do not step up to the task of co-ordinating their actions in time to prevent harm when they could have done so can be held responsible for their failure. This putative group is prima facie collectively responsible for the harm (May 1992, p. 111), and its failure is a case of collective inaction (pp. 116-117).12 This could easily be applied to positive cases too: the putative group is praiseworthy if it succeeds in taking the appropriate action. According to Isaacs (2011, p. 131), with harms like climate change, "the daunting task for individuals of knowing what their part as individuals is in ameliorating these seemingly 11 Other authors who have suggested that unstructured collectives/putative groups/potential collectives could have collective (or shared) obligations include Pinkert (2014) and Wringe (2010). 12 May (1992, pp. 116-117) gives the following three conditions for (backward-looking) collective responsibility of putative groups (in cases where blame is applicable): (a) the members of the group fail to act to prevent a harm, the prevention of which would have required the coordinated actions of (some of) the members of the group; (b) it is plausible to think that the group could have developed a sufficient structure in time to allow the group to act collectively to prevent the harm; and (c) it is reasonable to think that the members of the group should have acted to prevent the harm rather than doing anything else, such as preventing other harms which they also could have prevented. 112 insurmountable harms is made easier when we invoke the idea of a collective obligation." The idea is that while there is no collective agent that can be held responsible, collective obligation can provide order and help to shape individual actions, therefore playing a mediating role, helping "to narrow down the field of possible individual actions, making it more manageable." In short, she (p. 139) argues that the collective framework itself is helpful in this, thus enabling an individual "to take effective action against a daunting and individually insoluble problem." Her aim is to offer an account into "the murky middle ground between collective and individual obligation" (p. 139), stating that she wants "to motivate the possibility of thinking in terms of collective obligation in the absence of an organization or a goal-oriented collective" (p. 131). Isaacs takes her inspiration for obligations of potential agents, putative collectives, from May and Held. Isaacs (2011, p. 145) writes: "The idea of a putative group suggests that there may be room to establish collective obligation in the absence of collective agency-potential collective agency may provide grounds for collective obligation, either actual or also putative obligation, following May's terminology." She combines this with Held's (1970) idea that the course of action required of a random collective could be clear in some cases to the reasonable person, and that when it is clear, then there is responsibility at the collective level. Isaacs (2011, p. 148) translates this to "they failed as individuals to engage in the requisite action for organizing into an effective agent and fulfilling the collective obligation", and she suggests that the failure lies at two levels: "a failure to meet a collective obligation" and "a failure in each individual to join together with the others". While Isaacs (pp. 148-149) admits to hesitating to attribute actual obligations to potential agents, she thinks that by making also the obligation putative the problem is solved (p. 149): Instead of claiming that putative groups can have actual obligations, I maintain that when the clarity condition is met concerning the required course of collective action, the putative group has a putative obligation. I believe further, however, that when the clarity condition is met with respect to the putative collective obligation, it has exactly the same ordering and mediating potential for individual action that an actual collective obligation would. In either case, it is a mechanism through which individual moral possibility becomes clearer. The first thing to note is that contrary to Isaacs's formulation, Held does not use the terms "obligation" or "duty" anywhere in her article. Instead, she discusses the (retrospective) responsibility of these collectives. While Held and May (as well as Kutz 2000 and Miller 2010) discuss how (constituents of) unorganised groups can share backward-looking moral responsibility for an omission, Isaacs argues that forward-looking obligations can be held by putative groups (unorganised collectives). However, while May discusses holding unorganised collectives (putative groups) morally responsible in the retrospective blameworthy sense, he does not suggest that it is ontologically the group that is responsible, but rather it is the set of individuals that bears shared moral 113 responsibility for failure to organise (how this share might vary between individual constituents in another important question for May).13 What is important is that the individuals' responsibility should be understood qua the unorganised collective (set of individuals) as it was not an individual failure. Held's view, likewise, is that while the judgements about the moral responsibility of the members of a collective "are not logically derivable from judgments about the moral responsibility of a collectivity" (p. 475), the responsibility of a random collection of individuals distributes to its constituents (p. 480): A significant difference between the moral responsibility of a random collection as opposed to the moral responsibility of an organized group is that the former seems to be distributive-that is, if random collection R is morally responsible for the failure to do A, then every member of R is morally responsible for the failure to do A, although, perhaps, in significantly different proportions. In contrast, if organized group G is morally responsible for the failure to do A it does not follow that member M of G is morally responsible for the failure to do A. If a random collection R can be represented as a set equivalent, say, to M & N & Q, then, if R is morally responsible, we would seem to be able to conclude that M is morally responsible & N is morally responsible & Q is morally responsible. Held notes that saying that the moral responsibility of a random collection is distributive does not necessarily amount to much: we might not be able to apportion responsibility for all the components that doing A consists of, so the individuals are not responsible for the failure to do A, but instead "for not acting to transform the collection into an organized group" (p. 480). The actual context is decisive here, as elsewhere on Held's account. Furthermore, Held and May do not suggest that these random collectives could hold prospective moral obligations. While Isaacs and I are in agreement that issues such as climate change require collective solutions, I disagree with her that you can place a putative collective obligation on a putative collective. As King (2011, par. 14) observes, it is often the case that "problems that require a collective solution exist prior to any collective that shares a goal of solving it", and in many cases there is no collective agent who can be said to have an obligation. We might have an individual obligation to form a collective and a certain set of individuals that share this obligation. However, these are still obligations held by individual agents, agents that exist. A group that does not exist 13 As the responsibility is shared, each individual is only partially morally responsible for the harm, as each agent is only a partial cause of the harm. May (1992, p. 120) argues that this kind of partial responsibility does not normally entail guilt, but rather shame, or moral taint. His claim is that while guilt commonly attaches to explicit behaviour, shame in contrast is related to a person's self-conception. For a related discussion on reasons of character in Kutz, see section 5.2. For a principle about how the share of each individual varies, see May 1992, p. 117. Isaacs (2011) discusses collective guilt at length, devoting her entire third chapter to the topic, and wants to separate the notion of collective guilt from membership guilt, which she argues is just a certain type of personal guilt. She furthermore wishes to separate collective guilt from feelings of guilt and beliefs about being guilty, as these just confuse the concept. Instead, she argues that collective guilt should be understood simply as blameworthy collective moral responsibility. 114 cannot have obligations, even putative ones, as that would be to "put the normative cart before the metaphysical horse" (par. 15). I find King's criticism to be on point. Any forward-looking obligations in cases where no collective agent yet exists remains at the individual level, although they derive their normative significance from the collective context. In general, it is implausible to assign obligations to an entity that does not have the capacity to discharge them. For a claim to make sense as an obligation, be it individual or collective, there has to be corresponding capacity. Obligation after all entails both responsibility and capacity. Therefore, while blame can be ascribed to aggregates of individual people such as rich polluters, based on counterfactual reasoning of what they could have done as a collective had they organised themselves, we cannot ascribe collective obligation to an entity that does not exist. However, as I will argue in the next chapter, many of us have interdependent individual duties to try our best to mitigate climate change that we have qua constituents of unorganised collectives. The way to discharge of the duty is to seek a collective solution either through existing structures or through creating new institutions, or most likely both. If we manage to create a collective agent (or agents) that is fit for the purpose, then the set of individual duties can be delegated to this agent, and we can say that it holds a collective obligation. But in its absence, the duties remain those of individual agents. (I should note that this does not exclude the obligations of existing collective agents to do what they can in mitigating climate change. These agents include governments, corporations, intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, and so forth. Still, none of these collective agents can be assigned collective obligation to mitigate climate change (only to do their best in mitigating it). Instead, they are jointly responsible and interdependently obligated.) To be fair, Isaacs is at pains to underline that the collective obligations are only putative (and not actual) when no collective agent yet exists.14 Although putative, the collective obligations are supposed to help to clarify and map out "more determinate moral requirements for individuals who are members of the collectives", and once it is clear what the collective action necessary would be, this acts as "a mechanism through which individual moral possibility becomes clearer" (2011, p. 149).15 However, what is a putative obligation? It is an obligation that can come into existence only 14 Even though the concept of "putative" plays such an important role in her argument, Isaacs offers no definition of it other than by introducing the way May has used it. I think that providing an independent definition could have been helpful. 15 "In addition to lending shape to the obligations of individuals, the perspective of the collective obligation, even when putative, furnishes a further normative advantage. For in giving shape to the individual obligations, collective obligation provides a framework for understanding the moral dimensions of individual contributions and individual failures. This point is an extension of the claim, developed earlier, that collective moral responsibility is necessary for an adequate understanding of individual responsibility in collective contexts. Whether the individual contributes to collective action or collective inaction, the moral features of the individual's contribution become salient only against the background of the moral features of the collective action or inaction. For example, although one individual taking a completely individualistic view of a large moral issue such as global warming could abdicate responsibility as an individual by noting that she cannot make a difference, her failure to contribute to a collective effort that would make a difference 115 if the required capacity appears. But it now sounds like a conditional obligation. Therefore, to talk of putative collective obligations is to talk of duties that would exist if things were different.16 As things stand then, there is no collective obligation of unorganised potential collectives to mitigate climate change, just as I am arguing. However, talking of collective putative obligations can distract us from the obligations and duties that already exist: namely those of individual people and collective agents to do what they can to try to mitigate climate change. I agree with Isaacs that in many cases thinking about the collective action necessary can help to formulate what the individual should do, but there is no need to muddy the waters with talk about putative collective obligations of putative collective agents. We do not need the latter to do the former, as we can just think along the lines of 'how this situation could be solved by acting together?' Note that the duty of an individual is interdependent with other individuals' duties, i.e., they can only be achieved if enough people act together. I agree with Isaacs (2011, p. 140) that talking about unorganised collectives can be a useful tool for us to make sense of our responsibility: [I]ssues of global poverty, world hunger and disease, and environmental destruction appear so immense from the perspective of the individual that no action within the reach of ordinary moral agents seems likely to make much of a difference. The amount of actual and potential human suffering in these kinds of situations is enormous. As a result, it is difficult not to view them as moral issues. We face a great challenge in attempting to chart the territory of individual obligation in the context of moral issues that are so large that they require collective action solutions. It is tempting to think that the need for a collective action solution suggests that we are in fact dealing with a collective moral obligation that directs and grounds the obligations of individuals. [---] But the idea of a collective obligation without a collective agent who is so obligated appears to be a stretch. [--] when collective action solutions come into focus and potential collective agents with relatively clear identities emerge as the subjects of those actions, then we may understand individual obligations [--] as flowing from collective obligations that those potential agents would have. Still, talking about putative obligations of putative groups is not only terminologically confusing, it also means that if individual obligations flow from the collective obligation (as Isaacs argues), then individual obligations are also putative in cases like climate change mitigation. In contrast, I want to argue that individual people and existing collective agents have actual obligations with regards to climate change mitigation, although the duties take the form of 'doing what you can to mitigate', rather than 'to mitigate'. How demanding these duties turn out to be depends on the agent in question and what is feasible for them. Importantly, it is not only about capacity as such, as climate change is not akin to a bystander case: we are participants, not bystanders. In bystander cases is not so easily excused. Mediated by a putative collective obligation in which she could participate, her failing is not that she did not solve the problem of global warming-that is something we could never expect her to do. Instead, her failure is that she did not do her part in a collective action that could solve global warming." Isaacs 2011, p. 150. 16 I am not sure if Isaacs would agree with this or not. 116 individual obligation flows from the circumstances, from the bad luck of being at the wrong place at the wrong time (or for the good luck of being in a position to help, depending on your preferred outlook). In chapter five I will argue that in collectively caused harms, our shared duties flow from how our participatory or quasi-participatory intentions link us to the harm. In climate change mitigation, they flow from both forward-looking and backward-looking sources.17 Rather than putative obligations of putative collective agents, Bill Wringe (2010) argues that putative, potential collectives are subjects of actual obligations. Furthermore, the obligations of an "unstructured collection of individuals" are to be addressed to the individuals who make up the collective. He denies that for there to be a collective obligation there also needs to be a collective entity that the obligation is addressed to. Instead, the addressees are the individuals. In other words, Wringe (2010, p. 220) denies that to be the subject of moral obligation one needs to be an agent. According to Wringe (p. 225), the addressee of a moral obligation of a child is the parent/caretaker if the child in question is too young to be anything other than the subject of a moral obligation. While most adults are both the subjects and addressees of moral obligations, in some collective settings the situation changes. What he suggests is that a collection of individuals can be the proper addressee of a collective obligation instead of the collective itself.18 What, then, makes the obligation collective? It is essentially the content of the obligation: the obligation that falls on the individual is not the same as that which falls on the collective (p. 226). If an unstructured collective has a collective obligation to do X, the individual does not have an obligation to do X, but instead "to do things which are appropriately related to the carrying out of the action whose performance would constitute fulfilment of the collective obligation" (p. 227). While I agree with Wringe that the collection of individuals is the proper addressee of any duties (obligations) qua an unstructured collective, and furthermore that their duty is not to do X but to do what you can do, I do not see how such a collective could have obligations that would not be dependent on the individual ones. To see why, I will discuss the example that Wringe (2016, p. 479) offers of a situation that is supposed to give rise to a collective obligation: 17 An alternative distinction to the more-or-less straightforward separation of responsibility into backward-blame and forward-obligation is made by May (1996, pp. 88-98), who argues that the notion of moral responsibility can be understood in two ways: being accountable for what one has done (that comes with duties and obligations), and being responsive for someone in need, taking into account the particular situation. As the latter is contextual and discretionary, he argues that it cannot be encapsulated in a simple algorithm or universal guideline. Instead, the choices are to be made within an existing framework, one that is largely created by the society we live in and the process of socialisation. Note that May associates duties and obligations with essentially backward-looking responsibility that is causally linked to the agent's actions, while the other sense of moral responsibility appeals more to being a responsive moral creature: if someone is in need and you could help them, you should. This seems quite intuitive to me: we can generate obligations and duties from our past actions to either continue to do something, or to rectify past harms or wrongdoings. It seems similarly intuitive to talk about responding to someone in need when there are necessarily no past causal linkages to that person, like responding to the cries of a drowning stranger. 18 In contrast, Kutz (2000) separates the object of accountability (the collective) from the basis of accountability (the individuals), so his account builds up from the individuals. I will discuss his account in the next chapter. 117 Office: Two people share an office. Due to bad weather the roof starts to collapse. The person who needs to be informed has to be informed by email. A has the technical expertise necessary to describe the damage to the roof in an informative manner, but doesn't know how to use email. B is a computer wizard who doesn't know the first thing about roofs. Between them, they can pass an informative message to the right person. Individually, neither of them can. Wringe (p. 479) defends the claim that "A and B fall under a collective obligation to inform a responsible person about the state of the roof before a passer-by is injured." This collective obligation then gives rise to individual obligations (duties) to perform the necessary action so that the collective obligation can be met. Wringe (2014, p. 176) suggests that the relationship between collective obligations and individual duties is that of grounding: the duty of the collective grounds the duties of the individuals within it. He (2016, p. 482) defends the claim that collective obligations are more basic than the individual ones by asking the reader to imagine Office*, where the situation is just as it is in the original example, except that the capacities and limitations of A and B are reversed, meaning that their individual obligations are also reversed. He argues that this is equivalent to saying that the individual obligations of Office do not exist in Office*, while the collective obligation would be the same in both. Hence the collective obligation must be more basic than those of the individuals. I am not convinced by this argument because you could just as easily flip the argument the other way round: if the individual obligations would not exist, no collective obligation could exist. After all, consider Office** where the roof starts to collapse due to bad weather, but there is no one in the office that can either use email or knows a thing about roofs. Any collective obligation to inform a responsible person about the state of the roof before a passer-by is injured would be empty: it has no content as there is no one who could fulfil it. Wringe could reply that since only potential collective agents can hold obligations, there is no obligation: the occupiers of the office who all lack any relevant know-how cannot constitute a potential collective agent in this situation. I agree, but I think Office** also shows how we need individuals who could play their parts in bringing about a collective solution with their corresponding individual duties to get the ball rolling. Maybe, although they do not have an obligation to inform a responsible person about the roof, one could argue that they share an obligation to alert the passers-by about the danger, for example. Let us stipulate further that for some reason it takes at least two people to do so, one on both sides of the street. They would be an unstructured collective (i.e. unorganised collective in my vocabulary)19 because they could, if acting together, do something about the situation, and they should, given the imminent 19 See beginning of section 5.4 for clarification on the terms. 118 danger. Crucially, what they should do depends on what they as individuals can do. Following the suggestion by Aas (2015) discussed in the previous chapter (section 3.2), these individuals should be motivated enough to take action if they become sufficiently certain that other members will do their part, as well as have the absence of a belief that others will not do their part. In addition, they should be able to take action. However, the actual content of that shared obligation depends on their individual abilities and corresponding duties (e.g. inform a responsible person about the roof or alert passers-by about the danger). Furthermore, it amounts to interdependent individual duties.20 To sum up, I have argued that climate change harms do not share the structure of the responsibility of random collectives. I have also denied that you can place obligations, putative or actual, on unorganised collectives, although you can hold constituents of unorganised collectives blameworthy in the backward-looking sense under certain conditions. I will discuss this in section 5.4. Our duties qua unorganised collectives are always individual duties, although they are interdependent. While I rejected obligations of unorganised collectives, instead promoting individual forward-looking duties, I agree with Isaacs that in some cases it could be useful to discuss unorganised collectives so that we can make better sense of our individual interdependent duties, although we have to always be very clear about this. The next chapter will argue that structures and our quasi-participatory intentions will play a key role in our responsibility as constituents of unorganised collectives. But before we get to that argument, I want to motivate it by looking at a model that denies the need for (quasi-participatory) intentions in unorganised collectives. 4.3 Identifying relevant collectives The question that I now turn to is which unorganised collectives we should take into account in climate ethics. The discussion on the responsibility qua constituents of unorganised collectives is meant to highlight the collective context and flavour of these interdependent individual duties, in order to underline how these kinds of duties differ from our direct duties (or indeed our duties qua members of collective agents). This section concentrates on the account that Cripps (2011a, 2013) gives of unorganised collectives. By discussing the problems her account faces, I motivate the need for the complicity account related to unorganised collectives that I will give in the next chapter (section 5.3). The central question for Cripps is what is required of individuals when institutions fail to confront the problem of climate change. Her answer is that the responsibility of individuals is to try 20 Some authors have suggested that these kind of duties are essentially duties to collectivise (Collins 2013, Lawford-Smith 2015), but in my account they are collectivisation duties combined with avoidance of complicity (and/or attainment of virtue, if you like). I return to this when I discuss complicity in the next two chapters. 119 to bring about collective change; collective action is something that we owe to ourselves. The identification of collective duties allows Cripps to make her three-fold case for collective action that will, in turn, allow her to argue for correlative individual duties. According to her, our (collectivelyderived) duty with regards to climate change is to organise ourselves in a way that we can collectively respond to climate change by either mitigation, adaptation, or compensation. She offers three arguments for this duty to act together (weakly collective duty), one for each of the collectives The Young, The Able and Polluters. The duty is weakly collective duty in all three cases because these collectives are not yet collective agents in any strong sense and hitherto not capable of intentional action (Cripps 2013, p. 204). Therefore the moral duty translates as duties for individual constituents of these collectives, or potential collectives, to organise themselves to form a collective agent in order to secure a particular end, be it mitigation, adaptation, compensation, or all of them. Cripps distinguishes between what she terms "strongly" and "weakly" collective duties. A collective entity that is already capable of intentional action (i.e. a collective agent) holds strongly collective duties, while "a set of individuals which is not yet a collective agent in any strong sense" have a weakly collective duty to bring about some result between them (2013, p. 60). Mutual dependency is a key concept in the account as Cripps (2011a, 2013) denies the need for intentionality. Instead, she identifies collectives through actual mutual dependency that has two meanings. In Cripps's terminology (that does not follow the conventions of the literature on social ontology), a purpose, goal or fundamental interest is shared when it is something that each person jointly has, like taking a walk together or taking a trip with a friend. The individuals thus constitute a collective because it is essential to the action that it is done together. Because they share a goal, the individuals are mutually dependent for its satisfaction. The other option is that the purpose, goal or fundamental interest is individual yet common in the sense that it can only be secured when the individuals act together, like when they need to co-operate to save their own lives.21 They might not care at all about each other, but need each other to secure a fundamental interest (or a purpose or a goal). The interest is common because the individuals are mutually dependent for the satisfaction of it, not the other way round. In this model, there is no need for the individuals to acknowledge that they are a member of a collective for them to still count as one. The individual agent can deny the mutual dependency while acknowledging the shared individual goal or purpose. Or in cases of fundamental interests she does not even have to acknowledge it as a selfish goal; she can still be a 21 There are, of course, other options where my interest can only be satisfied if yours is: I hope it rains, you hope it rains, thus if my hope of rain is satisfied then so is yours. However, these are not cases of mutual dependency as the satisfaction of an interest, goal, or purpose is not linked to us acting together, it is not linked to us doing anything at all; it rains if it rains. 120 member of a collective without acknowledging the interest even at the individual level as long as the common interest really is fundamental. (Cripps 2013, pp. 32-33). With this Cripps refers to Sen's capabilities approach discussed in chapter two, so the interest at stake cannot be trivial, but instead it needs to be "so central as to count relatively uncontroversially as a prerequisite for a flourishing human life" (Cripps 2013, p. 33). Cripps lists the capability for continued life, bodily integrity, bodily health, affiliation and practical reason as such fundamental interests (adapted from Nussbaum's (2006) list). If the interest is non-fundamental, the interest (goal or purpose) must be shared as described above to qualify for mutual dependency. I think mutual dependency can be a useful concept for capturing what is important for collectives that are tied together through a fundamental interest that can only be secured together. However, I will argue that it is not sufficient to render a set of individuals such a collective that can bear obligations that are irreducible to members' duties. She formulates the conditions as follows: Cripps's non-intentionalist model22 A set of individuals constitutes a collectivity if and only if those individuals are mutually dependent for the achievement or satisfaction of some common or shared purpose, goal or fundamental interest, whether or not they acknowledge it themselves. (Cripps 2013, pp. 2829). Note that while in this model individuals can form a completely non-intentional collective if they are mutually dependent in the relevant way, it is paramount that they have already adopted the individual goals or purposes. If they have not, they are not yet a collectivity, but instead only a potential collectivity: a set of individuals who would be mutually dependent for the achievement of some goal, were they to adopt it (Cripps 2013, p. 59). This applies to individual goals and purposes only, as when it comes to fundamental interests, the individuals rendered mutually dependent through them always form a collective, even if it is a completely non-intentional one. As I already mentioned, a set of individuals who would be mutually dependent for the achievement of some goal, were they to adopt it, are in Cripps's terms a "potential collectivity" (2013, p. 59). So anytime when we potentially share a goal that can only be attained through co- 22 Cripps (2011a, 2013) does not deny that there are intentional collectives. In her account, collectives can be fully or partially intentional, or completely non-intentional. Examples of fully intentional collectives are book groups, sport clubs, universities, and corporations. They are what the literature on collective intentionality and collective agency has mostly focussed on. Partially intentional collectives refer to collectives where some of the members are not aware of their membership, while others (most) are. Cripps counts the family or state in this category, due to members such as infants and the intellectually disabled. Completely non-intentional collectives are those where no member considers themselves to be part of a group, there are no joint intentions, no acknowledged common purposes or goals, only mutual dependency. She gives three examples of such collectives, none of which I think work, but that is an argument for another occasion. The mutual dependency can be either in relation to individual goals or purposes, or a fundamental interest. These kind of collectives are both unintentional and involuntary. Aside from the distinctions related to intentionality and voluntariness, Cripps also makes other ones regarding collectives: they can be pre-existing or new, small or large, lasting or ad hoc, passive or active. 121 operation, we constitute a potential collective. As Cripps herself acknowledges, the array of potential collectives is indefinite and therefore unhelpfully large. What are relevant for moral and political philosophy according to Cripps (2013, pp. 59-60) are those potential collectives "whose members ought (morally) to cooperate to pursue those ends through which they would be mutually dependent." She formulates this in the following way (2013, p. 60): Cripps's should-be collectivity A set of individuals who: (i) would, were they to espouse some goal or goals, constitute a collectivity; and (ii) have a moral duty to espouse that goal.23 The goal could be an individual one that can only be attained through co-operation and each individual has an individual duty to pursue it, like when each parent has made an individual promise to their child of building a playground in the estate, something they can only bring about together. Or it could be a goal that the potential collective has a weakly collective duty to pursue (p. 60). The Young form a collectivity through mutual dependence for the satisfaction of a fundamental interest. The younger generations of humans across the globe (and possibly also future generations), are a collectivity because climate change poses significant risks to their central human functioning and renders their capabilities insecure. If future generations are included in The Young, they would be part of a large, mostly passive collective that has a collective self-interest in climate change mitigation. Just like equal voting rights for women, mitigation (unlike adaptation) is an end that is attained for all members of the collective if any of them achieve it. And just like with suffragettes, an active subset of the passive collective could bring it about, in this case the young alive at the moment. (Cripps 2013, pp. 43-48). Cripps's principle of moralized collective self-interest A set of human beings (moral agents) who are mutually dependent through a common fundamental interest have a weakly collective duty to cooperate to secure that interest, so long as this is possible without those individuals having to sacrifice some other fundamental human interest. (Cripps 2013, p. 48)24 The "without sacrifice" clause contained in the principle makes an appeal to the idea that we have a duty to co-operate to prevent serious suffering if we can do so at a minimal cost to each of us (with 23 This formulation is meant to narrow the field, but still seems wide enough to allow for nonsensical applications. For example (to use an example suggested to me by Arto Laitinen), could one argue that humanity is a should-be collectivity as it has (as a set of individuals) an interest to avoid being tortured? I will not pursue this line of criticism here though. 24 As mentioned at the beginning of this section, Cripps (2013, p. 204) defines weakly collective duty as follows: "A duty requiring some collectivity or potential collectivity, which is not yet set up for collective action, to organize as necessary to secure some particular end." 122 cost understood not in monetary terms, but it terms of cost to fundamental interests). To yield her principle, Cripps (2013, pp. 51) combines this with the requirement that the individual agents within the relevant set "can reasonably be expected to be aware of their mutual dependence" [italics in original]. While the individuals that have the duty to act together might not consider themselves members of a collective, or even accept the fundamental interest at stake as their personal goal, they have to be aware, or at least be expected to be aware, of the mutual dependence. As Cripps (2013, pp. 51-52) puts it, "it would be implausible to assign moral duties in cases where the individuals cannot know there is any mutual dependence. Such duties would be unfulfillable."25 When the collective and the scale of the problem are big, as is the case with climate change, the co-operation necessary to secure the fundamental interest demands complex co-ordination. The institutions necessary for enabling this might not even exist. The duty might therefore take the form of organising to act collectively to create new institutions, which can protect fundamental interests, although Cripps leaves it open whether current institutional structures are enough when it comes to responding adequately to climate change. (2013, pp. 50-51; p. 67). The twist in the tale with The Young is that they are not only the duty bearers, but also the victims. However, just because the cooperation of a victim is required to save her does not in any way absolve the others of their duty to save her. In addition, as the weakly collective duty to organise is grounded first and foremost in the significant risk to the central human functioning of all of The Young, the appeal to anyone's own interests is secondary. Cripps argues through many examples that even the adult members in The Young could not plausibly decide to ignore their fundamental interest in mitigation, rather, they should try to organise to secure it. (Cripps 2013, pp. 51-57). The Able form a should-be collective: their duty is grounded in a collectivised principle of beneficence to co-operate to mitigate and enable adaptation.26 The Able includes the affluent people around the world and all those who could contribute to climate change adaptation and mitigation at less than significant costs to themselves. They are not brought together by mutual dependence, as they might have little or no collective self-interest in mitigation. Some members of The Able are unlikely to suffer any serious harm from climate change impacts due to their age: the more serious impacts are projected to emerge after their lifetimes. They might not even care about future generations and what happens once they themselves are gone. This is, of course, not the case with all of the members of The Able, as most humans do care for the well-being of those who come after 25 Although, arguably, the individuals might work to try to secure a fundamental interest while being in denial that it constitutes a mutual dependence. 26 Cripps's collectivized moderate principle of beneficence: A set of human beings have a duty to cooperate to prevent the serious suffering (deprivation of a fundamental interest) of another human being or human beings if they can do so at less than significant cost to each. (Cripps 2013, p. 50) 123 them. The Able could also be The Young and there is a lot of overlap between the categories. However, the thing that picks them out as members of The Able is that they could contribute to adaptation and mitigation measures at a cost not too high to themselves. Because The Able are not mutually dependent in the way that The Young are (as some of them are too old for climate change to be a threat to their fundamental interests), the basis for their collective duty is different. Namely, it is based on a collectivised version of a moderate principle of beneficence: the moral duty to prevent serious harm to another person(s) as long as the costs are comparatively low to oneself. (Cripps 2013, pp. 58-61).27 Significant costs could arise in two ways when we are discussing should-be collectives like The Able, i.e. potential collectives without real collective agency. These are at the level of the process of bringing about the necessary collective action, i.e. getting organised to act collectively ("the cost of coordination condition"), or at the level of the collective action itself, i.e. the actions that contribute to the collective effort to secure the common end (the cost of action condition). Cripps argues that neither are too high when it comes to climate change action, citing among other things the 1% GDP mitigation costs from The Stern Review (the cost of action), or the already existing global level co-operation against claims that it would be too demanding to interact globally in the sufficient manner (the cost of co-ordination). (Cripps 2013, pp. 64-68). Polluters are another should-be collective but their duty is grounded negatively: to stop worsening climate change. The Polluters emit greenhouse gases at a level that is not sustainable, i.e. "above the level at which, were all emitting at that level, climate change would not be worsened", and their emissions above that level are furthermore "avoidable without the loss to them of some fundamental interest" (2013, p. 59). As is the case with The Able, Polluters are not a collective through mutual dependence, as again they might have little or no collective self-interest in mitigation due to their age or wealth. They might not care about the future much and the carbon-intensive lifestyle that they might be used to could work well for them. Again, while this is not the case with (hopefully) the majority of the Polluters, the point is that it is not moralised collective self-interest that picks them out, but their carbon-intensive lifestyles. Of course, members of the Polluters can also overlap with The Young (and to a substantial degree with The Able), but Cripps has formulated her arguments to be largely independent, although complementary, so the overlap is not an issue, particularly as one global collective scheme could encompass all duties.28 27 The Able appeals to the moderate principle of beneficence while The Young appeals to a weak version: the difference is that while the weak version stops at minimal cost to each individual, the moderate version allows a bit more leeway and draws the line at less than significant cost to each. See Cripps 2013, p. 13 for individual versions and p. 50 for the collectivised versions. 28 Cripps (2013, pp. 77-82) argues that the primary burden on mitigation falls on Polluters due to the no-harm principle. They also bear the full weight of complying with the weakly collective duty when it comes to adaptation and compensation. The Able come next: their duty is to avert the rest of the harm, or at least compensate for it. They also have a duty to pick up the slack if Polluters fail to act. The Young are responsible only for mitigation that the Polluters are 124 What makes Polluters a should-be collective is the way the individuals are grouped, in the weak sense that their individual goals have a certain predictable aggregative impact. Cripps argues that Polluters can be reasonably expected to be aware of the harm that their individual emissions cause between them, and also aware of how there are many others who emit in the same way, i.e. consumption patterns based on luxuries that could be foregone at less than significant cost to the individuals.29 The duty of Polluters is to mitigate and enable adaptation to climate change that the current generations are responsible for based on the no-harm principle. Where neither is possible, Polluters also have a duty to compensate, unlike The Young. Compensation is to try to make up for the harm that cannot be prevented. With climate change many impacts are already happening and will continue for centuries to come, so some serious harm is already inevitable. Therefore compensation applies. (Cripps 2013, pp. 68-77). These three collectives each have a weakly collective duty to organise as necessary in order to be able to act on climate change collectively. The duties are to the victims of climate change, to each harmed individual. While the duties arise out of different bases, and are different in scope (mitigation only, or also adaptation and compensation), in each case they translate to a duty to organise as necessary. As the categories partly overlap, most of the global affluent have two or even three grounds to take weakly collective climate duties seriously. Cripps (2013, p. 79) argues that individual duties follow from the collective ones at two levels: "those incurred within a fairly allocated collective scheme to tackle climate change; and those incurred by an individual in the absence of collective action." Currently there is no fairly allocated collective scheme, although there is plenty of discussion on what the fair distribution of burdens between states, for example, should look like. Some other collective actors might also be included in such a scheme, as I argued with regards to corporate responsibility for mitigation in the previous chapter. What is missing, and what is urgently required, is a coherent policy framework that provides a contract for shared participation-whether through voluntary measures or, as many campaigners now demand, some form of tax, ration, or dividend-within which personal actions are recognised and rewarded alongside equally important contributions from government, business, and fossil fuel companies. (Marshall 2014, p. 197). I agree with Cripps that we should seek to bring such a collective-level solution about and that any action towards this end is the best way to try to meet our duties qua constituents of unorganised not responsible for, but it is less clear what the distribution of burdens between them and The Able should be. Those members of The Able who belong also to The Young might be required to bear some additional burden. 29 Polluters thus fulfil Cripps's three-part sufficient condition for weakly collective responsibility, see footnote 11 in chapter five. 125 collectives. However, I do not find that the picture she offers of how these duties are based is a persuasive one. A big problem for Cripps, and one that she does not address, is that if we base responsibilities on our collective ability to aid, there will be competing claims, all of which are not possible to achieve simultaneously.30 It is not clear that The Able should put their efforts into mitigating climate change rather than providing universal primary education to all children in poor countries, work to eradicate global poverty and easily avoidable childhood mortality, to give just some examples. How should The Able decide what they should collectively do among the competing projects that would all further fundamental interests and prevent harms? This is also what a lot of the actual public policy discussions around spending on mitigation centres around: what public spending reaps the best results (Hormio 2017b). The Young could face a similar dilemma, at least those alive already (rather than the passive members of the collective, yet-to-be-born sometime in the future). This problem could be spelled out in terms of perfect and imperfect duties. While I borrow these from Kant, I will use them simply to refer to things that we should definitely do (perfect duties) and things that we should do, but that have to be balanced out by considerations of other such duties ― that thus come with some leeway about how to fulfil them (imperfect duties).31 At best, Cripps's model can argue that The Able and The Young have imperfect duties to take action to mitigate climate change, but this is hardly enough and also much less than what she argues the model achieves.32 She cannot appeal to the fact that since our individual emissions do harm, that is why we should reduce them even when we could be promoting a lot of good with the same resources (like Broome 2012, p. 66 argues), because she explicitly denies that they do harm. While The Able are all about co-operating to prevent serious suffering and harm to others at a less than significant cost to themselves, there is nothing to suggest that they could not do so more efficiently in other areas not directly related to climate change.33 Ideally we would want to argue that they should do both, i.e. to take action on climate change and prevent serious suffering and harm in other ways, but I do not see how we can get there on Cripps's account. 30 She allows that an individual, taken in isolation, could do more good by donating her money to Oxfam to save people from extreme poverty, instead of spending her resources to address climate change (2013, p. 120). But this is in the context of 'mimicking' and 'direct' duties and is meant to highlight the difference between individual and collectivelevel duties. 31 As Richardson (1994, p. 71) notes, Kant utilises the notion of latitude to explore how the extent and nature of an imperfect duty needs to be further specified: when exactly must we help others and in what way, what kind of sacrifices can be required of us, and so forth. Richardson suggests that our common beliefs about beneficence are latitudinarian in a similar way and that norms can be logically non-absolute. We should do "enough", but it is up to us what and when, although it is clear when we have not done anything even close to enough. 32 In a footnote (fn.46, p. 221) she states that if she would use the terminology, each weakly collective duty would be perfect, but the only reason she gives for this is that they identify both the duty-bearer and the victim. She makes no reference to the possibility of competing (imperfect) duties of collectives based on ability. 33 To fully address climate change, I find that we must address other global issues of injustice also, first and foremost inequality, but this does not affect the point about competing priorities. 126 One could argue that given the urgency of climate change, priority should be given to climate related duties, especially since climate change is connected to other problems.34 I agree at the level of policy and I argue as much in Hormio 2017b, where I discuss climate change as a threat to lifesupporting, critical forms of natural capital. However, there is no such discussion in Cripps's account, and more importantly, it is not clear that prioritising climate change over other issues would hold true to all individuals who factor in The Able. After all, some of them are likely to make more difference to alleviate suffering (now and in the future) by concentrating on, for example, funding cures for easily treatable and preventable deadly diseases such as diarrhoea.35 Or maybe, given their unique position, something else suggests itself as their priority duty, such as removing structural barriers that keep people in acute poverty. Although all things considered, climate change is one of the most urgent and biggest threats to humanity (maybe even the most urgent and the biggest), when it comes to the level of an individual person who has the capacity to help, it is not given that that individual should prioritise climate change mitigation and adaptation over other concerns. We are therefore left with Polluters, a category that most climate ethic responsibility models are willing to assign mitigation responsibility to. Cripps is right to do this, but her account lacks the apparatus to really explain why we are responsible despite the apparently marginal nature of our emissions. Recall Footbridge from the beginning of this chapter and how Cripps (2013, p. 74) argued that that Polluters are weakly collectively responsible "in precisely the same way". I denied this, but allowed that her other example of a should-be collectivity Swimming teenagers fares better as an allegory to climate change, depending on a reading, i.e. as long as we allow that the individual actions are interconnected. However, while it is similar enough to the actual climate change scenario in that it appreciates the faulty structures that lead to the unintended consequences (very broadly put), Cripps's model can only show who the too-splashy teenagers are at a given moment in time (say, the year 2017) and what they should do at that moment of crisis. However, it cannot explain why they or someone else should change the underlying structures so that similar threats do not rise again and again. As I argued earlier, climate change does not represent a one-off problem, but rather a long-term, wide-ranging set of issues. To respond to it in an adequate manner, therefore, we need to work on structures and long-term changes. If high emitters are viewed as atomistic individuals akin to the pedestrians with 15kg rucksacks, or the too-splashy lone swimmers, we lack a persuasive narrative why these people and not the ineffectual Bridge and Small Lake Council (something I made up: no such a thing is included in the 34 Thank you to Bill Wringe for the suggestion. 35 Each year a quarter of a million children die from diarrhoea, a condition both easily treatable and preventable. Diarrhoea can be treated with salts and prevented by safe drinking water and adequate sanitation and hygiene. It is the second leading cause of death in children under five: the World Health Organization's latest fact sheet on diarrhoeal disease from April 2013 (www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs330/en) puts the annual mortality figure at 760,000. 127 original cases)36 should take action to repair and rebuild the bridge before it collapses on anyone, or set up rules to keep the turbulence in the lake at a non-dangerous level. I will argue in the next chapter that Kutz's quasi-participatory intention can help us to fill this gap, whether we are discussing Polluters, or some other such unorganised collective that could be argued to be relevant for climate change, such as consumers. I am not denying that a lot of what Polluters do is just individual parallel action within a structural context (as opposed to genuine joint action), and that this leads to unintended consequence of emissions on the vast scale that we are currently witnessing.37 But our structures are upheld by the choices we continue to make.38 Our individual duties related to collective action are therefore not just parallel individual duties. I will return to this in chapter five. When denying the need for intentions when discussing collective responsibility, Cripps bypasses the literature on collective action.39 However, her own account of collective action (or individual action in a collective setting) is not spelled out and amounts to not much more than statements like "individuals acting together" or "continued failure to act collectively". Her model makes no separation between individual parallel action and collective action. Furthermore, it makes a jump from individual duty to collective agency and what is between the two is not explained or filled in. This way, it falls prey to the problem that Kutz (2000, p. 177) puts forward when he discusses problematic accountability in unorganised collectives: "[a]lthough there is pressure to regard ourselves as part of the collective that does harm, the ethical links between us as individuals and us as members of the collective dissolve under reflection." The solution he offers is to try to find psychologically feasible motivations that would lead individuals to shun contributing to collective harms. 36 With it I mean to give a nod to those arguments that want to place all the responsibility for taking action on climate change to governments and intergovernmental agencies. 37 Our choice of method of transport (and the fact that many of us nowadays tend to move around so much in the first place, whether for business or pleasure) is individual to a degree, but the framework is given by social structures that limit the options available and give incentives towards certain options. The same goes for housing, food, etc. 38 Structures are also upheld by collective agents of various form: nation-states, corporations and smaller companies, local and international agencies, and so on. 39 While I share the motivating concern that Cripps has that there are collectively caused harms that are not captured by accounts that focus on collective agency the opposition of her model with the "intentionalists" is unnecessary and leads astray. Cripps argues (2011a, p. 12) that intentionalist models of collectives do not separate between social groups and collectives, treating them essentially as one and the same, even though social groups are just a subset of collectives. She continues that if we instead aim to identify all collectives this "allows us to express new truths about certain situations in which individuals actually find themselves: a set of relations within which individual acts have a peculiarly collective significance and within which there is at least a prudential case for developing a framework for collective action." However, while we need to expand collective responsibility discussions into unorganised collectives, the way we define collective entities depends on the aim of the definition, and therefore there does not exist, and need not exist, any one definition or notion of collectives. By framing the discussion as she does, Cripps is in a danger of creating somewhat of a straw man: she accuses a debate focused on the nature of joint action for failing to answer the problems of unorganised collective harms where no true joint action exists (Hormio 2015). 128 Moral theories should try to accommodate the conceptions people have of themselves as moral agents: "A theory of individual complicit accountability must be psychologically feasible: it must be generally capable of motivating (or restraining) action, and it must be able to survive individual moral reflection." (Kutz 2000, p. 123). Furthermore, this "rules out purely institutional approaches to the problem, for such approaches fail to accommodate themselves adequately to individuals' own conceptions of themselves and others as moral agents." Skimming over what collective action is makes Cripps's account both psychologically empty and morally not as compelling as it could be. At the end of the day, the solution she offers is purely institutional. I will discuss what I hope is a more compelling alternative in the next chapter. Chapter 5 – Marginal participation and complicity for collective harms As individuals we understandably feel small and powerless when we think about climate change and oppression, for example. But when we reorient ourselves in relation to others and take the broader perspective of collective action, new moral possibilities present themselves, and our contributions, small though they may be, gain greater significance from the collective contexts in which they take place. Tracy Isaacs (2011, pp. 19-20) Because individuals are the ultimate loci of normative motivation and deliberation, only forms of accountability aimed at and sensitive to what individuals do can succeed in controlling the emergence of collective harms. The oughts of morality and politics must apply to me. The trick lies, then, not in modifying the fundamental bearer of accountability, but in expanding the scope of individual accountability by including an assessment of what an individual does with others. Christopher Kutz (2000, p. 7) When we debate climate change responsibility, questions pertaining to both marginal participation and direct responsibility (of individual and collective agents) are relevant. I discussed the direct responsibility of individual agents in chapter two and that of collective agents in chapter three. Now it is time to turn our attention to marginal participation. In chapter four I rejected attempts to account for marginal participation for collectively caused harms by placing collective obligations on unorganised collectives. In this chapter I will discuss an alternative way to conceptualise the responsibility of agents in such situations: complicity. The literature on individual complicity for climate change is slim, but in recent years few accounts have emerged (including Attfield 2009, Hormio 2013, and Lawson 2013).1 These accounts want to place the responsibility on the individual qua collectives, not directly on the unorganised collectives. I will introduce Christopher Kutz's (2000) account of complicity and apply it to climate change. For Kutz, the notion of participation is at the heart of collective action and collective responsibility. "Intentional participation provides a special basis for ascribing individual members' actions to the group as a whole, and to the group members individually. When we act together, we are each accountable for what we all do, because we are each authors of our collective acts." (2000, p. 138). Our authorship is inclusive in collective acts, rather than exclusive as it is when we act alone. Both make 1 For an anthropological account of moral complicity regarding climate change, see Hughes 2013. For closely related accounts on consumer complicity, see Lawford-Smith 2017 and Schwartz 2010. 130 us accountable, but are fundamentally different responsive positions (p. 139). I will discuss how responses of accountability make sense and can exist only "within particular concrete social relationships" (p. 139) that are the key to shared responsibility. I grant that judgements of responsibility must have an individual basis, for if we hold agents responsible on the basis of what others have done, we fail to respond to them as distinct persons.2 However, as Kutz points out, the object of accountability is analytically distinct from the basis of accountability. While judgements of responsibility must have an individualistic basis, the object of accountability can be collective. I think this is one of his most helpful insights. Collective action can have unintended consequences, just as individual action can. We saw in chapter two how accounts that concentrate on the quality of the will of an agent cannot assign responsibility for climate change to individuals. I do not intend any harm when I heat up my home in the winter, nor when I use a plastic keyboard that is manufactured using oil to type these words. In Kutz's view, we can be held morally accountable for collectively produced harms, even in situations when our individual effects are negligible. Although he does not discuss climate change, greenhouse gas emissions are a prime example of this. As Isaacs (2011, p. 7) puts it, "we are now experiencing the cumulative impact of individuals living their lives in ways that, until recently, no one had good reason to question." Agents can be accountable for unintended harms also as long as they foreseeably flow from actions that can be reasonably described as part of the shared goal. Kutz (2000, p. 114) offers a slogan for those who like slogans: "No participation without implication", although he recognises that the difficulties and complications of making ethical judgements cannot be captured by slogans. Unless we can provide a link between the collective harms and their individualistic basis, we fail to understand the nature of collective action: collective acts do not just emerge from parallel individual action where each agent pursues their private ends (Kutz 2000, pp. 137-138).3 Or as Nefsky (2015) argues, for us to be able to derive normative implications directly from an individual being part of a group we need an explanation of why the membership (participation) has these 2 Collective responsibility is not the same as collective guilt. Arendt (1948, 1963) distinguishes collective guilt from collective (political) responsibility, arguing that confusing the two obscures the real political issues that need to be dealt with. "Where all are guilty, nobody in the last analysis can be judged." (Arendt 1991[1948], p. 278). Young's (2011, pp. 75-93) argument is that structural, "ordinary" injustices can arise out of multitudinous individual and collective acts that are not unjust by themselves, and therefore guilt would be an inappropriate way to respond to these cases of collective responsibility. 3 Kutz (2000, pp. 130-131) argues that Parfit fails to show why the relation of an individual act and a set of acts should be morally significant as the relation itself is nonconsequential. While he allows for the object of assessment to be collective (the set of acts), Parfit at the same time forfeits "an intelligible and internalizable link between individual agents and the object of moral assessment"; he simply asserts it, therefore undermining "the capacity of an accountability system to regulate reflective behavior" (p. 137). 131 normative implications, and for that we need an understanding of what participation consists in.4 This, I find, is essentially what goes wrong with Cripps's account discussed in the last chapter. Recall Swimming teenagers (the allegory supposed to illustrate how Polluters are responsible) and how the teenagers all independently arrived at the scene and independently began splashing around in the same way.5 As Kutz (2000, p. 138) argues, in this kind of view, "collective acts are mysterious emergent effects", and the end result, i.e. the suffering of the victim(s), "seems to be a remarkable coincidence, a result unexplainable in terms of the [participants'] intentions, for no one intends to do harm." None of the teenagers want to put the child in danger of drowning, any more than the current generations aim to put future humans in danger. I will argue that our emitting actions are not this kind of parallel behaviour, but rather co-operative behaviour within a social structure.6 This chapter proceeds as follows. To begin with, I will motivate the complicity account by discussing issues of marginal participation in section 5.1. Many individual emission choices fall under this, such as one-off decisions of taking a plane or the train. I will argue in this chapter (following Kutz) that participatory intentions are the key to understanding responsibility in these cases. Participatory intentions, very simply put, are intentions to participate in collective (joint) action. However, before we can get to Kutz's account, I will set the scene by looking at his positional and relational understanding of accountability in section 5.2. This understanding is important for the idea of complicity. In section 5.3 I will introduce Kutz's Complicity Principle. I will then introduce the quasi-participatory basis of accountability in section 5.4, which applies in systemic harms by unorganised collectives. 5.1 Marginal participation and overdetermination In this section I discuss why marginal participation is problematic for many theories of moral responsibility. This will motivate the account of complicity that I will present in the later sections of the chapter. Although an individual's emissions can cause harm as I argued in chapter two, climate 4 Nefsky (2015) distinguishes between Weak Participation (Parfit) and Strong Participation (Kutz) approaches that both reject the implication that just because our individual acts do not make a difference to an outcome, we have no reason to refrain from the act (or to do it). She notes how Weak Participation and Strong Participation both make the claim that while you might not make a difference, you are part of a group that does. However, the difference is that while Weak Participation goes no further than this claim, Strong Participation attempts to explain why participation has normative implications. She does not discuss Cripps but her argument would arguably go under Weak Participation. 5 I argued in section 4.1 that this is not the structure of climate change harms, i.e. it is not the case that Polluters are pursuing their own private ends and unintended consequences aggregate. Instead, I will argue in the next chapter that climate change harm is for a large part a structural injustice. 6 With polluters taken as an unorganised collective, the relevant hook will be quasi-participatory intentions, but in many cases of marginal participation "regular" participatory intentions will suffice. To awaken a sense of responsibility in people who do not yet feel any (in cases where participatory intentions apply) we should reflect on "the way in which jointly acting individuals see themselves as promoting a common end" (Kutz 2000, p. 138). 132 change as an outcome is overdetermined, even though the severity of it is not. I will also argue that climate change represents what I will call a mixed harm: a combination of a threshold harm and an overdetermined harm. In causal terms, overdetermination occurs when multiple actual distinct events are symmetrically redundant in the sense that they are causally on a par with respect to causing an event: two rocks shatter a window (Schaffer 2003). One rock would have shattered the window just the same, but two were thrown simultaneously. "An effect is overdetermined if there are more causes present than would be necessary to bring it about" (Cripps 2013, p. 209). In moral terms, the harm (broken window) caused by the two vandals throwing the rocks at the same time was also overdetermined. What does this mean for individual responsibility? Kutz (2000, p. 177) poses the question: What is the ethical significance of the fact that an individual's act lies in the causal path of a harm, even though the act is neither necessary nor sufficient for the harm or wrong? An answer to this question ideally will provide agents with reasons to make repair to the victims of the collective harm, and to avoid such actions in the future. The answer that he gives is complicity. I find that complicity is an important concept when it comes to climate change harms for more than one reason. I argued in chapter two that lifestyle choices can be morally significant, as the cumulative emissions from these are noteworthy even at the level of individual emissions. Even so, many individual emission choices fall under marginal participation, such as a one-off decision to take a plane or a train, and this is where the complicity account becomes useful. Furthermore, our individual actions within particular collective projects (within collective agents) are sometimes normatively overdetermined. Last but not least, with each passing year the average individual's emissions (taken as an individual) will matter less if a collective solution is not found. Complicity will allow us to discuss responsibility in all these cases. When individual contribution in a collective harm is overdetermined in the normative sense, no individual's action or omission is necessary or sufficient for the normative properties of a collective outcome (Parfit 1986[1984], pp. 82-83, Kutz 2000, Cripps 2013, p. 50). I will argue that this applies to climate change also, even though the actions of certain agents, especially certain collective agents, can affect the severity of the resulting harm and when it will be realised. This is because the fact remains that climate change poses a serious threat to our basic functionings and capabilities, regardless of exactly how severe it turns out to be. In other words, I take it that the normatively relevant property, severe harm, is overdetermined. When we are dealing with overdetermined harms, it seems that it makes no difference whether or not I act or refrain from taking a certain action. And when acting in a certain way seems to make no difference to an outcome, it is hard to see how we might have a reason to refrain from acting in 133 such a way. Take a one-off decision to take a plane or a train as an example: a scheduled flight (or a train) will still take off (or leave) even with one (more) empty seat. The emissions of the slightly heavier plane (with one additional individual) are slightly more, but the difference is not normatively significant. In that sense, the emissions resulting from the decision to travel or not (and by plane or by train) are overdetermined: no individual travelling decision taken in isolation affects emissions. This is not to argue that decisions like this do not matter; they do, but the reason why they do has to be spelled out in terms of collective action. Recall from chapter two how Broome argues that our individual emissions are significant, as every reduction is beneficial (at the present moment in history at least), in addition to our individual emissions causing harm and increasing the risk of harm. In the same chapter I also noted how Cripps (2016, p. 125) has argued against Broome that the harm our individual emissions do is insignificant due to the quantity being so small, as there is "a significant difference between depriving one person of six months of life, and causing the loss of six months of healthy human life spread across so many people that each one loses only the most infinitesimal fraction of a second". Her argument is that as "long as we think only qua private individual, there remains the objection that what I do doesn't cause anybody to suffer anything." In response, Broome (2016, p. 162) argued that "[a] harm is significant when it matters", and that "there is an extremely significant difference between a very small number and zero", as adding up many zeros amounts to nothing, but adding up many small numbers can add up to a big number. He compared the situation to a bank that steals a penny from each of its customers, with the millions of pennies amounting to a significant sum that is a serious injustice. Each emitter could therefore be thought of as a bank that steals pennies from future people, amounting to a significant sum. Broome's point is that each person is committing an injustice. Cripps's argument, on the other hand, is that individual pennies make sense as a harm only if we look at the case from the collective viewpoint. I think Cripps's worry is mostly right, although we should be careful not to equate imperceptibility with insignificance. Let us say that I somehow steal a penny from ten million wealthy individuals, thus netting 100,000 pounds in the process. I have not harmed any of the ten million people, as each has lost only a negligible amount of money that makes no difference to their lives, although I have done wrong (committed an injustice), even more so if I am in a position of trust, like the bank would be. However, the wrong I have done cannot be based on the harm I have caused, as I have not caused harm. But if all my fellow five million Finns would do the same, i.e. each would steal a penny from these ten million wealthy people, then each one of our victims stands to lose five million pennies, and 50,000 pounds is no longer an insignificant amount to lose even for a wealthy individual. This latter scenario is closer to the anthropogenic climate change scenario: millions and 134 millions of us are stealing pennies from future generations. However, while the harm we do as individuals to any given future individual is negligible, the harm we do together is significant.7 If an individual's action has imperceptible effects, and is not performed repeatedly, we are essentially dealing with Parfit's (1986, p. 80) famous case of a mistake in moral mathematics, The Harmless Torturers.8 In Parfit's original example, a thousand torturers press a button that distributes a miniscule pain to a thousand victims, and because there are a thousand torturers, each victim is in severe pain, although no single torturer can be said to have made their pain worse. However, even if each individual torturer harms no one, together they impose great suffering on their thousand victims (p. 81). "Even if an act harms no one, this act may be wrong because it is one of a set of acts that together harm other people" (p. 70).9 I will discuss Spiekermann's (2014b, p. 77) one-victim only version of the case: A group of n torturers can each push a button to increase the voltage of the electric shock the victim receives by the amount 1,000 volt / n (one "notch"). The pain caused by 1,000 volts is excruciating. It is plausible to assume that there is a number of torturers n so large that the victim cannot distinguish between x torturers and x + 1 torturers for any x between 0 and n − 1. Suppose the torturers push their button only once. If the harm done is defined as the additional suffering caused, then, it can be argued, none of the single torturers causes any harm. And, unlike the case of carbon emissions, there is no larger individual action pattern that would cause any perceptible effects and could be criticized on the basis of the harm caused, since the torturers will not repeat their action. Each individual torturer cannot (when taken as an isolated individual) change the excruciating pain felt by the victim given the contributions of all other individual torturers. At the same time, however, several individuals together could make a difference to the victim's pain. This is the penny situation. Spiekermann (p. 87) argues that we should consider minimal perceptible subsets of the set of all actions. With minimal perceptible subsets he refers to "those sets that contain just enough actions such that together these actions avoid minimal change insensitivity-they can jointly make a perceptible 7 I want to separate my view from what Frank Jackson (1987) has argued, namely that the morality of an action depends on the difference it makes. He, like me, uses counterfactual reasoning to compare the case where an act was performed with what would be the case if it was not performed. However, unlike me, Jackson argues that the morality depends on the relationship between the two, i.e. the difference an action makes. In contrast to such consequentialistonly reasoning, I argue that marginal participation can and does matter morally, but that the wrongness of an act cannot be based on its consequences alone if it does no harm in isolation from the set. Instead, the wrongness is based on complicity in my view. Jackson's argument is that that the group action (understood as aggregation or sum of individual actions, like a thousand bandits stealing a bean each from a thousand villagers) can be described as wrong, but I want to argue that the individual bean stealing is wrong as well, but not due to the difference it makes. 8 Broome (2016, p. 163) refers to Parfit in refuting that imperceptible harms could not be significant. 9 The difficulty is how to cash out this intuition: if each torturer causes only miniscule pain (imperceptible by itself), it makes no difference to the pain the victim feels whether 1,000 torturers or 999 participated (or 423 instead of 422 etc.). My own view is that it is disingenuous to do something you would not do otherwise just because you have calculated that under the circumstances your act will not make a difference, and it would make you susceptible to arguments about your character. This would make you complicit in the torture through reasons of character (see next section). 135 difference" (p. 88). In this view, actions that are individually imperceptible can still be wrong because they are expected to bring about harm together with other actions. Individual actions within such a set leads to increased expected experienced harm for the victim.10 So, while I agree with Broome (2016, p. 163) that the imperceptibility of harms can be irrelevant from the point of view of justice (as a set of imperceptible actions are equal to small numbers and not to zeroes; they add up), I agree with Cripps that the reason why they count as harms has to be spelled out in terms of acting together with others, i.e. in terms of collective action.11 Bringing Spiekermann into the mix, we could say that minimal perceptible subsets of individual emissions cause harm. This applies to climate change harms too (see also Peeters et al 2015, pp. 74-78; Vanderheiden 2008, p. 165). There are several things going on with climate change harms and individuals. One is the impossibility of linking the harm done to any one future individual to any one current individual's emissions: we cannot do this as counterfactually we make no difference.12 Another question is do we commit a wrong by stealing pennies (fractions of seconds) from millions of victims: we do, but not by reasons of consequence. Yet another is the peculiar nature of greenhouse gas emissions: some of them stay in the air for centuries or longer. We are already committed to changes in our climate and all emissions increase the likelihood of harmful effects. Climate change harms are incremental because greenhouse gases stay in the atmosphere for so long (Peeters et al. 2015, p. 77). My individual lifetime emissions might not do any harm in any single event, but during the centuries 10 "Even though the action does not by itself increase experienced harm, the action is expected to do so in the following sense: The action (to contribute to the voltage) will be part of minimal perceptible subsets of contributions such that the actions of these subsets together can be felt by the victim. And since there is a positive probability that all the actions in the subsets are "not contribute" or "contribute," there is a positive probability that these subsets can make a difference." (Spiekermann 2014b, p. 88). 11 The solution that Cripps (2013, p. 69) offers to aggregated harms is to formalise the need for action through the notion of a should-be collective, where the individuals are grouped in a weak sense of their individual goals having a certain predictable aggregative impact: Cripps's weakly collective responsibility claim A number of individuals who do not yet constitute a collectivity (either formally, with an acknowledged decision-making structure, or informally, with some vaguely defined common interest or goal) can be held collectively morally responsible for serious harm (fundamental interest deprivation) which has been caused by the predictable aggregation of avoidable individual actions. She (2013, p. 69) supplements the weakly collective responsibility claim with a three-part sufficient condition: • the individuals acted in ways which, in aggregate, caused harm, and which they were aware (or could reasonably be expected to have foreseen) would, in aggregate, cause harm (although each only intentionally performed his own act); • they were all aware (or could reasonably be expected to have foreseen) that there were enough others similarly placed (and so similarly motivated to act) for the combined actions to bring about the harm; and • the contributory actions were avoidable at less than comparable cost to the individuals. One problem with this approach is that it gives us no tools to differentiate between individuals and the differences between individual participation. Another problem is that it faces the problem of mutual release, see section 6.1. 12 Perhaps it is not even true that counterfactually our individual emitting acts make no difference; perhaps we currently only lack any way of measuring what such a difference might be. Lawford-Smith (2016a, p. 67) suggests that even though our current technology is not sophisticated enough to measure the effect of a single emitting action on the atmosphere ― not even the effect of our yearly or lifetime actions, just estimates of these ― there is still no reason to think that in principle those tiny little differences do not add up. Furthermore, the difference might become perceptible with some future technology. 136 they are in the air they will have the chance of causing harm on innumerable occasions (by being the emission that tips a concentration over some tipping point). As Broome argued in chapter two, it is extraordinarily unlikely that they will do no harm at all. Conversely, reducing our emissions is beneficial, as it could delay certain thresholds from being passed. What we are left with then is a picture of climate change harms where most of the harms caused by our emissions are overdetermined in that they would have taken place even without us as an individual existing, but the lifetime emissions of each of us have innumerable occasions to contribute to harm during the centuries that they spend in the atmosphere. To illustrate this, consider this very simplified figure where the total emissions emitted by a collective pass various tipping points, resulting in various harms.13 I make no pretence to portray actual climate science with this figure, it is only meant to illustrate the complexity of marginal participation with mixed harms like climate change where there are several expected thresholds of harms. Our individual lifetime emissions are but a little microscopic speck on the chart, if even that. When we are under threshold of Harm 3 (like we are on Year 70 for example), we are only contributing to the risk of Harm 3 materialising. At the same time our individual (lifetime) emissions are counterfactually not required for Harm 2 to have taken place: i.e. while in Year 50 we could not have said that Harm 2 was overdetermined, in Year 70 we can say that it is. By the Year 150 all six harms 13 Thank you to John Davies for drawing the figure from the sketch in my notebook. 137 will become overdetermined. Every early emission reduction is thus more significant than later ones, although the later the emission occurs, the more likely it is that it will contribute to several harms (i.e. be among the set of emissions that crosses a certain tipping point). My view is that even if we grant that individual lifestyle emission can cause harm (which I think we should), this still leaves most of our everyday emissions choices in the context of overdetermination: the train to Tampere will leave with or without me. Uncertainty is a big issue with climate change harms: due to the complexity of the climate system, we do not know where exactly the harm thresholds are (or how many there are), so we cannot know with any certainty if our emissions will cause harms, especially as they can interact with other emissions in various ways. As Lawford-Smith (2016a, p. 76) argues, when we are dealing with so much uncertainty, we have to turn to expectations or probabilities of difference-making. Recall from chapter two that what matters with risk is not just the likelihood of an outcome, but also the expected value of an outcome (Broome 2010). Therefore I suggest that our individual duties have to be based on likelihoods of serious harm: to not to perform actions that in the light of the current science can be reasonably expected to cause harm to basic human functionings and capabilities. Counterfactual argument is an important tool for consequentialism as it "invites us to [--] consider how the history of the world would have gone had I acted differently", with my act being wrong if the counterfactual history would have been better than what actually took place (Kagan 2011, p. 106).14 For a consequentialist, climate change is inherently a problematic concept at the level of individual actions unless individual difference can be shown. The argument by Sinnott-Armstrong discussed in the second chapter illustrated that orthodox consequentialist approaches are inadequate in accounting for collective wrongdoing where an individual contribution makes no perceptible difference to the outcome.15 A view like his fundamentally "fails to acknowledge the interpersonal nature of morality"; that responses of accountability between individuals are essential constituents of relationships that in turn allow people to flourish (Kutz 2000, p. 128).16 Broome utilises deontology-style duties of justice as counterfactually individual emissions might not make a difference. Note that the discussion here is about an individual: consequentialists do not face these problems with the harm that collective agents cause as those effects are far from marginal. The problem of marginal participation for consequentialists thus lies at the individual level. 14 Kagan (2011) argues that collective action problems can be solved straightforwardly by consequentialist reasoning, as contrary to appearances, it is not that individual acts make no difference: they might. For criticism, see Nefsky (2011) and Lawford-Smith (2016a). 15 Kutz (2000, pp. 124-125) argues that whenever participation is marginal, direct consequentialism like actutilitarianism is indifferent to it, so it cannot provide adequate grounds for judging that some individual is accountable. Indirect consequentialist approaches like rule-utilitarianism do not fare much better, according to him, because if nothing is gained from nonparticipation, there is no rational reason to have a rule that would prohibit participation (p. 127). 16 Consequentialist virtue theories could potentially fare better with marginal participation cases. 138 Kantians can be just as much in trouble with cases of marginal participation, according to Kutz (pp. 132-135), as he argues that marginal participation can pass the universalisation test. An act is permissible in Kantian deontology if its maxim (the underlying intentions) could be willed to be universal without contradiction in conception, i.e. the agent could act successfully in a world where all other agents would also act upon that maxim. Agents have a perfect duty not to act upon a maxim that fails this test. Kutz (p. 134) explains: "Unlike the paradigm Kantian cases of impermissibility, such as making a lying promise, the possibility of making only a marginal contribution is enhanced rather than undermined by universal practice. The more who join in a cooperative scheme, the more negligible the contribution of each." To illustrate, consider this formulation: "I will continue to emit greenhouse gases by flying out weekly on work trips, in order to not to rock the boat at my workplace, but only because I know the emissions from my flights won't make a difference to anthropogenic climate change occurring." One could formulate countless similar maxims, for example, by replacing flying with eating meat, and referring to extended family and customs instead of the workplace. Kant also discusses imperfect duties, duties that are general but sometimes defeasible, i.e. they can be overruled in certain situations. While with perfect duties there is a contradiction in the conception of the maxim, imperfect duties are based on the test of contradiction of will. For example, a rational agent cannot will a world where no-one ever cares for others, even if one was willing to forego such care himself, as then no-one would care for others even when it is necessary for survival. Imperfect duties fare better with marginal acts, as the combined outcomes of those acts can result in a world where rational agents cannot pursue their ends. The test does get something important right, as it "fixes appropriately on the marginal participant's identification with the collective act", but it "fails to explain the significance of that connection", as to do so it would have to "incorporate the logic of collective action" (Kutz 2000, p. 136). When an individual act is sufficient to produce a harm, universalising the act universalises the harm, but this automatic connection breaks down in marginal participation. The Kantian test of contradiction in will merely stipulates the collective harm: "an individual marginal effect universalized remains both individual and marginal" (p. 137). Therefore, the contradiction of will test misses the point as "the problem posed by collective action is that it introduces a gap between act and harm" (Kutz 2000, p. 135). To rule such maxims out as flying for weekly work trips, we would have to incorporate the logic of collective action that is not included in the universalisation test itself. To complete the scheme, the logic of collective action must be incorporated into the test in order to account for the harm that these flights cause in aggregate. While in Kant's deontological view virtuous intentions insulate us from responsibility, Kutz wants to draw attention to the grey zone of producing bad outcomes without intending to do so. 139 Facts about the will of the agents by themselves do not capture the unique social context of an action. If we, on the other hand, try to draw individual responsibility directly from the outcome in cases of marginal participation, we face the problem of individual agency disappearing, as all symmetrically placed agents can correctly claim that they made no difference to the outcome (p. 122). Kutz claims that we should not make our moral focus overly narrow, because "if we restrict our discussion of accountability to just [-] individualistic objects, we lose sight of an important category of harms and wrongs. We ignore those harms and wrongs that result essentially from collective action, and that could not be the product of any one individual" (Kutz 2000, p. 115). Essentially the argument is that we should put our innumerable relations to each other at the centre of discussions on what we are responsible for. I will discuss Kutz's proposed solution to assigning responsibility in cases of marginal participation later in this chapter, but first I will look at what those innumerable relations might consists of. 5.2 Positional and relational conception of individual accountability In this section, I will outline Kutz's conception of accountability that is important to understanding his account of complicity. When our relationships with each other are put at the centre of ethics, it gives us tools to unlock puzzles presented by marginal participation. "Agents are held morally accountable for intentionally threatening or acting indifferently towards morally protected interests, inadvertently causing those interests harm, or symbolically impugning the significance of those interests through their statements, convictions, and associations." (Kutz 2000, p. 26). This section will set out the main arguments for positional and relational individual accountability. I will first summarise Kutz's account on each point and then illustrate their content with examples of my own. Accountability is "the implicit or explicit expectation that one may be called on to justify one's beliefs, feelings, and actions to others" (Lerner and Tetlock 1999, p. 255). Out of all animal species, human beings are the best at co-operating beyond kinship, and for the large part this is achieved because we have created systems of formal and informal accountability (Haidt 2012, p. 75). In standard desert-based models of accountability, once an action is deemed right or wrong, the agent responsible deserves praise or punishment in proportion to the act. Critical of this approach, Kutz (2000, pp. 18-19) accuses it of conflating the judgement of wrongfulness with the judgement of accountability. Desert-based models are non-positional: the search for a uniquely determined response fails to take the relation of the respondent and the agent into account. In contrast, his concept of accountability is both positional and relational, as we should separate the fact of wrongdoing from the responses it warrants. Kutz (p. 21) points out that social and moral 140 accountability share a common set of psychological responses, those of reactive attitudes such as indignation, shame, guilt and resentment. We react to violations of social and moral norms with these attitudes in our everyday lives, and the deep structural features of relationality and positional dependence are shared by moral, social and legal accountability. The social and moral strands of our relationships mimic each other and are tangled up to the point of being near inseparable when it comes to the norms they give rise to (p. 25). Accountability therefore needs to be understood as an assortment of relations among agents. I will discuss a bad friend example to elaborate how relationality and positional dependence affects the kind of responses the breach of confidence warrants. I tell you a secret that I have never told anyone before. It is something that took a lot of courage for me to say and I make it clear that I want you as my best friend to keep it absolutely confidential. A few weeks later the sister of your boyfriend asks me about my health and I realise from the words used that my secret is out. Perhaps there was a slip of the tongue of some kind. I am angry at you for breaking my trust. You feel guilt, but are also annoyed at your boyfriend for gossiping with his sister. You only told your boyfriend about my secret as you thought you could trust him 100% and you felt you needed someone to discuss the shock you felt at my admission. Maybe you wanted a sounding board for your ideas of the best way to support me; maybe you just are not that good at keeping secrets. Your boyfriend might feel annoyed at you for being dragged into a fight that he has no desire to be part of. His sister might feel guilty about having knowledge she should not have had and for unintentionally causing a rift between best friends. She might also feel disappointed that I did not confide in her and angry with me for choosing to confide in you instead (let us say we are friends also). Perhaps she is even jealous of you and secretly glad that we are now on bad terms. This example could go on: our parents happen to be neighbours and they have their own reactions to the situation. The lesson is that there does not exist just one warranted response to the breach of confidence between friends but many, dependent on the agents' position and relations relative to the harm. An agent thus deserves not just one uniform response, based on facts about her, but instead varied and many responses from different people dependent upon her relations to others (Kutz 2000, p. 22).17 This much contextualised view on social accountability allows us to explain the array of warranted responses: while I can choose to forgive you, my parents forgiving you on my behalf 17 Allowing for different warranted responses does not lead to relativism in my account, even though responses will vary depending on the context and culture. Kutz avoids taking sides on the relativism debate and describes subjective and objective as follows (2000, p. 24): "Positional dependence as I have characterized it only holds that the standards governing warranted response depend upon the structure of relationships between respondents and agents. But respondents in different positions may be variously correct or mistaken about what those standards warrant without there being one correct response, just as differently placed listeners might be variously correct or mistaken about the pitch of a moving train whistle without there being one pitch all listeners ought to report. In ethics, as in acoustics, the subjective and objective perspectives are not contraries but complements. The objective perspective is what gives the subjective its normative character, transforming attitudes into claims, and preferences into warrants." 141 might not be an appropriate response. As Kutz (p. 23) points out, the harm creates new relationships (such as victim and interested party) that overlay the pre-existing relationships. Our former history of reciprocity might warrant me to forgive you, just as our former history of previous breaches of confidence makes me want to never trust you again. The responses of different agents need not be and cannot be univocal: what response is warranted depends on the relation to harm that the agent is in. There is no single unifying verdict of the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of an action.18 For Kutz, an agent can be held accountable for how they act (reasons of conduct), what they cause (reasons of consequence) and who they are (reasons of character). The perspectives relevant for accountability include the second-person response of the victim (or the victor, depending on the act), the third-person response of the onlookers, as well as the first-person response of the agent herself. Kutz (pp. 64-65) wishes to stress the positional dependence of accountability, by which he means "the way that individuals' various perspectives on and relations to harms inflect the responses they give and are warranted in giving". Reasons of conduct cover the manner in which we act towards other people and the attitudes that our actions manifest. This warrants responses dependent not on the consequences but on the quality of the will of an agent, but this too is relational: the attitudes and expressions of an agent can only be made sense of in the context of the relationship that she has with the respondent. Therefore conduct cannot be judged internally only, independently of external affiliations. What is an appropriate way to behave differs according to specific relations. What is revealed in the course of a normal conversation between friends can seem like oversharing at the workplace, just as what counts as appropriate manners between a student and a teacher would be cold if transported directly into the home environment. Different relationships warrant different responses based on the demands and point of view of that relationship. (Kutz 2000, pp. 26-37). What about causal linkages to consequences then? When we look at things from the onlooker perspective of a role occupier such as a captain, the content of the will no longer matters, but consequences do. As Kutz (pp. 34-35) puts it: "Hierarchical relations are best sustained by external signs, not internal dispositions, because the ambiguities of intention undermine the possibility of decisive moral judgment." Considerations of reasons of consequence are not limited within the confines of roles, of course. Consequences and an agent's causal linkages to these warrant responses 18 This multiplicity of individual points-of-view is also central to Scanlon's (1998) contractualism, but in a slightly different way. If we want to reject a moral principle, our reasons for the rejection need to be from the point of view of an individual, not of an aggregation of individuals. Unlike in utilitarianism, we do not need to maximise the good (or human well-being) and try to occupy a position of impartial benevolence. When we compare two courses of action we are not comparing some objective collective viewpoint where individual effects are aggregated. In Scanlon's model we are always comparing individual viewpoints: aggregate little gains of millions do not outweigh the great suffering of one because what we have to reasonably compare are the claims of each of the million individually against the same claim of the one who is suffering. 142 in many kinds of situations. There is an asymmetry over the importance that causal linkages are given in many first-person responses in comparison to secondor third-person responses, where agents reproach themselves for accidents and faultless conduct that has caused harm (p. 38). To give an example, let us say that on my way to work I stop outside my front door to help a stranger who has fallen on the icy pavement, only to cause my neighbour to fall and break his leg as he trips over the bag that I had to put down in order to assist the fallen pedestrian. I feel guilty even if my neighbour does not blame me. The person I stopped to help probably feels sorry for me, but in any case he would not be warranted to scold me for my actions. This asymmetry reflects the important role causal relations play in agents' understanding of themselves, how they inform their identities and moral narratives about themselves as agents, while in contrast the people affected "care less about causal relations in the absence of faulty conduct" (p. 38). While I might blame myself for my neighbour's broken leg and feel guilty about it, he probably feels no resentment towards me, as it was an accident. Williams (1993, p. 70) discussed the regret an agent feels over some state of affairs the existence of which involved one's agency: "This is not just a regret about what happened, such as a spectator might have. It is an agent's regret, and it is in the nature of action that such regrets cannot be eliminated, that one's life could not be partitioned into some things that one does intentionally and other things that merely happen to one." This regret is a mixture of guilt and shame, even though the agent is not at fault. The regret is directed at the unlucky causal connection that is formed between the agent and the unwanted consequence, how the harm caused becomes part of the history of the agent (Kutz 2000, p. 39). Those affected do not place this emphasis on causal connections because faulty conduct, manifestations of ill will, is what matters in most relations (pp. 41-42). Causality in isolation does not tell us anything about the previous relations of the agent. We view ourselves differently dependent on who is suffering from the harm we brought about. Still, any gesture of repair is about more than just repairing the relation between the agent and the victim (p. 41): When I see myself as accountable for a harm I merely cause, and when repair is possible in part, my gesture of repair is directed at myself as well as at my victim. It is directed at the victim insofar as it attempts to compensate for a burden I have imposed. And it is directed at myself insofar as it provides a way for me to transform my trajectory through the world, eliminating what is unfortunate about what I have done. Here we see a further asymmetry in the responsive positions of the agent and victim, in cases of faultless wrongdoing: While my victim may be indifferent to the source of compensation, I may feel that it must, in symbolic part at least, come from me. And even if neither I nor my victim feels it necessary that I provide compensation, an apology or other gesture of repair may also be called for, and that can come only from me. 143 That leaves us with the last basis for holding someone accountable. While reasons of conduct and reasons of consequence relied upon "direct causal or attitudinal links between agent, victim, and harm", when an agent is held accountable based on reasons of character "the evaluator associates the harm with the agent because the harm manifests or symbolizes an enduring trait of the agent" (Kutz 2000, p. 43). Out of the three forms discussed, this form of accountability is the most unmistakeably relational, as it expresses directly the importance of the agent's relationships to others. Who an agent chooses to affiliate themselves with and who they identify with (or as, when it comes to collectives) is important when assessing her character. Relationships are therefore at the core of reasons of character. When an agent causes no harm through her actions, she might still be accountable if there is enough reason to think that in other circumstances she might have counterfactually caused harm, or at least endorsed harm. Aside from affiliations and social commitments, an agent's motivations and dispositions are some of the other bases for characterbased accountability. Kutz argues that one can feel counterfactual guilt due to the suspicion that one could have acted wrongly based on one's character traits, that one is willing to be associated with compromises that are moral in nature. If you accept a benefit from a tainted source, albeit distant in history, you might feel a pang of guilt over the counterfactual possibility of being complicit when the harm was present. (Kutz 2000, pp. 42-46). Let us say you inherit a piece of land in a country that has a history of exploiting and marginalising its native inhabitants. Your great-great-grandfather settled the land as part of some larger political movement and built a thriving farm on it. It now passes to you due to your uncle having no offspring. You accept the inheritance, as it pays off your mortgage and allows you to secure further education for your children. Still, you feel more than a pinch of guilt when explaining the origin of your newfound wealth to your friends and associates. This is because you are aware of how coolly realistic your character traits are when it comes to securing the interests of those near to you. While you condemn the treatment of the indigenous people by your great-great-grandfather and his generation, you suspect you might have acted just the same had you been living at the time and under similar circumstances. Your guilt is thus counterfactual. You do not need to have anything like certainty about your counterfactual actions for this kind of guilt to appear, you only need the possibility that you might have acted in a way that you now, as a bystander, condemn. Accountability linked to reasons of character also arises when we have close relations to the person(s) who brought about the harm. Kutz (p. 44) observes that we can sometimes feel shame when a close friend or a relative acts in a way that is deemed bad. I can also feel shame if someone close to me is humiliated. The strength of this kind of associational shame depends on the society, 144 and Kutz argues that it has been on the decrease in liberal democracies for a while now.19 This kind of shame is not about sympathising with the other, it is about imagining yourself in their situation, acting the way they did (or feeling the way they did if they are, for example, humiliated). The agent can posit themselves as a member in a collective that shares the objectionable trait that gives rise to shame (Kutz's example is a tourist hiding his guidebook in shame when another tourist acts brashly at a restaurant).20 To give an extreme but obvious example of such accountability, imagine a neo-Nazi who is at home when at the same time, and unbeknownst to her, her friends beat up someone in a racially motivated attack. Because she was not at the scene and did not even know about the planned attack, let alone intend it, she cannot be linked to the harm through reasons of conduct or consequence. However, based on her character it is very plausible to assume that had she known about her friends' plans and been present at the scene, she would have participated in the attack. She is therefore also accountable.21 Note, though, that being accountable for a harm in this way does not, of course, mean that she is accountable to the same degree as her friends who carried out the attack. An agent can be held accountable based on various reasons and to different degrees. Someone involved in the actual attack would be accountable based on reasons of conduct, consequence, and character all at the same time. Recall the Sunday driver with the gas-guzzler from chapter two. When concentrating on reasons of conduct, he does not intend to cause any harm as Sinnott-Armstrong pointed out, so perhaps no accountability can be pinned on him. For now, I will settle for this, although complications are introduced in the coming sections. Coming to reasons of consequence, it can be argued that individual emissions do cause harm and this harm is the increased risk. In chapter two, I argued that this is the case at least in relation to our lifestyle emissions. Last, but definitely not least, reasons of character warrant responses of accountability stemming from the motivations, affiliations, and dispositions of the agent. I will argue that these are key to understanding individual accountability for climate change harms in cases like the easily avoidable luxury emissions that enjoyable Sunday rides in high carbon footprint vehicles exemplify. For this we need to better understand the context these emissions are part of, and in effect how we are complicit in upholding and renewing the structures that allow the problem to go on and get worse. 19 Although social media and other recent developments in communication have arguably given rise to a new kind of associational shame, that of a group association. 20 Kutz (2000, p. 44) also describes partial accountability, where one feels the need to make amends without any feelings of guilt: "Contemporary Germans, for example, often claim that they accept collective responsibility without collective guilt, by which they mean all Germans, in virtue of their citizenship, owe duties of commemoration and reparation to the victims and survivors of the Holocaust regardless of any actual complicity." 21 Perhaps to a small degree (or part) she is also responsible for upholding and creating the atmosphere or culture that allows for such attacks, but exploring this option falls outside the scope of this thesis. 145 5.3 Complicity and participatory intentions This section explores Kutz's (2000) model of associative accountability, which explains how individuals can be responsible for collectively caused outcomes even when their participation is marginal.22 I will present his key terms and arguments for them in a relatively detailed manner. Complicity as understood in Kutz's analysis conflicts with the standard understanding of moral responsibility, whether orthodox ethical theories, or our common-sense understanding of morality (although the situation has changed somewhat since the book was published, with things like Fairtrade, slavery footprint, and carbon footprint gaining mainstream recognition). More specifically, Kutz (2000, p. 3-4) writes that recognising complicity poses problems for the principles of Individual Difference: one is accountable for a harm only if something one did made a difference to it occurring and the same harm would not have occurred regardless; Control: one is only accountable for events one has control over and could have prevented; and Autonomy: one is not accountable for harms caused by other agents, unless one has induced or forced the other agent to do what they did. We use these principles regularly to allocate responsibility and to make excuses for, and emotionally distance ourselves from, things we argue we have no control over, or what would have happened anyway. Together, these principles define an individualistic conception of moral agency and accountability, in which the subject, object, and basis are all individual as follows. The subject is an individual moral agent, not a collective. The object of accountability is ascribable to the individual agent alone, i.e. the harm or wrong for which the agent is admonished is ascribable to that subject alone. Finally, the basis of accountability (the grounds for holding the agent accountable) is comprised of facts about the individual agent, such as her causal contributions, the content her will, or her intentions. Kutz (2000, p. 4) sums up the orthodox view: "Paradigmatically, individual moral agents are reproached, or reproach themselves, for harms ascribable to them and them alone, on the basis of their intentional actions and causal contributions."23 22 Kutz (2000, pp. 17-18) distinguishes between an internal and an external sense of responsibility, and terms the external sense accountability. The internal sense refers to the psychological competencies one must have to be able to qualify as a moral agent, so it is about agency conditions for moral responsibility (i.e. the kitten or the industrial robot would not qualify). The external sense (accountability) refers to the normative affiliations and duties of the agent to other surrounding agents. A responsible agent (in the sense of qualifying as a moral agent) is only a suitable candidate for accountability, but yet not necessarily accountable. Kutz's example is a bank teller who has to empty the cash drawer while being held at gunpoint: the teller is responsible, but not accountable. Accountability thus is a narrower term than responsibility, and it is fundamentally relational. 23 Kutz (2000, pp. 4-6) argues that this non-relational understanding of accountability is deeply rooted in the modern consciousness, together with a commitment to a kind of evaluative solipsism, where questions of accountability are resolved without a reference to one's relations to others, with the emphasis on the content and effects of individual wills instead. This concept of accountability drives a wedge between public and private, between local effects and wider collective harms. It also makes the individual's role disappear in collective harms. 146 Kutz wants to offer an alternative to this. The starting position for Kutz (p. 115) is that accountability literature in philosophy usually confuses two distinct claims: that the basis of accountability must be individualistic (i.e. the facts about an agent that warrant holding them accountable for harm or wrong; who they are and what they have done), with the claim that the object of accountability must also be individualistic (i.e. an action of an individual, the consequences of the conduct of an individual, or an aspect of character). Kutz upholds the first claim about the individualistic basis of accountability, as without it we would be making unfair claims (p. 115): Holding agents morally accountable on the basis of what others have done fails to respond to those agents as distinct persons, with their own characteristics, decisions, and commitments. Just systems of moral accountability serve the purpose of relating agents harmoniously to one another, and protecting the interests that make their lives good. Ignoring individual differences among agents undermines these purposes, for the resulting responses of accountability do not attach to agents in such a way that they can be integrated into an understanding of their position with respect to their victims or bystanders. The relationships that systems of accountability are supposed to foster (and, in part, constitute) instead are sapped by undiscriminating reproach. The second claim about individualistic object of accountability is rejected by Kutz. He notes how the object and the basis of accountability are analytically distinct from one another (p. 116): If I willfully hit you, then I am accountable for that blow and its consequences. I am also accountable for the attitude of hostility I manifest by that action: you will rightfully take my attitude into account in your future dealings with me. My decision to strike you, assuming my capacity to govern myself according to moral norms, warrants you in holding me accountable. By contrast, if I tell my little brother to hit you, then the object of my accountability will be his blow and the harm it does, while the basis of my accountability will still be a fact about me, namely my telling him to hit you. Responses of accountability are always functions of the basis and the object of accountability ― as well as of the position of the respondent. The basis of accountability must always be individualistic so that we are not making unfair claims, but the object of accountability can be collective. The concept of participatory intention is what provides this individualistic basis of accountability in collective action and collective harms. Participatory intentions are a certain "way of regarding one's own action", namely one where "individual agents regard their own actions as contributing to a collective outcome" (p. 74).24 Jointly intentional action is a function of this. Kutz (p. 81) elaborates: 24 "What makes my behavior participatory is nothing more (and nothing less) than my conception of what I do as related to the group act, whether that conception is explicit in my deliberations, or functionally implicit in my actual or counterfactual behavior. Merely wearing appropriate clothing is not what constitutes my willing participation in IBM's corporate culture, but rather wearing dark suits with the intention of being part of that culture. [---] it must at least be true that my putting on a dark suit is counterfactually sensitive to my acceptance of the norms that structure life in that organization: if I worked at Apple, I'd wear jeans and a tee shirt instead." (Kutz 2000, pp. 82-83). 147 [We each conceive the choice] as one in which each intends to do his part in promoting our group act, [without necessarily] any prior agreement or concert on our part. Call this way of conceiving of action a participatory intention: an intention to do my part of a collective act, where my part is defined as the task I ought to perform if we are to be successful in realizing a shared goal. This conception of oneself as contributing to a collective, as manifested in one's deliberation and action, is what lies at the heart of collective action generally, from simple coordination to complex cooperation. Individual participatory intentions overlap and, according to Kutz, form the common element shared by all types of collective action (p. 75).25 A participatory intention is constituted through two sets of conditions (representational components), namely individual role (the act an individual performs in order to promote a collective end) and collective end (the object of a description constituted by the acts of different individuals, the causal product of the individual acts) (pp. 81-82). In other words, "individual participatory action aims at two goals: accomplishment of a primary individual task that contributes to a secondary collective achievement, be it an activity or an outcome" (p. 82), for example, dancing a tango or establishing a new institution.26 When our participatory intentions overlap (and we are sufficiently aware of this), we share a goal, which then teleologically explains our actions both individually and collectively. When individuals intentionally do their parts in a project that they conceive as collective ― and when these conceptions sufficiently overlap ― then they act collectively. (pp. 138-139). While the causal explanation of our actions is intrapersonal, stemming from the beliefs and intentions of each, the teleological explanation is interpersonal. This teleological explanatory link provides the basis for collective action ascription. My buying cheese and your picking out wine can be ascribed to us as a group, in virtue of the explanatory role played by our 25 Kutz's (2000, pp. 74-75) examples include filing through a narrow door into a theatre, voting absentee in a general election, playing chess, and tangoing. While Tuomela (2007) allows that participatory intention is sufficient for group action in cases involving collective agents, he argues against Kutz that it is not necessary for all collective action as "there need not be even such a participatory intention in the case of all participants" (p. 271) in weaker kinds of collective action. His examples (p. 115) of this kind of group action include operative members who are authorised to act for the group. These operational members jointly intend to perform the action in question, like scoring a goal, while the non-operational members tacitly accept this. The joint action can be attributed to non-operative members also, although they were not directly involved in the production of the action and thus are not required to have the shared we-intention. But participatory intentions need only sufficiently overlap, so the non-operational members' participatory intentions need not refer to scoring that particular goal for them still to count as members of the football team. The members do not have to undertake or intend every single action that is performed toward the collective end to count as members (or for them to understand themselves as acting collectively), but they do need to have the relevant participatory intention. Think of actions of any representative: a sales rep or a diplomat performs her role in order to promote some collective end that other individuals also share and it is this overlap that makes it a collective action. Tuomela (pp. 116-117) also gives examples of I-mode action that is nonetheless collective action, like teenage girls in a town all preferring to wear miniskirts. There is a shared, mutually believed social reason (acting as others do) and "an element of jointness", resulting in parallel collective social action. Depending on the actual scenario, these kinds of cases might come under quasi-participatory intentions (see section 5.4). 26 This does not rule out unintended collective consequences, as unintended things can happen with any action (individual or collective). It simply means that participatory intentions are directed at a goal that is intended. If the intended collective action A has unintended consequences B, I can be held accountable for B through my participatory intention to A as long as the consequences were foreseeable (see also the wasp example later on in this section). 148 shared goal [such as having a picnic]. They are our actions, because they are explained by our shared intention, which is causally efficacious through our individual participatory intentions. (p. 139) This account has taken inspiration from both Bratman's (1999) meshing subplans and Tuomela's we-intentions, although it is different from both. Kutz's account of joint action is more minimalistic and does not require collective commitment. A similar account is offered by Miller (2001, 2010) who discusses the layered structure of joint actions, where a number of joint actions achieve a collective end; some (threshold) set of joint actions are necessary and jointly sufficient for a collective outcome to be achieved. Level one is represented by individual actions that are components of joint action, whereas at level two these joint actions are directed at the collective end. The example that Kutz discusses to illustrate his account is the Dresden firebombing that took place towards the end of the Second World War in February 1945, where the historic German city was engulfed in flames and about 25,000 civilians were killed through intense heat and asphyxiation, leaving behind a scene of devastation with incinerated, even vaporised, bodies (Taylor 2008; Selwood 2015). At least 1,000 planes and 8,000 Allied soldiers were directly involved in the bombing raids, with each plane's, let alone crewman's, causal contribution "marginal to the point of insignificance" (Kutz 2000, p. 118). Kutz writes (p. 119): It is of course only too easy to find examples of fully deliberate mass participation in collective evil, from the increasingly well-documented extent of the complicity of "ordinary" Europeans in Nazi crimes to the massacres in Rwanda in 1994 and in [Srebrenica] in 1995. But the very purity and enormity of the evil involved in those cases obscures underlying moral structures. The wrongfulness of work as a field executioner, concentration camp guard, or a radio announcer urging bloodbath resonates throughout action, intention, and character. Despite the occasional difficulties of tracing causal connections between individuals and atrocity, the moral calculus of accountability nonetheless is overdetermined. By contrast, the Dresden bombing constitutes an evil that was more inhabited than made, where individuals discovered themselves on the verge or in the course of participation in a great wrong through the flow of obedience and circumstance. I concentrate here on inhabited evil, because the philosophical and psychological questions that arise are both less tractable and more pressing. If individuals are accountable in such circumstances, it will have to be by way of a more subtle argument than one that directly links homicidal intent to massive wrong, an argument that attends to the competing pulls of cooperative action and causal insignificance. It seems that climate change makes us susceptible to inhabited evil in relation to future generations, as well as those already vulnerable to climate risks (something that I will return to in section 5.4), even though the effects will be less certain and the devastation likely less swift than in Dresden. The scale of the catastrophe is much vaster though: in the worst case we will make Earth uninhabitable, but only after billions have first suffered and died. But Kutz's Dresden example needs to be looked 149 at in more detail before we can discuss climate change, as there are significant differences between our case studies in scale, timeframe, and intentionality. The question with the Dresden case is: were individual crewmen acting wrongly? Each individual contribution made a difference that is imperceptibly marginal to the outcome, but they were done in a collective setting: bombers' interactions were co-operative. Statements and interviews of the men involved showed that while some were indifferent to the devastation and suffering caused, others saw it as a necessary evil, while yet others regretted being part of it. What is similar across the reflections, however, is that the men's "sense of accountability was grounded not in an assessment of the differences they had made as individuals, but in an act they had performed together." (Kutz 2000, p. 121). This reflects the complexity of our ethical lives and moral thinking, where our intuitions can conflict and few things are black and white. Kutz (p. 122) thus offers: The Complicity Principle: (Basis) I am accountable for what others do when I intentionally participate in the wrong they do or harm they cause. (Object) I am accountable for the harm or wrong we do together; independently of the actual difference I make. This is what the "no participation without implication" slogan is about. Note that this is about intentional participation: not about being implicated in something those closest to you do without your knowledge, for example. Although the principle is inconsistent with the orthodox moral principles that emphasise individual will and actions, Kutz argues that it is "well-grounded in our intuitions, ethical practices, and psychologies" (p. 122). I think this is right: if a group of drunken friends decide to rob a liquor store, the one who idly stands by laughing as the others throw a rock through the window and grab the bottles is partly accountable for the harm by failing to prevent the harm and by encouraging it. Kutz wants to explore the moral difference between complicit participation in a collective harm (inclusive accountability) and direct action (exclusive accountability). He does this interpretatively through examples, as he argues that it would be futile to try to find the argument that would distinguish between participatory and direct wrongdoing as "there is no single framework for assessing accountability" (p. 148). He does not believe that all is subjective, though; normative can be separated from the descriptive by evaluating particular responses, as "the general test for the warrant of a particular response is whether the respondent would endorse that response under full ethical reflection ― that is, reflecting on the intelligibility of the response given the relationshipfostering goals of the accountability system." He elaborates (2000, pp. 148-149): In cases of collective action, we can try to engage each responsive position to see whether it would hold up under ethical reflection. The test has two questions. First is the question of whether the response accurately captures the ostensibly complicitous agent's role in the 150 collective act, for example, whether the agent must be seen as having intended to participate in something that did harm. Second is the question of whether the response coheres with other responsive positions. If I am disposed to care whether my response is warranted, then I must care that other interested parties can see its ground and its point, whether or not they fully endorse it. Otherwise, it becomes hard for even me to see it as appropriate.27 Recall the discussion from chapter two about individual agent's emissions creating or not creating harm. When we ordinarily talk about the causal effects of an act, we tend to assume that at least some of these effects were normatively significant also, i.e. we tend to take it as given that the causal contribution was normatively significant. However, even though metaphysical differences are usually conflated with moral differences, Kutz points out that this is not always appropriate. Even if we could differentiate the causal effects of a particular Dresden bomb and bomber at the level of blastor flame-paths, this would not make a moral difference as the normative properties of the event are still overdetermined.28 Therefore "the problem of marginal contribution is not primarily a problem of causal overdetermination, for we can stipulate solutions to the relevant metaphysical causal riddles without illuminating the ethical questions at all." (p. 125). He continues (p. 126): An event can be normatively overdetermined though not causally overdetermined, insofar as a given individual's action may make no difference to the normative properties of a given event. Among the relevant normative properties of the Dresden firestorm are tens of thousands of deaths and much additional suffering. Even if a given bomber had failed to drop his incendiary bombs, and so a fractionally different pattern of fires and explosions had occurred, the firestorm would still have had these normative properties ― indeed, the number of deaths might even have been greater. By the last comment, I think Kutz means to only refute the view that my participation cannot be held blameworthy if its effects are marginal. His argument is that we should not conflate causal overdetermination with normative overdetermination. Therefore he does not have to hold the implausible view that the number of deaths makes no difference to the normative properties of the event. The argument is only that with Dresden, as it happened, the relevant normative properties were overdetermined. 27 This line of reasoning is compatible with what Scanlon (1998) promotes: namely, being responsive to reasons. His contractualism conceptualises moral judgements as claims about what reasons people have to reject moral principles. The objectivity ― and therefore normativity ― of morality comes from the process, about thinking about the questions in the right way (pp. 354-355). 28 This point seems to have been missed or misunderstood by a reviewer of Kutz's book in Ethics (Gardner 2004), leading him to suggest that Kutz is being inconsistent when it comes to the causal effect of Dresden bombers, when he is not. The same review also accuses Kutz of not giving causality enough attention, arguing that the individual bombers did not merely attempt to participate, but actually participated. This criticism misses Kutz's point entirely: collectively the bombers obviously participated and made a causal difference (and caused a great deal of suffering, it was not just an attempt to cause it), but the causal effects cannot be cashed out in terms of the difference any one person's bombing action, taken in isolation, made to the resulting state of affairs. These misunderstandings could be based on how closely the cultural, legal and moral aspects of accountability interlink in Kutz's work. 151 While traditionally ethical theories have treated collective action as parallel behaviour, it is actually co-operative: jointly acting individuals are promoting a common end (p. 138). Instead of universalising the individual marginal participation, the test should accurately reflect the actual structure of the agent's intentions: we should universalise both the collective act and individual participation in it, i.e. "our bombing by way (in part) of my participation" (p. 142). An example that refers to the Dresden case is offered (p. 142), showing how the logic of collective action can be incorporated into the test: An agent who wills participation wills the collective act as well. Since we know a world in which firebombing occurs is a world in which agency cannot be universally exercised, we now can see how each bomber's will contradicts itself. The bomber wills a world in which rational agency is condemned to be ineffectual. The world of universalized firebombing is now treated as the object of the individual agent's will. Amended like this, we can now rule out such contradictory maxims (i.e. "world of universalized firebombing" and "a world in which agency can be universally exercised" are in contradiction). The victim's point of view is particularly important when we are dealing with collectively caused harms, as from the victim's point of view questions of individual causal contributions and exact shares in responsibility are not that relevant: the fact of suffering is what dominates the victim's experience (p. 123). The victim's view thus offers the best support to the Complicity Principle. Apart from the vastness of the timescale and the global reach, there is another big difference between mine and Kutz's case studies. The outcome in Dresden was intended for the most part, if not by individual agents participating, then at least by their superiors. Collective action can, of course, result in outcomes that were completely unintended also, like melting polar ice caps. Holly Smith (1983, p. 551) argues that there is a degree to which we can be held accountable for the consequences of our actions, and this is linked to the outcomes falling within the predictable outcomes for that act, i.e. "where the unwitting wrongful act falls within the known risk of the [-] act".29 Kutz's approach is somewhat different: while he acknowledges that our accountability for consequences that flow from our actions is in theory infinite and therefore needs to be "normatively delimited", he notes that some response is warranted even when the outcome is unforeseeable (pp. 142-143): Though the field of response-worthy events varies with the particular ethical culture, in every culture some unintended consequences warrant some response. By taking responsibility for the consequences of our acts, we demonstrate to others a concern for their projects and interests, and thereby work to ensure their respect for our work. Within this delimited set of consequences, normative questions of individual response arise: whether to apologize, compensate, or repair. 29 Smith's discussion is about culpable ignorance and cases that fall under it. 152 Kutz illustrates this point with a wasp that enters the house when he lets the cat out. He did not intend to let the wasp in, but when it stings you badly, he should express sadness at your pain and offer you comfort. He is not at fault and resentment towards him is therefore not warranted. The response to the pain caused by the sting indicates the importance attached to your interests within the community, and any claims for him to respond are rooted in the fact that his agency led to the suffering, however unintended it was. In other words, "accountability for unintended consequences manifest an acknowledgment of the fact that one's projects have interfered with another's interests" (p. 143). This applies also to the unintended consequences of collective action, as we are complicit in the consequences of what we do together. If some harm is a direct consequence of what we do intentionally, even though the harm itself was not intended, we have a duty to acknowledge it in the appropriate way (i.e. apologise, compensate, etc.). Collective responsibility entails individual accountability, participation entails implication. The collective act is an object of individual accountability, so participatory intentions thus are sufficient for accountability and "an agent who participates intentionally in a wrong is accountable in some form for that wrong" (p. 146).30 Complicit participation comes in shades of grey. Let us begin with collective action that is wholehearted in the sense that all agents involved in it wholly intend the outcome and are mutually aware of each other's co-operation. So we are talking about paradigm cases of collective action where the participatory intentions of the agents "transmit accountability from all to each" (Kutz 2000, p. 155). Even in these cases there are positional differences based on the roles and tasks people undertake. These positional differences in accountability, warranted by considerations of the aspects of direct and inclusive authorship that make up the collective act, become starker as we move away from the paradigm cases of collective action. As Kutz notes, "our knowledge of what others do when we act together is hazy or distorted" in many cases, and we only have a vague description of what it is that we promote together (p. 155). Kutz's (pp. 156-157) example is a mid-level engineer working for a large manufacturer of dualuse technology. He helps to design control modules that are used to manufacture consumer products, but he has reason to believe (but he does not know) that the same modules are also used in manufacturing land mines that are sold to poor countries involved in conflicts, resulting in civilian casualties. The engineer does not intentionally promote the sale of the land mines or indeed even know about it, but his participation in the day-to-day operations of the manufacturer is intentional. He performs his acts intentionally as a means to a collective end. This end he can be said to intend under some descriptions, like those that refer to his intentions to do his part in designing the control 30 Kutz discussed participatory intentions satisfying a threshold condition of accountability. 153 modules, or his part in producing whatever the manufacturer sells. These ends he identifies with and works towards. However, if the collective end was described in terms of referring to designing, manufacturing, and selling the land mines, then he would not subscribe to the collective end. Still, he is inclusively accountable (p. 157) because "so long as the decision to work with the company is voluntary, and information about the company's activities is available, every employee bears an accountable relation to the victims of the land mines." How exactly he is accountable is another matter, related to how strong his links are to the collective act, this aspect depending on roles and how deeply his contributions inhabit the collective act. A shipping clerk working at the same company, tasked to send out blenders and landmines alike, shares some inclusive accountability based on the consequences, but his contributions do not inhabit the collective act as deeply as the engineer's. After all, designing something requires skill, thought, and reflection. Still, the engineer is not accountable in the same way as the vice president in charge of selling arms is: her direct intention is to sell the mines. (pp. 157-158). Note then that not all participants are implicated in a collective harm to the same degree. Participatory intention might be a sufficient condition to ascribing accountability in the sense that participation implicates, but it does not implicate anyone in a black-and-white manner, but rather in all shades of grey. Kant notoriously proposed that you should not lie to a murderer about the whereabouts of your friend, as lying is always wrong. Kutz (p. 153) argues that the reason Kant suggests this is that he fails to take co-operation into account because it complicates the story: We are the instruments of one another's wills whenever we act cooperatively, in the sense that each of [us] pursues the goals of another. (This is what it is to share a goal.) This does not exonerate us of culpability for our own actions anymore [sic] than Othello can be exonerated of murdering Desdemona. Accountability is not an all-or-nothing matter, resting entirely with the misguided murderer or entirely with the manipulating liar, wholly on the shoulders of each incendiary bomber or wholly reserved to Bomber Command. Instead it is distributed in both degree and kind and, like any element of the real world, looks different from every angle. These different angles are the viewpoints of victims, agents, and onlookers discussed in the previous section. In many cases of collective action, the participants might feel alienated from the collective end to which they contribute, whether by wilful ignorance, coercion, or moral qualms (Kutz 2000, p. 102).31 The question then becomes what can an individual bomber be blamed for, personally? As Margaret Gilbert (2002, p. 181) rightly notes, Kutz does not give a clear answer to this question. She goes on to suggest two different readings (pp. 181-182). On the strong reading, Kutz's answer is that a survivor of the bombing, for example, might reasonably blame any given bomber for the 31 See fn. 6 in chapter six on the difference of performing an act as a means to an end as opposed to in order to realize an end. 154 destruction of the city of Dresden. On the weak reading, a bomber could be blamed for having participated in the destruction of the city. The strong reading would imply a questionable view (p. 182): If one assumes that the bombers are collectively blameworthy for the destruction of the city, this collective blameworthiness for the destruction cannot, surely, automatically "distribute" to our bomber and each of his fellow bombers personally. No one of them destroyed the city and no one of them can, therefore, be blamed for its destruction. The weak reading strikes Gilbert (p. 182) as "easy to accept-so easy that it seems not to require any special arguments or careful analyses to back it up." While I agree that what an individual participant is to be blamed for has to be along the lines of the weak reading (as otherwise the individual attribution of blame would be implausible), I disagree with Gilbert that the responsibility claim contained within the weak reading is so obviously true that it requires no arguments or analysis to back it up. What we do need an analysis for becomes apparent in the following paragraph by Gilbert (p. 183): Perhaps, as Kutz seems to fear, no single agent is to blame for destroying the city. Perhaps there is no collective subject to blame, and no individual whom it is appropriate to blame, in particular, no individual bomber. Why should this be a problem? It does not leave us without grounds for blame and related reactions towards individual bombers. That a person is not to be blamed for one particular thing, does not entail that there is nothing he can be blamed for. The grounds for blame is exactly what needs analysing. To begin with, Kutz's worry was not that there is no individual agent to blame (like Gilbert argues), but that the blame might disappear unless we root it in complicity, as the participation is marginal. This worry is not without a basis, as marginal participation is used as an excusing condition in everyday conversations, as well as by some philosophers such as Cullity (2015), Johnson (2003), Sandberg (2011), Sinnott-Armstrong (2005), and Van de Poel et al. (2012) in relation to climate change harms (although they might accept collective obligations in relation to taking climate action). Hypothetically no bomber made an individual difference to the normative properties of the event and had no control over the total outcome, so each could argue that they should not be blamed, as they have not caused the suffering. In cases of overdetermination, "any one individual can correctly claim that [the harm] could have been avoided without her changing her own behaviour, so long as enough others did so" (Cripps 2013, p. 72). The argument is thus counterfactual: if I had not participated the outcome would have been just the same, hence I am not to blame. Kutz (2000, pp. 122-123) argues that we must reconcile the Complicity Principle with the Difference and Control principles in order to avoid such a conclusion. Secondly, and relatedly, Kutz (2000, p. 123) is worried that the two most dominant 155 moral theories of today, consequentialism and Kantian deontology, are in trouble with cases of marginal participation, as they fail to provide the link between a collective harm (object) and the individualistic basis for holding someone accountable as was discussed in section 5.1.32 We can be complicit for many collectively produced harms in our modern, interdependent world, from environmental harms to the unethical ways the products we consume are manufactured. Complicity arises not only when we are inclusive authors through our participatory intentions, but it can also arise when we are complicit in a looser sense. In these cases "the usual basis for applying the Complicity Principle does not obtain" (p. 167). The harm is collective, the outcome is overdetermined in the normative sense, but individuals have no participatory intentions towards some collective goal that causes the harm, either directly or in an unintended way. Here quasiparticipatory intentions come in handy. I will turn to these next as I discuss climate change complicity in unorganised collectives. 5.4 Climate change complicity and quasi-participatory intentions This section discusses systemic collective harms and accountability for the consequences we can unintendedly (but foreseeably) bring about through our participation in unorganised collectives. Kutz (2000, p. 186) calls this a quasi-participatory basis of accountability: "'quasi' because there is no specific project to which individuals contribute". He (p. 166) refers to harms that are "the results of a confluence of individual behavior" as "unstructured collective harms", citing environmental damage resulting "from an aggregate of marginal individual contributions" as prominent examples. I find "unstructured collective harms" a somewhat misleading term. It is meant to bring out the contrast between these collective harms and those harms that are brought about by collective agents and the concerted action of the individual members within them. However, these harms often have systemic reasons behind them that lead to the harm, and they are thus rooted in the collective structures we uphold and create together. Therefore I will label these kinds of harms systemic harms by unorganised collectives, as I think that is more fitting. Later on, at the end of the next chapter, I will also refer to them as structural injustices (Young 2011). Recall that my argument in chapter four was that unorganised collectives cannot have forwardlooking responsibility, i.e. obligations. Our duties qua unorganised collectives are always individual duties, although they are interdependent. However, sets of constituents of unorganised collectives 32 Moral philosophy encompasses, of course, other theories than just consequentialism and deontology, like virtue ethics and contractualism, or pluralist intuitionism. The point here is only that the two dominant moral theories do not seem up to the task of dealing with collectively caused harms where participation and individual effects are marginal. 156 can have backward-looking (or current, present-day) responsibility and this is the topic of this section. The complicity involved in climate change is in many ways very different from the complicity discussed by Kutz with regard to the Dresden bombings: it is the unintended outcome of intentional participation in our societies, very broadly put. This stretches the telos of the collective action to the point that it might seem unfruitful to apply participatory intentions or collective intentionality to climate ethics at all, just as Cripps (2011a) argues. A similar sentiment is expressed by LawfordSmith (2016b, p. 135): It's not clear that we can make sense of the idea of intentions for unorganized and loosely organized groups, even if we can for highly organized groups; and more importantly even for individuals and highly organized groups it's not clear that the relevant intentions (etc.) would be present in the case of most GHG-emitting actions. Despite first appearances, I will argue in this section that the concept of participatory intentions (quasi or otherwise) is relevant to climate ethics in two ways. First of all, intentionality is obviously important to understanding the responsibility of collective agents such as corporations and governments, actors who play a big role in shaping our future. Participatory intention offers a simple, yet effective, way of conceptualising organised collective action, and collective action is the driving force behind most of the GHG-emitting actions. It also offers us a way of thinking about our individual responsibility as members of collective agents. The second way is related to the systemic harms that we can unintentionally bring about through our intentional participation in structures that lead to excessive emissions and the way we jointly uphold them. Here I find that quasi-participatory intentions can capture why we should care about the harm we bring about together even when our participation is marginal. Very broadly put, in climate change the object of accountability could be said to be the collective projects and structures that result in high greenhouse gas emissions and the harm that ensues from these unsustainable practices, while the basis of accountability is participating in the projects and social systems that uphold and create these structures (Hormio 2013). Without a proper understanding of responsibility that arises from collective moral complicity, it is easy to consider one's acts and omissions as unimportant and marginal to the outcome. Instead of trying to apply participatory intentions to systemic harms by unorganised collectives, what we need are quasi-participatory intentions. While there is no specific collective project to which individual agents contribute to, there is "a set of individuals who jointly cause harm, against a background of interdependent activity and shared values" (p. 186). "Shared values" has a loose 157 meaning here. Take Kutz's example about gun sellers and their blameworthy complicity in crimes that are committed with the guns they sell. He (2000, p. 186) writes that: [T]he culpable 'agent' is not the individual merchant, but the set of gun sellers who are routinely indifferent to the violence that flows from their trade. These merchants are unified in part by shared trade networks, lobbying efforts, and manufacturing standards. And they are united by a shared universe of values, here regarding the permissibility of selling such deadly instruments. So the set of individuals is culpable, i.e. blameworthy. The set of routinely indifferent gun merchants is an unorganised collective, although probably there will be some overlap with members of collective agents (perhaps they are members of the National Rifle Association, or some trading body, for example). Quasi-participation is an appropriate ground of liability and culpability. Kutz offers two elements that taken together can account for why people are warranted in holding themselves and others accountable for environmental harms and other such systemic harms.33 The first is that the group that causes the harm is clearly identifiable from the victim's perspective: the polluters, "people engaging in a concrete way of life that generates these harms" (p. 186). When it comes to ozone layer depletion, Kutz (p. 186) suggests that the set of people might be as wide as "the inhabitants of Western nations" as they "depend upon one another for the maintenance of the infrastructure that allows their way of life. More generally, they abide by and reinforce in one another a sense of accountability that treats collective and distant harms as off the moral map, so to speak." The victim's perspective is about the systemic ways a collective harm is brought about, so the fact that a set of people are an unorganised collective is not as important to them as it is to the agents themselves. The agents are thus abstracted from the victim's point of view (p. 186): "Individual agents are, broadly speaking, participants in a shared venture that does harm, and so are inclusively accountable for the unintended consequences of what they do together." Kutz acknowledges the problem that the victims' point of view might not be motivating for the agents, as the harming activities are generated by self-interested motives, although within a systemic context. Regardless, he (p. 187) argues that "a systemic, collective perspective" can become morally salient for agents if we start reflecting on our interdependent lives: "If we can look to and cultivate the groupings in which agents actually do find themselves to be participants, then perhaps there is material for generating a sense of accountability." Kutz argues that when the harm is caused 33 With environmental harms, one could easily will a Kantian universal maxim along the lines of "I will continue to pollute for my economic gain, but only as long as my individual actions make no difference". Kutz argues that the universalised world is the one we live in at the moment (p. 176). "Although there is pressure to regard ourselves as part of the collective that does harm, the ethical links between us as individuals and us as members of the collective dissolve under reflection" in the Kantian picture, and this will not do as individual motivations to shun contributing to collective harms "must be internalizable and stable under critical reflection" if they are to be psychologically feasible (p. 177). 158 by agents who "share an objectively determinate and highly interdependent way of life" this could elicit a "sense of accountability and collective identity" (p. 187-188). This is the situation with the individual emissions that contribute to climate change, as I shall argue soon. When harms are caused by unorganised collectives, we should emphasise "the moral significance of pre-existing networks of collaboration" (pp. 188-189) and use "the regional and institutional arrangements and roles that orient agents in social space" as the "foundations upon which to build structures of accountability" (p. 189). The second basis is character-based symbolic accountability; who we are, what we tolerate, what we are willing to be linked to. Our actions might have no actual impact, but they symbolise what we value, they are a way of expressing meaning (p. 190): In overdetermined contexts, agents can have reason to refrain from participating in a harm, not because of the relation between this choice and an actual outcome, but because of what the choice symbolizes in their characters and commitments. Agents who show no concern for their participation in collective harms in overdetermined contexts make themselves vulnerable to the suspicion they will be indifferent even when they could make a difference. By contrast, agents who distinguish themselves from other participants demonstrate a commitment to the value of the lives of those they harm. This is not about some high-minded integrity and trying to keep one's hands clean at any cost, it is about acknowledging symbolic reasons and that "acts do have a powerful symbolic dimension of choice" (p. 190). The reluctance of agents to participate is focussed on the harm and is not about the purity of their wills or consciences according to Kutz. While symbolic reasons are not moral demands as such, "it is plausible that some agents may require this of themselves, especially when the individual costs are not great in comparison with the harm that is done" (p. 191). Together with our participation in social structures that quasi-participatory intentions try to capture, the symbolic basis of accountability might cause us to reflect on who we are and foster a sense of accountability for what we do together.34 This has a lot in common with Williams's (1981) argument from integrity: we should not be fragmented agents, but internally coherent. Our individual actions should be coherent with the values and collective actions that we promote. We might fail, and we sometimes will, but we should aim at things that correspond with what we value. The idea is that bringing quasi-participatory intentions to moral discussions could foster a sense of accountability even in cases where the outcome is normatively overdetermined. Observing that 34 Refraining from marginal participation can also have a training aspect to it: by thinking about the demands of complicity, one can get used to doing something in a way that prevents one from being part of the harm-causing unorganised collective by the time one's actions could start mattering, i.e. if and when the overall structure changes (e.g. beginning to recycle before the local council sets up meaningful recycling infrastructure, thank you to Arto Laitinen for the example). 159 the systemic view rarely coincides with the agent's own perspective of their actions, Kutz (2000, pp. 187-188) suggests: One plausible route to eliciting this sense of accountability and collective identity lies in returning to the victims' observation that the agents of their suffering share an objectively determinate and highly interdependent way of life. For the socioeconomic structures noted by the victims are neither self-originating nor self-sustaining. They emerge, rather, from unreflective confluences of habit and sentiment, tacit agreements upon, for example, the value of private transportation. These manifest themselves in myriad public policy choices and private behaviors. I find that this applies to climate change also. It is not the case that we just have this system in which we live, where things just happen to be set in such a way that excessive greenhouse gas emissions are inevitable. While the previous generations have for the most part created the structures and systems that lead to the emissions, we are sustaining and shaping them. Looking at the situation from the victims' perspective could make us see more clearly that our socioeconomic structures are neither self-originating nor self-sustaining, but that they have an individualistic source. I will return to this soon. By introducing complicity of this kind to public debate, the systemic, collective perspective could become morally salient to individuals. We should strive for a sense of collective that is psychologically salient to us and that can impact upon how we act. Kutz (2000, p. 188) writes: Indeed, to the extent that the offending socioeconomic structures are social, they must arise from the motivations of individual agents, for all social activity is individual activity. [--] I claim that if collective harms can be ascribed to social and economic structures, then those harms can also be traced to individual motivations. And it is to these individual motivations that we can appeal in constructing a motivating sense of accountability. Kutz thus grants the individualistic source of social structures (something that Young would agree with). He is very careful about the limits of what he is saying, though, following the above observation with the qualification that most of these motivations remain unconscious. I would also like to add that social structures could also be created by people long since dead, based on the motivations they had while alive, however conscious or unconscious they were at the time. Sometimes social structures change painfully slowly, so some of the structures that we have could be disliked by nearly all, and not be linked to the motivations of any living people, yet still linger with us for one reason or another. Kutz (p. 188) also notes that individualistic motivations cannot be taken to be "foundational causal explanations of the social structure", as the relationship between social structures and individual motivations is reciprocal (as Pierre Bourdieu argued). Dispositions of acting, thinking, and feeling can "unify and individuate members of social groups", and this habitus of a social group "are 160 both shaped by and shape their social and natural environment" (p.188). Therefore, the values that drivers of luxury cars (to use Kutz's example) have in relation to privacy and personal comfort "are only realizable given cheap fuel and disguised public subsidies of automobile travel", while in a reciprocal manner, "those social conditions themselves reflect valuations by driver-citizens" (p. 188). Therefore the structures that subsidise private transportation are reinforced by the values that drivers of luxury cars hold, and vice versa, i.e. they mutually shape and reinforce each other. In general individuals do not and need not to conceive of themselves as either isolated units or as members of humanity writ large. Rather, they inhabit middle-sized, overlapping fields of shared meanings and political identifications. These shared bases of identification can in turn provide the requisite basis of individual accountability. Drivers can come to be aware of the damage done by a way of life that ignores atmospheric effects. Gun sellers can realize that their trade, taken as a whole, occasions a climate of violence. More generally, the regional and institutional arrangements and roles that orient agents in social space can be used as foundations upon which to build structures of accountability. (Kutz 2000, p. 189). The point is that these pre-existing social identifications and structures can motivate us to act in a non-complicit way in cases of marginal participation or in the absence of intention to cause the collective end (p. 184). In other words, they aid in giving quasi-participatory intention the moral weight it deserves by helping to ground it in existing practices: social structures, identities and roles. Individuals must reproach themselves for contributing to collective harms, and must identify affirmatively with efforts at their prevention and repair. More generally, individuals must come to think of themselves as inclusively accountable for what they do together, to see themselves as participants in a group. (Kutz 2000, pp. 184-186) We could thus claim that the complicity of constituents of unorganised collectives such as consumers, to give but one example, is based on the quasi-participatory intention to partake in a consumer lifestyle, a lifestyle that has excessive emissions as an unintended, but foreseeable consequence. I find that Lawford-Smith's (2017) recent criticism against applying Kutz's schema to consumer complicity misses its target because she does not discuss the quasi-participatory basis of accountability anywhere in her article. She argues that applied to cases like consumer complicity for global labour injustices, Kutz's account either fails to generate complicity, or fails to implicate ordinary consumers. Lawford-Smith (2017, p. 10 of the online-first version) explains: We need a collectively cased outcome such as the bombing of Dresden, where individual contributions to this outcome do not make a causal difference sufficient to individual culpability, but where contributions taken together constitute the (holistically described) injustice, and where participation in the collective action is sufficient to implicate individuals in the outcome. In the case of consumption, that would have to be something like failing to collectively resist global labour injustice. Then the question would only be whether we could read 161 individuals' purchases as being done with the intention of participating in that collective failure. That seems implausible. That would indeed be implausible, but it does not represent Kutz's model: instead of participatory intentions, the basis of consumer complicity (and therefore liability) would be quasi-participatory. The complicity of polluters or other unorganised collectives such as consumers is thus not based on some intention to emit, or intention to participate in climate change harms, or intention to participate in failing to collectively resist excessive luxury emission purchases, etc. Instead, it is based on the quasi-participatory intention to partake in a consumer lifestyle, a lifestyle that has excessive emissions as an unintended, but foreseeable consequence, as I will argue in more detail shortly. Now, Lawford-Smith could respond that the notion of quasi-participation is only a not-verysuccessful attempt on Kutz's part to be able to say something about the responsibility of people who are causal parts of unorganised groups.35 I have some sympathy for this scepticism as the concept of quasi-participatory intention might seem ad hoc at first, but upon closer inspection I think that it is not. Recall from the previous section how I noted that it seems that climate change makes us susceptible to inhabited evil in relation to future generations, as well as those already vulnerable to climate risks. There I also introduced a quote from Kutz (p. 119) where he discussed how it is "only too easy" for us to think of examples of fully deliberate participation in collective evil where the wrongfulness of the participation "resonates throughout action, intention, and character." He contrasted this with cases where the evil "was more inhabited than made" because the primary reasons for the individuals to participate in a great wrong were obedience and circumstance. He argued that if individuals are to be held accountable under such circumstances, then "it will have to be by way of a more subtle argument than one that directly links homicidal intent to massive wrong, an argument that attends to the competing pulls of cooperative action and causal insignificance." Although Kutz refers to participatory intention with this quote, I find that the point he makes applies to the concept of complicity more broadly, encompassing also cases of quasi-participation. Indeed, I believe that it is even more important to cases of quasi-participation, like those linked to structural injustices (see section 6.3). I say this because in cases like these, our intuition is usually to excuse ourselves exactly due to the lack of intent to harm, or due to the competing pull of our role duties, for example, or arguments about our causal insignificance. Rather than being a way to try to stretch one's account until it snaps in order to save it from objections, for me quasi-participation is more akin to truly appreciating the complexity of the moral realities that individuals often face in collective settings and with collective action. It is about us waking up to the uncomfortable realities of some 35 As she indeed did in the comments of her pre-examiner report, although not using these exact words. 162 of the aspects of our increasingly interdependent lives, and what this means for our morality and practices of holding others and ourselves responsible. When it comes to the many pressing global ills of today, instead of intentionally promoting evil, more often than not we are inhabiting evil. In my view, this kind of complicity can be blameworthy or partially blameworthy, perhaps sometimes coming under just the agent-regret discussed in section 5.2. What, then, can Kutz's account tell us about climate change responsibility? Recall how there are at least three different perspectives relevant for accountability: the agent, the victim (or the beneficiary in cases of praiseworthy action), and the onlooker/bystander. When an individual participates in a wrongful collective act, the outcome of which is overdetermined regarding individual contributions, Kutz (p. 119) argues that "reflective agents might come to understand that they have obligations of disobedience, repair, or prevention; victims must decide whether they can legitimately press their claims; and bystanders must decide whether and on what terms to return the perpetrators to the fold." Applying his schema to climate change, obvious challenges emerge: who are the agents, who are the victims, who are the bystanders? As we are talking about a collectively produced harm that is global, intergenerational, and unintended, these categories will be much harder to define than in most other cases. Nothing very neat or uncontroversial can be put forward, but some rather obvious candidates still emerge. Let us say that the complicit agents are all the adults that knowingly participate in a way of life that upholds and creates collective structures and projects that result in high greenhouse gas emissions, i.e. emissions above the threshold that the Earth can absorb. In practical terms, this would be close to Cripps's Polluters category discussed in section 4.3: people in the Global North plus affluent people in the Global South, basically anyone who is a high emitter. This will be somewhere around the region of one billion people (Chakravarty et al. 2009).36 The sheer volume of complicit people makes me imagine a headline in a newspaper about a philosopher solving the problem of climate change responsibility: One billion people are responsible!37 But alas, this is essentially the case, and also a big part of the reason why the problem 36 Chakravarty et al. (2009, pp. 11887-11888) calculates what would happen if CO2 mitigation assignments were set in terms of individual high polluters within each region. U.S. and China would have the highest mitigation assignments. While India mostly gets a free pass, the high carbon intensity in South Africa and in North African nations with energy industries means that Africa does not (although as a result of its large carbon-poor population, it should get higher emissions allocations in order to develop its economies). Russia and the Middle East also would get sizeable mitigation assignments. 37 Indeed, The Onion (2013) carried a satirical news item with the headline New Report Finds Climate Change Caused By 7 Billion Key Individuals in response to the release of the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report. The article also pointed out how not only do we know the culprits, we also know how they did it: "Researchers have isolated numerous instances of environmentally harmful activity committed by these 7 billion perpetrators in the past few decades alone, identifying practices such as using electric lights, shipping packages, traveling by car, traveling by air, buying clothes, washing clothes, using heat, using air conditioning, buying food, buying water, eating meat, commuting to work, shopping, exercising at the gym, disposing of waste, operating computers, operating televisions, operating other household electronic 163 has not been solved politically. Depending on the context, this collective can be further divided in innumerable ways. We could talk about the unorganised collective consisting of high emitters within China and Brazil, for example. Victims include future generations, constructed broadly to include the young alive today, but with a sliding scale of some sort: the impacts will become more severe as time passes (assuming we fail to adequately mitigate and adapt), so people born in 100 years' time could face much harder conditions than the young alive today. The effects are projected to become worse with time, possibly even rapidly in a runaway scenario, so the later you are born, the more you are victimised by the actions of the present generations. Presumably there will also be geographical and socio-political variation in how badly you are affected. Many indigenous peoples are also at a high risk (see section 6.3).38 Victims should also include people living in vulnerable areas where effects are already felt, but resources for adaptation measures are lacking. Many other species are also suffering and will suffer, so those species that will find it harder to survive or will become extinct due to anthropogenic climate change should also be counted among the victims. Polar bears and other arctic animals that are victims can hardly press their claims upon us, any more than they can adapt to the rapidly changing conditions fast enough. A related problem is that in the climate change scenario ― even if we want to include only our own species in the category of victims ― most of the victims will never get to have a say when it could have still mattered. The vast majority of the victims in future generations will not even be able to decide if they can press their claims: when they will be born, those alive now will be long gone. A further twist is, of course, that many in the category of victims will also become agents as they grow older and become accountable for their emissions and participation in their societies. Labelling someone as a victim is not unproblematic. Although it is a common strategy used by campaigning organisations to try to appeal to our emotions by giving a face to a problem, it can take the sense of agency a person has and make them seem passive (Hormio 2013, pp. 113-114). In addition, discussions about victims can take our attention away from the structural inequalities that lead to certain people becoming vulnerable (Cuomo 2011). With climate change, there is also some overlap between the categories of victims and agents. However, as Cripps (2013, pp. 52-57) notes, being both a victim and an agent of climate change is no reason in itself to not to take action. I do appliances, and showering-alarming activities that experts say show no signs of remitting." Peeters et al. (2015, p. 2) also found the article funny. 38 Indigenous peoples (also referred as the first nations, native peoples, or aboriginal peoples) view themselves as having a historical existence and identity that is separate and independent of the groups that have settled, invaded or colonised the area. Lands located in a specific geographic area form a central element in their identity and history and play an important role in their contemporary political demands, and questions of self-determination according to their own cultural and political systems within and across the states they live in are central. There are as many as 400 million indigenous peoples alive today. (Arctic Centre 2017, Whyte 2017). 164 not see why it should not offer even more motivation to act. Of course, identifying oneself as the victim of climate change, rather than as a complicit harming agent, can also act as a political tool or psychological defence-mechanism (Hughes 2013). The category of onlookers (bystanders) is not simple either. So many of us are implicated that hardly any reader of this text can call themselves purely an onlooker. This might seem such an obvious point that it is not worth even stating, but I think it is: anthropogenic climate change is very different from most of the problems discussed in collective responsibility literature. It is psychologically quite easy to accept the responsibility of a motorcycle gang, corrupted government, or an oil company, to give just some examples, as most of us are not members of those collectives. Even when we talk about difficult and pressing issues like being implicitly accountable for sweatshop labour in clothes manufacturing, or the suffering of animals in the often brutal conditions of the too-efficient meat and milk industries, alternative options are available (vegan food, fair trade clothes), options that rule us out from the collective of blame for the most part.39 But trying to become not complicit in climate change if you are living in an industrial nation? Near impossible.40 All agents in climate change are arguably onlookers relative to each other.41 While I am a polluting agent, I am also a witness to the emissions of all the people around me, so I have a responsibility to prevent them from harming. In this sense, the onlooker category includes those who are both witnesses and agents, and those who are just bystanders (and are not agents). After all, one does not get rid of their responsibility as a witness by committing harm oneself. This is not to say that there are no pure bystanders, because there are: people living in the Global South who have negligible carbon footprints and who might not feel the impacts yet where they live, and old enough not to bear the brunt of the changes, could arguably qualify as bystanders. Among these onlookers, there might be some overlap with the victim category because of the vast inequalities found in our world. The Ecological Footprint (gha per person) of an average American is 8.59, while it is negligible for a subsistence farmer living in a poor country like Eritrea, where the average Ecological Footprint comes to just 0.5 (the Earth's carrying capacity is currently around 1.7 gha per person).42 I find that the share of carbon within these figures is even more striking: while 39 It definitely takes more effort (and sometimes more money) to buy fairly produced clothing, shoes and food, but the options are at least out there, at least for those of us who do not have to scrape together a living and work excessive hours to be able to afford the essentials. Similarly, drastically reducing one's consumption of animals can require quite a lot in terms of adjusting one's lifestyle (including the possibility of upsetting those close to you by breaking social norms and customs around meat consumption). Still, it is hardly impossible to succeed in making oneself an onlooker only in relation to these harms. 40 Offsetting is not the solution (see section 2.5). 41 Thank you to Arto Laitinen for pointing this out. 42 The figures are retrieved from the Global Footprint Network's (footprintnetwork.org) latest available data from 2013. The global hectare (gha) is a common measurement unit for quantifying the Ecological Footprint of people or activities. It can also be used to quantify the biocapacity of the earth and its regions, i.e. the ability of an ecosystem to produce useful biological materials and to absorb carbon dioxide emissions. "Global hectare per person" refers to the 165 for the average American it comes to 6.06, for the Eritrean the carbon figure is a measly 0.04. In addition to these vast inequalities in the usage of resources, most of the very poor people have no way to contribute their perspectives in the global debate: they lack the education and technology necessary to do so. They may also lack knowledge about climate change (Godfrey et al. 2010). Even when they do have the knowledge and contribute to the global debate, like when the representatives of the countries that are most vulnerable to climate change effects speak at UN conferences, it is rare for anything to change because of the way global power is structured. The deeply unequal structures make it less likely that the debates required to make the agents properly reflect on what they should do in terms of disobedience, repair, or prevention, will get off the ground.43 The agent category is, of course, far less simple than what I suggested at the beginning, i.e. that it contains polluters, mostly from the Global North, but also the affluent in the Global South. Those agents are not deciding to harm anyone; the harm is an unintended consequence of other actions. Furthermore, polluters are polluting in large part because they are in a particular context that was largely defined by previous generations and the structures they have created. Many of the agents responsible for emissions are already dead and they were ignorant about the facts of anthropogenic climate change. The victims of climate change might not be able to point out faults in the quality of our will, as there is no intention to cause climate change, but the object of their response can be the consequences our emitting actions are having and are projected to have. In addition, our character ― the uninterested or avoiding attitude most of us manifest at times ― can also be objected to. Looking at reasons of consequence, marginal contributions are wrong only if they cause an increase in expected experienced harm; if they do not make a difference to expected harm they are permissible from a consequentialist viewpoint (Spiekermann 2014b, p. 89). Reasons of character can amount of biologically productive land and water available per person on the planet. As the Ecological Footprint refers to a continuous demand, and biocapacity refers to a continuous supply, both are correctly reported in global hectares. See www.footprintnetwork.org/faq for more details. The total number of global hectares was approximately 12.2 billion in 2012, averaging about 1.7 global hectares per person (WWF 2016, p. 77). Figures above this are unsustainable overconsumption. 43 Journalist and author Naomi Klein describes the situation in an interview (Mark 2013): "[There is a] willingness to sacrifice large numbers of people in the way we respond to climate change – we are already showing a brutality in the face of climate change that I find really chilling. [--] we are with full knowledge deciding to allow cultures to die, to allow peoples to disappear. We have the ability to stop and we're choosing not to. So I think the profound immorality and violence of that decision is not reflected in the language that we have. You see that we have these climate conventions where the African delegates are using words like "genocide," and the European and North American delegates get very upset and defensive about this. The truth is that the UN definition of genocide is that it is the deliberate act to disappear and displace people. What the delegates representing the North are saying is that we are not doing this because we want you to disappear; we are doing this because we don't care essentially. We don't care if you disappear if we continue business-as-usual. That's a side effect of collateral damage. Well, to the people that are actually facing the disappearance it doesn't make a difference whether there is malice to it because it still could be prevented. And we're choosing not to prevent it. I feel one of the crises that we're facing is a crisis of language. We are not speaking about this with the language of urgency or mortality that the issue deserves." 166 catch the latter cases. This is why quasi-participation is an appropriate ground for liability, i.e. complicity. In systemic harms by unorganised collectives, as in the case of anthropogenic climate change, no individual agent's contribution is causally significant, so the outcome is normatively overdetermined. Unlike with Dresden, the collective outcome is also unintended, i.e. it is not deliberate. This is why the Complicity Principle cannot be applied directly. Note that despite the unintended consequences (climate change harms) the emission-increasing actions, such as culling forests in order to herd more cattle, can still be described as intentional actions that contribute to climate change harms. Intentional action has a broad and a narrow meaning (e.g. Bratman 1987). In the narrow meaning, if I believe that a certain action does not lead to my intended outcome, I will not do it. Therefore we could argue that we would have acted otherwise had we known the outcome, i.e. the emissions are not included in the intentional action. The broader meaning of intentional action, on the other hand, includes the actions and outcomes of what we knowingly do, including the ones we did not intend as such. We thus act in the same way regardless of knowing the outcome, although we do not intend the outcome in its totality and we might regret some of it. In this view, the polluting is intentional action, even though it does not result from an intention to pollute, but rather from the intention to herd more cattle, and so on. Kutz's suggestion in cases of systemic harms by unorganised collectives is to ground responses of accountability in the systemic context that the actions take place in, as well as in symbolic considerations of character. He describes these two distinct bases as follows (p. 167): The first basis is an expanded notion of individual participation, to include participation in a culture or way of life. I suggest that unstructured harms [systemic harms by unorganised collectives] typically arise in contexts in which deeper, systemic, forms of collective action lie. Responses of accountability can be grounded in these systemic forms of collective action. The second basis of individual accountability [is] accountability for character. Symbolic considerations of character can support the claim that one ought to refrain from participating in even overdetermined wrongs, and can offer individuals reason to do their part in cooperative solutions to these wrongs. When coupled, these two bases of individual accountability avoid the problems inherent in purely instrumental conceptions of accountability. These "contexts in which deeper, systemic, forms of collective action lie" are discussed by Young in section 6.3. While Kutz does not discuss climate change, he does discuss environmental harms more generally and ozone layer depletion more specifically. The main differences between ozone layer depletion and climate change are that to deal with the ozone layer, only a handful of countries needed to work together, the countries responsible for emissions also felt many of the effects first hand, and the solution was relatively straightforward (although it had the unintended consequence 167 of contributing to climate change).44 While none of this applies to climate change, both problems share the essential characteristic of environmental harms (Kutz 2000, p. 171): "Environmental damage is typically the result of the knowing but uncoordinated activity of disparate individuals, each of whose actions contributes only imperceptibly to the resulting harm." With both ozone layer depletion and climate change there was a time when the emitters did not know that they were causing damage, although that time has now passed. Note how Kutz's characterisation of environmental harms makes no reference to knowing or not knowing about the consequences: it simply states that the damage results from uncoordinated human activity. Very few of us intend to pollute the environment in any way, it is almost always the unintended effect of our other activities, and sometimes we understand the mechanisms, sometimes we do not. What ozone layer and climate change polluters do share is that they do not intend the result, nor are they engaged in a "welldefined joint project" with the other emitters of which the environmental damage is an unintended consequence. Therefore, the Complicity Principle does not apply (p. 172), but quasi-participatory intentions do. To recap, I have argued in this chapter that climate change represents a mixed harm and that complicity can account for moral responsibility even in cases of marginal participation. I also suggested that our individual duties have to be based on likelihoods of serious harm: to not to perform actions that in the light of the current science can be reasonably expected to cause harm to basic human functionings and capabilities. Complicity can arise either through the Complicity Principle or through quasi-participatory intentions. The complicity of unorganised collectives such as consumers is not based on some intention to emit or intention to participate in climate change harms, but on the quasi-participatory intention to partake in a consumer lifestyle, a lifestyle that has excessive emissions as an unintended, but foreseeable consequence. Climate change puts us in a position of high likelihood of inhabited evil in relation to future generations, as well as those already vulnerable to climate risks. While in cases like these, our intuition is usually to excuse ourselves due to the lack of intent to harm or arguments about our causal insignificance, quasi-participation appreciates the complexity of the moral realities that individuals often face in collective settings and with collective action. When it comes to the many pressing global ills of today, instead of intentionally promoting evil, more often than not we are inhabiting evil. This becomes clearer when I examine structural injustices in the next chapter. Before moving on, I want to clear up a potential misunderstanding. When it comes to collective agents, I grant both collective obligations and responsibility of members-qua-collectives (as opposed to unorganised collectives where I only grant the responsibility of constituents-qua-collectives). The 44 See fn. 33 in chapter seven. 168 collective obligation can distribute to the members (see section 3.2), while the responsibility of members-qua-collectives is based on the complicity principle. When it comes to collective agents, I do not propose that we should go with just the participatory intentions of the individuals (some members have both types of responsibility, while others might just have complicity, like in cases where they are non-operational). In contrast, with unorganised collectives I argue that we should go just with the quasi-participatory intention of the individuals (with perhaps collective obligations a useful fiction in some cases, although this will always need to be made very clear). I categorise only complicity as individual responsibility, because discussing the obligations of collective agents under individual responsibility would be confusing due to the very nature of those obligations. Essentially, while collective obligations can distribute to their members, they remain collective in character. My obligation to do my share is in most cases conditional upon what other members do or fail to do, and can be discharged by others on my behalf (and on the behalf of all the other relevant members). The same cannot be said for complicity. My complicity is always mine alone to discharge. Chapter 6 – Complicity for climate change as a structural injustice People who understand that they share responsibility in relation to injustice and justice call on one another to answer before a public. The political process consists in the constitution of a public in which members raise problems and issues and demand of one another actions to address them. Iris Marion Young (2011, p. 122) Virtuous circularity results when mutual responses of accountability strengthen social cohesion, which in turns [sic] lends motivational efficacy to those responses. This is what underlies the possibility of noncoercive control of collective harms. Christopher Kutz (2000, p. 48) This chapter responds to recent criticisms of Kutz's account, and more importantly, adds two more pieces to the complicity puzzle while doing so. I discuss the potential of individual actions to help bring about an outcome (or to prevent it). I will argue that this will give us an additional reason to take action in cases of marginal participation.1 I will also suggest that we should combine Iris Marion Young's (2011) account on structural injustices with Kutz's account to get a full picture of climate change responsibility.2 Young critically engages with Kutz's arguments in her posthumously published book Responsibility for Justice, but both are in broad agreement over many issues regarding the importance of systematic issues that affect our responsibility. I find that together they offer clear signposts towards an account of interdependent responsibility for climate harms. Conceptualising climate change primarily as a structural injustice allows us to appreciate the complexity of the associated responsibility. After all, even though climate change harm is not attributable to individual fault or to certain unjust policies, it is not a matter of happenstance who the victims are and who are the ones responsible, as I have argued in the earlier chapters. I believe that if we include backward-looking assessment of historical injustices and how they have led to certain groups' increased vulnerability to climate change harms, we are more likely to get to the root of the problem, rather than just treating the symptoms. There are five lines of criticism related to the complicity account that I respond to in this chapter. The first criticism is that Kutz's model is too individualistic (Cripps 2011b, 2013). The second is that it is too demanding for requiring mutual openness from participants (Seibokaite 2015). 1 For us to be able to assess the potential of our actions, we need to have a certain amount of knowledge about the situation, but this will be a topic for the next chapter. 2 Framing climate change as a structural injustice is in contrast to many dominant discourses in climate policy, for example, how in mainstream economics environmental harms are perceived as negative externalities (Eckersley 2016, p. 346). 170 The third is that the concept of participatory intention faces "the Superfluity Problem" (Nefsky 2015). The fourth is that we cannot explain why we should take one specific action rather than another (Nefsky 2015). The fifth and final line of criticism that I discuss is that the liability model of responsibility cannot cover structural injustices and thus it remains unsatisfactory (Young 2011). I will discuss each criticism in turn, covering the first three in section 6.1 and the fourth one in section 6.2, with the fifth line of criticism reserved for section 6.3. I will argue that the first three criticisms do not hold, but that Kutz's complicity account should be supplemented from insights from the last two. 6.1 Criticism against Kutz's account In this section I look at three different criticisms that have recently been levelled against Kutz's account and argue that none of them hold.3 The first criticism is that Kutz's model is too individualistic (Cripps 2011b, 2013). The second is that it is too demanding for requiring mutual openness from participants (Seibokaite 2015). The third is that the concept of participatory intention faces "the Superfluity Problem" (Nefsky 2015). The first criticism was that Kutz's model is too individualistic. Cripps argues that by concentrating on participatory intentions, Kutz could be charged with "making demands of individuals, qua individuals, on basis of harms which they, as individuals, did not bring about", while in her model individuals are responsible qua putative group members (Cripps 2011b, p. 178). However, Kutz's participatory intentions do not make demands on people qua individuals, but either qua members of collective agents or qua constituents of unorganised collectives (when it comes to quasi-participatory intentions), to employ my terms. Recall that one of his starting points is that while judgements of accountability must have an individual basis (if we hold agents accountable based on what others have done we fail to respond to them as distinct persons), the object of accountability can be collective, as the object of accountability is analytically distinct from the basis of accountability. Rather than the exclusive authors of our actions, in collective actions we are inclusive authors; what we tolerate, desire and value links us to the outcome. Cripps is therefore incorrect in claiming that inclusive authorship (especially when it takes the form of quasiparticipatory intentions) equals making demands on individuals qua individuals. The ground for holding someone accountable is their participation in the collective action that causes harm. In other words, the collective level is there all the time, just as much (if not more) as it is in Cripps's work. 3 In addition, criticism by Gardner (2004) was discussed in the previous chapter under footnote 28 and criticism by Lawford-Smith (2017) in section 5.4. Criticism by Tuomela (2007) and Gilbert (2002) is discussed in this chapter under footnotes 6 and 7 respectively. 171 Kutz's account does not fall with the strongly individualistic positions like that of Downie's discussed in chapter three (within the collective intentionality literature of today these kinds of accounts would be hard to find). In most cases, accounts that can be labelled as individualistic within social ontology can appear relatively holistic to philosophers outside the field. Kutz himself states that his account represents a "very weak form of individualism" and "is compatible with many moderate forms of holism" (p. 71). Therefore, while collective action can be explained in terms of the intentions and beliefs of individuals, he does not deny the holistic observation that for the best explanations of social phenomena it is often useful not to reduce the collective level claim to individuals (p. 70). Explanatory adequacy is contingent upon the interests that motivate the explanation, what it is that we are trying to explain. It is individuals who act, but when their acts only make sense as part of the whole, then it is the collective-level phenomena that we should attempt to explain. Kutz clarifies (p. 71): "My claim is only that individual intentional action always implicitly mediates the causal explanation of collective acts and events, not that referring to individual acts always provides the most useful explanation." Relatedly, Kutz acknowledges that many collectives "cannot be reduced to sets of their members" because they can persist through changes in membership. The group identity is grounded in individual members' "dispositions to identify themselves (and certain others) as members of that group" (p. 72): These dispositions include not just inchoate, romantic feelings of group solidarity, but a willingness to assume obligations taken on by other group members, to speak, decide, and act on others' behalf, and to deliberate about how to act so as to further collective plans and intentions. The identity of Exxon is independent of the extensional composition of its membership, for example, because newly arriving insiders understand themselves to be joining the Exxon organization, and outsiders attribute representative authority to selfproclaimed Exxon members. Participatory intentions are thus individualistic only in the sense that they provide a direct link from an individual to a collectively caused harm, but the account is deeply relational at the end of the day as it is all about individuals interwoven in webs of participation of one kind or another. Kutz does suggest an alternative approach that would be fully holistic, and thus avoids the difficulty of providing the direct link between individuals and collective harms (i.e. it does not require participatory intentions). This alternative tactic he describes is to "ignore the relations between individual agents and victims, and focus instead upon the unmediated accountability of the collective" (2000, pp. 191-192). This is, I find, essentially what Cripps's account is doing. With a holistic response we would direct our responses of accountability "at collectives as collectives, rather than at individuals as members of collectives" (p. 192). He notes that the victim's point of view takes 172 a systemic view of the source of the harm, and therefore "victims can claim a holistic response from the people whose way of life harms them" (p. 202). Cripps (2011b, p. 178) complains that although Kutz "touches on the possibility of primarily holistic accountability, his discussion of such accountability focuses on structured collectives and he does not spell out how this would transfer to the unstructured case." It is true that Kutz dedicates most of the pages in that section to structured (agential) collectives, but contrary to Cripps's criticism, he does give a clear example of accountability in the unstructured cases (i.e. systemic harms by unorganised collectives in my vocabulary). The example that Kutz (2000, p. 202) gives is related to ozone depletion and chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) emissions: As a CFC car driver, I have no direct or exclusive duty to mend my ways, for my ways do not make a difference to anyone. We CFC drivers, however, together have a duty to mend our ways, for we do harm. Our collective accountability admits of only one response, namely our individually coordinated effort at CFC reduction. And so I have an inclusive duty to comply with the coordination scheme, in virtue of my membership in this group. This kind of an emergent, holistic obligation is in essence what Cripps suggests. Kutz does not reject this way of approaching collective harms, but he does caution that it might strike some as troubling for either metaphysical or other reasons (p. 202). Motivationally it is also not as strong as it could be because "any theory of collective accountability must be intimately related to a theory of individual accountability" and because to make any theory of accountability operational, it must be accomplished "through the motivations and normative commitments of individual actors." (p. 192). He therefore offers an alternative conception of such holistic obligations, one that he hopes is more palatable to those who are sceptical (p. 202): From the perspective of the agent, one may see holistic obligations as inputs to practical and ethical reasoning. They pose deliberative problems for participants, forcing them to think through the significance of their relationship to the collective structure, and to act on the basis of that understanding. Each participant individually, and all participants together, must deliberate about what they owe in virtue of what they have done. From the point of view of victims, the obligations are the source of claims against individuals, but claims whose basis likewise reflects the structure of participation. Responses of accountability, are owed ultimately by and to individuals, but the content of those claims is irreducibly collective. Complicity is a property of agents, linking them to one another and to their victims. This sounds like what Isaacs was after in chapter four (i.e. collective obligations helping to clarify and map out moral requirements for individuals), without going as far as actually talking about obligations of putative agents. As inputs ― as kinds of ethical idealisations or approximations ― it can be useful to discuss collective obligations, but this can also get confusing, as I argued in chapter four. While Cripps's model offers details of what such a holistic obligation might contain and entail 173 with regards to climate change, I would not be comfortable basing claims for action on it alone (i.e. without participatory intentions). First of all, her account faces the problem of mutual release of individual duties on the basis of others' likely inaction (Lawford-Smith 2012, Schwenkenbecher 2013, Cullity 2015), and this problem becomes even more pronounced in cases of unorganised collectives where individual emitters have good reasons for thinking that there will not be enough others to make the collective action possible. This is the reason why Simo Kyllönen (2016) criticises Cripps's model as implausible: individual emitters do not have real potential to bring about a new collective capable of taking action. Second of all, I find that Kutz's model offers a far richer and more plausible account of how these holistic idealisations actually can translate into individual motivation for action than that which Cripps's model can offer. I will return to this later on in the chapter. The second criticism is the worry that Kutz's account cannot be applied to unorganised collectives and the harms that they can bring about, because it requires mutual openness from participants. The common knowledge condition, i.e. to what extent should each member or a participant be aware of the intentions of other members or participants, has been one of the central debates in the literature on collective action. It is also at the core of Cripps's (2011a, 2013) criticism of the existing literature on collectives (criticism that is partly misguided, see Hormio 2015). However, it does not really apply to Kutz, as in contrast to authors such as Gilbert, he (2000, p. 90) offers a minimalist conception of joint action: "So long as the members of a group overlap in the conception of the collective end to which they intentionally contribute, they act collectively, or jointly intentionally."4 He elaborates (pp. 90-91): The superior descriptive coverage of the minimalist conception is only part of my reason for favoring it. My principal reason is normative. Ethically complex cases of joint action rarely involve perfect common knowledge, wholly shared conceptions of the joint act, or highly responsive strategic interaction. Indeed, the genius of organized criminality lies precisely in obscuring the interrelations of participants by removing the need for frequent interaction. And the enterprises responsible for significant unintended harms are likewise typically distinguished by the dispersion of task responsibility. [---] If joint action is to have special normative significance in such cases [-] as a basis for holding individuals accountable for the acts of others [--], then an account of joint action must not rely upon high degrees of interaction or mutual knowledge.5 Writing about the problems that unorganised collectives can bring about, Seibokaite (2015, p. 125) argues that while Bratman, Gilbert, and Tuomela all require common knowledge, Kutz's account 4 Or expressed more formally: "A set of individuals jointly G when the members of that set intentionally contribute to G's occurrence by doing their particular parts, and their conceptions of G sufficiently and actually overlap" (Kutz 2000, p. 103). 5 A similar line of reasoning is offered by May (1987). 174 replaces this with "a condition of mutual openness, which means that individuals have such attitudes which allow them to reflect others' intentions to cooperate and accept them positively". Thus it cannot account for harms caused by unorganised collectives any more than the accounts that require common knowledge, as the constituents of such collectives have at most only individual knowledge of the aggregated consequences (p. 124). But rejecting Kutz's account along with common knowledge accounts does not hold water. Kutz (2000, p. 96) positions his minimalist conception of joint action directly against group-intention accounts that require common knowledge, as they do not necessarily take into account that collective action often also incorporates contributions from participants who have no intentions regarding what the group as a whole should do.6 His (p. 90) worry is that because group-intention accounts "attempt to generalize from [-] highly interdependent activities", such as dancing the tango or travelling together, by doing so they "may arrive at an account of collective action that makes very strong demands upon agents' dispositions and expectations of one another."7 The point is that in order to discuss collective action in all of its 6 With participatory intentions, individuals do not need to intend to achieve a collective end, as it is sufficient that they regard themselves as contributing to a collective end (Kutz 2000, p. 96). Tuomela (2007, pp. 271-272, note 29) argues that the concept of participatory intention is not strong enough to explain joint action in cases of many-person joint action where there is no collective agent. In these cases, there must be collective commitment for a joint intentionality, otherwise the account may be "functionally deficient" (p. 272). More precisely, Tuomela argues that the two counterfactual conditions that Kutz discusses are rationality conditions and not conceptual conditions for joint action: (1) If I did not believe that P was a way of contributing to G in such circumstances, I wouldn't do P but would do P . (2) If I did not believe that P was a way of contributing to G's occurrence in such circumstances and I did not believe G could be realized in these circumstances, I wouldn't do P (but would do P or might call the whole thing off). Tuomela (p. 272) argues that in cases of irrational agents (1) might not be satisfied, while counterfactual (2) is too strong as a "rational agent might just hope that P together with the other participants' contributions might lead to G but not really believe it." I do not find this criticism very damning as there is nothing in Kutz's formulation to rule such a reading out: you do not have to believe that G will in fact be achieved. The only thing you must believe is that it is within the realm of (real) possibility that P is a way of contributing to G in such circumstances (and possible also the best way). Kutz (2000, p. 101) discusses these counterfactual conditions to illustrate the difference between performing an act as a means to an end (intentionally performing an act as a means to a joint end) as opposed to in order to realize an end (where group-intention to realise the joint act must also be present) and how these map out to joint action, i.e. they are about the difference between intentional and intended action. Kutz (p. 100) argues that "individuals can intentionally contribute to a collective end even though they do not intend the realization of that end." His example is that of a famous neurologist who lives in a country ruled by a ruthless dictator who has just had a stroke. The neurologist is called in by the dictator's aides to give the appropriate medications. However, unknown to the aides, the neurologist has secret dissident political sympathies. Still, he follows his ethical commitments as a doctor and administers appropriate medical care, while secretly hoping that the drug will not work. He thus does not administer the drug to save the dictator's life, although he does it as a means to an end (namely, the collective endeavour/end to save the dictator). This represents a case of minimal joint action. For full-blown joint action both (1) and (2) must be true, but for minimal joint action the second can be false. 7 Gilbert (2002, p. 171) has argued in return that Kutz's participatory intentions cannot account for cases of joint action that involve "inherent mutual accountability", like playing chess together, because if one player decides to break the rules, the other is not in "a position to respond in a demanding or rebuking or personally offended way". Gilbert's criticism is therefore that Kutz's account cannot explain the participants' standing to make demands of one another. I think it can, but this is not linked to the account of joint action as such, but rather to the reactive attitudes and positional and relational accountability discussed earlier. If I make a promise to you to play chess or go for a walk, and then break this promise by either dismissing the rules of chess or by staying on my sofa with a cup of tea, we are not engaged in joint action. I have made a false promise in both cases, however, and you would be right to blame me either via reasons of conduct, or character, or consequence. 175 manifestations we cannot rely only on examples of small-scale and decidedly interdependent, egalitarian cooperation.8 That is why mutual openness is not a separate necessary condition for joint action, it is only meant to explicate the notion of a participatory intention (p. 93). We can conceive of simple but genuinely joint forms of collective action that require "neither positive belief about others' intentions nor dispositions of responsiveness" (p. 93). An example of the latter, as offered by Kutz (p. 93), is two people agreeing to do their part in watering their friend's plants while she is away: the joint action is fully planned beforehand (one waters the plants on Mondays, while the other does so on Fridays) and the two people do not communicate at all during the execution of the plan, yet it seems plausible to say that they cooperated in tending to their friend's plants (p. 93). An example of the former would be trying to save a picnic when it suddenly begins to rain. Kutz (p. 92) describes the situation: I jump up, grab the sandwiches, and head for the car. I intend to do my part of our saving the picnic, hoping you will simultaneously grab the drinks and the blanket. If you do, then it is reasonable to say we will have jointly saved the picnic. [---] if we do both act with participatory intentions, then we will have jointly intentionally saved the picnic though neither had formed an intention to save the picnic in the light of expectations about the other's intentions. Mutual openness is thus not akin to reflecting on the intentions of others, so Seibokaite's characterisation of it is misleading. "Mutual openness is a much weaker condition that common knowledge of our situation: it can accommodate those cases of joint action that come off despite inchoate expectations about the other's plans or awareness." (Kutz 2000, p. 77). Both the plantsitting and the picnic examples satisfy the condition of mutual openness that is implicit in participatory intentions even though either positive belief about others' intentions or dispositions of responsiveness are missing in them.9 What is important is that if our intentions in these cases become common knowledge among us, we will regard our individual intentions as furthered, or at least not hindered, by the fact that they have now become mutually manifest (p. 93).10 Mutual 8 Kutz (2000, p. 97) does grant, though, that group-intentions are useful in explaining "the practical reasoning and planning of some members of jointly acting groups", and that "when agents act so as to realize the collective outcome, to the extent of aiding others in their contributions, we should attribute to them the group-intention to achieve that collective end." 9 Another example that Kutz discusses is the Storming of the Bastille (2000, p. 92). 10 Kutz (2000, p. 274, note 22) specifies that mutual openness comprises of "dispositions favourable to mutual manifestness". With this he refers to Sperber and Wilson (1995), who argue for relevance as the key to human communication and cognition: we pay attention only to information which seems to us relevant. They developed the idea of mutual manifestness to help to account for the role that the shared cognitive background of speakers has to play in assigning determinate content to their potentially ambiguous utterances. "A fact is mutually manifest to a set of individuals if each individual is capable of representing that fact and accepting it as probably true, and this fact is further manifest to each individual" (Kutz 2000, p. 274). 176 openness is thus not about each member (or a constituent) of the collective knowing that p, and that each knows that each knows that p, and so on, but about being open to the possibility of joint action. Kutz (p. 77) writes that "it seems that for our going to Chicago together to be joint, we each must believe it at least possible the other knows of or will try to predict our choice, and be favorably disposed to the other's knowledge or anticipation of that choice at least in the sense that no one would modify his or her plans in virtue of disclosure." 11 Granted, this description is not fine-grained to the level of being some kind of an absolute criterion, that is to say, it requires interpretation when employed by philosophers. But that, in my view, adds to the strength of Kutz's theory rather than weakens it. Collective phenomena are complicated and come in many forms, so to try to formulate away the need for contextual interpretation is futile and even counterproductive. More importantly, making no discernible distinction between Kutz's account and those with common knowledge conditions becomes even weaker a criticism if the focus is on the quasi-participatory intentions that Kutz argues are at play in unorganised collectives. In systemic harms by unorganised collectives only quasi-participatory intentions apply, and these require no mutual reflection: sometimes they are only unreflective confluences of habit and sentiment. Reflection only comes in if we try to make these people aware of the systemic way in which their actions uphold these structures, thus giving rise to accountability. The third criticism is that Kutz's account faces what Nefsky (2015) labels "the Superfluity Problem": we need a reason for taking action (or refrain from taking action) that connects appropriately to the collectively produced harms in cases of marginal participation, but if your act makes no difference, then why should it count as part of the group of acts that harms? In other words, if your act makes no difference (and cannot make a difference), then why should we count is as participation to begin with? Instead, your individual action seems to play only a superfluous role in bringing about the harm. Nefsky herself notes that this line of argument could be objected to because the conception of doing one's part seems instrumental, and that we should instead invoke a broader conception, where the relation between an individual act and the collective end is expressive or normative. This seems right: after all, Kutz discusses how our participatory and quasi-participatory intentions express what we tolerate, for example, so they can also express my support or solidarity for the collective outcome or for my fellow participants. Furthermore, I think that for the participatory intention to be functionally implicit in one's actual or counterfactual behaviour, as Kutz (2000, p. 82) argues, my 11 The mutual dependence condition is meant to exclude cases of adverse strategic interaction, like Kutz's (2000, p. 77) example of Spy and Counterspy who are keeping tabs on the other's movements, but trying to stay hidden at the same time. If these spies end up sitting on the same plane due to this, it would be odd to say that they have gone to Chicago jointly, as for that they should at least be open to the possibility of joint action, which they clearly cannot be. 177 conception of what I do needs only sufficiently overlap with the conceptions of others, as I have argued earlier. However, this leads to a further worry: on this broader conception of doing one's part we can no longer explain why we should take one specific action rather than another (Nefsky 2015). This objection, I find, is more pertinent to Kutz's account and I will turn to it next. 6.2 The potential of an individual act The concern raised at the end of the last section was, that the broad conception of doing one's part, Kutz's account can no longer explain why we should take one specific form of action rather than another (Nefsky 2015). If my action is meant to be mostly symbolic (and express support and solidarity) and is not expected to make an actual difference to the outcome, then why not do something symbolic only, like wear a t-shirt with a slogan about how emissions should be curbed? The problem, of course, is that if everyone thought like this in marginal participation cases, nothing significant would ever get done about the problem. I noted in chapter two how Nefsky (2016) has also recently argued that even if my act makes no difference with respect to some outcome, it can still play a significant and non-trivial role in bringing that outcome about. She rejects the assumption that helping to bring about an outcome requires making a difference. Her argument, which might strike one initially as being counterintuitive, is inspired by another one of Parfit's (1986) cases of mistakes in moral mathematics, The Drops of Water. A large number of wounded men lie out in the desert, suffering from intense thirst. We are an equally large number of altruists, each of whom has a pint of water. We could pour these pints into a water-cart. This would be driven into the desert, and our water would be shared equally between all these many wounded men. By adding his pint, each of us would enable each wounded man to drink slightly more water-perhaps only an extra drop. Even to a very thirsty man, each of these extra drops would be a very small benefit. The effect on each man might even be imperceptible. (Parfit 1986, p. 76). Nefsky (2016) asks us to imagine that there are ten thousand such men and an equal number of potential helpers. If each individual contribution only enables each man to drink one drop, i.e. an extra ten thousandth of a pint of water with imperceptible effect to their suffering, it is unclear why anyone should add their pints, as it will not make a difference. She suggests that there are many realworld cases that share this structure, citing climate change as one example. Nefsky labels such cases collective impact cases and she asks what reason there could be to act in the relevant way if the individual act makes no difference with respect to the morally significant outcome. According to her, to be 178 able to answer the no-difference challenge successfully we need to be able to show that an individual's act in collective impact cases is not instrumentally superfluous. She contrasts her account with participation views such as Kutz's where the challenge is to show that even if one's act cannot do anything significant toward changing an outcome (in relation to its normative properties), one still has other reason(s) to refrain from the act (or to do it) based on the act's participatory character.12 Therefore, Nefsky (2015) argues that Kutz's account cannot explain why we should add our pint to the cart, rather than just wear a t-shirt showing that we support the cause. Nefsky's claim, on the other hand, is that one's individual act can play a significant role towards bringing about an outcome, even if it cannot by itself make a difference with respect to the outcome, i.e. she challenges the claim of causal insignificance (superfluousness) in these cases. Namely, it could help to bring about a good outcome or prevent a bad outcome, even if it cannot make a difference.13 Note that we are now discussing marginal participation cases where the outcome is still undecided, so in effect what is under the microscope is forward-looking responsibility. A claim that an act, which in retrospect made no difference to some outcome, still played a significant role in bringing it about would be a different claim altogether and one that would seem metaphysically puzzling. So, in essence Nefsky's argument evolves around the epistemic aspects of responsibility. The potential of an individual act to help bring about or prevent an outcome is the central and most important reason for taking action (or refraining from acting) in collective impact cases. So when no such potential exists, in Nefsky's account, no reason exists (this is in contrast to Kutz's account where reasons of character could still apply). What is meant by superfluous should be clarified first. If at the time of your action the outcome is already guaranteed, then your act would be superfluous to it, even if it was causally involved in it. As an example Nefsky (2016) offers driving to the desert with your own supply of ten thousand pints of water when ten thousand people have already donated a pint each and the water-cart is at maximum capacity. When the cart is about to be driven into the desert, you come along with your own cart, take a power hose, lower it into the other water-cart, and turn it on full blast. The water that was already in the cart overflows onto the ground and is replaced by the new water. The cart is driven out into the desert, the water gets distributed, and the men's suffering is alleviated. Your act was causally involved in the alleviation of the suffering, but it was completely superfluous (not to mention wasteful). This example is meant to illustrate a distinction between actually helping and merely being part of the cause: wielding one's power hose was merely part of the cause but it did not 12 She argues that in participation views the presence of others who will (or might) act in the relevant way is built into the reason itself, i.e. the reason for taking action (or refraining from it) is that by doing so one would be a participant in a collective that could make a difference. 13 Nefsky uses 'helping' to refer to making a non-superfluous causal contribution, not in the sense of participation. 179 help. In contrast, each donated pint of water was actually helping while being part of the cause (at least until the power hose came along). Importantly, we must take it for granted that individual acts of the relevant type can be causally involved (even if they make no difference) in order to set up the problem of collective impact. Therefore the challenge Nefsky sets for herself is not to come up with an account of causal involvement that can handle these cases (i.e. to show that an act can be part of the cause of an outcome even when it makes no counterfactual difference to it), but to explain how one's act could be a helpful (i.e. non-superfluous) causal component even if it makes no difference to the outcome. For an act to help to bring about an outcome, in contrast to merely being part of the cause, at the time of the act the outcome cannot already be guaranteed, i.e. it must still be an open possibility that the outcome will fail to come about.14 Otherwise your act would be purely superfluous with respect to the outcome. Acting when there is no guarantee about an outcome could make a causal contribution towards bringing about the outcome. In other words, when it is still uncertain whether an outcome will obtain, there is a real possibility, however small, that what could stand in the way of it obtaining is exactly not enough such individual contributions as your own (think of a close vote in a national election, for example).15 Possibility has a wider extension than likelihood: unlikely things can still be within the realm of possibility. Possibility is thus a weaker condition. To claim that something is likely is therefore stronger as a claim than to say that it is possible. Nefsky distinguishes between threshold cases and non-threshold cases of harm. In threshold cases, for each outcome there is some precise number of acts needed to bring it about. If a threshold is hit exactly, then each act can make a difference (like in a close vote), but this is very rare. In non-threshold cases of harm there is no precise number of acts of the relevant kind needed for the outcome, so no sharp boundary between enough of acts of a certain type and not enough can be drawn (The Drops of Water is an example of this latter kind). Therefore, in non-threshold cases one individual act will never make a difference by itself, without its set (as there is no precise number of acts of the relevant kind needed for the outcome). Let's say that you add your pint of water to the cart in The Drops of Water well before the cart is close to its capacity. At the time of your act it is therefore still possible that the men's suffering will not be relieved. Furthermore, it is possible that it will not be relieved due to not enough people adding their individual pints of water to the cart. Now, while it is still true that your pint cannot by 14 I would like to add that counterfactual robustness may also matter in some cases; in an army of 10,000 soldiers against an army of only 300, even those soldiers who do not engage in the battle, but who would have engaged if the first ones would have died, may be significant in adding robustness. I owe the example to Arto Laitinen. 15 In this respect Nefsky's view is like the expected utility approach by Kagan (2011) where zero chance of making a difference would mean no reason to withhold the act or to do it. However, while in Kagan's account the collective impact cases have to include a threshold for the individual action to count, Nefsky's account applies across threshold and non-threshold cases of harms. For criticism of Kagan, see Nefsky (2011). 180 itself make a big enough difference to alleviate their suffering (i.e. it is still uncertain whether the good outcome will come about or not), your individual act of adding water is non-superfluous as it is potentially helpful. Nefsky (2016) thus proposes: Suppose your act of X-ing could be part of what causes outcome Y. In this case, your act of X-ing is non-superfluous and so could help to bring about Y if and only if, at the time at which you X, (*) It is possible that Y will fail to come about due, at least in part, to a lack of X-ing.16 When these conditions hold and when the outcome in question is normatively significant (good or bad), then one has as a reason to act in the relevant way, as it could make a causal contribution towards bringing about the outcome when it is uncertain whether that outcome will obtain. Furthermore, in this view there is no need to settle the question of whether we are dealing with a threshold case of harm or for you to be able to know that your individual action is not just a superfluous thing to do, but rather that you have a good reason to do it (so there is no need to know if a precise number of drops of water, or certain tons of emissions, are needed for a given level of suffering relief or climate harm threshold). All the reason we should require to pour our individual pints in is that there is a real risk that the need will not be met otherwise.17 Note that this proposal does not rest on the potential of your actions influencing others. For example, Anne Schwenkenbecher (2014) has argued that our individual actions could influence others to make a contribution towards climate change mitigation, and therefore we cannot say in advance that our individual acts are insignificant; instead, they may set a positive example to others, raise public awareness of the issue, and even trigger collective action. Whether or not our individual acts can be significant in this way is a separate issue from what is discussed in this section. What is at stake here, in Nefsky's account, is only that when an outcome is not certain, we should not decide in advance that our individual action is insignificant just because it will make no difference to the outcome; it might be, at least in part, up to us what ultimately happens. It is thus closer to what Spiekermann (2014b, p. 89) has argued, namely that individuals contributing to a harm do wrong not simply because they are part of a harming group, but because "they ignore the risk that their action, even though it cannot be perceived while holding all other actions fixed, may well be perceived with others if we do not hold everything else fixed."18 The individual's action therefore 16 Nefsky (2016) notes that three conditions are contained in this account: (1) it is possible that Y will occur, (2) it is possible that Y will fail to occur, and (3) it is possible that Y will fail to occur at least partly as a result of there not having been enough acts of X-ing. I would like to add that in some cases (like the army example in footnote 14) the Y will need to be defined or set up in a contrastive manner, for example "the victory of our army" or "the victory of our army with N casualties at most". 17 In the next chapter I will explore some of the ways in which we might not know that we have a reason to do something, although we do have a reason. 18 The "perceived" here refers to the impact of the action being perceivable in a set of such actions. 181 increases the chance that a harm comes about, and in order to avoid this, individuals must take a forward-looking view and think about the effect their contributions might have in the end result. I suggest that in cases of marginal participation, Kutz's account of complicity should be supplemented with Nefsky's proposal. Thus all the reason we need to do what we can to mitigate climate change is that there is a real risk that the need will not be met otherwise. But how are we to evaluate the strength of the reason that we get from this? Nefsky (2016) suggests that there are some obvious points to consider, like that the more serious the outcome in question, the stronger the reason (i.e. severe suffering gives us stronger reasons than moderate suffering), or that it is plausible that the larger the potential causal role of your act, again the stronger the reason. But how to weigh these considerations against all our other duties and commitments? The different considerations that could go into answering that would be a topic in its own right and it is a question that I will not attempt to answer in this thesis. My aim has been to show that despite the complexity of the situation, individuals can have climate change responsibility, and that there are three potential sources for this responsibility: direct responsibility, shared responsibility qua members of collective agents, and shared responsibility qua constituents of unorganised collectives. Furthermore, I do not believe that it is a question that a philosopher could even answer fully: each of us should look at our position and relations, lifestyles and roles, and make those assessments for ourselves.19 Public debate is of course needed at the general level to question some of our prevalent norms and to renegotiate these, but at the end of the day, in most cases there is no one better placed than you yourself to answer how to run your life all things considered (although, perhaps, with the help of other people close to you). Public debate done well can be great at bringing 19 Reasoning towards a truth of a proposition is the standard reasoning in philosophy, but according to Anscombe (1963, §33), this view misses what is characteristic about practical reasoning. Aristotle's practical syllogism is often seen as the classic example of a principle for action. You have a general premise in the style of "Europeans should reduce their carbon-footprint by taking less flights", and another premise "I am a European", leading to a conclusion "I should take less flights". Anscombe argues that the true nature of Aristotle's practical syllogism is not this kind of "ordinary reasoning" that my example represents, leading to a conclusion in the form of "I should do such-and-such", as "[t]here is a difference of form between reasoning leading to action and reasoning for the truth of a conclusion". In other words, the reasoning does not necessitate a conclusion: it is not inconsistent if I accept the premises but fail to act on the order that is given as the conclusion, even if there are no impediments (nothing prevents or intervenes). Anscombe can see a dress in a shop window, decide upon how it looks (its colour, cut etc.), that it would suit her, but not be inconsistent when she does not buy the dress, despite having enough money with her. It would be insane to universalise a premise that every time you see a dress that would suit you, you should buy it (as long as you have enough cash etc.). The same would apply to a premise such as "Do everything conducive to not having a car crash", as "there are usually a hundred different and incompatible things conducive to not having a car crash" (Anscombe gives an example in her typical dry sense of humour: drive your car immediately into the private gateway on your left/right and abandon your car there). She concludes: Thus though general considerations, like 'Vitamin C is good for people' (which of course is a matter of medical fact) may easily occur to someone who is considering what he is going to eat, considerations of the form 'Doing such-and-such quite specific things in such-and-such circumstances is always suitable' are never, if taken strictly, possible at all for a sane person, outside special arts. What Anscombe is saying is that we should be careful about what inferences we can draw from our premises when it comes to a course of action. In general, she cautions that "should" comes rarely with an "ought" attached: it "is a rather light word with unlimited contexts of application" (§35). 182 up new considerations and reasons for taking some course of action. We need each other for fresh viewpoints and previously unheard arguments, new evidence and illuminating data. In short, we need others to challenge our thinking if we want to change our habits and reassess our norms and set new parameters. But what actions you personally should take to do your part in mitigating climate change is something for you to decide (within the parameters set by the public debate). Saying that, if we think of our role within a collective agent, it will be relatively more straightforward to assess the risk that mitigation action will not be met without your individual act. At the workplace, for example, it will be much clearer that certain people especially run the risk of forfeiting meaningful mitigation action on the part of that particular collective agent if they do not contribute to the effort. An example could be a middle-manager at a retail store chain where internal debate has just begun on the need to switch to a greener energy supplier. Her actions, although potentially superfluous, could also be a deciding factor in what the collective agent decides to do. Assessing the risk that mitigation outcome will not be achieved without her actions is even clearer in her role as a coach in her kids' sports club, where the debate is about the necessary number of training trips abroad. In any case, her role and the power structures within that collective agent affect these odds. So in many (most) cases our actions as members of collective agents are less likely to be superfluous than our actions as constituents of unorganised collectives. Correspondingly, the strength of the reason that we get from this should be stronger than the reason we get as constituents of unorganised collectives. To recap, I have suggested that in cases of marginal participation, especially regarding harms by unorganised collectives where only quasi-participatory intentions apply, Nefsky's account can provide us with yet more reasons to take action.20 Note, however, that to be able to assess the potential of your act to help bring about or prevent an outcome, you need to have a certain amount of knowledge about the situation. I will argue in the next and final chapter that with climate change harms there are several obstacles for us assessing the situation in an objective manner. These are to do with the powerful interests that are at stake (resulting in agnotology), the complexity of the situation and of climate science, and also our psychological defence mechanisms. But before that, I will round off this chapter by looking at Young's criticism and I will suggest that the complicity account and the structural injustices account should be combined. 20 Nefsky (2016) herself acknowledges that her view is consistent with holding that there are additional reasons for action flowing from the participatory character of your act, i.e. that your membership or constituency in a collective can be normatively significant (although she does not endorse such a view). She has also argued that accounts based on participation like Kutz's cannot actually work unless we can say that individual acts of some relevant type can do something causally significant in these cases, but that her account solves this problem for participation views by providing that causal significance. 183 6.3 Climate change as a structural injustice The fifth, and perhaps the most interesting, line of criticism is that the liability model of responsibility cannot cover structural injustices. The reason this is important for my thesis is that I argue that climate change is for a large part a structural injustice. Structural injustices do not come about through individual interaction and they are not attributable to specific actions or policies (Young 2011, p. 45). Therefore the harm caused by them, the injustice, is not attributable to individual fault or some specifically unjust policies (p. 47). Rather, these injustices are consequences of social-structural processes that "put large groups of persons under systematic threat of domination or deprivation of the means to develop and exercise their capacities" (p. 52). Young explains (p. 52): Structural injustice is a kind of moral wrong distinct from the wrongful action of an individual agent or the repressive policies of a state. Structural injustice occurs as a consequence of many individuals and institutions acting to pursue their particular goals and interests, for the most part within the limits of accepted rules and norms. The beginning of this section is spent on describing Young's social connection model and her criticism of Kutz. I will argue that the criticism does not hold and that combining the two models of responsibility allows us to get the best out of both. Young (2011, p. 101) contends that while Kutz's account offers "the best effort I know of" to try to extend "the liability model of responsibility" to cover structural injustices, it remains unsatisfactory. In the liability model, the concept of responsibility evolves around the question if an agent is an appropriate target for blame for a harmful outcome. Assigning blame can only be done when the voluntary actions of agents are causally connected to the circumstances and the agents are not excused through ignorance. She (p. 96) argues that the problem with structural injustices is that a person's deeds cannot be connected linearly to a harm, and while we can identify the agents who contribute to structural processes, we cannot "identify how the actions of one particular individual, or even one particular collective agent, such as a firm, has directly produced harm to other specific individuals." She proposes an alternative model of responsibility, the social connection model of responsibility, which is primarily forward-looking, according to which someone who is responsible "has an obligation to join with others who share that responsibility in order to transform the structural processes to make their outcomes less unjust." Her argument is that while the liability model works for many cases of responsibility, the social connection model should be used in cases of structural injustices. 184 The primary structural injustice with climate change is that the worst impacts will be felt by many of the poorest communities, despite them contributing to the problem the least, as Robyn Eckersley (2016) argues. The marginal social structural position of these communities in the economy and in the state system exposes them to most of the risks that are generated by the social structures, with only few of the benefits. She concludes that the added injustice is that this "also places them in a particularly weak position to orchestrate their transformation in ways that will reduce their vulnerability" (p. 347). I would like to add future generations into this picture: their position is particularly vulnerable in relation to us. As Lisa Herzog (2016, p. 4)21 puts it, employing the notion of a structural injustice locates the focus on the "social positions that individuals can end up in, emphasizing that these should neither be understood as the result of personal failure nor as caused by unhappy circumstances for which no one is responsible." Unlike with the liability model, the primary purpose of assigning responsibility in the social connection model is not associated with punishment, sanctions, or getting compensation or redress, as the model is not backward-looking (Young 2011, p. 98). Instead of concentrating on finding something faulty in the motives and intentions of the agents, Young (p. 99) argues that the key to understanding structural injustices is to see that they "result primarily from a complex combination of actions and policies by individual, corporate, and government agents-actions and policies that most people consider normal and acceptable, or even necessary and good." The example she discusses is lack of decent affordable housing (pp. 99-100): Vast numbers of actors contribute to the processes that produce this outcome, many of them with little awareness of how their actions contribute. Landlords jump at a lucrative offer to sell the buildings they have had difficulty maintaining. Cities cultivate the developers who want to renovate them because they want to attract business investment and upgrade their image with bond investors. Young affluent professionals move back to the center of the city to be close to work and entertainment. Lower-income renters compete for units, contributing to patterns of housing demand that rebound on all of them in the form of higher rents. Each agent moves on their own interests within the existing legal and social norms, and their actions together contribute to the outcome that some people are displaced and have difficulty finding decent affordable housing. None ought to be blamed for that outcome, I am suggesting, because the specific actions of each cannot be causally disentangled from structural processes to trace a specific aspect of the outcome. Presumably none intended the outcome, moreover, and many regret it. On my view, this means not that they should not be found responsible, but that they ought to be held responsible in a different sense. This sense is the forward-looking sense of obligation that "refers to agents' carrying out activities in a morally appropriate way and seeing to it that certain outcomes obtain" (p. 104).22 So the argument 21 Page number refers to the online first version (section one, end of paragraph one). 22 Young refers to Henry S. Richardson in appealing to this meaning of responsibility. 185 is that rather than referring to backward-looking fault or liability, we should appeal to the responsibilities we have in virtue of our social roles and positions. Young writes that her model relies on this second usage of the term 'responsibility', but it shares with the liability usage "a reference to causes of wrongs in the form of structural processes that produce injustice" (p. 105). She offers a model of shared responsibility that is inspired by Larry May's notion, but she extends his model to cases of structural injustices where there are necessarily no guilty perpetrators (p. 111): As I understand it, a shared responsibility is a responsibility I personally bear, but I do not bear it alone. I bear it in the awareness that others bear it with me; acknowledgement of my responsibility is also acknowledgement of the inchoate collective of which I am a part, which together produces injustice. The ground of my responsibility lies in the fact that I participate in the structural processes that have unjust outcomes. These processes are ongoing and ought to be transformed so that they are less unjust. Thus I share with others the responsibility to transform these processes to reduce and eliminate the injustice they cause. My responsibility is essentially shared with others because the harms are produced by many of us acting together within accepted institutions and practices, and because it is not possible for any of us to identify just what in our own actions results in which aspects of the injustice that particular individuals suffer. The social connection model evaluates background conditions and does not isolate perpetrators; responsibility is shared and can only be discharged through collective action (p. 105). It thus shares the basic motivation of Cripps's model, without facing the problems of talking about the collective obligations of groups that are non-intentional and passive, or the putative obligations of putative groups as in Isaacs's model. The social connection model of responsibility says that individuals bear responsibility for structural injustice because they contribute by their actions to the processes that produce unjust outcomes. Our responsibility derives from belonging together with others in a system of interdependent processes of cooperation and competition through which we seek benefits and aim to realize projects. Within these processes, each of us expects justice toward ourselves, and others can legitimately make claims of justice on us. All who dwell within the structures must take responsibility for remedying injustices they cause, though none is specifically liable for the harm in a legal sense. Responsibility in relation to injustice thus derives [--] from participating in the diverse institutional processes that produce structural injustice. (Young 2011, p. 105). Note the reference to participating in processes as a basis for responsibility and how it sounds very much like Kutz. Let us go back a bit. Young (p. 100) argues that the liability model is inappropriate for discussing structural injustices: The primary reason that the liability model does not apply to issues of structural injustice is that structures are produced and reproduced by large numbers of people acting according to normally accepted rules and practices, and it is in the nature of such structural processes that their potentially harmful effects cannot be traced directly to any particular contributors to the process. 186 Not being able to trace effects directly to participants sounds, of course, very similar to what Kutz is arguing, just as referring to participation as a basis for responsibility brings to mind his complicity model. Young is not convinced, as she argues that the liability model could not be extended or modified to cover structural injustices. While she judges Kutz to offer "an excellent account of complicity in an endeavor where many people participate and coordinate their actions to bring about determinate results" (p. 102), she argues that his extension of his account to systemic harms by unorganised collectives does not work.23 She (p. 103) agrees with Kutz that "structural processes arise from the actions of individuals" and that this serves "as a basis for connecting individual responsibility to structural harms", but what she objects to is the idea that conceptualising responsibility this way is continuous with the theory of complicity that Kutz offers. The argument she gives is this (p. 103): I interpret his theory of complicity as coming under a liability model of responsibility. Those who are complicit with a harm are blameworthy in the same sense as those who have planned and directed it, though perhaps not to the same degree. Their participating in the enactment of the harm by virtue of things that they do is a necessary but, as I understand it, insufficient condition of finding that they are blameworthy. They are culpable because they understand the collective enterprise to which their actions contribute and have internalized that collective end as the end of their individual actions. On Kutz's own account, precisely these conditions are lacking in cases of collective harms produced by socioeconomic structures but without direct coordinated action. In the absence of an intent to produce the outcome, surely those who participate should not be found guilty in the same way that those who participate in a war crime are. Essentially, what Young (p. 104) argues is that Kutz fails to distinguish between difference in kind of responsibility, rather than in degree: "At the point when we consider issues of responsibility in relation to structural injustice, quantitative difference becomes qualitative difference. What we should seek is not a variation on a weaker form of liability, but rather a different conception of responsibility altogether." These different conceptions are forward-looking guilt-free obligation responsibility and backward-looking blame-based responsibility as liability. In standard desert-based models of accountability, once an action is deemed right or wrong, the agent responsible deserves praise or punishment in proportion to the act. Critical of this approach, Kutz (2000, pp. 18-19) accuses it of conflating the judgement of wrongfulness with the judgement of accountability. Desert-based models are non-positional: the search for a uniquely determined response fails to take the relation of the respondent and the agent into account. In 23 Young (p. 102) also notes what I discussed earlier (in the beginning of section 5.4) that Kutz's terminology might sound confusing here as structural injustices would come under unstructured collective harms, due to them not being a result of a coordinated project, but instead aggregated effects of individual actions. 187 contrast, his concept of accountability is both positional and relational (see section 5.2), as we should separate the fact of wrongdoing from the responses it warrants. I think that Young's critique of Kutz misses this. As quoted above, she (2011, p. 103) writes that the people "who are complicit with a harm are blameworthy in the same sense as those who have planned and directed it, though perhaps not to the same degree." But this is wrong. Recall from chapter one that complicity does not necessarily imply blameworthiness, as it is akin to liability, not culpability. So when one is complicit, it is a separate question if they are also blameworthy. In general, I find that including blameworthiness in "a liability model of responsibility" is somewhat confusing, as in the standard usage of the terms blameworthiness (culpability) and liability come apart (see section 1.2). While Young uses liability very broadly to refer to the reasoning that leads to finding guilt or fault for a harm, I would like to keep liability and blameworthiness separate. I already noted in chapter one that I disagree that prospective responsibility can be neatly cut off from retrospective responsibility in practice (although on a purely conceptual level it can). I now want to argue further that it is more powerful not to concentrate on just prospective responsibility even in cases of structural injustice, which a lot of climate change harm falls under (thereby I will advocate for an account that combines Kutz and Young). While Young argues that focussing on blame can be distracting and counterproductive, I want to argue that we should not aim to push blame aside, but instead blame better. By that I mean that we should cast a wider target for blame to avoid scapegoating, but also while doing so not to overstate the case. It is a tricky line to walk, for sure, but I am in agreement with Martha Nussbaum (2011) in that Young's arguments against blame are not entirely convincing. I will use Nussbaum's criticism to structure my own, as we seem to think along the same lines on this issue. Where we differ, though, is that while Nussbaum (p. xxii) questions the conceptual distinction itself, I do not want to question the separation of prospective and retrospective responsibility at a conceptual level. Instead, as I noted, I want to question a sharp distinction in practice and will argue that when the concepts are applied, the senses can blur into one another.24 For us to be able to blame better, we need to separate the senses on a conceptual level and then show how both senses are relevant when applied to real-life cases (I will give an example of this at the end of this section, one that is linked to indigenous communities). To begin with, Nussbaum (2011, p. xxi) notes that if an agent has responsibility for some social ill (in the forward-looking sense of an obligation), and she fails to take it up, then she is blameworthy after the relevant time passes for not shouldering her responsibility.25 Time indeed marches on and 24 Thank you to Pekka Mäkelä for pressing me to clarify my stand on this. 25 Nussbaum (2011, p. xxi) writes: "Let us stipulate that at time t, agent A bears responsibility R for social ill S. Time passes, and she shirks her responsibility. What should we say next? I think it can't be right to say, well, looking back on it, she did nothing wrong at t, and we should now forget about t and focus exclusively on what lies ahead of her at t + 1. If we take that line, preserving the clean distinction between retrospective guilt (which we're not supposed to 188 unfulfilled prospective obligations can morph into retrospective blame.26 Nussbaum's (p. xxi) second point is that while an agent that participates in creating or upholding a structural injustice need not to have any harmful or malicious intent, she might still be negligent: "if it is a general moral truth that citizens ought to monitor the institutions in which they live and be vigilant lest structural injustice occur within them, then I think it follows that they are culpably negligent if they do not shoulder that burden." To this I would like to add: "if they can", i.e. what Nussbaum argues seems to hold at least in countries and within structures where people have enough power, i.e. they are not uneducated people struggling for survival under a dictator, for example. Of course, even in well-off democratic societies (with adequate equality) agnotology and other tactics that create ignorance might be employed, creating complications to vigilance and monitoring, but I return to these issues in the next chapter. The third point is that "we don't blame an agent for not shouldering the entirety of the social task all by herself, but we blame her for not shouldering the part that she ought to have shouldered, and thus we blame her for her contribution to the bad outcome" (p. xxii), therefore we do not have to say that guilt is individualistic while responsibility is often shared. Young also offers pragmatic arguments for why we should focus on the future rather than the past. In offering a response to these, Nussbaum (2011, p. xxii) argues that focusing on blame does not necessarily distract us from future tasks, as it has a forward-looking sense too; namely as a deterrent. Ascriptions of blame can serve "as a powerful deterrent toward committing future blameworthy acts", and praising and blaming for past actions help child and adult alike to "learn how to perceive new situations in the future, and supply her with powerful incentives to seek good actions in the future and to avoid the bad" (p. xxii).27 By learning what we did wrong we can get be assigning to participants in structural injustice) and prospective responsibility (which we are supposed to be assigning to them), well, then people get a free pass indefinitely, since no task they have failed to shoulder ever goes onto the debit or guilt side of their ledger, and the new task always lies ahead of them." Nussbaum characterises this as a conceptual point, but I would describe this as a practical point. 26 Think of a leader who has been brought in to save a drowning institution. She is not to blame in any way for the current dire situation the institution is in (she was previously an outsider in relation to the institution), but by accepting the role she now has an obligation to at least try to improve things due to her new position. If she succeeds, she is worthy of praise (to some degree). If she fails to implement necessary changes, she is blameworthy to some degree (depending on how badly she failed, did she genuinely try, what others did, how much power she had, were her hands tied and so on and so on). She might be both praiseworthy and blameworthy, for example, if she improves certain things considerably while neglecting others. It all depends on the context and the actual situation. However, her responsibility was always different in terms of its quality from a leader who has the same obligation to try to improve things but who is implicated in the past failings. The second leader has an obligation that is a mixture of a neutral obligation based on his role of making things better, blended with an obligation arising from the past failures and harms created, based on his blameworthy agency. 27 Nussbaum (2011, pp. xxii-xxiii) gives an example about raising children where blame should be combined with guidance about a better way of conducting oneself in the future. "Surely, as Young says, the accent should always lie in the future, which can be changed, rather than the past, which cannot be. However, it is a little hard to see how we ever get to the future without a critique of the past: praise and blame for good and bad actions that have already happened help a child learn how to perceive new situations in the future, and supply her with powerful incentives to seek good actions in the future and to avoid the bad. Suppose every time the child does something selfish the parent says simply, 'From now on, treat others fairly.' Not 'From now on, do things differently,' which implies that the child did something substandard just now, and certainly not 'You just treated Johnny very unfairly, and next time I really expect you to try 189 better at spotting similar situations in the future and avoid repeating our mistakes, furthermore giving us an additional motivation to do so.28 She (p. xxiii) gives an example of how this applies to climate change: If we just say to people, "From now on conserve energy," without showing in detail how the wasteful lifestyle of Americans contributes to global harms, little learning takes place, and moral incentives are not created. By contrast, when we say, "Look how large your carbon footprint is," learning is promoted and motivation is strengthened by a confrontation with one's own obviously quite harmful acts. When it comes to Young's other pragmatic arguments, Nussbaum (p. xxiii) notes that while it is possible that when focusing on blame we often tend "to pin fault on a small number of culprits while making most of us feel exonerated", this is not necessarily so, and a careful causal analysis can "show us all the collective task that we have mostly all been shirking." I think Kutz's complicity account is a perfect example of this. Similarly, focusing on blame does not need to distract us from background conditions and a good analysis or ascription of blame takes these into account. Blame might make people feel defensive and evasive and thus be counterproductive for your cause, but as Nussbaum (p. xxiv) notes, guilt can also be "a powerful incentive to make reparations", so it all depends on the situation and how the message is delivered and also by whom. After all, we are more likely to listen to criticism from those that we share a good relationship with (Haidt 2012). In any case, when guilt is administered in the right way and in correct dosage, combining it with futuredirected advice and hope can be motivational.29 Lastly, while guilt can make people turn inwards and focus on themselves, rather than on others, Nussbaum (2011, p. xxv) points out how selfexamination can be an important ingredient in turning outwards, and that "if we turn outward prematurely, before we conduct an honest critique of our own inner world, our dedication to ameliorative action may prove shallow or short-lived." It therefore seems that the pragmatic arguments against assigning retrospective responsibility for structural harms works at most to warn us against focusing solely on blame. We thus do not need to concentrate on just forward-looking or backward-looking responsibility when discussing climate change harms, but instead should utilise both, as it is a context in which we need both. hard to be fair,' which tethers responsibility to guilt. No, this parent says simply, 'From now on, treat others fairly.' This sends an unhelpfully confusing message to the child. She really doesn't learn about fairness, since she doesn't learn what she did unfairly just now. Indeed, she doesn't even learn that she has done something unfair just now. So to that extent her ability to identify future fair acts is not enhanced, and her motivation to do so is not strengthened." 28 Kutz (2000, p. 177) discusses conceptions of wrongdoing and accountability as reasons that ground our motivations. Young (2011, p. 182) also allows that when we acknowledge "that current structural injustices have some roots in past injustice", it "provides additional weight to moral arguments for remedying these current injustices". 29 Nussbaum's example is Martin Luther King Jr. delivering his famous "I Have a Dream" speech in 1963. 190 Although Isaacs (2014) also makes a rather sharp distinction between prospective and retrospective responsibility,30 she also argues that when we discuss collective obligations we often need both. Isaacs associates forward-looking sense with having a responsibility and the backwardlooking with being responsible. She (p. 43) writes: "Blameworthiness and praiseworthiness are assessments of agents. They are qualities or evaluations we might attribute to agents based on actions they have taken. Thus, they have a retrospective quality to them that does not translate neatly into a future-oriented concept." In contrast, "to be prospectively responsible is simply to have a responsibility to perform some action in the future." While retrospective responsibility is evaluative, collective obligation has a primarily prescriptive function (p. 44). Nonetheless, both matter for collective obligations, as "agents who are collectively responsible for a wrong or harm have a stronger collective obligation to address it than they might have in the absence of collective responsibility" (p. 49). While I agree with Isaacs's assessment for the most part, I do not find that there is anything that prevents blame as assessment from translating "neatly into a future-oriented concept". After all, we do not blame just to punish or to voice our disapproval, but also to deter, to try to prevent such things taking place in the future, or to try to motivate someone to take action. Think of a patient that has been badly treated by the accident and emergency (A&E) department of his local hospital: they forgot to run some important tests; maybe the staff was rude when concerned relatives wanted to know why no treatment seemed forthcoming, and so on. After several hours of ineffectual care, a young doctor just starting her shift locates the problem and administers the right care. The patient recovers and gets to go home. He was never in any lifethreatening situation, but the delay caused him considerable pain and considerable anguish for his relatives. They decide to write a letter of complaint to the hospital board. It is stern but fair in its description of the night's events. They are protesting how they were treated, but just as strong a motivation for the letter is the hope that they could help prevent such things happening in the future. There are clear problems at the A&E: the night was not especially busy, yet staff seemed stressed and overwhelmed. As a result, many mistakes were made. On another night and with another patient similar mistakes might prove fatal. The man and his family want someone to take preventive action to make such a situation less likely, so they write the letter of complaint. Such an act of blaming is especially suited for situations where it is not clear to the victim who within some collective are responsible for remedying the situation. It is not difficult to come up with similar examples where a forward-looking sense seems to be built into the act of blaming. 30 Isaacs (2014, p. 43) writes: "Because both senses of responsibility have normative dimensions to them, they are easy to conflate. I maintain that they are fundamentally different from each other." On a conceptual level I agree. 191 The same goes for climate change. Take indigenous people as an example. Their voices are among the most audible in the global climate justice social movement, and over 200 delegates from these communities attended the 2015 Conference of the Parties (COP) in Paris (Whyte 2017).31 Indigenous people often have lived in ways that are in tune with the weather patterns and groups like Inuit contribute almost nothing to global carbon emissions, yet they are suffering already. Indigenous voices have lately become louder and louder (Arctic Council, Idle No More, Conversations with the Earth (Land is Life), to give just few examples). Indigenous people's lobby groups are protesting what is happening to their livelihoods and habitats due to the effects of the emissions of others, but this kind of blame is not primed exclusively, or even for the most part, to make the emitters feel bad and to apologise. Instead, it aims for them to open their eyes to their responsibility so that they would make the necessary changes and to finally begin effective mitigation efforts. It is arguably mainly forward-looking: it is about how things should be done from now on to prevent (or reduce) such harms that are already taking place. However, it also has a strong backward-looking sense, as the message is often not only that indigenous information should be respected and taken into use, but also that climate change harms are linked to previous harms and is exacerbated by these for many communities. After all, it is not the case that indigenous peoples are more at risk simply by choosing to live in certain places and in certain ways. Instead, Kyle Powys Whyte (2017) argues that the indigenous climate justice movement points out how ongoing, cyclical colonialism is a major reason for the current vulnerability of these communities. Legacies of colonialism include multi-faceted problems such as marginalisation and poverty, and the resulting socio-economic conditions are far from ideal for absorbing and withstanding climate change impacts. Climate change impacts are, however, not a new problem that exacerbates the old problems. Rather, the problems are related and form a continuum: climate injustice is catalysed by industrialisation and the capitalistic economic system, both of which are linked to colonialism. In this way, the injustice of the vulnerability is two-fold: the same institutions that facilitate carbon-intensive economic activities at the same time interfere with indigenous peoples' capacity to adapt to the adverse climate impacts.32 If we do not include backward-looking assessment of historical injustices and how they have led to increased vulnerability to climate change harms, the reason that indigenous peoples can be seen as facing greater risks seems only a matter of happenstance (a position labelled by Whyte as "The Bad Luck View"). If, on the other hand, we do 31 COP is the supreme decision-making body of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 32 For example, indigenous communities can be forced to settle in locations that are marginal and exposed to risks (e.g. flood prone areas) due to the lack of input into choices concerning them (procedural injustice). This containment and sedentarisation brought on by the building of infrastructure in these areas spells the end of high mobility for these communities. The community thus no longer can utilise high mobility as an adaptive strategy as they have throughout their history, making them more vulnerable. (Marino 2012, Whyte 2017). 192 include these historical reasons and their legacy to the overall picture of climate harms, i.e. we include retrospective blame to prospective arguments, we get to the root of the problem and are more likely to come up with something that actually could work. By supplementing the social connection model with the complicity principle, we can see clearly why we as individuals can be held responsible for collectively caused structural harms like climate change. The responsibility of those who participate in the practices and norms that uphold the structural injustices, or create the institutions that place others in a vulnerable positions, is to critically evaluate them together and to try to seek solutions to address the injustices (Kahn 2012, p. 50). Creating public debate on these issues is crucial for this process, and the same applies to climate change: we should seek to critically evaluate the practices, norms, and institutions that have created the issue and also put certain groups in particularly vulnerable positions in predictable and avoidable ways. Climate change really is an uncomfortable truth: to adequately mitigate and adapt to it, we need to fix the structures that led and lead to it. In structurally caused harms and injustices, where "many people contribute to producing and reproducing structures that cause injustice, and often many people are privileged in these structures", the responsibility derives "from being positioned in the structures in relation to others and acting within these positions" (Young 2011, p. 180). This kind of responsibility is shared and the obligation is to act to improve the situation. In the view that I suggest, if the structural injustice has just come to light, the responsibility is neutral in terms of moral assessment of the individual or collective agents relevantly positioned within these structures. To put it in simpler terms, the moral assessment amounts to only recognising the obligation. Once the relevant time passes and no action or insufficient action has been taken towards making the structure more just, the situation changes: you still have the same obligation, but it is now combined with some degree of blame. There is thus no need to reject Kutz's model just because it focuses on prospective responsibility. I believe that if we combine the two discussions, this makes the case for structural injustices stronger, as in that way we can cover both prospective and retrospective sources of responsibility. Young's treatment of collectively caused harms is more convincing than Cripps's or Isaacs's, as it does not have to refer to fuzzy collective obligations of agents who do not exist. Young and Kutz both place moral responsibility and obligations on individuals, so they do not get into metaphysical muddles. Most of our emissions take place within certain arrangements, so individual responsibility cannot be discussed isolated from the social systems and collective settings that we are all embedded in. I have argued that our greenhouse gas emissions take place within pre-existing social structures and systems and that the resulting harms can reinforce existing injustices. Conceptualising climate change harms as structural injustices can help us to look past questions of 193 unintended consequences and appreciate how deeply embedded the problem is in our existing way of life. If we are to adequately mitigate and adapt to climate change, and to offer compensation where appropriate, concerns of justice will force us to look at the system in a deeper way. Chapter 7 – Knowledge, ignorance, and climate change responsibility As people who live-in a broad sense-together, we cannot escape the thought that the terrible occurrences that we see around us are quintessentially our problems. They are our responsibility-whether or not they are also anyone else's. Amartya Sen (1999, p. 282) There are too many good reasons why we humans resist the many sad facts of climate disruption [--]. It finally boils down to the question, Why bother? That one question reveals a simple fact: The most fundamental obstacles to averting dangerous climate disruption are not mainly physical or technological or even institutional; they have to do with how we align our thinking and doing with our being. This missing alignment shows clearly in the current lack of courage, determination, and imagination to carry through the necessary actions. But these human capacities are, luckily, as renewable as the wind and the sunshine are. Per Espen Stoknes (2015, p. 227) In the last two chapters I defended the view that individuals can be complicit in climate change harms, either as members of collective agents (e.g. as citizens of states or employees of a corporation) or as constituents of unorganised collectives (e.g. as consumers or polluters). With collective agents the link between the individual and the collective outcome is a participatory intention, and in unorganised collectives it is a quasi-participatory intention. I supplemented Kutz's account with Young's analysis of structural injustices, arguing that anthropogenic climate change is mostly a byproduct of the modern way of living, its wastefulness and inequalities. Young (2011, p. 150) argues that for structural injustices to end, we need to make special efforts to first create a break in harmful social processes, and to do so we must engage in public discussions that bring the injustices to light, criticising the powerful agents that allow or encourage such injustices. This, however, requires knowledge about the harms and the systems and processes that uphold them, as well as the collective (and individual) agents relevant in their upkeep. In this final chapter I will discuss complications for assigning responsibility related to knowledge, ignorance, and psychological mechanisms, both at the individual and the collective level. Ignorance is usually seen as an excuse for blame as it undermines the voluntariness required for moral responsibility. If one does not know what one is involved in, and cannot be reasonably expected to know either, then one cannot be praiseworthy or blameworthy for doing that thing (although you can be praiseworthy in how you deal with ignorance). The standard line of thinking is that our responsibility as moral agents is limited by the information available, but as Steve 195 Vanderheiden (2016, p. 298) observes, our world is characterised by an abundance of information rather than a scarcity of it. This applies at least to citizens of the nations in the Global North, where large quantities of information are accessible at a relatively low acquisition cost to many persons. The problem, though, is that its totality exceeds our cognitive capacities to acquire and process information. "Some ignorance of morally relevant facts may therefore be excusable even when these are readily accessible, given the vast array of other morally relevant facts from which these must be culled" (Vanderheiden (2016, p. 298). The question then becomes how to set the relevant threshold between excusable and culpable ignorance? It is not easy to decide what is included in "reasonably expected knowledge" when a situation is collective or structural. Ignorance is traditionally defined as an absence: lack of knowledge1, the state of not knowing about something. More recently, ignorance has also been conceptualised as lack of true belief (Peels 2010).2 It usually has a negative connotation: "ignorant" or "ignoramus" are labels one does not wish for. If knowledge is power, then ignorance is the opposite (or bliss, depending on who you ask). However, the role of ignorance in society is not just passive and negative: ignorance is also an indispensable element in many social relations and structures (Moore and Tumin 1949). Often ignorance is simply unavoidable, or neutral. Not everyone can know everything, and not all information is relevant for all. Ignorance is not a static state of affairs. In the course of time, unknowns are transformed into new knowledge, while at the institutional level some old knowledge is forgotten and replaced with ignorance (Roberts 2013, p. 218). Science challenges the existing body of knowledge and is at the centre of most of our efforts of turning unknowns and ignorance into knowledge. It is a way of looking at the world and scientific attitude, in the sense of wonder about how things work, is a human characteristic. Lately, though, there has been a lot of talk about scepticism and even hostility towards science. The deliberately manufactured ignorance around climate change discussed in chapters one and three has fed into this. While there has been growing interest in ignorance and epistemic conditions for responsibility (Peels 2016, Smith 1983, Zimmerman 2008), literature on collective ignorance and its links to responsibility have so far been quite thin on the ground.3 Are there different standards of culpability for collective agents and individuals? How do institutional practices affect the knowledge we should have about the causes 1 Some writers differentiate knowledge of facts (propositional knowledge) from practical and experiential knowledge, like knowing how to play guitar or having met Susan. I will follow Rik Peels (2010) in concentrating here only on propositional knowledge, referring to it as simply 'knowledge'. Similarly I do not differentiate between propositional ignorance, practical ignorance, or experiential ignorance. This is so that I do not to get drawn into debates about the relation of propositional knowledge to possible other types of knowledge. 2 Peels (2010, pp. 59-61) argues that a true proposition that is arrived at in an unwarranted way, in the sense that it is does not qualify as a justified true belief (see footnote 4 on justified true beliefs), might not count as knowledge, but failing to know is not ignorance either. Ignorance, thus, is a lack of true belief rather than a lack of knowledge. 3 Miller (2016) is one such exception. For recent work on collective epistemology, see Lackey (2014). Isaacs (2011) discusses ignorance at a collective level and if it excuses individuals from blame, but her concern is on ignorance of wrongful discriminatory social practices. 196 and effects of our actions? Furthermore, how does the complexity of climate science (and the problem of climate change itself) affect our right to have enough information on issues that have a direct impact on us so that we can make informed decisions? With this I refer to the idea of an autonomous agent that I will discuss soon. This chapter will look at questions of ignorance and responsibility in relation to individuals and collectives, arguing that institutional collective agents have a lower threshold for culpable ignorance than individual agents. By this I mean that those collective agents with the capacity to process a lot of information have greater obligations to know about climate change than individuals do. I will argue that when it comes to climate change, there are several obstacles for us assessing the situation in an objective manner. I will discuss types of ignorance in section 7.1, psychological factors in section 7.2, and institutional factors in section 7.3. As the chapter is also the final chapter of my thesis, I will round the discussion off by summarising the thesis' main arguments in section 7.4 and present my full narrative of individual responsibility for climate change. 7.1 Responsibility and ignorance After arguing that control, freedom, and autonomy are not the only aspects that need to be taken into account when debating moral responsibility, i.e. that we should also take into account our complicity in collective harms, I will complicate the picture further by exploring the epistemic dimensions of responsibility. Note that my concern here is not with epistemic responsibility, i.e. questions regarding what you ought or ought not to believe. My concern is with the epistemic condition of responsibility, of acting under ignorance, and how agnotology and scientific uncertainty might complicate responsibility issues for climate change. I will first distinguish between different types of ignorance: disbelieving ignorance, conditional disbelieving ignorance, suspending ignorance, conditional suspending ignorance, and deep ignorance. In distinguishing between the different types, I utilise Rik Peels's (2010) recent work on ignorance and expand upon that. I will then link this debate to agnotology, which was already discussed in chapters one and three. We have knowledge only if the proposition p is true and the belief is justified.4 I believe that human activities are the main (perhaps even the sole) cause of global warming over the past 60 years, 4 In the orthodox view in epistemology, true justified belief involves three things: that p is in fact true, that S believes that p, and finally that S is justified in believing that p. If we were simply to identify knowledge with true belief, and leave out the justification part, it would be implausible. Say that a contestant chooses their answers randomly in a multiple choice quiz, firmly believing that destiny will give him the correct answers. When he answers a question (What is the name of Radiohead's drummer?) correctly because he happened to choose the right option (b: Phil Selway), the true belief in this case does not translate as knowledge due to the way it was arrived at. Arriving at something randomly and purely by luck is not a justified means of obtaining knowledge. Therefore the contestant does not know that Phil Selway is the drummer of Radiohead (at least until some further time when the results are revealed by the quiz master, but that is a 197 and my belief is justified, as I have arrived at it after reading the latest IPCC report that summarises the existing scientific evidence.5 When it comes to ignorance, there are more options. Take the other two doxastic attitudes: if p is true we can distinguish between disbelieving ignorance (S disbelieves p, while p is true) and suspending ignorance (S suspends judgement on p, while p is true), as well as conditional versions of both, referring to cases where one has not ever considered the true proposition p, but would either disbelieve or suspend judgment on p upon considering it (Peels 2010). To apply this to the agnotology case on climate change science, the lobbying efforts were aimed at creating suspending ignorance at the public debate level. Many people, of course, do not only suspend their judgement about the reliability of the science, but disbelieve the fact that anthropogenic climate change is taking place. Instead of human activity, the underlying causes for the changes are believed to be something else, like sunspots. This would be an example of disbelieving ignorance. One could also disbelieve that any climate change is underway at all, regardless of the causes. This could come about either because you disbelieve that climate change is underway (disbelieving ignorance), or because you have not even considered that climate change is underway, but would disbelieve it if you were to consider it (conditional disbelieving ignorance). An example of the latter would be a young teenager that has not yet heard anything about anthropogenic climate change, but would not believe in it if he did. If the teenager ― upon hearing about climate change for the first time – would decide to suspend his judgment, it would be a case of conditional suspending ignorance.6 If you are in a position where you lack adequate access to relevant knowledge about p, you are also in a state of deep ignorance about it (Peels 2010, p. 62). To give an example related to global justice, although contributing minimally to global emissions, not only will many people living in Africa be among the most affected by climate change, they are also the least informed about its causes and consequences (Godfrey et al. 2010). There exist wide global asymmetries in the amount of research different story). What counts as justification is a matter of ongoing philosophical debate. In the famous Gettier (1963) cases, individuals can have justified true belief of a claim, but still they have failed to know it. 5 "It is extremely likely that more than half of the observed increase in global average surface temperature from 1951 to 2010 was caused by the anthropogenic increase in greenhouse gas concentrations and other anthropogenic forcings together. The best estimate of the human-induced contribution to warming is similar to the observed warming over this period." (IPCC 2013, p. 17). 6 The above applies to cases where the proposition p is true. But what about if it is false? If p is false and you have a false belief that p, you cannot have knowledge. In other words, you are ignorant about p being false. If you believe p 'Ranveer Singh made his Bollywood debut in Bajirao Mastani', you are ignorant about the fact of him starring in Band Baaja Baaraat five years earlier. While you cannot be ignorant about falsehoods, you can be ignorant that some proposition is false. Therefore we can say that you lack knowledge about the first movie that Ranveer Singh acted in, but we could not say that you are ignorant of Bajirao Mastani being his debut movie as it is in fact not his debut movie. But it makes sense to say that you are ignorant that p is false. (For a discussion along these lines, see Peels 2010). This kind of ignorance usually results from errors and misunderstandings. 198 done and information available on climate change.7 While climate change can still feel abstract to many citizens of the Global North, many people in Africa are already dealing with its consequences in their everyday lives. Despite this, there exists widespread deep ignorance about anthropogenic climate change in Africa. Not only is there a shortage of relevant and local information about climate change for African audiences, the majority of Africans do not have access to the internet, for example.8 A lack of knowledge about climate facts deprives many Africans of the ability to act as a knower.9 Crucially, it deprives the subsistence farmers of the knowledge required to adapt their farming practices to the changing climate. It also deprives them of the possibility to add their voices to the international climate debate. The important point to note is that if you are ignorant about something in this deep sense, your ignorance always excuses you. Deeply ignorant people are thus never subject to blame.10 Nevertheless, there is a possibility to keep someone deeply ignorant: not allowing them the access to relevant knowledge. Keeping someone deeply ignorant in itself can be morally neutral, praiseworthy, or blameworthy. Imagine that there is a relative that has recently died, perhaps a grandparent, and while going through their belongings after the funeral a sibling of the deceased finds something incriminating. Maybe they should not tell the other relatives about the discovery: perhaps it would be morally praiseworthy or at least neutral to keep the others deeply ignorant about this aspect of the deceased's life, depending on the circumstances. If the discriminating evidence is linked to events and people long gone and would not have any impact on those alive other than making them think badly about their otherwise deeply beloved grandparent, it might be merciful to not to share it. However, keeping someone deeply ignorant about facts that affect their choices for the worse is blameworthy, in the sense that had they known the relevant fact(s), they would have 7 Information poverty in general is a problem for development and affects the efficient and equal dissemination of academic research in developing countries. For an overview on the promise and challenges of the internet as a way of distributing global scientific knowledge in a more equitable manner, see Chan and Costa 2005. 8 According to the latest statistics by Internet World Stats (www.internetworldstats.com) on Africa from 30 June 2017, internet penetration in Africa was 31.2% of the population, while the world average stands at 51.7% (for comparison, North America's figure was 88.1% and Europe's 80.2%). It should be noted, however, that these rates are increasing rapidly. For example, in 31 March 2017, internet penetration in Africa was still only 27.7% of the population. In fact, the growth between 2000 and 2017 has been a massive 8,503.1%, while the figures are 527.6% growth in Europe and 196.1% in North America over the same period of time. 9 This is not limited to just the knowledge we need in our daily lives, but also to the production of knowledge. It is very unequal in global terms who is producing knowledge, as a disproportionate number of scientists come from the Global North. This is a problem also for climate justice: "In the field of climate justice, expertise from researchers in developing countries is much needed, and efforts to strengthen local capacities and voices should be a priority of international research and assistance" (Roser et al. 2015, p. 357). 10 If you cannot grasp a proposition, then you cannot have beliefs about it either. Even the smartest two-year-old could not form a belief about the soundness of climate change science, because at that age a human's cognitive capacities are not at that level yet. They are thus deeply ignorant about it also, due to (temporary) cognitive limitations. 199 (more/most likely or definitely) chosen an alternative course of action that would have counterfactually been superior to the one they chose under deep ignorance.11 Coming back to the earlier distinctions, I would argue that for you to be in a state of disbelieving ignorance or suspending ignorance, you cannot be at the same time deeply ignorant. In other words, you must have access to relevant information about p in order to either disbelieve it or to suspend your judgement on it. However, the conditional versions of both might apply to someone who is deeply ignorant, as they only state that one has not considered the true proposition p, but would either disbelieve or suspend judgment on p upon considering it. Now, it is a complicated question if disbelieving ignorance or suspending ignorance are culpable. In some cases they might be, but in many they would not be. In order to assess such things we need to be aware of the collective context. Consider someone who has received basic education only, education that has been poorly planned and executed by mostly incompetent teachers. Let us further say that no one at home has been able to make up for the deficiencies in her education. This person has never been taught a thing about media literacy, for example, and has been taught to never question those in power. It would be hard to argue that this person would be in any way culpable for her ignorance about anthropogenic climate change if she encounters the lies and misleading facts about climate change propagated by the deniers. It seems clear that any blame would lie at the level of the deceiver, for example, the organised lobby groups discussed in chapter three. In many ways these kinds of agnotology campaigns misuse positions of power and exploit existing power imbalances and structures. Culpable ignorance can, therefore, in many cases be linked to the collective level where the blame also lies. There is a lot of scepticism towards science in public discourse. The internet is a source of not only information, but also of misinformation. Climate change denialists have created a wide array of websites that aim to discredit the science behind the IPCC's projections. Climate science denialism is but one example of the growing scepticism towards science, scepticism that is partially based on misunderstanding what scientific evidence is: it is not proof that something is right, but instead support for a claim, a proposal, a hypothesis, a theory, a mechanistic explanation, and so on. One of the main drivers of scepticism is the increasing complexity of science and how the latest results cannot be comprehended by the vast majority of people outside a given field. Climate science is especially susceptible to this because it is inconvenient for our current way of living, we would like it not to be so, and inconvenient truths are the easiest truths to label as false. Also, major business interests are at stake, giving agnotology incentives, as we saw in chapter three. 11 There is debate in bioethics around the right to know: could my lack of knowledge about a genetic disease hurt my relatives for example? 200 There seems to be general confusion about what science is. If and when a scientific hypothesis is proven to be incorrect, the science does not collapse, it advances. Utilising a very simplistic model of science, we can argue that it is a mixture of inductive and deductive logic. Logic can tell us which arguments are valid. Arguments consist of premises and conclusions, i.e. the reasons for believing a statement. In a valid argument the conclusion follows from the premises, its premises entail its conclusion, meaning that the argument does not suffer from a logical fallacy of some kind. However, a valid argument is not necessarily sound, as it can be utter nonsense if the premises are false. "All bachelors are birds of prey, Alan is a bachelor, therefore Alan is a bird of prey" is logically valid, but obviously nonsense. In deductive arguments the conclusion is necessarily true as long as the premises are true. Replace "birds of prey" with "unmarried men" in the above sentence and you have a deductive argument with a true conclusion (as long as we continue to call unmarried men bachelors). In inductive logic arguments are based on inferences and can only give us conclusions that are at best probably true. One cannot break any new scientific ground without hypotheses and theories that rely on generalisations, in other words without inductive logic (deductive logic can then be used to help test the theory or hypothesis). This is not meant to be some sophisticated story about how science works, my claim and ambition here is much smaller: to explain why science still advances even when a scientific hypothesis is proven to be incorrect. News about scientific advances can easily be distorted if the above is not widely understood, because new or conflicting information might seem to discredit earlier research. Climate science is especially susceptible to this, as you really do need to be an expert to be able to properly assess the science.12 But that is part of the reason why the IPCC was created: to pull together best available evidence and help policymakers and the general public form their opinions based on climate science.13 The question then becomes, with the easy availability of such high-quality, internationally produced, and carefully compiled information (the IPCC distributes all its materials on its website for free), can any able, relatively well-off adult (in the Global North at least) claim ignorance as an excuse for not taking climate change as a serious problem? The question is interesting, as there is still very widespread ignorance (and/or denial) about climate change amongst the citizens of the Global North (I will turn to denial when I discuss psychological factors in the next section). 12 In addition, climate change is such a multi-faceted problem that interdisciplinary research is a necessity, but this is no simple matter as disciplines have their own different vocabularies and standards of research. In order to reach better interdisciplinary results it would be necessary to have researchers from different fields conduct more joint research and write joint publications, not just to engage with each other's arguments (Roser et al. 2015). We must therefore trust each other and each other's expertise. 13 In interdisciplinary research it is possible that there are big differences in opinion between representatives of different branches of science regarding what exactly is the best available evidence, and if findings from some branch should have more weight than others, for example. This is yet another complication for climate science and climate policy alike. 201 According to Hiller (2011, p. 353), "to the extent to which ignorance does exculpate some individuals, the onus is on those who are aware of the dangers of [anthropogenic climate change] to ensure that no one can avoid culpability simply by lacking knowledge." But who are these agents who have this obligation to ensure knowledge about climate change? Bell (2011), Caney (2010, p. 209) and Singer (2002, p. 34) have all argued that ever since sometime in the 1990s, individuals cannot be excused by ignorance for not taking action on climate change, as that is when it became widely known that greenhouse gases cause climate change. But as Vanderheiden (2016, p. 307) argues, this is to commit a kind of category mistake, as it conflates "expectations for individual persons with no specialized training in climate science or professional commitment to environmental protection with states, with their collective capacity to process information and role responsibility to track environmental threats." I agree: we cannot argue that climate change became widely known as the threat it is among the general public based on when it became known as such for climate scientists, politicians, and policymakers. I find it more feasible to argue that climate change properly broke into the public consciousness only around the time that An Inconvenient Truth was released in 2006. While the Oscar-winning documentary in question is a prime example of how the efforts of a few influential individuals can make a big impact sometimes, I do not mean to argue that it was the sole cause or even the primary cause for the shift in public debate and media coverage.14 My point is simply that it is more feasible to place the time somewhere in that decade, rather than the 1990s. Furthermore, the wider understanding of the problem has been met with even more aggressive agnotology efforts from the carbon lobby. Far from giving up, the activities of the climate denial organisations are on the increase (Boussalis and Coan 2016). It seems clear that those collective agents with the capacity to process a lot of information have greater obligations to know about climate change than individuals. The capacity here is linked to the kind of collective agent we are discussing: a state or a government (or a large corporation, or an international NGO, etc.) have a much greater ability to process information, while smaller-scale collective agents (like a three-person company, for example) might not. Additionally, the role that collective agents like states play in our societies demands they take climate change science seriously. As Vanderheiden (2016, p. 306) puts it: While cognitive limits on the ability to know must allow for some excusable ignorance in the case of persons, states and other large-scale organizations have a much greater ability to process information than do individual persons, and are as a result more circumscribed in their claims to excusable ignorance. In the context of climate change, for example, states 14 A further disclaimer: just because an issue enters the public consciousness and some documentary (or a book or an event or a person) is influential in bringing this about, it does not mean that it has reached all and sundry. While climate change is at the present time an issue that most adult people in the Global North are aware of, it is most likely that a huge number of those people have never even heard of An Inconvenient Truth, let alone seen it. 202 face a much higher threshold of expected information processing before they can validly claim to have been reasonably ignorant about their contributions toward climate-related harm. Given their power to affect domestic greenhouse pollution as well as their command of scientific expertise in the service of environmental protection, states in their corporate capacities ought [--] to exercise far greater efforts to avoid factual ignorance about anthropogenic harms like climate change than would apply to individual persons, and would as a result no longer be able to reasonably claim ignorance once scientific consensus identified anthropogenic drivers to climate-related harm. After all, states sponsor scientific research into phenomena like climate change, employ scientists in administrative or regulatory institutions through which scientific knowledge is collectively produced, and can call upon the scientific community through such organizations as the National Academies of Science and National Research Council to advise on matters of state importance. Their professional responsibility for diagnosing anthropogenic environmental threats like climate change is therefore typically far greater than that of the average citizen, as is their knowledge of climate science and access to information about climatic risk and harm. Institutions and other large organisations have the resources necessary to call upon the expertise of individuals. If the required expertise cannot be found among their existing members, they can hire new staff or employ consultants. They can set aside money to fund research into a suitable course of action for them in light of the latest science. Institutional collective agents can afford to have the expert or a group of experts dedicate their working hours to thinking through issues to do with climate change from their point of view, in the same way they can and should do with any issue that affects their operating environment and future operations. Some institutional collective agents, such as states, have an obligation to know how climate change threatens their members, i.e. how it affects their citizens, based on the ethos of the collective, the reason for the continued existence of the collective. Collective agents arguably also have an obligation not to deceive us based on what they know, but as we saw in chapter three, some of them do so regardless. Don Fallis (2016) argues that intentionally making people ignorant is equivalent in moral terms to deceiving them. He describes this kind of deliberate manufacturing of doubt as pushing someone into a state of suspending ignorance. This means that when people obtain conflicting evidence, they often suspend their judgement on the issue. Someone is thus kept ignorant by increasing the degree of her belief in a falsehood. Creating misleading debate about climate science arguably produces false beliefs. Included in the idea of autonomy is that you are able to make choices about your life, so therefore creating false beliefs for someone is a way of manipulating your autonomy (Fallis 2016, p. 124). When the actions of climate science denialists result in people being either in a state of disbelieving ignorance or suspending ignorance about the facts related to anthropogenic climate change, their autonomy is undermined. I want to suggest something stronger than this: not only does the agnotology related to climate change science manipulate the autonomy of agents, it also makes these agents complicit in the harm 203 created collectively without them even being fully aware of it. This kind of complicity does not necessarily warrant any blame, rather it falls closer to the agent-regret discussed in chapter five, and being deliberately misled surely reduces the culpability of one's ignorance. However, what clearly does warrant blame is making someone inclusively accountable for a harm by disguising the true nature of the co-operation (or participation in a system) that they are involved in. Agnotology makes the deceiving agent accountable in a new way and is thus an additional reason for holding the organised lobby of climate denialists accountable. The partly-deceived agent (or agents) that was made complicit in a harm, if she find out about the deception, is right to demand a response from the agent(s) who got her involved. Their complicity by itself becomes "an object of accountability, a basis of resentment, repair, and even revenge" (Kutz 2000, p. 156). Kutz's example is Emilia from Othello, who has unwittingly been made an instrument in the tragedy by stealing Desdemona's handkerchief for Iago, who then uses it to convince Othello that Desdemona is unfaithful to him, resulting in Othello murdering his wife. Emilia is warranted in her anger towards her scheming husband Iago, and she can hold him accountable for making her accountable in her mistress's death. Emilia was aware that something shady might have been going on, but the true nature and the intention was hidden from her (counterfactually she would not have participated had she known the full details). Kutz (p. 156) suggests that we can compare the situation Emilia finds herself in "with that of a mid-level engineer for a large manufacturer, who has reason to believe but does not know that the control modules he is helping to design, which are used by the company in manufacturing consumer products, are also used in manufacturing land mines" that will be sold to poor countries in the Global South. The agents who have become complicit in a harm at least partly because of being deceived about the true nature of what they were participating in, are warranted to hold those agents that misled them (or concealed information from them) as accountable for their complicity in the harm. Thus the people who believe climate denialist through the organised agnotology campaigns can arguably hold their deceivers accountable for their (suspended or deep) ignorance about the impacts of their actions and choices (like voting decisions) on the climate. While there might be no blame for the individuals who are ignorant about the facts, it is often much clearer to assign blame for the ignorance of individuals to collective agents. This applies not only to the agents who have been active in spreading misinformation, but also to those collective agents with the capacity to process a lot of information that have been suspending their judgement on anthropogenic climate change, or indeed whose ethos has come to encompass disbelieving ignorance about the true nature of the climate problem. 204 7.2 Psychological factors For the most part the cause for inaction with climate change or other global problems it is not that we are deeply ignorant about the state of affairs in the world. It is not even that we have suspended our judgement on the issue. Instead, climate change, inequality, and the dangers of the financial markets' economic irresponsibility, to give just some examples, are facts known to most of us, at least to some degree. Hannah Arendt (1968, p. viii) observed in Men in Dark Times that unpleasant societal facts are often not veiled in secrecy but are instead darkened by "the highly efficient talk and double-talk of nearly all official representatives, who, without interruption and in many ingenious variations, explained away unpleasant facts and justified concerns."15Al Gore famously branded climate change as an inconvenient truth, and the ongoing political mumble around the topic is an example of the darkness that makes inconvenient facts invisible. Perhaps we could also argue, as Peeters et al. (2015, p. 110) do, that "the complex convergence of problems" that is involved in climate change presents us "with a convenient opportunity for moral disengagement".16 Gardiner (2011, pp. 193-195) argues that part of the explanation for political inertia lies in human psychology.17 He bases his claim on research done by Elke Weber (2006), who shows that in cases that involve risk and uncertainty, our affective processing system dominates our analytical one. Abstract arguments based on statistics fail to evoke strong emotions in us. Because the affective system tends to rely on personal experience, low-probability events generate less concern than their probability would warrant. "Single action bias" affects us also: we are likely to take some readily available single action to alleviate our worry, but leave things at that, even if the action we have taken is far from the most effective one we could have taken.18 We also have a "finite pool of worry", meaning that we only have a limited capacity for worry of the kind that motivates action (Linville and Fischer 1991). George Marshall (2014, pp. 81-90) argues that the issue goes even deeper than this: psychological denial mechanisms and general anxiety about the issue have led to a socially 15 I believe that the double-talk is only partially intended in the case of many structural injustices: the problem has more to do with institutional frameworks that limit the scope of the role-occupier's concern and can give them unhealthy motives, see section 7.3. 16 Peeters et al. (2015, p. 122) suggest a number of strategies for tackling moral disengagement, including emphasising the effects of individual choices (luxury emissions), and linking behavioural change to feelings of competence and pride. 17 Daniel Kahneman (in Marshall 2014, pp. 56-57) shares the view that our cognitive biases work against taking the climate change threat seriously. First of all, it does not adequately mobilise our sense of threat, as it lacks salience: it is not a concrete and immediate threat, but remains abstract and distant. Second of all, it is hard for us to accept shortterm costs to mitigate uncertain losses in the future. Thirdly, as long as information about climate change appears to be contested, people set it aside as an allegedly contested issue. 18 Weber (2006, p. 103) suggests that we should find ways to evoke visceral reactions towards climate change risks, "perhaps by simulations of its concrete future consequences for people's home or other regions they visit or value. Increased concern about global warming needs to solicited carefully, however, to prevent a decrease in concern about other relevant risks. The generation of worry or concern about global warming may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for desirable or appropriate protective or mitigating behavior on part of the general public." 205 constructed silence around climate change, as things that cannot be assimilated get repressed. Socially constructed silence is a circulation system of complex feedbacks, which has seen climate change as a topic fall out of favour with the media and politicians in the past ten years, and it has an even harder time finding a place in regular conversations among acquaintances or loved ones. While some commentators argue that if the general public were better able to understand climate science (and industrial climate deniers would not be adding fuel to the fire), progress on mitigation would be more likely (McKinnon 2016), others are not as optimistic. While the apparent public apathy over climate change often gets attributed to lack of knowledge or deficiencies in comprehending the science, research shows that members of the public with the highest degrees of science literacy and technical reasoning capacity were among the groups with the most diverged views on climate change (Kahan et al. 2012, p. 732): This result suggests that public divisions over climate change stem not from the public's incomprehension of science but from a distinctive conflict of interest: between the personal interest individuals have in forming beliefs in line with those held by others with whom they share close ties and the collective one they all share in making use of the best available science to promote common welfare. The study thus supports the research that people are very good at cherry-picking the evidence available to fit their biases and existing worldview, and thus they choose their side on issues such as climate change based on the social groups to which they belong.19 To give an example, research done in the US suggests that dissemination of scientific information increases concern about climate change only among Democrats, while Republicans do not appear to be persuaded (Carmichael et al. 2017). Climate change inaction on the part of individuals has mostly been presented as a motivational issue, but T.J. Kasperbauer (2016) argues (following Gardiner) that this is misleading because what is really the problem is that we fail to grasp the seriousness of the threat and the ethical challenge, and that there is a set of psychological processes that prevent us from adequately responding to climate change. The strongest one that he identifies is the human tendency to conform: "people only adopt proenvironmental behaviours to the extent that others they see as sufficiently similar to themselves (usually according to socioeconomic criteria) have also adopted those behaviours" (p. 359). He also notes that people tend to modify their consumption according to prevailing norms. This is the reason most people fail to see their carbon-intensive lifestyles as anything to be concerned 19 The researchers (p. 734) go on to suggest that to promote constructive and informed public deliberations around the need to take action on climate change, "communicators should endeavor to create a deliberative climate in which accepting the best available science does not threaten any group's values. Effective strategies include use of culturally diverse communicators, whose affinity with different communities enhances their credibility, and information-framing techniques that invest policy solutions with resonances congenial to diverse groups." 206 about. To me, the human tendency to conform highlights the importance of those social norms that uphold the idea that over-consumption is normal, permissible, and even aspirational. Such norms should be questioned publicly, and it could be argued that influential individuals and collective agents that can play their part in this have a duty to do so.20 Dave Elder-Vass (2010) argues that people do not spontaneously start to act in similar ways, but that our practices are products of a process in which people act under cultural influences or are influenced by social structures (or both). Individuals are thus influenced by social groups to follow certain practices. "Norm circles" are the primary causal power behind our evolving practices. The way we all subtly uphold and renegotiate norms daily is therefore something that arguably could come under complicity: what norms are we complicit in supporting in our daily lives? Kasperbauer also raises a different worry in addition to the psychological defence mechanisms, citing Jonathan Haidt's (2012) research on the foundations of human morality. Haidt (together with Craig Joseph and other researchers) posits that there are at least six psychological systems, universal foundations of morality, all evolved as responses to some adaptive challenge: care/harm, fairness/cheating, liberty/oppression, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation (see Appendix). Kasperbauer (2016, pp. 361-364) argues that not only will a harm-based ethical theory fail to resonate with people with certain psychological profiles, those who ground their morality in dominance hierarchies (see authority/subversion in Appendix) are likely to resist efforts to curb emissions, as they see emissions cuts taking away resources that would provide local benefits. Things are only somewhat better at the collective level, as the different combinations of moral foundations found across cultures and nations mean that in international negotiations incompatible values get pitted against each other. While I agree that our psychologies to some extent limit what it is feasible to ask of us in relation to climate change, I want to say two things against this pessimistic picture. First of all, unlike what Kasperbauer seems to be suggesting, we cannot get to incompatible values merely from the observation that people and cultures draw from different moral foundations (on the contrary, one could argue that searching for universal foundations is a first step towards finding common ground). Gaertner et al. (2010, p. 94) argue that "the presence of a behavioral difference per se is not evidence contrary to a universalist argument. The necessary consideration is whether the observed difference is 20 The example that Kasperbauer (p. 359) utilises seems to show that conformity is relatively easy to manipulate: all it takes is some smiley faces on flyers about how well you do in your energy consumption in comparison to the people around you to change people's behaviour. In reality, I doubt it is this easy, especially with the moral licensing effect: doing something that is perceived as morally good helps to strengthen our positive self-image as a good person, thereby making us less worried about the consequences of our behaviour and paradoxically more likely to make "bad" subsequent choices. 207 produced by a process or function common across societies."21 This line of argument is similar to what James Rachels (1998, pp. 411-419) has discussed: while the conception of right and wrong differs between cultures and is based on the customs of that society, this does not mean that there are no universal truths in ethics and that all standards of right and wrong are relative to culture and time.22 All societies have some moral rules in common, as those rules are necessary for societies to exist. If lying was widespread, communication would become pointless as nothing could be trusted. If murder was accepted, people would avoid each other in fear of getting killed. Under such circumstances, society and markets could not function, as everyone would need to be as selfsufficient as possible. If babies were not protected and cared for, no human would survive their first few days and the species would die out. There is a general agreement about these necessary features of society among cultures, and only what can be considered as a legitimate exception varies from culture to culture.23 My second point against Kasperbauer is that we can draw few normative claims from the moral foundations theory, as there is a real ambiguity in Haidt's theory about what is the merit of the values that people hold.24 The fact that people have come to hold different thick values based on the same 21 Note, however, that Sachdeva et al. (2011) argue that because moral systems might play different roles in different cultures, the processes that underlie moral cognition may not be universal in any simple sense. 22 What ― at a first glance ― can seem to be big differences in values, like Hindus refusing to kill cows and Europeans eating them, or Eskimos killing infants who are perfectly healthy (especially girls), might not be such a dramatic difference on closer inspection (Rachels 1998, pp. 415-416). I already used this example in my Master's thesis, but will utilise it again, as I think it is illuminating. Hindus do not eat cows, as they believe in reincarnation, and eating a cow could mean eating a dead relative. Europeans do not usually believe in reincarnation, so eating a cow does not equal possibly eating a dead relative. The beliefs vary, but both cultures share the same value of not eating relatives. Religious and factual beliefs are as important as values when the customs of a society are produced. The physical realities and circumstances are important too. The Eskimos live in a very harsh environment where food is often in short supply. Infants are nursed until they are about four, and carried along in the mother's parka as part of the nomadic lifestyle in search of food. One mother cannot have many small children at the same time. On average, Eskimo men die more prematurely than the women, as they are involved in hunting. If the Eskimos would not allow more male babies than females to survive, the women in the Eskimo society would far outnumber the men. Infanticide is considered the last option and childless Eskimo couples often adopt babies from the more fertile couples. Killing babies is therefore not a sign of a fundamentally different attitude towards human life and children. It is rather recognition of the very drastic measures sometimes needed to ensure human survival in the conditions that the Eskimos face. 23 Kutz (2000, pp. 13-14) does not take sides on the relativism debate, but argues that worries about relativism are often misguided. His reasoning is that we must be able to defend the plurality in social and ethical practices, and the fact of conventional variance is compatible with assessing cultural practices objectively. He concentrates on structural features of complex normative systems that are similar across different systems. Kutz (p. 14) writes that "nothing in the interpretive approach precludes the possibility that many substantive elements in our practices are, in fact, universal, for example functions of basic human needs and wants for security and community." 24 Take crime as an example. Haidt (2012, p. 183) writes that it is self-evident for conservatives that responses to crime should be proportional, but that liberals are uncomfortable with retribution. Even if this is the case, it does not give us any answers as to what kind of criminal justice system we should have. What we need is more public debate. With this I mean genuine debate, based not only on statistical facts and evidence, but also including testimonies from people who have been impacted by the current system one way or another. The current political atmosphere might be hostile to any kind of real discussion at the moment, but this just means we need it more than ever. Only when we look at our values together, emphasising the common ground but also trying to see the views of others, to understand them, can we hope to gain any meaningful understanding of a way forward. All sides might have good points. Maybe some laws are too lax (for example, sentences for financial fraud are often much more lenient than those for violent crime) and maybe some murderers and rapists should be locked up for life. Even if this were the case, radical reforms in the way we treat prisoners might still be needed and locking people up would still not be the best way to prevent most crimes. 208 thin foundations serves only as the background to morality, it does not in any way take away the need to form value judgements and to debate these. People have a plurality of values, but this does not by itself lead to relativism. I think it is important to separate two lines of debate here. What could be the shared foundations of morality is one question, and Haidt and his colleagues seek answers to this. However, which of the values and virtues should we actually try to endorse, here and now, out of the myriad ones that the shared foundations of morality give rise to, is another question entirely and to that they do not seem to give answers to (and rightly so). In other words, what kinds of moral matrixes should we collectively seek to build, especially in light of the looming danger of climate change? There have never been so many of us and we have never been so interdependent on such a vast scale. Surely this presents an adaptive challenge to the human species. What kinds of values help us to live together? As we now have tools to communicate like never before, they will play a role in our response to this adaptive challenge. Haidt (2012, pp. 216) himself notes how evolution can be fast: while new mental modules cannot be created from scratch even in several thousands of years, existing features can be tweaked by evolution. Cultural change can be very fast and can change the moral matrix constructed upon the six foundations radically within just a few generations. If the new moral matrix remains somewhat steady for "a few dozen generations", additional gene-culture coevolution might take place due to new selection pressures. We could learn to value the future more. Like psychologist and economist Per Espen Stoknes (2015), I believe that humans can and will take action to secure long-term benefits if and when conducive social conditions for climate action are in place.25 I am not saying that human nature needs to be nudged by institutional design to become somehow better. Rather, I am arguing that the way some of our institutions are currently designed could well bring out the worst in us and we should dismantle the kinds of incentives that misalign our behaviour, and block our feelings of empathy or belonging to a group, for example. We are at each other's mercy. Therefore we must learn to live together as a global collective.26 Our rationality can get muddled by various psychological mechanisms.27 To combat these tendencies we need to reason together: Some crimes like drug-related offences have complex socio-economic causes, so instead of treating the symptoms we should treat the disease. 25 Not everyone needs to get motivated to take action, but many are needed in any case. When being virtuous in relation to climate change has been made easier through structures and institutions, it will not be demanding for an individual to go carbon-neutral, but before that trailblazers will be required (Hormio 2014). 26 And if it is too late already and we have set off feedback mechanisms too great to adapt to, we still need each other to try to survive in the new world we have brought about. 27 Findings in moral psychology suggest that (just like with other thinking) we make intuitive judgements first and strategic thinking comes only after. We are good at finding evidence that supports the position that we have already taken on intuitive grounds, and we are also very good at coming up with justifications for our chosen position (Haidt 2012, pp. 72-92). The psychological phenomenon linked to this includes confirmation bias (Wason 1960, Kuhn 1989, 209 We should not expect individuals to produce good, open-minded, truth-seeking reasoning, particularly when self-interest or reputational concerns are in play. But if you put individuals together in the right way, such that some individuals can use their reasoning powers to disconfirm the claims of others, and all individuals feel some common bond or shared fate that allows them to interact civilly, you can create a group that ends up producing good reasoning as an emergent property of the social system. (Haidt 2012, p. 90). As Haidt (p. 85) notes, the internet has made it much easier for us to find evidence that support what we already think, so if you want to keep denying climate change science, there is plenty of material available for you to support your conclusion. But if we instead try to design institutions in which humans are "put together in the right way" based on the best available evidence in social sciences, and forced to reason in a productive manner, there is hope.28 Institutional design is unfortunately often riddled with incentives to do just the opposite, as we will see next. 7.3 Knowledge and misinformation in an institutional setting As we saw, ignorance can arise from the suppression of knowledge, either by refusing to recognise it or by unconsciously suppressing it. This is not limited to individual psychology: drawing from Joanne Roberts's (2013) work on institutional ignorance, I will introduce types of institutional ignorance that can arise from the suppression of knowledge. Taboos are socially constructed bans on certain types of knowledge deemed to be polluting. They can also be actively cultivated within organisations to influence the way its members behave, like a taboo about discussing bullying in the workplace. When knowledge is too painful to acknowledge, or it does not fit with one's worldview, it can be repressed or ignored, resulting in denials. Organisational denials can lead to ignoring evidence that contradicts the group decision for the sake of unanimity. This can be especially dangerous when encouraged by those in charge, as toleration for recklessness and dishonesty in practices has a tendency to spread. Denials can also be used strategically, like when a company Shaw 1996), our tendency to interpret evidence to confirm what we already think, and the effect that having plausible deniability has on our decision (Bersoff 1999). Furthermore, when we reason, we are often most concerned about how we come across to others (Lerner and Tetlock 2003). How other people see us matters to us and we are affected by what others think of us (Leary 2005), so we seek to keep our reputations by making sure that we can justify our actions to others. Reasoning has evolved to help us win arguments and persuade others (Mercier and Sperber 2011). Information that threatens our existing beliefs activates areas in our brain that are linked to negative emotions, while what we believe in the first place is affected by the social groups we belong to and their interests (Haidt 2012, pp. 85-88). The last point is particularly important. As a philosopher, I am not in a position to assess the accuracy of any of this research; I leave those debates for others. My point here is only to list some of the psychological factors that might be involved in the refusal to accept climate change science. 28 After all, the right kind of conflict can breed moral reflexivity: we are trying to judge our own arguments, to view them through the eyes of others. If we are sympathetic to the person we are disagreeing with, we are more likely to listen to what they have to say, we are more open to taking their criticism on board. If we can expand our sphere of sympathy, we could open up our perception to new viewpoints, which could give us reasons to renegotiate some of our values and norms. 210 encourages ignorance in their customers through misinformation campaigns (for example, the carbon lobby). We talk of secrecy when knowledge is consciously suppressed by individuals or collectives. Pockets of ignorance can be deliberately created for power purposes. Some secrecy is essential (keeping trade secrets, for example) but there has to be a balance and an understanding of how much secrecy the stakeholders are willing to tolerate. Privacy is socially sanctioned secrecy and the right to privacy is enshrined in many laws and declarations. To build trust between an organisation and its members and stakeholders, it is important to recognise and protect privacy, for example, the customer data registry of a company. (Roberts 2013, p. 218-226).29 It seems clear that ignorance arising from the suppression of knowledge can be amenable to blameworthiness. Holly M. Smith (1983, pp. 544-547) presents three types of situation where ignorance does not excuse, i.e. it is culpable because the person should have realised what they were doing. While Smith discusses the culpability of individual people, I will apply her account to Roberts's categories. Deficient investigation is the first type, either through failing to investigate properly, or failing to investigate at all. While it is a contested issue how much knowledge citizens should possess (Bell 2011, Caney 2010, Vanderheiden 2016, Young 2011), it is arguably our civic responsibility to acquire at least the basic knowledge on climate change at this point (as long as it is feasible given our circumstances). Preventing subsequent discovery presents the second case: a person has either failed to remove or introduced a condition, which made it impossible for him to acquire true belief of x's wrongness. Finally, culpable ignorance could arise from deficient inference: had the agent made the inference warranted by his background beliefs, he would have correctly believed the act to be wrong.30 Depending on how they are used and how justified their usage is in the first place, denials, secrecy and taboos do not excuse everyone in an organisation, as they are usually instruments of power. They fall under preventing subsequent discovery at the managerial level, or whatever level engages in the behaviour, while they can result in either excusing ignorance at the bottom level, or lead to conditions where it is all too easy to fall into the deficient inference trap. Think of some corporation that is involved in practices that are questionable in the light of climate science, but is not communicating this to its employees or other stakeholders. The organisation has introduced a 29 Privacy in Roberts's (2013, p. 225-226) typology refers to the privacy of the institutions' employees or customers. It is often about trust, the disability of an employee need not become common knowledge within the workplace, and not keeping customer data safe can by itself be a morally blameworthy act that can lead to the loss of those customers, or even to harm for those customers, depending on your line of business. The former US military policy of "Don't ask don't tell" related to the sexual orientation of personnel also falls under this category, so organisational ignorance always has power dimensions and the potential to be political in nature. 30 According to Smith (2016), while the agent is not blameworthy for the act that was done in culpable ignorance, they are to blame for the earlier failure to obtain the information that would have led to her not being ignorant in the relevant manner. The agent has performed an act that is morally inferior to the counterfactual act she would have performed had she obtained all the necessary information. The ignorance is thus traceable to past epistemic negligence. 211 condition (through denial, secrecy, privacy or taboo) – or failed to remove it – which made it difficult for employees to acquire true belief about the wrongness of being involved in some particular collective action. Depending on the actual circumstances, the employees' ignorance could be culpable if it is due to deficient inference, or excusable if the institutional barrier for acquiring the knowledge is too high. Withholding some important information, or the tendency to only communicate the positive news, is common among corporations and other large modern institutions. Although we live in the information age, secrecy is still a very prevalent component of our societies. For example, Peter Galison (2008, p. 38) describes how "we are living in a climate of augmented secrecy" today, with the number of classified document pages outnumbering the amount of open literature entering the public libraries and archives each year in the U.S.31 Naturally not everyone can know everything, and not all information is even relevant for all. Ignorance is often neutral in moral terms, as I argued at the beginning of this chapter. Yet it is hard to draw a clear line on what information should be available to whom. Elizabeth Wolgast (1992, p. 88) argues that "[l]ack of information and lack of responsibility go hand in hand, and both are built into the organizational structure." In even broader terms, whenever we act together, Kutz (2000, p. 156) argues that there are "agency costs" involved; as members of a collective venture "we must expect that the group act may have aspects we do not know about but with which we will have to reckon." Working together might allow us to expand our powers and rewards, but it also "entails the risk that the resulting act will not align with our moral interests" at the personal level. Frequently, our knowledge of what others do when we act together is hazy or distorted. Often we do not know the specific character of what we intentionally promote together, but only recognize it under a vague description. Vagueness about the collective end sustains a compartmentalized attitude towards one's own participation; agents regard only the immediate tasks before them. This compartmentalization generates the "just doing my job" explanations of one's role in a nasty business. (Kutz 2000, p. 155) Institutions sometimes deprive individuals of their capacity to make moral judgements by fragmenting available information. To give an example, bureaucracy breaks work and knowledge into pieces, and bureaucratic compartmentalisation and the secrecy that often comes with it prevents information passing on from one department to another. This fragmentation of consciousness provides rationales for not knowing about problems, and for not trying to find out. Rational bureaucracy can, in this sense, stimulate irrationality (Jackall 1988, p. 194). Bureaucratisation is therefore never a purely technical matter, just a system of organisation, but a power system with 31 Galison (2008, pp. 37-39) attributes this rise of modern censorship mainly to the infrastructure created after the Second World War around nuclear science and intelligence services. 212 privileges and domination. Max Weber already was worried about the implications of bureaucratisation for individuals' freedom and control, although he was supportive of bureaucracies as rational and efficient ways of humans to organise themselves. Unlike Weber, Arendt (1970, pp. 38-39) was very critical of bureaucracies and described them as "rule by Nobody". Bureaucracies can compartmentalise work to such a degree that individual human action is reduced to mere behaviour. If division of labour goes too far, people no longer know what their role is in the larger organisation, what their work is linked to, what the results are. Responsibility is impossible to locate anymore and becomes so diffused that the people working in the bureaucracy can come to view their actions to be outside the normal human realm where they would be responsible for what they do. Expanding on Arendt's thoughts, May (1996, pp. 71-76) similarly argues that institutional socialisation in bureaucracies can make people see themselves as the anonymous cogs of a machine, who do not have the need to develop a sense of responsibility in relation to what they do. Bureaucratic anonymity grows from the usual lack of face-to-face confrontation and not being directly linked to the consequences of one's actions. Some bureaucracies also socialise their members to feel that decisions should be made by the "experts" only, those members more experienced and knowledgeable. May (1996, p. 70) writes that "bureaucratic institutions socialize people to see themselves not as actors but as those acted upon. The ensuing feelings of powerlessness can give rise to the acceptance of, and even participation in, harms these people [-] would never have found acceptable outside of the bureaucratic institution." Psychological compartmentalisation worries Kutz also, as he (2000, p. 155) describes how we often act together under only a vague description of what we intentionally promote together. However, while knowledge can implicate a participant, ignorance can still never fully exculpate one as a participant in a collective venture (p. 157); there are always agency costs to consider. Returning to the landmine engineer example, responses are again positional (p. 158): He may say to himself or others, "Look, I'm only making tiny improvements in little black boxes." He is then vulnerable to the response by someone else who cares ― a partner, a victim, a campaigner against land mines ― that 50 hours of his week are invested in making these tiny improvements, and in fact the black boxes he improves end up in the killing fields. Alternatively, once ethical reflection is sparked within him, his accountability may resonate in his own mind far more strongly than in the minds of others, who see him as merely a part of an ethically irresponsible system of international arms sales. The respondents' particular depth of focus, personal or political, will make different responses apt. In addition to fragmentation of information, institutional frameworks also affect the way we think. Our minds both organise and censor our experiences through conceptual schemes. Patricia H. Werhane (1999, pp. 85-95) describes how all of our activities are framed by mental models – our perspectives on things – and embedded in conceptual schemes. Our mental models are influenced 213 by socialisation, culture, education, our upbringing, art, media, the place we work in.32 Thus corporate employees, for example, are trained to see things through the viewpoint of their employer, affecting the kinds of things they take into consideration when making decisions. If we choose any one perspective often, it gets reinforced in our minds. This is not to say that we have one-track minds, as most of us have several mental models to choose from so we can adapt to a given situation. Importantly, our perspectives can be altered if we choose to try to look at things from someone else's perspective. Thinking of the above, it is not hard to see why our responsibility as members of collective agents with regards to climate change can often get blurred by priorities of the collective we work for and the role demands this puts on us. This will be the case for most of us: how many of us have really considered what they could do in their work role, for example, to try to steer their workplace towards a more carbon-neutral future? We have many other things to consider, more pressing concerns, and it is easy to think that it is someone else's task. Even when we look at collective agents like ExxonMobil who really have gotten their hands dirty with regards to climate change, there need not be any ill-will among the members, i.e. we need not look for an intention to harm others. I doubt we would find such motivations. What we are more likely to find are narrow fields of concern, mental models that are influenced by a sceptical view of anything to do with "green" issues, concern for profits, genuine excitement seeing one's corporation succeed, perhaps cynical calculation of how far inevitable changes can be postponed, general thoughtlessness, and so on and so forth. Here I am referring to the people who hold some power within the corporation, the core agents, not some peripheral employee who might have only a participatory intention that is very loosely tied to the corporation's goals (like to do his job so he can get paid). It is doubtful that a peripheral employee spends a lot of time thinking about the future challenges of the energy industry and his employer's role in it. We might also not want to know, actively avoid finding out about the consequences of our actions and choices. While I was working with an NGO that campaigned on global supply chain management issues, like the use of child labour and poor working conditions, an acquaintance once told me to never tell her anything bad about the large corporation she was working for, as she wanted to continue working for them. Although it was meant partly as a joke, this kind of attitude is typical of wilful ignorance, where there "is a self-interested reason for evading moral knowledge that might 32 Our interests, desires, biases, intentions, and points of view operate as selective filters that restrict what we see in the world. Through the models, we make sense of our experiences, and interpret and clarify events to ourselves. This is often done retrospectively with events given a reframed focus and importance. We therefore do not observe the world objectively, but rather project our own perceptions on it and explain our experiences so that they fit our subjective point of view. We also tend to ignore data that does not fit our scheme. It is as if we are editing a movie and leave some of the scenes on the cutting room floor. 214 require one to rethink one's way of life" (Isaacs 2011, p. 162). Many times collective agents such as corporations with market shares to protect actively play into this, and thus we get meat packages with pictures of happy farm animals grazing on a green pasture, instead of pictures about the often bleak and even gory conditions under which these animals are kept and slaughtered. People who want to bring attention to the less pleasant aspects of something are rarely applauded at first. Instead, the more usual scenario involves a bunch of activists who start to push a certain point into the consciousness of the mainstream, and this process can meet with a lot of resistance. This is even more so the case when the new knowledge threatens powerful interests or the interests of the majority. Our politics are also impacted by mental models and too often the solutions discussed lack imagination. By this I do not refer to technological daydreaming, like a belief that geoengineering alone could save us.33 What I mean is that when presented with new problems like climate change, our governments should invest heavily in research and development. If we do not, we effectively bind ourselves to existing technologies. The question should not be whether to choose solar panels or nuclear energy. We should not limit our options like this, as human curiosity and creativity is surely our best chance of replacing what does not work with something better. Humans are great at innovation and there are new technologies based on solid science that could potentially be scaled up quickly. To give an example, high altitude wind energy is a very promising resource for producing electricity sustainably (Cherubini et al. 2015). In contrast to traditional wind turbines, Airborne Wind 33 While scientists are generally happy to acknowledge how much we still do not know, there is much unwarranted optimism that is often brought up in climate change debates. That is the technological optimism: engineers will surely find a way to fix things, be it with artificial carbon sinks or other geoengineering measures. Some politicians and many business leaders like this line of thinking, but it is just a belief, and an unwarranted one. The technology for geoengineering is just not there and will not be, at least not in the timeframe and on the scale required (Tavoni et al 2012, p. 221): Invoking the possibility of realizing 1,000 Gt CO2 of negative emissions and changing no other assumptions, the chance of avoiding a 2 °C temperature rise exceeds 95%. A larger fraction of the targets are accessible and stricter ECPC rules are allowed under this technology scenario, though the exact consequences for fairness depend on how negative emissions are assigned. However, achieving 1,000 Gt CO2 of negative emissions via engineered sinks will require a combination of monumental investment and extraordinary innovation. At present there is no reason to expect cheap, environmentally attractive, and scalable versions of these technologies to make a timely entrance into the space of options. As a consequence, counting on these technologies to provide the path to the simultaneous realization of safety and fairness is unwise. People who are technological optimists tend to also overlook the unintended consequences that nearly always crop up with new technology (O'Neill 2014). Take ozone layer depletion: to fix the problem, fluorinated compounds such as hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) were introduced to replace the chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) used as refrigerants and propellants in spray cans. This was implemented on a global scale after the Montreal Protocol [on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer] was agreed on 1987 and came into effect two years later, and it helped with the issue: the ozone hole in Antarctica is now slowly recovering. However, it also introduced a new potent greenhouse gas into the atmosphere: HFCs have a long-term global warming potential up to 4,000 times more powerful than carbon. This is "an unintended negative side effect" of the measures taken to fix ozone depletion (Velders et al. 2012, p. 922) and a very good example of why we should stay humble about our knowledge of the actual consequences when we are replacing one technology with another: often things do not get thought through or we just do not know enough about what we are playing with. These issues get ignored or underplayed in the grand visions of those who think we can always engineer our way out of problems. A deal to phase out HFCs was agreed in 2016. 215 Energy Systems (AWESs), such as power kites, reach winds blowing at higher atmosphere layers that are inaccessible for traditional technology. Average wind speed increases as altitude increases and furthermore the winds are more constant, meaning that power is generated at a steadier pace. What's more, there is enough power in Earth's winds to cover all our electricity needs many times over and for it to be a realistic primary source of near-zero-emission electric power (Marvel et al. 2013), even in the near-future. So far, this technology has been developed mainly with private money by big companies involved in the energy market, and the money spent on research and development has been relatively low considering the real potential of the technology (Cherubini et al. 2015). Public investments could speed up the progress considerably. In general, to combat climate change we need to get creative not just with technology, but also with our institutions and economies. Mitigation is often presented by politicians and policy-makers as an economic issue: can we afford it, what does it do to our economies, and so on. The problem with this framing is that it looks like the whole issue is just an optimisation puzzle waiting to be solved, albeit a very complex one, and that all that is required are the best technocratic solutions. With any large-scale problems that need a lot of individual and collective agents to work together, it is doubtful that purely technocratic solutions can be successful without ethical arguments to motivate the required change (just as ethical arguments are unlikely to be successful if they neglect the considerations and the constraints that arise in political, legal and economic debates).34 Furthermore, the economic feasibility of some form of renewable technology as a viable alternative to replace fossil fuels becomes an empirical issue only after certain political decisions have already been taken, as government incentives affect what energy sources it makes economic sense to invest in (Hormio 2017b, p. 113). Therefore technocratic solutions that rely on, for example, comparing relative prices that are set by market mechanisms are akin to working within the normative parameters already set by political action or inaction. With climate change, the problem has been framed unsuccessfully since the beginning. Marshall (2014, pp. 162-167) describes how decision-makers and policy strategists drew on what they saw as precedents (including the successful efforts to create a binding international treaty to deal with ozone depletion) and made assumptions based on perceived similarities, that on a closer inspection did not hold. This "cognitive error on a vast scale" resulted in "ever-more-energetic confirmation bias" that ensured the same mistakes were repeated over and over again, and "created an optimistic narrative 34 Caney (2012b) separates between "isolationist" and "integrationist" approaches to climate ethics. Isolationist approaches consider the implications of climate change only, whereas integrationist approaches consider climate change together with existing global structural problems such as poverty. Isolationist climate ethics could give implausible answers to policy questions such as burden sharing between nations, so plausible climate ethics needs to take an integrated approach at looking at the problem and possible solutions. 216 of resolution and renewal that was entirely inappropriate for the irreversible and open-ended problem of climate change" (p. 166). He continues (pp. 166-167): Frames do not just focus the attention: they define the areas for disattention. These precedents bound climate change to a limited set of meanings that actively excluded other approaches. They defined climate change as an environmental issue and therefore not a resource, an energy, an economic, a health, or a social rights issue. They determined that it would be best managed through emissions trading, and therefore not through regulation, taxation, and rationing. And the U.N., glowing from the success of its process to prevent ozone depletion, determined that climate change would be best controlled through international protocol rather than regional or multilateral agreements. The Nobel-prize winning economist Thomas Schelling argues that the way to simplify the "awfully complicated hodgepodge" of our current climate change policies would be "to put the cap on the fossil fuels, not on different industries-a cap on oil and gas at the wellhead, a cap on coal at the minehead" (Marshall 2014, p. 170). In other words, rather than concentrate on regulating greenhouse gases (and creating ill-advised emissions trading systems), the most efficient and enforceable system would be to tax the fossil fuels that produce them, or to constrain the development of new sources of fossil fuels. Yet, this has never been debated at policy level, and the IPCC does not produce data on fossil fuel production, only on greenhouse gas emissions (pp. 170171). The decision to concentrate our efforts on tailpipe emissions, rather than at the wellhead, has not even been successfully lobbied by the fossil fuel industry: they did not generate the dominant approach (although they have since been involved in upholding it), somewhat puzzlingly the debate to question the tailpipe-approach just has never taken place.35 Rather, the framing seems to have just happened. Why? Marshall (2014, p. 173) suggests that we should understand it primarily "as an extreme error of judgment resulting from cognitive error and false categorization", namely that Scientists categorized climate change as a tailpipe issue because production was considered a political issue that was outside of their domain. Policy makers then categorized climate change as a tailpipe problem because they drew on recent available experience that suggested viable solutions to tailpipe problems. Confirmation bias and a socially constructed norm of disattention finished off the job. Putting controls on the production of fossil fuels thus is not discussed in national or international politics because questions concerning the wellhead do not exist within the dominant debate. This allows most Western governments to have simultaneously enacted programs to subsidise renewable energy production, while at the same time continuing to encourage and subsidise ever-larger investments into developing new sources of fossil fuels (p. 173). Needless to say, the latter far 35 Marshall (2014, p. 171) writes that "there were no fights, no struggles, no backroom deals. There did not need to be because it was never discussed." He bases this claim on interviews with people involved in climate negotiations. 217 exceeds the former: in 2012, renewable energy investments reached $244 billion, while exploration and development into new oil and gas reserves received over $1 trillion (p. 174). As the key players involved seem to be too embedded in their institutional frameworks to see the dissonance of this approach, the thinking must be challenged from the outside. 7.4 Summary and concluding remarks Although the basic mechanism is simple ― we burn too much fossil fuels ― the result, climate change, is a very complex phenomenon. The science is complex, the implications are complex, and the number of agents involved in creating the harm is simply vast. Most of our emissions take place within certain structures. Individual responsibility cannot be discussed in isolation from the social systems and collective settings that we are all embedded in. The timescale spans thousands of years and the reach is global. The effects are potentially catastrophic. This is not a harm or an injustice akin to those that our moral theories are used to grappling with.36 It also presents a challenge to our moral psychology and information processing capacities. Institutional collective agents with the capacity to process a lot of information have greater obligations to know about climate change than individuals. My aim throughout the thesis has been to show that despite the complexity of the situation, individuals can have climate change responsibility, and that there are three potential sources for this: direct responsibility, shared responsibility qua members of collective agents, and shared responsibility qua constituents of unorganised collectives. I have not attempted to answer questions concerning the best way to allocate responsibility to solve the climate change problem, or to provide some precise formula to determine the responsibility of each agent. Rather, my aim has been to provide well-argued answers to the various responsibility questions raised by climate change. In doing so, I have hoped to make it at least a lot harder for a relatively wealthy individual to argue that they as individuals have no responsibilities regarding climate change. Accounts that deny individual responsibility for climate change fail to either take our interdependent reality seriously or fail to understand marginal participation (or in the case of lifestyle emissions and direct responsibility, fail to appreciate the nature of the climate change phenomenon). We should not place all the responsibility on collective agents such as states and governments. On 36 The possibility of a nuclear war comes close, and philosophers have, of course, grappled with the ethics of nuclear technology since it was invented. The difference is that with anthropogenic climate change we are not discussing only a risk, but something that is ongoing already. Furthermore, to start a nuclear war certain people must intend to start it, at least to some degree (negligence etc.), while with climate change no one intended it at all: it is a by-product. The incremental and cumulative nature of the harm, combined with various tipping points, also offers other reasons for disanalogy. 218 the other hand, accounts that want to place responsibility directly on unorganised collectives face several problems: putative agents cannot have obligations (instead, they fall on the individual qua the unorganised collective), the comparison to random collectives does not hold (climate change is a structural and systematic harm), and they fail to provide the link between the collective and the individual agents. I have argued in this thesis that what we need instead are accounts that centre on complicity and structural injustices, as these shed light on the relational and positional webs of participation that result in many global harms. Individuals can be complicit in climate change harms, either as members of collective agents (e.g. as citizens of states or employees of a corporation) or as constituents of unorganised collectives (e.g. as consumers or polluters). With collective agents the link between the individual and the collective outcome is a participatory intention, and in unorganised collectives it is a quasi-participatory intention. The potential of individual actions to help bring about an outcome gives an additional reason to take action in cases of marginal participation. Individual direct responsibility is limited to relatively wealthy individuals and their luxury emissions. This individual direct responsibility or duty is to not to increase the probable risk of serious harm – deprivation of fundamental capabilities – to other people, at least as long as we can do so at a less than significant cost to ourselves. I have also argued that offsetting is not a reliable way to meet this duty, but rather we need to look at the emissions from our lifestyle choices (within the available infrastructure), in contrast to questioning each individual purchase and consumer choice. There are at least three obvious such lifestyle choices that have large combined effects even at the level of individual emissions. These are how spaciously you choose to live, how you organise your travel in your everyday life, and what the main protein source is in your diet. With lifestyle choices, you make a decision that either leads to many little decisions taken daily, most of them taken without reflection, or you lock yourself into a certain emission path. Our lifestyle choices affect our overall emissions to a much greater extent than a one-off decision of where to take a rare holiday. They can also signal what norms we are willing to support. However, individual direct duties related to avoiding climate change harms are not prior to our shared duties, i.e. the duties we have as members or constituents of collectives. Solutions aimed purely at the individual level will be both insufficient and inefficient. Climate change cannot be solved without collective entities stepping up to their obligations, and collective entities will not do so unless enough of their members push for it. Shared responsibility qua members of collective agents is thus the key individual responsibility, and it presses especially on those occupying key positions within key collective agents. Saying that, our shared responsibility qua constituents of unorganised collectives has the potential to be decisive in whether some action is taken or not, either 219 through a set of actions that can signal certain acceptance or support, or as a form of political support from the grass roots. I am also not denying the obligations of collective agents. At the present moment in history, no agent could argue that they can reasonably believe that enough others are already doing their share to mitigate climate change, any more than adapt or compensate. Every agent should thus take a capacity-relative share in securing that goal. Nation states and governments are not the only relevant institutional collective agents for discussing climate change obligations. The corporations involved in GCC and similar lobbying efforts have by their past actions generated retrospective moral responsibility for themselves (to varying degrees) with regards to anthropogenic climate change. It is justified to demand that these corporations compensate for their actions and most importantly, to stop them from spreading misinformation immediately. Still, the ethical claims can only be understood by individual members of these collective agents because only they can feel the pull of moral claims. So far I have not said anything about how strong the reasons we get from these three potential sources (direct responsibility, shared responsibility qua members of collective agents, shared responsibility qua constituents of unorganised collectives) are compared to one another. That is because it depends on who you are. Conceptually shared responsibility is prior to direct responsibility due to the strength of the potential of individual actions multiplying when we act together. Climate change must be defeated by institutional collective agents, including both political and commercial actors, although it does not have to happen through international treaties. So the people who are members of these institutional collective agents have the strongest claim on them to take positive action towards finding a solution now. The closer to the core of the collective agent the individual member is, the stronger the reason they get from their participatory intention. Core agents will always have stronger responsibility qua members of collective agents than the peripheral agents. Core agents that can play key roles in taking meaningful climate change action include politicians, policymakers, corporate executives, financiers, and so on. While shared responsibility conceptually is prior to direct responsibility in the case of climate change, there will be some individuals who should concentrate on their direct responsibility first and foremost. These are what I call super-polluters: people whose lifestyles result in emissions many time over the carrying capacity of the Earth. I suggest that these comprise of High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs), i.e. people with at least US$1 million in investable wealth, excluding their primary residence and other personal items.37 There are currently 15.4 million people in the world that have 37 Capgemini Financial Services who compiles the World Wealth Report excludes primary residence, collectibles, consumables, and consumer durables from the investible assets, see www.worldwealthreport.com. They project that 220 this much investable wealth according to the latest available data from 2015 (World Wealth Report 2016).38 However, despite lifestyles that include regular use of private jets, there is very little research into the consumption patterns or ecological footprints of the HNWI (Kenner 2015). For my purposes it is safe to assume that while some people within this group might live frugally despite their wealth, there are plenty of people who have lifestyles that lead to emissions on a scale that qualifies them as super-polluters and makes their direct duties their primary duties. This is yet another reason why individual lifestyle emissions should not be discarded from responsibility discussions. Note, though, that even if your lifestyle emissions are excessive, it does not automatically mean that your direct duties will be your primary duties. Many among the HNWI will belong among the powerful individuals and their shared responsibility as members of collective agents might well be their most important responsibility. Think of the current US administration that consists mostly, if not exclusively, of HNWIs: their primary responsibility is dictated by their political role. In a similar way, many of the HNWIs hold top executive positions in collective agents and their membership in these is their primary source of responsibility.39 Many of our institutions and public systems have not kept up with the rapid changes initiated by technological innovations. We must urgently start updating them to better represent our interconnected lives and our evolving morality. When the vast majority of the human potential goes untapped or is severely underutilised, as is the case in our deeply unequal world, we are lowering our chances of flourishing. We are even diminishing our chances of survival as a species. It is far easier to devise a fair system than decides upon a fair outcome (the same idea lies behind democracy and the juror system, to give but two examples). When designing these better systems, we do not need to know the what, but the how: not what is the answer, but how can we increase our chances of getting to the solutions (with climate change and other issues), to reach them and to implement them. The process needs more of us to become creative and active and – crucially – more of us to be allowed and empowered to have our voices heard.40 global HNWI wealth will nearly triple in size from 2006-2025 and surpass US$100 trillion by 2025, propelled by strong growth in the Asia-Pacific region. 38 The data shows that 61.2% of the global HNWI population resides in either the United States, Japan, Germany, or China (the United Kingdom, France, and Switzerland come next in the chart of largest HNWI populations). HNWIs are separated into three wealth bands: "millionaires next door" (US$1 million to US$5 million in investable wealth), "mid-tier millionaires" (US$5 million to US$30 million), and "ultra-HNWIs" (US$30 million or more). 39 They have the potential to influence things not just through the membership roles they occupy, though, but also through their investments. Research by Oxfam (2015) has found that between the Copenhagen (2009) and Paris (2015) climate conferences, "the number of billionaires on the Forbes list with interests in fossil fuel activities has risen from 54 in 2010 to 88 in 2015, while the size of their combined personal fortunes has expanded by around 50% from over $200bn to more than $300bn." There are thus very powerful personal interests at stake in fossil fuels. 40 With climate change, any effective institutional solution must address the vast inequalities in our world, because inequality is the driving force between many of the structures that result in excessive emissions. Examples include the exploitative use of natural resources that is made possible by the very unequal access to these resources, externalisation 221 I posited in chapter one that the Socratic question of how one should live is a good starting point for ethics. How should we live then, with climate change snapping at our heels? Like Williams, I do not think that moral philosophy can offer an answer to this, but like him I believe that it can help us to better understand the issues that are involved in answering such a question. My contribution to this end has been to try to clarify the ways in which individuals can have climate change responsibility despite the complexity of the situation. We should acknowledge the relational and positional nature of moral responses, and give up the chase for one-model-fits-all –type solutions because context always matters. We are in this together and we are inherently social as a species, so all plausible theorising must start from this. Individual action and intention has been put on a pedestal for too long and we can no longer afford to pretend that things we do together do not bear on us: we are responsible for what we do. When we come together, we can do things that are impossible to do alone. While many people might feel hopelessness and apathy when they think about the magnitude of the climate change challenge, if we begin to openly discuss our fears and our complicity, we can find new ways forward. Recognising our complicity need not be a source for pointless guilt and the need for more denial mechanisms to kick in. Rather, it could act as a conversation starter: what should we do? What could I do? We should recognise the collective agents and the powerful individuals that need to take action now and hold them accountable. In addition, when we understand the potential of our own marginal participation, we can create new groups and networks that ensure that the potential in our actions turns into actual positive change. It is good for the human psyche to feel part of something bigger. We are in this together and what happens next is up to us. If there is no enfolding narrative that inescapably unfolds for the human race ― or for the world ― set out by a higher being or laws of nature, then we are responsible for our destinies. Luck and coincidence will always play significant roles in our lives, meaning that we will not be able to write our narratives with precision. But we can write them to some degree of certainty through the kinds of policies we create, the kinds of politics we support, the kinds of interaction we practice, the choices we make about how we live together. In this sense we are truly responsible. of costs to distant others, and lack of balance in the voices that dominate the climate change debate. "What is clear is that climate change and economic inequality are inextricably linked. It is a crisis driven by the 'haves', which hits the 'have-nots' the hardest" (Oxfam 2015, p. 6). According to Oxfam (2015), around 50% of global GHG emissions can be attributed to the richest 10% of people. The world's richest 10% of people have average carbon footprints 11 times as high as the poorest half of the population, and 60 times as high as the poorest 10%. These figures are not surprising, given that over half of the world's wealth is in the hands of 1% of the richest people (Hardoon et al. 2016). The average footprint of the richest 1% of people globally could be as much as 175 times that of the poorest 10% (Oxfam 2015). That is striking in itself, but there are vast differences in income within that group itself. Runaway inequality, driven by tax avoidance, has resulted in a world where eight men own the same amount of wealth as the bottom 50% of the world's population, 3.6 billion people (Hardoon 2017). That means that each of these individual billionaires, on average, holds the same amount of wealth than 450 million people combined. Appendix The six foundations of morality The table below is a modified version of figure 6.2 from Haidt (2012, p. 125), combined with discussion of liberty/oppression from pages 170-183 from the same book.1 Care/ harm Fairness/ cheating Liberty/ oppression Loyalty/ betrayal Authority/ subversion Sanctity/ degradation Adaptive challenge Protect and care for children Reap benefits of partnerships Banding together to rein in and punish would-be dominators Form cohesive coalitions Forge beneficial relationships within hierarchies Avoid contaminants Original triggers Suffering, distress, or neediness expressed by one's child Cheating, cooperation, deception Bullying alpha male, aggressive behaviour Threat or challenge to group Signs of dominance and submission Waste products, diseased people Characteris tic emotions Compassion Anger, gratitude, guilt Reactance, resentment Group pride, rage at traitors Respect, fear Disgust Relevant virtues Caring, kindness Fairness, justice, trustworthiness Freedom, solidarity Loyalty, patriotism, self-sacrifice Obedience, deference Temperance, chastity, piety, cleanliness These six systems seem to be akin to thin concepts, and the way different cultures and groups of people construct their moral matrices from them represent the thick concepts. The original triggers 1 The moral foundations theory is based on previous research done together with Joseph and others (Haidt and Joseph 2011). For more, see www.moralfoundations.org. 224 explain why an adaptive trait has been favoured, but the set of current triggers is larger than this and is influenced by culture. Our brains might be prewired by nature, but they are not hardwired. In other words, our brains are flexible and subject to change. Neuroscientist Gary Marcus has suggested an analogy to a book, of which genes write the first draft only. (Haidt 2012, p. 130). Because rules and virtues vary across cultures, we should not try to find universality in the finished books. However, "if you look for links between evolutionary theory and anthropological observations, you can take some educated guesses about what was in the universal first draft of human nature." (p. 153). The first of the six foundations of morality, care, has developed along the lines described earlier: to meet the adaptive challenge of protecting and caring for children. While reptiles usually leave their babies to fend for themselves once they hatch, mammals suckle their offspring. The cost of motherhood is thus raised and a lot more time and effort is placed on each child, putting the effort in the quality of the care, rather than the sheer number of offspring. This is even more the case with humans as our babies cannot even walk until they are roughly one year old, let alone fend for themselves for many years to come, thus requiring a collaborate effort in keeping the child safe and alive. Therefore an adaptive challenge is not just presented for the mothers, but for the species. Babies and cute animals alike trigger our instincts to care, protect, nurture, and interact. We are sensitive to signs of suffering and need, and therefore tend to despise cruelty. Arguments about protecting the geographically distant victims of some calamity fall under care and are more common to people on the left of the political spectrum (Haidt 2012, pp. 131-134). Fairness has an original trigger in human cooperation. While we are usually nice to people we meet for the first time, we tend to cooperate only with those who have been nice to us and have not taken advantage of us. Our interactions are "tit for tat" in that sense: we chose mutually beneficial cooperation whenever we can, and thus engage in reciprocal altruism. Feelings of friendship, pleasure, and liking emerge when people reciprocate and show signs that they can be trusted to do so, while we react with anger and contempt to someone cheating us or taking advantage of us. Culturally and politically many things to do with reciprocity and cheating have gotten linked to fairness. Some of the current triggers are associated with proportionality of the contribution, for example, to do with taxation and welfare system. The underlying idea is to protect communities from free-riders and slackers, because if this would be allowed to go on unchallenged, cooperation would stop. (Haidt 2012, pp. 136-138; pp. 180-181). This proportional notion of fairness could be summed up as "People should get what they deserve, based on what they have done" (p. 169). So in that sense fairness as proportionality is akin to laws of karma. While people across the political spectrum care about fairness as proportionality, conservatives are far more concerned with making 225 sure that people do not get what they don't deserve (hence campaign slogans about benefit frauds), while liberals feel more ambivalent about this. (p. 183). Liberty also means different things politically. It evolved as a response to reigning in bullying alpha males by a larger set who cooperate to take them down altogether (or at least down a peg or two). As early humans developed better weapons, physical strength no longer decided alone who won fights, so the balance of power shifted. The development of language allowed our ancestors to gossip about those who violated their powers and allowed moral communities to shame, punish, and ostracize those who behaved in a threatening manner towards the rest of the group (or simply annoyed them). Reputation became important. Liberty foundation is in tension with authority foundation, so while we recognise some authority legitimate in a given context, we are sensitive to what we perceive to be abuses of power. All people regardless of political orientation share a hatred of oppression. While liberals tend to view liberty as lack of oppression towards certain vulnerable groups, something that government has a major role in bringing about, conservatives (and libertarians especially) view liberty mainly as the right to be left alone, free from government interference. Any perceived signs of oppression towards one's groups is not tolerated: don't tread on me (high taxes, nanny state), on my business (regulations), or on my nation's sovereignty (international treaties, United Nations). In contrast, liberty for the left support much more universal ideals of social justice and equality, and when combined with care it amounts to solidarity. (Haidt 2012, pp. 170-176; 182-183, see also Iyer et al 2012). Loyalty is linked to our tribal roots. It evolved to allow us to form and maintain coalitions, so those deemed not to be team players are punished. Current inter-group competitions can be found in national and international politics alike, with conservatives often placing more weight to loyalty towards one's own nation or religion. (Haidt 2012, pp. 140-141). Authority includes many social relationships like the ones of a parent and child, or a village elder and younger members, based on perceptions of legitimate symmetry, beneficial relationships within social hierarchies: cultivating the protection of superiors and the allegiance of subordinates, protecting order and fending off chaos (pp. 143-144). Finally, sanctity is based on us being omnivores (and being subject to pathogens and parasites). As omnivores, we do not have sensory systems that are structured to guide us to certain foods (like koala bears to eucalyptus leaves): our eating habits are flexible and we can easily adapt to new environments and new food sources. The disadvantage is that some new foods can be poisonous or otherwise not good for us, and this gives rise to neophobia (a fear of new things), that has to be balanced with neophilia (an attraction to new things) that allows us to source new food in the first place. Those individuals with best calibrated sense of disgust were able to balance consuming enough calories with avoiding dangerous microbes. In similar vein, signs of infection or disease in other people triggers disgust in us, evolved to prevent infection. The current triggers of 226 sanctity vary widely (and are also linked to xenophobia and xenophilia, as new diseases are usually brought in by foreigners, but so are also new ideas, technologies, and goods). Conservatives tend to score higher on neophobia, preferring to stick to tried and tested foods, people, ideas, and others, thus valuing traditions over new ideas and experiences. Without a sense of the disgust we might not have a sense of the sacred either, something that helps to bind us into moral communities through things like flags, saints, principles, and certain sacred places. The value that some environmentalist place on the purity of nature could also be read as coming under sanctity, as well as many bioethical issues. (pp. 147-152). Bibliography Aas, Sean (2015) Distributing Collective Obligation. Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 9(3). Agarwal, Anil and Sunita Narain (1991) Global Warming in an Unequal World: A Case of Environmental Colonialism. Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi. Amadae, S. M. (2016) Prisoners of Reason: Game Theory and Neoliberal Political Economy. Cambridge University Press, New York. Anscombe, G.E.M. (1963) Intention, 2nd Edition. Harvard University paperback edition (2000). Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Anscombe, G.E.M.; L. Gormally, and M. Geach (2005) Human Life, Action, and Ethics: Essays. Andrews UK, Exeter. Arctic Centre (2017) Arctic Indigenous Peoples: Definitions. www.arcticcentre.org/EN/ communications/arcticregion/Arctic-Indigenous-Peoples/Definitions, accessed 05 May 2017. University of Lapland. Arendt, Hannah (1963) Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, with new introduction by Amos Elon (2006). Penguin Books, London. Arendt, Hannah (1968) Men in Dark Times. Harcourt, Brace & World, New York. Arendt, Hannah (1970) On Violence. Harcourt Brace & Company, San Diego. Arendt, Hannah (1991[1948]) 'Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility', in May and Hoffman (eds) (1991) Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham, pp. 273-283. Aristotle (2001) Nicomachean Ethics, translated by W.D. Ross. Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA. Arnold, Denis G. (2016) Corporate Responsibility, Democracy, and Climate Change. Midwest Studies In Philosophy 40, pp. 252-261. Attfield, Robin (2009) Mediated Responsibilities, Global Warming, and the Scope of Ethics. Journal of Social Philosophy 40(2), pp. 225–236. Attfield, Robin (2015) Sustainability and Management. Philosophy of Management 14(2), pp. 85-93. Aufrecht, Monica (2011) Climate Change and Structural Emissions: Moral Obligations at the Individual Level. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 25(2), pp. 201-213. Baard, Patrik (2015) Managing Climate Change: A View from Deep Ecology. Ethics & the Environment 20(1), pp. 23-44. Bakan, Joel (2004) The Corporation: The pathological pursuit of profit and power. Free Press, New York. Bell, Derek (2011) Does anthropogenic climate change violate human rights?. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14, pp. 99–124. Bersoff, David M. (1999) Why Good People Sometimes Do Bad Things: Motivated Reasoning and Unethical Behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 25(1), pp. 28-39. Björnsson, Gunnar and Kendy Hess (2017) Corporate Crocodile Tears?: On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporations. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94(2), pp. 273-298. Boussalis, Constantine and Travis G. Coan (2016) Text-mining the signals of climate change doubt. Global Environmental Change 36, pp. 89-100. Bowie, Norman E. (2013) Business Ethics in the 21st Century. Issues in Business Ethics, Volume 39. Springer, Dordrecht. 228 Bratman, Michael (1987) Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Bratman, Michael E. (1999) Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Bratman, Michael E. (2017) 'The Intentions of a Group', in Orts and Smith (eds) The Moral Responsibility of Firms. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 36-52. Broome, John (1992) Counting the Cost of Global Warming. White Horse Press, Cambridge. Broome, John (2010) 'The most important thing about climate change', in Boston, Bradstock, and Eng (eds) Public Policy: Why Ethics Matters. ANU E Press, pp. 101-116. Broome, John (2012) Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World. W. W. Norton & Company, New York and London. Broome, John (2016) A Reply To My Critics. Midwest Studies In Philosophy 40, pp. 158-171. Broome, John (2017) 'Do not ask for morality', in Walsh, Hormio, and Purves (eds) The Ethical Underpinnings of Climate Economics. Routledge, London, pp. 9-21. Calder, Gideon and Catriona McKinnon (2012) Climate Change and Liberal Priorities. Routledge, London and New York. Callicott, J. Baird (2011) The Temporal and Spatial Scales of Global Climate Change and the Limits of Individualistic and Rationalistic Ethics. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 69, pp. 101116. Caney, Simon (2005) Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change. Leiden Journal of International Law 18(4), pp. 747-775. Caney, Simon (2008) Human rights, climate change, and discounting. Environmental Politics 17(4), pp. 536-555. Caney, Simon (2009) Climate Change and the Future: Discounting for Time, Wealth, and Risk. Journal of Social Philosophy 40(2), pp. 163-186. Caney, Simon (2010) Climate change and the duties of the advantaged. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 13(1), pp. 203-228. Caney, Simon (2012a) Just Emissions. Philosophy and Public Affairs 40, pp. 255–300. Caney, Simon (2012b) 'Global Justice, Climate Change, and Human Rights', in Hicks and Williamson (eds) Leadership and Global Justice. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 91–111. Capgemini (2016) World Wealth Report 2016. Capgemini Financial Services. Available at www.worldwealthreport.com Carmichael, Jason T., Robert J. Brulle and Joanna K. Huxster (2017) The great divide: understanding the role of media and other drivers of the partisan divide in public concern over climate change in the USA, 2001–2014. Climatic Change 141(4), pp. 599-612. Carrington, Damian (2016) Arctic ice melt 'already affecting weather patterns where you live right now'. The Guardian 19 December 2016. www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/dec/19/arcticice-melt-already-affecting-weather-patterns-where-you-live-right-now Chakravarty, Shoibal; Ananth Chikkatur, Heleen de Coninck, Stephen Pacala, Robert Socolow, and Massimo Tavoni (2009) Sharing global CO2 emission reductions among one billion high emitters. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, pp. 11884-11888. 229 Chan, Leslie and Sely Costa (2005) Participation in the global knowledge commons: Challenges and opportunities for research dissemination in developing countries. New Library World 106(1210/1211), pp. 141-163. Cherubini, Antonello; Andrea Papini, Rocco Vertechy, Marco Fontana (2015) Airborne Wind Energy Systems: A review of the technologies. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 51, pp. 14611476. Clarke, Randolph; Michael McKenna, and Angela M. Smith (eds) The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays. Oxford University Press, New York. Collins, Stephanie (2013) Collectives' Duties and Collectivization Duties. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91(2), pp. 231-248. Collins, Stephanie and Holly Lawford-Smith (2016) Collectives' and individuals' obligations: a parity argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46(1), pp. 38-58. Cook, John et al. (2013) Quantifying the consensus on anthropogenic global warming in the scientific literature. Environmental Research Letters 8(2), pp. 1-7. Cook, John. et al. (2016) Consensus on consensus: a synthesis of consensus estimates on humancaused global warming. Environmental Research Letters 11, 048002. Copp, David (2007) The Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis. Journal of Social Philosophy 38(3), pp. 369-388. Cripps, Elizabeth (2011a) Collectivities without intention. Journal of Social Philosophy 42(1), pp. 1-20. Cripps, Elizabeth (2011b) Climate change, collective harm and legitimate coercion. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 14(2), pp. 171-193. Cripps, Elizabeth (2013) Climate Change and the Moral Agent: Individual Duties in an Interdependent World. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Cripps, Elizabeth (2016) On Climate Matters: Offsetting, Population, and Justice. Midwest Studies In Philosophy 40, pp. 114-128. Cullity, Garrett (2015) 'Acts, omissions, emissions', in Moss (ed) Climate Change and Justice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 129-147. Cuomo, Chris J. (2011) Climate Change, Vulnerability, and Responsibility. Hypatia 26(4), pp. 690– 714. Davidson, Marc D. (2017) 'The ethics of discounting: An introduction', in Walsh, Hormio, and Purves (eds) The Ethical Underpinnings of Climate Economics. Routledge, London, pp. 22-40. Davies, Nick (2007) The inconvenient truth about the carbon offset industry. The Guardian 16 June 2007, www.theguardian.com/environment/2007/jun/16/climatechange.climatechange Dower, Nigel (2011) 'Climate change and the cosmopolitan responsibility of individuals: policy vanguards', in Harris (ed): Ethics and Global Environmental Policy: Cosmopolitan Conceptions of Climate Change. Edward Elgar, Cheltanham, pp. 42–65. Downie, R. S. (1969) 'Collective Responsibility', in May and Hoffman (eds) (1991) Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics. Rowman & Littlefield, Savage, pp. 47-52. Driver, Julia (2015) 'Appraisability, Attributability, and Moral Agency', in Clarke, McKenna, and Smith (eds) The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 157-173. 230 Eckersley, Robyn (2016) 'Responsibility for Climate Change as a Structural Injustice', in Gabrielson, Hall, Meyer, and Schlosberg (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Political Theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 346-361. Elder-Vass, Dave (2010) The Causal Power of Social Structures: Emergence, Structure and Agency. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Erskine, Toni (2003) 'Introduction: Making Sense of 'Responsibility' in International Relations – Key Questions and Concepts', in Erskine (ed) Can Institutions Have Responsibilities? Collective Moral Agency and International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 1-16. Fallis, Don (2016) 'Is Making People Ignorant as Bad as Deceiving Them?', in Peels, Rik (ed) Perspectives On Ignorance From Moral And Social Philosophy. Routledge, 120-133. FAO (2013) Tackling Climate Change through Livestock: A global assessment of emissions and mitigation opportunities. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome. Available at www.fao.org/3/a-i3437e Feinberg, Joel (1970) 'Collective Responsibility', in May and Hoffman (eds) (1991) Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics. Rowman & Littlefield, Savage, pp. 53–76. Finneron-Burns, Elizabeth (2016) Contractualism and the Non-Identity Problem. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19(5), pp.1151-1163. Finneron-Burns, Elizabeth (2017) What's wrong with human extinction?. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47(2-3), pp. 327-343. Fischer, John Martin and Mark Ravizza (eds) (1993) Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London. Fischer, John Martin and Mark Ravizza (1998) Responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge University Press, New York. Fragnière, Augustin (2016) Climate change and individual duties. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 7, pp. 798–814. Francis, Blake B. (2017) 'Moral asymmetries in economic evaluations of climate change: The challenge of assessing diverse effects', in Walsh, Hormio, and Purves (eds) The Ethical Underpinnings of Climate Economics. Routledge, London, pp. 142-161. Franta, Benjamin and Geoffrey Supran (2017) The fossil fuel industry's invisible colonization of academia. The Guardian 13 March 2017. www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus97-per-cent/2017/mar/13/the-fossil-fuel-industrys-invisible-colonization-of-academia French, Peter A. (1979) 'The Corporation as a Moral Person', in May and Hoffman (eds) (1991) Collective Responsibility: Five Decades of Debate in Theoretical and Applied Ethics. Rowman & Littlefield, Savage, pp. 133-149. French, Peter A. (1984) Collective and Corporate Responsibility. Columbia University Press, New York. French, Peter A.; Jeffrey Nesteruk, and David T. Risser, with John Abbarno (1992) Corporations in the Moral Community. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, Forth Worth. Gaertner, Lowell, Constantine Sedikides, Huajian Cai, and Jonathon D. Brown (2010) It's not WEIRD, it's WRONG: When Researchers Overlook uNderlying Genotypes, they will not detect universal processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33, pp. 93-94. Galison, Peter (2008) 'Removing Knowledge: The Logic of Modern Censorship', in Proctor and Schiebinger (eds) Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance. Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp. 37-54. 231 Gardiner, Stephen M. (2006) A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics and the Problem of Moral Corruption. Environmental Values 15(3), pp. 397-413. Gardiner, Stephen M. (2011) A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change. Oxford University Press, New York. Gardiner, Stephen M. and David A. Weisbach (2016) Debating Climate Ethics. Oxford University Press, New York. Gardner, Gerald T. and Paul C. Stern (2008) The Short List: The Most Effective Actions U.S. Households Can Take to Curb Climate Change. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development 50(5), pp. 12-25. Gardner, John (2004) Book Review: Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age by Kutz, Christopher. Ethics 114(4), pp. 827-830. Gettier, Edmund L. (1963) Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?. Analysis 23(6), pp. 121-123. Gilbert, Margaret (2002) Collective Wrongdoing: Moral and Legal Responses. Social Theory and Practice 28(1), pp. 167-187. Godfrey, Anna; Emily Le Roux-Rutledge, Susan Cooke, and Miriam Burton, with Lucy Neville and Ed Pauker (2010) Africa Talks Climate: The public understanding of climate change in ten countries. Executive summary. BBC World Service Trust, London. Gosseries, Axel (2004) Historical Emissions and Free-Riding. Ethical Perspectives 11(1), pp. 36-60. Gosseries, Axel and Lukas H. Meyer (eds) (2009) Intergenerational Justice. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Greaves, Tom (2014) Climate Change and the Moral Agent: Individual Duties in an Interdependent World. Journal of Contemporary European Studies 22(3), pp. 347-349. Haidt, Jonathan (2012) The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. Pantheon Books, New York. Haidt, Jonathan and Craig Joseph (2011) How Moral Foundations Theory Succeeded in Building on Sand: A Response to Suhler and Churchland. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (23)9, pp. 2117– 2122. Hale, Benjamin (2011) Nonrenewable Resources and the Inevitability of Outcomes. The Monist 94(3), pp. 369-390. Hansen, James (2009) Storms of My Grandchildren: The Truth About the Coming Climate Catastrophe and Our Last Chance to Save Humanity. Bloomsbury Press, New York. Hardoon, Deborah, Sophia Ayele and Ricardo Fuentes-Nieva (2016) An Economy For the 1%: How privilege and power in the economy drive extreme inequality and how this can be stopped. Oxfam Briefing Paper 18 January 2016. Oxfam International. Hardoon, Deborah (2017) An Economy for the 99%: It's time to build a human economy that benefits everyone, not just the privileged few. Oxfam Briefing Paper 16 January 2017. Oxfam International. DOI: 10.21201/2017.8616 Harman, Elizabeth (2016) 'Eating Meat as a Morally Permissible Moral Mistake', in Chignell, Cuneo, and Halteman (eds) Philosophy Comes to Dinner: Arguments About the Ethics of Eating. Routledge, New York, pp. 215-231. Heede, Richard (2014) Tracing anthropogenic carbon dioxide and methane emissions to fossil fuel and cement producers, 1854-2010. Climatic Change 122(1), pp. 229-241. 232 Held, Virginia (1970) Can a Random Collection of Individuals be Morally Responsible. The Journal of Philosophy 67(14), pp. 471-481. Herzog, Lisa (2016) What Could Be Wrong with a Mortgage? Private Debt Markets from a Perspective of Structural Injustice. Journal of Political Philosophy, online first, 11 November 2016. DOI: 10.1111/jopp.12107 Hess, Kendy M. (2013) 'If You Tickle Us....': How Corporations Can Be Moral Agents Without Being Persons. The Journal of Value Inquiry 47, pp. 319-335. Hess, Kendy M. (2014) Because They Can: The Basis for the Moral Obligations of (Certain) Collectives. Midwest Studies In Philosophy 38, pp. 203-221. Heyward, Clare and Dominic Roser (eds) (2016) Climate Justice in a Non-Ideal World. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Hieronymi, Pamela (2001) Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62(3), pp. 529-555. Hiller, Avram (2011) Climate Change and Individual Responsibility. The Monist 94(3), pp. 349-368. Hormio, Säde (2013) 'Osallisuusvastuu ilmastonmuutoksesta', in Kortetmäki, Laitinen, and Yrjönsuuri (eds) Ajatuksia ilmastoetiikasta. SoPhi, Jyväskylä, pp. 103-119. Hormio, Säde (2014) 'Hyveet osana yhteiskuntaa: arkihyveet, sankarihyveet ja ilmastonmuutos', in Hämäläinen, Lemetti, and Niiniluoto (eds) Hyve. Filosofisia tutkimuksia Helsingin yliopistosta, Helsingin yliopisto, Helsinki, pp. 365-371. Hormio, Säde (2015) Climate Change and the Moral Agent: Individual Duties in an Interdependent World. Journal of Social Ontology 1(1), pp. 179–181. Hormio, Säde (2017a) Can Corporations Have (Moral) Responsibility Regarding Climate Change Mitigation?. Ethics, Policy & Environment 20(3), pp. 314–332. Hormio, Säde (2017b) 'Climate Change Mitigation, Sustainability and Non-substitutability', in Walsh, Hormio, and Purves (eds) The Ethical Underpinnings of Climate Economics. Routledge, London, pp. 103-121. Howe, Peter D.; Matto Mildenberger, Jennifer R. Marlon, and Anthony Leiserowitz (2015) Geographic variation in opinions on climate change at state and local scales in the USA. Nature Climate Change 5, pp. 596-603. Hughes, David McDermott (2013) Climate Change and the Victim Slot: From Oil to Innocence. American Anthropologist 115(4), pp. 570–581. Internet World Stats (2017) Internet Users in the World by Regions – June 30, 2017. Internet World Stats, Miniwatts Marketing Group. Available at www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm IPCC (2013) 'Summary for Policymakers', in Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 3-29. IPCC (2014) 'Introductory Chapter' [by Victor D. G., D. Zhou, E. H. M. Ahmed, P. K. Dadhich, J. G. J. Olivier, H-H. Rogner, K. Sheikho, and M. Yamaguchi], in Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 111-150. 233 Isaacs, Tracy (2011) Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts. Oxford University Press, New York. Isaacs, Tracy (2014) Collective Responsibility and Collective Obligation. Midwest Studies In Philosophy 38, pp. 40–57. Iyer, Ravi, Spassena Koleva, Jesse Graham, Peter Ditto, and Jonathan Haidt (2012) Understanding Libertarian Morality: The Psychological Dispositions of Self-Identified Libertarians. PLoS ONE 7(8): e42366. Jackall, Robert (1988) Moral Mazes: The World of Corporate Managers. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Jackson, Frank (1987) 'Group Morality', in Pettit, Sylvan and Norman (eds) Metaphysics and Morality: Essays in Honour of J.J.C. Smart. Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 91-110. Jamieson, Dale (2007) When Utilitarians Should Be Virtue Theorists. Utilitas 19(2), pp. 160-183. Jamieson, Dale (2015) Responsibility and Climate Change. Global Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric 8(2), pp. 23-42. Jeske, Diane (2014) 'Special Obligations', in Zalta (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/special-obligations Johnson, Baylor L. (2003) Ethical Obligations in a Tragedy of the Commons. Environmental Values 12(3), pp. 271-287. Kahan, Dan M., Ellen Peters, Maggie Wittlin, Paul Slovic, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Donald Braman, and Gregory Mandel (2012) The polarizing impact of science literacy and numeracy on perceived climate change risks. Nature Climate Change 2, pp. 732–735. Kahn, Elizabeth (2012) Global Economic Justice: A Structural Approach. Public Reason 4 (1-2), pp. 48-67. Kagan, Shelly (2011) Do I Make a Difference?. Philosophy & Public Affairs 39(2), pp. 105-141. Kasperbauer, T.J. (2016) The Implications of Psychological Limitations for the Ethics of Climate Change. Environmental Values 25(3), pp. 353-370. Kavka, Gregory S. (1982) The Paradox of Future Individuals. Philosophy & Public Affairs 11(2), pp. 93-112. Kenner, Dario (2015) Inequality of overconsumption: The ecological footprint of the richest. Global Sustainability Institute Working Paper No. 2015/2, November 2015. Anglia Ruskin University, Cambridge. Killoren, David and Bekka Williams (2013) Group Agency and Overdetermination. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16(2), pp. 295-307. King, Matt (2011) Tracy Isaacs: Moral Responsibility in Collective Contexts. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2011.11.39. Available at ndpr.nd.edu/news/27607-moral-responsibility-incollective-contexts Klein, Naomi (2014) This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate. Simon & Schuster, New York. Kortetmäki, Teea (2016) Reframing Climate Justice: A Three-dimensional View on Just Climate Negotiations. Ethics, Policy and Environment 19(3), pp. 320-334. Kuhn, Deanna (1989) Children and Adults as Intuitive Scientists. Psychological Review 96(4), pp. 674689. Kutz, Christopher (2000) Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 234 Kyllönen, Simo (2014) Civil Disobedience, Climate Protests and a Rawlsian Argument for 'Atmospheric' Fairness. Environmental Values 23(5), pp. 593-613. Kyllönen, Simo (2016) Climate Change, No-Harm Principle, and Moral Responsibility of Individual Emitters. Journal of Applied Philosophy (Early View: 4 November 2016). DOI: 10.1111/japp.12253 Lackey, Jennifer (2014) Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Laitinen, Arto (2014): 'Collective Intentionality and Recognition from Others', in Konzelmann Ziv and Schmid (eds) Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents: Contributions to Social Ontology. Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht, pp. 213-227. Lawson, Brian (2013) Individual Complicity in Collective Wrongdoing. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16(2), pp. 227-243. Lawford-Smith, Holly (2012) The Feasibility of Collectives' Actions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90(3), pp. 453-467. Lawford-Smith, Holly (2015) What 'We'?. Journal of Social Ontology 1(2), pp. 225-249. Lawford-Smith, Holly (2016a) 'Difference-Making and Individuals' Climate-Related Obligations', in Heyward and Roser (eds) Climate Justice in a Non-Ideal World. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 64-82. Lawford-Smith, Holly (2016b) Climate Matters Pro Tanto, Does It Matter All-ThingsConsidered?. Midwest Studies In Philosophy 40, pp. 129–142. Lawford-Smith, Holly (2017) Does Purchasing Make Consumers Complicit in Global Labour Injustice?. Res Publica, online first: 09 March 2017. DOI: 10.1007/s11158-017-9355-4 Leary, Mark R. (2005) Sociometer Theory and the Pursuit of Relational Value: Getting to the Root of Self-Esteem. European Review of Social Psychology 16(1), pp. 75-111. Lerner, Jennifer S. and Philip E. Tetlock (1999) Accounting for the Effects of Accountability. Psychological Bulletin 125(2), pp. 255-275. Lerner, Jennifer S. and Philip E. Tetlock (2003) 'Bridging Individual, Interpersonal, and Institutional Approaches to Judgment and Decision Making: The Impact of Accountability on Cognitive Bias', in Schneider and Shanteau (eds) Emerging Perspectives on Judgment and Decision Research. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 431-457. Lewis, H. D. (1948) 'Collective Responsibility', in May and Hoffman (eds) (1991) Collective Responsibility. Savage, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 17–33. Lichtenberg, Judith (2010) Negative Duties, Positive Duties, and the "New Harms". Ethics 120(3) pp. 557-578. Linville, Patricia W. and Gregory W. Fischer (1991) Preferences for Separating or Combining Events. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 60(1), pp. 5-23. Ludwig, Kirk (2016) From Individual to Plural Agency: Collective Action I. Oxford University Press, New York. Ludwig, Kirk (2017) Do corporations have minds of their own?. Philosophical Psychology 30(3), pp. 269-301. Magnus, David (2008) 'Risk Management versus the Precautionary Principle: Agnotology as a Strategy in the Debate over Genetically Engineered Organisms', in Proctor and Schiebinger (eds) Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance. Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp. 250-264. 235 Maltais, Aaron (2013) Radically Non-Ideal Climate Politics and the Obligation to at Least Vote Green. Environmental Values 22(5), pp. 589-608. Maltais, Aaron (2015) 'Making Our Children Pay for Mitigation', in Maltais and McKinnon (eds) The Ethics of Climate Governance. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, pp. 91-109. Marino, Elizabeth (2012) The long history of environmental migration: Assessing vulnerability construction and obstacles to successful relocation in Shishmaref, Alaska. Global Environmental Change: Human and Policy Dimensions 22(2), pp. 374-381. Mark, Jason (2013) Conversation: Naomi Klein. Earth Island Journal Autumn 2013. www.earthisland.org/journal/index.php/eij/article/naomi_klein Marshall, George (2014) Don't Even Think About It: Why Our Brains Are Wired To Ignore Climate Change. Bloomsbury, New York. Marvel, Kate, Ben Kravitz and Ken Caldeira (2013) Geophysical limits to global wind power. Nature Climate Change 3(2), pp. 118-121. May, Larry (1987) The Morality of Groups: Collective Responsibility, Group-Based Harm, and Corporate Rights. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame. May, Larry (1992) Sharing Responsibility. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. May, Larry (1996) The Socially Responsive Self: Social Theory and Professional Ethics. The University Chicago Press, Chicago. McKinnon, Catriona (2016) Should We Tolerate Climate Change Denial?. Midwest Studies In Philosophy 40(1), pp. 205-216. McShane, Katie (2017) Values and Harms in Loss and Damage. Ethics, Policy & Environment 20(2), pp. 129-142. Mele, Alfred R. (1995) Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy. Oxford University Press, New York. Mercier, Hugo and Dan Sperber (2011) Why do humans reason? Arguments for an argumentative theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34(2), pp. 57-74. Meyer, Lukas H. and Dominic Roser (2012) 'Enough for the Future', in Gosseries and Meyer (eds) Intergenerational Justice. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 219–248. Miller, David (2007) National Responsibility and Global Justice. Oxford University Press, New York. Miller, Seumas (2007) Against the Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis. Journal of Social Philosophy 38(3), pp. 389-409. Miller, Seumas (2010) The Moral Foundations of Social Institutions: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge University Press, New York. Miller, Seumas (2016) 'Ignorance, Technology, and Collective Responsibility', in Peels, Rik (ed) Perspectives on Ignorance from Moral and Social Philosophy. Routledge, London, pp. 217-237. Miller, Seumas and Pekka Mäkelä (2005) "THE COLLECTIVIST APPROACH TO COLLECTIVE MORAL RESPONSIBILITY". Metaphilosophy 36, pp. 634–651. Moellendorf, Darrel (2009) Treaty Norms and Climate Change Mitigation. Ethics & International Affairs 23(3), pp. 247-265. Moore, Wilbert E. and Melvin M. Tumin (1949) Some Social Functions of Ignorance. American Sociological Review 14(6), pp. 787-795. 236 Mulgan, Tim (2011) Ethics for a Broken World: Imagining Philosophy After Catastrophe. Acumen Press, Durham. Mäkelä, Pekka (2007) Collective Agents and Moral Responsibility. Journal of Social Philosophy 38(3), pp. 456-468. Nachmany, Michal, Sam Fankhauser, Joana Setzer, and Alina Averchenkova (2017) Global trends in climate change legislation and litigation. Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London. Available at www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/Global-trends-in-climate-change-legislation-and-litigation-WEB.pdf Nefsky, Julia (2011) Consequentialism and the Problem of Collective Harm: A Reply to Kagan. Philosophy & Public Affairs 39(4), pp. 364-395. Nefsky, Julia (2015) 'Fairness, Participation, and the Real Problem of Collective Harm', in Timmons (ed) Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 5. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Nefsky, Julia (2016) How you can help, without making a difference. Philosophical Studies (First Online: 28 November 2016). DOI: 10.1007/s11098-016-0808-y Neuhäuser, Christian (2014) Structural Injustice and the Distribution of Forward-Looking Responsibility. Midwest Studies In Philosophy 38, pp. 232–251. Nolt, John (2011) How Harmful Are the Average American's Greenhouse Gas Emissions?. Ethics, Policy & Environment 14(1), pp. 3-10. Nordhaus, William (2014) The Ethics of Efficient Markets and Commons Tragedies: A Review of John Broome's Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming World. Journal of Economic Literature 52(4), pp. 1135-1141. Nuccitelli, Dana (2016) These are the best arguments from the 3% of climate scientist 'skeptics.' Really. The Guardian 25 July 2016. www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-percent/2016/jul/25/these-are-the-best-arguments-from-the-3-of-climate-scientist-skeptics-really Nussbaum, Martha C. (2006) Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. The Belknap Press of Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. Nussbaum, Martha C. (2011) 'Foreword', in Young (2011) Responsibility for Justice. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. ix-xxv. O'Neill, John (2014) 'Sustainability', in Moellendorf and Widdows (eds) The Routledge Handbook of Global Ethics. Routledge, Abingdon, pp. 401-415. Oreskes, Naomi and Erik M. Conway (2010) Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming. Bloomsbury Press, New York. Oxfam (2015) Extreme Carbon Inequality: Why the Paris climate deal must put the poorest, lowest emitting and most vulnerable people first. Oxfam Media Briefing 2 December 2015. Oxfam International. Available at www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/mbextreme-carbon-inequality-021215-en.pdf Page, Scott E. (2007) The Difference: How the power of diversity creates better groups, firms, schools, and societies (With a new preface by the author). Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford. Palmer, Clare (2011) 'Does nature matter? The place of the nonhuman in the ethics of climate change', in Arnold (ed) The Ethics of Global Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 272-291. Parfit, Derek (1982) Future Generations: Further Problems. Philosophy & Public Affairs 11(2), pp. 113-172. Parfit, Derek (1986) Reasons and Persons. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 237 Parfit, Derek (2011) On What Matters: Volume Two. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Parker, Wendy S. (2010) Predicting weather and climate: Uncertainty, ensembles and probability. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41(3), pp. 263-272. Pearce, Fred (2016) What is causing the rapid rise in methane emissions?. The Guardian, 26 October 2016 www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/oct/26/what-is-causing-the-rapid-risein-methane-emissions Peels, Rik (2010) What is ignorance?. Philosophia 38(1), pp. 57-67. Peels, Rik (ed) (2016) Perspectives on Ignorance from Moral and Social Philosophy. Routledge, London. Peeters, Wouter; Andries De Smet, Lisa Diependaele, and Sigrid Sterckx (2015) Climate Change and Individual Responsibility: Agency, Moral Disengagement and the Motivational Gap. Palgrave Pivot, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke. Pettit, Philip (2007) Responsibility Incorporated. Ethics 117(2), pp. 171-201. Pickering, W.S.F. (ed) (2014) [1979] Durkheim: Essays on Morals and Education. James Clarke & Co, Cambridge. Pinkert, Felix (2014) What We Together Can (Be Required to) Do. Midwest Studies In Philosophy 38, pp. 187–202. Proctor, Robert N. and Schiebinger, Londa (eds) (2008) Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance. Stanford University Press, Stanford. Rachels, James (1998) 'The Challenge of Cultural Relativism', in Donaldson, Werhane, and Cording (eds) (2002): Ethical Issues in Business: A Philosophical Approach (7th Edition). Pearson Education, New Jersey, pp. 410-419. Richardson, Henry S. (1994) Practical Reasoning about Final Ends. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Roberts, Joanne (2013) Organizational ignorance: Towards a managerial perspective on the unknown. Management Learning 44(3), pp. 215-236. Roberts, Steven (2012) 'The Companies Abroad', in Distant Writing: A History of the Telegraph Companies in Britain between 1838 and 1868, available at distantwriting.co.uk/companiesandforeigntraffic.html Roser, Dominic, Christian Huggel, Markus Ohndorf, Ivo Wallimann-Helmer (2015) Advancing the interdisciplinary dialogue on climate justice. Climatic Change 133(3), pp. 349–359. Roy, Arundhati (2009) Listening to Grasshoppers: Field Notes on Democracy. Hamish Hamilton by Penguin Books, New Delhi and London. Sachdeva, Sonya, Purnima Singh, and Douglas Medin (2011) Culture and the quest for universal principles in moral reasoning. International Journal of Psychology 46(3), pp. 161-176. Sandberg, Joakim (2011) 'My Emissions Make No Difference': Climate Change and the Argument from Inconsequentialism. Environmental Ethics 33(3), pp. 229-248. Sandler, Ronald (2011) Beware of Averages: A Response to John Nolt's 'How Harmful are the Average American's Greenhouse Gas Emissions?' Ethics, Policy & Environment 14(1), pp. 31-33. Scanlon, T. M. (1988) 'The Significance of Choice', in McMurrin and Walzer (eds) The Tanner Lectures on Human Values: VIII. University of Utah Press; Cambridge University Press, pp. 149-216. Scanlon, T. M. (1998) What We Owe to Each Other. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 238 Scanlon, T. M. (2008) Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Schaffer, Jonathan (2003) Overdetermining Causes. Philosophical Studies 114, pp. 23-45. Schiebinger, Londa (2008) 'West Indian Abortifacients and the Making of Ignorance', in Proctor and Schiebinger (eds) Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance. Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp. 149-162. Schinkel, Anders (2011) Causal and Moral Responsibility of Individuals for (the Harmful Consequences of) Climate Change. Ethics, Policy & Environment 14(1), pp. 35-37. Schmid, Hans Bernhard (2009) Plural Action: Essays in Philosophy and Social Science. Contributions to Phenomenology Volume 58. Springer Science+Business Media. B.V., Dordrecht. Schwartz, David T. (2010) Consuming Choices: Ethics in a Global Consumer Age. The Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham. Schwenkenbecher, Anne (2013) Joint Duties and Global Moral Obligations. Ratio 26(3), pp. 310328. Schwenkenbecher, Anne (2014) Is there an obligation to reduce one's individual carbon footprint?. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 17(2), pp. 168-188. Seibokaite, Aiste (2015) 'Climate Change as a 'Hard' Case of Collective Responsibility', in Kissane and Volacu (eds) Modern Dilemmas: Understanding Collective Action in the 21st Century. ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart, pp. 117-142. Selwood, Dominic (2015) Dresden was a civilian town with no military significance. Why did we burn its people?, The Telegraph 13 February 2015. www.telegraph.co.uk/history/world-wartwo/11410633/Dresden-was-a-civilian-town-with-no-military-significance.-Why-did-we-burn-itspeople.html Sen, Amartya (1985) Commodities and Capabilities. North-Holland, Amsterdam. Sen, Amartya (1999) Development as Freedom. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Sen, Amartya (2007) 'Climate policy as human development', Special contribution in Watkins et al. (2007) Human Development Report 2007/2008. Fighting climate change: Human solidarity in a divided world. United Nations Development Programme. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke and New York, pp. 28-29. Shahar, Dan C. (2016) Treading Lightly on the Climate in a Problem-Ridden World. Ethics, Policy & Environment, 19(2), pp. 183-195. Shaw, Victoria F. (1996) The Cognitive Processes in Informal Reasoning. Thinking and Reasoning 2(1), pp. 51-80. Sher, George (2006) In Praise of Blame. Oxford University Press, Oxford Scholarship Online version, DOI: 10.1093/0195187423.001.0001 Shiffrin, Seana Valentine (2012) Harm and its moral significance. Legal Theory 18(3), pp. 357-398. Shue, Henry (1992) 'The Unavoidability of Justice', in Hurrell and Kingsbury (eds) The International Politics of the Environment: Actors, Interests, and Institutions. Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 373–397. Shue, Henry (1993) Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions. Law & Policy 15(1), pp. 39-60. Shue, Henry (1996) Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd Edition. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. Shue, Henry (2014) Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 239 Singer, Peter (2002) Global Ethics: One World: The Ethics of Globalization. Yale University Press, New Haven and London. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter (2005) 'It's Not My Fault: Global Warming and Individual Moral Obligations', in Gardiner, Caney, Jamieson, and Shue (eds) (2010) Climate Ethics: Essential Readings. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 332-346. Smiley, Marion (2011) 'Collective Responsibility', in Zalta (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2011/entries/collective-responsibility Smith, Angela M. (2013) 'Moral Blame and Moral Protest', in Coates, D. Justin and Tognazzini, Neal A. (eds) Blame: Its Nature and Norms. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 27-48. Smith, Holly (1983) Culpable Ignorance. The Philosophical Review 92(4), pp. 543-571. Smith, Holly (2016) 'Tracing Cases of Culpable Ignorance', in Peels (ed.): Perspectives on Ignorance from Moral and Social Philosophy. Routledge, London, pp. 95-119. Southwood, Nicholas (2016) Does "Ought" Imply "Feasible"?. Philosophy & Public Affairs 44(1), pp. 7-45. Spash, Clive (2010) The Brave New World of Carbon Trading. New Political Economy 15(2), pp. 169-195. Spiekermann, Kai (2014a) Buying Low, Flying High: Carbon Offsets and Partial Compliance. Political Studies 62, pp. 913–929. Spiekermann, Kai (2014b) Small Impacts and Imperceptible Effects: Causing Harm with Others. Midwest Studies In Philosophy 38, pp. 75-90. Stern, Nicholas (2007) The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Stoknes, Per Espen (2015) What We Think About When We Try Not To Think About Global Warming: Toward a New Psychology of Climate Action. Chelsea Green Publishing, White River Junction, VT. Strawson, Peter (1962) 'Freedom and Resentment', in Fischer and Ravizza (eds) (1993) Perspectives on Moral Responsibility. Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, pp. 45-66. Tavoni, Massimo; Shoibal Chakravarty; and Robert Socolow (2012) Safe vs. Fair: A Formidable Trade-off in Tackling Climate Change. Sustainability 2012, 4(2), pp. 210-226. Taylor, Frederick (2008) Death Toll Debate: How Many Died in the Bombing of Dresden?. Spiegel Online, 2 October 2008. www.spiegel.de/international/germany/death-toll-debate-how-many-diedin-the-bombing-of-dresden-a-581992.html The Onion (2013) New Report Finds Climate Change Caused By 7 Billion Key Individuals. The Onion 22 November 2013, Vol 49 Issue 48. www.theonion.com/article/new-report-finds-climatechange-caused-by-7-billio-34658 Thompson, Lonnie G. (2010) Climate Change: The Evidence and Our Options. The Behavior Analyst 33(2), pp. 153–170. Tognazzini, Neal and D. Justin Coates (2016) 'Blame', in Zalta (ed) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2016 Edition), plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/blame Tollefsen, Deborah Perron (2003) Participant Reactive Attitudes and Collective Responsibility. Philosophical Explorations 6(3), pp. 218-234. Tuana, Nancy (2008) 'Coming to Understand: Orgasm and the Epistemology of Ignorance', in Proctor and Schiebinger (eds) Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance. Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp. 108-145. 240 Tuomela, Raimo (2007) The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View. Oxford University Press, New York. Tuomela, Raimo and Pekka Mäkelä (2016) Group Agents and Their Responsibility. The Journal of Ethics 20(1), pp. 299-316. Tynkkynen, Oras (ed) (2016) Nordic Green to Scale: Nordic climate solutions can help other countries cut emissions. Nordic Council of Ministers 2016, Copenhagen. Available at media.sitra.fi/julkaisut/ Muut/Nordic_green_to_scale.pdf Union of Concerned Scientists (2007) Smoke, Mirrors & Hot Air: How ExxonMobil Uses Big Tobacco's Tactics to Manufacture Uncertainty on Climate Science. Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA. Available at www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/global_warming/ exxon_report.pdf United Nations (2008) Human Rights Council Resolution 7/23. Human rights and climate change. Retrieved from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_7_23.pdf Uusitalo, Susanne (2015) Addiction, recovery and moral agency: Philosophical considerations. The International Journal of Alcohol and Drug Research 4(1), pp. 85-89. Van de Poel, Ibo, Jessica Nihlén Fahlquist, Neelke Doorn, Sjoerd Zwart, and Lambèr Royakkers (2012) The Problem of Many Hands: Climate Change as an Example. Science and Engineering Ethics 18, pp. 49–67. Vanderheiden, Steve (2008) Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change. Oxford University Press, New York. Vanderheiden, Steve (2011) Globalizing Responsibility for Climate Change. Ethics & International Affairs 25(1), pp. 65-84. Vanderheiden, Steve (2016) The Obligation to Know: Information and the Burdens of Citizenship. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19(2), pp. 297-311. Velders, G. J. M., A. R. Ravishankara, M. K. Miller, M. J. Molina, J. Alcamo, J. S. Daniel, D. W. Fahey, S. A. Montzka, S. Reimann (2012) Preserving Montreal Protocol Climate Benefits by Limiting HFCs. Science 335(6071): pp. 922-923. Waddock, Sandra (2004) Parallel Universes: Companies, Academics, and the Progress of Corporate Citizenship. Business and Society Review, 109, pp. 5-42. Wallace, R. Jay (1996) Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Walsh, Adrian, Säde Hormio and Duncan Purves (eds) (2017) The Ethical Underpinnings of Climate Economics. Routledge Advances in Climate Change Research. Routledge, London. Wason, P. C. (1960) On the Failure to Eliminate Hypothesis in a Conceptual Task. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 12(3), pp. 129-140. Weber, Elke U. (2006) Experience-Based and Description-Based Perceptions of Long-Term Risk: Why Global Warming does not Scare us (Yet). Climatic Change 77(1-2), pp. 103-120. Weinberg Rivka M. (2002) Procreative Justice: A Contractualist Account. Public Affairs Quarterly 16(4), pp. 405-425. Weinberg, Rivka (2016) The Risk of a Lifetime: How, When, and Why Procreation May Be Permissible. Oxford University Press, New York. 241 Werhane, Patricia H. (1999) 'The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme', in Donaldson, Thomas; Werhane, Patricia H. & Cording, Margaret (eds) (2002): Ethical Issues in Business: A Philosophical Approach (7th Edition). Pearson Education, New Jersey, 83-97. Werhane, Patricia H. (2008) 'Corporate Social Responsibility, Corporate Moral Responsibility, and Systems Thinking: Is There a Difference and the Difference it Makes', in Flynn (Ed) Leadership and Business Ethics (Issues in Business Ethics Volume 25) (pp. 269–289). Springer Science+Business Media B.V., Dordrecht. Whyte, Kyle Powys (2017) 'Is it Colonial Déjà Vu? Indigenous Peoples and Climate Injustice', in Adamson and Davis (eds) Humanities for the Environment: Integrating knowledge, forging new constellations of practice. Routledge Environmental Humanities. Routledge: earthscan, London and New York, pp. 88-104. Williams, Bernard (1981) Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973―1980. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Williams, Bernard (1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Fontana Paperbacks and William Collins, London. Williams, Bernard (1993) Shame and Necessity. University of California Press, Berkeley; Los Angeles; London. Wolgast, Elizabeth (1992) Ethics of an Artificial Person: Lost Responsibility in Professions and Organizations. Stanford University Press, Stanford. Woodward, James (1986) The Non-Identity Problem. Ethics 96(4), pp. 804-831. World Bank (2012) Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided. World Bank, Washington DC. Available at documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/865571468149107611/Turndown-the-heat-why-a-4-C-warmer-world-must-be-avoided Wringe, Bill (2010) GLOBAL OBLIGATIONS AND THE AGENCY OBJECTION. Ratio (new series) 23(2), pp. 217-231. Wringe, Bill (2014) From Global Collective Obligations to Institutional Obligations. Midwest Studies In Philosophy 38, pp. 171-186. Wringe, Bill (2016) Collective Obligations: Their Existence, Their Explanatory Power, and Their Supervenience on the Obligations of Individuals. European Journal of Philosophy 24(2), pp. 472–497. WWF (2016) Living Planet Report 2016: Risk and resilience in a new era. WWF International, Gland, Switzerland. Yaffe, Gideon (2000) Review of John Fischer and Mark Ravizza's Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. Erkenntnis 53(3), pp. 429–434. Young, Iris Marion (2011) Responsibility for Justice. Oxford University Press, New York. Zimmerman, Michael J. (2008) Living with Uncertainty: The Moral Significance of Ignorance. Cambridge University Press, New York. Zimmerman, Michael J. (2013) Duty and Obligation. The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Blackwell Publishing Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee

History of Science Society and University of Chicago Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Isis. http://www.jstor.org History of Science Society University of Chicago Press The Sensory Core and the Medieval Foundations of Early Modern Perceptual Theory Author(s): Gary C. Hatfield and William Epstein Source: Isis, Vol. 70, No. 3 (Sep., 1979), pp. 363-384 Published by: on behalf of University of Chicago Press History of Science Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/231374 Accessed: 11-10-2015 17:28 UTC REFERENCES Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article: http://www.jstor.org/stable/231374?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Sensoty Core and the Medleval Foundations of Early Modern Perceptual Theory By Gary C. Hatfield* and William Epstein** N THE EIGHTEENTH and nineteenth centuries the majority of theories of visual perception were built upon the view that during the process of vision there occur two conscious states with quite different phenomenal properties. The first state is a mental representation of the two-dimensional retinal image. The second is our experience of the "visual world" of objects distributed in depth. According to the then commonly accepted theory, the mental correlate of the retinal image is the truly immediate component of perception, and it provides the raw material from which the mind generates the three-dimensional visual world. Yet this retinal correlate the "sensory core" of the perceptual process-typically goes unnoticed, and the percipient takes his experience of the three-dimensional visual world to be direct and unmediated.2 Although it may seem odd that an unnoticed state of consciousness should be viewed as the psychologically fundamental component of the visual process, that which we have labelled the "sensory core" has played a central role in visual theory since Berkeley drew his celebrated distinction between the immediate *Department of the History of Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, 53706. **Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, 53706. We wish to express gratitude to David C. Lindberg for helpful suggestions and critical comments on various drafts. This work was supported by a predoctoral fellowship from the National Science Foundation to the first author and by research grants 5R01 MH 26703 and lROI MH 31594 from the National Institute of Mental Health to the second author. 'We have chosen to use the term "sensory core" to refer to a conscious state with the phenomenal properties of the retinal image, without arousing unwanted connotations about its psychological status (as, say, a form of experience produced by a special attitude) and without implying anything further about its epistemological status (as, say, an incorrigible "given"). Our "sensory core" shares the phenomenal properties of James Gibson's "visual field" (The Perception of the Visual World, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950, Ch. 3). Our usage of the term "sensory core" is parallel to E. G. Boring's "core" of perception ("The Perception of Objects," in Herschel W. Leibowitz, Visual Perception, New York: Macmillan, 1965, pp. 67-85, on pp. 69-70), a term which he derived from E. B. Titchener. Our usage does not correspond to Roderick Firth's (pp. 216-219 of "Sense-data and the Percept Theory," in R. Swartz, ed., Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing, Garden City: Doubleday, 1965, pp. 204-270), but our "sensory core" shares the phenomenal properties of the "sense-data" he attributes to Locke and Berkeley (pp. 215-216). 2The 18th-century philosopher Thomas Reid summed up this position well in his discussion of "visible appearances" (his name for the sensory core). After remarking that these appearances "are never made the object of reflection, though almost every moment presented to the mind," he explained that "the mind has acquired a confirmed and inveterate habit of inattention to them; for they no sooner appear, than quick as lightning the thing signified [a solid object] succeeds, and engrosses all our regard. They have no name in language; and, although we are conscious of them when they pass through the mind, yet their passage is so quick and so familiar, that it is absolutely unheeded; nor do they leave any footsteps of themselves, either in the memory or imagination"; Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind (4th ed.; Edinburgh, 1785), Ch. 6, Sec. 3, in his Works, 2 vols., ed. William Hamilton (Edinburgh, 1863), Vol. I, p. 135. Reid's views were not anomalous; Nicholas Pastore, Selective History of Theories of Visual Perception (New York/ London: Oxford University Press, 1971), esp. Chs. 1-10, has shown that the concept of a mental representation of the retinal image was a central theme in 18thand 19th-century perceptual theory. ISIS, 1979, 70 (No. 253) 363 This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 364 GARY C. HATFIELD AND WILLIAM EPSTEIN and mediate objects of vision. This paper will explore the theoretical context within which the notion of a sensory core developed. Historically, the motivation for assigning the sensory core a content distinct from the visual world has come from geometrical optics. Unless it were believed that the spatial properties of objects as represented in the sense organ (say, by the retinal image) are different from the spatial properties of objects themselves, there would be no reason to question that perception of the visual world is simply a matter of directly apprehending the optical stimulation available at the retina. Consider the perception of a circle oblique to the line of sight. The circle projects an ellipse on the retina, yet a slanted circle is manifest in the visual world; the sensory core, in representing the retinal projection, thereby differs from the phenomenally direct apprehension of the circle. The postulation, on optical grounds, of a difference between the spatial attributes of objects themselves and the representation of those attributes in the stimulus pattern is logically anterior to the concept of sensory core, for without the supposition of such a difference, mere reception of the stimulus (which would now be assumed to share the spatial attributes of the seen object) could be viewed as adequate for perception of the spatially elaborated visual world. However, adherence to this optical distinction (between an object and its retinal projection) is not sufficient motivation for the postulation of two phenomenally distinct conscious states (the sensory core and the visual world). For one thing, it might be maintained that the phenomenal character of everyday experience in fact corresponds to the spatial features of the retinal projection; this would amount to denial, on phenomenological grounds, that there is a visual world distinct from the sensory core. Or some other kind of two-stage theory might be maintained, for instance, that the stimulus representation (the retinal projection) never enters consciousness, but, say, is processed into the visual world through physiological mechanisms.3 Indeed, a survey of the history of the psychology of vision would reveal that theories of vision in which a sensory core is postulated are but one species of two-stage theories of vision, and that an initial stage in which spatial properties of objects are represented as they are projected upon the retina may be postulated without it being supposed that this initial stage is consciously accessible. In any event, it can be seen that a second precondition of the distinction between the sensory core and visual world is the conjunction of the following two beliefs: (1) that a projective representation enters consciousness, and (2) that nevertheless we typically do apprehend (in a phenomenally direct manner) the objective spatial properties of objects.4 Our paper will focus upon medieval and seventeenth-century theories of vision, culminating in the work of Berkeley. Thus, even though the concept of sensory core derives its historical significance from its widespread employment during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the historical situation has dictated that we focus upon an earlier period, since the concept whose development we wish to understand has its foundations in an optical tradition stretching back to Greek antiquity and including both Arabic and medieval Latin components. Our investigations have led us to believe that the development of this concept resulted from alteration within, 3These "physiological mechanisms" are to be understood as noncognitive; another possibility, one that we shall invoke below, is that the projective pattern is represented and processed cognitively, but that these cognitive operations are not even in principle available to consciousness. 4The importance of these two notions in 18thand 19th-century visual theory is evident from Pastore, Selective History, pp. 11-13 and 178-181. This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN PERCEPTUAL THEORY 365 rather than the radical overthrow of, the psychology of vision as it had come to be conceived in this optical tradition. If our interpretation is correct, it was not a change in the theory of the psychology of vision that engendered the idea of a sensory core, but rather the introduction of the theory into a new metaphysical context. ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL OPTICS AND THEORY OF SPATIAL VISION The discovery that the three-dimensional attributes of objects are not represented in the sense organ in a direct or simple manner was not trivial. In several types of ancient visual theory, no difference was postulated between the spatial properties of objects and those of the optical stimulus, because it was believed that the stimulus to vision shares the attributes of the seen object. According to the extramissionist position, vision proceeds from the eye to the object, and the properties of the object are known by direct contact. Galen and some of the Stoics shared the view that something is extramitted from the eye into the air, transforming the air into an instrument of sensation (standing in relation to the eye as a nerve to the brain) and thereby allowing for direct apprehension of the object's spatial properties. For intromissionist theories, something proceeds from object to eye and represents the object to the sensitive soul. The eidolon of the ancient atomists, a film of atoms emitted from the surface of the object, was conceived to convey a three-dimensional representation of that surface directly to the sense organ and through the optic nerve to the soul.5 According to the theories considered so far, whether the eye reaches out to the object itself, or something comes to the eye and stands for the object, the spatial attributes of the thing that is sensed are identical to those of the object.6 The ancient writers just considered were concerned either with explaining the physical process of perception (perhaps in the service of epistemology) or with providing a description of the optical process for medical purposes. There was a third tradition in antiquity, in which geometry was employed in the analysis of vision.7 This tradition, whose most prominent members were Euclid and Ptolemy, provided a geometrical analysis of the field of vision in terms of a visual pyramid formed by rays extramitted from the eye to points on seen objects. According to this analysis, information about the viewer-relative situation of objects with respect to the horizontal and vertical dimensions is provided by the ordering of the rays within the visual pyramid to the right or left of one another and above or below one another. Information about distance is provided by the length of each ray from the eye to the object. In other words, to each of the three dimensions of Euclidean space there 5 For a summary of the theories mentioned in this paragraph, as well as other ancient theories, see David C. Lindberg, Theories of Vision from al-Kindi to Kepler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 2-11, and the bibliographical references mentioned there. 6The idea that the eye receives three-dimensional copies of objects has its attractions, and as late as 1823 C. J. Lehot, in his Nouvelle theorie de la vision (Paris, 1823), put forth the theory that "the points of the luminous cones which penetrate the eye form, in the vitreous humor, at a certain distance from the retina, images in three-dimensions, and vision is effected by the perception of these images," the vitreous humor being the sensitive portion of the eye (Pt. I, pp. 42-43). Conversely, the idea that a mere image might be sufficient for the apprehension of the three-dimensional world has obvious difficulties, and in antiquity the equivocality of images for size and distance was used as an argument against the view that the proper object of vision is an image: Theophrastus, On the Senses, trans. George M. Stratton, in Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psychology before Aristotle (New York: Macmillan; London: Allen & Unwin, 1917), pp. 97-99 (the image in question was the pupillary image). 70n the division of ancient optical thought into these three traditions, see Lindberg, Al-Kindi to Kepler, p. 1. This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 366 GARY C. HATFIELD AND WILLIAM EPSTEIN corresponds a dimension of the visual pyramid.8 It follows that if a percipient is to receive determinate information concerning the spatial features of a seen object, all three of the dimensions of the visual pyramid must be apprehended. Thus the objective size of an object is inadequately represented by visual angle; distance, the third dimension in the visual pyramid, must also be taken into account.9 A similar point may be made about shape. The relative order within the visual pyramid of those rays that meet the edges of the object does not bear determinate information about the object's shape; information about the lengths of these rays is also required. 10 Here then is the sort of optical distinction between elements in the optical pattern (visual angle, projective shape) and properties of objects themselves (size, shape) that is logically prerequisite to the idea of the sensory core. The observation that information about the lengths of the rays is required for the discrimination of size and shape is not present in Euclid's Optics. It is, however, present in Ptolemy, who went beyond the geometry of the relationship between eye and object to concern himself with the actual processes-physical, physiological, and psychological-that occur during vision.1" Following Aristotle and others, Ptolemy held that light and color are the proper objects of vision and that the mediate objects of vision-size, shape, location, motion, and rest-are discriminated through the differentiation of light and color.12 Yet as we have seen, mere differentiation within the ordering of the rays forming the visual pyramid would not be sufficient for the apprehension of size and shape (and the same holds for location and motion). Ptolemy was not only aware of this geometrical fact, but he also realized that despite the inadequacy of, say, visual angle for size, observers typically do apprehend objective size.'3 Hence he recognized not only an optical distinction between objective size and visual angle, but also a psychological distinction between the discrimination of visual angle and the visual apprehension of size. Moreover, he gave a psychological explanation (albeit a very sketchy one) of the process by which distance and visual angle are conjoined in size perception. Lejeune has characterized Ptolemy 's view as follows: "The information furnished by visual angle is not accepted in its 'raw' form. Long practice has accustomed us to make an appropriate estimate of the effects of the distance and obliquity of an object upon its apparent size, and we manage to restore the true size of the object."'4 One might wonder what led Ptolemy to characterize the psychological processes involved here as an estimation (existimare), and whether the observer is conscious, or at least potentially conscious, of the elements (distance and visual angle) upon which 8Ptolemy, Optica II 26, ed. A. Lejeune, L'optique de Claude Ptolmme dans la version latine d'apres l'arabe de l'emir Eugene de Sicile (Louvain: Bibliotheque de l'Universite, 1956), p. 25. Euclid, L'optique et la catoptrique, trans. P. Ver Eecke (Paris: Albert Blanchard, 1959), pp. 1-2. Euclid does not consider the lengths of the visual rays, but only their ordering within the visual pyramid. Cf. A. Lejeune, Euclide et Ptolemee, deux stades de l'optique geometrique grecque (Louvain: Bibliotheque de l'Universite, 1948), pp. 89-95. 9Ptolemy, Optica II 63, ed. Lejeune, pp. 45-46; cf. Lejeune, Euclide et PtoMme'e, pp. 95-101. ?Iobid., 64-73, ed. Lejeune, pp. 46-50; cf. Lejeune, Euclide et Ptolem6e, pp. 103-107. "As far as can be determined, Euclid intended his work to present geometrical optics in a way that would be of use to scenographers. Lejeune says that the Optics of Euclid is "no more than a treatise on perspective. It systematically ignores every physical or psychological aspect of the problem of vision" (Euclide et Ptolemee, p. 172, cf. pp. 93-95). E.g., as far as vision was concerned, Euclid identified size with visual angle (L'optique, trans. Ver Eecke, Props. 2-8, pp. 2-7). Lejeune stresses Ptolemy's concern for the physiological and the psychological as a way in which optics had progressed since Euclid (Euclide et Ptolme'e, pp. 172-177). 12Aristotle, De anima 418a 9-30. Ptolemy, Optica II 6-11, ea. Lejeune, pp. 13-16. 13Ptolemy, Optica II 52-63, ed. Lejeune, pp. 38-46. 14Lejeune, Euclide et Ptoleme'e, pp. 96-97. This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN PERCEPTUAL THEORY 367 the corrective estimations operate. Lejeune has concluded that Ptolemy "did not consider this operation as a judgment fully conscious and distinct from sensation itself,"'15 a turn of phrase that brings to mind the unnoticed judgmental processes described by latter-day theorists. It would, however, be hasty to identify Ptolemy's theory with more recent theory in all its essentials. Between the time of Ptolemy and the seventeenth century, the most significant contribution to visual theory was that of the Islamic natural philosopher Alhazen (c. 965-1039). He made the intromissionist theory viable by applying ray geometry to the problem of how the eye receives a spatially coherent impression despite the fact that each part of the eye is bombarded by entities transmitted from every part of the visual field. In addition, Alhazen integrated his theory of geometrical and physiological optics into a detailed account of the physiology and psychology of vision, including a thorough treatment of spatial vision.16 Each of these achievements is germane to our inquiry. Alhazen's establishment of a geometrical basis for the intromission theory depended upon his argument that the arrangement of points in the field of vision is reproduced in the physiological process generated at the crystalline humor (which he, in the tradition of Galen and Ptolemy, considered to be the seat of vision) by incoming radiation. Essentially he adapted the visual pyramid of Euclid and Ptolemy to the intromissionist position. For Alhazen, the pyramid consists of those rays that fall at right angles to the surface of the crystalline humor. 17 As in the theory of Euclid and Ptolemy, the pyramid has its base on the objects in the field of view and its vertex in the eye; unlike the previous theory, the direction of the rays is from object to eye. A cross-section of the pyramid is physiologically received by the crystalline humor through an act characterized as a "sensing." Of the luminous rays received at the surface of the crystalline, only the luminosity and color of each ray-and not the arrangement of the rays or the spatial information conveyed by that arrangement-is sensed by the eye itself.18 This act of sensing occurs through an alteration produced by each luminous ray in the "visual spirit" present in the crystalline humor, whereby the visual spirit takes on theform of light and color. 19 The alteration suffered by each punctiform area is transmitted, by a "quasi-optical" process involving refraction and l5Ibid., p. 99. 16For an evaluation of Alhazen's role in the development of optical theory, see Lindberg, Al-Kindi to Kepler, Ch. 4. On the physiological and psychological aspects of Alhazen's theory, see A. I. Sabra, "Sensation and Inference in Alhazen's Theory of Visual Perception," in Studies in Perception, Peter Machamer and Robert Turnbull, eds. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1978), pp. 160-185. In constructing our summary of Alhazen's views we have used these authors as a guide to Alhazen's De aspectibus (esp. Bk. I, Secs. 16-19 and Bk. II, Secs. 1-41, ed. Friedrich Risner, Opticae thesaurus Alhazeni Arabis libri septem, Basel, 1572, pp. 8-12, 24-57; all subsequent references are to this edition, which has been reprinted, New York: Johnson Reprint, 1972). 17The perpendicular is selected from the sheath of rays converging on a single point of the crystalline by a weakening of all but the unrefracted (perpendicular) rays, or by a special receptivity of the crystalline to perpendicular rays (Lindberg, Al-Kindi to Kepler, pp. 75-78; Sabra, "Sensation and Inference in Alhazen ," pp. 165-166). 18Alhazen, De aspectibus, Bk. II, Sec. 6, pp. 26-27. Cf. H. Bauer, "Die Psychologie Alhazens," Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, 1911, 10 (5): 29-32, and Sabra, "Sensation and Inference in Alhazen," pp. 173-174. Alhazen thus adopted the traditional view that light and color are the proper objects of vision (Bk. II, Secs. 17-18, p. 35). 19Alhazen adopts an Aristotelian view of the reception process; Aristotle had maintained that the sense organ accepts the form (in this case color) of the sensible thing without the matter, thereby taking on the properties of the sensible thing (cf. Lindberg, Al-Kindi to Kepler, pp. 8-9 and 78-79). Incidentally, the term "visual spirit" refers to a substance that serves as the soul's agent in the eye; it is not a "spiritual" (ghostlike) substance (Alhazen attributes density to it), but neither is it the inert matter of Descartes' "animal spirits," since it is endowed with sentience. This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 368 GARY C. HATFIELD AND WILLIAM EPSTEIN rectilinear transmission, from the crystalline humor through the vitreous humor and down the optical medium residing in each of the optic nerves (which were believed to be hollow and filled with visual spirit).20 This process is described as the transmission of a coherent "form"-bearing point-for-point correspondence to the objects in the field of vision-from the surface of the crystalline through the eye and optic nerve. In the optic chiasma the separate transmissions from each eye join to form a single impression, and this unified punctiform representation of the field of vision is received by the ultimum sentiens, the faculty of sense that completes the act of vision.21 The ultimum sentiens avails itself of the spatial information present in the crosssection of the visual pyramid in order to apprehend the objects of vision other than light and color (Alhazen listed twenty such objects in all, including spatial properties such as size, shape, solidity, and motion).22 However, as the geometry dictates, the arrangement of points within the cross-section provides direct information about only two dimensions: the third dimension, depth or distance, is lacking.23 In fact, Alhazen embraced the intromissionist counterpart of Ptolemy's geometrical observation that elements of the visual pyramid such as projective shape are indeterminate for objective properties such as shape. He was aware that a circle oblique to the line of sight would produce an elliptical pattern at the surface of the crystalline, and that visual angle does not specify the objective size of an object (distance, too, must be taken into account). Furthermore, and of greater interest for our story, Alhazen saw that an account was needed of the phenomenological fact that we typically apprehend circles as circles, even though they are oblique to the line of sight, and that we typically are able to discriminate the sizes of objects, even though this discrimination requires taking distance into account.24 His viewpoint thus included the two notions which historically have been associated with the concept of sensory core, that spatial properties as received at the eye (e.g., an ellipse) differ from objective properties (e.g., a rotated circle), and that we nonetheless apprehend the latter. In essence, we may say that Alhazen realized that a mere understanding of the geometry of visual stimulation is not sufficient to explain the perceptual achievements of the human percipient: 20The transmission within each eye proceeds rectilinearly, with one refraction at the posterior edge of the crystalline; this refraction, which is toward the normal (and hence away from the optic axis), serves both to keep the rays from crossing (which would produce an inverted ordering) and to direct the rays toward the opening of the optic nerve (which was thought to be centered at the rear of the eye, along the axis of vision). Because of the special efficacy of the visual spirit, within the optic nerve the transmitted entity follows the path of the nerve without its ordering being affected. Lindberg, Al-Kindi to Kepler, pp. 69-85, provides a thorough treatment of the physiology of this process; cf. Sabra, "Sensation and Inference in Alhazen," pp. 166-168. Figure 1 (below) illustrates the path of transmission according to a follower of Alhazen. 21Alhazen, De aspectibus, Bk. II, Secs. 1-6, pp. 24-27. The reception of the forms of light and color by the opaque body of the ultimum sentiens in the optic chiasma occurs by an "illumination" and "coloring" of this body (Sec. 6, p. 27). 22Ibid., Sec. 15, p. 34. Additional objects of vision, or "intentiones visibiles," include number, similarity, and beauty. 23Ibid., Sec. 24, p. 39: "Remotio rei visae non comprehenditur per se." Especially telling is Alhazen's treatment of the perception of solidity (or corporeity), in which he says that vision immediately apprehends the longitude and latitude of bodies opposite the eye, but not the third dimension: "visus . .. comprehendet statim extensionem illius corporis secundum longitudem & latitudem, & non remanet nisi dimensio tertia" (Sec. 31, p. 47). Cf. Bauer, Die Psychologie Alhazens, pp. 55-56. 24Alhazen clearly states that any pair of diameters on a circle are seen as equal even when the circle is oblique to the line of sight (De aspectibus, Bk. II, Sec. 36, p. 51). With respect to size, he says "virtus distinctiva distinguet quantitatem rei visae, non considerabit angulum tantum, sed considerabit angulum & remotionem simul" (Sec. 38, p. 51; on the virtus distinctiva, see below). This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN PERCEPTUAL THEORY 369 psychological processes must also be invoked. While this realization was also implicit in Ptolemy, Alhazen went further in developing an account of these psychological processes. Since, on Alhazen's account, only a two-dimensional arrangement of luminous points is represented in the cross-section of the pyramid transmitted to the ultimum sentiens, the apprehension of objects in three dimensions must involve more than the mere passive reception of the stimulation carried by the optic nerves. The activity by which the ultimum sentiens goes beyond the stimulation it receives consists of "reasoning" and "distinguishing" (rationem and distinctionem); these judgmental activities are performed by the virtus distinctiva.25 Alhazen offered an extended treatment of the psychology of visual judgments, but it will suffice here to observe that in cases where the judgments are performed over and over again, the faculty of judgment need not go through the entire process of judging (by "iteration of arguments ") each time it is confronted with a particular set of sensory data; rather it comes to perform these judgments through recognition (cognitionem) of significant features, or signs (signa), that lead it to assign a particular set of properties to the objects seen. Judgment by recognition takes place so quickly that we do not perceive that we judge.26 It is in this way that distance, size, and shape are perceived. Distance is apprehended through a judgment of the number of regular-sized intervals composing the continuous ground space between the observer and the distal object, or, since the process occurs frequently, through a judgment by recognition.27 From the distance to an object together with visual angle, the size of the object can be apprehended, again through judgment by recognition.28 Similarly, apprehension of the distance to various points in the field of vision can be used to apprehend the solidity and shape of seen objects.29 Thus, in general, according to Alhazen the visual apprehension of the spatial properties of the visual world is made possible by an unnoticed process of judgment. The essentials of Alhazen's theory of vision are, in fundamental ways, parallel to those of the standard theory of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. First, pertaining to the effective stimulus for vision: while the two-dimensional array of light and color transmitted to the ultimum sentiens is not an optical image (such as the real image formed by a lens or the virtual image of mirror vision), the geometrical qualities it shares with the retinal image are striking (e.g., point-for-point correspondence with luminous points in the field of vision and ambivalence with respect to actual size). One might choose to characterize the physiology of vision according to Alhazen as the transmission of an "image" or "picture" of the objects in the field of vision through the optic nerve to the brain. Such a characterization would serve to emphasize that the immediate object of vision according to Alhazen shares the essential properties of what was taken to be the immediate object of vision by Kepler: 25Ibid., Sec. 10, pp. 30-31. 26Sabra, "Sensation and Inference in Alhazen," pp. 171-179, gives a thorough account of Alhazen's statements on perceptual judgment in general (De aspectibus, Bk. II, Secs. 10-12, pp. 30-32), but does not deal with particular cases such as distance, size, or shape. Our discussion of these cases is of course not exhaustive, and a thorough treatment of Alhazen's psychology of vision is much needed. 27Alhazen's discussion of the apprehension of distance is long and complex (involving a distinction between the apprehension of mere outness as opposed to location, Bk. II, Secs. 23-24, pp. 38-39); we have focused upon the apprehension of the amount of distance for moderate distances, in which case distance is apprehended "per cognitionem" (Sec. 25, pp. 39-42; Secs. 39-40, pp. 53-56). 28Ibid., Sec. 38, pp. 51-53. 29Ibid., Secs. 31, 36, pp. 47-48, 50-51. This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 370 GARY C. HATFIELD AND WILLIAM EPSTEIN an arrangement of points of light and color reproducing the two-dimensional arrangement of points in the field of vision.30 But it is with respect to his thoughts about the psychological processes that occur during spatial vision that Alhazen's theory exhibits the most striking resemblance to later theory: distance is not immediately perceived (i.e., is not perceived by sense alone) but is apprehended by means of a judgmental act; size is apprehended by means of a judgment that takes distance into account; a circle oblique to the line of sight is perceived to be a circle through a judgment concerning the distance to various parts of the circle. And so it is not surprising that Bauer, in his 1911 study of Alhazen's psychology, remarked that in the field of spatial perception Alhazen "touched upon a series of the most important psychological problems, and his explanations anticipate in a surprising manner thoughts that were again taken up only in the most recent development of psychology."31 Bauer drew particular attention to what he characterized as Alhazen's theory of "unconscious inference,"32 a term that immediately calls to mind Helmholtz's nineteenth-century version of the psychology of unnoticed judgments. Is it true then that all of the central elements of later psychology of vision were present in Alhazen (or perhaps even Ptolemy)? The one element not clearly present is the sensory core, where the referent of this term is taken to be a consciously accessible representation of the field of vision in two dimensions. The difficulty in deciding whether Alhazen (or Ptolemy)33 employed the concept of sensory core lies deeper than a simple failure of these authors to state clearly an opinion on the matter. To ask whether sensory stimulation is, at a particular point in the process of vision that begins with the reception of light at the eye and ends with an experience of the visual world, experienceable or not, is to ask a question that makes sense only within certain intellectual frameworks. Among many authors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to ask this question would have been to ask whether something was an idea, since ideas were the only legitimate objects of awareness. It is not clear what the medieval equivalent to this question would have been. This lack of clarity probably results from the fact that in the psychology of the Middle Ages (at least as manifested in the optical tradition) there was no clear distinction between the physiological and the mental. As Bauer has remarked, for Alhazen and other Arabic as well as Latin authors (who were following Aristotle in this regard), the mental was not limited to the conscious.34 Thus if we ask whether the "sensing" of light and color by the eye and the "judging" of the pattern of stimulation by the virtus distinctiva are physiological or mental events (where these terms are restricted to something close to their modern significations), the answer comes out as a confused "both," or perhaps "neither." They are like mental events insofar as they are described in the mentalistic language of sensing and judging.35 Yet 30Lindberg has especially emphasized the degree to which Kepler's optical work remained within an intellectual framework provided by Alhazen (Al-Kindi to Kepler, p. 86). Incidentally, a second feature of standard post-Keplerian theory is found in Alhazen: the independent transmission of points of stimulation from the receptive surface of the eye into the brain, which is a key feature of the so-called "constancy hypothesis" (on the importance of this hypothesis in the history of perceptual theory, see Pastore, Selective History, pp. 11-12 and passim). 31 Bauer, Die Psychologie Alhazens, p. 54. 32Ibid., pp. 56-57. 33See Lejeune, Euclide et Ptolemee, p. 99, for the ambiguities in Ptolemy on this point. 34Bauer, Die Psychologie Alhazens, p. 11. 35Alhazen remarks that the rational processes by which the act of vision is completed are of the same type as other rational processes, but that we are able to ascertain this only through a second reasoning process, which is a reasoning about the reasoning that occurs during vision (De aspectibus, Bk. II, Sec. 13, pp. 32-33). But Alhazen's view that the rational processes in vision are properly cognitive processes is, of This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN PERCEPTUAL THEORY 371 they are like physiological events in that they take place at early or middle stages in the chain of physio-psychological processes that proceed from the eye toward the central cavities of the brain. Our intuition that events characterized as mental (described in mentalistic language) should be accessible to consciousness is not fulfilled. One is led to believe that the attempt to apply the modern categories "physiological" and "mental" to medieval visual theory is misguided. In sum, the explanation of spatial vision provided by Alhazen (and, to a lesser extent, Ptolemy) contained the central features of the standard eighteenthand nineteenth-century explanation. Included in Alhazen's theory was an optical distinction between objective spatial properties and spatial properties as received at the sense organ, as well as a physio-psychological distinction between spatial properties as represented in the sensory processes transmitted from the eye to the brain and spatial properties as apprehended in experience. If, despite the parallels between his explanation of vision and that of later thinkers, Alhazen did not employ the concept of sensory core, the reason is to be found in his conception of mind, rather than in factors internal to his theory of vision. VISUAL THEORY AFTER ALHAZEN Alhazen's major work on vision was available in translation to the Latin West by the early thirteenth century; his theory and its derivatives dominated optical science until the time of Kepler. A rapid survey of the relevant texts has suggested that with respect to the psychology of vision, Alhazen's chief followers in the West-Bacon, Pecham, and Witelo-were in fundamental agreement with the master: "no visible intention except light and color is perceived by sense alone";36 distance from the observer to the visual object "is not perceived by sight, but is determined by reasoning ";37 indeed, all of the objects of vision except light and color "are apprehended not by sense alone but by the cooperation of argumentation and the discriminative faculty, intermingled almost imperceptibly."38 As is illustrated by Figure 1, taken from Witelo but representative of Pecham and Bacon (and Alhazen as well), there was similar agreement on matters of ray geometry and the physiological process of transmission: vision takes place by a pyramid of rays reaching the eye (those rays received perpendicularly at the surface of the crystalline, which are represented in the diagram by the lines proceeding from gbc, the visual object, to each eye); a crosssection of this pyramid, the points of which stand in a one-to-one correspondence to points in the field of vision, is directed into the optic nerve by refraction of the rays travelling through the eye; and the impressions received by the two eyes are reduced to unity by being brought together in the nervous system (at kad).39 course, not evidence that he believed the premises of those operations (the transmitted "form") were ever phenomenally accessible. 36John Pecham, John Pecham and the Science of Optics: Perspectiva communis, ed. and trans. David C. Lindberg (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1970), Bk. I, Sec. 61, p. 139. 37Ibid., Bk. I, Sec. 63, p. 141; cf. Roger Bacon, Opus majus, Bk. V, Pt. 2, Dist. 3, Ch. 3, trans. Robert Burke (N.Y.: Russell and Russell, 1962), p. 523, and Witelo, Perspectiva, Bk. IV, Sec. 9 (ed. Risner, Opticae thesaurus), p. 121. 38Pecham, Perspectiva communis, Bk. I, Sec. 56, p. 137; cf. Bacon, Opus majus, Bk. V, Sec. I, Dist. 10, Ch. 3, and Witelo, Perspectiva, Bk. III, Secs. 60 and 63, pp. 111-113. 39Bacon, Opus majus, Bk. V, Pt. 1, Dists. 5 and 6, Ch. 2, pp. 449-453, 456-458; Pecham, Perspectiva communis, Bk. I, Secs. 32-38, pp. 117-123; Witelo, Perspectiva, Bk. III, Secs. 17-20, 37, pp. 92-94, 102-103. The diagram is from Witelo, ibid., p. 103, where it is introduced in a discussion of binocular single vision. It is clear from the text on p. 102 that lines gu and cx should be directed toward the center of This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 372 GARY C. HATFIELD AND WILLIAM EPSTEIN Remarkable as it may seem, there was nearly complete agreement on the principles underlying Alhazen's theory of vision among post-Keplerian visual theorists, including Kepler himself. Of special interest to us is the continuation of Alhazen's treatment . c of the psychology of vision, which we will examine presently. But the principles of Alhazen's optical analysis were also continued . This is not to say that Kepler and his followers believed the crystalline humor to be the seat of vision-all of the writers we will discuss accepted Kepler's view that vision takes place by means of the retinal image. It is rather that in terms of the / /f s f & analysis of the effective stimulus for vision, it makes little difference if the seat of one- \ \i to-one correspondence is moved from the \ _ nt crystalline humor to the retina. Assuredly, u the retinal image is inverted and is a true optical image, but these facts do not change the principle of one-to-one correspondence. Viewed in terms of the overall process of vision, the Keplerian lens system simply functions to establish a one-to-one correspondence in a fashion different from Alhazen 's selective reception of rays perpen- / dicular to the crystalline.40 Moreover, the essential features of Euclid's and Ptolemy's geometrical analysis of the field of vision were applicable in post-Keplerian / dioptrics. Particularly, the relationship between objective size and shape and optically received size and shape remained the same: / the static retinal projection is indeterminate for the objective properties. g C The discovery of the retinal image did _ necessitate a change in the conception of the physiological transmission of stimulaFigure 1. The visual system according to tion from the eye to the brain. The notion Witelo. The visual object is represented by noi gbc; the optic nerves are represented that the stimulus to vision is an image schematically by hrf-kad and Ise-kad, and formed across the posterior hemisphere of kad is the ultimum sentiens. the eyeball is incompatible with the "quasi-optical" transmission of a cross-section of the visual pyramid directly into and through the optic nerve. Yet, as we shall see, the the eye o, and gy and cz should be directed toward the center of the eyep, in which case the lines would be received perpendicular to the surfaces unx and yqz. This inaccuracy also occurs in a 14th-century manuscript version of the drawing, reproduced in A. C. Crombie, "The Mechanistic Hypothesis and the Scientific Study of Vision: Some Optical Ideas as a Background to the Invention of the Microscope," in Historical Aspects of Microscopy, S. Bradbury and G. L'E. Turner, eds. (Cambridge: Royal Microscopical Society, 1967), pp. 3-112, Fig. 10. 40Kepler and later writers explicitly treated the lens system as a means of establishing a one-to-one This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN PERCEPTUAL THEORY 373 arrangements proposed by Kepler and his successors to effect his transmission did not deviate from the spirit of Alhazen's theory. Despite major alterations in the conception of the transmission process itself, the same characterization of postocular transmission as we have applied to Alhazen-the transmission of a "picture" or "image" through the optic nerve-remained applicable for at least two centuries after Kepler.41 Two views of post-retinal transmission are discernible in the seventeenth century. The first stems from Kepler himself. What Kepler did was to provide an interpretation of the transmission process that was consistent with his new understanding of the eye's structure and function but that remained within the ontological framework of the traditional physiology of nervous transmission. In both Kepler's account and the accounts of Alhazen and others, the key role in the reception of light and color and the transmission of the received impressions to the seat of visual judgment is played by "visual spirit."42 Whereas for Alhazen the transmission could be seen as a direct extension of the received rays of light into and through the optic nerve, to Kepler it was clear that anything resembling an optical transmission had to end at the opaque surface of the retina. Kepler denied that visual spirit was an "optical body," but retained the view that the image or picture received at the eye is transmitted by means of the visual spirit to the seat of visual judgment, or, as he termed it (in Aristotelian fashion), the "common sense."43 He described the transmitted entity as an "immaterial image" (spiciem immateriatam).44 Both the affection (passio) of the visual spirit by light and color and the transmission of the immaterial image were considered by Kepler to be "occult" or "obscure" processes, belonging to "the realm of the wonderful ."45 The image itself was thought to be produced by and to correspond to the retinal image, and so to bear a point-for-point correspondence with the objects before the eye. Vision was pretty much equated with the immaterial image. Insofar as this was the case, there was no room in Kepler's views for the concept of a sensory core distinct from the visual world, since there was no basis for the distinction itself. The correspondence between points in the field of vision and points on the surface of the retina: Kepler, Ad vitellionem paralipomena (1604), in his Gesammelte Werke (Munich: Beck, 1939), Vol. II, pp. 153-156, trans. A. C. Crombie, in Melanges Alexandre Koyre (Paris: Hermann, 1964), Vol. I, pp. 150-157; Descartes, Dioptrique, in Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, eds., Oeuvres de Descartes (Paris: Vrin, 1969-1975) (this edition of Descartes' works will be referred to as AT), Vol. VI, p. 109, trans. P. Olscamp, in Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), pp. 91-95. 41Robert Smith's A Compleat System of Opticks (London, 1738) provides a brief but representative statement of the 18th-century view of post-retinal physiology: speaking of the "pictures" painted upon the retina, Smith says "these pictures propagated by motion along the fibres of the optick nerves into the brain are the cause of vision" (p. 27). 42Kepler, Ad vitellionem, Werke, Vol. II, p. 152, trans. Crombie, pp. 148-150; Dioptrice (1611, reprint, Cambridge: Heffner, 1962), Prop. 61, pp. 23-25, trans. F. Plehn, Dioptrik, Ostwald's Klassiker der exakten Wissenschaften, No. 144 (Leipzig, 1904), pp. 28-30. Kepler shared the earlier view (n. 19 above) that visual spirit is the agent of the soul. 43Kepler's denial that visual spirit is an optical body came in Ad vitellionem, Werke, Vol. II, p. 152, trans. Crombie, pp. 148-149, a work in which he did not take a firm stand on post-retinal transmission (cf. Lindberg, Al-Kindi to Kepler, pp. 203-204); in the later Dioptrice he clearly stated that an image is transmitted to the common sense, but he equivocated on the role of the optic nerve in this transmission, Prop. 61, pp. 23-24, trans. Plehn, pp. 29-30. 44Dioptrice, p. 24, trans. Plehn, p. 29. 45Ibid., and Ad vitellionem, Werke, Vol. II, pp. 152-153, trans. Crombie, pp. 148, 150. While Kepler maintained that the process of transmission is beyond the scope of the laws of optics, he countered that since "optics" derives its name from "vision," it is "wrong to exclude it [the transmission process] from the science of Optics simply because, in the present limited state of our science, it cannot be accommodated in Optics" (Werke, Vol. II, p. 152, Crombie, p. 148). This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 374 GARY C. HATFIELD AND WILLIAM EPSTEIN Figure 2. The visual system according to Descartes. visual world was equated with a mental correlate of the retinal image.46 The second view of post-retinal physiology discernible in the seventeenth century stems from Descartes. It differs from the first view and from the position of Alhazen and his Latin followers, not in its conception of the psychologically effective features of the transmitted stimulus, but in the ontology of the physiological process. Descartes ' physiological ideas often involve "adaptive modifications" of earlier ideas, and his views on the physiology of vision are no exception.47 Indeed, his treatment of post-retinal physiology is essentially a recasting of the view shared by Alhazen and others into his new ontology, with its strict division between mechanistically conceived physiological processes in the nervous system and sensations in the soul. For the quasi-optical transmission of the forms of light and color through the efficacy of the visual spirit, or the transmission of an immaterial image through the special power of a mysterious spiritual agent, Descartes substituted the mechanical transmission of a "material image" to the seat of visual judgment. As illustrated in Figure 2, the transmission from the two eyes results in the formation, on the surface of the pineal gland (H), of a single "image" or "picture" composed of a pattern of motions (abc) that bear a one-to-one correspondence to the motions comprising the retinal image (1-3-5), and hence to points on the visible object (ABC).48 Comparison of Figure 2 with Figure 1 reveals that although there are differences-primarily with respect to the anatomical destination of the transmitted entity (in the pineal gland as opposed to the optic chiasma) and the operations of the eye upon incoming rays of 46Ad vitellionem, Werke, Vol. II, p. 153, trans. Crombie, p. 150. Cf. E. G. Boring, Sensation and Perception in the History of Experimental Psychology (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1942), p. 223. 470n Descartes' "adaptive modifications" see Thomas S. Hall's commentary to his translation of Descartes' Treatise of Man (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972), nn. 85 and 40, and pp. xxxi-xxxlll. 48Descartes describes the transmission process in the Treatise of Man, trans. Hall, pp. 83-86; cf. Dioptrique, AT, Vol. VI, p. 137, trans. Olscamp, p. 100. The drawing is from the posthumous French edition of Descartes' L'homme (Paris, 1664, reprint in Hall), p. 71; it was not done under the supervision of Descartes but was produced by La Forge at the time of the posthumous edition, under contract from the editor, Clerselier (Hall, p. xxxv). There is no mention in the text of the "reinversion" of the pineal image as suggested by the drawing; cf. N. Pastore and H. Klibbe, "The Orientation of the Cerebral Image in Descartes' Theory of Visual Perception," Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 1969, 5:385-389. This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN PERCEPTUAL THEORY 375 light (formation of a retinal image through the refractive power of the lens, versus the singling out of perpendicular rays)-the principle underlying the two views of postocular transmission is the same: the nervous system transmits the ordered array of stimulation received at the two eyes to the brain and combines the two transmitted impressions into one. Yet for Descartes the transmitted entity, just as the light proceeding from objects to the eye, is in the material realm; it has nothing of the character of sensation. The mind senses, rather than the eye.49 At the pineal gland body and mind are "united," so that motions in the material nervous system produce sensations in the mind. These sensations serve for the apprehension of the qualities known by vision. In his Dioptrique (1637) Descartes listed six principal qualities: light and color, which alone are proper to vision, and four spatial qualities, location, distance, size, and shape.50 Descartes made clear that these qualities are not apprehended by direct inspection of the pineal image, as if we had other eyes in our brain with which to gaze at this physiological "picture." The pineal image causes sensations only insofar as it acts upon the mind; the movements that constitute this picture, "acting immediately on our mind inasmuch as it is united to our body, are so established by Nature to make it have certain sensations."'51 He explained the sensing of light and color according to the principle of psychophysical correspondence: the nature of our mind is such that the "force" and "character" of the movements that affect the soul in the brain cause us to have sensations of light and color.52 Similarly, through an "institution of Nature," sensations of location and distance are produced directly in the soul by the arrangement and character of motions in the brain.53 In the case of the perception of size and shape, Descartes did not rely entirely upon the principle of psychophysical correspondence, but rather invoked psychological processes of the sort described by Alhazen and his followers. He was aware that size and shape are not directly determined by visual angle and retinally projected shape. Rather, we must estimate or judge them: the size of objects "is estimated according to the knowledge, or the opinion, that we have of their distance, compared with the size 49Descartes, Dioptrique, AT, Vol. VI, pp. 117-121, Olscamp, p. 87. 5OIbid., p. 138, Olscamp, p. 101. 51Ibid. In applying the term "causes" to the relationship between the pineal image and the mind we do not mean to preclude the possibility of an occasionalistic interpretation of this relationship; indeed, there is strong evidence that Descartes was implicitly committed to an occasionalist metaphysics for both mindbody and exclusively material interations, on which see Gary C. Hatfield, "Force (God) in Descartes' Physics," forthcoming in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, esp. n. 87, and the literature mentioned there. 52Ibid. Descartes points out that in order for us to have sensations, there need be no resemblance between the physiological event (motions in the brain) and the mental event (the sensation of light and color). He thus rejected the traditional physiology, derived from Aristotle, in which the form of the light and color is received by the visual spirit through a process which is an illumination and a coloring (see n. 21 above). In place of this view in which the sensitive soul takes on (comes to "resemble") the properties of the object, Descartes substituted his "no resemblance" theory of sensory physiology and psychophysical correspondence, on which see Willem van Hoorn, As Images Unwind: Ancient and Modern Theories of Visual Perception (Amsterdam: University Press, 1972), pp. 164-167, and Pastore, Selective History, p. 21. 53Descartes, Dioptrique, AT, Vol. VI, pp. 134-137, Olscamp, pp. 104-105; Treatise of Man, trans. Hall, pp. 94-100. Position is apprehended because the motions in the brain are uniquely determined with respect to both the position of the eyes within the head and the position of a luminous point upon the retina (by means of the latter we know that the object is situated at some point along the line of sight drawn from that retinal location). Furthermore, distance can be known through the effect upon the mind of brain states that mediate the accommodation and convergence of the eyes (in the case of accommodation, Descartes built upon the one important difference between preand post-Keplerian dioptrics, the necessity to provide an accommodative mechanism for changing the focal length of the eye; the potential use of convergence as a gauge of distance could, in principle, have been a part of pre-Keplerian psychology of vision). This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 376 GARY C. HATFIELD AND WILLIAM EPSTEIN of the image they imprint in the fund of the eye," and "shape is judged by the knowledge, or opinion, that we have of the position of various parts of the objects, and not by the resemblance of the pictures in the eye; for these pictures usually contain only ovals and diamond shapes, yet they cause us to see circles and squares."'54 In the Dioptrique Descartes did not provide a thorough analysis of these estimations and judgments. In particular, he did not reveal how the mind is able to base its judgments of the size of objects upon "the size of the image they imprint in the fund of the eye," even though the mind has no direct access to the retinal image. An answer that suggests itself on principle is that when Descartes spoke of the mind's judgments being based upon retinally projected size, he meant retinally projected size as it is represented in a mental correlate of the pineal image, since events at the eye affect the mind only by virtue of the intervening nervous transmission to the pineal gland, and then only insofar as the pineal events themselves cause the mind to have sensations. Descartes' view that only a mental correlate of the pineal image is truly sensed found clear expression in a passage from the Objections and Replies (1641). In this passage Descartes distinguished among three grades of sense activity: (1) "the immediate affection of the bodily organ by external objects," which in the case of vision includes retinal stimulation and transmission to the surface of the pineal; (2) "the immediate mental result, due to the mind's union with the corporeal organ affected" (i.e., the pineal); and (3) "all those judgments which, on the occasion of motions occurring in the corporeal organ, we have from our earliest years been accustomed to pass about things external to US."55 Using the example of the perception of a staff, he clarified the relationship among the three grades: But from this [the first grade of sensation] the second grade of sensation results; and that merely extends to the perception of the colour or light reflected from the stick, and is due to the fact that the mind is so intimately conjoined with the brain as to be affected by the motions arising in it. Nothing more than this should be assigned to sense, if we wish to distinguish it accurately from the intellect. For though my judgment that there is a staff situated without me, which judgment results from the sensation of colour by which I am affected, and likewise my reasoning from the extension of that colour, its boundaries, and its position relatively to the parts of my brain, to the size, the shape, and the distance of the said staff, are vulgarly assigned to sense, and are consequently here referred to the third grade of sensation, they clearly depend upon the understanding alone.56 The first grade of "sensation" comprises only the motions in the nervous system and so is not a true mental sensing. The second grade-the immediate mental result of nervous motion-is what properly belongs to sense. The mind cannot base its judgment of size directly upon the relative size of the retinal image (since this image is part of the first grade of sense), but rather judges from the extension and boundaries of the color patch present in sensation. The distinction between the first and second grades of sense spans the boundary between body and mind. The distinction between the second and third grades is, interestingly, a distinction between types of mental events that occur during vision. The first term of the distinction-the second grade-is, however, unfamiliar to the ordinary observer, who takes the judgments of the third grade to be primary. Even 54Descartes, Dioptrique, AT, Vol. VI, pp. 140-141, Olscamp, p. 107. "5Descartes, Objections and Replies, AT, Vol. VII, pp. 436-437, trans. E. Haldane and G. Ross, Philosophical Works of Descartes (N.Y.: Dover, 1955) (referred to hereafter as HR), Vol. II, p. 251. 56AT, Vol. VII, pp. 437-438, HR, Vol. II, p. 252. This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN PERCEPTUAL THEORY 377 though these judgments "depend upon the understanding alone" and therefore fall outside the category of sense, they are "vulgarly" considered to be sensations. This confusionresults from the fact that phenomenally speaking we experience objects as being of a particular size and at a certain distance and are not aware that our ostensibly direct apprehension of objective size and distance is actually mediated by the second grade of sense and the judgments performed upon it. Descartes says that the reason we confusedly assign these judgments to sense "is just that in these matters custom makes us judge so quickly, or rather we recall the judgments previously made about similar things; and thus we fail to distinguish the difference between these operations and a simple sense perception."57 Our experience of objects in space is determined by the outcome of judgmental processes. In spite of, or because of, our experiencing the outcome, we fail to notice the judgmental process itself, presumably including that upon which the judgment is based (spatial properties as represented in the second grade of sense). Thus, in the tradition of Alhazen and his followers, Descartes held that the judgments (or recollections of previous judgments) underlying spatial vision occur so quickly that we fail to notice that we in fact do judge. There is a crucial difference between Descartes' treatment of these unnoticed perceptual judgments and that of previous writers. We have seen that for Alhazen it was difficult to decide-and most likely not appropriate to ask-whether the sensory impressions upon which judgments are made are in principle available to consciousness . With Descartes there is no doubt. The second grade of sensation is an event in the soul, an idea, and by virtue of this fact alone must be available to consciousness. Descartes identified the mental with the conscious; he contended that we can have no ideas of which we are not aware.58 If percipients typically are not aware of the second grade of sensation, this fact is to be explained away by recourse to the habitual and rapid nature of the judgments. But the second grade remains in principle experienceable . It should now be apparent that Descartes' distinction between the second and third grades of sense corresponds to the distinction between the sensory core and the visual world. The second grade of sensation is a mental representation of the retinal image; the third grade is the ostensibly direct experience of solid objects at a distance, which actually results from unnoticed judgmental processes performed upon the unnoticed sensory core. One might wonder what prompted Descartes to assert the existence of a mental representation of the retinal image and thereby to commit himself to a species of visual ideas that are distinct from ordinary visual experience and yet unfamiliar to the typical observer. Descartes' inclusion of the second grade of sensation in his analysis of vision does not seem to have resulted from an experiment in phenomenology. Nowhere does he claim to have experienced the second grade of sensation; we have seen that he was forced to explain why we typically do not experience it. Thus it seems unlikely that Descartes' postulation of a sensory core was the product of new introspective techniques;59 more likely, it was a hypothetical construction based upon 57Ibid. The statement that we "recall the judgments previously made about similar things" is reminiscent of Alhazen's process of judgment through recognition. 58Replies, HR, Vol. II, p. 115: "there can exist in us no thought of which, at the very moment that it is present in us, we are not conscious." Cf. Meditations, HR, Vol. I, p. 169. Descartes used the word "thought" to signify "everything that exists in us in such a way that we are immediately conscious of it. Thus all the operations of will, intellect, imagination, and of the senses are thoughts" (Ibid., Vol. II, p. 52). 59We are not implying that phenomenological considerations never entered Descartes' thought on perception; indeed, his observation that objects appear of constant size at different distances (see above) is This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 378 GARY C. HATFIELD AND WILLIAM EPSTEIN Descartes' knowledge of the properties of the retinal image and his belief that the topological properties of that image are retained while being transmitted physiologically to the pineal gland where they become represented in sensation. The belief that a mental correlate of the retinal image is available to consciousness was never central to Descartes' treatment of vision, and its introduction may be seen as a byproduct of his separation of the physiological from the mental. This separation restricted the domain of the mental to events occurring in a substance that is divorced from processes in the eye or neural pathways (except at the pineal); together with the view that every state of this mental substance is a conscious state, it led to the implication that every truly sensory state is conscious. So the second grade of sensation, as a true sensory state, must be available to consciousness. However, the postulation of a sensory core distinct from the visual world was in no way a necessary byproduct of these factors. In principle, Descartes could have extended the principle of psychophysical correspondence to include all of our spatial ideas; that is, he could have imagined a mechanism by which the brain states bearing information about, say, distance and visual angle, interact with one another and with the mind to produce a sensation directly representing objective size. One could proffer a number of speculations about why Descartes did not do so, though it is enough here to remark that the distinction between the second and third grades of sensation was not merely, or perhaps even primarily, intended to capture a purely psychological distinction between two stages in the process of spatial vision; it also served epistemology in that it distinguished between passively produced sensations which are not susceptible to error and actively produced judgments, which are. Thus the distinction allowed Descartes to assign the error in spatial illusions to the fallibility of the judging intellect, a move that would have been more difficult on a purely psychophysical account of spatial vision.60 In any event, although the distinction between the second and third grades of sensation was not necessitated by Descartes' new ontology, the properties of the second grade of sensation may nonetheless be understood in terms of Descartes' assimilation of the traditional account of spatial vision to that new ontology.61 The traditional view (of Alhazen and others) had it that during vision, unnoticed judgments are performed upon a sensory impression that represents the spatial properties of objects according to the projective geometry of optical stimulation. Descartes accepted both the traditional view of the geometry of the visual stimulus and the view explicitly phenomenological. However, it is an observation regarding the third grade of sensation. We have found no instances of his speaking of direct phenomenal access to the second grade; when he wished to illustrate its properties, he used perspective drawings as an example (Treatise of Man, Hall, p. 68; Dioptrique, AT, Vol. VI, pp. 113, 147), an example which clearly depends upon the geometrical relationship (as specified by theory) between the retinal image and a perspective projection, rather than upon phenomenal considerations. 60The passages quoted above regarding the three grades of sensation arose in the context of considering the question of perceptual error, which Descartes assigned to the implicit judgments of the third grade of sensation (HR, Vol. II, pp. 252-253). On a purely psychophysical account, spatial perception would result from the lawful interaction of matter with matter and of matter with mind (the first and second grades of sensation, in which no falsity can reside, p. 252). 61 It is not known whether Descartes was directly familiar with Alhazen's optical work. He was, however, familiar with Witelo (and hence with Witelo's version of Alhazen's theory), whom he mentioned several times (under the name "Vitellion": AT, Vol. I, p. 239; Vol. II, p. 142; Vol. III, p. 483), and from whom he apparently copied a table of refractions (Vol. X, p. 8). It is likely that he was familiar with one of the Nuremberg editions of Witelo, and not Risner (Vol. I, p. 241). Descartes also knew of Roger Bacon's optical work (Vol. II, p. 447). This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN PERCEPTUAL THEORY 379 that judgments serve to combine elements (such as visual angle and distance) that are represented separately in the optical array. His new ontology demanded that once the point-for-point transmission of the visual stimulus has its effect upon the mind (as it must if it is to serve as a basis for judgment), the resulting state is undeniably mental and therefore necessarily available to consciousness. And this state must in principle be available to consciousness even if Descartes did not draw attention to this fact. Such are the unexpected consequences that occur when explanatory schema cross the boundary from one ontology to another. BERKELEY'S NEW THEORY While there were adherents of the concept of sensory core62 between the time of Descartes and the publication of Berkeley's Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision (1709), Berkeley's work provided the first significant elaboration of the psychology of vision after Descartes' Dioptrique and was the primary vehicle by means of which the sensory core became a standard feature of visual theory for the next two centuries. Unlike the theories of the previous writers with whom we have been concerned, Berkeley's treatment of vision, where it was not epistemological or metaphysical, was psychological: it was primarily concerned with the associative connections among the ideas that comprise the immediate and mediate objects of vision.63 The keystone of Berkeley's analysis of the psychological or ideational processes of vision was his theory of visual language, according to which the ideas of vision bear the same sort of relationship to the ideas of other senses, such as touch, as words bear to their referents.64 Just as through a process of association words come to suggest their referents, the ideas proper to vision come to suggest ideas of the tactual properties, such as the idea of distance. These tactual ideas constitute our experience of a threedimensional world and are commonly mistaken for ideas proper to the sense of vision. Berkeley termed them the secondary objects of vision, thereby distinguishing them from properly visual ideas while recognizing that phenomenally these tactual ideas seem to belong to vision.65 And so according to Berkeley, our everyday experience of the visual world results from associative connections formed between properly visual ideas and tactual ideas, these tactual ideas being responsible for our perception of depth or distance.66 62Jacques Rohault, in his System of Natural Philosophy (1671), trans. Samuel Clarke (London, 1723), espoused the Cartesian point-for-point transmission of the retinal image into the brain, where there arises "an immaterial Image, or that Sensation in which Sight properly consists" (Pt. I, Ch. 32, Secs. 1 and 2, p. 248); he contrasted this sensation with the judgments that lead us to think we directly apprehend objects at a distance (ibid., Sec. 11, pp. 250-251) and with the judgments involving situation and distance, by which "we easily conceive what the Bigness of the Object is at a given distance" (Sec. 23, p. 254). Malebranche also accepted the sensory core-visual world dichotomy (Pastore, Selective History, pp. 46-49), as did Locke, Essay Concerning the Human Understanding (London, 1690), Bk. II, Ch. 9, Secs. 8-10. 63Berkeley, The Theory of Vision, or Visual Language Vindicated and Explained (1733), in Works on Vision, ed. Colin M. Turbayne (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), Secs. 37,43. Berkeley contended that the psychological side of visual theory had been neglected by previous writers in favor of physical considerations (ocular anatomy, the nature of light) and the study of vision in connection with lenses and mirrors. 64Berkeley introduced his linguistic theory of vision as the conclusion of the New Theory (Secs. 147, 148), whereas he begins with it in the later Theory of Vision Vindicated (Secs. 38-40). For a thorough discussion of Berkeley's linguistic theory of vision, see Turbayne, Works on Vision, editor's commentary, pp. vii-XlV. 65Berkeley, New Theory, Sec. 50. 66According to Berkeley the link between the proper and secondary (tactual) objects of vision is not mediated through active judgments of the intellect (as Alhazen and Descartes believed), but through a passive, associational process. Berkeley clearly distinguishes the associational process of suggestion from the judgmental process of inference in the Theory of Vision Vindicated, Secs. 42 and 16. He does speak of This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 380 GARY C. HATFIELD AND WILLIAM EPSTEIN The proper or immediate objects of vision constitute the sensory core in Berkeley's theory and are therefore of primary interest in the present context. In the Theory of Vision, or Visual Language, Vindicated and Explained (1733), Berkeley explained that the proper objects of vision are pictures.67 He did not mean that the mind directly contemplates the retinal image, for he denied that the images on the retina "are, or can be, the proper objects of sight"; these images are in the tangible realm, being "tangible figures projected by tangible rays on a tangible retina."68 While the images on the retina are sometimes referred to as pictures, Berkeley preferred to emphasize the distinction between the visual and the tactual by reserving that term for the visual ideas immediately present to the mind: Pictures, therefore, may be understood in a twofold sense, or as two kinds quite dissimilar and heterogeneous, the one consisting of [ideas of] light, shade, and colors; the other not properly pictures, but images projected on the retina. Accordingly, for distinction, I shall call those "pictures" and these "images." The former are visible and the peculiar objects of sight.69 But, as Berkeley tellsus, while we do not perceive our retinal images, they nonetheless bear some correspondence to the pictures that constitute the proper objects of sight: It is to be noted of those inverted images on the retina that, although they are in kind altogether different from the proper object of sight or pictures, they may nevertheless be proportional to them; as indeed the most different and heterogeneous things in nature may, for all that, have analogy, and be proportional each to other.70 Berkeley explained the nature of this proportionality by the extended use of an example involving a "diaphanous plane" divided into equal squares, similar to the painter's device. He compared the "image" that may be constructed upon this plane to the retinal image and explained that the visual "picture" itself (the proper object of vision) answers to the image on the diaphanous plane, in such a way that "what has been said of the images must in strictness be understood of the corresponding pictures."'71 Thus, according to Berkeley, the proper objects of vision are visual ideas of light and color, phenomenally present as a picture; this picture is correlated with "sudden judgments" in the New Theory (Sec. 20), but when he comes to explain the connection between the immediate and mediate objects of vision, he speaks of one idea "suggesting" another and not of inferences from one idea to another (Secs. 45, 47, 50, 51, etc.). 67Some passages in the earlier New Theory may suggest that Berkeley did not include form (retinally projected shape) among the proper objects of vision, from which it would follow that the immediate object of sight could not be a picturelike correlate of the retinal projection (e.g., Sec. 29; cf. Pastore, Selective History, pp. 72-73). Berkeley did deny that sight and touch perceive a common set of shaped and extended objects (New Theory, Secs. 127-143). Instead, he maintained that the visual shape and magnitude are ideas different in kind from tactual shape and magnitude, and thus that visual space (as represented in the immediate object of vision) and tactual space constitute separate, independent realms (Secs. 136-143). Thus even though he denied that vision immediately apprehends the spatial world of touch, he did include peculiarly visual spatial ideas within the proper objects of vision. 68 Theory of Vision Vindicated, Sec. 142. 69 Ibid., Sec. 51. Berkeley's statement that the proper object of vision is a picture should not be taken in a boringly literal sense to imply that the proper object of vision is planar and hence localized in threedimensional space. It was perhaps to avoid the long arguments surrounding the problem of geometry (New Theory, Secs. 149-158)-arguments easily misread as a denial that form is proper to vision-that Berkeley chose simply to characterize the proper objects as "pictures" in the more popular Theory of Vision Vindicated. 70 Theory of Vision Vindicated, Sec. 53. 7lIbid., Sec. 57. This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN PERCEPTUAL THEORY 381 the retinal image, but it is not our retinal images that we see.72 The fact that the ideas proper to vision are correlates of the retinal image while our everyday visual experience is of the visual world was not something that Berkeley could pass over without comment. As Berkeley admitted, "we cannot, without great pains, cleverly separate and disentangle in our thoughts the proper objects of sight from those of touch which are connected with them."73 The result is that we do not experience the sensory core in its primitive form, but only its elaboration into the visual world. Yet a key premise in Berkeley's own polemic against the "received view" (that vision results from judgments of lines and angles) was that "no idea which is not itself perceived can be the means of perceiving any other idea."74 An obvious tension arises. Berkeley surmounted this apparent embarrassment by drawing attention to a similar occurrence in the perception of speech: even though we must hear the words of the speaker in order to understand the thought that they convey, we hardly notice the words themselves, but pay attention to the meaning, and "even act in all respects as if we heard the very thoughts themselves."75 The difficulty that we experience in separating the proper objects of vision from the ideas of touch ... will not seem strange to us, if we consider how hard it is for anyone to hear the words of his native language pronounced in his ears without understanding them. Though he endeavors to disunite the meaning from the sound, it, will nevertheless intrude into his thoughts, and he shall find it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to put himself exactly in the posture of a foreigner that never learned the language, so as to be affected barely with the sounds themselves and not perceive the signification annexed to them.76 While Berkeley is essentially repeating the argument from habit found in Descartes and Alhazen, the metaphor of speech perception provides concreteness to the claim that we perceive the proper objects of vision and yet are not aware of them as such. We give primary attention to the ideas of touch because, just as with the meanings of words, they are found to be functionally significant. It is the tactual world of mediate vision with which our tactual body must interact and from which it can receive injury. 77 The reasons that could be put forth for Berkeley's allegiance to the distinction between ideas of vision and touch, and thus to a typically unnoticed form of visual experience distinct from the visual world, would take us far into his immaterialism.78 72Thus while we agree with Gary Thrane's assertion, in his "Berkeley's 'Proper Object of Vision,"' Journal of the History of Ideas, 1977, 38:243-260, that Berkeley's proper object of vision is a "freefloating " bidimensional array, we cannot agree that Berkeley took the proper object of vision to be the retinal image itself (pp. 243, 255). On Berkeley's immaterialistic account, the flow of causality is not from the "photosensitive surface" of the retina to the mind, but from God to the mind; the surface of the retina is in the "tangible realm" and can be known only through tactual ideas. 73New Theory, Sec. 159. 74Ibid., Sec. 10. 75Ibid., Sec. 51. 76Ibid., Sec. 73. 77Ibid., Secs. 59, 147. 78As an immaterialist, Berkeley could not allow that sight and touch perceive the same objects; he must show that the visual world that we seem to directly apprehend, and which agrees with our tactual ideas, is really mediately perceived by means of those same tactual ideas (or, rather, by means of associative connections established with previous tactual ideas), from which our properly visual ideas are really quite distinct. On his immaterialist account, each of the senses constitutes a separate realm, so that any regular connection between the ideas of separate sensory modalities is owing not to the fact that a single object is being sensed but to the benevolence of God in providing us with a coherent set of sensory ideas that exhibit cross-modal regularities (New Theory, Sec. 147; Theory of Vision Vindicated, Secs. 38-40, 29). For a recent study of Berkeley's immaterialism and theory of vision, see George Pitcher, Berkeley (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977). This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 382 GARY C. HATFIELD AND WILLIAM EPSTEIN The particular form that Berkeley attributed the proper objects of vision may, however, be understood in terms of the received tenets of visual theory. Berkeley found it to be "agreed by all that distance of itself and immediately, cannot be seen,"79 and thus he could use tradition to support his view that the proper object of vision contains no direct representation of the third dimension and is a correlate of the retinal projection. In essence, he simply accepted from the optical tradition the theoretical postulation of a mental correlate to the retinal image. When he described the properties of the proper objects of vision in his New Theory, he described them in a manner that would be consistent with a mental correlate of the retinal image, but provided no argument for doing so.80 He apparently assumed the point would be obvious enough, as it would have been to anyone familiar with previous visual theory. He certainly did not provide an argument based upon an empirical confrontation with the pure proper objects of vision themselves, and in fact spent more effort than had Descartes in explaining away the lack of such confrontation. And when in Visual Language he sought to provide a detailed explication of the proper objects of vision, he turned to the painter's device for constructing a projective drawing, not to any special phenomenological considerations. In sum, even though Berkeley disputed many features of the received theory of vision, he did not dispute the view that our immediate visual experience is a picturelike correlate of the retinal image. In this sense Berkeley's proper object of vision may be identified with Descartes' second grade of sensation. There is, however, a shift in emphasis. With Berkeley the fact that the proper object of vision is potentially experienceable no longer remains in the background. This shift of emphasis was in part brought about simply by the fact that Berkeley devoted more effort than had Descartes to developing his psychology of vision, in which the key distinction was that between the immediate and mediate objects of vision (sensory core and visual world). But underlying Berkeley's special concern to treat vision solely in terms of ideational processes was his immateralist metaphysics, in which to be is to be perceived is to be an idea in the mind of a perceiver.81 Insofar as Berkeley's metaphysics served to emphasize the distinction between the immediate and mediate objects of vision as two ideational states, it left its mark on subsequent visual theory. For after Berkeley the distinction between the sensory core and visual world became a widely accepted feature of visual theory, and remained so throughout the nineteenth century. While the view that the sensory core is fundamental in the process of vision has been strongly challenged, it retains adherents even today.82 CONCLUSION When the concept of sensory core emerged in the seventeenth century, it was a product of theory rather than of new phenomenological techniques. The crucial development was the inclusion in Descartes' visual theory of a distinction between 79New Theory, Sec. 2. 80Berkeley introduces the distinction between the immediate and mediate objects of vision in Sec. 50 of the New Theory and proceeds to describe their respective properties without further ado. 81Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (Dublin, 1710), Pt. I, Sec, 3. 82The challenges to the concept of sensory core provide gauges of its prior acceptance: see William James, Principles of Psychology (New York/London, 1890), Vol. II, pp. 203-282, and Wolfgang Kohler, Gestalt Psychology (New York: Liveright, 1947), Ch. 3. In the early development of the concept of "sense data" among philosophers, the sense data were attributed the phenomenal properties of the sensory core, and this seems to have been a borrowing from the psychologists (Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, 1914, reissued, London: Allen & Unwin, 1922, pp. 75-76). A recent adherent to a notion This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN PERCEPTUAL THEORY 383 two mental states, one corresponding to the retinal image, the other to experience of the visual world. Descartes' theory, however, was not uniquely responsible for the character of the sensory core-its two-dimensional, imagelike form-but only for the fact that it was conceived as available to consciousness (and hence conceived as the mental state we have named "sensory core"). Since the time of Alhazen (or, if we make allowances for differences owing to extramissionism, since Ptolemy), the effective stimulus for vision had been conceived as an entity that provided information about only two dimensions of the field of vision and which therefore required further enrichment by means of psychological operations in order to be elaborated into a world in depth. Descartes accepted this view of visual stimulation and the operations applied to it, and translated the view into his mechanistic physiology and particular form of mind-body dualism. A product of the translation was that the initial sensing of the two-dimensional stimulus pattern came to be viewed as a mental event in the Cartesian sense, and therefore as an event available to consciousness. Berkeley, who shared Descartes' equation of the mental with the conscious, incorporated the accepted view of visual stimulation into an associative learning theory of spatial perception. His immaterialism led him to have a particularly heightened awareness of the distinction between the sensory core and visual world. Though later thinkers tended not to accept Berkeley's metaphysical views, his theory of vision had a lasting impact. According to our analysis, Descartes' introduction of the concept of sensory core into the psychology of vision resulted in part from factors "external" to his visual theory. The argument is neither that Descartes' particular view of the mind and body demanded the concept of sensory core-we mentioned above that conceivably he could have developed a physiological mechanism sufficient for the generation of the visual world-nor that the concept is inconceivable on any other view of mind and body. Rather we are arguing that in fact it was the Cartesian view of mind as applied to the traditional conception of the visual stimulus and the psychological process of spatial vision that resulted in the introduction of the concept of sensory core. While the current state of the historiography of medieval and Renaissance psychology does not allow us to delve further into the matter, it appears that the significant difference between Descartes' view of mind and that of his medieval predecessors was Descartes' unification of the mind into a single, rational, conscious entity. Medieval writers, including those in the optical tradition, generally followed Aristotle in dividing the mind into parts, such as sensitive and rational, and also divided it into several faculties or "internal senses."83 Within this context it was appropriate to refer to events all along the chain of processes leading from the eye to the seat of visual judgment in mentalistic language, without conceiving of them all as belonging to consciousness. Descartes rejected the Aristotelian division of the soul. His unified conception of consciousness, which was dominant (though not unchallenged) well into the nineteenth century, provided a framework for continued adherence to the concept of sensory core. The reader may wonder why we have, in the course of this paper, focused our that is reminiscent of the sensory core is Irvin Rock, An Introduction to Perception (New York/ London: Macmillan, 1975), p. 562: "It is plausible to suppose that the first step in a very rapid process is a perception correlated with features of the proximal stimulus." 83Bacon, Opus majus, Bk. V, Sec. 1, Dist. 10, Ch. 3, p. 500, and Bk. V, Sec. 2, Dist. 3, Ch. 8, p. 543. On the partitioning of the mind into various internal senses, see Nicholas Steneck, "Albert the Great on the Classification and Localization of the Internal Senses," Isis, 1974, 65:193-21 1. This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 384 GARY C. HATFIELD AND WILLIAM EPSTEIN attention so steadfastly on the emergence of the concept of sensory core, and whether we have not produced a distorted picture by examining a question that does not obviously present itself upon an examination of either Alhazen's or Descartes' optical writings. We sympathize. One could write a history that emphasized the continuity and shared features of the psychology of vision from Alhazen to Descartes. Such a history would be a study of the development of one of the major viewpoints in the history of perceptual psychology: the view that the stimulus to vision is inherently impoverished with respect to the spatial properties of objects, so that the inadequate information contained in received stimulation must be enriched by judgmental or associative processes, or, to put it differently, so that the mind must construct the visual world by applying past experience to the inherently ambiguous sensory core. Our paper constitutes a portion of that history. If we have chosen to emphasize the concept of sensory core, it is because the notion that the psychologically fundamental component of the visual process is a conscious state representing the retinal projection played such a dominant role in eighteenthand nineteenth-century visual theory. Indeed, it was just that aspect of the sensory core which distinguishes it from Alhazen's transmitted "form"-its status as a conscious event-that became the target of criticism during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This content downloaded from 165.123.34.86 on Sun, 11 Oct 2015 17:28:22 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Wittgenstein como destructor Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz Universidad Europea Miguel de Cervantes Valladolid Un día de 1931, el filósofo Ludwig Wittgenstein dejó escritos entre sus notas ciertos pasajes musicales, por él recién inventados, a los cuales añadió la siguiente explicación, un tanto m achacona:"... Se me ocurrió hoy al refle- xionar sobre mi trabajo en filosofía y decirme 7 destroy, Idestroy, 1 destroy'" (v b . § 109). No es la única referencia a la destrucción a la que acudió cuando se propuso en un momento u otro describir su propia labor filosófica. En el pa- rágrafo 118 de las Investigaciones filosóficas (y en su paralelo Wittgenstein: 1997 ,411), por ejemplo, aparece la siguiente explanación: ¿De dónde sacan nuestras consideraciones su importancia, ya que parecen solo demoler todo lo interesante: es decir, todo lo grande e importante? (Toda edifica- ción, por así decir; dejando solo cascotes de piedra y escombros.) Naturalmente, este carácter destructivo del pensar wittgensteiniano no quedó desapercibido para buena parte de sus lectores desde el inicio de su re- cepción. Ya en 1949 titulabajosé Ferrater Mora un artículo referido a nues- tro autor, escuetamente, como "Wittgenstein o la destrucción".1 También Erizo Paci (1952), Lukács (1954), Peter Kampits (1978) o Staten (1 9 8 5 ,1 ) y, entre nosotros, Reguera (1998 ,189 ; 2002, passim) y Satne (2012) si bien el cuarto y el quinto mencionados han preferido usar a veces la expresión 'deconstructivo' han ido pespunteando la historia de las interpretaciones de Wittgenstein con calificativos similares hacia su manera de filosofar. En su famosa reivindicación 1 De este articulo (Ferrater, 1949) se realizaría una versión alemana 20 años después que conserva, tra- ducido, el mismo título (Ferrater, 1969). Algunos autores, como Massimo Baldini (2005 ,36) reputan precisamente al español Ferrater Mora como pionero en esta insistencia sobre el carácter destructivo del filosofar wittgensteiniano, extremo histórico que no hemos podido ni desmentir ni corroborar. 113 de la 'conversión' que la buena filosofía nos produce, tampoco Stanley Cavell (1 9 7 9 , xvii) vaciló en vincularla con tal destrucción wittgensteiniana. Y Martin Stone (2 0 0 2 ,1 1 0 ) llega tan lejos hasta aseverar que, a su ju ic io , la fi- losofía de Wittgenstein aspira a destruir incluso su propia "destructividad" (destructiveness). Parecen convenir varios analistas pues en que la convicción que Oscar Wilde enunciara en su obra A Woman ojNo lmportance, en el sen- tido de que "Todo pensamiento es inmoral, su auténtica esencia es la des- trucción", se aplicaría de manera paradigmática, al menos en su segunda cláusula, al pensar wittgensteiniano.2 Ahora bien, ¿qué es eso que con tanto ahínco buscaba Wittgenstein, filo- sofando , destruir? En las páginas que siguen intentaremos argüir que tal de- rribo lo es del pensamiento metafísico. Para lo cual, naturalmente, lo primero que procede es tratar de acotar qué entenderemos aquí como 'pensamiento metafísico' (pues Wittgenstein mismo no usa esa expresión, aunque sí 'me- tafísica' , que puede a menudo equipararse). A continuación sostendremos que la dificultad de destruir el pensamiento metafísico es a su vez lo que ex- plica el peculiar modo en que Wittgenstein escribe (o filosofa). Por último, trataremos de dar un apretado resumen (poco más podemos avanzar aquí) de qué nodos principales del pensamiento metafísico son aquellos que W itt- genstein puso más ahínco en demoler. Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz El pensamiento metafísico, blanco del afán destructivo de Wittgenstein Hace ya casi tres décadas el filósofojürgen Habermas (1988) popularizó la idea de "pensamiento postmetafísico" para referirse al tipo de filosofía ac- tual que, a diferencia de las metafísicas clásicas o medievales, o incluso de la 2 Otros autores, sin embargo, no han considerado pertinente prestar a la noción de 'destrucción' una especial relevancia a la hora de señalar los pilares esenciales del pensamiento de Wittgenstein. Así, verbigracia, en su reciente diccionario de términos wittgenstemianos DuncanRichter (2014) no se refiere a ella más que en relación con la bomba atómica lbidem., 29-30; 201) o la destrucción de otros seres humanos ( lbidem. , 159). Tampoco al anterior clásico entre los "diccionarios wittgensteinianos ", el de Glock (1996), le mereció mayor atención. 114 "metafísica de la conciencia" propia de la Modernidad, se centra en la comu- nicación humana para elaborar sus desarrollos. Con ese nuevo estatus, la filo- so fía, en lugar de proponerse desarrollar grandes visiones omnicomprensivas del mundo o del ser humano o de la conciencia humana (tareas que hoy ya le quedarían un tanto grandes; y que además han venido a ejercer con notable eficacia diversas ciencias), habría de conformarse con el mucho más humilde rol de mediador en el ámbito social y cultural, de crítica hacia algunos de sus elementos (los irracionales) y de vigilante de cómo ciertos campos de la acti- vidad humana (política, economía, cultura, ciencia, arte, religión...) se afec- tan a otros (para evitar que lo hagan de modo injustificado). Tal sería todo el modo en que le cabría seguir ejerciendo a la filosofía hoy su viejo papel de "tri- bunal de la razón". Esta idea habermasiana de "pensamiento postmetafísico" (y, por oposi- ción, de "pensamiento metafísico"), aunque no ajena a la que manejaremos aquí, creemos que adolece de una cierta carencia al fijarse sobre todo en rasgos secundarios de ese pensamiento y no subrayar lo suficiente cuáles son los que de veras lo definen. Dicho de otro modo: es cierto que el pensamiento postme- tafísico se concentra en el estudio de las prácticas comunicativas humanas, más que en términos antaño privilegiados como 'ser', 'mundo', 'mente' o 'espíritu'; es cierto que al hacerlo su tarea se restringe a menudo a ser simplemente la de crítico de construcciones irracionales, más que la de edificador de construc- ciones racionales el filósofo ejerce de 'guardián' e 'intérprete', en lugar de fun- damentados del resto de las áreas del saber (Habermas, 1983). Pero, ¿cuál es el motivo clave por el que hace todo esto? ¿Por qué fijarse en el lenguaje en lugar de en 'el mundo', en criticar en vez de en construir, en la comunicación humana en vez de en la conciencia humana? La razón de este 'giro' reposa a la postre, como el propio Habermas reconoce ( lbidem.), en una cuestión de au- toridad epistémica. Para el pensamiento metafísico, la autoridad epistémica última se cree ubicada en una instancia independiente3 de los agentes huma- Wittgenstein como destructor 3 Véase Dummett (1 9 7 8 ,1 2 1 ) para otro uso del concepto de 'metafísica' asociado a la independencia de algo frente a las prácticas humanas. Y Vattimo (1 9 8 7 ,7 1 ) para otra definición de pensamiento metafísico como aquel que patrocina la idea de una "estructura estable del ser que rige el devenir y da sentido a la conciencia y normas a la conducta" (el subrayado es nuestro para recalcar la idea de autoridad normativa, rectora, que Vattimo también anexa, como hemos hecho nosotros, a la meta- física: autoridad epistémica la "conciencia" que cita Vattimo, práxica las "normas de conducta" que 113 nos, para que pueda funcionar eficazmente como tal autoridad. Para el pen- samiento postmetafísico, en cam bio, la única autoridad epistémica con que contamos son las propias prácticas y discursos humanos.4 Un pensamiento metafísico buscará atrapar el 'ser', o la 'conciencia', o el 'mundo' (esas son sus au- toridades epistémicas últimas) para poder estar seguro de que lo que afirma es verdadero. Un pensamiento postmetafísico, por el contrario, sabe que no hay más acceso al mundo que las prácticas de entendimiento mutuo que es- tablecemos entre nosotros, individuos de la especie humana (Putnam, 1990); y que por lo tanto en la búsqueda de la verdad no se trata tanto de atra- par un obj eto que se halle ahí fuera, independiente de nosotros, sino de ser capaces de comunicarnos de forma razonable con el resto de personas que se lanzan a esa misma búsqueda de la verdad.5 "Puedo adjudicarle un predi- cado a un objeto cuando cualquier otro que pudiera entrar conmigo en con- versación [razonable, añade Habermas más adelante] le atribuiría ese mismo predicado a ese mismo objeto" (Habermas, 1 9 8 4 ,1 3 6 -1 3 7 ). Y bien, el sentido que en este texto queremos darle a "pensamiento metafísico " (recordemos, aquello que hemos aventurado que es lo que Wittgenstein anhela con su filosofía 'destruir') no es en modo alguno idiosincrático, sino justamente este sentido que estamos, de la mano de Habermas y autores anejos a su concepción, apuntando. El propio Habermas reconoce a W ittgenstein como precursor en lo que más tarde denominará "giro pragmático" (Habermas, 1996) y que hasta aquí estamos tildando como abandono del pensamiento metafísico para dar paso al postmetafísico; como abandono de la autoridad epistémica de algo-externó a los humanos para ira la autoridad del lenguaje (Edwards, 1990) y de las prácticas humanas. Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz también menciona, histórica por ello alude al 'devenir', ontológica mienta por ello el 'ser'... Ade- más, a aquello que aquí Vattimo se refiere como 'estable' es lo mismo a lo que nosotros hemos lla- mado 'independiente', pues es la falta de dependencia de los seres humanos lo que lo resguarda en esa estabilidacfabsoluta). 4 Para la diferenciación entre 'práctica' (Handlung) y 'discurso' (Dísku rs) véase Habermas (1984 ,130). Se trata por cierto, a nuestro juicio, de una diferenciación habermasiana de plausible inspiración wittgenstetniana ; pero para lo que aquí nos ocupa ahora podemos agrupar las dos, en tanto que esferas ambas en que se ejerce la autoridad epistémica de las comunidades humanas, en un mismo paquete. 5 Creemos que este es un buen resumen, además, de lo que implica la noción de 'lingüisticidad' (Sprachlichkeit) en un autor tan influyente como Hans-Georg Gadamer (véase por ejemplo Grondin , 1 9 9 5 ,1 5 0 ). 116 Wittgenstein como destructor Pero antes de acudir a explicar cómo efectúa Wittgenstein la destrucción de lo primero para transitar hacia lo segundo, nos gustaría detenernos bre- vemente en una matización que no creemos irrelevante. Pues es frecuente que algunos de los autores que han negado la pertinencia del pensamiento metafísico en ciertas áreas del saber humano lo hayan hecho... simplemente para reforzar tal pertinencia en otras áreas diferentes. Por ejemplo, es común que se le niegue a la ética el versar sobre nada que esté 'ahí afuera, en 'el mundo', más allá de lo que meramente nos pueda re- sultar plausible a los humanos al ponemos a discutir sobre sus temas (el bien y el mal, lo correcto o lo incorrecto, lo virtuoso o lo degradante). Es decir, se ha negado que a la ética le quepa apoyarse en alguna autoridad metafísica (los valores 'que están ahí afuera', los imperativos absolutos 'de la conciencia moral', los decretos de una divinidad externa, etcétera) y se ha subrayado que la ética se desenvuelve solo en los diálogos que sobre ética tenemos los seres humanos. Pero casi es igual de frecuente que ello se haga para recalcar que, a diferencia de la ética, otras áreas del saber humano, como por ejemplo la ciencia, sí que son capaces de captar lo que es en el fondo 'el mundo', 'el hom- bre' o 'la realidad'. Independientemente de lo razonable o no de este tipo de planteamientos,6 es palpable que no se trata de posturas postmetafísicas pro- piamente dichas: no niegan que hayan algo independiente de las prácticas humanas que deba servir de autoridad epistémica en las mismas, sino que simplemente se aclara que ese algo actúa en unos casos sí (la ciencia, verbi- gracia) y en otros no (la ética, en el caso citado). Por lo tanto, cuando alguien quiera combatir contra el pensamiento me- tafísico, como Wittgenstein quiso combatir, habrá de ser muy cuidadoso en no limitarse a deslegitimar este en unas áreas del saber humano pero no en otras; e incluso más cuidadoso aún en no apoyarse en la metafísica de ciertas áreas para hacer plausible la postmetafísica de otras. Esta tarea es ciertamente difí- cil: "los ejemplos están por todas partes: a la desvalorización de los valores su- premos, a la muerte de Dios, se reacciona solo con la reivindicación (patética, metafísica) de otros valores 'más verdaderos'" (Vattimo, 1985a, 33). De hecho, 6 Maclntyre (1981) cree que ese es el planteamiento predominante en la cultura occidental presente. Sin entrar ahora a debatirlo, pero desde una orientación filosófica asaz diversa de la de Maclntyre, hemos tratado de debelar las raíces de tal planteamiento en Quintana Paz (2008a). 117 avancémoslo ya, el gran mérito de Wittgenstein en su labor destructora es, creemos, que esquivó este riesgo: consiguió pensar postmetafísicamente en todas las prácticas de la actividad humana, sin apoyarse para ello en otras áreas en que sí que recayera en la metafísica que decía destruir.7 Mas para ha- cerlo tuvo que arrostrar di ficultades bien particulares que le forzaron a adop- tar un modo de filosofía asimismo bien particular, como pasamos, en el siguiente apartado, a esbozar. Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz Cómo sortearlas dificultades con que se topa el anhelo de destruir el pensamiento postmetafísico Quizá la mayor dificultad para destruir la metafísica es que esta no se nos suele presentar ni como un bloque único de pensamiento ni como una argu- mentación unívoca; sino que se despliega más bien, como la representa David Bloor (1 9 9 7 ,1 4 6 , n. 2), tal que una amalgama o versión reificada de fenó- menos cuya verdadera situación se queda sin reconocer. Es, asimismo, una doctrina que se presupone más a menudo que se enuncia. Vive en el reino de las presunciones tácitas, de las intuiciones y de las metáforas. Por ejemplo, el proceso denominado 'captar' un significado nunca ha sido clarificado. 7 Según Rorty (1990) no es este el caso de otros muchos pensadores que, tratando de evitar la me- tafísica, al final sucumbieron a la dificultad de esquivar congruentes hasta sus últimas consecuen- cias tal posición: Friedrich Nietzsche, Alfred N . Whitehead, Henri Bergson y Martin Heidegger, verbigracia. Pues todos ellos al final concedieron la autoridad última a una u otra instancia inde- pendiente de las prácticas concretas de los seres humanos (la "voluntad de poder", por ejemplo, en Nietzsche; o las "entidades actuales", verbigracia, en Whitehead). Solo unos pocos autores privi- legiados, como Donald Davidson y él mismo, Rorty, se habrían librado, según este análisis rortiano, de otorgar jamás a ninguna instancia independiente de las prácticas de los seres humanos cierta au- toridad sobre las tpismas. Sin embargo, en el libro que probablemente sea su principal aportación a la filosofía, el pensador turinés Gianni Vattimo (1 9 9 4 ,4 4 -4 7 ) argumenta que es más bien Rorty, ynoNietzsche(Vattimo, 1 9 7 4 ,7 1 -9 3 ; 1985a; 1985b, 35-68; 1 9 8 9 ,8 4 ) elreode esta recaída en el pensamiento metafísico que trata de evitar. Acusación sobre Rorty en la que Holt (1 9 9 7 ,1 1 2 ) ven- dría a coincidir, aunque desde una perspectiva bien distinta, con este italiano. Sirva esta nota, pues, como muestra de las dificultades de que incluso pensadores con clara voluntad de hacer filosofía postmetafísica mantengan, hasta sus últimas consecuencias, tal propósito y al final no recaigan en el redil de la filosofía metafísica que pretenden desmontar. 118 Wittgenstein como destructor Morris Lazerowitz (1955) llegó más lejos, tras las huellas de John Wisdom (1953), al equiparar la metafísica a un ramillete de variopintas "reco- mendaciones verbales" destinadas a sanar traumas personales de desigual estirpe. En todo caso, sean metáforas, presupuestos o recomendaciones, lo cierto es que esa diseminación de las estrategias metafísicas entorpece ex- traordinariamente a cualquiera a la hora de pretender pertrecharse, como pre- tendió Wittgenstein, para arrumbarlas. Puede siempre parecer que cuando se reivindica en cierto campo el pensamiento postmetafísico se está actuando a expensas de otro campo, más prestigioso, en que sí sería pertinente el pensa- miento metafísico, como ya hemos explicado antes que no es inusitado que ocurra. O puede también ocurrir que el simple hecho de que alguien se oponga a la metafísica ofrezca la impresión de que tal antagonista efectúa sus críticas desde una posición (metafísica malgrésoi) de "revelar lo que en reali- dad es la metafísica en sí, independientemente de nosotros".8 Contra esta última asechanza existen algunas terapias de matriz wittgensteiniana que nos sirven además muy bien para explicar el peculiar modo que tenía nuestro autor de escribir filosofía. Es meta de este apartado 2 ex- planar algunas de ellas. Por ejemplo, Dewi Z. Phillips (1992) ha detectado en el empleo estilístico de múltiples aforismos un recurso que, al igual que la plural pseudonimia de las obras de Soren Kierkegaard (1846), contribuiría, en su anfractuosidad, a disolver la sensación de que el crítico de la metafísica se apoya, contradictoriamente, en un fundamento estable, independiente, para su labor.9 Quien ataca desde fragmentos diversos a la metafísica da más la sensación de poner al descubierto sus errores que de presentarse como una teoría del todo que, ella sí, haya sabido captar la autoridad verdadera inde- pendiente desde la cual hablar. Si a ello le sumamos el carácter perturbador, paradójico , de muchos de esos aforismos, que casi se equipara a veces con los que se utilizan en el zen (Canfield, 1975; Shibles, 1969 ,84-100 ; Ueda, 1996; 8 Peligro contra el que es paradigmático el combate de Vattimo, y por ello lo hemos citado abun- dantemente en las notas a pie de página anteriores. g El aforismo estaba lejos de ser un método de escritura inusual en la Viena enque Wittgenstein se crió, hasta el punto de que se ha llegado a hablar de una potente "escuela vienesa del aforismo" (Johnston, 1 9 8 1 ,2 7 5 ); ahora bien, asimismo en tal contexto recibió una crítica acerba como gé- nero literario por parte de autores de la talla de Musil (1930-1933-1943) o incluso de un brillante cultivador suyo como Schnitzler (1927). Véase a este respecto Alonso (2002 ,35 -51). 119 Wienpahl, 1958), o los famosos koanes (Selmann, 1979), escasa ocasión daría W ittgenstein, merced a su estilo literario, para achacarle el estar des- truyendo una metafísica mientras cree asentar sus pies en otra; lo propio del zen es saber perturbar nuestros modos de pensamiento habituales sin nece- sidad de ofrecer otro modo (más autorizado) de razonar10 Pero además este mismo estilo aforístico, lo que Jolán Orbán (1998) llama, en expresión difícilmente traducible, Zerzettelung del pensamiento, presta otras utilidades a quien se propone la eversión de la metafísica, de tal manera que se le puede llegar a hacer prácticamente consubstancial, y W itt- genstein estaba convencido de ello, a "la naturaleza de su investigación misma" ( p u . "Vorwort"; véase también v b . § 156). En primer lugar, la condensación que exige cada aforismo, y su peculiar independencia autosuficiente res- pecto al resto de los proverbios que le acompañan en un texto, contrasta con la pretensión de los pensadores metafísicos de elaborar un discurso lineal y deductivo, encadenado, que recoja su legitimidad a medida que esta des- ciende por trabazones tenaces desde el fundamento último (que recaba así tanto poder cognoscitivo que casi parecería independiente de los humanos). Dicho de otro m odo, la escritura mediante aforismos se distingue vehemen- temente de la aspiración metafísica de configurar una teoría jerarquizada y predeterminada según la esencia de la cosa; esta aspiración metafísica que aliaría más fácilmente en cambio con un género de escritura de corrido lo que Carlos Pereda (199.4 ,265) ha llamado "razón austera". Bien al contrario, [... ] en la filosofía no estamos cimentando fundamentos, sino ordenando una ha- bitación, proceso en el cual tenemos que tocar todo una docena de veces. El único modo de hacer filosofía es hacerlo todo dos veces.11 Como consecuencia de ello, se ha podido hablar de un modo de leer metafísico , al cual habría que contraponer otro tipo de lectura "prudente, dife- renciada, lenta, estratificada" (Derrida, 1 9 7 2 ,4 0 ), más propio déla genuina postmetafísica. Este segundo modo de leer, que los aforismos fomentan, le Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz 10 Véase sin embargo Phillips (1977) para una refutación del aserto de que la filosofía wittgensteiniana y el zen tengan mucho que ver entre sí. Mi propia opinión a este respecto es que acaso existan otras zonas del pensamiento oriental, concretamente el pensamiento de matriz hindú, donde re- sulte más prometedor hallar influencias en el de Wittgenstein (Quintana Paz, 1998). 11 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1 9 8 0 , B 1,6 ; véase también pu. Vorworty§18. 120 Wittgenstein como destructor parecía sin duda a Wittgenstein un bien preciado a la hora de entender qué es lo que él estaba realmente tratando de hacer con ellos: Algunas veces sólo puede entenderse una frase si se la lee con el ritmo correcto. Todas mis frases deben leerse lentamente. [...] De hecho, quisiera retardar el ritmo de lectura mediante mis frecuentes signos de puntuación. Pues querría ser leído lentamente: como yo mismo leo.12 Ítem más: la escritura aforística, aparte de estas consideraciones formales que hemos hecho, nos otorga aún otro beneficio añadido. Pues facilita a quien la emplea el domeñar a esa hidra policéfala que es el conjunto de "presuncio- nes tácitas, intuiciones y metáforas" de que está formado, como decíamos, el pensamiento metafísico. "Se resuelven problemas (se apartan dificultades), no un único problema", diría Wittgenstein (pu. § 133); de modo que "no hay un único método en filosofía, sino que lo que hay más bien son métodos, es decir, diferentes terapias". Ello proporciona a la obra de Wittgenstein ese aspecto de "cajón de sastre" (snippet-box) que algunos le han atribuido (Hacker, 1971 ,141). A la proteica naturaleza de la metafísica le corresponde, así, una versatilidad metodológica afín: y el correlato literario de ambas es un sinfín de aforismos, de "cortes de un paisaje enorme" (vb. §317), que hagan desapare- cer la "metafísica latente" (Drury, 1996a, 84) que se agazapa en diversos reco- vecos de ese panorama. La sucesión de párrafos fragmentarios no persigue, pues (o no persigue solamente), los favores de la táctica que los latinos com- pendiaron en la máxima Gutta cavat lapidem (la gota acaba por excavar en la pie- dra, siendo aquí tal losa la del pensamiento férreamente jerarquizado de la metafísica); sino que es además una cuestión de simple adecuación metodo- lógica de un instrumento para con su blanco (múltiple). Por añadidura, a veces se ha resaltado que Wittgenstein habría conseguido, al empuñar dife- rentes filosofías según el adversario con quien se las tuvo que haber, que no se le achacase el acuerdo estricto a priori con ninguna corriente filosófica en concreto (Edwards, 1982): algo que, de nuevo, le beneficia con miras a evitar 12 Véase, en el mismo sentido, Wittgenstein (z: §73); y también vb: § 129, donde compara el filoso- far con hacer poesía, o 'poetizar' (díchten). Unos meses antes (Ibidem .,§126) nuestro autor no era, empero, tan optimista y, nostálgico de modos de filosofar más expeditivos, denigraba su estilo en- trecortado parangonándolo al de un 'desdentado' (si bien al mismo tiempo lo ponía a la altura del de otro maestro vienés de la paremia, nada menos que Karl Kraus). 121 la sensación de que pretende ofrecer una visión omnicomprensiva del ser, el mundo, el pensar o la conciencia humanos (de que pretende hacer lo que con Habermas hemos llamado pensamiento metafísico, por tanto). "Cuando se confronta con cuestiones de definición amplia, Wittgenstein invariablemente nos dirige hacia el examen de casos particulares" (Macksoud,1 9 7 6 ,1 7 1 ). Ahora bien, este último beneficio del aforismo es, sin embargo, la piedra de toque de cualquiera que pretenda (como yo mismo, Miguel Ángel Quin- tana Paz, al que usted lector lee ahora un trabajo sobre Wittgenstein) pro- longar la tarea wittgensteiniana de destrucción de la (autoridad) metafísica en filosofía. Pues le hace a cualquiera que escriba sobre la filosofía de W itt- genstein en términos no aforísticos reo de la legítima duda de si no se estará traicionando parte del legado wittgensteiníano, al reformularlo en el género prosístico y, por añadidura, al hacer tal cosa en aras de defender una filosofía bien concreta (en este caso, la propia del pensamiento postmetafísico). Por este motivo, a no pocos autores13 les ha parecido que no cabe sino una opción tras leer a Wittgenstein, y por buenos motivos wittgensteinianos: abandonar la tarea misma de hacer filosofía (al menos, filosofía en prosa y preposicio- nal). Opción que sin duda no quedaría lejos de los deseos de alguien, como el propio Ludwig Wittgenstein como individuo, que recomendaba a menudo a sus amigos14 que se cuidasen de la filosofía académica (Monk, 333-335 y 425; Britton, 1955; Wittgenstein, 1983, 23-2 -48 ; véase también vb. §352: "No quiero ser imitado, y menos aún por los que escriben artículos en revistas fi- losóficas"). Este camino, en suma, es el que ha seducido a lo que podríamos Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz 13 Véase Black (1 9 8 6 ,8 6 ) , C ollins(1992), Diamond ( 1 9 8 9 ,1991a y 1991b), Edw ards(1982), Hund( 1990), Hunter (1 9 7 3 ), McGuinness (1 9 9 1 ,1 1 ) , Phillips (1 9 8 6 ,9 3 -9 7 ; 1999), Reguera (1 9 9 8 y 2 0 0 1 ), Rorty (1 9 8 2 ), Schulz (1 9 6 7 ) y hasta el editorialista anónimo de The Economist (1 9 6 0 ,1 6 ), que simpatizan, de uno u otro jaez, con este enfoque. Eso si, ante la considerable fera- cidad de la literatura filosófica que ha manado de esta idea de dejar de filosofía, cabría acaso pre- guntarse si, a fuer de consecuentes, estos filósofos no deberían haber callado y cambiado de oficio con prontitud. Sorprende que no haya sido así. Lo que acaso quepa considerar una "contradicción performativa" de estos autores o bien, con Paci (1954), haya que denominar "neurosis" propia de toda filosofía que aspire a "autodestruirse" (Wein, 1961). 14 Consejo que sus amigos pocas veces siguieron, todo sea dicho. El único que le hizo caso hasta cierto punto fue Maurice O'Connor Drury (Hayes, 1996), ya que cambió su vocación filosófica por la psiquiatría. De no haberse malogrado tan tempranamente, tal vez Francis B. Skinner hubiese se- guido un camino incluso más radicalmente antiintelectual que el de Drury. Pero no hay muchos más que hicieran caso a este respecto a nuestro autor. 122 Wittgenstein como destructor llamar la "escuela del silencio", o "quietistas" filosóficos (Blackburn, 1990; 1993; Brandom, 1994, xn y 29): wittgensteinianos que reputan, como fin primordial de la filosofía que quiera inspirarse en el autor vienés, el "dejar de filosofar cuando se quiera" (pu. §133; véase también vb. § 2 5 2 ;tlp. §7). Es cierto que Wittgenstein no escatimó advertencias en el sentido de que, en la filosofía, había que aprender a "no tratar de ir más allá. La dificultad aquí está en: pararse" (z. §314). Ahora bien, para estos 'quietistas' en que nos estamos fijando, sería evidente que Wittgenstein en el fondo lo que quería decir ahí es que había que parar cuanto antes de hacer filosofía aunque también es patente que ambas aseveraciones no son idénticas. Discrepamos de ellos. Una cosa es que Wittgenstein hiciera en su día excelente uso de un sistema tan propicio como el que hemos descrito de los aforismos o párrafos sueltos para destruir el pensa- miento metafísico (Schweidler, 1983,49-56), y otra cosa es que ese sea el único sistema posible de escritura tras la metafísica y, por lo tanto, la filosofía en prosa, las revistas académicas de artículos de filosofía o los libros filosóficos no aforís- ticos deban extinguirse tras que Wittgenstein nos haya convencido. Una vez destruido el pensamiento metafísico cabe hacer otras muchas cosas con nues- tro pensar (ahora ya, postmetafísicamente). Solo ante ciertas cuestiones, y solo después de haber "logrado hacer algo" ante ellas con la filosofía (Drury, 1996b, 126) y, por ello, el famoso parágrafo 7 del Tractatus aparece al final, y no al ini- cio de la obra, lo cual la hubiese abortado desde sus comienzos es apropiado considerar que hemos alcanzado la "claridad completa" (pu. § 133) que W itt- genstein ponía como requisito sine qua non del "dejar de filosofar". "La filosofía es: rechazar falsos argumentos" (Wittgenstein, 1993 ,407 ;409). Como esa cla- ridad puede faltar o esos falsos argumentos pueden proliferar en uno u otro ám- bito de nuestra cultura postmetafísica, la filosofía siempre será necesaria. De hecho, a veces Wittgenstein posee palabras sustancialmente duras contra quie- nes piensan que se les han acabado los problemas filosóficos: Algunos filósofos (o como se les quiera llamar) sufren de lo que se podría llamar loss ojproblems, o 'pérdida de problemas' [Problemverlust]. Entonces les parece todo tremendamente simple, y les parece que ya no existe ningún problema pro- fundo, el mundo se hace vasto y chato y pierde toda profundidad; y lo que escri- ben se convierte en algo infinitamente insulso y trivial.13 15 15 z. §456. 123 Esto no obsta para reconocer que si bien Wittgenstein se prodiga en ofre- cernos pistas para destruir la metafísica, no es ni mucho menos tan generoso a la hora de proporcionarnos teorías explícitas dentro de su pensamiento postmetafísico. No le faltó razón, por ejem plo, a Anthony Giddens (1 979 , 49 -5 0 ) cuando señaló que W ittgenstein no nos entrega como pensador un desarrollo elaborado de las prácticas sociales que presupone continuamente, algo que han de reconocer incluso acérrimos partidarios del uno y de las otras (Bloor, 1 9 8 3 ,3 -5 ;1 9 9 7 ,ix ) . Tampoco hay en Wittgenstein una teoría postmetafísica explícita de la ética, la política, la estética, la religión... a pesar de que en varios de esos campos mostró un interés más que intenso.16 Parece que el propio Wittgenstein pensaba que, si se lanzaba a filosofar constructi- vamente sobre esos o cualesquier otros campos, no podría sino pronunciar trivialidades ( p u . § 1 2 8 ).17 De modo que a menudo los lectores de Wittgens- tein que quieren adentrarse en ellos con utillaje wittgensteiniano deben con- formarse con trazar las meras implicaciones (Crary, 2 0 00), no las explícitas afirmaciones, que tiene sobre esas áreas el pensamiento de este autor. En cualquier caso, por fortuna, el foco de este artículo que el lector tiene ahora entre manos no es esa espinosa tarea de tratar de construir algo sobre los materiales que nos legó Wittgenstein,18 sino concentrarnos, como anun- ciamos desde el inicio, en su labor destructora. Para ello, una vez explicado ya cuál era el blanco de tal destrucción (el pensamiento metafísico) y el modo en que Wittgenstein se las apañó mediante su estilo literario para sortear las Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz 16 Véase, sobre las dificultades de pretender adj udicar a Wittgenstein una u otra teoría en esos y otros campos, Quintana Paz (2006a); una versión más sintetizada de tal exposición aparece en Quintana Paz (2004). 17 "Si alguien quisiera proponer tesis en filosofía, nunca podría discutirse sobre estas porque todos estarían de acuerdo con ellas". Véase también Wittgenstein (1980 , B ti, 3). 18 Hemos tratado de hacerlo en otras obras. En Quintana Paz (2014), por ejemplo, intentamos pro- porcionar una teoría, basada en argumentos wittgensteinianos, sobre qué son las normas que nos damos en humajtos, y cómo esa idea de las normas puede afectar a la filosofía moral y política. Ex- traemos de esa obra muchas de las reflexiones quese resumen, amplían, corrigen o matizan en este artículo. Por otra parte, en Quintana Paz (2005a, 2006b y 2010a) se presenta una versión resumida de esa teorización sobre las normas, aunque no de sus consecuencias en ética y política. Justo a la inversa ocurre en el ya citado Quintana Paz (2008a). Los beneficios que nos dona Wittgenstein para una teoría de la comprensión intercultural los hemos tratado de apuntar en Quintana Paz (2002 y 2005b); para la teoría de la traducción, en Quintana Paz (2010b); para una teoría de la comunidad, en Quintana Paz (2005c). 124 Wittgenstein como destructor dificultades de tal empeño, tracemos ahora (en el siguiente y último apar- tado) un breve compendio de cuáles fueron los nodos principales del pensar metafísico sobre los que concentró su propósito destructor. Cuáles son los pilares principales del pensamiento metafí- sico que Wittgenstein se aplicó con denuedo en destruir El modo de escritura filosófica que hemos pergeñado (yjustificado) como el característicamente wittgensteiniano también ha sido aludido como un con- junto de hebras (strands, McDowell, 1998) desde lasque tirar para desenredar la "maraña" (Cewinkel, p u . § 18) o madeja (Faden, Ibídem., §67) de presunciones tácitas, intuiciones y metáforas en que, como observamos anteriormente, con- siste la metafísica. ¿Cuáles son las principales de esas hebras? A nuestro ju i- cio, las que citaremos a continuación. Naturalmente, no podemos aquí agotar la explicación de los argumentos con que la obra de Wittgenstein aco- mete cada una de ellas;19 pero sí nos detendremos a reseñar someramente cómo algunas han sido incluso consideradas por algunos autores (en nues- tra opinión, netamente desencaminados, pues) como el tipo de autoridad me- tafísica que defendería Wittgenstein, en lugar de uno de los disfraces de esta que nuestro autor se complacería en destruir. La 'mente' o ciertas 'entidades mentales' como autoridad metafísica Esta es una de las autoridades metafísicas más frecuentes en la filosofía moderna y, por consiguiente, una de aquellas a las que Wittgenstein dedicó más visibles y mayor número de esfuerzos destructivos. Tanto en su época del Trac tatas (Anscombe, 1959,25-27; Apel, 1989;Reguera, 1980 ,47-68 , es- pecialmente 49-51) como en las que seguirían nuestro autor se mantuvo aj eno a la tentación de acudir a 'lo mental' para explicar el lenguaje, el pensamiento, 19 Si lo hemos hecho, empero, en el capítulo 1 del ya citado Quintana Paz (2014). 125 las intenciones, el poder de las norm as... Para él, cada vez que alguien lo haga y recaiga en el "mito de la interioridad" (Bouveresse, 1987) en realidad habrá olvidado de que cualquier referencia a una "mente interna" no es sino una figura metafórica que ha olvidado eso, su carácter de mera metáfora (Wittgenstein, 1958: 3), y por ello ha acabado resultando desorientadora (pu. § 356)20 Ahora bien, ¿por qué esa metáfora es metáfora y no el reflejo de una realidad cierta? ¿Por qué no podemos pensar que las entidades mentales que posee cada uno en su cabeza son entidades independientes de las prác- ticas comunicativas humanas, y sirven como autoridad (entre otras cosas, como autoridad para decidir qué es lo que significa lo que ha dicho alguien en medio de tales prácticas comunicativas)? El argumento principal que W ittgenstein proporciona aquí es que esa presunta entidad mental de los demás, en el caso de que pudiera ser atrapada directamente (es decir, sin estar mediada por los símbolos del lenguaje), no sería para nosotros sino un símbolo que de nuevo debería ser interpretado para poder ser entendido; es decir, sería de nuevo algo sim ilar... a ese lenguaje que presuntamente viene a 'explicar'. ¿Sería posible comunicarse más directamente mediante un proceso de 'lectura del pensamiento'? ¿Qué querríamos decir con 'leer el pensamiento'? El lenguaje no es un método indirecto de comunicación, que haya que poneren contraste con un leer 'directamente' el pensamiento. Leer el pensamiento solo podría tener lugar a través de la interpretación de símbolos, así que estaría en el mismo nivel que el lenguaje. No nos libraría del proceso simbólico. La idea de leer un pensamiento más directamente se deriva de la idea de que el pensamiento es un proceso es- condido, y que la tarea del filósofo es penetrarlo. Pero no hay medio más directo de leer el pensamiento que a través del lenguaje. El pensamiento no es algo es- condido: está ahí afuera, abierto a nosotros.21 Entender un lenguaje no consiste pues en obtener contacto directo con una intención, una figura, "un objeto privado, un dato sensorial, un 'objeto' que capto inmediatamente con mi ojo u oreja m ental... una imagen interior" bpp. i, § 109) independientes de las expresiones externas del lenguaje. Porque, Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz 20 Cfr. el concepto de "expresiones sistemáticamente equívocas (misleading;)", de Ryle (1932). 21 Wittgenstein, 1980,Bn,2,cursivasnuestras;véasetam biénl958,5. 126 Wittgenstein como destructor aun suponiendo que arribásemos hasta ese objeto privado, dato sensorial, fi- gura, imagen interior, etcétera, seguiríamos teniendo la misma tarea por de- lante que la que tenemos cuando nos encontramos con un lenguaje: la de saber cómo interpretar ese objeto, ese dato sensorial, esa figura, esa imagen. No existe autoridad alguna pues, más allá del lenguaje entre los humanos, en que ubicar la clave metafísica de este.22 D isposiciones, funciones y naturaleza hum ana com o 'causas' que hacen de autoridad metafísica En la mentalidad que inauguraron los modernos hacia el siglo xvn (y atan perdura pujante) una entidad cualquiera o bien se adscribe al espacio de lo 'mental' y 'humano' o bien al de las causas y efectos de la 'naturaleza'; espacios ambos separados poruña grieta (Latour, 1991) que es tremendamente com- plicado salvar. Por ello quizá se hace más comprensible que, al dejar Wittgens- tein muy clara su idea de que no creía en las entidades mentales o internas como autoridad epistémica, un número no anecdótico de autores hayan cole- gido que entonces lo que estaba apoyando era el otro lado de esa grieta mo- derna: el lado de lo causal, la naturaleza, lo mecánico. Se trata, pues, de un caso de los que ya hemos anunciado antes: autores que toman los ataques de Witt- genstein a una instancia metafísica como defensa de otra diferente. Así, ha habido lectores de Wittgenstein que han defendido que él en rea- lidad pensaba que eran ciertas disposiciones,23 ciertas funciones2'1 o la misma naturaleza humana25 (entendidas como causas) las que ejercían de autoridad 22 He realizado un desarrollo más amplio de este apartado 3.1. en el apartado 1.2. de Quintana Paz (2014). 23 Autores como Smart (1992) hacen esta lectura de Wittgenstein. Su posición ha sido refutada principalmente por filósofos de la talla de Kripke (1 9 8 2 ,2 2 -3 3 ), Brandom (1 9 9 4 ,29 -3 1 )y Bloor (1997 ,68 ). 24 Ha defendido una posición funcionalista Millikan (1990). El uso paradigmático de Wittgenstein para oponerse a ello está, de nuevo, en Kripke (1 9 8 2 ,3 6 -3 7 ). Un lector de Wittgenstein que ha usado cierta idea de vida sana' que recuerda la insistencia de los funcionalistasen la 'salud' como concepto teleológico y normativo fue Edwards (1 9 9 0 ,1 3 9 ). 25 Autores como GarcíaSuárez(1976), McGinn (1984), Arrington(1991) y Hertzberg(1992) hacen esta lectura de Wittgenstein, en la que ha sido especialmente insistente Garver (1990 ; 1994a; 1994b). Su posición ha sido refutada principalmente por los autores ya citados en la nota penúltima. 127 que determina qué es lo correcto o lo incorrecto en cada caso en que exista duda al respecto. No podemos extendemos aquí en los motivos que da cada cual para defender tal posición. Pero es una postura que no refleja el afán des- tructor de la filosofía wittgensteiniana:26 "¡Cuidémonos de pensar aquí en términos de efecto y causa!" (z. §613). La respuesta de Wittgenstein a estas tesis es que el que las defienda "confunde la dureza de una regla con la dureza de un material" ( b g m . u i , §87). Las reglas que nos damos los humanos como autoridades producen resultados variables, nuestro comportamiento ante ellas es falible (a veces las obedecemos, a veces no). No ocurre lo mismo con las leyes naturales de la causalidad: si te afectan (si afectan a un material), te afectan sin posibilidad de que te 'desvíes' de ellas (salvo porque haya otra ley más potente que es entonces la que te afecta de veras). "El sentido en que es- tamos obligados por las normas [... ] que dictan lo que debemos, en ciertas circunstancias, creer o hacer, es muy diferente de la compulsión natural" (Brandom, 1 9 9 4 ,3 1 ). No podemos ubicar pues en algo 'natural'y 'causal' (disposiciones, funciones, 'naturaleza humana') la autoridad normativa me- tafísica que dicte lo que es correcto para los humanos de modo indepen- diente a estos: las normas funcionan de un modo muy distinto a las leyes naturales y causales. Las primeras se pueden desobedecer y las segundas no. Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz 'Criterios privados' com o autoridad m etafísica Quizá una de las aportaciones'más famosas de Wittgenstein a la filosofía sea precisamente su argumento del "lenguaje privado" y el modo en que este destruye la idea de que puedan usarse criterios a los que solo tiene acceso un individuo como jueces que determinen la validez o la invalidez de algo. Han existido numerosas interpretaciones de este argumento: algunas lo han repu- tado de "central" (Rossi-Landi, 1973,27;Finch , 1977,12 7) en el pensamiento wittgensteiniano; otrosde "prescindible" (Thomton, 1996; Grewendorf, 1979) 26 He realizado un desarrollo más amplio de la refutación wittgensteiniana de la idea de que sean ciertas "disposiciones causales" las que rigen como autoridad normativa nuestras acciones en Quintana Paz (2 0 0 5 d ). Para un desarrollo más amplio de la generalidad de las ideas de este apar- tado 3.2. véase el apartado 1.3. de Quintana Paz (2014). 128 Wittgenstein como destructor para comprender el mismo; algunas lo han visto como un argumento trascen- dental, a priori (Apel, 1991); otras como una mera constatación empírica (Blackburn , 1984;Fogelin, 1 9 7 6 ,153-171;Bloor, 1983; 1997); y, porúltimo, algún otro intérprete lo ha leído como un argumento ni trascendental ni empírico, sino histórico (Quintana Paz, 2014).27 Pero, por su general conocimiento, no nos detendremos sobre él aquí más que parar recordar este su innegable ca- rácter destructor: Wittgenstein nos mostró con él que una autoridad epistémica a la que solo pueda acceder un individuo no sirve en realidad como autoridad alguna, pues no cabe distinguirla de la mera arbitrariedad. Las cosas mismas, no interpretadas, com o autoridad metafísica Una de las tentaciones recurrentes del pensamiento metafísico ha sido la de llegar hasta las cosas mismas', ante la autoridad metafísica pura (sea esta la que sea: el mundo, las condiciones transcendentales, las esencias, las ideas...) , sin interpretación alguna que pudiera ya adulterarla. Es esta una idea que también sedujo a W ittgenstein... pero en su afán destructor. Su posición a este respecto bien puede equipararse con la de pragmatistas como Charles S. Peirce,28 como atina a detallar Esposito (1999): 27 En esta misma obra citada, en su apartado 1 .4 ., puede hallarse un desarrollo más amplio del apunte que hacemos en este apartado 3.3. 28 He ampliado el estudio de las conexiones entre Wittgenstein y la filosofía pragmatista en Quin- tana Paz (2010a). En todo caso, es palpable la similitud de la lucha wittgensteiniana contra "obje- tos" libres de su interpretación y celebérrimas diatribas neopragmatistas como aquella contra el mito empirista de "lo dado" y la separación esquema-contenido (Davidson, 1984), o su impugna- ción de una "visión desde ninguna parte" (Nagel, 1986) y de un mundo "listo y preparado" (Putnam , 1982) ahí afuera, que nos venga "dado" "preconceptualmente" (Sellars, 1956) y que nosotros solo tengamos que reflejaren nuestro "espejo mental" (Rorty, 1979) procurando supuestamente evitar en lo posible los quebrantos de interpretaciones que se le superpongan. En palabras (algo más intrincadas) de McDowell (1 9 9 4 ,9 ), se trata en este caso de mostrar que "la receptividad [hu- mana] no hace una contribución separable, ni siquiera nocionalmente, en su cooperación con la espontaneidad (del darse de lo que es el caso] " pues "nada puede contar como un episodio de nues- tra corriente de consciencia si no cuenta (no cuenta 'ya antes', podríamos decir) con una forma con- ceptual, un contenido articulable de experiencia" (McDowell, 1998 ,279). 129 Peirce y Wittgenstein se encuentran tras haber partido desde direcciones opues- tas: Wittgenstein no considera la interpretación como algo que derive de un mundo interno y que se aplique al mundo externo, mientras que Peirce consi- dera que cualquierjuicio perceptivo contiene o instiga inmediatamente una in- terpretación. En ambos casos, existe un rechazo de la idea de que se vea el objeto de un modo objetivo y que luego se le añada una interpretación que se incruste sobre lo que se supone que se ve 'realmente'. Ahora bien, ¿por qué rechaza Wittgenstein la idea de que podamos perci- bir objetos directamente, la 'realidad', y luego añadamos a estos 'una inter- pretación? Las estrategias que utiliza nuestro autor a lo largo de toda su obra para quitarnos de la cabeza tal noción (metafísica) son incontables, pero una de las más famosas quizá tenga que ver con el ejemplo de una figura que W itt- genstein usa en p u . xi, 4 4 4 y que básicamente reproducimos a continuación: Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz Uno bien podría aseverar, sin mayor misterio para nadie, que este dibuj o representa [...] un cubo de cristal; o una caja abierta y boca abajo; o un armazón de alambre con esa forma; o tres tablas que forman ese ángulo.29 29 Otra figura que Wittgenstein emplea a menudo (pu. xi, 446; ls i. i 165) para un fin semej ante a la del cubo que hemos reproducido es la que simplifica el más famoso de Necker (1 8 3 2 ); si se des- conoce este, puede verse una animación conjava instructiva sobre él, y no del todo carente de humor, en Newbold (1996) es la del pato-conejo de Jastrow (1900): No es seguramente casual quejastrow fuese de hecho alumno del recién citado Peirce enlajohn HopkinsUniversity. Ahorabien, tanto el cubo de Neckerpropiamente dicho como el pato-conejo de Jastrow parecen casos particulares y rebuscados de algo que en realidad, según Peirce y Witt- genstein, se produce continuamente, por lo que no hace falta recurrir a ellos para captarlo: que nuestras percepciones no son una suma separable de "realidad más interpretación" véase el fa- moso ejemplo de las azaleas de Peirce (1966). ¿ 0 7 __V 130 Pero aquellos que creen que estas interpretaciones no son sino matices personales yuxtapuestos a la realidad (en este caso, el dibujo) "exenta de toda interpretación", están comprometidos a poder mostrar algo más. Deberían, para resultar más convincentes, ser capaces de exhibir de algún modo el di- bujo aparte de esta y cualesquier otras interpretaciones; y ser capaces de mos- trar interpretaciones, como las enumeradas, separadas del dibujo. Mas ambas cosas les son imposibles: el dibujo siempre se piensa 'como algo' (aunque solo sea 'como un conjunto de rayas en un papel') . Y la única forma de mostrar la interpretación de un "cubo de cristal" (o de "una caja abierta y boca abajo", o de "un armazón de alambre con esa forma". ..) exactamente como el del di- bujo es... repitiendo ese dibujo: "Yo debería poder referirme directamente a la vivencia [de la interpretación] y no solo indirectamente" (Ibídem., 446). Cu- riosamente, todo el que habla de que hay que separar conceptualmente las interpretaciones por un lado y las cosas ensíporotroes incapaz de mostrar separadas luego las interpretaciones por un lado y las cosas en sí por otro. Todo el que habla, pues, de este modo metafísico es incapaz de probar su aserto principal.30 Wittgenstein como destructor Las 'relaciones internas' com o autoridad metafísica En la literatura de inspiración wittgensteiniana tuvo hace años cierto éxito la idea de que hay una autoridad metafísica contra la cual Wittgenstein no solo no combatiría, sino que sería de hecho la 'solución' que él mismo pro- pondría a muchas de las cuitas a las que le condujo su ánimo destructor. Es lo que se llamó 'relaciones internas', aprovechando algunos usos que hace el propio Wittgenstein de esta terminología.31 Los más conspicuos adalides de esta lectura serían especialmente GordonP BakeryPeterM. S. Hacker.32 Como expone Bloor (199 2 ,2 71), "decir que A y B están relacionados internamente significa que la definición de A implica una mención de B, mientras que la 30 Puede hallarse un desarrollo más amplio de este apartado 3.4 . en Quintana Paz (200 5e) y en el apartado 1.5. de Quintana Paz (2014). 31 lfm. x; Wittgenstein (1980, B xm, 2); Moore (1954, ii, 314-316). 32Véase porejemplo BakeryH acker(1984,117-172; 1 9 85 ,172). Epígono suyo es Zhok(2001). 131 definición de B implica una mención de A". Asi, por ejemplo, para explicar qué es aplicar correctamente el concepto de color rojo puedo referirme, ver- bigracia, a que es el color que he de mencionar al describir la piedra preciosa llamada 'rubí'; pero si quiero explicitar cuál es ese color propio del rubí.. ten- dré que acabar diciendo que es el rojo, sin que haya nada que justifique fuera de todo ello que el color de los rubíes o el cualquier otro obj eto que sirva de muestra de este color tenga que ser el rojo (Baker y Hacker, 1984 ,83). O, ver- bigracia, para entender qué significa hacer una promesa he de entender que debo cumplir la palabra empeñada; pero para explicar mi obligación de ser fiel a la palabra dada debo referirme a que he hecho uso de una institución so- cial llamada, justamente, "prometer" (Anscombe, 1978). Las dudas sobre lo correcto o lo incorrecto, pues, se resolverían si entendiésemos esta 'gramá- tica' que subyace a las reglas, autoridad que nos iluminaría independiente- mente de lo que queramos luego hacer con ellas. ¿Cuál es el principal argumento contra las 'relaciones internas' como au- toridad metafísica (y como autoridad metafísica que Wittgenstein ansiase defender)? La verdad es que abundan los textos wittgensteinianos en que se defiende como borroso el límite entre lo que entrará y no entrará en una regla al encontrarnos con ella sola ( p u . § 6 8 , § 71 y § 99), así que no está ya pre- determinado con una relación interna, ni ningún otro súper-mecanismo ( p u . §192; Williams,1 9 9 1 ,1 0 2 -1 0 3 ) qué es lo que le pertenece 'gramaticalmente', rígidamente, y qué no. La propia (y famosa) noción wittgensteiniana de "pa- recidos de familia" (Familienáhnlichkeiten)33 abundaría en esta vaguedad de cualquier regla o concepto por sí solos. Somos los seres humanos, y no una gramática ya dada, quienes decidimos al final como autoridad los límites pre- cisos entre lo correcto y lo incorrecto.34 Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz 33 En torno a las dos principales interpretaciones de esta noción, véase Bambrough (1 9 6 6 ) y Packard (1975), por un lado, y Wennerberg (1967), por otro. 34 Puede hallarse un desarrollo más amplio de este apartado 3.5 . en el apartado 1.6. de Quintana Paz(2014). 132 Wittgenstein como destructor La identidad com o autoridad metafísica Uno de los términos filosóficos con más éxito en la historia de la filosofía es probablemente el de 'identidad'. Aunque a Wittgenstein no le solía preo- cupar en exceso confrontarse con sus antecedentes en tal historia y llegó a blasonar de no haber leídojamás una línea de Aristóteles (Monk, 1991 ,496), lo cierto es que él tampoco dejó pasar la ocasión de confrontarse con este tér- mino para destruirlo siempre que se ansíe usar como referente metafísico.3 *5 Su manera favorita de hacerlo fue, como de costumbre, fijarse en casos con- cretos de uso de la idea de identidad en las actividades humanas; por ejemplo,36 cuando se le indica a alguien, tras mostrarle unos cuantos casos de aplicación de una regla, que "siga igual" o "haga lo mismo" ( p u . § 185; BrB. ii, §4-5). Witt- genstein argumenta que en realidad nunca podemos saber exactamente a qué se refiere ese "lo mismo", pues evidentemente nunca se trata de "exactamente lo mismo". Son los demás agentes humanos los que pueden dejamos claro a qué se refieren cuando pedían "lo mismo", no una idea metafísica (e independiente de ellos) de "mismidad". La postmetafísica de nuevo sale pues aquí revalidada.37 La com unidad propia com o autoridad metafísica Otra autoridad metafísica cuyas invocaciones resultan recientemente pujantes tanto desde parajes comunitaristas como relativistas es la de la co- munidad humana a que uno pertenece. Y, en este caso, de nuevo nos encontra- mos con el avatar de que hayan sido no escasos los lectores wittgensteinianos 33 El comúnmente reconocido como el otro gran filósofo del siglo xx, Martin Heidegger, también se ocupó minuciosamente de la noción identidad con aires no muy disímiles a los del propio W itt- genstein: véase Lívingston (2003). Y nuestro autor vienés había aportado ya interesantes contribucionesa la noción de identidad, en lógica, durante su "primera etapa", la del Tractatus (Hernández, 2008). 36 Otros ejemplos podrían haber sido el rechazo de Wittgenstein al uso filosófico de la noción de "igualdad" en el sentido de "identidad de algo consigo mismo", por suponerlo confuso, "inútil" y propenso a la metafísica (pu. §215-216). Para los numerosos problemas que tiene en general la idea de "lo mismo" según Wittgenstein véase Pitcher (1972). 37 Puede hallarse un desarrollo más amplio de este apartado 3.6. en Quintana Paz (2008b) y en el apartado 1.7.1. de Quintana Paz (2014). 133 (Maclntyre, 1992) que hayan creído hallar en el filósofo vienes sustento a esta tesis metafísica (metafísica por cuanto, aunque en este caso la autoridad se ubique en un conjunto de humanos, este conjunto de humanos pertinente para ejercer tal autoridad viene predeterminado por el lugar en que se halle o haya nacido uno o 'pertenezca'; por lo tanto es independiente de lo que cada uno hagamos). W ittgenstein, sin embargo, que personalmente creía que un filósofo debía abstenerse de formar parte de ninguna "comunidad de pensamiento" (z: §455), nos proporcionó merced a su ya citada idea de "parecidos de fami- lia", o sus dudas sobre la posibilidad de fijar límites exactos ( p u : § 8 8 ) , apoyo a la idea de que las comunidades humanas actuales están indefectiblemente abocadas a someterse a lo que Touraine (19 7 8 ) llamó "sociología perma- nente"; esto es, a una incesante interpretación y reinterpretación de sus pro- pios límites y contenidos.38 Interpretación y reinterpretación que sin duda efectúan sus propios miembros; por lo que defender que la comunidad como tal puede aspirar a algún tipo de autoridad por encima e independiente de las acciones de estos resulta desdeñable.39 Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz Conclusión Al ir leyendo, en el anterior apartado 3, cuáles son los diferentes pilares del pensamiento metafísico que W ittgenstein se afanó en destruir, al lector quizá le haya asomado más de una vez la sospecha de que dos o más de ellos se hallaban íntimamente relacionados entre sí; que, por ejemplo, combatir contra las entidades mentales como autoridad epistémica (apartado 3.1.) fa- cilitaba el repudiar también los criterios a los que solo un individuo tiene ac- ceso acasojusto poreso, porque son intemosa ese individuo (apartado 3.3.); ---------------------a--------------------------- !8 Véase también, en este mismo sentido, el capítulo 5 de Lyotard (1979). 39 Puede hallarse un desarrollo más amplio de este apartado 3.7. en Quintana Paz (2005c) y en el apartado 1.7.2. de Quintana Paz (2014). También he trabajado sobre una idea de comunidad siem- pre abierta a su propia reinterpretación en Quintana Paz (2015). En el apartado 1.7.3. de Quintana Paz (2014) aparece otra instancia metafísica, los 'ideales', que no nos detendremos a reseñar en este artículo que el lector tiene ahora entre manos por cuanto creemos que no seria difícil verla subsu- mida en los argumentos ya esbozados en el resto de este apartado 3. 134 Wittgenstein como destructor o que estar en contra de una idea metafísica de identidad (apartado 3 .6 .) se veía facilitado si previamente hemos rechazado que haya cosas ahí afuera "en sí mismas", independientes de nuestras interpretaciones de cada caso (apar- tado 3.4.). Tal sospecha no es vituperable como ejemplo alguno de excesiva suspicacia: de hecho, el que los diferentes temas que Wittgenstein aborda se hallen interconectados y unos impliquen a otros no es sino parte de esa "ma- raña" a que hemos aludido previamente de "presunciones tácitas, intuicio- nes y metáforas" interrelacionadas que caracterizan a la metafísica. Y que, como tratamos de justificar en el apartado 2, explican el peculiarísimo modo en que Wittgenstein escribe. "Wittgenstein, en efecto, no desarrolló una te- oría precisa respecto a su método, como respecto a nada" (Reguera, 1983, 335); en este artículo hemos intentado explicar someramente esa primera teo- ría a que alude Reguera (una 'teoría' de su método 'destructivo'); una teoría más precisa sobre el resto de cosas que preocuparon a Wittgenstein queda, ya, para otros trabajos a los que solo hemos podido ir aludiendo aquí. 135 Abreviaturas de las obras de W ittgenstein citadas por parágrafo o capítulos num erados (el resto de obras de W ittgenstein, citadas por página, se incluyen en la bibliografía general): Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz BrB. "The Brown Book". En Preliminary Studíesfor the "Philosophical Investigations ", Generally Known as the Blue and Brown Books. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1 9 5 8 ,pp. 75-185. bgm. Bemerkungen überdie Grundlagen der Mathematik / Remarks on the Fun- damente o/Mathematics (segunda edición de G. Elisabeth M. Anscombe, Rush Rheesy Georg H . von Wright). Oxford, Basil Blackwell,1978 . bpp i. Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie/ Remarks on the Philosophy ojPsychology, vol. I (edición de G. Elisabeth Anscombe y Georg H. von Wright). Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980. lfm . Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of theMathematics, Cambridge 1939 (edición de Cora Diamond). Hassocks.Harvester Press, 1976. LSI. LetzteSchriftenzur Philosophie der Psychologie. Vorstudien zum zweiten Teil der"Philosophischen Untersuchungen" / Last Writings on the Philosophy o f Psycho- logy. Preliminary StudiesforPartuof "Philosophical Investigations", vol. I (edición de Georg H. von Wright y HeikkiNyman). Oxford,Basil Blackwell, 1982. pu. Philosophische Untersuchungen / Philosophical Investigations (segunda edi- ción de G. Elisabeth M. Anscombe y Rush Rhees). Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1958. tlp. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus / Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung. Lon- dres: Routledge&Kegan Paul, 1922. vb. Vermischte Bemerkungen/Culture and Valué (edición de GeorgH. von Wright con la colaboración de Heikki Nyman). Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980. z. Zettel (edición de G. Elisabeth M. Anscombe y GeorgH. von Wright). O x- ford, Basil Blackwell, 1967. 136 Wittgenstein como destructor Bibliografía Alonso Puelles, Andoni, El arte de lo indecible. (Wittgensteiny las vanguar- dias). Cáceres, Universidad de Extremadura, 2002. Anónimo, "The HatredsofPhilosophers",en TheEconomist, 2 (enero), 1960, pp. 15-16. Anscombe, G. E lisabeth M ., An Introductíon to Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Lon- dres, HutchinsonUniversity Library, 1959. -------------- "Rules, Rights and Promises", en Peter A. French-Theodore E. Jr. Uehling-Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Studies in Ethical Theory. MidwestStudies in Philosophy, vo\. m. Morris, Universityof Minnesota, 1978, pp. 318323 . Apel, Karl-O tto, "II problema dell'evidenza fenomenologica alia luce di una semiótica trascendentale", en Gianni Vattimo (ed.), Filosofía '88. Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1989, pp. 5-40. Apel, Karl-O tto , "Wittgenstein und Heidegger: Kritische Wiederholung und Ergánzung eines Vergleichs", en BrianF. McGuinness (ed.), DerLówe spricht... und wir kónnen ihn nicht verstehen. EinSymposium ander Universítát Frankfurtanlásslichdeshundertsten GeburtstagvonLudwig Wittgenstein. Franc- fort del Meno, Suhrkamp,1 9 9 1 , pp. 27-68. Arrington , Robert L., "Sign-Post Scepticism", en Klaus Puhl (ed.), Meaning Scepticism. Berlín-NuevaYork, WalterdeGruyter, 1991, pp. 13-33. Baker, Gordon P y Peter M.S. Hacker, Scepticism, Rules and Language. O x- ford, Basil Blackwell. Baker, Gordon P y Peter M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein, Rules, GrammarandNecessity :AnAnalytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1985. Baldini, Massimo, Elogio del silenzio e delta parola: ifilosofi, i mistici e i poeti. SoveriaMannelli , Rubbettino Editore, 2005. Bambrough, Renford, "Universals and Family Resemblances", en George Pitcher (ed.), Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations. Garden City, Doubleday , 1966, pp. 186-204. Black, Max, "Wittgenstein's Language Games", en Stuart G. Shanker: Ludwig Wittgenstein. CriticalAssessments,vol. 2. Londres, CroomHelm, 1986. Blackburn, Simón, Spreadingthe World. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984. Blackburn, Simón, "Wittgenstein's Irrealism", en Rudolf H alleryjohannes Brandl(eds.), Wittgenstein: eineNeubewertung. AktendesM. Wittgenstein-Symposiums /Wittgenstein: Towards a Re-evaluation. Proceedings ojthe 14th Internatio- nal Wittgenstein-Symposium. Viena, Hólder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1990. -------------- "Wittgenstein and Minimalism", en Brian Garre tt y Ke vin Mulligan (eds.), Themesjrom Wittgenstein. Workíng Papers in Philosophy, n. 4. Canberra, Philosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, anu, 1993, pp. 1 -14. Bloor, David, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory o f Knowledge Londres-Nueva York, Macmillan-Columbia University Press, 1983. ---------------"Left and Right W ittgenstenians", en Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Practice and Culture. Chicago-Londres, University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 266-282 . ---------------Wittgenstein, Rules andlnstitutions. Londres, Routledge&Kegan Paul, 1997. Bouveresse,Jacques, Lem ythedel'intériorité. Expérience,significaronetlangage privé chezWittgenstein. París, Editions de Minuit, 1987. Brandom, RobertB ., MakingitExplicit: Reasoníng, Representing, andDiscursiveCommitment . Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1994. Britton, Karl, "Portrait of a Philosopher", en KuangT. Fannfed .), Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Man and his Philosophy. Nuevajersey-Sussex, Humanities Press-Harvester Press, 1967, pp. 60-61. Canfield,John V , "Wittgenstein and Zen", en Philosophy, 5 0 ,1975 . pp. 383408 . Cavell, Stanley, The Claim o/Reason. Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy . Oxford-Nueva York, Clarendon Press-Oxford University Press, 1979. Collins, Arthur W ., "On the Paradox Kripke Finds in Wittgenstein", en Peter A. French-Theodore E. Jr. Uehling-Howard K. Wettsteinfeds.), TheWittgenstein Legacy: MidwestStudies in Philosophy, vol. xvii. Notre Dame, University of NotreDamêPress, 1 9 9 2 ,pp. 74-88. C rary, Alice, "Wittgenstein s Philosophy in Relation to Political Thought", enAlice Crary ¿zRupert Readfeds.), The New Wittgenstein. London, Routledge ,2000. Davidson, Donald, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme", en Inquiries into TruthandInterpretaron. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, pp. 183-198. MiguelÁngel QuíntanaPaz 138 Wittgenstein como destructor Derrida.Jacques, Ladissémination. París, ÉditionsduSeuil, 1972. Diamond, Cora, "Rules: Looking in the Right Place", en Dewi Z. Phillips y Peter Winch (eds.), Wittgenstein: Attention to Particulars. Essays in Honourof RushRhees (1905-89). Londres, Macmillan, 1989, pp. 12-34. --------------"Wittgenstein and Metaphysics", en The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, PhilosophyandtheMind. Cambridge, The mitPress, 1991, pp. 13-38. --------------"Realism and the Realistic Spirit", en The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, PhilosophyandtheMind. Cambridge, The mit Press, 1 9 9 1 ,pp. 39-72. Drury, Maurice O 'Connor, "Some Notes on Conversations with Wittgens- tein", en The Danger ofWords and Writíngs on Wittgenstein (edición de David Berman,MichaelFitzgeraldyJohnHayes). Bristol, Thoemmes Press, 1996, pp. 76-96. ---------------"Conversations with W ittgenstein", en The Danger ofWords and Writings on Wittgenstein (ed. David Berman, Michael Fitzgerald y John Hayes). Bristol, Thoemmes Press, 1996, pp. 97-215. Dummett, Michael A. E., Trulh and Other Enigmas. Londres, Duckworth, 1978. E dwards, J ames C ., Ethics without Philosophy. Wittgenstein and the Moral Life. Tampa, University Presses of Florida ,1982 . -------------TheAuthority ofLanguage: Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and the ThreatoJ Philosophical Nihilism. Tampa, University of South Florida Press, 1990. EspositoJ oseph, "Lecture 7: Semiosis and the ProofofPragmaticism", Peirce 's Theory of Semiosis: Toward a Logic of Mutual Affection. Cyber Semiotic Institute Home Page: The Semiotic ReviewofBooks. http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/epc /srb/cyber/esp7.html, 1999. F erraterMora, J osé, "Wittgenstein o la destrucción". Realidad, 1 3 ,1 9 4 9 , p p .1-12. ---------------"Wittgenstein, oder die Destruktion", en AA.VV, Wittgenstein: Schriften/Beiheft: Arbeiten überWittgenstein. Fráncfort del Meno, Suhrkamp, 1 9 6 9 ,p p .21-29. F inch, H. Le Roy, Wittgenstein: The Later Philosophy. An Expositionof the "Phi- losophical Investigations". Atlantic Highlands, Humanities Press, 1977. F ogelin, RobertJ. , Wittgenstein. Londres-Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976. i. 139 García Suárez, Alfonso, La lógica de la experiencia: Wittgensteiny el problema del lenguaje privado. Madrid, Tecnos, 1976. Garver, Newton, "Form of Life ín Wittgenstein's Later Works", en Dialéctica, 44, n. 1 -2 ,1 9 9 0 ,pp. 175-201. ---------------This Complicated Form ojLije. Essays on Wittgenstein. Chicago-La Salle, Open Court, 1994. ---------------"Naturalism and Transcendentality: The Case o f'Form of Life'". En SourenTeghrarian (ed.), Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy. Bristol ,Thoemmes Press, 1 9 9 4 ,pp. 41-69. Giddens, Anthony, Central Problems in Social Theory. Berkeley-Los Ángeles, University of California Press, 1979. Glock, Hans-Johann , The Wittgenstein Dictionary. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1996. Grewendorf, Gunther, "Is W ittgenstein's Private Language Argument Tri- vial?", en Ratio, 2 ,1 9 7 9 ,pp. 149-161. GrondinJ ean, Sources o/Hermeneutics. Albany, suny Press, 1995. Habermas, J ürgen, "Die Philosophie ais Platzhalter und Interpret", en M oralbewusstsein und kom munikatives Handeln. Fráncfort del Meno, Suhrkamp, 1983, pp. 9-28. Habermas, J ürgen, "Wahrheitstheorien", en Vorstudien und Ergánzungen zur Theoriedes kommunikativen Handelns. Fráncfort del Meno, Suhrkamp, 1984, pp. 127-183. ---------------Nachmetaphysiches Denken: PhilosophischeAufsátze. Fráncfort del Meno, Suhrkamp, 1988. -------------- "Rortys pragmatische Wende", en DeutscheZeitschriftfür Philoso- phie, v o l.44 ,n . 5 ,1 9 9 6 ,pp. 715-741 . FIacker, Peter M ,S., Insight and ¡Ilusión. Themes in the Philosophy o f Wittgens- tein. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971. Hayes, J ohn , "W ittgenstein's Pupil: The Writings of Maurice O 'Connor Drury", erf Maurice O 'Connor Drury, The Danger o f Words and Writings on Wittgenstein (ed. David Berman, Michael Fitzgerald y joh n Hayes). Bristol, Thoemmes Press, 1 9 9 6 , ix-xliv. Hernández Márquez, Víctor M., "Wittgenstein y la identidad lógica", en Es- teban Gasson Lara ( e d Encuentros con Wittgenstein. Chihuahua, Universi- dad Autónoma de Chihuahua, 2008 , pp. 55-87. Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz 140 Wittgenstein como destructor Hertzberg, Lars, "Primitive Reactions Logic orAnthropology", en Peter A. French-Theodore E. Jr. Uehling-Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), The Wittgens- tein Legacy: MidwestStudies in Philosophy, vol. xvn. Notre Dame, University of Notre Dame Press, 1992, pp. 24-39. Holt, Robín, Wittgenstein, Politics and Human Rights. Londres-NuevaYork, Routledge & Kegan Paul-London School of Economics, 1997. Hund.J ohn, "Sociologism and Philosophy", en BritishJournal ofSociology, vol. 41, n. 2 (junio), 1 9 9 0 ,pp. 197-224. Hunter,John E M., "Logical Compukion", enEssaysa/ter Wittgenstein. TorontoBuffalo , University ofToronto Press, 1973, pp. 171-202. Jastrow, J oseph, Fací and Pable in Psychology. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1990. J ohnston, W illiam M., "The Vienna School of Aphorists 1880-1930: Reflections on a Neglected Genre", en Gerald Chapple y Hans H. Schulte (eds.), The Turn of the Century: Germán Literature andArt 1890-1915. Bonn, Bouvier, 1981. Kampits, Peter, "Destruktionen, Hermeneutikund System. Neue Wittgensteininterpretationen des deutschen Sprachraumes", en Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger , 3 1 ,1 9 7 8 , pp. 82-92. Kierkegaard, Soren, "En forste og sidste forklaring/Una primera y última aclaración", en Javier Teira Lafuente, "La pseudonimia en la obra de Kierke- gaard", Cuadernos Azafea, 1 ,1 9 9 6 ,pp. 93-105. Kripke, Saúl A., Wittgenstein on Rules and Prívate Language. An Elementary Exposition . Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1982. Latour, Bruno, N ous n'avons jam ais été modernes. París, La Découverte, 1991. Lazerowitz, Morris, The Structure o f Metaphysics. Londres, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1995. Livingston, Paul, "Thinkingand Being: Heidegger and Wittgenstein on Machination and Lived-Experience", en Inquiry, vol. 46, n. 3 ,2003 , pp. 324-345. Lukács, Gyórgy, DieZerstórungderVernunft. Berlín, Aufbau-Verlag, 1954. Lyotard.Jean-F rancois, Laconditionpostmoderne. Rapportsurlesavoir. París, Éditionsde Minuit, 1979. MacIntyre, Alasdair,AfterVirtue. Londres, Duckworth, 1981. -------------- "Colors, Culture and Practices", en Peter A. French-Theodore E. Jr. Uehling-Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), The Wittgenstein Legacy: MidwestStudies 141 in Philosophy, vol. xvn. Notre Dame, University ofNotre Dame Press, 1992, p p .1-23. Macksoud, S. J ohn, "Ludwig Wittgenstein, Radical Operationalism and Rhetorical Stance". En Donald G. Douglas (ed.),Philosophers on Rhetoríc: Traditional and Emerging Views. Skokie, National Textbook Company, 1975, p p .179-191. McDowell, J ohn , Mind and World. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1994. ---------------"One Strand in the Prívate Language Argument", en Mind, Valué andReality. Cambridge-Londres, HarvardUniversityPress, 1998, pp. 285303 . McGinn, Colín, Wittgenstein on Meaning.An Interpretation and an Evaluation. Oxford, BasilBlackwell, 1984. McGuinness, Brian E , '"Der Lówe spricht... und wir kónnen ihn nicht versteherí , Zu Wittgensteins hundertstem Geburtstag", en Brian F. McGuinness (ed.), Der Lówe spricht... und wir kónnen ihn nicht verstehen. Ein Symposium an der Universitát Frankfurt anlásslich des hundertsten Geburtstag von Ludwig Witt- genstein . Francfort del Meno, Suhrkamp,1 9 9 1 , pp. 9-19. Monk, Ray, Wittgenstein: The Duty of a Genius. Londres, Vintage, 1991. Moore, George E ., "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1 9 3 0 -3 3 ", en Mind, vol. 63, 1 9 5 4 ,pp. 1 -1 5 ,(partei); 1 9 5 4 ,pp. 2 8 9 -3 1 5 ,(parten);vol. 6 4 ,1 9 5 5 ,pp. 127 y 264, (parte iii). Musil,Robert, DerMannohne Eigenschaften,vol. 1 ,1930 , Berlín, Rowohlt; vol. 2 ,1 9 3 3 , Berlín, Rowohlt; vol. 3 ,1 9 4 3 , Lausana, Rowohlt. Nagel, T homas, TheViewfrom Nowhefe. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986. Necker, Louis A ., "Observations on Some Remarkable Optical Phaenomena seen in Switzerland; and on an Optical Phaenomenon which occurs on viewing a figure of a crystal or geometical solid", en London and Edinburgh Philosophical Magazine andJournal of Science, 1 ,1 8 3 2 , pp. 329-337 . Newbold, Mark, MarkNewbold'sAnimated Necker Cube. Mark's Home Page: Dogfeathers.com. http://dogfeathers.com/java/necker.html, 1996. Orbán. J olán, Language Games, Writing Games Wittgenstein and Derrida: A ComparativeStudy. The Paideia Project, Twentieth World Congress in Philo- sophy: Boston University http ://www.bu. edu/wcp/Papers/Lang/LangOrba. htm , 1998. Migue! Ángel Quintana Paz L42 Pací, Enzo, "Negativitá e positivitá di Wittgenstein", en Aut aut, 9 ,1 9 5 2 , pp. 252-256. ---------------"Wittgenstein e la nevrosi della filosofia", en Tempo e relazione. Turín,Taylor, 1954. Packard, DennisJ. , "A Note on Wittgenstein and Cyclical Comparatives", en Analysis, 3 6 ,1 9 7 5 , pp. 37-40. Peirce, Charles S .,"Manuscript 6 9 2 ", en The Charles S. PeircePapers [32 rollos de micro filmes conservados en la Houghton Library de la Universidad de Har- vard, y citados según el catálogo de Robin, Richard S ,,Annotated Catalogue oj the Papersof Charles Sanders Peirce. Amherst,UniversityofMassachusetts, 1967 (también accesible en Peirce Edition Project: Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis. http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/web/ro-bin/robin.htm., 1998); y Robin, Richard S., "The Peirce Papers: ASupplementary Catalogue", en Transactionsof the Charles S. Peirce Society, 7 ,1971 , pp. 37-57], Pereda Falache, Carlos, Vértigos arguméntales. Una ética de la disputa. Bar- celona, Anthropos, 1994. Phillips, Dewi Z ., "On Wanting to Compare Wittgenstein and Zen", en Philosophy , 5 2 ,1 9 7 7 , pp. 338-343. -------------Belief, Change and Forms o j Life. Basingstoke.Macmillan, 1986. -------------- "Authorship and Authenticity: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein", en Peter A. French-Theodore E. Jr. Uehling-Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), The Wittgenstein Legacy: Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. xvii. Notre Dame, UniversityofNotre Dame Press, 1992, pp. 177-192. -------------Philosophy's Cool Place. Ithaca, CornellUniversity Press, 1999. P iich er , George, "About the same", en Alice Ambrose y Morris Lazerowitz (eds.), Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophy and Language. Londres-NuevaYork, George Alien and Unwin-Humanities Press, 1 9 7 2 ,pp. 120-139. Putnam,H ilary, "Why isn't a Ready-Made World?", enSynthese, 5 1 ,1 9 8 2 , pp. 141-167. -------------RealismwithaHumanFace. Cambridge, HarvardUniversityPress, 1990. Quintana Paz, Miguel Ángel, "Influencia del pensamiento indio en F. W itt- genstein", en Ana Agud, N. Alberto Cantera Glera y Francisco Rubio Oreci11a (eds.), Actas del II Encuentro Español de Indoiogía. León, Ceralayn, 1998, pp. 187-197. Wittgenstein como destructor 143 Quintana Paz, Miguel Ángel, "Dos problemas del universalismo ético, y una solución. O de las curiosas ideas de los drusos sobre los chinos y de sus con- comitancias en ciertos filósofos morales contemporáneos", en Quintín Ra- cionero y Pablo Perera (eds.), Pensar la comunidad. Madrid, Dykinson, 2002, p p .223-264. -------------- "Introducción", en Ludwig Wittgenstein y Oets Kolk Bouwsma, Úl- timas conversaciones. Salamanca, Sígueme, 2004, pp. 11-16. ---------------"Entimemas y la tortuga de Carroll, o el problema de cómo llegar a ser determinados por reglas racionales", en A A .W , ¿Qué Cultura?, vol. I. Madrid, Ediciones sm, 2005 , pp. 145-159. ---------------"Euniversalismo di alcuni filosofi morali contemporanei (e le cu- rióse idee dei drusi sui cinesi)", en Filosofía e Questioni Pubbliche, vol. X, n. 2, 2 0 0 5 , pp. 75-102. -------------- "Comunidad", en Andrés Ortiz-Osés y Patxi Lanceros (eds.), Cla- ves de hermenéutica. Paralafilosofía, laculturay lasociedad. Bilbao, Universi- dad de Deusto, 2005 , pp. 71-82. ---------------"Máquinas como símbolos: Kant, Wittgenstein y la tesis disposicionalista en torno a la normatividad", en Ana María Andaluz Romanillos (ed.), Kant. Razóny experiencia. Salamanca, Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, 2005 , pp. 625-636 . ---------------"N o-interpretación", en Andrés Ortiz-Osés y Patxi Lanceros (eds.), Claves de hermenéutica. Para lafilosofia, laculturay lasociedad. Bilbao, Universidad de Deusto, 2005 , pp. 427-438 . ---------------"W ittgenstein 2006 . Un proemio sobre el significado del pensa- miento wittgensteiniano para nuestros trabajos y días", en Volubilis, n. 13, 2 0 0 6 , p p .90-118 . -------------- "De las normas como compromisos prácticos, y de la locura como incumplimiento de tales com prom isos", en Isegoría, n. 34 (enero-junio), 2006 , pp. 243-259 . --------------- "A vueltas con la herm enéutica rehabilitación de la filosofía práctica (reflexiones cabe W ittgenstein)", en Gianni Vattimo, Teresa Oñate, Amanda Núñez y Francisco Arenas-Dolz (eds.), El mito del Uno. Horizontes de latinidad. Hermenéutica de civilizaciones, vol. I. Madrid, Dykinson, 2008 , pp. 427-448 . -------------- "Pequeña reflexión de traza wittgensteiniana sobre hermenéutica yeducación", enjoaquín Esteban Ortega (ed.), Cultura, hermenéutica y eduMiguel Angel Quintana Paz 144 cación. Valladolid, Universidad Europea Miguel de Cervantes, 2 0 0 8 , pp. 195-202. -------------- "¿Era Wittgenstein pragmatista, los pragmatistas son wittgensteinianos o ni una cosa ni la otra?: Sobre reglas, verdades y acciones sociales", en (Daimon). Revista de Filosofía, v ol. supl. 3 ,2 0 1 0 ,p p . 275-292. ---------------"Interpretar y traducir: en diálogo con la hermenéutica analó- gica", en Gabriela Hernández Garda (com p .), Hermenéutica analógica: sím- bolo e imagen. México, Facultad de Filosofíay Letras, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2010, pp. 39-70. ---------------Normatividad, interpretacióny praxis. Wittgenstein en ungiro hermenéulico-nihilista. Valladolid, Universidad Europea Miguel de Cervantes, 2014. ------------------ " Me>KKyjibTypHaM KOMMyHHKattH» 3 a npegejiaMM pejmTHBH3Ma h 3THopeHTpn3Ma", en AA. W , Actas del II Congreso Internacional sobre Proble- mas Actuales de la Filología en el Espacio Hispano-Ruso de Investigación "La iden- tidad nacional a través del diálogo entre culturas". Rostov del Don, Universidad Federal del Sur (en prensa), 2015. Reguera, Isidoro, La miseria de la razón. El primer Wittgenstein. Madrid, Taurus , 1980. -------------- "Ludwig Wittgenstein, la razón de la miseria", en José Manuel Bermudo Ávila (ed.), Los filósofos y sus filosofías, vol. 3. Barcelona, Vicens Vives, 1983, pp. 333-380. ---------------"Was heifit 'philosophieren' für Wittgenstein?", en Jesús Padilla Gálvez y Raimundo Drudis Baldrich (eds.), Wittgensteiny el Círculo de Viena /Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis. Cuenca, Ediciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 1998, pp. 183-193. -------------- "Dos matones intelectuales" (reseña de David Edmonds y john Eidinow, El atizador de Wittgenstein. Una jugada incompleta entre Wittgensteiny Popper, traducción de María Morrás. Barcelona, Península), en Babelia, dia- rio ElPaís, 13de octubre,2001. -------------LudwigWittgenstein: unensayoasucosta. Madrid, Edaf, 2002. Richter, Duncan, HistoricalDictionary of Wittgenstein's Philosophy. Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield ,2014 . Rorty, Richard M ., Philosophy and theMirrorofNature. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979. Wittgenstein como destractor 145 -------------ConsequencesofPragmatism. Mineápolis, Harvester, 1982. ---------------"Pragmatism as Anti-Representationalism", en John P Murphy, Pragmatism:FromPeirce toDavidson. Boulder, WestviewPress, 1990, pp. 1-6. Rossi-Landi, F erruccio, "Per un uso marxiano di W ittgenstein", en II linguaggiocomelavoroecomemercato . Milán, Bompiani, 1973, pp. 11-60. Ryle, Gilbert, "Systematically Misleading Expressions", en Proceedíngs of the Añstotelian Sociely, 3 2 ,1 0 3 2 , pp. 139-170. Sa ín e , Glenda L ., "Construcción y destrucción: las dos caras de la filosofía de Wittgenstein", en Oscar Nudler, María Angélica Fierro y Glenda L. Satne, La filosofía a través del espejo: Estudios metafilosóficos. Buenos Aires, Miño y Dávila , 1 0 1 2 ,pp. 231-258 . Schnitzler, Arthur, Buch derSprüche und Bedenken. Aphorismen und Frag- mente. Viena, Phaidon-Verlag, 1927. Schweidler, W alter, WittgensteinsPhilosophiebegriff. Munich, Alber, 1983. Selmann, J ames D., "The Koan: A Language Game", en Indian Philosophical Quarterly, 7 ,1 9 7 9 , pp. 1-9. Shibles, W arren, Wittgenstein, Language and Philosophy. Dubuque, Kendall /HuntPublishingCo, 1969. Schulz, W alter, Wittgenstein: die Negation der Philosophie. Pfullingen, Neske, 1967. Smart. J ohn J .C ., "W ittgenstein, Following a Rule, and Scientific Psychology ", en Edna Ullmann-Margalit (ed.), The Scientific Enterprise. DordrechtBoston ,KluwerAcademicPublishers, 1 9 9 2 ,pp. 123-137. Staten, Henry, Wittgenstein and Derrida. Oxford, BasilBlackwell, 1985. Stone, Martin, "Wittgenstein on Deconstruction", en Alice Crary y Rubert Read, The New Wittgenstein. Londres, Routledge, 2002 , pp. 83-117. Touraine, Alain, La voixet le regará. París, Seuil, 1978. Thornton, Stephen, "Wittgenstein sans the Prívate Language Argument", en Cogito, vol. 10, n. 1 ,1996 . U eda, Shisuteru, "Schweigen und Sprechen tm Zen-Buddhismus", en Tilo Schabert y Remi Brague (eds.), Die Macht des Wortes. Munich, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1996. Vattimo, Giann, IIsoggettoe la maschera. Nietzsche e ilproblema della líberazione . Milán, Bompiani, 1974. Miguel Ángel Quintana Paz 146 -------------- "Apología del nichilismo", en Lafinedella modernitá. Milán, Garzanti, 1985, pp. 27-38. -------------IntroduzioneaNietzsche. Roma-Bari,Laterza, 1985. -------------- "Metafísica, violenza, secolarizzazione", en Gianni Vattimo (ed.), Filoso/ia'86. Roma-Bari,Laterza, 1987, pp. 71-94. -------------- "Heideggers Nihilismus: Nietzsche ais Interpret Heideggers", en Friedrich W von Hermann y Walter Biemel (eds), Kunst und Technik. Gedáchtnisschriftzum 100. Geburtstagvon Martin Heidegger. Fráncfort del Meno, Klostermann, 1989. -------------Oltrel'interpretazione. Il significato deU'ermeneuticaperlafilosofia. Roma-Bari,Laterza, 1994. W ein , H ermann, "Le monde du pensable et le langage", en Revue de Métaphysiqueetde Morale, 5 6 ,1961, pp. 102-115. W ennerberg, Hjalmar, "The Conceptof Family Resemblance in Wittgenstein 's LaterPhilosophy", en Theotia, 3 3 ,1 9 6 7 , pp. 107-132. W ienpahl, Paul D., "Zen and the W orkof Wittgenstein", en Chicago Review, 1 2 ,1 9 5 8 ,pp. 67-72. W illiams, Meredith, "Blind Obedience: Rules, Community and the Indivi- dual", en Klaus Puhl (ed.),MeaningScepticism. Berlín-Nueva York, Walter de Gruyter, 1991, pp. 93-125. W isdomJ ohn 0.,PhilosophyandPsychoanalysis, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1953. W ittgenstein, Ludwig, "The Blue Book", en Preliminary Studies forthe "Philosophical Investigations ", Generally Known as the Blue andBrown Books. O x- ford, Basil Blackwell, 1958, pp. 1-74. -------------Wittgenstein'sLectures, Cambridge 1930-1932(ed. DesmondLeea partir de las notas de John King y Desmond Lee). Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1980. -------------- "Some Hitherto Unpublished Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein to Georg Henrik von Wright" (con comentarios de Georg H. von Wright), en The Cambridge Review, vol. 104 (28 de febrero), 1983, pp. 56-64. -------------- "The 'BigTypescript"' (ed. parcial de ts 213 por Heikki Nyman), enjam es C. Klaggey Alfred Nordmann (eds.), Philosophical Occasions 19121951 . Indianápolis, Hackett, 1993, pp. 160-199. Zhok, Andrea, Hética del método: saggio su Ludwig Wittgenstein. Milán, Mime- sis, 2001 Wittgenstein como destructor

Risk and Decision Analysis 1 (2009) 73–74 73 DOI 10.3233/RDA-2009-0011 IOS Press Foreword Anticipation comes of age Mihai Nadin antÉ – Institute for Research in Anticipatory Systems, University of Texas at Dallas, Dallas, TX, USA In the context of contemporary science, we know that a particular domain of inquiry is coming of age once it is subject to brain imaging. Irony aside, in an article published in Neuroimage, Fukui and Murai [1] report on risk anticipation, making this observation: insensitivity to future consequences, after damage to the human prefrontal cortex, affects the anticipation of risk. Writing these introductory lines to the issue that our Journal dedicates to Anticipation and Risk Assessment, I cannot avoid making the connection to the current economic crisis in the USA (sub-prime mortgages, troubled financial institutions, excess energy consumption, inflation, etc.). The people's pre-fontal cortex – to use a bit of analogy – (or at least that of the people in power) seems to be damaged. If anything can be said with certainty, the risks involved in less than responsible mortgage lending or speculative futures trading, or hedging do not take anticipation into consideration. Interestingly enough, the year I was born, Willford Isbell King [2] published "The Causes of Economic Fluctuations: Possibilities of Anticipation and Control". In all fairness, King's book is only of documentary interest for a world that faces risk in ways that no one ever imagined – including risk management as a profitmaking machine. However, during King's time, there was no scientific focus on anticipation and anticipatory processes. It is only after Robert Rosen dedicated a number of years (starting in 1972), in affiliation with the (in the meanwhile defunct) Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions (Santa Barbara, CA) that the word Anticipation was elevated to what in science is called a concept. Institute members debated whether anticipation could be of any relevance to society. Parallel to Rosen's work, my own focus on the human being's cognitive condition eventually led to a book that suggested a theory, as well as applied aspects of anticipation (cf. [3,4]). But this is no time to reminisce. Professor Alain Bensoussan and Professor Elisabeth Pate Cornell organized an international conference – Decision and Risk Analysis: Convergence Between Finance and Industry (University of Texas at Dallas, 2007). They entrusted me with organizing a session – Anticipation and Risk Assessment – and the results of this session are submitted to the broader scientific community in this issue. My intention in organizing the session was to take a rather difficult subject of inquiry and bring it as close as possible to applications. Let me mention for the record that one of the participants in this session was Jeffrey V. Nickerson (Center for Decision Technologies, Howe School of Technology Management, Stevens Institute of Technology). It was he who, as one of my graduate students many years ago, brought Rosen's Anticipatory Systems to my attention. In his article ("Anticipation and Sensor Networks"), Nickerson presents an information-science based application intended to mitigate risks associated with enemy intrusions. Lev Goldfarb, together with Ian Scrimger and Reuben Peter-Paul ("ETS as a General Tool for Decision Modeling and Analysis: Planning, Anticipation, and Monitoring") advances his mathematics, meant to represent processes instead of the usual number-based descriptions of the state of affairs in the world. His understanding of anticipation is rather subtle. The reader will easily find ways to generalize from the example the authors chose (an insider's view of a terrorist operation) to many possible applications, using an internal view of a generic planning process. I'm partial to the way in which Jochen Corts and Daniel Hackmann translate the concept of anticipation into economic opportunity ("Information, Antic1569-7371/09/$17.00 © 2009 – IOS Press and the authors. All rights reserved 74 Foreword ipation, and Risk Management: Chances and Risk – The (constant) Fight for Innovation"). My first discussion with Jochen Corts (February 2004, in Wuppertal, Germany) brought up not only my theories of anticipatory systems [5], but also the possibility of applying them as an underlying component of the knowledgedriven economy. Subsequent meetings allowed me to learn from practitioners in engineering and information science, just as it allowed them to better understand how anticipation-driven solutions improve an enterprise's competitive edge. They recognized the risk, which many traditional industries face, of remaining captive to a production model that competitors can easily emulate (China does this with spectacular results), and applied anticipation in order to switch from the industrial model to a knowledge economy alternative. Disappointed that Mike McCready's conference presentation cannot be offered to the reader, I want to at least mention it. The subject of "Music X-Ray – Anticipation and Risk Mitigation in Producing Music" is anticipating success – in particular, how to identify the songs that will be successful in the extremely competitive music market. The PowerPoint presentation he made in Dallas, in order to share with us data from his company and to present the software used for the above-mentioned purpose, never evolved into a text that I could submit to the reader in good faith. But we keep the door open. The risks involved in identifying successful new music (in particular, songs) and in producing a new CD (a major investment that can make or break a label) can be diminished by a good anticipatory evaluation. My own contribution ("Anticipation and Risk – From the inverse problem to reverse computation") might provide an entry point for those without a background in the new field of anticipatory systems. It would be disingenuous to claim that it will be easy reading. As our Journal matures, more contributions to the tenuous relation between risk assessment and anticipation will probably become available. The current economic mess in which we all find ourselves is probably as good as any argument for encouraging the community of risk-focused scholars to integrate anticipatory considerations in their work. References [1] H. Fukui and T. Murai, Functional activity related to risk anticipation during performance of the Iowa Gambling Task, Neuroimage 24(1) (2005), 253–259. [2] W.I. King, The Causes of Economic Fluctuations: Possibilities of Anticipation and Control, Ronald Press Co., New York, 1938. [3] M. Nadin, Mind – Anticipation and Chaos, Milestones in Thought and Discovery, Belser Presse, Stuttgart and Zurich, 1991. [4] R. Rosen, Anticipatory Systems: Philosophical, Mathematical and Methodological Foundations, Pergamon Press, New York, 1985. [5] M. Nadin, Anticipation – The End is Where We Start from, Lars Müller Publishers, Basel, 2003.

PB January 2012 Young India Swami Narasimhananda Gunjan Veda is a voracious reader. She cannot think of a day without reading. Her work in the Planning Commission of India requires a lot of travelling. Away from her collection of books and libraries, she is deprived of books to match her reading pace. As a solution she founded www.indiareads.com, an online library that delivers books to your doorstep. In her early thirties, Gunjan is the face of young India: energetic, enthusiastic, enterprising, innovative, and in charge. Young and Responsible Th e young have always been labelled as irresponsible, immature, and lacking ideals. Growing years and greying hair have always been linked with maturity and wisdom. Old age may bring experience, but it also slows the brain! Th is confl ict of intelligence and experience was aptly described by Lyman Bryson: 'Th e error of youth is to believe that intelligence is a substitute for experience, while the error of age is to believe that experience is a substitute for intelligence.'1 From the state of 'there was nothing I could do and nothing I could say', as in the lines of the popular song 'Young and Foolish' by Arnold B Horwitt, the Indian young have come of age and taken charge. History shows that great people were always young. Jesus, Shankaracharya, Vivekananda, Einstein, or Alexander-all of them achieved greatness before they turned forty. Th e Upanishads speak of the young: 'In the prime of life, good, learned, most expeditious, most strongly built, and most energetic.' 2 Th at the young count is known but, what is so special about the Indian youth? Th ey are the pilots of the development story of a nation with a chequered history of more than sixty years of independence. When speaking of Indian youth one can say 'Young India', or better still 'India is Young', because according to the 2001 Indian census, more than 69 per cent 0f Swami Narasimhananda is a monk of the Advaita Ashrama at its branch in Kolkata. PB January 201244 Prabuddha Bharata62 Indians were less than 34 years old.3 India's population has become younger only in the last decade. Demographically speaking, India is the youngest country in the world. Any discussion or development plan for India should take into account this major chunk of its population. Before understanding the psyche of Indian youth, it will help to understand what being young is like. What is the concept of youth? Who is young? Does it depend solely on age or are there other indicators? Youth is generally categorised as a non-adult phase of life, a phase of growth, and the young are supposed to be still growing, incapable of handling the mature decisions of life by themselves. They are seen as babies sitting in cosy strollers having a peek into the garden of life. However comforting this categorization of the young may be to the old guardians of society, it is too simplistic and inaccurate. Youth is not a rigid concept but a very fluid one. The age of the phases of childhood, adolescence, youth, and adulthood vary from person to person. It also depends on social and cultural backgrounds. While adulthood takes its sweet time to appear in the life of the pampered child of a wealthy parent, it encroaches upon the childhood of the child of the pavementdweller. One is reminded of Swami Vivekananda's letter: 'The Chinese child is quite a philosopher and calmly goes to work at an age when your Indian boy can hardly crawl on all fours. He has learnt the philosophy of necessity too well.' 4 Poverty drove the Chinese child to learn the 'philosophy of necessity'. The Indian youth too has been driven to a faster stepping into adulthood by poverty and changing demographics. Recent studies affirm that youth is a concept not dependent on biological age alone: Age is a concept which is assumed to refer to a biological reality. However, the meaning and the experience of age, and of the process of ageing, is subject to historical and cultural processes. Although each person's life span can be measured 'objectively' by the passing of time, cultural understandings about life stages give the process of growing up, and of ageing, its social meaning. Specific social and political processes provide the frame within which cultural meanings are developed. Both youth and childhood have had and continue to have different meanings depending on young people's social, cultural and political circumstances.5 If the Indian youth was immature and not ready for real life, the country would have been in chaos and would have come to a standstill, with more than 70 per cent of its population in such a state. A tourist coming to India gets to see only young faces all the time. From the cab driver at the airport to the staff at the hotel, from tour guides at historical monuments to the antique shopkeeper, it is young faces everywhere. Sometimes the tourist finds it difficult to find old people. Many business houses in India are headed by women and men under thirty. Some of them were born into great business families like Devita Saraf of Vu Televisions, Lakshmi Venu of Sundaram Clayton, Sindhuja Rajaraman of Seppan, and Alok Kejriwal of Contests2win. Others have built successful business stories from scratch like Phanindra Sarma of Redbus, Sachin Bansal and Binny Bansal of Flipkart, Suhas Gopinath of Globals, Ashwin Ramesh of DailySEOblog, Raj kumar Koneru of Indiainfo, and Sunil Dutt Jha of icmg. The list seems endless. Even in government and public sector undertakings, youth is at the helm of affairs. Indian politics too has a good share of young faces, with some of them even finding a place in the parliament. Indian Youth's Psyche Therefore, the young in India are in charge. But, what is their psyche? What is their lifestyle? A 45PB January 2012 Young India 63 recent account of their lifestyle is not very encouraging: 'Welcome to the lifestyles of the young and the restless where the day never ends, just melts into one another. It starts at 9 a.m. with a hasty toothbrush and continues till well past midnight with a drag of a cigarette. For the average working youngster, this is routine. Add to that the consumption of junk food, smoking, and alcohol- the youth are happily and unabashedly ruining their health, albeit unconsciously. Not surprisingly, lifestyle diseases are on the rise.' 6 Though this may be the lifestyle of the urban youth, the rural youth has a different story. To toil or to study to ensure a comfortable future, the semi-urban and rural youth has to work hard and travel long distances. Here too 'the day never ends', but instead of melting, it seems to drag from one problem to another, from one dream to another-dreams that are uncertain of becoming a reality, but are the only solace in an otherwise drab existence. Some thought leads to the conclusion that Indian youth-urban, semi-urban, and rural-have acquired their psyche from their parents. Who are the parents of the present-day Indian youth? They were born between the 1950s and 1960s in the infant independent India. New vistas were opening up and people were experimenting with new careers, away from the traditional mindset and established archetypes. This entailed migrations from the rural to the urban, from homeland to new places even outside the country. The joint family system was breaking up and so were the values and customs that went with it. It was to the parents of this era that today's youth were born. Indian children are seldom sent to grooming schools, and Indian family values and traditions were always handed down by grannies and grandpas. With none of them around and with both the parents working or striving hard to ensure a better life for their offspring, the children were not given indigenous grooming lessons. All they got was 'moral values' from an education system that was and still is, to a great extent, a colonial remnant that apes Western cultures and remains dissociated from the Indian ethos. This has led to a situation where while the Indian youth is conversant with Mills and Boon, Tintin, Asterix, Alice in Wonderland, and Harry Potter, it is predominantly clueless about Kathasaritsagara, Hitopadesha, and Panchatantra and does not know much of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata beyond the version made popular by television. In many senses Indian youth have spent their childhood away from their native place. A significant number of them are not comfortable with their mother-tongue and all they know of their traditional customs, beliefs, and culture is what little they acquired during annual vacation trips to their 'native-place', at the end of which they brought some keepsakes, less to cherish than to flaunt them to their friends. However, it is not that Indian youth do not want to know their tradition; they do want, as the huge demand for courses on Indian culture among youth evince. Compared to the youth of other nations Indian youth have a greater leaning towards their social mores. A recent study reveals: 'The family remains a key institution in the life-world of Indian youth. One could perhaps argue that even in a situation of expanded choice, youth in India, in contrast to the situation ... where conservative mores were regarded as a function of limited opportunity, would freely adopt conservative mores.' 7 But brought up in a setting where such values were not practised much, knowing the culture could be an intellectual curiosity instead of a priority. Another development that significantly affects Indian youth's psyche is the seemingly innumerable options available to them in terms of disciplines of study, careers to pursue, places to settle in, and also a more stable society supporting changes in career later in life. Their parents PB January 201246 Prabuddha Bharata64 have struggled hard to create a better world for them and have unwittingly made them unaware of the value of what they have got. An Indian mother laments: Our generation were told we'd have to wait patiently for rewards ... whatever those would turn out to be. Work hard for the exams. Slog away, swot, swot, swot. Compete like crazy. Await results! Phew! First class in hand, work some more. Swot some more. Apply for a 'decent' job. Keep your fingers crossed. Land the job. Continue slaving. Wait for promotion. Keep slogging. Spend fifteen years or more in the same job. ... But that's not how it works today. Kids want it all. And they want it now. And they don't all want to work that hard, either. It's about having 'chill time', 'personal time', a 'life plan' that includes frequent holidays. Kids want to 'hang'. And they want to 'connect'. Mainly over the net. No personal contact-or very little. No emotional investment. Or very little. Just lots of stimulation and virtual relationships that include virtual gifts.8 Society not only gives innumerable choices to the youth but also allows them to choose any number of methods of consumption or enjoyment, making them as permissive as possible. What Swami Ranganathananda said about societies outside India four decades ago is relevant to India today: Children need loving parents at home. How can your children grow and unfold your possibilities without the love of a father and a mother and a peaceful home? But permissive societies and peaceful homes cannot co-exist. We must choose either the one or the other. In a permissive environment, children suffer psychic and personality privations and distortions, and the same children grow up and continue to deepen that malady of permissiveness, until the society becomes sick, and it decays and dies. ... Sheer pursuit of unchecked individual pleasure uninspired by any standard of ethical and moral values, lowers the quality of human life and human tastes, step by step, and brings about the ruin of a family, the ruin of a society, the ruin of a whole civilization.9 This permissiveness affects the mental and social health of the youth, who lose their ability to adapt to a resource-constrained environment. Social Impact Easy accessibility to various choices of life has led to a restless behaviour among youth. With advances in technology bringing means of pleasure close at hand, the youth become restive if they cannot access anything they want. Instant grat ification has led to instant frustration. Patience, calm, and composure are soon becoming qualities found only in books. To make matters worse, the social system prepares the youth only for expecting and handling success, but not for handling failure. An increasing number of youth suicides bear testimony to the near absence of tolerance levels. Nevertheless, all is not bad with the Indian youth. While restlessness has brought about an increase in violence and substance abuse, a considerable number of the young are socially active and influence major social and political changes. Apart from the enormous political participation unseen in other countries, Indian youth have always been key social activists, as witnessed in the protests against the laxity of justice in the insane murder of Jessica Lall and the crusade against the insurmountable evil of corruption. These movements involved the entire nation, and the youth of rural and urban India came together and raised their voice, taking full advantage of print and electronic media. This is representative of the extent of influence the youth can bring on society by using the same technological advances that wrongly used bring about unrest. That said, 47PB January 2012 Young India 65 the youth needs to have much more involvement in national matters. Patriotism is a dying virtue nowadays. A popular writer puts it this way: 'The young Indian is confused. But not angry. Angry enough, that is. Nobody reacts to atrocities any longer. One Jessica Lall murder investigation does not indicate change. By and large, there is widespread indifference in place of indignation.'10 Some youth are indeed angry, though they prefer to show their anger in positive ways. The last decade has seen the emergence of various small and big youth leaders and icons in the country. To encourage such leadership qualities various organizations have instituted awards for social involvement and leadership of the youth. The Times of India Lead India Campaign and ibn Young Indian Leader Awards are two such. Some awardees are good examples of the factors of social change the young can effect. Take the case of Chavi Rajawat for instance, who being a 'graduate from Delhi's Lady Shriram College and an mba from iimm, Pune, ... has worked with several corporate houses before she decided to join grassroots politics' 11 and is 'leaving behind the glamorous corporate world and the city arclights to head back to her village Soda in Rajasthan as its sarpanch' (ibid). The mind of the Indian youth is fresh and open. All they want is progress, and a comfortable one at that. They have been caught up in the sudden increase of pace of the country's development. While India was overwhelmed with local concerns a decade ago, today media and technology have flooded the popular minds with matters both local and global. Being a majority, Indian youth feel responsible, directly or indirectly, for the lack of even basic amenities for the countless in the country. They want to help, but their anxieties and aspirations are way too many, and the time and resources at hand too few. Only a synergy of thoughtful policies effectively implemented through youth power can lead to a smooth sailing of the nation, a sailing that includes young people at the stern. Though shifts in social and cultural framework have brought serious aberrations in their psyche, a little effort at attitudinal reorientation will still bring marvellous results, as they have tremendous energy waiting to be channelized. Swami Vivekananda said: 'I have faith in my country, and especially in the youth of my country.'12 Though the prospects of Indian youth seem promising, it remains to be seen if they can vindicate Swamiji's faith. P References 1. 1001 Quotes, Illustrations, and Humorous Stories for Preachers, Teachers, and Writers, ed. Edward K Rowell and Leadership (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2008), 14. 2. Taittiriya Upanishad, 2.8.1. 3. See <http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_Data_2001/Census_Data_Online/Social_ and_cultural/Age_Groups.aspx> accessed 6 October 2011. 4. The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda, 9 vols (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1–8, 1989; 9, 1997), 5.7. 5. Johanna Wyn and Rob White, Rethinking Youth (London: Sage, 1997), 9–10. 6. The Times of India: <http ://articles .timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-04-22/ man-woman/29459727_1_lifestyle-diseasesnoncommunicable-diseases-lifestyle-disorders> accessed 6 October 2011. 7. Indian Youth in a Transforming World, ed. Peter Ronald deSouza, Sanjay Kumar, and Sandeep Shastri (New Delhi: Sage, 2009), xxiii. 8. Shobha Dé, Superstar India: From Incredible to Unstoppable (New Delhi: Penguin, 2008), 203–4. 9. Swami Ranganathananda, Eternal Values for a Changing Society, 4 vols (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1995), 3.369. 10. Superstar India: From Incredible to Unstoppable, 214. 11. IBNLive: <http://ibnlive.in.com/youngindian/winners.html> accessed 7 October 2011. 12. Complete Works, 3.320.

AGAMBEN'S PHILOSOPHICAL LINEAGE Edited by Adam Kotsko and Carlo Salzani KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 3 17/08/2017 12:24 Edinburgh University Press is one of the leading university presses in the UK. We publish academic books and journals in our selected subject areas across the humanities and social sciences, combining cutting-edge scholarship with high editorial and production values to produce academic works of lasting importance. For more information visit our website: edinburghuniversitypress.com © editorial matter and organisation Adam Kotsko and Carlo Salzani, 2017 © the chapters their several authors, 2017 Edinburgh University Press Ltd The Tun – Holyrood Road, 12(2f) Jackson's Entry, Edinburgh EH8 8PJ Typeset in 10.5/13 Sabon by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire, and printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon CR0 4YY A CIP record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978 1 4744 2363 2 (hardback) ISBN 978 1 4744 2365 6 (webready PDF) ISBN 978 1 4744 2364 9 (paperback) ISBN 978 1 4744 2366 3 (epub) The right of Adam Kotsko and Carlo Salzani to be identified as the editors of this work has been asserted in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, and the Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 (SI No. 2498). KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 4 17/08/2017 12:24 Contents List of Abbreviations viii Introduction: Agamben as a Reader 1 Adam Kotsko and Carlo Salzani Part I Primary Interlocutors 1. Aristotle 15 Jussi Backman 2. Walter Benjamin 27 Carlo Salzani 3. Guy Debord 39 Dave Mesing 4. Michel Foucault 51 Vanessa Lemm 5. Martin Heidegger 63 Mathew Abbott 6. Paul the Apostle 76 Ted Jennings 7. Carl Schmitt 87 Sergei Prozorov Part II Points of Reference 8. Hannah Arendt 101 John Grumley KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 5 17/08/2017 12:24 vi Agamben's Philosophical Lineage 9. Georges Bataille 109 Nadine Hartmann 10. Émile Benveniste 117 Henrik Wilberg 11. Dante Alighieri 125 Paolo Bartoloni 12. Gilles Deleuze 131 Claire Colebrook 13. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 138 Alysia Garrison 14. Friedrich Hölderlin 146 Henrik Wilberg 15. Franz Kafka 154 Anke Snoek 16. Immanuel Kant 162 Susan Brophy 17. Friedrich Nietzsche 171 Vanessa Lemm 18. Plato 178 Mika Ojakangas 19. Plotinus 186 Mårten Björk 20. Marquis de Sade 193 Christian Grünnagel 21. Baruch Spinoza 201 Jeffrey A. Bernstein 22. Aby Warburg 208 Adi Efal-Lautenschläger Part III Submerged Dialogues 23. Theodor W. Adorno 219 Colby Dickinson 24. Jacques Derrida 230 Virgil W. Brower KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 6 17/08/2017 12:24 Contents vii 25. Sigmund Freud 242 Virgil W. Brower 26. Jacques Lacan 252 Frances L. Restuccia 27. Karl Marx 262 Jessica Whyte 28. Antonio Negri 272 Ingrid Diran 29. Gershom Scholem 282 Julia Ng 30. Simone Weil 292 Beatrice Marovich Conclusion: Agamben as a Reader of Agamben 303 Adam Kotsko Contributors 314 Index 318 KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 7 17/08/2017 12:24 viii Abbreviations References to the work of Agamben are made parenthetically in the text according to the following conventions. Italian English translation AV L'avventura. Rome: Nottetempo, 2015. CC La comunità che viene. Turin: Einaudi, 1990. The Coming Community. Trans. Michael Hardt. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993. CF Che cos'è la filosofia? Macerata: Quodlibet, 2016. CR La Chiesa e il Regno. Rome: Nottetempo, 2010. The Church and the Kingdom. Trans. Leland de la Durantaye. London: Seagull Books, 2012. CRM Che cos'è il reale? La scomparsa di Majorana. Vicenza: Neri Pozza, 2016. EP Categorie italiane. Studi di poetica. Venice: Marsilio, 1996. The End of the Poem: Studies in Poetics. Trans. Daniel HellerRoazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. FR Il fuoco e il racconto. Rome: Nottetempo, 2014. GU Gusto. Macerata: Quodlibet, 2015. HP Altissima povertà. Regole monastiche e forma di vita. Vicenza: Neri Pozza, 2011. The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life. Trans. Adam Kotsko. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013. HS Homo sacer. Il potere sovrano e la nuda vita. Turin: Einaudi, 1995. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 8 17/08/2017 12:24 Abbreviations ix Italian English translation IH Infanzia e storia. Distruzione dell'esperienza e origine della storia. Turin: Einaudi 1978. Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience. Trans. Liz Heron. London: Verso, 1996. IP Idea della prosa. Milan: Feltrinelli, 1985; new edn, Macerata: Quodlibet, 2002. Idea of Prose. Trans. Sam Whitsitt and Michael Sullivan. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1995. KG Il Regno e la Gloria. Per una genealogia teologica dell'economia e del governo. Vicenza: Neri Pozza, 2007; repr., Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2009. The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government. Trans. Lorenzo Chiesa (with Matteo Mandarini). Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011. LD Il linguaggio e la morte. Un seminario sul luogo della negatività. Turin: Einaudi, 1982. Language and Death: The Place of Negativity. Trans. Karen Pinkus and Michael Hardt. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991. MC L'uomo senza contenuto. Milan: Rizzoli, 1970; repr., Macerata: Quodlibet, 1994. The Man Without Content. Trans. Georgia Albert. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. ME Mezzi senza fine. Note sulla politica. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1996. Means Without End: Notes on Politics. Trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000. MM Il mistero del male. Benedetto XVI e la fine dei tempi. Rome–Bari: Laterza, 2013. NI Ninfe, Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2007. Nymphs. Trans. Amanda Minervini. London: Seagull Books, 2013. NU Nudità. Rome: Nottetempo, 2009. Nudities. Trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011. O L'aperto. L'uomo e l'animale. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2002. The Open: Man and Animal. Trans. Kevin Attell. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004. OD Opus Dei. Archeologia dell'ufficio. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2012. Opus Dei: An Archaeology of Duty. Trans. Adam Kotsko. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013. PJ Pilato e Gesù. Rome: Nottetempo, 2013. Pilate and Jesus. Trans. Adam Kotsko. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015. PO La potenza del pensiero. Saggi e conferenze. Vicenza: Neri Pozza, 2005. Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999. KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 9 17/08/2017 12:24 x Agamben's Philosophical Lineage Italian English translation PR Profanazioni. Rome: Nottetempo, 2005. Profanations. Trans. Jeff Fort. New York: Zone Books, 2007. PU Pulcinella ovvero divertimento per li regazzi in quattro scene. Rome: Nottetempo, 2015. RA Quel che resta di Auschwitz. L'archivio e il testimone. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 1998. Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. New York: Zone Books, 1999. S Stanze. La parola e il fantasma nella cultura occidentale. Turin: Einaudi, 1977. Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture. Trans. Ronald L. Martinez. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993. SE Stato di eccezione. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2003. State of Exception.Trans. Kevin Attell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005. SL Il sacramento del linguaggio. Archeologia del giuramento. Rome–Bari: Laterza, 2008. The Sacrament of Language: An Archaeology of the Oath. Trans. Adam Kotsko. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011. ST Signatura rerum. Sul metodo. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2008. The Signature of All Things: On Method. Trans. Luca di Santo and Kevin Attell. New York: Zone Books, 2009. STA Stasis. La guerra civile come paradigma politico. Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2015. Stasis: Civil War as a Political Paradigm. Trans. Nicholas Heron. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015. TR Il tempo che resta. Un commento alla "Lettera ai romani". Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2000. The Time that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans. Trans. Patricia Dailey. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005. UB L'uso dei corpi. Vicenza: Neri Pozza, 2014. The Use of Bodies. Trans. Adam Kotsko. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016. UG (con Monica Ferrando) La ragazza indicibile. Mito e mistero di Kore. Milan: Mondadori Electa, 2010. (with Monica Ferrando) The Unspeakable Girl: The Myth and Mystery of Kore. Trans. Leland de la Durantaye. London: Seagull Books, 2014. WA Che cos'è un dispositivo? Rome: Nottetempo, 2006. What is an Apparatus?, and Other Essays. Trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009. KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 10 17/08/2017 12:24 P A R T I I I Submerged Dialogues KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 217 17/08/2017 12:24 242 25 Sigmund Freud VIRGIL W. BROWER . . . invidiosa feri radiabant atria regis unaque iam tota stabat in urbe domus.1 Can Freud be abandoned? Interrelations between sacer, ambivalence, exception, suspension, property, use and civil war around the origin of law are traces of Freud that manifest themselves throughout the development of Agamben's thought. Most direct engagements are found in early texts,2 best articulated in Stanzas. Here is incipient indication of (a) Freud's guilt by association with shortcomings of the sociology of religion (S 137).3 Agamben displays (b) lessons learned from Freud in terms of phantasm, fetishism and the unconscious (S 22–3, 31–3, 145–7; IH 48), but overall performs (c) critical discouragement of an alleged Freudian delimitation (under the influence of Schelling) of the Unheimlich in terms of repression (S 144).4 Damage done by repressions return in a later text, The Signature of All Things, specifically Chapter 3, burrowed within its summary of (d) Foucault's critique of Freud as justification for Agamben's own idiomatic adoption of the archaeological method (ST 96–107). In essence, archaeological regression is elusive: it does not seek, as in Freud, to restore a previous stage, but to decompose, displace, and ultimately bypass it in order to go back not to its content, but to the modalities, circumstances, and moments in which the split, by means of repression, constituted it as an origin. (ST 102–3) Two laudatory supplements to these include (e) a quick deferential comment with regard to Freud's study of the sacred5 (which seems to be more about ambivalence) and (f) an evocative association – distanced by two degrees of citation6 – of exceptionality with festival and mourning, both of which supplements disclose an understated indebtedness to Totem and Taboo, in which Freud equates (perhaps flippantly) KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 242 17/08/2017 12:24 Sigmund Freud 243 the word taboo with the Latin sacer as it may relate to exception and sovereignty: 'It is difficult for us to find a translation for [taboo] [. . .] It was still current among the ancient Romans, whose "sacer" was the same as the Polynesian "taboo".'7 It is on these latencies, kept in the shadows, that my essay wishes to impress. Reactionary rebuttal against these comparisons (and those to follow) might insist – evidenced by his tactical preferences for Schelling, Hegel, Nietzsche or Heidegger – that Agamben is not an oedipal or psychoanalytic thinker; that the sovereign, king, chief or ruler (and, indeed, god) are merely iterated avatars of the father for Freud, but not so simply for Agamben. But a far from subtle paternalism is primal in Agamben's explanation of homo sacer's capacity to be killed but not sacrificed. The 'crimes that [. . .] merit sacratio' are, at one time, expressed as 'verberatio parentis, the violence of the son against the parent [which] constitute[s] the originary exception in which human life is included in the political order' (HS 85). Sovereign law is based on a parental (specifically paternal) relation. The violence of the child to the parent is exceptional to the power of the parent over the child. This piecemeal argument might be read as one that begins in Part II, §4 of Homo Sacer, continues through §§3, 5–6 of State of Exception, and culminates in Part 1 (§§1.3–1.10, 1.13) of Stasis. (This discussion sets the stage for the role of economy and oikos in The Kingdom and the Glory, for which it serves an indispensable introduction.) It begins with 'Numa's homicide law (parricidas esto) [which] forms a system with homo sacer's capacity to be killed (parricidi non damnatur) and cannot be separated from it' (HS 85).8 More importantly, Agamben continues, the 'first time we encounter the expression "right over life and death" in the history of law is in the formula vitae necisque potestas, which designates not sovereign power but rather the unconditional authority [potestas] of the pater over his sons' (HS 87). Each Roman is, thereby, born into sacerhood by way of Roman paternity. There, 'every male citizen [. . .] is in some way sacer with respect to his father' (HS 89). The potestas of progenitor over progeny determines the very understanding of life (and death) in the land of lex. It is not based on a mythic father of a primal horde but rather on the crucial difference Agamben discerns between (1) the power of the father over the son as opposed to (2) the power of the husband over the wife or servants. The latter is conditional, while the vitae necisque potestas attaches itself to every free male citizen from birth and thus seems to define the very model of political power in general [. . .] life exposed to death [. . .] is the originary political element. (HS 87–8, emphasis added) KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 243 17/08/2017 12:24 244 Agamben's Philosophical Lineage Paternity is becoming to polity. Like zoè, an alleged 'originary' political element here has an origin outside the polis. Agamben explicitly states as much in Stasis: 'zoè, natural life, is included in the juridical-political order through its exclusion, so analogously the oikos is politicized and included in the polis through the stasis' (STA 22). Even though the domination of the pater over the dominus is distinct from the power of potestas over the son, the latter would yet be borne upon domestic elements of power privileged to the father (that are, in turn, transferred to that one identified as the ruling sovereign over time). In Freud's mythopoetic musings on the emergence of law, taboo prohibitions 'grew into a conscious law: "No sexual relations between those who share a common home"'.9 Agamben insists that sacer esto 'is not the formula of a religious curse sanctioning the unheimlich' (HS 85).10 He relies on his earlier critiques and sidesteps Freud's theorisations of Unheimlich in later works, opting instead for its Heideggerian conceptions (e.g., UB 43). Something similar could be said for Agamben's interest in Oedipus, which prefers its Hegelian or Nietzschean conceptions, in his earlier work (e.g., S 137–9; LD 94–5), since '[i]n the psychoanalytic interpretation of the myth of Oedipus, the episode of the Sphinx [. . .] remains obstinately in the shadows' (S 137).11 Yet an uncanny paternalism sanctions the state of exception and sovereign law. This 'originary'12 structure of sovereign law is not simply the capacity to be killed but rather vitae necisque potestas, that is, the potent power of the pater out of which homicide law, as such, burgeons. This is perhaps a kind of inverted oedipality, no less uncanny by way of its inversion. In Homo Sacer, the problem is less about the son's parricidal proclivities towards the father than the pater's power over the life and death of the son, which discourages any Roman from killing another. This hardly escapes the mythologic of Totem and Taboo. The sons' parricidal penchant is not simply desire for the mother (or women of the horde), so often dismissed as/with Freudian pansexualism. It is also rebellion against unconditional potestas or authority exercised by the pater, 'the tyrannical father', 'the father's supreme power [. . .] unlimited power'.13 Colloquial caricatures of Freud overemphasise primal parricide. The radical hypothesis of Totem and Taboo is not simply the child's pregenital libidinal desire to fuck/kill parents, but rather the primal impotence of parricidal aggression. The grand reveal is that parricide fails. '[V]ictory lay' not with the deed, but rather with the drives towards the deed; 'the impulses that led to parricide'.14 Agamben's understanding of vitae necisque potestas would already be an expression of what KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 244 17/08/2017 12:24 Sigmund Freud 245 Freud considers to be the 'climax' of these drives' gradual development through group psychology, society, religion, morality and legislation. This climax is 'the dominance of authority' or 'revived paternal authority';15 a hair's breadth away from Agamben's understanding of verberatio parentis, which may be but a reaction to it. This develops into sovereign power, for Freud, as the ruler becomes surrogate of the pater. Politicisation of paternal power develops further throughout State of Exception. Agamben casts it as more complicated than anything resembling taboo: 'It is certainly possible to see the iustitium (in the sense of public mourning) as nothing other than the sovereign's attempt to appropriate the state of exception by transforming it into a family affair. But the connection is even more intimate and complex' (SE 68). This intimate complexity never frees Agamben from the powers of the father: In the sphere of private law, auctoritas is the property of the auctor, that is, the person of the sui iuris (the pater familias) who intervenes [. . .] in order to confer legal validity on the act of a subject who cannot independently bring a legally valid act into being. Thus, the auctoritas of the tutor makes valid the act of one who lacks this capacity, and the auctoritas of the father 'authorizes' – that is, makes valid – the marriage of the son in potestate. (SE 76) The senate is not simply magistrate, just as auctoritas is not potestas. But it still acts as father: 'with a strong analogy to the figure of the auctor in private law, the auctoritas patrum intervenes to ratify the decisions of the popular comitia and make them fully valid' (SE 78). The powers of the father may well dissipate into a complex more complicated than any oedipality, but the revenges of the latter seem inescapable: As we have seen, in public law auctoritas designates the most proper prerogative of the Senate. The active subjects of this prerogative are therefore patres: auctoritas patrum and patres auctores fiunt [the fathers are made auctors] are common formulas for expressing the constitutional function of the Senate. (SE 77) Transference of paternal power to sovereign power is not absent in Agamben, even as it complicates nuclear familial simplicity: 'For whoever may have been the person technically qualified to proclaim a iustitium [court holiday or suspension of law], it is certain that it was always and only declared ex auctoritate patrum [on the authority of the fathers]' (SE 47). Agamben's focus (or that of any anti-oedipal project)16 on synechdocal politics ex auctoritate patrum beyond any insinuated simplicity of the Freudian family is as necessary or required as it is heuristic or corrective. Forfeiting oedipality as a concept prone to ignoratio KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 245 17/08/2017 12:24 246 Agamben's Philosophical Lineage elenchi is understandable,17 but Freud, himself, less so. Totem and Taboo itself suggests thinking 'more correctly, [a] parental complex [Elternkomplex]'.18 If the problem is unilateral movement solely from the child's psyche to the parent, it must be remembered that infantile unconscious is not apostate to Agamben's project. 'The search for a polis and an oikìa [. . . that . . .] is the infantile task of future generations' (IH 10) is one that can 'of course [. . .] correspond to Freud's unconscious' (IH 48). At times, Agamben reads as hard-earned resistance against a unilateral understanding of the authority of the father as presented in Totem and Taboo. But if this is anti-oedipal thinking, it is as well-born as it is grandfathered. Freud would hardly disagree and is well aware of the boundless projections of the authority of the fathers. By the time of Massenpsychologie (1921), Freud's most overtly political text, it is ethnographic and socio-economic in scope and any exclusive unilateralism of it is compromised: If we survey the life of an individual man of to-day [. . .] he is bound by ties of identification in many directions, and he has built up his ego-ideal [internalised paternal authority] upon the most various models [. . .] those of his race, of his class, of his creed, of his nationality.19 This socio-political development of identification is the most important advance made in Freud's thought as Totem and Taboo matures into Group Psychology. Agamben's paternal complex culminates in Stasis through the course of his disagreement with Nicole Loraux, for whom 'the original place of the stasis is the oikos; civil war is a "war within the family", an oikeios polemos' (STA 13). He, instead, hypothesises that stasis takes place neither in the oikos nor in the polis, neither in the family nor in the city; rather, it constitutes a zone of indifference between the unpolitical space of the family and the political space of the city. In transgressing this threshold, the oikos is politicized; conversely, the polis is 'economized', that is, it is reduced to an oikos. (STA 16) Stasis 'forms part of a device that functions in a manner similar to the state of exception' (STA 22). In/as a state of exception, 'politics is a field incessantly traversed by the tensional currents of politicization and depoliticization, the family and the city' (STA 23). Lessons learned from ambivalence succour Agamben's conclusion that 'so long as the words "family" and "city", "private" and "public", "economy" and "politics" maintain an albeit tenuous meaning, it is unlikely that [stasis or civil war] can ever be eliminated from the political scene of the West' (STA 23–4). KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 246 17/08/2017 12:24 Sigmund Freud 247 The eventual identification of the state of exception as an aggressive stasis at the threshold of the family and politics invites (at least) three return visits to Freud. First, Agamben refrains from reconsidering that, like Loraux, Totem and Taboo also suggests civil war emergent within the family. Further, it evokes Hobbes while doing so. Parricidal failure and its resultant 'new organization would have collapsed in a struggle of all against all'.20 Secondly, what Agamben calls the 'archetype of the modern Ausnahmezustand' (SE 41), rooted in Schmitt's dictum 'Sovereign is he who decides on the exception' (emphasis added), need not be exclusively delimited to Schmitt alone. If it has a type of arche, it is perhaps discernible a decade earlier. Before the 'essential contiguity between the state of exception and sovereignty was established by Carl Schmitt in his book Politische Theologie' (SE 1), Freud had attempted in 1912 to articulate a plurality of states of exceptions in an Imago article that came to be published as Part II of Totem and Taboo in the following year. The same word (in the singular) that Schmitt uses to define sovereignty is that which Freud makes use of (in the plural) to describe uncanny taboo powers. Taboo is a 'power [that] is attached to all special individuals, such as kings [. . .] to all exceptional states [Ausnahmszuständen] [. . .] and to all uncanny [unheimlich] things'.21 A series of nodal points emerge throughout the Homo Sacer project at which Schmitt and Freud (or Political Theology and Totem and Taboo) commingle. These proto-Schmittian Ausnahmszuständen have sovereign expressions. They specifically (though not exclusively) apply to the king, chief or ruler. The kind of power attached to the sovereign is akin to that which attaches itself to Freud's states of exception or 'exceptional states' (examples of which include 'the physical states of menstruation, puberty or birth').22 Their legal or juridical expressions soon follow. For 'the earliest human penal systems may be traced back to taboo', because 'taboo has become the ordinary method of legislation'.23 The state of exception at the core of law, ever complicit in its own transgression – the illegality or criminality upon which law, as such, is grounded – further discloses possible reasons for a people's ambivalence towards the sovereign. At the heart of Freudian taboo is indistinction between law and crime, sovereign and criminal: [E]arly kingdoms are despotisms in which people exist only for the sovereign [. . .] the sovereign in them exists only for his subjects; his life is valuable so long as he discharges the duties of his position by ordering the course of nature for his people's benefit. So soon as he fails to do so [. . .] he is dismissed ignominiously [. . .] Worshipped as a god one day, he is killed as a criminal the next.24 KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 247 17/08/2017 12:24 248 Agamben's Philosophical Lineage In Group Psychology, exception becomes the rule: '[A] periodical infringement of the prohibition is the rule'; the psychic interiorisation of parental authority, that is, 'the ego-ideal[,] is inclined to display a peculiar strictness, which then results in its temporary suspension'.25 Identification may function for Freud much as stasis does for Agamben. Should Freud be granted entrance, his ban lifted, and be allowed to participate alongside the schema Agamben offers near the end of Part 1 of Stasis (22): depoliticisation / economisation → politicisation / an-economisation ← oikos––––––––| stasis |–––––––polis it might, perhaps, be supplemented: Ausnahmnszuständen–––––| identification |–––––Ausnahmezustand (Freud) (Schmitt) Primal horde–––––––| 'all against all' |–––––––Leviathan (Freud) (Hobbes) Identification is a way by which the family is politicised and the political is economised. It is the mode through which the parental complex becomes political in public life and, simultaneously, by which political powers of the sovereign leader come to function in private life (especially if it is 'wildly useful to have an id agitating amid the superegos').26 Finally, if the paternal complex in the earlier volumes of the Sacer project sows seeds of possible resistance to, or deactivation of, nomie and law crafted by exception that develops – in the later volumes (specifically, The Highest Poverty and The Use of Bodies) – as a mode, way or form of use, then it might also benefit from reconsideration of Totem and Taboo. Freud's investigations into the dark origin of the law already consider a possible converse of taboo related to a kind of common use: 'The converse of "taboo" [. . .] is noa, which means "common" or "generally accessible".'27 Sovereigns are not tabooed, alone (nor are the enemy and the dead). Taboo attaches itself to things and objects. There follows a prohibition not only 'against touching' the taboo object, but also 'against [. . .] making use of it for one's own purposes'.28 While mourning, the tabooed 'are secluded and forbidden to touch their own head or body; the cups and cooking vessels which they use may be used by no one else'.29 Use of bodies – even use of one's own KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 248 17/08/2017 12:24 Sigmund Freud 249 body30 – goes hand in hand with the peculiar practice. Anything used by a tabooed person becomes prohibited to be used by another. Taboo, as such, applies not only to objects but also the bodies of persons. 'Touching is the first step towards [. . .] attempting to make use of, a person or object.'31 Such high use is indissociable from certain revaluations of property, for example, in 'taboos imposed by chiefs and priests for the protection of their own property',32 that is, property owned (and determined by) the sovereign and law. Use is the secret core of taboo and, given time and gods, the unconscious itself. Perhaps this is the great testament of the Sacer project. N OT E S 1. Evoking Nero, 'once gleamed the odious halls of a cruel monarch, and in all Rome there stood a single house'; Martial, Epigrams, vol. 1, trans. D. R. Shackleton Bailey (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 12–13 (emphasis added). 2. Agamben employs the trope of Medusa's head in his inaugural book (MC 7), a vestige perhaps of Celan (e.g., The Meridian), but no less Freudian on that account, since Celan was a great reader of Freud. Cf. also IP 47–9; EP 126–9. Cf. the role of the Gorgon in RA 33, 52–3, 81. 3. Such as, 'Freudian interpretation has left [the mythologeme] in the dark' (S 137). This is perhaps the caricature of Freud that remains throughout Agamben's later writings. 4. Despite these critiques (c and d), Agamben yet indulges in use of the Freudian syntagma (perhaps revaluated), the return of the repressed (e.g., UB 21). 5. 'When Freud set out to write Totem and Taboo [. . .] the field had therefore already been prepared for him. Yet only with this book does a genuine general theory of the ambivalence of the sacred come to light on the basis not only of anthropology and psychology but also of linguistics' (HS 78, emphasis added). 6. Agamben cites 'an extensive study published in 1980' by H. S. Versnel, who – 'by proposing an analogy between the phenomenology of mourning [. . .] and periods of political crises, in which social institutions and rules seems suddenly to dissolve' – further cites Victor Turner with regard to liminality: 'perhaps Freud and Jung, in their different ways, have much to contribute to the understanding of these [. . .] aspects of liminal situations' (SE 66). 7. Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Strachey et al. (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1953–74), vol. 13, p. 18. Freud continues this reductive equivocating to include the Greek word άγος and the Hebrew word kadesh. Agamben makes mention of this KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 249 17/08/2017 12:24 250 Agamben's Philosophical Lineage gesture to sacer by Freud in a short essay on Karl Abel written a couple years prior to this one in Totem and Taboo (HS 78). 8. Parricido is not exclusively patrior parricidal here, and can play in the field of a false cognate. It is about cido – killing (or slaughter) – of, perhaps, a pars or part, specifically a fellow Roman, tantamount to treason. But recall that Numa himself is paternally authorised by 'Father Jupiter [Iuppiter Pater]'; Livy, The Early History of Rome, trans. Aubrey De Sélincourt (New York: Penguin, 1960), p. 52; and History of Rome, vol. 1, Books 1–2, trans. B.O. Foster (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1919), p. 66 (emphasis added). 9. Standard Edition, vol. 13, p. 126 (emphasis added). 10. It is difficult to imagine that Agamben is not thinking unheimlich (here, in Homo Sacer) in a Freudian valence rather than the Heideggerian one (on which he focuses in The Use of Bodies). 11. Yet, for Freud, it represents the first intellectual exercise of one's mental life. Cf. 'The Riddle of the Sphinx' section of Three Essays on Sexuality (Standard Edition, vol. 7, pp. 194-5). 12. Or, perhaps, co-originary, since: 'Every creation is always a cocreation, just as every author is always coauthor' (SE 76). See Laclau's criticism of the archaeological preoccupation with 'the origin [that] has a secret determining priority over what follows from it'; Ernesto Laclau, 'Bare Life or Social Indeterminacy', in Matthew Calarco and Steven DeCaroli (eds), Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 11. 13. Standard Edition, vol. 13, pp. 142 n. 1, 148 (emphasis added). 14. Standard Edition, vol. 13, p. 146. 15. Standard Edition, vol. 13, pp. 150, 151. 16. Deleuze and Guattari correctly formulate a 'rule [. . .] applicable in all cases: the father and the mother exist only in fragments [. . .] directly coupled to [. . .] the elements of the political and historical situation – the soldier, the cop, the occupier, the collaborator, the radical, the resister, the boss, the boss' wife – which constantly break all triangulations [. . .] the family is never a microcosm in the sense of an autonomous figure'; Anti-Oedipus, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), p. 97. This is 'the double bind [. . .] between the family and the State – the Oedipus of familial authority and the Oedipus of social authority' (p. 81). Agamben's piecemeal paternal complex (HS, SE, STA) allies itself with the anti-oedipality of Deleuze and Guattari, who yet acquiesce: 'We are not saying that Oedipus [amounts] to nothing. We are oedipalized [. . .]. [P]sychoanalysis didn't invent [this] operation'; 'And to be sure, it is not a question of knowing whether or not the familial determinations or indeterminations play a role. It is obvious that they do' (pp. 67, 90, emphasis added). Deleuze and Guattari also understand that 'it is the problem of identifications' (p. 91). 17. 'This term [. . .] seems the most unsuitable one possible'; Carl Jung, Freud KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 250 17/08/2017 12:24 Sigmund Freud 251 and Psychoanalysis, trans. R. F. C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 152. 18. Standard Edition, vol. 13, p. 157 n. 1. 19. Standard Edition, vol. 18, p. 129 (emphasis added). 20. Standard Edition, vol. 13, p. 144 (emphasis added). 21. Standard Edition, vol. 13, p. 22 (emphasis added). 22. Sovereign speciality functions like exceptional physiology. It is as if puberty or menstruation are sovereign expressions of one's living body; perhaps as modes of auto-affective self-modifications. (Cf. physiology vs. anatomy in HS.) 23. Standard Edition, vol. 13, pp. 20, 36 (emphasis added). 24. Standard Edition, vol. 13, p. 44, citing Frazer (emphasis added). Sovereignty is as much about nature or phusis as it is about duty or office. 25. Standard Edition, vol. 18, pp. 131, 133 (emphasis added). 26. This prescient phrase is Maureen Dowd's, referring to Donald Trump among his rivals for leadership during the Republican primaries leading up to the 2016 US presidential election (New York Times, 8 August 2015). The unconscious does not lie. 27. Standard Edition, vol. 13, p. 18 (emphasis added). 28. Standard Edition, vol. 13, p. 23, citing Wundt. 29. Standard Edition, vol. 13, p. 53, citing Frazer (emphasis added). 30. Cf. the body's accompanying auto-affection in US 28–9, 50–4. 31. Standard Edition, vol. 13, pp. 33–4 (emphasis added). 32. Standard Edition, vol. 13, p. 36. Cf. 'Taboos are imposed in order to secure against thieves the property of an individual' (pp. 19–20, citing Thomas). KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 251 17/08/2017 12:24 314 Contributors Mathew Abbott is Lecturer in Philosophy at Federation University, Australia. He is the author of The Figure of This World: Agamben and the Question of Political Ontology, published by Edinburgh University Press. Jussi Backman is a senior research fellow in philosophy at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland. He specialises in phenomenology, philosophical hermeneutics, recent continental thought and ancient philosophy. He is the author of Omaisuus ja elämä: Heidegger ja Aristoteles kreikkalaisen filosofian rajalla (Eurooppalaisen filosofian seura, 2005) and Complicated Presence: Heidegger and the Postmetaphysical Unity of Being (SUNY Press, 2015), as well as being the Finnish translator of Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics. Paolo Bartoloni is Established Professor of Italian at the National University of Ireland, Galway. He is the author of Objects in Italian Life and Culture: Fiction, Migration, and Artificiality (Palgrave, 2016), Sapere di scrivere. Svevo e gli ordigni di La coscienza di Zeno (Il Carrubo, 2015), On the Cultures of Exile, Translation and Writing (Purdue University Press, 2008) and Interstitial Writing: Calvino, Caproni, Sereni and Svevo (Troubador Publishing, 2003). Jeffrey Bernstein is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the College of the Holy Cross. He works in the areas of Spinoza, German philosophy and Jewish thought. Mårten Björk is a doctoral candidate at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden. His thesis is devoted to the discussion of eternal life and immortality in Germany between 1914 and 1945. Susan Dianne Brophy is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology and Legal Studies at St Jerome's University in the University of Waterloo, Canada. She has previously published articles on Agamben, KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 314 17/08/2017 12:24 Contributors 315 anticolonialism and politico-legal theory. Her current research focuses on the history of legal and economic development. Virgil Brower holds a PhD in Comparative Literary Studies from Northwestern University and another in Theology, Ethics and Culture from the Chicago Theological Seminary. His research focuses on the phenomenology of taste and its implications for both philosophy and theology. Claire Colebrook is Edwin Erle Sparks Professor of English at Pennsylvania State University. She has published numerous works on Gilles Deleuze, visual art, poetry, queer theory, film studies, contemporary literature, theory, cultural studies and visual culture. She is the editor of the Critical Climate Change Book Series at Open Humanities Press. Colby Dickinson is Assistant Professor of Theology at Loyola University, Chicago. He is the author of Agamben and Theology (Bloomsbury, 2011), Between the Canon and the Messiah: The Structure of Faith in Contemporary Continental Thought (Bloomsbury, 2013) and Words Fail: Theology, Poetry, and the Challenge of Representation (Fordham University Press, 2016). Ingrid Diran is an instructor in liberal arts at Pacific Northwest College of Art. She is completing a book manuscript entitled Mutinous Muteness: Radicalizing Illegibility in Twentieth-Century African American Literature. Adi Efal-Lautenschläger is a researcher at the University of Cologne. She has published Figural Philology: Panofsky and the Science of Things (Bloomsbury, 2016) and her Habitus as Method: Revisiting a Scholastic Theory of Art is forthcoming (Peeters, 2017). Alysia Garrison is Assistant Professor of English at Dartmouth College. She specialises in eighteenth-century literature, Romanticism and critical theory. Her work on Agamben has appeared in Law and Critique and in The Agamben Dictionary. John Grumley is the author of History and Totality: From Hegel to Foucault (Routledge, 2016) and Agnes Heller: A Moralist in the Vortex of History (Pluto Press, 2005), and many articles in international journals on critical theory. He is the Director of the Markus Archive. Christian Grünnagel is Assistant Professor of Romance Literatures at the University of Giessen (Germany) and the author of articles dealing with European premodernity, the Marquis de Sade and literary/cultural theory, among others. KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 315 17/08/2017 12:24 316 Agamben's Philosophical Lineage Nadine Hartmann is writing her doctoral thesis on epistemological challenges in Georges Bataille's Summa Atheologica at the BauhausUniversität Weimar and has published articles on Bataille, Freud and Lacan. Ted Jennings is Professor of Biblical and Constructive Theology at the Chicago Theological Seminary and the author, most recently, of Outlaw Justice: The Messianic Politics of Paul (Stanford University Press, 2013). Adam Kotsko is Assistant Professor of Humanities at Shimer College in Chicago, the author, most recently, of The Prince of This World (Stanford University Press, 2016), and the translator of many works by Giorgio Agamben. Vanessa Lemm is a Professor of Philosophy and Head of School at the School of Humanities and Languages of the University of New South Wales, Australia. She is the author of Nietzsche's Animal Philosophy (Fordham University Press, 2009) and Nietzsche y el pensamiento politico contemporáneo (Fondo, 2013). Dave Mesing is a PhD candidate in philosophy at Villanova University. He works primarily in political philosophy, and is preparing a dissertation on strategy informed by attempts to bring Spinoza and Marx together. Beatrice Marovich is Assistant Professor of Theology at Hanover College. She is working on a book-length project with the working title, Creature Feeling: Religion, Power, and Creaturely Life. Julia Ng is Lecturer in Critical Theory at Goldsmiths, University of London. She specialises in the intersection of mathematics, philosophy and political thought in the early work of Walter Benjamin. Mika Ojakangas is Professor of Political Thought at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland. He is the author of seven monographs, most recently On the Greek Origins of Biopolitics: A Reinterpretation of the History of Biopower (Routledge, 2016). Sergei Prozorov is Senior Lecturer in World Politics at the Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki. He is the author of seven monographs, most recently The Biopolitics of Stalinism (Edinburgh University Press, 2016). Frances Restuccia teaches contemporary theory and the world novel at Boston College. She is the author of Amorous Acts: Lacanian Ethics in KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 316 17/08/2017 12:24 Contributors 317 Modernism, Film, and Queer Theory (Stanford University Press, 2006) and is currently working on the relation of Agamben's philosophy to literature. Carlo Salzani holds a PhD in Comparative Literature from Monash University. His latest publications include Introduzione a Giorgio Agamben (2013) and the collection of essays Towards the Critique of Violence: Walter Benjamin and Giorgio Agamben (2015). Anke Snoek is a post-doctoral researcher at Maastricht University and has written a book on Kafka's influence on Agamben. Her main research interest concerns questions around the agency of marginalised people. Henrik Sunde Wilberg is Assistant Professor of German at the University of Minnesota, Morris. Jessica Whyte is Senior Lecturer and an Australian Research Council 'DECRA' Fellow at the University of Western Sydney. She is the author of Catastrophe and Redemption: The Political Thought of Giorgio Agamben (SUNY Press, 2013). KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 317 17/08/2017 12:24 Index a priori, 165, 312 historical, 72, 239n, 312 abandonment, 61n, 164, 165, 256, 268, 277, 299; see also ban Absolute, the, 67, 141, 142, 226 Acéphale, 111 action, 6, 19, 58, 71, 73, 102, 103, 105, 107, 128–9, 158, 163, 166, 186, 187–9, 192, 202, 237, 257, 289, 312 ethical, 290 historical, 30, 91, 110 political, 78, 91, 103, 204, 226, 261n, 290 actualitas see actuality actuality, 6, 18–21, 26n, 71, 96, 127, 142, 187, 191, 206, 207, 209, 220, 273, 276, 278–9, 288 integral, 279 Adorno, Theodor W., 36, 147, 193, 198n, 199n, 219–29 adynamia, 19, 25n, 273, 278 aesthetics, 1, 2, 4, 29, 33, 39, 40, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 148, 173, 222 of existence, 58, 175 aestheticisation of the messianic, 222 of violence, 114 affection, auto-/self-, 202–4, 232–8, 239, 251n, 272 Agamben, Giorgio (works) 'Absolute Immanence' ('L'immanenza assoluta'), 280n 'Aby Warburg and the nameless science' ('Aby Warburg e la scienza senza nome'), 211 'Author as Gesture, The' ('L'autore come gesto'), 35 'Bartleby, or On Contingency' ('Bartleby o della contingenza'), 6, 171–2 'Bataille e il paradosso della sovranità', 109, 111–12, 116n 'Beyond Human Rights' ('Al di là dei diritti dell'uomo'), 31 'Caro Giulio che tristezza questa Einaudi', 36n '121a giornata di Sodoma e Gomorra, La', 197, 200n Che cos'è il reale?, 299n Che cos'è la filosofia?, 188, 304, 305, 310 Church and the Kingdom, The (La Chiesa e il Regno), 84, 191, 225, 305 'Comedy' ('Commedia'), 127 Coming Community, The (La comunità che viene), 19, 21, 31, 34, 41, 42, 43, 44–5, 47, 48, 49n, 60n, 68, 136, 144, 166, 171, 178, 190, 204, 259, 313 'Difference and Repetition: On Guy Debord's Films', 48n, 176n, 177n 'Dream of Language, The' ('Il sogno della lingua'), 127 'Elements for a Theory of Destituent Power', 271n End of the Poem, The (Categorie italiane), 3, 83, 127, 150, 151, 152n, 159, 178, 200n, 204, 299n 'Eternal Return and the Paradox of Passion, The', 176n 'Experimentum linguae', 4, 118, 281n 'Form-of-life' ('Forma-di-vita'), 115, 140, 298 'Friendship' (L'amico), 175 Fuoco e il racconto, Il, 40, 125, 127–8 KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 318 17/08/2017 12:24 Index 319 'Glorious Body, The' ('Il corpo glorioso'), 261 Highest Poverty, The (Altissima povertà), 21, 41, 77, 81, 93, 108n, 168, 189, 190, 195, 196, 241n, 248, 278, 308, 310 Homo Sacer, 7, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 31, 32, 33, 38n, 40, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 61n, 68, 69, 77, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 95, 96, 101, 104, 105, 111, 113, 114, 116, 121, 122, 133, 139, 142, 148, 152n, 153n, 155, 157, 158, 159, 162, 164, 165, 167, 171, 178, 179, 181, 193, 194, 195, 196, 199n, 200n, 204, 206, 231, 232, 234, 241n, 243, 244, 249n, 250n, 251n, 259, 260n, 277, 278, 279, 280, 288, 296, 297, 298, 300n, 305, 306, 307, 309, 310 'Idea of Language, The' ('L'idea del linguaggio'), 304 Idea of Prose (Idea della Prosa), 3, 5, 8, 12n, 31, 55, 66, 154, 159, 160n, 171, 178, 183, 184, 227, 259, 305, 312 'Idea of Study, The' ('Idea dello studio'), 5, 12n, 305, 312 'Importante ritrovamento di manoscritti di Walter Benjamin, Un', 36n 'In Playland' ('Il paese dei balocchi'), 35, 261n Infancy and History (Infanzia e storia), 3, 4, 30, 35, 37n, 82, 118–19, 126, 133, 138, 139, 163, 164–5, 178, 190, 197, 209, 220, 221, 223, 242, 246, 304, 305, 310, 311 'K.', 7, 159, 160n Kingdom and the Glory, The (Il Regno e la Gloria), 20, 21, 40, 49n, 56–7, 61n, 69, 70–1, 73, 74, 77, 80, 84, 86, 93, 94, 125, 159, 167, 170n, 186, 190, 195, 206, 243, 276, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 312 'Kommerel, or On Gesture' ('Kommerel, o del gesto'), 35 Language and Death (Il linguaggio e la morte), 3, 30, 31, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 109, 110, 116, 117, 138, 139–40, 141–3, 174, 178, 184n, 230, 231, 232, 234, 236, 237, 240n, 241n, 257, 258, 304, 310, 311 'Language and History' ('Lingua e storia'), 30 Man Without Content, The (L'uomo senza contenuto), 2, 3, 7–8, 29, 33–4, 38n, 39, 40, 65, 139, 147, 148–9, 150, 152n, 154, 160n, 164, 171, 173–4, 176n, 178, 249n, 262, 311 'Marginal Notes on Commentaries on the Society of the Spectacle' ('Glosse in margine ai Commentari sulla società dello spettacolo'), 41–4, 45, 47, 49n, 176n Means without End (Mezzi senza fine), 31, 35, 40, 41–4, 45, 47, 48n, 49n, 77, 79, 104–5, 109, 115, 140, 156, 171, 172, 176n, 201, 204, 208, 212, 213, 235, 298 'Messiah and the Sovereign, The' ('Il Messia e il sovrano'), 156, 287, 305 Mystery of Evil, The (Il mistero del male), 305 'Notes on Gesture' ('Note sul gesto'), 35, 176n Nudities (Nudità), 7, 158, 159, 160n, 228n, 255, 256, 257, 260, 261n Nymphs (Ninfe), 210, 215n 'On Potentiality' ('La potenza del pensiero'), 310 'On the Limits of Violence' ('Sui limiti della violenza'), 31, 264 Open, The (L'aperto), 34, 64, 85, 109, 142, 176, 297, 307, 309 Opus Dei, 21, 23, 25n, 71–2, 162, 163, 167–8, 186–7, 188, 189, 192, 195, 210, 265, 266, 308, 309 'Pardes: The Writing of Potentiality' ('Pardes: La scrittura della potenza'), 230, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 240n 'Passion of Facticity, The' ('La passione della fatticità'), 185n 'Philosophical Archaeology' (Archeologia filosofica'), 174 'Philosophy and Linguistics' ('Filosofia e linguistica'), 304 'Politica dell'esilio', 191 Potentialities (La potenza del pensiero), 3, 6, 20, 30, 86, 119, 121, 134, 137, 141, 142, 145n, KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 319 17/08/2017 12:24 320 Agamben's Philosophical Lineage Agamben, Giorgio (works) (cont.) Potentialities (cont.) 155, 157, 171, 172, 178, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185n, 188, 202, 203, 205, 206, 209, 211, 213, 214, 220, 230, 231, 233, 234, 235–6, 241n, 253, 273, 280n, 283, 286, 287, 288, 299, 304, 305, 310 'Pozzo di Babele, Il', 160n Profanations (Profanazioni), 86, 91, 144, 197 'Project for a Review' ('Programma per una rivista'), 3, 305 Pulcinella ovvero divertimento per li regazzi in quattro scene, 172–3 'Quattro Glosse a Kafka', 12n, 160n Remnants of Auschwitz (Quel che resta di Auschwitz), 17, 56, 79, 85, 86, 105, 119, 120, 148, 155, 159, 165–6, 167, 171, 172, 195, 199n, 202, 219, 220, 234, 236–7, 241n, 307, 309, 310 Sacrament of Language, The (Il sacramento del linguaggio), 41, 79–80, 93, 123n, 178, 195, 240n, 304, 305, 307, 308, 309 Signature of All Things, The (Signatura rerum), 4, 9–10, 35, 51, 54–5, 87, 121–2, 140, 166, 172, 174, 178, 179, 210, 211, 212–13, 242, 280n, 304, 306, 307, 310, 312 Stanzas (Stanze), 2, 3, 8, 29, 109, 110, 122, 124n, 125, 126, 128, 130n, 146–7, 151, 164, 168, 178, 240n, 242, 244, 249n, 252, 260n, 311 Stasis, 80, 84, 93, 178, 195, 243, 244, 246, 248, 309 State of Exception (Stato di eccezione), 7, 28, 33, 35, 56, 73, 78, 89, 90, 92, 93, 156, 157, 158, 159, 166, 167, 195, 243, 245, 247, 249n, 250n, 261, 277, 307, 309, 312 'Thing Itself, The' ('La cosa stessa'), 180, 181, 183, 305, 310 Time that Remains, The (Il tempo che resta), 8–9, 28–9, 34, 78, 81, 82–3, 85, 91, 92–3, 117, 143–4, 156, 166, 221–2, 223, 233, 234, 257, 264–5, 284, 288–9, 310 'Toward a Theory of Destituent Potential' ('Per una teoria della potenza destituente'), 309 Use of Bodies, The (L'uso dei corpi), 10, 15, 16, 17, 20, 21–3, 34, 39, 41, 42, 58–60, 72–3, 75n, 80, 81, 87, 93, 94–6, 123, 125, 127, 128, 129, 131, 135, 143, 144, 149–50, 153n, 154, 168, 175–6, 178–9, 180, 181–2, 184, 185n, 186, 188–9, 190–1, 192, 195, 196, 201, 203, 204–5, 206–7, 224–5, 234, 237–8, 239, 240n, 241n, 248, 250n, 252, 258, 262, 263, 269, 272, 280, 298, 309, 310, 311 'Violenza e speranza nell'ultimo spettacolo', 49n 'Walter Benjamin and the Demonic' ('Walter Benjamin e il demonico'), 30, 283, 286 'What is an Apparatus?' (Che cos'è un dispositivo?), 306, 310, 311 'What is a Paradigm?' ('Che cos'è un paradigma?'), 306 'Work of Man, The' ('L'opera dell'uomo'), 262–3 Alexander the Great, 158 alienation, 8, 44, 47, 142, 267 Alighieri, Dante, 125–30, 151, 260n Améry, Jean (Hanns Chaim Mayer), 119, 223 Ammonius Grammaticus, 24n angel, 94, 159, 197, 199n, 282–3, 286 of history, 29, 282 Angelus Novus, 27, 282, 286 animal, 16, 17, 24n, 34, 53, 72, 85, 95, 136, 140, 142, 176, 177n, 204, 230, 293, 296–7 human, 53, 123, 205 laborans, 267 rationale, 267 animality see animal anomie, 88, 91, 92, 95, 167, 230, 239 mystery of, 92 anthropogenesis, 72, 206, 307–8, 312 Antichrist, 84, 91–3, 284 anti-liberalism, 284–5 Apelles of Kos, 28–9 apocalyptic/apocalypticism, 82, 84, 106, 256–7, 284, 285 apokatastasis, 55 apparatus, 4, 6, 8, 73, 86, 87, 88, 95, 96, 97, 114, 129, 159, 186, 187, 191, 192, 210, 212, 225, 235, 312 KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 320 17/08/2017 12:24 Index 321 biopolitical, 69 ontological, 73 theological, 253, 256–7 Aquinas, Thomas, 80, 129, 265 Arab Spring, 103 Aragon, Louis, 27, 36n archaeology, 2, 4, 10, 51, 54, 121, 211, 212, 280, 307, 312 philosophical, 54, 121, 212, 305 arché, 18, 54, 121, 209, 212, 247, 308, 309 Arendt, Hannah, 15, 16, 33, 52, 101–8, 267–8, 269 argos, 279 Aristotle, 6, 11, 15–26, 33, 39, 53, 70, 75n, 123, 125–6, 129, 132, 134, 135, 140, 144, 153n, 175, 180, 181, 183, 203, 232, 235, 237, 241n, 258, 262–3, 273, 279, 280 art, 43, 59, 65, 128, 130n, 132, 139, 142, 149, 164, 173, 206–7, 208, 210, 211, 212, 255 of existence, 58 of government, 56–7, 61n of quoting without quotation marks, 1, 8, 29, 36n without the artist, 58–9, 172–3, 176 work of, 33, 35, 58, 172–3, 176, 209, 210 Artaud, Antonin, 197 as if, 166–7, 187, 222–4 as (if) not, 80–2, 143, 224, 226 atheology, 113, 150, 151 auctoritas, 125, 245 Aufhebung, 3, 110, 138, 140, 143, 211, 233–4; see also sublation Augustine of Hippo, 11, 187, 190, 191, 198 Auschwitz, 45, 57, 172, 219–20, 221, 223, 227 Ausnahmezustand, 247, 248; see also exception authenticity, 63, 127, 224 authority, 8, 40, 89, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 179, 184n, 243, 244, 245, 246, 248, 250n, 305 constituted, 91, 92, 93 sovereign, 91, 231 transcendent, 56, 167 autoconstitution, 20, 234, 239, 241n Averroes (Ibn Rushd), 11, 126, 128, 129 ban, 89, 90, 105, 133, 234, 235, 253, 257, 260n sovereign, 32, 95, 168, 235, 278, 298 bare life see life: bare Bartleby, 6, 21, 260n Bataille, Georges, 27–8, 109–16, 140, 142, 171, 299 Baudelaire, Charles, 28, 30 Beauvoir, Simone de, 193 Beaufret, Jean, 147 Being, destiny of, 64, 147–8, 151 Benjamin, Walter, 1, 5, 7–8, 9, 10, 27–38, 40, 55, 63, 73, 76, 78, 79, 82, 84, 87, 92, 96, 97, 103, 106, 109, 111, 114, 118, 119, 123, 123n, 152n, 153n, 156, 158, 160n, 165, 172, 176, 177n, 220, 221, 223, 225, 275, 279, 282–3, 284–5, 286, 288, 289, 296, 305, 306, 307, 311, 313 Benveniste, Émile, 31, 117–24, 237, 272 Bergson, Henri, 214n Berlusconi, Silvio, 28 bilingualism, 127 biopolitical, the see biopolitics biopolitics, 33, 51–4, 56, 58, 60n, 63, 87, 88, 89, 90, 95, 104, 105, 175–6, 194, 205, 238, 273, 276 biopower, 52, 53, 276 bios, 15–18, 21, 22, 24, 24n, 53, 68, 70, 73, 75n, 95, 122, 127, 175, 179, 181, 184, 190, 192n, 224, 232, 259 Blanchot, Maurice, 11, 111, 197 Blaupot ten Cate, Anna Maria, 282 body, 80, 125, 126, 127, 128, 144, 173, 184, 203, 209, 234, 238, 241n, 248, 251n, 292 animal, 293 biological, 294 biopolitical, 88, 89, 259 glorious, 261n metaphysics of, 197 political, 179 singular, 58, 73, 95, 175 use of, 22, 144, 234, 237, 238, 248–9, 273, 280 Boethius, Severinus, 126 Böhlendorff, Casimir Ulrich, 149, 150, 151 Brecht, Bertolt, 35 Bucephalus, 7, 154, 157, 158 bureaucracy, 46, 154, 187, 266 KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 321 17/08/2017 12:24 322 Agamben's Philosophical Lineage Calvino, Italo, 28, 151 camp, 148, 165, 168, 220 concentration, 17, 52, 56, 195, 199n, 227, 294, 298, 306 death, 101 as paradigm, 53, 54, 55, 102, 104, 107 capital, 42–3, 112, 263, 266 capitalism, 46, 269 advanced, 162 industrial, 162 care, 22, 72 of the self, 59 Casel, Odo, 11 catastrophe, 91, 154, 155, 156 history as, 30, 224 Catholicism, 76, 187 cause, 66, 163 causa sui, 203 immanent, 203, 206 instrumental, 265 secondary, 57 Cavalcanti, Guido, 126–7, 197 Celan, Paul, 249n Char, René, 147 chresis/chresthai, 18, 21–3, 143, 188, 237, 280 Chrysippus of Soli, 237 Christ, 113, 187, 284, 294, 295, 298; see also Jesus Christianity, 56, 77, 78, 84, 91, 240n, 285 Pauline, 77, 285 chronos, 25n, 82, 178, 256, 260 Church, 84, 187, 225, 256, 284 citation, 1, 40 theory of, 7–9, 29 without quotation marks, 1, 8, 29, 34, 296 class, 263–5 ruling, 264 struggle, 115 universal, 265, 266 working, 263, 264 command, 162, 167, 168, 189, 265, 266 commodification, 29, 104 commodity, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 50n fetishism, 30, 42 communism, 73, 263, 268–9 community, 4, 17, 22, 42, 44, 46, 68, 69, 112–13, 183, 189, 195, 196, 225, 273 coming, 224 messianic, 82, 86 negative, 111 of life, 144 conatus, 204–6, 273 constitutionalism, 106, 274 contemplation, 16, 113, 126, 130n, 191, 201, 205–7 corporeality, 126, 203 naked, 256 creature, 32, 157–9, 167, 168, 264, 293–6, 297, 298 crisis, 2, 63, 69, 103, 105, 107, 168, 232, 273, 276, 285 constitutional, 105 of tradition, 2, 3, 29 culture, 8, 146, 151, 213, 221, 231, 262 commodification of, 29 museification of, 29 Western, 5, 21, 164, 214, 259, 305 Cynics/Cynicism, 59 de Man, Paul, 147 deactivation, 4, 6, 7, 34, 78–80, 97, 158, 166, 168, 223, 225, 236, 248, 280 death, 3, 24n, 65–6, 90, 112, 139, 140, 141, 174, 219, 253, 254, 257, 258, 259 penalty, 179 Debord, Guy, 33, 39–50, 171, 176n decision, 23, 90, 96–7, 107 sovereign, 53, 88, 96–7, 102, 105, 179, 235, 265, 274 deconstruction, 222, 230, 231, 233, 241n, 307 decreation, 292, 295, 296, 298–9 Deleuze, Gilles, 118, 131–7, 171, 250n, 253 democracy, 90, 104, 107, 275, 276 liberal, 107, 165 modern, 104 parliamentary, 89 deposition, 32, 34, 78, 81 Derrida, Jacques, 32, 87, 110, 118, 122, 175, 222, 223, 224, 225, 228n, 229n, 230–41, 253, 303, 307 Descartes, René, 131, 203 désoeuvrement, 32, 34, 125, 142, 143, 298, 299 destiny, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 72, 74, 85, 147, 148 of being, 64, 147, 148, 151 KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 322 17/08/2017 12:24 Index 323 biological, 68, 206 historical, 64, 74n social, 206 desubjectification, 151, 236, 238, 241n dialectics, 110, 231, 232, 233 lord-bondsman, 197 master-slave, 144 messianic suspension of, 221 negative, 221, 223, 225, 226 at a standstill, 221 diathesis, 23, 237; see also voice différance, 234, 235 Diogenes Laertius, 237 dispositif see apparatus division, 28, 85, 95, 138, 141, 191, 226 of division, 224, 226 of labour, 268–9 dolce stil novo, 126, 127, 151 Durkheim, Émile, 115 duty, 21, 71, 163, 164, 167, 186, 187, 251n, 266; see also office; officium dynamis, 15, 18–21, 22, 25n, 209, 235, 237, 273, 278 economy, 29, 46, 47, 57, 69, 73, 84, 109, 167, 192, 243, 246, 267, 308 divine, 20, 57 political, 57 of power, 57 Trinitarian, 86 Eichmann, Adolf, 266 Einaudi, Giulio, 28 emergency see exception Empire, 89, 149, 276 Christian, 91 Roman, 91, 92 energeia, 15, 18–21, 22, 71, 189, 209, 279 Enlightenment, 138, 194, 197, 198, 199n Entwicklungsfähigkeit, 1, 9–11, 35, 272 Ereignis, 63, 67, 70, 72, 260n ergon, 18, 21–2, 24n, 262, 279, 280; see also work Eros, 126, 197, 286; see also love eschatology, 28, 82, 84, 187, 285, 288 eschaton, 288 Esposito, Roberto, 171, 175 ethics, 1, 4, 58, 59, 68, 107, 128, 129, 166, 194, 204, 235, 253, 257, 259, 263, 283, 289, 290 coming, 224 Kantian, 167 ethos, 4, 18, 23, 68, 141, 144, 205, 213, 258, 259 eudaimonia, 17, 283 exception, 88–90, 91, 95, 96, 97, 111, 113, 166, 239, 242, 243, 247, 248, 257, 274, 277, 278, 284, 297, 309 logic of, 278 originary, 243 real state of, 92, 93, 157 and rule, 33, 165, 248, 253 sovereign, 89, 275, 296 state of, 20, 33, 53, 88, 89, 92, 156, 157, 162, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170n, 194, 199n, 234, 238, 239, 244, 245, 246–7, 254, 256, 259, 278, 288, 306 exclusion, 17, 69, 73, 95, 104, 106, 107, 148, 176, 181, 191, 244, 254, 255, 279, 298, 309 inclusive/inclusionary, 3, 89, 95, 96, 106 zone of, 105 experience, 3, 30, 44, 66, 68, 112, 125–6, 139, 142, 163, 164–5 aesthetic, 126 destruction of, 3 ecstatic, 112, 113 of history, 30, 91, 312 inner, 113, 114 intellectual, 128 of language/speech, 8, 30, 43, 117–19, 122, 127, 140, 141, 174, 258, 304 loss of, 3 original, 164, 165 pure, 165 sensible, 128 experimentum linguae, 44, 118 facticity, 63, 72, 224 feast/festival, 242, 267 fetishism, 242, 252 commodity, 30, 42 Feuerbach, Ludwig, 9–11, 35, 280n finitude, 63, 67 force, 293–6, 297 of the law, 156 weak messianic, 103, 221, 225 without significance, 32, 92, 156, 157, 158, 278 KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 323 17/08/2017 12:24 324 Agamben's Philosophical Lineage form-of-life, 12, 15, 21, 23, 51, 58, 60, 73, 79, 95, 96, 128, 129, 140, 175, 179, 195, 235, 259, 298, 299, 308, 310 Foucault, Michel, 10, 23, 33, 50n, 51–62, 69, 87, 88, 90, 103, 109, 110, 112, 113, 123, 171, 174, 175, 176, 195, 212, 231, 232, 239n, 242, 253, 273, 303, 306, 307 foundation, 3, 7, 15, 66, 69, 167, 180, 309 ineffable, 3, 141, 258 mystical, 239, 259 negative, 68, 72, 95, 139, 140, 141, 142, 254, 257, 258 Francis of Assisi, 151 Franciscanism, 21, 81, 108n, 168, 278 Freud, Sigmund, 117, 242–51 future, 55, 82, 83, 106, 283, 288, 290 anterior, 55, 275 genealogy, 2, 51, 55, 56, 57, 61n, 69, 70, 197, 272, 296, 307, 308 gesture, 35, 43, 158, 159, 212, 213 Ghirlandaio, Domenico, 210 Giacometti, Alberto, 10, 12n glory, 86, 94, 95 God/gods, 20, 53, 57, 61n, 73, 80, 81, 91, 93, 94, 113, 116, 133, 134, 137, 143, 149, 150, 154, 155, 159, 167, 174, 190, 191, 203, 243, 247, 249, 265, 282, 284, 285, 289, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 308 Godard, Jean-Luc, 49n Gould, Glenn, 259 governance, 52, 90, 95, 104 government, 21, 52, 57, 61n, 62n, 70, 87, 89, 93, 94, 159, 276 pastoral, 56 governmentality, 51, 52, 56, 57, 58, 69, 70 Gregory of Nazianzus, 57 Gregory of Nyssa, 85 Guantanamo, 90 Guattari, Félix, 118, 131, 132, 135, 136, 250n Guillaume, Gustave, 117 guilt, 127, 157–8, 242 habit, 18, 22–3, 96, 129, 263 habitus, 127, 128 Hadot, Pierre, 58, 59 happiness, 35, 139, 282, 283, 286–7 Hardt, Michael, 276 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 64–5, 66, 67, 110, 115, 138–45, 197, 221, 231, 232, 233, 240n, 243, 244, 258, 265 Hegelianism, 110, 138, 139, 140 Heidegger, Martin, 2, 10, 15, 18, 19, 22, 23, 25n, 27, 30, 33, 34, 36n, 37n, 38n, 39, 59, 63–75, 77, 81, 83, 85, 87, 109, 112, 117, 118, 119, 123, 123n, 135, 146, 147–8, 149, 150, 151, 152, 152n, 153n, 172, 173, 176, 185n, 202, 206, 224, 231, 232, 240n, 243, 244, 250n, 253, 256, 258, 260n, 303 Heinle, Christoph Friedrich, 28 Heller, Hermann, 274 Henrich, Dieter, 147 Heraclitus of Ephesus, 24n, 64, 65, 147 hexis, 18, 21–4 Hierocles, 237 history, 31, 34, 44, 54, 55, 57, 70, 81, 133, 147, 156, 174, 208, 213, 214, 221, 283, 285, 290 angel of, 29, 282, 286 of being, 67, 69, 70, 71, 73 bourgeois, 275 as catastrophe, 30, 224 end of, 110, 142–3, 268, 283, 287 experience of, 30 human / of humanity, 67, 72 of philosophy, 128, 132, 133, 135, 227 philosophy of, 29, 47, 159, 276, 283 post-, 142, 143 Hjelmslev, Louis, 118 Hobbes, Thomas, 11, 12, 83, 92, 93, 104, 112, 238, 247, 248 Hölderlin, Friedrich, 12, 34, 38n, 103, 139, 146–53 homo sacer (concept), 3, 52, 53, 54, 89, 90, 95, 114, 123, 132, 133, 195, 211, 220, 243, 297, 298, 306, 310 Homo Sacer (project/series), 10, 15, 21, 24, 31, 32, 34, 35, 41, 51, 52, 55, 58, 63, 65, 68, 69, 80, 81, 87, 93, 97, 109, 122, 186, 193, 196, 205, 224, 227, 238, 247, 262, KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 324 17/08/2017 12:24 Index 325 283, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311 Horkheimer, Max, 193, 199n Husserl, Edmund, 232, 234, 236, 237, 238, 240n, 241n, 253 hypostasis, 186, 188, 189, 238 I empirical, 163, 167, 168 transcendental, 163, 167 image, 42–3, 49n, 126, 182, 208, 210, 212–13, 214, 258 dialectical, 9, 307 imagination, 125, 126, 128, 213 immanence, 132, 133–4, 135, 136, 202, 203, 204, 274 absolute, 273 philosophy of, 106, 135, 253 impotentiality, 189, 253, 259, 273, 278, 279, 299 inclusion, 53, 73, 88, 95 exclusive, 17 political, 104 indistinction/indifference, 43, 96, 134, 136, 144, 205, 247, 260n, 265, 278, 286, 299 zone of, 53, 186, 203, 232, 234, 246, 265 infancy, 3, 30, 118, 162, 165, 168, 168, 209, 231 inoperativity, 5, 34, 63, 64, 68, 73, 92, 93, 95, 132, 142, 168, 201, 205–7, 262, 267, 269, 278, 280, 298–9, 308, 310 intellect, 186, 187, 190, 204 active, 128–9 potential, 128–9 universal, 128 intelligibility, 184, 219 interruption, 30, 32, 225, 305 inversion/reversal, messianic, 6, 34, 38n, 289 Jakobson, Roman, 118, 122 Jellinek, Georg, 274 Jesi, Furio, 11 Jesus, 79, 294, 295; see also Christ jouissance, 253, 254, 255, 256, 259, 260n Judaism, 5, 77, 85, 284, 285, 289 judgment, 79 aesthetic, 65, 164 divine, 289 Jung, Carl Gustav, 249n, 250n justice, 7, 42, 43, 78, 79, 158, 233, 289–90 natural, 179 iustitium, 245 Kabbalah, 282, 286, 288 Kafka, Franz, 6, 7, 32, 34, 35, 38n, 77, 154–61, 254, 288 kairos, 9, 82–3, 84, 260, 275, 281n Kant, Immanuel, 30, 118, 138, 139, 148, 162–70, 173, 193, 236, 253 katargesis, 23, 34, 78, 80, 92, 143 katechon, 77, 83–4, 87, 90–3, 284, 285, 289 Kelsen, Hans, 170n, 274 Kingdom, 94 of God, 93 Messianic, 93, 256, 259, 312 Klee, Paul, 282, 286 Kleist, Heinrich von, 197 Klossowski, Pierre, 111, 193 Kojève, Alexandre, 109, 110, 139, 140, 142, 143 Kommerell, Max, 11 Kraus, Karl, 42 labour, 22, 115, 144, 266–7, 268, 269, 280 division of, 268–9 Lacan, Jacques, 117, 118, 122, 124n, 147, 193, 252–61 Laclau, Ernesto, 250n Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, 147 language, 3, 4, 29, 30, 31, 41–4, 47, 49n, 65–6, 68, 69, 72, 86, 89, 120, 121, 123, 126, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 174, 178, 180–2, 183–4, 202, 207, 230, 237, 253, 259, 279, 304, 305, 307, 309, 313 being-in-, 48 experience of, 8, 30, 117–19, 122, 127, 141, 174, 258 fact of, 277, 304, 311 limits of, 118 philosophy of, 29, 30, 159 place of, 118, 120, 140, 279 pure, 165 question of, 30, 118, 183 Lassalle, Ferdinand, 274 law, 1, 7, 21, 52, 60n, 61n, 64, 77–80, 81, 89, 90, 94, 95, 96, 104, 111, 133, 134, 136, 143, 155–9, 165, 166, 167, 168, 225, 239, 245, KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 325 17/08/2017 12:24 326 Agamben's Philosophical Lineage law (cont.) 247, 248, 253–4, 255, 256, 257, 259, 261n, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 286, 287, 288, 289, 305 absence of, 92 constitutional, 238, 284 consummation/fulfilling of, 77, 78, 79, 157 deactivation/deposition of, 7, 78–9, 80, 81, 83, 143, 158 divine, 167 door of, 157, 254 -of-the-Father, 256 force of, 156 historical / of history, 102 international, 90, 104, 112 and order, 92 origin of, 242, 244, 248 play with, 157, 158, 261n, 312 positive, 88, 113 Roman, 53, 89, 280, 298 sovereign, 243, 244, 249 study of, 7, 78, 158 suspension of, 92, 111, 156, 194, 245, 253 violence and, 29, 32, 78, 79, 179 see also norm; rule lawlessness, 83, 84, 92, 136 Le Thor, seminars, 39, 64, 66, 67, 70, 72, 147, 150, 151 Lebovici, Gérard, 48n legislation, 105, 245, 247 security, 107 legitimacy, 6, 305 crisis of, 273 political, 104 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 9, 203 Leopardi, Giacomo, 140 Levi, Primo, 119, 236 Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 11, 117 Levinas, Emmanuel, 11, 224, 236, 241n, 253 liberalism, 170n, 284–5 life, 18, 51, 52, 56, 58, 68, 72, 89, 90, 104, 134, 136–7, 142, 175, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192, 201, 209, 238, 254, 259, 273, 285, 288 active, 290 animal, 24n, 293, 296 bare, 3, 17, 24, 32, 33, 37n, 53, 54, 55, 63, 69, 73, 88, 89, 95, 104, 105, 106, 114, 123, 132, 133, 134, 135, 153n, 159, 165, 175, 195, 211, 232, 238, 253, 254, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 277, 280, 292, 293, 296–9, 300n biological, 52, 268 civil, 104 community of, 144 contenplative, 16, 205–6 creaturely, 167, 292, 293–6, 297, 298, 299 eternal, 190, 191 everyday, 44, 107, 112, 127 finite, 190 form of see form-of-life Greek definitions of, 15, 53, 233 human, 4, 16, 17, 23, 80, 93, 135, 137, 168, 195, 199n, 205, 213, 226, 243, 298 language and, 41–4, 47, 49n law and, 21, 89, 156, 167, 168 mere, 32, 133, 296 messianic, 144 mode of, 15, 16, 24, 25n, 175, 179 monastic, 196 naked, 37n, 115, 140, 281n, 298 natural, 69, 181, 244, 259, 277 organic, 136, 191 philosophical, 59, 173 physiological, 195 political, 15, 16, 95, 128, 190, 235, 238, 259 power over, 53, 58, 243, 244, 293, 294, 297 private, 41, 42, 248 sacred, 32 true, 59 unqualified, 95 vegetative, 17 worthy of being lived, 105 linguistics, 29, 31, 65, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122–3, 249n liturgy, 71, 72, 210, 308 Locke, John, 9 logos, 17, 22, 64, 144, 166, 181, 182, 183, 184n, 263, 279 Lohmann, Johannes, 117 Loraux, Nicole, 11, 240n, 246, 247 love, 79, 130n, 142, 178, 194, 253, 254, 255, 258–9, 260n, 293, 294, 295 courtly, 126–7, 197 of one's neighbour, 79 of the world, 106 Löwith, Karl, 173, 177n KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 326 17/08/2017 12:24 Index 327 Lucretius (Titus Lucretius Carus), 234, 237 Lumpenproletariat, 115 Luther, Martin, 143 Machiavelli, Niccolò, 201 machine anthropological, 85, 176 biopolitical, 73 cultural, 6, 7 governmental, 70, 94 metaphysical, 72, 73 providential, 57 redemptive, 85 Magritte, René, 193, 198n Man Ray, 193 Marx, Karl, 115, 138, 142, 262–71 Marxism, 78, 115, 138, 220, 221, 223 Italian, 280n materialism base, 114, 115 historical, 33 Mauss, Marcel, 109, 110, 115 means pure, 34–5, 144 without end, 34, 161 mediality, 35, 125, 212, 213 melancholy, 6, 30, 252, 283, 286 Melville, Herman, 6, 21, 260n Messiah, 23, 34, 77, 80, 82, 83, 84, 143, 156, 157, 159, 233, 275, 276, 283, 285, 288, 313 messianicity, without messianism, 233 messianism, 5, 8, 34, 106, 233, 253, 285, 287, 288, 305 Christian, 285 Jewish, 38n, 284, 285, 288 thwarted, 233 weak, 289 metaphysics, 2, 65, 66, 67, 71, 75n, 139, 140, 151, 226, 231, 258, 272 of the body, 197 critique of, 63, 68, 69, 73 end of, 138 overcoming of, 4, 64 of subjectivity, 73 Western, 2, 3, 50n, 63, 66, 68, 69, 70, 72, 138, 148, 184n, 186, 189 of the will, 173, 187 middle voice see voice Mommsen, Theodor, 6 monasticism, 308 Franciscan, 168 Morante, Elsa, 12, 204, 299n multitude, 64, 128, 129, 274, 275, 276 Muselmann, 17, 102, 105, 165, 166, 220, 236, 238, 306 Nancy, Jean-Luc, 89, 111, 184 nature, 104, 164, 173–4, 203, 205, 210, 211, 251n, 269 corrupt, 256 and culture, 221 human, 102, 105, 128, 256, 268 order of, 20 state of, 92 Nazism, 17, 32, 56, 90, 195, 198, 199n, 219 necessity, 72, 171, 268 natural, 169n negation, 78, 88, 97, 113, 139, 140, 142, 148, 240n, 264 of negation, 224, 225, 226 self-, 164, 168, 264 negativity, 3, 66, 67, 68, 69, 110, 139, 140, 141, 142, 174, 231, 232, 233, 236, 240n, 253, 258–9, 299 a-relational, 110 disengaged, 110, 140 unemployed/without employ (sans emploi), 110, 111, 299 Negri, Antonio, 138, 204, 272–81 Neoplatonism, 137, 183, 188 Newton, Isaac, 203 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 18, 54, 55, 58, 123, 164, 171–7, 206, 212, 232, 233, 243, 244, 253, 307 nihilism, 2, 43, 47, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 73, 74, 171, 173, 258, 286 imperfect, 156, 157 perfect, 157 9/11, 87, 90, 107 Nougé, Paul, 198n norm, 1, 2, 23, 88, 89, 90, 96, 97, 104, 166, 167, 168, 273 constitutional, 88 juridical, 166 see also law; rule noumenon, 163, 166, 167 now-time see time: nownuda vita, 31, 292, 296; see also life nudity, 224, 255, 256, 259, 260 oath, 79, 80, 178, 305, 307, 308 objet a, 255, 256 Oedipus, 174, 244, 250n office, 21, 84, 167, 186, 187, 251n, 265–6; see also duty; officium KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 327 17/08/2017 12:24 328 Agamben's Philosophical Lineage officium, 186; see also duty; office oikonomia, 6, 57, 61n, 70, 71, 94, 167, 280 oikos, 53, 243, 244, 246, 248 ontology, 4, 18, 58, 59, 63, 70, 71, 72, 87, 90, 129, 134, 138, 180, 181, 188, 189, 190, 203, 276, 280, 307, 309 of actuality, 207 Christian, 186 classical, 186 of command, 162, 167, 168 of habit, 23 in the middle voice, 203 modal, 23, 72, 95, 96, 97, 136 modern, 186 of nudity, 256 of operativity, 167 political, 15 of potentiality, 18, 21, 206, 207 presuppositional, 97 of style, 59, 128, 175 of substance, 162, 167 of transformation, 290 Western, 94 ontotheology, 66, 67 Open, the, 259 operativity, 72, 167, 186, 187–8, 189, 190, 191, 192, 276, 279, 286 opposition, binary, 127, 231, 232 order, 91–2, 96, 104, 132, 275 biological, 191 biopolitical, 191 feudal, 265 Franciscan, 278 historical, 283, 286 juridical, 111, 167 juridico-political, 88, 244, 277 legal, 88, 277, 286 natural/of nature, 20, 264 normative, 89 political, 89, 194, 227, 243 social, 89, 219 Symbolic, 253, 254, 257 theological, 264 origin, 4, 15, 55, 69, 121, 174, 212–13, 237, 242, 248, 286, 289 Overbeck, Franz, 174 paradigm, 4, 20, 22, 51, 53, 54–5, 29, 69, 70, 71, 72, 88, 89, 94, 96, 121, 132, 133, 134, 136, 140, 148, 163, 165, 166, 167, 168, 179, 181, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 212–13, 252, 255, 256, 272, 273, 274, 288, 298, 306, 312 Parmenides of Elea, 64 parody, 197, 200n parousia, 5, 82, 83, 91, 257 Pasquali, Giorgio, 6 Pasolini, Pier Paolo, 12 passivity, 6, 202, 209, 235–6, 281n pathos formula (Pathosformel), 209–10, 211, 213, 214n Patriot Act, 90 Paul the Apostle, 8–9, 23, 34, 38n, 76–86, 91, 92, 111, 117, 143–4, 198, 221, 223, 224, 233, 264, 284, 285, 286, 288, 289, 312 Peckham, John, 126 Peterson, Erik, 11, 94, 191 phantasm, 126, 128, 152, 172, 178, 197, 242, 252 phenomenology Philo of Byblos, 24 philology, 118, 305 philosophy, 1–2, 5, 8, 9, 10–11, 27, 29, 64, 65, 132–3, 139–40, 141, 143, 146, 147, 151, 201, 212, 222–3, 226, 304, 305, 313 coming, 3, 7, 119, 183 end of, 172, 174 first, 59 Greek, 58 history of, 132, 135, 227 of history, 29, 47, 276, 283 of language, 30 modern, 71, 164, 236 moral, 167 political, 63, 76, 88, 127, 159, 195, 196 Western, 128, 162, 164, 165, 157, 181, 203, 258 Plato, 24n, 75n, 96, 131, 132, 134, 144, 178–85, 252, 304, 305 play, 35, 142, 157, 158, 252, 251n, 261, 312, 313 Pliny the Elder, 28 Plotinus, 25n, 186–92, 236 poetry, 2, 8, 10, 30, 83, 118, 126, 127, 139, 140, 143, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151, 178, 207, 220, 260n, 305, 311 poiesis, 19, 22, 280 police, 56, 94, 104, 159, 284 polis, 4, 17, 53, 64, 69, 89, 102, 148, 153n, 191, 235, 244, 246, 248, 256, 268 KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 328 17/08/2017 12:24 Index 329 political theology see theology: political politics, 1, 4, 29, 33, 34, 35, 41, 52, 59, 69, 74, 90, 94, 95, 102, 103, 104, 106, 108, 127, 129, 171, 175, 176, 178, 191, 206–7, 245, 246, 247, 252, 263, 276, 279, 285, 290, 297, 307, 309 classical, 190, 298 coming, 224 contemporary, 50n, 201 democratic, 103, 105, 107 of inoperativity, 73 liberal, 105, 107 messianic, 76, 86 modern, 53, 54, 104, 105, 235 ontic, 71 pastoral, 56 radical, 194 republican, 103 spectacular, 44–8 totalitarian, 104, 235 Western, 16, 33, 68, 70, 90, 106, 268 world, 273, 286 pornography, 197 Porphyry of Tyre, 24n post-history, 142, 143 potential, 6, 10, 15, 18–21, 22, 23, 104, 106, 129, 182, 186, 187, 205, 206, 207, 266 destituent, 21, 96, 162, 168, 169, 179, 239, 273, 278–80, 310 not-to, 20, 236, 259, 279, 299 potentiality, 5, 10, 17, 18, 20, 21, 26n, 68, 96, 103, 125, 127, 128, 129, 135, 136, 142, 144, 168, 171, 172, 187, 189, 206, 207, 209, 220, 235, 253, 259, 261n, 263, 265, 266, 269, 273, 278–80, 280n, 288, 289, 292, 299 pure, 6, 190, 220 potestas, 243, 244, 245, 273 vitae necisque, 243, 244 power, 18, 43, 50n, 51, 60n, 61n, 80, 81, 83, 86, 89, 90, 92, 93, 96, 97, 103, 104, 111, 112, 135, 154, 158, 159, 191, 206, 223, 247, 253, 263, 265, 273, 284, 289, 294, 297 absolute, 20, 26n, 94, 102 angelic, 80 bio-, 52, 53, 276 constituent, 18, 20, 21, 59, 102, 168, 239, 273–6, 277, 278, 280, 280n constituted, 18, 20, 59, 84, 92, 168, 169, 273–6, 278 constituting see power: constituent destituent, 21 disciplinary, 53 divine, 20 emergency, 107 executive, 289, 290 of the father over the son, 243, 244, 245 governmental, 94 heavenly, 80 juridical, 166 labour, 266, 267 messianic, 90, 92 mundane, 80 ordained, 20, 23, 26n over life and death, 53, 58 pastoral, 56, 57 political, 43, 58, 86, 243, 248, 285 presuppositional, 144, 181, 183 profane, 80, 92 religious, 86 sovereign, 18, 52, 53, 54, 61n, 69, 73, 87, 88, 89, 91, 93, 103, 107, 159, 165, 166, 195, 243, 245, 274, 277, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299 State, 53, 92 will to, 173 praxis, 3, 19, 22, 94, 96, 128, 142, 144, 166, 167, 186, 192, 206, 211, 221, 261n, 266, 274, 275, 278, 279, 280 administrative, 167, 168 animal, 142 human, 73, 86, 93, 141, 144, 167, 168, 262 political, 73, 222 social, 141 presupposition, 44, 73, 94, 95, 96, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144, 178, 181–2, 183 priest, 187, 249, 265, 266, 308 productivity, 74, 273, 279, 280 profanation, 35, 86, 144, 227, 228n profane, the, 35, 93, 112, 159, 287, 297 proletariat, 115, 191, 264, 266 prophecy, 285, 289 Protogenes, 29 Proust, Marcel, 132 KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 329 17/08/2017 12:24 330 Agamben's Philosophical Lineage providence, 57, 70 psychoanalysis, 252, 257, 260n, 261n, 308 psychology, 213, 245, 249n purity, 232, 236 Queneau, Raymond, 142 Rabelais, François, 196 racism, 52, 199n Rawls, John, 274 redemption, 5, 34, 45, 79, 85, 86, 91, 93, 127, 133, 136, 156, 159, 222, 223, 224, 253, 257, 264, 283, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 296, 299, 312 refugee, 105, 107 repressed, return of, 249 repression, 242 revelation, 66, 156, 255, 299 Nothing of, 156, 287 reversal/inversion, messianic, 6, 34, 38n, 289 revolution, 78, 264, 267 French, 193 right, 143, 204, 265 divine, 194 human, 104–5 over life and death, 243 Rilke, Rainer Maria, 11, 12 Robertson Smith, William, 115 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 61n, 62n, 263–4 rule, 69, 88, 89, 165, 167, 186, 196, 197, 249n, 277 authoritarian, 90 and exception, 33, 88, 111, 156, 248, 253 of law, 287 majority, 104 monastic, 196 positive, 105 see also law; norm rupture, 4, 82, 258 historical, 2, 101 moments of, 101 Sabbath, 85, 256, 257 sacer, 3, 116, 235, 242, 243, 250n esto, 244 and taboo, 243 sacrament, 65 sacratio, 243 sacred, the, 109, 112, 114, 116, 142, 150, 159, 228n, 242, 287, 297, 307 ambivalence of, 115, 116, 249n sacredness, 32 sacrifice, 3, 89, 109, 110, 114, 258, 259 Sade, Marquis de, 193–200 sadomasochism, 194, 195, 199n salvation, 5, 71, 85, 93, 105, 257, 286, 288, 312 Saussure, Ferdinand de, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 124n Saxl, Fritz, 210 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph, 18, 206, 242, 243 Schmitt, Carl, 11, 12, 32–3, 38n, 53, 76, 83, 86, 87–98, 105, 107, 109, 111, 152n, 170n, 198, 232, 233, 240n, 247, 248, 253, 274, 277, 284–5, 287, 288, 296 Scholem, Gershom, 7, 32, 38n, 156, 282–91 secularism, 312 secularisation, 57, 86, 91, 143, 307 self-reference/self-referentiality, 165, 166, 167, 231, 234–5, 237, 238 paradox of, 234, 235 semiology, 2, 120 shame, 159, 236, 241n Shekhinah, 42, 44, 45, 47, 286, 290 sigetics, 258 signature, 54, 61n, 133, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 256, 307, 308, 312 singularity, 58, 73, 95, 175, 212 whatever, 48, 60n, 259 Situationist International, 40 slave, 17, 22, 72, 81, 144, 268, 269, 280, 295 and master, 110, 140, 144 slavery, 144, 195, 294, 298 Smith, Adam, 57 society, 31, 50n, 115, 267 classless, 262, 263, 267–70 democratic, 106 post-democratic, 104 spectacular / of the spectacle, 40, 41, 42, 43–4, 45, 46, 47, 48, 104 totalitarian, 104 sociology, 90 of religion, 242 Socrates, 24n, 178, 179, 184n Sophocles, 147, 148, 152n, 153n soteriology, 5, 6, 32, 34 KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 330 17/08/2017 12:24 Index 331 sovereign, 88, 89, 92, 94, 96, 105, 111, 112, 159, 167, 194, 195, 243, 244, 247, 248, 249, 265, 297 absolute, 112 sovereignty, 32, 33, 42, 51, 53, 57, 61n, 62n, 69, 70, 88, 93, 94, 96, 102–3, 106, 107, 109, 111, 112, 114, 115, 134, 143, 158, 159, 171, 179, 230, 231, 238, 243, 247, 251n, 253, 254, 256, 257, 258, 260, 160n, 261n, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 284, 298 aporias of, 18 baroque, 97 logic of, 21, 89, 94, 95, 97 paradox of, 111, 112 theory of, 32, 53, 87, 88, 89, 90, 254 Spinoza, Baruch, 18, 76, 95, 131, 135, 201–7, 253, 272–3, 280n stasis, 178, 238, 244, 246–7, 248 state, 44, 47, 48, 61, 68, 78, 80, 83, 84, 91, 104, 112, 143, 167, 191, 192, 225, 250n, 273, 274, 275 biopolitical, 56 modern, 52, 56, 94 nation, 104, 105 Nazi, 53 police, 104 security, 107 totalitarian, 52, 162 state of emergency see exception state of exception see exception state of nature see nature Statius, Publius Papinius, 128 stil novo see dolce stil novo Stoa, 22, 24n, 234, 237 structuralism, 117 study, 1, 4–7, 35, 38n, 79, 157, 158, 305, 312, 313 style of life, 58, 96, 128, 175 ontology of, 59, 128, 175 subject, 4, 8, 23, 56, 58–9, 61n, 112, 114, 122, 136, 142, 150, 167, 176, 181, 183, 187, 188, 189, 190, 202, 213, 223, 225, 236, 245, 252, 253, 254, 255, 262, 264, 272 free, 59 Kantian, 139, 166, 168 Lacanian, 252–60 of law, 133 messianic, 264 and object, 65, 126, 127, 129, 134, 202, 237 political, 85, 115 of religion, 257 transcendental, 139, 164, 165, 166, 168, 169 subjectification, 59, 61n, 236, 237, 238 subjectivity, 65, 73, 165, 166, 189, 236, 237, 253, 262 transcendental, 163, 165 sublation, 65, 110; see also Aufhebung sublime, 164, 165, 167, 169 substance, 23, 95, 107, 164, 183, 188, 190, 203–5, 265, 266 ontology of, 162, 167 superstructure, 115, 221 Surrealism, 198n suspension, 81, 88, 89, 127, 129, 164, 165, 166, 233–4, 242, 248, 256, 267, 278 messianic, 221, 223 of the law, 92, 156, 194, 245, 277 Szondi, Peter, 147 taboo, 245, 247, 248–9, 251n incest, 253 and sacer, 243–4 Talmud, 5, 7 Taubes, Jacob, 11, 12, 222, 284–7, 288, 289 temporality, 67, 275, 276, 281n, 304 political, 276 Tertullian, 83, 91 testimony, 8, 59, 119 theology, 29, 34, 38n, 53, 94, 113, 134, 167, 292, 312 Christian, 56, 57, 143 economic, 94 negative, 113 political, 76, 87, 91, 94, 272, 276 positive, 113 thing itself, 125, 126, 144, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 223 Third Reich, 195 Thomas, Yan, 11, 251n Thompson, E. P. (Edward Palmer), 263–4 threshold, 22, 32, 109, 119, 120, 122, 126, 132, 133, 134, 135, 219, 232, 247 time, 25n, 30, 43–4, 55, 139, 159, 178, 208, 236, 241n, 276 apocalyptic, 256, 257 chronological, 257, 288 KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 331 17/08/2017 12:24 332 Agamben's Philosophical Lineage time (cont.) cyclical, 43 end of, 82, 93, 142, 156, 284 eschatological, 82 hitorical, 283, 288 irreversible, 43, 44 kairotic, 284, 288 linear, 221, 276 messianic, 23, 82–3, 85, 92, 117, 143, 221, 257, 288, 289 now-, 82–3, 84, 85, 283, 287, 288 operational, 117, 288 Titian (Tiziano Vecellio), 132 Torah, 143, 155, 287, 288, 290 totalitarianism, 101, 102, 104 trace, 231–2, 233, 234–5, 236, 237, 238, 239 tradition, 1, 2–4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 63, 66, 79, 101, 151, 212, 305 Christian, 190 crisis of, 2, 3 critique of, 2, 230 democratic, 107 Judaeo-Christian, 34 metaphysical, 69, 142, 165, 230 ontological, 258 political, 32, 104, 106, 175 republican, 106 theological-political, 105 Western, 3, 4, 6, 29, 78, 90, 101, 102, 183, 306, 311 transcendence, 171, 235, 253, 275, 283, 285 transcendentalism, 163 transmissibility, 2, 5, 34, 159 Trinity, 57 Trump, Donald, 251n typos, 9, 82 ultrahistory, 312 unconscious, 122, 212, 213, 242, 246, 249, 251n, 252, 260n undecidability, 144, 164 Unheimlich, 242, 244, 247, 250n unknowable, 164, 227 unsayable, 182, 184n unthought, 219–20, 227 Urphänomen, 213 use, 1, 2, 21–4, 34, 72, 138, 143–4, 150, 188, 189, 190, 192, 235, 242, 248, 249, 272, 279, 310 another/new, 4, 6, 7, 80, 81, 143, 144, 158, 192, 261n, 261, 269, 280 of the body, 22, 60, 144, 234, 237, 238, 248, 273, 280 common, 86, 248, 261n free, 143, 144, 149, 150, 151 messianic, 81 of the proper, 150 of the self/oneself, 22–3, 144, 149, 151, 188–9, 234, 238, 239, 273 utilitarianism, 102 utopia/utopianism, 106, 225, 226–7, 267–8, 269, 283, 287 value, 30, 210, 232 exchange, 42 truth, 8 use, 42 violence, 31, 69, 79, 83, 95, 102, 103, 104, 198, 206, 243, 253, 258, 264, 293 aestheticisation of, 114 divine, 32, 92 governmental, 83 and law, 29, 32, 78, 158, 167, 179 law-positing, 32 law-preserving, 32 political, 297 pure, 32, 34 sovereign, 73 Virgil (Publius Vergilius Maro), 127 Virno, Paolo, 49n vocation, 64, 68, 144, 184n, 263, 264, 265, 268, 269, 280 biological, 23 messianic, 77, 84, 143, 223, 264 revolutionary, 264 voice, 66, 138, 140, 141, 142, 174, 184n, 231 animal, 140 medial/middle, 22, 202–5, 237, 272 passive, 22 Waiblinger, Wilhelm, 148 Walser, Robert, 6 war, civil, 178, 242, 246, 247, 284 Warburg, Aby, 121, 208–15 Weber, Max, 108 Weil, Simone, 292–301 whatever being, 136, 227 singularity, 48, 60n, 259 will, 23, 104, 163, 175, 187–8, 189, 235, 266, 269 democratic, 274, 275 divine, 20, 102, 265 KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 332 17/08/2017 12:24 Index 333 free, 164, 167, 187 metaphysics of, 173, 187 of the people, 107 political, 107 to power, 173 utopian, 106 witness, 119–20, 165, 166, 236, 238 complete, 166, 167 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 11, 12 Wölfflin, Heinrich, 214n work, 6, 10, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24n, 78, 104, 142, 186, 187–8, 205, 206–7, 209, 257, 262–3, 267, 269, 273, 279 absence of, 142, 206, 267 of art, 33, 35, 58, 172, 173–6, 208, 209 of man, 159, 262–3, 279, 280 see also ergon Yates, Frances, 214 Žižek, Slavoj, 32, 225, 228n, 229n, 257 zoè, 15, 16–18, 21, 24, 24n, 53, 68, 69, 70, 73, 75n, 95, 122, 127, 175, 179, 181, 184, 190, 192n, 224, 232, 244, 256, 259, 297 KOTSKO 9781474423632 PRINT.indd 333 17/08/2017 12:

Apparency and Actuality Marvin E. Kirsh 1 [email protected] 1 Departments of Philosophy and Anthropology California State University Los Angeles Abstract Apparency and actuality are discussed with respect to science, genetics, evolution, cognition and perception. Rules for a (sub)set of actual/allowable sets of entities and objects from a total set that is based on differences and contrasts extracted from perceptual experience of the world elucidate tenable combinations/recombinations from a total of the transparent(history/past dependant) and the apparent as they can be construed to comprise the actual/real faces of perception. The elements of dreams, language, symbolisms, abstractions are proposed to encompass to encompass a total set of plausible apparencies. Nature from which both internal and external life is mirrored at the simplest structural level is propose to be constructed similarly-to physically possess also concepts and abstractions as states that reflect differences/combinations/recombinations parametrically that are emerged from the parameters associated with particular circumstances. This view is dependant upon, for its' conceptual soundness, a total construction of the world that descends, rather than ascends, in structural complexity and diversity and which is innately divided and compartmentalized in sequence from a more complex uniquely existing state describable singularly as a place of force and proximities form which all processes ensue. Integration of sound, light, into sensory experience and language is proposed to be a natural process of the accomplishment of new proximities/states from total apparent plausibility‟s (past and actual combined) verses the actually(past and present) existing. Two potential important aspects of this scheme exist with regards to evolution theory: 1) a very relative dynamic state of change and emergence is plausible 2) a consistent identity of objects and entities is resolvable that is not based on apparent observations or partial history of events but on a set of total states and processes occurred during the progression to an actual condition. This is suggested to be unique for each and every actual situation as an identifier and is proposed to account for allowances with respect to new potentials. "Self" in this sense can assume more involved relations with self more than with the more distant, hence alien, otherwise arrived at proximal components, components of the environment, inert or otherwise. An example is presented with respect to solar energies and their toxicity to cause disturbances/disease upon internal exposure-as an unnaturally arrived imbalance/proximity between the transparent (history dependant) and the apparent-together comprising, in this situation, a disturbed actual state that can encompass also distortions in the perception of time. Time is proposed to be delineated as a contrast of proximal and distal factors mutually involved with both transparent (genealogically) oriented parameters, and empirically apparent factors that together comprise the actual, as well as those more immediate proximal and distal components(e.g. solar radiation, light-the less structured ambient verse those elements 2 that comprise visual perceptions) as they influence the senses. Each entity species in this scheme possesses its‟ own characteristic sense of time along with contemporary factors that influence the perception of time state, state of health and disturbance. . Introduction Sought order, ready explanation, within the hodgepodge of facts and intuitive associations that trail sociological, environmental, biological evidences concerning the population of the planet by the species rarely congeal into a cogent united framework with which to find an acceptable common reference that might lend an order to the diversities and mixtures encountered empirically. It is common, if not recent in attempts to understand mankind and history to assume that it is a collection of particulars, particular cases that, though allowed within current conceptualizations of nature, might have no coherent thread that might lend a conceptual unity with which to build an understanding. It is the purpose of these materials to demonstrate, that although specific rules without exceptions are difficult to conceive of within the vast array of evolution and sociological examples from discovery that unifying factors exist. The eye appears to have evolved independently in many separate examples. Some mammals have clavicles as a unique characteristic that is intermixed with other traits that are found randomly distributed among the species, do not appear to distribute into particular patterns, or statistically co-relatable characteristic associations, but appear as random expressed mixture of observed possibilities. Sociological factors, the evolution of language, the literal and figurative in expression, communication, dream content is suggested to arise from universally present cognitive conceptual differences in the presented allowable constructions for the real faces of nature and experienced phenomenon and that which has no empirical foundation or existence, the existence of non randomness to the whole of nature verses its content of randomly occurring processes. The fueling of cognition, might be found also to be contained within this same description of affinities within associations; memory, maintained as a state involving localized properties of space, sequestering born from complex, more complex diversity, energy attributed to sensory functioning that is relocated to new positions and environments , together with active experience form a source of material for combinations, originating as a universal of path from energy matter conversion involving very long distances of the same magnitude as a trip across the universe. 3 The hodgepodges of nature ,odd mixtures in the apparent faces of nature , the micro, the macro might all fall to be contained with the described unified conceptualization that entails a parity to the world, in retrospect, as conceptual and non-existent separately mirrored halves that are present and appeaqr as singular concrete tangible structures that are possessed of a transparent energy, are elaborated here with respect to the molecular genetics of living entities as an energy scale based on the topology and geometry of a theoretical one sided surface. Discussion A. Perspective and Abstraction Abstraction into realms that exceed the capacity for direct comparison and experimental validation are excluded here, as well as notions that entail conceptions and beginning/ends. It is conjectured in a presented model of a genealogy of life and nucleic acids that the world can be divided into categories of the apparent and the transparent, the transparent is dependant on a history of events. The locks and keys of biological significance in genetics and molecular biology are given a dynamic facet that supersedes the more concretely known physical structures of the cell, nucleus and associated macromolecular structures and criteria for affinities and mating based on direct physical alignment, or organization described by a linear genetic code. A model is created for emerged representation from the direct perspective of entities in motion that also accommodates human perception, overcoming an objectivity problem that is associated with scientific interpretation. This representation, entitled as a transparency is assigned as a universal and is based on a concept of changes in the propagation medium of transmissions related to changing properties of spaces as entities encounter each other. A re-modulation of transmissions 4 is described to result from the presence of premodulated energy in new physical spaces and reveals the physical characteristics of approaching original entities to one another. It is postulated that the apparent faces of entities may or may not represent a total construction based on all existing faces, as may be common in ordinary experience. Actual constructions are proposed to be a relation of apparent and transparent parameters that are logically definable and orderable An odd feature given to all of space, in this regard, is attributed to a naturally dictated physical congruence of the apparent with (a history) dependant transparent based on an existing parity associated with an inversion surface (mobius strip) as a substrate for force. Three dimensional graph models generated from simple equations for inversions from trigonometric functions that mimic an egg or a helix are shown to have mathematical inverses that align in form, shape, and dimension with non-inverted original structures as support for the model. A physical symmetry in the structure of uracil and an energy division associated with a genealogy of the genetic material is related conceptually with the described parity in transparent and apparent features of processes that is structured with respect to roles of entities/divisions as catalyst and/or substrate, particularly with respect to an overall genealogy as a mirror of known genetic recombination mechanisms. Cancers are interpreted as the result of a disturbance in apparenttransparent balances, loss of genetic identity associated memory and the growth of a subsequent force applied to tissues and cellular structures from abnormal sub-epidermal exposure of tissues that are normally buffered from sunlight within this scheme, by highly ordered transparent/apparent relations inherent within the actualities of a total perspective, to energies that originate from the earths sun. It is concluded that studied biological interactions cannot be successfully divided into separate components with respect to witnesses in witness pairs for a scientific understanding . Though 5 current modeling sufficiently accounts for many phenomenon, this conceptualization is significantly different from current ideas and leads to a significantly different criteria for the understanding of processes, emergence, and the potential gains in light of goals in with respect to avenues in experimentation; the genetic code is concluded to be only an apparent phenomenon, the species not a evolutionary process in terms of an interpretation based on an emergence as a unique transmission, but is composed of a combination of unique energies with distinct genealogies that function in a concert orchestrated inherently by nature to compose the locks and keys that comprise observation-the conventional know mechanisms of inheritance (e.g. via the nucleic acids), observation of genetic inheritance based on the molecular biology of genes, only a facet, a single mechanism of plural existing facets that impart change and progression. 1) All perspective of all entities is in the first person and is held as the only suitable point of reference as the only plausible standard, moves in relation to the external and with itself. Witness is defined as any location in space that exchanges energy with another location and is realized by and confined to pairs of witnesses. A universal of space and processes is based on an ordering by an inversion (Figure 1), one sided surface-mobius like strip, in that assumes a role of catalyst, represents space as a catalyst of processes. All witness points , entities , are the product of a genealogy of two energy paths-the transparent and 6 the apparent. 2) A relativeness of nature is introduced that focuses on temporal differentials involved with volumes and their contained/containing processes that are ultimately Einsteinian and distributed uniformly, qualitatively throughout. 3) Representation is accomplished, at any entity location, by the means of ratios of differentials that are the result of a change in the spaces involved in the propagation of force as different spaces with different spatial properties engage in relations e.g. in analogy, visual representation is postulated to be produced in the brain from differentials in detected sensory signals with time that assume associations re-modulated by the internal environment of the brain (Figure 4). 4) All is construed to be exclusively composed of paths of transmissions. For example, biological memory, DNA, RNA, identity is considered to emerge from energy matter 7 conversions involving transit across vast inversion surfaces as a "physical piece of path" (Figure 3) and are defined as transparent processes. The conversion of matter to energy, a reverse of energy to matter, supplying metabolic energy is defined as apparent. In analogy food ingestion with respect to the whole mammalian organism is given as a higher order parallel to DNA/RNA or protein substrate interactions, the inter-molecular with the intra-molecular. 5) Empirical values of the apparent and the transparent, based on a plane geometry of volumes are secondarily theorized to be alike as a prerequisite for the formation of associations that define the locks and keys of nature( Figures 2, 6, 8, 9) Actual energy lineages as in the description of the means of emergence of DNA (number 4 above) are automatically construed as transparent. Apparent features are designated not to possess a unique genealogy with applicable reference to interactions-i.e. are intermolecular. 8 6) The existence of a natural calculator that combines positive and negative values to produce outputs is postulated and is an apparent feature . The transparent and apparent are thus intermingled an acted on by simple arithmetic processes in the creation of representations by entities. For example one micron of path length added with one micron of path length, three points, results in apparent distances that correspond with the values according to the Pythagorean Theorem but are arrived at naturally. From a higher level, perceptual (and cognitive) representations are suggested to function similarly (Figure 4). 7) The proposed natural existing overlap in numerical differentials of the apparent and the transparent, lending a means for interactions, is suggested to constitute the biological mechanism of locks and keys( Figure 9). Lock and key like mating assume a fluid aspect in which parameters of interactions are not dividable into separate witness components for study –i.e. parameters of a ligand within an interaction are "in dance" with those of the catalytic agent and cannot be treated independently from the substrate to yield coherent meaningful results though mechanisms of function, certain analytical determinations, as partly illustrated, are not precluded with respect to the extraction of pertinent meaning in light of goals. 8) The term multi-function gene or enzyme then gives reference only to a single lock and key, and two independent energy paths composed of transparently originating parameters (intramolecular) and apparently originating parameters (intermolecular) , that are respectively associated with described mechanisms. 9 These concepts, some of which appear to exceed the subject matter of an energy genealogy for the nucleic acids are presented in order to frame the discussion in advance of potentially ensuing contradictions of logic and interpretation. B. Theory and Function: Genetics, Physiology, Visual Perception Other than conceptualizations that structure associations according to physical properties, mass, energy, physical geometry etc., a scheme to construct it with respect to a force of encounter of entities and apparent and transparent factors related to dimensions and energies is introduced. . In consideration of efforts to fit data and observation into theoretical boundaries, noting the vast number of exceptions to expectations that have been arising and the very difficult topic of emergence, a new view is presented to consider an origin of life that is devoid of topics that entail conceptions, beginning and death, as any of them are philosophically unsound and useless in approaches. Temporal considerations, in alternative to a singular descriptive account of function, can give birth to the same set of chicken-egg like logical confusions that perennially entail an overlap of unifying conceptual details with those of a particular and circumstantial nature. A basic unit structured with respect to a mathematical inversion, volumes and energy does not, in the absence of particulars, entail temporal factors. Two components to the model are given as a unit feature as a one sided inversion alike a mobius strip as a surface/catalyst for all processes involving the propagation of force and energy of either of a transparent or apparent nature. Energies of processes are entailed to a separation somewhere along an inversion from highest potential (most energetic and complex) to lowest potential (Figure 1). DNA is characterized as „a piece of physical path‟ that is emerged from energy that has transited a path from a very high potential to low potential, has assumed a state 10 of matter, and reflects physically the path across the entire inversion from which it is derived (Figure 3). DNA , in this scheme has the paradoxical role of both physical form and function as the genetic material and a transparent form and function as memory. A second factor of external metabolic energy that is distinct from described energy genealogies is attributed as intra-molecularly derived , is postulated to fund energetically, biological, as well as all processes. It is important to note here that apparent metabolic fueling energies, tangential energies to the transparent, serve to reverse the sign of potentials of transparencies. Thus energetically downwards , descending, is made to look ascending in the process of seeking, testing, in cognitive processes, feeling around to learn. In accord with the notion that processes reflect nature, the same is assumed to exist in the micro-environment of inert entities. Thus processes proceed with an endowed immediate attraction (perceived as positive in representations) towards the negative as the sole choice in all processes. This again reaffirms ideas of a universal parity centered around a one sided surface in all genealogies, descending in order from the primary possessing the greatest energy potential-here described as an energy matter conversion yielding an energetic mass of identity "path"/memory-descending in order towards the secondary etc. This centricity, though, is strictly apparent, conceptually parallels laws of thermodynamics regarding the permissible directions of change and the conservation of energy. The resulting model is uniquely composed of, at all levels, catalyst and substrate – i.e. space is considered as a catalyst for the substrate light (Figures 1, 2, 3). 11 All processes, in constant flux in this scheme, are postulated to occur from a comparison of self to the external in the sense that both are subject to conditions of the laws that detail space with respect to the geometry of spaces, distances, volumes, energy etc. Entity-self representations are proposed to exist as reflections of temporal differentials of transmissions modulated by conditions dictated by the laws of mass and energy, that upon change in the environment environment of energy from one space to the other as entities approach each other or engage in associations, produce a net transparency that is conceived of as a representation. In the case of visual function (figure 4), 12 an energy differential representing a visual image of the external or external entities results that is maintained by an intersecting metabolic energy provided by the ingestion of food. All aspects are postulated to be laid out this way in all facets, whether witnesses pairs involving living entities or otherwiseall discussed facets, related to witness pairs, are attributed as interactions with respect to first person/entity representations as natures control/standard in that they are 13 more constant in relation to the external, move with the particular entity/the self ; all endogenous components bear a closer genetic relation to self than to exogenous components. With respect to the RNA/DNA pair , as in the description of the origin of deoxynucleic acid (i.e. a lengthy transmission of energy to become DNA and a transient transmission of genetic inheritance from cell to cell), a parallel emerges if one considers RNA as a transient entity with respect to DNA. In attempts to construct the specifics of a respective parallel, a conflict results if one considers the possibility for a discrete route of emergence for the nucleosides and their subsequent assembly into DNA and RNA as a tenable route of emergence, verses the inclination to construe RNA and DNA as a single emergence but with emerged differences. The suggested paradox between a construed independent, and discrete route of emergence for the nucleosides, as they exist also as independent entities, ultimately gives witness to a conceptual paradox involving the entities of life and the inert entities of matter, as it entails, as the most logically implied path, a perspective, in contrast to a unique genealogy for mechanisms, a genealogy involving individual parts that are assembled to account for whole structures that are conceptually construed to be assembled from, with the input of energy that cannot be accounted for thermodynamically, energetically non-descript, inert matter as a precursor for life. This leads to conceptual models construed as tree like and that logically entail a unique origin that is discrete from either-i.e. a single root of a tree in which the ordinary forces and mass of two dimensional space are absent. This paradox might be witnessed in the theory of relativity (Einstein, 1955) in which a special subset of general theory is included for explanation that entails a universe composed of pluralisms that are housed within the single monism that was conceived to intuitively exist as a motivation for creation of the theory, but containing both topologically open and closed features, if not implications of a location-less space made to 14 mathematical, but not common, sense. It is suggested that this trail in a description of nature involves definition of a temporal origin and is both unhandleable conceptually and false. As an alternative, criteria for witness is established with respect to first person/entity representations as ratios of self to the external (Figure 4) and is proposed to be sufficient to account for these difficulties. If it is construed that a single emergence of nucleic acids, as the entities of genetic transmission, precede conceptually the emergence of autonomously existing bases/nucleosides/nucleotides, such as uracil, uridine or deoxyuridine, in an identical scheme of apparent and transparent energy associations but is initiated with an inversion, an inversion product such as DNA, and/or light energy, each with potential multiples roles of catalyst and/or substrate, in a second step not involving the primary light energy from which the nucleic acid chains are postulated to have originated, a scheme for their emergence can be arrived at from mechanisms resembling known genetic mechanisms (e.g. unequal crossing over, deletions, additions, inversions) in succeeding steps from those postulated for the macromolecular genetic material. In this manner the emergence of the nucleotides/nucleosides/bases might be conceived to occur either independently of the emergence of the nucleic acids or in a temporal fashion from them depending on the particulars of mechanisms and genealogies that are entailed with respect to topics-i.e. it is not unfeasible that plural routes in the genealogies of the nucleosides exist with subsequent intermixed associations of the apparent and transparent kind that are separately dissected and significant only with respect to the particulars/pathways under discussion. A likeness in whole to established genetic mechanisms that are based on physical comparison, additions, subtraction, inversions is envisioned (Figures 11 a,b) with the symmetry of uracil (Figure 9) as basic in concept-i.e. transparently existing mirroring halves in which a transparent funding, sequestering, dividing energy exists a transparent component of actual functioning. 15 If one considers, as a possibility, a single path for the emergence of RNA and DNA, a plausible route for the emergence of the bases, nucleotides, and nucleosides (existing also as physically independent of their natural presence in parent nucleic acid structures), may involve a set of recombinations, reordering, overlap and ensuing extraction, repetition of likenesses and differences via alternating roles of substrate and catalyst (Figure 11 a,b ). The routes to the existence of the nucleosides and bases may be postulated to occur in a series of processes involving alternating roles of entities as either catalysts and/or substrates. An overlap in resemblances and differences in surviving intramolecular compositions results, if one allows entities to be either or both catalyst and substrate in steps of a series of emergences involving energy and mass, and can account for all of the discussed entities and features-i.e. RNA, DNA and the nucleosides, the components of the cell, locks and keys that define processes Uridine substituted for thymidine in RNA (might had emerged as an impetus, lending identity for homeostasis, maintenance, and reproduction if one considers the emergence of a vast energy potential division between transient (RNA) and long term (DNA) transmissions as the result of the distinctness and separation of the genealogies of respective emergences entailed by this model in which correct interpretation is dependant on a history of events.. The emergence of uracil, which possesses a structural symmetry (Figure 10) based on 3-carbon units, proposed as a model for processing and catalytic action based on the apparent and the transparent might occupy a central position in all genealogies in which it is sieved into the lower potential energy category into the cytoplasm that harbors RNA verses DNA. The existence of a transparently/ derived, potential energy related, intracellular barrier, analogous to features of the energy matter conversion involving an inversion, theorized to produce DNA, is suggested in which apparent features of cellular biochemistry are an exact consequence of an invisible parity akin to an 16 invisible finger in a dike, that is not directly apparent experimentally and is derived strictly from genealogies of origins. A potential for relations exists in which a resulting proximity of entities is inversely associated with the loss of potential of energy involved in the transit of energy to form matter in the form of catalysts/substrates/macromolecules in which locations of resulting mutual associations, parameters of locks and keys may be established only by historical values related to energy origins in genealogies and proximities which may have, themselves, a genealogy that narrows the probabilities of encounters to be controlled by inherited proximities that initially existed. Inverse numerical relations of the apparent (intermolecular) to the transparent (intramolecular) (Figures 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9) may underline an apparent deception involving falsely construed mechanisms and processes-i.e. timelines in evolution related to the segregation of characteristics and a linearly arranged genetic language that is construed more legally than may be actual in explanations of emergence. Though current data and theory seem to fit together and are not significantly diverged from predictions based on the model presented, total understanding is in the dark many unexplained, unpredicted exceptions to theory are constantly emerging and are more easily accounted for by this more fluid scheme that focuses on, instead of the 17 acquisition of traits, the fitting that form processes and pathways. (Figure 9). A central role ascribable to uracil as template for life processes based on its‟ physical symmetry (Figure 10) in view of the energy genealogy presented as the emergence of odd asymmetrical appearing relation, is not intuitively unreasonable. In the conceptual absence of uni-directional temporal relations it allows the conception of an invisible order conceived as non-existing symmetrical mirroring halves that are automatically donated a energetic component when temporal particulars are considered; as a template for all processes. This places a pronounced importance on the elucidation with respect to the molecular geometries, symmetries, biochemical and genetic constituents of pathways to determine quantitative parameters and description that might be accommodated into the same framework described. As a important factor the helix and its‟ inverse (Figure 8) are oriented 180 degrees out of phase, appear to turn in opposing directions, animated representations of the egg and its‟ inverse also rotate in opposite directions, uracil assumes a position of stress with an applicable torque when incorporated into macromolecules, and in this model has an inherent, transparent torque with in its transparent 18 energy history that may constitute a constituent of the divides and parities elucidated between the nucleus and cytoplasm, if not a similar arrangement of reverse angular orientations depending on its‟ association in processes and location (suggesting that all features/events it may orient themselves uniquely within the angular parity described ), a role the mathematics of the mobius, parameters related to turns, distances, and surfaces, oscillations related to active events, to describe relations, as a central feature for analytical approaches may be feasible. 19 Though a two step mechanism involving separately inert matter and living entities in a temporal order of emergence is customary in theories, here it is contained within a unit concept of genealogies involving locks-and -keys/catalyst-and-substrate. More important, with respect to the paradox introduced involving the theory of relativity, a conceptual unity and contiguity is maintained that avoids referral to origins entailing properties/entities that are beyond empirically focused conceptual description with respect to a genealogy of mechanisms. Theological paradoxes entailing infinite regresses and origins, resolved into notions of a creator, an ever present and omnipotent deity resolve into a genealogical order that dictates structures and associations, encompasses perception, cognition, intelligence, is proximal to experience, "ever present", and leave the question of an actual creation beyond the scope of science or evolution theory. This arrangement, of an orderable form, from which DNA, RNA, enzymes etc. emerge and associate as catalysts and/or substrates entails a description of a transparent nature of the transparent verses the apparent physical nature of structures emerged and their associations. This means of description, utilizing notions of transparent and apparent, follows a strict adherence to first perspectives of entities and also permits a complete description of a encompassing mechanism based on a concept of transparencies as dynamic energy-grams related to the physical approach, proximity of entities . The transparency, always the primary and singular ingredient of associations, a synergy modulated by physical parameters of the proximal(present) and the distal(past), is, here, determined to yield analytically inseparable witnesses in witness pair associations, less for a conjectured genealogy of origins that is strictly based on empirical observation-i.e.-observation of the egg, of nature, or related to the 20 determination of the biochemical and genetic components and associations within the cell and organism, etc. C. Language and Actuality Facets of descriptive language usage, philosophical inquiries that put to question the nature of concealed faces of the objects of perception, facets of experience concerning reflexive assumptions about the likeness of hidden faces to those observed are given as mirrored from nature as a transparency of apparent and transparent relations, might raise to prominent significance, as discussed above, the symmetry in the structure of uracil (Figure 10) as a mirrored aspect related to all features in the emergence of the life processes, a mirrored process of all processes.. Uracil appears to represent the simplest structure possible to possess both a mirror symmetry and a directional parity. Additional undiscussed considerations are entailed by uracils‟ plural chemical composition of hydrogen nitrogen and carbon, their origin and place in the model In the model, on a molecular level the figurative and the literal/actual become empirically interchangeable to produce combinations and recombinations that evolve into the locks and keys that modulate apparent, empirically grounded interpretation with respect to mechanisms and function. In figure 6 a 3-D plot of energies involved in the displacement of light emitted from a moving body as an additive sum of motions at any particular angle of light radiation with respect to motion of the body(Figure 5), matches the common shape of an egg. The included video A Graphical Representation of An Egg as it Mirrors Nature highlights the congruence of size and shape of the plot of the egg and its‟ inverse from a three dimensional perspective might 21 suggest how stable apparent geometrical form can be the product of dynamically changing relations. 22 23 An inverse plot (Figure 6b),1/R (R=radius), intended to conceptually represent a transparent genealogy of the apparent egg , generates values that fall within the same range, in a different order, as those for R, and nearly consumes the same shape and volume (Figure 6c). 24 Figure 8 demonstrates the same relationship with respect to a helix. 25 In the figures dependant values of R and 1/R with respect to independent parameters do not align but overlap to produce nearly identical shapes, displacement volumesan arrangement of dependant parameters that are contained within a common range in all plots. A transparent, apparent rearrangement of parameters as explanation for apparent structure and function, as in the description of memory as both transparent and apparent emerges. The genetic language, thus, is only an apparent property with respect to this interpretation. Its‟ observation is suggested to be a result of a necessity of perception combined with observation, a dependence of perception/life for the existence of two surfaces, space(s) that are actually emerged from one surface and is paradoxically observed in an apparent manner, existing that way (i.e. the linear arrangement of nucleotides in a string ). A motion birthing deception of nature, a universal potential for ambiguity in meaning, also existing in aspects of language usage is attributed in analogy to the same exchangeability of parameters of the apparent and transparent at all levels from the molecular to the more tangible objects of existence. In this same sense the tautologies used by philosophers and linguists in the validity test of sentences and propositions might be conceived to, in analogy, if transposed into a geometrical form of lengths 26 and truth values assume a motion from offset truth values of phrasesa valid test of a phrase would be designated to produce no motion-the universe, though, in model construction cannot be given a stillness in any aspect. In this light, this described model tested for logical structure only with respect to its‟ conception as a transparency of the transparent and the apparent, though internally consistent conceptually, entails a constancy only with respect to nomenclatures and conceptual mechanisms of representation of entities in associations. In nature, meaning, as in language is attributable to conceptual origins that entail perspectives related to histories of emergence and long time intervals in comparison to transiently existing life entities. In abstraction, as in reflexive perception, as in language usage with respect to meaning the apparent and transparent cannot be so easily divided, but can be ordered conceptually from experience to conceive of laws of nature in which the two might become interchangeable in the description of emergence. 1. Biological genetic processes are here attributed a like-from-like, genetic origin as a class of processes that are self belonging, i.e. genetic processes that originate genetically, but are not self belonging in the sense that life itself cannot be given as a singular genetic emergence, is not a genetic process but involves al least two distinct and intersecting energy paths with a conceptually non random framework that is unique and does not belong to its‟ own set. (Kirsh, 2008) 2. Multi-function genes, multi active enzymes (Kirsh et al 1978) are more easily accommodated as lock and key matching rather than enzyme –substrate matching in which nature possess a wobble in that orientation and not with respect to lock and key. 27 3. Cytosine is known to be capable of spontaneous conversion to uridine at room temperature. However uridine is not detected in the DNA (Kirsh 1986) though it can pair with adenosine to cause a C/G to U/A to A/T change in base pairs on DNA replication. As an additional fact pertaining to its‟ absence in DNA, based on this discussion, it might not be expected to be involved in mutagenic wobbling as it is suggested to be intimately associated with a lock and key function involving identity and maintenance. 4. The use of inverse functions to represent the transparent is an approximation in the sense that energy differences, i.e. displacement energies involved in the creation of volumes as functions of ∆c are the actual topic. It may result that c^x/ ∆c^x, x is an integer, i.e. x=3 to illustrate volumes; ∆c bearing a universally modulating association to naturally allowed velocities of masses. 5. Proximal and distal (i.e. reflected light and refracted/ ambient light/daylight) sources combined, provide the energy inputs for visual transparencies. (Figure 7) 28 From a first person/species perspective of location on the earth as a single apparent source (though having a dual as both an apparent and transparent source if the eye/brain is considered as a catalyst and light a substrate in the formation of 29 transparencies) ,energy from the sun is secondarily apparent only as a source of metabolic energy for food as a substrate and members of the species as a catalyst-i.e. as a transparent component. It is interesting to note that the entire length of human DNA is estimated to be of the same order of magnitude as the distance from the earth to the sun. Speculation, in light of these analogies, suggests strictly an alternate source of energy for processes involved in transparent aspects of a genealogy for the origin for the species than that provided by processes of the earths‟ sun as a transparent value for the length of the DNA would greatly exceed its apparent value in the model. If it is significant the matching of the length of human DNA to the earth sun distance suggests that it has a transparent component that is significant, both values are empirically derived from direct measurement. A direct relationship of DNA to sunlight, not construed to exist, suggests that intervening catalyst/substrate processes within the organism and cell might be accounted for as catalytic, transparent values, intersecting physically/apparently with both DNA and solar energy as substrates. If the role of the eye/brain is considered catalytic with respect to light, a role of DNA (sequestered from solar radiation) as memory in terms of its‟ length is suggested to be as a substrate with respect to solar radiation. This suggested duality of role of solar radiation and the nucleic acids as either catalyst or substrate is suggested to delineate time, is modulated by totally by apparent geometrical length and transparent energy differentials: mass*velocity ^2(energy)/distance = mass*distance/timê2=mass*acceleration = force 30 A resulting net force, inversion potential, related to total surfaces involved in the sequestering of the nuclear material in the cell might be entailed to function in a manner inversely with whole transparent potentials(i.e. DNA as physical piece of memory from a descent across space) suggested to be associated with homeostatic integrity/immunological identity. The physical application of force is known to induce cancers. Direct sunlight, especially an ultraviolet component of sunlight, is reported to be a source of cancers of the skin, eye, and able to cause thymidine dimers in DNA which have a high mutagenic potential. It is also possible to account generally for apparent and transparent energies by a displacement of light energy from one location to another (Naomi,2007) involving the application of a large magnitudes of energy to exert a force to guide energies. In analogy, a short circuit in sequestering/buffering forces may result in a dedifferentiation of ordinary stabilities provided by apparent and transparent associations, destabilization/loss of identity/memory related to genealogies of origin effected by forces connected with internal exposure to energies associated genealogically with solar radiation. Figures 11 a, b and the included animation demonstrate an origin for uracil (Figure 11 b) and uracil as a component of nucleic acids (Figure 11 a) from an exclusively transparently existing fragment that is mirrored across an inversion that defines space and a geometrically determined transparent energy for uracil that is innately derived from its‟ symmetry respectivelty. 31 32 D. Language and Symbolism If space, its' empirical and deduced properties is claimed as universal as proposed , where in do we account for our dreams, lingual, conscious and unconscious functioning? It is here at the juncture of test and question, I will term as "The Great Wall of Paradox" that a new orientation for approach to understanding must be undertaken. I hope to have demonstrated if „all‟ proceeds from induction to deduction to induction to deduction ,etc, if all of our inductions/abstractions entail, refer back to, our starting point of sensory experience, that the current progress of civilization is stunted in the interval between an induction and an ensuing deduction that relates from our abstractions back to initial starting facts of primary sensory experience of which our knowledge of the world ascends. If an order must exist to our 33 conceptions, as intuition argues, something logical that defines them may be very hard to capture even a glimpse of. It is contended here that the glimpse itself is also part of the whole picture and does not need a high speed, a superfast shutter, and special technology to capture, but only a fact that the kaleidoscopes in our dreams, of language, the collage of our thoughts and symbolisms, the scrambling and re-assembly that produces the faces of life as a concoction of our awake and/or sleeping minds has a likeness in nature. As an example, what is color ? A figurative?, a concept without a tangible correlate. But it is a transparent feature descended from the apparent experience of particular colors. In analogy, in my enclosed paper the transparent property of memory is conjectured to exist physically as mass that is descended from light energy that has traversed vast distances. When we try to think of this we are still in the logical tunnel realm of life that relies on the logical additions of our preoccupations with nature and survival. But the world is a place of motion and contrasts within which no fixed standards exist. Blue can be seen as green with the correct filter. All that is retained from this experience is a memory of blue changing to green, a path from blue to green, an action that requires energy. So the concept of color is the result of a change (in this case an intentionally induced change). If one reflects carefully, all concepts are that way exclusively and involve the perception of a change in path involving particulars. The change of path itself might be denoted as a particular, but has no apparent correlate in perceived reality. It is particulars with which we construct our ideas of the faces of things, but also have concept of their change. It is intended here that, although unperceivable, originating within, that" concept" itself is a reflection from facets of change in nature that have a different set of particular values associated with them and an associated path for the differences that denote particular concepts. One might be able to imagine a volume filled with red rays or one filled with blue rays. In this example the implication of 34 volume entails a face to the space that is enclosed, and volume to energy ratio for blue maybe standardly different to that for red, so that the face of blue in suitable proximity of the face of red yields a change in volume/energy that is reflected, maintained as a proximal concept. This is a second order change, change from change, that is more stable, resistant, lasting ..on a different frequency from normal "first order particulars of size and shape for instance. Color as a concept is an idea about the faces of things, that is reflected from ordinary processes of nature that respond to change, conduct natural mathematical operations as simply as lengths added to lengths add up to longer lengths, tell of a total and changes in a total-face 1 plus face 2 need not add up to face 3but to a total that speaks of the presence of faces 1 and 2. ; color most likely entails an internal energy path in the brain from spaces/volumes with entailed particular parameters to other spaces/volumes with distinct ,by definition, alternate special parameters propertiesi.e. change to the changes from which the particulars of color are filterable, filter to our senses. Facets of the topology, and physiology, evolved arrangements of space in the brain may create the special circumstances, reflected from processes of nature (an external nature, identical but for its‟ topological arrangement ) , in which sound, light etc, input to the senses enable new internal regional associations to result in sound communications, speech and language coordination of the visual, audio etc. Take the phrase 'I am blue" for instance "I have a blue face". Presto, we are all essentially clairvoyant geniuses about nature and the „faces‟ of the world . An understanding of it is in our language to start-we have a good command of the "bucket of particular parts" of the faces of things but have not thought about it in depth, caught our breath within the fast rate of world change, to view deliberately in retrospect, to know and compare, or at least resolve that a deducible universal rule to assemble these particulars exists. Somehow we have come to start 35 with the bucket of parts and a construed random universe from which we arrive at a lot of generalities and general descriptions, a near infinite way things might be arranged that is far different from an infinite number of real, actually existing, possibilities. My contention in this presentation is that we must start with ourselves and what we experience as both a beginning and end total. It is from that basis only that we might find first base. Steps to a first base, taken from the mathematical concoction of the bucket of particulars, in current conceptions produce the "Great Wall of Paradox", the parts are the mortar. Looking for clues via scientific dissection of the parts is no more than 'dissection of the parts,' dissection of the mortar which can damage nature, and which may not reveal a whole. The bucket, though, should exclusively entail from its‟ contents only an alphabet of mathematics, an assortment of possible spaceregionally associated conceptuals from which we begin our application of mathematics to life and nature yet somehow scientists have arrived at only a mathematics of the alphabet of language, that though can be fit to explanation of observation, the world begins, not as an engineering plan , but with observation and not preceding explanation in advance of observation for the parts of construction, unless one wants to claim a cognitive creator who thinks logically like an engineer. We must acknowledge that man, in all his aspects must be a reflection from nature, and not visa versa. If a concept of the faces of things exists from a bucket of particulars as a representation of the cognitive and biological functioning of the human species, then from where in nature is this reflected? Nature, for example, does not contain the word color, it has many particulars of colors and still no word for it; in essence nature does not appear to have a language. I am proposing that nature does have a language that we already know, it is not the genetic code which is only a product of lingually oriented observation which is a product of 36 nature. For natures language, concepts are proposed to exist literally in nature as proximity associated contrast/change derived from the contrast in properties of particular spaces through which energy passes, is modulated and remodulated location to location. An existing diversity (of concepts), a variety of representations of all interactions can be related, related to, in order to account for a logic of conscious existence that is based on primary perceptions of our surrounding. The inductive trail of reasoning leading to the "Great Wall of Paradox" from the "bucket of particulars" starts and must again return to the self always with a philosophical deduction rather than induction , in this case filling in darker areas of science with a better relational view to the self . The "wall of paradox", of scientific paradox, emerges as a facet related to survival when inductions in a cycles of induction, deduction ,induction, deduction become incomplete and alien to the senses, not necessarily related to life experience, trail off into a realm of description that, regardless of their complexity, are absent of deduction relations to primary sensory experience. In the graphical representation of an egg (figure 8) apparent and hypothetical transparent properties of the egg are reconciled in a unique mathematical way , but are potentially reconcilable in other ways. A sphere and its‟ inverse for example have identical shapes and comparable sizes, as does the representation created with trigonometric functions. However an off-center center or changing center of mass/gravity is impossible to explain with the mathematics of a sphere. Both types of representations can be made to appear identical with each other in gross features but under the surface conceptual differences are pronounced. The sphere has a simple center though which every point has a mirror, the egg demonstrated from trigonometric functions has no center at all and a plot trail length that would dwarf the dimensions of the egg. In these cases appearances are exactly deceiving-each representation is 37 exactly different from the other though they appear identical. In reference to the sphere as a representation, stationary representations, pictures, are at the level of sensory experience, in the presented model, the products of second order change, the intersection of change with change. If one asks how such accelerating intersections produce stabile interpretations/representations, it must be that accelerating components meeting in intersection bear an underlying identical universal property, property of space, of the paths of space of which they belong, perhaps as mating partners in which energy histories and contemporary structures of masses as they relate to spatial distances are never, cannot be, far adrift of one another if physical proximity is present. . Conclusion A world of proximity, distance constrictions might be taken as the world itself, rather than as description. Length proximity of the initial point on egg plots to the end point verses those of a simple sphere paint very contrasting views, a resulting hidden behind the scenes reality, that is not composed of conceptual inductions such as electrons, protons, etc. but of lengths and cycles that not only are strictly relative, composed of ratios, proximity factors, without temporal factors, maybe relatable physically to a potential ratio of the various frequencies and proximities (e.g. chicken to egg to chicken... ) associated with mating cycles of different species. A chicken might not have an associatable center, as a near spherical egg might stimulate the imagination to investigate, study of the symmetry of the egg is futile/meaningless if it cannot be related to the movements of the chicken. The point here is that not only is mathematics useless, meaningless without empirical observation, gross observations of both the 38 chicken and the egg, but that this fact is not applied diligently in modern sciences that deal with abstract elucidations such as the constituents of atoms in which real meaning escapes and does not return to the sound and coherent estimation of the senses in the construction of the environment, i.e.in relation to the senses, to self and survival as the only conceivable meaning. I hope to have demonstrated an underlying principle that can account for the great diversities of observation, a theoretical context with which to confine into proportion a set for the allowable faces of structure and function, adaptation and change, progression with time of populations over the environment. It is hoped that those walls and divisions premeditating distinct paths of change, convergences, divergences, parallel phenomenon might attain a more fluid interpretation than those based on random paths of migration, meeting, adaptation, genetic expression, so that the discrimination of one species from another for definition, identification, might find an understanding that is based on a latitude for structure that has a common unifying element that si common to all/preceding states as successive progenitors, a specific traversed path of changes that have, as a common denominator certain desired identifiers that constitute inherent unchangeable distinctness that are unique and single to each path as actual states are traversed to the present A world defined as a place of proximities and past associations with respect to a geometrical energy genealogy scale of birthing processes, the egg before the chicken as a happening, conceived within a nonrandom, but homogenous throughout, identifying order, here is intended to become categorized, in micro to macro aspect, in the facets of associations with that same notion into a more actual set of classes. Mankinds‟ origin, the origin of other species, migrations, potential re-meeting, subsequent expansion are envisioned to be modulated by 39 allowances, permissible crossing denoted by a flexibility in the barriers related parametrically and allow for associations as endowed and comprehensive to an entire unique progression in which a certain state that is evolved from parameters of proximity, is common and unchangeable throughout, both in internal structure(s) in organisms and entities as whole, within the actualities, actualities of the modulators of associations, of which an assessment of more readily obtainable apparent notions from test and observation conceptually may or may not overlap , .I am so and so alike or different from my environment partners with respect to an underlying state that is consumed as self that only certain potential associations can be assumed upon the events of proximity. To re-stress, proximity, expressed as transparent (past energy potential related)and a mathematically related apparent proximity is postulated to be the sole conceptual element and is proposed to function dynamically in all aspects of interactions ranging from the assumption of all classifications to the" seeing" "knowing" identification (of self, pseudo-self) involved in interactions upon the re-accomplishment of proximity. Apparent likenesses may not exist, non apparent others invisibly allowing cohabitation, modulating varied associations, allowing or not reproduction. Buried within concepts of the apparent and its hypothesized relation to transparent, history dependant factors is a potential key for the ordering of physical law as it relates to structure and function, more important, to processes. 40 References Einstein, Albert (1955) Meaning of Relativity 5thed. Princeton University Press Princeton N.J.. Kirsh, Marvin, E., Dembinski, D, and Hartman,P.E. (1978) Carnosinase in S. Typhimurium J. Bacteriol. 1978 May; 134(2): 361-374. Kirsh, Marvin, E., Hartman, P.E., and Cutler, R.G. (1986) Absence of deoxyuridine and 5- hydroxymethyldeoxyuridine in the DNA from three tissues of mice of various ages. Mech. Ageing Dev. 1986 Jun;35(1):71-7. Kirsh (2008) Social Science Research Network Working Paper Series, Uniqueness and Self Belonging in Nature (under review in Theory in the Biosciences) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1280584 Kirsh, Marvin, E. , (2009) Social Sciences Research Network Working Paper Series, The Universe Framed with Respect to Paradox: Is Memory Physically All That Exists? http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1280605 Kirsh, Marvin, E. (2009) Social Sciences Research Network Working Paper Series Induction, Space and Positive Ethics (in press) Ludus Vitalis http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1280594 41 Naomi S. Ginsberg 1 , Sean R. Garner 1 and Lene Vestergaard Hau (2007) Coherent Control of Optical Information With Matter Wave Dynamics, Nature 445,623-626(8 February 2007). Seoighe, Cathal et al, (2000) Prevalence of Small Inversions in Yeast Gene order Evolution, Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2000 December 19; 97(26): 14433–14437. Weisstein, Eric W. "Helix." From MathWorld--A Wolfram Web Resource. http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Helix.html.

Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics Volume 1 | Issue 1 Article 4 2011 Two Views of Conscience for the Australian People Matthew Beard University of Notre Dame, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity ISSN: 1839-0366 COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Copyright Regulations 1969 WARNING This material has been copied and communicated to you by or on behalf of the University of Notre Dame Australia pursuant to part VB of the Copyright Act 1969 (the Act). The material in this communication may be subject to copyright under the Act. Any further copying or communication of this material by you may be the subject of copyright protection under the Act. Do not remove this notice. This Article is brought to you by ResearchOnline@ND. It has been accepted for inclusion in Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics by an authorized administrator of ResearchOnline@ND. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Recommended Citation Beard, Matthew (2011) "Two Views of Conscience for the Australian People," Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 4. Available at: http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol1/iss1/4 Two Views of Conscience for the Australian People Abstract Australian democracy has recently seen a new emphasis on 'conscience votes' in parliament. However, despite this increasing awareness, the Australian media, public and governments have failed to examine closely the concept of a 'conscience vote', and the important question of what conscience really is. I will examine a number of statements made by politicians, media commentators and other groups surrounding conscience votes to show the problems that emerge from lacking a clear account of conscience. From this, I will outline two different classical views of conscience: that of Bishop Joseph Butler and that of St. Thomas Aquinas, and show the implications for politicians of adopting either view. I will suggest that the contemporary Australian usage of conscience has more in common with Butler than Aquinas, but that the Thomistic view could serve to better inform both the contemporary Australian usage, and Butler's views. I will briefly suggest some ways that adopting the Thomistic view of conscience would impact on the Australian democratic system, and explain the problems with a philosophical view that upholds the primacy of conscience and fails to appeal to external moral truth. This article is available in Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics: http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/ solidarity/vol1/iss1/4 Two Views of Conscience for the Australian People Matthew Beard Australian democracy has recently seen a new emphasis on 'conscience votes' in parliament. Although no conscience votes were actually held by the last federal government, public awareness of the notion has increased, with the NSW state parliament holding a conscience vote in September 2010 on the Adoption Amendment (Same Sex Couples) Bill, 2010, (hereafter Same Sex Couples) and increasing calls for Prime Minister Julia Gillard to call a conscience vote on the issue of same-sex marriage. Further discussion about the nature and purpose of conscience votes arose when Joe Hockey announced that he would call a conscience vote on the ETS issue if elected leader of the Liberal Party in 2009, and in discussion of the Victorian Abortion Law Reform Bill, 2008. However, despite this increasing awareness, the Australian media, public and governments have failed to examine closely the concept of a 'conscience vote', and the important question of what conscience really is. I will examine a number of statements made by politicians, media commentators and other groups surrounding conscience votes to show the problems that emerge from lacking a clear account of conscience. From this, I will outline two different classical views of conscience: that of Bishop Joseph Butler and that of St. Thomas Aquinas, and show the implications for politicians of adopting either view. I will suggest that the contemporary Australian usage of conscience has more in common with Butler than Aquinas, but that the Thomistic view could serve to better inform both the contemporary Australian usage, and Butler's views. I will briefly suggest some ways that adopting the Thomistic view of conscience would impact on the Australian democratic system, and explain the problems with a philosophical view that upholds the primacy of conscience and fails to appeal to external moral truth. 1: Discussion Surrounding Conscience Votes In this section I will focus on a number of recent comments about various conscience vote issues including the NSW vote on Same Sex Couples, and the calls for a federal conscience vote on gay marriage. From these I will try to uncover some common ground between the three different discussions, which I will use to understand the contemporary Australian usage of conscience. Conscience vote is here understood as "the rare vote in parliament, in which members are not obliged by the parties to follow a party line, but vote according to their own moral, political, religious or social beliefs." 1 Typically, conscience votes are reserved for contentious, politically difficult – usually social/moral – issues on which the parties do not have a clear policy. 2 This idea was echoed by NSW Opposition Leader Barry O'Farrell when he allowed a conscience vote surrounding Same Sex Couples, he remarked "[t]he liberal party has a tradition of allowing conscience votes where there is no party line that must be 1 The Penguin Macquarie Dictionary of Australian Politics, (Ringwood, Victoria: Penguin Books, 1988), p. 86 2 Deirdre McKeown and Rob Lundie, 'Conscience Votes During the Howard Government 1996-2007, Politics and Public Administration Section, Research Paper no. 20 2008-09, 2009 Accessed from: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/2008-09/09rp20.htm#_ftnref4 [1 Nov, 2010] 1 Beard: Two Views of Conscience for the Australian People Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2011 followed". 3 So, a conscience vote is not a typical vote; it is employed only in extraordinary circumstances, and refers to when a politician does not have to vote alongside her party, and is encouraged to make a decision based on whatever is most important to her surrounding the issue. Thus, the question that needs to be asked is 'on what grounds should a politician make her decision during a conscience vote?' These grounds will give insight into the nature of conscience. Discussing the question of gay marriage in Australia, the Independent MP Andrew Wilkie remarked "Why on earth won't the Prime Minister agree to a conscience vote? [...] We know 62 per cent of Australians support same sex marriage, we know now that 78 per cent of Australians support a conscience vote in the parliament on same sex marriage." 4 Wilkie appeared frustrated that a conscience vote was being denied, seemingly because, to his mind, a conscience vote would be more representative of the Australian public than usual parliamentary voting: "I think it's virtually unexplainable how the Prime Minister can be so prepared so consistently to be out of step with the will of the people." 5 Clover Moore, Lord Mayor of Sydney, who introduced Same Sex Couples to state parliament says of conscience votes that they "allow all members of Parliament to consider their communities' wish[es]". 6 By voting in any other way "the MP is not representing the electorate's wishes but following their own personal views", 7 and although this may not be immoral, it places the politician in a difficult position. The suggestion here is that popular consensus should be a consideration when making a decision of conscience; an MP's constituency should govern, at least to an extent, her conscience; the political conscience vote allows an MP to represent her local electorate, rather than her political party. 8 Another method of conscience voting is for a politician to "look only to their (sic.) own sense of right and wrong and vote according to their own conscience. That may be a carefully articulated and principled outlook or perhaps a more case-by-case approach, maybe involving getting in touch with their feelings on the day." 9 Basically, conscience voting becomes a medium through which a politician is entitled to act on personal belief. Julia Gillard echoed such sentiments when speaking of calling a conscience vote on territory rights to legalise euthanasia, saying "The Labor Party has previously allowed MPs to express their views on this issue with a conscience vote". 10 Significant here is the phrase "express their 3 Ani Lamont, 'Libs Granted Conscience Vote on Relationship Register', Star Observer, 5 May, 2010-11-01 Accessed from: http://www.starobserver.com.au/news/2010/05/05/libs-granted-conscience-vote-on-relationshipregister/24881 [1 Nov, 2010] 4 Emma Rodgers, 'Wilkie calls for gay marriage conscience vote', ABC News, 22 nd Oct, 2010 Accessed from: http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/10/22/3045375.htm [1 Nov, 2010] 5 Ibid. 6 Clover Moore, Accessed from: www.freevote.org.au [2 Nov, 2010] 7 Dr. Steven Tudor, 'Conscience Votes and the Victorian Law Reform Bill', La Trobe University Accessed from: http://www.latrobe.edu.au/news/articles/2008/opinion/conscience-votes-and-the-victorianabortion-law-reform-bill [2 Nov, 2010] 8 In this case, it should be asked whether a commitment to 'conscience voting' entails a commitment to conscience in general. This was questioned in the case of the Victorian Abortion Law Reform Act, where National MP Julian McGauran argues that "the very parliamentarians who hold dear their right to exercise a conscience vote on this issue did not hesitate to smite the right of doctors and nurses to exercise their conscience on the same matter." See: 'Matters of Public Interest, Victoria: Abortion Law Reform Act', Government of Australia Parliamentary Debates, Senate Hansard, Wed, 19 August, 2010. 9 Ibid. 10 'PM vows right-to-die conscience vote', AAP, Sept. 20, 2010 Accessed from: http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/1357646/PM-vows-right-to-die-conscience-vote [2 Nov, 2010] 2 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 1 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 4 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol1/iss1/4 views". On this account, conscience voting affords an MP the opportunity to vote in accord her own opinion of what is right. A conflict begins to emerge here between community/public interest and the MP's personal opinion of the good. Although sometimes an MP will be elected because of her consistency with the community views, there are cases where an individual is elected on the popularity of her party, not her own personal views. Thus, when given an opportunity to diverge from her party (or where her party has no policy), the commitment of the politician is difficult, on the contemporary Australian account, to discern. The reason for this is because contemporary Australian usage of the term conscience shows no consistent understanding of what conscience is on which to build its account of how conscience votes ought to be applied: conscience is seen as, varyingly, a 'different way' of approaching voting, a way for MP's to represent local constituencies rather than the party, a non-partisan voting method, 'moral' judgement in politics, or a way for individual politicians to support their own personal views. However, none of this serves to inform the true nature of conscience, nor does it lend aid to the MP trying to decide whether to vote based on her local electorate, or on her own personal beliefs. In what follows, I will present two different accounts of conscience, and demonstrate how they both serve to inform the MP's action. 2: Two Versions of Conscience Although I have said that this section aims to provide MP's with two versions of conscience that could lend assistance in decision making, I will only endorse one position here: the Thomistic account of conscience. Philosophical analysis of both accounts will make my reasons for doing so clear: I believe that the Thomistic account offers a much richer version of conscience, which is both (i) more philosophically persuasive, and (ii) offers politicians a clearer method of decision-making, providing a clear solution to the conflict raised above (between personal and public belief). A: Bishop Joseph Butler Joseph Butler was an Anglican bishop living from the 1692-1752, whose philosophical project was to discover "what is meant by the nature of man, when it is said that virtue consists in following, and vice in deviating from it." 11 His view of conscience, therefore, is based in his account of human nature, which aimed to re-write the egoist view of nature that was the legacy of Thomas Hobbes. Butler argued that conscience must be obeyed "because it is a law [...] my nature [carrying] its own authority with it." 12 Moral obligations, for Butler, derive from human nature, and knowing who one is qua human, one's conscience will inform a person how to act with virtue. 13 The obligation to perform a morally good action and the feeling of motivation to do so come entirely from within the individual and are a result of a person's nature qua human. So, Butler argues that both the moral demand of 11 R.G. Frey, 'Butler, Joseph', Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Accessed from: http://www.rep.routledge.com.ipacez.nd.edu.au/article/DB012SECT2 [May 29, 2009] 12 Peter Fuss, 'Conscience', Ethics, University of Chicago Press, Vol.74 No.2, 1964, p.111 13 Butler remarks: "obligations of virtue shown, and motives to the practice of it enforced from a review of the Nature of Man are to be considered as an appeal to each particular person's heart and natural conscience" See: Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons preached at the Rolls Chapel, (Knapton, 1726), p.27, Accessed from: http://books.google.com.au/books?id=RmUAAAAAMAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=joseph+butler&hl=en&ei =lf0bTeHDGormvQPY2vj5DQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAA#v=onep age&q&f=false [30 Dec, 2010] 3 Beard: Two Views of Conscience for the Australian People Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2011 conscience and the feeling to respond to such a demand come from within the person. This (and more) can be learned by reading further in the Sermon on Human Nature. Since then our inward feelings and the perceptions we receive from our external senses are equally real, to argue from the former to life and conduct is as little liable to exception as to argue from the latter to absolute speculative truth. A man can as little doubt whether his eyes were given to him to see with as he can doubt of the truth of the science of Optics, deduced from ocular experiments. 14 Here, Butler discusses the validity of extracting truths about human nature from internal intuition of how a human should behave. It is, for Butler, valid to determine that the eyes were designed to provide vision, from the intuited sense that "eyes see", rather than to require an empirical examination of the behaviour and makeup of the eye in order to reach the same conclusion. From this, Butler suggests humans have similar intuitions about behaviour, and these internal senses are sufficient to inform human behaviour. This intuition is, for Butler, conscience; it is a kind of 'moral sense'. He argues that it is equally valid to construct a set of moral norms based solely on the demands of conscience as it is to rationally formulate a series of moral principles based on experience and deduction, and which can then be used to advise the conscience. For Butler, the latter process is arbitrary: sense data is sufficient. Butler is a teleologist. For him, it is "good" to behave in consistency with the demands of our nature. Butler argues that "every man is naturally a law unto himself; that everyone may find within himself the rule of right, and obligations to follow it." 15 It is not difficult to see similarities with the thought of the more widely known Immanuel Kant, but where Kant would argue that the categorical imperative applies to every rational being equally simply through reason of their being rational, Butler's conception of conscience "does not speak in general rules or formulas". 16 Martin McGuire sees Butler's view of conscience as "a sort of magistrate." 17 As such, Butler's conception cannot be seen to function in the same way that Kantian ethics does as it does not apply universally. It is a personal intuition, coming from within the person, and based in her nature. 18 However, Butler makes clear that although the moral sense is not universal, it has power over the person as if it were: it carries absolute authority over the individual. Thus that principle which we survey, and either approve or disapprove our own heart, temper and actions is not to be considered as what is, in its turn, to have some influence; which may be said of every passion of the lowest appetites: but likewise as being superior, as from its very nature manifestly claiming superiority over all other [passions]... This is a constituent part of the idea, that is, of the faculty itself; and to preside and govern, from the very economy and constitution of man belongs to it. Had 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid., p.32 16 Fuss, op. cit., p. 111 17 Martin C. Maguire, 'On Conscience', The Journal of Philosophy, Journal of Philosophy Inc., Vol.60 No.10, 1963, p.253 18 I will later raise the question of whether an intuition like this can stem 'purely' from human nature, separate from particular experiences. 4 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 1 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 4 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol1/iss1/4 it strength as it has right, had it power as it has manifest authority, it would absolutely govern the world 19 Moral sense is not to be confused with other appetitive senses. It is to be seen as superior to these things simply because its nature is superior to the other passions. 20 It comes from 'human nature', not from our 'animal nature'. Interesting also, is the final sentence where Butler suggests that the conscience would serve as an external moral law if it were not limited to the individual. However, as each individual has a conscience which is "manifestly superior", a single conscience cannot claim universal power, but the conscience acts in the same way as a moral law, simply on an individual rather than universal level. So, Butler "show[s] men that they have a moral faculty which tells them their duties", 21 and suggests that these duties derive from human nature, known subjectively. A politician acting under Butler's account of conscience will approach an issue and, upon considering it, examine her moral sense response. If it is favourable, she ought to (according to Butler) vote in favour of the issue. Thus, Butler's argument suggests that in a conflict between the beliefs of an MP's constituency and her own beliefs, she ought to (and will) uphold the view of her own personal conscience. To do otherwise would be unnatural for her. B: St. Thomas Aquinas In Aquinas, "conscience is introduced as the rational application to present contingent circumstances of the first principles of practical reason." 22 That is, conscience is the rational process whereby a person intuits basic goods in a situation and weighs them up against her subjective desire for a particular good, and then decides either to act or not to act based on the rational decision of whether her desire for a particular good is consistent with her intuition of basic goods. On this point it is evident (and important to note) that conscience is not a faculty, or simply a sense (as in Butler's theory), but an act; conscience "implies the relation of knowledge [of the good] to something [particular situation]." 23 As I have said, for Aquinas, conscience is an act in that it "implies the relation of knowledge to something." The question of conscience is an epistemological one: namely, how humans dispositionally intuit the good, and, through repeatedly acting in (in)consistency with that intuition, come to know (or believe they know) the moral law. The process of conscience is outlined by Aquinas in De Veritate where he argues: [In situations] whereby we deliberate what ought to be done or examine what has been done, it is a habit of practical reason that is applied, namely the habit of synderesis and the habit of wisdom through which higher reason is perfected and the habit of science through which lower reason is perfected, whether all together or one 19 Butler, op. cit., pp.41-42 20 I will return to the circularity of this argument later to examine its validity 21 D. Daiches Raphael, 'Bishop Butler's View of Conscience', Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Vol.24 No.90, 1949, p.219 22 Thomas Aquinas, trans & ed. Ralph McInerny, Selected Writings, (Victoria: Penguin Books, 1998), p.217 23 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Q.79-13 Accessed from: http://www.newadvent.org/summa.htm [May 31, 2009] 5 Beard: Two Views of Conscience for the Australian People Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2011 alone should be applied. By these habits we examine what we have done and deliberate about what is to be done 24 Synderesis is defined in Summa Theologica where Aquinas writes "synderesis is said to incite to good and murmur at evil, inasmuch through first principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear that synderesis is [...] a natural habit." 25 Synderesis is, for Aquinas, a dispositional habit of practical reason; it is an aspect of all people which allows them to intuit those things that are intrinsically good: "an immediate, non-inferential grasp of principles, the foremost of which is that one ought to do good and avoid evil." 26 Synderesis is the means with which persons can intuit the good, the "spark of consciousness", 27 without which we would have no conception of goodness or evil to help us determine our actions. Furthermore "in the universal judgement of synderesis error cannot occur" 28 ; the intuition of synderesis is infallible. Put simply, synderesis is the intelligibility of the first principle of practical reason ("good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided.") 29 and the basic human goods, which are those things that perfect human nature (in the sense Butler alludes to with his account of virtue). The other habits Aquinas mentions are those of wisdom and science, and these, in combination with synderesis, make up Thomas' conception of conscience. Aquinas considers a habit to be "something a man can exercise at will" 30 , as regards wisdom; the habit of the higher part of reason, Thomas considers this to be philosophic and divine knowledge that cannot come through experience; 31 whilst science the habit of the lower part of reason refers to the ability to deduce from experience, as Aquinas writes in Summa Theologica: [I]n man himself it is manifest that the common sense which is higher than the proper sense, although it is but one faculty, knows everything apprehended by the five outward senses, and some other things which no outer sense knows; for example, the difference between white and sweet. 32 Conscience is a more complex process. For Aquinas, an act of conscience "include[s] the perception of the principles of morality [synderesis]; their application in the given circumstances by practical discernment of reason and goods [wisdom]; and finally judgement about concrete acts yet to be performed or already performed [science]." 33 Essentially, conscience is the act by which universal first principles of morality are provided by synderesis in order to help judge a particular situation, as seen in the following example: Evil must always be avoided (a first principle grasped by synderesis) 24 Aquinas, De Veritate, Q.17-1 in Ralph McInerny, Selected Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, (London: Penguin, 1998) 25 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Q.79-12 26 Stephen J. Pope, The Ethics of Aquinas, (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), p.40. Note that New Natural Law (as developed by Germain Grisez, John Finnis & Joseph Boyle) will replace "do good and avoid evil" with "good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided." 27 Phillip the Chancellor, Summa de Bono, Treatise on Conscience, I-A, in T. Potts, Conscience in Medieval Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p.95 28 Aquinas, De Veritate, 17-2 29 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-II, Q.94-2 accessed from: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2094.htm [21, Sept, 2010] 30 Pope, op. cit., p.143 31 Ibid., p.146 32 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Q.57-2 33 Catechism of the Catholic Church, (Homebush: Society of St. Paul, 1994), p.1780 6 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 1 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 4 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol1/iss1/4 Adultery is evil (forbidden by God [habit of wisdom]) Therefore, the act of adultery must be avoided (application of a judgement of conscience [deductively through habit of science]) 34 To make clearer Aquinas' view of conscience, it may be helpful to explain the distinction between wisdom, science and synderesis by calling them the 'moral, practical and natural conscience'. 35 The natural conscience (or synderesis) is simply the underlying, foundational knowledge from which any kind of moral knowledge or judgement emerges. Without synderesis, terms such as 'right' and 'wrong' would defy meaning to humans – natural conscience provides avenue for humans to begin reasoning about right and wrong by making us aware of the basic rule of action: "good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided". 36 This is the basic knowledge afforded to us by our natural conscience. From here, humans need more guidance as to (a) what is good or evil (so it can be done and pursued or avoided), and (b) what behaviour will instantiate goodness or avoid evil in specific circumstances. Only natural conscience combined with both A and B will allow a person to decide how to act in a specific circumstance (judgement of conscience). Requirement A refers to a 'moral conscience' or, in Aquinas' words, wisdom. The knowledge of what good and evil actually are. Some may argue (as section 1 suggested) that this knowledge stems from religious beliefs, feeling, or social consensus, informed by rational reflection on the basic awareness provided by synderesis. However, once a person comes to have an idea of what good and evil are, she must still decide what the best course of action is to bring good about in specific circumstances. This is the role of the practical conscience, which Aquinas calls 'science'. Here, the knowledge that X is good, and good should be done, is applied to the specific situation, where a person deduces the way in which X can be done based on the nuances of her circumstances. Practical conscience then, on the above example, will make the deduction that if (i) good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided, (ii) adultery is evil, and (iii) sleeping with this person would constitute adultery, then (iv) I ought not to sleep with this person. This entire process – whereby the natural, moral and practical consciences (properly understood as synderesis, wisdom and science) collaborate in determining best action is what Aquinas understands to be an 'act of conscience'. So, for Aquinas, the politician experiencing a conflict between what one believes to be right, and what the public believes to be right, an MP should, simply, do what is right according to her best judgement of conscience. Now, obviously the question becomes one of what is right, but Aquinas will explain how a person makes a judgement in that regard (based on the above example): it will be a rational judgement based on what is known about human nature through wisdom, and how this knowledge should be applied to the particular situation. Once this decision is made, a politician should act in accord with that judgement, regardless of what her constituency thinks, because Aquinas argues that "[A man] sins more if he does not do what his conscience dictates, while his conscience lasts, since it is more binding than [any other source]." 37 Aquinas believes that conscience is binding because to disobey ones 34 This example is taken from Luc Thomas Somme OP, 'The Infallibility, Impeccability and Indestructibility of Sydneresis', Studies in Christian Ethics, Vol. 19 No.3, 2006, p.407 35 Although, of course, such a distinction should be understood as purely explanatory; humans have only one conscience, to which each of these aspects contributes. They do not, in themselves, constitute independent (or, for that matter, dependent) consciences. 36 Germain Grisez, 'The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa Theologiae, 1-2 Question 94, Article 2', Natural Law Forum, Vol.10, 1965, pp.168 37 De Veritate, Q.17-V 7 Beard: Two Views of Conscience for the Australian People Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2011 conscience is to do what one manifestly believes to be wrong. Therefore, the politician vote in accord with what she believes to be right. C: Critical & Comparative Analysis I find a number of problems with Joseph Butler's theory: the first critique is quite straightforward, and is raised by Alasdair MacIntyre in A Short History of Ethics. The point, quite simply, is that Butler's argument is circular, and fails to enjoin conscientious judgements to moral principles. [H]ow do we know which actions are enjoined and which proscribed? Here the argument becomes entirely obscure because it is circular. I ought to perform those actions which will satisfy my nature as a rational and moral being; my nature as a rational and moral being is defined by reference to my adherence to certain principles; and those principles demand obedience because the actions which they enjoin will as a matter of fact satisfy my nature as a rational and moral being. 38 This objection raises a more substantive question: how does Butler's conscience access any objective moral truth? One answer may be that 'there is no objective moral truth', but such an argument will be of little help to the MP trying to discern between her beliefs and those of her constituency. Butler suggests that conscience directs toward acts that are consistent with human nature because it is a part of human nature. However, this doesn't answer the question how how/why a person would act against their conscience. It is overly simplistic and appeals to a human nature that it fails to prove. Butler places absolute supremacy in a person's conscience. However, he is unable to show precisely what actions are permissible and which are not based in human nature, and he is also unable to explain how the conscience is able to do as much; he simply believes that our experience of human nature shows us that it does. However, this fails to explain how the conscience can be misguided and do wrong, considering "Butler [holds] that any man reflecting in a calm and cool hour simply knows what is right and wrong." 39 It is my opinion that Butler is confusing the complex and fallible conscience with Aquinas' synderesis, which is infallible. I believe that Butler has confused the idea of a morally binding conscience (as Aquinas holds it to be) with that of a morally supreme, law-giving conscience. Butler's concept of conscience is such that there is "[n]o clash between duty and interest" 40 because he believes conscience is based entirely in the way humans should act as rational, moral beings. This is a problem for Butler because, as McIntyre later points out I may, although Butler judges this to be the exception rather than the rule, find that duty and interest do not precisely coincide, so far as life in this present world is concerned [...] Thus the satisfaction of my nature as a reasonable and moral being is not precisely coincident with my happiness in any empirical sense. How then does the criterion of duty manifest itself? 41 38 Alasdair McIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, (London: Routledge, 2007), p.160 39 Fuss, op. cit., p.111 40 McIntyre, op. cit., p.160 41 Ibid. 8 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 1 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 4 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol1/iss1/4 This contradiction demonstrates the problem with Butler's view of a supremely authoritative conscience as sole ground for morality; whereas Aquinas would say that the event of a conflict between desire and synderesis is where the judgement of conscience previously outlined takes place. The scenario that raises most difficulty for Butler (conflict between natural desire and perceived duty) is the exact focus of Aquinas' theory of conscience. 3. The Importance of External Moral Truth It is my belief that the Thomistic account of conscience has largely been lost in the increasing moral relativism of today's society. An appeal to objective truth is difficult when personal beliefs are seen as simply unquestionable. However, as I have shown, making personal beliefs equivalent to objective truth makes a politician's job extremely difficult when it comes to casting a conscience vote. If her opinion is no more right or wrong than anyone else's, why should her decision be vote-worthy? Her role as elected representative will be of limited help in answering this question, because she may well have been elected on the mandate of party policy. However, despite the problems with such an account, I believe that the current Australian view of conscience is closer to that of Butler than to that of Aquinas. It is based in a feeling or belief about right and wrong, as Stephen Tudor suggests in remarking that politicians may decide how to vote on conscience simply by "getting in touch with their feelings on the day." As such, Australian democracy is at risk of losing touch with objective truth when making decisions based on conscience. Because of this, I believe it is important to re-assert the necessity of a moral law outside of individual conscience. From what we have seen of Aquinas, "conscience is taken to be pre-eminently the application of natural law principles to particular actions." 42 I want to focus on the fact that conscience applies to particular actions. Conscience, it seems, is able to determine what is good in a particular situation with the advice of synderesis, and thus, the act of conscience is inherently an epistemological question of how we know the good. However, there is a marked difference between knowing the good and dictating the good, which is the role that Butler seems to have assigned to conscience. Analogically, if my mind is able to intuit the basic laws of mathematics a priori (for example; laws of addition and subtraction), it does not follow that because this intuition is prompted by the mind that those laws which the mind intuits originated there. The laws of mathematics are discovered by the mind by way of its understanding of basic logical laws; which do not apply only to the mind, but are fundamental first principles for the universe as a whole. It seems that synderesis operates in much the same way; it intuits the first principles of practical reason in the same way that theoretical reason understands basic logical principles. These first principles are then used as a judge for all decisions that follow, as Eric D'Arcy says in Conscience and It's Right to Freedom: One does not deduce all the truths of metaphysics from the principle of noncontradiction; it is, rather, the formal principle which controls and governs all our syllogizing. So in the practical order, the principle "Good must be done and evil 42 McInerny, Ethica Thomistica, (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), p.105 9 Beard: Two Views of Conscience for the Australian People Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2011 avoided" is not one from which we deduce all the precepts of the natural law; it is the formal principle which governs all "practical" syllogisms. 43 Not only does D'Arcy here compare the principles of synderesis to the first principles of theoretical reason, but he also, importantly, limits synderesis to such; we cannot derive all principles from synderesis (as this would leave no role for wisdom), rather, all actions will act in congruency with this principle, the major premise of synderesis. What we can say of synderesis then is that insofar as it is infallible, it will always intuit the basic ground of the moral law, such as "nothing prohibited by the law of God is to be done." 44 The conscience however, can, through the combination of synderesis, wisdom and science know the moral law in a way that synderesis never can. However, though a well shaped conscience will know the moral law, it will never invent it; it will only derive it following the murmurs and first principles of synderesis, and the promptings of wisdom and science. It would, however, be untrue to say that because conscience only intuits moral law and does not shape it; that conscience plays a purely superfluous role in morality. Conscience is the way by which (as has been discussed) persons are able to know the moral law. Without the act of conscience there would be no moral or immoral actions, because the moral law would be manifestly unknowable, and therefore all actions would be excusable on the grounds of epistemic ignorance, as "[n]o-one is bound by a law save by one means alone: knowledge of that law." 45 So, though Butler is incorrect in asserting that conscience is a sufficient ground for moral norms, it is true to say that conscience plays a necessary role in morality. For conscience to function effectively, it must, necessarily, make appeal to external truth as the basis of (or, at least, justification for) conscientious judgement. The current situation, where the primacy of conscience has (at least in common thinking) triumphed over appeals to universal, objective moral truth, places conscience at dire risk at being misunderstood and re-conceptualised to the point where the term loses all meaning. This threat could be overcome were people to adopt a Thomistic account of conscience, which respects objective truth and demands it be sought in moral decisionmaking. However, such an account of conscience would have some significant ramifications on Australian democracy. The first consequence would be that politicians, under a moral imperative to do what they believed to be right, would be less inclined to vote along partisan lines at all times, and a policy that forbade members from 'crossing the floor' (such as the ALP have), would be considered positively unethical. This would likely see a diminishing in the dominance of both the major parties, and the emergence of smaller, like-minded groups. Otherwise, it may see the rise of more independent MP's being elected, and increased bipartisanship, where politicians united based on where they stood on each particular issue, rather than under the banner of whichever party they had been represented under. Under such a system, every vote would be a conscience vote! The Thomistic conscience would refuse to allow ideological compromise, meaning that debate and reflection would be increased during parliament. Of course, this may decrease the amount of day-to-day work that government could see to (a possible drawback of a morally conscious government). It would also mean that citizens would be less inclined to 43 Eric D'Arcy, Conscience and It's Right to Freedom, (London: Sheed and Ward Ltd., 1961), pp.208-209 44 De Veritate, Q.17-II 45 D'Arcy, op. cit., p.95 10 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 1 [2011], Iss. 1, Art. 4 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol1/iss1/4 demand a politician to vote in accord with their beliefs – politicians would be elected more on their capacity as moral decision-makers, and less on their existing opinions. Such a view is idealistic, and some will argue that it paints a picture of a government that is 'all talk, no action'; and to some extent this is true. However, it would also mean that politicians and citizens alike could be confident in the integrity of the government, and in its capacity to reflect on how to best reflect truth through governance. The current issue with conscience, I have suggested, is that contemporary usage implies two different functions for the conscience vote – to represent the local community or minority interests, or to express one's own personal opinion. These two purposes can easily come into conflict, placing an MP in a very difficult situation, because, in a context where conscience is given primacy over, or entirely replaces, moral truth, the MP has no real reason to place either her own, nor her constituency's conscience over the other. A Thomistic understanding reverts conscience to a role that is informative of, rather than equivalent to, moral truth, and as such, gives the MP some guide to action: because conscience is the best judgement about what the right thing to do in a situation is, it must always be followed, because "it is logically impossible that one could be aware that one's present judgment of conscience is mistaken, setting oneself against one's own firm judgment of conscience is setting oneself against the goods of truth and reasonableness, and that cannot fail to be wrong." 46 As such, the Thomistic account provides a solution to the conflict that arises from the two views of conscience that are currently prevalent amongst the Australian people. 46 John Finnis, 'Aquinas' Moral, Political & Legal Philosophy', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2005 Accessed from: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aquinas-moral-political/ #Con [30 Dec 2010] 11 Beard: Two Views of Conscience for the Australian People Published by ResearchOnline@ND,

ARTICLE Self-deception in and out of illness: are some subjects responsible for their delusions? Quinn Hiroshi Gibson1 ABSTRACT This paper raises a slightly uncomfortable question: are some delusional subjects responsible for their delusions? This question is uncomfortable because we typically think that the answer is pretty clearly just 'no'. However, we also accept that self-deception is paradigmatically intentional behavior for which the self-deceiver is prima facie blameworthy. Thus, if there is overlap between self-deception and delusion, this will put pressure on our initial answer. This paper argues that there is indeed such overlap by offering a novel philosophical account of self-deception. The account offered is independently plausible and avoids the main problems that plague other views. It also yields the result that some delusional subjects are self-deceived. The conclusion is not, however, that those subjects are blameworthy. Rather, a distinction is made between blameworthiness and 'attributability'. States or actions can be significantly attributable to a subject-in the sense that they are expressions of their wills-without it being the case that the subject is blameworthy, if the subject has an appropriate excuse. Understanding delusions within this framework of responsibility and excuses not only illuminates the ways in which the processes of delusional belief formation and maintenance are continuous with 'ordinary' processes of belief formation and maintenance, it also provides a way of understanding the innocence of the delusional subject that does not involve the denial of agency. DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 OPEN 1 Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA. Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to Q.H.G. (email: [email protected]) PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3: 15 |DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 |www.nature.com/palcomms 1 Introduction In this paper I intend to raise a somewhat uncomfortablequestion: are at least some delusional subjects responsible fortheir delusions? The question strikes us as uncomfortable at least in part because we think the answer is just pretty clearly 'no'. Nevertheless, I will argue that at least some delusional subjects are responsible for their delusions. My argument will be as follows: When we consider the dynamics of a related phenomenon-to wit, self-deception-we will see that there is enough overlap between them to ground the judgment that self-deception is implicated in the formation and maintenance of at least some delusions. In order to show this, I will first offer my own account of self-deception. We typically think self-deceivers are responsible, and my account captures the sense in which this is correct. I then argue that, according to my account, at least some delusional subjects are self-deceived. Importantly, I believe that this can be shown to be the case without leading us to the judgment that delusional subjects are blameworthy for their delusions. In order to thread this line, I will appeal to the distinction between what I will call 'attributability' (roughly1 following Shoemaker (2011) and Watson (2004b)) and blameworthiness. I will argue that while self-deceivers are typically responsible both in the sense that their self-deception is attributable to them and in the sense that they are blameworthy, delusional subjects, even when they are self-deceived, are typically only responsible in the sense that their delusions are attributable to them. Why this should be so will be made clear by consideration of the details of my own view of selfdeception, as well as the details of the delusions which I consider. A little bit more about the significance of our question: lying behind the seemingly ordinary idea that delusional subjects are not responsible is the idea that delusions are somehow beyond the scope of ordinary interpersonal understanding. Karl Jaspers (Jaspers, 2007, pp 174–175) famously distinguished this kind of understanding from what he called 'explanation'. Jaspers was aware that psychiatry was partly a natural science, and partly a human science. Explanation is what natural science does: it uses objective empirical methods to elucidate causal structures. Understanding, on the other hand, is unique to human science, and uses ordinary interpersonal imagination and other 'subjective' methods to appreciate the experiences of subjects 'from the inside' (Kendler and Campbell, 2014, p 1). Jaspers nevertheless found that understanding could sometimes break down in the face of more extreme symptoms. The prevailing ethic in contemporary medical psychology seems to agree with him. The idea is to regard patients suffering extreme symptoms as deserving of compassionate treatment, but also as nevertheless, at some ultimate level, perhaps beyond understanding-or as Jaspers himself put it, 'un-understandable'. I will not (and cannot) argue that understanding does not break down in the face of some extreme conditions, but it is my view that we should push the boundaries of such understanding as far as they can go in the hopes of coming to grips with how best to understand, in ordinary humanistic terms, what is going on in certain forms of mental illness. I will return to some of the consequences of my argument for the understandability of delusions below under 'Responsibility and delusion'. So, the uncomfortable nature of our question belies a commitment to extending ordinary human understanding-and indeed, the boundaries of the moral community-as inclusively as we can. For non-experts, our understanding of delusions depends on a highly elaborated medical practice to which we are largely outsiders. And I wish to take seriously the critical idea that practices such as institutionalized medicine and the knowledge which they enable often conceal dynamics of unequal power (Foucault, 1969).2 This behooves us to be sensitive to the tacitly normative aspects of the explanatory categories appealed to by such practices (categories such as delusional), and the effects that such categorization may have on those who are subject to it. Whether someone who is suffering from delusions is-and whether it is appropriate eo ipso that they should be made to feel like-a non-agent, a passive sufferer, or someone who is generally non-responsible, are philosophical questions, and answers to them should not be implicitly imported along with the very idea of a delusion. This discussion is an attempt to provide a philosophically sound way of broaching these questions, and to temper the temptation to give too-easy answers to them. So, I think our question is important. As I said, to go about answering it, I will argue that there is overlap between delusion and self-deception. More precisely, I will argue self-deception can play a role in the formation and maintenance of delusions. But as I said (and I hope to be able to illuminate why this ought to be so) we typically judge self-deceivers responsible for their selfdeception. We are also, as I said, pulled towards the claim that delusional subjects are not responsible for their delusions. Taken together with the thesis that I want to argue for, this suggests the following triad: 1. Delusional subjects are not responsible for their delusions 2. Self-deceived subjects are responsible for being self-deceived 3. There is overlap between self-deception and delusion If (1) and (2) are read as generics (and they certainly should not be read as universal generalizations), then the triad is not, strictly-speaking, inconsistent. But it points to the need to say something about how we should think of the identified cases of overlap with respect to responsibility. Are they, in this respect, more self-deception-like or more like typical delusions? I hope to be able to make clear, by way of appeal to my account of selfdeception, why we should go for the former and not the latter. With that in mind, let us turn to my account of self-deception. Self-deception as omission Amongst philosophers there is still a lively debate going on concerning the correct analysis of self-deception, and I will not be able to settle that debate here. But I do have a view to offer (which I develop more extensively elsewhere). To begin, let's consider an example:3 A: A is an academic who is self-deceived about the quality of his own work. A is unhesitant about advertising what he takes to be his own brilliance to others, but it is clear to his colleagues and everyone familiar with his work that the work is flimsy. Nonetheless, A badgers OUP to put out a volume of his collected papers. He avoids situations where he might have to confront his work's obvious shortcomings, and when he does encounter criticism he dismisses it as jealous or vindictive. It is clear that A longs deeply for the respect and admiration of his colleagues, but it is equally clear that his pursuit of it is self-undermining. What is the right way to describe what is going on with A? A natural place to begin, and the view which most philosophical debate about self-deception takes as a starting point, is to think of self-deception as the intrapersonal analogue of ordinary otherdeception. I've called this view 'the naïve view': The naïve view of self-deception: A is self-deceived that p just in case A believes that not-p and A has acted intentionally so as to cause A to believe p According to the naïve view, A believes that his work is flimsy, and he has somehow managed to act so as to cause himself, on that basis, to come to believe that his work is not flimsy. There is ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 2 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3: 15 |DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 |www.nature.com/palcomms a way in which this captures the phenomenon. A seems to believe both things, and the more comforting belief seems to be a defensive response to the more sobering one. But there's a big problem. How could someone ever manage to do what the naïve view describes successfully? How is an agent to act intentionally so as to get herself to have a belief when she also already believes that very belief to be false? Even moderate doxastic voluntarists would admit that an agent cannot come to believe anything at all just at will, and it seems if anything constrains what one is able to believe at will, it is precisely what else one knowingly believes. Even if there is no other obstacle to my coming to believe that it is raining, the fact that I already believe, and am going to continue to believe, that it is not raining, and that I know this about myself, seems more than enough to prevent me from believing that it is raining. There seems to be three moving parts to the problem: belief, intentional action, and psychological unity. If the selfdeceived agent could somehow pull off an intentional act of getting himself to believe what he also believes to be false, would this not undermine his psychological unity? This seems like a process which the agent's psychological unity would suffice to prevent. If what the self-deceived sufficiently unified agent manages to bring about in himself is a genuine belief, would he not have to have done it non-intentionally? Mutatis mutandis, if the sufficiently unified self-deceived agent really intends to deceive himself, how can the deception involve the bringing about of a genuine belief? Philosophers have dealt with this so-called 'dynamical' problem of self-deception in different ways. Some have downgraded the self-deceptive act from fully intentional to something less than that (Mele, 1997); others have downgraded the self-deceptive state from fully doxastic to something than that (D'Cruz, In prep.; Gendler, 2007; Darwall, 1988); still others have thought it would suffice to give up on a certain degree of psychological unity (Davidson, 2004; Pears, 1984). All of these approaches have their advantages and disadvantages. For most views on offer, the problem is quite simply that they do not adequately address the dynamical problem. The scope of the present inquiry forbids going into all the details, but this is worth illustrating, so let's consider one such view. One particularly popular strategy has it that self-deception is a kind of pretense. I will focus on Stephen Darwall's (1988) version of the view, but Tamar Gendler (2007) has also proposed a similar view, and Jason D'Cruz (In prep.) has a revision of Gendler's view. According to the self-deception-as-pretense view, when one is self-deceived about p one need not believe it (although one does typically believe its negation). Rather, one is engaged in an elaborate pretense according to which p is the case. One acts as if p were true. But unlike in ordinary pretense, where one also believes that one is engaged in pretense, when one is selfdeceived, one is also engaged in a second-order pretense about one's first-order pretense: one behaves as if one is not merely behaving as if p. Darwall claims that the self-deceived agent need not literally believe the thing that he is supposedly self-deceived about. Perhaps he just thinks various thoughts that amount to a kind of elaborate pretense to the effect that the thing in question is the case. But, in ordinary cases of pretense, we know that we are pretending. So, in order for the pretense to have the desired psychological results (preservation of self-image, successfully avoiding facing up to painful realizations, etc.) it seems that the nature of the pretense itself has to be concealed. As Darwall puts it, '[This is] not simply the first-order pretense involved in fantasy, but also the second-order pretense that...pretensions are real. When the self-deceiver plays the role of fool to himself, he must also pretend that he is not playing that role' (1988, pp 414–415). I take it that the reason that the second-order pretense is necessary is to conceal from the self-deceiver the fact that he is engaged in pretense. But now we have to face squarely the question of how someone could ever manage to get himself into that state in the first place. And further, the purpose of engaging in the pretense must not be simply to sharpen theatrical skills or for merry diversion. Plausibly the purpose is something selfdirected and psychological such as, again, the preservation of selfimage, or to avoid facing up to some painful facts. But this is the sort of thing that just cannot be achieved by pretense if one knows that one is pretending. So the purpose of engaging in the pretense, whatever it is precisely, will often be something which cannot be achieved unless it is hidden from the agent. But if the reason for engaging in the second-order pretense is to make the first-order pretense more credible-i.e., to conceal it as pretense-how are we to make sense of the act of engaging in that second-order pretense without attributing to the agent the very knowledge that would undermine its aim? It seems that the agent must intend to get himself into the state of engaging in both pretenses for the sake of achieving a psychological end, but he must somehow manage to do this without revealing to himself that this is what he is doing. If the problem with intentionally trying to acquire a belief that one also believes to be false has to do with the fact that (acquiring this kind of) belief is not under control of the will, the problem here is that what one is able to conceal from oneself about what one is doing is not under control of the will either. For that matter, why would second-order pretense do the trick, even if we could pull it off? Would we not need third order pretense, and so on, indefinitely? This is merely illustrative, but some of the difficulties there are generalizable to other views and I take the difficulties to be serious enough to warrant a different approach. According to my own view, there is no single act which is the act of self-deception. This is because, on my view, it is not always crucial to self-deception how the self-deceptive belief comes about. Often what is crucial is how that belief is maintained. My view says: Self-deception as omission: An agent is self-deceived that p if she believes p and intentionally omits to seek, recognize, or appreciate externally available evidence for not-p, for reasons which ultimately relate to her desire that p be true, in a way which enables the maintenance of the belief that p.4 By severing the connection between some distinctively selfdeceptive process of belief formation, and the resulting selfdeceptive state, we can avoid the dynamical problem. My view also captures-as some others do not-the sense in which selfdeceivers are responsible: it describes a distinctive kind of motivated epistemic failure which (as we will see shortly) can be grounds for at least a couple of varieties of responsibility judgments. My view also captures what is going on with A. From the vignette we have seen, we do not know how A came to his belief about the quality of his work, but on my view that does not much matter. A's belief in the quality of his work may have been wellfounded at one point. Perhaps he used to be a big fish in a small pond, outperforming other undergraduates at the small state school where he studied, but as he advanced through his career the abilities of those he was surrounded by rose consistently, while his remained stagnant. Or maybe he was never really cut out for academic work and his belief was formed directly and unconsciously as a way of dealing with the stresses of academic life. According to Self-deception as Omission, it does not much matter. What matters is that now the belief is manifestly defeated by evidence which is readily available, but A is impervious to that evidence because he prefers to continue to believe as he does- that is, he has a desire that p be true-and this motivates him to forswear looking into the matter any further. This is why he PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3: 15 |DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 |www.nature.com/palcomms 3 avoids confrontations with others in his field. He omits to do whatever it is precisely that the epistemic norms say that he ought to do in order to bring his belief into proper conformity with the evidence. What does it mean for the agent's reasons for omitting to seek, recognize, or appreciate evidence to relate to her desire that p be true? I will say that a subject is emotionally entangled with a proposition p if she is liable to satisfaction or dissatisfaction when p is believed to be true or false. To desire that p be true is for satisfaction to accompany the belief in p and dissatisfaction the belief in not-p (as opposed to the other way around). Of course, the belief that p does not formally satisfy the desire that p be true. Rather, the formal object of that desire is the truth of p itself. So the satisfaction and dissatisfaction in question for emotional entanglement is not formal, nor is it experiential.5 It is, we could say, representational. It is the kind of satisfaction or dissatisfaction that obtains when the subject's take on the way the world is more or less closely approximates the way the subject thinks the world ought to be. This is obviously a matter with motivational efficacy, but it can be so without having a readily identifiable experiential component. There is admittedly something metaphorical in talk of entanglement, but this expression captures something about the way in which the interaction between, and layering of, desires can produce a complicated web-like structure. There are many ways in which I may desire the truth of some proposition. I might desire it to be true for its own sake (such as I might desire to have a good relationship with someone); I might desire it to be true for the sake of something else (such as I might desire my car to function well); I might desire that something be case rather than something else (such as I might desire my partner's infidelity as an explanation for her growing distance over my own emotional unavailability). These are all things I can be self-deceived about because they are things in the truth of which I can manifest an emotional interest.6, 7 My view departs from the naïve view in one very crucial way by finding what is distinctive about self-deception, not in the process of belief formation, but in the dynamics of belief maintenance. It is usually taken for granted in the self-deception literature that nothing should count as a self-deceptive state that does not arise from some distinctively self-deceptive process, that there is a constitutive connection between self-deception as a process, and self-deception as the product of that process. Call this thesis the constitutive connection thesis. Now, if the constitutive connection thesis is true, it is clear what the object of philosophical analysis ought to be: If what makes something self-deception is how it comes about, we had better figure out how it comes about. Of course, there is a trivial reading on which the constitutive connection thesis is true: every particular that comes about as the result of a process is constitutively connected with that process. You do not get goulash by baking pie. However, with selfdeception, the connection between process and product is thought to be more intimate than that. The fact that some process was a process of deceiving oneself confers on the resulting state the status of self-deception. Suppose that state is a belief. There are lots of ways to get a belief, many of which are epistemically respectable. Only one way (or some privileged set of ways) of getting that belief is a self-deceptive way. Even though whatever way the goulash comes about will trivially be a goulash-making process, it does not much seem to matter (purist intuitions about goulash with science-fiction pedigree notwithstanding) from the standpoint of assessing whether something is goulash which particular process resulted in it. This does not seem to be true for self-deception. Or so the thought goes. My view involves the denial of the constitutive connection thesis. The way I wish to cash this out it is to appeal somewhat more perspicuously to the distinction between belief formation and belief maintenance. We ought not to think that a perfectly clear temporal line can be drawn to distinguish between processes of belief formation and processes of belief maintenance: When is the belief formation process over, and when does the process of belief maintenance begin? I will say that a process (or part of a process)8 is one of belief formation if the belief counterfactually depends on it for the agent's credence in it to increase; and that a process is one of belief maintenance if the belief counterfactually depends on it for the agent's credence in it not to decrease.9 On this way of thinking about it, some processes will (relative to a given belief) clearly be processes of belief formation (such as, with respect to the belief that it is raining, the perceptual experience of seeing the rain outside my window); others will clearly be processes of belief maintenance (such as, with respect to the belief that it is raining, not encountering any evidence to the contrary in the meantime); and a great deal will be both (such as, looking again and seeing that it is still raining, as opposed to seeing that it is not). As I suggested could be the case with A, I think there are cases of self-deception where one initially had good evidence for what one believes, but where the evidential situation has since changed, and this change has gone unnoticed for some motivationally biased reasons. To give another example, suppose I believe that I am popular with the kids at school. Maybe I was popular with the kids, but kids are fickle, and they have since turned on me. It seems to me that I might be self-deceived if the reason that I continue to believe as I do is because I am impervious to the manifestly available evidence on account of my preference for continuing to believe as I do. We can suppose that once I have reached the point where the kids have turned on me, my credence in the belief that I am popular is not increasing and eo ipso it does not counterfactually depend on me doing or not doing anything in order to increase. But my belief does counterfactually depend on my doing something-or more precisely, not doing something -in order for my credence not to decrease. The evidence is manifestly there, and confronted with such evidence a rational agent would revise her beliefs. What's going on with me? I'm selfdeceived! I am intentionally omitting to do what is necessary to bring my beliefs in line with the evidence. What is the nature of this intentional omission? One might wonder the following:10 If all the agent is doing is maintaining her belief-especially if it is done via omission-in what way is selfdeception an intentional phenomenon? For it to be intentional, would not the agent have to be knowingly maintaining her belief against available evidence? Does not Self-deception as Omission face a revised version of the dynamical problem? This worry is actually two distinct worries, and I take them both in turn. The first worry is that my view would not be able to capture what is intentional about self-deception without facing a version of the dynamical problem. The problem is thought to arise because for something to be self-deception, not only does something about it have to be intentional, but it seems that the violation of epistemic norms-the irrationality itself-has to be somehow intentional. This, I take it, is what makes this worry seem like a version of the dynamical problem. Now, of course, belief maintenance that flies in the face of manifest evidence to the contrary cannot be fully knowing. But it need not be in order to be fully intentional. Here I wish to make a move which Al Mele makes in giving his account (1997) of selfdeception. Mele distinguishes, in effect, between intending something de re and intending it de dicto. According to Mele's view the self-deceiver intends to do something which is an act of deceiving herself without intending to deceive herself as such.11 This, Mele thinks, recovers what is intentional about self-deception, all the while deflating it to avoid the dynamical problem.12 I think this is precisely the right move to make after we have given ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 4 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3: 15 |DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 |www.nature.com/palcomms up on the constitutive connection thesis. Once we are talking merely about belief maintenance, and not belief formation, the imagined challenge for my view is not to give a psychologically coherent account of some process, but rather to recover a node of intentional agency which is also recognizably an epistemic failure. The answer to this challenge is pretty straightforward on my view: the agent intentionally (de re) omits to seek, recognize, or appreciate externally available evidence for reasons that are motivationally biased, even if she does not intend to do these things as such. So, after it has become clear to everyone else that I am no longer popular, I may simply do nothing by way of further investigation into the matter and thus continue to believe as I do. The omission may, of course, not be total. It could be that on occasion I do encounter evidence but I omit to put it together or to engage with it as evidence.13 So long as my lack of further effective epistemic engagement is motivated by a desire that it be true that I am popular, then I will be guilty of self-deception according to my view. And of course this need not be a one-off affair. My desire that a certain proposition be true may cause me to forego epistemic engagement on many separate occasions. The second worry here has to do more directly with my appeal to omissions. It's not true in general that every time I omit to do something, I do so intentionally. If someone in the next room requires aid, but I do not know it, then it seems I do not intentionally omit to aid them if I go on reading my book. But this is precisely the sort of knowledge which is denied to self-deceivers on pain of falling into the dynamical problem. My failure to seek, or my failure to engage with, evidence against what I believe cannot be motivated by knowledge that it is evidence against what I believe. But the norms that the self-deceiver violates are, in the first instance, epistemic norms, whereas the norm that requires me to render aid is a moral norm. Moral norms may fail to apply to agents who do not have the right knowledge, assuming the agent is not culpable for her ignorance itself-this seems to be a version of ought-implies-can. But epistemic norms cannot be wriggled out of in the same way, especially if they are norms that require an agent to form a particular belief (against a background of evidence and other beliefs). Epistemic norms say how one ought to conform one's beliefs to evidence, or to one's other beliefs, and it is no violation of ought-implies-can that the agent not already have the target belief. If it were, then it would never be epistemically required that anyone form any belief that they do not already hold, no matter how strong the evidence. Ignorance itself cannot be-at least not in the same straightforward way- grounds for claiming that an epistemic norm does not apply as it can be with moral norms. So, while it is plausible that some knowledge is required for an omission to count as a violation of a moral norm, it is not plausible in the same way for omissions which are violations of epistemic norms. What I want to claim next is that the self-deceiver's motivated epistemic failure is a form of mental agency. We interpret him as having some motivations-wanting to believe well of himself, wanting acclaim in the profession, and so on-and those motivations underlie his failure to bring his belief into conformity with the evidence that is available to him. The state that he thus ends up with is, I will say, a manifestation of his will. Allow me to elaborate this by distinguishing two different kinds of responsibility. What kind of responsibility? To make the distinction I want to make, let's consider a very simple example. Suppose you step on my foot. Naturally, perhaps, I may want to blame you. First things first. First: are you a candidate for moral assessment? Are you a member of the moral community towards whom attitudes like praise and blame are ever appropriately directed? One way to get at this is to ask: Are you a normal adult human being who can recognize and respond to reasons for action? If you are a child, or a paramecium, or-as we too often say-if you are insane, you do not have that capacity and we say you are exempt (Strawson, 1962, p 3) from assessment altogether. (Obviously there are some forms of insanity which ground exemptions of this kind. I do not think having delusions, on its own, is one such form. What it means to be 'insane' in this sense is, in part, the topic of current discussion.) Suppose you are the right kind of creature with the right kinds of capacities to be a candidate for moral assessment. Still, that does not settle the question of whether you are blameworthy. We must now ask whether you are excused. There are at least two varieties of excuses:14 1. Strong excuses work by undermining the agent's ownership of the state or action itself. If the action is not yours in the right way you are not blameworthy for it. So, if you stepped on my foot because you were shoved by a passerby, you are not blameworthy because, strictly speaking, stepping on my foot was not something that you yourself did. 2. Weak excuses block the step from an agent's ownership of the state or action to blameworthiness. If you have a blind spot, and my foot happened to be in it while you were trotting on your merry way, you are not blameworthy. But it's not because you are exempt, nor is it because you failed to act. You act intentionally in stepping, and are responding to reasons (we may suppose), and the action is yours. But, you are not blameworthy because of your ignorance. Note that the typical way in which this works is by demonstrating that you did not display a malicious (or, say, negligent) quality of will. The distinction between exemption and the two kinds of excuses ought to be fairly familiar from ordinary legal reasoning. I must be indicted before charges can be brought against me in a court (this analogous to finding that I am not exempt), and once I am there I can plead not guilty either on account of having not in fact done the thing in question (strong excuse), or on account of having done it in a non-culpable way (weak excuse).15 Relevant to this, of course, is indeed the quality of my will. Whether I am guilty of malevolence, negligence, or excused altogether will depend on what I believed and what I desired at the time of my action. We can now define two different kinds of responsibility. The first is: Attributability: An action or state is attributable to an agent iff that agent is neither exempt from the sort of assessment appropriate for that action or state nor strongly excused from such assessment. Attributability is a way of marking that at least two hurdles have been cleared: you are not exempt, and you are not strongly excused. If you step on my foot because of your blind spot, we can get at least this far. Blameworthiness goes further. Blameworthiness: An agent is blameworthy for an action or state only if that state or action is attributable to her (she is not exempt from assessment and is not strongly excused) and is not weakly excused. So, only if your action is attributable to you, and you have no excuses that justify the performance of it, is it appropriate for me to blame you. The kind of blameworthiness that I have in mind here is perhaps best thought of as a kind of liability. To be blameworthy in this sense is for a range of reactions of what we might call 'holding to account' to be appropriate.16 These reactions include the Strawsonian reactive attitudes, such as resentment and the withholding of good will, but also things such as demands for compensation, material or otherwise. What unites PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3: 15 |DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 |www.nature.com/palcomms 5 these reactions of holding to account is that they demand of the offending party a response, the appropriate response to which in turn is forgiveness. The simplest case of blaming someone in this sense is perhaps finding them blameworthy, demanding an apology and withholding good will until it is given. The appropriate response to a sincere apology is forgiveness and a repair of relations. The compensatory nature of the demands of accountability which are characteristic of this kind of blame thus distinguish it from punishment, which is retributive.17 My use of the term 'attributability' is closely related to that of David Shoemaker (2011) and Gary Watson (2004b). For Shoemaker and Watson, judgments of attributability are also grounds for aretaic, or characterological, assessments of agents. My use of the term is in accordance with their use in this respect. So, not only is attributability a logically necessary condition on blameworthiness, it is also in its own right typically grounds for a distinctive kind of assessment. When an agent 'owns' a state or action in the right way, it is expressive of her will in the sense that she thereby reveals to us something of her deep self: perhaps something about her desires and motivations; her perspective on life and on herself; or her characteristic patterns of thought, action, and evaluation. This can be brought out in connection with the two different kinds of excuses. Since strong excuses work by undermining attributability itself, we should expect that when someone is strongly excused we find that there are no grounds for assessing him aretaically. And this is what we find. If you step on my foot because you were pushed, you do not thereby disclose yourself to me. On the other hand, if you are merely weakly excused you might not be an appropriate target for blame, but I may nevertheless learn that you are clumsy.18 Sometimes, in addition to blocking the step from attributability to blameworthiness, a weak excuse will also provide grounds for a countervailing aretaic assessment. If I learn that you pushed me to save me from being hit by oncoming traffic, not only are you excused by demonstrating that the quality of your will was not malicious, you show yourself to be acting virtuously, in a way that merits praise. I will return to this function of weak excuses below. I hope that it is reasonably clear how, according to my view of self-deception, self-deceivers are attributability-responsible for their self-deception, and that they are (typically at least) also blameworthy. The self-deceiver seems to violate an epistemic norm, and so we can begin anew an inquiry parallel to the questions asked when we inquired about whether you were blameworthy for stepping on my foot. Let us consider A. A has somehow come to the belief that his work is not flimsy. But it is manifest that this is not the case. He persists in his fantasy nevertheless. According to my view, this is because he omits to do what is necessary to bring his belief in line with the available evidence because he has a desire that his work not be flimsy. A is not exempt. (In general, it seems self-deceivers are not exempt; no creature without the capacities to be a candidate for moral assessment generally could be the subject of self-deception.) Is A strongly excused? Strong excuses work by showing that the action or state did not 'belong' to the agent in the right way, that it was not an expression of his will. Of course, it is possible for someone very much like A to act, and think, and speak like A and yet to be strongly excused. If A were being controlled remotely via a chip implanted in his brain perhaps he would be strongly excused. But as we are imagining him, A is engaged in a kind of fantasy which serves an important psychological function for him (though he is almost certainly unaware of it), and it reflects, on account of the motivation which my account attributes to him, his desire that things be a certain way, a way which they manifestly are not, and from which he has insulated himself. He thus is the owner of his self-deceptive omission(s), he does manifest his will in the process, and, importantly, he discloses himself and is an appropriate target for aretaic assessment. Self-deceivers often elicit judgments of frustration, pity, and even contempt. These judgments first get a foothold at the level of attributability because they are appropriate responses to someone who has displayed the qualities of character that A has, viz., injudiciousness, vanity, and even cowardice. The only thing which remains to be determined is whether A might have a weak excuse that could insulate him from blame or potentially provide grounds for a countervailing aretaic assessment. But as far as we can tell-and as seems to be the case for self-deceivers quite generally-there is no excuse that A can appeal to. Weak excuses work by showing that the agent did not manifest a malicious or negligent quality of will, but A does manifest (at least) a negligent quality of will. Indeed, in self-deception we see the marriage of both epistemic and volitional defects combining to make for this negligence.19 In willing something to be the case which is manifestly false, A both shows the epistemic vice of injudiciousness and is engaged in a flight from anxiety. This combination of epistemic and volitional failures strikes me as distinctive of motivated irrationality. Doing one's epistemic duty often requires a steadier will than the agent possesses, and this failure can manifest itself, on my view, as a motivated failure to seek, recognize, or appreciate evidence. Below I will discuss a case where a manifestation of epistemic vice seems to be excused, but that does not appear to be the case here. I now wish to turn to delusions. Background: delusions In this section I want to introduce delusions by way of a working definition, and by examples, many of which I will return to as we go along. By way of a definition, the DSM–V says (APA 2013): Delusions are fixed beliefs that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. Their content may include a variety of themes (e.g., persecutory, referential, somatic, religious, grandiose) [...] Delusions are deemed bizarre if they are clearly implausible and not understandable to same-culture peers and do not derive from ordinary life experience [...] The distinction between a delusion and a strongly held idea is sometimes difficult to make and depends in part on the degree of conviction with which the belief is held despite clear or reasonable contradictory evidence regarding its veracity. Many parts of this definition are controversial, and it is substantially different from the DSM-IV version.20 There is plenty to say about the definition and its relation to earlier ones but for now it suffices to note that the focus in the updated definition has shifted to what we might call the epistemic features of delusions. These features (fixity, degree of felt conviction, persistence in the face of clear contradictory evidence, etc.) are those that have most puzzled philosophers. To get an idea for the variety of possible contents for delusions, here are some examples of (types of) delusions, individuated by their content:21 1. Delusions of persecution: Most common content for delusion (APA, 2000, p 299). The subject believes that his or her life is being interfered with from outside (almost but not always harmfully). Occurs in schizophrenia, affective psychosis, and in organic states. 2. Capgras delusion: Subject believes that a close friend or family member has been replaced by an impostor (Capgras and Rebould-Lachaux, 1923). I will return to Capgras in ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 6 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3: 15 |DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 |www.nature.com/palcomms below in connection with the 'two-factor' account (Davies, et al. 2001) of delusion formation and maintenance. 3. Anosognosia: The denial of illness. Often follows stroke or brain injury and involves denial of following disability, e.g., paralysis. Ramachandran's (Ramachandran, 1996) patient F.D. suffered a right hemisphere stroke causing left hemiplegia. But F.D. claimed she could walk and clap. Can also occur in schizophrenia, leading patients to refuse to take medication. 4. Reverse Othello delusion: Subject believes in the fidelity of his or her romantic partner in the face of strong evidence to the contrary. Peter Butler (2000) reports the case of B. X., who suffered a severe head injury in a high-speed car accident. Despite the absence of contact with his romantic partner, he subsequently 'developed an intense delusional belief that [she] remained sexually faithful and continued as his lover and life partner' (Butler, 2000, p 86). I will discuss B. X.'s case extensively below. I should note just in passing that, despite the language in the DSM (and the language I have used here), it is a matter of some dispute amongst philosophers whether delusions should count as doxastic states. However, in what follows I will be assuming that delusions are best thought of as beliefs.22 Responsibility and delusion Now that we have a working understanding of both selfdeception and delusion on the table, and a sense of how selfdeceivers are typically responsible for their self-deception on my view, our question becomes: are some delusional subjects selfdeceived? Does self-deception play a role in forming and maintaining at least some delusional beliefs? Here I will argue that we should say 'yes'. This may seem surprising not least of all because self-deception typically concerns matters which are much more 'garden variety' than the bizarre contents of delusional belief, however, not all delusions have such bizarre content, as we shall see. And even where the content is bizarre, there is room for motivation to be playing a role that might imply self-deception is at work. If my account of self-deception is correct, it seems to provide relatively straightforward criteria for assessing whether selfdeception is implicated in delusional belief. We must only ask whether it is true that the agent has failed to confront, for motivationally biased reasons, manifestly available evidence that would overturn her belief. What remains, however, are two tasks which are not so straightforward: first, we must try to determine whether any actual delusions satisfy those criteria, and further, we must determine what kind of responsibility, if any, that would ground. Let us first address head-on the question of whether any delusions can be thought to fit my model of self-deception. The most plausible candidate for such a case is the Reverse Othello delusion.23 Reverse Othello delusion. Recall Peter Butler's patient from before, B.X.. B.X. suffered severe head injuries in a car accident. As a result of the crash he was left quadriplegic and unable to speak without the use of an electronic communicator. According to Butler, in the initial stages of his illness he expressed both insight and 'intense emotional response to a massive disability and a fracturing of his interpersonal relationships' (2000, p 87). However, in the year following his injury, B.X. gradually developed the delusional belief that he was still in a successful romantic relationship with his former partner (who left him following his injuries) and even claimed that they had recently married, occasionally claiming that he needed to leave treatment to return home to his wife. B.X.'s appreciation of his injuries is important. He is trying to come to terms with the significance of an irreversible lifechanging calamity, and seems to be doing it head-on. But there is a limit to how much such change he can accept at once without falling apart. Butler characterizes B.X.'s delusion as protecting him from falling into severe depression, or as we might say, existential collapse. For him, the ability to go on is contingent on his believing that his former partner remains faithful to him. To lose her, on top of all of that has already happened, would be, in some sense approaching the literal, unbearable. In this context it is also important to note that B.X. eventually manages to recover from his delusion. Even when the delusion was at its most elaborated B.X. did not experience any other psychotic symptoms. The delusional belief seemed to dawn on him somewhat gradually, and eventually reached its most elaborated form in the idea that he and his former partner had been recently married. But the delusion also gradually receded, and he came to accept that she had no intention of returning to him. It is as though the delusion held at bay the need to face something that B.X. was not capable of accepting, until such time as he was more fit to do so. Together these two things suggest that B.X. is reasonsresponsive generally. His initial sensitivity and insight into his condition are not things that he could have displayed if he had crossed that strange boundary that leads outside the space of reasons altogether. And the fact that he was able to recover more or less on his own suggests that his capacity to be sensitive to epistemic reasons remained intact-for what else other than that very capacity could he have used to get himself out?-even if it suffered partial muting and redirection. On Butler's way of thinking of things-to which I am obviously very sympathetic-B.X.'s belief served a protective or defensive function. How did it serve that function? It is plausible that B.X. needed (in some appropriate sense) to believe something which would forge a strong sense of coherence and connection with his pre-injury self. As Butler suggests, the primary challenge for B.X. during his recovery was coming to terms with how dramatically and irreversibly changed his life had become. Believing that his partner was there, that a dear corner of his otherwise unrecognizably marred life remained as before, could plausibly offer him something to hang on to, some piece of his past life to use as a flotation device while he tries to get himself to shore. Now, according to my view of self-deception, it seems that B.X. counts as self-deceived. The belief that his partner had not left him made its appearance sometime after the period of insight that Butler describes. This suggests that B.X. had the belief that his partner had indeed left him at some point prior to the onset of the delusion. Now let us suppose that as the significance of how his life has been transformed dawns on him bit-by-bit B.X. develops a need to believe that his partner had not left him. In a number of ways such a belief is a good candidate for a life-preserver-belief because it concerns a matter which is indeed of great personal significance for him but, compared to the other things of great personal significance to him which are manifestly in shambles it less often and less flagrantly bumps up against evidence to its contrary which would need to be ignored in order for the belief to persist. It seems that if B.X. is to persist in his life-preserver belief he will need to avoid confronting evidence which points to its falsity. His case is an interesting one because presumably the evidence which is available concerning the falsity of that belief is given by his memory and the memories of his caretakers. Compared to the body of evidence that would have to be ignored if he were to, say, try to deny his injuries (as some delusional patients do), this body of evidence is quite sparse. A little bit of motivated failure to consult that part of one's memory might be all that would be PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3: 15 |DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 |www.nature.com/palcomms 7 required. If this is what happened, then B.X. counts as selfdeceived according to my view. His belief, however it was formed precisely, is false, and manifestly so. But he manages to persist in believing for a time (as long as he needed to, it seems) and this seems to require making himself somehow impervious to the evidence which he had previously appreciated. The possible complicity of his caretakers in facilitating his failure to confront or appreciate evidence against his delusional belief is another interesting feature of B.X.'s case. It is also quite readily understandable. Clinicians often have to face the difficult question of whether it is appropriate to confront a subject about their delusional belief and many factors might go into determining the appropriate course of action. Plausibly, it would have seemed to many clinicians that the right course of action in B.X.'s case would be to allow him, as he seemed himself to want to do, to take things one at a time, so to speak. If the self-deceiver is encouraged or facilitated in their motivated omission, I am inclined to think that it may partially mitigate his degree of blameworthiness. Although I do think B.X. is self-deceived on my view, I do not think he is blameworthy. A very small part of the reason for this might be the facilitation of his caretakers. But far more important, it seems to me, was the function that the self-deceptive/delusional belief was playing for B.X. at the time. If it really was (perhaps the only thing) keeping him together, then I think we are right to see it as an excusable trade-off between negative epistemic value and significant improvement to overall well-being. This does not change the facts concerning whether B.X. in fact deceived himself, but it is certainly relevant for determining what the appropriate attitude is to take towards him in the light of his self-deception. I chose to express this by saying that the self-deceptive omission, and the resulting delusional belief are attributable to B.X., but that he is not blameworthy for the subsequently persistent belief because he has a weak excuse. What of the aretaic assessment that is typically grounded by attributability-responsibility? Is B.X. injudicious in the same way that A is? Does he display a negligent quality of will? He may. The moral hazards of self-deception-risk of harm to self or others, for example-are there just as much in his case as in others. But the weak excuse that is available in B.X.'s does more than just block his blameworthiness. It also provides ground for counterbalancing, or perhaps undermining, the aretaic assessment that would normally apply.24 Excuses of this kind work as follows. Suppose I am tasked with delivering some valuable cargo. If, on the way down the only available path, I encounter a hairy spider and decide to turn back, risking the cargo in the process, I am pretty clearly guilty of cowardice. The action of fleeing is attributable to me (and is the grounds for finding me cowardly), and so too am I blameworthy (liable) if the cargo is lost. On the other hand, if I turn back risking the cargo because there is a grizzly bear on the path, I do not display cowardice, but perhaps prudence. (Or, if one prefers, I display cowardice tempered with prudence.) For the same reason that the negative aretaic assessment of me would seem inappropriate, I submit that I am not blameworthy should the cargo end up lost; the very thing that excuses me from blameworthiness also undermines or counterbalances the judgment of cowardice. This seems to be what is happening in B. X.'s case. His flight from the truth is analogous to my flight from the bear: it comes with risks that we all recognize, but it is not undertaken lightly or negligently. The quality of will that he displays, against the situation in which he finds himself at the same time makes blaming him, and finding aretaic fault, inappropriate. It is worth mentioning that I want to resist saying that B.X. has a strong excuse for his self-deception. To say this would be to deny B.X. the appropriate ownership over the strategy that he deployed for getting through. I have spoken of his psychological need to believe as he did, but I did not mean to suggest that his deceiving himself was something he was literally compelled to do. And more importantly, merely being compelled to do something in this sense might not be enough to constitute a strong excuse. I said that if you only stepped on my foot as a result of being pushed, you would have a strong excuse because the action would not be yours. What if you also, simultaneously wanted to step on my foot? Then your action would have a cause outside of you, but would also be an expression of your will. If we were in this situation, we would have to do hard work to figure out which thing should properly be considered the reason for your bodily movement. I do not have a general procedure for coming to answer questions of this kind, but I think it is safe to say here that B.X. is not overdetermined in this way. It is clear that what he does is a manifestation of his will, even if there is a sense in which he must do it, because he wills to do as he must. This would not be true of you if you were both shoved and malevolent; your will was not to be shoved, even though it may have been to step on my foot. Being compelled may not be enough to constitute a strong excuse if one also wills the means. Capgras; two-factor theory. While I do think that B.X counts as self-deceived on my view, it is unclear how many other cases of delusional belief will satisfy my account of self-deception. My aim has certainly not been to argue that all delusional subjects are selfdeceived, or even that it is the norm. However, I think it is worth pointing out that my approach here dovetails quite nicely with a prominent approach in cognitive neuropsychiatry to the formation and maintenance of delusion which is called the 'two-factor theory', and which I mentioned earlier in connection with Capgras. This raises the possibility that motivational factors akin to those that I think are at work in self-deception may be at work in more cases than is widely recognized. Let me elaborate. Recall the Capgras delusion. Someone with this delusion believes that a friend or family member has been replaced by an impostor. Understanding of how this delusion is formed was greatly enhanced by the discovery that the human facial recognition system has at least two neurologically independent subparts. The first, which is responsible for 'overt' facial recognition is in the temporal lobe and underlies the ability to explicitly recognize the faces of those one is familiar with. The second, affective, system, which appears to involve the amygdala, produces Skin Conductance Responses (SCRs)-covert recognition-when subjects are exposed to faces they are familiar with, even if they fail to recognize the face overtly. This is what is thought to be at work in people who have prosopagnosia. This insight led cognitive neuropsychiatrists studying Capgras to wonder whether the two facial recognition systems were doubly dissociated-that is, whether each was independent of the other and whether there could be people who had the 'opposite' of prosopagnosia. Such people would overtly recognize familiar faces, but would be left without the typical accompanying affective response. Could this be what was causing Capgras? The patient would see his wife, and would accept that the person before him bore an exact physical resemblance to her, but the experience would be entirely without the ordinary feeling of familiarity. It is, perhaps, only a small leap from there to the idea that this person before me, while she looks exactly like my wife, must be someone else. The two components of the facial recognition system are now largely thought to be doubly dissociated and the abnormal experience of seeing someone who looks exactly like a loved one, but who feels somehow alien, is thought to be involved in Capgras (Ellis and Young, 1990; Ellis et al. 1997). There is, however, a ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 8 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3: 15 |DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 |www.nature.com/palcomms problem. Not everyone with damage to the covert facial recognition system develops the delusion. Even though these patients are having the same unusual experience as the Capgras patients, they do not form the delusion. So, something else must be required to fill in the gap between the unusual experience and the subject eventually forming or endorsing the belief. This leaves somewhat unsettled what the second factor must be (and there is no consensus) but the idea that some kind of two-factor theory is correct, at least for some delusions like Capgras, seems difficult to deny given the evidence. There must be some role for the abnormal experience to be playing, but if that does not take us all of the way there, there simply must be something else at work. Many of those who pioneered the two-factor theory were responding to an idea, tracing back to the work of Brendan Maher beginning in the 70s,25 that delusions were largely rational responses to highly unusual experiences (Davies, et al. 2001; Davies, et al. 2010). Maher himself thought of his work as a direct challenge to Jaspers' claim that delusions were ununderstandable. If some delusions could be understood as rational responses to a certain special kind of experience, experience with a certain kind of force and character, then the content of the beliefs that those experiences gave rise to could be readily understood. Whether this rational connection can be maintained, and what it means for self-deception depends on how we think of the relation between the first and the second factor. One way of getting at this is to ask how specific the representational content of the abnormal experience is. For example, according to Coltheart (2005), the Capgras patient does not experience that his wife is an impostor; rather, an unconscious system predicts that seeing his wife should be accompanied by a certain autonomic response which fails to occur. He thus forms the Capgras hypothesis as an attempt to explain the abnormal experience. According to this 'explanationist' account, the representational content of the experience which prompts the delusion is less rich than the content of the delusion itself. According to the competing 'endorsement' account (Bayne and Pacherie, 2004), the representational content of the experience prompting the delusion is as rich as the content of the delusional state itself. On this kind of account, the subject does not reach for the Capgras hypothesis as an explanation of his experience but merely takes what is already presented in experience to be veridical. Obviously, whether there is room for appeal to motivational factors (and whether such an appeal would make a given case count as self-deception on my view), depends on which of these competing accounts is true. On either account, motivational factors (possibly jointly with neuropsychological factors) could be playing a role in generating the anomalous experience. Since the experience is much thinner on the explanationist model, it might be thought that appeal to motivation would be otiose; still, there could be a role for it to play. If, as some philosophers-and increasingly many psychologists-think, it is possible for a subject's propositional attitudes to cognitively penetrate (Pylyshyn, 1999) her experience, then two subjects may have different experiences even if we hold fixed what is perceived, the perceiving conditions, and the state of the relevant sensory organ. If this is right, then the mere fact that one subject desires that p be the case while the other fails to desire it or desires that not-p be the case, might just be the difference-maker when it comes to answering the question, 'Why did the subject have the experience that he had?'-even on the explanationist model.26 If motivation is playing a role in the first factor, that will not be enough for the sufficient condition identified by Self-deception as Omission to be satisfied. When we learn that the subject had some distinctive kind of experience, we just have not learned one way or another whether there has been motivated mismanagement of evidence which sustains an externally defeated belief over time. However, we may nevertheless be able to learn something about the subject that undergoes such an experience which is akin to what we can learn about the selfdeceiver. If we are interpreters of someone who has undergone an experience of this kind, and we learn that this is how it has happened, we come to learn something about the kind of cognitive agent that the subject is. There is also room for motivation to be playing a role in the second factor,27and if it is present, it may go some of the way to restoring the kind of understandability that Maher was aiming for. On either the endorsement or the explanationist account of things, if we have gotten this far, the Capgras belief is already in place, either as an explanation for a bizarre experience or as one given rise to by a bizarre experience directly. Once the belief is in place, there is room for Self-deception as Omission to be satisfied. All that would need to be the case would be for there to be a failure of epistemic agency which is partially motivated by a desire for the world to be as the subject already believes it to be.28And as strange as it may sound, the operation of the second factor seems more readily understandable when it is cashed out in motivational terms, or indeed in terms of the kind of mental agency that I think is at work in self-deception. The varieties of human motivation are nearly limitless, and I do not know of any clinical examples that bear this out, but it is not difficult to imagine someone facilitating the maintenance of the Capgras belief for motivationally biased reasons.29 Perhaps the couple has recently had a particularly acrimonious quarrel and it would be somehow easier to not face the genuine article just yet; perhaps he has been secretly yearning for a divorce and this would save him the trouble; perhaps he has a motivation which only years of deep analysis would uncover. Any such motivation, if it were to underlie and facilitate the acceptance of the Capgras hypothesis, would be grounds for thinking that we had a potential case of self-deception here. The availability of an explanation of this kind greatly reduces the sense that the delusion is un-understandable by bringing the psychological dynamics of the subject into the focus of ordinary intentional explanation. Conclusion: innocence I have tried to bring a number of distinctions between types of responsibility to bear on the question with which we began. I have also put the notion of self-deception to work in a way that I hope has been doubly illuminating: since we have defeasible but determinate antecedent judgments about the responsibility-status of self-deceivers, asking whether someone's conduct can be assimilated to a self-deceptive paradigm can help us think about the ways in which they may or may not be responsible. Delusions can also help us understand the ways in which our ordinary notion of self-deception can be extended to include, e.g., cases where the self-deception is attributable but not blameworthy for very good reason. Using self-deception as a tool for thinking about some delusions also forces on us the question of what a subject's motivations are and this question can only be answered by (suitably supplemented) ordinary interpersonal interpretation. Motivations can partially constitute nodes of intentional agency and reminding ourselves about the motivations of subjects with delusions and the role that such motivations may play in our assessment of them can serve as a general bulwark against slipping too easily into thinking of them as outside of the scope of ordinary assessment and understanding altogether. It is telling that when we bring to bear the tools that I have recommended for thinking about responsibility for delusions we find that there is a good case to be made that the subject is excused. I take this to be in keeping with something Lisa Bortolotti has PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3: 15 |DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 |www.nature.com/palcomms 9 recently argued for (2015, 2016), viz., what she calls the 'epistemic innocence' of some delusions. She says that a delusion is epistemically innocent if it confers significant epistemic benefits which could not be achieved otherwise. Bortolotti is focused on cases where some negative epistemic consequences are embraced for the sake of otherwise unattainable epistemic benefits. I agree with Bortolotti that the notion of epistemic innocence is of clinical and conceptual value. What I hope to have done here is to have introduced what might be thought of as an expansion of that notion of innocence to cases where the negative epistemic consequences are traded off against non-epistemic gains. In order to address such cases we need conceptual tools developed from the more general standpoint of moral theory. Taking up this standpoint-taking seriously the possibility that assessment might here really be appropriate-has, I hope, revealed a more comprehensive and detailed picture of what that innocence consists in. There is a kind of innocence which may only be possible against a backdrop of possible guilt. Received: 14 October 2016 Accepted: 2 October 2017 Notes 1 But only roughly. I explain how my use of this term-and the distinction I use it to mark-differs from Shoemaker's below. 2 Foucault located such dynamics within what he called 'discourses' which are 'ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them' (Weedon, 1987, p 108). I do not wish to problematize the knowledge that discourses enable (as Foucault did) but merely to draw attention to the tacitly normative aspects of certain practices of categorization. 3 This example is adapted from Doggett (2012). 4 Note that the view is stated as a sufficient condition. Because the satisfaction of this condition can be sufficient for something to count as self-deception, the constitutive connection thesis (see below) must be false. But that is not to say that there could not in principle be cases of self-deception which do not satisfy the condition given here. (It would be a separate question, however, whether such cases and the view meant to capture them would run afoul of the dynamical problem.) 5 I use the terms 'satisfaction' and 'dissatisfaction' deliberately to avoid commitment to the idea that there must be positively or negatively valenced experiences accompanying the subject's belief. However, there no doubt will be cases where the subject will experience satisfaction or believing p or will experience something like distress. 6 Theorists of self-deception disagree about what form the subject's emotional interest must take. For Mele (2006, 1997), for example, what it is to have an emotional interest in p's being true is to take the error of mistakenly believing not-p when p is in fact the case to be more costly than the error of taking p to be the case when in fact not-p is the case, where that preference is itself to be understood in terms of a motivational bias. So, on this view, I might prefer to believe that I am not going bald to believing that I am going bald because believing that I am going bald if I am not would cause me great distress, much more than the distress that I would feel if I mistakenly believed that I was not going bald when I was. Barnes is more explicit about self-deception's anxietyreduction function. She says (1997, p 39): 'When a person is anxious that not-q, the person (1) is uncertain whether q or not-q and (2) desires that q'. Self-deception reduces the person's anxiety by resolving the question of whether q in the appropriate direction. Although my formulation is much closer to Barnes', as far as I can tell my use of the idea of 'desiring that p be true' is consistent with both of these ways of thinking about self-deceptive motivation. That is, having the motivated errorpreferences that Mele is pointing to is as much a matter of being emotionally entangled (in my sense) as anxiously desiring that p be true. 7 It is also worth noting that both Barnes and Mele are keen to be able to handle cases of 'twisted' self-deception, i.e., cases where the subject self-deceptively believes something he wants not to be true. My way of putting things can also handle these cases once we distinguish between wanting something to be true in the ordinary sense and desiring it to be true in the sense that I mean it here. A subject may desire (in my sense) for something to be true (we may say) masochistically. That is, he may be liable to satisfaction at believing that p where p is something that is bad for him, something he, in the ordinary sense, does not want (or wants the opposite of). Believing that p closes the gap between the way he takes the world to be and the way he thinks the world ought to be, but the way that the world ought to be from his point of view is bad (say, hedonically bad) for him. 8 I add this qualification to avoid having to individuate processes, and will omit it from here on. 9 Modulo, should there be such a thing, natural credence extinction. 10 I thank an anonymous referee for formulating this worry in this way to me. 11 If Mele would be willing to understand his view as including cases of culpable belief maintenance, our views would be very closely related. 12 I am not sure that Mele succeeds in avoiding the dynamical problem, which is part of the reason why I think we need to go further and deny the constitutive connection thesis, that is, move to talking not about belief formation but about the dynamics of belief maintenance. For critical discussion of Mele and the dynamical problem see Lockie (2003). 13 There is thus an affinity between my view and Fingarette's (1969). 14 Using the term 'excuse' to refer to a specific variety of what Strawson (1962, p 5) called 'pleas' or 'special considerations' is due to Watson (2004b, p 224). I take this way of distinguishing between two types of excuses to be intuitive, however it has not, to my knowledge, been drawn in this way and in connection with the two types of responsibility I wish to distinguish. 15 The analogy is limited in the following way: There is difference between what is standardly called 'excuse' and justification. If an agent can produce either, she can be shown to have avoided culpable wrongdoing. An action is justified if, all things considered, it was not wrong. (self-defense); an agent is excused if something undermines her responsibility (acting under hypnosis or duress). Either could be presented as a defense against criminal charges, but weak excuses, as I intend them to be, only comprise the latter. 16 It is worth noting, however, that whereas Shoemaker contrasts attributability with what he calls 'accountability' (as well as a third notion, 'answerability'), my understanding of blameworthiness should not be identified with Shoemakerian accountability. For Shoemaker, accountability has specifically do with violating relationship-defining demands (which play no role in my discussion). 17 So there ought still to be a considerable gap between someone's being blameworthy, and the truth of the claim that we should actually punish them. Even if someone is found fully blameworthy for an action attributable to them it may still be a wide open question what the right kind of response to their wrongdoing is. Indeed, it is compatible with my way of thinking about moral responsibility that punishment is seldom, if ever, justified or appropriate. We can see this if we imagine adopting a flatfooted consequentialist justification for punishment. What if it turned out that punishment was an ineffective deterrent and a poor means of personal rehabilitation? It would not follow from this that no one's actions were ever properly attributable to them, nor that they were not blameworthy for those which were bad. It would simply mean that punishment would not be the response justified by those facts. And it seems immensely plausible to me that if anything would make punishment inappropriate, it would be the fact that the wrongdoer already suffers great enough misfortune that further punishment would take on a perverse character. This is just to say that the question guiding this paper is certainly not the question of whether some delusional subjects should be punished for their delusions. 18 Whether you are excused for being that way (or whether it is countervailed by another aretaic assessment) is yet another question which will arise again in connection with delusional subjects below. 19 There are some habits of mind which are epistemic vices only because they are accompanied by indolence. For example, perhaps all of us are subject to the availability heuristic, or liable to commit the base rate fallacy, or to manifest various other System 1 cold biases. What separates those of us who allow the errors characteristic of those biases to persistently take hold and those who do not is some degree of epistemic vigilance, which is effortful. For example, consider the following example of Kahneman's to illustrate the System 1 at work. He says: 'Do not try to solve it, but listen to your intuition' (Kahneman, 2011, p 44): A bat and a ball cost $1.10. The bat costs one dollar more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? The intuitive-incorrect -answer that System 1 offers up is $0.10. And it seems to do so more or less unbidden, once the specification of task has been grasped. Whether one chooses to go on and perform the calculation and ultimately arrive at the correct answer seems to be an independent matter. Without the exercise of vigilance, one is saddled with a false belief. This is not an example of self-deception, but it is a nice illustration of how some epistemic vices are enabled by unwillingness. In cases where this is true, there is a foothold for various forms of assessment, including aretaic assessment. (I leave open the question of whether there are cases of 'pure' cognitive bias and what kind of assessment, if any, would be appropriate there.) 20 In particular, the requirement that the belief be false, that it be based on 'incorrect inference', and that it be bizarre, have all been weakened or dropped. These ought to strike us as welcome changes. 21 Delusions are typically differentiated by their content, but it is also widely acknowledged that delusions are partially dependent on their cultural milieu for the particular contents that they have (Ahmed, 1978). ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 10 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3: 15 |DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 |www.nature.com/palcomms 22 One reason is simple: I am very sympathetic to the idea that belief is at bottom a concept we use to understand other agents, to explain and predict their behavior in terms that are readily understandable to us, and generally to calibrate them in the space of reasons. To say that someone believes p might mean things as various as (i) they are inclined to act on p; (ii) they are inclined to report p in speech; (iii) they are inclined to use p as a fixed point in practical or theoretical reasoning; (iv) they have a certain felt conviction in the truth of p; (v) they treat the question of whether p to be largely settled etc. (Scanlon, 1998). So, on this way of thinking about it, belief is a kind of syndrome with no essential features, and someone can be thought to count as believing that p by exhibiting some number of the marks of beliefs. My sympathy with the idea that delusions ought to count as beliefs stems largely from the incontrovertible way in which delusional subjects satisfy, albeit in shifting and sometimes patchy ways, these criteria. In particular, it is very difficult to deny that patients with delusions take themselves to believe the things in question. They are subjectively experienced as ordinary beliefs and indeed, one's degree of felt conviction in a delusion can often greatly exceed the conviction one might experience in ordinary belief. As Sims (2003, pp 141–142) puts it: 'It cannot be stressed too often that patients believe their delusions literally: subjectively, delusions are completely different from fantasy. Patients do not describe them 'as if' they existed. The reality is 'known' with the unconcerned certainty that the undeluded person assumes for the concrete events and ideas of his own life, such as the floor being solid...[A] man who believed that American battleships were sailing down the main street of Birmingham UK (100 miles from the sea), had the refined social conscience to report this to the police!' This example is a nice illustration of how delusions may exhibit some of the marks of belief with clarity and sharpness, even while exhibiting many of the negative epistemic features which are characteristic of them. This subject is using his belief that there are battleships sailing down the main street of Birmingham as the basis for speech, inference, and indeed concern (i, ii, iii) because of his degree of felt conviction (iv) in it. Moreover, it seems that the very fact that he takes such a thing to be a reason for concern shows that his belief exhibits a degree of coherence with his other beliefs, beliefs, e.g., about geopolitics and nationhood (not to mention a whole lot of beliefs about military hardware, the nature of peacetime etc.) which together suggest that what is happening is cause for some alarm. The belief is no doubt implausible, and we can imagine that it exhibits a high degree of fixity and resistance to counterevidence, but that should not disqualify it from counting as belief. 23 The Reverse Othello delusion is noteworthy among delusions for not having the same kind of bizarre content that most delusions have. It may in this respect seem tailormade for someone who wants to defend the claim that there is overlap between selfdeception and delusion. A critic might say: 'Most delusions involve believing a highly bizarre content, and it is plausible that (part of) what is distinctive about being in that state is how the subject comes to have that attitude towards that content (perhaps, e.g., it is caused by unusual perceptual experience.) But then there will be a gap between self-deception and delusion, one that is missed if we focus only of belief maintenance.' I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue to me. My response is twofold: First, trying to figure out how delusions are formed is surely to be counted as one of the chief aims of the neuropsychology of delusions. And it is very plausible that for a great many of them there will be abnormal mechanisms at work that partially explain (among other things, perhaps) the bizarreness of the delusional content. And this may mean that there is, in some respect, a gap between (some) delusions and (some) self-deception. But the size of this gap, and its significance, will depend, in part, on what the neuropsychological abnormalities in question turn out to be like. We can see this by considering how, when we think of the neuropsychological abnormalities that we do know about already, it is still just a good question the extent to which this shows there to be 'gap' of relevance to thinks like, say, our responsibility judgments. When this-or-that neuropsychological abnormality is discovered, it will still be a good question the extent to which that abnormality presents or underlies a philosophically interesting discontinuity with ordinary cognition, agency, autonomy, or whatever. Second, even if it turns out that the relevant abnormalities do underlie significant discontinuities between the delusional and the non-delusional with respect to belief formation, it may remain true that there is an interesting overlap between self-deception and delusion precisely because the mechanisms of belief formation are not the only ones we must look to if we want a comprehensive picture of the ways delusional subjects are and are not like 'ordinary' subjects. 24 I make this qualification because I want to remain neutral with respect to whether the virtues are necessarily unified. 25 Such as, e.g., Maher (1974). 26 Of course, this could also be the case on the endorsement model. Indeed, I am assuming that the connection between what the subject desires and the content of the experience would be easier to see on this model since the content of the experience is identical to the content of the delusional belief. So, whenever it is plausible that the subject could desire that the delusional belief be true, it will be plausible that the subject desire that the content which shows up in his experience be true. (Of course, whether cognitive penetration works this way-whether desiring that p, say, probabilifies an experience with the content that p-is an empirical matter.) 27 Davies (2010) also discusses cases where motivational factors could be playing a role between the first factor and the second. 28 Mele denies that self-deception obtains when the subject also suffers from a cognitive impairment, on the grounds that the 'causal contribution [of motivation] may be so small' (2006, p 123) that it should not count. I do not see why we should say that it does not count rather than say that the contribution that it makes is gradable. And even in cases where (as Mele has in mind) the reflection on the available evidence that is prevented by motivational factors would not have caused the subject to revise his beliefs, it seems to me that there is a characterologically relevant difference between the agent whose reflection is prevented by motivational factors and the agent whose reflection is not, one that we may well register by calling the former self-deceived and not the latter. When we ask whether someone is self-deceived, we are not just asking which factors are causally responsible for sustaining his beliefs. We are asking whether he manifests a certain epistemic vice. 29 I was told anecdotally of a case where a patient had stopped her medication in an attempt to manage her symptoms without the distressing side-effects that the medication caused. After it became clear that her symptoms were unmanageable without assistance her psychiatrist recommended, to her great dismay, that she restart the medication, to which she responded 'You're not Dr. X! He would never treat me this way!' This suggests that there are cases of patients forming the Capgras delusion without any underlying bizarre perceptual experience and where motivational factors seem to be doing most of the work. Conversely, there have been cases reported of people experiencing the Capgras delusion with their pets, or with inanimate objects (Islam, et al 2015.), where motivational explanations seem far less plausible. The size of the gap that needs to be closed by the second factor is evidently highly variable, as is the force of the motivational component. But this does not show that motivational factors are not playing a role in some cases of Capgras, it just shows that the role played may be greater or lesser (or perhaps nil) depending on the case. References Ahmed SH (1978) Cultural influences on delusion. Psychiatr Clin 11(1):1–9 American Psychiatric Association (2000) Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 4th edn. American Psychiatric Association, Washington DC, Text Revision American Psychiatric Association (2013) Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, 5th edn. American Psychiatric Association, Washington DC Barnes A (1997) Seeing through self-deception. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK Bayne T, Pacherie E (2004) Bottom-up or top-down? Campbell's rationialist account of monothematic delusions. Philos Psychiatr Psychol 11:1–11 Bortolotti L (2015) The epistemic innocence of motivated delusions. Conscious Cogn 33:490–499 Bortolotti L (2016) Epistemic benefits of elaborated and systematized delusions in schizophrenia. Br J Philos Sci 67:879–900 Butler P (2000) Reverse Othello syndrome subsequent to traumatic brain injury. Psychiatry 63:85–92 Capgras J, Reboul-Lachaux J (1923) "Illusion des sosies" dans un délire systématizé chronique. Bulletin de la Société Clinique de Médecine Mentale 2:6–16 Coltheart M (2005) Conscious experience and delusional belief. Philos Psychiatr Psychol 12:153–157 D'Cruz, J (In prep) Unwitting pretense and the self-deceptive mind Darwall S (1988) Self-deception, autonomy, and moral constitution. In: Mclaughlin B and Rorty AO (eds) Perspectives on self-deception. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, p 407–430 Davidson D (ed) (2004) Deception and division. In: Problems of rationality. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, p 200–210 Davies M (2010) Delusion and motivationally biased belief: self-deception in the two-factor framework. In: Bayne T and Fernández J (eds) Delusion and Selfdeception: affective and motivational influences on belief formation. Psychology Press, Hove, UK, p 71–86 Davies AMA, Davies M, Ogden JA, Smithson M, White RC (2010) Cognitive and motivational factors in anosognosia. In: Bayne T and Fernández J (eds) Delusion and self-deception: affective and motivational Influences on belief formation. Psychology Press, p 187–225 Davies M, Coltheart M, Langdon R, Breen N (2001) Monothematic delusions: Toward a two-factor account. Philos Psychiatr Psychol 8(1/2):133–158 Doggett T (2012) Some questions for Tamar Gendler. Analysis 72:764–774 Ellis HD, Young AW (1990) Accounting for delusional misidentifications. Br J Psychiatr 157:239–248 Ellis et al. (1997) Reduced autonomic responses to faces in Capgras delusion. Proc R Soci Biol Sci 264(1384):1085–1092 Fingarette H (1969) Self-deception. Humanities Press, New York, NY Foucault M (1969) L'archéologie du savoir. (The Archaeology of Knowledge, Allan Sheridan, Trans.) Harper and Row, New York, NY Gendler T (2007) Self-deception as pretense. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):231–258 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3: 15 |DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 |www.nature.com/palcomms 11 Islam L et al. (2015) Cagras delusion for animals and inanimate objects in Parkinson's Disease: a case report. BMC Psychiatry 15:73 Jaspers K (2007) Causal and 'understandable': relationships between events and psychosis in dementia praecox (schizophrenia). In: Sass H (ed.) Anthology of German Psychiatric Texts, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, pp 174–279 Kahneman D (2011) Thinking fast and slow. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, New York, NY Kendler KS, Campbell J (2014) Expanding the domain of the understandable in psychiatric illness: An updating of the Jasperian framework for explanation and understanding. Psychol Med 44:1–7 Lockie R (2003) Depth psychology and self-deception. Philos Psychol 16 (1):127–148 Mackay R, Kinsbourne M (2009) Confabulation, delusion, and anosognosia: Motivational factors and false claims. Cognit Neuropsychiatr 15(1/2/3): 288–318 Maher B (1974) Delusional thinking and perceptual disorder. J Individ Psychol 30:98–113 Mele A (1997) Real self-deception. Behav Brain Sci 20(1):91–102 Mele A (2006) Self-deception and delusions. Eur J Analytic Philos 2(1):109–124 Pears D (1984) Motivated irrationality. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK Pylyshyn Z (1999) Is vision continuous with cognition? Behav Brain Sci 22:341–365 Ramachandran VS (1996) The Evolutionary biology of self-deception, laughing, dreaming, and depression: Some clues from anosognosia. Med Hypotheses 47 (5):602–632 Scanlon T (1998) What we owe to each other. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA Shoemaker D (2011) Attributability, answerability, accountability. Ethics 121 (3):602–632 Sims A (2003) Symptoms in the mind: An introduction to descriptive psychopathology, 3rd edn. Elsevier Science, Saunders Strawson P (1962) Freedom and resentment. Proc Br Acad 48:1–25 Watson G (ed) (2004a) Responsibility and the limits of evil: Variations on a Strawsonian theme. In: Agency and answerability, Clarendon, Oxford, p 219–259 Watson G (2004b) Two faces of responsibility. In: Watson G (ed) Agency and answerability, Clarendon, Oxford, pp 260–288 Weedon C (1987) Feminist practice and poststructuralist theory. Blackwell, Cambridge, 1987 Data availability Data sharing is not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study. Additional information Competing interests: The author declares no competing financial interests. Reprints and permission information is available online at http://www.nature.com/ reprints Publisher's note: Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/. © The Author(s) 2017 ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 12 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3: 15 |DOI: 10.1057/s41599-017-0017-0 |www.nature.com/palcomms

Should Scientists Embrace Scientific Realism or Antirealism? Abstract If scientists embrace scientific realism, they can use a scientific theory to explain and predict observables and unobservables. If, however, they embrace scientific antirealism, they cannot use a scientific theory to explain observables and unobservables, and cannot use a scientific theory to predict unobservables. Given that explanation and prediction are means to make scientific progress, scientists can make more scientific progress, if they embrace scientific realism than if they embrace scientific antirealism. Keywords Scientific Antirealism, Scientific Progress, Scientific Realism, Moore's Paradox Park, Seungbae (2018). "Should Scientists Embrace Scientific Realism or Antirealism?" Philosophical Forum (to be assigned). Seungbae Park Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology Republic of Korea [email protected] 1. Introduction This paper concerns the two kinds of scientific progress: theoretical and empirical. 1 Science makes theoretical progress when a new theory comes closer to the truth than an old theory, and empirical progress when a new theory comes closer to empirical adequacy than an old theory. T1 is closer to empirical adequacy than T2, for example, if 90% and 80% of the observational consequences of T1 and T2 are true, respectively. An interesting question arises: Should scientists be scientific realists or antirealists in order to make theoretical and empirical progress? We conduct cost-benefit analyses in our daily lives when we face two competing courses of action. Suppose, for example, that we have the goal of having fun over the weekend by going on a trip, and that we have the option of going to Las Vegas and the option of going to the Grand Canyon. In such a situation, we perform the cost-benefit analyses of the two options, i.e., we imagine what the costs and benefits of going to Las Vegas and to the Grand Canyon would be. After comparing the costs and benefits, we make a final judgment about whether to go to Las Vegas or to the Grand Canyon. To say that we should choose Las Vegas over the Grand Canyon means that the net benefit of going to Las Vegas outweighs that of going to the Grand Canyon. Similarly, suppose that scientists have the goal of making scientific progress, i.e., that they have the goal to be closer to truths and empirical adequacy than before. Should they be realists or antirealists? To answer this question, they should conduct cost-benefit analyses of being realists and of being antirealists, i.e., they should imagine what the costs and the benefits of being realists and of being antirealists would be. After comparing the costs and the benefits, they should make the final judgment about whether to be realists or antirealists. This paper focuses on epistemic costs and benefits, aiming to show that scientists should embrace realism over antirealism, i.e., that the net epistemic benefit of being realists outweighs that of 1 This paper does not address methodological progress, given that the relevant discourse about it can be extrapolated from the present discourse about empirical progress. 2 being antirealists. My discussion proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I display the costs and the benefits of the important versions of realism and antirealism vis-à-vis scientific revolutions, arguing that realists have no more reason to resist scientific revolutions than antirealists, and vice versa. In Section 3, I apply the cost-benefit analyses to the debate between Ernst Mach (1838-1916) and Max Planck (1858-1947) over whether scientists should be realists or instrumentalists. I argue that Mach overlooked what realists gain from scientific revolutions, and that Planck overlooked what instrumentalists gain. In Section 4, I provide reasons for thinking that realism is more effective for achieving scientific progress than antirealism is, and hence that scientists should choose realism over antirealism. This paper operates under the following two assumptions: First, there will be scientific revolutions, as there were before the early twentieth century. This assumption is controversial. P. Kyle Stanford (2006: 19–20) and K. Brad Wray (2013: 4329) affirm it. By contrast, Seungbae Park (2016a) denies it, arguing that scientific revolutions will be rare as in the twentieth century. Second, new theories are closer to truths and empirical adequacy than old theories. So science progresses through scientific revolutions. This assumption is also controversial. While Wray (2007: 86) denies it, Moti Mizrahi (2013), Seungbae Park (2014a: 270), and Juha Saatsi (2015) affirm it. The main thesis of this paper would collapse without these two assumptions. Any objection that readers will raise against them should be addressed in separate papers. 2. Cost-Benefit Analyses 2.1. Truth vs. Empirical Adequacy Suppose that realism and antirealism are defined as the views, respectively, that successful theories are true 2 and empirically adequate. 3 So before scientific revolutions, realists believed that old theories were true. After scientific revolutions, they believe that the old theories were false, and that the new theories are true. Analogously, before scientific revolutions, antirealists believed that old theories were empirically adequate. After scientific revolutions, they believe that the old theories were empirically inadequate, and that the new theories are empirically adequate. Under this condition, who would be more motivated to welcome scientific revolutions? To answer this question, we need to consider what realists and antirealists lose and gain as a result of scientific revolutions. Realists lose their old belief that old theories were true, but they get new theories which are closer to truths and empirical adequacy than the old theories, i.e., they gain both theoretical and empirical progress. In contrast, antirealists lose their old belief that old theories were empirically adequate, but they get new theories which are closer to empirical adequacy than the old theories, i.e., they gain empirical progress. To put it roughly, after a scientific revolution, realists lose a lot but gain a lot, while antirealists lose a little but gain a little. Therefore, it is not clear who would be more motivated to resist scientific revolutions. Antirealists might contend that it is better to lose a little and gain a little than to lose a lot and gain a lot. Epistemic security is more important than anything else, so a big loss outweighs a big gain, a small loss also outweighs a small gain, and even a small loss 2 Extensional realists (Park, 2016b: 47) believe that a scientific theory is true, once they think that scientists' arguments for it are strong. 3 Bas van Fraassen (1985: 294) and Wray (2008: 321; 2012: 376) claim that successful theories are empirically adequate. Mario Alai interprets constructive empiricism as claiming that "all we need to believe is that a theory is empirically adequate" (2017: 21). 3 outweighs a big gain. Realists have no theoretical resource to persuade antirealists. Consider, however, that Cartesian skeptics can raise the same objection to antirealists. Cartesian skeptics believe that none of what successful theories say about the world is worthy of our beliefs. They argue that epistemic security is more important than anything else, so it is better to lose nothing and gain nothing than to lose a little and gain a little. Antirealists have no theoretical resource to persuade Cartesian skeptics. A moral is that it is merely a matter of taste whether one chooses to lose a lot and gain a lot, or chooses to lose a little and gain a little. No rational argumentation can persuade realists or antirealists one way or the other. If realists and antirealists claim that their position is better than that of their opponents, they are merely expressing their different tastes. A referee raises the following interesting issue. Von Neumann and Dirac's version of Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics competes with many-worlds interpretation and Bohmian mechanics. The three competitors make radically distinct claims about unobservables but the same claims about observables. Realists should demonstrate the superiority of one competitor over the others before they believe that it is true. By contrast, antirealists do not have to because they only believe that the observational claims of the three competitors are true. Which of the three competitors should realists choose? The aim of this paper is not to solve the problem of underdetermination in quantum mechanics but to establish the modest thesis that realism is a better means than antirealism for making scientific progress. The modest thesis does not require that realists should adjudicate among the three competitors. Consider that antirealists should also choose one among the three rivals to make predictions about observables. If they choose von Neumann and Dirac's version and then believe that it is empirically adequate, realists can also choose it and then believe that it is true. Of course, the realist belief is more likely to be false than the antirealist belief. But the main thesis of this section remains unscathed that realists are no less favorable than antirealists to the scientific revolution that will oust all the three competitors. 2.2. Approximate Truth vs. Approximate Empirical Adequacy Suppose that realists and antirealists believe, respectively, that successful theories are approximately true and approximately empirically adequate. A theory is approximately empirically adequate when most of its observational consequences are true (Park, 2009: 117, footnote). Realists and antirealists might retreat to approximate truth and approximate empirical adequacy, respectively, in response to the pessimistic induction, which maintains that since past theories turned out to be false and empirically inadequate, present theories will also turn out to be false and empirically inadequate (Poincaré, 1905/1952: 160; Mach, 1911: 17; Laudan 1977: 126; Putnam, 1978: 25). Before scientific revolutions, realists believed that old theories were approximately true. After scientific revolutions, they believe that both old and new theories are approximately true, but that the new theories are closer to truths and empirical adequacy than the old theories were. Similarly, before scientific revolutions, antirealists believed that old theories were approximately empirically adequate. After scientific revolutions, they believe that both old and new theories are approximately empirically adequate, and that the new theories are closer to empirical adequacy than the old theories were. Is it possible to believe that both old and new theories are approximately true, and that the new theories are closer to truths than the old theories were? Wray (2008: 323) and Mizrahi (2013: 401) would say yes. They distinguish between being close to the truth and being closer to the truth than a competitor. Their distinction can be illuminated with the following analogy. Suppose that you and I are in a marathon race from Paris to Berlin, that you and I are almost in Berlin, and that you are one step ahead of me. In such a situation, you 4 and I are both close to Berlin, but you are closer to Berlin than I am. Similarly, it is possible that both T1 and T2 are close to the truth, i.e., they are both approximately true, and yet T1 is closer to the truth than T2 is. It is not the case that if both T1 and T2 are approximately true, T1 cannot be closer to the truth than T2 is. Analogously, it is possible that both old and new theories are approximately empirically adequate, and that the new theories are closer to empirical adequacy than the old theories were. Under this condition, who would be more open-minded to new theories? Again, to answer this question, we need to examine what realists and antirealists lose and gain as a result of scientific revolutions. Realists have nothing to lose. As Philip Kitcher (1993: 140– 149) and Stathis Psillos (1999: 113) argue, some theoretical constituents of past theories were carried over to present theories after scientific revolutions, so past theories can be said to be approximately true. Their position is called 'selective realism' and 'preservative realism' in the literature. Thus, realists can retain their belief that old theories were approximately true. Antirealists have nothing to lose either. The fact that the phlogiston theory and the caloric theory clashed with empirical anomalies does not refute the weak position that they are approximately empirically adequate, although it does refute the strong position that they are empirically adequate. Thus, antirealists can retain their old belief that old theories were approximately empirically adequate. Now, who gains more from scientific revolutions? Realists gain both theoretical and empirical progress, whereas antirealists gain only empirical progress. It follows that overall, realists have a stronger reason for supporting scientific revolutions than antirealists do. 2.3. Truth vs. Usefulness Suppose that realists believe that successful theories are true, and that instrumentalists believe that they are useful. 4 On the instrumentalist account, successful theories "are simply tools or instruments for making empirical predictions and achieving other practical ends" (Stanford, 2006: 189). Instrumentalists do not believe that successful theories are true, although they believe that the observational consequences of successful theories are true. Before we compare the advantages and disadvantages of realism with those of instrumentalism, we need to be clear about what exactly instrumentalists are committed to. They are committed either to the view that successful theories are empirically adequate or to the view that they are approximately empirically adequate. They cannot hold the view that successful theories are less than approximately empirically adequate. After all, if most of the observational consequences of a theory are false, it is not clear how it can be useful for making predictions and manipulations. Under this condition, who would be more receptive to new theories? Suppose that instrumentalists are committed to the position that successful theories are empirically adequate. It is not clear whether instrumentalists would be more supportive of scientific revolutions than realists, as we have already seen in Section 2.2. Realists lose a lot but gain a lot, whereas instrumentalists lose a little but gain a little from scientific revolutions. Suppose that instrumentalists are committed to the position that successful theories are approximately empirically adequate. It is not clear either who would be more open-minded to new theories. Realists lose their old belief that old theories were true. Instrumentalists do not lose their old belief that old theories were approximately empirically adequate. But realists gain both theoretical and empirical progress. Instrumentalists gain only empirical progress. It is not clear how we can compare the weight of the realist loss of their belief with the weight of the 4 Stanford (2006: 195) embraces epistemic instrumentalism. 5 instrumentalist failure to gain theoretical progress. In sum, it does not matter whether instrumentalists are committed to the position that successful theories are empirically adequate or to the position that they are approximately empirically adequate. It is difficult to determine who would be more motivated to welcome or unwelcome scientific revolutions. 3. Debate between Mach and Planck This section applies the preceding cost-benefit analyses to the debate between Mach and Planck over whether realism or instrumentalism was better for scientific progress. Mach maintained that instrumentalism is more beneficial to scientific progress; Planck maintained that realism is more beneficial to scientific progress. The cost-benefit analyses indicate, however, that their arguments are all flawed, as will become clear in this section. Mach accused realism of hindering the advent of new theories. He observed that realists are dogmatic about old theories and hesitant to entertain new theories. He says that whoever "knows only one view or one form of a view does not believe that another has ever stood in its place, or that another will ever succeed it; he neither doubts nor tests" (Mach, 1911: 17). In short, realism has the disadvantage of impeding scientific revolutions by making scientists believe that old theories are true. In my view, however, we should expose the advantage, as well as the disadvantage, of realism. The advantage of realism is that as a result of scientific revolutions, scientists are closer to truths than before. In addition, we should compare the advantage and the disadvantage of realism with those of instrumentalism before we make the final choice between realism and instrumentalism. Instrumentalism has an advantage, viz., as a result of scientific revolutions, scientists are closer to empirical adequacy than before. But it has a disadvantage, viz., as a result of scientific revolutions, scientists lose their old belief that old theories are empirically adequate. Again, realism makes scientists lose a lot but gain a lot, whereas instrumentalism makes scientists lose a little but gain a little. Given this cost-benefit analysis of realism and instrumentalism, it is not clear which is better in terms of making scientists open-minded. Mach might reply that instrumentalists believe that successful theories are not empirically adequate but approximately empirically adequate. So they do not lose their belief that old theories are approximately empirically adequate. Realists would reply, however, that they believe that successful theories are not true but approximately true. So they do not lose their belief either that old theories are approximately true. Hence, retreating to approximate empirical adequacy does not make instrumentalism more congenial than realism to the advent of new theories. Planck accused instrumentalism of making scientists complacent, saying that "the physicist, if he wants to promote science, has to be a realist, not an economizer" (Planck, 1910/1992, 146). His idea is that instrumentalists do not care whether theories are true or false. They only care whether theories make true predictions or not. So they are content insofar as theories make true predictions, and they do not bother to replace old theories with new theories with the view to better representing unobservables. Only realists make such efforts. Planck's criticism against instrumentalism is unfair for the following reason. The history of science tells us that theories have been getting closer and closer to empirical adequacy through scientific revolutions. New theories have broader predictive scopes than old theories. As a result, instrumentalists would not settle for old theories, even if they are useful to a certain extent. They would be in search of more useful theories, which make more true predictions than old theories. In short, empirical progress motivates instrumentalists to 6 replace old theories with new ones. In sum, Mach overlooked what realists gain from scientific revolutions, viz., theoretical progress, while Planck overlooked what instrumentalists gain from scientific revolutions, viz., empirical progress. Neither of them compared both the advantage and the disadvantage of his own position with those of his opponent's position. If they had conducted thorough cost-benefit analyses of both realism and instrumentalism, they would not have attacked each other's positions as they did. 4. Explanation and Prediction The cost-benefit analyses of realism and antirealism show that it is not clear which position is more beneficial to scientific progress. The debate between Mach and Planck does not decide this issue. This section aims to tip the scale in favor of realism by invoking the advantages of realism over antirealism concerning explanation and prediction. Realists believe, but antirealists do not, for example, that the standard model of particle physics is (approximately) true. According to the standard model, macro objects like stones and trees are composed of atoms. An atom is made up of protons, neutrons, and electrons. Protons and neutrons can be further broken down into quarks. All these particles have mass. But why do they have mass? The standard model says that they have mass because they interact with the Higgs field. If the Higgs field were turned off, they would become massless and move at the speed of light. Thus, the Higgs field is what makes them have mass, slow down, and form atoms. Imagine that antirealists say, "A stone has mass because it interacts with the Higgs field, but I don't believe a stone interacts with the Higgs field." They say, "A stone has mass because it interacts with the Higgs field" to explain why a stone has mass. They add, "I don't believe a stone interacts with the Higgs field" to express their antirealist commitment that unobservables, including the Higgs field, are not worthy of our belief. Their sentence, however, sounds odd. Why does it sound odd? It involves Moore's paradox. Moore's paradox occurs when we say any sentence that takes the form, "P, but I don't believe p" or "P, but I believe not p" (Moore, 1993: 207–212). Moore's paradox stems from the gap between what we speak and what we believe (Park, 2014b). Antirealists say, "A stone has mass because it interacts with the Higgs field," when they do not believe that a stone has mass because it interacts with the Higgs field. Their speech act does not match up with their doxastic state. So they are caught in Moore's paradox. By contrast, realists' speech act matches up with their doxastic state. They say, "A stone has mass because it interacts with the Higgs field" in accordance with their belief that a stone has mass because it interacts with the Higgs field. So they are free from Moore's paradox (Park, 2016c: 77–78). Suppose that antirealists say, "A stone has mass because it interacts with the Higgs field," but they do not declare to their audience that they do not believe that a stone has mass because it interacts with the Higgs field. In such a case, their audience may ask them disconcerting questions: "Do you believe what you just said? If you don't, why should I believe what you don't? How can you say to me what you don't believe? Do you expect me to believe what you don't?" Antirealists owe us answers to these questions. Antirealists run into Moore's paradox or the disconcerting questions not only when they explain observables but also when they explain unobservables. Consider the explanation that a proton has mass because it interacts with the Higgs field. The explanandum – a proton has mass – is not observable. Antirealists cannot explain such an explanandum due to Moore's paradox and the disconcerting questions. Set aside these problems. Antirealists would not bother to explain why an unobservable 7 fact is as a scientific theory says it is, for their beliefs are restricted to observables. They would think that it is a waste of time to ask and explain why a proton has mass, just as you would think that it is a waste of time to ask and explain why a unicorn has one horn as opposed to two horns, if you believe that a unicorn does not exist. In general, we do not take an explanation seriously, if we do not believe that its explanandum exists. Let me turn to the issue of prediction. Moore's paradox does not arise when antirealists predict an observable fact, but it arises when they predict an unobservable fact. The standard model predicts that if the Higgs field were turned off, a stone and a proton would become massless and their constituent particles would travel at the speed of light. Antirealists can say, "If the Higgs field were turned off, a stone would become massless." Such a prediction does not require that antirealists believe that the standard model is true. But how about the prediction that if the Higgs field were turned off, a proton would become massless? This prediction is not a prediction of an observable fact but a prediction of an unobservable fact. Antirealists cannot give such a prediction, for they would be caught in Moore's paradox. They would have to say, "If the Higgs field were turned off, a proton would become massless, but I don't believe if the Higgs field were turned off, a proton would become massless." In response, antirealists might appeal to van Fraassen's (1980) distinction between belief and acceptance. According to him, antirealists do not believe T, but they accept T. They do not believe, for example, that if the Higgs field were turned off, a proton would become massless, but they accept that if the Higgs field were turned off, a proton would become massless. So it is legitimate for antirealists to say, "If the Higgs field were turned off, a proton would become massless." In short, antirealists can talk as if they are realists because they accept T. It appears therefore that van Fraassen's notion of acceptance enables antirealists to predict an unobservable fact by invoking another unobservable fact. It is not clear, however, whether van Fraassen's distinction between belief and acceptance is tenable or not. Van Fraassen claims that there is a mental difference between realists who believe T and antirealists who accept T. The mental difference is that realists believe that T is true, while antirealists believe that it is empirically adequate. There is, however, no verbal difference between them, i.e., antirealists talk exactly as realists do, as we noted above. However, the absence of the verbal difference between them gives rise to the suspicion that there is no mental difference between them either, i.e., antirealists believe T, as realists do. In other words, if antirealists say everything that realists say and vice versa, we have no reason for thinking that the putative mental difference between them exists. Thus, antirealists have the burden to flesh out a non-mental difference between realists and antirealists that stems from the alleged mental difference between them. In other words, they need to make it explicit what it is that realists can do but antirealists cannot due to the fact that realists believe T while antirealists accept T. Even if antirealists successfully cash out a non-mental difference between realists and antirealists, they cannot still escape from Moore's paradox. Imagine that antirealists accept the standard model and then say, "(1) If the Higgs field were turned off, a proton would become massless, (2) but I don't believe if the Higgs field were turned off, a proton would become massless, (3) but I accept if the Higgs field were turned off, a proton would become massless." Antirealists say (1) to make the prediction and (2) to express antirealism. Note that they are caught in Moore's paradox. Therefore, it does not matter whether van Fraassen's notion of acceptance is coherent or not. Antirealists are not free from Moore's paradox. 5 5 See Park (2015: 227, 2017: 60) for other critical responses to antirealists who appeal to van Fraassen's distinction between belief and acceptance in order to avoid Moore's paradox and the disconcerting questions. 8 Explanatory power and predictive power are virtues of scientific theories that scientists use to choose a theory over its competitors. Other things being equal, scientists choose T1 over T2, if T1 has higher explanatory power or predictive power than T2. The discussion above shows, however, that Moore's paradox or the disconcerting questions prevent antirealists from using scientific theories to explain observables and unobservables, and to predict unobservables. So if scientists embrace realism over antirealism, they can fully use explanations and predictions as means to make scientific progress. By contrast, if they embrace antirealism, they cannot. Antirealists might object that I have appealed to explanatory power and predictive power to support realism, thereby begging the question against them. One of the key disagreements between realists and antirealists is whether explanations and predictions can provide warrant for a theory. Realists say yes; antirealists say no. I cannot resolve the dispute between them by appealing to the realist position. The preceding objection, however, commits the straw man fallacy. Nowhere does this paper assume that explanations and predictions provide warrant for a theory. This paper only assumes that when T1 explains or predicts more phenomena than T2, we are justified in believing that T1 is closer to the truth than T2, while remaining neutral as to whether we are justified in believing that T1 is (approximately) true. Recall that I stated in Section 1 that this paper operates under the assumption that new theories are closer to truths than old theories. This modest assumption is very different from the ambitious assumption that new theories are (approximately) true, as Wray (2008: 323) and Mizrahi (2013: 401) observe. To use the analogy in Section 2.2, you can be closer to Berlin than I am, even if you are far from Berlin. So it is one thing to say that new theories are (approximately) true; it is quite another to say that new theories are closer to truths than old theories. Even if we grant for the sake of argument that antirealists have demolished the former thesis in the literature, it does not follow that they have thereby demolished the latter thesis. It is much harder to refute the latter thesis than the former thesis. 5. Conclusion If realists were more motivated to welcome scientific revolutions than antirealists, realism would be the better means to achieve scientific progress than antirealism, and scientists would have to be realists. By contrast, if antirealists were more motivated to welcome scientific revolutions than realists, antirealism would be the better means to achieve scientific progress than realism, and scientists would have to be antirealists. The cost-benefit analyses of realism and antirealism show, however, that realists lose a lot but gain a lot, while antirealists lose a little but gain a little, as a result of scientific revolutions. Hence, it is hard to tell who would be more motivated to welcome scientific revolutions, and the cost-benefit analyses do not yield guidance as to whether scientists should be realists or antirealists. The examination of the doxastic requirement of scientific explanation and prediction shows, however, that realists can use a scientific theory to explain and predict both observables and unobservables. By contrast, antirealists cannot use a scientific theory to explain something, whether that thing is observable or unobservable. Nor can they use a scientific theory to predict unobservables. They can only use it to predict observables. For this reason, realism is a better means than antirealism for scientists to make scientific progress. In sum, I believe more. Therefore, I progress more. References 9 Alai, Mario (2017). "The Debates on Scientific Realism Today: Knowledge and Objectivity in Science", In Varieties of Scientific Realism: Objectivity and Truth in Science. Evandro Agazzi (ed.), Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 19–47. Kitcher, Philip (1993). The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without Illusion. New York: Oxford University Press. Laudan, Larry (1977). Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth. California: University of California Press. Mach, Ernst (1911). History and Root of the Principle of the Conservation of Energy (Jourdain P. E. B., Trans.). Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company. Mizrahi, Moti (2013). "The Argument from Underconsideration and Relative Realism", International Studies in the Philosophy of Science. 27 (4): 393–407. Moore, George (1993). "Moore's Paradox", In G.E. Moore: Selected Writings. Baldwin, Thomas (ed.), London: Routledge. Park, Seungbae (2009). "Philosophical Responses to Underdetermination in Science", Journal for General Philosophy of Science 40 (1): 115–124. ---------- (2014a). "On the Evolutionary Defense of Scientific Antirealism", Axiomathes 24 (2): 263–273. ---------- (2014b). "On the Relationship between Speech Acts and Psychological States", Pragmatics and Cognition 22 (3): 340–351. --------- (2015). "Accepting Our Best Scientific Theories", Filosofija. Sociologija 26 (3): 218–227. ---------- (2016a). "Why Should We Be Pessimistic about Antirealists and Pessimists?" Foundations of Science. doi:10.1007/s10699-016-9490-y. ---------- (2016b). "Extensional Scientific Realism vs. Intensional Scientific Realism," Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 59: 46–52. ---------- (2016c). "Scientific Realism and Antirealism in Science Education", Coactivity: Philosophy. Communication. 24 (1): 72–81. ---------- (2017). "Defense of Epistemic Reciprocalism", Filosofija. Sociologija 28 (1): 56– 64. Planck, Max (1910/1992). "On Mach's Theory of Physical Knowledge – A Reply", In Ernst Mach – A Deeper Look: Documents and New Perspectives. John Blackmore (ed.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Poincaré, Henri (1905/1952). Science and Hypothesis. New York: Dover. 10 Psillos, Stathis (1999). Scientific Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. New York: Routledge. Putnam, Hilary (1978). Meaning and the Moral Sciences. London: Routledge & K. Paul. Saatsi, Juha (2015). "Historical Inductions, Old and New", Synthese. doi:10.1007/s11229015-0855-5 Stanford, P. Kyle (2006). Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bas van Fraassen (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ---------- (1985). "Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science" In Images of Science. P. Churchland and C. Hooker (eds.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Wray, K. Brad (2007). "A Selectionist Explanation for the Success and Failures of Science", Erkenntnis 67 (1): 81–89. ---------- (2008). "The Argument from Underconsideration as Grounds for Anti-Realism: A Defence", International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (3): 317–326. ---------- (2012). "Epistemic Privilege and the Success of Science", Noûs 46 (3): 375–385. ---------- (2013). "Pessimistic Induction and the Exponential Growth of Science Reassessed", Synthese 190 (18): 4321–4330.

International Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 51, No. 3, Issue 203 (September 2011) Craig on God and Morality Thomas W. Smythe and Michael Rectenwald ABSTRACT: In this paper we critically evaluate an argument put forward by William Lane Craig for the existence of God based on the assumption that if there were no God, there could be no objective morality. Contrary to Craig, we show that there are some necessary moral truths and objective moral reasoning that holds up whether there is a God or not. We go on to argue that religious faith, when taken alone and without reason or evidence, actually risks undermining morality and is an unreliable source of moral truths. We recommend a viewpoint on morality that is based on reason and public consensus, that is compatible with science, and that cuts across the range of religious and non-religious positions. THERE IS AN HISTORICAL DEBATE in philosophy that begins with Plato's Euthyphro on the relation between the omniscient authority of God and morality. We do not intend to rehash the vast literature on this topic.1 Instead we will concentrate on the arguments given by William Lane Craig, a well-known philosopher of religion whose influence on Christians is considerable. Craig has given a moral argument for the existence of God.2 If he is correct, then non-believers and non-theistic moral theories are inadequate. We regard Craig's view as invalid and in need of correction. We contend that the argument Craig gives is unsound. Let us first state the argument as Craig gives it: 1. If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist. 2. Objective moral values do exist. 3. Therefore, God exists. (p. 19) The argument is deductively valid because if (1) and (2) are true, then (3) must be true. However, the argument is unsound because, as we will show, (1) is clearly false. 1Some of the more salient work in this area includes Peter Byrne, The Moral Interpretation of Religion (Edinburgh UK: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 1998), and his "Moral Arguments for the Existence of God," in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; Kai Nielsen, Ethics Without God (London UK: Pemberton Books, 1973), one of the first recent attempts to divorce morality from religion; P. H. Nowell-Smith, "Morality: Religious and Secular," in Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. John Edwards (New York NY: Macmillan, 1967); Plato, The Euthyphro, in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (New York NY: Pantheon Books, 1961), pp. 169–85; and Philip Quinn, Divine Commands and Moral Requirements (Oxford UK: Clarendon Press, 1978) are among the vast literature. 2William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, God? A Debate between A Christian and an Atheist (New York NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), pp. 17–21, 67–69. In the introduction the debaters say that this is a popular debate and not professional philosophy, which would be more detailed and careful (pp. x–xi). However, Craig does not appear to have discussed this issue more professionally elsewhere, and since he influences the beliefs of a goodly number of people, we think it is worth pursuing the difficulties with his views. Hereafter, the page numbers in parentheses in the main text will be to this volume. 332 THOMAS W. SMYTHE AND MICHAEL RECTENWALD We will prove this by showing that (a) Craig has given no good reason for supposing that (1) is true, and that (b) there is excellent reason for supposing that (1) is false. We hold that there are objective moral values, in Craig's sense of that phrase, even if there is no God. We will then argue that it is desirable for pragmatic reasons to take the justification of morality out of the hands of religion entirely. First, we argue that (a) the author gives no good reason for believing that (1) is true. Let us look at the reasons that the author gives us for (1). The author must show that objective moral values are impossible without God. What is an objective moral value? Craig says that objective moral values are "values that are valid and binding whether anyone believes them or not" (p. 17). An example that the author gives is that the Holocaust was objectively wrong regardless of whether or not the Nazis, or anyone else, believed it was wrong. The author quotes non-theistic philosophers Bertrand Russell, Michael Ruse, and Friedrich Nietzsche, who all denied that there are any objective moral values. It should be mentioned here that there are plenty of non-theistic philosophers who have defended objective moral values.3 In addition, simply finding a few non-theists who disclaim objective moral values is not a good reason to think that they do not exist if there is no God. We raise some questions about Craig's conception of objective moral values. First, is a proposition binding independently of what anyone thinks sufficient for objectivity? We take Craig to be saying that it is sufficient. Secondly, if being valid and binding independently of what anyone thinks is necessary for objectivity in morality, then we believe this condition can be met by a non-theistic moral theory. But let us look at the arguments of the author. The author says that in the absence of God there is no reason to think that, if we evolved through a process of evolution only, that there could be objective values.4 The author says if one person were to rape another and if the rapist were an atheist, there would be nothing wrong with it. In short, if God does not exist, there is really nothing wrong with raping someone (18). We think that the author commits a form of the genetic fallacy here. His reasoning seems to be something like this: 1. Without God the morality of human beings simply evolved by natural processes. 2. Any moral code that evolves by natural processes cannot be objective. 3. Therefore, a non-theistic morality cannot be objective. Again, the argument is deductively valid but nevertheless unsound. It is unsound because premise (2) is false. Premise (2) is false because it assumes that if morality is something that is only conceived by human beings, then since human beings conceive it, it cannot be true independently of our beliefs. But a human origin for morality does not negate its truth as something independent of the beliefs of any 3Russ Shafer-Landau, Michael Smith, James Rachels, and others have argued for the objectivity of morality without theism. One example is James Rachels and Stuart Rachels, chap. 11, "Ethics and Objectivity," in Problems From Philosophy, 2nd ed. (New York NY: McGraw-Hill, 2005). 4We want to point out that these two alternatives are not exhaustive. Human beings could have been put here by a giant gorilla, a nonbenevolent deity, two or more Gods, or an endless list of other possibilities. CRAIG ON GOD AND MORALITY 333 person or group. We think that we can allude to universal moral truths that are true independently of what people think and that are true universally by virtue of the meaning of the terms involved: they are logically necessary moral truths. The explicit recognition of these truths evolved as mankind did, yet they are universally necessary moral truths that are being expressed in the ways in which our language is actually used. One example of a universal moral truth that is logically necessary and true independently of anyone's belief is the statement "murder is morally wrong." The term "murder" means "to kill unlawfully and with malice" or "the unlawful and malicious killing of a human being by another." It is universally and necessarily true that "murder is wrongful killing," whether anyone believes it or not and whether or not there is a God.5 The author has a further argument. Suppose "moral values do exist independently of God. . . . How does that result in a moral obligation for me? . . . Who or what lays such an obligation on me?" (p. 19). Our question here is why do moral values have to be given by someone, or laid on us, to have a foundation? Why cannot moral agents, or humans, give themselves moral obligations by virtue of the relations in which they stand to each other, and by virtue of the common moral language they use? Such moral obligations, once conceived, would be binding on all moral agents whether they believe so or not. The author argues that without God there would be no foundation or ground for morality (p. 20). Even if objective moral values existed, according to the author, there would be no grounds for our moral obligations. Our reply is that utilitarian ethics, Kantian ethics, ethics of virtue theories, and social contract theories of ethics have all provided grounds and foundations for morality that meet the conception of objective moral values that the author has specified. On any one of these moral theories reasons can be given to ground our moral theories. We do not need a deity to do the job.6 We now argue (b) that there are excellent reasons for supposing that (1) is false. Consider our moral language. Our moral language is enough to provide for an objective morality that is true independently of anyone's thinking so. Consider the following moral argument: 1. Lying tends to harm other people. 2. Harming other people is presumptively morally wrong. 3. Therefore, lying, when it results in harming other people, is presumptively morally wrong. This is a sound and valid deductive moral argument. The argument is sound independently of whether anyone believes it or not. If someone were to accept (1) and 5We do not think we have to show how these moral truths deriving from humans and encoded in human language became logically and objectively true. That would take a book. Craig does not have to show how humans developed a belief in God as the author of moral truths either. 6We believe we can make this point that possible nontheistic grounds can and have been given by ethical theorists without going into the details or trying to establish those theories. We assume the knowledgeable reader can fill in the details. 334 THOMAS W. SMYTHE AND MICHAEL RECTENWALD (2) but deny (3), one would simply be mistaken. Premises (1) and (2) logically imply (3) whether any moral agent makes an inference from premises (1) and (2) to the conclusion (3) or not. It is just as if one were to fail to make the inference from 3x = 3 to x = 1. Both would be logical errors. This consideration completely satisfies the author's conception that objective moral values are valid and binding whether anyone believes them or not. We need no appeal to abstractions or moral entities or divine commands. The objectivity of moral values lies in moral reasoning and moral logic. Does Craig think that God has moral authority because he knows moral truths? If so, why can't we know them as well? God may be better placed epistemically by being omniscient. That will still not show that moral truths do not exist independently of God. Craig may mean that God is the originator of moral requirements by divine fiat. This may be true, but it is not necessarily the case and the absence of divine fiat does not abrogate the possibility of an objective morality.7 Craig makes no good reply to the famous Euthyphro dilemma of Plato's. Is abusing children immoral because God forbids it, or does God prohibit us from abusing children because it is wrong? The author says nothing to show that abusing a child is not objectively wrong if God does not exist. His command-like His existence-is not necessary to make child abuse immoral. It is necessarily true that child abuse is immoral whether there is a God or not. The author does not show "how" God underwrites morality in any meaningful way. According to William Hasker (in correspondence), we have still not given a compelling reason for thinking that justice and other moral values could be objective if there were no God.8 Craig could very well say that "(2) Harming other people is presumptively morally wrong" is true only because there is a God, and would not be true otherwise. So, according to Hasker, we have not refuted Craig's position. We agree that we have not refuted Craig or shown that he is wrong to hold his position. Indeed, objective morality may exist due to divine fiat. However, we have shown that it is possible to hold an alternative position. Craig is claiming that objective morality is impossible without God, but by showing that it is possible to hold another position, we have shown that no one is compelled to hold Craig's position. We think we have a plausible alternative view to the author because he has not shown just exactly how God underwrites an objective morality, or why no alternative position can be true. The author may say that he is arguing that only an omniscient being who can take a view sub species aeternitatis can be morally objective, since there would be a correct answer to every moral question from such a point of view. However, the author never makes this clear. One problem with this view is that it does not help us to solve moral dilemmas. If that is the case, then there is no source of knowledge for human beings on certain moral quandaries such as the rights of workers, the effects of capitalism, stem-cell research, and cloning human beings. If the sole goal of moral agents is to find out what God wants us to do, there is no reliable 7We are indebted to Doug Long for the ideas in this paragraph. Long points out that even though God can punish us, that may or may not have anything to do with moral truths. 8William Hasker has kindly read our paper and made some comments on it. CRAIG ON GOD AND MORALITY 335 answer to that question. Consider the methods for finding out what God wills us to do. Religious faith is one such resource. But religious faith causes some people to behave abominably and to commit crimes against humanity in the name of God. Sacred texts, like the bible, provide another way. But nothing is true just because it is in the bible or in other sacred texts. When someone is telling other people how to live their lives, or what they ought to do, one needs reasons for acting on what any sacred text commands or forbids. If one can give no reasons, then there is not yet a good reason why anyone should or should not do it. This is especially true because there are diverse religions with diverse sacred texts that are not all compatible. We do not find the method of revelation to be a reliable indicator of what is right and wrong for human beings to do. We firmly believe that revelation never has been and never will be a reliable guide to understanding the reasons why something is morally right or wrong. Some people are not graced with such revelations, and thus revelation misses some of the very people who need instruction the most. Revelation may be a ground for a personal relationship with a deity, but it is not a reliable basis for telling other people how they ought to live their lives vis-à-vis other methods like evidence and reason. There is a more perspicuous way that we can bring out our argument. Consider child abuse. We think that it is a necessary truth that "it is wrong to abuse someone." It is objectively wrong in the same way that a truth of arithmetic is true, whether anyone believes it or not, independently of what anyone thinks. If someone thinks that "it is wrong to abuse someone" is not true by virtue of the meaning of the terms in the statement, then we would ask him to describe a logically possible situation in which it would be all right to abuse someone. We submit that it cannot be done. To abuse means "to use wrongly, to misuse; to mistreat." The statement "it is wrong to abuse someone" is necessarily true independently of anyone's belief whether there is a God or not. On the other hand, if somehow God willed that we should abuse a child, then God would be wrong. Even if there were no God, then it would still be objectively and necessarily true that it is wrong to abuse someone. Craig admits this point himself when he argues that objective moral values exist. He says: "We know objective moral values exist because we clearly apprehend some of them. The best way to show this is to describe situations in which we clearly see right and wrong: torturing an child, incest, rape . . ." (p. 21). We agree, and we see these truths to be the case independently of what anyone may think (thus they are objectively true) and whether or not there is a God. So, we may conclude that these truths exist independently of God's will and do nothing to show that God exists. Further, it is just not true that if there were no God, then ethical judgments would be a matter of "expressions of personal taste" (p. 20). There are objective ethical truths for both the believer and non-believer alike. The author's argument can be interpreted in another way. Premise (1) says that if God exists, there are objective moral values. That is true. If God exists, and he wills that stealing is wrong, then it is an objective truth that stealing is wrong because God says so, whether anyone believes it or not. The argument then goes on that since objective moral values exist, there is a God. However, that does not follow. Since there are other ways of accounting for the existence of objective moral values, their 336 THOMAS W. SMYTHE AND MICHAEL RECTENWALD existence does not entail the existence of a deity. The argument is invalid. It has the form if p, then q; q, therefore p. This pattern is clearly an example of affirming the consequent, which is a deductively invalid argument form. Nor is it a good inductive argument or an argument from the best explanation. We thus conclude that the values that the author cites are necessarily good or bad independently of anyone's thinking so, and good or bad whether or not there is a God. Craig has not shown premise (1), namely, that if there is no God, objective moral values do not exist, to be true. There are excellent reasons to think that it is not true. Hence, his moral argument for the existence of God is unsound or invalid. We now argue that for pragmatic reasons we should reject moral arguments from the existence of God as well as the position that morality is somehow dependent on religion, because to do so actually undermines morality. We begin by noting what William K. Frankena said in a paper on the logical relation between morality and religion: "one cannot help but wonder if there is any rational and objective method of establishing any religious belief against proponents of other religions or irreligion." He warned us against introducing "into the foundations of morality . . . all of the difficulties involved in the adjudication of religious controversies." Such a view "encourages ethical and political skepticism in those who cannot accept the required religious beliefs." He adds that "if one is honestly to hold that morality can be established if and only if it is grounded in religion, then one must also believe that religion has adequate grounds to stand on."9 We maintain that morality does not have to be grounded on religion, and, further that an effort at a religious grounding undermines morality. Frankena was much too kind and subtle. Religious faith is compatible with a lack of evidence and a lack of reason. So, if morality depends in the strong sense on religion, the foundation of morality will have to be religious faith. But blind faith of any sort (including religious) has not proven to be conducive to producing truth. If I have blind faith that someone who has gone off to fight in the war in Iraq will return unscathed, that is not a reliable indicator of the truth of such a belief. We think it is better to base morality on scientific knowledge and human reasoning as much as possible. To take an example from the contemporary scene, President George W. Bush, the leader of the free world in 2008, believes that frozen embryos are fully human beings and ought not to be used for stem cell research. His belief is based on the view that the embryo embodies a human genome at the time of fertilization, and this seems to be a scientifically established fact. But scientific knowledge shows that the human embryos that are destroyed for stem cell research do not have brains, or even neurons. There is no reason to believe that they suffer their destruction in any way at all. Even though they contain human genomes, it does not follow that they are fully-fledged human beings. Killing a fly may cause more suffering than killing a human blastocyst. As a result, we may be unnecessarily prolonging the misery of millions of human beings who could probably be helped by the development of stem cell research. We find this morally suspect. 9William K. Frankena, "Is Morality Logically Dependent on Religion?" in Divine Commandsand Morality, ed. Paul Helm (Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 30. CRAIG ON GOD AND MORALITY 337 Another example is that of a pope who apparently advocates that people in poor countries should not have abortions or use other methods of contraception. Instead he seems to recommend that they use one of the methods of natural family planning, but we believe that such methods may prove less effective than contraception, thereby allowing them to have numerous children, even though they are suffering from lack of food and housing, and contributing to population explosion. Again, we find this sort of position advocated by a world leader morally suspect. Another way that religious faith may undermine morality has to do with moral knowledge. How do we know what God requires of us? This is usually done by appealing to some sacred text such as the bible. Although we do not have the space here to go into the matter sufficiently, the bible was probably written by human beings, and nothing is true necessarily just because it is uttered in the bible. Instead, its propositions require independent moral reasoning if it is to be established as acceptable morality. It is quite controversial whether the entire bible is to be regarded as the inerrant word of God, and we will not enter into that thicket here. We point out that the bible documents such things as slavery, killing homosexuals and adulterers, killing prostitutes, killing children who curse their parents, burning witches, and dozens of other questionable precepts. Although the bible does not approve of everything it mentions, we think that there are morally suspect directives implied or explicitly mentioned therein, and we think it sufficient to point out that if morality can be established without such controversial foundations, it is worth doing so. We think it is relevant to point out here that classical utilitarians such as David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, and John S. Mill formulated the principle of utility without any mention of God's will. These theories are compatible with theism, but the non-believer can just as well adopt these theories too. Kantian deontological ethics is based on what is rational to do, and, although it is compatible with theism, it can be held without any dependence on a deity. The social contract theory of ethics does not depend on a deity for the social contract to be objective, once consent is given. The ethics of virtue, as formulated by Plato and Aristotle, does not depend on a deity. There is a certain kind of person that we ought to be for humans to thrive, independent of any deity. This remains true for more recent ethics of virtue theories.10 Religious ethics may also undermine morality by its tendency to be authoritarian. Religious authorities such as priests or preachers may be presumed to have been authorized to tell others what God wants them to do or to avoid. But we find the whole idea of such authorities problematic insofar as they obstruct our access to moral truths, and we find this to be a further way in which religion risks undermining morality. We do not think appeals to such moral authorities are preferable. As we have suggested, in some cases they may implicitly or explicitly maintain morally suspect positions. Instead, morality ought to be like science, in which a community of scholars searches for truth using reliable epistemic norms. We feel that morality should change as the facts, situations, and findings of science change. Such a view 10We take it that the typical reader of this paper knows these ethical theories well enough so that we do not have to go into the details to show that each of them is compatible with nontheism. 338 THOMAS W. SMYTHE AND MICHAEL RECTENWALD is incompatible with most religious means for gaining knowledge about reality and morality, such as revelation and scriptural authority. When reasonable persons morally disagree, we do not want to accept without further qualification that one of them speaks for God, or that the other is attacking God, being blasphemous, or committing a heresy. Moral disagreement should be reasonable and open to public debate, with participants arriving at consensus based on reasonable considerations, without reversion to religious authority that may stifle such debate and consensus. We conclude that an objective morality is possible without God. We find this liberating, uplifting, and beneficial to everyone concerned. We can direct our own lives by basing morality on evidence and reason rather than satisfying divine directives. If we see no compelling reason to do otherwise, we are happy non-diviners. In addition, we find it necessary for pragmatic reasons not to ground morality on religion since religious based morality may prove in some cases to be inimical to human welfare. Religious faith may inhibit the development of competent moral agents. We agree with those philosophers who advocate having a common morality for all of mankind based on evidence, reason, and justified belief independently of any particular religion.11 We need a philosophically justified common morality that cuts across religious differences and irreligion. 11Nothing we have said rules out adopting religious faith as a source of comfort, meaning, and purpose in life for believers. We are only against using such faith as a basis for telling everyone else how they ought to live their lives without appeal to evidence, reason, and justified belief. We do realize that many theists are reasonable moral agents. We just do not think it is because they are theists. We are concerned with the ones who are not morally reasonable because they are theists. We think the philosophy of William Lane Craig promotes intolerance towards other people because they are not theists.

Journal of Symbolic Logic. 52 (1987) 886-7. Updated 24 December 2014 John Corcoran, Three rules of distribution: one counterexample. Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150 E-mail: [email protected] Let FX be a proposition having an indicated occurrence of the term X. Let FY be the result of replacing the indicated occurrence of X by Y. The indicated occurrence of X is distributed in FX if and only if FY is implied by FX and every Y is an X-otherwise undistributed. This applies to the four categorical propositions as follows. The subject is distributed in every S is a P and no S is a P, and it is undistributed in some S is a P and some S is not a P. The predicate is distributed in no S is a P and some S is not a P, and it is undistributed in every S is a P and some S is P. Let A(SM), B(MP), and C(SP) be propositions each having one occurrence of each of its indicated terms where S, M, and P are distinct. It has been known since the 1600s that, when C(SP) follows from A(SM) and B(MP) and when all three propositions are categorical, (1) the middle M is distributed in a premise, (2) if S is distributed in the conclusion it is distributed in a premise, and (3) if P is distributed in the conclusion it is distributed in a premise. These three results continue to obtain if the Aristotelian presupposition of nonempty terms is dropped as in medieval or modern writers. Some logicians have alleged that these results obtain even when the propositions are not categorical. Indeed it has been alleged that these results are universal principles of logic. The following is a counterexample to all three: with at most two exceptions no S is a P follows from with one exception every S is an M and with one exception no M is a P. This vitiates many discussions of distribution, and it raises questions about the objectivity of historical and contemporary sources. In addition, it may serve to reintroduce the question of whether any general principles underlie the traditional doctrine or whether this doctrine is merely a rationalization of an unwarranted generalization from independently verified particular cases. NOTE ADDED 24 December 2014: My 1972 JSL paper proves that Aristotle's method of syllogistic deduction is sufficient to establish the validity of every valid categorical argument no matter how many premises. It also shows that Aristotle's method of counterarguments is sufficient to establish the invalidity of every invalid categorical argument no matter how many premises. There is no need for burdening the theory of categorical syllogistic with an anachronistic doctrine of distribution alien to the historical Prior Analytics. Do these three rules generalized to >2-premised categorical arguments? What claims are made about distribution in Eaton, Cohen-Nagel, PRL, Whately, De Morgan, etc.

Tactful animals: How the study of touch can inform the animal morality debate Susana Monsó & Birte Wrage1 PENULTIMATE VERSION: Accepted for publication in Philosophical Psychology Abstract: In this paper, we argue that scientists working on the animal morality debate have been operating with a narrow view of morality that prematurely limits the variety of moral practices that animals may be capable of. We show how this bias can be partially corrected by paying more attention to the touch behaviours of animals. We argue that a careful examination of the ways in which animals engage in and navigate touch interactions can shed new light on current debates on animal morality, like the study of consolation behaviour, while also revealing further forms that animal morality may take and that have been neglected so far, like capacities of tolerance or trust. This defence is structured as an analysis of the three main functions of touch: the discriminative function, the affiliative function, and the vigilance function. Keywords: nonhuman animals; animal morality; moral emotions; touch; affiliation; vulnerability Funding information: This research was funded by the FWF (project numbers P31466G32 and M2518-G32). Acknowledgements: This research was presented at a JACSON meeting at the University of Vienna. The authors would like to thank the attendants for their feedback. Additional thanks go to Kristin Andrews, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg, Antonio Osuna-Mascaró, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper. 1 Unit of Ethics and Human-Animal Studies, Messerli Research Institute, University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna. [email protected]; [email protected] Both authors contributed equally to this paper. 2 1. Introduction Imagine the following scenario. You're at home when suddenly your housemate enters, crying. Not knowing what the matter is, you immediately walk up to her and put your arm around her, trying your best to console her. As you take a glance through the open door you realise what happened: her car is in the driveway and your cat lies motionless on the ground beneath it. You freeze and then push your housemate away. Trying to apologise, she grabs your hands, but you shake her off, rush outside, kneel down beside the car, and carefully place a hand on your cat's body. To your dismay, he doesn't respond. After sitting with him for a while, you gently pick up his limp body and cradle him in your arms. This little tale illustrates the extent to which touch is naturally involved in our social interactions. In fact, humans can communicate a range of distinct emotions through touch alone (Hertenstein et al. 2009). Moreover, in human infancy, touch is a more important and earlier mode of social interaction than verbal communication (Hertenstein et al. 2006), and communicative touch has been postulated as the evolutionary precursor to language (Ibid.). Not for nothing, touch is called 'the first sense': it is the first sensory faculty to develop in the womb, and its neural receptor types are among the oldest in evolutionary history (Fulkerson 2014, xii). All of this makes it likely that touch also plays an important role in the social lives of non-linguistic animals. But, importantly, the interactions in the story we told are not only social, they have a moral hue, and indeed the characters use touch to express various moral emotions, such as sympathy, guilt, resentment, love, and grief. This gives rise to the question we want to address, namely, could the ways in which animals engage in and navigate touch interactions give us insight into their moral capacities? In this paper, we will outline how the animal morality debate can benefit from a closer look at the role of touch in the social interactions of animals. This has been prompted by the work of Maria Botero on primate2 social cognition, in which she suggests that scientists studying joint attention and theory of mind need to move away from a focus on vision, because touch as 'the first sense' might be an earlier facilitator of these capacities (Botero 2016, 2018a, 2018b). We think that the importance of these claims on the role of touch extends beyond the specific case of social cognition and the particular 2 Botero's argument applies to both human and nonhuman primates, but in referring to her work we shall focus on the case of nonhuman primates. Accordingly, we use the terms 'primate' and 'ape' to refer to nonhuman ones. 3 order of primates. Although the animal morality debate is not characterised by a bias towards vision, we will show that scientists have been operating with a different bias: a narrow view of morality that prematurely limits the variety of moral practices that animals could be capable of. This bias can be partially corrected by paying more attention to touch. Our aim is to argue that a careful examination of touch in animals can shed new light on current debates on animal morality, like the study of consolation behaviour, while also revealing further forms that animal morality could take and that have been neglected so far, like the capacities for tolerance or trust. We will begin this paper by giving a quick overview of the animal morality debate3 and showing how the issue of touch has received only scarce and implicit attention. We will then defend why this needs to be remedied. This defence will be structured as an analysis of the three main functions of touch and their relevance for animal morality. The first two functions (the discriminative and the affiliative function) are acknowledged by Botero and, as we will argue, the reasons why they are important for animal morality are closely connected to the reasons why Botero considers them to be important for primate social cognition. The third function we will consider is the vigilance function as described by Filip Mattens (2017), which is not mentioned by Botero. While touch in its vigilance role may not be so relevant for social cognition, we will argue that this is a crucial function to consider when discussing the role of touch in animal morality. Before we begin, we must make a short terminological clarification, since the term 'touch' is somewhat ambiguous. If we exclude all metaphorical and literary uses, we can distinguish two broad meanings. On the one hand, 'touch' can be used to refer to (1) two physical entities coming into contact, which can be either (a) the result of a purposeful action (e.g. "I touched her cheek") or (b) a non-voluntary event (e.g. "The two umbrellas were touching"). On the other hand, 'touch' can also refer (2) to the act of perceiving by means of the tactile sense (e.g. "She touched something slimy"), or to the tactile sense itself (e.g. "She can read by touch"). In this paper, we are mostly concerned with meaning (1a). However, since acts of purposefully coming into contact with a physical entity typically entail perception by means of the tactile sense, meaning (2) cannot be completely left aside. The only sense of the word 'touch' we are not concerned with is (1b), that is, nonvoluntary touch. This is because we are concerned with touch interactions that are, to a certain degree at least, under the animals' control, for they are the ones that can be indicative of their cognitive and emotional capacities. In addition to excluding all forms of 3 Throughout the paper, we will refer to many empirical studies to substantiate our claims. A lot of this research can be seen as ethically problematic, and we would like to note that our reference to any particular study does not imply an endorsement of its methodology. 4 touch that occur non-voluntarily, we will also leave aside forms of touch that occur through a medium. This is purely for simplicity reasons, since we do not in principle exclude that there may be moral capacities expressed through distal touch (e.g. using a stick to probe or feel) or hybrid forms thereof (e.g. tacto-acoustic signals in dolphins). 2. The neglect of touch in the animal morality debate As Fitzpatrick (2017) rightly points out, there are two distinct discussions contained in the animal morality debate. One discussion, exemplified by the theoretical work of authors such as Bekoff and Pierce (2009) and de Waal (e.g. 1996), but especially by the empirical studies done in labs and in the field, concerns the distribution in nature of certain psychological capacities that are generally understood to be indicators of (proto- )morality; capacities such as empathy, altruism, or inequity aversion. The other discussion, present in the work of philosophers such as Korsgaard (2006) and Rowlands (e.g. 2012), centres on whether these psychological capacities actually deserve the label 'moral.' The first debate is more of an empirical endeavour, the second one consists of conceptual analysis and clarification. In this paper, we are mostly concerned with the first of these debates, that is, with addressing the empirical study of the distribution in nature of moral capacities. Although we will offer some conceptual reasons for linking touch to morality, our main aim is to highlight how a close analysis of the touch interactions of animals could provide evidence of psychological capacities that are directly or indirectly involved in moral practices. Those readers who remain uneasy about the use of the term 'morality' to describe animal behaviour can reinterpret our arguments as a discussion of proto-morality in animals.4 If we understand the animal morality debate in the first way described above, we can distinguish three broad research foci: the altruism cluster, the fairness cluster, and the empathy cluster.5 The altruism cluster consists of studies that investigate animals' 4 Though we will often use the term 'animals' as a shorthand, our analysis throughout the paper mostly focuses on nonhuman social mammals. This is due to space constraints and to the present bias in the relevant behavioural and physiological literature. It should not be taken as an a priori exclusion of the possibility of moral practices in non-mammalian species. 5 This is an artificial classification and not all studies will fall neatly into one category or another. For instance, some of the evidence of animal empathy comes from anecdotal accounts of altruistic helping (e.g. Bates et al. 2008), and the animals in the altruism experiments may be motivated to help others by empathic mechanisms. In addition, it should be noted that in classifying the studies this way we take inspiration in the three clusters of animal moral behaviours that Bekoff and Pierce (2009) talk about. However, our distinction does not map on exactly to theirs. While we talk of the altruism cluster, the fairness cluster, and the empathy cluster, they talk of the cooperation cluster, the empathy cluster, and the justice cluster. The change is not fortuitous. We are not trying to reproduce Bekoff and Pierce's ideas, but rather capture the main research foci of contemporary 5 capacity to engage in altruistic helping, that is, helping behaviour that involves no direct gain or even a direct loss for the helper, where the relevant behaviour is motivated by concern for the other and not the result of pure self-interest. In addition to many observational reports of wild animals helping each other (e.g. Bates et al. 2008; Park et al. 2012), there are also several experimental studies in this cluster. The latter can be divided into two rough groups. The first one corresponds to what could be called the 'active helping' experimental paradigm, where animals are given the option of helping an individual who is distressed or otherwise in need.6 The second group of studies in the altruism cluster corresponds to what is known as the 'prosocial choice' experimental paradigm, where animals can choose to spontaneously benefit another individual who is not necessarily in need nor actively asking for help.7 The fairness cluster consists of studies that investigate whether animals possess a sense of fairness. In the field of comparative psychology, this is exemplified by the inequity aversion studies, where pairs of animals are rewarded unequally for performing the same task and their reactions observed to see if they track this inequality.8 Animals' sense of fairness has also been a research focus of observational studies, predominantly those concerned with social play. Social play in mammals often involves behavioural patterns that are similar to those used in predation or mating. To avoid misinterpretation during play, these animals often use play markers. Different species of canids, for instance, use the play bow as a signal (Bekoff 1977) and chimpanzees have been found to increase their play signaling when the mother of their play partner is in close proximity, presumably as a way of preventing her from intervening and ending the play bout (Flack et al. 2004). In empirical approaches to animal morality. Bekoff and Pierce have a very broad understanding of animal morality, and their three clusters encompass a wide range of behaviours, since they use them to illustrate the different forms that animal morality could take. Under cooperation they include "altruism, reciprocity, honesty, and trust;" under empathy, "sympathy, compassion, grief, and consolation;" under justice, "sharing, equity, fair play, and forgiveness" (Bekoff and Pierce 2009, xiv). While we think that their open-mindedness is commendable, it is an exception and not the rule in the animal morality debate. This broad understanding of morality does not correspond to how animal morality is being systematically studied. There are, for instance, barely any studies on honesty, trust, or forgiveness in animals. We are therefore using these three clusters in a narrower sense, as explained below. 6 Positive results in the 'active helping' sub-group have been obtained with rodents (e.g. Bartal et al. 2011; Ueno et al. 2019), pigeons (Watanabe and Ono 1986), and primates (e.g. Masserman et al. 1964; Warneken and Tomasello 2006). 7 Positive results using this paradigm have been obtained with chimpanzees (Horner et al. 2011), capuchin monkeys (Lakshminarayanan and Santos 2008), common marmosets (Burkart et al. 2007), cotton-top tamarins (Cronin et al. 2010), rats (e.g. Hernandez-Lallement et al. 2015) and parrots (Brucks and Bayern forthcoming). 8 Apparent 'inequity aversion' has been found in chimpanzees (e.g. Brosnan et al. 2010), capuchin monkeys (Brosnan and de Waal 2003) cotton-top tamarins (Cronin and Snowdon 2008), longtailed macaques (Massen et al. 2012), dogs (e.g. Range et al. 2009), rats (Oberliessen et al. 2016), crows, and ravens (Wascher and Bugnyar 2013). 6 order to play 'fairly', mammals also engage in self-handicapping, which occurs when an animal does not use her full strength when playing with another individual, and rolereversing, which takes place when an animal engages in a behaviour that does not correspond to her relative place in the hierarchy (Špinka et al. 2001). The last big research focus corresponds to the empathy cluster. This comprises studies on emotional contagion, the spontaneous 'catching' of another's emotion, which is widely viewed as a basic form of empathy. This ability is commonly tested in animals by providing them with visual or auditory access to emotional cues from another individual, and measuring whether there are any signs of emotional state-matching in the witnessing subject.9 The empathy cluster is also made up of experimental and observational studies that have documented consolation behaviour, which is a form of affiliative behaviour directed at individuals in distress and is thought to be triggered by empathic processes. Apparent consolation has been observed in a wide range of animals, including some avian species (see Table 1). As one can see from this quick overview, the topic of touch has received scarce attention in these debates. In the tests that are commonly used to study these moral capacities in animals, the experimental subjects, when there is more than one, are usually separated from each other, in order to facilitate testing and avoid any confounding factors. Thus, the test conditions tend to physically prevent animals from touching one another. Obviously, this is not the case in field studies, where the natural interactions of wild animals are observed. Although animals often touch each other when they engage in helping and play behaviours, this specific issue has not been the explicit focus of studies to date. An exception to this lack of attention to animal touch is provided by the consolation studies. Consolation behaviour in animals was first described by de Waal and van Roosmalen (1979). It is defined as "an increase in affiliative contact in response to and directed toward a distressed individual, such as a victim of aggression, by an uninvolved bystander, which produces a calming effect" (Burkett et al. 2016, 375, our emphasis). Thus, the idea of touch ('affiliative contact') is present in the very definition of this behaviour. However, even though the majority of criteria used to identify consolation involve the animals touching in one way or another (see Table 1), scientists do not explicitly reflect on this, to the extent that 'touch' is often listed as a separate behaviour 9 The available evidence suggests that emotional contagion is an ability possessed, at the very least, by chimpanzees (Parr 2001), greylag geese (Wascher et al. 2008), dogs (e.g. Huber et al. 2017), mice (e.g. Langford et al. 2006), rats (e.g. Atsak et al. 2011), prairie voles (Burkett et al. 2016), chickens (Edgar et al. 2011), pigs (e.g. Goumon and Špinka 2016), cockatiels (Liévin-Bazin et al. 2018), and kea (Schwing et al. 2017). 7 instead of as a common denominator. The general focus of the consolation studies has been on who is involved in the consolation interaction, what happened immediately before the consolation event, what happened afterward, and what are the motives of the consoler. Although consolation is largely thought to occur via touch, the implications of this are not explicitly reflected upon. Study Species Other-directed affiliative behaviours used as consolation indicators de Waal and van Roosmalen 1979 Chimpanzees Kissing, embracing, hold-out-hand, touching, submissive vocalisations Kutsukake and Castles 2004 Chimpanzees Allo-grooming, sitting in contact, gentle touching, kissing, embracing, wrapping an arm around another, passing touch, mounting, grasping testicles, playing, inspecting another's genitals Palagi et al. 2004 Bonobos Contact sitting, grooming, touching (gentle patting or stroking movements), sociosexual behaviours, play Cordoni et al. 2006 Gorillas Contact sitting, embracing, grooming, touching, touching in walk, playing Seed et al. 2007 Rooks Bill twining Fraser et al. 2008 Chimpanzees Kissing, embracing, grooming, finger-in-mouth touching, gentle touching, playing, submissive pant-grunt greeting Palagi and Cordoni 2009 Wolves Body contact, social licking, social play, inspecting, social sniffing Cozzi et al. 2010 Horses Mutual grooming, friendly contact, nasal sniff, body sniff, genital sniff, play, approach, follow Fraser and Bugnyar 2010 Ravens Contact sitting, preening, beak-to-beak touching, beak-to-body touching McFarland and Majolo 2012 Barbary macaques Grooming, body contact, mutual teeth chattering, successful <1.5m approaches Clay and de Waal 2013 Bonobos Embracing, socio-sexual contact (genito-genital contact, mounting, copulating, genital touch), touching, grooming, contact sitting, holding, patting, playing, inspecting Palagi and Norscia 2013 Bonobos Grooming, touching, contact-sitting, embracing, kissing, socio-sexual interactions, social play, food-sharing Baan et al. 2014 Wolves Body contact, nose touch, licking, playing, greeting, sniffing, inspecting Palagi et al. 2014 Japanese macaques, Tonkean macaques Grooming, contact sitting, touching, playful contacts, mounting, manipulating genitals, copulating, kissing, mouthing, cheek-to-cheek, face holding, face sniffing Plotnik and de Waal 2014 Asian elephants Body contact, vocalisations Burkett et al. 2016 Prairie voles Licking, grooming QuervelChaumette et al. 2016 Dogs Affiliative behaviours: rubbing one's own body alongside that of the partner, greeting (licking the lips of the partner, whilst tail wagging), play, sniffing any body part; time spent in proximity This lack of attention to touch comes at an explanatory cost, since the neurophysiology of affiliative touch can shed some light on why consolation is Table 1. Consolation studies and the criteria used to identify consolation behaviour. In italics: those criteria that necessarily entail touch; most of the other listed behaviours can involve touch too. 8 comforting.10 It has recently been discovered that nerve fibres found in hairy mammalian skin, which covers major parts of most mammalian bodies, seem to be specifically attuned to processing social touch, especially affiliative touch in the form of slow, gentle stroking (Löken et al. 2009; McGlone et al. 2014). These nerve fibres, called C-tactile afferents, apparently process slow, gentle touch as 'pleasant' and 'affiliative' the way other nerve fibres, for example, process noxious stimuli as 'painful' (Löken et al. 2009). Consolation behaviour in the form of slow, gentle touch is thus likely especially effective in having a calming effect. Of course, other factors like social context also influence how touch is ultimately experienced. However, CT afferents point to a significant 'social bias' of the mammalian nervous system. The importance of considering these socially-attuned nerve fibres is further underlined by the fact that they have been found in all species examined, i.e. primates, pigs, rats, mice, guinea pigs, rabbits, and cats, and it has been suggested that all mammals possess them (Morrison 2012; Pitcher et al. 2016). Despite its explanatory potential, the neurophysiology of affiliative touch is hardly considered in the consolation studies.11 We propose that greater attention to the identification of consolation behaviour with a certain kind of touch may inform research in this area. This overview of the animal morality debate not only shows that scientists have paid only scarce and implicit attention to the issue of touch, but also that they have operationalised morality in a rather narrow way. There are many other ways of being moral12 besides being empathic, altruistic, and averse to inequity. These include being grateful, caring, trusting, tolerant, and loyal, as well as being resentful, envious, jealous, disgusted, and cruel. This narrow conception of morality is not the sole fault of the scientists, but is surely influenced by moral philosophers, who have traditionally attempted to reduce morality to one or two key capacities. And naturally there are exceptions on both sides. Among the scientists, Bekoff (Bekoff and Pierce 2009) has defended a pluralistic account of morality. Among the philosophers, Pierce (Ibid.), Rowlands (2012), Monsó and Andrews (forthcoming), and Rutledge-Prior (2019) have also given accounts of animal morality that presuppose a pluralistic framework. We propose that this pluralistic approach is the way to go, since opting for a narrow operationalisation of morality could amount to a premature reduction that failed to do 10 Scientists clearly expect consolation to be comforting, because they often either define consolation as a behaviour that produces a calming effect or they look for evidence of a stress reduction in the consoled individual. However, to the best of our knowledge, none of the scientists working on consolation have explained why they expect the behaviours that they deem indicative of consolation to be comforting. 11 A single study on prairie voles (Burkett et al. 2016) mentions the role of oxytocin, a mammalian hormone associated with social touch (Uvnäs-Moberg et al. 2005) and attachment (Feldman 2011, 380), in consolation behaviour. 12 We are using the term 'moral' not in its normative but in its descriptive sense. 9 justice to the range of moral practices that animals are potentially capable of. Though some of these practices may be out of reach for animals, this should not be assumed without empirical investigation. We will argue that animals' touch interactions could reveal nuances in the practices thus far considered in the animal morality debate (such as consolation and social play), while at the same time providing evidence of some of these alternative ways of being moral. Our focus throughout the paper will be on potential cases of what we call 'moral practices,' which we define as those that involve the exercise of moral capacities. Since we do not want to circumscribe our claims to a particular account of moral capacities, the readers should understand this term in a broad sense, as capacities that imply a "sensitivity to [some of] the goodor bad-making features of situations" (Rowlands 2012, 230) or as those whose exercise conveys information about a being's moral character (Parrott 2019). We understand moral capacities to include moral emotions (those that are involved both in pro-social and in anti-social behaviour), as well as other capacities that can't be classified as emotions but could still be said to 'track' moral properties (in Rowlands' [2012] sense), such as trust, care, or normative capacities.13 For the purposes of this paper, it is not necessary that we take a stand on whether any of these capacities on its own is enough to endow an animal with full-blown morality. Instead, what we will argue is that looking at animals' touch interactions has the potential to help reveal many of these (proto-)moral capacities.14 In what follows, we will explain this by analysing the three functions of touch and their connection to potentially 13 We understand 'normative capacities' as the ability to make normative evaluations about others' behaviour, as well as the ability to comply with and enforce normative standards of behaviour. See section 5. 14 An interesting question posed by a reviewer is whether there are studies that employ the frame of touch to explore morality in humans. Studies on human moral psychology mostly focus on gaze (e.g. showing clips of antagonistic interactions and just or unjust punishment to pre-linguistic children and tracking their gaze to infer their understanding of norms and fairness), visualor auditory-mediated emotional contagion (e.g. babies crying in response to hearing another baby cry as an indicator of the innateness of empathy), and, as soon as developmentally possible, language (e.g. to inquire about moral judgments). Since humans have linguistic abilities, studies of our moral capacities may not benefit as much from a focus on touch as the study of animal morality. However, some studies do document the role of touch in humans' moral interactions broadly construed. For instance, affective touch has been found to affect our impression of others (e.g. Fisher et al. 1976), and to have a positive effect on compliance and cooperation in mundane situations (e.g. Goldman et al. 2010), which may affect moral decision-making, e.g. in the context of helping. Affective touch is also a prominent criterion in the studies of consolation in pre-linguistic infants or infants in early linguistic development. Consolation in these infants is operationalised, like in animals, as hugging the distressed other or offering some other form of comfort contact (e.g. Zahn-Waxler 1992). Researchers have also found an analgesic effect of partner touch, which increases when a more empathic partner provides the touch (Goldstein et al. 2018; Goldstein et al. 2016). Lastly, touch may also play a role in the experiencing of moral disgust, though it should be noted that the link between physical revulsion as a protective mechanism and moral disgust is controversial (Oaten et al. 2018). 10 moral practices. Though we will separate these three functions for analytic purposes, it is important to bear in mind that in reality they intertwine and support each other. 3. The discriminative function of touch and its importance for animal morality Touch in its discriminative function serves as a perceptual source of information. When the body of a being with a tactile sense comes into contact with a physical entity, there is some information made available to that being about the qualities of the entity being touched, such as its shape, temperature, motion, texture, malleability, and so on. This is the discriminative function of touch, and it does not reduce to the touching of inanimate objects, but extends to touching other living beings. For this reason, Botero has argued that discriminative touch must be factored into discussions on primate social cognition (Botero 2016, 1203–4). In this section, we will show how this should be extended to the animal morality debate. In arguing for the importance of discriminative touch in primate social cognition, Botero is going against the general trend in debates and experiments on this topic, which, as she herself points out, have been characterised by an almost exclusive focus on the visual sense. Joint attention, for example, is commonly understood as a triadic interaction occurring between two subjects who coordinate their attention on one object. Although attention is not necessarily linked to visual perception, most of the research on joint attention in primates has been circumscribed to testing their ability to follow another's gaze on an object (see Carpenter and Call 2013 for a review). Research on theory of mind in primates has likewise privileged the visual mode. Although theory of mind refers to the general ability to attribute mental states to others, a significant proportion of studies attempts to determine whether primates possess a theory of mind by studying whether they can understand what others can and cannot see (see Andrews 2017 for a review). And even those studies that focus on the attribution of a different type of mental state, namely, emotions, tend to emphasise the sense of vision. Indeed, a common method for measuring emotions in primates concentrates on their facial expressions, which are a visual way of expressing emotions, and most of the experiments that have been carried out to determine whether primates can attribute emotions to others have tested for their ability to visually discriminate facial expressions of emotions (e.g. Parr 2001; 2003). Botero suggests that the operationalisation of socio-cognitive capacities via the visual modality results in a limited understanding of social cognition in primates. She points out, for instance, that chimpanzees' facial features lack the salient contrasts that in 11 our case allow for an easy visual detection of the subtle facial movements that indicate emotions (Botero 2018b, 373). This means that the discrimination of facial expressions may not play such an important role in the attribution of emotions amongst chimpanzees. In addition, chimpanzee mothers rarely use prolonged gaze as a form of interaction with their offspring. However, during the first nine months, infant chimpanzees spend most of the time in close contact with their mothers, who carry them around as they go about their day. By means of this touch interaction, the infant chimpanzee learns about the mother's reaction to different stimuli, thereby gaining information on her perspective and on the world surrounding them (Botero 2016, 1204–5). Botero considers that, due to similarities in neurophysiology and infant development across primate species, these points probably generalise to other apes. Discriminative touch thus likely constitutes the very first source of social information that apes make use of, and by means of it they can learn "that there are others and that these others have a different perspective, two basic traits of joint attention and theory of mind" (Botero 2018b, 377). Since discriminative touch is a source of social information, and moral practices require social information, discriminative touch can support moral practices. In order to respond in ways that are morally appropriate or that exemplify the use of a moral capacity, the animal first has to gauge the social situation.15 In certain circumstances, namely when there is bodily contact involved, the relevant social information can be gauged by means of touch. For instance, in the case of consolation behaviour, the consoler can gain tactile information on whether the other is tense or relaxed, which can be used to determine when the contact should go on and when it can stop. Likewise, the appropriate duration of other affiliative behaviours, like grooming, can be informed by touch, e.g. the groomer can use it to discriminate when the recipient is annoyed by or uninterested in this interaction. Touch can also be used to gain information about other morally relevant features of situations besides emotions. An example of this is provided by the literature on animals' reactions to conspecifics' deaths. Death can be construed as morally relevant, insofar as, other things being equal, it is a bad-making feature of situations that calls for a certain reaction in beings who care about the deceased. In order to respond in a morally laden 15 This of course connects to theory of mind, and sometimes it may be useful (perhaps even necessary) for an animal to first determine that another is in a particular mental state before exercising a moral capacity. However, we do not want to circumscribe our claims to animals who possess a theory of mind. Instead, we follow Andrews (2018) in considering that many sociocognitive practices don't require mindreading but trait attribution, understanding of past history, relationship status, etc., and, following Monsó (2015), we consider it quite likely that this pluralistic set of capacities for predicting and understanding others is sufficient for the exercise of many moral capacities. 12 way to death, animals would have to first discriminate that they are dealing with a dead individual, which could in principle be done through touch. In fact, a variety of social mammals have been witnessed insistently touching or nudging corpses (for reviews, see Fashing and Nguyen 2011; Boesch 2012, chapter 7; Anderson 2016). The meaning of this behaviour is unclear, but it entails bodily contact and thus offers the animals tactile information that points to the state of the dead conspecific: she is not responding the way she usually would to touch, and she does not feel the way she used to, e.g. because of limpness or, later, rigor mortis and coldness. The death of a conspecific can thus be grasped to a degree by means of the tactile sense. Similarly, touching injured, disabled, or sick conspecifics may provide information on their state (e.g. when they flinch or respond unusually to a common form of touch), thus providing a reason to adapt one's interactions with them. Another example of situations in which social information can be gained by means of touch are play fights and aggressive encounters. Puppies are often described as not knowing their own strength yet, which may well be said for any mammalian young at a certain developmental stage. Rough-and-tumble play provides an opportunity to learn about one's own and others' strength, information that is gathered most prominently through touch. Moreover, tactile information about the other's strength and character gained through play and aggressive interactions can shape relationships and determine one's own and the other's status, which could in turn provide a context for many moral practices. Deciding, for instance, if and when to share food with, groom, help, or console another will depend on the characteristics of the preexisting relationship. These are just some examples of how touch can contain morally relevant social information regarding others' characteristics and present state, as well as one's capacities and relationship to others. Lack of attention to the discriminative powers of touch can result in scientists misconstruing or simplifying the range of social information available to an animal in a certain situation. For instance, some scientists have speculated that monkey mothers who carry the mummified remains of their dead infants for extended periods of time perhaps do so because they haven't properly processed the change in the infant's state, given that the mummification allows the corpse to retain its shape and still be visually recognisable as an infant (e.g. De Marco 2018). This ignores how radically different a dead infant will feel from the very first moment when compared to a live one. Incorporating the study of touch as a medium for social information can thus give us a richer and more accurate account of the mechanisms underlying the behaviour of animals and has the potential to help us uncover moral practices. 13 4. The affiliative function of touch and its importance for animal morality Touching another individual is not only a source of information, it can also be a form of affiliation. Although the term 'affiliation' refers to any behaviour that serves to strengthen social bonds, it often takes the form of voluntary bodily contact between individuals, e.g. in the context of parental16 care (Feldman 2011) or social grooming (Spruijt et al. 1992). In this section, we will argue that affiliative touch is linked to morality (1) indirectly, due to the causal connection between parental touch and normal development, and (2) directly, since affiliative touch could be an expression of moral emotions. The link between parental touch and development was demonstrated by the infamous maternal deprivation studies first conducted in the 1950s. In one of these studies by Harlow (1958), infant monkeys were taken from their mothers and were either offered a surrogate made of bare mesh wire or one draped in soft cloth. When given a choice between the two conditions, the monkeys strongly preferred the cloth surrogate, even when only the wire surrogate provided food. While monkeys in both surrogate conditions took in the same amount of milk and gained the same amount of weight, the monkeys in the wire surrogate condition showed psychosomatic symptoms, which lead Harlow to conclude that "[t]he wire mother is biologically adequate but psychologically inept" (Harlow 1958, 677). Furthermore, in an open-field test, where Harlow put surrogate-raised monkeys in a room with novel stimuli, either with or without the cloth surrogate, he found that in the condition with the surrogate available the infants displayed less behavioural signs of stress. The surrogate thus seemed to function as a "source of security" (ibid., 679). This research led to two novel insights relevant for our case that have been supported by follow-up studies: first, parental touch, and not as previously assumed the providing of food by the parent, seems to be crucial in the emergence of the parent-infant attachment, and second, touch seems to decrease negative arousal. This apparent soothing effect is immediate, but parental touch has also been found to positively influence stress response in the long term, improving the adequacy of the individual's response to stressors and her ability to cope with stress throughout her life (for a review, see Hertenstein et al. 2006). Importantly, the significance of parental touch for the normal 16 We use the terms 'parent' and 'parental' to refer to any primary caregiver. 14 development of attachment and emotional self-regulation is a constant across mammalian species (Hertenstein et al. 2006; Feldman 201117). The capacities for attachment and emotional self-regulation are indirectly relevant for morality because they enable the emergence of sociality. We understand sociality as a prerequisite for morality, since the ability to abandon a self-centred stance is necessary for one's attitudes to be directed towards the welfare of others.18 And as Botero argues, emotional self-regulation, facilitated by the soothing effect of parental touch, is a precondition for being able to pay attention to others (Botero 2018b, 376–377), which is critical for behaviour to be other-directed. Furthermore, concern for others can be motivated and modulated by attachment, for which the parent-infant attachment seems to act as a blueprint. This first attachment facilitates the emergence of capacities that are necessary for forming further social bonds, such as play tendencies (Lévy et al. 2003) or social discrimination, the ability to distinguish familiar from unfamiliar conspecifics (Kentrop et al. 2018). The latter has also been found to play a crucial role in the triggering of empathic mechanisms across species (de Waal and Preston 2017). Therefore, parental touch facilitates basic capacities necessary for moral practice. However, parental care isn't only indirectly relevant for animal morality, it could also be a direct expression of moral capacities. To the extent that the parent is motivated by a moral emotion, such as love, whenever she grooms, holds, or nurses her infant, we can speak of her affiliative touch as a moral practice in itself. Affiliative touch, however, is not exclusive to parent-infant interactions, but is instead an integral part of the social lives of many animals at all developmental stages and across different sorts of relationships. Therefore, affiliative touch can also be an expression of moral emotions beyond the parent-infant bond. The most obvious example, which is widely studied and welldocumented in the literature, is consolation behaviour. This behaviour, as explained in 17 Feldman (2011, 373) notes: "Maternal touch patterns are among the most evolutionarily conserved behaviors and, as such, there is marked consistency in the genetic, neuroendocrine, and brain circuitry between humans and other mammals. [...] Such consistency in the role of maternal touch between humans and other mammals renders research in animal models particularly useful for understanding the biological underpinnings of early touch and contact and their effect on shaping the infant's capacity for social affiliation and stress modulation throughout life." 18 Although in this section we emphasise prosocial behaviours, given that the focus is on affiliation, the link between morality and sociality doesn't circumscribe solely the positive side of morality. Cruelty, for example, is an attitude that has the other's (negative) welfare as its goal and, in that sense, it also requires abandoning a purely self-centred stance. In addition, our view regarding the importance of sociality for morality should not be taken to imply that egoism or callousness are not moral attitudes. Our point is that one can only make sense of the morality of an animal's attitudes if one assumes the animal has the capacity to abandon a self-centred stance. This applies also to callous and egoistic attitudes. Animals who naturally lead solitary lives and lack all capacity to engage with others could not be said to be egoistic or callous, at least not in the moral sense of these terms. 15 section 2, occurs as a response to distress behaviour in others and most often takes the form of affiliative touch. Consolation, in turn, is generally thought to be motivated by empathy or sympathy (see e.g. de Waal and Preston 2017), so affiliative touch would be functioning here as an expression of these moral emotions. Affiliative touch can also point us to other moral emotions beyond empathy, sympathy, and parental love. The potential of affiliative touch to uncover further moral emotions has to do with the strong social significance that this interaction has in many animal societies. Although some of these emotions may ultimately be beyond the reach of (most) animals, we propose grief, gratitude, jealousy, and resentment as exemplary moral capacities that could either be expressed by affiliative touch or through its prevention, disruption, or evasion. Grief may be manifested by means of affiliative contact towards a corpse, including grooming, prolonged holding, and protective behaviours such as preventing others from touching it.19 Gratitude could be expressed by spontaneous affiliative touching directed at a benefactor. Jealousy, as a negative emotion evoked by affiliation in others, could take the form of attempts to prevent affiliative touch or to disrupt its occurrence. And lastly, resentment could be expressed in the aftermath of a conflict by avoiding the offender's touch, ignoring attempts at affiliation, or engaging in aggressive responses to affiliation attempts. The ways and contexts in which animals manifest and respond to affiliative touch could thus give us insight into moral capacities that have received little attention in the animal morality debate so far. In addition, they also point to the importance of performing field studies, since these capacities could never be detected without considering the social context and history in which they are embedded and without allowing for animals to freely and spontaneously engage in social interactions with their conspecifics. 5. The vigilance function of the tactile sense and its importance for animal morality Filip Mattens (2017) has argued that there is a third function that can be attributed to the tactile sense, namely, the vigilance function. Mattens criticises philosophers of touch for their excessive focus on the hands and the discriminative function of touch. Hands or organs with the function of touching in order to feel are a rare feature once we move beyond the primate order, and yet, we attribute a tactile sense, at the very least, to all mammals. That is because the tactile sense is not something that is circumscribed to 19 The prolonged transportation and nurturing of an infant's corpse have been witnessed in mothers from a wide range of mammalian species (Reggente et al. 2016). 16 hands, but a body-wide feature. This, he argues, suggests that the basal function of the tactile sense is not its discriminative function: Although not all areas of the body are used for touching, nearly every single area can sense when something touches it. Because it signals when and where an animal is being touched, tactile sensitivity functions like a surveillance system: it keeps a watch on the animal's body. (Ibid., 690) The vigilance function of the tactile sense is distinct from its discriminative function. This is easily illustrated by considering cases in which you are touched by something that is not anticipated by your other senses and thus met with a startle response: "[a]s soon as you sense the slightest contact, you flinch back. You do not wait until it is clear whether the object is injurious; you flinch back before you even know what touched you" (Ibid., emphasis in the original). Touch in its vigilance function is not meant as a means for exploring objects, but as a way of protecting the body. This function of touch, therefore, "does not first and foremost serve the animal's desire to touch, but rather [her] need to know that [she] is being touched" (Ibid., emphasis in the original). The vigilance function of touch thus points us to the body's vulnerability. The tactile sense watches over the body because, whenever something touches our body, there is a potential threat to our health and integrity. And indeed, when an animal touches another, she is invading their bodily space, thus becoming a potential threat to them while also risking injury herself. Both animals are made more vulnerable by this interaction. As we will argue in this section, studying how animals navigate this increase in vulnerability that occurs as a result of touch may illuminate further moral capacities. In particular, it has the potential to reveal capacities of trust, care, and tolerance, moral capacities involved in antisocial behaviour, such as cruelty, and normative capacities. Although until now it has barely been taken up as a research topic in the animal morality debate, trust can be plausibly regarded as a moral capacity insofar as it is likely a necessary mechanism (or at least a very useful one) for a moral society to function. Moral societies are generally regarded as ones in which individuals do not merely pursue their own selfish desires, but rather decide to cooperate and look out for others' interests too (e.g. Tomasello 2016). In order to ensure that this works, members of the society need to place trust in that the others will reciprocate (Ibid., 162ff.). But trust may also be involved in other interactions beside reciprocity. Whenever animals engage in behaviours like grooming, contact sleeping, or social play, they are placing themselves in a situation that makes them more vulnerable, and insofar as it is under the animal's control to place herself in this situation, we could speak of a capacity of trust in the other, which would be 17 more or less explicit depending, perhaps, on how aware the animal is that the other could hurt her. It could, however, be argued that common behaviours like grooming, contact sleeping, or social play do not necessarily imply that the animals involved trust each other; instead, perhaps they have merely learnt which touch behaviours are safe or effective. This may be true, but it does not necessarily exclude an explanation in terms of trust. Instead, this learning process might precisely amount to a development of trust. Trust does not have to be something that is explicitly present in the animal's mind as a propositional judgement such as "This individual can be trusted." Rather, trust may be a capacity that is implicit in their choosing to place themselves in a situation that makes them more vulnerable. Another objection here might be that the very neurophysiology of touch, which we discussed in section 2, makes these sorts of affiliative interactions pleasurable for the animals, so that there is no role for trust to play, but rather the animals are just motivated to encourage what they feel as a pleasant stimulus. We believe that it is quite likely that part of the motivation for engaging in affiliation is indeed that it is inherently rewarding. However, two things must be borne in mind. The first one is that the individual initiating the affiliation might not get pleasure out of it right away, and still this individual is also risking injury. Second, and relatedly, the fact that the neurophysiology of touch ensures that affiliation is pleasant does not mean that things can't go wrong. Not all attempts at affiliation are successful. And for the animal on the receiving end there is always the risk of misreading the situation, interpreting as an affiliative approach what is not, which likely means that the animals who purposefully let others touch them implicitly trust them. The capacity of trust may also be manifested in certain touch behaviours that some animals engage in and that seem to create vulnerability as a gesture of reassurance or friendliness. One example first described in chimps has been aptly named 'vulnerable contact behaviour' and consists of inserting a finger into another's mouth (Nishida et al. 2010, 145), either to appease another in distress or to reassure oneself. De Waal (1989) puts the use and risk of this behaviour into context: Chimpanzees have a habit of putting their fingers or the back of one hand between the teeth of dominant group members. A friendly gesture, it is also a test of the dominant's state of arousal and often is used in ambiguous situations. I experienced it myself when performing psychological experiments with two juvenile chimpanzees at the University of Nijmegen. Each day I spent hours in a room with them, and occasionally their constant mischievousness would get on my nerves. They would notice the slightest irritation and hurry over to fill my mouth with their big hands. Of course, I never bit, but in the Arnhem colony I have seen quite a few instances when fingers were not treated so gently during appeasement attempts. Young chimpanzees of three years or less, who may have lacked 18 the experience to judge whether the gesture was safe or not, were almost always the victims of such bites. (80) Vulnerable contact behaviour also takes other forms amongst primates. Once more in the context of peace-keeping, de Waal (1989) describes the following behaviour: [M]ale chimpanzees often finger each other's scrotum at moments of mild tension, a gesture irreverently known among field-workers as ball bouncing. Is there a more convincing way of indicating friendly intentions than by touching these vulnerable parts? (79) Anecdotal evidence also points to the consolidation of alliances by means of gently holding another's testicles in other primates (e.g. Balter 2010). Vulnerable contact behaviour has also been witnessed in elephants, who will touch or put their trunk inside the mouth of a distressed conspecific (Plotnik and de Waal 2014, 12). A recent study on captive orcas also documents what appears to be vulnerable contact behaviour: the orcas were found to occasionally put their snouts together, and then one of them would insert her tongue into the mouth of the other, who would gently bite it. The authors interpret this as an affiliative gesture (Sánchez-Hernández et al. forthcoming). Even if we were to favour a more intellectualistic notion of trust that excluded these behaviours from counting as expressions of such, these sorts of interactions could still point us to the capacity of care or tact. A chimpanzee holding another's testicles or an orca biting another's tongue are examples of situations in which an animal could very easily hurt the other, but she apparently puts care into making sure this doesn't happen. And this extends beyond vulnerable contact behaviour. For instance, controlling the strength with which one bites during play or carrying one's offspring in the mouth with the exact pressure needed to hold them without hurting them could also constitute examples of animals exhibiting care. To be sure, whether or not these count as instances of care or tact will be a function of the amount of behavioural flexibility and self-control the animal has. If she could not perform the behaviour any other way then it would not make sense to say that she is putting care into how she does it. This is not particularly problematic, however, since the study of moral capacities in animals must in any case go hand-in-hand with the study of animal self-control (see Monsó and Andrews forthcoming). There may be more to learn about the moral capacities of animals if we look further beyond gentle touch. For instance, young animals of various species often play with each other or with adults in ways that can be quite painful. These individuals enjoy enormous levels of tolerance from the older members of the group. In the case of young chimpanzees, for instance, de Waal writes: "They can do nothing wrong, such as using the back of a dominant male as a trampoline, [...] or hitting an older juvenile as hard as they can" (de Waal 2014, 189). Tolerance is also a moral capacity that has not received the 19 attention it deserves. Having a young chimp use your back as a trampoline or hit you as hard as she can must hurt. If it were an older chimp doing it, this would trigger an aggressive response in return, so it is possible that there is an inhibition of aggression going on that could also plausibly be regarded as a moral capacity. The fact that social tolerance and the inhibition of aggression have not been considered as research topics in the animal morality debate highlights a bias towards moral capacities that are manifested actively. But one can also exercise a moral capacity by refraining from doing things. The ways in which animals navigate each other's vulnerability could thus give us evidence of various moral capacities. But what about cases in which the animals purposefully hurt each other? The animal morality debate has until now focused almost exclusively on prosocial behaviour and its underlying mechanisms. We suggest that it's also important to look at antagonistic and antisocial interactions in our search of moral capacities beyond the human species. Consider the following description of an aggressive altercation among captive chimpanzees: Luit was alpha for only ten weeks. The Yeroen-Nikkie alliance made a comeback with a bloody vengeance one night during which the two allies together severely injured Luit. Apart from biting off fingers and toes and causing deep gashes everywhere, the two aggressors removed Luit's testicles, which were found on the cage floor. Luit died on the operating table due to loss of blood from the fight, which took place in a night cage with only the three senior males present. Given the victim's massive injuries and the relatively few injuries sustained by the other two, we must assume a remarkable level of coordination between Nikkie and Yeroen. (de Waal 1998, 211) To be clear, by citing this example we do not mean to imply that this incident necessarily amounted to a moral practice. Perhaps Nikkie and Yeroen were motivated by a non-moral desire to rise in the social hierarchy. But the interaction could have had a moral component if, for instance, Nikkie and Yeroen enjoyed and purposefully prolonged Luit's suffering. While this single anecdote is far from definitive, the fact remains that chimpanzees are capable of very sophisticated social cognition (which suggests they might have understood that Luit was suffering) and exhibit high levels of behavioural flexibility (which suggests a certain degree of control over the way in which the killing was performed). Thus, the extreme violence displayed is noteworthy and justifies paying more attention to cases like this. Lethal intra-specific coalitionary aggression in chimpanzees has also been documented in the wild, both within and outside the instigators' own social group (e.g. Kaburu et al. 2013; Pruetz et al. 2017). Additionally, non-predatory inter-specific killings have been witnessed in several mammalian species. For instance, killer whales have been described to kill narwhal "for fun" in a variety of ways, like drowning, ramming, and mutilating them, and then "playing soccer" with their body parts (Ferguson et al. 2012, 7, 20 11). Bottlenose dolphins have also been observed to harass harbour porpoises, only to brutally kill them and abandon their bodies (Cotter 2011). Depending on the behavioural flexibility manifested in these interactions, the social context surrounding them, and the amount of premeditation involved, emotions like cruelty, envy, resentment, schadenfreude, or blood lust could be driving the behaviour. Perhaps these emotions are exclusively human, but this should not be established from the armchair. Not even considering the possibility that animals may also possess these negative moral emotions could also amount to a distorted or partial account of animal morality. Before we conclude, we would like to mention how touch can also illuminate a final, very important branch of the animal morality debate: the study of the normative capacities of animals. Although animals' ability to follow and enforce normative standards of behaviour has only begun to be systematically studied in the lab (e.g. by measuring chimpanzees' spontaneous reactions to videos of infanticide [Rudolf von Rohr et al. 2015]), normativity figures prominently in many accounts of morality and much of the work done on the evolution of human morality has focused on the emergence of our normative capacities (e.g. Joyce 2007; Kitcher 2014; Tomasello 2016). In addition, Kristin Andrews, one of the most prominent philosophers in the animal morality debate, has also focused a great deal of her work on animal normativity (e.g. Andrews 2009; 2013; 2020). Thus, it is worth considering to what extent the study of touch can be illuminating here too.20 Although discriminative and affective touch could possibly have a role to play in the enforcement of animal social norms (for instance, discriminative touch could be used to determine when an animal is not playing 'fairly,' and affective touch could perhaps be used to reinforce norm-appropriate behaviour), we believe that the vigilance function of touch is likely the most relevant when it comes to considering how touch can inform the study of animal normativity. Following Andrews (2020), we assume that an animal social norm occurs when "(a) there is a pattern of behavior demonstrated by community members; (b) individuals choose to conform to the pattern of behavior; (c) individuals expect that community members will also conform, and will sanction those who do not conform." We believe that a fruitful area of study for uncovering animal social norms thus understood concerns how animals navigate each other's bodily vulnerability. Looking at how animals touch each other, when they refrain from touching each other, how they react to others' touch, or when they decide to intervene to stop others from touching could illuminate what animals consider to be appropriate patterns of behaviour, as well as to what extent they expect 20 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for encouraging us to take on this point. 21 others to conform to these patterns and are motivated to sanction nonconformity. Thus, investigating the touch patterns involved in social play, mating, co-feeding, grooming, infant handling and alloparenting, vulnerable contact behaviour, reconciliation, and consolation could all be promising ways of establishing whether the animal societies in question countenance and enforce social norms. 6. Conclusion We have argued that scientists and philosophers have been operating with a somewhat narrow view of the set of moral practices that animals could engage in, and that bringing the issue of touch to the discussion has the potential to uncover further moral practices, while also revealing unnoticed nuances in the ones that are under discussion. Our defence of the need to pay more attention to touch has been structured as an analysis of the discriminative, affiliative, and vigilance functions of touch. However, it is important to remember that this division is an artificial one: in reality these three functions are intertwined, and purposeful touch as an expression of moral capacities cannot be studied without taking the role of all three in a specific context into consideration. Moreover, as also emphasised by Botero, touch as a social medium and its role in animal morality cannot be properly analysed without incorporating field studies. We need to study animals' spontaneous interactions, and consider their social bonds and social history to assess their moral capacities and their use of touch, e.g. to distinguish resentment from mistrust. Lastly, lab conditions, like many other instances of the human-animal relationship, deprive animals of some of the conditions they might need to develop moral capacities, like parental care or lasting relationships, and thus on their own cannot provide us with a fair assessment of the prevalence and scope of animal morality. References Anderson, James. 2016. "Comparative Thanatology." Current Biology 26(13): R553–56. Andrews, Kristin. 2009. "Understanding Norms without a Theory of Mind." Inquiry 52 (5): 433–48. ---. 2013. "Ape Autonomy? Social Norms and Moral Agency in Other Species." In Animal Minds & Animal Ethics: Connecting Two Separate Fields, edited by Klaus Petrus and Markus Wild, 173–97. Bielefeld: Transcript. ---. 2017. "Chimpanzee Mind Reading: Don't Stop Believing." Philosophy Compass 12 (1). 22 ---. 2018. "Do Chimpanzees Reason about Belief?" In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds, edited by Kristin Andrews and Jacob Beck, 258–68. New York: Routledge. ---. 2020. "Naïve Normativity: The Social Foundation of Moral Cognition." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (1): 36–56. Atsak, Piray, Marie Orre, Petra Bakker, Leonardo Cerliani, Benno Roozendaal, Valeria Gazzola, Marta Moita, and Christian Keysers. 2011. "Experience Modulates Vicarious Freezing in Rats: A Model for Empathy." PLoS ONE 6(7): e21855. Baan, Candice, Ralph Bergmüller, Douglas Smith, and Barbara Molnar. 2014. "Conflict Management in Free-Ranging Wolves, Canis Lupus." Animal Behaviour 90(April): 327–334. Balter, Michael. 2010. "Probing Culture's Secrets, From Capuchins to Children." Science 329(5989): 266–67. Bartal, Inbal, Jean Decety, and Peggy Mason. 2011. "Empathy and Pro-Social Behavior in Rats." Science 334(6061): 1427–30. Bates, Lucy, Richard Byrne, Phyllis Lee, Norah Njiraini, Joyce Poole, Katito Sayialel, Soila Sayialel, and Cynthia Moss. 2008. "Do Elephants Show Empathy?" Journal of Consciousness Studies 15(10–11): 204–25. Bekoff, Marc. 1977. "Social Communication in Canids: Evidence for the Evolution of a Stereotyped Mammalian Display." Science 197(4308): 1097–99. Bekoff, Marc, and Jessica Pierce. 2009. Wild Justice: The Moral Lives of Animals. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press. Botero, Maria. 2016. "Tactless Scientists: Ignoring Touch in the Study of Joint Attention." Philosophical Psychology 29(8): 1200–1214. ---. 2018a. "Bringing Touch Back to the Study of Emotions in Human and Non-Human Primates: A Theoretical Explanation." International Journal of Comparative Psychology 31. ---. 2018b. "Primates Are Touched by Your Concern: Touch, Emotion, and Social Cognition in Chimpanzees." In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Animal Minds, edited by Kristin Andrews and Jacob Beck, 372–380. New York: Routledge. Brosnan, Sarah, Catherine Talbot, Megan Ahlgren, Susan Lambeth, and Steven Schapiro. 2010. "Mechanisms Underlying Responses to Inequitable Outcomes in Chimpanzees, Pan Troglodytes." Animal Behaviour 79(6): 1229–37. Brosnan, Sarah, and Frans de Waal. 2003. "Monkeys Reject Unequal Pay." Nature 425(6955): 297–99. Brucks, Désirée, and Auguste von Bayern. forthcoming. "Parrots Voluntarily Help Each Other to Obtain Food Rewards." Current Biology https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2019.11.030. Burkart, Judith, Ernst Fehr, Charles Efferson, and Carel van Schaik. 2007. "Other-Regarding Preferences in a Non-Human Primate: Common Marmosets Provision Food Altruistically." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104(50): 19762–66. Burkett, James, Elissar Andari, Zachary Johnson, Daniel Curry, Frans de Waal, and Larry Young. 2016. "Oxytocin-Dependent Consolation Behavior in Rodents." Science 351(6271): 375–78. Carpenter, Malinda, and Josep Call. 2013. "How Joint Is the Joint Attention of Apes and Human Infants?" In Agency and Joint Attention, edited by Janet Metcalfe and Herbert A. Terrace, 49–61. New York: Oxford University Press. Campbell, Matthew, and Frans de Waal. 2014. "Chimpanzees Empathize with Group Mates and Humans, but Not with Baboons or Unfamiliar Chimpanzees." Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 281(1782): 20140013. Clay, Zanna, and Frans de Waal. 2013. "Bonobos Respond to Distress in Others: Consolation across the Age Spectrum." PLoS ONE 8(1): e55206. 23 Cordoni, Giada, Elisabetta Palagi, and Silvana Borgognini Tarli. 2006. "Reconciliation and Consolation in Captive Western Gorillas." International Journal of Primatology 27(5): 1365–82. Cotter, Mark, Daniela Maldini, and Thomas Jefferson. 2012. "'Porpicide' in California: Killing of Harbor Porpoises (Phocoena Phocoena) by Coastal Bottlenose Dolphins (Tursiops Truncatus)." Marine Mammal Science 28 (1): E1–15. Cozzi, Alessandro, Claudio Sighieri, Angelo Gazzano, Christine Nicol, and Paolo Baragli. 2010. "Post-Conflict Friendly Reunion in a Permanent Group of Horses (Equus Caballus)." Behavioural Processes 85(2): 185–90. Cronin, Katherine, Kori Schroeder, and Charles Snowdon. 2010. "Prosocial Behaviour Emerges Independent of Reciprocity in Cottontop Tamarins." Proceedings. Biological Sciences / The Royal Society 277(1701): 3845–51. Cronin, Katherine, and Charles Snowdon. 2008. "The Effects of Unequal Reward Distributions on Cooperative Problem Solving by Cottontop Tamarins, Saguinus Oedipus." Animal Behaviour 75(1): 245–57. De Marco, Arianna, Roberto Cozzolino, and Bernard Thierry. 2018. "Prolonged Transport and Cannibalism of Mummified Infant Remains by a Tonkean Macaque Mother." Primates 59 (1): 55–59. de Waal, Frans. 1989. Peacemaking among Primates. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. ---. 1996. Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. Harvard University Press. ---. 1998. Chimpanzee Politics. Power and Sex among Apes. Revised Edition. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. ---. 2014. "Natural Normativity: The 'Is' and 'Ought' of Animal Behavior." Behaviour 151 (2–3): 185–204. de Waal, Frans, and Angeline van Roosmalen. 1979. "Reconciliation and Consolation among Chimpanzees." Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 5(1): 55–66. de Waal, Frans, and Stephanie Preston. 2017. "Mammalian Empathy: Behavioural Manifestations and Neural Basis." Nature Reviews Neuroscience 18(8): 498–509. Dudzinski, Kathleen, Heather Hill, and Maria Botero. 2019. "Methodological Considerations for Comparison of Cross-Species Use of Tactile Contact." International Journal of Comparative Psychology 32(0) Edgar, Joanne, John Lowe, Elizabeth Paul, and Christine Nicol. 2011. "Avian Maternal Response to Chick Distress." Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 278(1721): 3129–34. Fashing, Peter, and Nga Nguyen. 2011. "Behavior toward the Dying, Diseased, or Disabled among Animals and Its Relevance to Paleopathology." International Journal of Paleopathology 1(3): 128–29. Feldman, Ruth. 2011. "Maternal Touch and the Developing Infant." In The Handbook of Touch: Neuroscience, Behavioral, and Health Perspectives., edited by Mathew Hertenstein, and Sandra Jean Weiss, 373–407. New York: Springer Pub. Co. Ferguson, Steven, Jeff Higdon, and Kristin Westdal. 2012. "Prey Items and Predation Behavior of Killer Whales (Orcinus Orca) in Nunavut, Canada Based on Inuit Hunter Interviews." Aquatic Biosystems 8 (January): 3. Flack, Jessica, Lisa Jeannotte, and Frans de Waal. 2004. "Play Signaling and the Perception of Social Rules by Juvenile Chimpanzees (Pan Troglodytes)." Journal of Comparative Psychology 118 (2): 149–59. Fisher, Jeffrey, Marvin Rytting, and Richard Heslin. 1976. "Hands Touching Hands: Affective and Evaluative Effects of an Interpersonal Touch." Sociometry 39 (4): 416. Fitzpatrick, Simon. 2017. "Animal Morality: What Is the Debate About?" Biology & Philosophy 32(6): 1151–83. 24 Fraser, Orlaith, and Thomas Bugnyar. 2010. "Do Ravens Show Consolation? Responses to Distressed Others." PLoS ONE 5(5): e10605. Fraser, Orlaith, Daniel Stahl, and Filippo Aureli. 2008. "Stress Reduction through Consolation in Chimpanzees." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 105(25): 8557–62. Fulkerson, Matthew. 2013. The First Sense: A Philosophical Study of Human Touch. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Goldman, Morton, Odette Kiyohara, and Dorothy Pfannensteil. 1985. "Interpersonal Touch, Social Labeling, and the Foot-in-the-Door Effect." The Journal of Social Psychology 125 (2): 143–47. Goldstein, Pavel, Simone Shamay-Tsoory, Shahar Yellinek, and Irit Weissman-Fogel. 2016. "Empathy Predicts an Experimental Pain Reduction During Touch." The Journal of Pain 17 (10): 1049–57. Goldstein, Pavel, Irit Weissman-Fogel, Guillaume Dumas, and Simone Shamay-Tsoory. 2018. "Brain-to-Brain Coupling during Handholding Is Associated with Pain Reduction." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115 (11): E2528–37. Goumon, Sébastien, and Marek Špinka. 2016. "Emotional Contagion of Distress in Young Pigs Is Potentiated by Previous Exposure to the Same Stressor." Animal Cognition 19(3): 501–11. Harlow, Harry. 1958. "The Nature of Love." American Psychologist 13(12): 673–85. Hernandez-Lallement, Julen, Marijn van Wingerden, Christine Marx, Milan Srejic, and Tobias Kalenscher. 2015. "Rats Prefer Mutual Rewards in a Prosocial Choice Task." Frontiers in Neuroscience 8. Hertenstein, Matthew, Rachel Holmes, Margaret McCullough, and Dacher Keltner. 2009. "The Communication of Emotion via Touch." Emotion 9(4): 566–73. Hertenstein, Matthew, Julie Verkamp, Alyssa Kerestes, and Rachel Holmes. 2006. "The Communicative Functions of Touch in Humans, Nonhuman Primates, and Rats: A Review and Synthesis of the Empirical Research." Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs 132(1): 5–94. Horner, Victoria, Devyn Carter, Malini Suchak, and Frans de Waal. 2011. "Spontaneous Prosocial Choice by Chimpanzees." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 108(33): 13847–51. Huber, Annika, Anjuli Barber, Tamás Faragó, Corsin Müller, and Ludwig Huber. 2017. "Investigating Emotional Contagion in Dogs (Canis Familiaris) to Emotional Sounds of Humans and Conspecifics." Animal Cognition 20(4): 703–15. Joyce, Richard. 2007. The Evolution of Morality. A Bradford Book. Kaburu, Stefano, Sana Inoue, and Nicholas Newton-Fisher. 2013. "Death of the Alpha: Within-Community Lethal Violence Among Chimpanzees of the Mahale Mountains National Park." American Journal of Primatology 75(8): 789–97. Kentrop, Jiska, Claire Smid, Marijke Achterberg, Marinus van IJzendoorn, Marian Bakermans-Kranenburg, Marian Joëls, and Rixt van der Veen. 2018. "vy." Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience 12(September). Kitcher, Philip. 2014. The Ethical Project. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Korsgaard, Christine. 2006. "Morality and the Distinctiveness of Human Action." In Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved, edited by Stephen Macedo and Josiah Ober, 98–119. Princeton University Press. Kutsukake, Nobuyuki, and Duncan Castles. 2004. "Reconciliation and Post-Conflict ThirdParty Affiliation among Wild Chimpanzees in the Mahale Mountains, Tanzania." Primates; Journal of Primatology 45(3): 157–65. Lakshminarayanan, Venkat, and Laurie Santos. 2008. "Capuchin Monkeys Are Sensitive to Others' Welfare." Current Biology 18(21): R999–1000. Langford, Dale, Sara Crager, Zarrar Shehzad, Shad Smith, Susana Sotocinal, Jeremy Levenstadt, Mona Chanda, Daniel Levitin, and Jeffrey Mogil. 2006. "Social 25 Modulation of Pain as Evidence for Empathy in Mice." Science 312(5782): 1967– 70. Lékevy, Frederic, Angel Melo, Bennett Galef, Melissa Madden, and Alison Fleming. 2003. "Complete Maternal Deprivation Affects Social, but Not Spatial, Learning in Adult Rats: Learning in Mother-Deprived Rats." Developmental Psychobiology 43(3): 177–91. Liévin-Bazin, Agatha, Maxime Pineaux, Olivier Clerc, Manfred Gahr, Auguste von Bayern, and Dalila Bovet. 2018. "Emotional Responses to Conspecific Distress Calls Are Modulated by Affiliation in Cockatiels (Nymphicus Hollandicus)." PLoS ONE 13(10): e0205314. Löken, Line, Johan Wessberg, India Morrison, Francis McGlone, and Håkan Olausson. 2009. "Coding of Pleasant Touch by Unmyelinated Afferents in Humans." Nature Neuroscience 12(5): 547–48. Massen, Jorg, Lisette van den Berg, Berry Spruijt, and Elisabeth Sterck. 2012. "Inequity Aversion in Relation to Effort and Relationship Quality in Long-Tailed Macaques (Macaca Fascicularis)." American Journal of Primatology 74(2): 145–56. Masserman, Jules, Stanley Wechkin, and William Terris. 1964. "'Altruistic' Behaviour in Rhesus Monkeys." American Journal of Psychiatry 121(6): 584–85. Mattens, Filip. 2017. "The Sense of Touch: From Tactility to Tactual Probing." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95(4): 688–701. McFarland, Richard, and Bonaventura Majolo. 2012. "The Occurrence and Benefits of Postconflict Bystander Affiliation in Wild Barbary Macaques, Macaca Sylvanus." Animal Behaviour 84(3): 583–91. McGlone, Francis, Johan Wessberg, and Håkan Olausson. 2014. "Discriminative and Affective Touch: Sensing and Feeling." Neuron 82(4): 737–55. Monsó, Susana. 2015. "Empathy and Morality in Behaviour Readers." Biology & Philosophy 30(5): 671–90. Monsó, Susana, and Andrews, Kristin. Forthcoming. "Animal Moral Psychologies." In The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology, edited by John Doris and Manuel Vargas. New York: Oxford University Press. Morrison, India. 2012. "CT Afferents." Current Biology 22(3): R77–78. Nishida, Toshisada, Koichiro Zamma, Takahisa Matsusaka, Agumi Inaba, and William McGrew. 2010. Chimpanzee Behavior in the Wild. An Audio-Visual Encyclopedia. Tokyo: Springer. Oaten, Megan, Richard Stevenson, Mark Williams, Anina Rich, Marina Butko, and Trevor Case. 2018. "Moral Violations and the Experience of Disgust and Anger." Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience 12 (August). https://doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2018.00179. Oberliessen, Lina, Julen Hernandez-Lallement, Sandra Schäble, Marijn van Wingerden, Maayke Seinstra, and Tobias Kalenscher. 2016. "Inequity Aversion in Rats, Rattus Norvegicus." Animal Behaviour 115(May): 157–66. Palagi, Elisabetta, and Giada Cordoni. 2009. "Postconflict Third-Party Affiliation in Canis Lupus: Do Wolves Share Similarities with the Great Apes?" Animal Behaviour 78(4): 979–86. Palagi, Elisabetta, Stefania Dall'Olio, Elisa Demuru, and Roscoe Stanyon. 2014. "Exploring the Evolutionary Foundations of Empathy: Consolation in Monkeys." Evolution and Human Behavior 35(4): 341–49. Palagi, Elisabetta, and Ivan Norscia. 2013. "Bonobos Protect and Console Friends and Kin." PLoS ONE 8(11): e79290. Palagi, Elisabetta, Tommaso Paoli, and Silvana Borgognini Tarli. 2004. "Reconciliation and Consolation in Captive Bonobos (Pan Paniscus)." American Journal of Primatology 62(1): 15–30. 26 Park, Kyum, Hawsun Sohn, Yong An, Dae Moon, Seok Choi, and Doo An. 2012. "An Unusual Case of Care-Giving Behavior in Wild Long-Beaked Common Dolphins (Delphinus Capensis) in the East Sea." Marine Mammal Science 29(4): E508–14. Parr, Lisa. 2001. "Cognitive and Physiological Markers of Emotional Awareness in Chimpanzees (Pan Troglodytes)." Animal Cognition 4(3–4): 223–29. Parr, Lisa. 2003. "The Discrimination of Faces and Their Emotional Content by Chimpanzees (Pan Troglodytes)." Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1000 (December): 56–78. Parrott, Gerrod. 2019. "Emotions as Signals of Moral Character." In The Social Nature of Emotion Expression, edited by Ursula Hess and Shlomo Hareli, 161–77. Cham: Springer International Publishing. Pitcher, Mark, Claire Le Pichon, and Alexander Chesler. 2016. "Functional Properties of CLow Threshold Mechanoreceptors (C-LTMRs) in Nonhuman Mammals." In Affective Touch and the Neurophysiology of CT Afferents, edited by Håkan Olausson, Johan Wessberg, India Morrison, and Francis McGlone, 31–48. New York, NY: Springer New York. Plotnik, Joshua, and Frans de Waal. 2014. "Asian Elephants (Elephas Maximus) Reassure Others in Distress." PeerJ 2: e278. Pruetz, Jill, Kelly Boyer Ontl, Elizabeth Cleaveland, Stacy Lindshield, Joshua Marshack, and Erin Wessling. 2017. "Intragroup Lethal Aggression in West African Chimpanzees (Pan Troglodytes Verus): Inferred Killing of a Former Alpha Male at Fongoli, Senegal." International Journal of Primatology 38(1): 31–57. Quervel-Chaumette, Mylene, Viola Faerber, Tamás Faragó, Sarah Marshall-Pescini, and Friederike Range. 2016. "Investigating Empathy-Like Responding to Conspecifics' Distress in Pet Dogs." PLoS ONE 11(4): e0152920. Range, Friederike, Lisa Horn, Zsófia Viranyi, and Ludwig Huber. 2009. "The Absence of Reward Induces Inequity Aversion in Dogs." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106(1): 340–45. Reggente, Melissa, Filipe Alves, Cátia Nicolau, Luís Freitas, Daniele Cagnazzi, Robin Baird, and Paolo Galli. 2016. "Nurturant Behavior toward Dead Conspecifics in FreeRanging Mammals: New Records for Odontocetes and a General Review." Journal of Mammalogy, May, gyw089. Rowlands, Mark. 2012. Can Animals Be Moral? New York: Oxford University Press. Rudolf von Rohr, Claudia, Carel van Schaik, Alexandra Kissling, and Judith Burkart. 2015. "Chimpanzees' Bystander Reactions to Infanticide." Human Nature 26 (2): 143–60. Rutledge-Prior, Serrin. 2019. "Moral Responsiveness and Nonhuman Animals: A Challenge to Kantian Morality." Ethics & the Environment 24 (1): 45–76. Sánchez–Hernández, Paula, Anastasia Krasheninnikova, Javier Almunia, and Miguel Molina–Borja. Forthcoming. "Social Interaction Analysis in Captive Orcas (Orcinus Orca)." Zoo Biology. DOI: 10.1002/zoo.21502 Schwing, Raoul, Ximena Nelson, Amelia Wein, and Stuart Parsons. 2017. "Positive Emotional Contagion in a New Zealand Parrot." Current Biology 27(6): R213–14. Seed, Amanda, Nicola Clayton, and Nathan Emery. 2007. "Postconflict Third-Party Affiliation in Rooks, Corvus Frugilegus." Current Biology 17(2): 152–58. Špinka, Marek, Ruth Newberry, and Marc Bekoff. 2001. "Mammalian Play: Training for the Unexpected." The Quarterly Review of Biology 76(2): 141–68. Spruijt, Berry, Johan van Hooff, and Willem Gispen. 1992. "Ethology and Neurobiology of Grooming Behavior." Physiological Reviews 72(3): 825–52. Tomasello, Michael. 2016. A Natural History of Human Morality. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. Ueno, Hiroshi, Shunsuke Suemitsu, Shinji Murakami, Naoya Kitamura, Kenta Wani, Yosuke Matsumoto, Motoi Okamoto, and Takeshi Ishihara. 2019. "Helping-Like Behaviour in Mice Towards Conspecifics Constrained Inside Tubes." Scientific Reports 9(1): 5817. 27 Uvnäs-Moberg, Kerstin, Ingemar Arn, and David Magnusson. 2005. "The Psychobiology of Emotion: The Role of the Oxytocinergic System." International Journal of Behavioral Medicine 12(2): 59–65 Warneken, Felix, and Michael Tomasello. 2006. "Altruistic Helping in Human Infants and Young Chimpanzees." Science 311(5765): 1301–3. Wascher, Claudia, and Thomas Bugnyar. 2013. "Behavioral Responses to Inequity in Reward Distribution and Working Effort in Crows and Ravens." PLoS ONE 8(2): e56885. Wascher, Claudia, Isabella Scheiber, and Kurt Kotrschal. 2008. "Heart Rate Modulation in Bystanding Geese Watching Social and Non-Social Events." Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences 275(1643): 1653–59. Watanabe, Shigeru, and Kunihiko Ono. 1986. "An Experimental Analysis of 'Empathic' Response: Effects of Pain Reactions of Pigeon upon Other Pigeon's Operant Behavior." Behavioural Processes 13(3): 269–77. Zahn-Waxler, Carolyn, Marian Radkerrow, Elizabeth Wagner, and Michael Chapman. 1992. "Development of Concern for Others." Developmental Psychology 28(1): 126-36.

IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 International Journal of Digital Publication Technology Learning Organizations and Their Role in Achieving Organizational Excellence in the Palestinian Universities Mazen J. Al Shobaki1,a, Samy S. Abu Naser1,b, Youssef M. Abu Amuna1,c, Amal A. Al hila2,d 1Department of Information Technology, Al-Azhar University, Gaza, Palestine 2Department of Management and Financial Business, Palestine Technical College, Dair Al Balah, Palestine [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Abstract-The research aims to identify the learning organizations and their role in achieving organizational excellence in the Palestinian universities in Gaza Strip. The researchers used descriptive analytical approach and used the questionnaire as a tool for information gathering. The questionnaires were distributed to senior management in the Palestinian universities. The study population reached (344) employees in senior management is dispersed over (3) Palestinian universities. A stratified random sample of (182) workers from the Palestinian universities was selected and the recovery rate was (69.2%). Statistical analysis (SPSS) program was used for analysis and processing the data. The research found the following results: there is a fair degree of approval on "cognitive dimension", there is a high approval about the importance of "organizational dimension", there is moderately consent of the importance of "Community dimension", there is a large degree of consent about the importance of axis of the "leadership excellence", there is a large degree of consent about the importance of axis of the "service-excellence", there is a fair degree approval about the importance of the axis of "cognitive excellence", and there is a moderately consent of the importance of "Organizational Excellence". The research found a group of recommendations including: the need to develop appropriate strategies for the University, employ modern technology in information systems, in addition to provide appropriate environment that achieve learning organizations, develop technological infrastructure, adopt universities for knowledge management in the academic and administrative departments because knowledge is the core of the work of these departments, create technological incubators in universities to adopt excellence academic research projects, and protected them, support them, and market them. Establishing of centers of Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 40 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 excellence for scientific research in the university.The need for cooperation and coordination between local, Arab and international universities for the exchange of knowledge, information, and participation programs and training courses, as it provides an opportunity to develop the capabilities and skills of personnel and expertise. IndexTermsLearning organizations, organizational excellence, the Palestinian higher educational institutions, Palestinian universities, Gaza Strip. I. INTRODUCTION Many of the authors and researchers have discussed the special role of the university, and the need to work away from the economic forces that affect the quality of activity in the commercial sector, see for example: (Gilbert, 2001; Pister, 1999; Scott, 1998). There is a strong debate about the need for public sector support for the University to allow it, to some extent, to stay out of the competitive market. In any event, in this era of new liberalism, the emergence of private universities, and the need to ensure the educational value and keep the support of the public sector pushed management of universities and its various bodies to look for ways to create through it the value and test it and hold it in their institutions (Elloumi, 2004). In order for higher education institutions to compete efficiently in the markets they need to be characterized by its services to ensure customer satisfaction entering and leaving alike. The strong internal culture that valued enterprise customers can help improve the motivation of employees, creating loyalty, access to the high performance and achieve creativity; to achieve a competitive institutional advantage (Khan&Matalay, 2009). The higher education and university is the strategic balance of the movement of development in the community and directing its activities; to the fact that the cultural identity of any community built on the basis of the increase in this strategic balance and employed well at the desired level, It is looked at the university as an engine of inclusive and sustainable community development, that works to improve the quality of life financially and morally and to provide the conditions and the elements of precious life, so that it could bear the burdens of independent development and allowing it giving ample opportunities for the community in order to ensure a higher utilization of the fruits of development. The university is seeking towards the development of the spirit of social and professional responsibility as a general duty. Despite the recent emergence of the higher education system in Palestine, but it has made a remarkable development and progress rapidly, interest in the development of institutions of higher education has become a necessity, and desperately need to witnessing the current era of scientific and technological developments in various fields of science, where it will witness agreat attention at various levels in all countries of the world, it is developing for the better to keep up with the individual and society and the characteristics of scientific and technical age needs, and therefore is seen in university education based on the unique role it plays in the progress of societies and development through the preparation of technical, scientific, cultural and professional personnel. Based on this quest, researchers began to examine in a modern management topics, which form the focus of contemporary organizations in general and universities in particular, as are learning organizations of Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 41 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 modern management concepts, so universities should care for workers in senior management who have the experience, skill, knowledge and have multiple roles in scientific, humanitarian and social order to enhance and improved the quality of educational services provided by the community. Where these universities have provided an excellent example of progress in the knowledge of Palestinian society, and took the modern methods in order to keep up with the progress of Arab and foreign universities. II. RESEARCH PROBLEM The progress of nations and underdevelopment at the moment is measured by the extent of their interest in active university education due to its role in the overall development. The importance of the knowledge of higher education institutions became greater, and the duty of those institutions and quick successive regional variables and the global response despite the weakness of their ability to quickly respond and these represent a challenge. Change may be planned or randomly;nevertheless, it remains from essential operations and at the core of management. The administrative leaders should recognize that these changes have produced new structures of management concepts. Excellence in education is a dialectical concept, there is a need to be discussed and put frames for it because this will help to encourage excellence in higher education, and the development of reward systems for excellence, to identify the implications of these initiatives on the educational system (Raftery, 2006). Higher education need the culture that encourages creativity, that is trying to improve learning and teaching, to contribute to the development of pedagogy and curriculum, technological developments, and not vice versa (Hannan, 2005). This requires creativity to be rewarded appropriately, to be included within the benchmark for excellence in learning and teaching, and encourages, not humiliating the quality assurance processes. The practices of excellence in learning and teaching are fundamentally essential for higher education institutions that include the presence of the teacher is always to improve student learning (Raftery, 2006). (Al-Hajjar, 2004) confirmed the need to spread the concepts of total quality culture, and create a regulatory environment that promotes the overall quality. (AL-Dahshan, 2007) see that basic needs emerged that calls for the development of creativity in higher education, according to (the brain's ability to form new relationships in order to actually change), employ these new relationships in order to change reality. This can be bythe variety of basic programs for institutions of higher education and raise the value of community, and that this diversity leads to the realization of the principle of lifelong learning. III. RESEARCH QUESTIONS Q1:Does the Palestinian universities have the learning organization components (organizational dimension, the human dimension, the dimension of knowledge, societal dimension) from the perspective of senior management? Q2: What is the level of corporate excellence (Leadership Excellence, service sectors Excellence, and knowledge excellence) in the Palestinian universities from the perspective of senior management? Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 42 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 IV. RESEARCH VARIABLES Independent variables: learning organization which consisting of 4 main dimensions, namely: 1. Organizational dimension covers (organizational structure, technological infrastructure, The strategy) 2. Human dimension which includes (Strategic Command, Teams / Committees) 3. Cognitive dimension which includes (knowledge management, continuing education, scientific research, institutional culture) 4. Community dimension covers (strategic partnerships and alliances, keep up with the labor market, consulting, training, social responsibility, technological incubators) The dependent variable: Organizational Excellence and consists of 3 main dimensions, namely: 1. Leadership Excellence 2. Service Sectors Excellence 3. Knowledge Excellence Research assumes The first main hypothesis: There is no statistically significant role for learning organizations in achieving organizational excellence from the perspective of the senior management of the Palestinian universities in Gaza Strip. The second main hypothesis: There are no statistically significant differences between the mean responses of the respondents about the components of learning organizations and achieving organizational excellence attributed to the name of the university. V. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES This research aims to achieve the following objectives: 1. Identify the concepts and applications of learning organizations, and its importance for universities to excellence in performance management in addition to the recognition of corporate excellence. 2. Outline the relationship between the learning management and knowledge management and its availability in the university senior management. 3. Clarify the application of the concept of learning organization in thePalestinian universities. 4. Identify the extent to which the Palestinian universities have the components of learning organization from the perspective of senior management. 5. Determine the level of corporate excellence in the Palestinian universities from the perspective of senior management. 6. Detect the challenges that face to the universities, what are the features that must be available in the universities to shift to Excellence. 7. Disclosure of the role of the learning organization components (organizational dimension, the human dimension, the dimension of knowledge, and community dimension) in organizational excellence in the Palestinian universities from the perspective of senior management. 8. Detect whether there are statistical significant differences between the Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 43 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 mean scores of estimation of members of senior management about the axes of research according to the name of the university. VI. RESEARCH IMPORTANCE 1. Highlight the theoretical importance of this study is to clarify the role of the learning organization in the Palestinian universities. 2. This study is important as this issue is modern, scientific, practical and distinct. 3. Clarify the concepts and practices of learning organization to shift from administrative weakness to organizational excellence, and perhaps the Arab universities more vulnerable than ever, and even more in need from the advanced universities themselves to the concepts of management and methods of scientific rational sophisticated tools and technology to achieve the desired development through institutional development at the level of both the university and the activities and sectors that are dependent on empowerment, information, and knowledge management. 4. Providing scientific and practical recommendations for Palestinian universities as learning organizations. 5. Draw the attention of Palestinian university management to the importance of the practice of organizational excellence because of its role in the institutional development of the academic performance and raise the profile of the university at the local and regional level. 6. Provide scientific and practical recommendations for Palestinian universities to help them to achieve organizational excellence. VII. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS Place limit: the study was conducted in the universities of Gaza Strip, namely (Islamic University, Al-Azhar University, and AlAqsa University). Human limit: The research was conducted at the senior management in the universities of Gaza Strip. Time Limit: The research has been conducted and preliminary data collection was during the year (2017). Subject (Academic) Limit: The research was limited on مearning organizations and their role in achieving organizational excellence from the perspective of the senior management of the Palestinian universities in the Gaza Strip. VIII. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Researchers used analytical descriptive approach which is a scientific approach that commensurate with the nature of the research. IX. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK A. Learning organizations Learning organizations as stated by (Marqwardt, 2002), itdepend onagroup of method of learning, management exert effort on improving their ability to cope and use knowledge, allowingpersons to learn within and out of the organization, and the usage of suitable technology for the organizational learning and manufacturing. It was specified by (Garvin et al, 2008) that the place where the employeeoutrivals in the formation, acquirement, knowledge relocation, and it Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 44 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 contains three rudimentarycomponents: the interiorcaring environment to learn, practices and performs to learn, and the conduct of a leadership that cares and improves learning. The association that fulfills the situations that set it apart from the other standardassociations by: educational leadership, educational restructuring, permittingemployees to take part and move compliantly and efficiently, embrace a contribution strategy, providing chances for the interchange of knowledge, information, strategy and culture (Bryan, 2009). The association that improves strategies, policies, structures, mechanisms of action is merely a learning organization targeting to improve the capability of management to embrace the operations of the organization with the modifications and dares, in addition toattain its aimspositively to sustenance and inspireendless learning processes, selfimprovement, and the interchange of proficiencies and skillinside and outside, collective learning effective knowledge management, and the usage of suitable technology in learning and knowledge allocation (Abu-khodaier, 2006). The learning organization is the situations that fixed it to one side from other standard establishments where: endless learning is accessible, enquiry and discourse, collaboration and cooperative learning, enabling of employees to a shared vision, the improvement of the gaining and postlearning systems, connecting the organization to the outside environment, strategic command (Abdel-Fattah, 2013). B. Organizational Excellence Excellence concept of a complete and comprehensive is inseparable, in the sense that it cannot portray the characterizationof an organization in a particular area, while the performance breaks down in other areas, equilibrium and tangles marked by two characteristics of excellence in the various sectors of the Organization, which includes the two dimensions of modern management axes and they are the real administration should pursuit of excellence, and the other that everything that comes out from management such as business, decisions, and adopted systems and events characterized by excellence, and the two dimensions are complementary, and they are two sides of the same coin, no one without the other is achieved (AL-Selmi, 2002). (Shawqiand AL-kharsha, 2008) define Excellence as quality process of the practices include self-evaluation to improve the effectiveness of the organization, its competitive position, the flexibility to work within it, the participation of all the users in each section of the organization to work together through the understanding of all activities, work to remove the errors, and to improve the process towards achieving excellence. X. PREVIOUS STUDIES Study of (Erdem et al., 2014), which aimed to test the level of the relationship between learning organizations and job satisfaction among workers in primary schools. The study found the most important results of that job satisfaction for teacher's level was acceptable and there were no statistically significant differences depending on (gender, specialty, the size of the organization, and length of service). There is a positive relationship between job satisfaction and dimensions of learning organizations at a moderate level. Study of (Ibrahim, 2014) that aimed to identify how the perception of managers and heads of departments in the bank as learning Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 45 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 organization. Determine the nature of the relationship between learning organization and behavior of teams. Determine the level of discrepancy between the application and the learning organization variables and application behaviors teams. Test the achieved relationship between learning organization (shared cultural values, communication, knowledge transfer, personnel) and the characteristics and behaviors of work teams (coordination, cooperation, sharing of information, the team's performance). The study reached the following results: cultural values were not at a high nor effective level, in addition to the lack of communication with the external environment and its dependence often on the intercom as well as a lack of environmental monitoring operations which creates a gap between the institution and the environment, as follows knowledge transfer policy but faces some weaknesses. The bank enjoys a spirit of cooperation and information sharing between members of the same team, along with the presence of aid among themselves and their dependence principle of brainstorming between the team members. There is a correlation between the impact of the learning organization and behavior of teams. Study of (Abu-Kaoud and Rababah, 2013)aimed to identify the availability of the critical success factors in the Jordanian pharmaceutical companies. And to identify the levels of organizational excellence in the Jordanian pharmaceutical companies dimensions. The research found the most important results of the availability of the success of (the focus on the consumer factors, organization, technology and information systems strategy, enabling intellectual capital) came high, and perceptions of respondents about organizational excellence (leadership excellence, structure excellence, service excellence, organizational culture excellence) were high. Study of (Greiling & Halachm, 2013), which aimed to reach a large role in the expansion of the size and scope of accountability in learning organizations, and the extent of the government's response to the continuous improvement and development efficiently and effectively. The study found a group of the most important results that accountability in learning organizations working to improve organizational learning in the long term. Ongoing accountability means next government reports to make sure that the institution is working the right way. Service-tasks must take into consideration when designing organizations focusing on social responsibility in the long run. Study of (Hussein, 2012) that aimed to demonstrate the availability of learning organization characteristics in the Egyptian private universities. Monitor and analyze the views of faculty members working in a private university about the availability of learning organization properties at that institution. The study found the most important results of that there are statically significant differences in the perceptions of the teaching staff of the importance of learning organization characteristics, the importance of organizational factors, cultural support for the concept of the learning organization in the private university depending on their demographics variables, and depending on the variant of: (length of service, age). There are no statistically significant differences in perceptions of the teaching staff of the importance of learning organization characteristics and the importance of organizational and cultural factors in support of the application of the concept of learning organization in the October 6 University Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 46 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 depending on the variant of: (gender, educational qualification, and the faculty). Study of (AL-Hilali and Gabor, 2012)aimed to recognize the concept of management excellence and its most important characteristics. Learn about the application of excellence in institutions of higher education management requirements, and the most important challenges. The study found the most important results of that there is a statistically significant difference between the degree of importance and the degree of availability in the axis (leadership, strategic planning, customer focus, knowledge and innovation management, involvement of employees, focusing on processes, organizational culture) was in favor of importance. Furthermore, effective leadership plays a pivotal role in shaping the goals and objectives of the institution. XI. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND PROCEDURES A. Research Methodology: Depending on the nature of the research and the objectives sought by this study are based on the deductive analytical approach; for it is the right approach that achieves the objectives of the study. It is based on the monitoring, precision of the phenomenon or event and following a certain quantity or quality way in a given period of time or several periods, in order to identify the phenomenon or event in terms of content, and accessing to the results and generalizations will help in the understanding of reality and develop it. B. Population and study sample: The study population is the entire vocabulary phenomenon studied by researchers, who have been the subject of the study problem. Based on the subject of the study, its problem, and objectives the targeted community may be define in all employees from senior management in the universities of Gaza Strip (the Islamic University and Al-Azhar University, AlAqsa University), and the total number of senior management in the universities of the study of the Year (2017) are (344) employees. The researchers used a sample stratified random approach, the total number of senior management was (182) employees. An exploratory sample of (30) questionnaires were distributed to test the internal consistency, honesty constructivist, and the stability of the questionnaire. After making sure of the validity and integrity of the questionnaire for the test (135) questionnaires were distributed to senior management, and the return rate was 69.2%. Table No. 1 shows the distribution of the population and the study sample in the three universities under study. Table 1: Distribution of population and study sample Source: prepared by researchers depending on the surveyed universities statistics 2017 C. Research sample characteristics: Sn . The University Study Sample Study population 1. Islamic University 60 114 2. Al-Azhar University 61 115 3. Al-Aqsa University 61 115 Total 182 344 Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 47 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 The statistical description of the sample according to the characteristics and demographic variables: The following are the characteristics of the sample according to the workplace and the educational qualification and length of service in the universities under study. Table2: The statistical description of the sample according to the characteristics and Demographic Variables (n = 135) Demographic Variables Study Sample Tota l % Place of work Islamic University 52 38. 5 Al-Azhar University 37 27. 4 Al-Aqsa University 46 34. 1 Qualificati on PhD degree 47 34.8 MS degree 63 46.7 BS degree 25 18.5 Years of service Less than 5 years 6 4.4 From 5 to 9 years 23 17. 0 From 10 to 15 years 54 40. 0 More than 15 52 38. years 5 Table 2 shows (38.5%) of the study sample work at the Islamic University, (27.4%) working at Al-Azhar University, and (34.1%) working in the Al-Aqsa University. The researchers explains this increase in the study sample of the Islamic University for several reasons: notably that the Islamic University offers the largest number of academic programs compared to universities in the Gaza Strip, and that the number of students is greater than the rest of the universities, this request the presence of a larger number of workers to meet the various academic programs and student needs. (34.8%) of the study sample hold the doctorate degree, (46.7%) hold master's degrees, and (18.5%) hold bachelor degrees. The researchers explain the increase in the number belonging to the senior of scientific qualifications to the fact that the nature of undergraduate majors and standards of the National Authority for quality and quality related to the adoption of programs require a high degree, it is clear from the fact that the largest category is PhDs degrees. (4.4%) of the study sample was the year of service, working less than five years, (17.0%) ranged from years of service in the work between (5-9 years), (40.0%) for years of service ranged between (10-14 years), and (38.5%) years of service was more than 15 years. It is clear that the largest proportion of senior management are those who exceeded their service years (10) years, which demonstrates the adoption of the universities in the selection of senior management on years of service. D. Reliability Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 48 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 Reliability of questionnaire means that the questionnaire gives the same result if it is redistributed more than once under the same circumstances, terms, and conditions, or in other words reliability means the questionnaire results do not change dramatically if they were re-distributed to individuals several times during certain time periods. The reliability of a questionnaire was checked through the alpha Cronbach's coefficient. The following table shows that: Table 3: shows the reliability coefficient (Alpha Cronbach's method) N . Dimensions Alpha Cronbac h Intrins ic Vali dity 1. Organizational dimension 0.767 0.876 2. Human dimension 0.774 0.880 3. Cognitive dimension 0.771 0.878 4. Community dimension 0.771 0.878 5. Organizational Excellence 0.760 0.872 We conclude from the tests of validity and reliability results that the search tool (questionnaire), is valid to measure for what it was developed to measure, and it is stable with a very high degree, which qualifies it as measuring instrument to be suitable and effective for this study, and can be applied with confidence, so that the questionnaire is finalized. E. Statistical methods: To analyze the data and achieve the objectives of the research that has been assembled, computers have been used to analyze and process the data through many appropriate statistical methods using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). The following is a set of statistical methods used in data analysis: SMA in order to find out how high or low the sample responses from the default average (3) for each phrase from basic research variables phrases. The use of standard deviation (Standard Deviation) to identify the extent of the deviation members search for each phrase of the search phrases variables, and each part of the main parts of the arithmetic average of all responses. Alpha Cronbach's test to ensure the stability of the questionnaire. - (t) Test of the average for one sample to know the difference between the average and the default average of the paragraph (neutral) "3." Pearson correlation to find the Content Validity of the questionnaire. Multiple regression tests to find the impact of the independent variables on the dependent variables. - (One Way ANOVA test) to test the differences between the responses of the respondents. XII. TEST OF SEARCH QUESTIONS Answer to the Q1: Does the Palestinian universities have the learning organization components (organizational dimension, the human dimension, the dimension of knowledge, societal dimension) from the perspective of senior management? 1. Analysis of the paragraphs of the field components of learning organizations Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 49 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 associated with the organizational dimension: A. Organizational structure: T test was used per sample, and the results are shown in Table 4, which shows the views of the study sample in the paragraphs of the first axis members (organizational structure). Table 4: shows the first paragraphs of the axis of the organizational dimension analysis (organizational structure) No . Axis SM A SMA relativ e standar d deviati on Value of t test Probabili ty value (Sig) Ranki ng 1. The organizational structure of the University fits the nature of their activities 3.7 73.8 0.696 11.498 0.000 1 2. The organizational structure defines the lines of authority clearly. 3.6 71.6 0.868 7.735 0.000 2 3. The organizational structure of the university supports the principle of delegation of authority. 3.3 66.6 0.954 4.059 0.000 4 4. The development of the organizational structure in line with the environmental changes and developments 3.4 67.0 1.01 4.006 0.000 3 5. Employees are involved in policy-making 2.9 57.4 0.896 -1.729 0.086 5 All paragraphs 3.4 68.4 0.773 6.265 0.000 The researchers draw from the previous table, the following: Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 50 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 The paragraph "the organizational structure of the University fits the nature of their activities", got the first place in this axis. The researchers attribute this to the clarity of the authority lines, the organizational structure in the Palestinian universities depend on the mandate, as there are clear mechanisms for coordinating work between the different jobs. Paragraph "Employees are involved in policy-making" came in the last place to be a negative response. The researchers attribute that to the fact that universities follow the supervision of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education, with the knowledge that the body that sets operational policies at universities is senior management, which reflected negatively on their attitudes. Study sample opinions are in agreement about the importance of organizational structure as the centerpiece of the regulatory components, and received a large consent. The researchers attribute that to the importance of organizational structure, as it provides universities the opportunities for the integration of processes within the university, facilitate communication, communication, collaboration, and the formation of relationships, in addition to giving some flexibility which contributes in enabling the universities to keep abreast of developments and global changes and this is evident through the follow-up of the evolution of the universities organizational structure, as periodically updated in accordance with the requirements by changes in the surrounding environment. This result is consistent with the findings of the study of (Berrio, 2006) which showed an attempt to build its entity, and achieve its goals in order to survive, to be stable, and continue to work. The university should begin the process of organizational transformation aiming to reach to the process of distinct learning through: development of a shared vision and organizational culture of learning within the organization, building a strong and effective strategy to build a learning organization, the establishment of a structure capable of implementing that strategy, and the application of transformational leadership styles among decision makers to reach high levels of motivation and performance. B. Technological infrastructure: T test was used per sample, and the results are shown in Table 5, which shows the views of the study sample in paragraphs of the axis (technological infrastructure). Table 5: The second axis shows the analysis of the organizational dimension (technological infrastructure) No. Axis SM A SMA relativ e standar d deviatio n Value of t test Probabili ty value (Sig) Rankin g 1. The technology used to provide the necessary information in decisionmaking 3.7 73.8 0.9 9.045 0.000 3 Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 51 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 The researchers draw from the previous table, the following: Paragraph "Communication system available facilitates the performance of electronic services for the beneficiaries," got the first place in this axis. The researchers attribute this to the keenness of the Palestinian universities to keep up with technological development through the use of technologies and programs that will strengthen the institutional work, which makes its competitive position always in the lead. Paragraph "The University provides protection programs that are characterized by safety and privacy", got the last place. The researchers attribute that to the development of technology and the means of information storage, sharing in different ways, or so-called transfer of data across the network from one location to another, where the security of such data and information is very important, so the Palestinian universities are seeking to provide protection of information from risk, threat or attack, and by providing the necessary tools and means to protect the information and to prevent the arrival of the information into the hands of unauthorized persons to use it. The study sample agreed about the importance of "technological infrastructure" as the centerpiece of the regulatory components, and received a large proportion of consent. the researchers attribute that the technological infrastructure has become one of the basic resources to be invested in by the Palestinian universities, so as to automate the administrative and academic work, and raise the level of performance of the administrative configurations, as is the standard level of use of the technology of the basic criteria for measuring the administrative and academic progress for any university. This result is consistent with the findings of the study of (Al-karimin et al., 2014) where the technological infrastructure got a moderate approval rate (3.41) and it showed that the availability of infrastructure positively affects the development of work and improve performance. 2. The University provides protection programs that are characterized by safety and privacy 3.5 70.6 1.0 6.115 0.000 5 3. Technological facilities are available at the university to create and share knowledge 3.7 73.4 0.9 8.254 0.000 4 4. There is a network helping to speed the completion of the work 3.7 74.6 1.1 7.846 0.000 2 5. Communication system available facilitates the performance of electronic services for the beneficiaries 3.8 76 0.9 9.839 0.000 1 All paragraphs 3.7 73.7 0.9 9.006 0.000 Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 52 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 C. Strategy: T test was used per sample, and the results are shown in Table 6, which shows the views of the study sample in paragraphs of the axis (Strategy). Table 6: illustrates the analysis of the third axis of the organizational dimension (Strategy) No . Axis SMA SMA relativ e standar d deviatio n Value of t test Probabili ty value (Sig) Rankin g 1. The university has a clear strategy for facing the future 3.56 71.2 1.214 5.319 0.000 4 2. Staff at the university participate in the development of the University's mission and goals 3.51 70.2 1.125 5.277 0.000 5 3. I have a clear knowledge of the university mission and objectives 3.72 74.4 1.063 7.857 0.000 1 4. The follow-up implementation of the strategic plan for the University periodically 3.64 72.8 1.116 6.709 0.000 3 5. The mission Reflect of the university mission of the Ministry of Education and Higher Education 3.68 73.6 1.111 7.129 0.000 2 6. The vision and mission of the university depend on the environmental analysis 3.23 64.6 0.954 2.798 0.006 7 7. Corrective decisions for the performance of the university in light of the 3.36 67.2 1.012 4.168 0.000 6 Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 53 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 evaluation results are taken All paragraphs 3.53 70.6 0.913 6.733 0.000 The researchers draw from the previous table, the following: Paragraph "I have a clear knowledge of the university mission and objectives" came in the first place; the researchers attribute that to the post of senior management in the development of the university's vision and mission. The study sample sees the vision and mission of the university depends moderately on the environmental analysis. The researchers attribute this to the adoption of environmental analysis on traditional methods such as: (personal experience, questionnaires, etc.). Paragraph "The vision and mission of the university depend on the environmental analysis" came in the last rank; the researchers attribute that to the unstable circumstances experienced by the State of Palestine in general and Gaza strip in particular. The study sample views agreed on the importance of the axis "strategy" as regulatory components, and received a large proportion of consent. The researchers attribute that the Palestinian universities senior management to the adoption and support of the strategic planning approach because they desire to bring about change and development, to achieve comprehensive development, to follow-up of the educational process and development, to contribute to the harmony between education and society in order to bridge the gap between them, and to achieve integration in the educational process. This result agree with the study of (Berrio, 2006) which showed that the university should begin the process of organizational transformation to reach to the process of distinct learning through: development of a shared vision and organizational culture of learning within the organization, building a strong and effective strategy to build a learning organization, the establishment of the structure that is able to carry out that strategy, and the application of transformational leadership styles of decision-makers to reach high levels of motivation and performance. It also agrees with the study of (Abu-Kaoud and Rababah, 2013) that the availability of the critical success factors of (focus on consumer, organizational strategy, technology and information systems, and enabled intellectual capital) got high approval. 2. Analysis of the paragraphs of the field components of learning organizations associated with the human dimension: A. Strategic Leadership: T test was used per sample, and the results are shown in Table 7, which shows the views of the study sample in paragraphs of axis (Strategic Leadership). Table 7: shows the first paragraphs of the axis of the human dimension analysis (Strategic Leadership) Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 54 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 N o. Axis SMA SMA relativ e standar d deviatio n Value of t test Probabili ty value (Sig) Ranki ng 1. The university senior management focused on attracting and recruiting talented employees. 3.41 68.2 0.957 5.035 0.000 4 2. The university senior management is keen on solving personnel problems 3.31 66.2 0.996 3.629 0.000 5 3. The university senior management supports openness among employees and share information 3.45 69 0.975 5.384 0.000 2 4. University senior management encourages employees to make initiatives to improve performance 3.44 68.8 1.019 4.982 0.000 3 5. The university senior management provides programs that improve the skills and abilities of employees 3.51 70.2 0.961 6.18 0.000 1 6. The university senior management provide encouraging incentives to attract excellent human resources 2.99 59.8 1.004 -0.086 0.932 6 7. Incentives and rewards of employees at the university are linked to 2.91 58.2 0.958 -1.078 0.283 8 Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 55 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 level of their performance 8. Employees involved in the selection of leaders at the university 2.95 59 1.108 -0.544 0.588 7 All paragraphs 3.25 65 0.83 3.65 0.001 The researchers draw from the previous table, the following: Paragraph "The University senior management provides programs that improve the skills and abilities of employees" came in the first place. This is due to the attention of university senior managements to provide all the necessary programs to improve the performance of employees through specialized training programs. Paragraph "Incentives and rewards of employees at the university are linked to level of their performance" came in the last place. The researchers attributed this to the lack of a list of incentives in addition to the fact that most of the incentives and rewards granted randomly according to personal bias and considerations, so it should work on linking incentives and rewards system based on the level of achievement. Study sample agreed about the importance of the axis of "strategic leadership" as one of the human components, and got the approval of the proportion of medium. The researchers attribute that to the importance of strategic leadership; because it is considered a critical component in the development of educational institutions, reach to leadership through its role clearly in the implementation of the university's strategy in a changing and volatile business environment by enhancing the role of employees depending on both styles of reward and punishment to motivate them, where the Strategic leadership is the source of creativity or inertia, and this depends to a great extent on what is owned by the strategic leader of the vision for the future in light of the internal variables. This result is consistent with the study of Hussein (2012) where it got in response to the high level of owning property in support of strategic leadership for learning at the University of October 6 for a mean (3.1). B. Teams / Committees: T test was used for each sample and the results are shown in Table 8, which shows the views of the research sample in paragraphs of axis (teams / committees). Table 8: The second axis shows the analysis of the human dimension (teams / committees) No. Axis SM A SMA relativ e standar d deviati on Value of t test Probabilit y value (Sig) Rankin g Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 56 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 1. Senior management provides opportunities for collaboration and teamwork 3.15 63.0 0.894 1.926 0.056 4 2. Senior management will form working teams from multiple organizational levels. 3.45 69.0 0.968 5.426 0.000 2 3. Team members have high professional skills appropriate to perform the work efficiently 3.46 69.2 0.929 5.747 0.000 1 4. The team is characterized by the ability to generate creative ideas at work 3.44 68.8 0.878 5.786 0.000 3 5. The university Senior management provides degrees of empowerment and freedom of action for teams 3.09 61.8 0.918 1.125 0.263 6 6. Teams trust that the administration will take its recommendations 3.15 63.0 0.842 2.044 0.043 4 All paragraphs 3.25 65.0 0.83 3.461 0.001 The researchers draw from the previous table, the following: Paragraph "Team members have high professional skills appropriate to perform the work efficiently" came in the first place due to the fact that team building foundations are subject to professional standards. Paragraph "The university senior management provides degrees of empowerment and freedom of action for teams" came in last place due to the existence of regulations control work teams and committees within the university. Study sample agreed about the importance of the axis "teams / committees" as one of the human components, and received a percentage of medium-approval. The researchers attribute that to the importance of working teams which give individuals experience and skills that will contribute to Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 57 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 improving the performance of their academic and administrative duties, in addition to improving relations and raise the level of job satisfaction among employees, through: the study of the problems, allowing the presentation of new ideas, and working teams to contribute to the principle of commitment of individuals in achieving the goals and participation in decisionmaking at the university. This result agrees with the study of (Ibrahim, 2014) which showed the enjoyment of the bank in a spirit of cooperation and information sharing between team members, also showed Bank enjoyment of the behaviors of the effective work teams, as agreed with the results of Hussein study (2012), where it got a medium in response to the level of owning property teams at the University of October 6 for a mean (3.1). It also agreed with the study (Aktar et al, 2013) which showed that the learning strategies and teams contribute to achieving competitive advantage. It also agreed with the study of (Erdem et al, 2014) where systemic thinking received approval by (3.22) and the extent of support learning teams received approval by (3.5). 3. Analysis of the paragraphs of the field components of learning organizations associated with the cognitive dimension: A. knowledge management: T test was used per sample, and the results are shown in Table 9, which shows the views of the research sample in paragraphs axis members (knowledge management). T test was used per sample, and the results are shown in Table 9, which shows the views of the research sample in paragraphs axis members (knowledge management). Table 9: shows an analysis of the paragraphs of the first axis of the dimension of knowledge (knowledge management) No . Axis SM A SMA relativ e standar d deviatio n Value of t test Probabili ty value (Sig) Ranki ng 1. The university senior management has a knowledge base to serve all departments and branches 3.71 74.2 1.139 7.256 0.000 1 2. The university senior management has documented and declared to the process of teaching and learning strategy 3.64 72.8 1.13 6.548 0.000 2 Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 58 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 The researchers draw from the previous table, the following: Paragraph "The university senior management has a knowledge base to serve all departments and branches." got first place in this axis. The researchers attribute this to the attention of the universities to develop cognitive abilities, and provide a database that facilitate the access of researchers and decision-makers to the intellectual and scientific production to take advantage of it. Paragraph "The University senior management is moving toward the purchase of knowledge that cannot be developed internally" got on the last rank with high degree of approval. Researchers think that because of the lack of scientific achievement of Palestinian researchers, universities resort to buy knowledge in many ways to get the knowledge from both inside or outside the university to keep up with the continuous developments including: (appointment of experts, or through applied research activities, or develop expertise available to employees, and the license through patents, the purchase of various information). Study sample views agreed on the importance of the axis of the "knowledge management" as one of the cognitive components, and received a large proportion of consent. The researchers attribute that to the fact that knowledge is one of the university's assets that require effective management of their investment and participation among employees, and disseminated to remain available to help achieve permanent competitive advantage for universities, in addition to the fact that knowledge is the dominant on information technology and services markets, and it is source to improve many of the facilities and services. It also promotes knowledge of the university's ability to retain academic and administrative performance based on experience and knowledge and improvement, also it supports efforts to take advantage of all the assets to provide a framework for strengthening the organizational knowledge. This result is consistent with the 3. The university senior management supports the exchange of knowledge and experience process between employees. 3.61 72.2 1.166 6.052 0.000 3 4. The university senior management is moving toward the purchase of knowledge that cannot be developed internally 3.39 67.8 1.203 3.72 0.000 4 All paragraphs 3.59 71.8 1.087 6.254 0.000 Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 59 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 findings of the study of (Boukhamkham, 2009) which showed that organizations rely on knowledge than on the traditional elements of the performance, and it is necessary to measure knowledge capital as a source of excellence and value-based composition. Also it disagreed with the study of (Al-karimin et al., 2014) which showed that the degree of availability of knowledge management requirements were intermediate. B. Continuing Education: T test was used per sample, and the results are shown in Table 10, which shows the views of the research sample in paragraphs of axis (continuing education). Table 10: The second axis shows the analysis of the cognitive dimension (continuing education) No. Axis SM A SMA relativ e standar d deviatio n Value of t test Probabili ty value (Sig) Ranki ng 1. Availability of continuous training courses to improve the capabilities and skills of employee 3.70 74.0 1.18 6.857 0.000 1 2. University stimulate personnel management for continuous learning and creating new knowledge 3.61 72.2 1.222 5.774 0.000 2 3. Training programs at the university fit with the needs of the labor market 3.55 71.0 1.22 5.221 0.000 3 All paragraphs 3.62 72.4 1.14 6.248 0.000 The researchers draw from the previous table, the following: Paragraph "Availability of continuous training courses to improve the capabilities and skills of employee " got for first place in this axis. The researchers attribute this to the Palestinian university senior management's interest in developing the human element, and its dependence on the training courses mainly for the development of its staff by Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 60 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 providing rehabilitation programs and training to contribute to the development of capabilities and skills of employees. Paragraph "Training programs at the university fit with the needs of the labor market" got the last place with a relative weight (71%). The researchers attributed that to the fact that the training programs are developed and implemented in the light of the identification of training needs of employees, and appropriate to the changing needs of the labor market, and in light of the potential and the limited capabilities of universities under siege and successive wars. Study sample agreed on the importance of the axis of "continuing education" as one of the cognitive components and obtained a large proportion of consent. This is because we are in the knowledge explosion era need to have the ability to deal with problems, narrow the cultural gap and reconcile the values, attitudes, the requirements of the times, as well as contribute to continuing education to improve the ways and methods of performance of employees for their work, therefore increase their productivity, enable employees to keep up with scientific and technological progress, and knowledge of modern methods of work. It disagrees with Hussein study (2012) where it was found that the level of possession of the property as a dimension of continuous learning of the learning organization dimensions was average. C. Research: T test was used per sample, and the results are shown in Table 11, which shows the views of the study sample in paragraphs of axis (scientific research). Table 11: illustrates the analysis of third axis of the cognitive dimension (scientific research) No. Axis SMA SMA relativ e standar d deviatio n Value of t test Probabili ty value (Sig) Rankin g 1. The university senior management will hold conferences and study days, workshops, scientific seminars 3.69 73.8 0.988 8.097 0.000 1 2. The university senior management benefit from the results of research in the development work. 3.19 63.8 0.932 2.309 0.022 3 3. The university senior management provides a distinct research centers 2.81 56.2 0.956 -2.252 0.026 4 Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 61 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 according to disciplines of the departments 4. The university senior management supports the advancement of scientific research mechanisms 3.2 64 1.078 2.156 0.033 2 All paragraphs 3.22 64.4 0.823 3.134 0.002 The researchers draw from the previous table, the following: Paragraph "The university senior management will hold conferences and study days, workshops, scientific seminars" got the first place in this axis. This result is natural in light directed toward universities interact, learn, and exchange experiences and expertise, and through the data survey showed that Palestinian universities annually held many specialized scientific conferences in several scientific areas. Paragraph "The university senior management provides a distinct research centers according to disciplines of the departments" came on the last rank. The researchers believe the availability of research centers at universities under study, but they do not cover all disciplines, as well as the weakness of the budgets allocated to research centers and universities. Study sample agreed on the importance of the axis of "scientific research" as one of the cognitive components, and got the approval of the proportion of medium. The researchers attribute that the attention to scientific research in the Arab world in general is weak, due to the weakness allocated to scientific research in the Arab countries in general and Palestine in particular. One manifestation of the weakness that is the decided budgets are not spent, in addition to lack of interest in supporting the researchers and directing them towards the needs of the local community, and the lack of attention to the results of scientific research, which made the researchers less interested, and has become a concern in the scientific research of the door to get scientific promotions, and by reference to the experiences of the universities in the world such as University of Western Australia and the University of Manchester they focused on scientific research in their visions and values, and to be among the top universities in research in the world. This is consistent with the study (Radwan, 2013), which showed the need for emerging universities for most elements of developmental planning in the process of scientific research and the investment in community partnership, and the need of the emerging universities for many of the elements of success of scientific research. D. Corporate Culture: T test was used per sample, and the results are shown in Table 12, which shows the views of the study sample in paragraphs of axis (corporate culture). Table 12: illustrates the analysis of third axis of the cognitive dimension (corporate culture) Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 62 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 No. Axis SMA SMA relativ e standar d deviatio n Value of t test Probabili ty value (Sig) Rankin g 1. The university senior management working toward finding a positive culture to activate collective work 3.44 68.8 1.012 5.101 0.000 1 2. The university senior management interested in the principle of innovation and continuous improvement 3.36 67.2 0.95 4.349 0.000 3 3. Employees are involved in decision making related to the field of work 3.18 63.6 0.961 2.15 0.033 5 4. Form of cognitive behavioral management (such as knowledgeesteem, build knowledge, share knowledge) model for employees 3.27 65.4 0.916 3.383 0.001 4 5. The university senior management is keen to promote a culture of quality among employees 3.41 68.2 0.925 5.119 0.000 2 All paragraphs 3.33 66.6 0.831 4.618 0.000 The researchers draw from the previous table, the following: Paragraph "The university senior management working toward finding a positive culture to activate collective work" got the first place in this axis. The researchers believe that teamwork is an opportunity to take advantage of all the skills and experience of its employees. It also develops the capacity of individuals to achieve the goals and act in a positive way; to become prevalent culture in the university. Paragraph "Employees are involved in decision making related to the field of work" got the last rank. This is due to the fact that decisions often in universities are centralized, but Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 63 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 the involvement of employees in decision-making makes the decision more stable and acceptable to the employees, in addition to achieving mutual trust between senior management and employees, and increase the sense of working responsibility and understanding of the goals of their universities, and raises the morale of employees. Study sample agreed about the importance of the axis of "institutional culture" as one of the cognitive components and got the approval of the proportion of medium. The researchers attribute that the institutional culture is considered a guide to senior management and employees; they constitute models of behavior and relationships that must be guided by them, guiding their thinking and their efforts to achieve the university and its mission objectives, they also have a significant impact in motivating and empowering employees, which will reflect positively or negatively on the outputs, thus culture is the observer of employees behaviors inside and outside the university. So the university should reduce the negative effects and strengthen the positive effects that strengthen the institutional culture that achieve excellence. This is in line with the results of a study of (Sharma &Talwar, 2007) which showed that the external environment is integrated with the culture and working environment, and supports assure the success of the leadership, culture, and shared values that facilitate the removal of obstacles, and facilitate the flow of knowledge, information, and services for those involved, and satisfy the various parties and contributes to knowledge in reducing problems. It agreed with the results of a study of (Khadra&Rawabdeh, 2006) that the concept of the learning organization can be illustrated in the industrial corporate environment in Jordan through eight elements: supportive organizational culture, leadership, strategic planning, organizational structure vertical, knowledge management system, the system returns, and performance appraisal system). 4. Analysis of the paragraphs of the field components of learning organizations associated with societal dimension: A. Strategic partnerships and alliances: T test was used per sample, and the results are shown in Table 13, which shows the views of the study sample in paragraphs of axis (strategic partnerships and alliances). Table 13: illustrates the analysis of first paragraphs of the axis of the societal dimension (strategic partnerships and alliances) No. Axis SMA SMA relativ e standar d deviatio n Value of t test Probabili ty value (Sig) Rankin g 1. The university senior management uses a clear methodology in the social partnership 3.41 68.2 0.813 5.822 0.000 3 2. The university senior management hold cooperation agreements with various universities 3.76 75.2 1.143 7.683 0.000 1 Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 64 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 and institutions 3. University invests media and event management to support the partnership with the community. 3.42 68.4 0.98 4.832 0.000 2 All paragraphs 3.52 70.4 0.883 6.885 0.000 The researchers draw from the previous table, the following: Paragraph "The university senior management holds cooperation agreements with various universities and institutions" got first place in this axis. The researchers attribute this to the keenness of the Palestinian universities to strengthen cultural relations, scientific, research, and expand communication and cooperation frameworks, strengthening the links between universities. Paragraph "The university senior management uses a clear methodology in the social partnership" got the last rank. The researchers attributed the reason for this to the attention of universities to improve the quality of the educational process through the activation of the role of community participation that lead to a full understanding and great potential in dealing with problems, and ensure the continued participation and success of the change, and develop a sense of responsibility. Study sample views agreed about the importance of the axis of "strategic partnerships and alliances" as a community-based components, and received a large proportion of consent. The researchers attribute that to the fact that educational institutions are generally required to integrate with the community and interact with its institutions, through the establishment of continuous mechanisms for cooperation and information exchange between various universities and institutions of society to participate actively, and capacity building of trained and qualified, take advantage of scientific expertise in various disciplines, add to that the partnerships make universities connect with a real development in society, contribute to the search for solutions to the problems they face, contributes to solving the problem of university funding, and increase efficiency, in addition to highlighting the scientists and innovators. The result of this study disagree with the results of (Radwan, 2013), where it was the most important problems facing the emerging universities is holding partnerships with international expertise with relative weight (67%). B. Keep up with the labor market: T test was used per sample, and the results are shown in Table 14, which shows the views of the study sample in paragraphs of axis (keep up with the labor market). Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 65 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 Table 14: The second axis shows the analysis of the societal dimension (keep up with the labor market) No. Axis SMA SMA relativ e standar d deviatio n Value of t test Probabili ty value (Sig) Rankin g 1. The evolution of the university senior management plans to keep up with the needs of renewable society 3.43 67.8 0.981 5.086 0.000 2 2. The university senior management provides the community with qualified workforce 3.47 69.4 1.013 5.351 0.000 1 3. Admission policy in the university fits the requirements and needs of the labor market 3.43 68.6 1.033 4.831 0.000 3 All paragraphs 3.44 68.8 0.928 5.531 0.000 The researchers draw from the previous table, the following: Paragraph "The University senior management provides the community with qualified workforce" came in the first place in this axis. The researchers attribute that to the keenness of the Palestinian universities on the harmonization of outputs and labor market needs through reciprocal relationship and partnership between the production sectors and institutions of higher education, in addition to solicit the views of the local community about the disciplines that intend to open and examine the need for them, which are among the criteria that interest the Palestinian national commission for quality assurance. Paragraph "Admission policy in the university fits the requirements and needs of the labor market," got the last place. This is because of the unified admission policy in most universities, they are subject to the standards of the Palestinian Ministry of Education and Higher Education, but we find that there is a relatively higher in some disciplines over other disciplines like technical, because the community has inferior look to these disciplines. Study sample agreed on the importance of the axis of the "keep up with the labor market" as community-based components, and received a large proportion of approval to some extent. The researchers attribute that to the characteristic that explains this era as the rapid change in all scopes of life until it became known as the era of revolutions, information technology, and Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 66 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 communications. These rapid changes produced with an urgent need for the universities to work to keep up with an ongoing basis; to be able to catch up with the top universities at least, and meet the needs of the labor market. These vary with the result of the findings of the report of (State Planning Department, 2012) which showed general dissatisfaction among employers for graduates working skills, and disciplines offered by the universities need to modified with a relative weight (74%), and that their contribution in the drafting of academic programs was weak with relative weight of (63.9%). C. Consulting and Training: T test was used per sample, and the results are shown in Table 15, which shows the views of the study sample in paragraphs of axis (consulting and training). Table 15: illustrates the analysis third axis of the societal dimension (consulting and training) No. Axis SMA SMA relativ e standar d deviatio n Value of t test Probabili ty value (Sig) Rankin g 1. The university senior management offers vocational training programs that support community development 3.43 68.6 0.919 5.434 0.000 1 2. The university senior management contributing to the provision of consulting services to solve the problems of society 3.22 64.4 0.959 2.691 0.008 2 3. The university senior management relies on experts and consultants to improve its services 3.09 61.8 0.758 1.363 0.175 3 All paragraphs 3.25 65 0.77 3.729 0.000 The researchers draw from the previous table, the following: Paragraph "The University senior management offers vocational training programs that support community development" got the first place in this axis. The researchers attribute Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 67 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 this to the desire of universities to link the various educational institutions of the society, and contribute to the professional and career development of local community institutions with globally acceptable standards. Paragraph "The university senior management relies on experts and consultants to improve its services," got the last place. The researchers attributed that to the limited possibilities in the Palestinian universities on the nature of the indoor environment, and the blockade, and the difficulty of knowledge exchange, which limits the ability of universities to benefit from the experience and knowledge accumulated by the experts and consultants. There was consensus among the study sample members about the importance of the axis on "consulting and training" as a community-based components, and received a percentage of medium consent. The researchers attribute that to the fact that consulting and training institutions contribute to solving problems, working to increase awareness among the local community, provide the opportunity to benefit from the diverse expertise, and enhance the competitiveness of universities through the development of their working systems. D. Social Responsibility: T test was used per sample, and the results are shown in Table 16, which shows the views of the study sample in paragraphs of axis individuals (CSR). Table16: illustrates the analysis of fourth axis of societal dimension (CSR) N o Axis SM A SMA relativ e standar d deviatio n Value of t test Probabilit y value (Sig) Rankin g 1. The university senior management allows their facilities to serve the local community institutions 3.4 68.0 0.994 4.676 0.000 1 2. The university senior management allocates some of the seminars to raise awareness of the culture and society. 3.4 67.2 1.097 3.845 0.000 2 3. The nature of the university disciplines reduce the unemployment problem in the community 3.3 66.0 1.216 2.831 0.005 3 4. The university senior management contributes to 3.2 64.6 0.889 3.001 0.003 4 Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 68 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 environmental protection, conservation, and development (noise reduction, the dissemination of culture ..etc)," All paragraphs 3.3 66.4 0.93 4.033 0.000 The researchers draw from the previous table, the following: Paragraph "The University senior management allows their facilities to serve the local community institutions" got the first place in this axis. The researchers attribute this to the attention of universities to strengthen the principle of community participation and social responsibility by providing facilities like conference rooms, training rooms, laboratories, sports fields, parks for community service. Paragraph "The university senior management contributes to environmental protection, conservation, and development (noise reduction, the dissemination of culture ... etc)", got the last place. The researchers attributed the reason to the importance of the university's role in protecting the environment, solving its problems so as to maintain it and work on development and managing its resources, through exploiting the media and scientific research in the development of environmental awareness. Study sample agreed on the importance of the axis of the "social responsibility" as a communitybased component, and received a percentage of medium consent. The researchers attribute that to the fact that environmental conservation issues and to provide services that do not harm it, and attention to social responsibility contributes to improve the reputation of the universities and supports its ability to attract talented persons, in addition to strengthening the competitive advantage. This result is consistent with the findings of the study of (Greiling&Halachm, 2013) that the responsibility for learning organizations working to improve organizational learning and improvement of social responsibility in the long term. H. Technology incubators: T test was used per sample, and the results are shown in Table 17, which shows the views of the study sample in paragraphs of axis (technology incubators). Table17: illustrates the vertebrae fifth axis of the societal dimension analysis (technology incubators) N o Axis SM A SMA relativ e standar d deviatio n Value of t test Probabili ty value (Sig) Rankin g Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 69 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 1. The university senior management is seeking incubators that provide support for the local community 3.44 68.8 1.182 4.367 0.000 4 2. Incubators enhance communication between research centers and the community 3.58 71.6 1.129 5.944 0.000 1 3. Incubators strengthen the role of the university of investment to become productive university. 3.53 70.6 1.196 5.182 0.000 2 4. Incubators are working on linking scientific research problems of society. 3.46 69.2 1.183 4.511 0.000 3 All paragraphs 3.5 70 1.1 5.313 0.000 The researchers draw from the previous table, the following: Paragraph "Incubators enhance communication between research centers and the community" got the first place in this axis. The researchers attribute this to the fact that the incubator provides an integrated package of services and facilities that contribute to community service through (provide support, invest human potential, and the development of scientific research and ideas, etc.). The paragraph "The university senior management is seeking incubators that provide support for the local community," came in the last place. The researchers attributed the reason for this is the availability of an incubator in the Islamic University which contribute to community service, in addition to the other universities seeking to provide incubators and research centers that contribute to community service. The study sample agreed about the importance of the axis "technology incubators" as community-based components, and received a large proportion of consent. The researchers attribute that the incubators are working on providing human resources, competencies and capabilities, skills, also contribute to attracting domestic and foreign investment, and developing new ideas to create and find new innovative projects which contribute to the upgrading of the competitive capabilities. Answer to the Q2: What is the level of corporate excellence (Leadership Excellence, service sectors Excellence, and Knowledge Excellence) in the Palestinian universities from the perspective of senior management? Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 70 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 1. Analysis of the paragraphs of the field organizational excellence components: A. Leadership Excellence T test was used per sample, and the results are shown in Table 18, which shows the views of the research sample members in paragraphs axis (Leadership Excellence). Table 18: Demonstrates paragraphs axis analysis (Leadership Excellence) No . Axis SMA SMA relativ e standard deviation value of t test Probabilit y value (Sig) Rankin g 1. The university management emphasizes to adhere to the contents of the learning organization 3.62 72.4 0.976 7.405 0.000 2 2. The university management set goals based on the needs and wishes of the beneficiaries. 3.48 69.6 0.991 5.643 0.000 3 3. There is a commitment from the university management towards achieving a good competitive position. 3.68 73.6 1.131 7.003 0.000 1 4. The university management is keen to solve the problems facing the university. 3.33 66.6 0.962 4.026 0.000 6 5. The university management benefit from the experiences of others 3.29 65.8 1.014 3.311 0.001 8 6. The university management is keen to motivate others toward common goals 3.48 69.6 0.937 5.969 0.000 3 Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 71 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 7. The university management provide the necessary resources for creativity and excellence 3.17 63.4 0.842 2.35 0.020 10 8. The university management take into account the existence of an effective working relationship between them and the workers. 3.18 63.6 0.913 2.262 0.025 9 9. The university management concerned with the interaction with civil society institutions 3.39 67.8 0.947 4.816 0.000 5 10 . The university management provides a suitable working environment for the success of the educational process. 3.33 66.6 0.977 3.963 0.000 6 All paragraphs 3.4 68 0.804 5.72 0.000 The researchers draw from the previous table, the following: The paragraph "There is a commitment from the university administration towards achieving a good competitive position", got the first place in this axis. The researchers attribute the growing interest in competition based on the competencies and capabilities, as the need arose to harness the available knowledge in the universities to build organizations seeking learning, through its interest in providing organizational capabilities, physical, human, technological, and to achieve excellence. The paragraph "The university administration to provide the necessary resources for innovation and excellence" got the last place. The researchers reason this for blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip, the financial crisis experienced by the majority of universities, which have affected its ability to provide material resources and pay for their workers' salaries. The study sample agreed on the importance of the axis of the "leadership excellence" as one of the elements of organizational excellence, and received a large proportion of approval to some extent. The researchers attributethat a distinguished leader is an art which enable the leader of the university to anticipate change, forecasting, working on his administration in accordance with a clear vision of management strategy change with overall development, continuous, deal with the Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 72 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 developments that appear creatively, to achieve excellence in performance. This result agrees with the study of (AL-Hilali and Gabor, 2012) which showed that effective leadership plays a pivotal role in shaping the goals and objectives of the university, responsible for laying the foundations and standards, provide the elements of proper implementation of plans and programs, andtake development decisions in the light of the discussion of the evaluation results on competent administrative levels. It also agreed with the study of (Abu-Kaoud and Rababah, 2013) which showed that the respondents' perceptions about organizational excellence (leadership excellence, structure excellence, service excellence, organizational culture excellence) were also high. B. Excellence Service T test was used per sample, and the results are shown in Table 19, which shows the views of the study sample members in axis paragraphs sectors (Excellence service). Table 19: Demonstrates paragraphs axis analysis (service-excellence) No . Axis SMA SMA relativ e standar d deviatio n Value of t test Probabili ty value (Sig) Ranki ng 1. The university management is conducting polls continuing to learn about the diverse needs of the community 2.99 59.8 1.018 -0.085 0.933 10 2. Operations provide various services subject to continuous improvement. 3.12 62.4 0.985 1.398 0.165 9 3. The university management adopt modern technologies to provide services 3.74 74.8 0.897 9.59 0.000 1 4. Procedures providing services are quickly achieved 3.61 72.2 0.978 7.216 0.000 3 5. The university management provides services consistent with the needs of beneficiaries. 3.54 70.8 0.968 6.491 0.000 4 6. The university management benefit from the results of 3.25 65 0.87 3.363 0.001 8 Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 73 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 the evaluation Reza community organizations 7. The university management benefit from the results of the evaluation of community organizations satisfaction 3.47 69.4 1.006 5.474 0.000 5 8. The university management taken into account ethical dimensions of community service 3.67 73.4 1.085 7.22 0.000 2 9. University management offers its services to all the institutions fairly and without discrimination 3.46 69.2 1.214 4.395 0.000 6 10. The university management respond to suggestions and complaints made by the beneficiaries 3.32 66.4 0.92 4.025 0.000 7 All paragraphs 3.42 68.4 0.801 6.06 0.000 The researchers draw from the previous table, the following: The paragraph "The university administration adopts modern technologies to provide services" got the first place in this axis. The researchers attribute that to the contemporary technology revolution, which provided a lot of time and effort to get the services and facilities in light of availability of modern means of advanced communication, the commitment of management and staff to perform well at work and provide excellent services to achieve customer satisfaction. The paragraph "The university administration is conducting polls continuously to learn about the diverse needs of the community", got the last place. The researchers attributethat tothe lack of interest in some universities in polls, but they go back to college for many benefits for examples to identify the level of efficient performance, discover the ideas, proposals or projects or better applications, identify the efficiency of their plans, and knowing the trends and new issues for the future. Study sample agreed on the importance of the axis of the "service-excellence" as one of the elements of organizational excellence, and obtained a large approval. The researchers attribute that to the fact that excellence means that there are certain unique differences to the University from the other. Excellence in services is these services that exceed customer expectations. Therefore, in light of the increase in the number of universities, the weakness of the diversity of disciplines, and limited Palestinian universities capabilities, they need to provide services to satisfy customers until additional competitive advantage, and they should do polls of opinion Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 74 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 about the quality of service level, provides customer satisfaction report on an ongoing basis. We think theIslamic University conduct surveys on an ongoing basis such as student polls in teaching performance, and the graduate poll, students and lecturers in courses offered and their contents, as well as the extent of the participation of graduates in the development of community institutions. These result disagree with the findings of the study of (Abdul Aziz, 2013), which showed that there is a lack of cooperation and response by the human resources altogether, interact with the students, to respond to them, solving their problems, that students are dissatisfied with the service provided by the college and do not rise to the level of theirexpectations. C. Knowledge Excellence T test was used per sample, and the results are shown in Table 20, which shows the views of the individuals in the study sample in paragraph of axis (Knowledge Excellence). Table 20: Demonstrates paragraphs axis of the analysis (excellence of knowledge) N o. Axis SM A standard deviatio n SMA relative Value of ttest Probability value (Sig) Ranki ng 1. The university maintains panel discussions among employees to invest the intellectual energies in the fields of knowledge permanently 2.89 57.80 1.104 -1.169 0.244 10 2. Bulletins to disseminate knowledge applications are issued monthly. 2.95 59.00 0.972 -0.62 0.536 7 3. The university has a working knowledge of the market requirements in terms of specialties 3.3 66.00 1.1 3.13 0.002 3 4. E-learning is used to support learning programs in the university 3.36 67.20 0.959 4.398 0.000 1 5. The university management provides scholarships for talented workers 2.9 58.00 1.007 -1.112 0.268 9 6. The university management supports student participation 3.1 62.00 1.046 1.152 0.251 5 Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 75 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 in local and international competitions. 7. The university management assesses training programs to keep up with the cognitive developments. 3.3 66.00 1.024 3.446 0.001 3 8. The university management is following the performance of its graduates in the institutions in which they work. 2.94 58.80 0.937 -0.735 0.463 8 9. The efficiency of our university graduates contribute to the interest of institutions on employment. 3.35 67.00 1.024 3.949 0.000 2 10 . The university management employs of scientific research to serve the community 2.98 59.60 0.926 -0.279 0.781 6 All paragraphs 3.11 62.20 0.771 1.618 0.108 The researchers draw from the previous table, the following: The paragraph "E-learning is used to support learning programs at the university",got the first place in this axis. The researchers attributed this to the orientation of the majority of universities towards the use of synchronous and asynchronous e-learning techniques which are the most important tools at the moment (YouTube) and winner of the second classification globally in the tools of British learning Technology Center (2011). The paragraph "Evaluate the panel discussions among employees to invest their energies in intellectual fields of knowledge permanently" got the last rank. This is because of the weakness of this skill among workers at universities and monopoly of their knowledge, unlike the concept of debate based on the exchange of information, ideas, experiences, and opinions rings. Study sample agreed on the importance of the axis of the "cognitive excellence" as one of the elements of organizational excellenceand obtained the approval of the proportion of medium somewhat. The researchers attribute the fact that universities are the basis for building a knowledge society, which puts all the countries of the world among the priorities of plans and tasks, it depends mainly on the excellence of higher education processions scientific and technological developments, so it falls on the responsibility of universities, production and dissemination of knowledge as a culture, and using them effectively, the activities of those in the generation of knowledge, research and development, and dissemination of education, training Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 76 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 and employment through scientific research directed to solve the problems of society. The results of this study agree with the study of (Sharma &Talwar, 2007), which explained that the external environment is integrated with the culture and working environment, and supports assure the success of the leadership, culture, and shared values that facilitate the removal of obstacles, and facilitate the flow of knowledge, information, and services for those involved, and satisfy the different parties, and knowledge contribute to the reduction of problems. Test research hypotheses First main hypothesis: There is no statistically significant role for learning organizations in achieving organizational excellence from the perspective of the senior management of the Palestinian universities in Gaza Strip. The use of multiple linear regression analysis to determine the impact of the independent variables (organizational dimension, the human dimension, the dimension of knowledge, and community dimension) on the dependent variable (Organizational Excellence). Table 21: The results of multiple linear regressions to the influence of the independent variables on the dependent variable analysis Independent variables Regressi on coefficie nts Stand ard error Standardi zed regressio n coefficien ts Beta Value of t test Potentia l value sig. Signific ance level at (0.05) Ranking Constant 6.862 2.594 2.645 0.000 sig. Organizatio nal dimension 0.166 0.098 0.069 .673 0.040 sig. 4 Human dimension 0.350 0.087 0.356 3.984 0.000 sig. 2 Dimension of knowledge 0.268 0.122 0.076 0.554 0.008 sig. 3 Community dimension 0.400 .092 0.453 4.367 0.000 sig. 1 ANOVA Analysis Test valueF 149.327 Potential value 0.000 Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 77 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 Value of the average coefficient of interpretationR2 0.821 The potential value of coefficient of interpretation 0.000 The results of the analysis described in Table21the zero hypothesis was rejected and the alternative was accepted that there is impact between the mean responses of the respondents on the dimensions of learning organizations combined together at the level of organizational excellence, and an equation of regression was good and acceptable to all categories. The value of calculated F is equal to (149.327), which is a statistically significant as the potential value equal to (0.000) which is less than (0.05). This indicates the presence of a role of statistical significance for organizations of learning in organizational excellence and regression model is good Second main hypothesis: there are no statistically significant differences between the averages of the respondents' responses about the components of learning organizations and achieving organizational excellence attributed to the name of the university. To test this hypothesis One Way ANOVA analysis of variance was used to test the differences between the responses of the respondents about the components of learning organizations and achieving organizational excellence attributed to the name of the university, and the results are shown in Table 22. Table 22: shows the results of variance (ANOVA) between the responses of respondents about the components of learning organizations and organizational excellence in the Palestinian universities attributed to the name of the university Learning organizatio nal and achieving Organizatio nal Excellence University Total SMA standar d deviatio n Valu e of t test Probabili ty value (Sig) Islamic University 52 73.14 6.52 35.5 8 0.000 Al-Azhar University 37 71.69 8.60 0.000 Al-Aqsa University 46 53.77 18.30 0.000 Total 135 66.14 15.12 Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 78 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 From the results shown in the table 22, it is clear that there are statically significant differences between the views of respondents about the components of learning organizations and achieving organizational excellence attributed to the name of the university where the value of statistical significance (0.000) which is less than (0.05) and this means that there are clear differences in the views of the respondents on average for the components of learning organizations and achieving organizational excellence attributed to the university were the Islamic University with a relative weight (73.14%), relative weight of Al-Azhar University (71.07%), followed by Al Aqsa University ofrelative weight (53.77%). This result is consistent with a study (Mohammed&Atallah, 2010) which showed that there are differences in the responses of both colleges for the benefit of Boys Collegein capabilities, equipment, and facilities axis. Also it disagreed with Hussein study (2012), which showed no statistically significant differences in perceptions of the teaching staff of the importance of learning organization characteristics and the importance of organizational and cultural factors in support of the application of the concept of learning organization in the private 6 October University depending on the variable type of college. XIII. RESEARCH RESULTS  The results showed the proportion of medium-approval on the importance of the axis of "organizational structure", high approval on "technological infrastructure" axis where the results confirmed as important for universities, as agreed conclusions about the importance of "The strategy" by an average approval. Where the results were about the importance of a high degree of "organizational dimension."  Results assured that "strategic leadership" at the university level was average. There is a fair degree approval about the axis of interest "Teams / Committees", and the importance of the "human dimension" is approved moderately.  The results showed a high degree of importance on the axis of "knowledge management", and that there are highly consent about the importance of the axis of "continuing education", the degree of somewhat weak on the importance of the axis of "scientific research". There is a fair degree of approval on the importance of the axis of "institutional culture" and moderatelyon the "cognitive dimension".  The results showed that there is a large degree of consent about the importance of the axis of "strategic partnerships and alliances", high approval of the axis "keep up with the labor market", there is a fair degree of consent about the importance of the axis "consulting and training", and the axis of "social responsibility". The results showed that there was a moderate approval on the importance of the "Community dimension",and high approval about the importance of the axis "technology incubators". The universities have shown that theyare seeking towards the provision of incubators support the local community, and promote Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 79 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 communication between the research community centers, and strengthen the role of the university investment, linking scientific research and the problems of society.  The results showed that there is a large degree of consent about the importance of axis of the "leadership excellence", explained that the university administration emphasizes the obligation of the contents of the learning organization, there is a commitment from university departments to achieve a good competitive position, and is keen to resolve the problems facing the university, as it derives its objectives based on the needs and desires of the beneficiaries by providing a suitable working environment for the success of the educational process.  The results showed that there is a large degree of consent about the importance of axis of the "serviceexcellence". The results showed that the university administration take into account the ethical dimensions of community service, and adopt modern technology in the provision of services, procedures for the provision of services are rapidly achieved and compatible with the needs of the beneficiaries. A weakness of the attention of the university administration has shown in conducting ongoing surveys to identify the diverse needs.  The results showed that there is a fair degree of consent on the importance of the axis "cognitive excellence". The results explained that the university uses e-learning to support learning programs, has a working knowledge of the market requirements of the terms of reference, and they evaluated their training programs to keep up with the cognitive developments, supports student participation in local and international competitions, there is a weakness in the employment of scientific research to serve the community, the weakness of the follow-up by the university administration for the performance of its graduates in the institutions in which they work, also showed that there is a weakness in the provision of scholarships for talented workers, poor attention to ring debates that contribute to the investment of intellectual energies of staff in the areas of knowledge.  Results showed that there was a moderate approval on the importance of "organizational excellence" was we found that most colleges and universities have procedures for academic review; planning and development to achieve excellence in education not only at the individual level, but also at the enterprise level,and support for the foundation of Excellence in Education facilitate this distinction.  XIV. RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS The recommendations of the study include:  The need to develop appropriate strategies for the University and the employment of modern technology in information systems, in addition to providing an appropriate environment that achieve learning organizations.  The development of technological infrastructure (hardware, software, networks, databases, and human skills) because of the great advantages that they offer. Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 80 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017  Lay the foundations and criteria for fair selection of the best candidates for the university and university leaders based on specialization, competence, experience, skill, integrity, and not on the basis of favoritism and nepotism.  Universities need to adopt knowledge management in the academic and administrative departments because knowledge is the core of the work of these departments.  Create technology incubators in universities to adopt outstanding university research projects, and protect, support, and market them.  The establishment of centers of excellence for scientific research in the university, subject to the disciplines of departments at various colleges, offering research and knowledge services to researchers, policy makers, community and various institutions.  Cooperation and coordination between local, Arab and international universities for the exchange of knowledge, information, and participation programs and training courses, as it provides an opportunity to develop the capabilities, skills,and expertise of personnel.  Build a supportive organizational culture to improve the quality of services in the universities, through configuring an appropriate climate of profound values, principles, and beliefs that elevate the capabilities and competence of employees.  The need to review the medium and low relative performance of the business, which expresses the weakness in the quality of output of the educational process in each of the universities to increase their effectiveness.  Work on developing the capacity and skills of workers in the field of information technology across admitted training courses to enable them to deal with the hardware and networks of modern communication, conduct regular meetings between employees in different levels of management and employees at other universities characterized by dialogue, openness, and transparency in the work, in order to exchange experiences and knowledge. XV. REFERENCES [1]. Abdel-Fattah, Fedaa Ghazi (2013), "the degree of availability of learning organization characteristics of the public school administrators in the provinces of northern and central West Bank of their views," Unpublished MA Thesis, An-Najah National University Nablus, Palestine. [2]. Abdul Aziz, Ahmed Mohamed Mohamed (2013), "a proposed strategy to achieve excellence in the quality of services provided to students of colleges of education in Egyptian universities using SERVQUAL model", Journal of the Faculty of Education Ain Shams University, Volume 37, the first part. [3]. Abu Naser, S. S., Al Shobaki, M. J., Abu Amuna, Y. M., &Al hila A. A. (2017). Trends of Palestinian Higher Educational Institutions in Gaza Strip as Learning Organizations, 1(1). [4]. Abu-Kaoud, Ghazi Rasmi and Rababah, Fatima Ali (2013), "The role of the critical success factors CSFs in achieving organizational Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 81 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 excellence in business: a field study on the Jordanian pharmaceutical companies from the perspective of senior management," King Saud University Journal, Vol. (25), Science administrative (1) [5]. Abu-khodaier, Iman (2006), "Organizational learning management for the application of the concept of the learning organization in the Institute of Public Administration", unpublished PhD thesis, Faculty of Education, King Saud University, Saudi Arabia. [6]. Al hila, A. A., &Al Shobaki, M. J. (2017). The Role of Servant Leadership in Achieving Excellence Performance in Technical Colleges Provinces of Gaza Strip. International Journal of Management Research and Business Strategy (IJMRBS), Vol. 6, No. 1, P: 69-91, January 2017. [7]. Al Shobaki, M. J., & Naser, S. S. A. (2016). Decision support systems and its role in developing the universities strategic management: Islamic university in Gaza as a case study. International Journal of Advanced Research and Development, 1(10), 33-47. [8]. Al Shobaki, M. J., & Naser, S. S. A. (2016). Performance development and its relationship to demographic variables among users of computerized management information systems in Gaza electricity Distribution Company. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Research, 2(10), 21-30. [9]. Al Shobaki, M. J., & Naser, S. S. A. (2016). The Dimensions of Organizational Excellence in the Palestinian Higher Education Institutions fromthe Perspective ofthe Students. Global Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies, 5(11), 66100. [10]. Al Shobaki, M. J., & Naser, S. S. A. (2016). The reality of modern methods applied in process of performance assessments of employees in the municipalities in Gaza Strip. International Journal of Advanced Scientific Research, 1(7), 14-23. [11]. Al Shobaki, M. J., Amuna, Y. M. A., & Naser, S. S. A. (2016). The impact of top management support for strategic planning on crisis management: Case study on UNRWA-Gaza Strip. International Journal of Academic Research and Development, 1(10), 20-25. [12]. Al Shobaki, M. J., Amuna, Y. M. A., & Naser, S. S. A. (2017). Strategic and Operational Planning As Approach for Crises Management Field Study on UNRWA. International Journal of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering, 5(6), 43-47. [13]. AL-Dahshan, Jamal Ali (2007). Virtual University A new patterns in university education, and working paper submitted to the Fourteenth National Congress of the Center for fly-university education (new horizons in the Arab university education), from 25 to 26 November guesthouse Ain Shams, Cairo, Egypt University. [14]. Al-Hajjar, Raed Hussein (2004): the academic performance evaluation from the viewpoint of faculty members at the University of AlAqsa in the light of Mviom total quality management ", Journal of AlAqsa University, a series of Science and Humanities, Gaza, Volume VIII, (2) from 0.203 to 240. Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 82 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 [15]. AL-Hilali, El-SherbiniHilali and Gabor, Amani AL-Sayed. (2012). Excellence Department entrance requirements applied in Mansoura University," Journal of the future of Arab education, Volume 20, Issue 83, April (2012). [16]. Al-karimin, Raed Ahmed Ibrahim and Abdul Rahman, Jamil Abdel Fattah faith and Tadros, Ibrahim Harbi Al-Hashim (2014), "The relationship between knowledge management requirements and the development of academic and human resources in the faculties of education in universities official Jordanian", Journal of Arabic Studies Informatics, No. IV, January (2014). [17]. AL-Selmi, Ali (2002): "Human Resources Management", Cairo: Dar Ghareb for printing, publishing and distribution, the Arab Republic of Egypt. [18]. Berrio, Angle. (2006). "Assessing the learning organization profile of Ohio State University extension using the systems-linked organizational model". [19]. Bryan, S. (2009). "The Application of Learning Organization Principles to Church Growth", phd Dissertation, Walden University. [20]. Abu Amuna, Y. M., Al Shobaki, M. J., Abu Naser, S. S., &Badwan J. J. (2017). Understanding Critical Variables For Customer Relationship Management In Higher Education Institution From Employee Perspective. International Journal of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering 6(1) 10-16. [21]. Elloumi, Fathi, (2004). "Value Chain Analysis: a strategic approach to online learning, in Theory and Practice of Online Learning." Chapter 3, Athabasca University. [22]. Erdem, Mustafa; Ilgan, Abdurrahman; Ibrahim, Halil. (2014). "Relationship between Learning Organixation and Job Satisfacation of Primary School Teachers", International Online Journal of Educational Sciencee, 6 (1). [23]. Garvin, D., Edmondson,A.,&Gino,F. (2008). "Is Yours a Learning Organization? "Harvard Business Review. [24]. Gilbert, A. D. (2001). "The idea of a university: Enterprise or academy." Manning Clark Symposium. Retrieved Jan. 11, 2012, from: http://www.unimelb.edu.au/vc/prese nt/manningclark.pdf [25]. Greiling,& A. Halachm. (2013). "Accountability and Organizational Learning in the Public Sector", Public Performance & Management Review, Vol.36. No. 3, March (2013). [26]. Hannan, A. (2005). "Innovating in higher education: contexts for change in learning technology." British Journal of Educational Technology 36 (6), pp.975-985. [27]. Hussein, Osama Maher (2012), "learning organization evaluating the characteristics of the Egyptian universities (universities of Special Case Study), Journal of the College of Education in Banha, No. (91), July (2012). [28]. Ibrahim, Noor Khalil (2014). "the role of the learning organization in the application of Business Conduct / survey teams in the Rasheed Bank," Journal of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Vol. 20, No. 77, (2014), pp. 146-180. [29]. Khadra, M.F &Rawabdeh, I. A. (2006). "Assessment of development of the learning organization concept Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 83 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 in Jordanian industrial companies", the learning Organization, Vol. 13, No. 5. [30]. Khan, Hina&Matlay, Harry (2009). "Implementing service excellence in higher education." Education & Training, Vol. 51 Issue: 8/9, pp.769 – 780. [31]. Naser, S. S. A., & Al Shobaki, M. J. (2016). Computerized Management Information Systems Resources and their Relationship to the Development of Performance in the Electricity Distribution Company in Gaza. European Academic Research, 9(8), 6969-7002. [32]. Naser, S. S. A., &Shobaki, M. J. A. (2016). Enhancing the use of Decision Support Systems for Reengineering of Operations and Business-Applied Study on the Palestinian Universities. Journal of Multidisciplinary Engineering Science Studies (JMESS), 2(5), 505512. [33]. Naser, S. S. A., &Shobaki, M. J. A. (2016). Requirements of using Decision Support Systems as an Entry Point for Operations of Reengineering in the Universities (Applied study on the Palestinian universities in Gaza Strip). World Wide Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development, 2(4), 3240. [34]. Naser, S. S. A., &Shobaki, M. J. A. (2016). The Impact of Management Requirements and Operations of Computerized Management Information Systems to Improve Performance (Practical Study on the employees of the company of Gaza Electricity Distribution). In First Scientific Conference for Community Development, 5-6 November, 2016 (pp. 1-28). AlAzhar University of Gaza, Palestine. [35]. Naser, S. S. A., Al Shobaki, M. J., &Amuna, Y. M. A. (2016). KM Factors Affecting High Performance in Intermediate Colleges and its Impact on High PerformanceComparative Study. Computational Research Progress in Applied Science & Engineering, 2(4), 158167. [36]. Naser, S. S. A., Al Shobaki, M. J., &Amuna, Y. M. A. (2016). Knowledge Management Maturity in Universities and its Impact on Performance Excellence" Comparative study". Journal of Scientific and Engineering Research, 3(4), 4-14. [37]. Naser, S. S. A., Al Shobaki, M. J., &Amuna, Y. M. A. (2016). Measuring knowledge management maturity at HEI to enhance performance-an empirical study at Al-Azhar University in Palestine. International Journal of Commerce and Management Research, 2(5), 55-62. [38]. Naser, S. S. A., Shobaki, M. J. A., &Amuna, Y. M. A. (2016). KMM Factors Affecting High Performance in Universities' Case Study on AlQuds Open University in GazaStrip'. International Journal of Information Technology and Electrical Engineering, 5(5), 46-56. [39]. Naser, S. S. A., Shobaki, M. J. A., &Amuna, Y. M. A. (2016). Promoting Knowledge Management Components in the Palestinian Higher Education Institutions A Comparative Study. International Letters of Social and Humanistic Sciences, 73, 42-53. Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page 84 IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02||FEBRUARY 2017 [40]. Pister, K. (1999). The University of the Future: Place, process or paradigm. In J. Brennan, J. Fedrowitz, M. Huber, & T. Shah (Eds.), what kind of university? International perspectives on knowledge, participation and governance (pp. 229-239). Buckingham, UK: SRHE and Open University Press. [41]. Radwan, Sami Abdel Samie (2013), "the development of research performance in emerging universities in the light of the institutional community partnership and networking," Journal of Studies in Education, Egypt, No. 24. [42]. Raftery D. (2006). "In Pursuit of Teaching Excellence: Encouraging Teaching Excellence in Higher Education." AISHE Conference 2006, Maynooth 31st August-1st September. Retrieved Jan. 15, 2012, from: (http://www.aishe.org/events/20052006/conf2006/proceedings/) [43]. Scott, P. (1998). "Decline or transformation? The future of the university in a knowledge economy and a post-modern world." In P. Baggen, A. Tellings, & W. van Haaften (Eds.), The University and the knowledge society (pp. 7-13). Bemmel-London-Paris: Concorde Publishing House. [44]. Sharma, Anilk, &Talwar, Balvir. (2007). "Evalution of Universal Business Excellence Model in Corporating Vedic Philosophy, Measuring Business Excellence", Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Vol. 11, No. 3, Emerald Group Publishing Limited. [45]. Shawqi, JawadAnad AL-kharsha, Yassin (2008), "leadership skills and role in the adoption of excellence strategy: analytical study in Jordanian banks," the paper scientific introduction to the first Arab conference perpetuate excellence and competitiveness in the public and private sector institutions, Amman: Arab Organization for Administrative Development. AUTHORS FirstAuthor–Mazen J. Al Shobaki,AlAzhar University, Gaza, Palestine, [email protected] SecondAuthor– Samy S. Abu Naser, Prof. Dr., Al-Azhar University, Gaza, Palestine, [email protected]. ThirdAuthor – Youssef M. Abu Amuna, Al-Azhar University, Gaza, Palestine,[email protected]. Fourth Author Amal A. Al hila, Palestine Technical College, Dair Al Balah, Palestine, [email protected] Correspondence Author – Prof. Dr. Samy S. Abu Naser, +972599783837 Mazen J. Al Shobaki, IJDPT VOL||01||ISSUE||02 Page

Aalborg Universitet Logic and Philosophy of Time Further Themes from Prior, Vol. 2 Blackburn, Patrick Rowan; Hasle, Per; Øhrstrøm, Peter Creative Commons License CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 Publication date: 2019 Document Version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication from Aalborg University Citation for published version (APA): Blackburn, P. R., Hasle, P., & Øhrstrøm, P. (Eds.) (2019). Logic and Philosophy of Time: Further Themes from Prior, Vol. 2. (1 ed.) Aalborg Universitetsforlag. Logic and Philosophy of Time, Vol.. 2 General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. ? Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. ? You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain ? You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Downloaded from vbn.aau.dk on: August 26, Logic and Philosophy of Time Futher Themes from Prior, Vol. 2 Patrick Blackburn, Per Hasle and Peter Øhrstrøm (Eds.) Logic and Ph ilo so ph y of Logic and Philosophy of Time A.N. Prior (1914-69) in the course of the 1950s and 1960s founded a new and revolutionary paradigm in philosophy and logic. Its most central feature is the preoccupation with time and the development of the logic of time. However, this was inseparably interwoven with fundamental questions about human freedom, ethics, and existence. This remarkable integration of themes also embodies an original and in fact revolutionary conception of logic. The book series, Logic and Philosophy of Time, is dedicated to a deep investigation and also the further development of Prior's paradigm. The series includes: 1 Logic and Philosophy of Time: Themes from Prior. Edited by Per Hasle, Patrick Blackburn, and Peter Øhrstrøm. 2 Logic and Philosophy of Time: Further Themes from Prior. Edited by Patrick Blackburn, Per Hasle, and Peter Øhrstrøm. Series editors Per Hasle, Patrick Blackburn & Peter Øhrstrøm -PHJD BOE 1IJMPTPQIZ PG 5JNF 'VSUIFS 5IFNFT GSPN 1SJPS &EJUFE CZ 1BUSJDL #MBDLCVSO 1FS )BTMF BOE 1FUFS μISTUSÔN -PHJD BOE 1IJMPTPQIZ PG 5JNF 7PMVNF  -PHJD
BOE
1IJMPTPQIZ
PG
5JNF
'VSUIFS
5IFNFT
GSPN
1SJPS
&EJUFE
CZ
1BUSJDL
#MBDLCVSO
1FS
)BTMF

1FUFS
μISTUSÔN 1. Open Access Edition ‰
5IF
BVUIPST
BOE
"BMCPSH
6OJWFSTJUZ
1SFTT
 *OUFSJPS
EFTJHO
6MSJL
4BOECPSH1FUFSTFO

'BUJNB
4BCJS
$PWFS
EFTJHO
BLJMB
CZ
,JSTUFO
#BDI
-BSTFO 1IPUP
PO
GSPOU
DPWFS
"/
1SJPS
DPVSUFTZ
PG
.BSUJO
1SJPS
$PQZ
FEJUJOH
'BUJNB
4BCJS 4FU
XJUI
UIF
5F9
(ZSF
1BHFMMB

5F9
(ZSF
)FSPT
GPOUT
*4#/
 *44/
 5IJT
CPPL
JT
GJOBODJBMMZ
TVQQPSUFE
CZ
UIF
%BOJTI
$PVODJM
GPS
*OEFQFOEFOU
3FTFBSDI
]
$VMUVSF
BOE
$PNNVOJDBUJPO 1VCMJTIFE
CZ "BMCPSH
6OJWFSTJUZ
1SFTT
-BOHBHFSWFK
 %,
v

"BMCPSH
μ
1IPOF


BBVG!GPSMBHBBVEL
GPSMBHBBVEL Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives i$I3 R8 +RNj3Njc 1SFGBDF /PXT BOE 5IFOT JO UIF 1SJPS 1SPKFDU 1BUSJDL #MBDLCVSO  5IF 3FUVSO PG .FEJFWBM -PHJD JO UIF 1IJMPTPQIZ PG 5JNF %BWJE +BLPCTFO  5IF 4JHOJaDBODF PG UIF $POUSJCVUJPOT PG "/ 1SJPS BOE +FS[Z ƒP| JO UIF &BSMZ )JTUPSZ PG .PEFSO 5FNQPSBM -PHJD 1FUFS μISTUSÔN  1FS )BTMF  #UIFPSZ BOE 5JNF #JBTFT 4BZJE 3 #OFGTJ  1SFTFOUJTN BOE $SPTT5JNF 3FMBUJPOT 3% *OHUIPSTTPO  *OHUIPSTTPO .D5BHHBSUrT 1BSBEPY BOE UIF 3UIFPSZ PG 5JNF - /BUIBO 0BLMBOEFS  %VNNFUU PO .D5BHHBSUr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a3c3NjCcL N0 +aRccAiCL3 `3IjCRNc 3% *OHUIPSTTPO -VOE 6OJWFSTJUZ BOE -JOLÓQJOH 6OJWFSTJUZ 4XFEFO SPHOWBMEVSJOHUIPSTTPO!aMMVTF "CTUSBDU 5IJT QBQFS JT B QBSUJBM EFGFODF PG QSFTFOUJTN BHBJOTU UIF BSHVNFOU GSPN DSPTTUJNF SFMBUJPOT *U JT BSHVFE aSTU UIBU UIF "SJTUPUFMJBO WJFX PG DBVTB UJPO BOE QFSTJTUFODF EPFT OPU SFBMMZ EFQJDU UIFTF QIFOPNFOB JO UFSNT PG SFMBUJPOT CFUXFFO FOUJUJFT FYJTUJOH BU EJêFSFOU UJNFT BOE JOEFFE FYDMVEFT UIF QPTTJCJMJUZ PG TVDI DSPTTUJNF SFMBUJPOT PCUBJOJOH 4FDPOE JU JT BSHVFE UIBU UP SFKFDU UIF FYJTUFODF PG UIF QBTUwBOE UIFSFCZ CF VOBCMF UP HSPVOE UIF USVUI PG DMBJNT BCPVU UIF QBTUwEPFT OPU MFBE UP BOZ BCTVSE DPOTF RVFODFT ,FZXPSET 1SFTFOUJTN DSPTTUJNF SFMBUJPOT HSPVOEJOH PCKFDUJPO DBVTB UJPO QFSTJTUFODF S BNjaR0n,jCRN 1SFTFOUJTNwUIF WJFX UIBU POMZ UIF QSFTFOU FYJTUT UIF GVUVSF OPU ZFU UIF QBTU OP MPOHFSwJT DVSSFOUMZ B GPDBM QPJOU PG DPOUFNQPSBSZ QIJMPTPQIZ  PG UJNF *U JT TUJMM CZ OP NFBOT UIF GBWPVSFE WJFX BOE ZFU VOEFOJBCMZ BO FRVBMMZ IPU UPQJD BNPOH UIPTF XIP QSPNPUF JU TFF GPS JOTUBODF $SJTQ  <> #PVSOF  <> .BSLPTJBO  <> *OHUIPSTTPO  <> BOE UIPTF XIP PQQPTF JU TFF GPS JOTUBODF 0BLMBOEFS  <> .P[FSTLZ  <> 5PSSFOHP  <>  * BN OPU FOUJSFMZ TVSF XIZ QSFTFOUJTN JT HFUUJOH BMM UIJT BUUFOUJPO *U NBZ CF SFMBUFE UP UIF HSPXJOH SFBMJTBUJPO UIBU QSFTFOUJTN JT JNNVOF UP.D5BHHBSUrT 1BSBEPY BOE UIF QSPCMFN PG UFNQPSBSZ JOUSJOTJDT $SBJH  <> $BNFSPO  <> *OHUIPSTTPO  <> BOE UIFSFGPSF FNFSHFT BT UIF NPTU QSPNJTJOH WFSTJPO PG UIF " WJFX PG UJNF "T B DPOTFRVFODF DPOUFNQPSBSZ QIJMPTPQIZ PG UJNF HSBWJUBUFT UPXBSET QSFTFOUJTN BOE JO QBSUJDVMBS JUT XFBL TQPU XIJDI JT VOEFOJBCMZ UIF QSPCMFN PG DSPTTUJNF SFMBUJPOT #JHFMPX  <> $SJTQ  <>  * TVTQFDU UIBU B DPOUSJ CVUJOH GBDUPS JT BMTP B HSPXJOH EJTTBUJTGBDUJPO XJUI UIF # WJFX PG UJNF JF JUT GBJMVSF UP DPOWJODJOHMZ BDDPNNPEBUF GPS FOEVSJOH QBSUJDVMBST BOE NPSF HFOFSBMMZ UP BDDPVOU GPS UIF EZOBNJD GFBUVSFT PG FYQFSJFODF 1SPTTFS  <> JT QPTTJCMZ UIF CFTU BUUFNQU ZFU  5IF BSHVNFOU GSPN DSPTTUJNF SFMBUJPOT HPFT BT GPMMPXT *G UIF GVUVSF QBTU EP OPU FYJTU UIFO SFMBUJPOT QPQVMBSMZ CFMJFWFE UP IPME CFUXFFO UIF QSFTFOU BOE UIF GVUVSFQBTU EP OPU FYJTU FJUIFS 4JODF DSPTTUJNF SFMBUJPOT IBWF DPNF UP aHVSF DFOUSBMMZ JO UIF GPSNVMBUJPO PG B SBOHF PG NFUBQIZTJDBM OPUJPOT MJLF DBVTBUJPO BOE QFSTJTUFODF BOE NFUBQIZTJDBM DVN TFNBOUJD SFMBUJPOT TVDI BT USVUI BMCFJU POMZ UIF USVUI PG QSPQPTJ UJPOT BCPVU UIF QBTU BOE GVUVSF USVUI CFJOH DFOUSBM UP PVS VOEFSTUBOE JOH PG LOPXMFEHF UIFO QSFTFOUJTN JT UBLFO UP FOUBJM UIF BCTVSE DPODMV TJPO UIBU UIFSF JT OP DBVTBUJPO OPUIJOH QFSTJTUT OP DMBJNT BCPVU UIF QBTUGVUVSF BSF USVF BOE UIFSFGPSF XF IBWF OP LOPXMFEHF PG UIF GV UVSFQBTU 5IF BSHVNFOU GSPN DSPTTUJNF SFMBUJPOT XPVME CF B SFEVDUJP BE BCTVS EVN JG QSFTFOUJTUT XFSF VOBCMF UP PêFS WJBCMF BMUFSOBUJWFT CVU UIFZ DBO *O UIJT QBQFS * XJMM aSTU QSFTFOU DPOUFNQPSBSZ WFSTJPOT PG QSFTFOUJTN BOE IPX UIFZ QSPQPTF UP EFBM XJUI UIF QSPCMFN PG DSPTTUJNF SFMBUJPOT 4FDUJPO   5IFO * XJMM QBSBQISBTF XIBU * IBWF BSHVFE FMTFXIFSF OP UBCMZ UIBU B QSFTFOUJTU DBO BDDFQU UIBU UIFSF DBO CF OP USVF QSPQPTJUJPOT BCPVU UIF QBTU BOE GVUVSF BOE ZFU BSHVF UIBU XF DBO IBWF KVTUJaFE CF MJFG BCPVU UIF GVUVSF BOE QBTU 4FDUJPO   8IFUIFS UIBU JT FOPVHI GPS IBWJOH LOPXMFEHF JT B DPOUSPWFSTJBM JTTVF CVU JU TFFNT UP NF UIBU UIJT BMSFBEZ JT B DPOUSPWFSTZ FWFO GPS UIBU QBSU PG UFNQPSBM SFBMJUZ XIPTF FY  JTUFODF XF BMM BHSFF BCPVUwUIF QSFTFOUwBOE FWFO JG JU CF BTTVNFE UIBU UIF GVUVSF BOE QBTU FYJTU JO QBSJUZ XJUI UIF QSFTFOU 5IF DPOUSPWFSTZ CSJFbZ JT UIBU JG LOPXMFEHF JT BTTVNFE UP CF GBMMJCMF UIFO UIJT JT UP BT TVNF UIBU CFMJFGT BCPVU UIF XPSME DBO DPVOU BT LOPXMFEHF FWFO JG UIFZ BSF GBMTF *G POMZ UIPTF CFMJFGT DPVOU BT LOPXMFEHF UIBU BSF BDUVBMMZ USVF BOE KVTUJaFE XF IBWF EFDJEFE UP DPOaOF UIF TQIFSF PG LOPXMFEHF UP UIJOHT UIBU BSF JOGBMMJCMF 'JOBMMZ * XJMM BSHVF UIBU UIF QSFTFOUJTU DBO FBTJMZ QSPWJEF BO BMUFS OBUJWF BDDPVOU PG DBVTBUJPO BOE QFSTJTUFODF POF UIBU EPFT OPU JOWPMWF DSPTTUJNF SFMBUJPOT 4FDUJPO   5IFZ OFFE OPU JOWFOU POF GSPN TDSBUDI CFDBVTF UIFZ DBO NBLF VTF PG UIF PME "SJTUPUFMJBO DPODFQUJPO PG DBVTB UJPO XIJDI EJE OPU SFQSFTFOU DBVTBUJPO BT B UXPQMBDF DSPTTUFNQPSBM SFMBUJPO *OEFFE NPTU OFP"SJTUPUFMJBO QPXFSTCBTFE BDDPVOUTwXIJDI EFQJDU DBVTBUJPO BT UIF QSPEVDUJPO PG DIBOHF UISPVHI UIF JOUFSBDUJPO PG QPXFSGVM QBSUJDVMBSTwBSF BMSFBEZ WJBCMF QSFTFOUJTU BDDPVOUT PG DBVTB UJPO *OHUIPSTTPO  <>  l Ta3c3NjCcL *O UIF DPOUFNQPSBSZ MJUFSBUVSF QSFTFOUJTN JT TFMEPN EFTDSJCFE CZNPSF UIBO B TJOHMF QISBTF TVDI BT qPOMZ QSFTFOU PCKFDUT FYJTUr PS qFYJTUFODF JT DPOaOFE UP UIF QSFTFOUr CFGPSF UIF EJTDVTTJPO UVSOT UP UIF QSPCMFNT PG VQIPMEJOH UIBU CFMJFG "VUIPST PGUFO NBLF VQ GPS UIF CSFWJUZ PG UIFJS QSFTFOUBUJPO CZ BQQFBMJOH UP UIF SFBEFSrT JOUVJUJWF VOEFSTUBOEJOH PG UIF UIFTJT DMBJNJOH UIBU UIF DPOaOFNFOU PG FYJTUFODF UP UIF QSFTFOU JT B QBSU BOE QBSDFM PG UIF MJWFE FYQFSJFODF PG FWFSZ IVNBO CFJOH #JHFMPX  <>  /FWFSUIFMFTT POF DBO EJTDFSO B OVNCFS PG BMUFSOBUJWFT BMM PG XIJDI BSJTF GSPN DPODFSOT BCPVU UIF SFGFSFODF BOE USVUI PG FYQSFTTJPOT BCPVU UIF GVUVSF BOE QBTU *OEFFE BMM PG UIFN EFQMPZ XIBU * IBWF FMTFXIFSF DBMMFE UIF SFMPDBUJPO TUSBUFHZ UP BSHVF UIBU UIF FOUJUJFT XF OBJWFMZ CFMJFWF UP CF JO UIF QBTU PS GVUVSF BSF BDUVBMMZ JO UIF QSFTFOU *OHUIPSTTPO  <>  * XJMM GPDVT PO UIF QBTU TJODF UIF MBDL PG USVUIWBMVFT GPS QBTU UFOTFE FYQSFTTJPOT JT B NVDI HSFBUFS QSPCMFN UIBO UIF MBDL PG USVUI WBMVFT GPS GVUVSF UFOTFE FYQSFTTJPOT  ;HQ#H T`QT2`iv T`2b2MiBbK 0OF WFSTJPO PG QSFTFOUJTN TPNFUJNFT DBMMFE HMPCBM QSPQFSUZ QSFTFOUJTN ,JFSMBOE  <> JT VTVBMMZ USBDFE CBDL UP "SUIVS 1SJPSrT TVHHFT UJPO UIBU DMBJNT BCPVU UIF QBTU FWFO UIPTF UIBU IBWF UIF HSBNNBUJDBM TUSVDUVSF PG TJOHVMBS TUBUFNFOUT EP OPU SFGFS UP BOZ QBSUJDVMBS FYJTUJOH TUBUF PG BêBJST CVU UP TPNF HFOFSBM GFBUVSF PG UIF XPSME BT JU JT OPX UIF GBDU UIBU2VFFO"OOF IBT CFFO EFBE GPS TPNF ZFBST JT OPU JO UIF TUSJDU TFOTF PG qBCPVUr B GBDU BCPVU 2VFFO "OOF JU JT OPU B GBDU BCPVU BOZPOF PS BOZUIJOHwJU JT B HFOFSBM GBDU 0S JG JU JT BCPVU BOZUIJOH XIBU JU JT BCPVU JT OPU 2VFFO"OOFwJU JT BCPVU UIF FBSUI NBZCF XIJDI IBT SPMMFE BSPVOE UIF TVO TP NBOZ UJNFT TJODF UIFSF XBT B QFSTPO XIP XBT DBMMFE q"OOFr SFJHOFE PWFS &OHMBOE FUD 1SJPS  Q  <> MFBTF OPUF UIBU CZ qGBDUr 1SJPS NFBOT TPNFUIJOH MJLF USVF QSPQPTJUJPO XIJMF XIBUFWFS GBDUT BSF qBCPVUr SFGFST UP UIF FYJTUFOU TUBUF PG BêBJST UIBU NBLFT UIBU QSPQPTJUJPO USVF "OZXBZ GPS 1SJPS GBDUT BCPVU UIF QBTU DPOTUJUVUF UIF TFU PG CFMJFGT UIBU BSF QVUBUJWFMZ USVF BOE UIVT JO OFFE PG USVUINBLFST 5IF QSPCMFN JT UIBU UIF QBTU EPFT OPU FYJTU BDDPSEJOH UP 1SJPSrT QSFTFOUJTN BOE IFODF IF USJFT UP aOE QMBVTJCMF DBOEJEBUFT JO UIF QSFTFOU UP BDU BT SFGFSFOUT BOE USVUINBLFST GPS DMBJNT BCPVU UIF QBTU 1SJPS BENJUT IF JTOrU UPP TVSF XIBU FYBDUMZ UIFTF UIF USVUINBL JOH GFBUVSFT BSF BOE TVHHFTUT UIBU JU DPVME FWFO CF TPNF GFBUVSF PG UIF FBSUI BT B XIPMF XIJDI JT XIZ UIJT QPTJUJPO JT DBMMFE HMPCBM QSPQFSUZ QSFTFOUJTN 1SJPSrT QPJOU JT OPU HSBNNBUJDBM CVU POUPMPHJDBM )F JT OPU BSHVJOH UIBU UIF USVF HSBNNBS PG QBTU UFOTFE FYQSFTTJPOT JNQMJFT UIBU XF BSF SFBMMZ UBMLJOH BCPVU HFOFSBM GFBUVSFT PG UIF FBSUI * BN TVSF IF SFDPH OJTFT UIBU UIF HSBNNBS PG q2VFFO "OOF JT EFBEr JT NPTU OBUVSBMMZ SFBE BT UIF BUUSJCVUJPO PG TPNFUIJOH UP TPNF QBSUJDVMBS FOUJUZ #VU IJT BQQSBJTBM PG UIF POUPMPHZ PG UJNF JF UIBU UIF QBTU EPFT OPU FYJTU DPOWJO DFT IJN UIBU UIF HSBNNBS PG QBTU UFOTFE FYQSFTTJPOT NVTU CF NJTMFBEJOH BOE DPOTFRVFOUMZ TVHHFTUT BOPUIFS XBZ PG VOEFSTUBOEJOH UIFN 1SJPSrT QPTJUJPO DBO CF DSJUJDJTFE GPS CFJOH UPP WBHVF 4VSFMZ UIF DMBJN q2VFFO "OOFrT EFBUI XBT QFBDFGVMr BOE qEJOPTBVST SPBNFE UIF &BSUIr BSF NBEF USVF CZ EJêFSFOU UIJOHT CVU IJT TVHHFTUJPO EPFTOrU HJWF NVDI HVJEBODF BT UP XIJDI GFBUVSFT PG UIF QSFTFOU UIJT XPVME CF 7FSZ  QMBVTJCMZ 1SJPS NFBOT UP TBZ UIBU 2VFFO "OOFrT EFBUI NVTU IBWF MFGU B NBSL PO SFBMJUZ UP DPOUSJCVUF TPNFIPX UP XIBU JU JT MJLF UPEBZ )PX FWFS IF EPFTOrU HJWF BOZ EFUBJMT BCPVU IPX TVDI NBSLT BSF MFGU BOE XIFSF UP aOE UIFN *rMM WFOUVSF UP PêFS NPSF EFUBJM 8F aOE PVU BCPVU 2VFFO "OOFrT EFBUI CZ DIFDLJOH XIBU JT EPDVNFOUFE JO IJTUPSJDBM SF DPSET 4P UIF IJTUPSJDBM SFDPSE BOE JUT FOEVSBODF JO UIF QSFTFOU GSPN UIF UJNF PG IFS EFBUI VOUJM OPX JT B NVDI CFUUFS TVHHFTUJPO UIBO UIF FBSUI BT B XIPMF BCPVU XIBU JU JT BCPVU UIF QSFTFOU XPSME UIBU KVTUJaFT PVS CFMJFG UIBU UIFSF JOEFFE XBT TVDI B UIJOHT BT 2VFFO "OOFrT EFBUI 'PTTJMJTFE SFNBJOT PG EJOPTBVST SFQSFTFOU UIF QBSUJDVMBS NBSLT MFGU PO SFBMJUZ CZ UIF EJOPTBVST PG UIF QBTU QSFTFSWFE JO XIBU DPVME CF DBMMFE UIF OBUVSBM SFDPSE PG UIF QBTU 8F UIFO IBWF UXP EJTUJODU GFBUVSFT PG UIF QSFTFOU XPSME UP TVQQPSU PVS CFMJFG JO UIF EFBUI PG 2VFFO "OOF BOE JO UIF QSFIJTUPSJD FYJTUFODF PG EJOPTBVST #VU EP TVDI FOUJUJFT SFBMMZ NBLF PVS CFMJFGT USVF BT PQQPTFE UP TJNQMZ DPOTUJUVUJOH PVS HSPVOET GPS CF MJFG 8FMM SFUVSO UP UIBU RVFTUJPO MBUFS #bì+i 2MiBiv T`2b2MiBbK 0UIFST IBWF TVHHFTUFE BT USVUINBLFST GPS QBTU UFOTFE FYQSFTTJPOT WBSJ PVT BCTUSBDU FOUJUJFT UIBU BSF OPU UP CF VOEFSTUPPE BT QSPQFSUJFT PG UIF DPODSFUFMZ FYJTUJOHQSFTFOU 'PS JOTUBODF UIBU FYQSFTTJPOT MJLF q4PDSB UFT XBT XJTFr SFGFST UP BO JOEJWJEVBM FTTFODF PG 4PDSBUFT B LJOE PG BCTUSBDU FOUJUZ UIBU DPVME FYJTU FWFO JG 4PDSBUFTr IBT QIZTJDBMMZ DFBTFE UP FYJTU $SBJH  Q  <>  * aOE UIJT TVHHFTUJPO UPP BSCJUSBSZ BOE FQJT UFNJDBMMZ VOJOGPSNBUJWF *UrT WFSZ FBTZ UP QPTUVMBUF UIBU FWFSZUIJOH UIBU DPNFT UP CF JO UIF QSFTFOU MFBWFT BO JODPSQPSFBM USBDF PG JUTFMG UIBU TPNF IPX FOEVSFT JO UIF QSFTFOU UIFSFBGUFSwBOE UP BQQFBM UP TVDI JODPS QPSFBM FOUJUJFT UP TVQQPSU POFrT CFMJFG UIBU 1 JT USVFwCVU JU JT EJëDVMU UP JEFOUJGZ UIPTF USBDFT BOE FYUSBDU BOZ JOGPSNBUJPO BCPVU UIF QBTU GSPN UIFN 'VSUIFSNPSF UIJT TUSBUFHZ DPOWFSUT QSFTFOUJTN GSPN POF PG UIF TQBSTFTU POUPMPHJDBM EPDUSJOFT PG BMM JOUP TPNFUIJOH NVDI MFTT TQBSTF JO BEEJUJPO UP UIF QSFTFOU CFJOH DPOTUJUVUFE CZ UIF DVSSFOU TUBUF PG UIF XPSME JU BMTP DPOTJTUT JO UIF JODPSQPSFBM JOEJWJEVBM FTTFODFT MFGU CZ FWFSZ CFDPNJOH JO UIF IJTUPSZ PG UIF VOJWFSTF * EPOrU IBWF B LOPDL EPXO BSHVNFOU BHBJOTU TVDI B WJFX 5IF CFTU * DBO EP JT UP DIBMMFOHF UIF OFFE UP QPTUVMBUF JU  "OPUIFS PQUJPO JT FSTBU[ QSFTFOUJTN *OTUFBE PG QPTUVMBUJOH JOEJWJEVBM BCTUSBDU FOUJUJFT GPS FBDI DPODSFUF QBSUJDVMBS BOEPS FWFOU UIBU FWFS FYJTUFE FSTBU[ QSFTFOUJTN QPTUVMBUFT UIBU BU FBDI QSFTFOU NPNFOU UIFSF FYJTUT GPS FWFSZ GVUVSF BOE QBTU UJNF B TFU PG QSPQPTJUJPOT SFQSF TFOUJOH UIF TUBUF PG UIF XPSME BU UIPTF UJNFT #PVSOF  <> $SJTQ  <>  /PX TPNFUJNFT JU BQQFBST UIBU TVDI FSTBU[ UJNFT BSF POMZ QPTUVMBUFE GPS SFQSFTFOUBUJPOBM QVSQPTFT UP BMMPX VT UP UBML BCPVU UIF GVUVSF BOE QBTU 8ØUISJDI  Q  <> CVU PG DPVSTF UIJT XPVME OPU HP B MPOH XBZ UPXBSET BOTXFSJOH BOZ PCKFDUJPOT UP QSFTFO UJTN 0O UIF PUIFS IBOE UIF TBNF XSJUFST DMBJN UIBU FSTBU[ QSFTFOUJTN SFQSFTFOUT B QSPNJTJOH TPMVUJPO UP UIF QSPCMFN PG SFGFSFODF BOE USVUI 8ØUISJDI  BCTUSBDU <>  -JLF .P[FSTLZ  Q  <> * XPSSZ UIBU JG FSTBU[ UJNFT BSF BTTVNFE UP IBWF B USVUINBLJOH GVODUJPO UIJT UISFBUFOT UP SFWFSTF UIF POUPMPHJDBM QSJPSJUZ PG UIF QSFTFOU 5IF DPSF JEFB PG QSFTFOUJTN BT * VOEFSTUBOE JU JT UIBU SFBMJUZ JT HSPVOEFE JO UIF DPODSFUFMZ FYJTUJOH QSFTFOU &STBU[ QSFTFOUJTN JOTUFBE DPOTUSVFT UJNFT BT BCTUSBDU QSPQPTJ UJPOT XIJDI UIFO TPNFIPX NBLF USVF BOZUIJOH FYQSFTTFE BCPVU DPO DSFUF FWFOUT BU WBSJPVT QSFTFOUT /PX PCWJPVTMZ JU JT QPTTJCMF UP BSHVF UIBU UIF FSTBU[ UJNFT UIBU SFQSFTFOU UIF QBTU BSF NBSLT MFGU CZ UIF QBTU JO UIF TBNFXBZ JOEJWJEVBM FTTFODFT BSF CVU UIJT XPOrU XPSL GPS UIF GVUVSF CFDBVTF JU IBT ZFU UP NBLF B NBSL PO UIF QSFTFOU *O BEEJUJPO FSTBU[ QSFTFOUJTN EPFTOrU FYQMBJO FJUIFS IPX UIFTF FS TBU[ UJNFT aHVSF JO PVS FQJTUFNJD QSBDUJDFT BOE TP DBOOPU CF VTFE UP TVQQPSU PVS CFMJFGT BCPVU UIF QBTU *U JT TUJMM UIF DBTF UIBU XF MFBSO BCPVU EJOPTBVST GSPN GPTTJMT JO UIF HSPVOE BOE OPU CZ BDDFTTJOH B SFBMN PG BCTUSBDU QSPQPTJUJPOT 'VSUIFSNPSF OPOF PG UIF PQUJPOT UIBU QPTUVMBUF BCTUSBDU FOUJUJFT BEESFTT BU BMM UIF JTTVFT XF IBWF BCPVU DBVTBUJPO BOE QFSTJTUFODF 5IF NBJO XPSSZ BCPVU UIFTF HFOFSBM JODPSQPSFBM BOE BCTUSBDU FOUJ UJFT UIBU QSFTFOUJTUT BSF QPTUVMBUJOH JT UIBU UIFZ BSF FOUJUJFT UIBU EP OPU SF BMMZ DPNF XJUI B TUPSZ PG HFOFTJT IPX EP UIFZ DPNF JOUP CFJOH JG BU BMM /PS EP UIFZ DPNF XJUI B TUPSZ BCPVU IPX UIFZ aHVSF JO PVS FQJTUFNJD QSBDUJDFT 5IFZ BSF EJëDVMU UP VOEFSTUBOE BT NBSLT PO QSFTFOU SFBMJUZ UIBU DPVME TPNFIPX JOGPSN VT BCPVU UIF QBTU 5IFZ BQQFBS JOTUFBE BT BS CJUSBSZ QPTUVMBUJPOT BCPVU UIF XPSME IBWJOH XIBUFWFS GFBUVSF SFRVJSFE UP NBLF TPNF PS PUIFS FYQSFTTJPO BCPVU UIF QBTU USVF *O PUIFS XPSET UIF QSFGFSSFE QSPDFEVSF TFFNT UP CF UIBU XF aSTU EFDJEFwPO TIFFS JO  UVJUJPO JU TFFNTwXIJDI QSPQPTJUJPOT BCPVU UIF QBTU BSF USVF UP UIFO JOGFS UIBU UIF XPSME NVTU BU QSFTFOU CFBS TPNF USVUINBLJOH GFBUVSFT UIBU NBLF UIPTF QSPQPTJUJPOT USVF 5IJT KVTU JTOrU JO DPOGPSNJUZ XJUI XIBU XF BDUVBMMZ EP JO PVS FQJTUFNJD QSBDUJDFT 8F KVTUJGZ PVS CFMJFGT BCPVU UIF QBTU CZ BQQFBMJOH UP UIF IJTUPSJDBM BOE OBUVSBM SFDPSE 5IFTF SFDPSET FYJTU DPODSFUFMZ JO UIF QSFTFOU JO UIF GPSN PG WBSJPVT NBO NBEF BSUFGBDUT CPPLT BVEJP SFDPSEJOHT QIPUPT aMNT BSDIBFPMPHJDBM BSUF GBDUT FUD BOE OBUVSBM SFNBJOT TVDI BT GPTTJMT MBZFST PG TPJM BOE SPDL PJM FUD /PCPEZ TBZT UIBU 4PDSBUFT XBTXJTF CFDBVTF UIJT JT FWJEFOU GSPN IJT JOEJWJEVBM JODPSQPSFBM FTTFODF CVU CFDBVTF PG XIBU XF MFBSO GSPN UIF IJTUPSJDBM SFDPSE Hm+`2iBM Q` MQKB+ T`2b2MiBbK " NPSF DPODSFUF TVHHFTUJPO BCPVU XIBU DPVOUT BT B NBSL PG UIF QBTU JO UIF QSFTFOU JT UIF DPODSFUF BOE EFUFSNJOBUF TUBUF PG UIF XPSME BU BOZ HJWFO UJNF 5IF CBTJD JEFB JT UIBU XIFO UIJOHT BSF BMJWF BOE LJDL JOH UIFZ MFBWF B DPODSFUF NBSL PO FOEVSJOH SFBMJUZ XF IBWF TDBST MFGU BT SFNJOEFST PG GPSNFS UJNFT BOE XF aOE GPTTJMT JO UIF HSPVOE +PIO #JHFMPX UFMMT VT UIBU UIJT JT B DPSF JEFB JO 4UPJD QSFTFOUJTN BOE IF DJUFT 4FYUVT &NQJSJDVT BT TBZJOH sJG UIJT NBO IBT B TDBS UIJT NBO IBT IBE B XPVOEt  Q  <>  *G XF QFSDFJWF UIBU B NBO IBT B TDBS OPX XF DBO JOGFS UIBU IF IBT IBE B XPVOE JO UIF QBTU *U JTOrU DMFBS UP NF XIFUIFS &NQJSJDVT JOUFOET UP TBZ UIBU XF BDUVBMMZ BTDSJCF UIF QSPQ FSUZ PG qIBWJOH IBE BXPVOEr UP UIF TDBSSFENBO CVU BU MFBTU IF JT TBZJOH UIBU XF DBO JOGFS GSPN UIF TUBUF PG UIJOHT OPX IPX TPNFUIJOH XBT JO UIF QBTU 5IJT TBUJTaFT NZ RVBMNT BCPVU IPXXF aOE PVU BCPVU UIF QBTU 5IF RVFTUJPO JT JG PVS HSPVOET GPS CFMJFWJOH Q NVTU CF UIF TBNF BT XIBU BDUVBMMZ NBLFT Q USVF 5IF OBNF qOPNJD QSFTFOUJTNr ,JFSMBOE  <> BT GBS BT * DBO UFMM SFBMMZ EFOPUFT UIF TBNF CBTJD JEFB CVU JT NPSF DPODFSOFE XJUI UIF NPEFSO JEFB UIBU UIBU PO UIF CBTJT PG PVS LOPXMFEHF PG UIF RVBMJUBUJWF TUBUF PG UIFXPSME BU BOZ HJWFO QSFTFOU BOE PVS LOPXMFEHF PG UIF MBXT PG OBUVSF XF BSF BCMF UP JOGFS XIBU UIF XPSME XBT MJLF JO UIF QBTU BOE QSF EJDU IPX JU XJMM CF JO GVUVSF  5P EP UIJT XF EPOrU OFFE UP QPTUVMBUF UIF FYJTUFODF PG JODPSQPSFBM HFOFSBM PS BCTUSBDU FOUJUJFT FYJTUJOH TPNFIPX QBSBMMFM UP UIF FYJTUJOH RVBMJUBUJWF TUBUF PG DPODSFUF SFBMJUZ 5IF MBXT PG  OBUVSF BSF JO UVSO QFSGFDUMZ CFaUUJOH B QSFTFOUJTU POUPMPHZ CFDBVTF UIF XPSME JOTUBOUJBUFT UIFN BU BOZ HJWFO UJNF /PX * MJLF OPNJD QSFTFOUJTN BT B WJFX PG UIF XPSME BOE PG IPX XF aOE PVU BCPVU UIF XPSME CVU OPU BT B XBZ UP NBLF PVS DMBJNT BCPVU UIF QBTU USVF 'JSTU BT B UISVUINBLJOH UIFPSZ JU SFRVJSFT UIF XPSME UP CF DBVTBMMZ EFUFSNJOFE JO PSEFS UIBU FBDI TUBUF PG UIF VOJWFSTF QBTTFT POwJO BO VOCSPLFO DIBJOwJOGPSNBUJPO OPU KVTU BCPVU JUTFMG BOE FBDI JNNFEJBUFMZ QSFDFEJOH TUBUF CVU BCPVU FWFSZ QSFDFEJOH TUBHF *G UIF XPSME XBT MJLF UIBU JU XPVME DFSUBJOMZ BMMPX VT UP FYUSBDU JOGPSNBUJPO BCPVU UIF QBTU CVU BMTP NBLFT UIF GVUVSF BT aYFE BOE EFUFSNJOFE BT UIF QBTU * aOE UIJT UP CF BO VOXBOUFE DPOTFRVFODF 5IF TFDPOE QSPCMFN JT UIBU FWFO JG XF HSBOU DBVTBM EFUFSNJOBDZ BOE JHOPSF UIF QSPCMFNT PG B aYFE GVUVSF * TUJMM EPOrU TFF IPX UIF QSFTFOU MBXT DBO HSPVOE UIF USVUI PG PVS CFMJFGT BCPVU UIF QBTU OPU PO BOZ FYUBOU UIFPSZ PG USVUI 5IF QSFTFOU UIF MBXT PG OBUVSF EPFTOrU MPPL JO BOZ XBZ MJLF UIF QBTU TP JU DBO IBSEMZ NBLF PVS CFMJFGT BCPVU UIF QBTU USVF CZ DPSSFTQPOEJOH UP UIFN "QQFBM NVTU CF NBEF UP B DPNQMFUFMZ EJêFSFOU OPUJPO PG USVUI 5IFSF BSF UIFPSJFT BCPVU USVUI UIBU EP OPU SFRVJSF UIF FYJTUFODF PG XIBUFWFS JU JT B QSPQPTJUJPO JT BCPVU CVU * DBOrU TFF UIBU UIFZ XJMM EP UIF OPNJD QSFTFOUJTU BOZ HPPE 5IF DPIFSFODF BOE QSBHNBUJD UIFPSJFT PG USVUI EP OPU NBLF USVUI SFMJBOU PO XIBU UIF XPSME JT MJLF BU BMM 5IF EF bBUJPOBSZ UIFPSZ BSHVBCMZ SFKFDUT USVUI BMUPHFUIFS BOE UIF JEFOUJUZ UIF PSZ DPOTUSVFT USVUI BT BO JEFOUJUZ PG B CFMJFG UP B USVF QSPQPTJUJPO OPU UP UIF XPSME GPS B NPSF EFUBJMFE EJTDVTTJPO PG WBSJPVT USVUIUIFPSJFT TFF *OHUIPSTTPO GPSUIDPNJOH <>  5IF JEFOUJUZ UIFPSZ NBZ XPSL GPS TPNF GPSNT PG FS[BUT QSFTFOUJTN CVU OPU OPNJD QSFTFOUJTN 5IF TVHHFTUJPO XJMM POMZ XPSL JG XF VOEFSTUBOE qNBLJOH USVFr JO TPNF BMUPHFUIFS OFX BOE QSJNJUJWF XBZ * IBWF ZFU UP TFF QSFTFOUJTUT UBLF B TUBOE PO UIJT JTTVF BOE XPOrU TQFDVMBUF GVSUIFS PO UIJT JTTVF IFSF *OTUFBE * XJMM DPOTJEFS UIF BMUFSOBUJWF NPTU QSFTFOUJTUT EP OPU DPOTJEFS BU BMM XIZ OPU TJNQMZ EFOZ UIBU FYQSFTTJPOT BCPVU UIF QBTU IBWF USVUI WBMVFT * GPS NZ PXO QBSU BN QFSGFDUMZ TBUJTaFE BT MPOH BT JU JT QPTTJCMF GPS B QSFTFOUJTU UP KVT UJGZ IFS CFMJFGT BCPVU UIF QBTU TBZ UIBU EJOPTBVST SPBNFE UIF FBSUI  k ian3 qcY DncjC~30 #3IC38c $Rnj j@3 Tcj 1SFTFOUJTUT EFOZ UIF FYJTUFODF PG UIF QBTU CVU UIFZ BDLOPXMFEHF UIF FYJTUFODF PG FWFSZUIJOH UIBU BOZ TDJFOUJaD EJTDJQMJOF IBT FWFS EF GBDUP BQQFBMFE UP JO UIFJS KVTUJaDBUJPO PG UIFPSJFTIZQPUIFTFT BCPVU UIF QBTUw NBO NBEF EPDVNFOUBUJPO GPTTJMT FWPMVUJPO UIFPSZ LOPXMFEHF PG UIF MBXT PG OBUVSFwCFDBVTF UIFZ BMM PCUBJO OPX $POTFRVFOUMZ KVTUJaDB UJPO JT PCWJPVTMZ OP QSPCMFN BU BMM #VU UIF CFMJFGT XF KVTUJGZ BCPVU UIF QBTU DBOOPU DPSSFTQPOE UP BOZUIJOH %PFT UIJT NFBO UIBU XF DBOOPU TBZ UIBU XF IBWF LOPXMFEHF BCPVU UIF QBTU 8FMM JU EPFT BU MFBTU JNQMZ UIBU PVS LOPXMFEHF BCPVU UIF QBTU JT BU CFTU IZQPUIFUJDBM BOE GBMMJCMF XIJDI JT XIBU JT BMSFBEZ BDLOPXMFEHFE BCPVU PVS LOPXMFEHF BCPVU UIF QSFTFOU *G LOPXMFEHF JT KVTUJaFE CFMJFG UIBU JT BMTP USVF LOPXMFEHF JT CZ EFaOJUJPO JOGBMMJCMF " CFMJFG UIBU JT USVF XJMM OPU KVTU OFWFS IBQQFO UP CF GBMTJaFE JU DBOOPU CF GBMTJaFE JU DBO POMZ CF GBMTFMZ GBMTJaFE CZ TPNF FYQFSJNFOUBM NJTUBLF  .PSF UIBO BOZUIJOH UIJT QSPCMFN SFWPMWFT BSPVOE UIF QIJMPTPQIJ DBM RVFTUJPO PG IPX FYBDUMZ UP VOEFSTUBOE LOPXMFEHF *U EPFT OPU SFBMMZ DPODFSO UIF FQJTUFNPMPHZ PG UIF QBTU PS PVS DVSSFOU FQJTUFNJD QSBDUJDFT /P " PS #UIFPSJTU BSHVFT UIBU XF aOE PVU BCPVU UIF QBTU JO BOZ PUIFS XBZ UIBO CZ JOGFSSJOH JU GSPN UIF IJTUPSJDBM BOE OBUVSBM SFDPSE BT JU FYJTUT BU BOZ HJWFO UJNF 5IBU TJNQMZ JT UIF XBZ TDJFODF XPSLT "DDPSEJOHMZ UIJT EJTDVTTJPO POMZ DPODFSOT PVS HFOFSBM BUUJUVEF UPXBSET UIF QBTUwEP XF CFMJFWF JU FYJTUT PS OPUwBOE XJUI PVS VOEFSTUBOEJOH PG LOPXMFEHF HFOFSBMMZ TQFBLJOH * XJMM GPDVT PO UIF MBUUFS RVFTUJPO XIJDI * VOEFS TUBOE UP CF B RVFTUJPO PG XIFUIFS XF DBO BMMPX LOPXMFEHF UP DPNF JO EFHSFFT JT TPNF LOPXMFEHF CPUI KVTUJaFE BOE USVF BOE JT TPNF LOPXM FEHF POMZ KVTUJaFE 5IF aSTU UIJOH UP OPUF UIBU B DPODFQUJPO PG LOPXMFEHF BCPVU UIF QBTU BT POMZ KVTUJaFE CVU OPU USVF JT OPU FRVBM UP B DPODFQUJPO PG LOPXMFE HF BCPVU UIF QSFTFOU BT POMZ KVTUJaFE CVU OPU USVF *G XF CFMJFWF TPNF UIJOH BCPVU UIF QSFTFOU PO UIF CBTJT PG UIF BWBJMBCMF FWJEFODF CVU JU GBJMT UP DPSSFTQPOE UP SFBMJUZ CFDBVTF UIF BWBJMBCMF FWJEFODF XBT JODPNQMFUF UIFO PVS CFMJFG JT GBMTF CFDBVTF JU SFQSFTFOUT SFBMJUZ BT JU SFBMMZ JTOrU )PX FWFS JG XF CFMJFWF TPNFUIJOH BCPVU UIF QBTU PO UIF CBTJT PG UIF BWBJM BCMF FWJEFODF CVU JU GBJMT UP DPSSFTQPOE UP SFBMJUZ CFDBVTF UIF QBTU IBT DFBTFE UP FYJTU UIJT EPFT OPU NFBO UIBU UIF CFMJFG SFQSFTFOUT UIF QBTU BT JU SFBMMZ XBTOrU 4VSF UP NBLF UIJT BSHVNFOU SFBMMZ TUJDL POF XPVME  IBWF UP EFWFMPQ B UIFPSZ PG GBMTFNBLJOH XIJDI * XJMM OPU EP IFSF )PXFWFS * UIJOL UIF QPJOU JT JOUVJUJWFMZ DMFBS FOPVHI GPS NZ QSFTFOU QVSQPTFT OPUBCMZ UIBU MBDL PG USVUINBLFST GPS QBTU UFOTFE FYQSFTTJPOT EPFT OPU NBLF PVS JEFBT BCPVU UIF QBTU JOUP NJTSFQSFTFOUBUJPOT PG UIF QBTU CVU UIF MBDL PG USVUINBLFST GPS QSFTFOU UFOTFE FYQSFTTJPOT XJMM JOFWJUBCMZ NFBO UIBU UIFTF FYQSFTTJPOT NJTSFQSFTFOU SFBMJUZ 4FDPOE UIF JEFB UIBU LOPXMFEHF IBT UP CF USVF BOE KVTUJaFE JT BM SFBEZ UPP TUSJDU UP DPNQMZ XJUI SFDFJWFE WJFXT BCPVU XIBU DPVOUT BT LOPXMFEHF 8F HFOFSBMMZ DBMM FWFSZUIJOH LOPXMFEHF UIBU TUSJLFT VT BT KVTUJaFE PO UIF CBTJT PG UIF BWBJMBCMF FWJEFODF OFWFS NJOE XIFUIFS JU BDUVBMMZ JT USVF 8F FWFO DBMM TPNF UIJOHT LOPXMFEHF UIBU XF LOPX JT GBMTF 5BLF DMBTTJDBM NFDIBOJDT BT BO FYBNQMF 8F LOPX UIBU DMBTTJDBM NFDIBOJDT JT BU CFTU B VTFGVM BQQSPYJNBUJPO UP SFBMJUZ CVU JU DPOUJOVFT UP CF B TUBQMF JO QIZTJDT FEVDBUJPO BOE DPOUJOVFT UP CF DBMMFE LOPXMFEHF *U DPOUJOVFT UP CF B QBSU PG UIF DVSSJDVMVN CFDBVTF JU JT TP VTFGVM BOE NVDI FBTJFS UP BQQMZ JO UIF TJUVBUJPOTXIFSF JU JT LOPXO UP HJWF UIF TBNF SFTVMUT BT RVBOUVN NFDIBOJDT BOE UIFPSZ PG SFMBUJWJUZ SFTQFDUJWFMZ "U UIF WFSZ MFBTU PVS CFMJFGT BCPVU UIF QBTU UIBU BSF KVTUJaFE CZ UIF IJTUPSJDBM SFDPSEXPVME DPOUJOVF UP CF DBMMFE LOPXMFEHF FWFO JGXF BHSFF JU DBOOPU DPSSFTQPOE UP B QBTU UIBU OP MPOHFS FYJTUT 0UIFSXJTF QVU UIF DPODFQU PG LOPXMFEHF UIBU JT BMSFBEZ JO VTF JT POF UIBU BMMPXT PG EFHSFFT 0O B SFMBUFE OPUF TPNF NBZ XPSSZ UIBU UIF MBDL PG USVUIWBMVFT GPS FYQSFTTJPOT BCPVU UIF QBTU JNQMJFT UIBU UIF QBTU JT JOEFUFSNJOBUF 4UBUFNFOUT BCPVU UIF QBTU BSF QPQVMBSMZ CFMJFWFE UP IBWF EFUFSNJOBUF USVUIWBMVFT CFDBVTF PODF UIJOHT IBQQFO JO B DFSUBJO XBZ JO UIF QSFTFOU UIFSF JT OP XBZ UP VOEP PS DIBOHF JU )PXFWFS * DBOrU TFF UIBU USVUI IBT NVDI UP EP XJUI EFUFSNJOBUJPO 'PS NJOEJOEFQFOEFOU SFBMJUZ UP CF EFUFSNJOBUF JU JT OPU SFRVJSFE UIBU UIFSF CF QSPQPTJUJPOT BCPVU JU XJUI EFUFSNJOBUF USVUIWBMVFT OPS JT JU SFRVJSFE UIBU UIF QBTU CF EFUFSNJOBUF GPS JU UP CF USVF UIBU XIBUFWFS IBQQFOT JO UIF QSFTFOU JT EFUFSNJOBUF BOE DBO OFWFS CF VOEPOF *U JT FOPVHI UP LOPX UIBU XIBU IBQQFOT JO UIF QSFTFOU JT BMXBZT EFUFSNJOBUF GPS VT UP LOPX UIBU XIBU IBQQFOFE JO UIF QBTU BMTP XBT EFUFSNJOBUF CFDBVTF XIFO JU IBQQFOFE JU XBT QSF TFOU BOE UIVT EFUFSNJOBUF 5IJT DPODMVTJPO IPMET XIFUIFS PS OPU XF LOPX BOZUIJOH BCPVU UIF QBTU 5IF JOUVJUJPO UIBU PODF UIJOHT IBWF IBQ QFOFE UIFZ DBO OFWFS CF VOEPOF JT TBUJTaFE QFSGFDUMZ XFMM CZ UIF DPOTJEFSBUJPO UIBU PODF UIJOHT IBWF IBQQFOFE BOE DFBTFE UP FYJTU UIFZ  DBOOPU CF VOEPOF ZPV DBOOPU HP CBDL UP B OPOFYJTUFOU QBTU UP VOEP JU "OE BOZXBZ JU JT TVQQPTFE UP CF UIF DBTF UIBU QSPQPTJUJPOT IBWF EFUFSNJOBUF USVUIWBMVFT CFDBVTF SFBMJUZ JT EFUFSNJOBUF OPU UIF PUIFS XBZ BSPVOE 4P XPVME JU CF TP PVUSBHFPVT UP TVHHFTU UIBU UIF JEFB PG LOPXMFEHF CFJOH USVF KVTUJaFE CFMJFG NBZ QFSIBQT CF VTFGVM BT B SFHVMBUJWF JEFB GPS XIBU XF JEFBMMZ TUSJWF UPXBSET CVU GBJMT UP EFNBSDBUF CFUXFFO XIBU JT UPEBZ DPVOUFE BT LOPXMFEHF BOEXIBU EPFTOrU "MM UIJOHT DPOTJEFSFE JU XPVME TFFN B MJUUMF UIJOH UP BMMPX PVS CFMJFGT BCPVU UIF GVUVSF BOE QBTU UP CF DBMMFE LOPXMFEHF JG UIF BWBJMBCMF FWJEFODF KVTUJaFT UIFN FWFO JG UIFZ DBOOPU JO QSJODJQMF DPSSFTQPOE UP BOZUIJOH * UBLF JU UP CF BO PQFO RVFTUJPO TUJMM JO FQJTUFNPMPHZ XIFUIFS LOPXMFEHF JT UP CF EFNBSDBUFE JO UFSNT PG USVF KVTUJaFE CFMJFG PS OPU $POTFRVFOUMZ QIJMPTPQIZ PG UJNF TIPVME OPU EFDJEF JO GBWPVS PG POF QBSUJDVMBS UIFPSZ PG UJNF PO UIF CBTJT PG B QSFNBUVSF TUBODF PO XIBU JT UIF DPSSFDU WJFX PG LOPXMFEHF 5IBU XPVME CF B DBTF PG MFUUJOH POF FQJTUFNJD QPTJUJPO PWFSSJEF BOZNFUBQIZT JDBM DPODFSOT UP TFUUMF B NFUBQIZTJDBM JTTVF 8IBU * IBWF TP GBS BSHVFE XJUI SFHBSET UP LOPXMFEHF BOE USVUI EPFT OPU PG DPVSTF QSPWF BOZUIJOH *U KVTU TFSWFT UP TIPX UIBU UIF DPO TFRVFODFT PG EFOZJOH UIBU QBTU BOE GVUVSF UFOTFE QSPQPTJUJPOT DBO CF USVF BSF OPU TP TFSJPVT BT UP NBLF UIBU PQUJPO VOUIJOLBCMF *U EPFT OPU IBWF BOZ JNQMJDBUJPOT GPS PVS DVSSFOU FQJTUFNJD QSBDUJDFT OPS EJNJOJTI PVS QSPTQFDUT PG KVTUJGZJOH PVS CFMJFGT -FU NF OPX UVSO GSPN USVUI BOE LOPXMFEHF UP QFSTJTUFODF BOE DBVTBUJPO : T3acCcj3N,3 N0 +ncjCRN a3 MRj +aRccAiCL3 `3IjCRNc $BO QFSTJTUFODF BOE DBVTBUJPO CF FYQMJDBUFE JO QSFTFOUJTUJD UFSNT JF XJUIPVU JOWPLJOH DSPTTUJNF SFMBUJPOT 5IF BOTXFS JT ZFT BOE UIJT TIPVME OPU CF OFXT UP BOZPOF 5IF "SJTUPUFMJBO BDDPVOU PG DIBOHF QFS TJTUFODF BOE DBVTBUJPO BMSFBEZ JT QSFTFOUJTUJD -FU VT CSJFbZ DPOTJEFS UIF "SJTUPUFMJBO BDDPVOU PG DIBOHF JO DPOUSBTU UP UIF DPOUFNQPSBSZ DIBS BDUFSJTBUJPO PG DIBOHF BT sTJNQMZ EJêFSFODF PS OPOJEFOUJUZ JO UIF GFB UVSFT PG UIJOHTt .PSUFOTFO  TFDU  <>  5IF MBUUFS JT TPNFUJNFT DBTIFE PVU NPSF GPSNBMMZ JO UFSNT PG B DPOKVODUJPO PG PS EJêFSFODF CFUXFFO UXP TUBUFT JF qaJTGBUtr BOE qaJTOPUGBUt∗r XIJDI DBO  WFSZ FBTJMZ CF JOUFSQSFUFE BT B DSPTTUFNQPSBM DIBSBDUFSJTBUJPO PG DIBOHF OPUBCMZ BT B SFMBUJPO CFUXFFO UIF UFNQPSBM QBSUT PG a XIJDI BSF G BOE OPUG SFTQFDUJWFMZ 5IJT JT XIBU +PIBOOB 4FJCU DBMMT UIF qTUBUF BOBMZTJT PG DIBOHFr XIJDI TIF BSHVFT JT POF PG NBOZ VORVFTUJPOFE QSFTVQQPTJ UJPOT JOXIBU TIF DBMMT UIF qQBSBEJHNPG TVCTUBODF POUPMPHZr  <>  #VU UIF TVCTUBODF POUPMPHZ TIF IBT JO NJOE JT OPU UIF "SJTUPUFMJBO POUPM PHZ JU JT UIF POUPMPHZ GBWPVSFE JO UI $FOUVSZ BOBMZUJD QIJMPTPQIZ CZ QIJMPTPQIFST UIBU OPUPSJPVTMZ SFTJTU QSJNJUJWF OPUJPOT 'BS GSPN CFJOH B SFMBUJPO BDSPTT UJNFT CFUXFFO UXP TUBUFT PG B UIJOH UIF "SJTUPUFMJBO BDDPVOU PG DIBOHF JO UFSNT PG BMUFSBUJPO JF B NBUFSJBM TVCTUBODF DFBTJOH UP NBOJGFTU POF RVBMJUZ BOE CFHJOOJOH UP NBOJGFTU BOPUIFS DPOUSBSZ RVBMJUZ FYDMVEFT UIBU DIBOHF DBO JOWPMWF BOZ TVDI SFMB UJPO 4JODF UIF UXP TUBUFT PG B UIJOH CFGPSF BOE BGUFS UIF DIBOHF BSF DPO USBSZ TUBUFT PG POF BOE UIF TBNF FOUJUZ UIBU FOEVSFT UISPVHI UIF DIBOHF UIF FYJTUFODF PG POF TUBUF FYDMVEFT UIF FYJTUFODF PG UIF PUIFS $IBOHF TJNQMZ DBOOPU CF B SFMBUJPO CFUXFFO FYJTUFOU TUBUFT MPDBUFE FYJTUJOH BU EJêFSFOU UJNFT BU MFBTU JG XF BDDFQU UIF JEFB UIBU SFMBUJPOT DBO POMZ IPME CFUXFFO FYJTUFOU FOUJUJFT "T * IBWF BSHVFE FMTFXIFSF  <> BOE  DI  <> UIF QSPCMFN PG UFNQPSBSZ JOUSJOTJDTwXIJDI JT NFBOU UP TIPX UIBU UIJOHT DBOOPU SFBMMZ FOEVSFwBSJTFT POMZ XIFO JU JT aSTU BTTVNFE UIBU BMM UJNFT FYJTU JO QBSJUZ JU JT POMZ PO UIF BTTVNQUJPO UIBU qaJTGBUtr BOE qaJTOPU GBUt∗r BSF FRVBMMZ FYJTUFOU BOE SFBM FOUJUJFT MPDBUFE BU EJêFSFOU UJNFT UIBU XF HFU UIF DPODMVTJPO UIBU a JT FRVBMMZ G BOE OPUG *OEFFE %BWJE -FXJT BENJUT UIBU QSFTFOUJTN XIJDI EFOJFT UFNQPSBM QBSJUZ BWPJET UIF QSPCMFN  Q ê <>  "DDPSEJOHMZ UIF POMZ UIJOH UIF QSPC MFN PG UFNQPSBSZ JOUSJOTJD FTUBCMJTIFT JT UIBU UIF BUUFNQU UP DPNCJOF FOEVSBODF BOE FUFSOBMJTN MFBET UP DPOUSBEJDUJPO FSHP UIJOHT DBOOPU FOEVSF JO UFOTFMFTT UJNF GPS B NPSF EFUBJMFE BSHVNFOU TFF *OHUIPST TPO  <>  0UIFSXJTF QVU UIF "SJTUPUFMJBO BDDPVOU EPFT OPU QPSUSBZ B TVDDFT TJPO PG TUBUFT BT DPOTUJUVFOUT PG DIBOHFwJU JT OPU XIBU DIBOHF DPOTJTUT JOwCVU B DPOTFRVFODF PG DIBOHF JF PG UIF BMUFSBUJPO PG TPNFUIJOH GSPN POF TUBUF UP B DPOUSBSZ TUBUF XIJMF SFNBJOJOH OVNFSJDBMMZ UIF TBNF 5IF TUBUF BOBMZTJT DBO SFBMMZ POMZ CF VOEFSTUPPE FJUIFS BT B EFTDSJQUJPO PG UIF BQQFBSBODF PG DIBOHF XF aSTU PCTFSWF a UP CF G BOE MBUFS XF PC TFSWF JU UP CF OPUG PS JU JT B TUBUFNFOU PG XIBU DIBOHF NVTU CF MJLF JG POF BTTVNFT FUFSOBMJTN UP CF USVF  *OEFFE QFSTJTUFODF BOE DBVTBUJPO DBOOPU QPTTJCMZ CF DSPTTUFNQPSBM SFMBUJPOT FJUIFS PO UIF "SJTUPUFMJBO BDDPVOU GPS UIF WFSZ TBNF SFBTPO DIBOHF DBOOPU CF B DSPTTUFNQPSBM SFMBUJPO BENJUUFEMZ UIJT JT OPU BT PC WJPVT JO UIF DBTF PG DBVTBUJPO  1FSTJTUFODF DBOOPU CF B DSPTTUFNQPSBM SFMBUJPO JG BT UIF "SJTUPUFMJBO BTTVNFT UIJOHT QFSTJTU CZ FOEVSJOH JF JG UIFZ QBTT GSPN POF UJNF UP BOPUIFS BOE JO UIBU QSPDFTT DFBTF UP FYJTU BU UIF UJNF JU QBTTFT GSPN 0O UIJT WJFX BO PCKFDU FYJTUJOH XIPMMZ BU t1 DBOOPU TUBOE JO B SFMBUJPO UP JUTFMG BU PUIFS UJNFT CFDBVTF JU EPFTOrU FYJTU BU BOZ PUIFS UJNF *OEFFE BMSFBEZ "SJTUPUMF BEESFTTFE UIF QSPCMFN PG UFNQPSBSZ JOUSJOTJDT XIJDI IF BUUSJCVUFE UP UIF 4PQIJTUT OPUBCMZ UIF BS HVNFOU UIBU $ISZTJQQVT JO UIF NBSLFU QMBDF JT OPU JEFOUJDBM UP $ISZTJQ QVT JO UIF HZNOBTJVN CFDBVTF TPNF UIJOHT IPME USVF PG UIF GPSNFS UIBU EPFT OPU IPME GPS UIF MBUUFS 1IZTJDT #L  1BSU  <>  "SJTUPUMFrT TP MVUJPO JT UIBU $ISZTJQQVT SFNBJOT OVNFSJDBMMZ UIF TBNF XIJMF MPPTJOH BOE BDRVJSJOH QSPQFSUJFT BT IF TBVOUFST GSPN UIF NBSLFU QMBDF UP UIF HZNOBTJVN 8IFO JO UIF NBSLFU QMBDF UIFSF JT OP $ISZTJQQVT JO UIF HZNOBTJVN BOE WJDF WFSTB "OPUIFS JOUFSFTUJOH FYBNQMF PG XIFO QSJPS DPNNJUNFOUT BêFDU UIF BQQSFDJBUJPO PG QIJMPTPQIJDBM WJFXTwBOE XIJDI IFMQT UP VOEFSTUBOE XIZ DPOUFNQPSBSZ QIJMPTPQIFST BSF OPU DPNGPSUBCMF XJUI QSFTFOUJTNw JT UIBU JU JT EJëDVMU UP EFBM XJUI QSFTFOUJTN JO UIF MBOHVBHF PG aSTU PS EFS QSFEJDBUF MPHJD "U MFBTU JG aSTU PSEFS QSFEJDBUF MPHJD JT NFBOU UP GVODUJPO MJLF 2VJOF QSFTDSJCFE OPUBCMZ UP TQFDJGZ PVS FYJTUFOUJBM DPN NJUNFOUT GPS BSHVNFOUT UP UIJT FêFDU TFF μISTUSÔN BOE 4DIÁSGF  <> 4FJCU  <>  4VSF POF DBO JOUSPEVDF UFNQPSBM PQFSBUPST CVU PO 2VJOFrT VOEFSTUBOEJOH TVDI PQFSBUPST NVTU PQFSBUF PO TPNFUIJOH FYJTUJOH XIFSFGPSF UIF VTF PG QBTU UFOTF PQFSBUPST UP UBML BCPVU $ISZTJQ QVT JO UIF NBSLFU QMBDF JT TUJMM UP RVBOUJGZ PWFS FYJTUFOUT UIFSF FYJTUT BO x TVDI UIBU Px  *OEFFE BT μISTUSPN BOE 4DIÁSGF BSHVF JU XBT DPODFSOT BCPVU 2VJOFrT JEFB BCPVU POUPMPHZ UIBU ESPWF "SUIVS 1SJPS UP EFWFMPQ B UFNQPSBM MPHJD PG B EJêFSFOU LJOE /PX * EP OPU XBOU UP HFU FOUBOHMFE JO UIF EFUBJMT PG UIF FOEVSBODF WT QFSEVSBODF EFCBUF * IBWF OPUIJOH UP BEE UP XIBU * IBWF FMTFXIFSF BSHVFE  <>  <> BOE  DI  <>  5IF JNQPSUBOU QPJOU GPS UIJT QBQFS JT TJNQMZ UP QPJOU PVU UIBU UIF QSPCMFN PG DSPTTUJNF SFMBUJPO JT OPU B SFEVDUJP BE BCTVSEVN PG QSFTFOUJTN CFDBVTF BMUFSOBUJWF FYQMBOBUJPOT PG QFSTJTUFODF BOE DBVTBUJPO BSF BWBJMBCMF 5IF BMUFSOBUJWFT NBZ XFMM CF QSPCMFNBUJD JO NBOZ SFTQFDUT CVU UIPTF XIP BQQFBM UP UIF  QSPCMFN PG DSPTTUJNF SFMBUJPOT EP OPU PGUFO UBLF BOZ TVDI QSPCMFNT JOUP DPOTJEFSBUJPO UIFZ UZQJDBMMZ BTTVNF UIBU OP PQUJPOT FYJTU -FU VT OPX DPOTJEFS DBVTBUJPO BOE BHBJO UVSO UP "SJTUPUMF BU MFBTU JOJUJBMMZ "T XJUI UIF DBTF GPS DIBOHF UIFSF JT B UFOTJPO CFUXFFO UIF "SJTUPUFMJBO BDDPVOU PG DBVTBUJPO BOE XIBU * UBLF UP CF UIF SFDFJWFE WJFX JO QIJMPTPQIZ UPEBZ OPUBCMZ UIBU DBVTBUJPO JT BU SPDL CPUUPN B SFMBUJPO CFUXFFO UFNQPSBMMZ EJTUJODU FWFOUT 5IF MBUUFS IBT CFDPNF TP XFMM FOUSFODIFE JO UIF QIJMPTPQIJDBM USBEJUJPO UIBU UIFSF JT MJUUMF PS OP BXBSFOFTT PG BMUFSOBUJWFT $POTJEFS UIBU +POBUIBO 4DIBêFSrT FOUSZ PO q5IF .FUBQIZTJDT PG $BVTBUJPOr JO 5IF 4UBOGPSE &ODZDMPQFEJB PG 1IJMPTP QIZ  <> JT XSJUUFO FOUJSFMZ PO UIF BTTVNQUJPO UIBU BMM FYUBOU WJFXT QPSUSBZ DBVTBUJPO BT B SFMBUJPO BOE UIBU UIF DPOUSPWFSTJFT BCPVU DBVTBUJPO POMZ SFWPMWF BSPVOE UIF OBUVSF PG UIF SFMBUB PS PG UIF SFMB UJPO 4DIBêFS EPFT EJTDVTTFT WBSJPVT QSPCMFNT XJUI XIBU IF DBMMT DBVTBM QSPDFTTFT CVU EFBMT XJUI UIFN BT JG UIFZ BSF DPNQPTFE PG TFRVFODFT PG TUBHFT BOEPS FWFOUT 4DIBêFS TFFNT VOBXBSF PG UIF GBDU UIBU QIJMPTP QIFST MJLF 4BMNPO  Q ê <> BOE 4FJCU  <> FYQMJD JUMZ SFKFDU BO FWFOU POUPMPHZ PG QSPDFTTFT BOE MJLFXJTF UIBU *OHUIPSTTPO  <> $IBLSBWBSUUZ  <> BOE .VNGPSE BOE "OKVN  <> FYQMJDJUMZ BSHVF UIBU DBVTBUJPO TIPVME CF UIPVHIU PG BT B QSPDFTT JOTUFBE PG BT B SFMBUJPO $MFBSMZ UIFSF BSF OPOSFMBUJPOBM DPODFQUJPOT PG DBVTBUJPO BMTP JO DPOUFNQPSBSZ QIJMPTPQIZ CVU MFU VT IFSF GPDVT PO UIF USBEJUJPOBM "SJTUPUFMJBO WJFX /PUF IPXFWFS UIBU UIF BDDPVOU * PêFS JT OPU "SJTUPUMFrT PSJHJOBM WJFX *U JT B QBSBQISBTF PG B WJFXXJEFMZ BUUSJCVUFE UP UIF"SJTUPUFMJBO TDIPPM PG UIPVHIU *U DPNFT WFSZ DMPTF UP UIF BDDPVOU TUBUFE CZ)PCCFT JO UIF WFSZ FBSMZ CFHJOOJOHT PG FNQJSJDJTN  DI *9v9 <>  #VOHF  DI  <> BOE +PIBOTTPO  Q DI  <> PêFS TJNJMBS QBSBQISBTFT PG UIF DBVTBM SFBMJTU USBEJUJPO UIFZ USBDF CBDL UP "SJTUPUMF 5IF NBJO EJG GFSFODF GSPN UIF PSJHJOBM WJFX JT UIBU JU EPFT OPU JODMVEF aOBM DBVTFT *OEFFE BMSFBEZ)PCCFT BSHVFE BHBJOTU aOBM DBVTFT  Q DI 9 TFDU  <> BMUIPVHI IJT BDDPVOU JT SPVHIMZ "SJTUPUFMJBO JO NBOZ PUIFS SF TQFDUT "DDPSEJOH UP UIF SPVHIMZ"SJTUPUFMJBO WJFX * IBWF JONJOE UIFO OFX TUBUFT PG BêBJST BSF QSPEVDFEXIFO BO BMSFBEZ FYJTUJOHNBUFSJBM CPEZ PS DPNQMFY PG CPEJFT DIBOHFT EVF UP BO FYUFSOBM JObVFODF XJUIPVU XIJDI UIF DIBOHF XPVME OFWFS IBWF DPNF BCPVU BOE UIF OFX TUBUF PG BêBJST OFWFS FYJTU 5IF LFSOFM PG UIJT WJFX DPNFT PVU DMFBSMZ JO UIF TMPHBO  qXIBUFWFS DPNFT UP CF JT OFDFTTBSJMZ CPSO CZ UIF BDUJPO PG B DBVTFr WFSZ QSPCBCMZ B QBSBQISBTF PG "SJTUPUMFrT DMBJN UIBU sFWFSZUIJOH UIBU DPNFT UP CF DPNFT UP CF CZ UIF BHFODZ PG TPNFUIJOH BOE GSPN TPNFUIJOH BOE DPNFT UP CF TPNFUIJOHt .FUBQIZTJDT CL  QBSU  <>  5ZQJDBMMZ UIF FYUFSOBM JObVFODF PS DBVTF JT EFQJDUFE JO UFSNT PG BO qFYUSJOTJD NP UJWF "HFOUr PS TJNQMZ "HFOU JF BO PCKFDU QPTTFTTJOH BO BDUJWF DBVTBM QPXFS XIJDI FYFSUT UIBU QPXFS VQPO BOPUIFS PCKFDU 5IF MBUUFS PCKFDUT JT UZQJDBMMZ DBMMFE 1BUJFOU TJODF JUT SPMF JO UIF JOUFSBDUJPO JT UP QBTTJWFMZ SFDFJWF UIF JObVFODF FYFSUFE CZ BO "HFOU BOE DIBOHF JO TPNF TQFDJaD XBZ JO BDDPSEBODF UP JUT QBTTJWF QPXFS JF BO BCJMJUZ UP DIBOHF JO TPNF TQFDJaD XBZ JO SFTQPOTF UP UIF JObVFODF PG UIF BDUJWF QPXFS "DDPSE JOHMZ B DBVTF JT UIF FYFSUJPO PG JObVFODF CZ BO "HFOU VQPO B 1BUJFOU BOE BO FêFDU JT UIF SFTVMUJOH DIBOHF JO UIF 1BUJFOU 8IFO * TBZ UIBU B DBVTF JT UIF BDUJPO PG BO "HFOU VQPO B 1BUJFOU UIFO POF TIPVME OPU VOEFSTUBOE B DBVTF BTNFSFMZ UIF BDUJPO PG UIF"HFOU CVU BT UIF JOUFSBDUJPO CFUXFFO "HFOU BOE 1BUJFOU *U JT UIJT JOUFSBDUJPO UIBU * JEFOUJGZ XJUI B QSPDFTT PG QSPEVDUJPO BOE UIFSF BSF UXP TBMJFOU GFBUVSFT PG UIJT QSPDFTT UIBU OFFE FNQIBTJT CFDBVTF UIFZ TUBOE JO TUBSL DPOUSBTU UP UIF SFMBUJPOBM WJFX PG DBVTBUJPO 5IF aSTU QPJOU JT UIBU DBVTBM JObVFODF JT TPNFUIJOH UIBU JT FYFSUFE CZ BO"HFOU PO B 1BUJFOU *O PUIFSXPSETwBOE UIJT JT DSJUJDBM GPS VOEFSTUBOEJOH UIF NBJO QPJOU PG UIJT QBQFSwBDUJPOT PDDVS CFUXFFO QFSTJTUFOU PCKFDUT OPU CFUXFFO FWFOUT PS TUBUFT *U JT OPU UIF DBVTF UIBU BDUT PO PS JObVFODFT UIF FêFDU JOEFFE UIBU JT JNQPTTJCMF *G UIF FêFDU POMZ DPNFT JOUP FYJTUFODF CZ CFJOH QSPEVDFE CZ UIF DBVTF JF CZ UIF BDUJPO PG UIF qFëDJFOU DBVTFr UIF FêFDU DBOOPU CF TVCKFDU UP UIF WFSZ TBNF BDUJPO UIBU JT TVQQPTFE UP QSPEVDF JU 5P BTTVNF UIF FêFDU JT TVCKFDU UP UIF BDUJPO UIBU QSPEVDFT JU JT UP BTTVNF UIF FêFDU BMSFBEZ FYJTUFE XIFO JU JT BDUFE VQPO BOE UIVT DPVME OPU IBWF CFFO QSPEVDFE CZ UIBU WFSZ TBNF BDUJPO *OEFFE XF TFF JO UIF GPMMPXJOH QBTTBHF GSPN )PCCFT B DMFBS TUBUFNFOU CPUI PG UIF JEFB UIBU BDUJPOT PDDVS CFUXFFO QFSTJTUFOU PCKFDUT BOE UIBU UIF FêFDU POMZ DPNFT JOUP CFJOH BT B DPOTF RVFODF PG BDUJPOT CFUXFFO QFSTJTUFOU PCKFDUT " CPEZ JT TBJE UP XPSL VQPO PS BDU UIBU JT UP TBZ EP TPNF UIJOH UP BOPUIFS CPEZ XIFO JU FJUIFS HFOFSBUFT PS EFTUSPZT TPNF BDDJEFOU JO JU BOE UIF CPEZ JO XIJDI BO BDDJEFOU JT HFOFSBUFE PS EFTUSPZFE JT TBJE UP TVêFS UIBU JT UP IBWF TPNF UIJOH EPOF UP JU CZ BOPUIFS CPEZ BT XIFO POF CPEZ CZ QVU  UJOH GPSXBSET BOPUIFS CPEZ HFOFSBUFTNPUJPO JO JU JU JT DBMMFE BO "(&/5 BOE UIF CPEZ JO XIJDI NPUJPO JT TP HFOFSBUFE JT DBMMFE UIF 1"5*&/5 TP aSF UIBU XBSNT UIF IBOE JT UIF "HFOU BOE UIF IBOE XIJDI JT XBSNFE JT UIF 1BUJFOU 5IBU BDDJEFOU XIJDI JT HFOFSBUFE JO UIF 1BUJFOU JT DBMMFE UIF &' '&$5 )PCCFT  QBSU ** DI *9 TFDU  <> IF TFDPOE QPJOU JT UIBU UIF "SJTUPUFMJBO WJFX EFQJDUT FêFDUT BT UIF QSPE VDU OPU PG UIF BDUJPO PG UIF "HFOU BMPOF CVU PG B UPUBM DBVTF PG B DFSUBJO LJOE JU JT B QSPEVDU PG UIF XBZ UXP PS NPSF NBUFSJBM CPEJFT BDU PO FBDI PUIFS JO WJSUVF PG UIFJS QPXFST UP QSPEVDF B DIBOHF JO UIPTF WFSZ CPEJFT "HBJO XF DBO BQQFBM UP )PCCFT BT XJUOFTT <e> BO FOUJSF DBVTF JT UIF BHHSFHBUF PG BMM UIF BDDJEFOUT CPUI PG UIF BHFOUT IPX NBOZ TPFWFS UIFZ CF BOE PG UIF QBUJFOU QVU UPHFUIFS XIJDIXIFO UIFZ BSF BMM TVQQPTFE UP CF QSFTFOU JU DBOOPU CF VOEFSTUPPE CVU UIBU UIF FêFDU JT QSPEVDFE BU UIF TBNF JOTUBOU BOE JG BOZ POF PG UIFN CF XBOUJOH JU DBOOPU CF VOEFSTUPPE CVU UIBU UIF FêFDU JT OPU QSPEVDFE )PCCFT  DI 9 TFDU  <> +PJOJOH OPX UPHFUIFS UIF "SJTUPUFMJBO BDDPVOU PG DIBOHF QFSTJTUFODF BOE DBVTBUJPO UIFSF JT OPU NVDI DPODFQUVBM TQBDF MFGU UP UIJOL PG DBV TBUJPO BT B UXPQMBDF SFMBUJPO CFUXFFO UXP FYJTUFOUT FYJTUJOH BU EJêFS FOU UJNFT 8IBUFWFS NBUFSJBM FOUJUJFT UIFSF FYJTU BU POF UJNF XJMM QBTT JO UIFJS FOUJSFUZ UP UIF OFYU CZ WJSUVF PG FOEVSJOH XIFUIFS JU CF VODIBOHFE PS DIBOHFE CZ BOZ PDDVSSJOH DBVTBM JObVFODF 'VSUIFSNPSF BO FWFOU PS TUBUF FYJTUJOH BU POF UJNF EPFT OPU DBVTF UIF OFYU CZ TPNFIPX TUBOEJOH JO BO VOBOBMZTFE BOEPS QSJNJUJWF SFMBUJPO PG qQSPEVDUJPOr UP UIF MBUFS FWFOUTUBUF $BVTBM QSPEVDUJPO JT BOBMZTFE JO UFSNT PG B DIBOHF JO B DPNQMFY PG PCKFDUT QSPWPLFE CZ BO JObVFODF FYFSUFE CFUXFFO UIPTF PC KFDUT 4JODF UIF JObVFODF JT FYFSUFE CFUXFFO PCKFDUT BOE UIF UFNQPSBM SFMBUJPO CFUXFFO UIPTF PCKFDUT JT QFSNBOFOUMZ TZODISPOPVT UIFSF OFWFS JT B EJBDISPOJD SFMBUJPO PG JObVFODF CFUXFFO BOZUIJOH *O QBSUJDVMBS UIF SFMBUJPO PG QSPEVDUJPO DBOOPU CF TVDI B EJBDISPOJD SFMBUJPO CFDBVTF XIBUFWFS QSPEVDFT BOZUIJOH DFBTFT UP FYJTU JO UIBU QSPDFTT 5IF "SJTUPUFMJBO WJFX * IBWF EFTDSJCFE TFFNT UP NF UP CF JO BDDPS EBODF UP BMM NBKPS TDIPPMT PG UIPVHIU CFGPSF UIF SJTF PG FNQJSJDJTN JO  UIF QBSUJDVMBS SFTQFDUT DPOTJEFSFE IFSF  *O "UPNJTN 4UPJDJTN 4DIPMBT UJDJTNBTXFMM BT JO UIF DPSQVTDVMBS WJFXFOEPSTFE CZ UIF OBUVSBM QIJMPTP QIFST PG UIF FBSMZ FOMJHIUFONFOU UIF DPNNPO BTTVNQUJPO JT UIBU JO bVFODF JT FYFSUFE CFUXFFO UXP NBUFSJBM PCKFDUT XIPTF SFMBUJPO JT TZO DISPOPVT *OEFFE BT GBS BT * DBO UFMM UIJT JT TUJMM B TUBOEBSE VOEFSTUBOE JOH JO QBSUJDMF QIZTJDT "MM UIF GVOEBNFOUBM GPSDFT PG OBUVSF BSF FYFSUFE CFUXFFO QFSTJTUFOU FOUJUJFT TPNF PG UIFN EP QFSTJTU WFSZ CSJFbZ UIBU JT USVF CVU QFSTJTU OFWFSUIFMFTT  *O UIF -BSHF )BESPO $PMMJEFS UIFZ BSF OPU BDDFMFSBUJOH FWFOUT UP NBLF UIFN TNBTI JOUP PUIFS FWFOUT UIFZ BD DFMFSBUF QBSUJDMFT UP NBLF UIFN TNBTI UPHFUIFS UP CSFBL FBDI PUIFS VQ *O DIFNJTUSZ UIF BTTVNQUJPO JT UIBU WBSJPVT TVCTUBODFT SFBDU XJUI FBDI PUIFS 0YZHFO SFBDUT XJUI TPNF GVFM UP DPNCVTU PYZHFO EPFT OPU SFBDU XJUI DPNCVTUJPO 'VSUIFSNPSF UIF DPNNPO TFOTF DPODFQUJPO JT UIBU CPEJFT BDU PO FBDI PUIFS UIF MFBEFO CBMM ESPQQFE VQPO B QJMMPX BDUT PO UIF QJMMPX UP NBLF B IPMMPX UIF GBMMJOH EPFTOrU BDU VQPO UIF GPSNJOH PG B IPMMPX UIF IPSTF QVMMT UIF DBSU OPU UIF NPUJPO PG UIF IPSTF UIBU QVMMT UIFNPUJPO PG UIF DBSU UIF CSJDL IJUT UIF XJOEPX OPU UIFNPUJPO PG UIF CSJDL IJUT UIF CSFBLJOH PG UIF XJOEPX  9 +RN,IncCRN 5IF WFSZ IVNCMF DPODMVTJPO UIBU UIJT QBQFS MFBET VQ UP JT TJNQMZ UIBU QSFTFOUJTUT XPVME OPU CF BCTVSEMZ PVU PG UPVDI XJUI SFBMJUZ XFSF UIFZ UP TVHHFTU UIBU GVUVSF BOE QBTU UFOTFE QSPQPTJUJPOT KVTU BSF OPU USVF PS UP EFOZ UIBU QFSTJTUFODF BOE DBVTBUJPO BSF BU SPDL CPUUPN DSPTTUJNF SFMB UJPOT 5IFZ TIPVME BSHVF UIBU XIJMF GVUVSF BOE QBTU UFOTFE FYQSFTTJPOT KVTU DBOrU CF UFDIOJDBMMZ USVF XF TUJMM IBWF BMM UIF SFBTPOT XF FWFS IBWF IBE UP CFMJFWF XIBU UIF QBTU VTFE UP CF MJLF BOE XIBU UIF GVUVSF XJMM CF /P MPTT FQJTUFNJDBMMZ UP EFOZ UIF FYJTUFODF PG UIF GVUVSF BOE QBTU "OE UIFZ TIPVME QPJOU PVU UIBU UIF JEFB UIBU QFSTJTUFODF BOE DBVTBMJUZ BSF DSPTTUFNQPSBM SFMBUJPOT JT B QFDVMJBSMZ )VNFBOFNQJSJDJTU DPODFQUJPO UIBU EPFTOrU SFTPOBUF XJUI UIF "SJTUPUFMJBO WJFX PG UIJOHT ,GNRsI30<3L3Njc 5IJT QBQFS JT CBTFE PO SFTFBSDI JO UIF QSPKFDU s4DJFOUJaD &TTFOUJBMJTN .PEFSOJTJOH UIF "SJTUPUFMJBO 7JFXt GVOEFE v CZ 3JLTCBOLFOT  +VCJMFVNTGPOE 4XFEJTI 'PVOEBUJPO GPS )VNBOJUJFT BOE 4PDJBM 4DJFODFT (SBOU*% 1 #C$ICR<aU@w <> "SJTUPUMF .FUBQIZTJDT  "SJTUPUMFrT .FUBQIZTJDT 3PTT 8% FE  0YGPSE $MBSFOEPO 1SFTT  <> "SJTUPUMF 1IZTJDT  1IZTJDT *O 8JDLTUFBE 1) BOE $PSOGPSE '. USBOTM  "SJTUPUMF 7PM *7 $BNCSJEHF .BTTBDIVTFUUT )BS WBSE 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT  <> #JHFMPX +   1SFTFOUJTN BOE 1SPQFSUJFT 1IJMPTPQIJDBM 1FS TQFDUJWFT  v <> #PVSOF $   " 'VUVSF GPS 1SFTFOUJTN 0YGPSE 0YGPSE 6OJWFS TJUZ 1SFTT <> #VOHF .   $BVTBMJUZ $BNCSJEHF .BTTBDIVTFUUT )BSWBSE 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT <> $BNFSPO 3   5IF .PWJOH 4QPUMJHIU "O &TTBZ PO 5JNF BOE 0OUPMPHZ 0YGPSE 0YGPSE 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT <> $IBLSBWBSUUZ "   $BVTBM 3FBMJTN &WFOUT BOE 1SPDFTTFT &SLFOOUOJT    v <> $SBJH 8-   .D5BHHBSUrT 1BSBEPY BOE UIF 1SPCMFN PG 5FN QPSBSZ *OUSJOTJDT "OBMZTJT  v <> $SBJH 8-   5IF 5FOTFE 5IFPSZ PG 5JNF %PSESFDIU ,MVXFS "DBEFNJD 1VCMJTIFST <> $SJTQ 5.   1SFTFOUJTN BOE s$SPTT5JNFt 3FMBUJPOT "NFS JDBO 1IJMPTPQIJDBM 2VBSUFSMZ    v <> $SJTQ 5.   1SFTFOUJTN BOE UIF (SPVOEJOH 0CKFDUJPO /P×T  v <> )PCCFT 5   &MFNFOUT PG 1IJMPTPQIZ $PODFSOJOH #PEZ *O 8 .PMFTXPSUI FE  5IF &OHMJTI 8PSLT PG 5IPNBT )PCCFT PG .BMNFT CVSZ -POEPO #PIO  <> *OHUIPSTTPO 3%   5FNQPSBM 1BSJUZ BOE UIF 1SPCMFNPG$IBOHF 4"54v/PSUIFSO &VSPQFBO +PVSOBM PG 1IJMPTPQIZ    v <> *OHUIPSTTPO 3%   $BVTBM 1SPEVDUJPO BT *OUFSBDUJPO .FUB QIZTJDB    v <> *OHUIPSTTPO 3%   $BO 5IJOHT &OEVSF JO 5FOTFMFTT 5JNF 4"54v/PSUIFSO &VSPQF +PVSOBM PG 1IJMPTPQIZ    v  <> *OHUIPSTTPO 3%   .D5BHHBSUrT 1BSBEPY /FX :PSL 3PVU MFEHF <> *OHUIPSTTPO 3%   $IBMMFOHJOH UIF (SPVOEJOH 0CKFDUJPO UP 1SFTFOUJTN .BOVTDSJUP    v <> *OHUIPSTTPO 3% GPSUIDPNJOH  5IFSFrT /P 5SVUI5IFPSZ -JLF UIF $PSSFTQPOEFODF 5IFPSZ %JTDVTJPOFT 'JMPTÐaDBT <> +PIBOTTPO *   0OUPMPHJDBM *OWFTUJHBUJPOT BO *ORVJSZ JOUP UIF $BUFHPSJFT PG /BUVSF .BO BOE 4PDJFUZ /FX :PSL 3PVUMFEHF <> ,JFSMBOE #   (SPVOEJOH 1BTU 5SVUIT 0WFSDPNJOH UIF $IBM MFOHF *O $JVOJ 3 .JMMFS , BOE 5PSSFOHP ( FET  /FX 1BQFST PO UIF 1SFTFOUw'PDVT PO 1SFTFOUJTN 1IJMPTPQIJB 7FSMBH QQ v  <> -FXJT %   0O UIF 1MVSBMJUZ PG 8PSMET 0YGPSE #BTJM #MBDL XFMM <> .BSLPTJBO /   " %FGFOTF PG 1SFTFOUJTN 0YGPSE 4UVEJFT JO .FUBQIZTJDT    v <> .PSUFOTFO $   $IBOHF BOE *ODPOTJTUFODZ *O ;BMUB &/ FE  5IF 4UBOGPSE &ODZDMPQFEJB PG 1IJMPTPQIZ IUUQTQMBUPTUBOGPSEFEVBSDIWFTXJOFOUSJFTDIBOHF "DDFTTFE /PW   <> .P[FSTLZ +.   5JNF -BOHVBHF BOE 0OUPMPHZ 0YGPSE 0Y GPSE 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT <> .VNGPSE 4 BOE "OKVN 3-   (FUUJOH $BVTFT GSPN 1PXFST 0YGPSE 0YGPSE 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT <> 0BLMBOEFS -/   .D5BHHBSUtT 1BSBEPY BOE $SJTQtT 1SFTFO UJTN 1IJMPTPQIJB    v <> 1SJPS "/   $IBOHFT JO &WFOUT BOE $IBOHFT JO 5IJOHT -BX SFODF ,BO 6OJWFSTJUZ PG ,BOTBT 1SFTT <> 1SPTTFS 4   &YQFSJFODJOH 5JNF 0YGPSE 0YGPSE 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT <> 4BMNPO 8   4DJFOUJaD &YQMBOBUJPO BOE UIF $BVTBM 4USVDUVSF PG UIF 8PSME /FX +FSTFZ 1SJODFUPO 6OJWFSTJUZ 1SFTT <> 4DIBêFS +   5IF .FUBQIZTJDT PG $BVTBUJPO *O ;BMUB &/ FE  5IF 4UBOGPSE &ODZDMPQFEJB PG 1IJMPTPQIZ IUUQTQMBUPTUBOGPSEFEVBSDIJWFTGBMMFOUSJFT DBVTBUJPONFUBQIZTJDT "DDFTTFE /PW   <> 4FJCU +   &YJTUFODF JO 5JNF 'SPN 4VCTUBODF UP 1SPDFTT *O 'BZF + 4DIFìFS 6 BOE 6ST . FET  1FSTQFDUJWFT PO 5JNF  #PTUPO 4UVEJFT JO 1IJMPTPQIZ PG 4DJFODF %PSESFDIU ,MVXFS QQ v <> 4FJCU +   5IF %ZOBNJD $POTUJUVUJPO PG 5IJOHT 1P[OBO 4UVE JFT JO UIF 1IJMPTPQIZ PG UIF 4DJFODFT BOE UIF )VNBOJUJFT  v <> 4FJCU +   1SPDFTT 1IJMPTPQIZ *O ;BMUB &/ FE  5IF 4UBO GPSE &ODZDMPQFEJB PG 1IJMPTPQIZ IUUQTQMBUPTUBOGPSEFEVBSDIJWFTXJOFOUSJFT QSPDFTTQIJMPTPQIZ "DDFTTFE /PW   <> 5PSSFOHP (   5IF .ZUI PG 1SFTFOUJTNrT *OUVJUJWF "QQFBM 1IFOPNFOPMPHZ BOE .JOE  v <> 8ØUISJDI $   %FNBSLBUJOH 1SFTFOUJTN *O EF 3FHU ) 0LBTIB 4 BOE )BSUNBOO 4 FET  &14" 1IJMPTPQIZ PG 4DJFODF "NTUFSEBN  %PSESFDUI 4QSJOHFS QQ v <> μISTUSÔN 1 BOE 4DIÁSGF )   " 1SJPSFBO"QQSPBDI UP 5JNF 0OUPMPHJFT *O 8PMê ,& FU BM FET  *OUFSOBUJPOBM $POGFSFODF PO $PODFQUVBM 4USVDUVSFT  $PODFQUVBM 4USVDUVSFT BU 8PSL %PS ESFDIU 4QSJOHFS QQ v 

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Mind and Mental Health Based on a Realistic Constructivism Khosrow Baghen Noaparast;Khosravi, Zohreh Constructivism in the Human Sciences; 2006; 11, 1/2; ProQuest Social Science Journals pg. 20 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

June 25, 2020 Tentatively forthcoming in Cambridge University Press's the Elements of Ethics series Morality and Practical Reasons Douglas W. Portmore – Arizona State University Abstract: As Socrates famously noted, there is perhaps no more important question than how we ought to live. And the answer to this question depends on how the reasons that we have for living in various different ways combine and compete. To illustrate, suppose that I've just received a substantial raise from my employer. What should I do with the extra money? It seems that I have most moral reason to donate it to effective charities but most self-interested reason to spend it on luxuries for myself. So, whether I should live my life as I have most moral reason to live it or as I have most self-interested reason to live it depends on how these and other sorts of reasons combine and compete to determine what I have most reason to do, all things considered. This short book seeks to figure out how different sorts of reasons-and, in particular, moral reasons and non-moral reasons-combine and compete to determine how we ought to live. 1. Morality and How We Ought to Live Whereas primitive animals are ruled solely by their impulses, we are rational creatures who can respond to reasons for acting contrary to our impulses. We are, therefore, capable of directing our lives in accordance with our reasons rather than just being swept along by the flow of our impulses. So, it's important for us to ask how we ought to live, as the answer to this question will tell us what our living in accordance with our reasons entails. After all, how we ought to live just depends on how our various practical reasons-our reasons for living in various different ways-combine and compete to determine the way (or, if there's a tie for first place, the ways) that we have most reason to live, all things considered. The relevant reasons are practical reasons. And practical reasons differ from other types of reasons in that they count for or against performing certain actions (or intending to perform certain actions), whereas other types of reasons count for or against having some other kind of response. For instance, epistemic reasons count for or against believing certain propositions. And evaluative reasons count for or against desiring certain states of affairs. Now, I'll be concerned almost exclusively with practical reasons. So, the reader should assume that, unless I explicitly state otherwise, the reasons that I'm discussing are practical reasons. As suggested above, there seem to be different sorts of (practical) reasons. For instance, whereas moral reasons support doing what's most morally choiceworthy, self-interested reasons support doing what's 2 most self-interestedly choiceworthy. But how do these different sorts of reasons combine and compete to determine which is the most overall choiceworthy? And which is the way that we ought to live? Should we live as it would be most morally choiceworthy to live, as it would be most self-interestedly choiceworthy to live, or as it would be most overall choiceworthy to live? The question arises, because these can seemingly come apart. After all, the most morally choiceworthy way to live may not be the most overall choiceworthy way to live. Consider that those known as effective altruists believe that the most morally choiceworthy way to live is by maximizing the good that you do over the course of your life.1 Some of them even go so far as to suggest that you ought to earn as much as possible with the goal of giving most of what you earn (say, everything over the $35,000 a year that you need to subsist) to effective charities. And they argue that it would be better for you to work on Wall Street and earn lots of extra money that you then give away to charity than to work in a profession in which you help people directly but make very little extra money that you can then donate to charity. They argue that, as a nurse, teacher, or social worker, you would make the world better only by the margin that you do the job better than whoever would have otherwise done it. But, as an effective altruist working on Wall Street, you can make much more of a difference, because the person who would have otherwise filled your position would almost certainly have used the substantial extra earnings that you'll give to charity to instead purchase luxuries for herself.2 So, according to many effective altruists, the most morally choiceworthy life that a young person can lead is the one in which she works to become an investment banker on Wall Street and then donates all but what she needs for bare subsistence to the most effective charities that she can find. Such a person won't be able to afford to raise a family, for it isn't easy living in New York City on only $35,000 a year. And she'll almost certainly need to live in a cramped apartment with several roommates just to afford the high rents in that city. What's more, she'll need to forego expensive hobbies, such as golfing, scuba diving, music lessons, and art collecting. Lastly, she'll need to give up the luxuries that many of us take for granted: vacations, dinners out, streaming services, nights at the theatre, etc. Indeed, when she gets some time off work, she should probably use it to recover from a surgery in which she has donated one of her kidneys to a stranger in renal failure rather than use it to take a vacation. For, as some effective altruists have argued, the risk of her dying as a result of making such a donation is only one in 4,000 and, so, to refrain from making such a donation would be to value her own life 4,000 times more than that of this stranger.3 1 Two prominent effective altruists are William MacAskill (2015) and Peter Singer (2015). 2 See, for instance, MacAskill (2013). 3 For some examples, see Baggini (2015). 3 But even if living in the single-minded pursuit of doing the most good that one can is perhaps the most morally choiceworthy way to live, it may not be the most overall choiceworthy way to live. After all, it seems that we have good reason to pursue more well-rounded lives-see, e.g., Berg (Manuscript). It seems, for instance, that I have good reason to live a life in which I raise a family, travel the world, attend the theatre, take music lessons, and pursue a career that I find more rewarding than any on Wall Street. Thus, it seems that even if I could do more good by plugging away as an investment banker on Wall Street and donating most of what I earn to effective charities, I have good reason to want to interact faceto-face with the people that I'm helping (e.g., my students) while doing the kind of work that I find fulfilling (e.g., teaching). Of course, all of this has been rather quick. I've just assumed that the effective altruist is correct about its being most morally choiceworthy to maximize the good that one does. And I've just assumed that the reasons that one has, say, to take a vacation or pursue a fulfilling career are non-moral reasons, and that these non-moral reasons are not outweighed, overridden, or undermined by the moral reasons that one has instead to do as much good as possible. Yet, it does seem that the most morally choiceworthy life is just the life that one has most moral reason to live. And it seems that the most overall choiceworthy life is just the life that one has most reason to live, all things (including both moral and non-moral reasons) considered. So, it seems that, in order for us to determine both what's the most morally choiceworthy and what's the most overall choiceworthy, we need to better understand what our reasons are, which of them are moral, which of them are non-moral, and how they combine and compete to determine what we have most reason to do, all things considered. And this is what I aim to do, starting with an exploration of moral reasons. 2. The Nature of Moral Reasons Moral reasons are a subset of normative reasons. Thus, to understand them, we must first understand what normative reasons are and how they differ from non-normative reasons. What's more, we'll need to understand how moral reasons differ from other kinds of normative reasons. This means that we'll need to understand both how moral reasons differ, in general, from non-moral reasons and how they differ from various particular types of non-moral reasons, such as self-interested reasons. Lastly, we'll need to understand how normative reasons differ from factors that are relevant to how we ought to live but that are not themselves normative reasons-that is, how they differ from what I'll call normatively relevant non-reasons. 2.1 Normative Reasons versus Non-Normative Reasons 4 A normative reason is a fact that counts for or against a subject's responding in a certain way to her circumstances. It counts for or against this response in that it counts for or against this being how she ought to respond.4 For instance, the fact that I'll probably need a root canal later if I don't get this cavity taken care of right away is a normative reason for me to get it taken care of right away. That is, it counts in favour of this being what I ought to do in that this will be what I ought to do unless something else (some factor or other reason) defeats its favouring force. More precisely, then, we can define normative reasons for and against as follows. Normative Reasons: For any subject S with the option of φ-ing in circumstances C, a normative reason for S to φ in C is any fact that will, absent its favouring force being defeated, make it the case that she ought to φ in C.5 And a normative reason against S's φ-ing in C is any fact that will, absent its disfavouring force being defeated, make it the case that she ought not to φ in C. Given that there can be normative reasons both for and against one's φ-ing, normative reasons can conflict. The fact that I'll probably need a root canal if I don't get this cavity taken care of right away is a normative reason for me to get it taken care of right away, but the fact that I'm really pressed for time and need to finish a project at work by the end of the week is a normative reason against my doing so. Thus, whether I ought to take care of it right away depends (in part) on whether these reasons against doing so are defeated. And there are a number of possible ways that they might be defeated. One possibility is that the reasons for getting the cavity taken care of right away nullify, or otherwise undermine, the disfavouring force of the reasons against doing so. To illustrate, suppose that I've promised my wife that I wouldn't let work interfere with my healthcare. Perhaps, this promise-related reason nullifies the workrelated reason, undermining whatever disfavouring force that it would otherwise have. Another possibility 4 Others believe that nothing more can be said. Here's Scanlon (1998, p. 17): "Any attempt to explain what it is to be a reason for something seems to me to lead back to the same idea: a consideration that counts in favor of it. 'Counts in favor how?' one might ask. 'By providing a reason for it' seems to be the only answer." And still others agree with me that more can be said but disagree with me about what more can be said. For instance, Markovits (2014, pp. 2–3) holds that "what it is for a consideration to count in favor of an action is for it...to help satisfy one of [the agent's] desires." 5 Jonathan Dancy has claimed that some normative reasons for φ-ing (what he calls 'enticing reasons' for φ-ing) favour one's φ-ing without being such that they will, absent being defeated, make it the case that one ought to φ. He claims that "they go to make a choice the best one, but not yet the one which one ought to take" (2004, p. 116). He denies that these enticing reasons can take us to an ought, because he denies that they can take us to an obligation and believes that we're obligated to do whatever we ought to do (2006a, p. 135). Yet, it seems clear both that one ought to take whatever option one has most reason to take and that one isn't always obligated to take the option that one has most reason to take-more on this below. So, contrary to Dancy, I believe that what makes a normative reason for one to φ an enticing reason, rather than a requiring reason, is that it's a fact that favours one's φ-ing without giving anyone (even oneself) sufficient grounds for demanding that one φs. It does, however, take us to an ought if undefeated. 5 is that health-related reasons always override (that is, trump or cancel out) work-related reasons such that even the weakest health-related reason for getting it taken care of right away trumps the strongest workrelated reason against doing so. And a third possibility is that the reasons for taking care of it right away outweigh the reasons against doing so. For, perhaps, the combined favouring force of all the reasons for taking care of it right away outweighs the combined disfavouring force of all the reasons against doing so.6 Note, then, that the favouring and disfavouring forces of normative reasons can be more or less weighty. That is, normative reasons can favour or disfavour an option to a greater or lesser degree. And the weights of these forces can combine and compete with those of other normative reasons. What's more, the combined favouring force of a multitude of relatively weak reasons for one to φ could outweigh the disfavouring force of a relatively strong reason against one's φ-ing: the result being that one ought to φ even though none of the individual reasons that one has for φ-ing could, on its own, outweigh the strong reason one has against φ-ing. To illustrate, suppose that I have a weighty reason against going into the office today: I'll lose over an hour of productivity just in the time it would take me to commute to and from the office. And suppose that I have only one student who wants to meet with me today. In that case, the relatively weak favouring force of this reason would, we'll suppose, be defeated by the comparatively strong disfavouring force of the reason that I have against going into the office. But, now, suppose that I have instead a total of five students who each want to meet with me today. In that case, the combined force of each of these reasons would, we'll suppose, defeat the disfavouring force of the reason that I have against going into the office. So, if I have only one student who wants to meet with me, I ought not to go into the office. But if I have five students who want to meet with me, I ought to go into the office. As we've just seen, if I have an undefeated normative reason to φ in C, then φ is what I ought to do in C. And it's this ability to combine and compete so as to determine what one ought to do that's definitive of normative reasons. Normative reasons are normative in that they can contribute both to generating oughts and to preventing other reasons from generating oughts. It's important to note, then, that a fact that doesn't constitute a normative reason in one set of circumstances can constitute a normative reason in another set of circumstances. For instance, the fact that I've promised that I would come into the office if and only if I have some other reason to come into 6 When combining the forces of reasons, we should never combine the force of a derivative reason with that of the reason from which its force derives. That would involve a kind of problematic double-counting. Thus, when I talk about combining the forces of reasons, I'm talking about combining the forces of only non-derivative reasons. See Nair (2016). 6 the office doesn't constitute a reason for me to come into the office in those circumstances in which I don't have any other reason to come into the office, but it does in those circumstances in which, say, I have a meeting at the office that I have good reason to attend (Dancy 2006b, p. 42). It's also important to note that normative reasons, if not defeated, necessarily take us to an ought, but they don't necessarily take us to an obligation. For although we ought to do whatever we are obligated to do, not everything that we ought to do is something that we're obligated to do. To say that an act is one that you ought to perform is to say that it's the option that you have most reason to perform and is, therefore, your most choiceworthy option.7 But to say that an act is one that you're obligated to perform is to say, additionally, that you would be blameworthy for failing perform it without having some suitable excuse. Thus, an act can be one that you ought to perform without being one that you are obligated to perform. For you are not always blameworthy for failing to perform the option that you have most reason to perform-even when you lack a suitable excuse for so failing. Whether you are or not just depends on whether there is some actual or hypothetical person (either oneself or some other) who can rightfully demand that you perform this option. Thus, there has to be some (at least, possible) person who can rightfully hold you to account (by blaming you) if you fail to perform it without having some suitable excuse. To illustrate, consider the following claim: "I ought to send my mother flowers for Mother's Day, but, at the very least, I must send her a card." This claim, I take it, expresses the thought that what I have most reason to do is to send her flowers, but that I'm obligated, at a minimum, to send her a card. This is the least that I could do, because she has every right to demand that I do at least this much given all that she's done for me as a mother. And although neither she nor anyone else has the right to demand that I send her flowers, I ought to do so given what it would mean to her and how little it would inconvenience me to do so, which is what explains why this is what I have most reason to do. As I've just explained, normative reasons are related to oughts; they can contribute both to generating an ought and to preventing other reasons from generating an ought. It's potentially confusing, then, that in ordinary English we often use the word 'reasons' to refer to things that are not related to oughts. So, to avoid confusion, we should label these reasons "non-normative reasons" and get clear on how they differ from normative reasons. 7 I take all the following to be equivalent: 'you ought to φ', 'you have most reason to φ', and 'φ is your most choiceworthy option'. But I take all three to be distinct from 'φ is your best option in terms of whatever ultimately matters'. See Portmore (2019a, especially chap. 6). Also, note that I'm assuming that there is non-moral blame as well as moral blame-see Portmore (Manuscript). 7 There are at least two types of non-normative reasons: explanatory reasons and motivating reasons. I'll consider each in turn. An explanatory reason explains why a subject responded as she did. For instance, the fact that I haven't gotten enough sleep lately may explain why I've just snapped at you (Markovits 2014, p. 1). But, of course, my not having gotten enough sleep doesn't count in favour of my snapping at you. Rather, it's merely what caused me to snapped at you. And, so, explanatory reasons are distinct from normative reasons-they are facts that explain why an agent did what she did without necessarily counting in favour of what she did, whereas normative reasons for an action necessarily count in favour of that action.8 Another type of non-normative reason is a motivating reason. Consider that even if I snap at you because I haven't been getting enough sleep lately, this won't be the consideration on the basis of which I chose to snap at you. Perhaps, I chose to snap at you because you've been tapping your foot and this has gotten on my nerves (Markovits 2014, p. 1). But, of course, the consideration on the basis of which I chose to snap at you needn't be one that counts in favour of my doing so. The fact that you've been tapping your foot doesn't count in favour of my snapping at you. Thus, motivating reasons are also distinct from normative reasons-they are the considerations on the basis of which the agent chooses to act without necessarily being considerations that count in favour of that act. And note that, unless I explicitly state otherwise, I'll use the term 'reasons' to refer to normative reasons. 2.2 Qualified Normativity versus Unqualified Normativity I've claimed that what's definitive of normative reasons is that they contribute both to generating oughts and to preventing other reasons from generating oughts. But what sorts of oughts? Interestingly, some philosophers deny that there's anything that we just plain ought to do. They claim instead that there is only what we legally ought to do, what we morally ought to do, what we self-interestedly ought to do, what we aesthetically ought to do, etc. That is, they deny that there is anything that we just plain ought to do and hold instead that there is only what we ought to do in various qualified senses. These philosophers are known as normative pluralists.9 To illustrate, suppose that I'm playing chess, I'm in check, and it's my turn.10 The rules of chess dictate that, given that I'm in check, I must move my king one square to the left-this being the only move that gets me out of check. But the rules of etiquette dictate that I ought 8 Sometimes, when an agent is motivated to act by a consideration that counts in favour of her act, that very consideration counts not only as a motivating reason, but also as both an explanatory reason and a normative reason (Markovits 2014, p. 1). 9 Proponents of normative pluralism include David Copp (1997) and Evan Tiffany (2007). Critics include Owen McLeod (2001) and Dale Dorsey (2006). 10 This example is borrowed from Richard Joyce (2001, p. 50). 8 instead to resign by tipping over my king, because I can no longer expect a draw, let alone a win. Yet, from the point of view of self-interest, I ought to offer a draw, because I don't want to lose and my opponent doesn't yet seem to realize how untenable my situation has become. Lastly, let's suppose that morality directs me to violate the rules of chess by using my cell phone during the game given that I promised my wife that I would text her during the game. In such a case, normative pluralists hold that I morally ought to use my cell phone, self-interestedly ought to offer a draw, etiquettically ought to resign, and chess-rules-wise ought to move my king one square to the left. But they deny that there's anything that I just plain ought to do-that is, they deny that there's anything that I ought to do, all things considered. We should, I believe, be sceptical of normative pluralism. After all, when ordinary people (those without advanced training in contemporary moral philosophy) use the word 'ought', they rarely, if ever, use any overt qualifier with it. That is, they rarely, if ever, use constructions such as 'morally ought', 'legally ought', 'prudentially ought', or 'self-interestedly ought'.11 And I doubt that they intend for there to be some covert qualifier attached to their 'ought' that's supposedly fixed by the context. For it seems that when ordinary people use the word 'ought', they use it in an unqualified way that's meant to be authoritative such that if you don't respond as they say that you ought to, they take you to be guilty of a mistake from the point of view of reasons generally and not just from the point of view of some qualified normative perspective. Of course, whenever there's a standard-whether it be of legality, morality, etiquette, or reasons generally-you'll be guilty of the "mistake" of having violated that standard if you violate it. But, for any standard other than that of reasons generally, it's an open question whether you'll also be guilty of the mistake of not responding appropriately to your reasons. After all, you may not have any reason to abide by that standard. After all, many standards come cheap in that they can be constructed for any or no purpose at all. Consider, for instance, what we might call the many-books standard: an act meets this standard if and only if it involves touching three or more distinct books.12 Thus, the act of arranging a stack of several distinct books meets this standard, but the act of jogging around the neighbourhood doesn't. Thus, in jogging around the neighbourhood, one makes the "mistake" of violating the many-books standard. But if one doesn't have any reason to abide by this standard, then one isn't making the mistake of responding inappropriately to one's reasons. 11 On March 17, 2020, I did a search of the online version of The New York Times (www.nytimes.com). And whereas I got 820,437 results for 'ought', I got only two results for 'legally ought', one result for 'morally ought', and zero results both for 'self-interestedly ought' and for 'prudentially ought'. The one result for 'morally ought' was due to a quotation from the Oxford academic Richard Dawkins. And, of the two results for 'legally ought', one seemed to be the result of a transcription error, and the other was due to a quotation by a highly educated congressman who has both a BA and a JD from Harvard. 12 This is inspired by a similar example from Dale Dorsey (2016, p. 9). 9 So, one reason to reject normative pluralism is the fact that it conflicts with the way that ordinary English speakers tend to use the word 'ought'. They tend to use it in an unqualified way such that those who fail to do as they say that they ought to are seen as guilty of having failed to respond appropriately to their reasons.13 Indeed, few people would say that you ought to do something simply because it was in accordance with just any old standard, such as the many-books standard. For it is only some standards that there is reason to abide by. And because of this we can sensibly ask whether we just plain ought to do what we ought to do in some qualified sense-e.g., whether we ought to do what we many-books-wise ought to do. So, another reason to think that there is this unqualified sense of ought is the fact that we seem to be able to ask questions such as whether we ought to do what we legally, morally, or selfinterestedly ought to do. And such questions presuppose that there is an unqualified sense of 'ought'. Lastly, we should reject normative pluralism because it often seems to us that there's a normative question that needs answering even when we know what we ought to do in every qualified sense of 'ought'. For instance, sometimes I morally ought to do one thing but self-interestedly ought to do another. And, yet, it seems important to inquire further and ask what I ought to do, all things considered-that is, what I ought to do considering both what is most morally choiceworthy and what is most self-interestedly choiceworthy. And, in some cases, it seems that I ought to do what is most morally choiceworthy, whereas, in other cases, it seems that I ought to do what is most self-interestedly choiceworthy. To illustrate, suppose that I promised to meet a student Friday afternoon to help her with her term paper. But suppose that, come Friday afternoon, I'm rather tired and would prefer to take a nap. In such a case, I morally ought to meet with her, but I self-interestedly ought to take a nap. What's more, in this case, it seems that what I ought to do, all things considered, is meet with her as promised. For it seems that when determining what I ought to do, all things considered, the normative (and self-interested) reason that I have to take a nap is outweighed by the weightier normative (and moral) reason that I have to keep my promise. But now consider a different version of the case. Suppose that right before our planned meeting I accidentally cracked a tooth. And let's suppose that the pain is excruciating. What's more, I'll have to pay thousands of dollars extra to get it fixed at an emergency dental clinic this weekend if I don't get it fixed before my regular in-network dentist closes this afternoon. But if I'm to get it taken care of right away, I'll have to miss my appointment with the student (and there's no way for me to let her know beforehand). In this variant of the case, it seems that the normative (and self-interested) reasons that I have to do what 13 As I see it, failing to do what one ought to do entails failing to respond appropriately to one's reasons in that it is inappropriate for one to fail to do what one has most reason to do. But if no one (not even oneself) can legitimately demand that one does what one has most reason to do in the circumstances, then one will be neither required to do so nor blameworthy for failing to do so. 10 will save me hours of agony and thousands of dollars outweighs the normative (and moral) reason that I have to keep my promise. Thus, contrary to what the normative pluralist claims, it seems quite sensible to speak of what I just plain ought to do in these cases in which various qualified oughts conflict. So, there seems to be two kinds of normativity. On the one hand, there's qualified normativity, which concerns what we ought to do in various qualified senses: e.g., what we legally, morally, or selfinterestedly ought to do. On the other hand, there's unqualified normativity, which concerns what we just plain ought to do-or, in other words, what we ought to do, all things (and, thus, all reasons) considered. This kind of normativity is unqualified such that those who fail to do as they ought to do in this sense are guilty of not having responded appropriately to their reasons. Given this distinction between qualified and unqualified normativity, we can distinguish between qualified and unqualified (normative) reasons. First, there are qualified (normative) reasons, which are considerations that are relevant to what we qualifiedly ought to do. And different kinds of qualified reasons count for or against different kinds of qualified oughts. For instance, a moral reason for or against a subject's φ-ing in circumstances C is any fact that counts for or against φ's being how she morally ought to respond in C. A self-interested reason for or against her φ-ing in C is any fact that counts for or against φ's being how she self-interestedly ought to respond in C. And an aesthetic reason for or against her φ-ing in C is any fact that counts for or against φ's being how she aesthetically ought to respond in C. Second, there are unqualified (normative) reasons, which are considerations that combine and compete to determine what we just plain ought to do-that is, what we ought to do, all things considered. More generally, a D reason for φ-ing ('D' standing for some domain such as 'moral', 'legal', or 'unqualified') makes φ-ing more D-ly choiceworthy and a D reason against φ-ing makes φ-ing less D-ly choiceworthy. Of course, a reason can be both a qualified and an unqualified reason. For instance, the fact that I would be better off taking care of my cavity right away seems not only to be a self-interested reason for me to do so, but also an unqualified reason for me to do so. That is, this consideration seems relevant in determining both what I self-interestedly ought to do and what I just plain ought to do. And, in what's to come, I'll be talking about unqualified reasons whenever I use the word 'reason'-unless, of course, I explicitly use some qualifier such as 'moral' or 'legal'. 2.3 Normative Reasons versus Normatively Relevant Factors We've seen that a normative reason for a subject to φ counts in favour of φ's being what she normatively ought to do-that is, what she just plain ought to do. But normative reasons are not the only normatively relevant factors, where a normatively relevant factor with respect to a subject's φ-ing is just any factor that's relevant to whether she normatively ought to φ. Likewise, moral reasons are not the only morally 11 relevant factors, where a morally relevant factor with respect to a subject's φ-ing is just any factor that's relevant to whether she morally ought to φ. In general, for any qualified or unqualified normative domain D, a D-ly relevant factor with respect to a subject's φ-ing is any factor that's relevant to whether she D-ly ought to φ. Now, clearly, any D reason for or against a subject's φ-ing will be a D-ly relevant factor with respect to her φ-ing, but, as I've just indicated, not every D-ly relevant factor with respect to a subject's φ-ing will be a D reason for or against her φ-ing. To illustrate, suppose both that each agent morally ought to produce the greatest balance of pleasure over pain for others that she can produce without violating anyone's rights and that each agent has a right not to be slapped by others but no right not to be slapped by herself. On this moral view, the fact that the face that I'm slapping is my own is a morally relevant factor with respect to my slapping this face but it's not a moral reason for or against my slapping it. It's a morally relevant factor given that it morally justifies my slapping this face. But the fact that the face that I'm slapping is my own is not a moral reason for or against my slapping it. After all, it counts neither for nor against this being what I morally ought to do. For, on given moral view, the only thing that counts for an act's being one that I morally ought to perform is that it will either increase someone else's pleasure or decrease someone else's pain. And the only thing that counts against an act's being something that I morally ought to perform is that it will increase someone else's pain, decrease someone else's pleasure, or violate someone's rights. Of course, I'm not suggesting that this is a plausible moral view. The point is only to illustrate how, on certain moral views, not every morally relevant factor will constitute a moral reason. Here's another example. The fact that I can touch my nose is neither a normative reason for nor against my doing so. For the mere fact that this is something I can do neither favours nor disfavours my doing so. Nevertheless, this fact is relevant to whether I ought to touch my nose, because 'ought' implies 'can' such that one ought to φ only if one can φ-or so let's assume for the sake of argument. Thus, touching my nose can be something that I ought to do only if it's something that I can do. So, if I were paralyzed and consequently unable to touch my nose, touching my nose wouldn't be something that I ought to do no matter how great it would be for me to do so. The fact that I'm able to touch my nose is, therefore, a normatively relevant factor with respect to my touching my nose, but it's not a normative reason for or against my touching my nose-that is, it's a normatively relevant non-reason with respect to my touching my nose. The distinction between a D reason for or against a subject's φ-ing and a D-ly relevant non-reason with respect to her φ-ing applies across various normative domains, including the epistemic domain. Thus, someone might hold that whether one should believe that p depends not only on how much evidence one 12 has for p's being true, but also how much is at stake for one with regard to whether p is true.14 To illustrate, consider the following example. The Layover: Hector is at the Houston airport contemplating taking a certain flight to New York. He wants to know whether the flight has a layover in Atlanta. Peeking over another passenger's shoulder (a passenger named Louise), he sees that her itinerary clearly states that the flight has a layover in Atlanta. But whereas Louise doesn't really care where the layover is, Hector does. For Hector has a very important business contact he has to meet at the Atlanta airport. Hector wonders: "How reliable is this itinerary? It could contain a misprint. Or the airline could have changed the schedule since it was printed." Thus, Hector decides to check with the agent at the gate to see whether it does indeed stop in Atlanta.15 Now, it seems that Hector and Louise have the exact same evidence with regard to whether the flight stops in Atlanta: the fact, as each sees, that the itinerary clearly states that the flight has a layover in Atlanta. But someone might think that whereas Louise ought to believe that it stops in Atlanta, Hector shouldn't. Given the high stakes for him and the possibility of misprints and last-minute schedule changes, he shouldn't believe that it's going to Atlanta without first confirming that it does with the agent at the gate. Louise, by contrast, should believe that it's going to stop in Atlanta despite the slight possibility of misprints and last-minute schedule changes given that the stakes are quite low for her. So, in The Layover, it may be that, on certain epistemic theories, how high the stakes are for one in whether the flight stops in Atlanta is doxastically relevant with respect to whether one ought to believe that it does, and, yet, whether the stakes are high or low counts neither for nor against believing that it does. For the fact that the stakes are high or low doesn't count as evidence for or against the flight's stopping in Atlanta. Thus, it's neither a reason for nor a reason against believing that it will stop in Atlanta. Thus, it's a doxastically relevant factor with respect to whether one ought to believe that it stops in Atlanta, but it's not a doxastic reason to believe that it does. Thus, it's a normatively relevant non-reason with respect to believing that it stops in Atlanta. Normatively relevant non-reasons divide into types. Two of these types are enablers and nullifiers. An enabler is a fact that enables some other fact that wouldn't otherwise count as a reason to count as a 14 I realize that most epistemologists think that the stakes are relevant only with respect to whether one counts as knowing a proposition and not with respect to whether one ought to believe that proposition, but the point of this example is only to illustrate the distinction between normative reasons and normatively relevant factors. 15 This is based off a similar example from Stew Cohen (1999, p. 58). 13 reason.16 To illustrate, the fact that it would be good if the doctor were to give the boy a shot of penicillin counts as a reason for her to do so only if she can give him such a shot. After all, it seems that 'S has a reason to φ' implies that 'S can φ' (see Streumer 2007). Thus, the fact that she can give him such a shot counts as an enabler. Although the fact that she can give him a shot of penicillin is not itself a reason to do so, it's what enables the fact that it would be good if she were to give him such a shot to constitute a reason for her to do so. There are also nullifiers. For instance, some think that the fact that I've promised not to let my selfinterested concerns influence my decision about which candidate to recommend to the department prevents the fact that I would personally benefit from recommending a given candidate from counting in favour of my recommending her to the department. They take it to be a nullifier in that it prevents the fact that I would personally benefit from recommending her to the department (a fact that would otherwise count in favour of my doing so) from counting in favour of my doing so. Two other types of normatively relevant non-reasons are intensifiers and attenuators. To illustrate, suppose that I come across, on an infrequently travelled road, a man who is struggling to change his vehicle's flat tire. The fact that I'm the only one who can help him seems to intensify the reason I have to stop and help him, but the fact that it's entirely his fault that he's in this predicament (because, say, he didn't get new tires even though I'd told him last month that he needed new tires) seems to attenuate my reason to stop and help him (Dancy 2006b, p. 49). Lastly, there are justifiers and counter-justifiers: facts that make it easier or harder to justify responding in a certain way, respectively. For instance, the fact that it's my face that I'm slapping may morally justify my slapping my face, but it doesn't morally count in favour of my doing so. Thus, it's a moral justifier, but not a moral reason. That is, it's a fact that justifies my slapping this face, making it permissible for me do so, but without in any way making it more morally choiceworthy for me to do so. And there are counter-justifiers: facts that make it harder to justify responding in certain ways. To illustrate, recall The Layover. As noted above, one might want to say that although Hector and Louise have the exact same doxastic reasons for believing that the flight will stop in Atlanta, these reasons are sufficient for Louise to believe that it will do so but insufficient for Hector to believe that it will do so given that the stakes are much higher for Hector than for Louise. And if this is right, then the high stakes 16 As with the other types to follow, enablers can be reasons as well as non-reasons. That is, the fact that enables some other fact that wouldn't otherwise count as a reason to count as a reason could itself be a reason. For the sake of brevity, I'll illustrate each type in term of non-reasons only. 14 would be a counter-justifier. That is, the fact that the stakes are quite high for Hector would be a counterjustifier for Hector's believing that the flight will stop in Atlanta. In this section, I've argued that there is an important distinction between a fact that counts D-ly in favour of one's φ-ing and a fact that is relevant to whether one D-ly ought to φ. And although every D-reason for or against one's φ-ing is relevant to whether one D-ly ought to φ, not every fact that is relevant to whether one D-ly ought to φ is a D reason for or against one's φ-ing. What's more, I explained how there are various different sorts of normatively relevant non-reasons: enablers, nullifiers, intensifiers, attenuators, justifiers, and counter-justifiers. 2.4 Moral Reasons versus Non-Moral Reasons Despite the importance of the distinction that I've just explicated in the previous section, philosophers have often conflated morally relevant factors with moral reasons. For instance, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (1992, p. 403) claims: "Since a reason for action is a fact that can affect the rationality of an act, a moral reason is a fact that can affect the morality of an act, either by making an otherwise morally neutral act morally good or by making an otherwise immoral act moral." But the fact that it's my face that I'm slapping can make an otherwise immoral act (e.g., the act of my slapping someone's face) moral, but it's not a moral reason for or against my doing so. Thus, it affects the moral status of an act, but it isn't something that counts for or against that act, morally speaking. Shelly Kagan also conflates a morally relevant factor with a moral reason. He holds that if "we are concerned with what is required by morality, the relevant reasons-whether decisive or not-must be moral ones" (1991, p. 66). Now, if we're concerned with what is required by morality, then the relevant reasons must be morally relevant reasons, but they needn't be moral reasons-that is, they needn't be considerations that count for or against some response, morally speaking. For although all moral reasons must be morally relevant reasons, not all morally relevant reasons must be moral reasons. To illustrate, consider the following case. The Trivial Promise: I've promised to meet with a student to discuss her exam grade from last semester. But, subsequent to my making this promise, I learn of a golden opportunity to take a free trip around the world on a luxury sailing yacht-something both that I've always dreamed of doing and that would normally cost many hundreds of thousands of dollars. Unfortunately, if I'm to take advantage of this opportunity, I must immediately drive down to the city to sign up before the offer expires. But this will mean missing my appointment with the student, and I have no way of contacting her beforehand. In the end, I decide to drive down to the city and sign up for the free trip. But I 15 apologize profusely to the student when I get back, making sure to pay her sufficient restitution to more than compensate for any frustration or inconvenience that I've caused her. What's more, I go out of my way to reschedule our meeting at her earliest convenience. In this case, it seems that the reason that I had to drive down to the city (that doing so will get me a free trip around the world on a luxury sailing yacht) was a non-moral reason, for it didn't make my driving down to the city morally choiceworthy (or unchoiceworthy) in any respect.17 Yet, this non-moral reason was morally relevant, because it did make an otherwise morally impermissible act (that of missing my appointment) morally permissible. Of course, I was required to make it up to the student, but it wasn't wrong for me to miss our appointment given that this was the only way for me to fulfil my life-long dream of sailing around the world. Thus, the self-interested reason that I had to drive down to the city to sign-up for the free trip seems to be a morally relevant non-moral reason. Now, Joshua Gert thinks that "the phrase 'morally relevant non-moral reason' should raise some eyebrows" (2014, p. 211). He wonders: "Why should we not grant that if a consideration is capable of providing moral justification, then this shows that it does count, morally, in favour of an option?" (p. 211). The answer is that we should not grant this because morally justifying is not at all the same thing as morally favouring. The fact that it's my face that I'm slapping may morally justify what I'm doing (viz., slapping this face), but it doesn't morally favour my doing so. That is, the fact that it's my face that I'm slapping doesn't speak in favour of my slapping it, morally speaking. Indeed, it does nothing to make my doing so morally choiceworthy. So, however we draw the distinction between moral reasons and nonmoral reasons, we must be careful not to conflate moral reasons with morally relevant reasons, as Gert, Kagan, and Sinnott-Armstrong have done. So, morally relevant reasons are reasons (moral or non-moral) that are relevant to the moral status of a response. These reasons can be morally relevant either because they morally favour/disfavour that response or because these reasons serve as an enabler, defeater, intensifier, attenuator, justifier, or counter-justifier. The former are moral reasons, and the latter are morally relevant non-moral reasons. More precisely, the two can be defined as follows. Moral Reasons: For any subject S with the option of φ-ing in circumstances C, a moral reason for S to φ in C is any fact that will, absent its morally favouring force being defeated, make it the case that 17 Assume that if I don't take advantage of this offer, this will only free up a spot for someone who is even more deserving of this opportunity. So, if anything, I have a moral reason to free up this spot for this more deserving someone. 16 she morally ought to φ in C. Likewise, a moral reason against S's φ-ing in C is any fact that will, absent its morally disfavouring force being defeated, make it the case that she morally ought not to φ in C.18 And a non-moral reason is any reason that's not a moral reason.19 Morally Relevant Non-Moral Reasons: For any subject S with the option of φ-ing in circumstances C, a morally relevant non-moral reason for or against S's φ-ing in C is any non-moral reason that's relevant to whether or not she morally ought to φ in C given that it serves as an enabler, defeater, intensifier, attenuator, justifier, or counter-justifier. Of course, just because there's a distinction between two kinds of things doesn't mean that it's a useful or important one. There's a distinction between live rabbits that have hearts and live rabbits that don't have hearts, but it's not a very useful distinction given that all actual live rabbits have hearts. Perhaps, the distinction between moral reasons and non-moral reasons is like this. For, perhaps, all reasons are moral reasons. This view is called moralism.20 Another possibility is that all reasons are non-moral reasons. And I'll call this view non-moralism. I think that neither view is plausible. Contrary to moralism, the fact that I get more pleasure from drinking Coke than I do from drinking Pepsi seems clearly to be a non-moral reason for me to drink Coke instead of Pepsi. It's a non-moral reason, for the mere fact that I get more pleasure from drinking Coke doesn't seem to make my choosing Coke over Pepsi in any way morally choiceworthy. After all, it doesn't seem that choosing Coke over Pepsi is what I morally ought to do even if it is what I self-interestedly ought to do.21 18 Stephen Darwall has suggested that "moral reasons...are pro tanto moral obligation-making considerations. They are facts that tend to make an act morally obligatory" (2017, p. 1). But, as I explained above, something can be what we morally ought to do without being morally obligatory. For instance, supererogatory acts are acts that we morally ought to perform even though we're not morally obligated to perform them. And what makes an act supererogatory are the moral reasons that favour it. So, I think that, contrary to Darwall, we should think that moral reasons are pro tanto moral ought-making considerations, not pro tanto moral obligation-making considerations. 19 What distinguishes moral reasons from non-moral reasons is neither that the two have distinctive grounds (e.g., the former is and the latter isn't grounded in our social practices) nor that the two have distinctive contents (e.g., the former is and the latter isn't other-regarding). Rather, what distinguishes the two is their distinctive functional roles. Moral reasons, unlike non-moral reasons, function to generate moral oughts when their favouring forces remain undefeated. See Forcehimes & Semrau 2018 for difficulties with those approaches that instead appeal either to their putative distinctive grounds or to their putative distinctive contents. 20 John Haldane (2011) is, for instance, a proponent of moralism. 21 The claim is not that there can never be a moral reason to promote one's self-interest, nor is the claim that there is never any self-regarding moral reasons. The claim is only that the mere fact that φ-ing would promote one's selfinterest is not itself a moral reason for one to φ, for the fact that φ-ing would promote one's hedonic utility (that is, increase the net sum of pleasure over pain that one experiences) doesn't itself count as a moral reason for one to φ. It could, of course, derivatively count as a moral reason, as where decreasing my hedonic utility would interfere with my mental health to an extent that would impede my ability to act morally. I'll have more to say on this topic in section 3.3 below. 17 And, contrary to non-moralism, the fact (if it is a fact) that Pepsi corporation treats their workers better than the Coca Cola corporation seems clearly to be a moral reason to purchase stock in Pepsi as opposed to Coke. So, it seems that there are reasons of both the moral and non-moral varieties. What's more, the distinction between moral and non-moral reasons would seem to be an important one, for, as I'll argue below, both types of reasons are relevant in determining how we just plain ought to live. Indeed, these two types of reasons can support conflicting answers to the question of how we ought to live. For instance, it could be that I have a non-moral reason to choose Coke over Pepsi but a moral reason to choose Pepsi over Coke.22 3. Are Moral Reasons Unqualified (Normative) Reasons? We've seen that moral reasons are, by definition, relevant to what we morally ought to do. But are moral reasons also relevant to what we just plain ought to do? That is, are they merely qualified (normative) reasons, or are they also unqualified (normative) reasons? This is an important question, because moral reasons are relevant to answering the all-important question of how we just plain ought to live only if they are unqualified reasons. On the face of it, moral reasons seem to be unqualified reasons, for they seem to combine and compete with other unqualified reasons (such as self-interested reasons) to determine what we just plain ought to do. For instance, the fact that my pulling a drowning child out of the pool would save her life seems to count in favour of this being not only what I morally ought to do, but also what I just plain ought to do. Thus, if I don't have any strong reason not to pull her out of the pool, then this will be what I ought to do, all things considered. Self-interested reasons are also, on the face of it, unqualified reasons. If I have a self-interested reason to go to the dentist, then, absent the favouring force of this reason being defeated, this will be, not only what I self-interestedly ought to do, but also what I ought to do, all things considered. In this respect, moral reasons and self-interested reasons seem to differ from etiquettal reasons. For etiquettal reasons seem to be merely qualified reasons. Thus, although the fact that my eating with my elbows on the table is contrary to the rules of etiquette seems relevant to whether I etiquettally ought to do so, it doesn't seem relevant to whether I just plain ought to do so. Indeed, it seems that the rules of etiquette are relevant to what I have unqualified reason to do only insofar as I have some unqualified 22 Of course, some have historically tried to argue that these two never conflict on the grounds that being moral is always in one's self-interest (see, e.g., Plato's Republic). But I've never found these arguments convincing. 18 reason to follow the rules of etiquette-as I would have if, say, someone at my table would be offended by my violating these rules. But even then, the unqualified reason that I would have to refrain from eating with my elbows on the table would not be the etiquettal reason that I have to follow the rules of etiquette, but the moral reason that I have to refrain from needlessly offending someone. Now, as it happens, no one at my table cares about such rules, and so no one would be offended by my eating with my elbows on the table. So, although I make a mistake from the point of view of etiquette when I eat with my elbows on the table, I don't fail to respond appropriately to my (unqualified) reasons in doing so. After all, I have no (unqualified) reason to refrain from eating with my elbows on the table. Thus, etiquettal reasons count for or against an act's being what I etiquettally ought to do, but not for or against an act's being what I just plain ought to do. 3.1 Subjectivism Although moral reasons, unlike etiquettal reasons, certainly seem to be unqualified reasons, some philosophers have argued that things are not as they seem. For instance, Philippa Foot has argued that moral reasons are not unqualified reasons. She's argued that just as etiquettal reasons provide us with unqualified reasons only insofar as we have some unqualified reason to follow the rules of etiquette, moral reasons provide us with unqualified reasons only insofar as we have some unqualified reason to follow the rules of morality. And she claimed, in general, that only those who care about following some particular set of rules have any unqualified reason to do so. Thus, she believed that those who reject the rules of morality have no (unqualified) reason to abide by them. She argued as follows: The fact is that the man who rejects morality because he sees no reason to obey its rules can be convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency. Nor will his action necessarily be irrational. Irrational actions are those in which a man in some way defeats his own purposes, doing what is calculated to be disadvantageous or to frustrate his ends. Immorality does not necessarily involve any such thing. (Foot 1972, p. 310) The problem, though, is that Foot hasn't shown that we don't have any unqualified reason to act as we're morally required to act. If anything, she's shown only that it can be rationally coherent-involving no inconsistency in one's attitudes-to fail to act as morality demands (Worsnip Forthcoming). But to show that there need be no inconsistency in one's attitudes when one fails to act as one is morally required to act is not to show that the moral reasons grounding this moral requirement are not unqualified reasons. For even if the cruel person needn't be guilty of any inconsistency, it may be that she is, nonetheless, failing to respond appropriately to the unqualified reasons that she has not to be cruel. 19 So, it seems that Foot must have been assuming a kind of subjectivism about unqualified reasons. That is, she must have been assuming that one has an unqualified reason to refrain from being cruel only if one happens to have a concern for not being cruel. More carefully, "subjectivism about [unqualified] reasons for action is the thesis that only an agent's contingent concerns ultimately ground her" unqualified reasons for action (Sobel 2016, p. 219). Thus, "subjectivists agree that if one has a reason to [φ], that reason can only be grounded by the fact that [φ]-ing would serve some contingent concern or other" (Sobel 2016, p. 219). To have a concern about something is to have a pro-attitude toward it. And a pro-attitude is just any attitude that favours its object-attitudes such as liking, valuing, admiring, desiring, approving, and preferring. These attitudes favour their objects in that they dispose their subjects to find them attractive or appealing and to, consequently, choose, pursue, or promote them if able to.23 For instance, my liking Coke more than Pepsi disposes me to find the prospect of drinking Coke more appealing than that of drinking Pepsi and to, consequently, choose Coke over Pepsi when I have the choice between the two. So, something serves one's contingent concerns only insofar as it serves to effect one's getting, achieving, or promoting the objects of one's contingent pro-attitudes. By 'contingent', subjectivists don't mean 'metaphysically contingent'. The idea isn't merely that it's metaphysically possible for the subject to lack the given concern or pro-attitude. For the relevant sort of contingency is rational contingency. Thus, a contingent concern or pro-attitude is just one that the subject isn't rationally required to have. And what makes a concern or pro-attitude contingent in this sense is that there are no unqualified reasons requiring the subject to have it. For instance, there's no unqualified reason for me to like Coke more than Pepsi. I just do; it's just a contingent fact about myself that I happen to enjoy the taste of Coke more than that of Pepsi. But other people enjoy the taste of Pepsi more than that of Coke. And it's not that the some of us are being irrational in liking the one more than the other. It's just that different people often happen to have different rationally acceptable likes. Now, the fact that likings are rationally contingent is uncontroversial. But whether all pro-attitudes, including desires, are also rationally contingent is controversial. Those known as Humeans (given that they follow David Hume on this issue) think that no pro-attitude is rationally assessable. They claim that there are never any unqualified reasons for having or lacking a particular pro-attitude, such as a particular desire or preference. Indeed, Hume famously said: "'Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger" (1739, bk. 2, pt. 3). Others, known as anti-Humeans, think that the fact that you would be much better off if your finger was scratched than if the whole world (with 23 A favouring attitude is more than just a disposition to act so as to promote its object. It must additionally dispose its subject to find its object attractive or appealing. 20 you in it) were destroyed is an unqualified reason for you to prefer the scratching of your finger. But we needn't resolve the issue here, because we can just formulate subjectivism in terms of rationally contingent pro-attitudes, and leave open whether these include only a subset of pro-attitudes (perhaps, only likings) or all pro-attitudes (including both likings and desires). Thus, we can formulate the relevant view as follows. Subjectivism: For any subject S and any act available to her φ, S has a reason (that is, an unqualified reason) to φ if and only if her φ-ing would serve to satisfy some rationally contingent pro-attitude of hers. And if S has a reason (that is, an unqualified reason) to φ, it's ultimately due to the fact that her φ-ing would serve to satisfy some rationally contingent pro-attitude of hers.24 Subjectivism, as even subjectivists themselves admit, has various problematic features (Sobel 2016, p. 11). Perhaps, the most serious of these is that it cannot accommodate our intuition that moral reasons are unqualified reasons (Sobel 2016, p. 17).25 For instance, it seems that we all necessarily have a moral, and an unqualified, reason to refrain from torturing the innocent and that this is ultimately because doing so would cause tremendous physical and psychological suffering to those who don't deserve to so suffer. Yet, the subjectivist can't guarantee that we all have such a reason, nor can she hold that it's ultimately because doing so would cause tremendous physical and psychological suffering to those who don't deserve to so suffer. Instead, the subjectivist must hold that only those who happen to have a rationally contingent pro-attitude that would be served by refraining from torturing the innocent have an unqualified reason to so refrain. And the subjectivist must hold that their reason to so refrain ultimately has nothing to do with how torture affects its victims, but has only to do with how it will affect the torturer by either serving or failing to serve her rationally contingent pro-attitudes. What's worse, the subjectivist must hold that if a subject has some rationally contingent pro-attitude that would be satisfied by torturing the innocent (if, for instance, she likes the experience of torturing) and no rationally contingent pro-attitude that would be dissatisfied by torturing the innocent, then she just plain ought to torture the innocent. And even today's leading proponents of subjectivism admit that this is a problem. For they admit that intuitively it seems that "we have significant reasons to not, for example, abuse the vulnerable regardless 24 A lot of what I say below concerning subjectivism is indebted to Derek Parfit's work on this topic. See, for instance, his (1997) and his (2011). 25 According to the subjectivist, the fact that torturing the innocent causes underserved suffering (which is itself a moral reason against torturing the innocent) is not itself an unqualified reason against torturing the innocent. For the subjectivist holds that what would constitute an unqualified reason against torturing the innocent is only that doing so would serve to dissatisfy some rationally contingent pro-attitude of the agent-such as her dislike of the experience of watching people suffer. 21 of our concerns." And they admit that "subjectivism...cannot guarantee that all agents have such reasons" (Sobel 2016, p. 17). Of course, just because subjectivism has certain problematic features doesn't mean that we should reject it. For it may have fewer, or less serious, problematic features than any alternative position does. As Sobel points out: "Those who have done philosophy for a while are used to the unsettling reality that the attempt to systematize our thinking in an area almost always forces us to abandon or explain away some features that felt intuitive" (2016, p. 21). So, ultimately, subjectivists want to argue that although subjectivism forces us to abandon the intuition that we all necessarily have an unqualified reason to refrain from torturing the innocent, subjectivism does a better job of systemizing all of our intuitions than any alternative position does. That is, they want to argue that the merits of adopting subjectivism outweigh its demerits, including the demerit of its not being able to account for our intuition that at least some moral reasons (e.g., the moral reason that we have to refrain from torturing the innocent) are unqualified reasons. 3.2 Matters of Mere Taste What, then, are the merits of subjectivism? One thing that subjectivists believe counts in favour of their view is that it gives (they contend) a simpler and more straightforward account of why, in many cases, what we have reason to do depends on what our rationally contingent pro-attitudes are. Specifically, subjectivists contend that subjectivism does a better job of accounting for our reasons concerning matters of mere taste than any alternative theory does. For instance, they contend that it does the best job of accounting for the reason that I have to drink Coke rather than Pepsi given that I like the taste of Coke more than I like the taste of Pepsi. What accounts for this reason? The answer, according to subjectivism, is simple and straightforward: what we have reason to do ultimately depends on what our rationally contingent pro-attitudes (such as our likings) are. Of course, being able to account for our reasons concerning matters of mere taste constitutes an advantage for the subjectivist only if there is no alternative theory that can provide an account that is at least as plausible. So, let's consider the following alternative. Desire Objectivism: For any subject S and any act available to her φ, S has a reason (that is, an unqualified reason) to φ if and only if her φ-ing would serve to satisfy some desire that she's rationally required to have (that is, one that's not rationally contingent). And if S has a reason (that is, 22 an unqualified reason) to φ, it's ultimately due to the fact that her φ-ing would serve to satisfy some desire that she's rationally required to have.26 The desire objectivist can account for our reasons concerning matters of mere taste if she assumes both that we're rationally required to desire the state of affairs in which we experience a sensation that we like having and that we're rationally required to prefer the state of affairs in which we experience a sensation that we like having more to one in which we experience a sensation that we like having less. Thus, the explanation for why I have more reason to drink Coke than to drink Pepsi is ultimately that this will satisfy a preference that I'm required to have: the preference for the state affairs in which I experience a sensation that I like having more (that of drinking Coke) to one in which I experience a sensation that I like having less (that of drinking Pepsi). So, subjectivism and objectivism agree that I have a reason to drink Coke rather than Pepsi, they just disagree on why this is so. But which view gives the better explanation? I believe that desire objectivism does. The problem with the subjectivism's explanation is that it implausibly implies that attitudes that we have no reason to have could be the ultimate source of our reasons. To see why this is implausible, imagine that I have a brain disorder with the following three effects: (1) I can no longer rid myself of a desire to eat by eating and so have a constant desire to eat unless medicated, (2) the only way for me to rid myself of a desire to eat is by taking an X pill, a pill that gets rid of any desire to eat and lasts eight hours, and (3) I can receive no pleasure from eating.27 Now, let's suppose that it's been more than eight hours since I last took an X pill and, consequently, I desire to eat even though I've just eaten a large and nutritious meal. And let's suppose that this is a non-instrumental desire. Thus, I desire to eat, not because I believe that this will satiate my desire to eat or give me any pleasure (I know that it won't), but simply because I find the prospect of eating inherently appealing. Lastly, let's suppose that I lack any non-instrumental desire to take an X pill-that is, I want to take an X pill only because I know that it will get rid of my desire to eat, which results in my experiencing the pain of dissatisfaction when it goes unsatisfied. Now, in this case, it seems that I have no reason to eat. Eating wouldn't give me any pleasure. And it wouldn't provide me with any health benefits, as I've already eaten a large and nutritious meal. Yet eating would satisfy my rationally contingent desire to eat for the sake of eating. So, according to subjectivism, I have a reason to eat. But I find this is implausible. It's seems that I have no reason to satisfy my desire by eating and 26 For a further defence of this view, see my (2011, chap. 3). 27 I'm open to pleasures being either (a) sensations that have a certain phenomenological flavour or dimension or (b) sensations that their subjects like in virtue of the way that they feel. In either case, I claim that subjects are rationally required to desire such sensations and that they have reason to pursue such sensations ultimately because doing so would serve to satisfy such a rationally-required desire. That such subjects are rationally required to desire such sensations and have a reason to satisfy such desires is, I believe, just a brute normative fact. 23 should instead just get rid of it by taking an X pill. Since there's no reason for me to have this desire, I should just get rid of it rather than fulfil it. Thus, it seems that the fact that my φ-ing would satisfy some rationally contingent desire of mine is not itself a reason for me to φ. Rather, if I have a reason to satisfy my rationally contingent desire by φ-ing, it's only a derivative reason. That is, I would have a reason to do so only in virtue of the fact that in doing so I would, say, obtain pleasure or avoid pain. Thus, it seems that the desire objectivist has the more plausible account of our reasons concerning matters of mere taste. For the desire objectivist holds that what ultimately grounds my reason to choose Coke over Pepsi is the normative fact that I ought to prefer the state of affairs in which I have an experience that I like more to the one in which I have an experience that I like less. By contrast, the subjectivist holds that what ultimately grounds my reason to choose Coke over Pepsi is the non-normative fact that I happen to like the taste of Coke more than that of Pepsi even though I have no reason to.28 3.3 The Non-Alienation Constraint Another thing that subjectivists believe counts in favour of their view is that it supposedly best accounts for the following constraint on (practical) reasons. The Non-Alienation Constraint: For any fact F, any subject S, and any act available to her φ, F constitutes a reason (that is, an unqualified reason) for S to φ only if S wouldn't find this intolerably alienating in the appropriate circumstances. David Sobel, for instance, makes the point as follows: "subjectivism has a very good story of in what sense my reasons are built to suit me. I can hardly be alienated from my entire conative set" (2016, p. 36). But it seems to me that we can indeed be alienated from our entire set of rationally contingent proattitudes and that what we can't be alienated from is only our rationally required pro-attitudes. Thus, I think that, if anything, the non-alienation constraint actually favours objectivism when we properly interpret the phrase: "in the appropriate circumstances." 28 Whether one favours subjectivism or objectivism is often determined by whether one thinks that the normative can ultimately be grounded in (and, thus, reduced to) the non-normative. I don't, and that's my main reason for favouring objectivism. Admittedly, though, this issue is far from settled, and there's a lot of interesting work that has been done and is being done that I don't have space here to address. For an opposing viewpoint, see, for instance, Schroeder (2007). 24 Consider that, upon reflection, I feel alienated from many, if not all, of my rationally contingent proattitudes. For I often find that these rationally contingent pro-attitudes are not supported by my rationally required desires/values. What's more, they conflict with them in many instances. For instance, I have a sweet-tooth even though my blood-sugar levels are higher than they should be. I gather this is because, when my hominid ancestors evolved, calories were often in short supply and sweet things tended to be loaded with needed calories. But now I find myself in a world with easy access to calories, including heavily refined sweets with no nutritional value, and so I find myself with a desire for something that's bad for me-a desire that I'm rationally required to wish that I lacked. Consider, also, that I enjoy watching mixed martial arts. Yet, upon reflection, I can't see any reason why I should want to watch two people needlessly beat each other up. But, again, I assume there is some evolutionary explanation for why I'm entertained by such displays of violence. But, upon reflection, I find that I disvalue such violence, for it seems that I should desire not to want to watch such violence. Lastly, take the case of my liking the taste of Coke more than I do the taste of Pepsi. This doesn't seem to reflect who I am in any deep or important sense. It just seems to be an arbitrary fact about my physiology-one that has nothing to do with anything that I have reason to care about. Thus, these likes seem alien to me qua rational subject, which is how I conceive of myself. In all such cases, then, I find myself having rationally contingent pro-attitudes that I have absolutely no reason to have. And, again, when I reflect on this, I find this alienating given that these pro-attitudes fail to reflect (and even sometimes conflict) with my values, with what I see myself as having reason to desire.29 What's more, it seems possible for all my rationally contingent pro-attitudes to be alienating in this way. So, it seems to me entirely possible, contrary to Sobel's claim, for someone to be alienated from her entire set of rationally contingent pro-attitudes. Given this, it seems to me that the desire objectivist is again in a better position to account for the constraint in question. For it seems to me that the appropriate circumstances are the ones in which I reflect on whether my rationally contingent pro-attitudes reflect the values and desires that I would have if I were relevantly informed and substantively rational.30 And, in those circumstances, I find many (if not all) of the rationally contingent pro-attitudes that I just happen to have to be alienating. But I don't find any of the pro-attitudes that I ought to have (such as the desire that I have to protect my child) to be alienating. So, it's the objectivist, not the subjectivist, that can best account for the non-alienation 29 Even if they reflect the values that I actually have, they don't reflect the values that I would have if I were substantively rational. Thus, even if I don't, as I am, find them alienating, I would find them alienating if I were substantively rational. 30 I'm substantively rational if and only if I have every attitude that I'm rationally required to have and only those attitudes that I am rationally permitted to have. 25 constraint when properly understood. What's more, the desire objectivist can, it seems, account for the relevant sense in which my reasons must suit me. They must suit me in that they must be grounded in the desires and preferences that I, in particular, ought to have, which may be different from the desires and preferences that others ought to have. For instance, whereas I ought to prefer my child's faring well to your child's faring well, it seems that you ought to prefer your child's faring well to my child's faring well. And neither of us should find this alienating in the way I find my preference for violent over nonviolent sports alienating, because we can both see reasons why we should have such a preference, as we each have certain reason-grounding relations with our own child that we lack with respect to the other's child.31 3.4 The Motivation Constraint Subjectivists also claim that their theory supposedly best accounts for the following further constraint on what can count as a reason. The Motivation Constraint: For any fact F, any subject S, and any act available to her φ, F constitutes a reason (that is, an unqualified reason) for S to φ only if the recognition of F would motivate S to φ in the appropriate circumstances. But, as with the non-alienation constraint, we need to interpret the phrase "in the appropriate circumstances." On what we may call the internalist interpretation, the appropriate circumstances are those in which the subject has no false beliefs, has all the relevant true beliefs, and has deliberated in a procedurally rational way. And deliberating in a procedurally rational way involves using one's imagination to add elements to, and to subtract elements from, one's initial set of motivations, but it doesn't require that one ends up having or lacking any particular motivations. For it requires only that the set of one's motivations and beliefs be jointly coherent. On the externalist interpretation, by contrast, the appropriate circumstances are those in which the subject has no false beliefs, has all the relevant true beliefs, and is substantively rational. And to be substantively rational one must have all the motivations one has decisive reason to have and no motivations that one lacks sufficient reason to have. To illustrate the difference between these two interpretations, imagine that I have no desire to avoid the destruction of the world but a strong desire to avoid the scratching of my finger. That is, imagine that I don't care if everyone and everything including myself ceases to exist but I 31 Note that it's the special relations that come from parenting a child, and not the biological relations that come from spawning a child, that are reason-providing. 26 do care whether my finger gets scratched. And imagine that I have no false beliefs and have all the relevant true beliefs. Thus, I know that I will cease to exist if the world is destroyed and that I will not have the many pleasant experiences that I would otherwise have if I were to cease to exist. And I know that the scratching of my finger will hurt very little and result in no permanent damage or discomfort. In this case, it could be that my recognizing that I would lose out on a lot of pleasure if the world were destroyed fails to motivate me to opt for the scratching of my finger over the destruction of the world. For it's entirely possible for me to have no false beliefs, all the relevant true beliefs, and to deliberate in a procedurally rational way and yet end up with no desire to avoid losing out on a lot of pleasure. It may be that all I care about is avoiding immediate pain. By contrast, on the externalist interpretation, knowing the relevant facts will, if I respond appropriately to the reasons that they provide, result in my having a preference for the scratching of my finger over the destruction of the world, which in turn will motivate me to opt for the former over the latter. Thus, on the internalist interpretation of the motivation constraint, I have no reason to choose the scratching of my finger to the destruction of the world. But, on the externalist interpretation, I do so long as we assume that the fact that I would be much better off if my finger were scratched than if the world were destroyed gives me decisive reason to prefer the former to the latter. And that's precisely what the desire objectivist holds. So, again, we see that desire objectivism can accommodate the relevant constraint provided we interpret the constraint in the right way.32 3.5 Summing Up We started this section noting that, intuitively, moral facts (such as the fact that torturing innocents results in people suffering in ways they don't deserve to suffer) seem to be unqualified reasons that are relevant to how we just plain ought to live and not just to how we morally ought to live. Of course, we saw that Foot offered an argument against this intuitive view, but we found it wanting, because it relied on subjectivism, which we also found wanting. So, absent there being some other more compelling argument against this intuitive view, we should accept that moral reasons are unqualified reasons. What's more, we should accept that certain non-moral reasons (e.g., self-interested reasons) are also unqualified reasons. Given this, we now need to know how these two different types of unqualified reasons combine and compete both to determine what we're morally required to do as well as to determine what we're required to do, all things considered? In the next section, I'll try to answer these questions. 32 Admittedly, there is still much debate about internalism and externalism, and I haven't had space here to fully explore all the nuances. For those interested in these nuances, a good place to start is with Finlay and Schroeder (2017). 27 4. The Normative Significance of Moral Reasons and the Moral Significance of Non-Moral Reasons In this section, I'll be concerned with a proper subset of the acts that we ought to perform: those that we're required to perform. More specifically, I'll be concerned with what role moral reasons play in determining what we're normatively required to do-that is, what one is required to do, all things considered. I'll argue that moral reasons are not normatively overriding, and, so, we're not always normatively required to do what we have most moral reason to do. I'll also be concerned with moral requirements. And I'll argue that moral reasons are not morally overriding, and, so, we're not always morally required to do what we have most moral reason to do. 4.1 Are Moral Reasons Normatively Overriding? Let me start by explaining what, in general, I mean when I say that one type of reason (say, moral reasons) is overriding with respect to a given normative domain. Overridingness Defined: For any subject S, any two acts available to her φ and ψ, and any two normative domains D1 and D2, to say that D1 reasons are D2-ly overriding is to say that, if S has more D1 reason to φ than to ψ, then S is not D2-ly permitted to perform ψ. And, thus, if S has most D1 reason to φ, then S is D2-ly required to φ. Thus, to hold that moral reasons are normatively overriding is to accept the following thesis. The Normatively Overriding Thesis: For any subject S and any two acts available to her φ and ψ, if S has more moral reason to φ than to ψ, then S is not normatively permitted to perform ψ. And, thus, if S has most moral reason to φ, then S is normatively required to φ. Note that any thesis to the effect that reasons of a certain type are overriding must be indexed to a given domain. And, thus, we must distinguish the thesis that moral reasons are normatively overriding (that is, the normatively overriding thesis) from the thesis that moral reasons are morally overriding, which is as follows. The Morally Overriding Thesis: For any subject S and any two acts available to her φ and ψ, if S has more moral reason to φ than to ψ, then S is not morally permitted to perform ψ. And, thus, if S has most moral reason to φ, then S is morally required to φ. 28 The normatively overriding thesis and the morally overriding thesis are different theses. The normatively overriding thesis says that moral reasons trump non-moral reasons with respect to what one is normatively required to do. By contrast, the morally overriding thesis says that moral reasons trump non-moral reasons with respect to what one is morally required to do. In this subsection, I'll be concerned with the normatively overriding thesis, and, in the next, I'll be concerned with the morally overriding thesis. If the normatively overriding thesis were true, then it would always be normatively impermissible to refrain from doing what one has most moral reason to do, even when what one has most moral reason to do is supported by only the most trivial of moral reasons and opposed by the weightiest of non-moral reasons. That's implausible, for it seems that, in many instances, we have sufficient reason, all things considered, to act contrary to what we have most moral reason to do. For instance, it seems that, in The Trivial Promise, I have sufficient, if not decisive, reason to break my promise to meet with the student to discuss her exam grade from last semester given that this is the only way for me to take advantage of a golden opportunity to fulfil my life-long dream of sailing around the world. Clearly, taking advantage of this opportunity is not what I have most moral reason to do, but it does seem to be what I have most reason to do, all things considered. For it seems that the relatively trivial moral reason that I have to keep this promise fails to trump the weighty non-moral reason that I have to take advantage of this once-in-alifetime opportunity. Of course, one might counter by suggesting that I have a moral reason to fulfil my life-long dream such that what I have most moral reason to do in The Trivial Promise is to break my promise. But if so, we would expect it to be morally impermissible for me to keep my promise. But that doesn't seem right. It seems morally permissible (perhaps, even morally noble) for me to make such an extreme personal sacrifice for the sake of fulfilling my promise. So, although it may be foolish and imprudent for me to keep my promise in these circumstances, it doesn't seem to be immoral. I wouldn't be blameworthy for keeping my promise and letting some more-deserving other take advantage of this special opportunity. Thus, this is a case in which it seems that it's normatively permissible for me to fail to do what I have most moral reason to do. So, we should reject the normatively overriding thesis. 4.2 Are Moral Reasons Morally Overriding? Recall that the morally overriding thesis holds that even if moral reasons don't trump non-moral reasons with respect to what we're normatively required to do, they trump non-moral reasons with respect to what we're morally required to do. If the morally overriding thesis were true, then it would always be morally wrong to refrain from doing what one has most moral reason to do, even if what one has most moral reason to do is supported by only the most trivial of moral reasons and opposed by the weightiest of non29 moral reasons. But, as The Trivial Promise seems to show, it is sometimes not only normatively permissible, but also morally permissible, for a subject to refrain from doing what she has most moral reason to do. For, in this case, it seems that it is both morally and normatively permissible for me to refrain from keeping my promise even though this is what I have most moral reason to do. So far, all I've done in arguing against the normatively overriding thesis and the morally overriding thesis is to present one case, The Trivial Promise, in which it seems both morally and normatively permissible for a subject to refrain from doing what she has most moral reason to do. But, below, I'll provide a more systematic argument against both theses. I'll argue that the moral justifying strength of non-moral reasons (such as the non-moral reason that I have to sign up for the free trip around the world) far exceeds their moral requiring strength and that this is what accounts for why we are often morally permitted to do either what we have most moral reason to do or what these non-moral reasons support our doing instead. To illustrate, it seems that, in The Trivial Promise, the non-moral reason that I have to sign up for the free trip morally justifies my breaking my promise, and it does so without morally requiring me to instead sign up for the free trip. Thus, I have the moral option of either keeping my promise or breaking it so as to sign up for the free trip. And keeping it seems morally supererogatory-that is, above and beyond the call of moral duty. Of course, that was all rather quick, but below I'll go through the argument more methodically, starting with definitions of both the moral justifying strength of a reason and the moral requiring strength of a reason.33 Moral Requiring Strength: For any two of a subject's reasons R1 and R2, R1 has more moral requiring strength than R2 if and only if both (i) R1 would make it morally impermissible to do anything that R2 would make it morally impermissible to do, and (ii) R1 would make it morally impermissible do some things that R2 would not make it morally impermissible to do. Moral Justifying Strength: For any two of a subject's reasons R1 and R2, R1 has more moral justifying strength than R2 if and only if both (i) R1 would make it morally permissible to do anything that R2 would make it morally permissible to do, and 33 These are adapted from Joshua Gert's (2003, pp. 15–16) criteria for rational requiring strength and rational justifying strength. 30 (ii) R1 would make it morally permissible do some things that R2 would not make it morally permissible to do. To illustrate the above criteria for moral requiring strength, consider that, on commonsense morality, the moral reason that one has to refrain from killing an innocent person has more moral requiring strength than the moral reason that one has to prevent an innocent person from dying. This is true in virtue of the following two facts: (i) If it would be immoral to do something-for instance, to stand still rather than move about-because that would entail failing to prevent an innocent person's death, then it would also be immoral to do that same thing if it would entail killing an innocent person.34 (ii) Even though it would be morally permissible to let an innocent person die in order to save one's daughter (as where both are drowning and one has only enough time to save one of the two), it would not be morally permissible to kill an innocent person in order to save one's daughter (as where one's daughter needs that person's heart transplanted into her). To illustrate the above criteria for moral justifying strength, consider that, on commonsense morality, the moral reason that one has to save three lives has more moral justifying strength than the moral reason one has to save one life. This is true in virtue of the following two facts: (i) If it would be morally permissible to do something that would otherwise be immoral-for example, to break a promise to meet with a student-in order to save a life, then it would also be permissible to do the same in order to save three lives. (ii) Even though it would not be morally permissible to fail to save two lives in order to save just one (assuming that everything else is equal and, thus, that there is no reason that favours saving the one as opposed to the two), it would be morally permissible to fail to save two lives in order to save three. Having clarified these two notions, I can now state the thesis that I will use to argue against both the normatively overriding thesis and the morally overriding thesis. This thesis holds that the moral justifying strength of a non-moral reason exceeds its moral requiring strength. It goes as follows. The More-Justifying-Strength Thesis: The moral justifying strength of a non-moral reason (which is greater than zero) exceeds its moral requiring strength (which is zero). Thus, non-moral reasons can, and sometimes do, prevent moral reasons, even those with considerable moral requiring strength, 34 Imagine that, in standing completely still, you would be intentionally allowing the dust to settle on a very sensitive trigger mechanism that, when triggered by the settling dust, blows up the innocent person. This example is inspired by a similar one from Bennett (1995, pp. 97–98). 31 from generating moral requirements, and they do so without generating a moral requirement to do what they (these non-moral reasons) favour our doing instead.35 Again, to illustrate, the non-moral reason that I have in The Trivial Promise to break my promise (that I must do so in order to get the free trip around the world) morally justifies my breaking my promise despite the fact that the moral reason that I have to keep my promise has considerable moral requiring strength. What's more, it does so without generating a moral requirement to break my promise, because the non-moral reason that I have to break my promise has no moral requiring strength. If we accept the more-justifying-strength thesis, we should reject both the normatively overriding thesis and the morally overriding thesis. We should reject the morally overriding thesis, because the morejustifying-strength thesis implies to the contrary that non-moral reasons can morally justify acting contrary to what there is most moral reason to do such that we're not always morally required to do what we have most moral reason to do. And if we're morally justified in acting contrary to what there is most moral reason to do, then we should think that we're also, contrary to the normatively overriding thesis, normatively justified in acting contrary to what there is most reason to do. For it would be implausible to suppose that I could be morally, but not normatively, justified in failing to do what I have most moral reason to do. After all, if I'm morally justified in failing to do what I have most moral reason to do, this must be in virtue of the non-moral reasons that I have for doing something else instead. And it would be strange to think that these non-moral reasons could morally justify my acting contrary to what I have most moral reason to do if they can't even normatively justify my acting contrary to what I have most moral reason to do. So, if we accept the more-justifying-strength thesis, we should reject both the normatively overriding thesis and the morally overriding thesis. But why should we accept the more-justifying-strength thesis? I believe that there are at least two reasons. First, as I'll argue in the next section (section 4.3), we need the more-justifying-strength thesis to account for many typical instances of what are known as agent-centered options. Second, as I'll argue in the subsequent section (section 4.4), we need the more-justifying-strength thesis to account for many typical instances of supererogatory acts.36 4.3 Moral Reasons and Agent-Centered Options 35 Recall that I'm assuming that moral reasons are unqualified (normative) reasons. 36 The following arguments for the more-justifying-strength are adapted from my (2011, chap. 5). 32 The sorts of moral options that I'll be concerned with are known as agent-centered options. An agentcentered option is a moral option either to act so as to make things better overall but worse for oneself (or others) or to act so as to make things better for oneself (or others) but worse overall. There are two types of agent-centered options: agent-favouring options and agent-sacrificing options. An agent-favouring option is a moral option either to act so as to make things better overall but worse for oneself or to act so as to make things better for oneself but worse overall. For instance, the moral option either to donate my tax refund check to charity or to spend it on a trip to Las Vegas for myself is an agent-favouring option. An agent-sacrificing option, by contrast, is a moral option either to act so as to make things better overall but worse for others or to act so as to make things better for others but worse overall. For instance, the option to use my last dose of pain-killers to alleviate someone else's mild pain rather than my own somewhat more severe pain is an agent-sacrificing option. Whereas agent-favouring options permit agents to give their own interests more weight than they have from the impersonal perspective, agent-sacrificing options permit agents to give their own interests less weight than they have from the impersonal perspective. Now, the following is a typical instance of an agent-centered option (more specifically, an agentfavouring option): an agent has a certain sum of money that she can use to secure either a considerable benefit for herself or a far more considerable net benefit for various needy, distant strangers. Suppose, for instance, that she must choose to use the money that she has saved either to place a down payment on a new home or to help various needy, distant strangers by donating it to Oxfam. In this and many other typical instances of agent-favouring options, the following four claims hold: (C1) The agent has the choice to act either self-interestedly or altruistically-that is, she has the choice either to promote her own self-interest or to sacrifice her self-interest for the sake of doing more to promote the interests of others. (C2) It is morally permissible for her to act self-interestedly. (C3) It is also morally permissible for her to act altruistically. (C4) The reason that she has to act altruistically is, what I will call, a moral requiring reason-a moral reason that has sufficient moral requiring strength to generate, absent its requiring force being defeated, a moral requirement to perform the act that it favours. 33 That claims C1–C3 must hold is, I take it, incontrovertible, as each just follows from the definition of an 'agent-favouring option' given above. C4, however, probably needs some defence. To see that the reason that the agent has to act altruistically is, in many typical instances, a moral requiring reason, consider the following two cases. Costly Donation: Fiona is accessing her savings account via the Internet and is about to transfer the entire balance to her escrow company so as to place the necessary down payment on her new home. She must do this if she is to purchase her new home, and she can do this simply by clicking on the TRANSFER button. However, there is an alternative. By clicking instead on the DONATE button, her savings will be transferred, not to her escrow company, but to Oxfam-a charity. Let us suppose, then, that by clicking on the DONATE button she will be providing various needy, distant strangers in the Third World with some considerable, indeed potentially life-saving, benefit. Those who accept that there is an agent-centered option in such a case believe that, given the tremendous sacrifice involved, Fiona is not morally required to click on the DONATE button. But it seems that they should also accept that the fact that her doing so would produce such a considerable benefit for these distant, needy strangers constitutes a reason of considerable moral requiring strength to click on the DONATE button. Indeed, but for the costs involved, it seems that this reason would generate a moral requirement to click on the DONATE button. To see this, consider a variant on the above case. Costless Donation: Fiona can transfer the money to her escrow company by clicking on either the TRANSFER button or the DONATE button. In this case, the money that would be donated to Oxfam if Fiona clicks on the DONATE button is not hers, but that of a very rich woman who has agreed to donate an equivalent sum of her own money if, and only if, Fiona clicks on the DONATE button. Again, in either case, Fiona's money will be transferred to her escrow company, ensuring the purchase of her new home. It is just that by clicking on the DONATE button as opposed to the TRANSFER button, she also ensures that various needy strangers receive a considerable benefit. Assume that these are the only morally relevant facts. In this case, Fiona is morally required to click on the DONATE button, for there is no good reason why she should not do so. By clicking on the DONATE button, she can purchase her new home while also providing an even more considerable net benefit for a number of others, and she can do so at no cost to herself or 34 anyone else, for assume that if Fiona does not click on the DONATE button, the sum of money that the rich woman would have otherwise donated to Oxfam will instead be burned, benefiting no one. If one thinks that beneficence is only required when the would-be beneficiaries are below a certain threshold of wellbeing, assume that the various needy, distant strangers that will be helped by Fiona's clicking on the DONATE button are below this threshold. Given that we think that the reason that Fiona has to click on the DONATE button gives rise to a moral requirement in the absence of any factor or reason that defeats its favouring force, we must conclude that it is a moral requiring reason. Now, the only relevant difference between this case and the original one is how costly it is for Fiona to help the strangers. But it is implausible to suppose that Fiona's reason to help the strangers, or its favouring force, is attenuated as the cost of her doing so increases. Nor is it plausible to suppose that its favouring force is nullified when the cost reaches a certain threshold. To illustrate, consider that if we were to gradually increase the cost of clicking on the DONATE button, from no cost at all, to ten cents, to twenty cents, to thirty cents, and so on, there wouldn't be less and less to be said in favour of Fiona's helping the strangers. And there certainly wouldn't be any point at which helping those strangers no longer counted in favour of clicking on that button at all. At least, that is not what the phenomenology of the case tells us, for it feels like a case in which one reason is outweighed by another, not like a case in which one reason is attenuated or nullified by some other reason or factor. If it were the latter, then once the cost was high enough, Fiona should cease to feel any pull toward clicking on the DONATE button. But even when the cost is extremely high, the fact that clicking on the DONATE button would help these others continues to count in favour of Fiona's doing so, and with the same force as before. And there is nothing particularly special about this case. So, we should conclude that, in many typical instances in which the agent has an agent-centered option, C4 is true. Of course, some moral theorists who endorse agent-centered options could object that although they are committed to certain moral principles, they are not committed to there being any moral reasons, let alone to there being a moral requiring reason to act altruistically in such cases. They might, therefore, deny that they are committed to C4. But their moral principles commit them to certain moral reasons, for moral principles entail that certain facts have moral requiring strength. For instance, if one accepts the principle of utility (i.e., that agents are required to maximize aggregate utility), then one is thereby committed to there being a moral requiring reason to promote utility. The principle of utility entails that the fact that some act would promote utility is a moral requiring reason to perform that act. Likewise, anyone who accepts a moral principle that entails that agents are obligated to provide needy others with a significant benefit whenever their doing so would be costless both to themselves and to others is thereby committed to there being a moral requiring reason to act altruistically in such instances. 35 So, one of the assumptions that I am making is that some such moral principle is true. If this assumption were false, then Fiona would not, in Costless Donation, be obligated to click on the DONATE button. And if that were right, then I would be wrong in saying that those who wish to accommodate many typical agent-centered options are committed to C4. I doubt, though, that my assumption is false. In any case, I will be assuming in what follows that some such moral principle is true and that, therefore, anyone who wishes to accommodate many typical agent-centered options must accept C4. Given C4, we must ask: What prevents the moral requiring reason that the agent has to act altruistically from generating a moral requirement to act altruistically? Clearly, it must be the reason that the agent has to act self-interestedly, as this is the only countervailing consideration, and we must cite some countervailing consideration, since, given C4, we are to assume that the moral reason that the agent has to act altruistically would generate a moral requirement to act altruistically absent something that defeats its favouring force. We must also assume that this reason to act self-interestedly must have at least as much moral justifying strength as the reason that the agent has to act altruistically has moral requiring strength-otherwise, it would not be able to prevent the reason that the agent has to act altruistically from generating a requirement to act altruistically. Lastly, we must assume that this reason to act selfinterestedly must have less moral requiring strength than moral justifying strength, for, otherwise, we would end up with a moral requirement to act self-interestedly instead of a moral option to act either altruistically or self-interestedly. This is Shelly Kagan's worry. He says: If, in some particular case, the balance of morally relevant reasons did not favor promoting the overall good [i.e., acting altruistically] but favored instead promoting the agent's own interests [i.e., acting self-interestedly]-then it seems that these reasons would still go on to generate a moral requirement. Admittedly, the agent would not be morally required to promote the overall good, but she would be morally required to promote her interests. Yet...what we were looking for was a defense of a moral option, according to which the agent would still be morally permitted (although not required) to do the act with the best results overall. (1994, pp. 338–339) The solution, as a number of philosophers have pointed out, lies with the fact that the morally relevant reasons that favour acting self-interestedly as opposed to altruistically are non-moral reasons. If such nonmoral reasons can prevent the moral reason that the agent has to act altruistically from generating a moral requirement, then what we end up with is a moral option rather than a moral requirement to act selfinterestedly, for non-moral reasons, by definition, lack any moral requiring strength. Kagan overlooks this possible solution to his worry, because he assumes that the only sorts of reasons that could prevent a 36 moral reason from generating a moral requirement are other moral reasons. He says, "since we are concerned with what is required by morality, the relevant reasons-whether decisive or not-must be moral ones" (1989, p. 66). But Kagan's inference is unwarranted; we should not just assume that nonmoral reasons are irrelevant with regard to what is required by morality. As I argued above, non-moral reasons can be morally relevant factors. Fortunately for the defender of agent-centered options, it is quite plausible to suppose that the fact that performing some act would further one's self-interest is not itself a moral reason to perform it and, thus, is not a reason of any moral requiring strength. For there is nothing, morally speaking, that counts in favour of one's promoting one's own self-interest per se. This is not to say that one never has a moral reason to do what will further one's self-interest; one often does, as when doing one's moral duty coincides with promoting one's self-interest. And one may even have a moral duty to ensure that one flourishes and, consequently, to ensure that one lives happily. But one doesn't seem to have a moral duty to maximize one's happiness or self-interest. So, my claim is only that the mere fact that performing some act would further one's self-interest does not itself constitute a moral reason to perform that act.37 Consider, for instance, that the fact that I would benefit from drinking a Coke in that it would give me some pleasure doesn't, morally speaking, count in favour of my doing so. If I had the opportunity to get some pleasure by drinking a Coke and chose not to, I could rightly be called foolish or imprudent if I had no good reason not to, but I could not rightly be called immoral. Nor would it be supererogatory for me to change my mind and then get some pleasure by drinking a Coke. And note that promoting one's selfinterest in the process of doing what's minimally required doesn't amount to going above and beyond the call of moral duty. Suppose, for instance, that I'm required to save a child drowning in a shallow pond. Promoting my self-interest in the process (by, say, alerting the news media so that I might receive some reward) would not by itself constitute going above and beyond the call of moral duty. Of course, some might object that there are duties to the self (e.g., duties to develop one's talents, to respect one's own dignity, and to ensure that one flourishes), and that such duties show that there is a moral reason to promote one's self-interest. But the idea that there are certain duties to the self is compatible with the thought that there is no moral reason per se to promote one's self-interest. To illustrate, take the duty to develop one's talents. It seems that this duty derives not from some duty to 37 Thus, on my view, I'm morally permitted to use my last dose of pain-killers to alleviate someone else's mild pain rather than my own somewhat more severe pain. Nevertheless, if I have a pro tanto moral duty to ensure that I flourish, then it would be wrong for me to sacrifice my life merely to save someone from a mild burn. Chris Tucker (Manuscript) has denied that there is such a moral permission. 37 promote one's self-interest, but from some duty to make use of certain valuable "gifts," and this explains why we are not morally obligated to develop every talent that would be of potential benefit to ourselves. Take, for instance, the ability to walk on one's hands over great distances. This is not the sort of talent that one is morally obligated to develop. Of course, one might benefit from developing such a talent, as where one wishes to make it into The Guinness Book of World Records. But even so, one would not be morally required, but only normatively required, to develop this talent. Consider also that it would have been wrong for Mozart to have wasted his unique musical talents even if he would have been just as well off (self-interestedly speaking) being a mason instead of a musician. It seems, then, that the wrongness of wasting such great gifts lies with its wastefulness and not with its effects on the individual's self-interest. So, we can admit that people are required to make use of certain valuable "gifts" (and, thus, have certain self-regarding duties), but we should not infer from this that the fact that some act would promote one's self-interest constitutes a moral reason for performing it. That is, we should admit that there is sometimes a moral reason to do that which will promote one's self-interest, but deny that the reason one has to promote one's self-interest is itself a moral reason. Of course, there is no denying that, on some moral theories, such as act-utilitarianism, the reason one has to promote one's self-interest (i.e., to promote one's own utility) is itself a moral reason. But part of the reason why utilitarianism is so counterintuitive is that it implausibly holds that the reason one has to promote one's self-interest is a moral reason. Because of this, the utilitarian must claim that it's immoral for me to refrain from drinking a Coke if this will be best for me and worse for no one. And the utilitarian must claim that it's immoral for me not to alert the media when I'm going to rescue someone if this would promote my self-interest by a greater amount than it would demote the interests of others. In any case, if we want to account for our intuitions in cases like the above, we must hold that the reason we have to promote our self-interest is a non-moral reason and that this non-moral reason morally justifies not performing the altruistic act but without morally requiring that we perform the self-interested act instead. We should conclude, then, that if we want to accommodate many typical instances of agentcentered options, we must accept: (C5) The reason that she has to act self-interestedly is a non-moral reason.38 What's more, we must accept: 38 We're to assume that Fiona needs neither this money nor this opportunity to put a down payment on a house in order to flourish and live happily. 38 (C6) This non-moral reason that the agent has to act self-interestedly has sufficient moral justifying strength to prevent the moral reason that she has to act altruistically from generating a moral requirement to act altruistically, and yet it has no moral requiring strength and so doesn't generate a moral requirement to act self-interestedly. Unless both C5 and C6 are true, there is no way that C1–C4 could all be true. If, contrary to C5, the reason to act self-interestedly was a moral reason, then what we would get is either moral requirement to act self-interestedly (if this moral reason to act self-interestedly outweighs the moral reason to act altruistically) or a moral requirement to act altruistically (if the moral reason to act altruistically outweighs this moral reason to act self-interestedly).39 And this would contradict either C2 or C3. And it won't do to deny C6 either, because if we deny that non-moral reasons have moral justifying strength, then the self-interested reason that the agent has to perform the self-interested option would be powerless to prevent the moral reason she has to perform the altruistic option from generating a moral requirement, for, according to C5, the self-interested reason she has to perform the self-interested option is a non-moral reason. Clearly, if non-moral reasons have no moral justifying strength, then they are powerless to prevent moral reasons from generating moral requirements. And, given C4, we must assume that the agent has a moral reason to perform the altruistic option and that it has considerable moral requiring strength, such that it will generate a moral requirement absent its favouring force being defeated. But the only countervailing consideration in this instance is the reason the agent has to perform the self-interested option, and, as we have just established, this non-moral reason is, assuming the falsity of C6, incapable of preventing the moral reason she has to perform the altruistic option from generating a moral requirement to do so. So, we must accept C6 to account for C2. Thus, in order to accept all of C1–C4, we must accept both C5 and C6. And since we must accept all of C1–C4 if we want to accommodate many typical instances of agent-centered options, it follows that, if we want to accommodate many typical instances of agent-centered options, we must accept both C5 and C6. What's more, we'll need to accept the more-justifying-strength thesis in general and not just C6, because the thought is not just that this specific non-moral reason mentioned in C6 behaves in this way, but that all non-moral reasons behave in this way. 39 Admittedly, another possibility is that they just exactly balance out. But it seems to me that C2 and C3 would both hold even if we were to slightly up the stakes either for Fiona or for those who would benefit from her donation. So, this can't be the solution. 39 In the next section, I will approach the same issue from a different angle, showing that, if we want to accommodate many typical instances of supererogatory acts, we must accept the more-justifying-strength thesis. Thus, I believe that insofar as we want to accept our commonsense moral views (views that imply that we have various typical instances of agent-centered options and supererogatory acts), we must accept the more-justifying-strength thesis. 4.4 Moral Reasons and Supererogatory Acts The word 'supererogatory' is the technical term that philosophers use to refer to the concept that the following colloquial expressions refer to: 'doing more than one has to', 'going the extra mile', and 'going above and beyond the call of duty'. Thus, an act is morally supererogatory (hereafter, simply 'supererogatory') if and only if, in performing it, the agent exceeds the minimum that's morally required of her. Given this understanding, there are at least two necessary conditions for an act's being supererogatory: Two Necessary Conditions: For any subject S and any act available to her φ, S's φ-ing is supererogatory only if there exists some available alternative, ψ, such that: (NC1) S is both morally permitted to φ and morally permitted to ψ, and (NC2) S has more moral reason to φ than to ψ. NC1 is necessary because if there were no permissible alternative, the act would be obligatory. And, in that case, it wouldn't go beyond the call of duty; it would just be part of one's duty-that is, part of what one's minimally required to do. And NC2 is necessary, because the act wouldn't go above the call of duty if it were not more morally choiceworthy than what's minimally required of the subject. Now, some might deny that NC2 states a necessary condition for an act's being supererogatory, claiming instead that an act is supererogatory if and only if it is both morally optional (NC1) and morally praiseworthy. While I do not (at least, not here) want to deny (or assert) that a supererogatory act must be morally praiseworthy, I do want to defend NC2. Consider, then, that an act can be both morally optional and morally praiseworthy without going above and beyond the call of duty. To illustrate, consider the following case, which I borrow from Paul McNamara. Soldier on Point: A soldier is on point this evening. It is her turn to guard the camp. As a general policy and by mutual agreement of everyone in the camp, the soldier on point has the choice of 40 holding either a first or a second position, the first being slightly better with respect to protecting the camp and the second being slightly safer for the soldier on point. This evening the enemy launches a massive assault on the camp in an attempt to overrun it. Despite the grave danger involved and the temptation to run and hide, our soldier faithfully holds the second position, losing her life in the process but providing those back at the camp with sufficient time to prepare and launch a successful counter assault. (This is adapted from his 2011, p. 220.) In holding the second position, our soldier does the least that she can permissibly do-the minimum that is required of her. Doing anything less than holding the second position (such as, running and hiding) would have been impermissible. But even though our soldier did not go above and beyond the call of duty (as she would have had she held the first position), her actions are praiseworthy. As McNamara points out, "to stay on point (in either position) in the face of a high chance of death for the sake of others, knowing the advantages of running and having a much better chance of survival, is surely praiseworthy" (2011, p. 220). Thus, our soldier did something that was both morally optional (given that she had the option of holding the first position instead) and morally praiseworthy (given that it is praiseworthy to face such a high chance of death for the sake of others even when this is obligatory). But her act wasn't supererogatory. For, in performing this act, she didn't go above and beyond the call of duty. Had she held the more personally dangerous but more altruistic first position, she would have. But she didn't. She did only the minimum that was required of her. A further reason to accept NC2 as a necessary condition is that it nicely accounts for the normative force that supererogatory acts supposedly have. Supererogatory acts are acts that are more morally choiceworthy than their non-supererogatory alternatives. Indeed, the facts that make an act supererogatory are presumably considerations that, morally speaking, count in favour of performing it as opposed to any of its non-supererogatory alternatives. But if, contrary to NC2, agents do not have more moral reason to perform a supererogatory act than to perform its non-supererogatory alternatives, then it is hard to see why there is supposedly something that, morally speaking, counts in favour of their doing so. So, we should accept that both NC1 and NC2 constitute necessary conditions for an act's being supererogatory. Once we accept these two necessary conditions, though, supererogation can seem impossible since NC2 can appear to be in tension with NC1, as James Dreier has explained: 41 Morality, we are inclined to think, is a matter of what reasons one has from the moral point of view. When there is a supererogatory act available, it would be better for you to perform it. So surely you have a reason, from the moral point of view, to perform the act. You may have some reason not to perform it, but at least typically you have no reason from the moral point of view [that is, no moral reason] to refrain from it (if you do have such reason, then it will ordinarily be outweighed by the reason you have to perform, because by hypothesis it is better to perform). But now it is hard to see how it could be permissible, from the moral point of view, to refrain from doing something that you have an undefeated reason (from that very point of view) to do. Everything from the moral point of view speaks in favor of your... [performing the supererogatory act], and nothing at all speaks against it. ...[In] what sense is it "all right," "permissible," "not wrong" to fail...[to do so]? There seems to be no sense at all. Supererogation, according to this way of seeing things, turns out to be impossible. (2004, p. 148) This is known as the paradox of supererogation, and it stems from the fact that the following three claims are jointly inconsistent: (C7) For any subject S and any act available to her φ, S's φ-ing is supererogatory only if there exists some available alternative ψ such that: (NC1) S is both morally permitted to φ and morally permitted to ψ, and (NC2) S has more moral reason to φ than to ψ. [From the definition of 'supererogatory'] (C8) For any subject S and any two distinct acts available to her φ and ψ, if S has more moral reason to φ than to ψ, then S is not morally permitted to perform ψ. [From the morally overriding thesis] (C9) There are supererogatory acts. [Assumption] These are jointly inconsistent, because, given C8, it follows that, whenever NC2 is met, NC1 isn't. And this means that no act can be supererogatory, which contradicts C9. To solve the paradox, the supererogationist (i.e., the person who accepts that there are supererogatory acts as defined in C7) must deny C8. And, in doing so, she must explain why the morally undefeated reason that favours performing the supererogatory act fails to generate a moral requirement. If one wants to deny C8 (i.e., the morally overriding thesis), then one must accept either or both of the following two theses. 42 The More-Justifying-Strength Thesis: The moral justifying strength of a non-moral reason (which is greater than zero) exceeds its moral requiring strength (which is zero). The No-Requiring-Strength Thesis: Some moral reasons have no moral requiring strength. There are, then, two possible (and not mutually exclusive) explanations for why the morally undefeated reason that favours performing the supererogatory act fails to generate a moral requirement to so act. One explanation involves appealing to the no-requiring-strength thesis, claiming that the moral reasons for performing the supererogatory alternative have no moral requiring strength and are, thus, incapable of generating a moral requirement. Call this the non-requiring-moral-reason explanation. Another possible explanation, though, involves appealing to the more-justifying-strength thesis, claiming that the relevant non-moral reasons justify acting contrary to the moral reasons for performing the supererogatory alternative and, thereby, prevent those moral reasons from generating a moral requirement. Call this the non-moral-reason explanation. Philosophers such as James Dreier and Michael J. Zimmerman overlook the non-moral-reason explanation, because they assume that the more-justifying-strength thesis is false.40 According to them, non-moral reasons are irrelevant to the determination of an act's moral status, for they overlook the possibility that non-moral reasons can be morally relevant factors. Hence, they assume that the nonrequiring-moral-reason explanation is the only possible explanation. In an effort to spell out how exactly the non-requiring-moral-reason explanation might go, Dreier speculates that there might be two moral points of view, one being the point of view of justice and the other being the point of view of beneficence. Dreier further speculates that reasons stemming from justice have considerable moral requiring strength, but that reasons stemming from beneficence have no moral requiring strength. According to Dreier, supererogatory acts are more beneficent, but not more just, than their non-supererogatory alternatives. So, although agents have more moral reason to perform a supererogatory act than to perform any of its non-supererogatory alternatives, they are not morally 40 That Dreier (2004) rejects the non-moral-reason explanation is clear from the fact that he thinks that an act's moral status is a function of solely moral reasons-see the first sentence in the above quote as well as what he says on p. 149 of the same article. Zimmerman, by contrast, is less explicit, but he does say that if there being more moral reason to perform the supererogatory alternative is essential to supererogation, then any theory wishing to accommodate supererogation will have to declare that there are two sets of moral reasons, deontic and non-deontic reasons (or what I am calling moral reasons with, and moral reasons without, moral requiring strength)-see Zimmerman (1993, pp. 375–376). 43 required to do so, for the relevant reasons (i.e., reasons of beneficence) have no moral requiring strength-they're non-requiring moral reasons. The problem with Dreier's particular suggestion, and with the general suggestion that the non-requiringmoral-reason explanation is the only possible explanation, is that they both rest on the mistaken assumption that the reasons that make a supererogatory alternative morally superior to its nonsupererogatory alternatives are always moral reasons of no moral requiring strength. To the contrary, it seems that in many typical instances of supererogation the moral reasons that favour performing the supererogatory alternative over its non-supererogatory alternatives are moral requiring reasons-that is, reasons that have sufficient moral requiring strength. To illustrate, recall Costly Donation, where Fiona must choose between acting so as to secure a considerable benefit for herself by transferring the money from her savings account to her escrow account and acting so as to secure a more considerable benefit for various needy, distant strangers by instead donating those funds to Oxfam. In that case, her forfeiting the chance to buy a new home and instead donating her savings to Oxfam is supererogatory. Given that Dreier and Zimmerman insist on the nomoral-requiring-strength explanation, they must deny that the moral reason that favours Fiona's donating the money to Oxfam as opposed to transferring it to her escrow company is a moral requiring reason. If it were, then her donating the money to Oxfam would, on their view, be obligatory, not supererogatory, because, on their view, whatever non-moral reason she has to purchase a new home would be powerless to prevent the moral requiring reason that she has to donate the money to Oxfam from giving rise to a moral requirement to so act. But, as we have already seen in the above, the moral reason that favours her donating the money to Oxfam is a moral requiring reason; for, absent countervailing considerations, Fiona is morally required to donate the money to Oxfam. And there are many other similar cases in which the moral reason that the agent has to perform some beneficent and supererogatory act is a moral requiring one. So, if we are to account for many typical instances of supererogation, we are going to have to accept the non-moral-reason explanation, thereby accepting, contrary to Dreier and others, that non-moral reasons, and not just moral reasons, are relevant to the determination of an act's deontic status. That is, we must accept the more-justifying-strength thesis. 4.5 An Objection to this Account I've argued that we should accept the more-justifying-strength thesis in part because we must do so in order to account for many typical agent-centered options. Now, my account is inspired by Michael Slote's similar account (see his 1991). Consequently, mine is subject to many of the same objections to which his is subject. And one of these is the following objection from Shelly Kagan. 44 Slote is arguing, in effect, that whenever the agent has a moral option, then from the rational point of view the reasons the agent has for favoring her own interests outweigh the reasons that support promoting the greater good [that is, support acting altruistically].... But if this is so, then what if anything prevents these reasons from grounding a rational requirement to favor her interests in each such case? (1991, p. 927) If the answer is that nothing would, then this would seem to be an unacceptable result both for Slote and myself, for it would mean that in such cases "it would be rationally forbidden-irrational-to choose to do the morally preferable act [i.e., the supererogatory act]" (Kagan 1991, pp. 927–928). This would seem unacceptable for at least two reasons. First, it seems unacceptable to suppose that, whenever there is a moral option, performing the morally preferable (and, thus, supererogatory) option is necessarily rationally forbidden. Second, it seems unacceptable to suppose that, whenever there is a moral option, there is a rational requirement (or, as I would put it, a normative requirement) to perform the selfinterested option, for what we want to account for is the intuition that there is both a moral, and a rational (i.e., normative), option to act either altruistically or self-interestedly. Nevertheless, Kagan's objection is, as stated, a bit too quick, for, contrary to what Kagan says, Slote and I need not claim that, from the rational point of view (that is, the point of view of all reasons), the nonmoral reason the agent has to act self-interestedly outweighs the moral reason the agent has to act altruistically. For we can instead claim that these two opposing reasons exactly balance out. And if they do, then we can plausibly claim that the fact that there is just as much overall reason to act selfinterestedly as to act altruistically accounts for the lack of a moral requirement to act altruistically. Moreover, since there is just as much reason, all things considered, to perform the one as the other, there will be a rational option to do either. And, thus, we can account for the intuition that there is both a moral, and a rational, option to act either altruistically or self-interestedly. As convenient as this might be, it may seem implausible to suppose that in all the typical instances of agent-centered options the altruistic reasons and the self-interested reasons exactly balance out. As Kagan suggests, it seems that such ties would be too rare to account for the wide range of options we take there to be. So, Kagan's objection amounts to the following worry. If the reasons that favour the two alternatives are not exactly balanced out, then one or the other alternative will be rationally (i.e., normatively) required even if not morally required. What's more, the reasons that favour the two alternatives will only very rarely exactly balance out. Therefore, this strategy for defending agentcentered options involves trading, in most instances, a moral requirement for a rational requirement, when 45 what we were looking for was both a moral, and a rational, option to act either altruistically or selfinterestedly. It is important to realize, though, that the problem of accounting for rational options given the seeming implausibility of supposing that the relevant reasons always exactly balance out is a difficult philosophical problem that befalls anyone interested in accounting for what Joseph Raz calls "the basic belief," and he calls it this, because it seems so clearly correct that we should give it "credence unless it can be shown to be incoherent or inconsistent with some of our rightly entrenched views" (2000, 100). It is as follows. The Basic Belief: The basic belief is the deeply entrenched common-sensical belief that in many typical choice situations, the relevant reasons do not require performing one particular act-type, but instead permit performing any of a variety of different act-types, such as gardening, watching TV, volunteering for Oxfam, reading the newspaper, or working on a book.41 It seems, for instance, that I could now, in accordance with reason, perform any of these very different act-types. But how are we to account for this? It seems that there could be such rational options only if there were exactly equal reason to perform each of the optional alternatives, and yet it is hard to believe that such is the case. For instance, it is hard to believe that I have just as much reason to watch TV as either to volunteer for Oxfam or to work on this book. After all, volunteering for Oxfam seems vastly superior to watching TV in terms of the amount of impersonal good that it would do, and working on this book seems vastly superior to watching TV in terms of the amount of good it would do me-assume that I am not at this moment too tired to work productively on the book. Moreover, the fact that, in many of these choice situations, the relevant alternatives remain rationally optional even after there has been a small increase in the number and/or the strength of the reasons that favour just one of the alternatives seems to show that their rationally optional status could not have been due, in the first place, to a perfect 41 As Raz states things, the basic belief is the belief "that most of the time people have a variety of options such that it would accord with reason for them to choose any one of them and it would not be against reason to avoid any of them" (2000, p. 100). But, interpreted literally, this seems too weak to capture the belief that Raz has in mind. For I take it that Raz doesn't mean to be discussing the belief that we always have a variety of options that would accord with reason given that there are always countless permissible ways of performing a required act-type. For instance, suppose that reason requires that I push a certain button with my right index finger. Even so, I'll have a variety of options that would accord with reason given that there are countless permissible ways for me to push that button with my right index finger. I can do so as quickly as possible or not as quickly as possible. I can do so while singing the national anthem or while keeping quiet. I can do so while tapping my foot or while not tapping foot. And so on and so forth. I take it, then, that Raz has in mind the belief that there is often a variety of different act-types that we could perform that would all accord with reason, such as watching TV, painting the fence, volunteering for Oxfam, reading the newspaper, or working on a book. 46 balance of reasons (Gert 2008, p. 14). For instance, it seems that it would still be rationally permissible for me to continue to work on this book even if there were a slight increase in the strength and/or number of reasons that favour just one of the other options, as where, say, Oxfam institutes a new policy of giving each volunteer a delicious cookie. So, the puzzle is to explain how, in most choice situations, there could be so many rationally optional alternatives given that it is seemingly implausible to suppose that there is exactly equal reason to perform each one of them. What this all means is that the problem of accounting for rational options is not any more serious for the defender of agent-centered options than it is for anyone else who accepts the basic belief. And if the problem is not specific to the above account of agent-centered options, then it is no objection to this account that it encounters the same problem that anyone wishing to account for rational options faces. What's more, I have argued elsewhere that this problem can be solved and in a way that's conducive to the sort of account that Slote and I want to give.42 In this section, I've argued that moral reasons are neither normatively nor morally overriding. I've argued that the moral justifying strength of a non-moral reason exceeds its moral requiring strength. And this enables non-moral reasons to prevent moral reasons, even those with considerable moral requiring strength, from generating moral requirements, and to do so without generating a moral requirement to do what they favour. I've argued that we must accept this view in order to accommodate many typical instances of agent-centered options and supererogatory acts. Now, this view implies that moral reasons are not inherently more important than non-moral reasons when it comes to determining how we ought to live. For, in determining how we ought to live, we will, on this view, need to consider not only our moral reasons but also our non-moral reasons. But even if moral reasons are not especially normatively important, it may be that moral requirements are. Indeed, I believe that they are. For, as I'll argue in the next section, moral requirements are supremely normatively important in that we must abide by them if we are to live as we just plain ought to live. 5. The Normative Significance of Moral Requirements If we accept that non-moral reasons are morally relevant reasons in that they have sufficient moral justifying strength to prevent the moral requiring strength of moral reasons from generating a moral 42 See my (2011, chap. 6) and my (2019a, chap. 6). I argue that, despite appearances, there is indeed exactly equal reason to perform each of the relevant alternatives. But see Gert (2018) for some worries about my solution to accommodating the basic belief and for some alternative solutions. 47 requirement to do what there is most moral reason to do (say, φ), then we need to ask when do these nonmoral reasons to do something other than φ (say, ψ) prevent the moral reasons that favour φ-ing from generating a moral requirement to φ? There are just three possibilities. Possibility 1: They do so even when they, and any moral reasons that also favour ψ-ing, have less combined normative weight than do all the reasons (moral and non-moral) that favour φ-ing. On this possibility, we will sometimes be morally permitted to ψ even though we have not only more moral reason, but also more reason, all things considered, to φ than to ψ. Possibility 2: They do so only when they, and any moral reasons that also favour ψ-ing, have at least as much combined normative weight as do all the reasons (moral and nonmoral) that favour φ-ing. On this possibility, we will be morally permitted to ψ only when we have at least as much reason, all things considered, to ψ as to φ. Possibility 3: They do so only when they, and any moral reasons that also favour ψ-ing, have more combined normative weight than do all the reasons (moral and non-moral) that favour φ-ing. On this possibility, we will be morally permitted to ψ only when we have more reason, all things considered, to ψ than to φ. It seems to me that Possibility 2 is the most plausible. For it seems that if we don't do what we have most moral reason to do (viz., φ) and instead ψ, we need some sort of excuse for not φ-ing. And it seems that we'll have an adequate excuse for not doing what we have most moral reason to do (viz., φ) if and only if we have at least as much reason, all things considered, to ψ as to φ. So, it seems that we must accept Possibility 2. And this means we should accept the following. Moral Rationalism (MR): For any subject S and any act available to her φ, if S is morally required to φ, then S is normatively required to φ-that is, S has decisive (and, thus, most) reason, all things considered, to φ. Besides the fact that MR offers the most plausible explanation for why non-moral reasons have moral justifying strength, I think that MR is just good commonsense. There are several reasons for this. First, MR explains why moral requirements serve as a rational/normative constraint on how, and to what extent, we may pursue our own personal aims and projects. For "morality's felt role as a constraint on the pursuit of those aims would be undermined if it were OK-not morally OK, but OK from this more encompassing point of view [of normativity in general]-to ignore moral injunctions in favor of those projects" (Stroud 1998, p. 176). In other words, MR explains why it's normatively impermissible for us to ignore moral injunctions so as to pursue our own personal aims and projects: it's because we're always normatively required to act as morality requires us to act. And, thus, "moral requirements place rational [i.e., normative] constraints on our actions. If someone has a moral obligation to act in a particular way then we do not think that she is free to choose how to act. Rather, we think that she has most reason [all 48 things considered] to do what is morally required" (Archer 2014, p. 107). Second, MR explains why a commitment to do as morality requires strikes us, not as a rationally arbitrary personal choice or preference, but as the rationally required response to the interests and claims of others. In choosing to act as I'm morally required to act rather than as I'm selfishly disposed to act, I seem to be choosing rationally rather than just plunking for acting altruistically rather than selfishly. That is, it feels like I'm responding appropriately to the relative normative weights of my own concerns as well as those of others.43 And, third, MR explains why figuring out that we're morally required to act in a certain way seems sufficient for figuring out what we ought to do, all things considered. For instance, it seems that if I've settled that I'm morally required to refrain from eating meat, then this settles for me the question of whether or not I ought to refrain from eating meat. And, thus, we are inclined to take someone's response "That's what I was morally required to do" as sufficient normative justification for how she acted, even if what she did was culturally, aesthetically, or self-interestedly sub-optimal. As Archer puts it, "moral requirements provide a rational justification for action. If we accept that an act is morally required then there does not seem to be any need to give a further rational justification for performing that act" (2014, p. 108). And, fourth, MR explains why "showing that an act was in line with what an agent had most reason to do seems sufficient to show that the act was not morally wrong. It would be odd for someone to claim that an act was in line with what she had most reason to do but also morally impermissible" (Archer 2014, p. 109). After all, on MR, the reason for this is plain: "moral requirements are always in line with what there is most reason to do. As a result, showing that an act is not what an agent has most reason to do is sufficient to show that it is not morally required" (Archer 2014, p. 109). For all these reasons, MR seems to be built into our ordinary conception of morality. But I won't settle for this alone. In the next section, I'll try to provide a deeper explanation for MR. It has to do both with the fact that 'morally wrong' just means 'morally blameworthy absent some suitable excuse (such as ignorance or the inability to do otherwise)' and with the fact that no one can be morally blameworthy for doing something morally bad if that's something she had sufficient reason, all things considered, to do- 43 Admittedly, not everyone shares this intuition. For instance, Josh Gert thinks that there are powerful people who act normatively permissibly when they act morally wrongly for the benefit of themselves. He says, "my pretheoretical intuition is that these immoral people have plenty of reason to want to behave in the [immoral] ways in which they do, and these reasons are not overridden by the reasons they have to behave in [moral] ways" (2014, p. 218). Now, I agree that that they have plenty of self-interested reasons to act immorally and that these reasons are not overridden by the moral reasons they have for doing something else, but I believe that they must be outweighed by the moral reasons for doing something else; for, otherwise, we would not think it immoral for them to act selfinterestedly just as we don't think it immoral for me to act self-interestedly in The Trivial Promise. 49 and this holds even if she had no other suitable excuse or justification for doing so.44 Thus, if I step on your toe and you object, demanding that I account for my action, it seems that I will succeed in doing just that if I can demonstrate to you that I had sufficient (and, thus, good) reason for stepping on your toe. 5.1 My Argument for Moral Rationalism There are two ways I might argue for moral rationalism ('MR' for short). I could argue that the correct substantive accounts of both moral requirements and normative (or what others call 'rational') requirements are such that the former is a proper subset of the latter, thus ensuring that MR holds. Alternatively, I could try to establish MR independently of any such substantive accounts. And this is the route that I'll take. But, even having chosen this route, I still need to choose between two further possibilities. On one possibility, I would argue for the normatively overriding thesis-the view that moral reasons normatively override all other types of reasons.45 For if the normatively overriding thesis were true, MR would follow. But I will not take this tack, as I've already argued against the normatively overriding thesis. On the other possibility, the one that I favour, I'll try to establish MR on the basis of certain relevant conceptual connections-specifically, a conceptual connection both between responsibly violating a moral requirement and being blameworthy and between having sufficient reason to perform an act and not being blameworthy for performing that act. But before I can clearly state my argument, I need to clarify some relevant terminology.46 First, to say that a subject has decisive reason, all things considered, to φ is to say that her reasons are such as to make her normatively required to φ, and to say that she has sufficient reason, all things considered, to φ is to say that her reasons to φ are such as to make her normatively permitted to φ.47 Thus, a subject has decisive reason, all things considered, to φ if and only if she does not have sufficient reason, all things considered, to refrain from φ-ing. And I will use "a subject, S, has decisive reason to φ" and "S 44 As I see it, whether you have an excuse for doing something morally bad bears on whether you're morally responsible for having done so. By contrast, whether you have a justification for doing something morally bad bears on whether you were morally wrong in having done so. 45 Stephen Darwall disagrees. He suggests the following possible defence of the normatively overriding thesis: "Can moral reasons actually reduce or eliminate the weight of a countervailing reason? It surely seems that they can. Consider, for example, the pleasure a torturer might take in seeing her victim squirm. In such a case, the wrongness of torture or of taking pleasure in others' pain seems not only to outweigh any reason provided by the pleasure; it seems to 'silence' it" (2006b, p. 287). But I'm not convinced that there is any countervailing reason in this case- that is, I'm not convinced that sadists have any reason to do what will give them sadistic pleasure. 46 This is based off the argument that I provided in my (2011, chap. 2). 47 With this and the other definitions, I leave implicit that we could replace 'φ' with 'refrain from φ-ing' throughout. 50 has sufficient reason to φ" as shorthand for "S has decisive reason, all things considered, to φ" and "S has sufficient reason, all things considered, to φ," respectively. Second, to say that a subject has sufficient reason to φ is to say that there is at least one act-token that is an instance of her φ-ing that she has sufficient reason to perform. Likewise, to say that she has decisive reason to φ is to say that there is at least one act-token that is an instance of her φ-ing that she has decisive reason to perform. Third, to say that a subject freely φ-ed is to say that she meets the control condition (sometimes called the freedom condition) for being morally responsible for having φ-ed, such that she had the relevant sort of control over whether she was to φ-the sort of control that's required for her being appropriately praised or blamed for having φ-ed. Fourth, to say that a subject attributively φ-ed is to say that she meets the ownership condition for being responsible for having φ-ed, such that she had the relevant sort of ownership over her having φ-ed-the sort of ownership that's required for her being appropriately praised or blamed for having φ-ed. In other words, in φ-ing, she sufficiently expressed her values, her character, and/or her judgments about reasons such that she counts as being morally responsible for having φ-ed. Fifth, to say that a subject knowledgeably φs is to say that she meets the knowledge condition (sometimes called the epistemic condition) for being morally responsible for having φ-ed, such that she had the relevant sort of knowledge concerning the nature and effects of her φ-ing-the sort of knowledge that's required for her being appropriately praised or blamed for having φ-ed. Sixth, to say that a subject is blameworthy for having φ-ed is to say both that it is appropriate for her to be blamed for having φ-ed and, thus, for her to feel guilty for having φ-ed and for others to feel indignation-and, perhaps, also resentment-toward her for having φ-ed.48 And, here, I use "appropriate" in the sense of being apt, fitting, or correct and, thus, in the same sense that fear is the appropriate response to something that one perceives as posing a danger to oneself. In this sense, it can be appropriate to blame oneself or someone else even though having this attitude (and/or expressing it) would be instrumentally bad. 48 For more on this and on the nature of blame, see Portmore (Manuscript). 51 Seventh and last, when I say that a subject is morally required to φ, I mean this in the objective (or factrelative) sense-the sense in which I'm required to unplug a toaster that's about to start a fire even if I have no evidence suggesting that leaving the toaster plugged in poses a danger. With these terms defined, I can now state my argument as follows: (P1) For any subject S and any option of hers φ, if S is morally required to φ, then S would be blameworthy for freely, attributively, and knowledgeably refraining from φ-ing.49 [A conceptual truth50] (P2) For any subject S and any option of hers φ, if S would be blameworthy for freely, attributively, and knowledgeably refraining from φ-ing, then S does not have sufficient reason to refrain from φ-ing. [Assumption] (Inf1) Thus, for any subject S and any option of hers φ, if S is morally required to φ, then S does not have sufficient reason to refrain from φ-ing.51 [From P1 and P2] (P3) For any subject S and any option of hers φ, if S does not have sufficient reason to refrain from φ-ing, then S has decisive reason to φ. [From the definitions of 'sufficient reason' and 'decisive reason'] (Inf2) Therefore, for any subject S and any option of hers φ, if S is morally required to φ, then S has decisive reason to φ-and this just is MR. [From Inf1 and P3] The argument is deductively valid. P1 is intuitively plausible. Indeed, it expresses the common assumption that there is a conceptual connection between wrongdoing and blameworthiness.52 Although there may not be an essential connection between wrongdoing and blameworthiness per se, there is, it seems, an essential connection between blameworthiness and responsibly doing wrong-that is, between blameworthiness and freely, attributively, and knowledgeably doing wrong. P2 is also intuitively 49 If you think that the set of conditions that are necessary and sufficient for being moral responsible for φ-ing is something other than the conjunction of the control condition, the ownership condition, and the knowledge condition, then feel free to make that substitution here and elsewhere. Essentially, the claim, here, is just that, if S is morally required to φ, then S would be blameworthy for morally responsibly refraining from φ-ing. 50 I think that this is just as much a conceptual truth as "If S is a bachelor, then S doesn't have a spouse" is. 51 'Px' indicates a premise and 'Infx' indicates the product of an inference (that is, a conclusion). 52 See, for instance, Darwall (2006a), Gibbard (1990), Mill (1991), and Skorupski (1999). 52 plausible.53 In any case, there is, I think, a sound argument for it, which is based on assumptions that are even more intuitively plausible than itself. But before I present that argument, let me rebuff some putative counterexamples to P2. Consider the following example. Suppose that Arthur, a white supremacist, sneaks up behind an unsuspecting black man, named Bert, and clubs him over the head, knocking him unconscious. Now, it's good that he did so, for Bert was just about to kill his ex-girlfriend Carla, who's completely innocent. So, as it turns out, Arthur saves Carla's life, as any less violent or injurious act would have been insufficient to prevent Bert from killing Carla. And let's assume that Arthur knew what Bert was about to do, but that this wasn't what motivated him. What motivated him was solely the desire to hurt a black person. In this case, it seems that Arthur had sufficient reason to club Bert over the head, and yet, clearly, he is blameworthy. But this is no clear counterexample to P2. For although it is clear that Arthur is blameworthy, it is far from clear that Arthur is blameworthy for clubbing Bert over the head, which is what would need to be true for this to constitute a counterexample to P2. So, I think that we can rightly blame Arthur for his vicious motive, for his malevolent intent, and for his racist attitudes.54 We can even rightly blame him both for acting out of hatred and malice and for being willing to club Bert over the head even if there is no good reason for him to do so. But I do not think that we can rightly blame him for clubbing Bert over the head, as this is exactly what he should have done. Later in life, when Arthur finally comes to realize the error of his ways, what he should come to regret and feel guilty about is the fact that he was a racist who acted out of hatred and malice. Arthur should not, however, regret having clubbed Bert over the head, nor should he feel guilty for having done so, for this is what he had sufficient (indeed, decisive) reason to do. To accept blame for having φ-ed, one must judge that one should not have φ-ed. But although he should neither have wished Bert harm nor acted out of hatred or malice, he should have clubbed him over the head, as this was necessary to save Carla's life. So, although it is clear that Arthur is blameworthy for something, it is not clear that he is blameworthy for freely, attributively, and knowledgeably doing anything that he had sufficient reason to do. Thus, the proponent of P2 can reasonably claim that there is no φ such that Arthur had sufficient reason to φ and yet is blameworthy for freely, attributively, and knowledgeably φ-ing. If, on the one hand, we let "φ" stand 53 Proponents include Darwall (2006b) and Wedgwood (2013). Even some of those who deny moral rationalism admit that P2 is quite intuitive. See, for instance, David Sobel, who explicitly denies moral rationalism (see 2007a) and yet claims that it "seems quite intuitive that earnestly blaming a person for [φ]-ing entails the view that the agent all things considered ought not to have [φ]-ed" (2007b, p. 155). 54 For a defence of the view that we can be morally responsible for our motives, intentions, and other attitudes, see both my (2019a, chaps. 2 and 3) and my (2019b). 53 for "clubbing Bert over the head," then although it is clear that Arthur had sufficient reason to φ, it is not so clear that he is blameworthy for freely, attributively, and knowledgeably φ-ing. And if, on the other hand, we let "φ" stand for, say, "acting out of malice," then although it is clear that Arthur is blameworthy for freely, attributively, and knowledgeably φ-ing, it is not so clear that he had sufficient reason to φ. So, I do not see this is as a clear counterexample to P2. Having cleared this up, let me now explain why we should accept P2. The thought underlying P2 is that agents are blameworthy only for freely, attributively, and knowledgeably doing what they lack sufficient reason to do. One way to bring out the intuitive plausibility of this claim is to point to the tension there is in blaming someone for acting in a certain way while acknowledging that she had sufficient reason to act in that way. Stephen Darwall puts the point thusly: It seems incoherent...to blame while allowing that the wrong action, although recommended against by some reasons, was nonetheless the sensible thing to do, all things considered. ...Part of what one does in blaming is simply to say that the person shouldn't have done what he did, other reasons to the contrary notwithstanding. After all, if someone can show that he had good and sufficient reasons for acting as he did, it would seem that he has accounted for himself and defeated any claim that he is to blame for anything. Accepting blame involves an acknowledgment of this proposition also. To feel guilt is, in part, to feel that one shouldn't have done what one did. (2006b, p. 292) Another way to bring out the intuitive plausibility of P2 is to point to the tension there is in holding someone morally responsible for her actions on account of her having the capacity to respond appropriately to the relevant reasons and then blaming her for responding appropriately to the relevant reasons by doing what she had sufficient reason to do. Let me explain. It seems that an agent can be blameworthy for her actions only if she is morally responsible for them and that she can be morally responsible for them only if she has the relevant sort of control over her actions. What's more, it is plausible to suppose that she has the relevant sort of control over her actions only if she has the capacity to respond appropriately to the relevant reasons-that is, the capacity both to recognize what the relevant reasons are and to react appropriately to them, being moved by them in accordance with their associated normative weights. Indeed, it is this capacity for responding appropriately to the relevant reasons, which sane adult humans typically possess and which young children, primitive animals, and the criminally insane typically lack, that distinguishes those who can be held accountable for their actions from those who cannot. 54 Given that an agent can be morally responsible (and, thus, blameworthy) only if she has the capacity to respond appropriately to the relevant reasons, it is important to note that, in flawlessly exercising this capacity, she could be led to perform any act that she has sufficient reason to perform. But if an agent is morally responsible for her actions and, thus, potentially blameworthy for her actions in virtue of her having the capacity to respond appropriately to the relevant reasons, then how can we rightly blame her for acting as she is led to act in flawlessly exercising this very capacity? Surely, it cannot be that the very capacity that opens the door to the possibility of her being blameworthy is the one that leads her to walk through that door, performing a blameworthy act. And yet this is exactly what we would be allowing if we held that agents can be blameworthy for performing acts that they have sufficient reason to perform, for it is their capacity to respond appropriately to the relevant reasons that opens the door to their being blameworthy in the first place-a capacity that, when exercised flawlessly, leads them to perform acts that they have sufficient reason to perform. To put the point in slightly different terms, it seems that appropriate blame cannot be unjust, and yet it would be unjust to hold an agent responsible on the condition that she has the capacity to be guided by sound practical reasoning and then blame her for acting as she might very well be led to act if she is guided by sound practical reasoning. And since an agent can be led to perform any act that she has sufficient reason to perform when guided by sound practical reasoning, it seems inappropriate to blame her for freely, attributively, and knowledgeably doing what she has sufficient reason to do, as this would be unjust. Consider an analogy. It seems that appropriate instructional penalties cannot be unjust, and yet it would be unjust to penalize a student for her writing errors on the condition that she has the capacity for errorless writing and then penalize her for writing in a way that she might very well be led to write in flawlessly exercising this capacity. To illustrate, imagine that I hold only those students who have the capacity for errorless writing responsible for their writing errors, penalizing their writing errors. By contrast, I don't penalize students who lack this capacity. Further suppose that those with the capacity for errorless writing are often led in flawlessly exercising this capacity to rewrite a sentence such as "Jeff likes hiking and to swim" as "Jeff likes hiking and swimming"-thus, replacing a sentence with a nonparallel structure with one with a parallel structure. But, now, imagine that, for some strange reason, I deduct points from all students who employ parallel structures in their writing. In sum, I penalize a student who writes "Jeff likes hiking and to swim" only if she has the capacity for errorless writing. But I penalize every student who writes something like "Jeff likes hiking and swimming." This seems unjust. For those who lack the capacity for errorless writing don't get penalized when they fail to rewrite a 55 sentence such as "Jeff likes hiking and to swim," and yet those who have this capacity are penalized when they rewrite "Jeff likes hiking and to swim" as "Jeff likes hiking and swimming," which is precisely what they may be led to do in flawlessly exercising this capacity. Thus, they have the right to complain that if other students get excused for not rewriting a sentence like "Jeff likes hiking and to swim" given that they lack the capacity for errorless writing, then they shouldn't be penalized for rewriting it as they may be led to by the very capacity that opens them up to being penalized for failing to rewrite it. More formally, my argument for P2 is as follows. (PI) S would be blameworthy for freely, attributively, and knowledgeably refraining from φ-ing only if S has the relevant sort of control over whether she refrains from φ-ing. [From the definition of 'freely'] (PII) S has the relevant sort of control over whether she refrains from φ-ing only if S has the capacity to respond appropriately to the relevant reasons. [Assumption55] (InfI) Thus, S would be blameworthy for freely, attributively, and knowledgeably refraining from φ-ing only if S has the capacity to respond appropriately to the relevant reasons. [From PI and PII] (PIII) If S has sufficient reason to refrain from φ-ing, then, in flawlessly exercising her capacity to respond appropriately to the relevant reasons, S could be led to freely, attributively, and knowledgeably refrain from φ-ing. [A conceptual truth] (PIV) If S would be blameworthy for freely, attributively, and knowledgeably refraining from φ-ing only if S has the capacity to respond appropriately to the relevant reasons, then S cannot be blameworthy for freely, attributively, and knowledgeably refraining from φ-ing when, in flawlessly exercising this capacity, S could be led to freely, attributively, and knowledgeably refrain from φ-ing. [Assumption] (InfII) Thus, S would not be blameworthy for freely, attributively, and knowledgeably refraining from φ-ing if S has sufficient reason to refrain from φ-ing. [From InfI–PIV] 55 I defend this assumption in chapters 2 and 3 of my (2019a). 56 (InfIII) Therefore, S would be blameworthy for freely, attributively, and knowledgeably φ-ing only if S does not have sufficient reason to φ-and this just is P2. [From InfII] In considering this argument, it will be helpful to have a specific example in mind. So, consider a revised version of The Trivial Promise. In this version, we'll replace the offer of a free trip around the world on a luxury sailing yacht with a less appealing alternative such that I have only exactly as much reason, all things considered, to drive down to the city to accept this alternative offer as to show up to my meeting as promised. And assume that I have considerably less reason to do anything besides these two. Thus, assume that I have sufficient reason to do either of these two, but insufficient reason to do anything else. Furthermore, assume that I am flawless in exercising my capacity to respond appropriately to reasons, such that I always do what I have decisive reason to do, only do what I have sufficient reason to do, and choose arbitrarily which of two acts to perform (by, say, tossing a coin) if and only if I have sufficient and equivalent reason to do either. And let's assume that, having sufficient and equivalent reason to do either, I choose arbitrarily to drive down to the city to accept the offer. That is, assume that I first designate heads to driving down to the city to accept the offer and designate tails to showing up to the meeting as promised and then toss a coin, which lands heads. As a result, I decide to drive down to the city, missing my meeting with the student. Of course, being flawless in how I exercise my capacity to respond appropriately to my reasons, I would have kept my promise and met with the student had there been decisive reason to do so. For instance, I would have kept my promise had my moral reason for doing so been a bit stronger, as where, say, the student's scholarship was at stake. Likewise, I would have kept my promise had my self-interested reason for driving down to the city been a bit weaker, as where, say, the offer had been a bit less enticing. And had there been a third option that I had decisive reason to do (e.g., saving some drowning child), I would have done that instead. But, as it was, none of these were true. As it was, I had sufficient reason to drive down to the city and thereby break my promise to meet with the student. And that is what I did, having flawlessly exercised my capacity for sound practical reasoning. Given my flawless exercise of my capacity for sound practical reasoning, how can I be faulted for breaking my promise? It seems unjust and, thus, inappropriate to hold me morally responsible for what I've done in virtue of my having the capacity to respond appropriately to my reasons and then blame me for acting as I was led to act in virtue of responding appropriately to my reasons. Indeed, it seems that even the student whom I stood up should admit that, had she been in my situation and perfectly rational, she might also have been led to act as I did. And if so, how can she rightly resent me for acting as she would have acted in such circumstances? 57 5.2 Dorsey's Objection I've argued that moral rationalism can be known a priori and, thus, that we can know that it's true independently of our doing any first-order theorizing about the substance of our requirements. Thus, I believe that we know that moral rationalism is true, not because we know both what we're morally required to do and what we're normatively required to do and see that the former is a proper subset of the latter, but because we understand that certain a priori necessary connections among moral requirements, normative permissions, and blameworthiness entail moral rationalism. Specifically, I've argued that, as a matter conceptual necessity, if we're morally required to φ, then we are blameworthy for freely, attributively, and knowledgeably refraining from φ. Yet, we can't be blameworthy for freely, attributively, and knowledgeably refraining from φ-ing if this is something we're normatively permitted to refrain from doing. So, we can't be morally required to do what we're normatively permitted to refrain from doing. And, therefore, moral rationalism is true. Note that I haven't argued that moral rationalism is analytic in the way that "If X is bachelor, then X is unmarried" is. 'Being normatively required to φ' isn't part of the analysis of 'being morally required to φ' in the way that 'being unmarried' is part of the analysis of 'being a bachelor'. To be normatively required to φ isn't part of what it means to be morally required to φ. For what it means for φ to be something that one is morally required to do is for φ to be something that one would be blameworthy for refraining from doing absent some suitable excuse. And I've argued that one couldn't be blameworthy for refraining from φ-ing if one had sufficient reason to so refrain-and this holds even if one lacks any suitable excuse for so refraining. So, I think that just as we can know independently of any first-order theorizing about our requirements that one will never be morally required to do something that one is not free to do, we can know that one will never be morally required to do something that one has sufficient reason to refrain from doing. For just as having the inability to φ is an adequate moral excuse for refraining from φ-ing, having sufficient reason to refrain from φ-ing is an adequate moral justification for refraining from φing.56 But Dale Dorsey (2015 and 2016) has objected to my argument on the grounds that in assuming that there is a conceptual connection between violating a moral requirement and being blameworthy, I'm begging 56 So, contrary to Dorsey (2016, p. 54), I don't find it absurd to think that we can know that certain first-order moral principles are false without doing any theorizing about the first-order content of morality. Clearly, we can know independent of any first-order moral theorizing that any moral principle that demands that subjects do what they are unable to do is false. And, likewise, I believe that we can know independent of any first-order moral theorizing that any moral principle that demands that subjects do what they're not normatively required to do is false. 58 the question and just presupposing that moral rationalism is true. He writes: "To insist on an a priori connection between immorality and blameworthiness relies on a presumption of moral rationalism" (2015, p. 38). But if that were true, then one wouldn't be able to accept that there is such a connection without accepting moral rationalism. Yet, clearly, one can. For one can agree with me that what it means for φ to be something that one is morally required to do is for φ to be something that one would be blameworthy for refraining from doing absent some suitable excuse while denying moral rationalism on the grounds that having sufficient reason, all things considered, to refrain from φ-ing doesn't count as an adequate moral justification for refraining from φ-ing. Thus, one could accept that although an inability to perform φ constitutes an adequate moral excuse for failing to φ, having sufficient reason to refrain from φ-ing doesn't constitute an adequate moral justification for failing to φ. So, clearly, I'm not presupposing moral rationalism in assuming that there is an a priori connection between immorality and blameworthiness. And that's precisely why I needed to argue that having sufficient reason to refrain from φ-ing is an adequate moral justification for failing to φ, which was just my argument for P2. And this is just to point out that moral rationalism doesn't follow solely from P1. I need P2 as well. What's more, Dorsey fails to provide any reason to think that my assuming P1 begs the question.57 6. Conclusion I've argued for a commonsense approach to morality and practical reasons. I've argued that, other things being equal, we should accept that things are as they seem. Thus, we should accept that there are agentcentered options, that there are supererogatory acts, that moral reasons are unqualified reasons, and that moral requirements are normatively authoritative. This means that there are only two ways to resist my arguments. One way is to resist my account of how things seem. Thus, some readers might deny that moral reasons seem to be unqualified reasons or that moral requirements seem to be normatively authoritative. But even the leading critics of these positions accept my account of how things seem. For instance, the leading proponent of subjectivism (i.e., David Sobel) concedes that moral reasons seem to be unqualified reasons. Besides, I have, in each case, given reasons for accepting my account of how things 57 Dorsey (2016) claims to provide two arguments for his claim that "without a prior commitment to moral rationalism, (1) should simply be rejected" (p. 56), where '(1)' stands for what I'm here calling (P1): For any subject S and any option of hers φ, if S is morally required to φ, then S would be blameworthy for freely, attributively, and knowledgeably refraining from φ-ing. But his first argument, which he calls the explanation argument, argues instead that P1 "can only be rendered plausible if we are already committed to" P2 of that same argument (2016, p. 57). And this doesn't show that P1 is question-begging. His second argument, which he calls the epistemological argument, argues instead that "if a priori [moral] rationalism is true then the fact that extra-moral considerations play a role in determining the extent to which φ-ing is morally justified can be established independently of a firstorder inquiry into the content of the moral domain" (2016, p. 64). And this too fails to show that P1 is questionbegging. Dorsey does, however, provide an argument against my P2 in his (Forthcoming), but I believe that his argument relies on a false account of when blame is appropriate-see my (Manuscript). 59 seem. For instance, I've given four reasons for thinking that the idea that moral requirements are normatively authoritative-that is, moral rationalism-is built into our ordinary conception of morality. The only other way to resist my arguments is to argue that other things are not equal and that the cost of accepting these seemingly true claims is just too high in terms of our having to reject other things that seem to be true. For instance, some subjectivists (e.g., Sobel) have argued that, although it seems that moral reasons are unqualified reasons, we cannot accept this without failing to adequately explain how our rationally contingent concerns affect what we have reason to do, which is something that also seems to be true. But, in each case, I've argued that, in fact, there are no significant costs in our accepting these seemingly true claims. For instance, I've argued that we can adequately explain how our rationally contingent concerns affect what we have reason to do while accepting that moral reasons are unqualified reasons. Of course, not everyone will agree. And, so, I've tried throughout to highlight where some of these disagreements may lie.58 References Archer, A. (2014). "Moral Rationalism without Overridingness." Ratio 27: 100–114. Baggini, J. (2015). "A New Breed of Hardcore Altruists are Changing the Way We Think about Charity. But Can Generosity Go too Far?" New Statesman, <https://www.newstatesman.com/economics/2015/08/new-breed-hardcore-altruists-are-changing-waywe-think-about-charity-can>. Bennett, J. (1995). The Act Itself. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Berg, A. (Manuscript). "How and Why to Be Well-Rounded." Cohen, S. (1999). "Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons." Philosophical Perspectives 13: 57–89. Copp, D. (1997). "The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason." Social Philosophy 58 For helpful comments on earlier drafts, I thank Dale Dorsey, James Fanciullo, Andrew Forcehimes, Shyam Nair, David Sobel, and Travis Timmerman. 60 and Policy 14: 86–106. Dancy, J. (2006a). "Nonnaturalism." In D. Copp, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. New York: Oxford University, pp. 122–145. Dancy, J. (2006b). "What Do Reasons Do?" In T. Horgan and M. Timmons, eds., Metaethics After Moore. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 39–59. Dancy, J. (2004). "Enticing Reasons." In R. J. Wallace, P. Pettit, S. Scheffler, and M. Smith, eds., Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 91– 118. Darwall, S. (2017). "What Are Moral Reasons?" The Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 12: 1–24, <http://www.amherstlecture.org/darwall2017/>. Darwall, S. (2006a). The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Darwall, S. (2006b). "Morality and Practical Reason: A Kantian Approach." In D. Copp, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 282–320. Dorsey, D. (Forthcoming). "Respecting the Game: Blame and Practice Failure." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Dorsey, D. (2016). The Limits of Moral Authority. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dorsey, D. (2015). "How Not to Argue Against Consequentialism." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90: 20–48. Dreier, J. (2004). "Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn't." In M. Byron, ed., Satisficing and Maximizing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 131–154. Finlay, S. and M. Schroeder (2017). "Reasons for Action: Internal vs. External." In E. N. Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2017 Edition). URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/reasons-internal-external/>. 61 Foot, P. (1972). "Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives." The Philosophical Review 81: 305– 316. Forcehimes, A. T. and L. Semrau (2018). "Are There Distinctively Moral Reasons?" Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21: 699–717. Gert, J. (2018). "Underdetermination by Reasons." In D. Star, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 443–460. Gert, J. (2014). "Perform a Justified Option." Utilitas 26: 206–217. Gert, J. (2008). "Michael Smith and the Rationality of Immoral Action." Journal of Ethics 12: 1–23. Gert, J. (2003). "Requiring and Justifying: Two Dimensions of Normative Strength." Erkenntnis 59: 5– 36. Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Hume, D. (1975). [1739]. A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), 2nd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Joyce, R. (2001). The Myth of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kagan, S. (1994). "Defending Options." Ethics 104: 333–351. Kagan, S. (1989). The Limits of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kagan, S. (1991). "Replies to My Critics." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51: 919–928. MacAskill, W. (2013). "To save the world, don't get a job at a charity; go work on Wall Street." Quartz, <https://qz.com/57254/to-save-the-world-dont-get-a-job-at-a-charity-go-work-on-wall-street/>. MacAskill, W. (2015). Doing Good Better. New York, NY: Gotham Books. 62 Markovits, J. (2014). Moral Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McLeod, O. (2001). "Just Plain 'Ought'." The Journal of Ethics 5: 269–91. McNamara, P. (2011). "Supererogation, Inside and Out: Toward an Adequate Scheme for Common Sense Morality." In M. Timmons, ed., Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume I. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 202–235. McNamara, P. (1996). "Making Room for Going Beyond the Call." Mind 105: 415–450. Mill, J. S. (1991). [1861]. Utilitarianism. In J. M. Robson, ed., Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. 10. London: Routledge, pp. 203–59. Nair, S. (2016). "Conflicting Reasons, Unconflicting 'Ought's." Philosophical Studies 173: 629–663. Parfit, D. (2011). On What Matters. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Parfit, D. (1997). "Reasons and Motivation." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. 71: 99–130. Portmore, D. W. (Manuscript). "A Comprehensive Account of Blame: Self-Blame, Non-Moral Blame, and Blame for the Non-Voluntary." Portmore, D. W. (2019a). Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options. New York: Oxford University Press. Portmore, D. W. (2019b)." Control, Attitudes, and Accountability." Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 6: 7–32. Portmore, D. W. (2011). Commonsense Consequentialism: Wherein Morality Meets Rationality. New York: Oxford University Press. Raz, J. (2000). Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Scanlon, T. M. (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press. 63 Schroeder, M. (2007). Slaves of the Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Singer, P. (2015). The Most Good You Can Do. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (1992). "An Argument for Consequentialism." Philosophical Perspectives 6: 399–421. Skorupski, J. (1999). Ethical Explorations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Slote, M. (1991). "Shelly Kagan's The Limits of Morality." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51: 915–917. Sobel, D. (2016). From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sobel, D. (2007a). "Subjectivism and Blame." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (Supplement): 149– 170. Sobel, D. (2007b). "The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection." Philosophers' Imprint 7: 1–17. Streumer, B. (2007). "Reasons and Impossibility." Philosophical Studies 136: 351–384. Stroud, S. (1998). "Moral Overridingness and Moral Theory." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79: 170– 189. Tiffany, E. (2007). "Deflationary Normative Pluralism." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37: 231–62. Tucker, C. (Manuscript). "Too Far Beyond the Call of Duty: Moral Rationalism and Weighing Reasons." Wedgwood, R. (2013). "The Weight of Moral Reasons." In M. Timmons, ed., Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume III. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 35–58. Worsnip, A. (Forthcoming). "Immorality and Irrationality." Philosophical Perspectives. 64 Zimmerman, M. J. (1993). "Supererogation and Doing the Best One Can." American Philosophical Quarterly 30: 373–380.

1 AVNER COHEN MARCELO DASCAL, The Institution of Philosophy. A Discipline in Crisis, Open Court, La Salle (Ill) 1989. Un volume di pp. 334. Il libro comprende quindici interventi, di filosofi degli Stati Uniti con un australiano e due israeliani (i curatori), sul tema centrale di quella che nel mondo anglosassone si usa chiamare metafilosofia: la domanda se l'unità della filosofia si riduca alla sua definizione «istituzionale» (vi è una professione che viene comunemente chiamata filosofica, con sue istituzioni di ricerca e insegnamento, riviste e altre pubblicazioni specialistiche; i discorsi prodotti entro questo contesto sono da considerare filosofici) e se abbiano senso i discorsi su una presunta «fine» della filosofia. Il discorso dei curatori, svolto oltre che nella Prefazione, nel contributo di Dascal, Reflections on the «crisis of modernity», e in quello di Cohen, The end-of-philosophy: an anatomy of a cross-purpose debate, parte dalla constatazione dell'assenza di un consenso nella comunità filosofica sui propri fini e identità e da quella di una divisione fra difensori del natural kind filosofia e critici "postmoderni" che professano al proposito uno storicismo radicale. I curatori sostengono che una definizione «istituzionale» non risolve il dissenso perché per gli essenzialisti si tratta di sapere chi sono i "veri" filosofi, e che d'altra parte proprio il dissenso profondo esistente impone la discussione metafilosofica che proprio questi tendono a evitare. Suggeriscono infine l'esistenza di punti di contatto impensati fra i due schieramenti: a) gli essenzialisti difendono la continuità del genere letterario filosofia come si presenta nella tradizione occidentale e quindi di fatto una definizione istituzionale; si differenziano soltanto nel rifiutarne la radicale storicità; b) i postmoderni non hanno il monopolio della tesi della fine della filosofia: enunciare la verità filosofica definitiva significa anche dichiarare tutte le filosofie future non necessarie e questo è proprio ciò che tendono a fare i costruttori di sistemi. Il libro si articola in tre sezioni: la prima, intitolata «Philosophy: self-identity questioned» comprende contributi di Rorty, Castañeda, Putnam (sui quali si ritornerà) e un contributo di A.J. Mandt in difesa del «pluralismo», la parola d'ordine degli oppositori dell'establishment analitico negli Stati Uniti negli anni Ottanta. La seconda sezione «Philosophy: interpreting the crisis» comprende, oltre ai contributi di Cohen e di Dascal, contributi di Rosenthal sulla filosofia e la sua storia e di Carlin Romano sul ruolo delle metafore giurisprudenziali nella filosofia, e infine un contributo di Mark Okrent sulle conseguenze metafilosofiche del pragmatismo (sul quale si ritornerà). La terza sezione «Philosophy: what next» comprende contributi di Joseph Margolis, Amelie Oksenburg Rorty, Nancy Fraser e Linda Nicholson su femminismo e postmodernismo, e infine di Harry Redner sul futuro della filosofia morale. 2 2 Si dirà qualcosa in dettaglio sui saggi dei tre autori più famosi e si aggiungerà qualcosa sul contributo di Okrent in quanto si riallaccia direttamente a quello di Rorty. Va detto che Rorty, Putnam, Castañeda non sfuggono alla tentazione di fare un bilancio del proprio tragitto di ricerca e identificare i compiti della filosofia futura con quelli svolti nella propria filosofia personale (fa eccezione Putnam che si sottrae a questa tentazione con una abile mossa retorica). Richard Rorty, in Philosophy as science, as metaphor, and as politics, sostiene che vi sono tre concezioni dei fini del filosofare (e tre risposte alla domanda: come dobbiamo concepire il nostro rapporto con la tradizione filosofica occidentale). Queste sono: a) quella husserliana "scientistica": b) quella heideggeriana "poetica"; c) quella pragmatista "politica". Vi sono motivi di vicinanza fra Heidegger e Dewey: l'avversione al cartesianismo": il carattere ultimo riconosciuto alle pratiche sociali; la diffidenza nei confronti della metafora visuale (che è invece comune a Husserl e Carnap). Le differenze fra i due sono: il diverso trattamento del rapporto fra metaforico e letterale (per Dewey il compito di rendere letterali o lessicalizzare nuove metafore è essenziale, per Heidegger banale); un diverso atteggiamento sul rapporto fra filosofia e politica (Heidegger e gli heideggeriani rifiutano l'eredità della rivoluzione francese e credono nella «critica radicale» di estrema destra o marxistarivoluzionaria, Dewey crede nel progetto della rivoluzione francese di una società pluralista e volta a promuovere il massimo di felicità degli individui, una società in cui il linguaggio in cui formuliamo e credenze comuni sia il meno "pesante" possibile). Sulla scia di Heidegger e dei pragmatisti va ammessa la metafora come terza fonte di credenze al pari di percezione e inferenza; la critica di Davidson alla distinzione fra schema e contenuto conduce a conclusioni identiche a quelle di Heidegger e dei pragmatisti. Nella situazione odierna della filosofia Rorty vede una duplice divisione: a) fra scientismo (fenomenologia e positivismo) e reazione allo scientismo; b) entro la reazione allo scientismo: da un lato la reazione di Heidegger, un tacito e non argomentato rifiuto del progetto della rivoluzione francese e dell'idea che anche la filosofia sia uno strumento per ottenere la massima felicità del maggior numero; dall'altro lato la tacita e non argomentata accettazione da parte di Dewey di quel progetto e di quell'idea. In conclusione, Rorty sostiene che oggi, entro l'ambito della «filosofia» ci sono due istituzioni invece di una: la filosofia analitica vive in un suo mondo, ha un approccio «scientistico» anche negli esponenti più morbidi come Thomas Nagel (l'idea che la filosofia "analizzi" o "descriva" delle "strutture" formali astoriche e che abbia un suo canone, comprendente Hume, Frege ecc., che si ritiene abbia isolato profondi problemi centrali che definirebbero la disciplina). Sul fronte non analitico una concezione astorica della filosofia alla Nagel è considerata invece segno di immaturità intellettuale: i due schieramenti «differiscono sulla domanda se la filosofia abbia un 3 3 dominio di oggetti prelinguistico, e quindi sulla domanda se vi sia una realtà astorica alla quale un dato vocabolario filosofico possa essere adeguato» (p. 26). Per i quasi-scientisti la domanda sul rapporto fra filosofia e cultura nel suo insieme non è una domanda importante; i non-analitici sarebbero invece convinti della contiguità fra filosofia, letteratura e politica (hanno ragione – pensa Rorty – ma hanno la mania della politica radicale, di destra o di sinistra, invece della politica socialdemocratica prediletta da Dewey). La morale di Rorty consiste in due punti: a) i filosofi debbono discutere esplicitamente le questioni politiche senza travestirle da questioni filosofiche; b) per risolvere queste questioni, che sono le vere questioni, l'umanità deve però smettere di rivolgersi ai filosofi, ma deve rivolgersi da un lato ai poeti e dall'altro agli ingegneri. E con questo invito, che ripete le tesi di Irony, Contingency, Solidarity, Rorty conclude il suo pronunciamento sul futuro della filosofia. Hector-Neri Castañeda, in Philosophy as a science and as a worldview, sostiene che non c'è una crisi professionale: ci sono crisi personali legate alla crescita di complessità dei campi della filosofia. Sostiene che c'è una fine della filosofia in un senso strettamente professionale sui tempi lunghi (la ricchezza di tematiche e metodi ha alterato l'istituzione della filosofia); sui tempi brevi invece la ristrettezza di problemi e metodi della filosofia analitica è stata superata con quello che l'autore considera (con buona pace di Rorty) un proficuo riavvicinamento alla filosofia continentale. La situazione odierna è quindi rosea: sia nei problemi fondativi (mente, linguaggio, realtà e ragionamento pratico) sia in filosofia applicata (progetti normativi, progetti di ricerca congiunti con altri scienziati: linguistica, intelligenze artificiali, psicologia cognitiva, informatizzazione del diritto) la filosofia gode di una illimitata libertà di tema ti che e di una libertà metodologica senza vincoli. La filosofia, nella definizione di Castañeda, è rivolta a «produrre comprensione delle strutture generali del mondo in cui ci troviamo e degli schemi onnipervadenti delle nostre esperienze di ciò che appartiene, o potrebbe appartenere, al mondo» (p. 40). Il requisito metodologico fondamentale della filosofia per Castañeda è il pluralismo filosofico: «per comprendere la natura umana abbiamo bisogno di tutte le teorie e di tutti i modelli che possiamo inventare» (p. 43), e quindi vanno sviluppate le diverse visioni alternative, non come qualcosa che andrà confutato e superato ma come candidati per un uso alternativo. Gli obiettivi che questo approccio filosofico pluralista dovrà proporsi di realizzare sono chiamati dall'autore dia-filosofia (il sistema di isomorfismi, parziali o meno, fra le diverse teorie fondamentali), e sin-filosofia, l'attività di elaborare queste master-theories comprensive del mondo e dell'esperienza in vista della comparazione dia-filosofica. Attraverso queste tappe si giunge a elaborare quella ontologia formale che è l'obiettivo ultimo assegnato alla filosofia. Questa ontologia formale risulta dalle strutture dei linguaggi naturali, sulla 4 4 base della presupposizione che in queste si depositi la sapienza cumulativa dell'umanità riguardo alla forma del mondo; infatti l'unità diacronica delle nostre vite esige la presunzione che il mondo abbia una certa forma attendibile a cui noi abbiamo un accesso almeno parziale. Hilary Putnam, in Why is a philosopher? parte dall'abbandono da parte di Rorty di quella che era stata la domanda centrale per Frege, Carnap, Wittgenstein, Russell: «come fa il linguaggio ad agganciarsi al mondo?». Rorty – sotto l'influsso di Derrida – affermerebbe invece che non c'è un «mondo» esterno a cui il linguaggio possa agganciarsi ma ci sono solo «testi». La domanda alternativa di Rorty è: «come fanno i testi a connettersi ad altri testi?», Putnam dichiara di non avere voluto prendere posizione su quale sia la domanda giusta perché «entrambi i fronti sono sotto l'influsso di idee semplicistiche» e per di più queste idee sono intimamente connesse: «la grande differenza di stile fra la filosofia francese (e più in generale "continentale") e la filosofia anglosassone nasconde profonde affinità» (p. 60). Per illustrare in che consistono queste affinità, Putnam ricorda le difficoltà dell'empirismo logico nel ridurre il problema della natura della verità al problema della natura della conferma e la sua ricaduta in una forma di solipsismo. La via di uscita indicata da lui e da Kripke era rappresentata da un genere di realismo immune dai limiti individualistici e aprioristici del realismo seicentesco (derivanti dall'ignorare la divisione linguistica del lavoro e dall'ignorare che il riferimento dei nostri termini è determinato anche dall'ambiente non umano). Tenendo conto della pluralità delle "relazioni di riferimento" dei nostri linguaggi Putnam ha precisato la sua soluzione con la distinzione fra realismo metafisico (per il quale una misteriosa relazione di riferimento è ciò che rende possibili riferimento e verità) e realismo interno (il riferimento è interno ai «testi» o alle teorie, posto però – per non cadere in una forma di relativismo – che si riconosca che ci sono «testi» migliori e peggiori). Più precisamente, «migliore o peggiore possono anch'essi dipendere dalla nostra situazione storica e dai nostri scopi... Ma la nozione di una risposta giusta (o almeno migliore) a una domanda è soggetta a due vincoli: 1) la giustezza non è soggettiva... non è questione di opinione... 2) la giustezza va oltre la giustificazione» (p. 69). La verità va quindi «identificata con la giustificazione idealizzata più che con la giustificazione sulla base delle evidenze attuali» (p. 70), e «le condizioni di asseribilità non sono esplicitabili»: queste condizioni vengono apprese acquisendo una pratica. «L'impossibilità di formalizzare le condizioni di asseribilità di proposizioni arbitrarie è l'impossibilità di formalizzare la razionalità umana stessa» (p. 70). In conclusione, posta la sua riconosciuta incapacità di spiegare anche solo la possibilità del riferimento, della verità ecc. Putnam sostiene di avere comunque una risposta alla domanda: «ma allora perché non sei anche tu un relativista?». La risposta è che «la spinta a conoscere, ad avere una 5 5 spiegazione totalizzante ... è di fatto rimasta insoddisfatta, non perché illegittima, ma perché va oltre ai limiti di ogni nozione di spiegazione che possediamo» (p. 73). La proposta conclusiva di Putnam è quella di una moratoria per quel tipo di speculazione ontologica che cerca di descrivere l'Arredamento dell'Universo... e per quel tipo di speculazione epistemologica che cerca di direi l'Unico Metodo per valutare tutte le nostre credenze» (p. 73). Questa proposta – insiste – è in realtà l'opposto del relativismo: non guarda con sospetto alla tesi che vi siano giudizi di valore ragionevoli, o concezioni vere, o termini che hanno un riferimento, ma ci rimanda proprio a queste tesi che noi dopo tutto formuliamo costantemente nella vita quotidiana» (ibid.). Si tratta di recuperare il senso del mistero e il senso di ciò che è comune. Sono le bizzarre nozioni di «oggettività» e «soggettività» che abbiamo ricevuto dall'Ontologia e dall'Epistemologia che ci hanno tolto questo senso. Resta da fare qualcosa per i filosofi? Sì e no. Putnam si cava d'impaccio di fronte a questa domanda difficile con l'abile mossa che si è annunciata: la filosofia è, come direbbe Derrida, «scrittura» e i filosofi futuri potranno o meno continuare la filosofia producendo testi filosofici dal contenuto non prevedibile: «noi filosofi ereditiamo un campo, non un'autorità» (p. 74). Mark Okrent, in Metaphilosophical consequences of pragmatism, critica la ricostruzione rortiana della storia della filosofia che la riduce alla storia dell'ascesa e caduta della «fantasia platonica»: ciò che questa storia non riconosce è che c'è sempre stata una tradizione alternativa entro ciò che è stato generalmente chiamato filosofia (sofisti, scettici pirroniani, storicisti e idealisti tedeschi). Se queste figure soo filosofi, la filosofia è un termine più ampio di quanto la storia rortiana presupponga (non implica cioè l'accettazione della fantasia platonica). Okrent propone di definire la filosofia come semantica trascendentale: l'ambito di discorso in cui si mettono in questione la necessaria natura formale del discorso stesso, e con esso il contenuto semantico, il significato, la verità, la conoscenza. Del pragmatismo non è quindi legittimo fare l'uso che ne ha fatto Rorty: non è fine della filosofia ma una corrente filosofica che attacca la fantasia platonica. Il pragmatismo è quindi un terzo incomodo fra le due filosofie (analitica e continentale) che Rorty vuole vedere come discipline soltanto omonime; anzi, gran parte della filosofia contemporanea possiede proprio il genere di unità che si è suggerito: è semantica trascendentale. Per concludere con un'impressione complessiva sul libro: si tratta di una raccolta stimolante, utile lettura per chi voglia andare oltre le caricature della filosofia odierna in America, per chi è interessato alla discussione sulle origini della scissione fra filosofia continentale e filosofia angloamericana e per il filosofo che non disdegna un momento di «autocoscienza». I curatori, che insegnano a Tel-Aviv, hanno dimostrato di saper gestire con originalità questa piccola impresa transoceanica; è un sintomo, come quelli rappresentati da numerosi altri libri di filosofi israeliani pubblicati negli ultimi anni in 6 6 tedesco e soprattutto in inglese, della vitalità e dell'apertura al mondo esterno di una piccola comunità filosofica (si pensi che Israele conta non più di cinque dipartimenti di filosofia). Non sarebbe forse una cattiva idea che con questa comunità anche la comunità filosofica italiana, geograficamente la più vicina fra quelle di un qualche peso, riuscisse a instaurare qualche contatto. SERGIO CREMASCHI

The Irrationality of Pluralistic Ignorance [penultimate draft-please cite published version] Abstract: Pluralistic ignorance is a social-psychological phenomenon in which an agent believes that their attitudes, feelings, and beliefs are different from those of others, despite the fact that their public behavior is identical. I argue that agents in standard cases of pluralistic ignorance are epistemically irrational. I accomplish this, first, by rebutting a recent argument for the rationality of pluralistic ignorance. Next, I offer a defeat-based argument against the epistemic rationality of pluralistic ignorance. Third, I examine a type of case in which the pluralistically-ignorant agent's belief is irrational, despite the fact that this belief lacks a defeater. Finally, I consider instances of pluralistically-ignorant agents whose beliefs are not irrational, but explain why such cases are not problematic for my main thesis. This critical discussion allows me to offer an important amendment to an extant account of pluralistic ignorance. Pluralistic ignorance has received much attention in recent years in formal and social epistemology. Roughly, pluralistic ignorance is a social-psychological phenomenon in which an agent believes that their attitudes, feelings, and beliefs are different from those of others, despite the fact that their public behavior is identical.1 Bjerring et al. (2014) argue that agents in situations of pluralistic ignorance can be and often are epistemically rational. In this paper I argue that agents in standard cases of pluralistic ignorance are epistemically irrational. In order to show this, I first explicate the account of pluralistic ignorance that Bjerring et al. offer. Next, I respond to their argument for the rationality of pluralistically-ignorant agents. Third, after 1 See Bicchieri (2006, pp. 186-188). 2 arguing that their account of pluralistic ignorance neglects a crucial feature, I offer a defeatbased argument against the epistemic rationality of pluralistic ignorance that draws on this feature. Next, I examine an objection derived from the work of Miller and McFarland (1987, 1991) that claims that pluralistically-ignorant agents do not hold a defeated belief. Finally, I respond to an objection that claims that pluralistically-ignorant agents are not necessarily irrational. 1 Bjerring et al. on Pluralistic Ignorance To get a better grasp of the phenomenon, it will help to start with some examples. Drawing from examples in the literature on pluralistic ignorance, Bjerring et al. (2014, p. 2448) present the following paradigmatic cases: Classroom Case A teacher has just finished presenting some difficult material in class and asks the students whether they have any questions. Although each student does not fully understand the material, no one asks a question. Based on the observation that no student in the class asks a question, each student believes that everyone but him believes that [ P] the material was not difficult. To avoid being publicly displayed as the only one who did not understand the material, no student dares ask a question. College Drinking Case A group of freshmen students have just arrived at their new dorm. At the inauguration party, each student drinks excessively, although each student in fact believes that [P] drinking is not enjoyable. Upon observing the excessive drinking of others, however, each student forms the belief that everyone but him believes that [ P] drinking is 3 enjoyable. To avoid being publicly displayed as the boring one, every student continues to drink excessively at the party. Emperor's Case In Hans Christian Andersen's fable "The Emperor's New Clothes" (1837), we meet two impostors who sell imaginary clothes to an emperor. They claim that those who cannot see the clothes are either not fit for their office or just truly stupid. In fear of appearing unfit for his office and truly stupid, the emperor-as well as everyone else-pretends to be able to see the garment. Yet, everyone believes that [P] the emperor is in fact naked. Based on the observation that everyone acts as if the emperor is dressed, however, each person forms the belief that everyone but him believes that [ P] the emperor is dressed. To avoid being publicly labelled as someone who is unfit for his office or truly stupid, everyone pretends that the emperor is dressed-except for the little boy who after a while cries out: "but the emperor has nothing on at all!" With these sorts of examples in mind we can provide a more formal characterization of pluralistic ignorance. Perhaps the most formal and detailed characterization of the nature of pluralistic ignorance comes from Bjerring et al. (2014). Consequently, their account can serve as a nice starting point for discussing the epistemic rationality of pluralistic ignorance. In light of the above cases, Bjerring et al. take pluralistic ignorance to characterize social situations in which "group[s] of individuals all have the same attitude toward some proposition or norm, all act contrary to this attitude, and all wrongly believe that everyone else in the group has a certain conflicting attitude to the proposition or norm" (Bjerring et al. 2014, p. 2446). More specifically, after examining three other accounts and finding them wanting, they propose (Bjerring et al. 2014, p. 2558): 4 (PI) "Pluralistic ignorance" refers to a situation where the individual members of a group (i) all believe some proposition P; (ii) all believe that everyone else believes  P; (iii) all act as if they believe  P; and where (iv) all take the actions of the others as strong evidence for their belief that the latter believe  P.2 My question is whether the belief in (ii) is epistemically rational.3 Bjerring et al. make the case that it can be and often is epistemically rational for agents to conform to condition (ii).4 In the following section I'll consider their argument for this claim. 2 Bjerring et al.'s Defense of the Epistemic Rationality of Pluralistic Ignorance Why might one think that the belief in (ii) is epistemically rational? In attempting to establish the possibility that pluralistically-ignorant agents are epistemically rational, Bjerring et al. (2014, p. 2463) consider the following question: "[W]hich epistemic factors can help explain why an agent ignores-or at least assigns a very low credence to-the possibility...that other agents in the social group, like him, do not reflect their private beliefs in their public behavior?" They take it that agents in situations of pluralistic ignorance have two main items of evidence concerning what others in the group believe. First, agents have observational evidence: they are observing others act as if they believe  P (e.g. that drinking is enjoyable). Second, agents know from 2 For the sake of clarity, (PI) is a slightly amended version of their (PI4). 3 Like Bjerring et al., I'll take "epistemically rational" to be synonymous with "epistemically justified." 4 They also argue that agents in standard cases of pluralistic ignorance may be pragmatically and all-thingsconsidered rational. 5 simple reflection that they themselves are acting contrary to their belief that P (e.g. that drinking is not enjoyable) and that it's possible that other people are doing the same. Bjerring et al. describe the latter as introspective evidence. So in order to determine whether the agent's belief that others believe that  P is epistemically rational, we need to ask "whether the agent's observational evidence outweighs his introspective evidence. If it does, we have an explanation of why the agent...has epistemic reasons to ignore the possibility that the actions of others do not truly reflect what they believe" (Bjerring et al. 2014, p. 2464). Bjerring et al. hold that there are cases where an agent's observational evidence outweighs her introspective evidence. They say, "In most cases of pluralistic ignorance, it seems, an agent has indeed good epistemic reasons to give more weight to his observational evidence than to his introspective evidence" (Bjerring et al. 2014, p. 2464). They think the College Drinking Case is just such an example (Bjerring et al. 2014, p. 2464): In standard cases such as the College Drinking Case, agents lack any observational evidence for seriously doubting that the group's behavior does not reflect what each member in the group in fact believes. In the College Drinking Case, there is no striking conflict between the agent's belief that drinking is not enjoyable, his observations of the group's behavior, and his higher-order belief that everyone but him finds drinking enjoyable. Rather, the agent's observations of the excessive drinking in the group makes it epistemically rational for him to maintain the higher-order belief in question. If so, it is sensible to hold that the agent's observational evidence outweighs his introspective evidence in these sorts of cases...5 5 Bjerring et al. allow that examples such as the Emperor's Case will likely make agents who continue to be pluralistically-ignorant epistemically irrational. The reason is that, in addition to their introspective evidence that 6 This argument fails, though, because it does not acknowledge that some evidence is capable of epistemically undercutting other evidence or beliefs. When an item of evidence functions in this way, it acts as an undercutting defeater, a "reason[ ] to question whether your evidence or reasons or grounds for a belief actually indicate that the belief is true" (Bergmann 2006, p. 159). Bjerring et al. appear not to countenance undercutting defeaters. However, we can see why undercutting defeaters should be acknowledged by contrasting two examples, one in which two competing sets of evidence are on a par, and another in which one set of evidence defeats a competing set. For the first case, suppose that, Lisa, one of my colleagues, tells me that it's raining out. Another, Aldo, tells me that it's not. In coming to a conclusion about whether it's raining on the basis of this information, epistemic propriety might require that I simply weigh the testimony of Lisa against that of Aldo. But consider another case, one in which I visit a furniture store, seem to see a red table in front of me, and, on the basis of that visual experience, form the belief that there is a red table before me. A minute later I'm told by a sales clerk that there is actually a red light shining on the table that I'm looking at. Unlike the first case, this case involves defeating evidence: the testimony of the sales clerk is an undercutting defeater of my observation-based belief that the table in front of me is red. Consequently, upon receiving this testimony, I can no longer rationally believe that the table is red; the new evidence disqualifies the old, rendering it epistemically impotent, unlike in the previous case. As I'll argue below, they act as if they believe  P, though they believe P, and that others may well be doing the same, they have observational evidence that the emperor is naked. This, combined with the thought that other people's perceptual faculties are working properly, gives the agent a strong reason to deny that everyone else believes that the emperor is clothed. Such an agent cannot be epistemically rational in continuing to be pluralistically-ignorant. 7 many cases of pluralistic ignorance involve agents who have an irrational belief due to undercutting defeater. 3 A Defeat-Based Argument Against the Rationality of Pluralistic Ignorance My argument against the epistemic rationality of agents in situations of pluralistic ignorance draws on a feature of these situations not mentioned in (PI). The latter account is importantly incomplete in that it does not recognize that, as in the examples from Bjerring et al. and those in the wider literature on pluralistic ignorance, non-conformity on the part of pluralisticallyignorant agents is potentially costly. That is, agents in situations of pluralistic ignorance act as if they believe  P because there is a perceived risk associated with acting on their actual belief that P. This perceived risk varies from one case to another, but it concerns the potential social cost of actions that reflect the agent's frame of mind. The classic cases of pluralistic ignorance discussed in Prentice and Miller (1993), Miller and McFarland (1987, 1991), Kauffman (1988), Matza (1964), Schanck (1932), Katz and Allport (1931), and Andersen (2000) all have this feature.6 Consider a couple examples. Bjerring et al.'s College Drinking Case involves students who act as if they like drinking "to avoid being publicly displayed as the boring one" (2014, p. 2448). Kauffman (1988, p. 246-248) finds that many prison officers occasionally have sympathetic attitudes toward inmates, but disguise these attitudes by adopting a cold and indifferent façade on the job. The reason they adopt this façade is, in part, that they fear rejection from their fellow officers if they show sympathy toward inmates. Another reason that (PI) is inadequate concerns the fact that pluralistic ignorance is commonly recognized as an explanation for the existence and persistence of unpopular social norms. Unlike (PI), an account of pluralistic 6 Note that while Andersen (2000) doesn't describe his story as a case of pluralistic ignorance, it is taken as a standard example by, e.g., Bicchieri (2006) and Bjerring et al. (2014). 8 ignorance that acknowledges that agents face potential social costs when deciding whether to conceal their belief that P is able to do this explanatory work. Thus, the following revised version of (PI) is a more accurate account of pluralistic ignorance: (PIʹ) "Pluralistic ignorance" refers to a situation where the individual members of a group (i) all believe some proposition P; (ii) all believe that everyone else believes  P; (iii) all act as if they believe  P because of a perceived potential social cost; and where (iv) all take the actions of the others as strong evidence for their belief that the latter believe  P. The following example, which is similar to the Emperor's Case, provides a dramatic illustration of a situation in which the perceived risk of acting on one's beliefs is especially elevated: Dictator Case Dictator has a cabinet of 30 advisors. Dictator has selected his advisors for the purpose of providing input in various matters concerning the operations of the state. He is known to treat advisors with whom he disagrees with great cruelty, sentencing some of them to death. Recently, Dictator has aired a policy idea to his advisors. Advisor A believes that [P] Dictator's policy is unsound, but is quick to voice support for it in meetings, much like the rest of A's fellow advisors. Based on their outward behavior and positive statements about Dictator's policy, Advisor A believes that everyone but her thinks that [ P] the policy is sound. 9 Is Advisor A's belief that everyone but her agrees with Dictator epistemically rational? Recall that she formed this belief by observing the pro-policy behavior of her fellow advisors. Given this fact, it seems that the rationality of her belief is undermined by an undercutting defeater. After all, she believes B: Everyone else believes that [ P] Dictator's policy is sound. But she has a reason to think that the ground of this belief (observations of other people's behavior) is not a reliable indicator of truth under the circumstances. That is, she has good reason to believe D: My fellow advisors would act as if they believe that  P whether or not they actually do. Advisor A's support for D is strong because, she realizes, if the other advisors are anything like her, they wish to avoid the high risks of speaking out. While under normal circumstances Advisor A would rationally take people acting as if  P to be evidence that they in fact believe  P, she cannot rationally do so here. The reason is that she is well aware of the fact that an advisor who believes that P would have a very good reason to misrepresent what they believe in order to save their neck. Note that this diagnosis is not mere speculation on her part, for all she needs to do is attribute to others the kind of practical reasoning she herself performed. Assuming that Advisor A has no reason to doubt that other advisors are rational and care about their well-being, her belief that B is epistemically irrational. Many instances of pluralistic ignorance conform to this characterization of the Dictator Case: the risk of acting in accordance with one's belief that P is high enough to warrant the belief that others reasoned in the same way and decided to act as if they believe that  P. However, not 10 all instances of pluralistic ignorance are such. Take the Classroom Case. The student believes that B2: Everyone else believes that [ P] the material was not difficult. Unlike in the Dictator Case, it seems the student doesn't have a compelling reason for thinking that the ground of this belief (observations of other people's behavior) is not a reliable indicator of truth under the circumstances. That is, he doesn't have a good reason to believe D2: My fellow classmates would act as if they believe that  P whether or not they actually do. Again, contrasting this case with the Dictator Case, Advisor A (like most of us) has very good reason to believe that very few people would be willing to risk their lives over a simple public policy disagreement. Thus, her evidence for D is strong. In contrast, the student (like most of us) does not have good reason to believe that his classmates would be unwilling to accept the possible social costs associated with displaying their ignorance. For all the student knows, his classmates are willing to tolerate the possible social costs, such as embarrassment or disapproval for interrupting the lecture, if it means advancing their own learning. Thus, his evidence for D2 is fairly weak. If so, his belief that B2, if it is epistemically irrational at all, is not so for the same reason that Advisor A's belief that B is irrational. Nonetheless, I think the student, like Advisor A, ought to withhold judgement regarding his belief that B2. In other words, both B and B2 are irrational to believe. The reason B is irrational for Advisor A is that she has an undercutting defeater for B. The reason that B2 is irrational for the student, however, is not that he, like Advisor A, has a reason to think that his evidence for B2 is misleading. Rather, the reason is that he cannot rule out the non-remote possibility that his evidence for B2 is misleading. Consider the student's evidence for B2. On the 11 one hand, he observes his classmates acting as if  P. On the other, he knows that he himself is acting contrary to what he believes. This latter, introspective evidence raises the non-remote possibility that the student's evidence for B2 (his observations of others' behavior) is misleading. After all, the student knows that his own behavior is misleading in this scenario. Assuming he has no reason to think he is unique in this regard (we'll examine this assumption further in the next section), it is an open question whether or not the behavior of his peers regarding P is misleading or not. If there is a non-remote possibility that his evidence for B2 is misleading, then the student should suspend judgement regarding B2. Consider a version of the example offered in the previous section. Suppose that, after having formed a belief that the table before me is red (on the basis of my visual experience) and before I encounter the sales clerk, I read the price tag attached to the table, which says at the bottom, "Note that this table may not be colored as it appears. This store occasionally switches to non-ordinary lighting colors throughout the week." Assuming there is no immediate way for me to tell whether the lighting conditions in the store are ordinary or not, I should withhold belief regarding the color of the table. And this is so even though I don't have enough evidence to think that my visual experience as of a red table is misleading, just that it's a non-remote possibility that it's misleading. Things are similar in the Classroom Case. Given that it's a non-remote possibility that the behavior of his peers regarding P is misleading, the student ought to refrain from believing (on the basis of his observations of his peers' behavior) that his peers believe that  P. The rational thing for him to do, like Advisor A, is to suspend judgement regarding B2. These considerations generalize to other standard cases of pluralistic ignorance. In some of these, such as the Dictator Case, the agent has a reason to think that her observational 12 evidence concerning what others believe is misleading. In these cases, agents have an undercutting defeater for their belief that others believe that  P (mentioned in (ii)). Other cases are like the Classroom Case: while agents don't have a reason to think that their observational evidence is misleading, their belief that others believe that  P is still irrational because there is a non-remote possibility that their observational evidence is misleading. This non-remote possibility is present because the agent knows that her own behavior regarding P is misleading. Unless she has a reason to think that she is unique in this regard, reflection on her own case raises the non-remote possibility that the behavior of her peers is similarly misleading. But if so, then her belief that everyone else believes that  P is irrational. So, pluralistically-ignorant agents are not rational in believing (as they do in (ii)) that everyone else but them believes  P. So, I am arguing that the rational doxastic attitude for an agent in a situation of pluralistic ignorance to take is that of withholding. But it might be objected that pluralistic ignorance, intuitively understood, could still obtain if agents adopted that attitude. That is, we could still have a case of pluralistic ignorance on our hands even if conditions (ii) and (iv) of (PIʹ) were not met. For example, the student in the Classroom Case believes the lecture was difficult and, due to the threat of potential social costs, acts as if he thought it wasn't difficult. Would the situation be much different if we simply added that, on reflection, the student did not take the actions of others as strong evidence for what they believe about the lecture and, thus, refrained from believing that his classmates thought it difficult? After all, the student might still act in a way that conceals what he actually thinks about the lecture because he is unsure if others will share his assessment (even if he doesn't form the belief that they won't). However, while this is an interesting scenario and may be worth further study, it should not be classified as a case of pluralistic ignorance. The idea that subjects believe that others 13 disagree with them (not just believe that they might disagree) is indispensable to the concept of pluralistic ignorance, as it is generally understood. Halbesleben and Buckley (2004, p. 126), in their examination of the history of the study of the phenomenon, understand pluralistic ignorance as a "social comparison error where an individual holds an opinion, but mistakenly believes that others hold the opposite opinion." Other general characterizations in the literature also mention agents holding a mistaken view or having a misperception about what other agents believe. Interest in studying what is now called pluralistic ignorance grew out of Allport's (1924) work on the illusion of universality of opinions, "the tendency of individuals to believe that opinions are universally held by members of a social group" (Halbesleben and Buckley 2004, p. 128). An early detailed treatment of pluralistic ignorance is that of Katz and Allport (1931), which found that a majority of students in their study believed that racial minorities should be admitted to fraternities, but (mistakenly) believed that others would not agree (Halbesleben and Buckley 2004, p. 128). Schanck (1932) explored the religious and ethical views of residents in a small community with a large Methodist presence and found that residents tended to think, with respect to a number of issues, that the others residents held more conservative views than they did. Discussions of pluralistic ignorance, from the start, have been concerned to study a believed self/other divergence in opinion. Cases where agents withhold, by contrast, don't involve any doxastic commitment on the part of the agent concerning whether her views differ from those of others in the group. For this reason, they should be classified differently. Another reason not to treat cases of withholding as cases of pluralistic ignorance is that the two phenomena likely have distinct consequences. For example, in cases involving alcohol consumption among college students, Prentice and Miller (1993) found that subjects who mistakenly believed their peers to be more comfortable with drinking than themselves 1) felt 14 alienated as a result of thinking their views diverged from the norm (both males and females); and 2) felt pressure to change their views over time to align with what they took their peers to believe about drinking (males). While I know of no literature that has directly studied what might result if a student simply withholds judgment about what their peers believe, it seems that in general these two consequences would be significantly less likely to result. For example, the work of Schroeder and Prentice (1998) points in this direction. The former examined the effects on subsequent drinking behavior of educating incoming college freshmen about pluralistic ignorance. The students who participated in the study were divided into two groups, one which was informed via group discussion that they may be overestimating how comfortable their peers are with drinking, another which engaged in non-peer individualistic discussion focused on decision-making in a drinking situation. Schroeder and Prentice found that the first group of students reported drinking significantly less than the second. In theorizing about how, exactly, the first group of students may have been led to drink less, Schroeder and Prentice suggest that in drinking situations the former adopted a skeptical attitude with regard to whether their peers' drinking behavior revealed what the latter actually believed about drinking: When they saw their peers looking relaxed with, and even amused by, excessive alcohol consumption, they knew enough to discount their perceptions. They knew that public acquiescence did not necessarily signal private acceptance. Thus, from the outset, these students probably experienced little social pressure to conform to local drinking practices (p. 1273). Thus, it appears that, from how pluralistic ignorance has historically been understood in the literature and the distinct consequences that result from believing one's peers' views diverge 15 from one's own, cases of withholding judgement about the attitudes of others in the group should not be treated as cases of pluralistic ignorance. 4 A Defeater-Defeater? One might object to my analysis by claiming that agents in situations of pluralistic ignorance have reason to think that they are not like their peers in relevant respects. So, the fact that they are misrepresenting themselves gives them no reason at all to think that others might be doing the same. Put differently, my objector might concede that we typically have no reason to doubt that we are like other members of our peer group in relevant respects, but insist that subjects in states of pluralistic ignorance do have a reason to doubt that they are like everyone else in relevant respects. That is, my objector might claim, they are typically in possession of a defeaterdefeater, a reason that removes (defeats) the rationality-defeating power of the original defeater. To illustrate, let's return to the furniture store example. Suppose that just as the sales clerk is finished telling me that a red light is shining on the table I'm looking at, a group of her coworkers walks over to the conversation. While they are all chuckling, one of them speaks up: "She's pulling your leg. She's been saying that to all of the customers who've been looking at that table." This new testimonial evidence serves to defeat the rationality-defeating power of the original sales clerk's testimony. The result is that my belief that the table before me is red, formed on the basis of its appearing to be red, is now as rational as it was before I heard the sales clerk's testimony. One might propose that such a situation obtains in standard cases of pluralistic ignorance. If so, then pluralistically-ignorant subjects' beliefs about what others believe can be rational after all. What might this defeater-defeater be? One might claim that the agent has a reason to think she is unique in relation to her peers. Miller and McFarland (1987, 1991) provide a fairly 16 detailed, experimentally supported, account of the cognition of agents in situations of pluralistic ignorance. One of their conclusions is that: ...people believe that they possess a greater degree of traits that lead to social inhibition than does the average other. We proposed that it is people's belief that they are generally more bashful, hesitant, self-conscious, and so on than the average other that leads them to infer the situationally specific differences between self and others that constitute pluralistic ignorance (Miller and McFarland 1987, p. 300). Relatedly, Miller and McFarland (1991, p. 298) say that people generally think they are more fearful of embarrassment than the average other. For the sake of specificity, let's take the subject's uniqueness belief to be the following: FE: Fear of embarrassment is a more potent determiner of my behavior than the behavior of others. Contrary to my proposed analysis, pluralistically-ignorant agents see themselves as unique in this way and so don't take the fact that they are misrepresenting themselves to make it any more likely that others might do the same. On this view, they would properly take the fact that other people act as if they believe  P to be strong evidence that they do in fact believe  P. Thus, FE serves to reinstate the full evidential force of the observed behavior of others by casting doubt on propositions like D and on the idea that it is a non-remote possibility that others' behavior is misleading. But if so, then pluralistically-ignorant agents can be epistemically rational in believing propositions like B and B2 in light of their observational evidence. As Miller and McFarland (1991, p. 298) say, "If people believe that they possess a greater degree of a particular trait than does the average other, it seems reasonable for them also to expect that their behavior in situations that engage that trait would be different from that of the average other." 17 Given that subjects believe FE, it is reasonable that they would take the behavior of others at ordinary face value and believe that others believe  P. This objection is unsatisfactory, however, for we can ask about the rationality of FE. It seems that Miller and McFarland are inclined to say that, given that a subject holds FE, it's reasonable for him or her to take the observed behavior of others (acting as if  P) at ordinary face value and believe something like EB: Everyone else but me believes  P. The agent would reason that if others believed P, then that belief would be reflected in their behavior, given that nothing like FE applies to them. It's epistemically reasonable to infer EB from FE and the observed behavior of others. However, our question is whether FE is believed rationally in the first place. If it is not, then subjects are epistemically irrational in believing EB.7 Miller and McFarland seem to think that FE can be rationally believed. They remark that "people have access to more cues pertaining to the presence of internal traits in self than in others." Or, put slightly differently, "...individuals have more data relevant to the existence of internal traits in self than in others" (Miller and McFarland 1987, p. 301). In an important sense, then, agents' belief in FE is based on the evidence they have. But Miller and McFarland's remarks do not show that the belief that FE is rational. While the agent's evidence about their internal traits makes rational their belief that their own behavior is in many cases influenced by fear, it does not rationally allow them to form any views regarding the extent that fear influences the behavior of others. It certainly does not allow them 7 It's a fairly uncontroversial constraint on inferentially-justified belief that if one's belief that P is to be justified on the basis of an inference from Q, then Q needs to be justified. Both "inferential internalists" and "inferential externalists" agree on this much. 18 to rule out the possibility that others' behavior is also in many cases influenced by fear. At most, this internal, introspective evidence supports something like FE*: Fear of embarrassment is a potent determiner of my own behavior. Thus, the fact that agents' belief in EB is (typically) based in part on an irrational belief in FE implies that their belief in EB is not rational. While the work of Miller and McFarland might be good as a descriptive account of the psychology of pluralistically-ignorant agents, it is not adequate as a normative account. Their work helps us to see why agents in situations of pluralistic ignorance form the beliefs they do about what others believe. But it does not vindicate the epistemic rationality of pluralisticallyignorant agents. Rather, their work helps us to locate the source of epistemic irrationality in such agents. Instead of showing that agents in situations of pluralistic ignorance have a defeater for their defeater of the belief that everyone else believes  P, Miller and McFarland's work lends credence to the idea that typical agents are epistemically irrational. This is so whether the focus is on agents' belief in FE itself or on their inference to EB on the basis of (in part) FE. One might object that subjects who form the belief that FE, whether or not as a result of cognitive biases, are more likely to act in a rational way. If they fear the potential consequences of letting others know they believe P, and if they use FE to infer EB, it seems to make sense for them to refrain from acting on their actual belief that P. In the College Drinking Case, students who believe FE will infer EB and, due to their fear of being considered boring by their peers, rationally refrain from displaying their view that drinking is not enjoyable. In other words, believing FE ultimately leads to prudentially rational action.8 Further, one might argue that it's 8 For an argument that agents in situations of pluralistic ignorance can be prudentially rational to conceal their belief that P, see Bjerring et al. (2014, p. 2463). 19 appropriate for subjects in situations of pluralistic ignorance to belief that FE because doing so confers a benefit to the group by increasing social integration. Social integration might occur because agents who believe FE (and use it to infer EB) will think their views sharply diverge from those of their peers and, thus, will be less likely to spread (what they think is) their deviant view to other members of the group.9 In the College Drinking Case, students who believe FE will infer EB and, thus, think that nobody else shares their view that drinking is not enjoyable. Because of their fear of being considered boring, they will not spread what they take to be a deviant view to other members the group. As a result, the current uniform drinking norm of the group will remain intact. While I do not deny that there may be cases in which agents' forming FE would lead to prudentially rational action or that agents' forming FE could lead to increased social integration for the group, the focus of this paper has been epistemic rationality, rather than prudential rationality. By "epistemic rationality" I have in mind the sort of rationality that one's belief has when it is supported by (and formed on the basis of) one's evidence. The fact that the belief that FE may lead to prudentially rational action, does not entail that that belief is epistemically rational. There are many situations in which it's in an agent's self-interest to believe something that is not supported by her evidence. Likewise, the fact that a widely shared belief increases social integration does not imply that the belief is supported by evidence. Further, even if the social integration resulting from agents' believing FE is so beneficial as to be evolutionarily advantageous, it still does not mean that FE is supported by agents' evidence. Some beliefs that lead to evolutionary advantages might well be adopted for reasons entirely unrelated to their 9 For a similar idea, see Noelle-Neumann (1974, p. 43). 20 truth-value or epistemic support. 10 But then it's difficult to maintain the idea that agents' belief that FE must be epistemically rational if it benefits the group. 5 Is Pluralistic Ignorance Always Epistemically Irrational? One might object that I haven't shown pluralistic ignorance to be an epistemically irrational phenomenon because I haven't shown that all pluralistically-ignorant agents are epistemically irrational. Rather, what I've shown is merely that standard instances of pluralistic ignorance involve epistemically irrational agents. By a "standard instance of pluralistic ignorance," I mean a case that conforms to (PIʹ) and in which the agent's epistemic position regarding other participants' beliefs is comparable to that of the agents involved in cases commonly discussed in the literature on pluralistic ignorance. Now, not all cases of pluralistic ignorance are such. Consider a case just like the Classroom Case, except that the instructor starts the lecture by stating that the upcoming lecture topic should be easy to understand and that in the last several years, every previous student who has heard it had no trouble grasping it. The instructor's statement is false, but seems sincere and accurate. In this case (call it the Deceitful Instructor Case), it appears that the student believes rationally that the other students believe the material was not hard. Or consider a case in which pluralistically-ignorant agents have evidence for FE. Suppose each individual's therapist has informed them that they are more fearful than the average person. In this case (call it the Informative Therapist Case), it would be rational for these agents to take the behavior of others at face value and believe that they believe  P; their own misleading behavior wouldn't give them a reason to be suspicious about whether others were doing the same. 10 See, e.g., Churchland (1987, p. 548-549). 21 While it seems reasonable to allow that the above cases are both genuine cases of pluralistic ignorance and that agents in such cases may be rational in believing that their peers believe  P, such cases differ from what I call standard cases. The cases in the wider literature on pluralistic ignorance exclude a significant feature that is present in the current examples. That is, standard cases of pluralistic ignorance are such that the only evidence the subject is using to form beliefs about what others in the group believe is what the subject can gather on introspection and the observation of others' behavior, perhaps along with some general folk psychological assumptions (e.g. that people's behavior regarding P generally reflects their attitude regarding P). But in the Deceitful Instructor Case and the Informative Therapist Case there is another source of evidence: the testimony of the professor and therapist, respectively. Thus, such cases should not be thought of as standard ones; they are not in the spirit of cases of pluralistic ignorance discussed in the literature. Now, I am not in a position to specify in a nontrivial way what demarcates standard cases from non-standard ones, mainly because it does not seem possible to formulate a precise criterion for what counts as admissible background knowledge in standard cases of pluralistic ignorance. General beliefs about the kind of thing people fear are allowed, but specific beliefs about how fearful one is relative to others are not. Beliefs about what the teacher has said are acceptable, except when these beliefs concern a misleading statement the teacher made about the difficulty of the material. The task of specifying what makes a piece of evidence admissible in a standard case of pluralistic ignorance seems hopeless. However, standard cases do appear to differ importantly from non-standard ones. In the Deceitful Instructor Case and Informative Therapist Case, the agent's belief that others believe  P is clearly rational, and the rationality of this belief has a straightforward explanation: the agent 22 possesses specific evidence warranting her belief. For this reason, the two non-standard cases do not raise the kind of puzzle that standard cases generate. Let me elaborate on this point a little further. Pluralistic ignorance is commonly treated among those who study it as an undesirable state of affairs, one that (other things equal) ought to be dissolved.11 The reason it is treated as such is that it often has bad consequences. For example, standard cases often perpetuate unpopular social norms. The College Drinking Case illustrates this. While most students prefer not to drink, most end up doing so due to the potential social costs of refraining. And this drinking behavior further supports the impression that most students prefer drinking, which continues to impel students to act contrary to their preferences and engage in behavior that may be harmful. By better understanding these cases we might hope to understand more about how to keep them from arising and/or dissolve them, thus preventing these bad consequences. My arguments against the epistemic rationality of pluralistic ignorance, if successful, contribute in a modest way to our understanding of the phenomenon by pointing out that pluralistically-ignorant agents epistemically err in a particular way. Given that they increase our understanding in this way, perhaps they further suggest that efforts to prevent or dissolve situations of pluralistic ignorance should address the cognitive biases of those involved. At any rate, since my discussion applies to the vast majority of actual cases, very little seems to be lost when it comes to solving the real-world problems associated with pluralistic ignorance; a discussion that covered all cases (both actual and possible) wouldn't amount to a significant improvement in this regard. 6 Conclusion 11 See, e.g., Prentice and Miller (1993, p. 254) and Bicchieri (2006, pp. 193-196). 23 In the course of arguing that agents in standard cases of pluralistic ignorance are epistemically irrational I argued that (PI) neglects an important feature of situations of pluralistic ignorance. That is, it ignores the fact that agents in such situations believe that there is a potential social cost to acting on their belief that P. I thus proposed (PIʹ), which in turn served as the basis of my defeat-based argument against the epistemic rationality of pluralistically-ignorant agents. Miller and McFarland's work, rather than casting doubt on my contention, helped us to locate the source of irrationality. My view is not that standard cases of pluralistic ignorance are irrational by definition. Rather, I define "standard cases" ostensibly by pointing to the extant literature on pluralistic ignorance, which happens to include cases that involve epistemically irrational agents. References Allport, F. H. 1924. Social Psychology. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. Andersen, H. C. 2000. The Emperor's New Suit (1837). Zurich: North-South Books. Bergmann, M. 2006. Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Bicchieri, C. 2006. The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bjerring, J. C., Hansen, J. U., and Pedersen, N. J. L. L. 2014. 'On the Rationality of Pluralistic Ignorance.' Synthese, 191 (11): 2445-2470. Churchland, P. S. 1987. 'Epistemology in the Age of Neuroscience.' Journal of Philosophy, 84 (10): 544-553. 24 Halbesleben, J. R. B. and Buckley, M. R. 2004. 'Pluralistic Ignorance: Historical Development and Organizational Applications.' Management Decision, 42: 126-138. Katz, D. and Allport, F. H. 1931. Student Attitudes. Syracuse, NY: The Craftsman Press. Kauffman, K. 1988. Prison Officers and Their World. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Matza, D. 1964. Delinquency and Drift. New York: Wiley. Miller, D. and McFarland, C. 1987. 'Pluralistic Ignorance: When Similarity is Interpreted as Dissimilarity.' Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 5 (2): 298-305. -- 1991. 'When Social Comparison Goes Awry: The Case of Pluralistic Ignorance.' In J. Suls and T. Wills (eds), Social Comparison: Contemporary Theory and Research, pp. 287313. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Noelle-Neumann, E. 1974. 'The Spiral of Silence: A Theory of Public Opinion.' Journal of Communication, 24 (2): 43-51. Prentice, D. and Miller, D. 1993. 'Pluralistic Ignorance and Alcohol Use on Campus: Some Consequences of Misperceiving the Social Norm.' Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64 (2): 243-256. Schanck, R. L. 1932. 'A Study of a Community and Its Groups and Institutions Conceived of as Behaviors of Individuals.' Psychological Monographs, 43 (2): i-133.

Contradictions at the borders∗ David Ripley [email protected] 1 The issue The purpose of this essay is to shed some light on a certain type of sentence, which I call a borderline contradiction. A borderline contradiction is a sentence of the form Fa ∧ ¬Fa, for some vague predicate F and some borderline case a of F , or a sentence equivalent to such a sentence. For example, if Jackie is a borderline case of 'rich', then 'Jackie is rich and Jackie isn't rich' is a borderline contradiction. Many theories of vague language have entailments about borderline contradictions; correctly describing the behavior of borderline contradictions is one of the many tasks facing anyone offering a theory of vague language. Here, I first briefly review claims made by various theorists about these borderline contradictions, attempting to draw out some predictions about the behavior of ordinary speakers. Second, I present an experiment intended to gather relevant data about the behavior of ordinary speakers. Finally, I discuss the experimental results in light of several different theories of vagueness, to see what explanations are available. My conclusions are necessarily tentative; I do not attempt to use the present experiment to demonstrate that any single theory is incontrovertibly true. Rather, I try to sketch the auxiliary hypotheses that would need to be conjoined to several extant theories of vague language to predict the present result, and offer some considerations regarding the plausibility of these various hypotheses. In the end, I conclude that two of the theories I consider are better-positioned to account for the observed data than are the others. But the field of logically-informed research on people's actual responses to vague predicates is young; surely as more data come in we will learn a great deal more about which (if any) of these theories best accounts for the behavior of ordinary speakers. 1.1 Contradictions and borderline cases In (Ripley, 2013), I defend a theory of vague language based on the paraconsistent logic LP.1 LP can be thought of as a three-valued logic; it is dual to Strong ∗Published as (Ripley, 2011). 1LP is so christened in (Priest, 1979). 1 Kleene logic, which has been recommended as a logic for vague language by eg Soames (1998) and Tye (1994). If we use the numbers 1, .5 and 0 as the three values, then we can assign each atomic sentence A a value ν(A), and calculate the values of compound sentences as follows: • ν(¬A) = 1− ν(A) • ν(A ∧B) = min(ν(A), ν(B)) • ν(A ∨B) = max(ν(A), ν(B)) It follows from these clauses that when A takes value .5, so too will A ∧ ¬A. But what do the values mean? We can, as usual, take the value 1 to represent truth and 0 to represent falsity. When it comes to the value .5, LP and Strong Kleene logic differ from each other. The Strong Kleene theorist reads .5 as a gappy value-one taken by sentences that are neither true nor false. Since such sentences aren't true, they aren't to be asserted, and they aren't part of the Strong Kleene theorist's theory. On the other hand, the LP theorist reads .5 as a glutty value-one taken by sentences that are both true and false. Since such sentences are true, they are to be asserted, and they are part of the LP theorist's theory. An LP-based theory of vagueness uses this middle value for borderline cases. That is, where Egbert is a borderline case of 'old', the sentence 'Egbert is old' receives value .5. As above, this ensures that the sentence 'Egbert is old and Egbert isn't old' also receives the value .5. Since sentences with the value .5 are true, this theory predicts borderline contradictions to be true (it predicts them to be false as well). For similar reasons, whenever a is a borderline case of a vague predicate F , I claim that 'a is F and a is not F ' is true. Similarly, I claim that 'a is neither F nor not F ' is true as well, since this follows from the former by a single De Morgan law plus an application of a double-negation rule, both of which are valid in LP. This is a dialetheist theory, since it takes some contradictions to be true. Other theorists, of various stripes, have not been so sanguine about the truth of borderline contradictions. A few quick examples: Fine (1975) dismisses the idea in a single sentence-"Surely P ∧¬P is false even though P is indefinite".2 Williamson's (1994) much-discussed argument against denials of bivalence works by arguing the denier to a contradiction; assuming the denial of bivalence was initially made about a borderline case, this contradiction will itself be a borderline contradiction. If Williamson thinks this is a dialectically strong argument, as he gives every indication of, borderline contradictions had better not be true. Keefe (2000) offers: "many philosophers would soon discount the paraconsistent option (almost) regardless of how well it treats vagueness, on the grounds of . . . the absurdity of p and ¬p both being true for many instances of p". And Shapiro (2006) claims, "That is, even if one can competently assert Bh and one can competently assert its negation, one cannot competently contradict oneself 2Notation changed slightly; note that Fine is here treating borderline cases as "indefinite". 2 (dialetheism notwithstanding)."3 None of these rejections of borderline contradictions offers much in the way of argument; it's simply taken to be obvious that borderline contradictions are never true, presumably since no contradictions are ever true.4 Not all theorists-not even all non-dialetheist theorists-have been so quick with borderline contradictions, though. For example, fuzzy theorists allow for borderline contradictions to be partially (up to half) true.5 Let's see how. The usual way of doing things assigns each sentence A a real-number truth value ν(A) from 0 to 1, inclusive. Then, the values of compound sentences are determined truth-functionally from the values of their components, according to the same clauses given above for LP. It follows from this that a contradiction (conjunction of a sentence with its own negation) can take a value as high as .5. It takes this maximum value when its conjuncts themselves each take value .5-right in the middle of a vague predicate's borderline. A fuzzy theorist interprets the value .5 as a degree of partial truth, in particular as half truth, so a fuzzy theorist predicts borderline contradictions to be at least partially true, as much as half true. This prediction is often held up as a liability of fuzzy theories; see for example (Williamson, 1994). 1.2 Predictions about ordinary speakers Smith (2008, pp. 252–253) lists ten sorts of sentence for which we don't as yet have clear empirical data about speakers' intuitions; he resists making many predictions about speakers' intuitions pending the data. At least three of his categories are borderline contradictions, in my sense, and he's right: there isn't much data on speakers' responses to them. Some experimenters have taken brief looks at ordinary speakers' intuitions surrounding vague predicates (for example Bonini et al. (1999)), but these have primarily looked at atomic sentences, whereas the crucial action for theories of borderline contradictions is clearly in compound sentences; empirical work here is still in its infancy.6 Few logically-minded theorists of vagueness, then, have bothered being very explicit about what their theories predict about ordinary speakers. This does not mean, however, that there is no relation between these logical theories and 3Since, for Shapiro, the relevant cases in which one might competently assert Bh and competently assert its negation are all cases where h is a borderline case of B, this is a rejection of borderline contradictions. 4Williamson might claim to have an argument for his rejection of borderline contradictions: his defense of classical logic on grounds of its simplicity. Note, though, that that defense is dialectically out of line in the midst of the argument Williamson gives against denials of bivalence; why bother arguing the bivalence-denier to a contradiction, and then appeal to the truth of classical logic to reject the contradiction, when you could simply appeal to the truth of classical logic directly to counter a denial of bivalence? Presumably, Williamson thinks the rejection of borderline contradictions is dialectically more secure than his defense of the full apparatus of classical logic. 5At least the usual sort of fuzzy theorists do. See for example (Smith, 2008). 6Since this paper was prepared, a few other studies have appeared that explore compound sentences like those considered here: (Alxatib and Pelletier, 2011) and (Serchuk et al., 2011). 3 experimental data. We have supervaluationist and contextualist and fuzzy theories of vagueness, and we can take these theories to be formal semantic theories, answerable to speaker intuitions in just the same way that other semantic theories-about gradable adjectives, or quantifier inferences, say-are. It may well be, of course, that some theorists don't intend for their logical theories to be interpreted in this way. They might be offering hypotheses, for example, about the structure of reality itself, independent of how we talk about it; or they might be offering hypotheses about how we ought to use our language, rather than about how we do. These are worthy questions in their own right, but I won't explore them here. Rather, I'll present an experiment and weigh various possible explanations for the result; as such, the goal here is to consider various hypotheses about how speakers actually use vague language. These hypotheses are best understood, I think, as theories of speakers' linguistic competence, and there is of course much more to participant responses than simply their competence; any number of performance factors may intervene. While there is no direct inference to be made from data about participants' responses to conclusions about their competence, the two are still related. The connection is provided by theories of the intervening performance factors. Given data x, we can compare theories of competence y and z by seeing what theories of performance would need to be conjoined to them, respectively, to explain x. If we find that y needs an odd story about performance factors to explain x, while z can explain x when conjoined with a natural (ideally, an independentlymotivated) theory of performance, then this gives us some reason to favor y over z. As we've seen above, different logical theories accord different status to borderline contradictions-some predict them to be fully true, some predict them to be at best half-true, and some predict them to never be true at all. I'll present and consider some evidence about which of these predictions seems to accord best with speakers' intuitions. Where predictions seem to come apart from participants' intuitions, I'll consider various performance-based explanations that might be offered. 2 The experiment To explore intuitions about contradictions in borderline cases of vague predicates, I conducted an experiment. Participants were 149 undergraduate students at the University of North Carolina.7 They saw a slide (projected onto a screen) with seven circle/square pairs on it, labeled 'Pair A' to 'Pair G'. In Pair A, at the very top of the slide, the circle was as far from the square as it could be, while in Pair G, at the very bottom of the slide, the circle was touching the square. In between, the remaining five pairs moved the circle bit-by-bit closer to the square. (See Figure 1 on page 5.) 7No demographic information was collected. All students were within the first month of introductory-level non-logic philosophy courses; it would be odd but possible for some of them to have taken other philosophy courses (including logic) in the past. 4 Pair B Pair C Pair D Pair E Pair F Pair G Pair A Figure 1: Experimental Stimulus It's difficult to tell exactly what's a borderline case of 'near the square'; as many authors have pointed out, the extension of vague predicates like 'near' is quite context-dependent, and it can be difficult to tell where the borderline is. For example, if we're discussing distances between cities, this provides a context in which the circle is near the square in every pair; the distance in the farthest pair is never more than the size of the screen being used, which is surely smaller than the distance between even the closest cities. Nevertheless, I take it that the context provided by this experiment is one in which: in Pair A, the circle is a clear countercase of 'near the square' (that is, it is clearly not near the square-after all, it's as far away from the square as can be projected on the screen), and in Pair G, the circle is a clear case of 'near the square'. Somewhere in between are the borderline cases. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. In each condition, participants were asked to indicate their amount of agreement with a particular sentence as applied to each of the seven circle/square pairs. The four conditions involved four different sentences; each participant, then, saw only one sentence and rated it seven times, once for each pair. Ratings were on a scale from 1 to 7, with 1 labeled 'Disagree' and 7 labeled 'Agree'.8 The four sentences were: Conjunction, Non-elided: The circle is near the square and it isn't near the square. 8As will emerge in §3.4, offering participants a range of responses is crucial to evaluate how well fuzzy theories describe participants' responses. 5 Conjunction, Elided: The circle both is and isn't near the square. Disjunction, Non-elided: The circle neither is near the square nor isn't near the square. Disjunction, Elided: The circle neither is nor isn't near the square. I'll discuss the difference between the elided and non-elided cases later. For now, note that each of these sentences has the form of a contradiction. The conjunctions wear their contradictoriness on their faces, while the disjunctions are a bit disguised; but one application of a De Morgan law reveals them to be contradictions as well. 2.1 Agreement to contradictions The mean responses to each pair formed a hump pattern: higher in the middle than at the ends. This is true overall, and it's also true of each of the four conditions (see Figure 2 on page 7). The highest overall mean occurred in response to Pair C; there the mean response was 4.1, slightly above the midpoint of the 1 to 7 scale. In other words, participants exhibit higher levels of agreement to these apparent contradictions when they are about borderline cases; they do not reject what appear to be borderline contradictions. They seem to make it to at least ambivalence. In fact, they go considerably further. The means are as low as they are because the participants do not agree amongst themselves as to which stimulus should receive the highest response. If we forget about where the highest responses occur, and look only at how high each participant's highest response is (see Figure 3 on page 7), we see that the modal maximum response is 7-full agreement-and that the majority of participants offer a maximum response of either 6 or 7. Similar results are reported in (Alxatib and Pelletier, 2011); they do not measure degree of agreement, but also record agreement with apparent contradictions in borderline cases. 2.2 Response Types Over 90% of participants gave responses that fall into one of four groups. I'll call these groups flat, hump, slope up, and slope down. Here are the defining characteristics of these groups (see Figure 4 on page 8 for frequencies): Flat: A flat response gives the same number for every question. (24 participants) Hump: A hump response is not a flat response or a slope response, and it has a peak somewhere between the first and last question; before the peak, responses never go down from question to question (although they may go up or remain the same), and after the peak, responses never go up from question to question (although they may go down or stay the same). (76 participants) 6 A B C D E F G 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 M ea n Stimulus Overall Conjunction Conj Elided Disjunction Disj Elided Figure 2: Mean responses 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 M ax im um r es po ns e le ve l % of participants Conjunction Conj Elided Disjunction Disj Elided Figure 3: Maximum responses 7 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Other Slope Down Slope Up Hump Flat % of responses R es po ns e ty pe Conjunction Conj Elided Disjunction Disj Elided Figure 4: Response type frequencies Slope up: A slope up response is not a flat response, and it never goes down from question to question (although it may go up or stay the same). (22 participants) Slope down: A slope down response is not a flat response, and it never goes up from question to question (although it may go down or stay the same). (18 participants) Other: There were a few responses that didn't fit any of these patterns. (9 participants) Flat responses, in particular flat 1s (14 participants), look like the sort of response that would be predicted by all those theorists who hold that no contradiction is ever true, even a bit, even in borderline cases. But the majority of responses (76/149 participants) were hump responses. The discussion that follows in §3 will consider various explanations for participants' agreement, partial or full, with these sentences. I'll focus discussion on the relatively large number of hump responses; a fuller discussion would consider potential explanations for the flat and slope groups as well.9 9Question type (conjunction vs. disjunction) had a significant effect on response type (χ2(4, N = 149) = 11.27, p < .05). However, this effect disappeared when the two slope response types were lumped together (χ2(3, N = 149) = 2.76, p = .43). Slope up responses 8 3 Interpretations It seems at first blush that we have substantial numbers of participants agreeing, at least somewhat, with borderline contradictions of various sorts. As in §1.1, however, theorists of varying stripes have not only claimed, but taken it to be obvious, that borderline contradictions can never be true. If those theorists are right, then participants in the present study either 1) were not really agreeing with contradictions, but rather with something else, or 2) were really agreeing with contradictions, but were mistaken in doing so. In this section, I'll consider a variety of potential explanations along these lines for the observed results. I'll also consider potential explanations of a third sort: those that hold that participant were really agreeing with contradictions, and that they agre because those contradictions are (partially or wholly) true. In the end, I'll argue that two potential explanations-one of the first type and one of the third type-are better positioned to explain the data than are the others. 3.1 Contextual factors This explanation falls into the "not really a contradiction" category. Here's one way to explain the relatively high levels of assent to sentences like 'The circle is near the square and it isn't near the square' and 'The circle neither is near the square nor isn't near the square': participants take the phrase 'near the square' to have subtly different extensions in each of its two occurrences within the sentence. If this is so, their assent to these sentences can be explained without supposing that any participants agree to a contradiction. (For my purposes here, a "contextualist" is not someone who offers any particular theory of vagueness, but rather anyone who thinks that the hump responses in the present experiment are to explained by appealing to contextual shift in the extension of 'near the square'.) Such a contextualist theory can come in one of two flavors: it might hold that 'near the square' has these different extensions because it has different contents in each of its uses, or it might hold that 'near the square' has the same content in each of its uses, but that nonetheless it has different extensions in different contexts. Following (MacFarlane, 2009), I'll call the first flavor 'indexical contextualism' and the second 'nonindexical contextualism'. I discuss each in turn.10 occurred more in response to conjunctions, and slope down responses in response to disjunctions. This makes it seem as though the slope responders tended to ignore the second conjunct in each case, treating 'both near and not' as 'near' and 'neither near nor not' as 'not near'. More study would be needed to definitively interpret the slope responses. 10Besides the difference between indexical and nonindexical contextualism, there is another difference in the area: the difference between theories that posit sensitivity to context-of-use (sometimes called "contextualist") and theories that posit sensitivity to context-of-assessment (sometimes called "relativist"). I'll ignore that distinction; for my purposes here, I'm happy to lump the relativists in with the contextualists. 9 3.1.1 Indexical contextualism Indexical contextualism about vague terms is defended in (Soames, 2002). On this theory, different uses of vague terms can express different properties. This shiftiness is understood as the very same shiftiness exhibited by such indexical expressions as 'here', 'now', 'you', 'tomorrow', &c. For example, let's focus on 'you'. 'You', let's suppose, picks out a certain person: the person being addressed when it's uttered. Now, imagine someone uttering the following sentence: 'Mona sees you, and Louie sees you'. It should be clear that the two occurrences of 'you' in such an utterance might pick out different people; just imagine the context changing in the right way (that is, so that the first half of the sentence is addressed to someone different than the second half). On an indexical contextualist theory, something just like this might be happening in the sentence 'The circle is near the square and not near the square'; the first occurrence of 'near the square' can pick out one property, and the second some other property. For this to be the case there would have to be some relevant shift in context between the two occurrences, and the indexical contextualist would have to provide some story about what the relevant context is and why it shifts.11 Even with such a story in hand, though, the indexical contextualist runs into some difficulties with the experimental data. The difficulty arises with the elided sentences: 'The circle both is and isn't near the square' and 'The circle neither is nor isn't near the square'. Each of these sentences contains only one occurrence of 'near the square'. It's clear, though, that indexicals, in these circumstances, can have only a single interpretation. Compare our earlier 'Mona sees you, and Louie sees you' to 'Mona sees you, and Louie does too'. Even with the same shift in context (that is, with the second half of the sentence addressed to someone different than the first half), the second sentence must report that Mona and Louie see the very same person. Since there's only one occurrence of 'you', it can only pick out one person.12 Thus, the indexical contextualist should predict that, although participants might agree to the non-elided sentences, they should not agree to the elided sentences, since the mechanism invoked to explain participants' agreement in 11This requirement is not unique to the indexical contextualist; every contextualist needs such a story. I won't be concerned with the details of such stories here-see for example (Raffman, 1996), (Shapiro, 2006), or (Soames, 1998). (NB: Raffman and Shapiro are not indexical contextualists.) 12Similar phenomena arise around (at least) demonstratives, definite descriptions, and proper names. In each of the following pairs, the first member allows a shift where the second does not: • ∗ Mary's buying that, unless Murray buys that ∗ Mary's buying that, unless Murray does • ∗ Put your bag on the table, and your books on the table ∗ Put your bag on the table, and your books too • ∗ Esmerelda went to the store, and Esmerelda bought some fish ∗ Esmerelda went to the store and bought some fish 10 the non-elided cases can't operate in the elided cases. Participants simply should not agree with elided sentences. At the very least, they should agree less than they do with the non-elided sentences. This prediction is not borne out. If we consider each participants' maximum level of agreement, there is no significant difference between responses to elided and non-elided sentences.13 Nor is there a difference in response types (flat, hump, &c.) between elided and non-elided cases.14 If participants' agreement to these apparent contradictions, then, is to be explained by appealing to context, that context can't be operating in the way that context operates on indexicals.15 3.1.2 Nonindexical contextualism Is there another way, then, for context to come into play? The nonindexical contextualist thinks so. I think nonindexical contextualism, suitably filled in, provides one of the more plausible explanations for the results of the present study. The task of this section will be to present some constraints that the nonindexical contextualist must satisfy to explain the observed results. To see how nonindexical contextualism works, let's consider an indexical case in more detail. Consider an utterance, by me, of the sentence 'I like to dance'. The occurrence of 'I' in that utterance refers to me, so the whole utterance has the content Dave likes to dance.16 That content is (very) true, but it might have been false; it is true with regard to the world we find ourselves in, and false with regard to other possible worlds. So, in determining the extension (truth-value) of the utterance from its content, we need to take something more into account: we must consider at least which possible world we're in. The nonindexical contextualist finds a role for context in just this way-in the step from content to extension. They can offer various theories, still, about which contextual factors come into play; the key to nonindexical contextualism is when those factors do their work.17 For the details of one particular nonindexical contextualist theory of vague predicates, see (Fara, 2000); for general arguments that contextualists about vagueness should be nonindexical contextualists, see (Åkerman and Greenough, 2010). So what would a nonindexical contextualist offer as a take on the present study? Let's start with 'The circle is near the square and it isn't near the square'. The indexical contextualist held that this sentence ascribes one property ('near the square' in context 1) and the negation of some other property ('near the square' in context 2) to the circle; its content was thus baldly noncontradictory. But the nonindexical contextualist doesn't go this route; she'll say that the sentence ascribes one property (nearness-to-the-square) and the negation of that very property to the circle. In order to avoid contradiction, then, she must say 13As measured by a one-way ANOVA, F (1, 148) = .24, p = .62. 14χ2(4, N = 149) = 1.98, p = .74. 15This is similar to the argument in (Stanley, 2003), except that Stanley fails to distinguish between indexical and nonindexical contextualism. See (Åkerman and Greenough, 2010) for details. 16I ignore any possible context-sensitivity, of any sort, in 'likes to dance'. 17This way of framing the issue owes much to (Kaplan, 1989) and (MacFarlane, 2009). 11 that the one property has two different extensions with regard to two different contexts. Importantly, those contexts must both be at play in the interpretation of the single sentence.18 If context is ephemeral, dependent on, say, a transient mental state of the judger (as in (Raffman, 1996)), then this should be possible. On the other hand, if context is coarser-grained, dependent on only things like world, approximate time, location, speaker, and the like, then we can see that context could not have changed mid-sentence, and so a contextualist explanation couldn't get off the ground. By examining the elided conditions in the present study, we can see further constraints on a workable nonindexical contextualist theory. We've already seen that, for this explanation to work, the relevant features of the context in play must be relatively fine-grained. The elided conditions provide us evidence about which context it is that comes into play. Consider 'The circle both is and isn't near the square'. For a nonindexical contextualist explanation to work, the context relevant to determining the extension of 'near the square' cannot be the context in which 'near the square' is read by the participant. After all, there is only one such context, but the contextualist appeals crucially to a change in context between two extension-determinations. I see two options for the nonindexical contextualist: 1) it may be that participants process this sentence into some form that contains two occurrences of 'near the square' or something (conceptual material, presumably) corresponding to 'near the square'-then each separate occurrence can be affected by the context in which it occurs-or 2) it may be that participants evaluate the conjuncts one at a time, retaining only the truth-value of each conjunct after its evaluation-then each evaluation can be affected by the context in which it occurs. Neither of these explanations is straightforwardly available to an indexical contextualist, lest she (falsely) predict that sentences like 'Mona sees you, and Louie does too' can exhibit the same kind of shift. The nonindexical contextualist, though, can avoid this prediction, by supposing that the duplication or repetition process operates on contents rather than characters or expressions. Thus, nonindexical contextualism, suitably filled in as above, can offer an explanation of the present results. Below, I'll consider other possible explanations. 3.2 Noncompositional theories Another variety of not-really-a-contradiction explanation claims that the sentences in question are not compositionally interpreted; that 'The circle is near 18At least for indexical context-sensitivity (and why should nonindexical sensitivity differ?), it seems incontrovertible that multiple contexts can be involved in the interpretation of a single sentence. See note 12, or consider 'I am here now', which can be false if said very slowly while moving very quickly. Some authors, though, have missed this: for example Richard (1993), who writes, 'Switching contexts in the middle of interpreting a sentence is clearly contrary to the spirit, not to speak of the letter, of Kaplan's approach to indexicals.' (I'm skeptical of his reading of Kaplan.) Other authors have played it down: see (Kaplan, 1989), which makes 'I am here now' come out as a logical truth in its logic of indexicals, or (MacFarlane, 2009), which talks of context affecting whole propositions at once. 12 the square and it isn't near the square' directly expresses something like what's expressed by 'The circle is a borderline case of "near the square"'. Perhaps it's an idiom, or something like an idiom. Then participants' relatively high level of agreement could be explained without supposing that they agree to a contradiction. The problem with such an account is that it's difficult to see why apparent contradictions would express borderline-case-ness. How would such an idiom get off the ground? Presumably because some other explanation canvassed here (in particular, one of the explanations in §§3.1, 3.4, or 3.5) was at one time correct; then language learners, for whatever reason, might have mistaken their elders' compositional utterances for direct claims of borderline-case-ness. This fills in the story, but it does so compositionally. Without some explanation very unlike this (lightning strike?), I don't see that a noncompositional theory can avoid essentially appealing to some compositional theory, and it seems that it will then take on the pros and cons of whatever compositional theory it chooses. There will be a few extra cons, however. A non-compositional theory must explain why there is no significant difference in the frequency of observed hump responses between the four experimental conditions, and why there is no significant difference between the maximum responses given by participants in these conditions.19 Do we have four closely-related idioms? If so, why? In addition, this strategy invokes an additional step: learners coming to acquire noncompositional uses of these once-compositionally-used expressions. Without further evidence, a noncompositional theory introduces needless complication; better to stick with a compositional story. 3.3 Error theories So much for explanations that work on the hypothesis that what participants are agreeing to isn't a contradiction. Among theories that concede that participants are agreeing to a contradiction, error theories of various sorts are available. An error theorist holds that, while participants are in fact agreeing to real contradictions, they are wrong to do so-these contradictions are simply false. Those who hold a supervaluationist or epistemicist theory of vague predicates might most naturally explain the present results via an error theory. An error theory might work something like those presented in (Eklund, 2005) and (Sorensen, 2001), according to which all competent speakers have dispositions to accept certain falsehoods involving vague predicates, or it might work in a more informal way, supposing participants to simply be mistaken, not in virtue of being competent speakers, but just in virtue of being confused, or not paying attention, or being misled by the experiment, or failing to report what they actually believe, or some such. 19See notes 9, 13, and 14; and note that there was also no significant difference between maximum responses to conjunctive and disjunctive sentences (F (1, 148) = .53, p = .47), nor any interaction effect on maximum responses between conjunction/disjunction and elided/nonelided (as measured by a two-way ANOVA, F (1, 148) = 1.37, p = .25). 13 3.3.1 Competence-based error theories I'll turn now to the former sort of error theory. Eklund's view can directly explain why participants would make errors in these cases; it's part of his theory that competent speakers have a disposition to make errors in the use of vague predicates. But the errors he takes speakers to be disposed to make are not hump-style responses. Rather, he supposes that competent speakers are disposed to believe tolerance principles around their vague predicates. He takes his tolerance principle from (Wright, 1975); for a vague predicate F , the tolerance principle reads: • Whereas large enough differences in F 's parameter of application sometimes matter to the justice with which it is applied, some small enough difference never thus matters.20 But belief in a principle like this would not lead participants to give hump-style responses; rather, if it applied at all, it would lead participants to give flat responses, responses not affected by the small differences in the cases they were shown. So while Eklund predicts that participants will make a certain sort of error, he does not predict the hump-style responses given by many participants. Sorensen (2001) faces a similar problem: although he claims that competent speakers will believe contradictions involving vague predicates, he does not predict the present results. The "contradictions" Sorensen predicts speakers to believe are sentences of the form 'If a is F , then a's successor is F too', where a and its successor are consecutive members of a sorites sequence for F . Since Sorensen is an epistemicist, he thinks there is some sharp cutoff between the F s and the non-F s; when a and its successor straddle this sharp cutoff, he believes this conditional to be analytically false. Nonetheless, he thinks, we believe it. This is essentially the same as Eklund's view, except for the decision to call these tolerance conditionals "contradictions". This sort of view, if it can be made to make any predictions at all about the present study, predicts flat responses, not hump responses. So again, this style of view cannot explain the present results. I suppose someone might hold a view like this: being a competent speaker requires us to believe contradictions like 'a both is and isn't F ' when a is a borderline case of F , but nevertheless such contradictions are always false. That view of course would predict the hump responses obtained in the present study. But why would competent speakers believe those falsehoods and not others? Any view of this sort would need to answer that question. Sorensen and Eklund go to great lengths to motivate their claims that speakers believe certain falsehoods; an error theorist of this type would need some story to fill a corresponding role. I know of no error theorist who holds this kind of theory, and so I know of no error theorist who's attempted to provide such a story. 20F 's parameter of application is the dimension along which something can vary to make it more or less F ; so 'tall"s parameter of application is height, 'bald"s is amount and arrangement of hair, &c. 14 3.3.2 Other error theories I turn now to the other sort of error theory. This sort takes the participants who agreed with some contradiction to be mistaken for some reason other than their linguistic competence. So stated, there is a gap: on its own, this offers us no explanation for why participants would make these errors and not others. It could of course be supplemented with some theory about the conditions under which people are likely to make certain errors, and then that supplemental theory could be dealt with on its own merits.21 Two such supplemental theories are offered by an anonymous referee. First, it's possible that, although participants would naturally want to simply reject all the sentences, the mere fact of being asked about the same sentence again and again suggests that something else is wanted of them. This might lead participants to vary their responses. Indeed, it's likely that asking participants about the same sentence repeatedly leads at least some of them to vary their responses, to avoid being uncooperative. As the referee points out, though, this stops well short of explaining why participants would vary their responses in such a coordinated way; it would predict (correctly) few flat responses, but it would fail to predict the hump responses that predominated.22 Second, it's possible that being asked about their agreement or disagreement with the sentences, rather than the sentences' truth or falsity, suggested to the subjects that the issue at hand is a matter of personal opinion, causing them to respond to some proposition 'about which opinions could differ', rather than responding to the target sentence. I am skeptical about this hypothesis, for two reasons. The first reason is that it's not clear what this other proposition might be. In order to explain the present results, the proposition must meet two constraints: 1) it must be a plausible interpretation of the test sentences, and 2) it must be more likely to be agreed with in borderline cases. I don't know what might meet these constraints. The second reason is that agreement and disagreement are not restricted only or even primarily to matters of opinion. We quite often agree and disagree with statements of fact. As such, I doubt that asking about agreement and disagreement suggests to participants that the question is opinion-based, although there is certainly room to explore this issue further. There may be other available hypotheses as to why participants would err in the task at hand in this experiment; each would have to be considered on its own merits. 21NB: It can't simply be that participants err randomly under certain conditions; there are very many possible response patterns that simply didn't occur, or that occurred very rarely, while the hump pattern occurred in the majority of responses. 22A partial explanation for the relatively large number of slope responses might be lurking around here; given that participants were presented with seven smoothly-shifting pairs and asked to judge each sentence from one to seven (a coincidental double use of seven), that may have suggested to some that a smooth shift in their responses from one to seven or from seven to one was called for. This, of course, is to gesture towards an error theory of the slope responses; but I don't see how the slope responses can be accounted for without an error theory of some sort. They are in that regard quite unlike hump (and for that matter flat) responses. 15 3.4 Fuzzy theories A fuzzy theory can both 1) allow that participants interpreted the sentences in question as contradictions, and 2) allow that participants might not be mistaken in partial assent to such sentences. This second feature is a virtue for a few reasons. First, as we've seen in §3.3, no existing error theory predicts speakers to be mistaken in this way; and second, it seems a bit odd to suppose that speakers are mistaken about what's near what, when they can see the relevant objects clearly, are deceived in no way about the distance between them, and are not under any time pressure to come to a judgment. A fuzzy theory can allow for non-mistaken (partial) assent to contradictions because on a fuzzy theory contradictions can be partially true, as we saw in §1.1. At first blush, then, it appear that the fuzzy theorist has the resources to account for the responses observed. This appearance is strengthened if we look at the mean responses for each question (see Figure 2 on page 7): the clear cases on each end result in mean responses just above 2-very low in agreement-and the mean responses rise gradually as one approaches pair C, where the mean response is just barely above 4, the midpoint in the agreement scale. These data are very much in line with what a fuzzy theorist would most likely predict. Appearances, though, can be deceiving. Although the mean responses to each question create a pattern congenial to the fuzzy theorist, they do so for a strikingly non-fuzzy reason. This can be brought out by considering the difference between the maximum of the mean responses (4.1) and the mean of the maximum responses (5.3). The majority of responses were hump responses, but not all humps reach their peak in response to pair C, presumably due to slight disagreements between participants on which pairs were the clearest borderline cases. Recall Figure 3 on page 7. If the fuzzy theorist's formalism maps directly on to participants' responses, we would expect participants' responses to these contradictions to peak somewhere around 4, the midpoint. After all, none of these sentences can ever be more than .5 true, on a fuzzy theory. But this is not what happens. As reported above, more participants peak at 7-full agreement-than at any other response.23 The mean of the maximum responses is 5.3-significantly above 4.24 The fuzzy theorist, faced with these data, should conclude that the fuzzy formalism does not map directly onto participants' responses, then. Here's a hypothesis she might offer: perhaps responses as high as 7-full agreement- can still indicate the speech act of .5-assertion. If this is so, then the fuzzy theorist can simply claim that participants who gave very high responses to these sentences were still only .5-asserting them. I don't see that this hypothesis is untenable, but it would take some filling 23Actually, more than twice as many peak at 7 than at any other response, and over half of participants peak at either 6 or 7. 24In fact, this is so for each of the four conditions: for conjunction, non-elided, mean 5.2, t(43) = 3.96, p < .001; for conjunction, elided, mean 5.3, t(39) = 4.719, p < .001; for disjunction, non-elided, mean 5.7, t(28) = 5.67, p < .001; for disjunction, elided, mean 5.1, t(35) = 2.81, p < .01. 16 in. Presumably a response of 7 can also indicate 1-assertion (full assertion), so this hypothesis leads the fuzzy theorist to suppose that a 7-point scale from 'Disagree' to 'Agree' is not sensitive to the different degrees of assertion participants might wish to make. But if not this sort of scale, then what would be sensitive to those degrees? It seems that the fuzzy theorist appealing to this hypothesis would need to address that question. With an answer to that question in hand, a study like the present one could be conducted, to see whether participants really do indicate .5-assertion to these sentences. Alternatively, the fuzzy theorist could offer an error theory of some sort. She might allow that although the highest level of assertion appropriate to these sentences is .5, most participants in fact evinced a higher level of assertion, and simply claim that these participants are mistaken. As we've seen, such responses are unilluminating unless conjoined with some explanation of why participants would make these mistakes in these circumstances; but there is no reason why a fuzzy theorist couldn't propose such an explanation. 3.5 Dialetheisms A dialetheic theory like that presented in (Ripley, 2013) shares some of the features of a fuzzy explanation for the present data: it can allow that, in line with appearances, participants are responding to genuine contradictions; and it can allow that these participants are not mistaken. What's more, since a dialetheic theory predicts that the contradictions that occurred in this study are (fully) true, it naturally predicts levels of assent higher than the midpoint values most naturally predicted by fuzzy theorists. This is because, according to this variety of dialetheic theory, the borderline contradictions in the present study are true.25 The circle really is both near the square and not near the square, when it's a borderline case of 'near the square'. And similarly, it's neither near the square nor not near the square, in the same circumstances. Since participants in the present study were well-positioned to see this, and since they are competent with 'near the square', conjunction, disjunction, and negation, they agreed with the borderline contradictions because they recognized them as true. A dialetheic explanation, then, faces a quite different puzzle from the other theories we've seen. The question a dialetheist must answer is not 'Why so much assent?' but 'Why so little?'. As we've seen, the mean of the maximum responses was 5.3. Even allowing for ceiling effects, this is unlikely to represent full agreement. But if participants were well-situated to recognize the truth, and the truth is contradictory, why would they not simply fully agree to borderline contradictions? A dialetheist owes some answer here. Since I defend a dialetheic theory of vagueness elsewhere, I'll offer a sketch of one possible answer. It's been alleged among cross-cultural psychologists that people from East Asian cultures are more open to contradictions than are people 25It thus differs from the dialetheic theory proposed in (Hyde, 1997), which holds borderline contradictions to always be false. A Hyde-style dialetheist would presumably resort to an error theory of some variety to explain the present results. 17 from Western cultures. These allegations, though, have often used a very wide sense of 'contradiction', much wider than that used here. For example, Peng and Nisbett (1999) count all of the following as "tolerating contradictions": • Preferring compromise to adversarial dispute resolution • Preferring proverbs like 'too humble is half proud' to proverbs like 'one against all is certain to fall' • Reconciling 'most long-lived people eat fish or chicken' with 'it's more healthy to be a strict vegetarian' Clearly, their sense of 'contradiction' is not the sense in play here; so while they may have found a very real cultural difference, their data do not show anything about cultural acceptance of contradictions, in our sense. In an attempt to connect this cross-cultural research more directly to the philosopher's idea of contradiction, Huss and Yingli (2007) ran a cross-cultural study that asked participants in Canada and China for their responses to more paradigm contradictions: the liar paradox, a reductio argument, and most importantly for my purposes here, a borderline contradiction. In particular, they presented their participants with a vignette describing a borderline case of 'raining', and asked about the sentence 'It's raining and it's not raining'. Despite the narrower focus, the results they found were broadly in line with Peng and Nisbett's research: Huss and Yingli's Chinese participants were much more willing to agree with the contradictions they saw than were their Canadian counterparts. This suggests that cultural differences matter for agreement with contradictions, in particular borderline contradictions. One possibility is that Westerners hold a cultural norm against agreeing with contradictions.26 Suppose this to be true. Then, despite their linguistic competence pushing them to accept the borderline contradictions, subjects in the present experiment (as well as Canadian subjects in Huss and Yingli's study) may well have had their assent reduced by cultural norms. The effect would be much the same if we were to ask participants for their grammatical (rather than semantic) intuitions about sentences like 'Which table did you leave the book on?'; although ending a sentence with a preposition is perfectly grammatical in English, the cultural norm against it may well drive participants to reduce their judgments of grammaticality.27 If it is true that Westerners have a cultural aversion to contradictions in general, we should expect the levels of assent given by university students in North Carolina to be somewhat lower than what would be generated purely by their linguistic competence; once we take this into account, the dialetheist has a straightforward explanation for the middling levels of assent. So it seems that the dialetheist has a plausible explanation for the observed results as well. 26Note that if contextualism of the sort described in §3.1 is right, Huss and Yingli's sentence was presumably not really interpreted as a contradiction either, at least by those who agreed with it. A contextualist should then probably say that Canadians are more likely to give such a sentence a contradictory reading than Chinese. 27See (Labov, 1996) for examples of this sort of response. 18 As an anonymous referee points out, one could also suppose that East Asians hold a cultural norm pushing in favor of contradictions; or that both Westerners and East Asians hold cultural norms pushing in favor of contradictions, but that the East Asian norm is stronger. Either of these hypotheses gibes with the cross-cultural results, but would not support the dialetheist interpretation of the present study. They might support a fuzzy interpretation or even a purely classical interpretation. Unfortunately, despite the wealth of data on crosscultural psychology, not much is yet known about how cultural norms relate to contradictions in the sense that's relevant here. More research is called for, to get clearer on what cultural differences exist and how they are arrived at. 4 Conclusions When it comes to (apparent) borderline contradictions, then, it seems that the nonindexical contextualist and the dialetheist offer the two most plausible explanations of the observed results. Before I close, I want to draw some attention to the similarities between these views that allow them to succeed where other views do not. I also want to draw attention to just how hard it will be to design an experiment that could distinguish between these theories. Note that the nonindexical contextualist, to plausibly explain the results of this study, needed to invoke a relatively fine-grained notion of context. In particular, it seems that context must be able to change for a participant who sees nothing different and doesn't move. Context must thus be at least difficult to observe. Now, the nonindexical contextualist I've envisioned sticks to classical logic at the level of extensions. But since it's very difficult to tell when we've changed context, this means that the logic of properties we'll use to generate experimental predictions will blur across contexts. And when you blur classical logic in this way, the result is the paraconsistent logic LP. (See (Lewis, 1982) and (Brown, 1999) for details and discussion.) On the other hand, the dialetheist view I defend in (Ripley, 2013) holds LP to be the correct logic of vagueness even in a single context.28 Thus, it could be quite tricky to find an experimental wedge between the two views. The key to such a wedge would come from some operationalization of the notoriously slippery term 'context'. The contextualist and the dialetheist make different predictions about what will happen in a single context. I leave this issue for future work.29 28NB: the dialetheist is under no obligation to use a fine-grained context, although she might find reason to. 29This paper has been drastically helped by discussions with Mark Colyvan, Paul Egré, Patrick Greenough, Graham Priest, Diana Raffman, Greg Restall, Robert van Rooij, Nick Smith, audiences at the Philosophy and Psychology of Vagueness Workshop and the 2009 Amsterdam Graduate Philosophy Conference and especially Joshua Knobe. This research was partially supported by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche, Project "Cognitive Origins of Vagueness", grant ANR-07-JCJC0070. 19 References Åkerman, J. and Greenough, P. (2010). Vagueness and non-indexical contextualism. In Sawyer, S., editor, New Waves in the Philosophy of Language. Palgrave Macmillan. Alxatib, S. and Pelletier, J. (2011). The psychology of vagueness: Borderline cases and contradictions. Mind and Language, 26(3):287–326. Bonini, N., Osherson, D., Viale, R., and Williamson, T. (1999). On the psychology of vague predicates. Mind and Language, 14:377–393. Brown, B. (1999). Yes, Virginia, there really are paraconsistent logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 28:489–500. Eklund, M. (2005). What vagueness consists in. Philosophical Studies, 125(1):27–60. Fara, D. G. (2000). Shifting sands: An interest-relative theory of vagueness. Philosophical Topics, 28(1):45–81. (Originally published under the name "Delia Graff"). Fine, K. (1975). Vagueness, truth, and logic. Synthese, 30:265–300. Huss, B. and Yingli, Y. (2007). Ethnologic: Empirical results. Presented at the 2007 meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association (Saskatoon, SK, Canada). Hyde, D. (1997). From heaps and gaps to heaps of gluts. Mind, 106:641–660. Kaplan, D. (1989). Demonstratives. In Almog, J., Perry, J., and Wettstein, H. K., editors, Themes From Kaplan, pages 481–564. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Keefe, R. (2000). Theories of Vagueness. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Labov, W. (1996). When intuitions fail. In McNair, L., Singer, K., and Aucon, M., editors, Papers from the Parasession on Theory and Data in Linguistics, Chicago Linguistic Society 32, pages 77–106. Lewis, D. (1982). Logic for equivocators. Noûs, 16(3):431–441. MacFarlane, J. (2009). Nonindexical contextualism. Synthese, 166:231–250. Peng, K. and Nisbett, R. (1999). Culture, dialectics, and reasoning about contradiction. American Psychologist, 54:741–54. Priest, G. (1979). Logic of paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8:219–241. Raffman, D. (1996). Vagueness and context-relativity. Philosophical Studies, 81:175–192. 20 Richard, M. (1993). Attitudes in context. Linguistics and Philosophy, 16:123– 148. Ripley, D. (2011). Contradictions at the borders. In Nouwen, R., van Rooij, R., Schmitz, H.-C., and Sauerland, U., editors, Vagueness and Communication, pages 169–188. Springer. Ripley, D. (2013). Sorting out the sorites. In Tanaka, K., Berto, F., Mares, E., and Paoli, F., editors, Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications, pages 329–348. Springer, Dordrecht. Serchuk, P., Hargreaves, I., and Zach, R. (2011). Vagueness, logic, and use: Four experimental studies on vagueness. Mind and Language, 26(5):540–573. Shapiro, S. (2006). Vagueness in Context. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Smith, N. J. J. (2008). Vagueness and Degrees of Truth. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Soames, S. (1998). Understanding Truth. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Soames, S. (2002). Replies. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(2):429–452. Sorensen, R. (2001). Vagueness and Contradiction. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Stanley, J. (2003). Context, interest-relativity, and the sorites. Analysis, 63(4):269–280. Tye, M. (1994). Sorites paradoxes and the semantics of vagueness. Philosophical Perspectives, 8:189–206. Williamson, T. (1994). Vagueness. Routledge, London. Wright, C. (1975). On the coherence of vague predicates. Synthese, 30:325–365.

Will Hominoids or Androids Destroy the Earth? -A Review of How to Create a Mind by Ray Kurzweil (2012) Michael Starks ABSTRACT Some years ago I reached the point where I can usually tell from the title of a book, or at least from the chapter titles, what kinds of philosophical mistakes will be made and how frequently. In the case of nominally scientific works these may be largely restricted to certain chapters which wax philosophical or try to draw general conclusions about the meaning or long term significance of the work. Normally however the scientific matters of fact are generously interlarded with philosophical gibberish as to what these facts mean. The clear distinctions which Wittgenstein described some 80 years ago between scientific matters and their descriptions by various language games are rarely taken into consideration, and so one is alternately wowed by the science and dismayed by its incoherent analysis. So it is with this volume. If one is to create a mind more or less like ours, one needs to have a logical structure for rationality and an understanding of the two systems of thought (dual process theory). If one is to philosophize about this, one needs to understand the distinction between scientific issues of fact and the philosophical issue of how language works in the context at issue, and of how to avoid the pitfalls of reductionism and scientism, but Kurzweil, like nearly all students of behavior, is largely clueless. He, is enchanted by models, theories, and concepts, and the urge to explain, while Wittgenstein showed us that we only need to describe, and that theories, concepts etc., are just ways of using language (language games) which have value only insofar as they have a clear test (clear truthmakers, or as John Searle (AI's most famous critic) likes to say, clear Conditions of Satisfaction (COS)). I have attempted to provide a start on this in my recent writings, such as The Logical Structure of Consciousness (behavior, personality, rationality, higher order thought, intentionality) (2016) and The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 662p (2016). I will give a very brief presentation of this framework since I have described it in great detail in many recent papers and several books, available on this site and others. Also, as usual in 'factual' accounts of AI/robotics, he gives no time to the very real threats to our privacy, safety and even survival from the increasing 'androidizing' of society which is prominent in other authors (Bostrum, Hawking etc.) and frequent in scifi and films, so I make a few comments on the quite possibly suicidal utopian delusions of 'nice' androids, humanoids, democracy, diversity, and genetic engineering. I take it for granted that technical advances in electronics, robotics and AI will occur, resulting in profound changes in society. However, I think the changes coming from genetic engineering are at least as great and potentially far greater, as they will enable us to utterly change who we are. And it will be feasible to make supersmart/super strong servants by modifying our genes or those of other monkeys. As with other technology, any country that resists will be left behind. But will it be socially and economically feasible to implement biobots or superhumans on a massive scale? And even if so, it does not seem remotely possible, economically or socially to prevent the collapse of industrial civilization. So, ignoring the philosophical mistakes in this volume as irrelevant, and directing our attention only to the science, what we have here is another suicidal utopian delusion rooted in a failure to grasp basic biology, psychology and human ecology, the same delusions that are destroying America and the world. I see a remote possibility the world can be saved, but not by AI/robotics,CRISPR, nor by democracy and equality. Those who wish to read all my articles please consult the ebook Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 by Michael Starks 3rd Ed 675p (2017) Some years ago I reached the point where I can usually tell from the title of a book, or at least from the chapter titles, what kinds of philosophical mistakes will be made and how frequently. In the case of nominally scientific works these may be largely restricted to certain chapters which wax philosophical or try to draw general conclusions about the meaning or long term significance of the work. Normally however the scientific matters of fact are generously interlarded with philosophical gibberish as to what these facts mean. The clear distinctions which Wittgenstein described some 80 years ago between scientific matters and their descriptions by various language games are rarely taken into consideration, and so one is alternately wowed by the science and dismayed by its incoherent analysis. So it is with this volume. If one is to create a mind more or less like ours, one needs to have a logical structure for rationality and an understanding of the two systems of thought (dual process theory). If one is to philosophize about this, one needs to understand the distinction between scientific issues of fact and the philosophical issue of how language works in the context at issue, and of how to avoid the pitfalls of reductionism and scientism, but Kurzweil, like nearly all students of behavior, is largely clueless. He, is enchanted by models, theories, and concepts, and the urge to explain, while Wittgenstein showed us that we only need to describe, and that theories, concepts etc., are just ways of using language (language games) which have value only insofar as they have a clear test (clear truthmakers, or as John Searle (AI's most famous critic) likes to say, clear Conditions of Satisfaction (COS)). I have attempted to provide a start on this in my recent writings, such as The Logical Structure of Consciousness (behavior, personality, rationality, higher order thought, intentionality) (2016) and The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 2nd Ed 675p (2017). I will give a very brief presentation of this framework since I have described it in great detail in many recent papers and several books, available on this site and others. Actually, "reduction" is a complex language game or group of games (uses of words with various meanings or COS) so its use varies greatly depending on context and often it's not clear what it means. Likewise with modeling or simulating or reproducing or equivalent to or the same as etc. Likewise with the claims here and everywhere that "computation" of biological or mental processes is not done as it would take too long but not computable or calculable means many things or nothing at all depending on context and this is usually just totally ignored. Chapter 9 is the typical nightmare one expects. Minsky's first quote "Minds are simply what brains do" is a truism in that in some games one can e.g., say 'my brain is tired' etc. but like most he has no grasp at all of the line between scientific questions and those about how the language games are to be played (how we can use language intelligibly). Descriptions of behavior are not the same as descriptions of brain processes. This 'reductionism' is a hopelessly bankrupt view of life, -it just does not work, i.e., is not coherent, and this has been explained at length, first by Wittgenstein and subsequently by Searle, Hacker and many others. For one thing, there are various levels of description (physics, chemistry, biochemistry, genetics, neurophysiology, brain, thought/behavior) and the concepts (language games) useful and intelligible (having clear meaning or COS) at one level work differently at another. Also one 'mental state', 'disposition' or 'thought' or 'action', can be described in first person or third person by many statements and vice versa, one statement may describe many different 'mental states', 'dispositions', 'thoughts' or 'actions' depending intricately on context, so the match between behavior and language is hugely underdetermined even for 'simple' acts or sentences. and as these become more complex there is a combinatorial explosion. There is no clear meaning to describing my desire to see the sun set at the lower levels and their never will be. They are different levels of description, different concepts (different language games) and one cannot even make sense of reducing one to the other, of behavior into neurophysiology into biochemistry into genetics into chemistry into physics into math or computation and like most scientists Kurzweil's handwaving and claims that it's not done because its inconvenient or impractical totally fails to see that the real issue is that 'reduction' has no clear meaning (COS), or rather many meanings depending acutely on context, and in no case can we give a coherent account that eliminates any level. Nevertheless, the rotting corpse of reductionism floats to the surface frequently (e.g., p37 and the Minsky quote on p199) and we are told that chemistry "reduces" to physics and that thermodynamics is a separate science because the equations become "unwieldy", but another way to say this is that reduction is incoherent, the language games (concepts) of one level just do not apply (make sense) at higher and lower levels of description, and it is not that our science or our language is inadequate. I have discussed this in my other articles and it is well known in the philosophy of science, but it is likely never going to penetrate into "hard science". The psychology of higher order thought is not describable by causes, but by reasons, and one cannot make psychology disappear into physiology nor physiology into biochemistry nor it into physics etc. They are just different and indispensable levels of description. Wittgenstein famously described it 80 years ago in the Blue Book. "Our craving for generality has [as one] source ... our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is "purely descriptive." Like nearly all 'hard' scientists and even sadly 'soft' ones as well, he has no grasp at all of how language works, e.g., of how 'thinking' and other psychological verbs work, so misuses them constantly throughout his writings (e.g., see his comments on Searle on p170). I won't go into an explanation here as I have written extensively on this (see my recent ebook Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 by Michael Starks 3rd Ed. 675p (2017)). So, like most scientists, and even most philosophers, he plays one language game (uses the words with one meaning or Condition of Satisfaction) but mixes it up with other quite different meanings, all the while insisting that his game is the only one that can be played (has any 'real' sense). Like most, he also is not clear on the distinction between scientific issues of fact and the issues of how language can be used intelligibly. Also he does not have a clear grasp of the distinction between the two systems of thought, the automaticities of nonlinguistic system S1 and the conscious deliberations of linguistic system S2 but I have described this extensively in my writings and will not do so here. Another thing that Kurzweil never mentions is the obvious fact that there will be severe and probably frequently fatal conflicts with our robots. Just think about the continual daily problems we have living with other humans, about the number of assaults, abuses and murders every day. Why should these be any less with androids--and then who takes the blame? There would not seem to be any reason at all why androids should be less in conflict with each other, and with us, than other humans are already. Asimov's law of robotics –do not harm humans, is a fantasy that is unattainable in practice for androids just as it is for us. I admit (as Searle has many times) that we are 'androids' too, though designed by natural selection, not having 'intelligence' from one viewpoint, but having limitless 'intelligence' from another. What is to stop androids having all the mental ailments we have-neuroses, psychoses, sociopathies, egomania, greed, selfish desire to produce endless copies of one's own 'genome' (electrome, digitome, silicome?), racism (programism?), something equivalent to drug addiction, homicidal and suicidal tendencies? Of course humans will try to exclude bad behavior from the programs but this will have to be after the fact, i.e., when it's already dispersed, and as they will be self programming and updating, any badness that confers a survival advantage will spread rapidly. This is of course just the android equivalent of humanoid evolution by natural selection (inclusive fitness). John Searle killed the idea of strong AI with the Chinese room and other descriptions of the incoherence of various language games (as Wittgenstein had done superbly long before there were computers, though few have noticed). He is regarded by some as the nemesis of AI, but in fact he has just kept it on track and has no antipathy to it at all. Searle has said repeatedly that of course machines can think and feel, for we are such machines! Made of proteins etc., and not metal, but machines in a very fundamental sense nevertheless. And machines that took about 4 billion years of experimentation in a lab the size of the earth with trillions or trillions of machines being created and only a tiny number of the most successful surviving. The efforts of AI seem or at least robotics, seem trivial by comparison. And as he notes it is possible that much or all of our psychology may be unique to fleshy beings, just as much of AI may be to solid state androids. How much might be true overlap and how much vague simulation is impossible to say. Darwinian selection or survival of the fittest as it applies to machines, is a major issue that is never addressed by Kurzweil, nor most others, but is the subject of a whole book by philosopher-scientist Nik Bostrum and of repeated warnings by black hole physicist and world's longest surviving ALS sufferer Stephen Hawking. Natural selection is mostly equivalent to inclusive fitness or favoritism towards close relatives (kin selection). And there is no countervailing 'group selection' for 'niceness' (see my review of Wilson's The Social of Conquest of Earth(2012)). Yes we do not have DNA and genes in robots (yet), but in what is perhaps philosopher Daniel Dennett's most (only?) substantive contribution to philosophy, it is useful to regard inclusive fitness as the 'universal acid' which eats through all fantasies about evolution, nature and society. So, any self-replicating android or program that has even the slightest advantage over others will automatically eliminate them and humans and all other lifeforms, protein or metal, that are competitors for resources, or just for 'amusement' as human do with other animals. Exactly what will prevent programs from evolving selfishness and replacing all other competing machines/programs or biological life forms? If one takes the 'singularity' seriously, then why not take this just a seriously? I commented on this a long ago and of course it is a staple of science fiction. So AI is just the next stage of natural selection with humans speeding it up in certain directions until they are replaced by their creations, just as the advantages in our 'program' resulted in the extinction of all other hominoid subspecies. As usual in 'factual' accounts of AI/robotics, Kurzweil gives no time to the very real threats to our privacy, safety and even survival from the increasing 'androidizing' of society which are prominent in other nonfiction authors (Bostrum, Hawking etc.) and frequent in scifi and films. It requires little imagination to see this book as just another suicidal utopian delusion concentrating on the 'nice' aspects of androids, humanoids, democracy, computers, technology, ethnic diversity, and genetic engineering. It is however thanks to these that the last vestiges of our stability/privacy/security/prosperity/tranquility/sanity are rapidly disappearing. Also, drones and autonomous vehicles are rapidly increasing in capabilities and dropping in cost, so it will not be long before enhanced AI versions are used for crime, surveillance and espionage by all levels of government, terrorists, thieves, stalkers, kidnappers and murderers. Given your photo, fingerprints, name, workplace, address, mobile phone #, emails and chats, all increasingly easy to get, solar powered or self-charging drones, microbots, and vehicles will be able carry out almost any kind of crime. Intelligent viruses will continue to invade your phone, pc, tablet, refrigerator, car, TV, music player, health monitors, androids and security systems to steal your data, monitor your activities, follow you, and if desired, extort, kidnap or kill you. Its crystal clear that if the positives will happen then the negatives will also. This dark side of AI/Robotics/The internet of things goes unmentioned in this book, and this is the norm. Though the idea of robots taking over has been in scifi for many years, I first started to think seriously about it when I read about nanobots in Drexler's Engines of Creation in 1993. And many have worried about the 'grey goo' problem-i.e., of nanobots replicating until they smother everything else. Another singularity that Kurzweil and most in AI do not mention is the possibility that genetic engineering will soon lead to DNA displacing silicon as the medium for advanced intelligence. CRISPR and other techniques will let us change genes at will, adding whole new genes/chromosomes in months or even hours, with superfast development of organisms or brains in vats without bothersome bodies to encumber them. Even now, without genetic engineering, there are precocious geniuses mastering quantum mechanics in their early teens or taking the cube of a 10 digit number in their head. And the programming of genes might be done by the same computers and programs being used for AI. Anyone who takes AI seriously also might find of interest my article on David Wolpert's work on the ultimate law in Turing Machine Theory which suggests some remarkable facets of and limits to computation and 'intelligence'. I wrote it because his work has somehow escaped the attention of the entire scientific community. It is readily available on the net and in my book: Wolpert, Godel, Chaitin and Wittgenstein on impossibility, incompleteness, the liar paradox, theism, the limits of computation, a nonquantum mechanical uncertainty principle and the universe as computer-the ultimate theorem in Turing Machine Theory (2015). To his credit, Kurzweil makes an effort to understand Wittgenstein (p220 etc.), but (like 50 million other academics) has only a superficial grasp of what he did. Before computers existed Wittgenstein discussed in depth the basic issues of what computation was and what makes humans distinct from machines, but his writings on this are unknown to most. Gefwert is one of the few to analyze them in detail, but his work has been largely ignored. On p222 Kurzweil comments that it is 'foolish' to deny the 'physical world' (an intricate language game), but it is rather that one cannot give any sense to such a denial, as it presupposes the intelligibility (reality) of what it denies. This is the ever-present issue of how we make sense of (are certain about) anything, which brings us back to Wittgenstein's famous work 'On Certainty' (see my various reviews of his books) and the notion of the 'true only' proposition. Like all discussions of behavior, Kurzweil's needs a logical structure for rationality (intentionality) and (what is equivalent) a thorough understanding of how language works, but it is almost totally absent. As much of my book deals with these issues I won't go into them here except to provide the summary table of intentionality. After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest topic in the behavioral sciences and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930's (the Blue and Brown Books) to 1951, and from the 50's to the present by his successors Searle, MoyalSharrock, Read, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., I have created the following table as an heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSP), of Mind (LSM), of language (LSL), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very recent writings. The ideas for this table originated in the work by Wittgenstein, a much simpler table by Searle, and correlates with extensive tables and graphs in the three recent books on Human Nature by P.M.S Hacker. The last 9 rows come principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans and colleagues as revised by myself. System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated "Rules" R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no gaps and is voluntary or deliberative "Rules" R2 and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) Dispositio n* Emotio n Memor y Perceptio n Desire PI** IA*** Action/Wo rd Cause Originates From**** World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind Causes Changes In***** None Mind Mind Mind None Worl d World World Causally Self Reflexive****** No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes True or False (Testable) Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes Public Conditions of Satisfaction Yes Yes/No Yes/No No Yes/N o Yes No Yes Describe a Mental State No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/N o Yes Evolutionary Priority 5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 Voluntary Content Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes Voluntary Initiation Yes/No No Yes No Yes/N o Yes Yes Yes Cognitive System ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Time, Place(H+N,T+T) ******** TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes Bodily Expressions Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Self Contradictions No Yes No No Yes No No No Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No FROM DECISION RESEARCH Subliminal Effects No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No Associative/Rule Based RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Context Dependent/Abstrac t A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S Heuristic/Analytic A H/A H H H/A A A A Needs Working Memory Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes General Intelligence Dependent Yes No No No Yes/N o Yes Yes Yes Cognitive Loading Inhibits Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Arousal Facilitates or Inhibits I F/I F F I I I I Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as COS, Representations, truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by others ( or COS1 by myself). * Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions etc. ** Searle's Prior Intentions *** Searle's Intention In Action **** Searle's Direction of Fit ***** Searle's Direction of Causation ****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this causally selfreferential . ******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. ******** Here and Now or There and Then It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter Hacker's recent 3 volumes on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein's discovery that after we have described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy) only get us further away from the truth. He showed us that there is only one philosophical problem-the use of sentences (language games) in an inappropriate context, and hence only one solution- showing the correct context. On p 278 he comments on our improving life and references 'Abundance' by his colleague Diaminidis – another utopian fantasy, and mentions Pinker's recent work "The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined", but fails to note that these improvements are only temporary, and are bought at the cost of destroying our descendant's futures. As I have reviewed Pinker's book and commented in detail on the coming collapse of America and the world in my articles, I will not repeat it here. Every day we lose about 200 million tons of topsoil into the sea (ca. 12kg/person/day) and about 20,000 hectares of agricultural land becomes salinified and useless. Fresh water is disappearing in many areas. And every day the mothers of the 3rd world (the 1st world now decreasing daily) 'bless' us with another 300,000 or so babies, leading to a net increase of about 200,000-another Las Vegas every 10 days, another Los Angeles every month. About 4 billion more by 2100, most in Africa, most of the rest in Asia. The famously tolerant Muslims will likely rise from about 1/5th to about 1/3 of the earth and control numerous H bombs. Thanks to the social delusions of the few hundred politicians who control it, America's love affair with 'diversity' and 'democracy' will guarantee its transformation into a 3rd world hellhole and the famously benevolent Chinese will take center stage. Sea level is projected to rise at least one to three meters by 2100 and some projections are ten times higher. There is no doubt at all that it will eventually rise much higher and cover much of the world's prime cropland and most heavily populated areas. It's also clear that the oil and natural gas and good quality easy to get coal will be gone, much of the earth stripped of topsoil, all the forests gone, and fishing dramatically reduced. I would like to see a plausible account of how androids/AI will fix this. Even if theoretically possible, at what cost in money and pollution and social distress to created and maintain them? The second law of thermodynamics and the rest of physics, chemistry and economics works for androids as well as hominoids. And who is going to force the world to cooperate when its obvious life is a zero sum game in which your gain is my loss? There is no free lunch. Even if robots could do all human tasks right now it would not save the world from constant international conflicts, starvation, disease, crime, violence and war. When they cannot be made to cooperate in this limited time of abundance (bought by raping the earth) it is hopelessly naïve to suppose that they will do it when anarchy is sweeping over the planet. I take it for granted that technical advances in electronics, robotics and AI will occur, resulting in profound changes in society. However, I think the changes coming from genetic engineering are at least as great and potentially far greater, as they will enable us to utterly change who we are. And it will be feasible to make supersmart/super strong servants by modifying our genes or those of other monkeys. As with other technology, any country that resists will be left behind. But will it be socially and economically feasible to implement biobots or superhumans on a massive scale? And even if so, it does not seem remotely possible, economically or socially to prevent the collapse of industrial civilization. So, ignoring the philosophical mistakes in this volume as irrelevant, and directing our attention only to the science, what we have here is another suicidal utopian delusion rooted in a failure to grasp basic biology, psychology and human ecology, the same delusions that are destroying America and the world. I see a remote possibility the world can be saved, but not by AI/robotics,CRISPR, nor by democracy and equality.

TEORIE V!DY / THEORY OF SCIENCE / XXXV / 2013 / 1 ////// tematické studie / thematic articles ////////////////////// ADOLF FILÁČEK Centre for Science, Technology, and Society Studies / FÚ Akademie věd ČR, v. v. i. Institute of Philosophy, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic Jilská 1, 110 00 Praha 1, Czech Republic e-mail: $ [email protected] JAKUB PECHLÁT Economic Analysis Unit / City Development Authority Prague Vyšehradská 57, 128 00 Praha 2, Czech Republic e-mail: [email protected] * PLACES Project „Platform of Local Authorities and Communicators Engaged in Science" is the four-year European project (2011-2014), $ nanced from FP7, establishing and developing the concept of the European City of Scienti$ c Culture. LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND COMMUNICATORS ENGAGED IN SCIENCE: PLACES* IMPACT ASSESSMENT CASE STUDY OF PRAGUE Abstract: ! is study focuses on research questions related to regional dimension of science communication, its impacts and suitable tools. Document analysis and a questionnaire distributed among selected experts were used for elaboration of the study. Results suggest that the regional dimension of science communication policy and initiatives (SCIP) is relevant in Prague. However, the attention given to this topic by national and regional authorities is unsatisfactory, resulting in the lack of activity co-ordination between the respective stakeholders. Impacts of SCIP consist of encouraging young people's interest in science, increasing awareness of general public in science-related issues and explaining the role of science in society and the problems it is facing as a sector. To maximize the e# ects of science communication, national and regional authorities should play an integrating role. Given the concentration of SCIP actors, the City of Prague should aspire to develop its science communication policy. Keywords: science communication policy and initiatives; regional dimension of science communication; city of scienti$ c culture Komunální orgány a komunikátoři ve vědě: případová studie Prahy ve vyhodnocení dopadů PLACES* Abstrakt: Tato studie se zaměřuje na výzkumné otázky vztahující se k regionálnímu rozměru komunikace vědy v Praze, jejím dopadům a vhodným nástrojům. Pro vypracování studie byly použity analýza dokumentů a dotazník distribuovaný vybraným expertům. Výsledky naznačují, že regionální rozměr komunikační politiky a iniciativ pro vědu (SCIP) je v Praze relevatní. Avšak pozornost věnovaná této otázce národními a regionálními úřady je nedostatečná a vede k nedostatečné koordinaci mezi zainteresovanými aktéry. Dopady SCIP spočívají v povzbuzovaní zájmu mladých lidí o vědu, zvyšování obeznámenosti široké veřejnosti s otázkami vztahujícími se ke vědě a ve vysvětlování role vědy ve společnosti a problémů, jimž jako sektor čelí. Aby byly dopady komunikace vědy maximalizovány, národní a regionální o$ ciální místa by měla sehrát integrační roli. Vzhledem ke koncentraci aktérů SCIP by město Praha mělo aspirovat na rozvinutí vlastní politiky komunikace vědy. Klí!ová slova: komunikace vědy; komunikační politika a iniciativy; regionální rozměr komunikace vědy; město vědecké kultury 30 Adolf Filá!ek – Jakub Pechlát 1. Introduction Regional aspects of science communication represent a potential asset and as such are quite suitable topic for further examination with respect to future social and economic development in Prague. Science Communication Initiatives and Policies (SCIP) have a signi" cant in# uence on relationship of general public to science and research and on appreciation and dissemination of new technologies. $ is case study has therefore set several main research questions on which the examination will be based. Research focus and questions: Does science communication in Prague have a discernible regional dimension? What are the impacts of SCIP in the 4 pre-de" ned areas? What are suitable tools for SCIP with respect to competencies and capacities of regional government? Where the impacts are most apparent? Rationale for case selection: Prague is a typical example of a larger capital city of a newer member state of the EU (accession a% er 2000) which is still being a& ected by its totalitarian history with centrally-planned social and economic development, focus on being a capital city, absence of democracy, free market and entrepreneurship. $ ose circumstances contributed to exceptional concentration of science, research, education and related organizations and facilities in Prague. Nowadays, the city is therefore a natural centre of science promotional activities in the Czech Republic. Available data shows that Prague is a major centre of science, research and education facilities of the Czech Republic. $ is also means high concentration of people that work in research, development, innovation and related activities and who have a natural a& ection for all things new and are more open to novelties in all forms. People whose response to information on science related topics is generally higher than is usual in the country as a whole. Factors for case study elaboration: In relation to the Prague Regional Innovation Strategy (RIS) that is in the process of update since last year, participation in the PLACES project in the form of science city case study seems a suitable complementary step. 31 Local Authorities and Communicators Engaged in Science: As thematic area „People" in the RIS that includes promotional activities related to science, research and entrepreneurship, closer analysis of SCIP aspects at regional level can present valuable base for development of suitable measures and projects. 2. Methods ! e study focuses on Prague as a science city and the chosen research questions led to selection of methods and modules deemed most suitable for this purpose. Out of modules o# ered by the PLACES Toolkit1, document analysis (Module B2) and semi-structured interviews (Module B1) were used. Document analysis was used to further examine and elaborate the $ ndings on the situational context of science communication policy in Prague and its socioeconomic characteristics. Analysis provided us with useful data describing both the general situation of Prague as regards research, development and innovation environment and more closely subjects active in science communication and related policies and initiatives. For examining the general situation we used public data2 from the Czech Statistical O% ce (CZSO), ad hoc data provided by the CZSO to the City Development Authority Prague (see Annex I in both cases), o% cial documents of the City of Prague (Prague Strategic Plan3 etc.) and to a lesser extent other data found in professional magazines or websites. As regards science communication, the above-mentioned sources were supplemented by outputs of the MASIS project (Monitoring research and policy activities of science in society) which focused on mapping of science awareness activities (see Annex II). Module B2 (PLACES Toolkit 2011) was used as a standard tool with which the authors of this study are well acquainted with and have a thorough knowledge of what kind of data CZSO and other mentioned sources can o# er. Under these circumstances, use of this module seemed to be a suitable time-e% cient and cost-e# ective approach to proceed with study elaboration. 1 PLACES Toolkit for the Impact Assessment of Science Communication Initiatives and Policies [online]. 2011. Available at: <http://www.occ.upf.edu/img/imatges_cms/TOOLKIT%20 MAY%202012.pdf> [cit. 8. 5. 2013] 2 Yearbook (2012): Indicators of Science, Research and Innovation in the Czech Republic in 2011. Prague: Czech Statistical O% ce 2012. 3 Strategic Plan for Prague 2008 Update [online]. 2008. Available at: <http://www.urm.cz/en/ strategy-of-development> [cit. 2. 8. 2012] 32 A! er consideration, Module B1 (PLACES Toolkit 2011) was chosen to consult selected experts and gather a sample of professional opinions on the topic of the study. # e experts come from local authority, research institutes, education and business sphere. # e aim was to approach representatives of all those categories in order to get a more complex picture of the issue. # e choice was based on their respective expertise and experience in both science-related policy and practise of science communication. Expert opinions were thus gathered using a questionnaire with some additional clari$ cations communicated via e-mail a! erwards. Experts were chosen as follows: – 1 representative of local authority (City of Prague); – 1 representative of academic research institution (Academy of Sciences); – 1 representative of business sphere (representing Association of SMEs of the Czech Republic); – 1 representative of science communication facility (Centre of Administration and Operations of the Academy of Sciences); – 1 representative of universities and professional association (Czech Technical University, Association of Research Organizations). From the sum of their opinions, common observations and conclusions served as a main basis for drawing up answers to research questions of this study and the resulting recommendations. Furthermore, another European project with similar focus, CASC – Cities and Science Communication, was used to help formulate the recommendations. Questions regarding opinion of the respondent on the future development in a given $ eld o! en produced very general answers as a quali$ ed answer would require "foresight approach" or thorough thinking about the issues. Both are unsuitable for questionnaire which usually has a limited timeframe for ful$ lment. Even in the semi-structured interviews, we consider certain questions unsuitable for generating more insightful answers. 3. Results # is part presents $ ndings related to research questions posed in part 1. Question 1: Does science communication in Prague have a discernible regional dimension? Adolf Filá!ek – Jakub Pechlát 33 Based on ! ndings described below in Question 2, we conclude that regional dimension of science communication exists and can be related to. On the part of regional (in this case municipal) administration, opportunity for initiative is substantial as the administration can in" uence primary and secondary education institutions and many cultural institutions (museums, libraries etc.). Research organization and universities can also act within the region as various events organized by them take place in Prague and therefore in" uence local public the most. Question 2: What are the impacts of SCIP in the 4 pre-de! ned areas? a) policy # e environment of science communication policy (meaning mainly publicizing and popularization) in the Czech Republic is not formed by a common national policy with a dedicated institution with speci! c commission for this ! eld of activities. Only certain measures in the National Research, Development and Innovation Policy4 are focused on these issues. It is rather a sum of endeavours of various organizations, groups and individuals with di% erent focus and rate of in" uence. Institutions with nation-wide renown and activities, many of which are seated in Prague, naturally cover a wider public, be it general or professional one. # is represents an opportunity for the Prague region to develop its own regional policy. With increasing attention that is being given to R&D&I in recent years, new forms of ! nancial support are being provided, especially from the level of the European Union. EU also puts increasing emphasis on mobilization of regional comparative advantages and local resources to spur economic recovery and development. # e concept of "science in society" that projects the role of science communication policy in regional/local community can be perceived as an evidence-based approach in governing local agendas both at o& cial (regional/local government) and informal (business, non-pro! t sphere) level. As such science communication seems a natural part of R&D&I regional policy. # e science communication in Prague was developing together with SCIP on national level re" ecting the radical changes initiated by major reforms of the Czech R&D systems, including also the more or less extensive decrease in funding. # e signi! cant reduction of ASCR sta% in 1993 (50% for 4 Analyses for implementation and update of National Research, Development and Innovation Policy of the Czech Republic. Prague: Technology Centre AS CR [online]. 2011. Available at: <http://www.vyzkum.cz/FrontClanek.aspx?idsekce=13634> [cit. 8. 5. 2013] Local Authorities and Communicators Engaged in Science: 34 ASCR as a whole, some institutes were abolished completely) had been seen namely in Prague. On the other hand, new high schools and universities were established there since the second half of 1990s. Also the privatization of the business enterprise sector in the sphere of research and development (the voucher privatization form) in Prague region was carried out within the framework of the so-called "big privatization", and it was " nished in two waves in 1990s. Many traditional platforms of popularization of science (namely newspaper sections and journals) ceased to exist because they were not able to survive in the new market economy. # e transformed or new media are sometimes criticized by scientists for being too shallow and entertaining rather than informative, whereas scientists are criticized by journalists for being unable to do any kind of systematic popularization on their part. In examining the potential of science communication, however, one also cannot leave aside certain fundamental characteristics of Czech society that applies to majority of the population. # ese have consequences on science communication e$ ciency and reception. Czech society is one with quite low share of religious people, hence "scienti" c" or "common sense" approach to life is relatively deeply anchored among the population and the need to "measure and weight" things and phenomena is common. # is re% ects in behaviour of people both in their professional and private life. Two additional aspects can be added to the description of Czech specifics. First, no signi" cant change can be expected in upcoming years as the above-mentioned feature of Czech society has a substantial level of inertia. Second, the Czech Republic's population of 10 million is too small for this general aspect to have important regional di& erences. Observations listed above provide a basis for the role of regional administration in science communication policy. Prague city administration operates various scienti" c and cultural organizations and facilities (museums, libraries etc.) that allow for contact of the general public with scienti" c and technical knowledge and discoveries. Public primary and secondary schools also fall under city administration's jurisdiction and so educational policy can be to a signi" cant extent in% uenced that forms pupils and students up to 19 years of age as far as their perception of science and its role in society is concerned. City government also supports independent organizations with relevant similar activities (especially various non-pro" t organizations and civic associations) through provision of grants and similar " nancial support. All these institutions are perceived as an inseparable part of Prague – Adolf Filá!ek – Jakub Pechlát 35 the city of culture. And science is, by one of the PLACES project de! nitions, form of culture. Given the large concentration of institutions relevant to science and education, we conclude that regional dimension of science communication policy in Prague exists. More so as at present, these institutions are the most active in science communication activities. " ough, such activities arise mainly from individual e# orts rather than be based on uni! ed policy. As domestic and especially international marketing of Prague as a Central European centre of science will be part of Regional Innovation Strategy (RIS) implementation, with Prague's renown abroad it can become a "brand" interchangeable for the Czech Republic in various research ! elds. Support of scienti! c communication policy is expected to become one of the pillars of activities that Prague will implement following the completion of its RIS update. It will be an umbrella over activities the city will be supporting, ranging from more "traditional" support of research sphere to new topics such as social innovations which seem to be especially suitable and topical for cities and urban areas. " e updated RIS shall also provide a framework and pilot projects for those activities related to science communication that will lead to promotion of Prague as a national and Central European centre of science and innovation and to promotion of science as socially bene! cial career path for an individual and as a source of sustainable economic prosperity for the city. b) Social and economic impacts Social and economic impacts of science communication policy are mainly long-term in nature and as such require long-term approach in their implementation. " e presence of science in society a# ects directly or indirectly social relationships and stimulates public-private interaction. In the long term, the main goal of promotional activities is to attract young people to science and in% uence decision on their future career. And as science and innovation-driven economy is deemed to be source of European competitiveness, increasing the number of graduates ready to employ creativity and innovations in their professional life is a valuable contribution of science communication. Demand on the labour market for graduates with background in natural and technical sciences is increasing, following fast development in human knowledge and technology. Public policies begin to re% ect this trend with increasing resources being dedicated to adapt to the new situation. " ese economic repercussions can be seen behind the e# ort of Prague to stimulate co-operation between schools, enterprises and Local Authorities and Communicators Engaged in Science: 36 research organizations, which is embedded in city's key strategic documents (Strategic Plan for Prague, Regional Innovation Strategy). Non-pro! t sphere can also provide valuable input and ways are being developed to allow for its more active participation. Science communication is also developing independently from public policies to some extent. " is is a result of omnipresence of IT technologies which allow for easy communication and are key element for easy di$ usion of science-related knowledge and information. Contemporary IT-based tools function as an interface between general public and professionals. Easy access to information has become an ordinary element of our lives. On the other hand, the volume of communication activities tends to decrease our ability to study information in greater detail resulting in its super! cial absorption. Management of science communication is therefore important to help set up respected communication channels. As already mentioned, the increasing role of science in society leads to setting up new sources of funding on the part of public administration. European policies are the main driving force behind this as well as contemporary economic reality. In Prague, during the last years, signi! cant funds were disseminated that were provided from EU Structural Funds5. Science related activities received major support that would otherwise not have been available from the city budget itself as in the Czech Republic, R&D&I policy is mainly domain of central government. EU cohesion and R&D policy thus provided a stimulus that hastened development of support measures at both national and regional level. Infrastructure built with this support in Prague will be accompanied by further promotional activities multiplying the e$ ects described above. To list a few examples where EU co-funded projects relate directly to science communication, we can name the Information Centre of Academy of Sciences for general science communication and "Power for Competitiveness" project of Technology Centre ASCR aimed at professional public. Promotional events organized by Academy of Sciences are one example when general public can directly communicate with R&D sector. Same is true for various web pages addressing di$ erent scienti! c topics, regardless of their institutional (o% cial) or individual (private) origin. Detailed list of activities was elaborated in the course of the project "Monitoring Policy 5 Operational Programmes for EU Structural Funds support in Prague – website: www. prahafondy.eu Adolf Filá!ek – Jakub Pechlát 37 and Research Activities on Science in Society in Europe" (MASIS)6; see Annex II. To conclude, science communication activities have impacts, among others, on the relationship of public to science, on approach of pupils and students to their future career and on decisions of public authorities on allocation of their ! nancial resources and prioritization of their respective activities. " is means that better understanding of science and what it can o# er to society can improve quality of both public and private decision-making. c) Quality of Life Within PLACES project context, this part refers mainly to public participation, media activities and cultural identity. " ere are no formalized procedures of public engagement (grounded in legislation, in governmental or Prague management structures or in Prague municipality measures) focused speci! cally on R&D&I in the Czech Republic;7 it is only possible to ! le speci! c petitions. Public debates (public hearings) oriented on the general public and civil organizations have not yet become part of public life in Prague. However, there are initiatives trying to open public debates on the part of civic society. In general, public engagement is an important trend in$ uenced by examples coming from advanced European countries, one that public authorities are trying to respond to and make e% cient use of. To name one example, in 2009, debates with the participation of the public took place in response to the proposal of a new budget for the Academy of Sciences, which was 20% lower in comparison with 2008 and was projected to be 50% lower in 2012. " ere were public debates involving of- ! cials representing scienti! c and educational institutions, the government and industry, which dealt with the actual ratio of institutional and project funding, basic and applied research, the levels of applicability of results in research and industry. New civic initiatives aimed at supporting science in society have come into being (e.g. Forum Science Is Alive!8). " e current intensity of public interest in political debates about science, R&D and new technologies and their impact in the given society in the 6 MASIS project (Monitoring research and policy activities of science in society) [online]. 2010. Available at: <http://www.masis.eu/english/home/> [cit. 8. 5. 2013] 7 See National report of the Czech Republic [online]. 2010. Available at: <http://www.masis. eu/english/storage/publications/nationalreports/masisnationalreportczechrepublic> [cit. 8. 5. 2013] 8 Forum "Science Is Alive!" ("Fórum věda žije!") website http://vedazije.cz/en Local Authorities and Communicators Engaged in Science: 38 Prague region is rather low. ! e main reason is the contemporary economy and " nancial crisis and related " nancial cuts and public savings. In general, the Prague public learns about S&T decisions and developments via the mass media. As regards the scienti" c community, it may be said that citizens are consulted, and their opinions are considered in S&T decisionmaking. ! e most frequent topics included in the debates are the following: climate change, the environment, energy policy, reform of tertiary education, broader national strategies for science and research development and various issues related to knowledge-based economy. Main result of public participation is realization of the existing problem and discussions on possible approaches, problems and clari" cations of attitudes of parties involved. ! e extent of public participation is expected to slowly increase in the future, depending on the ability of science community and media to articulate relevant topics and issues. Scienti" c culture in Prague is formed by Prague being the capital of the Czech Republic and by its long tradition of science at Prague universities and, since mid-20th century, also at the Academy of Sciences. Region of Prague was analysed in the research study of Technopolis with the results describing the "science city" features of Prague. ! e main conclusion was that the Capital Prague stands out from the other Czech regions, being typical representative of Type "Science & Service Centre".9 Prague with a population of around 1.2 million is by far the largest Czech city. It serves as a national centre of business services, government administration, public research institutes and higher education. However, historic tradition is related mainly to former Prague industrial base. More contemporary notion of tradition related to science and re$ ecting present socio-economic development is only slowly spreading among the general population. d) Education As Prague is an educational centre of the country, educational activities are a strong impulse for development of science communication activities. Recently, around 60% of secondary school graduates apply for admission to tertiary education institutions. Unfortunately, this trend supported by 9 Strategic Evaluation on Innovation and the knowledge based economy in relation to the Structural and Cohesion Funds, for the programming period 2007-2013 [online]. 2007. National Report for the Czech Republic available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/ docgener/evaluation/pdf/evalstrat_innov/czechrepublic.pdf> [cit. 8. 5. 2013] Adolf Filá!ek – Jakub Pechlát 39 way of public funding of universities has detrimental e! ects on quality of university graduates as regards their readiness for practise. Signi" cant share of students apply10 for social sciences and humanities whereas the needs of the economy and labour market lie more in natural and technical sciences. On the side note, share of students of Prague tertiary education institutions (public and private) on the country's total accounts for around 40%. Lifelong learning initiatives are also developing in larger numbers as strong intellectual potential of tertiary education will generate courses for both the public and " rms. # e non-saturated demand for certain quali" cations of graduates (e.g. so$ skills) is one of the driving forces. New and growing initiatives of research organizations that want to attract present and future students and graduates are being developed. # e project Open Science11 can be considered as another good practice with a focus on science education in schools. # is project aimed at attracting especially secondary schools students to pursue scienti" c careers, namely in natural and technical sciences. E! orts of R&D workplaces to open to public are expected to increase. For example, number of school excursion is increasing. Scienti" c events are organized during the Week of Science and Technology12. New sponsors are interested in participation in such events which further strengthens the campaign. However, systematic approach to "detect" and work with talented young people should be behind these efforts, not only self-presentation. Question 3: What are suitable tools for SCIP with respect to competencies of regional government? Competencies of regional and local authorities in the " eld of scienti" c communication are not stipulated in Czech legislation. # erefore, it is either up to voluntary initiative of these authorities or with relation to their other competencies (e.g. primary and secondary education) to exercise measures that support SCIP. As in many other policy " elds, regional science communication policy should be, in ideal circumstances, based on relevant national policy. Such speci" c policy exists only in the form of rather generally formulated 10 Yearbook (2008): Statistical Yearbooks of Czech Education 2007. Prague (Institute for Information in Education), CD-ROM 11 Open Science II [online]. Available at: <http://www.otevrena-veda.cz/index-en.html> [cit. 8. 5. 2013] 12 Week of Science and Technology website: http://www.tydenvedy.cz/index.jsp Local Authorities and Communicators Engaged in Science: 40 measures in National Research, Development and Innovation Policy for 2009-2015. Prague administration can therefore rely only on various related national policies in the ! eld of R&D&I, education etc. and their particular objectives and measures. Leaving aside systematic measures and complex projects, we observed that tools o" ering direct personal experience for participants (promotional events, excursions, exhibitions etc.) seem to have a potential for more profound e" ect or response on the part of target group. Question 4: Where the impacts of SCIP are most visible? According to our ! ndings, main recent general outcome of identi! ed SCIP activities is their growing numbers. Increasing frequency positively a" ects their perception by the public, makes them more ordinary part of cultural life in Prague. What is more important, numbers of (young) people who participate in events and visits to scienti! c workplaces are increasing. Number of marketing products (website, lea$ ets, TV shows etc.) also increases. All this makes science more and more common part of life which is one of the general objectives of the SCIP. Still, there is space for the SCIP to aspire to have more concrete outcomes relating to socio-economic development of both the country and the city. 4. Conclusions % ere is a growing interest within the Prague public in the issues of spiritual, philosophical, cultural and ethical nature, issues that seem to stem from a greater appreciation of the actual weight of cultural and moral values and the human dimension in all walks of life. Furthermore, these issues are connected with an urgent need to restore its local cultural-historical traditions, while safeguarding the development of what are seen as unique and irreplaceable local studies. % ese topics come primarily under the heading of humanities, and today's rising interest in these branches – especially among young and well-educated people – is highly visible in the public in Prague. Seen in this context, the relationship between expert opinion and democratic decision-making appears to be of great importance. At present, scienti! c expertise is known to exercise only occasional and limited in$ uence on the political decision-making process of the Prague City Hall. % e public in Prague does not perceive "science" in all its relevant factors but rather considers individually the various unique aspects connected to it. In the public opinion polls a "scientist" belongs traditionally among the Adolf Filá!ek – Jakub Pechlát 41 most prestigious occupations (ranking second behind physicians, while university teachers rank third). Until recently, the questions of science policy and science funding were not a subject of serious public debate. But from the middle of 2010 we could say that they present an "important" agenda, however, it is being pushed aside by the social and economic problems caused by the economic depression. Generally, the dialogue between science and society and the Science Communication Initiatives and Policies supporting it is a key issue. O" en, they talk about the necessity of a new alliance between science and society on all societal levels. As far as Prague is concerned, such a vital dialogue has been so far replaced by e# orts to popularize science and well-meant endeavours aimed at making the general public understand science and its importance. But a genuine dialogue needs a two-way model, i.e. e# orts to win over public understanding for science should be supplemented with endeavours to make scientists understand public attitudes as well. Nevertheless, the Science Communication Initiatives and Policies can play a valuable role in regional dimension. In Prague, we identi$ ed (based also on project MASIS $ ndings) initiatives of various bodies (universities, Academy of Sciences) in science communication that can in% uence the perception of role of science in daily lives of citizens and workers in the city. Clearly, promotional activities can ease articulation of what science has to o# er to a common person and society as a whole. To maximise e# ects of science communication there is a space for national and regional authorities to play an integrating role in the form of elaborating and implementing suitable national and regional policies with appropriate focus. & rough in% uence of public authorities on many research institutions and on educational system, they could help create respected communication channels for systematic promotion of science and its role in society. & e city of Prague expects to develop some kind of science communication policy together with implementation of its Regional Innovation Strategy that is being updated since last year. With this strategy in place, Prague aspires to promote itself as a Central European centre of science and innovation and exploit its comparative advantages in competition with relevant cities in neighbouring countries (Vienna, Munich etc.) with similar aspirations. Local Authorities and Communicators Engaged in Science: 42 5. Recommendations Ambition of this study is to put forward recommendations focused on regional level, however, the ! rst recommendation calls for national umbrella framework for Science Communication Initiatives and Policies (SCIP) activities. On the other hand, if the regional government wants to take initiative within its remit, non-existence of national policy should not constitute an obstacle. x Elaborate national science communication policy. – National science and communication policy should motivate more both the public and scientists towards dialogue. But such a dialogue must be genuine and necessitates a two-way model, i.e. e# orts to win over public understanding for science should be supplemented with endeavours to make scientists understand public attitudes and needs as well. x Elaborate regional dimension of national science communication policy. – Most e# ective Science Communication Initiatives and Policies in Prague, which would support future scienti! c and innovation culture should systematically and intensively support innovative entrepreneurship in Prague region. It should be accompanied by popularisation of positive results and explanatory communication of examples of the "best practice". $ is type of popularisation activity could bring more communicable and understandable comprehensibility of both real and potential e# ects of research and technology development. Development of SCIP for Prague could motivate higher participation of the public in decision processes and implementation of solutions for the key problems in Prague. – $ e potential for public-private interaction is substantial in Prague. If it is stimulated through SCIP, it will lead to development of science and innovation culture and subsequently to improvement of city's competitiveness. x Emphasize personal experience in science communication – place substantial focus on events where people can "meet with science" in person. – New modes of SCIP; scientists understand public attitudes and are going close to public (TV periodical programmes, shows, exhibitions, street activities). Adolf Filá!ek – Jakub Pechlát 43 – Popularisation events organized by research organizations in Prague are becoming more and more frequent. ! eir positive in" uence on the awareness of local public, on encouragement of young people in their interest in science, research and technologies is undeniable. However, so far, they tend to be more a one-way communication campaigns instead of a two-way discussion on the society's priorities.  x Follow recommendations of the CASC Project13 aimed at strengthening public participation in science, in particular: – Promote science through partnerships between scientists and corporations. – Invest in science educators and communicators. – Strengthen links between science professionals and the media. 13 EUCASC Project website http://www.eucasc.eu/theproject.html Local Authorities and Communicators Engaged in Science: 44 ANNEX I – MAIN INDICATORS OF R&D&I IN PRAGUE14 Table 1: Main indicators of science, research and innovation environment in Prague Indicator 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 GDP per capita in PPS as percentage of EU-27 average 159 162 172 174 n. a. n. a. n. a. Work force (thousand persons) 637.5 645.2 648.2 658.1 680.8 682.4 674.8 Persons with tertiary education as share of work force (%) 28.5 28.2 28.4 32.1 31.4 35.1 38.0 Number of universities (public/ private) 9/20 9/20 9/22 9/24 9/23 9/24 n. a. Number of university students 127,434 128,300 136,598 148,931 149,830 154,036 152,972 Share of employed in tertiary sector (%) 79.1 79.2 81.4 80.4 79.8 81.6 82.6 Professionals (CZ-ISCO-88) (thousand persons) 142.9 147.2 152.3 153.1 147.0 157.6 n. a. Researchers (HC) as share of economically active population (%) 2.58 2.73 2.96 3.00 2.67 2.61 2.78 GERD (million CZK) (million EUR1) 15,835 532 19,186 677 22,914 825 22,481 901 20,906 791 20,998 860 23,180 943 GERD as share of regional GDP (%) 2.11 2.36 2.52 2.30 2.21 2.16 n. a. Number of R&D workplaces 591 594 626 614 627 657 670 Share of ! rms with innovation activities (%)2 48.3 50.5 54.6 Sources: Czech Statistical O" ce, Eurostat, Czech National Bank, City Development Authority Prague, Community Innovation Survey Note on used abbreviations: HC – head count; GERD – gross expenditure on research and development; PPS – purchasing power standard; n. a. – data not available 14 # e Annex 1 was elaborated by Jakub Pechlát, based on the cited statistical data and the study R&D&I in Prague – Analysis of regional data (in Czech), City Development Authority Prague, Prague 2010, see more on <http://www.urm.cz/uploads/assets/soubory/data/strategicky_plan/ Analyzy/vavai_v_praze_2010.pdf> [cit. 8. 5. 2013] Adolf Filá!ek – Jakub Pechlát 45 Graph 1: Employees in R&D in Prague and the Czech Republic Graph 2: R&D expenditure in Prague and the Czech Republic Local Authorities and Communicators Engaged in Science: 46 Graph 3: Share of Prague's R&D expenditure in selected research branches (in % of Czech Republic's total) Graph 4: Share of Prague's R&D expenditure in selected sectors (in % of Czech Republic's total) Adolf Filá!ek – Jakub Pechlát 47 Graph 5: Share of Prague's R&D expenditure by sources of funding (in % of Czech Republic's total) Graph 6: Share of Prague's R&D expenditure by type of research (in % of Czech Republic's total) Source: Czech Statistical O! ce (for all Graphs 1–6) Local Authorities and Communicators Engaged in Science: 48 ANNEX II – SCIENCE COMMUNICATION ACTIVITIES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC ! is Annex is based on " ndings of the MASIS Project, see more detailed National report of the Czech Republic available at: <http://www.masis.eu/ english/storage/publications/nationalreports/masisnationalreportczechrepublic> [cit. 8. 5. 2013]; cf. part 4, p. 33–43. 1. Festivals, science weeks, etc. Activity title (and web-link if possible) Activity type Organiser Frequency Number of participants (approx) Venue (city/ region-/national) Short description A Week of Science and Technology http://www.tydenvedy. cz/ Science-week Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic Once a year 30.500 (in 2009) National (7 cities) Lectures, seminars, presentations, exhibitions, workshops for general audience Academia Film Olomouc http://afo.cz/ Science Film Festival University Palackeho, Olomouc Once a year 2.000 Olomouc Festival of popularscienti" c and documentary " lms European Philosophy Festival http://festival" loso" e. webnode.cz/o-nas/ Philosophy Festival Masaryk University, Academy of Sciences Once a year 1.000 Velké Meziříčí Popularization of philosophy and literature based on public discussions. Czech Days for European Research http://www.tc.cz/ detail-event/id-1271/ Presentations, conference Academy of Science, Technology Centre of ASCR Once a year 500 National Presentations of research centres to students and public. Academy of Science Open Days http:// press.avcr.cz/sys/ search.jsp Presentations of AS Institutes Academy of Science Once a year 5.000 National Presentations of research centers to students and public. European Night of Scientists http://www.nocvedcu.cz/ Presentations of AS Institutes EU, Academy of Science Once a year 6.000 National Presentations of research centers to students and public. Adolf Filá!ek – Jakub Pechlát 49 European Week of Brain Lectures Academy of Science and Charles University Once a year Prague Presentations of news from neuroscience Science Festival Brno http://www. vojenskaskola.cz/ school/ud/university/ Pages/events_ schedule.aspx Presentations Academy of Science, Masaryk University Once a year 3.000 Brno Lectures and presentations for general public. Pilsen Days of Science and Technology http://www.fst.zcu. cz/en/o-fakulte/ prezentace-FST/akceFST.html happening City of Pilsen Once a year 2.000 Pilsen Lectures and presentations for general public. Scientia Pragensis – Prague Day of Science http://www.sciprag.cz/ Presentations Prague's Universities Once a year 3.000 Prague Lectures and presentations for general public. Days of Arts and Science in Ústí nad Labem Presentations University of J. E. Purkyne Once a year Ústí nad Labem Lectures and presentations for general public. 2. TV programmes Programme title (and web-link if possible) Frequency Pick from list: 1. Daily 2. Weekly 3. Monthly 4. Less than monthly Duration (in minutes) Target audience " emes covered Adventures of Science and Technology http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ program/1098111603-dobrodruzstvivedy-a-techniky.html 2 26 Young and general audience Various topics from history and contemporary science Planet Science http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ program/10095530301.html 2 22 general Popular science Backyard Science I, II, III (Australian series) http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ program/10096431862-veda-jezabava.html 2 25 general Popular scienti# c experiments Local Authorities and Communicators Engaged in Science: 50 PORT http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ program/10121359557.html 2 27 general News from di! erent " elds of science and technology Prism Prizma http://www.ceskatelevize. cz/program/10252893246. html?nzv=Prizma 2 30 general Information from the world of science and technology; laboratories from around the world; new technologies, applied research. Millenium http://www.ceskatelevize. cz/program/10252610809. html?nzv=Mil%E9nium 1 25 general Futurological magazine introducing newest trends in modern technologies, medicine, lifestyle, transport. Living Heart of Europe http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ ivysilani/10121011820-zive-srdceevropy/ 2 (3 times a week) 5 general Information about engendered fauna and $ ora of Europe. Don't Give Up http://www.ceskatelevize. cz/program/10267429305. html?nzv=Nedej+se 2 15 general Ecological magazine. Give In http://www.ceskatelevize. cz/program/10266832871. html?nzv=P%F8idej+se 2 15 general Ecological magazine. Diagnosis http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/program/ diagnoza/ 2 15 general Popular medicine. History.cs http://www.ceskatelevize. cz/program/10252562955. html?nzv=Historie.cs 2 55 general Series about important historical moments from modern Czechoslovak and Czech history a% er 1918. Chapters about vermin http://www.ceskatelevize. cz/program/10214729714. html?nzv=Kapitolky+o+hav%ECti 2 10 children Popular scienti" c documentaries for kids. Medicine for 21st Century http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ program/10283905824.html?nzv=Me dic%EDna+pro+21.+stolet%ED 2 15 general Popular medicine. About Czech Language http://www.ceskatelevize. cz/program/10266244783. html?nzv=O+%E8e%9Atin%EC 2 25 general Entertaining series about interesting aspects of Czech language. Adolf Filá!ek – Jakub Pechlát 51 Science is a Detective Story http://www.ceskatelevize. cz/program/10257332777. html?nzv=V%ECda+je+detektivka 2 25 children Australian series about the mysteries of science for children. Magical Planet http://www.ceskatelevize. cz/program/search. php?tov=Z%E1zra%E8n%E1+planeta 2 55 general Series about planet Earth and its fauna. 3. Radio programmes Programme title (and web-link if possible) Frequency Pick from list: 1. Daily 2. Weekly 3. Monthly 4. Less than monthly Duration (in minutes) Target audience " emes covered Leonardo Czech Radio station devoted exclusively to science. Some of its programs are adopted by other stations. http://www.rozhlas.cz/leonardo/ portal 1 Non-stop general Digital and online radio station devoted to popularization of science, technology, history, and medicine. Science-Mosaic http://www.rozhlas.cz/mozaika/ veda/ 2 (several times a week) 5 general News from # elds of science and technology Meteor http://www.rozhlas.cz/meteor/ portal/ 2 50 general Popular nature, space, science and technology Periscope http://www.rozhlas.cz/praha/ porady/_zprava/107191 2 25 Children and young Scienti# c adventures for children. Document http://www.rozhlas.cz/praha/ porady/_zprava/234447 2 20 general Documentaries from the worlds of science, nature, history. Talks about science http://www.rozhlas.cz/cro6/ porady/_zprava/102406 2 30 General News form Czech and international science and medicine Centaury http://www.rozhlas.cz/cro6/ porady/_zprava/102314 2 30 General Ecological magazine Minute from the World of Science http://www.rozhlas.cz/sever/ porady/_porad/3843 5 times a week 10 General New scienti# c discoveries. Local Authorities and Communicators Engaged in Science: 52 Planetarium http://www.rozhlas.cz/planetarium/ portal/ 2 15 General Interviews with scientists, popularizators of science and alternative scientists. From the World of Science http://www.rozhlas.cz/mozaika/ veda 1 25 General News and interesting information from the world of science. 4. Popular science magazines: Title (and web-link if possible) Frequency Pick from list: 1. Daily 2. Weekly 3. Monthly 4. Less than monthly No. of print runs Target audience ! emes covered 21st Century http://21stoleti.cz/ 3 85.000 general Popularization of science and technology Universe http://vesmir.cz/ 3 general Popularization of (namely natural) science Life http://ziva.avcr.cz/ 4 general Popularization of biology World http://www.epublishing.cz/svet 3 genral Popularization of science and technology Realm of Stars http://www.risehvezd.cz/ general Popularization of astronomy Astropis http://www.astropis.cz/ 4 general Popularization of astronomy Technics Weekly http://www.techtydenik.cz/ 2 general Popular technics and technology VTM science http://www.vtm.cz/ 3 young News from science, technology and nature. ABC http://abc.blesk.cz/kategorie/1312/ casopis-abc Once very two weeks Children and young Technical and natural sciences for young audience. Adolf Filá!ek – Jakub Pechlát 53 5. National portals, blogs Activity title (and web-link) Activity type Number of users (if known) ! emes covered Short description Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic http://www.cas.cz/ Presentation of the main scienti" c institution in the Czech R. All areas of research Presentation of the Czech Academy of Science and its 53 institutes (each has it own web presentation). Research http://www.vyzkum.cz/ Portal of the Scienti" c Council of the Government of the CR News from science policy in the Czech Rep. Presents information about the national science policy and the activities of the Scienti" c Council "Science Is Alive!" http://www.vedazije.cz/ Civic forum for promoting communication among scientists, government, NGOs, and public All areas of research Aims to promote better communication among di# erent subjects dealing with science. Scienceworld http://scienceworld.cz/ Internet portal which tries to mediate between specialized journals and popular scienti" c journals All areas of research Daily news form all areas of research. Osel http://www.osel.cz/ Internet portal for popularization of science All areas of research Popular news from all areas of research Astro http://www.astro.cz/ Czech Astronomical Society portal Universe Information from astronomical research Amavet http://www.amavet.cz/ Association for youngsters, science, and technology All areas of research Popular news from all areas of research for young audience 6. Citizenor Civil society organisations initiatives Activity title (and weblink if possible) Activity type Frequency Number of participants Short description "Science Is Alive!" http://vedazije.cz/ Citizen forum 5 times a year 10s 100s Aims to promote better communication among di# erent subjects dealing with science. Science Café http://sciencecafe.cz/ Discussions Monthly 10s Meeting of scientists and public in cafes and restaurants Local Authorities and Communicators Engaged in Science: 54 Council of Scienti! c Societies of the Czech Republic http://old.cas.cz/rvs/ Society of the main scienti! c ! gures 10s 100s International and national congresses, conferences, seminars. Czech Astronomical Society http://www.astro.cz/ Czech Astronomical Society 550 members Interfaces between scienti! c and popular astronomy. Czech Learned Society http://www.learned.cz/ Citizen forum 10s 100s Promotes research and its popularization Adolf Filá!ek – Jakub Pechlát

Modularity and the Predictive Mind Zoe Drayson Modular approaches to the architecture of the mind claim that some mental mechanisms, such as sensory input processes, operate in special-purpose subsystems that are functionally independent from the rest of the mind. This assumption of modularity seems to be in tension with recent claims that the mind has a predictive architecture. Predictive approaches propose that both sensory processing and higher-level processing are part of the same Bayesian information-processing hierarchy, with no clear boundary between perception and cognition. Furthermore, it is not clear how any part of the predictive architecture could be functionally independent, given that each level of the hierarchy is influenced by the level above. Both the assumption of continuity across the predictive architecture and the seeming non-isolability of parts of the predictive architecture seem to be at odds with the modular approach. I explore and ultimately reject the predictive approach's apparent commitments to continuity and non-isolation. I argue that predictive architectures can be modular architectures, and that we should in fact expect predictive architectures to exhibit some form of modularity. Keywords Bayesian computation; cognitive architecture; cognitive penetration; information encapsulation; modularity; predictive processing 1. Introduction The aim of this paper is to explore the relationship between two approaches to the architecture of the mind: modular architectures, in which at least some mental mechanisms operate in functionally-isolated special-purpose modules; and predictive architectures, in which mental mechanisms are integrated into a hierarchy of Bayesian computational processes. The two approaches are often discussed as though they are in tension with each other, but I aim to show that predictive approaches are consistent with modular approaches, and that predictive architectures may in fact entail some form of modularity. Claims about the modularity of mind take various forms, but all proponents of modular architectures agree that there are special-purpose sensory subsystems which are functionally isolated from other mental processes. The more modest versions of modularity propose that only this subset of mental processes are modular, while amodal reasoning and thought are non-modular. Proponents of 'massive modularity', on the other hand, propose that all mental processes are modular. In this paper, I'll be focusing on a commitment that is shared by proponents of both modest and massive modularity: the claim that there is some stage of sensory processing which is isolated from amodal thought processes. This seems to be the feature of modular architectures that is most in tension with the predictive approach to the mind. Predictive approaches to the mind propose that our mental architecture should be understood as a hierarchy of Bayesian computational mechanisms. Cognitive information higher in the hierarchy is used to generate predictions about lower-level sensory information, and information about prediction errors is passed back up the hierarchy. Proponents of the predictive approach, most notably Clark Andy Clark and Hohwy Jakob Hohwy, claim that there is no obvious boundary or distinction to be drawn between the kinds of processing found at different levels of the hierarchy, which seems to be at odd with the idea of modular decomposition. Additionally, the Bayesian priors for each level in the hierarchy are provided by the level above, which makes it difficult to see how a lower-level sensory 2 process could be informationally isolated from higher-level cognition. These features of the predictive approach are thus prima facie in tension with the modular approach to the architecture of the mind. In this paper, I explore the apparent tensions between the predictive and modular approaches to the mind, and suggest that they can be reconciled. I start by introducing modular architectures (Section 2) and predictive architectures (Section 3). I outline the predictive approach's commitments to the continuity of perception and cognition, and to the non-isolation of sensory processing from higher level informational influence (Section 4). I then challenge these commitments (Section 5). I argue that continuity at one level of a mental architecture is compatible with discontinuity at a different level, and that continuity alone cannot provide an argument against modularity. I also argue that the predictive approach's commitment to top-down influences on lower-level processes does not entail the lack of functional isolability that would be inconsistent with modularity. Furthermore, I show that there are ways of understanding modularity on which predictive approaches seem to require a sort of modularity. 2. The modular mind To claim that the mind is modular is to posit a functional distinction between different kinds of mental processes. The modular approach to the mind claims that certain of our mental processes are functionally distinct, in the sense of being independent or isolable from other mental processes. Sensory input processes are often cited as an example of modules in virtue of exhibiting the relevant sort of functional independence: if the data on one's relevant sensory receptors are processed without drawing on information elsewhere in the system, such as data at one's other sensory receptors or one's beliefs more generally, then that sensory process is functionally independent from those other mental processes. To the extent that a sensory process relies only on its own proprietary store of information, it operates in functional isolation from other mental processes. There is much debate over precisely how to specify the sort of independence and isolation that matter for modularity, some of which I'll touch on later in this section. It is important to notice, however, that these notions of independence and isolation associated with modular architectures are functional rather than structural. In particular, modular approaches to the mind are not claims about neural localization: whether a functionallyisolated information process is also neurally isolated is a matter for empirical investigation. Modular architectures come in different strengths. 'Modestly modular' views, such as those of Fodor Jerry Fodor (Fodor1983), propose that modularity is largely a feature of sensory input processes (e.g. vision, audition), and sometimes extend this claim to include mental processes such as language comprehension. Each of these modules, however, is assumed to output into the same central cognitive system: a set of non-modular processes which combine the products of the modules with stored beliefs and memories, and which is responsible for amodal thought processes such as general reasoning, beliefrevision, planning, and decision-making. 'Massively modular' views, such as those of Peter Carruthers (Carruthers2006) reject the idea of a central cognitive system in favour of further modular processing. Proponents of massive modularity tend to deny, therefore, that we have general-purpose capacity for reasoning. Instead, they propose that there are distinct modules for the kinds of reasoning related to distinct domains: the reasoning processes that allow us to detect unfair social behavior, for example, might be functionally independent from the reasoning processes that we go through in assessing potential mates. Whether the architecture in question is modestly or massively modular, the most characteristic feature of modular processes is their functional independence or isolation from other information processes. Beyond that, there is much disagreement over the exact definition of modularity which need not concern us here. And even specifying the precise kind of functional independence exhibited by modules is difficult. One way to characterize it is in terms of information encapsulation, 3 whereby a process is informationally encapsulated to the extent that it lacks access to information stored elsewhere in the architecture (Fodor1983). Information encapsulation seems to explain why a mental process can be tractable and fast, in virtue of not being able to take the mind's vast amounts of information into consideration. But to use this as the defining feature of a module is somewhat restrictive: we might have reasons to think that a process is functionally independent in some interesting respect even where it does not meet the condition of being informationally encapsulated. As an example, consider sensory input processes such as vision. Visual processes have long been considered to be informationally encapsulated, on the assumption that each different feature of the environment (shape, colour, etc.) is extracted by a dedicated and functionally independent process. Empirical evidence, however, shows interactions within and across sensory modalities to an extent that challenge their claim that informational encapsulation. But visual processes still seem to exhibit degrees of functional independence, in the sense that they are functionally detachable or seperable from other mental processes. Daniel Burnston and Jonathan Cohen, for example, argue that visual processes still exhibit distinct perceptual strategies: while these strategies interact with each other, each perceptual strategy is sensitive to a restricted range of informational parameters. This sensitivity means that each process interfaces with other mental processes in a limited number of ways. This, they suggest, gives us a different way to characterize the sort of functional independence involved in modular processes: [W]hat makes modular processes modular, detachable, and in some sense separable from the rest of mentation is that they interface with other aspects of mental processing in a circumscribed number of ways. That is, modular processes are modular just because, and in so far as, there is a delimited range of parameters to which their processing is sensitive. (BurnstonCohen2015) In what follows, I won't assume that modular processes need to be informationally encapsulated by definition. I will assume that there needs to be some form of functional independence and isolation, and I'll come back to Burnston and Cohen's characterization of modularity later in the paper. 3. The predictive mind The predictive approach to the architecture of the mind goes by a number of names, such as 'the hierarchical predictive processing perspective' (ClarkBBS2013) and the 'the prediction error minimization framework' (Hohwy2013). There are two fundamental ideas on which it rests: a hierarchical architecture of Bayesian computational processes, and a data-compression strategy called 'predictive coding'. I'll outline each out of these commitments in turn. Proponents of predictive mental architectures propose that the brain implements Bayesian computational processes: it generates hypotheses or expectations about the world and updates these in light of new evidence in accordance with Bayes' Rule. Bayes' Rule states that the probability of a hypothesis, given the evidence, is updated by considering the product of the likelihood (the probability of the evidence given the hypothesis) and the prior probability of the hypothesis. In the case of visual perception, for example, the claim is that the visual system generates hypotheses about the external world on the basis of its existing information and estimates their prior probability: the probability of their being true before the sensory data has been taken into account. If I walk into my office, for example, the hypothesis that the furniture is located where I left it will generally have a higher prior probability than the hypotheses that the furniture is on the ceiling. The system also has existing information about what sort of sensory input is caused by certain objects, e.g. what sort of retinal data are associated with viewing certain items of furniture from certain angles. This is what enables the system to calculate the likelihood of the hypothesis once the actual sensory data are known: the 4 probability of that particular sensory input, given the hypothesis in question. The product of the hypothesis' likelihood and its prior probability is what generates the posterior probability of the hypothesis. According to the predictive approach, the hypothesis with the highest posterior probability will determine what I perceive. This example is oversimplified. In fact, the predictive approach posits many hypothesis-testing computational processes, arranged hierarchically. The hypotheses and predictions at lower levels of the hierarchy tend to be spatially and temporally precise, while those at higher levels are more abstract. The higher-level hypotheses act as Bayesian priors for lower-level processes: each level tries to predict the input to the level below, and then updates the hypothesis accordingly. The predictive approach adopts an empirical Bayes method, on which the priors are estimated from the data rather than fixed pre-observationally, so they are shaped over time from the sensory data. This allows the predictive approach to account for priors without circularity, because the hypotheses determining perceptual experience are not themselves based directly on perceptual experiences but extracted indirectly from higher-level hypotheses. For more on empirical Bayes and the predictive approach, see (Hohwy2013, p. 33) and (ClarkBBS2013, p. 185). Predictive mental architectures combine this hierarchy of Bayesian processing with the second key element of the approach: the computational framework of predictive coding. Predictive coding is a way of maximizing the efficiency of an information system, by ensuring that it doesn't process any more information than it needs to. Predictive coding was developed as a data compression strategy by computer scientists to allow more efficient storage and transmission of large files, and works by using the information system's existing information to predict its own expected inputs, so that the system only needs to account for deviations from its predictions. This means that more of its resources can be allocated to novel information. Neuroscientists have suggested that the brain might use a similar strategy to deal with the massive amounts of sensory information it receives: if it can correctly predict at least some of the information received by the sense organs, then it can direct its resources to accounting for novel or unexpected sensory information. (Further details of predictive coding as a neurocomputational strategy can be found in FristonStephan2007.) Proponents of predictive mental architectures combine the Bayesian computational hierarchy with the predictive coding strategy to argue that the brain doesn't first process all the sensory input available, then construct hypotheses about the probable worldly causes of the sensory input. Instead, hypotheses generated at higher levels of the hierarchy are used to predict the inputs received from the level below. At the lowest level of the hierarchy, the hypotheses are used to predict the data on the sense receptors. If a prediction is correct, there is no need to update the corresponding hypothesis: the input is explained away by it. The corresponding hypothesis only needs to be updated if its prediction is incorrect, that is, if there are discrepancies between the generated prediction and the actual input at a level. In this way, the predictive architecture only has to account for unexpected or novel inputs. 4. The apparent tension between modular and predictive architectures There are two features of predictive architectures of the mind that seem to be directly in tension with modular architectures of the mind. First, the predictive approach is often described as lacking any obvious boundary between cognitive processes and perceptual processes in the predictive hierarchy, and therefore as committed to the continuity of cognition and perception. Second, information-processing at each level of the predictive hierarchy incorporates information from the level above, which suggests that no level of processing is isolated from the information elsewhere in the 5 system. In this section, I'll explore these features in greater detail, and show where the prima facie tension is supposed to arise. 4.1. The continuity claim The continuity claim is the claim that there is no clear divide between cognitive processes and non-cognitive (particularly perceptual) processes in the Bayesian hierarchy. The claim is that the entire predictive hierarchy uses the same Bayesian computational processes, so there is no distinction to be made between the kinds of processes that underlie cognition, on the one hand, and the kinds of processes that underlie perception, on the other hand. Clark makes the continuity claim when he proposes that predictive architectures depict perception and cognition as "profoundly unified and, in important respects, continuous" (ClarkBBS2013, p. 187). Predictive architectures, he claims, "appear to dissolve [...] the superficially clean distinction between perception and knowledge/belief [...] we discover no stable or well-specified interface or interfaces between cognition and perception" (ClarkBBS2013, p. 190). Predictive architectures, he claims, makes the lines between perception and cognition fuzzy, perhaps even vanishing (ClarkBBS2013, p. 190). Hohwy makes the continuity claim when he observes that the predictive approach to mental architecture seems to deny our standard distinction between cognition (understood as involving conceptual thoughts such as beliefs) and perception (understood as involving the processing of sensory experience): It [the predictive framework] seems to incorporate concepts and thinking under a broader perceptual inference scheme. [...] On this view, concepts and beliefs are fundamentally the same as percepts and experiences, namely expectations (Hohwy2013, p. 73). Proponents of predictive architectures thus suggest that our standard tendency to distinguish between believing and perceiving is not supported by their account of mental architecture. They generally allow that processes lower in the hierarchy are doing something akin to sensory processing, in the sense that their predictions are often spatially and temporally precise, and may even refer to these as perceptual processes. They likewise allow that the predictions of higher-level processes are increasingly abstract and more akin to amodal reasoning, and may even refer to these processes as cognitive. But the core of the continuity claim is that there are many levels in the middle of the hierarchy that are not recognizable as standard cases of either perception or cognition: there is no point in the hierarchy at which the processes stop being perceptual and start being cognitive (see also VetterNewen2014). There is a prima facie tension between the continuity claim associated with predictive architectures and the commitments of modularity. Modular architectures seem to respect our standard distinction between perceiving and believing: perception and cognition are assumed to be different kinds of processes (often relying on different forms of representation) with a clear boundary between them. In particular, at least some part of perceptual processing is assumed to be functionally isolated and independent from cognitive processing. 4.2. The non-isolation claim The second relevant commitment of the predictive approach is the non-isolation claim: the claim that there is no part of perceptual processing that is informationally isolated from higher-level cognitive processing. This commitment seems to arise from the hierarchical structure of the Bayesian computational mechanisms, in which the priors at each level in the hierarchy are provided by the level above. This suggests that there is top-down influence at every level. (Recall that the lower down the 6 hierarchy, the more spatiotemporally precise the predictions are; the higher up the hierarchy, the more abstract the predictions are.) Proponents of predictive architectures seem to assume that this role of the Bayesian priors within the hierarchy entails that no part of the hierarchy is isolated from higher-level information. Hohwy, for example, claims that there is "no theoretical or anatomical border preventing top-down projections from high to low levels of the perceptual hierarchy" (Hohwy2013, p. 122). Clark emphasizes that the sorts of abstract predictions made at higher levels can influence the more spatiotemporally precise predictions at lower levels: he claims that perception is "theory-laden" and "knowledge-driven" on the predictive approach, and that "[t]o perceive the world just is to use what you know to explain away the sensory signal" (ClarkBBS2013, 190). In philosophy, perception that is subject to top-down effects is often characterized as 'cognitively penetrable'. Predictive architectures are sometimes described in these terms: Hohwy, for example, suggests that predictive architectures "must induce penetrability of some kind" (Hohwy2013, p. 120); while Gary Lupyan claims that "[p]redictive systems are penetrable systems" (Lupyan2015, p. 547) and that we should expect penetrability whenever we have higher-level information processing making predictions about lower-level information processing; and Petra Vetter and Albert Newen claim that the top-down influences on perception suggest that "[p]redictive coding can thus be regarded as an extreme form of cognitive penetration" (VetterNewen2014, p. 72). If predictive architectures are committed to the cognitive penetration of perception, this seems to put them in tension with modular architectures. Proponents of modular architectures claim that at least some informational processing is isolated from other informational processing. In particular, the relevant claim here is that sensory processing (at least in its early stages) is not influenced by cognitive information in the form of beliefs or memories. Modularity thus provides a mechanism for avoiding cognitive penetration. If proponents of predictive architectures are right that higher-level processes are able to influence lower-level processes in the relevant way, then this suggests that predictive architectures are not modular architectures. 5. Predictive architectures as modular architectures When proponents of predictive architectures propose versions of the continuity claim and the non-isolation claim, they don't always draw an explicit contrast between their approach and modular approaches. But it is often assumed that predictive architectures are non-modular architectures: Jona Vance and Dustin Stokes, for example, describe the predictive approach as involved in "the development of non-modular mental architectures" (VanceStokesForthcoming). I want to demonstrate that neither the continuity claim nor the non-isolation claim entail that predictive architectures are non-modular. First, I'll argue that the continuity claim does not show that there is no distinction between perception and cognition. Then I'll argue against the non-isolation claim, and demonstrate that there is a kind of isolation on the predictive approach that is consistent with some form of modularity. 5.1. Challenging the continuity claim As already demonstrated, proponents of predictive architectures argue for the continuity claim on the grounds that the same kinds of Bayesian computational processes are in play throughout the processing hierarchy. This means that at each level in the hierarchy, the same methods of hypothesis testing are used, whether the hypotheses in question are at the spatiotemporally precise or more abstract end of the scale. 7 This fact in itself, however, does not distinguish predictive architectures from modular architectures. Proponents of modularity can allow that perceptual processes and cognitive processes use the same kind of computational mechanisms: Fodor, for example, thinks that both perceptual and cognitive processes use classical computational inference involving rules and representations (Fodor1983). Whether perceptual processes use precisely the same kind of format as cognitive processes, e.g. the same 'language of thought', is an empirical matter and thus isn't ruled out simply by adopting a modular architecture (Aydede2010). When modular approaches distinguish between cognitive processes and perceptual processes, therefore, this distinction can't rely on the claim that the relevant processes use different computational mechanisms. Since it is consistent with modularity to claim that perception and cognition use the same kinds of computational processes, the continuity of the Bayesian hierarchy on the predictive approach does not demonstrate that predictive architectures are non-modular. It is true that modular architectures generally distinguish between higher-level cognitive processing and a certain stage of perceptual processing. But this distinction need not be found in the finer-grained details of the computational processes. By way of example, consider the difference between classical computational theories which posit a syntactic process of symbol manipulation, and connectionist theories which posit processes of activation through a network, mediated by connection weights. Connectionist networks may look non-modular in the sense that there are no obvious boundaries between one part of the network and any other part. But a system that is non-modular at one level of description can still be modular at a different level, as Martin Davies has demonstrated: once we observe the connectionist network performing a task, discontinuities can appear and functions can become dissociated. Davies suggests that we employ the idea of coarser and finer grains of modularity, to respect the fact that "[w]hat we really have is a hierarchy of levels of coarser and more detailed interpreted descriptions of the way in which the task is carried out" (Davies1989). The moral here is that modularity is a matter of grain: a computational system can be modular when viewed at one level of abstraction but not when viewed at another: continuity in the fine-grained details of the information-processing is compatible with discontinuity at a coarser-grained perspective. When proponents of predictive architectures make the continuity claim, therefore, this does not rule out that the system is a modular one. And as long as modularity is not ruled out, it is possible that perceptual processes are distinct from cognitive processes at some appropriately coarse-grained level of description. Furthermore, even if the predictive approach could demonstrate that there is no clear boundary between perceptual processes and cognitive processes, this would not entail that there is no difference between the two. The lack of clear boundary might suggest that the distinction between perception and cognitive is non-exclusive, for example, such that processes in the middle of the hierarchy are best classified as both perceptual and cognitive; or it might suggest that the distinction between perception and cognition is not exhaustive, such that processes in the middle of the hierarchy are neither perceptual nor cognitive. Both of these approaches are consistent with the claim that there are clear cases of perceptual processing which is not cognitive at the lower end of the hierarchy, and clear cases of cognitive processing which is not perceptual at the higher end of the hierarchy. 5.2. Challenging the non-isolation claim The non-isolation claim is the claim that there is no part of perceptual processing that is informationally isolated from cognitive processing. As already demonstrated, proponents of predictive architectures argue for the non-isolation claim on the grounds that each level in the predictive Bayesian 8 hierarchy has its priors provided by the level above, suggesting that lower-level processes can't be wholly isolated from the influence of higher-level processes. This aspect of predictive archictectures has been interpreted by some as entailing the cognitive penetration of perception. Care is needed when talking about cognitive penetrability, because some people use the term 'cognitive penetration' to refer to all top-down influences on perception – regardless of which stages of perceptual processes are influenced, which kinds of cognitive processes are doing the influencing, and what the type of influence is. But in philosophy in particular, the label is often reserved for a certain kind of top-down influence on perception: the phenomenon whereby particular kinds of higher-level mental states (notably beliefs and memories) exert a direct influence on the contents of conscious perceptual experience. (See MacphersonForthcoming for an overview of the different varieties of cognitive penetration.) It is far from clear whether predictive architectures result in cognitive penetration of this sort. On the predictive approach, conscious perceptual experience is the product of the entire prediction minimization process: it is determined by the interactions between top-down and bottom-up information flow within the entire hierarchy, rather than being associated with a particular level in the Bayesian hierarchy. While this might suggest that there generally will be top-down effects on perceptual experience, it doesn't entail that these top-down influences will be of the right kind to constitute cognitive penetration. As an epistemologically interesting phenomenon, cognitive penetration requires that the cognitive states involved are traditionally doxastic: they are the beliefs of the person rather than merely information represented in the cognitive system. (For further elaboration on the personal/subpersonal and doxastic/subdoxastic distinctions, see Drayson2012, Drayson2014.) Proponents of the predictive approach can interpret the architecture as including these doxastic states, but they also have the option of adopting an eliminativist take on beliefs so construed (cf. DewhurstThisCollection). There is also a question of whether the influence from top-down processing associated with predictive architectures is appropriately direct. As a result, the predictive approach does not necessarily entail cognitive penetration. In a longer discussion of some of these issues, Fiona Macpherson reaches the similar conclusion that "mere acceptance of the predictive coding approach to perception does not determine whether one should think that cognitive penetration exists" (MacphersonForthcoming, p. 10). If we leave talk of cognitive penetration out of the picture, however, there is still the question of top-down influence more generally on perceptual processing. The non-isolation claim merely proposes that no part of perceptual processing is isolated from cognitive processing. If we allow that the labels 'perceptual' and 'cognitive' refer respectively to the most spatiotemporally precise predictive processes and the most abstract predictive processes, as discussed with relation to the continuity claim, then predictive architecures look like clear instances of non-isolation. Predictive architectures are committed to the claim that slightly more abstract and less spatiotemporally precise hypotheses act as the priors for slightly less abstract and more spatiotemporally precise hypotheses. Since this is the case at every level in the hierarchy, then doesn't it follow that cognitive processes influence perceptual processes? There are, I suggest, ways to avoid this conclusion. Notice that this way of reasoning seems to assume that the 'influencing' relation between two levels has the logical property of transitivity: if Level A+1 influences Level A, and Level A influences Level A-1, then Level A+1 influences Level A-1. When Hohwy suggests that the top-down processing associated with predictive architectures "is not a freefor-all situation" (Hohwy2013, p. 155), his argument seems to involve rejecting the transitivity of the 'influencing' relation between two levels. He claims that each pair of levels form a "functional unit", with 9 the higher level passing down predictions and the lower level passing up prediction errors (Hohwy2013, p. 153), and that each pair of levels is evidentially insulated: In this sense the upper level in each pair of levels only 'knows' its own expectations and is told how these expectations are wrong, and is never told directly what the level below 'knows'. [...] For this reason, the right kind of horizontal evidential insulation comes naturally with the hierarchy. (Hohwy2013, p. 153) Hohwy argues that this evidential insulation prevents high-level processes from influencing low-level processes, except where there is uncertainty and noisy input. He seems to be suggesting that we shouldn't expect the 'influence' relation between any two levels to exhibit transitivity, because the relation should be understood in terms of one level 'providing evidence for' or 'justifying' another. Notice that this relies on a strongly epistemic reading of the Bayesian hierarchy in terms of knowledge and evidence, which Hohwy unpacks in terms of the confidence of a system in its judgments. Ultimately this comes down to the precision of the system's predictions, and its expectations about how good its perceptual inferences are in particular situations. If lower-level predictions are highly precise, then it is more difficult for them to be influenced by higher-level predictions. (For an argument against Hohwy's approach, see VanceStokesForthcoming.) I propose an alternative (not necessarily incompatible) way to explain why we shouldn't expect the 'influencing' relation between levels to be transitive: I suggest that the relation between any two levels is one of probabilistic causal influence. Bayesian networks are simply maps of probabilistic dependence, and probabilistic dependence is transitive: if Level A-1 probabilistically depends on Level A, and Level A probabilistically depends on Level A+1, then Level A-1 probabilistically depends on Level A+1 (Korb2009). But predictive architectures use Bayesian computation: mechanisms that implement causal Bayesian networks. In causal Bayesian networks, the probabilistic dependences between variables are the result of causal processes between those variables. Metereological models used to forecast the weather provide a good example of problems that probabilistic causal models raise for the transitivity of the causal relation between two events: For instance, given our very coarse and only probabilistic metereological models, each day's weather may be granted to causally influence the next day's weather. But does the weather, say, at the turn of last century still influence today's weather? It does not seem so; somewhere in between the influence has faded completely, even though it may be difficult to tell precisely when or where. (Spohn2009, p. 59). Proponents of probabilistic causal models tend to argue that the causal influence between states of a network is weak, and that such weak causal influences will not be preserved over long causal chains (Spohn2009). As a result, probabilistic causation is widely acknowledged to result in failures of transitivity of the causal relation (Suppes1970). If we apply this thinking to predictive architectures, we can explain why, when it is true that Level A+1 causally influences Level A, and Level A causally influences Level A-1, we need not expect it to be true that Level A+1 causally influences Level A-1. The further apart the levels in the hierarchy are, the less likely there is to be causal influence from the higher level to the lower level. In this way, we can accept that each level in the predictive hierarchy is causally influenced by (i.e. gets its priors from) the level above, without having to accept that each level in the hierarchy causally influences all the levels below it, or that each level is causally influenced by all the levels above it. And so it remains plausible that there are perceptual processes (lower-level processes involved in spatiotemporally precise predictions) which are isolated from cognitive processes (higherlevel processes involved in abstract predictions) in the sense that the former are not causally influenced by the latter. The non-isolation claim associated with the predictive approach seems to rely on the assumption that the relation of influence between any two levels in the predictive hierarchy is a 10 transitive one. I have argue that the relation of causal dependence between two events fails to be a transitive relation when the causal dependence in question is probabilistic. And since Bayesian computational mechanisms are probabilistic causal networks, we shold not expect the relation of causal influence between levels to be transitive. As a result, the non-isolation claim is not entailed by predictive mental architectures. 5.3. Modularity or something like it I have argued that, despite the appearance of tension between predictive architectures and modular architectures, adopting the predictive approach does not entail rejecting modularity. Claims about the continuity of perception and cognition seem to be compatible with modularity, and the commitment to top-down information processing doesn't entail that no part of perceptual processing is isolated from cognition. I want to go further, and suggest that predictive architectures themselves possess a kind of modularity. Against the non-isolation claim, I argued that the causal influence of top-down information processing is unlikely to penetrate from the higher levels of the Bayesian hierarchy to the lower levels, due to the causal intransitivity of probabilistic causal networks such as those found in a Bayesian computational hierarchy (Suppes1970, Korb2009). Just as the causal influence of today's weather on future weather diminishes the further into the future we consider, so the causal influence of higherlevel processing in the predictive hierarchy diminishes the further down the hierarchy we look: in probabilistic causal models, causal influence is not preserved over long causal chains (Spohn2009). As a result, we can acknowledge that a low-level process is influenced by the levels immediately above, but deny that much higher-level processes have any causal influence on it. Such a low-level process would function independently and in isolation from those high-level processes. In other words, it would posess the sort of functional features that we associate with modular architectures. The top-down effects from the level immediately above would presumably count as 'within-module' effects, and this might extend to further levels above. The important point is that not every higher level would necessarily exert a causal influence merely in virtue of being a higher level, because transitivity cannot be expected in causal probabilistic networks. The kind of modularity involved, however, looks somewhat different from traditional approaches to the modularity of mind. It is not clear, for example, that there is genuine information encapsulation going on here: while it is very unlikely that high-level processes could extend their causal influence all the way down to low-level processes, it is still possible. On traditional approaches to modularity, encapsulated processes are generally portrayed as informationally isolated in principle, rather than merely in practice. A related concern is that, on the view I'm suggested, the boundaries of modules wouldn't be clearly defined – or at least wouldn't retain fixed boundaries over time. It even seems possible for the boundaries of modules to overlap on this view, which is not a feature of traditional modularity. I propose that these worries should not lead us to think of the architectures in question is non-modular. Some of these features are simply the result of using Bayesian computation: probabilistic mechanisms won't yield the same clean distinctions as classically computational mechanisms. This should prompt us to explore the nature of modularity in probabilistic systems, rather than to reject the useful notion of modules as inapplicable to such architectures. At least some of the modular aspects of predictive architectures, I suggest, can be understood as informationally encapsulated in the Fodorian sense: the processes in question can access less than all of the information available to the organism as a whole (Fodor1983). But even if it could be argued that there is no information encapsulation in 11 predictive architectures, we can retain the claim that predictive architectures are modular architectures by returning to an alternative characterization of modules introduced earlier. Recall Burnston and Cohen's proposal that a process is modular to the extent that there is a delimited range of parameters to which its processing is sensitive; i.e., insofar as there is a circumscribed number of ways that the process interfaces with other aspects of mental processing. The processes at each level of the Bayesian hierarchy are highly circumscribed in the sense that they are generating hypotheses at different spatiotemporal grains: more precise hypotheses towards the lower levels, and more abstract hypotheses towards the higher levels. Each process is sensitive to a limited range of parameters: generally those of the processes in the levels immediately above and below. And notice that Burnston and Cohen's approach to modularity actually predicts the existence of overlapping modules. They argue that if we individuate modules by the delimited range of parameters to which their processing is sensitive, then it is likely that modular systems will significantly overlap in their associated ranges of parameters (BurnstonCohen2015). My conclusion, that predictive architectures are modular architectures, is similar to Hohwy's conclusion that predictive architecture is "a kind of partially segregated architecture" (Hohwy2013, 152). (Note that Hohwy's partially segregated architecture posits horizontal evidential insulation in addition to the vertical evidential insulation that is relevant to cognitive penetration. For further details, see Hohwy2013, pp. 152-155.) Hohwy's argument against widespread cognitive penetration also draws on the difference in spatiotemporal grain between hypotheses at different level: he claims that higher levels can't influence much lower levels because of the difference in abstractness of their predictions (Hohwy2013). But it is unclear to me how Hohwy can use this difference to argue against top-down influences on sensory processing without first explaining why we should not expect the relation between levels in the predictive hierarchy to be transitive. His argument for evidential insulation between levels relies on a strong epistemological interpretation of Bayesian processing, as previously discussed, and a courtroom metaphor. My argument can be read as a way of taking Hohwy's argument (from the differences in spatiotemporal grain to the unlikelihood of cognitive penetration) and fleshing it out with the addition of two further claims: first, that causal influence in probabilistic causal networks is intransitive; and second, that the circumscribed nature of the hierarchical processes allows us to individuate them as modules. 6. Conclusion Proponents of predictive architectures often emphasise the way in which their approach constitutes "a genuine departure from many of our previous ways of thinking about perception, cognition, and the human cognitive architecture" (ClarkBBS2013, p. 187). In particular, they tend to highlight the continuity and integration of the Bayesian computational hierarchy, suggesting that it is at odds with the sorts of functionally decomposed or compartmentalized architectures that are associated with modular approaches to the mind. I have argued that whatever continuity and integration we find in predictive architectures is consistent with modularity. There is no reason to think that the continuity of processing in the predictive hierarchy forces us to deny the distinction between perception and cognition, for example. And while the Bayesian computational processes get their priors from the level above, the limited reach of causal influences in Bayesian mechanisms prevents this from resulting in problematic cognitive penetration. Furthermore, I have argued that the causal probabilistic networks employed by predictive approaches will actually result in the existence of sensory processes that are functionally isolated from 12 high-level cognition. The causal intransitivity of the probabilistic computational mechanisms ensures that the top-down causal influence diminishes at each level, and suggests that there will be low-level processes which operate entirely independently of the influence from high-level processing. In other words, I have suggested that the predictive approach to the mind, in virtue of its Bayesian computational processes, leads us to expect a modular architecture – albeit perhaps a non-traditional version of modularity. That predictive architectures are modular architectures should perhaps come as no surprise, if we reflect on the general motivations for modularity. An entirely integrated non-modular computational system, in which every process has access to all the information in the system, would be inefficient, slow, and potentially intractable. Modularity provides a way to make computational processes more efficient and fast by restricting the information to which certain processes have access. Predictive architectures operate in exactly the same way: each level of the hierarchy is restricted in the information it accesses: it uses information from the level above to predict its inputs from the level below. One way to interpret this fact is to claim that predictive architectures are rivals to modular architectures, using different processes to achieve similar results. I would suggest, to the contrary, that predictive and non-predictive architectures achieve similar results by organizing their information in a modular way. This is not to deny that there are differences between kinds of computational architectures. But modularity is a higher-level feature that can be shared by distinct computational architectures, and which allows us to categorize systems by the way they organize their information. The focus on Bayesian computational hierarchies and predictive coding makes for a new and interesting approach to mental architecture, which is ripe for exploration and development. And while there are aspects of the continuity and integration of these architectures that deserve to be emphasized, we must not lose sight of the fact that they ultimately have to explain a wide array of very different skills and capacities. The appeal of the predictive approach is not that it shows our minds to be continuous and integrated, but that it shows how a set of continuous and integrated computational processes can be organized in such a way as to give rise to distinct mental capacities. It does so, I suggest, by organizing its information processes in a modular way. Moreover, it provides us with a new way to understand modularity as a flexible and dynamic feature of architectures, and to appreciate that predictive architectures are modular architecture. 7. Acknowledgements This paper was presented at MIND 23: The Philosophy of Predictive Processing at the Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies in May 2016. An earlier version was presented at the University of Bergen in 2015. Many thanks to both audiences for helpful feedback and questions. Particular thanks to Christopher Burr, Max Jones, and two anonymous readers for the MIND Group's "Philosophy and Predictive Processing" project.

The Philosophy of Suresh Chandra Edited by R.C. Pradhan Indian Council of Philosophical Research New Delhi © Indian Council of Philosophical Research 2004 All rights reserved. No part o f this publication may be reproduced in any form, or by any means, without the written permission o f the publisher. Published by M ember-Secretary for INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH Darshan B ha wan 36 Tughlakabad Institutional Area, M ehrauli-Badarpur Road, (near Batra Hospital), New Delhi 110 062 ISBN: 81-85636-74-5 Typeset by Print Services B-17, 2nd Floor, Lajpat N agar Part 2, New Delhi 110 024 Printed in India at Saurabh Printers Pvt. Ltd., Noida 201 301 12 Paradox of Method: Suresh Chandra on Social Scientific Research KOSHY THARAKAN The reason why we think that interpretation is restricted to either inevitable distortion or literal reproduction is that we want the meaning of a man's works to be wholly posi- tive and by rights susceptible to an inventory which sets forth what is and is not in those works. But this is to be deceived about works and thought. -Maurice Merleau-Ponty in Signs The point that Merleau-Ponty raises here is quite significant to my discussion of Suresh Chandra's views regarding social scientific research. My paper is based on a Presidential Ad- dress delivered by Suresh Chandra at the Indian Philosophi- cal Congress held in Jadavpur quite some time ago. What he said then need not be the whole of his 'thought' on this topic. Some of the points that I raise might have already been taken care of by Suresh Chandra and even if it is not so, what I discuss here is still part of his thought and works in the sense in which Merleau-Ponty understands the work of a thinker. In another important sense, all that I discuss below is also a part of Suresh Chandra's thought and works because he him- self was one of my teachers in Hyderabad who trained me to think philosophically. Paradox o f Method 271 In order to understand the paradox of social science re- search as pointed out by Suresh Chandra, we may recall that scientific investigations consist in methodical inquiries. It is the adherence to 'method' that makes any inquiry scientific in the sense of being objective and the results thus attained as valid for all those who undertake the inquiry. Thus if the method is the route to scientific knowledge, our investiga- tions with regard to social reality to be 'scientific' cannot but stick to proper methodology. As Suresh Chandra rightly notes, there are two types of methods that are widely used in social science research, namely 'Positivistic' and 'Normative'. Ac- cording to him, it is '... these methods which are responsible for the paradoxical situation of social science.'5 The positiv- ists construe social science as fundamentally similar to natu- ral science. Thus the positivist standpoint represents what is known as 'methodological monism'. The rationale for such a unity of method thesis consists in the conviction that the social world originates from and is continuous with the natu- ral world and as such it has nothing to do with normative or ideological interpretation.2 As against the positivists, the pro- ponents of normative interpretation consider only such inter- pretations as legitimate for social sciences. They may very well concede a positivistic methodology for natural sciences but nevertheless argue for a different methodology for the study of social reality. Their rationale for holding such a 'methodological dualism' consists in their belief that the two worlds are not continuous with each other. Rather the social world is a construction and as such it involves ideological and norm ative elements. There is another strand of 'interpretivism' that upholds the unity of method. According to it any inquiry is interpretive as there is nothing like pure description. Since all observations are theory-laden, even our 272 KOSHY THARAKAN observations of the natural world also have an interpretive bearing. Suresh Chandra points out that the advocates of normative interpretation would even go to the extent of saying that a positivist social science, say history, is no 'history' if it merely replicates historical 'facts'. He uses an analogy from the domain of art to explain the interpretivists' standpoint. Thus he draws our attention to the debate between the advocates of 'Realism' in painting and the practitioners of 'Cubism'. According to the latter, it is only cubism, only abstract art is art. Their argument is that only in the case of abstract art is the mind of man made to think. In a realist painting, the job is better done by a camera and consequently the artist is redundant. In other words, the practitioners of abstract art construe art as a specialized 'discipline', as an academic pursuit. It needs an expert to judge the beauty of an abstract painting. Thus, with abstract painting, art is liberated from the hands of the common man. Similarly, the interpretivists argue that history done in the photographic fashion is no history. History is no science if it merely copies the events. Here the assumption is that 'science' is an abstraction and as such it cannot remain at the level of 'pure descriptions'. The concept of positivist science is based on the concept of pure description, something that does not involve any interpreta- tion. But such a concept of 'science' is a myth. Thus Suresh Chandra feels the need to lift history from the stage of pure descriptions. History done in the positivist mode is history cast in the photographic mould. To have the academic status, history must give up its photographic character. It must ac- quire the normative and ideological character, if it aspires to be a science. Now, the issue as I understand it concerns the question: can there be at any stage a photographic history, one that Paradox o f Method 273 needs to be lifted from pure descriptions? It seems to be an impossible stage. Unlike the ideological conviction of cu- bists regarding the prestige of art as something to do with its belonging to an academic discipline, a status it acquires by virtue of abstractions and interpretations, the interpretivists do have an epistemological point to negate the plausibility of positivist science. The interpretivists would argue that there could be no photographs' of social or historical events sim- ply because there is nothing to be photographed. The social world is a construction. It is this assertion of the interpretivists that generates what Suresh Chandra identifies as the Second Paradox of social science research. The paradox consists in '...the kind of opposition that an ideological interpreter gives to the positivistic interpretation of science.'3 As Suresh Chandra notes, according to the ideological interpreter there can be no such thing as a positivistic science. All science is ideological; there is no objective 'reality' and therefore no 'final court of appeal'. Even in art, the artist by using his hands and eyes distorts reality. He paints reality as he sees it and not reality as it is. But then what is the paradox involved here? There will not be any paradox of the kind Suresh Chandra refers to if the interpretivist claims that there is nothing like reality as it is, all that there is are our view- points. It is our viewpoints that make reality. It is not that Suresh Chandra fails to recognize this. He very well notes this when he makes the following remark about the interpretivist stance: 'Not only that none of us as a matter o f fact are in contact with the naked reality, but none of us could ever be in such a contact. The naked reality is a mi- rage; all reality is dressed up. Not only this, the dresses con- stitute the whole of reality.'4 Nevertheless, Suresh Chandra sees a paradox here. But the paradox arises only because he believes there are some 'facts' out there, some 'truths' to be 2 7 4 KOSHY THARAKAN known independent of our viewpoints.5 In other words, the paradox that he alludes to is an epistemic paradox of knowability. The knowability paradox arises from accepting that some truths are not knowable and that any truth is knowable .6 If there is reality as it is and all that we can capture by way of our epistemic practices is reality as we see it, then there indeed is a paradox. Suresh Chandra seems to sub- scribe to this. Suresh Chandra claims th a t£... the occurrence of a histori- cal event and so also of its being photographed are essential conditions for a genuine scientific history to be written.'7 According to him, the photographs do have a function, as it is the datum on which the historians work. The historian in explaining an event needs to capture the event first by way of a photograph and only if such a photograph is available can he proceed to 'explain' it. Thus Suresh Chandra argues that the positivistic account of history cannot be rejected as useless. Rather it is the foundation of all kinds of historical interpretations to be given. Here Suresh Chandra seems to dilute his original characterization of positivistic science. Earlier he talked about the positivistic science as based on the concept of 'pure description' and denounced it as a myth or in any case it was a myth for the interpretivists. So when he now talks about the necessity of positivistic account, as it is the foundation for any interpretation, it does not necessar- ily follow that such a foundation is devoid of any interpre- tation. Rather the datum, the event that needs to be explained is already the result of some interpretations. Thus the photo- graph is not a pure description devoid of any interpretations. The very fact that the historian chooses to capture the pho- tograph of a particular segment of historical reality rather than some other segment betrays his interpretive preferences. I think this is what we primarily mean when we say that all Paradox o f Method 275 observations are theory-laden and there is nothing like pure descriptions. But then this is not just a peculiarity of social scientific research. All our inquiries are carried out within this interpretive net. Once this is granted, the issue is the possibility of further interpretations of the very same photo- graphic datum. Obviously such possibilities rest on the avail- ability of the photograph in the first place. This I think is what Suresh Chandra means when he asserts the necessity of positivistic account. Nevertheless he envisages further inter- pretations of such data in the course of historical research. According to him, histories 'written in the positivistic fash- ion are nothing but files of the photograph.' Thus he says: '... the economic interpretation of history is not the photographic account of history, yet without the photographic account of history the economic interpretation of history would have been impossible.'8 My problem here is our difficulty to visu- alize any account of history as a photographic account. Take for example the recent controversy over an NCERT text- book. It characterizes the events that took place in Russia in the year AD 1917 as a 'coup'. Earlier accounts of the same event describe it as a 'Revolution'. The ideological interpre- tations are evident in the very labeling of the event. Either you may call it a coup or a revolution or any other descrip- tion you deem to be apt according to your ideological stance. But it seems impossible to characterize the event devoid of any labeling. Even a chronicle has to baptize the event and baptism of any sort is normative at some level. This does not mean that only the name exists and no 'event' at all, yet without the name we cannot refer to the event. Then where is the scope for a positivistic account of history? It may be that what Suresh Chandra calls a 'positivistic' account of history is one that faithfully captures the events as they were understood by the historical spectators themselves. 2 7 6 KOSHY THARAKAN In other words the events that took place in Russia in the year a d 1917 are understood or described by the people who 'witnessed' the events. I say 'witnessed' because I hope it would do justice to the positivistic ideal o f 'objectivity' thereby eliminating the subjective colourings of the participants who either acted in a manner of favouring the occurrence of the event or in a manner of preventing it from taking place. But even this prescription seems to be impossible according to Gadamer. For Gadamer interpretation is not a matter of re- construction a, la Dilthey. Rather it is mediation. In order to understand the past, we mediate the past meaning into our situatedness. That is, our historicity is an integral part of our understanding. It is historicity, even though it involves pre- suppositions and prejudices that open the past for us. The metaphor of 'fusion of horizons' captures this aspect of un- derstanding. For him, genuine understanding is a fusion of horizons in which the subject and object of knowing are fused together such that knowing the other is knowing one- self. It is this element of 'prejudice' in our understanding that marks Gadarper's philosophical hermeneutics from traditional hermeneutics. Thus it seems that the task of writing history in the positivistic manner is never realizable in the actual process of history writing. The impossibility of a positivistic account thus undercuts the second paradox that Suresh Chandra identifies with his- torical research. Nevertheless, a shade of this paradox may seem to remain in other social scientific inquiries, particu- larly in sociology and social anthropology. Recall that the second paradox that Suresh Chandra talks about arises only if we accept the notion of reality as it is over and above our perspectives or interpretations. Such a view is held explicitly by some interpretivists and implicitly by positivists with re- gard to the relevance of an agent's motives or intentions in Paradox o f Method 277 understanding his or her actions. Sociologists of Weberian legacy consider grasping the agent's point of view as neces- sary for our understanding of action. Here the assumption is that there is some 'fact of the matter' with regard to the agent's point of view that needs to be captured. Now, if it is argued that it is not possible to capture the agent's intentions or motives, as these are not amenable to objective sensory perception, the paradox resurfaces. Of course positivists skirt this paradox in social science research by arguing the irrel- evance of such mental states for our understanding of social reality. For them what is important in understanding social reality are the objective consequences of action rather than subjective intentions or motives. Thus after all there seems to be a paradox of the type Suresh Chandra identifies with social science research carried out in the Weberian fashion.9 The ideal of recapturing what the agents 'have in mind' as the goal of social scientific understanding operates with what Quine calls the 'museum myth' view of meaning. According to the museum myth, meanings are determined by the speak- er's intention. It conceives language as providing the 'labels' for meanings, which are mental entities. Quine's naturalism is a strong indictment of this myth of the museum. It rejects the very conception of capturing the agent's intentions, as there is no such determinate 'fact of the matter'. In other words, Quine proposes the 'indeterminacy of meaning' and the impossibility of translating the intentions of the agent, as there is always underdetermination of meaning by experi- ence. Consequently there can be no objective basis that de- termines the meaning of action, let alone recapturing the agent's intended meaning. For Quine, reference cannot be secured merely by recognizing a thing. The rationale behind this is Quine's thesis of 'inscrutability of reference' and the philosophical lesson that Quine wants to convey through these 278 KOSHY THARAKAN problems of reference is primarily the thesis of 'ontological relativity'. The adoption of such a framework is arbitrary, chosen by convention and it is erroneous to think that we can get to the 'roots of reference' in an absolutist manner. Thus the hope to find the uniquely correct meaning or the attempt to capture the agent's intended meaning is like the search after the Holy Grail. Thus the second paradox that Suresh Chandra talks about does not really arise, given that the social world is a con- struction by the agents by bestowing meaning on their acts and there is nothing like a uniquely correct meaning to which the agents have a privileged access. Thus only the first para- dox remains. It seems to me that Suresh Chandra himself ultimately recognizes only this paradox as even though he mentions these two paradoxes, the Presidential address he delivered was titled 'The Paradox of Social Science Research', thereby negating a plurality of paradox. The paradox as Suresh Chandra characterizes it consists in the impossibility of avoid- ing different competing ideologies. Since what is 'unwritten' is open to \ multiplicity of readings, different interpretations vie with each other for legitimacy and we have no 'final court of appeal' to settle it one way or other. It is important to note here that even this paradox does not arise if one claims that what is called social science is hardly a science. Science by its very nature is objective in the sense of being possible to arrive at intersubjective agreement. So the para- dox consists in claiming scientific status to social inquiries. Nevertheless, this way of avoiding the paradox is forestalled by Suresh Chandra. He considers such a move as an aca- demic absurdity and says it is no defense of an ideological interpretation.10 It is so because, as Suresh Chandra points out, the scientific status of history consists in its ability to 'acquire the normative and ideological character' and such a Paradox o f Method 279 normative dimension is the aspect of transcending the posi- tivist ideal of photographic history'. It is absurd to conceive the very same normative and ideological dimensions that ascribe the scientific status to history while jettisoning the scientific status of history. This absurdity may be the real paradox of social science research. If it is argued that the kind of interpretation that is central to doing 'science' is not the same as the kind of interpretation that besets social scientific understanding, then even this paradox does not arise. In fact, Charles Taylor provides such an argument." What makes us think that there is no distinc- tion between the two kinds of interpretation is our blind al- legiance to the new kind of 'interpretivism' that argues for the unity of method. According to Taylor, this new call for the 'unity of science' based on hermeneutics is not in tune with reality. He is in agreement with the post-positivist phi- losophers of science in holding that the logical positivist's understanding of science is unacceptable as it failed to assign any place for interpretation. Nevertheless, Taylor is of the opinion that such an interpretative element within the prac- tice of 'science' is different from the kind of understanding that is central to social sciences. Taylor points out that our scientific understanding arises as a refinement of our ordi- nary understanding. This ordinary understanding or 'pre-un- derstanding' is prior to any theoretical stance and cannot be exhaustively formulated. Rather, our formulation of how to deal with things or theorization makes sense to us because of this background knowledge or pre-understanding. When we say that science or for that matter any inquiry is interpretive, it is this ordinary understanding that we refer to. Interpreta- tion that is central to social sciences is much more than this kind of understanding. It is hot just the kind of understanding that is required for an implicit grasp of things. Rather it is the 280 KOSHY THARAKAN kind of understanding that one needs in order to grasp the 'desirability characterizations'. These desirability characteri- zations are descriptions that lie beyond the limits of natural sciences. Natural sciences are characterized by the require- ments of 'absoluteness'. Natural sciences, as Taylor points out, seek an account of the world independent of the mean- ings it has for human beings. Thus, I would say that even this paradox does not really obtain as the interpretative dimension that inscribes our in- quiry as scientific is not the same as that which generates a multiplicity of interpretations vying with each other. Such possibilities of different interpretations only underscore the 'essential contestability' of social sciences. Nevertheless such possibilities of interpretation do not rule out intersubjective agreement. Also, some interpretations may fare better than some other interpretations when we take the whole of the socio-historical world into account. Thus one may argue that the events of AD 1917 as they happened in Russia are better interpreted as a 'Revolution' in the context of struggle as envisaged in Marxian political theory. This line of argument, of course, presumes that the events are the outcome of cer- tain political ideology. The moving force of such ideologies may in turn rest on the existence of certain other socio-his- torical reality. Thus, though the social world, including the historical world, is a construction, an ideological one at that, as Suresh Chandra rightly points out, the whole of social reality cannot be treated as mere 'constructs'. It has got some 'thingly' reality that enables such constructions. Sometimes this 'thingliness' of the socio-historical world constricts our interpretations. For example, the strong archaeological evi- dence that may obtain in the course of our historical inves- tigations will rule out certain hitherto accepted interpreta- tions as no more valid. In other words, the 'photographic Paradox o f Method 281 data' as Suresh Chandra may call it, plays a crucial role in our interpretations. Here, it may be pointed out that the ar- gument for a 'methodological dualism' based on the discon- tinuity of the social world from the natural world is mis- taken. As has been pointed out above, there are occasions when the natural world provides the material basis or the 'thingliness' of the social world. To that extent the methods of natural sciences do have a role to play in our investiga- tions pertaining to the social world. Where the positivists got it wrong was their refusal to accept this 'thingliness' as al- ready interpreted. NOTES AND REFERENCES 1. Chandra, Suresh: 'The Paradox of Social Science Research', Presidential address for 'Logic and Scientific Method', Indian Philosophical Congress, 61st Session, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, October 1986, p. 1. 2. Suresh Chandra equates normative with ideological. But such identification need not obtain always. The positivist norm of 'objectivity' is one that attempts to eschew any ideology. Also, one may claim the possibility of an ideology that is non-normative . Thus, a scientific world-view as adopted by some natu- ralists tries to explain away the normative aspects of epistemic concepts such as 'justification' and 'rationality' by invoking a scientific ideology. 3. Chandra, Suresh: op. cit, p. 6. 4. Ibid., p. 7. 5. In Suresh Chandra's discussion on Pradhan's interpretation of Wittgenstein his belief regarding the notion o f 'reality as it is' can be seen explicitly. See in this connection Suresh Chandra: 'Seeing and Seeing As: Pradhan and Panneerselvam' in JICPR, Vol. XII, No. 3, 1995, pp. 111-23. 6. See Jonathan L. Kvanvig: 'Epistemic Paradoxes' in Concise Routledge Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, London, Routledge, 2000, p. 656. 282 KOSHY THARAKAN 7. Chandra, Suresh: 'The Paradox of Social Science Research', p. 3. 8. Ibid., p. 3. 9. Nagel criticizes Weber's verstehen thesis by stating that none of the psychological states that we impute to the agents may in reality be theirs and even if our ascription is correct their manifest behaviour interpreted in terms of these psychological states would not be intelligible in the light of our own expe- riences. See in this regard Ernest Nagel: 'Problems of Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences' in Philosophy o f the Social Sciences; A Reader, (Ed.) Maurice Natanson, New York, Random House, 1963, p. 203. 10. Chandra, Suresh: 'The Paradox of Social Science Research', p. 7. 11. Taylor, Charles: 'Understanding in Human Sciences', in Re- view o f Metaphysics, Vol. 34, September 1980.

Is there a pro-self component behind the prominence effect? Individual resource allocation decisions with communities as potential beneficiaries Marcus Selart Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, Norway Daniel Eek Göteborg University and University of Skövde, Sweden A n important problem for decision-makers in society deals with the efficient and equitable allocation ofscarce resources to individuals and groups. The significance of this problem is rapidly growing since there is a rising demand for scarce resources all over the world. Such resource dilemmas belong to a conceptually broader class of situations known as social dilemmas. In this type of dilemma, individual choices that appear ''rational'' often result in suboptimal group outcomes. In this article we study how people make monetary allocation decisions between the community where they live and a neighbouring community, with the aim of finding out to what extent these decisions are subject to biased over-weighting. The manuscript reports four experiments that deal with the way individuals make such allocation decisions when the potential beneficiaries are such communities. The specific goal of these experiments is to gauge the amount of bias in the weights that people assign to the various beneficiaries. Taken together, the results from all the four experiments suggest that making the gain of the neighbouring community prominent to a higher extent de-biases the outcomes (the prominence effect) compared to when own community gain is made prominent. Place identity is discussed as a potentially important factor in this connection. Hence, it may be argued that there seems to be some kind of a pro-self component that is able to explain a large part of the variance observed for the prominence effect. Connections between such a factor and in-group favouritism are discussed. A strength of the study was that these major results appeared to be quite robust when considered as task effects, as the salience of the manipulated context factors in the studies (in terms of reliable main or interaction effects) did not distort them. U n problème important pour les décideurs dans la société concerne la répartition efficace et équitable desrares ressources disponibles pour les individus et les groupes. L'ampleur de ce problème se développe rapidement depuis qu'il y a une demande croissante pour le petit nombre de ressources tout autour du monde. De tels dilemmes de ressources appartiennent à une classe conceptuellement plus large de situations connues comme les dilemmes sociaux. Dans ce type de dilemmes, les choix individuels qui apparaissent «rationnels» résultent souvent en des conséquences de groupe sous-optimales. Dans cet article, nous étudions comment les gens prennent des décisions de répartition monétaire entre la communauté où ils vivent et la communauté voisine. Le but est de faire ressortir dans quelles mesures ces décisions sont sujettes à un biais de surpoids. Le manuscrit rapporte quatre expériences se référant à la façon dont les individus prennent de telles décisions de répartition quand les bénéficiaires potentiels sont de ces communautés. Le but spécifique de ces expériences est de mesurer la quantité de biais dans le poids accordé par les gens aux divers bénéficiaires. Dans l'ensemble, les résultats des quatre expériences suggèrent que le fait de mettre à l'avant-plan le profit de la communauté voisine réduit en grande partie les biais dans les conséquences (effet de saillance) comparativement à lorsque le profit de sa propre communauté est mis à l'avant-plan. L'identité du lieu est discutée comme facteur potentiellement important dans ce lien. À partir de là, il peut être avancé qu'il semble y avoir une sorte de composante de favoritisme envers soimême qui pourrait expliquer une grande partie de la variance observée pour l'effet de saillance. Les liens entre ce # 2005 International Union of Psychological Science http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/pp/00207594.html DOI: 10.1080/00207590544000103 Correspondence should be addressed to Marcus Selart, Department of Strategy and Management, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Breiviksveien 40, N-5045 Bergen, Norway (E-mail: [email protected]). This research was supported financially by grant F0652/96 to the first author from the Swedish Council for Research in the Humanities and Social Sciences and by grant 421-2001-4697 to the second author from the Swedish Research Council. The authors thank Anders Biel, Robyn Dawes, Tommy Gärling, Roland Scholz, and Kazuhisa Takemura for comments on a previous version of the paper. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, 2005, 40 (6), 429–440 facteur et le favoritisme envers l'endogroupe sont discutés. Une force de l'étude était que ces principaux résultats se montrent plutôt robustes lorsque considérés comme effets de la tâche, alors que la saillance des facteurs contextuels qui furent manipulés dans les études (en termes d'effets principaux ou d'interaction fiables) ne les a pas altérés. U n problema importante para los decididores en la sociedad trata con la asignación eficiente y equitativa delos escasos recursos a individuos y a grupos. La importancia de este problema crece rápidamente debido a la creciente demanda de los escasos recursos en todo el mundo. Tales dilemas de asignación de recursos pertenecen a una clase de situaciones conceptualmente más amplia conocida como dilemas sociales. En este tipo de dilemas, las opciones individuales que parecen ''racionales'' a menudo resultan en desenlaces grupales subóptimos. Este artıculo estudia cómo la gente toma decisiones sobre asignaciones monetarias entre la comunidad en la que viven y una comunidad vecina, con el propósito de determinar en qué medida estas decisiones están sujetas a sesgo. El manuscrito presenta cuatro experimentos que se refieren a la forma en que los individuos toman tales desiciones sobre asignación de recursos cuando los beneficiarios potenciales son esas comunidades. La meta especıfica de estos experimentos es calcular la cantidad de sesgo en el peso que la gente asigna a varios beneficiarios. En conjunto, los resultados de los cuatro experimentos sugieren que al hacer prominente la ganancia de la comunidad vecina reduce en mayor medida el sesgo en los resultados (efecto de prominencia) comparado con que la ganancia de la propia comunidad sea la que se haga prominente. La identidad de lugar se discute como un factor potencialmente importante a este respecto. Por lo tanto, podrıa alegarse que parece haber algún tipo de componente en favor de sı mismo que podrıa explicar gran parte de la varianza observada para el efecto de prominencia. Se discuten las conexiones entre tal factor y el favoritismo intra grupo. Una fortaleza de este estudio es que estos resultados principales son al parecer bastante robustos, considerados como efectos de la tarea, pues la prominencia de los factores contextuales manipulados en los estudios (en términos de efectos principales o de interacción fiables) no los distorsionaron. An important problem for decision-makers in society deals with the efficient and equitable allocation of scarce resources to individuals and groups (Leventhal, 1976; Samuelson, 1993). The significance of this problem is rapidly growing since there is a rising demand for scarce resources all over the world. This fact was pinpointed in Hardin's (1968) classic article entitled The tragedy of the commons, in which he suggested that there is a dilemma inherent in the management and organization of common pool natural resources (see also Messick & Brewer, 1983). Such resource dilemmas, where people choose between acting selfishly or collectively, belong to a conceptually broader class of situations known as social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980). A social dilemma incorporates the following two features: (a) each group member has an individual incentive to make a self-interested choice since the monetary payoff to each individual is higher for such a choice, regardless of the others' choices; (b) when all members make these ''rational'' choices, the collective outcome is worse than if all members had made cooperative choices favouring the group interest. Thus, the monetary payoff for all individuals in the group is higher if all cooperate than if all defect (Messick & Brewer, 1983). In this vein, individual choices that appear ''rational'' often result in suboptimal group outcomes. This article focuses on how people make monetary allocation decisions between the community where they live and a neighbouring community. The aim is to find out to what extent these decisions are subject to biased over-weighting. A major result of the study is that biased overweighting plays an important role in resource allocation decisions, but that it operates differently depending on whether a ''pro-self'' or a ''proother'' dimension is manipulated. THE ROLE OF PRO-SELF AND PRO-OTHER IN PREFERENCE CONSTRUCTION According to previous research, the most important attribute of a decision situation generally looms larger in a variety of preference tasks than in a calibrating procedure (e.g., a matching task) (Fischer & Hawkins, 1993; Montgomery, Selart, Gärling, & Lindberg, 1994; Selart, 1996; Selart, Boe, & Gärling, 1999; Selart, Gärling, & Montgomery, 1998; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988). Despite having made two alternatives equally attractive through the calibrating matching procedure, people, when asked to choose the one alternative that they prefer most, do not make random choices. Instead, research indicates that people systematically opt for the alternative with the highest value on the prominent attribute. This phenomenon has been labelled the prominence 430 SELART AND EEK effect, and it has been found to have a bearing on aspects of environmental valuation (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). For instance, Kahneman and Ritov (1994) showed that prominence effects leading to preference reversals between choices and monetary values are present in environmental interventions. In the present research it is assumed that these effects may also be present in resource allocation decisions. For instance, it could be argued that both pro-self and pro-other could play a part in a resource allocation task. If the maximization of own community gain in a resource allocation task is made salient, it would appeal to people's ingroup social identity. People should accordingly opt for an alternative that maximizes their own community gain (pro-self alternative). If, on the other hand, the maximization of neighbouring community gain is made salient, people should opt for an option that maximizes the joint gain of the own community and the neighbouring one (joint alternative). Thus, they should not opt for an alternative that maximizes the neighbouring community gain only (pro-other alternative). From a practical point of view, this implies that if administrators in a region want to stimulate cooperative behaviour in Community A, they should highlight the needs of neighbouring Community B, making its share of the resource allocation the prominent attribute. This will most probably have a de-biasing impact on the prominence effect in the sense that Community A citizens will apply more compensatory decision strategies that allow for trade-offs to be made between the attributes (what Community A and B will receive). THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EQUALITY HEURISTIC IN RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS The equality norm prescribes that a resource should be equally allocated to all its legitimate members (Deutsch, 1975; Sampson, 1975). This principle is widely used in situations where cooperation and harmony within the group are the major goals. Resource allocation decisions constitute such a situation in several ways. Here, people usually make their decisions based on some notion of the idea of equality (Messick, 1993, 1995). Recently, Roch, Lane, Samuelson, Allison, and Dent (2000) also established that members of groups sharing resources first anchor their consumption choices on an ''equal-division'' heuristic and then adjust their choices in a self-serving direction. A necessary condition for this adjustment was sufficiency of cognitive capacity. It has been demonstrated that whether or not the amount of a resource is (easily) divisible with the number of share takers is a factor that influences the application of equality (Allison & Messick, 1990). Hence, the use of the equality heuristics may be a factor with the potential of distorting the prominence effect in resource allocation tasks. THE ROLE OF IDENTITY AS A DRIVER IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION DECISIONS It has been observed that withinand betweengroup communication has an important impact on how people behave in resource dilemmas (Bornstein, Rapoport, Kerpel, & Katz, 1989). Moreover, it has been observed in resource dilemma studies (see e.g., Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kramer & Brewer, 1984) that group member categorization in terms of membership in smaller as compared to larger social units results in social identity effects. Similarly, previous research reveals that between-groups comparisons result in a general tendency to evaluate one's own membership group (in-group) more positively than any nonmembership group (out-group) (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). This tendency is generally referred to as in-group favouritism or in-group bias (Brewer, 1999, 2001; Otten & Mummendey, 2000). It is argued that in-group social identity may be the major reason as to why people in some resource allocation contexts tend to favour their own community over a neighbouring community. Recently, there has also been a debate on whether core concepts in environmental psychology such as, for instance, place identity may play a role in resource dilemmas (e.g., Bonaiuto, Carrus, Martorella, & Bonnes, 2002; Fried, 2000; Giuliani, 2002). In this research, the concept of place identity is used to encompass both social and physical environments. It has, for instance, been revealed that the notion of place, in people's general opinion, to a great extent refers to any combination of regional communities (Cuba & Hummon, 1993). Therefore, it is argued that there is some evidence supporting the idea that the driving force behind joint community gain may be derived from place identity. The concept of ''place identity'' may therefore be interpreted as a special form of social identity in which both social and physical dimensions play a part. The circle of what is to be defined as the in-group may thus be widened (see Cuba & Hummon, 1993). PROMINENCE EFFECT: A PRO-SELF COMPONENT? 431 HYPOTHESES Four experimental studies investigating whether or not the prominence effect is present in resource allocation decisions are reported. Generally, it is assumed that the prominence effect will be present in these types of decisions given that it has been proved to be present for more purely individualistic choices. It is also assumed that the effect will depend on whether a ''pro-self'' or a ''pro-other'' dimension is looming largest. The following two hypotheses are tested in the present research: N H1a. A prominence effect will be found in resource allocation decisions such that participants will prefer a matched alternative that maximizes the own gain when ''own community gain'' is manipulated to be the prominent attribute. The reason underlying this hypothesis is that the prominence effect generally is assumed to be favoured by prominent ''self-interest attributes'' and not by prominent ''other-interest attributes''. On the contrary, it is not assumed that participants will prefer a pro-other alternative that maximizes neighbouring community gain (altruism) when ''neighbouring community gain'' is made the prominent attribute. It is therefore hypothesized that: N H1b. Participants will prefer an alternative that maximizes the joint gain of the own community and a neighbouring community when neighbouring community gain is made the prominent attribute. STUDY 1 H1a was tested in Study 1. Thus, it was assumed that participants systematically should opt for the alternative that maximizes own community gain, when this attribute is made salient, even though that alternative has been matched by other participants to be equally attractive as a competing alternative that maximizes joint gain (own + neighbouring community gain). In order to understand the influence of framing factors on the prominence effect, attribute range was also manipulated. Still, this factor was not expected to distort the prominence effect. Attribute range effects constitute an important class of framing effects that imply context manipulation. They have been proved to have an impact on judgment and decision-making tasks. As an example, it has been revealed that decision weights shift as a function of variance (Meyer & Eagle, 1982); attributes with greater variance receive more weights. Goldstein (1990) and Selart (1996) have also revealed that ratings of attribute importance and preferences are a function of attribute ranges. On the other hand, there are studies showing that decision weights do not depend on the variation of scores (Beattie & Baron, 1991). However, in Study 1 it was assumed that the introduction of a framing manipulation of the type described would not affect the prominence effect. The reason is that context effects generally are considered to be less influential than task effects (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). The introduction of the factor may therefore be regarded as a way of testing the robustness of the model. Hence, it provides for a sensitivity test of the hypotheses, which is standard procedure in decision analysis. Method Participants. Seventy-two undergraduate students (36 men and 36 women) at Göteborg University participated in the study and were paid SEK 50 (approximately US$5.5) for their participation. Participants predominantly lived in the Greater Göteborg area, Sweden. Half of them were undergraduates in psychology and the other half were undergraduates in economics. Experimental design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions of a 3 (response procedure: choice, preference rating, rank ordering)62 (alternative: own community vs joint community)62 (attribute range: wide vs narrow) factorial design, where gender and type of student population were balanced. Participants were initially instructed to indicate their preferences for resource allocation alternatives in 16 tasks. The order of the tasks was counterbalanced. Based on a real-life initiative that took place in Swedish politics in the mid 1990s (the so-called ''Persson plan,'' named after Prime Minister Göran Persson), each decision task was described by the following two attributes: (1) how much money the own community received in financial support for environmental protection from the government, and (2) how much money a neighbouring community received from the government for the same purpose (see also Kemp, 1998, 2003; Kemp & Burt, 2001; Kemp & 432 SELART AND EEK Willetts, 1995, for reviews of people's valuation of government-funded services). In all tasks, own community gain was manipulated as the prominent attribute. Thus, participants were informed that the own community deserved priority over the neighbouring community due to either need or performance, respectively, in the two conditions. Building on the previous introduction of attribute range effects as potential threats to the hypotheses, two different versions of attribute range were introduced. In one condition, the range between the attribute levels of the prominent attribute was narrow, and for the other it was wide. In the narrow condition, the differences between the attribute levels were hence very low, whereas they were high in the wide condition. Response procedure. Study 1 also manipulated response procedure on three levels; choice, preference ratings, and rank orders. This factor was treated as a measure of control since previous research has revealed that elicitation form has practically no effect on the prominence effect (Selart, 1996). Response mode was manipulated between subjects. Four alternative allocations were consistently applied: own community gain maximized the individual gain; joint community gain maximized the common gain of self and other; equality allocated the resource equally between self and other; and pro-other maximized the gain of the other. Prior to this study, two of the allocations (own community gain and joint community gain) had, in another study, using other undergraduates as participants, been matched to appear equally attractive. In this matching study, one missing attribute level was to be filled in by the participant (see Tversky et al., 1988). The participants' task was to provide the missing value so that they perceived the options to be as equally attractive. They were informed that the value provided had to be higher (lower) than the value of the other option on the same attribute. In this way the constructed options that were based on the matching experiments provided some form of normative benchmark. A control group was therefore unnecessary. The remaining two allocations (equality and pro-other) were constructed on the basis of the matched data, that is, they were constructed in such a way that the sum of the objective attribute levels was systematically set at on the same average level. A score of 1 was assigned to the alternative that was chosen, given the highest rating, or rank ordered as the most attractive in the different response procedures, respectively. The remaining three alternatives were assigned a score of 0. If more than one alternative received the same preference rating, the score of 1 was divided equally among the equally preferred alternatives (e.g., a score of 0.5 was assigned to two alternatives when they were equally preferred, and a score of 0 to the remaining two). Results and discussion A 3 (response procedure: choice vs preference ratings vs rank orders) 6 2 (alternative: own community vs joint community gain)62 (attribute range: wide vs narrow) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two factors was performed. The analyses yielded the following effects: univariate F(2, 68) 5 0.13, p 5 .88 for response mode; univariate F(1, 68) 5 5.03, p , .05 for alternative; univariate F(1, 68) 5 6.67, p , .05 for attribute range; univariate F(1, 68) 5 8.89, p , .01 for the interaction between alternative and attribute range. H1a. As indicated by the reliable main effect for alternative (see Figure 1 for an illustration), a prominence effect was observed, in that the own community alternative (the alternative with the highest value on the prominent attribute) generally was more frequently chosen or highly rated than the joint community alternative (the matched nonprominent alternative). There was also an unexpected reliable interaction between alternative and attribute range. This implies that attribute range, although considered a context factor, has an impact on the prominence effect. However, it does not distort it. Manipulation check. The mean weight ratio obtained from the pilot matching-experiment (n 5 36) was 2.18 (the difference between the attribute levels of the nonprominent attribute divided by the difference between the attribute levels of the prominent attribute), indicating that own community gain was perceived to be the prominent attribute. STUDY 2 To replicate the finding from Study 1, the same experimental design was used in Study 2, except PROMINENCE EFFECT: A PRO-SELF COMPONENT? 433 that another context factor was used. It was assumed that H1a should also be supported in Study 2. In the present study, the framing of gains (as a pure gain or as a loss reduction) was used. The substantial importance of framing was first established by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), who defined a decision frame as ''the decision maker's conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice.'' They also suggested that decision frames are partly controlled by the formulation of the problem, and partly by the norms, habits, and characteristics of the decision maker. In addition, Schelling (1981) has revealed that the way in which alternatives are framed is of great importance for the acceptance of governmental tax laws. For instance, depending on the reference point, tax payments may be perceived as a reduced gain or as a loss (Chang, Nichols, & Schultz, 1987). A refund withholding may represent a gain, whereas a tax payment represents a loss (see also Kuhberger, 1998, for a review of the framing literature). However, as in Study 1, it was assumed that the introduction of a framing manipulation of the type described would not have a negative impact on the prominence effect. The reason for introducing the factor is once again to test the robustness/sensitivity of the model. Method Participants. Another 72 undergraduate students (36 men and 36 women), drawn from the same populations of psychology and economics undergraduates at Göteborg University as in Study 1, participated in the study and were paid SEK 50 for their participation. Experimental design. The experimental design was the same as in Study 1, except that type of resource description was used as the context factor for the alternatives. In one version, the resource was framed as ''amount of money per year and inhabitant that the community receives from the government for environmental protection measures.'' In the other version, the resource was framed as ''amount of money per year and inhabitant that the community receives from the government for reduction of taxes related to environmental issues.'' Based on the balancing of gender and type of student population, participants were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions of the 3 (response procedure)62 (alternative)62 (frame; reduction vs reception) factorial design. The same scoring procedure of participants' responses was used as in Study 1. Results and discussion A 3 (response procedure: choice vs preference ratings vs rank orders)62 (alternative: own community vs joint community gain)62 (frame: reduction vs reception) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two factors was performed. The analyses yielded the following effects: univariate F(2, 58) 5 1.22, p 5 .30 for response mode; univariate F(1, 58) 5 22.98, p , .0001 for alternative; univariate F(1, 58) 5 0.68, p 5 .68 for type of frame; univariate F(1, 58) 5 4.98, p , .05 for the interaction between alternative and type of frame. H1a. As indicated by the reliable main effects for alternative (see Figure 2 for an illustration), a prominence effect was once again observed, in that Figure 1. Mean response scores in Study 1 by alternative and control condition. 434 SELART AND EEK the own community alternative generally was more frequently chosen or highly rated than the joint community alternative. A reliable interaction between alternative and type of frame was also observed, indicating that type of frame had an impact on the prominence effect. However, it did not distort it. Manipulation check. The mean weight ratio obtained from the pilot matching-experiment (n 5 36) was 2.36, indicating that own community gain was perceived to be the prominent attribute. STUDY 3 The aim of Study 3 was to replicate the results from Studies 1 and 2, despite the fact that the other key attribute, neighbouring gain, was made prominent and that a new type of framing was applied. This new type is often referred to as the Asian disease design (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), and is generally considered to be the standard type of framing. Participants choose between two options, one offering a sure outcome and the other a risky one. The frames are manipulated by changing the salience of reference points such that participants perceive formally identical outcomes either as gains or as losses. However, as in Studies 1 and 2, it was assumed that the introduction of a framing manipulation of the described type would not have a negative impact on the prominence effect. It was therefore assumed that H1b should be supported in Study 3 and not distorted by this manipulation of a context factor. Method Participants. Forty-eight undergraduate students (24 men and 24 women), drawn from the same populations as in the previous studies, were paid SEK 50 to participate in the study. Experimental design. The experimental design was the same as the one that was used in Studies 1 and 2, with the difference that the nature of the outcome was used as the context factor for the alternatives. In one version the resource could be framed as ''50% likelihood for the community to receive X amount of money from the government per year and inhabitant for environmental protection measures.'' In the corresponding version to this example, the resource would be framed as ''100% likelihood for the community to receive X/2 amount of money to the community from the government per year and inhabitant for environmental protection measures.'' Another difference from the preceding studies was that in all tasks, neighbouring community gain was manipulated as the prominent attribute in the sense that participants were informed that the neighbouring community was in need of (need condition), or had deserved (equity condition), priority over the own community. Based on the balancing of gender and type of student population, participants were assigned to one of two experimental conditions (different versions of manipulating the prominence effect). The same scoring procedure of participants' responses was used as in Studies 1 and 2. Results and discussion A 3 (response procedure: choice vs preference ratings vs rank orders)62 (alternative: own community vs joint community)62 (frame: risky vs risk less) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on all factors was performed. The analyses yielded the following effects: univariate F(2, 47) 5 2.73, p 5 .08 for response mode; univariate F(1, 47) 5 4.15, p , .05 for alternative; Figure 2. Mean response scores in Study 2 by alternative and control condition. PROMINENCE EFFECT: A PRO-SELF COMPONENT? 435 univariate F(1, 47) 5 61.20, p , .0001 for type of frame. H1b. As revealed in Figure 3, the prominence effect was not supported in that the joint community alternative generally was not more frequently chosen or highly rated than the own community alternative. Moreover, a main effect of type of frame was observed but the factor did not interact with alternative. Thus, it had no impact on the prominence effect. Manipulation check. The mean weight ratio obtained from the pilot matching experiment (n 5 36 ) was 1.28, indicating that neighbouring community gain was perceived to be the prominent attribute. STUDY 4 A specific type of framing has been labelled mental accounting (Thaler, 1980). It implies that people in general write down each consequence in black ink or red ink, depending on whether they count it as a gain or loss with respect to some reference point. The basic characteristic of this type of accounting is that people use it in order to take shortcuts and combine, for instance, two gains, or two losses, or a gain and a loss, before writing them down mentally (Baron, 1994). It was assumed that H1b should be supported in Study 4. The status quo effect represents one major form of mental accounting. It implies that people tend to stick to plans with which they are familiar. For instance, it has been revealed by Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) that employees hired before 1980 in an organization tended, 6 years later, to stick with the plans they had originally chosen, and that new plans were chosen mainly by new employees, regardless of age of either group. However, as in Studies 1, 2, and 3, it was assumed that the introduction of a framing manipulation would not have a negative impact on the prominence effect. Method Participants. Another 48 undergraduate students (24 men and 24 women), drawn from the same populations as in the previous studies, participated in the study and were paid SEK 50 for their participation. Experimental design. The experimental design was the same as the one in Study 3, with the difference that the novelty of the situation was used as the context factor for the alternatives. In one version the resource was framed as ''amount of money currently distributed from the government to the community per year and inhabitant since one year for environmental protection measures.'' In the other version the resource was framed as ''amount of money currently distributed from the government to the community per year and inhabitant since ten years for environmental protection measures.'' Based on the balancing of gender and type of student population, participants were assigned to one of two experimental conditions (different versions of manipulating the prominence effect). The same scoring procedure of participants' responses was used as in the previous studies. Results and discussion A 3 (response procedure: choice vs preference ratings vs rank orders) 6 2 (alternative: own Figure 3. Mean response scores in Study 3 by alternative and control condition. 436 SELART AND EEK community vs joint community) 6 2 (status quo: present vs absent) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on all factors was performed. The analyses yielded the following effects: univariate F(2, 45) 5 0.015, p 5 .99 for response mode; univariate F(1, 45) 5 38.31, p , .0001 for alternative; univariate F(1, 45) 5 1.07, p 5 .31 for status quo. H1b. As revealed by the reliable main effect for alternative (see Figure 4 for an illustration), a prominence effect was observed, in that the joint community alternative generally was more frequently chosen or highly rated than the own community alternative. Manipulation check. The mean weight ratio obtained from the pilot matching experiment (n 5 36) was 1.14, indicating that neighbouring community gain was perceived to be the prominent attribute. GENERAL DISCUSSION The results revealed that the manipulation of own community gain as the prominent attribute in a resource allocation situation led to biased preferences. Clearly, in these kind of situations people tended to prefer alternatives that maximize the gain of the own community in favour of alternatives that, for instance, maximize the joint gain of the own and the neighbouring community (see Bonaiuto et al., 2002; Fried, 2000; Giuliani, 2002, for a discussion). On the other hand, making neighbouring community gain prominent made participants take into account both own community gain and neighbouring community gain to a higher extent. The underlying logic for this reasoning is that making one of the attributes (own community gain) prominent in a resource allocation decision would be equal to a strong manipulation of in-group social identity. The pro-self nature of the prominence effect Based on the previous research, a prominence effect was expected in that participants were generally assumed to prefer a matched alternative that maximized the own community gain to a matched alternative that maximized the joint gain, if ''own community gain'' was manipulated to be the prominent attribute. The results obtained from Studies 1 and 2 supported these predictions. It was also assumed that participants would prefer an alternative that maximized the joint gain of the own community and a neighbouring community, if ''neighbouring community gain'' was made the prominent attribute. In this situation, participants were not assumed to prefer a pro-other alternative that maximized the gain of the neighbouring community. The underlying reason was that it was predicted that making an ''other interest attribute'' prominent would not result to the same extent in noncompensatory reasoning leading to the prominence effect. Since participants in these studies preferred an alternative that maximized the joint gain of both communities, the results obtained from Studies 3 and 4 also supported these predictions. Taken together, the results from all the four studies thus suggest that making the gain of the neighbouring community prominent de-biases the prominence effect to a higher extent compared to making own community gain prominent. Place identity may very well serve as an important driver (Cuba & Hummon, 1993). Hence, it may be argued that there seems to be some kind of a pro-self component that explains a large part of the variance observed for the prominence effect. Some form of in-group Figure 4. Mean response scores in Study 4 by alternative and control condition. PROMINENCE EFFECT: A PRO-SELF COMPONENT? 437 favouritism may also serve as the driver for it (Brewer, 1999, 2001; Otten & Mummendy, 2000). A strength of the study was that these major results appeared to be quite robust when considered as task effects, as the salience of the manipulated context factors in the studies (in terms of reliable main or interaction effects) did not distort them. The salience of equality as a competing force It should be noted that the equality alternative was not assumed to be the most preferred alternative to such a high extent as it actually was. Whether the preference for the equality alternative may be interpreted as being driven by place identity or resulting from some kind of shallow processing is a question that remains to be answered. For instance, Messick (1993) observed that the popularity of the equality principle in many resource allocation tasks may be explained by the fact that it is quite easy to implement heuristically. Thus, an important feature of this principle is that it is quite simple to use. All the information one needs is the number of share takers and then it becomes quite easy to make a division and calculate the per capita share. For this reason, people use equality heuristically, that is, they do not always think seriously and inquisitively about their decision (Messick, 1993, 1995; Roch et al., 2000). Taking the results from all four studies into account, an interpretation seems plausible in line with Messick's explanation of why people prefer equality alternatives to such a high extent. After all, the preference levels for the equality alternative appeared rather independent on whether ''own community gain'' or ''neighbouring community gain'' was manipulated to be the prominent dimension. Limitations The operationalization of the joint community alternative was built on the fact that it has recently been suggested that place identity may play a role in resource dilemmas (e.g., Bonaiuto et al., 2002; Fried, 2000; Giuliani, 2002). It was also built on empirical findings suggesting that the notion of place, in people's general opinion, refers to any combination of communities in a region (Cuba & Hummon, 1993). Still, there seems to be a disagreement between different camps of place theorists in the sense that some of them state that place identity is restricted to relationships between humans and their physical environment whereas others use the concept to encompass both social and physical environments. For this reason, it is difficult to draw any clear conclusions about how the concept of place identity may have served as a driver for the observed cooperative behaviour (preference for the joint community alternative). This is something that remains to be explored more thoroughly. Implications for future research Future research in the area of contingent weighting in judgment and choice will probably focus more on social decision situations that involve the maximization of gains for others too. Research on how different biases may occur in decision situations that do not include the welfare of others has dominated up until now (Baron, 1997, 1998; Loukopolis & Scholz, 2003, for a practical example). Future field experiments may, for instance, compare people who have been residents in their own community for a long time to people who recently have moved to a new community. It may be the case that such subgroups will have different cognitive representations of what place identity means to them. Manuscript received March 2004 Revised manuscript accepted February 2005 REFERENCES Allison, S. T., & Messick, D. M. (1990). Social decision heuristics in the use of shared resources. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 3, 195–204. Baron, J. (1994). Thinking and deciding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Baron, J. (1997). Biases in the quantitative measurement of values for public decisions. Psychological Bulletin, 122, 72–88. Baron, J. (1998). Judgment misguided. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Beattie, J., & Baron, J. (1991). Investigation of the effect of stimulus range on attribute weight. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 17, 571–585. Bonaiuto, M., Carrus, G., Martorella, H., & Bonnes, M. (2002). Local identity processes and environmental attitudes in land use changes: The case of natural protected areas. Journal of Economic Psychology, 23, 631–653. Bornstein, G., Rapoport, A., Kerpel, L., & Katz, T. (1989). Withinand between-group communication in intergroup competition for public goods. 438 SELART AND EEK Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 25, 422–436. Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice: Ingroup love or out-group hate? Journal of Social Issues, 55, 429–444. Brewer, M. B. (2001). In-group identification and intergroup conflict: When does in-group love become out-group hate? In R. D. Ashmore, L. Jussim, & D. Wilder (Eds.), Social identity, intergroup conflict, and conflict reduction (pp. 17–41). New York: Oxford University Press. Brewer, M. B., & Kramer, R. M. (1986). Choice behaviour in social dilemmas: Effects of social identity, group size, and decision framing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 543–549. Chang, O. H., Nichols, D. R., & Schultz, J. J. (1987). Taxpayer attitudes toward tax audit risk. Journal of Economic Psychology, 8, 299–309. Cuba, L., & Hummon, D. M. (1993). A place to call home: Identification with dwelling, community, and region. The Sociological Quarterly, 34, 111–131. Dawes, R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 169–193. Deutsch, M. (1975). Equity, equality, and need: What determines which values will be used as a basis of distributive justice? Journal of Social Issues, 31, 137–150. Fischer, G. W., & Hawkins, S. A. (1993). Strategy compatibility, scale compatibility, and the prominence effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 19, 580–597. Fried, M. (2000). Continuities and discontinuities of place. Journal of Environmental Psychology, 20, 193–205. Giuliani, V. (2002). Theory of attachment and place attachment. In M. Bonnes, T. Lee, & M. Bonaiuto (Eds.), Psychological theories for environmental issues (pp. 137–170). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate. Goldstein, W. M. (1990). Judgments of relative importance in decision making: Global vs local interpretations of subjective weight. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 47, 313–336. Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243–1248. Hewstone, M., Rubin, M., & Willis, H. (2002). Intergroup bias. Annual Review of Psychology, 53, 575–604. Kahneman, D., & Ritov, I. (1994). Determinants of stated willingness to pay for public goods: A study in the headline method. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 9, 5–38. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (2000). Choices, values, and frames. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kemp, S. (1998). Rating the values of government and market supply goods. Journal of Economic Psychology, 19, 447–461. Kemp, S. (2003). The effect of providing misleading cost information on the perceived value of government services. Journal of Economic Psychology, 24, 117–128. Kemp, S., & Burt, C. D. B. (2001). Estimation of the value and cost of government and market supplied goods. Public Choice, 107, 235–252. Kemp, S., & Willetts, K. (1995). Rating the value of government-funded services: Comparison of methods. Journal of Economic Psychology, 16, 1–21. Kramer, R. M., & Brewer, M. B. (1984). Effects of group identity on resource use in a simulated commons dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 1044–1057. Kuhberger, A. (1998). The influence of framing on risky decisions. A meta-analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 75, 23–55. Leventhal, G. S. (1976). The distribution of rewards and resources in groups and organizations. In L. Berkowitz & E. Walster (Eds.), Advances in experimental social psychology, Vol. 9 (pp. 99–131). New York: Academic Press. Loukopolis, P., & Scholz, R. W. (2003). Future urban sustainable mobility: Using 'area development negotiations' for scenario assessment and for assisting the democratic policy process. Natural and Social Science Interface, 40, 1–32. Messick, D. M. (1993). Equality as a decision heuristic. In B. Mellers & J. Baron (Eds.), Psychological perspectives on justice: Theory and applications (pp. 11–31). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Messick, D. M. (1995). Equality, fairness, and social conflict. Social Justice Research, 8, 153–173. Messick, D. M., & Brewer, M. B. (1983). Solving social dilemmas: A review. Review of Personality and Social Psychology, 4, 11–44. Meyer, R. J., & Eagle, T. C. (1982). Context-induced parameter instability in a disaggregate-stochastic model of store choice. Journal of Consumer Research, 19, 62–71. Montgomery, H., Selart, M., Gärling, T., & Lindberg, E. (1994). The judgment–choice discrepancy: Noncompatibility or restructuring? Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 7, 145–155. Otten, S., & Mummendey, A. (2000). Valence-dependent probability of in-group favouritism between minimal groups: An integrative view on the positive– negative asymmetry in social discrimination. In D. Capozza & R. Brown (Eds.), Social identity processes: Trends in theory and research (pp. 96–116). London: Sage. Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1993). The adaptive decision maker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Roch, S., Lane, J. A. S., Samuelson, C. D., Allison, S. T., & Dent, J. L. (2000). Cognitive load and the equality heuristic: A two-stage model of resource overconsumption in small groups. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 83, 185–212. Sampson, E. E. (1975). On justice as equality. Journal of Social Issues, 31, 45–64. Samuelson, C. D. (1993). A multiattribute evaluation approach to structural change in resource dilemmas. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 55, 298–324. Samuelson, W., & Zeckhauser, R. (1988). Status quo bias in decision making. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1, 7–59. Schelling, T. C. (1981). Economic reasoning and the ethics of policy. Public Interest, 63, 37–61. PROMINENCE EFFECT: A PRO-SELF COMPONENT? 439 Selart, M. (1996). Structure compatibility and restructuring in judgment and choice. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65, 106–116. Selart, M., Boe, O., & Gärling, T. (1999). Reasoning about outcome probabilities and values in preference reversals. Thinking and Reasoning, 5, 175–188. Selart, M., Gärling, T., & Montgomery, H. (1998). Compatibility and the use of information processing strategies. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 11, 59–72. Thaler, R. (1980). Toward a positive theory of consumer choice. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1, 39–60. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211, 453–458. Tversky, A., Sattath, S., & Slovic, P. (1988). Contingent weighting in judgment and choice. Psychological Review, 95, 371–384. 440 SELART AND EEK

Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference Daihyun Chung*1) 【Keywords】Inter-personal Co-referentiality, Inter-theoretic Co-referentiality, Natural Reference, Vivid Demonstrative Predicate, Same L Relation, Original Reference, Derivative Reference 【ABSTRACT】I happen to believe that although human experiences are to be characterized as pluralistic, they are all rooted in one reality. I would assume the thesis of pluralism but how could I maintain my belief in realism? There are various discussions in favor of realism but they appear to stay within a particular paradigm and so to be called 'internal realism.' In this paper, I try to justify my belief in reality by discussing a special use of indexicals. I argue for my indexical realism by advancing the thesis that indexicals can be used as an inter-agentic referential term. Three arguments for the thesis are presented. The first argument derives from a revision of Kaplan-Kvart's notion of exportation. The notions of exportation of singular terms can be analyzed as intra-agentic exportation in the context of a single speaker. This may be revised to be an inter-agentic exportation in the context of two speakers who use the same indexicals. The second argument is from the notion of causation, which is specifically characterized in the context of inter-theoretic reference. I argue that any two theories may each say "this" in order to refer to what is beyond its own theory. Two theories may address themselves to "this" same thing although what "this" represents in each theory can turn out to be different objects all together. The third argument is based * Ewha Womans University, Seoul, [email protected] The Journal of Philosophical Ideas, Special Issue, 03-33, 2017. DOI : http://dx.doi.org/10.15750/chss.65s.201708.001 Daihyun Chung4 on a possibility of natural reference. Reference is used to be taken mostly as a 3-place predicate: Abe refers an object oi with an expression ej. The traditional notion of reference has been constructive and anthropocentric. However, I argue that natural reference is a reference that we humans come to recognize among denumerably many objects in natural states: at moment mi in a natural state, there is a referential relation among objects o1, o2, o3, ..., oj, oj+1, ... which interact with each other as agents of information processors. Natural reference is an original reference, which is given independently of a human language and to which humans are passive as they derivatively refer to it by using "this." I. Indexicals: A Foundation for Realism An utterance of the sentence "I am here now" is like a human footprint in that both entail the existence of an agent―the speaker of the remark and the maker of the footprint. This article pursues this suggestive analogy in an attempt to develop a stable theory of realism, one that is based upon certain features of indexical expressions. The discussion that follows is motivated by the realization that the assumption of pluralism, which is essential for the co-existence of human kinds, requires a stable theory of realism and that perhaps the three most common versions of realism may not suffice for this purpose. Thus, a new theory of realism is needed. While pluralism and realism may at first glance appear to be incompatible,1) in what follows I argue that they are indeed consistent; in 1) I would start with a sort of working definitions of pluralism, realism and indexical realism. Pluralism is a belief that there are two or more systems of true interpretations of the world, realism is a belief that there are things independent of a human language which make sentences to be true, and indexical realism is a belief that indexicals like "this" have certain roles to play in connecting plural systems and reality. The traditional dichotomy of realism and idealism may be due to a failure to Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 5 particular, I show that indexical-based realism does not violate the presuppositions of pluralism. At a general level, realist theories can be divided into three types: common sense realism, internal realism and radical realism. Common sense realism generally manifests itself as a critical response to relativism or postmodernism. One well-known approach to common sense realism was taken by D. Davidson,2) who held that truth is primitive; contrary to what relativists claim, Davidson insisted that truth is what is presupposed whenever people make assertions. Common sense realists typically believe that pluralism does not, whereas relativism does, presuppose a primitive notion of truth. An explanation is needed of whether, and if so how, these two views can be reconciled. One possible explanation may hinge on the idea that every speaker presupposes some notion of truth, but this truth need not be the primitive truth of metaphysical realism. Another version of realism worth considering is Putnam's internal realism.3) Like Kantian epistemology, this version of realism depends on the distinction between a thing-in-itself and a concept-dependent object. Putnam advanced this notion of realism along with a notion of truth that is concept-dependent. He abandoned the notion of metaphysical realism appreciate the roles that indexicals play in human languages. One type of realism, exemplified in Aristotle's and Aquinas' notion of scala naturae, presupposes an ontological hierarchy, supposing that purer a form is more real it is; and traditional idealism, which may be traced to the philosophies of Berkeley and Hume, provides justifications for pluralism in actual social experiences, regarding that indexicals are just relative as any cognitive ideas are. Neglect for the role of indexicals may be due to the long-standing presupposition in philosophy that ordinary language is inferior to "the" formal language. 2) Davidson, D. (1990: 279-328; 1984: 65-76). 3) Putnam, H. (1981: 22-48; 1988: 22-32; 1990: 30-42; 1980: 464-482). Putnam in his later period advanced semantical externalism in his discussion of the twin-earth thought-experiment, which may be understood as a move toward scientific realism. This version, though more persuasive than other versions, still does not discuss how inter-agentic references can be related. Daihyun Chung6 and along with it any notion of truth that is transcendent or non-epistemic, such as the correspondence theory of truth. Putnam accepted that truth is epistemic and that reference is not transparent but rather internalistic in the sense that communal forms of life are constructed out of an "empirical influx." However, it is far from clear how this empirical influx makes his internalism genuinely realistic. Further explanation is needed. A third version of realism can be found in Davidson's theory of radical interpretation.4) According to Davidson, it is possible, given the principle of charity, for the speakers of one language to correctly interpret the sentences uttered by speakers of a radically different language. Furthermore, Davidson held that the possibility of radical interpretation does not require any notion of direct reference or external truth. However, the process of radical interpretation relies too much on the individual capacities of the interpreter and provides an unsatisfactory basis for drawing realist conclusions. If there is a solid justification for realism, it should be found in something other than Davidson's notion of primitive truth, Putnam's empirical influx, or the theory of radical interpretation. The argument for realism that I put forward in this paper is based on a particular understanding of indexicals, that is, expressions such as "I/you," "here/there," "today/yesterday," and other terms whose referents are context-sensitive. Some philosophers regard expressions of tense (e.g. "is"), modality (e.g. "possible"), gradual adjectives (e.g. "fast"), and even folk-psychological verbs (e.g. "realizing", "intending", "knowing")5) as indexicals, at least when they are understood contextually. According to Kaplan, the linguistic meaning (i.e. character) of indexicals is 4) Davidson, D. (1984: 125-140; 1990: 279-328). 5) Perry, J. (1979: 723-734); Babb, M. (2016: 439-457); Schaffer, J. (2004: 73-76). Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 7 conventional while their reference or referential meaning (i.e. content) is contextual; Kaplan also proposed that the contexts of indexiclas are constituted by agent, time, location and possible worlds.6) Thus, Kaplan thought that any sentence S is true in the context C or in the world of C, where the predicate "being true in the world of C" is more basic than the predicate "being true in the context of C" since the latter is regulated by the former. In what follows I accept that indexicals are ordinarily understood in accordance with Kaplan's semantics, but I explore the possibility that in certain exceptional cases indexical expressions can be used independently of any notion of possible worlds. My strategy is to pay close attention to the way in which indexical expressions like "this" refer. While "this" is typically used in ordinary language to refer to an object, indexical realism looks beyond Kaplan's intra-contexts to consider how the term functions in inter-contexts.7) In other words, the direct referentiality of "this" can be generalized as inter-agentic referentiality. I will argue below that the inter-agentic referentiality of "this" covers both inter-speaker and inter-theoretic referentiality and, furthermore, that inter-agentic referentiality applies also to the information processors that are found in the natural world. These arguments will be used to justify the position of indexical realism.8) 6) Kaplan, D. (1985; 1979: 401-412); Braun, D. (2015; 2008: 57-99). 7) Schaffer, J. (2004: 82-86) makes a distinction between indexicality, which is constructed by semantical rules, and ternicity, which is generated by the absence of clear devices. He takes contextualism to treat 'knows' as an indexical that denotes different epistemic properties in different contexts and contrastivism to treat 'knows' as denoting a ternary relation with a slot for a contrast proposition. I will argue that contrastivism resolves the main philosophical problems of contextualism, by employing a better linguistic model. Contextualist insights are best understood by contrastivist theory. But he seems to deny the possibility that an indexical can be used independently of an established language. 8) Sun-Hie Kim (2013: 276-278) takes the thesis of my conception of inter-agentic reference (i) to presuppose that two theories are incommensurable, not sharing any Daihyun Chung8 II. Inter-Personal Co-Referentiality My first argument for indexical realism is based on Kaplan and Kvart's notion of the exportation of singular terms. Writing in response to Quine's question, sometimes called "Frege's Puzzle", concerning the logic of propositional attitudes,9) Kaplan and Kvart claimed that different singular terms can refer to the same object in the context of a single speaker. By way of illustration, consider the following sentences: (1) Ralph believes "the man in the brown hat is a spy." (2) Ralph believes "the man seen at the beach is not a spy." (3) The man in the brown hat = the man seen at the beach = Ortcutt. (4) Ralph believes "Ortcutt is a spy and Ortcutt is not a spy." (5) Ralph believes "the man in the brown hat is a spy and the man seen at the beach is not a spy." (6) Is Ralph rational or not rational? Quine believed that (1), (2), and (3) together imply (4) and that (4) entails that Ralph is irrational, which is counter-intuitive. The problem, in Quine's view, is the failure of the rule of the substitutivity of identicals in the context of propositional attitudes. However, according to Kaplan and Kvart, the problem consists in the inference from (1), (2), and (3) to (4); they insist that what is entailed by (1), (2), and (3) is not (4) but rather (5), which does not conflict with the supposition that Ralph is rational. Kaplan and Kvart's argument is based on the idea that (3) is object or any property, and (ii) to imply that the co-referentiality thesis allows two theories to be commensurable. And she questions whether the presupposition and the implication are compatible. 9) Quine, W. (1971: 101-111); Kaplan, D. (1971: 112-144); Kvart, I. (1982: 295-328). Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 9 true on its de re reading but false on its de dicto reading. Since Ralph's beliefs―those expressed by (1) and (2)―are de dicto one cannot use the de re reading of (3) to infer (4). The rule of the substitutivity of identicals implied by (3) applies only in de re contexts. In order to provide a de dicto interpretation of (3), Kapalan and Kvart introduce the notion of a vivid reference predicate, "predicate R (that a singular expression e denotes an object oi vividly in the case of the speaker a)," which is formalized as follows:10) (K1) R (e, o, a) iff e represents o vividly to a; that is, iff (i) e denotes o, (ii) e is a name of o for a, and (iii) e is sufficiently vivid. One can rewrite (1) and (2) in accordance with (K1) by using the following notation [B = believe; S = being a spy; H = a man in the brown hat; ιxHx=the man in the brown hat (the x: Hx); B = a man seen at the beach; ιxBx=the man seen in the beach (the x: Bx); o1 = Ortcutt; r = Ralph]. (1a) (∃x) (R (ιxHx, Ortcutt, Ralph) and Ralph B "x is a spy"); (2b) (∃y) (R (ιxBy, Ortcutt, Ralph) and Ralph B "y is not a spy"); Then, given (1a) and (2b), together with the de dicto reading of (3), one can infer (5a) or, formally, (5b). (5a) (∃x) (∃y) (R (ιxHx, Ortcutt, Ralph) and R(ιxBy, Ortcutt, Ralph) and Ralph B "ιxHx is a spy and ιxBy is not a spy"). 10) Kvart, I. (1982: 305-307); Kaplan, D. (1971: 134-138). Daihyun Chung10 (5b) (∃x) (∃y) (((R(ιxHx, ο1, r) ∧ R(ιxBy, ο1, r)) ∧ Β(r, "Sx and ˥Sy")) Finally, (5b) allows the transparent structure in (7), which shows that Ralph can maintain consistency and rationality in the context in which he apparently holds incompatible beliefs about the same person (e.g. Ortcutt). (7) (∃x) (∃y) (((R(ιxHx, ο1, r) ∧ R(ιxBy, ο1, r)) ∧ Β(r, "Sx and ˥ Sy")) ∧ (ιxHx = ιxBy= ο1)). Kaplan-Kvart's notion of vivid reference predicate R can be revised to support indexical realism; thus, two speakers, while using "this" to refer the same thing, can say about different objectst. In other words, it is possible to transform the vivid reference predicate R into the vivid demonstrative predicate D, that is, "predicate D (that a demonstrative 'this' refers an object oi vividly in the case of the speaker a"). In ordinary language, "this" typically exhibits direct referentiality, which carries with it a concrete space-time context. The fact that a speaker a utters "this" to refer an object oi means that a has a vivid representation at space-time t when a utters "this". I now introduce the following predicate, D, modeled on Kaplan and Kvart's predicate R: (K2) D (this, o, a, t) iff "this" represents o vividly to a at t; that is, iff (i) "this" denotes o at t, (ii) "this" is a name of o for a at t, and (iii) "this" is sufficiently vivid at t. Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 11 The question to ask at this point is how if at all this vivid demonstrative predicate D is relevant to indexical realism. To see how it is, consider the following hypothetical scenario. Mary and Nancy adopt different paradigms and yet they pay attention to what is the shared interest of a scientific community to which they both belong. And they use the demonstrative "this" to refer to that shared interest. This scenario can be represented as in (8) using the following notation: [∃this = for some token utterance of "this";11) m = Marry; n = Nancy; g=the thing of the shared interest of a scientific community at a certain time period; thism = "this" uttered by Mary at ti; thisn = "this" uttered by Nancy at tj; Ui = being understood in language Li ]. (8) (∃this)(D (this, g, m, t) ∧ D (this, g, n, t) ∧ (Uithism ∧ ˥ Uithisn ∧ Ujthisn)) Mary's "this" and Nancy's "this" have the same demonstrative character but represent different uses or contents. The two cases of "this" behave as rigid demonstratives, possibly referring to the same thing, that is, a shared interest of the scientific community to which they both belong. This grammar can be expressed as follows: (9) (∃this) (((D (this, g, m, t) ∧ D (this, g, n, t)) ∧ (Uithism ∧ ˥ Uithisn ∧ Ujthisn)) ∧ (this = g)) This sentence captures the idea that Mary and Nancy can use the same word "this" to refer to the same thing while having different understandings of the thing in question. In other words, different 11) "∃this" can be rephrased as "(∃x) (this) x m t (for some x, x is an event of utterance of "this" by an agent m at time t)". Daihyun Chung12 speakers are able to speak differently about the same thing.12) The plausibility of the vivid demonstrative predicate D can be seen by reconsidering Quine's notion of reference. For Quine, reference is both inscrutable and relative. It is inscrutable in that referential relations cannot be determined uniquely by states of affairs; it is relative in that referential relations are chosen relative to a translation manual.13) Davidson, on the other hand, rejected the idea that reference is relative, claiming that the natural way of stating a rule to the effect that "expression x refers to object y relative to a translation manual" is to say simply that the translation manual translates x into y. Davidson drew a distinction between the ontology and the epistemology of reference and thereby accepted the inscrutability of reference while denying its relativity. Quine tried but failed to introduce the relativity of reference into a speaker's language, for no discussion can take place unless the relativity of reference is already solved.14) These debates concerning the understanding of reference are plausible only if one ignores the issue of indexical reference. The direct referentiality of "this" shows the limitations of the Quine-Davidson debates over reference. To see this one need only consider the notion of an object, which is one of the four places for the demonstrative predicate. Sentence (8) indicates how Mary and Nancy 12) One may ask what is the same thing referred to by "this" used by two competing theories. This question sounds natural since there seems no candidate for a sortal concept readily available to combine the two cases in the competing theories. But from my perspective, it is empirical investigations which will answer to the question whether what the competing theories talk about by using "this" are the same or not. 13) Quine, W. V. O. (1960: 26-30, 72-79). Quine's two propositions may lead him to embrace a form of semantic eliminativism, but his notion of stimulus meaning allows him to entertain a sort of dispositional reductionism (Kai-Yuan Cheng 2008). Yet, both of Quine's meaning skepticism and his notion of stimulus meaning points to the idea of naturalizing of meaning. 14) Davidson, D. (1984: 229-239). Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 13 speak of the object oi within their respective languages Li and Lj, both uttering "this" at time t to refer it. Though the two objects which are grasped and understood in two different languages may not be the same, those two objects are traceable, in principle, to something which is not yet involved with any conceptual or linguistic networks. It is something which is free of Kaplanian possible worlds, which is to be directly referred to only by "this", and which is to be given only as a thing rather than an object. When different scientific communities under different paradigms come to recognize a shared interest it may be rigidly designated by "this" and dubbed "g." For example, if what is called "water" is H2O in the actual world it is H2O in every possible world; here "it" refers rigidly to that same thing. What (8) and (9) show is that it is possible to maintain the special function of the direct referentiality of "this" even if one accepts Quine's or Davidson's understanding of reference. Two speakers may use "this" to say differently about two different objects in their own languages, and yet their different explanations may be about the same thing. III. Inter-Theoretic Co-Referentiality The second argument for indexical realism is based on the idea of inter-theoretic co-referentiality, that is, the idea that two different theories can refer to a thing outside of each theory using "this". Two theories on the surface seem to construct two different objects from what they call "this" within intra-theoretic space. But on a deeper analysis these "two different objects" are traceable to the same source.15) It will 15) One case of tracing to the same source can be constructed as follows. In my view, Newton's 'lightn' and Einstein's 'lighte' are causally connected to their utterances of Daihyun Chung14 be helpful at this point to see how intra-theoretic reference is related to inter-theoretic reference. In the previous section I accepted the distinction between the ordinary linguistic meaning (i.e. character) of "this" and its context-dependent referent (i.e. content), and I assumed that the selection of the referent is determined solely by a speaker's intentions. Jaegwon Kim has made an important observation about this assumption.16) Kim's reservation about the notion of reference concerns the causal relation between the event of the initial naming and that of the derivative naming, but his question is ultimately focused on the relation between the act of naming and the object thereby named. How does the act of naming reach the object thereby named? In other words, how are an act and an object connected? The first candidate to connect them is a description which selects a referent. However, Kim believes that a descriptive phrase does not "this," and their relevant singular terms can be identified with what was referred to by their utterances of "this". Jinho Kang (2013:272-274) has observed that what is required of the causal connection is theory-dependent, and Hwan Sunwoo (2013: 284-287) has suggested that things which can be identified are not guaranteed to be identical. Both Kang and Sunwoo have concluded that the notion of co-referentiality that I tried to reach by the means of "this" is not available. Their observations are relevant as far as their traditional frames are allowed to be reasonable. But I claim that a distinction between theory-dependent object and theory-independent thing can be made and that "this" can be used to refer not only intra-causal events which we can talk about within scientists's frames, but also to refer trans-causal events which we cannot talk about but which we can only point to as thisness. 16) Kim, Jaegwon (1977: 606-620). However, Kim may be taken as a sort of indexical realist. For the notion of indexicals need not be limited to particular linguistic expressions. The notion may be expressed by an indicator, which was suggested by Kim (1996: 191-193) and Stalnaker (1984: 18). Many people may share the same belief that it is now raining here. For there is a correlation in a normal condition between the situation that it is now raining here and the perception that it is now raining here. If the correlation obtains then the perception is said to be the indicator of the situation that it is now raining here. Since Kaplan's notion of indexical consists of two elements, linguistic meaning (character) and referential meaning (content), Kim's notion of indicator appears to satisfy these two conditions. Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 15 determine the selection of a referent; rather, he thinks that the description which helps to select the referent presupposes the speaker's cognitive contact with the referent. This cognitive contact is some sort of direct cognition or Russelian acquaintance. Furthermore, Kim believes that the Kripkean causal theory of reference is exposed to the difficulties associated with Russel's idea of acquaintance. Kim's concern about the relation between the act of naming and the object named is justified when one maintains a sharp epistemological distinction between subject and object. However, this distinction, which was central to the tradition that stretches from Descartes to Hume, was first weakened by Kant's Copernican turn and later called into question again by epistemology of quantum mechanics. According to Jung Won Lee,17) whereas measurement in classical mechanics is a copying process that shows the value of physical quantities on the assumption that physical quantities really exist in physical objects and correspond to physical properties, quantum mechanics involves a completely different notion of measurement. In quantum mechanics measurement is not a mirroring act that copies what is there physically; rather, measurement has two aspects, one of which consists of an epistemic mode in the sense that some physical stimulus allows some empirically meaningful proper value, the other of which is a physical mode in the sense that physical objects carry proper states to correspond to empirical effects. The coexistence of epistemic and physical states gives rise to a distinction between measurement information and state information. Measurement information exhibits an empirical representation, which is significant at the moment the observer obtains a measurement but which has nothing to do with any future events or their causal involvements. State information, on the other hand, is informative of the causal relations by which one can 17) Lee, Jung Won (2009: 1-23; 2002: 287-290). Daihyun Chung16 predict the result of the measurement. This information is given empirical meaning only through some special semantic rules, which give rise to theory-dependent object descriptions. State information has a one-to-one correspondence with measurement information only at the moment of measurement. Thus, these two different kinds of information are heterogeneous. The distinction between state information and measurement information in the epistemology of quantum mechanics has significant implications for the role of the demonstrative "this" in intraand inter-theoretic reference. "This" may be used to reflect both types of reference at the same time even when used in different theories. The demonstrative's intra-theoretic referentiality is a descriptive referentiality in which state information is given some empirical meaning in accordance with relevant semantic rules. But the demonstrative's inter-theoretic referentiality is a referentiality of measurement information, which the speakers obtain in their contact with the thing at the moment of measurement. Intra-referentiality may vary at different times of measurement, but it is stable due to the constancy of a theory, whereas inter-referentiality, though restrained by the condition that measurement is relevant only at the moment, is real referentiality that mirrors state information in the sense that measurement information and state information have a one-to-one correspondence.18) 18) The distinction between intra-theoretic referentiality and inter-theoretic referentialiy may be clarified through the contrast between haecceity and haecceitism. If haecceity is a term to denote some discrete properties of an object that make it a particular thing then the haecceity would be an object's thisness, whereas if haecceitism is a term to denote the numerical distinctness of two possible worlds which are indistinguishable from each other then the haecceitism provides a candidate for the criterion for transworld-identity. It may be plausible to take the following understanding that haecceity is an essentialist interpretation of this to see its thisness in the intra-theoretic context whereas haecceitism is an empirical investigation of whether two possible worlds are only numerically distinct (Son Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 17 While quantum mechanics challenges the epistemological distinction between subject and object, it remains to be seen how the dissolution of this dichotomy is realizable in the relation of state information and measurement information by using "this" as an inter-agentic reference. Toward this end, Putnam's discussion of indexicality and rigid designation will be helpful.19) Putnam tried to clarify the Kripkean notion of rigid designation by indexicality. Suppose, for instance that W1 and W2 are possible worlds which are indistinguishable except what are clled "water" in the two worlds is H2 O in W1 and XYZ in W2 and that a glass in W1 is filled with H2O and a glass in W2 is filled with XYZ. Two speakers, one in each world, each point to their respective glasse, and make the following utterance: (10) This is water. Putnam thinks that there are two possible theories for explaining the meaning of "water" in the utterance (10). Suppose W1 is the actual world. Then the first theory is that "water" is extensionally relative to worlds but is intensionally independent of worlds. The second theory is that "water" means different things in the two worlds, that what is called "water" in W2 is really not water, and that water is H2O in every possible world. Thus, the demonstrative "this" is interpreted differently in the foregoing two theories. "This" is understood in its de dicto sense in the first theory but in its de re sense in the second. Putnam takes the second interpretation to be the proper one. The two theories can be summarized as follows: 2003; Choi 2008; Dorato 2013). 19) Putnam, H. (1970: 102-118; 1973: 119-132; 1977: 423-442; 1978b: 97-119). Daihyun Chung18 (T1) (W)(x in W)(x is water ↔ x bears same L to the entity referred to as "this" in W); (T2) (W)(x in W)(x is water ↔ x bears same L to the entity referred to as "this" in the actual world W1). The "same L" relation stands for a trans-world relation between two terms. Their extension is the set of ordered pairs of individuals which may not exist in the same possible world. For example, if a is 5m tall in W1 and b is 5m tall in W2, {<a, b>} belongs to the extension for the predicate "being of the same height." Likewise, "being of the same liquid" or "being not of the same liquid" may have a trans-world relation. {< H2O, XYZ>} belongs to the extension for the predicate "not being of the same liquid." Appealing to this notion of trans-world indexicality, Putnam defined rigidity as follows: an expression "e" is rigid if and only if the object which is so called in the world W1+n has the same L relation with the object which is called "e" in the actual world W1.20) Putnam's strategy of obtaining rigidity by means of "this" is interesting in that "this" may play a similar role in alleviating ambiguity and vagueness since "this" can refer to either state or measurement information. Without Putnam's strategy, it is difficult to know whether "this" should be understood in its de re or de dicto sense in reference to that information. But with his analysis, it is easy to see how "this" can be 20) Putnam and I share a realistic view of the world by appealing to the notion of indexicality as shown in Putnam's view of the twin earth thought experiment and my notion of reference. But Putnam does not go in to the detailed discussion as to how the notion of de re indexicality could get out of the Kaplanian possible world structure. In other words, Putnam explains how the demonstrative "this" can hold the same L relation of reference of the actual world W1 to the reference of another possible worldn+1. But his explanation takes place within a Kaplanian intra-possible worlds. He did not pay attention to a possible notion of trans-possible world reference relation. Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 19 understood in its de re sense. For the "same L" can be understood, not relative to worlds, but rather based on the actual world W1. However, Putnam's position is incomplete since though the referentiality of state information is stabilized through Putnam's de re interpretation of "this", the referentiality of measurement information remains in darkness. Though the referentiality of state information can clearly maintain its intra-theoretic referentiality, there seems no way to show how the inter-theoretic referentiality would be plalusible in the case of measurement information. One candidate to explore for the challenge may be accessible from Jung Won Lee's notion of pluralistic reality. This can be characterized as follows: (i) if measurements about what is denoted by "this" or "something" result in the same consequences under the same circumstances then the identity of the denotation can be empirically confirmed; (ii) as for the value of "this" if one can predict through a theory that the probability of the value is 1 then what is denoted by "this" is not discontinued but temporally sustainable; (iii) if the measurement of the denotation of "this" (property A) of a thing does not have any influence on the information of the denotation of "that" (property B) of the thing then what are denoted by "this" and "that" are independent. Given that constancy, sustainability, and independence are neither logical nor a priori, these are conditions for pluralistic realism.21) It seems that Jaegwon Kim's question about the relation between the naming act and the object named has been partially but not completely answered. To provide a complete answer it is necessary to take into 21) The three conditions for Lee's pluralistic reality can be read in the context of epistemology of classical mechanics. But here they need to be taken to entertain the idea of how some different momentary pluralistic measurements could be empirically correlated with each other in the context of the Seoul Interpretaion of quantum mechanics. Daihyun Chung20 account how "this" is used causally in context. The aforementioned distinction between an object oi and a thing gj can be rephrased as follows: what is connected with other elements within a system by the utterance of "this" becomes an object oi (state information), but what is not connected thus but just touched by an utterance of "this" is a thing gj (measurement information). The distinction enables one to see more clearly the two dimensions of the causal context of "this". There are two routes leading to causality in the context of an utterance of "this." The linguistic route is a causal chain which starts from an utterance of "this" and ends with the object oi within the theory; the ontic route is a causal chain which starts from an utterance of "this" and ends with the thing gj outside of the theory. The linguistic route of causality is one in which different theories arrive at objects of different understanding with a notion of rigidity that is relevant to their own linguistic formulations. But the ontic route of causality reaches what is the same endpoint despite the different uses of "this" by various theories. IV. Natural Reference The third argument for indexical realism is based on the notion of natural reference.22) In this section I will explicate the notion of natural 22) My thesis of natural reference may look "highly stretched" but it may be strengthened by considerations of semantics of natural languages. Procedural semantics by Johnson-Laird (1977), Cognition as Categorization by Harnad (2005), Semantics of Natural Selection by Jeongmin Lee (2017) and Reference Naturalized by Chung (2016b) may be taken to show such a direction. Meaning of a word does not have to presuppose notions like intentionality or mental image but is fully located at the role-place which the word occupies in the meaning space of its system, natural or artificial. Any spatio-temporal marks exhibited in Whalesongs, warning sounds of birds, bees' waggle dance are bound to have the role-place in Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 21 reference and show how indexicals play an instrumental role in it. Traditionally, reference is understood as a three-place predicate, Rabc, as in "a speaker ai refers to an object bj by an expression ck". A speaker is the subject of a referring act, an object is the target, and an expression is a part of a given language or something added to the language. The distinction between the traditional reference and natural reference can be understood in terms of the relation between an object and a thing: an object is concept-dependent whereas a thing is theoryindependent. Prior philosophical discussions that establish the concept-dependency of objects include Kant's transcendental arguments, Wittgenstein's discussion of language games, and Goodman's exposition of the ways of world making.23) Perhaps the best example of arguments for the concept dependency of objects may come from Kaplan, who constructed the notion of context relative to possible worlds. For him, a referential object (i.e. the content) of an indexical expression is a language-dependent or possible world-dependent object. However, a thing exists independently of the linguistic constraints that any conception presupposes. Kaplan interprets indexicals in terms of contexts defined by possible worlds, but on this interpretation there is no way in which indexicals can connect to things outside of Kaplanian possible worlds, yet it should in principle be possible to connect them. If traditional reference is intra-theoretic, there should also be a trans-theoretic reference by means of indexicals to refer to those things outside of Kaplanian possible worlds. This is how the notion of natural reference should be understood. To illustrate the foregoing consider how "this" can refer to an inter-theoretic thing. Of course, "this" is capable of referring to whatever their respective life systems. They don't require any notion of intentionality in order to have a meaning. 23) Kant, I. (1987, 1781/1787), Wittgenstein, L. (1953), Goodman, N. (1978). Daihyun Chung22 a speaker wants to talk about, an object or a thing. Some notions of causality may help to shed light on the distinction between an object and a thing. The theoretical immanence of an object is part of the structure on which the linear theory of causality is based. The linear theory analyzes the notion of causation in terms of the following bi-conditional:24) "ci is a cause of cj if and only if ci is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for cj but a necessary part of a sufficient condition for cj". The events that enter into linear causal relations must be intra-theoretic events, otherwise it would be impossible to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the alleged causation. Though such events are passive, as all Cartesian material things are, they obtain conceptuality through Kantian epistemological constructions in order to become theoretically inter-connected and eventually part of a sufficient condition for causation within a theory. The linear theory of causation offers no explanation as to how passive material events can engage in active causal relations. Such causal relations can be described as mechanistic, but the key question is how this sort of causation is powered and structured. A plausible answer to this question can be found in the notion of yinyang, where things in nature are viewed as active subjects that process information. Yinyang permits and demands the active agency from things in nature and requires those things to exhibit natural referentiality unlike passive objects that possess only concept-dependent referentiality.25) But what exactly is this natural reference? Just as mechanistic reference is dependent on the metaphysics of the Cartesian tradition, natural reference may be taken to be based on the naturalism of yinyang, which comes from a different philosophical tradition.26) 24) Mackie, J. L. (1975). 25) Chung, D. (2014; 2013; 2008a). Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 23 Yinyang naturalism is an ontology in which trans-theoretic things exist and complement each other with the properties of yin and yang. In the order of yinyang, things in nature consist of dispositions, properties, and events, all of which are trans-theoretic beings. Such things are active processors of information and intentional subjects that preserve their own identity, existing among other subjects. Therefore, a thing in nature at a particular moment simultaneously plays the dual roles, (i) as a subject that refers to others and at the same time (ii) as an object that is referred to by others. Inter-connections of natural reference are thus given in such a yinyang order. Humans approach this order of natural reference linguistically with an understanding of natural reference that is interpretative and hermeneutical. Natural reference is not an a priori reference reflecting an established language but rather an executive reference exhibiting how nature really works. To understand how natural reference is trans-theoretic, one must distinguish between two notions of natural reference, namely, that of state information and that of property essentiality. Given this, let us now see how "this" can function derivatively as a natural referring term. The first type of natural reference is that of state information in which different things are mutually referential as active processors of information. State information is local and causal. There are many ways in which things, as parts of an organic system, communicate with each other, one of which relates to the hypothesis that causal relations are a natural kind.27) Natural kinds are exemplified in things like tigers and spinach and also in material substances like water and gold. One understands how they behave through scientific inquiry. Scientists construct theories to understand and explain concrete cases of natural 26) Chung, D. (2016a; 2008c). 27) Chung, D. (2014: 10). Daihyun Chung24 kinds. But when they refer to these natural kinds, the act of referring is an act of interpreting what they are presented with; it is hermeneutical rather than constitutive of the natural kind. For example, chemists construct theories about molecular formulas within one or another conceptual framework, but what they observe in concrete cases is types of material molecules or the number of atoms within the molecule. When chemists say "water is H2O," "caffeine is C2H10N4O2," or "gold is Au," they are referring to structural elements within particular natural kinds. They are referring hermeneutically to what they experience in the lab. Causal relations are generally understood as localized or lateralized. For example, information-processing for perceptions and emotions are localized in the brain. Seeing, hearing, sensing, movement, linguistic understanding, and aphasia are exemplifications of the relevant properties of different parts of a human brain. And yet these different parts of the brain share information with each other, exhibiting the inter-relationality of parts of the whole and facilitating a re-invigoration of perception at another level.28) The notion of brain localization may be applicable to the case of state information as well. We can regard the world as the totality of state informations and take various states not only as localized but also as inter-relational. States form systems of various kinds and levels, showing manifestations of dispositions as well as the silencing of dispositions. States as dispositions can be analyzed in terms of the dispositional property of causality.29) Causes are merely dispositions toward particular results and they do not necessitate any particular results simply because those causes may be constrained by 28) According to Jungoh Kim (2011), the notion of information localization seems to have helped Fodor (1983) and Robbins (2009) advance the concept of informational encapsulation, but this concept fails to explain the connections among information encapsulations at the next stage because of its dissociative character. 29) Mumford & Anjum (2011, 2010); Marmodoro (2010). Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 25 other forces. Such forces behave additionally or deductively just as vectors have sizes and directions. Such a model helps to draw a picture of the relations between things such as causal modality, the manifestations of power, a power's withdrawal causality, and causal probability. This picture can be understood as nothing other than an informational structure in which the manifestation forces as well as the withdrawal forces of parts of a state are both localized. The efficacy of causality is the power of a property of a thing.30) Properties are given, natural or physical, and yet they are also dispositional, intentional, and information-processing. The essentiality of properties is manifested when properties reveal themselves as subjects that refer to each other in their causal relations. Speakers utter "this" to refer derivatively to what those natural subjects refer to originally. The second type of natural reference is based on an analysis of the essentiality of a property. Some reference seems to be mutual reference among essential properties in states of nature; in other words, essential properties do exist. The argument for this claim consists of the following three hypotheses: (i) fitting31) pairs in a causal relation are connected essentially; (ii) essential properties of a thing are primitively modal; and (iii) the rejection of essential properties implies that true counterfactuals cannot be entertained. What then are essential properties? One may answer this question in Kripkean manner.32) Nelson Rolihlahla Mandela 30) As John Heil (2003) claims, properties or qualities are all objects of perceptions, they cannot be objects of perception without power, and the individuation of properties cannot be separated from the individuation of manifestations of properties. Thus, the powers of properties become dispositions of properties. As Heil thinks that all properties are dispositions, we may be reminded of the way he argues: properties are all objects of perceptions; they cannot be objects of perception without power; the individuation of properties cannot be separated from the individuation of manifestations of properties; the powers of properties become dispositions of properties; therefore all properties are dispositions. 31) Chung, D.(1997; 2008b). Daihyun Chung26 was a South African anti-apartheid politician, who served as President of South Africa from 1994 to 1999. This is true, but contingently true. The property expressed by "being President of South Africa" was a contingent property of N. R. Mandela, since he might not have been President of South Africa. Born on July 18, 1918, N. R. Mandela was the son of Nkosi Mphakanyiswa Gadla Mandela and Nonqaphi Nosekeni. If this is true then it is necessarily true. The property of being the son of N. M. G. Mandela and N. Nosekeni is an essential property of N. R. Mandela. For the zygote cell that developed at time ti from a sperm of N. M. G. Mandela and an ovum of N. Nosekeni could not become anything other than N. R. Mandela. Once an essential property is understood in such a way, it is easy to see that natural reference is not a notion constructed within an arbitrary language; rather, it is something reached through the interpretation of the structure of an essential property. This can be illustrated by means of an example that shows how fitting pairs in a causal relation are connected essentially. Consider this sentence: "Ice cubes in a glass cool water and water in the glass melts ice cubes." The properties referred to by "the cooling of water by ice cubes" and "the melting of ice cubes by water" execute causal powers to each other and construct simultaneous and mutual causal relations.33) The two 32) Kripke, S. (1977a: 16-17, 113-114; 1977b); Chung, D. (1988). 33) Martin (2008: 175-185); Molnar (2003: 187-196). Some may disagree with my interpretation of Kripkean property essentialism here. Chen Bo (2011) does not accept the idea of a posteriori necessity; instead he claims that proper names or rigid designators are forms of descriptions. Lee & Yi (2016) argue that origin essentialism implies that there are individually possible but jointly impossible organisms and material objects, whereas the essentialist arguments rest on the assumption that, contra to origin essentialism, any two possible things of the kind in question are compossible. Sungil Han (2016) proposes that Kripke's negative thesis of origin essentialism―the claim that objects necessarily have their origin in no alternative source to the actual one―fails to constitute the positive thesis of origin essentialism that objects necessarily have their origin in some pertinent source. But Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 27 properties above each have their own individual dispositions; they become a causally fitting pair under relevant conditions and engage in causal manifestations. The two properties become essential for the manifestation of their causal relations. They become fitting pairs, fitting only to each other, among all the properties in the world. They refer to each other in their essential relation through the processing of informations, and a human observer derivatively can recognize their original mutual references and interpret them. How is it possible that two properties in the relation of a fitting pair refer to each other? According to one dispositionalist analysis,34) the properties referred to by "the cooling of water by ice cubes" and "the melting of ice cubes by water" are dispositions toward manifestations of such results under appropriate circumstances, having the function of selecting a fitting partner among many available properties. Properties are disposed to direct themselves toward fitting partners, to look for them, and to favor them. Causal powers and the dispositions of these properties cannot be analyzed in any other way, it seems. The causal powers of the essential properties of a thing are primitively modal. In this article I have tried to defend the position of realism by arguing that "this" can be an inter-agentic referential term. The indexical can be used to connect the different experiences of two speakers; two token utterances of "this" can point to the same thing even though the two the structure of my interpretation is such that if N. R. Mandela actually originated from the zygote formed at ti from the sperm of N. M. G. Mandela s and the ovum of N. Nosekeni then it is necessary that N. R. Mandela originated from that zygote. I would not reject the notion of compossibility, for an example, that it is actual that N. R. Mandela was the son of N. M. G. Mandela and N. Nosekeni, and yet it is compossible that N. R. Mandela was the son of non-N. M. G. Mandela and N. Nosekeni. But this compossibility is allowed when we take Putnam's "same L" relation as de dicto. (note my discussion above about two theories of meaning of the word "water"). 34) Mumford & Anjum (2011: 189-190). Daihyun Chung28 speakers express different contents with those utterances. The demonstrative "this" may also be used in two different theories to refer to the same thing with which the theories are concerned. Even though "this" tends to be understood in ordinary language mostly as an intra-agentic term, I tried to identify a space in which an inter-agentic use takes place. I have also argued that the natural world of causal dispositions consists of natural agents that are information processors. If these natural agents find fitting partners and come to have mutual causal relations, they can refer to each other in their original state. We human beings interpret those original referential relations derivatively by using indexicals.35) Submitted: 2017. 02. 28 Reviewed: 2017. 07. 09 Confirmed for Publication: 2017. 07. 10 35) Acknowledgment: This paper was read at The 3rd CCPEA (Conference on Contemporary Philosophy in East Asia, August 19-20, 2016, Seoul National University). I thank all the participants of the conference for their helpful discussions. I am especially grateful to Professors John McGuire, Inrae Cho, Jung Won Lee, Jinho Kang, Hwan Sunwoo, Sun-Hie Kim, and 3 anonymous reviewers for their criticisms, stimuluses or helps to improve the paper. Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 29 References Babb, M. (2016), "The Essential Indexicality of Intentional Action", The Philosophical Quarterly, 66 (264): 439-457. Bo, Chen (2011), "Proper Names, Contingency A Priori and Necessity A Posteori," History and Philosophy of Logic 32 (2):119 138. Bacon, J. et al. eds. (2008), Ontology, Causality, and Mind, Cambridge University Press. Braun, David (2015), "Indexicals", Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (on line), ed. E. N. Zalta. Braun, David (2008), "Complex Demonstratives and Their Singular Contents," Linguistics and Philosophy, 31: 57-99. Cheng, Kai-Yuan (2008), "The Significance of Indeterminacy: Semantic Eliminativism or Dispositional Reductionism?", Philosophy and Culture 35 (8): 47-65. Chung, Daihyun (2013), This Spoken of Thus-Pluralistic Realism (in Korean), Seoul: Sechang Publishing. Chung, Daihyun (1997), Philosophy of Fitting: Toward Meaning and Truth (in Korean), Seoul: Cholhakgwahyunsilsa. Chung, D. (2016a), "Integrationality(誠): A Metaphysical Basis for the Concept of Causation" (CCPEA 2012 Teipei), The Korean Society of Analytic Philosophy, ed., Philosophical Analysis, 17(1): 1-20. Chung, D. (2016b), "Can Reference Be Naturalized?Notes toward an Integrational(誠) Causality" (CCPEA 2014 Kyoto), Philosophy Study 6 (5): 289-304. Chung, D. (2014), "Dispositions: An Integrational(誠) Analysis" (Gyunghee Disposition Workshop 2012), Diogène, 248: 59-70. Chung, D. (2008a), "Intentionality of Cheng (誠): Toward an Organic View," Korean Philosophical Association, ed., Philosophy and Daihyun Chung30 Culture: Metaphysics, 2008: 33-40. Chung, D. (2008b), "Fitting: A Case of Cheng(誠) Intentionality", Abstracts: XXII World Congress of Philosophy: 109. Chung, D. (2008c), "Seeds: Agents of Cheng(誠) Intentionality", Abstracts: XXII World Congress of Philosophy: 110. Chung, D. (1988), "Kripkean Essentialism and Natural Kinds" (in Korean), Korean Philosophical Association, ed., Philosophy, 29(Spring 1988): 129 -145. Choi, Lee-Sun (2008), "Essence and Identity", Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 15:29-36. < https://philpapers.org/s/ Lee-Sun%20Choi >. Davidson, D. (1990), "The Structure and Content of Truth," Journal of Philosophy, June, 1990: 279-328. Davidson, D. (1984), Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press, 1984. Dorato, M. and Morganti, M. (2013). "Grades of Individuality: A Pluralistic View of Identity in Quantum Mechanics and in the Sciences". Philosophical Studies 163: 591-610. French, P. A. et al. eds. (1979), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Goodman, N. (1978), Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis: Hackett. Han, Sungil (2016), "The Limit of the Kripkean Defence of Origin Essentialism," The Spring Proceedings of the Korean Society of Analytic Philosophy. Harnad, Stevan (2005). "To Cognize is to Categorize", in Lefebvre, C. and Cohen, H., Eds. Handbook of Categorization. Elsevier. Heil, John (2010), "Powerful Qualities", in Marmodoro (2010): 58-71. Heil, John (2003), From an Ontological Point of View, Oxford University Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 31 Press. Johnson-Laird, Philip N. (1977), "Procedural Semantics", Cognition, 5: 189-214. Kang, Jinho (2013), "Co-referentiality and Theory Realism" (in Korean), in Chung (2013): 272-274. Kant, I. (1781/1787), Critique of Pure Reason, tr. P. Guyer, et al. Cambridge University Press, 1987. Kaplan, D. (1985, 1978), "Dthat," In Martinich, A. P. ed., (1985). Kaplan, D. (1979, 1978), "On the Logic of Demonstratives," in French, P. A. et al. eds., 1979: 401-412. Kaplan, D. (1971, 1968), "Quantifying in", in Linsky, L. ed. (1971): 120-144. Kim, Jaegwon (1996), Philosophy of Mind, Westview. Kim, Jaegwon (1977), "Perception and Reference without Causality," Journal of Philosophy, 1977: 606-620. Kim, Jungoh (2011), Study of Minds (in Korean), Sigmapress. Kim, Sun-Hie (2013), "Co-referentiality and Theory Realism" (in Korean), In Chung (2013): 276-278. Kripke, S. (1977a, 1972), Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press. Kripke, S. (1977b, 1971), "Identity and Necessity", Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds, in Schwartz, S. P. ed. 1977: 66-101. Kvart, I. (1982), "Quine and Modalities de re: A Way Out?" Journal of Philosophy, June 1982: 295-328. Lee, Chunghyoung & Byeong-uk Yi (2016), "Impossible Objects and Origin Essentialism," The Spring Proceedings of the Korean Society of Analytic Philosophy, 2016. Lee, Jeongmin (2017), "Learning Chinese Room", AI after Alphago, Korean Society for Philosophy of Science Proceedings, July 5-6, Daihyun Chung32 2017: 179-194. Lee, Jung Won (2009), "A New Approach to the Measurement and Schroedinger' Cat Paradox: Supports from Stern-Gerlach Experiment" (in Korean), Korean Society for Philosophy of Science, ed., Philosophy of Science, 12(1): 1-23. Lee, Jung Won (2002), "A Critical Defense of Internal Realism" (in Korean), Korean Society of Philosophical Studies, ed., Philosophical Studies, 58: 279-303. Linsky, L. ed. (1971), Reference and Modality, Oxford University Press, 1971. Mackie, J. L. (1975), "Causes and Conditions", Causation and Conditionals, ed. Ernest Sosa. Oxford University Press. Marmodoro, A., ed. (2010), The Metaphysics of Powers, Routledge. Marmodoro, A. (2010), "Introduction", in Marmodoro (2010): 1-7. Martin, C. B. (2008), "Power for Realists", in Bacon, J. et al. eds. (2008: 175-185). Martinich, A. P. ed., (1985), The Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Molnar, G. (2003), Powers-A Study in Metaphysics, Oxford University Press. Mumford, S. & Anjum, R. K. (2011), Getting Causes from Powers, Oxford University Press. Mumford, S. & Anjum, R. K. (2010), "A Powerful Theory of Causation", in Marmodoro (2010): 143-157. Perry, J. (1979), "The Problem of the Essential Indexical", Nous, 24 (5): 723-734. Putnam, H. (1990), Realism with a Human Face, Harvard University Press. Putnam, H. (1988), Representation and Reality, MIT Press. Indexical Realism by Inter-Agentic Reference 33 Putnam, H. (1981), Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge University Press. Putnam, H. (1980), "Models and Reality" The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 45-3(Sept. 1980): 464-482. Putnam, H. (1978b), "Reference and Understanding", in Putnam, H. (1978a): 97-119. Putnam, H. (1978a), Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Boston: RKP. Putnam, H. (1977), "Analyticity and Apriority: Beyond Wittgenstein and Quine", Midwest Studies in Philosophy, IV: 423-442. Putnam, H. (1973), "Meaning and Reference", in Schwartz, S. P. ed. (1977): 119-132. Putnam, H. (1970), "Is Semantics Possible?" in Schwartz, S. P. ed. (1977): 102-118. Quine, W. (1956), "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes", in Linsky, L. ed. (1971): 101-111. Quine, W. (1960), Word and Object, Wiley. Schaffer, J. (2004), "From Contextualism to Constrastivism", Philosophical Studies, 119 (May 2004): 73-103. Schwartz, S. P. ed. (1977), Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Son, Byung-Hong (2003), "Haecceitic Modal Acutalim" (in Korean), Korean Society for Analytic Philosophy, ed., Philosophical Analysis, 17: 61-82. Stalnaker, R. (1984), Inquiry, MIT Press. Sunwoo, Hwan (2013), "Co-referentiality and Theory Realism" (in Korean), in Chung (2013): 281-287. Wittgenstein, L. (1953), Philosophical Investigations, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell.

Digital self-harm: Prevalence, motivations and outcomes for teens who cyberbully themselves PREPARED BY DR EDGAR PACHECO, NEIL MELHUISH AND JANDY FISKE What is this about? This research report presents findings from an exploratory study about the extent and nature of digital self-harm among New Zealand teens. Digital self-harm is broadly defined here as the anonymous online posting or sharing of mean or negative online content about oneself. The report centres on the prevalence of digital selfharm (or self-cyberbullying) among New Zealand teens (aged 13-17), the motivations, and outcomes related to engaging in this behaviour. The findings described in this report are representative of the teenage population of New Zealand by gender, ethnicity and age. New Zealand-based research on teens and online risks and harm has focused on the nature of peer victimisation incidents such as the case of cyberbullying and its impact (see Fenaughty & Harré, 2013; Jose, Kljakovic, Scheib, & Notter, 2012; Marsh, McGee, NadaRaja, & Williams, 2010). Netsafe has also contributed to this emerging body of research by investigating topics such as the impact of unwanted digital communications on teens, including their involvement in risky behaviours Summary of findings • Overall, 6% of New Zealand teens have anonymously posted mean or negative content online about themselves in the past year. • Among those teens who engaged in digital self-harm, most did it more than once (65%). • Digital self-harm appears to be more prevalent among younger teenagers, those aged 13 and 14 years old. • Teenagers' top reasons for this behaviour were: making a joke, wanting to show resilience, looking for friends' sympathy, and seeking reassurance of friendship. • Girls and boys pointed out different reasons for engaging in digital self-harm: o Girls reported wanting to show resilience, looking for friends' sympathy, and seeking reassurance of friendship. o Meanwhile, for boys it was mainly about making a joke. • There is an indication that digital selfharm is more prevalent among teens experiencing one or more disabilities. • About a third of respondents (35%) said they achieved the outcome they looked for after digitally self-harming themselves. This was significantly higher for boys than girls. • Teens who did not self-harm believe that those who did it mainly look for peer attention and the sympathy from friends. 2 such as "sexting" (see Pacheco & Melhuish, 2017, 2018c). As outlined above, investigation about New Zealand children and teens being the target of the online aggression of other(s) is increasing. This is due to concerns that technologymediated abuse can cause emotional distress and problematic behaviour, and affect academic achievement at school (Harel-Fisch et al., 2011) and is possibly linked to depression (Raskauskas, 2009). Meanwhile, international media outlets have been reporting individual cases of young people's engagement in technology-mediated self-harassment1 – also called "selfcyberbullying" (Englander, 2012) or "selftrolling" (Patchin & Hinduja, 2017). However, no New Zealand studies have explored this topic until now2. This situation differs from overseas where some seminal work has been conducted on the prevalence of this apparently new behaviour (see Englander, 2012; Patchin & Hinduja, 2017). The term digital self-harm was first used by boyd (2010) to describe those teens who "are self-harassing by 'anonymously' writing mean questions to themselves and then publicly answering them" (boyd, 2010, para. 3). boyd's observations about this phenomenon originated from anecdotal conversations with staff from Formspring, a social media platform that allowed anyone to ask questions to registered users anonymously. After receiving complaints from parents about their children being anonymously bullied online, the platform found that in some cases the abusive content had been sent by those children to themselves. According to boyd, teens' engagement in digital self-harm appeared to be, in part, a "cry for help" as they seemed to want attention, support and validation from their parents. Another apparent reason was teens wanting to "look cool" as being exposed to public criticism can make them look 1 See for instance https://www.bbc.co.uk/bbcthree/article/05e9991d-4713-4ad4-b9af-eecd47d7dfd7 or https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/04/21/604073315/when-teens-cyberbully-themselves 2 However, like overseas, media and research interest has concentrated on traditional forms of self-harm which include inflicting self-injury (e.g. cutting or burning). See https://www.stuff.co.nz/national/108558122/why-are-our-girls-hurting-themselves important. A third explanation was that teens were looking for compliments and support from their friends (boyd, 2010). The following section presents current research on digital self-harm. These studies have informed our methodological design. What we know so far Current quantitative research on the extent of digital self-harm is limited to a handful of overseas studies. One is a 2012 report by Englander who investigated the prevalence of digital self-harm among 617 American first-year college students (18-19 years old). She asked participants whether they had falsely posted a cruel remark about themselves during high school. The study found that 9% of students said they engaged in this behaviour. The prevalence was higher among boys (13%) than girls (8%). According to the study, participants' main motivation for posting mean online content about themselves was to gain the attention of their peers. In addition, those who engaged in this behaviour were more likely to be frequent users of drugs and alcohol (Englander, 2012). Recently, Englander has estimated that the prevalence of digital selfharm or self-cyberbullying, as she also calls it, has not only increased compared to her 2012 study but has consistently remained around 15% in the last three years (Englander, 2017). Another American study (see Patchin & Hinduja, 2017) found that around 6% of students have anonymously posted online mean content about themselves at any point in time. In contrast with Englander's (2012) research, this study was based on nationally representative data of students aged 12-17 years old. Patchin and Hinduja (2017) also found that digital self-harm was more common among males (7.1%) than females (5.3%) and that non-heterosexual teens were three times more likely to have done it compared to their heterosexual peers. However, the authors did not find a significant link between this 3 behaviour and age or race. Finally, the study also found a relationship between digital selfharm and depression, offline self-harm, and bullying (Patchin & Hinduja, 2017). As previously mentioned, there is no New Zealand-based research on digital self-harm. We believe that by exploring the nature and extent of this behaviour, Netsafe is providing the online safety community, schools and parents with insights about a complex and, to some extent, hidden phenomenon involving New Zealand teens. However, we also understand that more interdisciplinary work is needed to understand this phenomenon in order to provide support to those young people who engage in this behaviour, their families and communities. What we did This digital self-harm report is part of a larger research project exploring New Zealand children and teens' experiences of online opportunities, risks and challenges3. The project also includes the views of parents/caregivers. An online survey was the research instrument used for this project. Quantitative data were collected between 20 July and 30 September 2018. The survey was administered by Colmar Brunton. This report only presents findings about questions related to digital self-harm asked of teenage participants aged 13-17 years old (n=1110). Our decision to focus on teenagers was supported by prior research that suggests young people in this age range are more likely to engage in self-harming behaviours and be more active online (Lewis, Heath, Michal, & Duggan, 2012). The maximum margin of error of this study for the whole sample is +/2.9% at 95% confidence level. The maximum margin of error of this study for the whole sample is +/2.9% at 95% confidence level. 3 The study is part of Netsafe's contribution as an active member of the Global Kids Online (GKON) network. See http://globalkidsonline.net/ 4 This definition as well as our research approach were informed by available research and analysis conducted overseas (see boyd, 2010; Englander, 2012; Patchin & Hinduja, 2017). The objective of this study was to explore the prevalence of digital self-harm among teens, their self-reported motivations, and the outcomes related to engaging in this behaviour. Our working definition of digital self-harm was4: The anonymous online posting or sharing of mean or negative online content about oneself. This definition situates digital self-harm as a behaviour rather than as an illness or disorder. This is because a range of underlying factors might explain this behaviour from family issues to psychological aspects and physical illness (Skegg, 2005). As mentioned, data collected for this study are broadly representative of New Zealand teenagers in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, and region. In our sample, 16% of teenagers indicated having a disability, which included one or more experiences of a physical disability, physical illness, learning difficulty, and/or mental health difficulty. While this study provides relevant insights about an unexplored topic in New Zealand, it also has limitations. There is a possibility that participants did not answer honestly about their engagement in digital self-harm, because, for example, they feel embarrassed about their actions. This sort of challenge is common in research that relies on self-reported data. In addition, research on offline self-harm suggests that young people tend not to disclose their behaviour (Armiento, Hamza, & Willoughby, 2014). We managed these challenges by guaranteeing participants that their responses were anonymous. Due to the nature of the questions we also provided links to support services in case the young people participating in the survey wished to seek advice or help. 4 What we found This section presents the main findings of the study including insights based on key demographics, when relevant. Also, as the Approved Agency under the Harmful Digital Communications Act 2015, Netsafe holds unique professional and operational experience within the online safety domain. For this reason, we asked our Contact Centre team, which directly and daily deals with a number of technology-mediated incidents affecting New Zealanders, to contribute with comments on the findings and to reflect on their implications which are included in this section. Note that percentages in figures/tables may not total exactly 100% due to rounding or because survey participants were allowed to choose multiple answers to some questions. FREQUENCY OF DIGITAL SELF-HARM The digital self-harm questionnaire started by asking the 1110 teenage research participants (aged 13-17) whether they have anonymously posted or shared online mean or harmful content about themselves in the past year. To measure prevalence our response scale included: "Never", "Once", "A few times (2-4 times)", "Many times (5 or more times)", "I don't know", and "Don't want to answer". After aggregating participants' responses, our data show that a large majority of participants (87%) said they did not engage in digital selfharming. However, 6% indicated they posted anonymously negative comments about themselves while the remaining 7% said they did not know or did not want to answer the question – see Figure 1. Figure 1. Overall frequency of digital self-harm among teenagers Base: All teenage participants aged 13-17 (n=1110) Of the teenagers who engaged in digital selfharm in the last year (n=66) most had done so more than once. Specifically, our results show that 57% anonymously posted mean online content about themselves "A few times (2-4 times)" while 8% did so "Many times (5 or more times)". Teens who engaged in this behaviour only once represented 35% – see Figure 2. Figure 2. Frequency of digital self-harm among those who have done this Base: Teenagers aged 13-17 who have shared mean/harmful content about themselves in the prior year (n=66) 87% 6% 7% No Yes Don't know/don't want to answer 35% 57% 8% Once A few times (2-4 times) Many times (5 or more times) 5 The difference regarding gender was not statistically significant in our results. However, it is noteworthy that the prevalence of digital self-harm was slightly higher among boys (7%) than girls (5%) – see Figure 3 for details. Figure 3. Frequency of digital self-harm among teenagers by gender Base: All teenage participants aged 13-17 (n=1110) Interestingly, our findings also reveal some differences regarding the prevalence of digital self-harm among specific age groups. For example, the percentage of younger teenagers, those aged 13 and 14 years old, who engaged in digital self-harm was 7% and 9%, respectively5. From there the trend started to decrease. The prevalence of digital selfharm for 15-year-olds was 6%, and 5% for those aged 16 years old. A lower occurrence of digital self-harm was registered among 17 years old (4%). See Figure 4 for further details. Note that the labels "Don't know" and "Don't want to answer" are not included to facilitate graphical interpretation of the frequency of digital self-harm by age. 5 Note the error for this age-related data is 4.2% (at 10%/90% agreement). 6 Note that teenage participants in our survey were not directly asked whether they have a disability. We asked their parents this question. Figure 4. Frequency of digital self-harm among teenagers by age Base: All teenage participants aged 13-17 (n=1110) Our data does not show significant differences in regard to ethnicity. On the other hand, while our data are not representative of the teenage population with a disability, there is an indication from the findings that teens experiencing one or more disability are more likely to engage in digital self-harm, in particular those teens having a physical disability, a behavioural disability and mental health issue6. MOTIVATIONS FOR DIGITAL SELFHARM We also wanted to explore the motivations of the teens that reported digital self-harming in the past year. This involved asking these participants the question: "What was the reason(s) that motivated you to post or share anonymously mean or harmful content online against yourself?". To answer the question, participants were presented with a list of possible reasons. They were able to choose one or more options. 87% 7% 6% 87% 5% 7% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% No Yes Don't know/don't want to answer Male Female 87% 87% 86% 86% 91% 7% 9% 6% 5% 4% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 13 14 15 16 17 Teenagers' age (years) No Yes 6 According to the teens who engaged in digital self-harm the four top reasons explaining their behaviour were: making a joke (33%), wanting to show others "I could take it" (24%), looking for friends' sympathy (23%), and wanting to know if someone was "really my friend" (22%) – further details are given in Table 1. Table 1. Main motivations for digital self-harm Motivations % It was a joke 33% I wanted to show others I could take it 24% I was looking for sympathy from friends 23% I wanted to see if someone was really my friend 22% I don't know why I did it 18% I was looking for attention 12% I was looking for help 8% Another reason (please explain) 5% Don't want to answer 2% Base: Teenagers aged 13-17 who have shared mean/harmful content about themselves in the prior year (n=66) Interesting differences were found regarding teens' gender. For boys (41%), engagement in digital self-harm to make a joke was significantly higher than girls (21%). However, in relation to other top reasons, it was more common among girls to say that they anonymously posted mean content online to show others "I can take it" (29%), look for their friends' sympathy (31%), and seek reassurance of friendship (29%). Boys rated these reasons significantly lower – see Table 2 for further details. Table 2. Main motivations for digital self-harm by gender Motivation Boys Girls It was a joke 41% 21% I wanted to show others I could take it 21% 29% I was looking for sympathy from friends 17% 31% I wanted to see if someone was really my friend 17% 29% I don't know why I did it 14% 24% I was looking for attention 14% 9% I was looking for help 10% 6% Another reason (please explain) 5% 5% Don't want to answer 2% 3% Base: Teenagers aged 13-17 who have shared mean/harmful content about themselves in the prior year (n=66) SUCCESS IN ACHIEVING THE DESIRED OUTCOMES THROUGH DIGITAL SELFHARM Participants who shared mean/harmful content online about themselves were also asked about the outcomes of their behaviour. Specifically, we asked them whether they achieved what they wanted after posting the mean content online. Figure 5. Success in achieving the desired outcomes of engaging in digital self-harm Base: Teenagers aged 13-17 who have shared mean/harmful content about themselves in the prior year (n=50) 35% 33% 32% Yes No Don't know/Don't want to answer 7 As Figure 5 shows, just over a third of these participants (35%) responded "Yes". Meanwhile, 33% indicated they did not achieve the outcome they looked for. Those who said they did not know or did not want to answer the question comprised 32% of the results. Interestingly, boys and girls reported different outcomes regarding the sharing of mean content online about themselves. The percentage of boys (48%) indicating they achieved what they wanted was significantly higher compared to girls (16%). This result might be explained by the motivation behind this behaviour reported by boys, who indicated that, in most cases, the action(s) was a joke. The differences between boys and girls are highlighted in Figure 6. Figure 6. Success in achieving the desired outcomes of engaging in digital self-harm by gender Base: Teenagers aged 13-17 who have shared mean/harmful content about themselves in the prior year (n=50) PERCEIVED REASONS FOR OTHERS' ENGAGEMENT IN DIGITAL SELF-HARM The last question explored teens' perceived reasons for why other people would engage in this behaviour. Only those teenage participants who said they did not post anonymously online content about themselves (n=978) were asked this question: "Why do you think some people would post or share anonymously mean or harmful content online about themselves?". The response scale used to explore the motivations of teens engaging in digital self-harm – see Table 2 – was adapted. The insights from this question show a mismatch between perceived and actual reasons behind digital self-harm behaviour among teenage participants. For these respondents the most common reasons were getting peers' attention (42%) and receiving their friends' sympathy (41%). These results contrast with the responses from those who actually posted mean content online about themselves (see Table 3). Table 3. Perceived motivations for others' engagement in digital self-harm Perceived motivations % To get their peers' attention 42% To get sympathy from friends 41% To see if someone was really their friend 24% I don't know why they do it 24% To get help 20% It was a joke 20% To show others they could take it 12% Another reason 3% Don't want to answer 2% Base: All teenagers aged 13-17 who have not shared mean/harmful content about themselves (n=978) 42% 10% 48% 17% 67% 16% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% Don't know/Don't want to answer No Yes Male Female 8 7 This percentage is similar to an American study which also relied on data from a representative sample (see Patchin & Hinduja, 2017). Concluding remarks This report has presented findings from an exploratory study about the prevalence of digital self-harm among New Zealand teens, including the motivations and outcomes related to engaging in this behaviour. Based on data collected from a nationally representative sample, the study found that 6% of New Zealand teens aged 13-17 years old have anonymously posted mean or negative content online about themselves in the past year7. It is noteworthy to mention that digital self-harm or self-cyberbullying was slightly more common among boys compared to girls and that prevalence was particularly higher among 14-year-old teens (9%), and lower among their peers aged 17 years old (4%). Findings about teens' reasons for engaging in digital self-harm are also revealing. Those who posted mean content online about themselves pointed out that they mainly did it as a joke, wanted to show resilience, looked for friends' sympathy, and/or sought reassurance of friendship among other reasons. However, and more interestingly, there are distinctive differences in girls' and boys' motivations. For girls, engagement in this behaviour seems motivated by the need (and perhaps pressure) for peer recognition and validation but also the consolidation of close social connections. In this respect, and as our data describe, wanting to show others that they can take aggression online or wanting to make sure someone else was indeed their friend were motivations rated higher by girls. In contrast, for boys, making a joke was largely the reason behind digital selfharm. At first glance, boys' behaviour can be seen as a naïve act. However, it is also plausible that seeking to be funny or cool might also be another form of looking for peer attention and validation. In short, teens' motivations for digital self-harm vary but they seem to fall under the scope of looking for support and attention. Contact centre reflections on cases and queries Since November 2016 Netsafe's contact centre team has received two reports of cases known to involve self-cyberbullying, and several in which it may have been involved. We also have received a few queries about the topic from concerned parents. However, this is a much lower reporting rate compared to other online risks young people experience such as abuse or harassment. In both confirmed cases the teenagers involved clearly experienced a high degree of distress and/or harm. However, it was also apparent that their self-cyberbullying behaviours were just one aspect of a more complex situation involving a range of online and offline factors. In our experience parents and other caregivers cannot always determine whether this is in fact self-inflicted behaviour. Sometimes, as impartial observers experienced in understanding and addressing online risks and challenges, the contact centre team are better placed to identify where self-cyberbullying may be occurring. However, rather than 'calling out' that behaviour, which the teen and/or those around them may not want to admit to, we instead try to focus on helping that person change how they are interacting online which is more constructive in the long term. Finally, perhaps because of the lack of cases we have received, this research has raised Netsafe's awareness of this phenomenon, and the need to develop our understanding of what is involved. 9 Young people's internet safety is a critical issue not only for parents but also broader society. However, while digital tools provide young people with a range of opportunities for learning, socialising and being informed among others (Pacheco & Melhuish, 2018a), there are risks and potential harm due to their use and misuse. As previous Netsafe research shows, the negative impact of harmful digital communications is higher among young people compared to adults (Pacheco & Melhuish, 2018c). Thus, supporting teens to develop healthy online behaviours is also key for their general safety and wellbeing. In such a context, this study provides insights about a type of behaviour that, until now, had received little attention in New Zealand. The fact that there is a group of teens engaging in digital self-harm or self-cyberbullying for different reasons demands raising awareness about this phenomenon and reflecting on its implications. As teenagers go through a complex process of personal development and identity formation, understanding their behaviour can help to comprehend teenagers' everyday experiences, needs, and concerns. In this respect, prior Netsafe research shows that parents and friends are young people's first line of support when they face an online risk or challenge (Pacheco & Melhuish, 2018b). Thus, by being aware and informed about this behaviour, we will be able to provide them with the attention they look and ask for through this anonymous behaviour. However, we also need to be aware that technology allows teens (and adults) to easily construct multiple online personas and identities for different purposes such as selfpresentation and self-promotion (Belk, 2013; van Dijck, 2013). As this study shows, this includes self-cyberbullying where teens essentially put on a 'mask' to the outside world enabling them to post anonymous negative content while presenting themselves as the apparent target of others' online aggression. This makes identifying and managing incidents 8 See for instance https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2019/02/suicide-memes/582832/ of digital self-harm among teenagers a challenging task. Also, it is difficult to determine whether these teens experience any harm as a result of their actions. All these issues make digital self-harm more likely to be involuntarily misunderstood and/or reported as a case of cyberbullying or another form of peer victimisation by parents, friends, teachers or support services. Furthermore, we need to consider the collateral effect of digital selfharm such as the distress that parents and friends might experience once they realise that the young person they care for is selfcyberbullying. Another issue is, as Stanford (2017) points out, that there seems to be concerns in society that talking about selfharm in general will encourage this behaviour among young people. Similarly, it is necessary to understand that while technology-mediated abuse can be the means for self-harm (Hay & Meldrum, 2010), technology can also play a therapeutic role8 or provide young people with access to peer support networks to mitigate harmful behaviours (Daine et al., 2013; Lewis et al., 2012). The latter seems to be, in part, the case in our study as a third of those who engaged in digital self-harm reported they had received the attention and support they were looking for after posting negative content online. While this study contributes to the body of knowledge, further research is still needed. Our contribution to the literature and practice is in raising awareness of the prevalence, motivations and outcomes of digital self-harm on the basis of key demographics. However, there is still a need for research about risk factors such as family issues, socio-economic disadvantage, social and cultural aspects, and psychological and health issues (e.g. depression, substance abuse, and anxiety disorders) which have only been explored in the context of traditional forms of offline selfharm (see Skegg, 2005). Studying all or part of these aspects is a next research step to better understand the nature and extent of digital self-harm in New Zealand. 10 What's next? Throughout 2019 Netsafe will be publishing reports based on nationally representative data of New Zealand children and teens (aged 9-17). These forthcoming reports will provide a range of insights into young people's experiences with digital technologies in the context of topics related to digital self-harm and other challenges but also the opportunities provided by these tools. This work is Netsafe's contribution as an active member of Global Kids Online, an international network of researchers and academics dedicated to the study of digital technologies and young people. References Armiento, J. S., Hamza, C. A., & Willoughby, T. (2014). An examination of disclosure of nonsuicidal self-injury among university students. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 24(6), 518–533. https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2190 Belk, R. W. (2013). Extended self in a digital world. Journal of Consumer Research, 40(3), 477– 500. https://doi.org/10.1086/671052 boyd, d. (2010). Self-harm and other acts of selfharassment. Retrieved April 3, 2018, from http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/20 10/12/07/digital-self-harm-and-other-acts-ofself-harassment.html Daine, K., Hawton, K., Singaravelu, V., Stewart, A., Simkin, S., & Montgomery, P. (2013). The power of the web: A systematic review of studies of the influence of the internet on selfharm and suicide in young people. PLoS ONE, 8(10), e77555. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0077555 Englander, E. (2012). Digital self-harm: Frequency, type, motivations, and outcomes. Retrieved from http://webhost.bridgew.edu/marc/DIGITAL SELF HARM report.pdf Englander, E. (2017). Cyberbullying, selfcyberbullying, and coerced sexting: Epidemiology and clinical correlates. Journal of the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 10(56). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaac.2017.07.024 Fenaughty, J., & Harré, N. (2013). Factors associated with distressing electronic harassment and cyberbullying. Computers in Human Behavior, 29(3), 803–811. Retrieved from http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S07 47563212003135 Harel-Fisch, Y., Walsh, S. D., Fogel-Grinvald, H., Amitai, G., Pickett, W., Molcho, M., ... Members of the HBSC Violence and Injury Prevention Focus Group. (2011). Negative school perceptions and involvement in school bullying: A universal relationship across 40 countries. Journal of Adolescence, 34(4), 639–652. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2010.09. 008 Hay, C., & Meldrum, R. (2010). Bullying victimization and adolescent self-harm: Testing hypotheses from General Strain Theory. Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 39(5), 446–459. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-009-9502-0 Jose, P. E., Kljakovic, M., Scheib, E., & Notter, O. (2012). The joint development of traditional bullying and victimization with cyber bullying and victimization in adolescence. Journal of Research on Adolescence, 22(2), 301–309. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.15327795.2011.00764.x 11 Lewis, S. P., Heath, N. L., Michal, N. J., & Duggan, J. M. (2012). Non-suicidal self-injury, youth, and the Internet: What mental health professionals need to know. Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and Mental Health, 6(1), 13. https://doi.org/10.1186/1753-2000-6-13 Marsh, L., McGee, R., Nada-Raja, S., & Williams, S. (2010). Brief report: Text bullying and traditional bullying among New Zealand secondary school students. Journal of Adolescence, 33(1), 237–240. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2009.06. 001 Pacheco, E., & Melhuish, N. (2017). Teens and "sexting" in New Zealand: Prevalence and attitudes. Wellington, New Zealand. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3128598 Pacheco, E., & Melhuish, N. (2018a). New Zealand Teens' Digital Profile: A Factsheet. Wellington, New Zealand. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3134305 Pacheco, E., & Melhuish, N. (2018b). New Zealand teens and digital harm: Seeking and accessing support. Wellington, New Zealand. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3208456 Pacheco, E., & Melhuish, N. (2018c). New Zealand teens and digital harm: Statistical insights into experiences, impact and response. Wellington, New Zealand. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3188608 Patchin, J. W., & Hinduja, S. (2017). Digital self-harm among adolescents. The Journal of Adolescent Health : Official Publication of the Society for Adolescent Medicine, 61(6), 761– 766. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jadohealth.2017.06.01 2 Raskauskas, J. (2009). Text-bullying: Associations with traditional bullying and depression among New Zealand adolescents. Journal of School Violence, 9(1), 74–97. Retrieved from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1 5388220903185605 Skegg, K. (2005). Self-harm. Lancet (London, England), 366(9495), 1471–83. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(05)676003 Stanford, S. (2017). Talking about suicide and selfharm in schools can save lives. Retrieved from https://theconversation.com/talking-aboutsuicide-and-self-harm-in-schools-can-savelives-83232 van Dijck, J. (2013). 'You have one identity': Performing the self on Facebook and LinkedIn. Media, Culture & Society, 35(2), 199–215. https://doi.org/10.1177/0163443712468605 DIGITAL SELF-HARM: PREVALENCE, MOTIVATIONS AND OUTCOMES FOR TEENS WHO CYBERBULLY THEMSELVES Wellington, New Zealand, May 2019 www.netsafe.org.nz [email protected] Retrieved from: https://www.netsafe.org.nz/digital-self-harm-19/ ISBN: 978-0-473-47502-4 ATTRIBUTION-NONCOMMERCIAL-SHAREALIKE https:/ /creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ [English] https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/legalcode.mi [Te Reo Māori]

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The populist interpretation of American history: A materialist revision Daniel Gaido Science & Society; Fall 2001; 65, 3; Research Library Core pg. 350 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Revista de la Escuela de Estudios Generales, Universidad de Costa Rica Enero-junio, 2017 • Volumen 7, número 1 • EISSN 2215-3934 • pp. 1-27 Recibido: 19-Mayo-2016 Aceptado: 10-Agosto-2016 Prolegómenos para una bioética desde el principio de alteridad DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15517/h.v7i1.27621 Esteban J. Beltrán Ulate Ministerio de Cultura y Juventud, Costa Rica. Correo electrónico: [email protected] Todos los derechos reservados. Universidad de Costa Rica. Esta revista se encuentra licenciada con Creative Commons. Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada 3.0 Costa Rica. Correo electrónico: [email protected] / Sitio web: http://revistas.ucr.ac.cr/index.php/humanidades Esteban J. Beltrán Ulate Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 2 Prolegómenos para una bioética desde el principio de alteridad Resumen Prolegomenon for Bioethics from the Principle of Alterity Abstract El presente artículo exhibe un análisis sobre el principio de alteridad desde el planteamiento de Emmanuel Levinas, quien revela su visión antropológica basada en el reconocimiento del Otro. Mediante este estudio se establece un preludio a lo que se podría considerar como una bioética fundada en la alteridad. Palabras claves: Filosofía, bioética, cultura, antropología cultural. This article shows an analysis of the principle of alterity from the approach of Emmanuel Levinas, who reveals his anthropological vision based on recognition of the Other. Through this study a prelude to what could be considered as a bioethics founded in alterity is established. Keywords: Philosophy, bioethics, culture, cultural anthropology. Prolegómenos para una bioética desde... Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 3 Palabras preliminares "El otro es el que me inquieta con su sola presencia" Inés Riego de Moine, Sobre la poética del Otro La alteridad como principio fundamental de la filosofía de Emmanuel Levinas resulta sugestiva a fin de brindar un aporte a la disciplina de la bioética, debido a la carga antropológica que el término conlleva, el reconocimiento del Otro en su desnudez, sin importar su condición, sea esta la de un pobre, la de un extranjero, etc. En este sentido el pensamiento levinasiano invoca un reconocimiento de la humanidad en cuanto a su esencia, comprensión que resulta pertinente para una disciplina que procura responder a los desafíos propios de la vida humana. Es así que mediante esta consigna se aborda este trabajo, presentando en un primer momento un esbozo del origen, alcance y fundamento de la bioética, con el fin de contextualizar el campo de estudio a analizar. Una vez definido este, se despliegan una serie de desafíos en cuanto a su variabilidad en torno a sus principios. Es a partir de esta línea base que se procede a presentar el principio de la alteridad según el autor lituano de origen judío, lo que conlleva una comprensión de su visión antropológica. Las conclusiones, más que frontera final del trabajo en cuestión, resultarán desafíos en miras a una bioética remozada, de ahí que el presente escrito se haya denominado "Prolegómenos para una bioética desde el principio de alteridad". Esteban J. Beltrán Ulate Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 4 Hacia una comprensión de la bioética Se podría considerar la bioética como una derivación pragmática de la ética, en cuanto pretende prever de insumos necesarios a la sociedad para establecer principios generales con respecto a la conducta humana, especialmente en la relación ser humano-ser humano, las decisiones que afectan a las instancias cruciales de la vida biológica de la persona atendiendo a un análisis casuístico, por ende considerando las particularidades de cada caso específico. Resulta significativo reconocer que el término bioética es producto de la reflexión del siglo XX: Hans Martin-Sass (2011), bioeticista y profesor de Filosofía en la Universidad de Ruhr, Alemania, considera que dicho neologismo es acuñado en 1927, por el pastor protestante Fritz Jahr, de ahí que lo catalogue como el padre de la disciplina. Fritz Jahr aborda el término en un artículo titulado Bio-Ethics: A Review of the Ethical Relationships of Human to Animals and Plants, donde asume el vocablo desde una óptica kantiana; por lo que, comprende la bioética como un imperativo moral: The rule for our action may be the bio-ethical demand: Respect every living being on principle as a goal in itself and treat it, if possible, as such! [La regla para nuestra acción ha de ser una demanda bio-ética: respetar todo ser vivo bajo el principio de meta en sí mismo, y tratarlo en lo posible (a cada ser vivo), como tal] (Jahr, 1927, citado por Sass, 2007, p. 279). Si bien la bioética es una disciplina lozana, encuentra aportes de la ética en general y asume el desafío de responder al hecho de la vida, partiendo del Prolegómenos para una bioética desde... Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 5 diálogo con otras ciencias, tales como la medicina, la biología, el derecho, la antropología, la sociología, en fin con todo aquello referente al estatuto vital del ser humano. En este contexto resulta pertinente la frase del autor de la comedia Heauton Timoroumenos, que enuncia "humani nihil a me alienum puto", pues para la bioética nada humano le es ajeno, incluso aquello no humano, pues incluso eso tiene relación con lo humano. En este contexto es que la amplitud de la bioética permite que esta estudie casos específicos en temáticas problemáticas, tales como el aborto, la clonación, la eutanasia, la investigación médica, el suicidio, la biotecnología, la ingeniería genética humana, entre múltiples tópicos similares; en síntesis se podrían considerar como campos de labor de la bioética, todo lo referente a la vida, no humana y humana. La bioética como disciplina, en su afán de ser accesible a toda la sociedad, se ha visto caracterizada de múltiples maneras; en algunos casos desde la visión laica, con búsqueda de pluralismo en la participación de quienes la ejercen: autónoma, racional-filosófica-discursiva, universal, interdisciplinaria, intermediadora, regulatoria-procedimental y aplicada, según explicita el Comité Institucional de Bioética de la secretaría de Salud del Hospital de Juárez en México. Lo anterior podría evidenciar una dificultad en tanto las caracterizaciones que se dan a la bioética pueden ser divergentes en cuanto al sustento antropológico o visión filosófica que la sustenta, ya que desde Esteban J. Beltrán Ulate Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 6 diversos enfoques, nociones como "autonomía" o "laico", entre otras, pueden ser asumidos desde visiones conceptuales distintas. Si bien en la mayoría de los casos la bioética pretende mantenerse al margen de cualquier aparato socio-político o ideológico que pretenda interferir en el desarrollo de la disciplina, no se puede obviar que las personas que la teorizan y la llevan a la práctica de diversas maneras, no pueden mantenerse totalmente neutrales; sin embargo, pueden tener la conciencia clara para establecer puentes de diálogo y tolerancia, a tenor de un ejercicio apto para responder a necesidades inmediatas. Lo anterior implica que las ideologías, la visión económica, e incluso las concepciones antropológicas de las personas que competen a estos ámbitos de acción deben ceder al compromiso con la vida y proceder así a un encuentro diáfano que permita esgrimir considerandos al respecto. En estas circunstancias, apoyado en la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos (1948), la Unesco esgrime su postura al respecto mediante la declaración Universal sobre Bioética y Derechos Humanos; en esta se apela en un primer momento a la dignidad humana, los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales (Unesco, 2005, numeral 1, artículo 3), enumerándose a su vez una serie de principios entre los que destaca la autonomía, la responsabilidad, el consentimiento, la justicia, la privacidad, la igualdad, así como en el desafío de considerar la creación de comités de bioética y desarrollar una educación y formación con respecto al tema. Prolegómenos para una bioética desde... Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 7 Principios de la bioética La declaración, a su vez, considera que los principios han de comprenderse y relacionarse unos con otros, por tanto no es conveniente apelar a un principio de autonomía si este violenta a su vez el principio de justicia, en cuyo caso es labor atinente a los comités de bioética iluminar mediante el análisis particular de cada caso las posibles resoluciones, que a su vez, valga decir, no son necesariamente de acato por parte de las personas inmersas en el caso. Como se ha de notar, el equilibrio de los principios no es una tarea fácil, incluso esto ya se había notado desde 1974 cuando el Congreso de los Estados Unidos conforma una Comisión Nacional para la Protección de los Sujetos Humanos de Investigación Biomédica y del Comportamiento; es en esta comisión donde se establece la necesidad de identificar principios básicos para la investigación con seres humanos, de esta labor emana el informe de Belmot (1979), del cual se desprenden los principios de Respecto a las personas, Beneficencia y Justicia, según comenta Siurana (2010). Sin embargo, dos investigadores reformulan estos principios con el fin de ser utilizados desde una ética asistencial, es así como Tom L. Beauchamp y James F. Childress, se han decantado por distinguir y promover cuatro principios que detallo a continuación: 1. Respeto de la autonomía: Comprendida como la capacidad de autogobierno, la potestad de auto dirigirse fuera de influencias que controlen las acciones, por ende con posibilidad para la acción intencional. Esteban J. Beltrán Ulate Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 8 2. No Maleficencia: Desde esta concepción se apunta a la no infracción de daño intencional, asimilada bajo la sentencia latina primum non nocere, lo que encuentra su base histórica en el antiguo juramento hipocrático. 3. Beneficencia: Consiste en la prevención del daño; los autores apelan a dos visiones de beneficencia, la positiva que postula la provisión de beneficios, y la de utilidad, comprendiendo esta como un balance entre beneficio y daño. 4. Justicia: Se comprende esta como la máxima clásica de Ulpiano: Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi. Iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere,1 lo que se podría entender como dar a cada cual una parte igual, a cada cual según su necesidad individual, a cada cual según su esfuerzo, a cada cual según su contribución a la sociedad, a cada cual según su mérito. Estos principios resultan atractivos hoy día para los Comités de Ética, sin embargo, se presenta como una pendiente resbaladiza debido a su carácter de variabilidad. Como se mencionó anteriormente, los principios deben procurar una armonía entre sí, empero al no presentarse dicha disposición se apela a un diálogo entre los miembros de los respectivos comités para resolver y ofrecer así sus sugerencias. Es en este diálogo donde resulta necesaria una visión Prolegómenos para una bioética desde... Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 9 antropológica integral, que invoque características laicas y racionales, sin dejar de lado la sensibilidad humana. Resulta poco alentador que en algunos casos se apele al principio de la autonomía sobre el de justicia, mientras que en otros se apela al de no maleficencia sobre el de autonomía. Esto demuestra la relativización de los principios,2 lo que claramente es pernicioso para la disciplina, pues si bien es cierto que cada caso requiere un análisis de sus particularidades, no se debe partir ex nihilo sino que se ha de procurar partir de un principio común e inviolable. El preámbulo de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos es claro en cuanto considera que tanto la libertad, la justicia y la paz tienen como fundamento el reconocimiento de la dignidad (humana) intrínseca y de la igualdad de derechos así como su carácter inalienable con respecto a todos los miembros de la humanidad. Sin embargo, esto no es correlativo a la realidad social, ejemplo de ello es que aún existe la pena de muerte, -cita Amnistía Internacional (2007)en países como Estados Unidos, Irak, Japón, además del aborto sin restricciones en lugares como Estados Unidos, Nepal, Guyana, Etiopía, entre otros, según enuncia MMCL-GO (2012). Aunado a esto hay países donde la eutanasia está legalizada como en Holanda y Bélgica, y en otros donde se permite la muerte asistida, tal es el caso de Alemania y Austria (Álvarez, 2006). Esteban J. Beltrán Ulate Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 10 La figura de Levinas Ante este escenario resulta importante cuestionarse si se están llevando a la práctica los principios de la bioética, y respondiendo certeramente a las palabras del preámbulo de la Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos (1948), así como al artículo tercero que expresa: "Todo individuo tiene derecho a la vida, a la libertad y a la seguridad de su persona". La respuesta queda sin duda relegada a la incertidumbre. Ante la incertidumbre que deviene de la variabilidad de los principios de la bioética y la fragilidad de la noción de dignidad, se ha estimado pertinente establecer un análisis del principio de la alteridad según el planteamiento de Emmanuel Levinas, con el fin de proponer una línea base que funja como preámbulo a una bioética desde la alteridad. Emmanuel Levinas3 es reconocido como representante del pensamiento dialógico según Juan Pablo II (1994), debido a su impronta en cuanto al reconocimiento de la humanidad del otro y la idea de la manifestación de la persona por medio del rostro. Parte de la formación filosófica del pensador procede de la Escuela Fenomenológica, de ahí que su base antropológica apele a un planteamiento del ser que se vivifica en el reconocimiento del Otro, comprendiendo esta acción como un acto que involucra una responsabilidad infinita hacia el ser humano. El autor judío presenta una crítica a la sociedad individualista producto de la modernidad, ya que la existencia del ser humano está ligada íntimamente a su relación con los demás, comprendiendo esta acción como un descubrir en lo Prolegómenos para una bioética desde... Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 11 Principio de alteridad humano la esencia de la vida misma. La noción de alteridad en Levinas invoca a vislumbrar la idea de salir de sí mismo hacia el otro, de la sociedad individualista a la sociedad comunitaria. Es en esta circunstancia que resulta atrayente considerar el principio de alteridad en Levinas y la visión antropológica que se desprende de él. Ya Philiphe Nemo afirmaría con respecto a Emmanuel Levinas : "est le philosophe de l'éthique, sans doute le seul moraliste de la pensée contemporaine" (Levinas, 2009, p. 7). El pensamiento levinasiano, más que proponer una ética, pretende brindarle un sentido a la misma a partir de la relación entre el Mismo y el Otro, asumiendo el encuentro a través de la develación del rostro. Emmanuel Levinas, desarrolla su planteamiento ético a partir del concepto de alteridad, comprendida esta como la exterioridad del Yo hacia el Otro evocando a su vez una responsabilidad; desde esta perspectiva el Otro es algo inalcanzable, eo ipso, ningún ser humano puede poseer ni abarcar al Otro. La propuesta levinasiana se metaforiza a través del relato hebreo veterotestamentario, donde se hace alusión a la salida sin regreso de Abraham de Ur de los Caldeos, en contraposición a la salida con ansia de regreso por parte de Ulises en la Odisea Homérica.4 Estos relatos muestran un aspecto contrapuesto: por un lado, a partir de Abraham se simboliza una salida del Yo hacia la alteridad, mientras que desde el segundo relato -el de Ulisesse apela a un simbolismo que denota un egología. Esteban J. Beltrán Ulate Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 12 La comprensión del Yo es la identificación del ser humano como tal, pero esto solo se comprende a partir del reconocimiento que se genera en el encuentro con el Otro, el planteamiento apela a una concepción del ser humano en relación estrecha e íntima con la humanidad misma, pero no con una humanidad anónima, sino con cada cual, ya sea este el pobre, la viuda o el huérfano, como el mismo autor indica. El ser humano se descubre solamente en su relación con los demás, y es en esta relación entre el Mismo y el Otro donde se hallan libres, en la develación del rostro; el autor denomina a esto un deshechizamiento, ya que en el encuentro con la otra persona ocurre un desencantamiento de la realidad totalizante que ha obviado la humanidad. El rostro es la huella de la alteridad, pues es en el rostro donde se percibe la lejanía del Otro, por tanto, este se comprende como altura-alteridad (hauteur), "como extranjero viene de la lejanía y desde una absoluta altura indefinida" (Santiesteban, 2008, p. 174), es una relación que asimila una altura infinita. Esta alteridad demanda una relación ética, alcanzar a aquel por el cual el Yo se reconoce mediante ese desvelamiento del rostro; de ahí surge una responsabilidad, que a su vez demanda un cambio social, pues el Otro se encuentra encarnado en el enfermo, en la prostituta, en el político, en el discapacitado; en este contexto, la relación ética sugiere un cambio social: "si se quiere cambiar el mundo... se debe meditar hacia dónde se Prolegómenos para una bioética desde... Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 13 Alteridad y responsabilidad quiere cambiar, ... se necesita un orden de valores, una jerarquización" (Casper, 2003, p. 27). La sociedad moderna muestra una 'alergia' hacia el Otro, (Levinas, 2006), esto se comprende como una reducción del Otro, característica principal de una cosmovisión materialista donde el ser humano es reducido a su carácter de productividad. En esta dinámica ser humano es correlativo a ser productivo, por ende si no se es productivo para el mercado no se es necesario, la productividad precede a la existencia según este planteamiento. Sin embargo existe una distancia infinita entre el Yo y el Otro, lo que indica que el segundo no puede ser alcanzado por el primero, ni dominado ni comercializado; el filósofo judío descubre en su experiencia como prisionero de guerra, que el ser humano a pesar de estar ante el asesino que procurará su muerte no será alcanzado en su integridad, nunca podrá hacerlo parte de sí, el espacio que ocupa el Otro no puede ser sumado al de aquel que quiere apresarle. La filosofía levinasiana apunta a la erradicación de la egología del Otro dominado por el Mismo, (Silvana Rabinovich en Levinas, 1998). Así pues, la alteridad es un mecanismo para descubrir al Otro a través de lo que Levinas llama el rostro, "visage et discours sont liés. Le visage parle" (Levinas 2009, p. 82). En este escenario el rostro humano compromete, es en sí una demanda ética, como expresa Bernasconi: "the human face... demans an ethical response" (Robert Bernasconi en Levinas, 2001, xiii). Esteban J. Beltrán Ulate Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 14 Visión antropológica levinasiana La demanda ética levinasiana plantea el mandato del no matarás, pero más que mandato es invitación a hacerse responsable infinitamente por el Otro, asumiendo su humanidad como propia (Levinas 1985). De este modo es que se comprende una relación entre iguales, el Mismo recibiendo al Otro de manera hospitalaria, sin condicionamiento, sin importar su sexo, religión, o ideología, esto es un diálogo manifiesto, en este sentido la libertad del hombre está consagrada al prójimo, "la humanidad del hombre... es una responsabilidad por los otros" (Levinas, 1973, p. 130). Levinas critica de modo enérgico la supresión de valores suprasensibles en la época moderna, atribuyendo dicha supresión al pensamiento alienado del ser heideggeriano ya que en él yergue una visión del ser para la muerte (Dasein), a raíz de lo cual se ha cernido la desesperanza en torno a lo humano. Es así que el pensador judío atiende a establecer una disputa con las diferentes libertades producto del existencialismo que promueve el individualismo y el culto a la autonomía por encima de la vida en comunidad. Estos planteamientos, con influencia en el pensamiento de Jean Paul Sartre y Albert Camus, muestran un desencanto de lo humano presentando al hombre como enemigo del hombre. Esta dinámica se revitaliza en ideologías que sustentan las macroeconomías, tales como el marxismo y el neoliberalismo, donde el ser humano se torna o bien competidor o bien masa que trabaja. El pensamiento occidental ha caído en una concepción de vida de inmanencia, donde las decisiones han de ser Prolegómenos para una bioética desde... Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 15 Bioética y alteridad rápidas, individuales, por ende autónomas, y así la humanidad se torna amenazada por ella misma; la respuesta levinasiana reclama un giro ético que promueva un cambio social. La visión antropológica levinasiana se traduce en el Yo que trasciende más allá de mismo, visión esta que rompe con el ideal de hombre como lobo del hombre. Desde este punto de mira el ser humano es libertad que parte total y absolutamente hacia el Otro, como Abraham saliendo de Ur de los Caldeos; de este modo lo humano encontrará asilo en lo humano, llámese este el indigente, el indignado, el travesti, etc. Por lo tanto, en el rostro de cada cual se develará el reflejo de su humanidad, en cada rostro hallará la huella del infinito, responsabilidad perpetua: "Yo soy para el Otro en una relación de diacronía: estoy al servicio del Otro" (Levinas, 2005, p. 193). Una concepción de la bioética planteada desde el principio de alteridad levinasiano, comprende la vida humana como compromiso en comunidad; de esto modo se desaloja cualquier planteamiento ególatra, y a su vez se distancia de todo postulado que intente asimilar la existencia humana relegada a la capacidad de producción o consumo dentro de la sociedad. La alteridad como principio fundante de la bioética permite tener una base referencial sobre la cual argumentar y sugerir, pero sobre todo acompañar en los diversos casos que atienden a hechos de difícil resolución, como el inicio y final de la vida, así como en otros temas no menos importantes como la relación ser humano-ser no humano, e investigaciones médicas. El Esteban J. Beltrán Ulate Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 16 ¿Principios de la bioética? pensamiento levinasiano propone una nueva comprensión antropológica donde la responsabilidad resulta ser el cordón umbilical de la humanidad. El desvelamiento del rostro, alteridad descubierta en el encuentro, donde Yo y Tú u Otro, no son nociones abstractas, sino que se manifiestan de manera viva en el cigoto, en el parapléjico, en aquel que está en estado de inconsciencia profunda, en el que padece Alzheimer, en el seropositivo; en una palabra, el Otro, está ahí y no ha de ser obviado. El encuentro remite a la responsabilidad, el compromiso, el acompañamiento. A partir de la noción de 'alteridad'5 se posibilita una nueva lectura de la ética, partiendo del encuentro que viene del Otro al sí, y ante el cual emana un "heme aquí", una apertura a la hospitalidad. Desde el pensamiento levinasiano, el único sentido es la existencia del existente, reconocida o mediada por el encuentro, el rostro frente al rostro. Es así como la concepción tradicional de principios bioéticos queda relegada, al menos en su concepción tradicional, pues de ellos se desprende una variabilidad donde la existencia humana pende de un hilo. De este modo los principios expuestos por Tom L. Beauchamp y James F. Childress carecen de cimiento, pues ellos son el reflejo de la sociedad desencantada, ególatra e individualista. El principio de autonomía muestra en sí el reflejo de la intransigencia de aquel que no desea escuchar a la comunidad, de la cual es miembro, partiendo de una sociedad donde el humano resulta temeroso del humano. Esta hipótesis es Prolegómenos para una bioética desde... Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 17 validada porque la autonomía toma forma de escape, sin embargo la realidad es otra, la humanidad está inscripta íntimamente en cada ser humano y la alergia contra la humanidad debe irse disipando para la consolidación de una nueva civilización. En cuanto al principio de no maleficencia resulta oprobioso en sí el mismo término, pues hace referencia a la búsqueda de un mal menor, de modo que el objetivo no está centrado en el bien per se, sino en el desentendimiento apelando a una petición del principio de ignorancia.6 En este caso, los principios de beneficencia y de justicia son los que más encuentran eco en el principio de alteridad levinasiano. Sin embargo, resulta pertinente juzgar si estos principios son hoy día ejecutados de modo efectivo, ya que resulta impreciso hacer consideraciones en torno a la noción de justicia cuando las posibilidades económicas para acceder a ciertos servicios médicos están relegadas a un mínimo de la población, a tenor de una sociedad occidental regida por un sistema económico que ha impulsado un resquebrajamiento de la misma en estratos, calificados así según su capacidad de capitalización y adquisición de bienes. Visto de este modo, los cuatro principios de Beauchamp y Childress resultan oportunos para una sociedad llena de desconfianza, de miedo, de alergia hacia el Otro, más no así para una sociedad que procure una actitud de fe frente al ser humano, de modo que el Yo no se oculte tras las banalidades del ego sino que se deleite en el encuentro con el Otro. Esteban J. Beltrán Ulate Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 18 Bioética desde el principio de alteridad Una bioética desde la alteridad ha de tener como principio fundamental la "existencia del existente", pero no como una individual y simple voluntad de vivir, sino más bien en una actitud de compromiso con los demás existentes. El principio de alteridad es en sí una acción dinámica, pues presenta una diversidad de acciones a realizar, es encuentro-reconocimientoresponsabilidad-compromiso; este es el fundamento de la visión antropológica, y por ende ética, levinasiana. Lo que implica un giro a la disciplina bioética en cuanto a su lastre conceptual, relativo e impreciso en sus principios. Por lo tanto, a partir de una lectura levinasiana no debe haber espacio para la concepción desesperanzada propia del Dasein heideggeriano. Una bioética que conciba la alteridad como principio fundante ha de considerar al menos los siguientes postulados: 1. La existencia adquiere sentido en el existente, el existente adquiere sentido mediante el encuentro con los demás existentes. 2. El principio de la alteridad se concibe de modo dinámico, pues implica encuentro-reconocimiento-responsabilidad-compromiso. El Yo que se encuentra con el Otro, se deja visitar, cada uno por cada cual, es una acción pasiva, donde huérfano, migrante, trans-sexual, político, sacerdote, prostituta, en la pasividad de su ser descubre el otro modo de ser. Prolegómenos para una bioética desde... Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 19 Desafíos para un bioética desde el principio de alteridad 3. Una bioética desde la alteridad ha de considerar como imperativo categórico moral la existencia del existente, como responsabilidad, como compromiso eterno. 4. El campo de labor de una bioética desde la alteridad ha de ser implementado en dos vertientes, la educativa y la orientativa. La primera se gesta en todo momento y será el motor para promover un giro antropológico, y por ende una nueva dinámica global, mientras la segunda será el acompañamiento, la asesoría objetiva, lejos de prescripción, buscando la comprensión y el diálogo. La posibilidad de una bioética desde la alteridad será proporcionalmente consecuente a una sociedad que asuma este postulado como un imperativo moral. En este caso, la bioética tradicional responde a un contexto determinado que, como se ha señalado, está caracterizado por pluralidad de concepciones en torno a las buenas costumbres; aunado a esto se encuentra dominada por un relativismo moral y por sobre todo una exaltación del cuerpo, predominio del hedonismo, como indica Iriarte (1998). Todo esto se traduce en una postmodernidad que, lejos de promover un humanismo integral, se decanta por una supremacía del ser sobre el tener, como indicaría Erich Fromm. Teniendo en consideración este panorama, resulta importante considerar cuáles han de ser los desafíos para aquellos que emprendan la faena de promover una bioética desde el principio de alteridad. Entre ellos cabe indicar: Esteban J. Beltrán Ulate Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 20 a) La bioética desde la alteridad se comprende como una disciplina orientada al otro, que fungirá en vertientes tanto educativas como orientativas, en miras de cimentar procesos de cambio social, reconocimiento del Otro, y por sobre todas las cosas gestación del humanismo del otro, hombre y mujer. b) Es posible y necesaria una revolución personal que se inicie a partir del reconocimiento, es un despertar de la conciencia en medio del contexto que envuelve al existente; esta revolución indica un cambio de paradigma personal respecto a la dinámica social que invita a una supremacía del poseer por encima del ser, y del ser en comunidad. Este cambio implica considerar al Otro como rostro o prójimo, es el primer paso de la alteridad para comprender la responsabilidad y el compromiso con la humanidad. c) A partir del reconocimiento que deriva del salir hacia el rostro del Otro se produce un giro antropológico que demanda un despertar de las conciencias. Esto ha de desarrollarse mediante un plan formativo, lo que provendrá de la reflexión comunal a partir de aquellos que despertaron del sueño postmoderno, del individualismo, del consumismo, de aquellos que se olvidaron de ser lobos y pasaron a ser humanos. El giro antropológico parte del diálogo horizontal, donde no medien posiciones de poder, pues se Prolegómenos para una bioética desde... Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 21 Palabras finales fundamenta en el encuentro cara a cara propio de la concepción levinasiana. El aporte de Emmanuel Levinas en torno a la reflexión ética y bioética es valioso e inestimable en cuantía, en tanto reposa sobre la concepción de una humanidad en compromiso y reciprocidad. Las atrocidades del siglo XX especialmente las de la segunda guerra mundialimpactaron fuertemente al pensador judío, de ahí que su planteamiento posicione al ser humano en relación con el infinito, pero este al no poder ser comprendido en la finitud del hombre solo puede ser percibido a través del rostro del Otro, desvelando en el cara a cara la huella de lo infinito. La alteridad como principio de la ética levinasiana significa un rechazo a la visión individualista y utilitarista del ser humano y de la vida misma, el Otro sexuado e histórico, pues la persona no puede ser considerada un objeto adaptado a variables que definan su buen-vivir. Levinas destroza las tesis que presentan al ser humano como un ser arrojado en la existencia y condenado a la muerte, contraponiendo a ello una visión que trasciende lo objetivable, en tanto el ser humano es siempre un ser para ser más allá del ser. Mientras la sociedad actual, encorazada en una visión totalizante de la realidad, torna ínfima la posición del ser humano en la existencia misma, la propuesta esbozada en el presente estudio expone que el ser humano es un Esteban J. Beltrán Ulate Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 22 otro de mí, que convoca al yo, de manera asimétrica, como una voz desde lo Infinito. En una sociedad que se sustente en una visión antropológica caracterizada por tesis económicas donde el ser humano termina por ser un agente de producción y consumo, la bioética que se derive de ella será consecuente con su visión de ser humano. En cambio desde el planteamiento de Levinas, a propósito de la alteridad, el ser humano no es un ser de consumo, sino más bien una persona responsable de manera infinita respecto al otro (persona) que es una huella de lo Infinito mismo. Concebir una bioética desde la alteridad es pensar una bioética donde el "No matarás" sea el mandato que evoque como principio fundamental en la mirada del Otro una negativa a la muerte, que no deriva de la capacidad o incapacidad que tiene el Yo sobre el Otro sino de la infinitud que asomadesaparece en el rostro del otro como huella de lo Infinito. La bioética desde la alteridad deberá ser herramienta gestora en este giro que pretende un posicionamiento del ser humano en compromiso con la humanidad del Otro, sin importar su condición, género, ideología o religión. Prolegómenos para una bioética desde... Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 23 Referencias Álvarez, A. (2006). El derecho a la Eutanasia. Instituto de Investigaciones jurídicas, México. Recuperado de http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/sisjur/saldyder/pdf/5-237s.pdf Amnistía Internacional. (2007). La ONU aprueba una decisión histórica sobre la suspensión mundial de las ejecuciones. Recuperado de http://www.es.amnesty.org/noticias/noticias/articulo/la-onu-aprueba-unadecision-historica-sobre-la-suspension-mundial-de-las-ejecuciones/ Canal Mecano. (21 agosto del 2010a). Ramón Sampedro: 1 Entrevista Mercedes Milá [Archivo de video]. Recuperado de https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8fFb_bFw4Tc Canal Mecano. (21 agosto del 2010b). Ramón Sampedro: 2 Entrevista Mercedes Milá [Archivo de video]. Recuperado de http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r4OXDdupmZ8&feature=relmfu Casper, B. (2003). El rostro de la primogenitura y la fecundidad". En Revista de Filosofía, Universidad Iberoamericana, 35, 19-28. Comité Institucional de Bioética de la Secretaría de Salud del Hospital de Juárez en México. (s. f.). Concepto y principios de la Bioética. Recuperado de http://www.hjc.salud.gob.mx/interior/Bioetica/CONCEPTO_Y_PRINCI PIOS_DE_LA_BIOxTICA.pdf Esteban J. Beltrán Ulate Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 24 Iriarte, G. (1998). Postmodernidad, Neoliberalismo, Globalización. Bolivia: CEPROMI. Juan Pablo II. (1994). Cruzando el umbral de la esperanza. San José, Costa Rica: Grupo Editorial Norma. Levinas, E. (1973). Humanismo del otro hombre. Madrid: Siglo Veintiuno Editores. Levinas, E. (1985). Ethics and Infinity. Pittsburgh, U.S.A.: Duquesne University Press. Levinas, E. (1993). El tiempo y el otro. Barcelona: Ediciones Paidós. Levinas, E. (1998). La huella del otro. México: Ediciones Taurus. Levinas, E. (2001). Existence & Existents. Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press. Levinas, E. (2005). Dios, la muerte y el tiempo. Madrid: Ediciones Cátedra. Levinas, E. (2006). Totalidad e Infinito. Salamanca: Ediciones Sígueme. Levinas, E. (2009). Éthique et infini. París: Litografía Rosés. MMCL-GO. (2012). Women's Health & Abortion. Recuperado de http://www.mccl-go.org/pdf/mm_brochure_en_2012.pdf National Library of Medicine. (2012). Juramento Hipocrático. Recuperado de http://www.nlm.nih.gov/hmd/greek/popup/images/hippo_oath_detail.jpg Prolegómenos para una bioética desde... Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 25 Observatori de Bioetica i Dret. (1979). El informe de Belmont. Recuperado de http://www.pcb.ub.edu/bioeticaidret/archivos/norm/InformeBelmont.pdf Perera, Y. (11 de enero del 2005). La familia del tetrapléjico Ramón Sampedro llama a Ramona Mairena 'asesina' por ayudarle a morir. El Mundo. Recuperado de http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2005/01/11/sociedad/1105446908.html Santiesteban, L. (2008). "Pasividad" una noción clave del filosofar de Heidegger y Levinas. Analogía Filosófica. Revista de Filosofía, 22, 157-184. Sass, H. (2007). El pensamiento bioético de Fritz Jahr 1927-1934. En Aesthethika. Revista Internacional sobre subjetividad, política y arte, 6(2), 20-33. Sass H. (2007). Frits Jahr's 1927 Concept of Bioethics. En Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 17(4), 279-295. Siurana, J. (2010). Los principios de la bioética y el surgimiento de una bioética intercultural. En Veritas, Revista del Pontificio Seminario Mayor San Rafael Valparaíso, 22, 121-157. ONU. (1948). Declaración Universal de Derechos Humanos. Recuperado de http://www.un.org/es/documents/udhr/ Unesco. (2005). Declaración Universal sobre Bioética y Derechos Humanos. Recuperado de http://portal.unesco.org/es/ev.phpURL_ID=31058&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html Esteban J. Beltrán Ulate Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 26 Notas 1 Justiniano, Institutas I, 1, 3. 2 Respecto al tema resulta oportuno traer a colación el caso del español Ramón Sampedro, en el cual se evidencia la relativización de principios, quien a los 25 años luego de un accidente queda tetrapléjico (Milá, 1995a). Solicita la muerte ante lo cual la Ley se opone, pero es ayudado a morir por su cuñada quien le brinda un vaso de agua con cianuro, según Perera (2005). 3 Emmanuel Levinas es un pensador de descendencia judía nacido en Kaunas en 1906; realiza estudios de filosofía en la Universidad de Estrasburgo entre los años 1923 y 1928, luego en la Universidad de Friburgo estudia Fenomenología. En 1958 es nombrado en la Universidad de Bar Illar de Israel, doctor Honoris Causa; en 1967 labora para la Universidad de Nanterre y en 1973 en la Sorbona. Influido por las filosofías dialógicas de Martin Buber y Franz Rosenzweig inicia su planteamiento acerca de la ética en 1950, en 1961 escribe una de sus obras más representativas, Totalidad e infinito, y reelaborando unas de sus ideas expuestas ahí escribe en 1974 otra de sus obras importantes, De otro modo de ser o más allá de la esencia, Levinas muere en París el 25 de diciembre de 1995. 4 Cfr. Levinas, 1998. 5 A lteridad deriva del latín alteritas, alteritatis que refiere a la condición de ser otro. Prolegómenos para una bioética desde... Vol. 7 (1), 2017 / EISSN: 2215 – 3934 27 6 La petición del principio de ignorancia también conocida en latín como petitio principii ad ignorantiam, refiere a un argumento no válido, por tanto a una falacia, en la que se asume algo como verdadero por el simple hecho de no contar con una prueba clara que avale lo contrario. ¿Cómo citar este artículo? Beltrán, E. J. (Enero-junio, 2017). Prolegómenos para una bioética desde el principio de alteridad. Revista humanidades, 7(1), 1-27. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.15517/h.v7i1.

Perseitas | Vol. 4 | No. 2 | pp. 185-201 | julio-diciembre | 2016 | ISSN: 2346-1780 | Medellín-Colombia BIOÉTICA DE LA ESPERANZA: CLAVES DESDE LA LAUDATO SI' Bioethics of hope: keys from the Laudato Si' Recibido: 1 de diciembre / Aceptado: 10 de febrero Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez* Resumen La reciente encíclica del Papa Francisco ha sido catalogada por muchos como la encíclica sobre el clima y el medio ambiente. Sin embargo, el Papa Francisco no solo menciona varios de los problemas ambientales del mundo actual, incluyendo los más dramáticos, sino que analiza las causas de dicha problemática y busca arrojar abundante luz para encontrarle soluciones. En la presente investigación, se ahonda en la importancia del mensaje de esperanza del Papa Francisco frente a la grave crisis que describe en su encíclica y se insiste en la esperanza como elemento medular de una ética que ayude a salir de dichos problemas, pues sin esperanza no hay ética posible. Se sitúa la encíclica en el ámbito de la bioética evidenciando la preocupación del Papa por la situación general del planeta Tierra, poniendo a la persona humana en el centro de dicha reflexión, para luego describir los elementos positivos del diagnóstico de la realidad y las apuestas que permiten construir una visión de esperanza. Palabras clave Bioética, esperanza, medio ambiente, encíclica, Papa Francisco. Forma de citar este artículo en APA: Rosas Jiménez, C. (2016). Bioética de la esperanza: claves desde la laudato si'. Perseitas, 4(2), pp. 185 201 * Magister en Bioética por la Universidad Libre Internacional de las Américas. Miembro de la Fundación Colombiana de Ética Bioética FUCEB y del grupo de investigación KHEIRON Bioética, Universidad de la Sabana, Bogotá, Colombia. Correo electrónico: [email protected] Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez Perseitas | Vol. 4 | No.2 | julio-diciembre | 2016186 Abstract The recent encyclical of Pope Francisco has been classified by many as the encyclical on the climate and the environment. However, father Francisco not only mentions several of the environmental problems of today's world, including the more dramatic, but analyses the causes of such problems and seeks to shed plenty of light to find solutions. In the present investigation, it delves into the importance of the message of hope from Pope Francisco facing the serious crisis which describes in his Encyclical insists on hope as a core element of an ethic that will help to get out of these problems, because without hope there is no possible ethics. The Encyclical is situated in the field of bioethics demonstrating the concern of the Pope at the general situation of the planet Earth, placing the human person at the Centre of this reflection, to then describe the positive elements of the diagnosis of the reality and bets that allow you to build a vision of hope. Keywords Bioethics, hope, environment, encyclical, Pope Francisco. Bioética de la esperanza: claves desde la Laudato Si' Bioethics of hope: keys from the Laudato Si' 187Perseitas | Vol. 4 | No.2 | julio-diciembre | 2016 Introducción La reciente encíclica del Papa Francisco (2015) ha sido catalogada por muchos como la encíclica sobre el clima y el medio ambiente. Sin embargo, el Papa Francisco no solo menciona varios de los problemas ambientales del mundo actual, incluyendo los más dramáticos, sino que analiza las causas de dicha problemática y busca arrojar abundante luz para encontrarle soluciones. Científicos y líderes políticos que trabajan en favor de la acción para mitigar estos problemas han expresado directamente gratitud y admiración por el valiente paso que ha dado el Papa Francisco. Es novedoso que un Papa hable en una encíclica de tantos datos científicos para ilustrar la realidad actual de nuestro planeta. Asimismo, no deja de sorprender la claridad y la fuerza de sus palabras cuando denuncia algunas situaciones, como cuando manifiesta la debilidad de las reacciones ante todos los problemas que describe, por ejemplo cuando dice que: Estas situaciones provocan el gemido de la hermana tierra, que se une al gemido de los abandonados del mundo, con un clamor que nos reclama otro rumbo. Nunca hemos maltratado y lastimado nuestra casa común como en los últimos dos siglos (Francisco, 2015, p. 53). Esta y otras afirmaciones tienen la capacidad de remover la conciencia de todos, de quienes están directamente involucrados en los atentados a la vida humana o al medio ambiente, como también de aquellos que son espectadores de esta realidad, y que, por indiferencia, conformismo o cualquier otra razón, hacen poco o nada por ayudar a salir de la crisis por la que pasa nuestro planeta. Sumado a esto, "La gente ya no parece creer en un futuro feliz, no confía ciegamente en un mañana mejor a partir de las condiciones actuales del mundo y de las capacidades técnicas" (Francisco, 2015, p. 113). Frente a esta crisis, el Papa Francisco contrapone un mensaje de esperanza, tanto para los seguidores de la Iglesia Católica, como para personas de otras creencias, como lo constató la editorial de la revista Nature del 25 de junio de 2015 titulada Hope from the Pope. La propuesta del Papa es totalmente Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez Perseitas | Vol. 4 | No.2 | julio-diciembre | 2016188 opuesta a la que planteaba Nietzsche en su Filosofía general (como se citó en Naranjo, 2008), cuando decía que la esperanza es el peor de los males, porque prolonga los suplicios de los hombres. Por el contrario, la postura en la que se insistirá en esta investigación es aquella de Pieper (2003) que dice que "la única respuesta que corresponde a la situación real de la existencia humana es la esperanza" (p. 375). En la presente investigación, se ahonda en la importancia del mensaje de esperanza del Papa Francisco frente a la grave crisis que describe en su encíclica y se insiste en la esperanza como elemento medular de una ética que ayude a salir de dichos problemas, pues "sin esperanza no hay ética posible si concebimos la ética como un proyecto de vida y sociedad mejores" (Camps, 1985). Cuando no existe un horizonte positivo, una visión que busque permanentemente una salida a los problemas, las opciones por el cambio se reducen, las personas y la sociedad se esclerotizan, se endurecen y se conforman con lo que tienen, y por eso se puede llegar a pensar que no es necesario hacer las cosas mejor, que no es necesario un cambio de mentalidad, ni siquiera que es necesaria una ética; se podrá hablar, escribir y enseñar ética, pero no se vive de acuerdo a ella. Teniendo en cuenta lo anterior, en el presente artículo se sitúa la encíclica en el ámbito de la bioética evidenciando la preocupación del Papa por la situación general del planeta Tierra, poniendo a la persona humana en el centro de dicha reflexión, para luego describir los elementos positivos del diagnóstico de la realidad y las apuestas que permiten construir una visión de esperanza. La encíclica en el ámbito de la bioética La preocupación por el medio ambiente Es bien sabido que el científico Van Rensselaer Potter ha sido considerado por muchos como el padre de la bioética. El esfuerzo de Potter estuvo concentrado en establecer un puente entre ciencia experimental y las humanidades, busBioética de la esperanza: claves desde la Laudato Si' Bioethics of hope: keys from the Laudato Si' 189Perseitas | Vol. 4 | No.2 | julio-diciembre | 2016 cando dar los fundamentos éticos de los valores y principios del juicio ético, y profundizando en dilemas específicos en el ámbito médico y biomédico. Así mismo, Potter buscaba con la bioética una disciplina que encontrara soluciones eficaces para aprovechar mejor el conocimiento biológico en beneficio de la sociedad y así poder asegurar la existencia de los seres humanos en el planeta Tierra. Sin embargo, si bien muchos textos de bioética se remiten a Potter como el que utiliza el término bioética por primera vez en 1970, la aparición del concepto corresponde al año 1927 cuando Fritz Jahr, filósofo y educador alemán, utilizó la expresión, que fue refinando en escritos de los años siguientes. Parafraseando a Kant, Jahr sugiere considerar a cada ser vivo como un fin en sí mismo y tratarlo como tal en la medida de lo posible (Wilches, 2011). Jahr acuña una idea, no solo un término, piensa la bioética en tanto concepción y visión del mundo (Lima y Cambra, 2013). Dicha propuesta de Jahr, que busca el respeto por el bios, por la vida humana, animal y vegetal, dicen Lima y Cambra (2013), encuentra su antecedente en las ideas de variados pensadores y filósofos, por ejemplo, adopta las enseñanzas de San Francisco de Asís (1182-1226), quien abogaba por el cuidado y respeto hacia los animales y las plantas, y toma el aporte teórico de importantes pensadores como Theodor Fechner, Rudolf Eisler y Arthur Schopenhauer. En particular, dice Sass (2011), Jahr subraya en su obra Tierschutz und Ethik (La protección de los animales y la ética) la importancia del sentimiento ético, la empatía, la compasión y la ayuda hacia los animales y las plantas como parte de las obligaciones morales y sociales que los humanos se deben los unos a los otros. Jahr introduce, además, el concepto del imperativo bioético, que a diferencia del imperativo moral de Kant que contempla solo a los seres humanos y tiene un carácter formal, abarca a todos los seres vivos y sus interacciones, revistiendo un carácter pragmático y flexible (Sass, 2011). Este enfoque de la bioética se dio gracias a una visión amplia de la realidad, que fue la que le permitió a Potter (1988), algunos años más tarde, proponer el término Bioética global. En efecto, Potter no solo elaboró, sino que incluso vivió su credo de activista, que hace énfasis en la responsabilidad social y ambiental (Pessini, 2013). Potter (como se citó en Pessini, 2013) llega incluso a afirmar Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez Perseitas | Vol. 4 | No.2 | julio-diciembre | 2016190 un papel importante de la religión en el cuidado del medio ambiente, pues los valores imbuidos en el ethos científico necesitan ser integrados con aquellos de la religión y la filosofía para facilitar procesos políticos benéficos para la salud global del medio ambiente; las religiones, insiste, no pueden resolver los problemas económicos, políticos y sociales de la Tierra, pero pueden proveer lo que no se puede conseguir a través de los planos económicos, programas políticos y regulaciones legales. Con este mismo espíritu de estos padres de la bioética, el Papa Francisco ha optado por una mirada situada, ubicada, aterrizada, encarnada en la realidad en la que vivimos; pone desde el inicio de la encíclica a San Francisco de Asís, a quien Fritz Jahr había llamado "el descubridor de la Bioética" (RoaCastellanos y Bauer, 2009), como el ejemplo por excelencia del cuidado de lo que es débil y de una ecología integral vivida con alegría y autenticidad. Es por ello que el Sumo Pontífice no ha sido ajeno a lo que acontece en la realidad del mundo actual, y se ha preocupado por hablar desde dentro, desde lo que le sucede al planeta Tierra, así como desde lo que le sucede a una gran cantidad de personas que sufren y ven violentada su propia existencia o su dignidad humana. No ha sido necesario un gran nivel de detalle en los datos científicos presentados en la encíclica, ya que lo se quiere resaltar es evidente, estamos ante una debacle ecológica, enfrentando feroces atentados a la vida humana. Lo interesante es que esa mirada al planeta Tierra ha permitido llegar a cuestionar la forma en la que el ser humano ha conducido su existencia llegando a destruir su propia casa. Más allá de buscar culpables, el Papa Francisco quiere manifestar su preocupación por el medio ambiente y encontrar las causas de dichos daños para mitigarlos. La centralidad de la persona humana: una bioética personalista Detrás de este interés por el estado del medio ambiente manifestado por el Papa en su encíclica, está la preocupación por la persona humana; principalmente, una preocupación por los pobres, por los que sufren, los débiles e indefensos, pero también por aquellos que hacen sufrir a las demás personas, e incluso por aquellas personas que hacen poco o nada por remediar estos daños e injusticias. Bioética de la esperanza: claves desde la Laudato Si' Bioethics of hope: keys from the Laudato Si' 191Perseitas | Vol. 4 | No.2 | julio-diciembre | 2016 La bioética personalista toma como centro a la persona humana, sea cual sea su condición, y se fundamenta en una filosofía personalista que toma a la persona humana como clave arquitectónica de su antropología (Burgos, 2013). Esta postura de la bioética se ha convertido en una de las corrientes de fundamentación y práctica bioética más importantes del mundo y ofrece una lucha cultural a favor de la dignidad humana en los escenarios más diversos (Guerra, 2013). Este personalismo, menciona Burgos (2013), presenta algunas novedades que vale la pena destacar. En primer lugar, el paso del qué al quién, es decir, que el hombre no es una cosa, es un sujeto individual irrepetible. Existe una estructura tridimensional de la persona, cuerpo, psique y espíritu. Por otro lado, el hecho de que la persona posee un carácter autónomo, originario y estructural de la afectividad. La importancia de las relaciones interpersonales, del encuentro y del diálogo. Además, se destaca la primacía de la libertad y del amor; así como de la corporeidad, que abre el camino hacia el tratamiento de la sexualidad. Finalmente, se encuentran otros rasgos que se destacan como el carácter narrativo de la persona, la relevancia de la subjetividad, y demás. Sustentado en estos presupuestos y en las obras de autores como Santo Tomás de Aquino, Maritain, Scheler, Von Hildebrand y Marcel, entre otros, Elio Sgreccia (1928) se convirtió en el padre de la bioética personalista. Esta visión, que pone como piedra angular a la persona humana, es el hilo conductor de toda la encíclica del Papa Francisco. En consecuencia, vale la pena destacar algunas claves antropológicas mencionadas por el Papa que aportan al enfoque de la bioética personalista. En primer lugar, no somos Dios (Francisco, 2015, p. 67). La persona humana ha sido creada a imagen y semejanza de Dios (Gn 1, 26), pero no es Dios. Dios es omnipotente, es el Creador; sin embargo, la persona humana es creatura, y por lo mismo, no es todopoderosa; esto quiere decir que es contingente, tiene límites, es frágil y débil; como expresa el Papa: Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez Perseitas | Vol. 4 | No.2 | julio-diciembre | 2016192 La mejor manera de poner en su lugar al ser humano, y de acabar con su pretensión de ser un dominador absoluto de la tierra, es volver a proponer la figura de un Padre creador y único dueño del mundo, porque de otro modo el ser humano tenderá siempre a querer imponer a la realidad sus propias leyes e intereses (Francisco, 2015, p. 75). En segundo lugar, la persona humana es responsable de su propia vida y de sus relaciones con la naturaleza. A ninguna otra creatura se le puede hacer responsable de sus actos; por el contrario, a la persona humana sí, puede y tiene que dar cuenta de ellos. El rechazo más claro a asumir esta responsabilidad es la respuesta que da Caín a Dios después de asesinar a Abel, "¿Soy yo acaso guardían de mi hermano?" (Gn 4, 9). El ser humano ha recibido un regalo muy grande para que pueda sacar provecho de él, la Tierra. Sin embargo, si bien cada comunidad puede tomar de la bondad de la Tierra lo que necesita para su supervivencia, tiene también el deber de protegerla y de garantizar la continuidad de su fertilidad para las generaciones futuras (Francisco, 2015, p. 67). En tercer lugar, la prioridad del ser sobre el ser útiles. No puede ponerse la utilidad de una persona antes que su misma existencia; lo que le da su dignidad es que existe, no su utilidad. En cuarto lugar, la posibilidad de un nuevo comienzo. Gracias a la posibilidad de toma de conciencia que tiene la persona humana, le es factible cambiar el rumbo de su vida, rehabilitarse, hacerse responsable y reponer los daños; sucedió después del diluvio universal (Gn 7) y puede hacerlo también hoy. En quinto lugar, la capacidad de entrar en diálogo consigo mismo y con Dios: La capacidad de reflexión, la argumentación, la creatividad, la interpretación, la elaboración artística y otras capacidades inéditas muestran una singularidad que trasciende el ámbito físico y biológico. La novedad cualitativa que implica el surgimiento de un ser personal dentro del universo material supone una acción directa de Dios, un llamado peculiar a la vida y a la relación de un Tú a otro tú (Francisco, 2015, p. 81). Es esa capacidad de diálogo la que lleva también al ser humano a alabar a Dios (Francisco, 2015, p. 72). En sexto lugar, la compasión, que está dirigida principalmente a los mismos de su especie, pues no puede ser real un sentimiento de íntima unión con los demás seres de la naturaleza si al mismo tiempo en el corazón no hay ternura, compasión y preocupación por los seres humanos (Francisco, 2015, p. 91). Bioética de la esperanza: claves desde la Laudato Si' Bioethics of hope: keys from the Laudato Si' 193Perseitas | Vol. 4 | No.2 | julio-diciembre | 2016 En consecuencia, nos conduce a una recta comprensión de la administración de los bienes, pues "quien se apropia algo es solo para administrarlo en bien de todos" (Francisco, 2015, p. 95). Finalmente, y como clave principal de toda la bioética personalista que develamos en esta encíclia, es la Encarnación del logos, pues el logos se hizo carne, se hizo hombre; esta realidad no solo le da el sentido pleno a la existencia humana, sino que de este modo, las criaturas de este mundo ya no se nos presentan como una realidad meramente natural, porque el Resucitado las envuelve misteriosamente y las orienta a un destino de plenitud (Francisco, 2015, p. 100). Posibles salidas a la problemática actual. Una visión de esperanza En su encíclica, el Papa Francisco menciona algunos problemas muy graves en los que está sumida la sociedad actual. Para describirlos, no escatima palabras duras y crudas, como cuando habla del "trágico aumento de los migrantes huyendo de la miseria empeorada por la degradación ambiental" (Francisco, 2015, p. 25), o cuando dice: La tierra de los pobres del Sur es rica y poco contaminada, pero el acceso a la propiedad de los bienes y recursos para satisfacer sus necesidades vitales les está vedado por un sistema de relaciones comerciales y de propiedad estructuralmente perverso (Francisco, 2015, p. 52). O al hacer referencia a la debilidad de la reacción de la política internacional, pues "el sometimiento de la política ante la tecnología y las finanzas se muestra en el fracaso de las Cumbres mundiales sobre medio ambiente" (Francisco, 2015, p. 54). Sumado a estas descripciones, el Papa hace también alusión a problemas de fondo como la cultura del descarte o el de la "globalización de la indiferencia" (Francisco, 2015, p. 52), caracterizada por una falta de reacciones ante estos dramas como un signo de la pérdida del sentido de responsabilidad por nuestros semejantes sobre el cual se funda toda sociedad civil (Francisco, 2015, p. 25). Pues bien, no vale la pena detenerse por ahora en la descripción de los problemas que se exponen en la encíclica, más bien, se buscan claves de esperanza, que puedan constituirse en horizonte sobre el cual mirar, en obtener Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez Perseitas | Vol. 4 | No.2 | julio-diciembre | 2016194 salidas que potencien aquello que es la persona humana, pues de lo contrario, somos testigos de cómo progresivamente no solo se le hace daño a las personas, sino que a causa de estos problemas que se mencionan en la encíclica se va perdiendo la diginidad humana y con ello, varias de las características propias de la persona que hemos mencionado en el punto anterior. Estas claves vienen dadas por elementos positivos del diagnóstico que hace el Papa y por algunos medios que constituyen salidas a los problemas, así como por cuestiones de fondo que es necesario revisar en nuestra cultura actual, los cuales trataremos a continuación. Elementos positivos del diagnóstico El diagnóstico de la realidad actual ya está hecho. Las investigaciones abundan. Lo que hay que hacer es descubrir los puntos por donde se pueden encontrar salidas para resolver dicha problemática. Aunque aún hay mucho por hacer, no todo es negativo; una parte de la sociedad está entrando en una etapa de mayor conciencia, se percibe una sensibilidad con respecto al ambiente y al cuidado de la naturaleza (Francisco, 2015, p. 19, p. 55). Las tareas que alguien se propone constituyen siempre una fuente de esperanza porque nos lanzan a trabajar, nos mueven a tomar decisiones para solucionar los problemas. Por ejemplo, se han desarrollado tecnologías adecuadas de acumulación de energías renovables en algunos países de manera significativa, aunque están lejos de lograr una proporción importante (Francisco, 2015, p. 26). También se ha avanzado en la sensibilización de la sociedad hacia los temas ambientales, como dice el Papa: Es loable la tarea de organismos internacionales y de organizaciones de la sociedad civil que sensibilizan a las poblaciones y cooperan críticamente, también utilizando legítimos mecanismos de presión, para que cada gobierno cumpla con su propio e indelegable deber de preservar el ambiente y los recursos naturales de su país, sin venderse a intereses espurios locales o internacionales (Francisco, 2015, p. 38). Bioética de la esperanza: claves desde la Laudato Si' Bioethics of hope: keys from the Laudato Si' 195Perseitas | Vol. 4 | No.2 | julio-diciembre | 2016 Apuestas que aportan esperanza Cuando se habla de solucionar problemas, se dice que se debe acabar el problema de raíz para que no vuelva a suceder, o al menos, baje en intensidad o en frecuencia. Sin embargo, en la actualidad se malentiende lo que significa eliminar los problemas de raíz, pues se ha llegado a pensar que el problema es el hombre mismo, con lo cual, por ejemplo, en lugar de resolver los problemas de los pobres y de pensar en un mundo diferente, algunos atinan solo a proponer una reducción de la natalidad. No faltan presiones internacionales a los países en desarrollo, condicionando ayudas económicas a ciertas políticas de "salud reproductiva" (Francisco, 2015, p. 50). Ahora bien, muchas veces dichas políticas terminan apoyando abortos o atentando directamente contra la vida humana misma, como es el caso del desarrollo de la investigación para la producción de nuevas armas ofensivas (Francisco, 2015, p. 57); ¿qué esperanza puede dar el hecho de que cada vez hay más armas con las cuales hay mayor grado de probabilidad de que un ser humano pierda la vida? ¿Trae alguna esperanza la carrera armamentista? ¿Qué esperanza trae impedir la existencia de una vida humana que no se puede defender? Habrá salidas que podrán solucionar problemas inmediatos de índole socio-económica, pero no están respondiendo a la lógica de quién es la persona humana ni mucho menos aportando a construir una visión de esperanza. Pero ante tantos ataques a la vida humana y frente al descalabro ecológico del cual somos testigos hoy, cabe preguntarnos ¿cómo es posible tener esperanza? No basta con mencionar algunas cosas buenas que se están haciendo en pro de la sociedad y del medio ambiente. Es necesario encontrar herramientas que abran el horizonte y que permitan agudizar la mirada para enfrentarse a esta realidad; y la fe católica puede dar luces que orienten por dónde caminar, pues ya decía el mismo Potter (como se citó en Pessini, 2013), que las religiones pueden causar cambios en la orientación interior, en la mentalidad, en los corazones de las personas y llevarlas a la conversión de un falso camino hacia una nueva orientación de vida; son capaces de dar a las personas Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez Perseitas | Vol. 4 | No.2 | julio-diciembre | 2016196 un horizonte de sentido para sus vidas y un hogar espititual. En este sentido es que el Papa Francisco plantea algunas claves, que de no tenerlas, no es posible ganar esa visión de esperanza. Reconocimiento de la fragilidad humana. Cuando no se comprende bien quién es el ser humano, cuando se dejan de lado aquellas características primordiales, en especial, cuando no se reconoce el carácter contingente de la persona humana, se construyen castillos en el aire. El ser humano ha llegado a creerse todopoderoso, otro Dios; ¿realmente es consciente de todo el poder que puede llegar a tener? Más aún, ¿se pregunta por las consecuencias que puede tener el ejercicio de ese poder? Pareciera que el ser humano tiene una autonomía absoluta sobre todo y todos, pues como dice el Papa "cada época tiende a desarrollar una escasa autoconsciencia de sus propios límites" (Francisco, 2015, p. 105). El no reconocimiento de esa limitación lo lleva a construir un horizonte irreal de vida y por lo tanto, la esperanza que se construye es igualmente irreal; si se declara autónomo de la realidad y se constituye en dominador absoluto, la misma base de su existencia se desmorona (Francisco, 2015, p. 117). Por el contrario, en la medida en que el ser humano se reconoce limitado, quedará posibilitado para medir mejor sus fuerzas antes de emprender cualquier tarea, siendo más consciente de hasta dónde es capaz de llegar y hasta dónde le es permitido llegar. La mirada recta sobre el ser humano que toma en cuenta sus limitaciones, lleva a comprender que lo que nos rodea también ofrece un margen, pues como dice el Papa: "ha llegado el momento de volver a prestar atención a la realidad con los límites que ella impone, que a su vez son la posibilidad de un desarrollo humano y social más sano y fecundo" (Fransisco, 2015, p. 116). En consecuencia, su esperanza está cimentada sobre lo real, toma consciencia de que su casa es una casa común, cuyos recursos pueden agotarse si no promueve un desarrollo sostenible. Bioética de la esperanza: claves desde la Laudato Si' Bioethics of hope: keys from the Laudato Si' 197Perseitas | Vol. 4 | No.2 | julio-diciembre | 2016 Mirar el conjunto. Este horizonte del que hablamos se debe observar con una mirada de conjunto. El Papa, en ese sentido, nos recuerda que es posible ampliar la mirada para así lograr un progreso más sano, más humano, más integral (Francisco, 2015, p. 112). No es posible caminar cuando no se tiene una visión global. En este sentido, la especialización propia de la tecnología implica una gran dificultad, dice el Papa, pues la fragmentación de los saberes cumple su función a la hora de lograr aplicaciones concretas, pero suele llevar a perder el sentido de la totalidad, de las relaciones que existen entre las cosas, del horizonte amplio, que se vuelve irrelevante (Fransisco, 2015, p. 110). El filósofo español José Ortega y Gasset (1998) escribió un ensayo llamado La barbarie del especialismo, en el que habló de cómo la excesiva especialización había creado personas muy competentes en un área determinada del conocimiento, pero analfabetos funcionales en todo lo que fuese ajeno a esa área. Será quizá debido a esta sociedad sumergida en la excesiva especialización, la que impide que se tengan respuestas más claras para superar las crisis en las que vive el mundo de hoy. Se deben generar puentes entre la ciencia y la religión que, como dice el Papa, aportan diferentes aproximaciones a la realidad y pueden entrar en un diálogo intenso y productivo para ambas (Fransisco, 2015, p. 62). Esta mirada de conjunto es la que posibilita plantear una ecología integral, que como dice el Papa Francisco en el capítulo cuarto de la encíclica, incorpora las dimensiones ambiental, económica y social. Esta integralidad es la que permite encontrar soluciones que no sean parciales, pues muchas veces se apunta a resolver un problema desde un ángulo simplemente, por ejemplo el ambiental, o el social, pero no de manera conjunta, lo cual dificulta encontrar verdaderas salidas. Echar a andar procesos. La cultura de la provisionalidad del mundo actual, lleva a querer todo ya. Es la cultura del inmediatismo y de la impaciencia. Como se ha mencionado, se han dado muchas soluciones a problemas ambientales; sin embargo, la cultura ecológica no se puede reducir a una serie de respuestas urgentes y parciales a los problemas que van apareciendo (Francisco, 2015, Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez Perseitas | Vol. 4 | No.2 | julio-diciembre | 2016198 p. 111). Muchas empresas multinacionales, generalmente al cesar sus actividades y al retirarse, dejan grandes pasivos humanos y ambientales (Francisco, 2015, p. 51). Para remediarlos, envían indemnizaciones a los países o compran bonos de carbono con los que buscan mitigar los graves daños causados. Pero es evidente aquí una doble moral e incoherencia con los tratados que buscan una mejor calidad del medio ambiente. Por tanto, es necesario echar a andar procesos que permitan un desarrollo sostenible y poner la mirada sobre los que ya están en marcha, por ejemplo las comunidades de pequeños productores que optan por sistemas de producción menos contaminantes, sosteniendo un modelo de vida, de gozo y de convivencia no consumista (Francisco, 2015, p. 112). Echar a andar un proceso siempre es síntoma de que hay esperanza, pues es plantearse metas a largo plazo y dejar que con el tiempo vayan madurando los frutos. El trabajo y el desarrollo científico y tecnológico. Si bien es cierto que el trabajo puede llevar a convertirse en una carga difícil de llevar, pues se encuentran obstáculos en la convivencia y el diálogo y se hace frente muchas veces a la corrupción; también resulta ser una necesidad, parte del sentido de la vida en esta tierra, camino de maduración, de desarrollo humano y de realización personal (Francisco, 2015, p. 128). Actualmente, el desarrollo científico y tecnológico se han convertido en fuente de trabajo para muchos. En algunos casos, este desarrollo ha actuado en detrimento de unas personas que han sido reemplazadas por máquinas. Sin embargo, este desarrollo traza caminos de largo alcance, plantea retos para los investigadores y promueve la creatividad; como dice el Papa, no es posible frenar la creatividad humana (Francisco, 2015, p. 131). En el campo de innovación tecnológica se abren horizontes grandes de trabajo para el hombre, que son y pueden ser cada día más amplios y ser motivo de esperanza para toda la humanidad. Claro está que, "al mismo tiempo, no pueden dejar de replantearse los objetivos, los efectos, el contexto y los límites éticos de esa actividad humana que es una forma de poder con altos riesgos" (Francisco, 2015, p. 131). El Diálogo. Para el Santo Padre queda muy claro que el eje transversal de las líneas de orientación y de acción que se proponen para superar la crisis en la cual está sumido nuestro planeta es el diálogo: diálogo sobre el medio Bioética de la esperanza: claves desde la Laudato Si' Bioethics of hope: keys from the Laudato Si' 199Perseitas | Vol. 4 | No.2 | julio-diciembre | 2016 ambiente en la política internacional, diálogo hacia nuevas políticas nacionales y locales, diálogo y transparencia en los procesos decisionales, política y economía en diálogo para la plenitud humana, y las religiones en diálogo con las ciencias. El diálogo es una dimensión esencial de la persona humana. Será mediante éste que se podrá construir esa cultura del encuentro que tanto reclama el Papa Francisco para el mundo de hoy. Educar en gratitud para valorar lo sencillo. Podríamos preguntarnos en qué momento nos enseñaron a agradecer, a ser agradecidos con lo que tenemos. Lo más probable es que nos lo hayan enseñado una vez y luego se convirtió simplemente en un formalismo, en una costumbre. No obstante, la gratitud es quizá aquello que se le ha enseñado a toda persona humana. Es sobre ésta que se cimienta el aprecio por lo sencillo, pues el verse agradecido por los dones, favores o bienes recibidos, y el cultivo de esta actitud, lleva a valorar incluso lo más simple o pequeño que se haya recibido (Francisco, 2015, p. 220). Esa experiencia que propone la espiritualidad cristiana de crecer con sobriedad y el desarrollo de una capacidad de gozar con poco, es lo único que permitirá que se dé la conversión ecológica (Francisco, 2015, p. 217) y la apuesta por llevar otros estilos de vida (p. 206). Hay que reconocer que "la sobriedad y la humildad no han gozado de una valoración positiva en el último siglo" (p. 224). Conclusión La encíclica del Papa Francisco presenta al mundo una manera renovada de ver la fe católica. En este caso, la fe ha sido la luz que ha permitido mirar con mayor claridad la realidad que nos rodea, aportando a la comunidad mundial a darse cuenta no solo de que el planeta Tierra parece caerse a pedazos, sino a descubrir que es el estilo de vida que lleva el mundo de hoy el que alimenta las actitudes materialistas y los comportamientos individualistas que están conduciendo a la destrucción de nuestra casa común. Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez Perseitas | Vol. 4 | No.2 | julio-diciembre | 2016200 Por otro lado, la encíclica del Papa se inserta en el desarrollo de la bioética actual, muy atenta al medio ambiente, pero sobre todo teniendo a la persona en el centro de su reflexión, dando significativos aportes a una bioética personalista. Teniendo como punto de partida la persona humana, se abre un horizonte de esperanza, en el que la Palabra de Dios tiene mucho que aportar; pero también, elementos y realidades muy propias de la persona humana misma se tornan en fuentes de esperanza, como lo es el diálogo, el trabajo mismo, la mirada de conjunto e incluso el reconocer la propia fragilidad humana. Finalmente, se quiere resaltar que para tomar decisiones de cambio de un estilo de vida y de mentalidad, así como adoptar un comportamiento ético que proteja a la persona humana, su dignidad y su entorno, es necesario apuntar a una visión esperanzada; de lo contrario, la vivencia de la ética se debilita y se corre el riesgo de perder las motivaciones para construir un mundo mejor. Por esta razón, se plantea una bioética de la esperanza como una propuesta que permite encontrar salidas a la problemática del mundo actual, cuyo principal promotor es el Papa Francisco. Referencias Burgos, J. M. (2013). ¿Qué es la bioética personalista? Un análisis de su especificidad y de sus fundamentos teóricos. Cuadernos de Bioética, 80(25), 17-30. Camps, V. (1985). Etica de esperanza. Estudios. Recuperado de: http://biblioteca.itam.mx/estudios/estudio/estudio04/sec_4.html Francisco. (2015). Carta Encíclica Laudato Si'. Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana. Guerra, R. (2013). Bioética y racionalidad. El personalismo al servicio de la ampliación del horizonte de la razón en la fundamentación bioética. Cuadernos de Bioética, 80(25), 39-48. Bioética de la esperanza: claves desde la Laudato Si' Bioethics of hope: keys from the Laudato Si' 201Perseitas | Vol. 4 | No.2 | julio-diciembre | 2016 Lima, N. S. y Cambra, B. I. (2013). La bioética según Fritz Jahr: idea y cosmovisión. Referencias contextuales y narrativas del surgimiento del concepto. V Congreso Internacional de Investigación y Práctica Profesional en Psicología. XX Jornadas de Investigación. Noveno encuentro de investigadores en Psicología del Mercosur. Facultad de Psicología. Universidad de Buenos Aires, Buenos Aires. Naranjo, N. (2008). Frases explosivas de Federico Nietzsche. Medellín: Editorial Lealon. Ortega y Gasset, J. (1998). La barbarie del "especialismo". En M. Gardner (Coord.), Los grandes ensayos de la ciencia (pp. 91-96). México: Nueva Imagen. Recuperado de: http://users.df.uba.ar/solari/Docencia/Complejos/ortega.pdf Pessini, L. (2013). En la cuna de la Bioética: el encuentro de un credo con un imperativo y un principio. Revista Colombiana de Bioética, 8(1), 8-31. Pieper, J. (2003). Las virtudes fundamentales (8a. ed.). Madrid: Rialp. Potter, V. R. (1988). Global Bioethics. Building on the Leopold Legacy. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. Revista Nature. (25 Jun 2015). Hope from the Pope. Revista Nature, 522, 391. doi:10.1038/522391a Roa-Castellanos, R. A., y Bauer, C. (2009). Presentación de la palabra bioética, del imperativo bioético y de la noción de biopsicología por Fritz Jahr en 1929. Bioethikos, 3(2), 158-170. Sass, H. M. (2011). El pensamiento bioético de Fritz Jahr 1927-1934. Aesthethika, 6(2), 20-33. Wilches, A.M. (2011). La Propuesta Bioética de Van Rensselaer Potter, cuatro décadas después. Opción. 66, 70-84.

International Journal of Academic Multidisciplinary Research (IJAMR) ISSN: 2000-006X Vol. 2 Issue 4, April – 2018, Pages: 19-27 www.ijeais.org/ijamr 19 Wireless Network Security: Challenges, Threats and Solutions. A Critical Review 1 Lusekelo Kibona, 2 Hassana Ganame 1 Department of Computer Science, Ruaha Catholic University (RUCU), Tanzania, [email protected] 2 Department of Information and Telecommunication, School of Engineering of Bamako, Mali [email protected] Abstract: Wireless security is the avoidance of unlawful access or impairment to computers using wireless networks. Securing wireless network has been a research in the past two decades without coming up with prior solution to which security method should be employed to prevent unlawful access of data. The aim of this study was to review some literatures on wireless security in the areas of attacks, threats, vulnerabilities and some solutions to deal with those problems. It was found that attackers (hackers) have different mechanisms to attack the networks through bypassing the security trap developed by organizations and they may use one weak pint to attack the whole network of an organization. However the author suggested using firewall in each wireless access point as the counter measure to protect data of the whole organization not to be attacked. Keywords Wireless network, network security, WAP2, WEP, hackers, Firewall 1. INTRODUCTION Wireless network is a network set up by using radio signal frequency to communicate among computers and other network devices, sometimes it is referred as Wi-Fi network or WLAN and it is getting popular nowadays due to easy setup feature and no cabling involved [1]. Wireless Internet access technology is being gradually arrayed in both office and public surroundings, as well as by the Internet users at home. With continual advances in technology, coupled with increasing price/performance advantages, wireless accessibility is being deployed increasingly in office and public environments. This new era of technological flexibility can also provide an open invitation for network security threats not only in the corporate world, but also the privacy of users at home. When the decision is made to move from a physically connected architecture to wireless LAN technology, component accessibility and signal propagation provided convenient opportunities for unauthorized users to introduce malicious activities, intercept data transmission, or passively eavesdrop upon the infrastructure of a system Figure 1: Showing the architecture of wired network and wireless network (for devices accessing Wireless Access Point) [1]. International Journal of Academic Multidisciplinary Research (IJAMR) ISSN: 2000-006X Vol. 2 Issue 4, April – 2018, Pages: 19-27 www.ijeais.org/ijamr 20 In Figure 1, both wired network and wireless network get data to be communicated among the laptops/computers or any mobile devices from the router, for wireless network the wireless access point provide data access for laptops but for wired network the router provides data access to laptops/computers. Both (wired network and wireless network) require resolute confidentiality with no violations to system integrity, while continuing to sustain access to information and related systems for authorized users. The pervasive availability and wide usage of wireless networks with different kinds of topologies, techniques and protocol suites have brought with them a need to improve security mechanisms [2]. Wireless security is the prevention of unauthorized access or damage to computers using wireless networks. The most common types of wireless security are Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) and Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) [3]. It requires different thinking from wired network security as it gives hackers or attackers an easy transport medium access and this access increases the threat that any security architecture must deal with. Wireless security on the IEEE 802.11 standard has received a lot of critics, because it is has got several design errors and security problems. In dealing with wireless network security availability, authenticity, integrity, confidentiality and nonrepudiation are very important aspects to deal with because any effective wireless network security must make sure [4]: Availability: guarantees that the desired network services are available whenever they are expected, in spite of attacks. Systems that ensure availability seek to combat denial of service and energy starvation attacks. Authenticity: guarantees communication from one node to another is genuine. It ensures that a malicious node cannot masquerade as a trusted network node. Confidentiality: is a core security primitive for ad hoc networks, It guarantees that a given message cannot be understood by anyone else than its (their) desired recipient(s). Integrity: denotes the authenticity of data sent from one node to another. That is, it guarantees that a message sent from node A to node B was not modified by a malicious node, C, during transmission. Non-repudiation: guarantees that the origin of the message is legitimate. i.e when one node receives a false message from another, nonrepudiation allows the former to accuse the later of sending the false message and enables all other nodes to know about it. According to the above security problems, the main objective of this research was to identify principle elements related to wireless network security and provide an overview of potential threats, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures (solutions) associated with wireless network security. 2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE SURVEY a) NETWORK SECURITY CHALLENGES, ATTACKS AND THREATS According to [1], the threats in the network were not known to public people till prices of wireless equipment went down around 2000, before that date, the military was the number one client for wireless security products especially during the cold war but now days every person, company and even military are very much aware of network security. In his paper titled "What is computer security? " [2], asked several questions, such as what exactly the network infrastructure is, what threats it must be secured against, and how protection can be provided on a cost-effective basis, but underlying all these questions is how to define a secure system. As per [3], Denial of Service (DoS) attack is the most severe security threat among various security risks, because DoS can compromise the availability and integrity of broadband wireless network. [4], discussed about computing as the most new technology adopted in the wireless network today in the case of shift of information technology but security and privacy are perceived as primary obstacles to its wide adoption in modern technological information. [5], examined the challenges of providing intrusion detection in wireless ad-hoc networks, they reviewed current efforts to detect attacks against the ad-hoc routing infrastructure, as well as detecting attacks directed against the mobile nodes, they also examined the intrusion detection architectures that may be deployed for different wireless adhoc network infrastructures, as well as proposed methods of intrusion response. Using wireless mesh networks (WMNs) to offer Internet connectivity had become a popular choice for wireless Internet service providers as it allows fast, easy, and inexpensive network deployment, but [6, 7], found that, security in WMNs was still in its infancy as very little attention has been devoted thus far to this topic by the research community. [8], came out with the applicability and limitations of existing Internet protocols and security architectures in the context of the Internet of Things by giving an overview of the deployment model and general security needed and then challenges and requirements for IP-based security solutions and highlighted specific technical limitations of standard IP security protocols. In their paper titled „A Secure and Lightweight Approach for Routing Optimization in Mobile IPv6, [9], found out security weakness in mobility support that has a direct consequence on the security of users because it obscures the distinction between devices and users and they went further by finding that, a malicious and unauthenticated message in mobility support may open a security hole for intruders by supplying an easy mean to launch an attack that hijacks an ongoing session to a location chosen by the intruder, so International Journal of Academic Multidisciplinary Research (IJAMR) ISSN: 2000-006X Vol. 2 Issue 4, April – 2018, Pages: 19-27 www.ijeais.org/ijamr 21 they come up with the solution on how to thwart such a session hijacking attack by authenticating a suspicious message. In a paper „Analysis of Security Threats in Wireless Sensor Network' by [10], investigated the security related issues in wireless sensor networks because wireless communication technology incurs various types of security threats due to unattended installation of sensor nodes as sensor networks may interact with sensitive data and /or operate in hostile unattended environments. [11], explained Internet of Things (IoT) as a three layer perspective: perception layer, transportation layer and application layer, they analyzed the security problems of each layer separately and tried to find new problems and solutions, they also analyzed the cross-layer heterogeneous integration issues and security issues in detail and discussed the security issues of IoT as a whole and tried to find solutions to them. As discussed by [12], some current solutions data security and privacy protection issues associated with cloud computing across all stages of data life cycle. Even though security issues have received great considerations in cloud computing and vehicular networks, [13] identified security challenges that are specific to vehicular clouds (VCs), e.g., challenges of authentication of high-mobility vehicles, scalability and single interface, tangled identities and locations, and the complexity of establishing trust relationships among multiple players caused by intermittent short-range communications and finally they provided a security scheme that addresses several of the challenges discussed. The paper titled „Survey on VANET security challenges and possible cryptographic solutions‟ by [14], presented the communication architecture of VANETs and outlined the privacy and security challenges that needed to be overcame to make such networks safety usable in practice they then identified all existing security problems in VANETs and classified them from a cryptographic point of view [15]. In their research paper, [16], improved the security of the 3G protocols in a network access by providing strong periodically mutual authentication, strong key agreement, and non-repudiation service in a simple and elegant way. [17], found out the security challenges such as identity theft, international credit card fraud, communications fraud and corporate fraud are some of the main barriers preventing wireless technologies from growing and over taking the wired technology position, so they explored the security vulnerabilities of the 802.11b wireless LAN and presented solutions for some of its major vulnerabilities. As per [18], the wormhole attack forms a stern threat in wireless networks, specifically against many ad hoc network routing protocols and location-based wireless security systems taking an example on present ad hoc network routing protocols, in which without some ways to defend against the wormhole attack, they will be unable to find routes longer than one or two hops, and thus severely disrupting communication. According to [19] ,the loss of confidentiality and integrity and the threat of denial of service (DoS) attacks are risks typically associated with wireless communications as unauthorized users may gain access to agency systems and information, corrupt the agency‟s data, consume network bandwidth, degrade network performance, and launch attacks that prevent authorized users from accessing the network, or use agency resources to launch attacks on other networks. As per [20], they researchers focused on routing and security issues associated with mobile ad hoc networks which are required in order to provide secure communication. On the basis of the nature of attack interaction, the attacks against MANET were classified into active and passive attacks. Attackers against a network can be classified into two groups: insider and outsider. Whereas an outsider attacker is not a legitimate user of the network, an insider attacker is an authorized node and a part of the routing mechanism on MANETs. [21], presented the rushing attack, a new attack that results in denial-of-service when used against all previous ondemand ad-hoc network routing protocols. For example, DSR, AODV, and secure protocols based on them, such as Ariadne, ARAN, and SAODV, are unable to discover routes longer than two hops when subject to this attack, the attack is also damaging because it can be performed by a relatively weak attacker. They analyzed why previous protocols failed under this attack and then developed Rushing Attack Prevention (RAP), a generic defense against the rushing attack for on-demand protocols. RAP incurs no cost unless the underlying protocol fails to find a working route, and it provides provable security properties even against the strongest rushing attackers. According to [22], current wireless technologies in use allow hackers to monitor and even change the integrity of transmitted data so the lack of rigid security standards has caused companies to invest millions on securing their wireless networks which is very expensive. b) OSI MODEL IN NETWORK SECURITY To adequately secure the integrity of a network, administrators require standards of the framework to implement various protocols. In order to replace TCP/IP and satisfy this prerequisite, the Open System Interconnection (OSI) model was introduced as network reference model for analyzing data communication between hardware and software in a seven layer system. While carrying out very unique tasks, each layer is also assigned to support the layer above and offer service to the one below it respectively. According to [23], OSI layers are categorized into two group layers depending on the functionalities, and those layers are layers 1-4 which are assigned the lower layers of the International Journal of Academic Multidisciplinary Research (IJAMR) ISSN: 2000-006X Vol. 2 Issue 4, April – 2018, Pages: 19-27 www.ijeais.org/ijamr 22 protocol stacks and media layers responsible for transferring and moving data and layers 5-7 which are considered to be the upper host layers of the system and are associated with application level data. Table 1: Seven layers Architecture and their functionalities [24]. In the OSI model each layer is susceptible to numerous attacks, which standstills the performance of a network. [25], defined vulnerability as a weakness in security system and a certain system may be susceptible to unlawful data operation because the system does not authenticate a user‟s distinctiveness before permitting data access thus MANET is more vulnerable than wired network. The following is the description of the attacks, threats and vulnerabilities of various OSI layers [26] Physical Layer Vulnerabilities includes: Loss of Power, Loss of Environmental Control, Physical Theft of Data and Hardware, Physical Damage or Destruction of Data and Hardware, Unauthorized changes to the functional environment (data connections, removable media, adding/removing resources), Disconnection of Physical Data Links, Undetectable Interception of Data and Keystroke & Other Input Logging. Link Layer Vulnerability includes: MAC Address Spoofing (station claims the identity of another), VLAN circumvention (station may force direct communication with other stations, bypassing logical controls such as subnets and firewalls.), Spanning Tree errors may be accidentally or purposefully introduced, causing the layer two environment to transmit packets in infinite loops, In wireless media situations, layer two protocols may allow free connection to the network by unauthorized entities, or weak authentication and encryption may allow a false sense of security, Switches may be forced to flood traffic to all VLAN ports rather than selectively forwarding to the appropriate ports, allowing interception of data by any device connected to a VLAN. Network Layer Vulnerabilities includes: Route spoofing propagation of false network topology, IP Address Spoofingfalse source addressing on malicious packets, Identity & Resource ID Vulnerability Reliance on addressing to identify resources and peers can be brittle and vulnerable. Transport Layer Vulnerabilities includes: Mishandling of undefined, poorly defined, or "illegal" conditions, Differences in transport protocol implementation allow "fingerprinting‟ and other enumeration of host information, Overloading of transport-layer mechanisms such as port numbers limit the ability to effectively filter and qualify traffic, Transmission mechanisms can be subject to spoofing and attack based on crafted packets and the educated guessing of flow and transmission values, allowing the disruption or seizure of control of communications. Session Layer Vulnerabilities includes: Weak or nonexistent authentication mechanisms, Passing of session credentials such as user ID and password in the clear, allowing intercept and unauthorized use, Session identification may be subject to spoofing and hijack, Leakage of information based on failed authentication attempts, Unlimited failed sessions allow brute-force attacks on access credentials. Presentation Layer Vulnerabilities includes: Poor handling of unexpected input can lead to application crashes or surrender of control to execute arbitrary instructions, Unintentional or ill-advised use of externally supplied input in control contexts may allow remote manipulation or information leakage, Cryptographic flaws may be exploited to circumvent privacy protections. Application Layer Vulnerabilities includes: Open design issues allow free use of application resources by unintended parties, Backdoors and application design flaws bypass standard security controls, Inadequate security controls force "all-or-nothing" approach, resulting in either excessive or insufficient access, Overly complex application security controls tend to be bypassed or poorly understood and implemented, Program logic flaws may be accidentally or purposely used to crash programs or cause undesired behavior. The following figure shows the exact classification of security attacks for MANETS for different layers of the OSI model International Journal of Academic Multidisciplinary Research (IJAMR) ISSN: 2000-006X Vol. 2 Issue 4, April – 2018, Pages: 19-27 www.ijeais.org/ijamr 23 Figure 1: Classification of Security Attacks for different layers in MANETS [27]. Some attacks are non-cryptography related, and others are cryptographic primitive attacks. Table 2 below shows cryptographic primitive attacks and the examples[28]. Table 2. Cryptographic Primitive Attacks Cryptographic Primitive Attacks Examples Pseudorandom number attack Nonce, timestamp, initialization vector (IV) Digital signature attack RSA signature, ElGamal signature, digital signature standard (DSS) Hash collision attack SHA-0, MD4, MD5, HAVAL128, RIPEMD c) SOME NETWORK SECURITY SOLUTIONS [29], suggested a new routing technique called SecurityAware ad hoc Routing (SAR) that includes security attributes as parameters into ad hoc route discovery thus SAR allows the use of security as a negotiable metric to improve the significance of the routes exposed by ad hoc routing protocols, they then developed a two-tier classification of routing protocol security metrics, and proposed a framework to measure and enforce security attributes on ad hoc routing paths. According to [30], suggested to defend routing against denial-of-service attacks by taking advantages of the inherent redundancy in ad-hoc networks multiple routes between nodes, they also used replication and fresh cryptographic schemes, such as threshold cryptography, to build a highly secure and highly accessible key management service. [18], presented a general mechanism, called packet leashes, for spotting and, thus protecting against wormhole attacks, and then presented a specific protocol, called TIK, that implements leashes. A modest solution to protect VANETs as suggested by [31], is the use of cryptographic algorithms and approaches that are already widely deployed to protect against traditional threats in computer networks. [28], suggested cryptography as an imperative and dominant security tool that offers security services, such as authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation but In all possibility, there exist attacks on many cryptographic primitives that have not yet been revealed even though Cryptographic primitives are considered to be secure, however, lately some problems which were discovered, such as collision attacks on hash function, e.g. SHA-1, Pseudorandom number attacks, digital signature attacks, and hash collision attacks which are very difficult to be secured. In their paper titled „Secure aggregation for wireless networks' [32], presented a protocol that provided a secure aggregation mechanism for wireless networks that is strong to both intruder devices and single device key concessions, their protocol was envisioned to work within the computation, memory and power consumption limits of lowcost sensor devices, but takes benefit of the properties of wireless networking, as well as the power irregularity between the devices and the base station. According to [33] a new and efficient wireless authentication protocol providing user secrecy was presented and was based on the hash function and smart cards, and mobile users only do symmetric encryption and decryption, in their protocol, it takes only one round of message exchange between the mobile user and the visited network, and one round of message exchange between the visited network and the corresponding home network. [34], came up with the description that when either firewalls or VPN gateways are used in security of wireless local area networks, centralized server based solutions can be used for authentication, as in Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service RADIUS server (RADIUS), their architecture (as in figure 2 below) differ from others because they use location information together with user privileges in access control and they have chosen to determine location of the client from IP subnet information, which is considerably simpler compared to other studies which utilized GPS technology for a similar purpose. International Journal of Academic Multidisciplinary Research (IJAMR) ISSN: 2000-006X Vol. 2 Issue 4, April – 2018, Pages: 19-27 www.ijeais.org/ijamr 24 Figure 2: Proposed security architecture using RADIUS [34]. [35], concluded that Wi-Fi Protected Access repairs all known susceptibilities in Wi-Fi network security and greatly improves data security and access control on current and future Wi-Fi wireless LANs and it also delivers an instant, strong, standards-based, interoperable security solution that addresses all known errors in the original WEP-based security. Ping Guo et al [36], proposed a novel design prototype in the direction of lightweight and tolerant authentication for service-oriented WMNs, named Variable Threshold-value Authentication (VTA) architecture in which VTA's intrusion-tolerant ability was guaranteed to design a series of node stimulated mechanisms to remain threshold values t and n of system private key unchanged the analysis and simulation results show that VTA can not only overcome the disadvantage of those static threshold value schemes, but also mostly increase system cost relating to the schemes not equipped with threshold mechanism for WMNs. d) WPA AND WPA2 TECHNOLOGIES The acronyms WEP, WPA, and WPA2 refer to different wireless encryption protocols that are anticipated to protect the information you send and receive over a wireless network and the first protocol the Wi-Fi Alliance created was WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy), introduced in the late 1990s. WEP, however, had serious security weaknesses and has been superseded by WPA (Wi-Fi Protected Access). [37]. Table 3: Showing comparison between WEP and WAP [35]. Just as WPA substituted WEP, WPA2 (second version of Wireless Protected Access (WPA) has substituted WPA as the most current security protocol because WPA2 implements the latest security standards, including "government-grade" data encryption and since 2006, all WiFi certified products started to use WPA2 security and was an optional feature on some products before that so it was designed to improve the security of Wi-Fi connections by requiring use of stronger wireless encryption than what WPA requires [38]. According to [39], WEP and WPA use RC4 (RC4 [40], is a stream cipher algorithm, which "takes one character and replaces it with another character, the output of which is known as a key stream), a software stream cipher algorithm that is susceptible to attack, WPA is still vulnerable to attacks because it is grounded on the RC4 stream cipher. The main difference between WEP and WPA is that WPA adds an extra security protocol to the RC4 cipher known as TKIP (Temporal Key Integrity Protocol) but WPA2 makes use of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES and it is so secure that it could potentially take millions of years for a supercomputers' brute-force attack to crack its encryption even though, there is speculation, partially based on Edward Snowden's leaked National Security Agency (NSA) documents, that AES does have at least one weakness which is a backdoor that might WEP WPA Encryption Flawed, cracked by scientists and hackers Fixes all WEP flaws 40-bit keys 128-bit keys Static – same key used by everyone on the network Dynamic session keys. Per user, per session, per packet keys Manual distribution of keys – hand typed into each device Automatic distribution of keys Authentication Flawed, used WEP key itself for authentication Strong user authentication, utilizing 802.1X and EAP International Journal of Academic Multidisciplinary Research (IJAMR) ISSN: 2000-006X Vol. 2 Issue 4, April – 2018, Pages: 19-27 www.ijeais.org/ijamr 25 have been purposely built into its design.) and CCMP, a TKIP replacement. The following table gives brief comparisons between WAP and WAP2. Table4: Comparison between WAP and WAP2 [39]. WPA WPA2 Abbreviation stands for Wi-Fi Protected Access Wi-Fi Protected Access 2 Definition A security protocol developed by the Wi-Fi Alliance in 2003 for use in securing wireless networks; designed to replace the WEP protocol A security protocol developed by the Wi-Fi Alliance in 2004 for use in securing wireless networks; designed to replace the WEP and WPA protocols. Methodology As a temporary solution to WEP's problems, WPA still uses WEP's insecure RC4 stream cipher but provides extra security through TKIP. Unlike WEP and WPA, WPA2 uses the AES standard instead of the RC4 stream cipher. CCMP substituted WPA's TKIP. Security and Recommendations Somewhat. Superior to WEP, inferior to WPA2. Yes, though more secure when WiFi Protected Setup (WPS) is disabled. One firewall may be the solution to some extent but the problem appears to the costs to be incurred as each wireless access point must be secured with firewall in order to make stubbornness for attackers to attack the whole system. So computers connected to one access point may be attacked but not all access points or even the server can be attacked by the same attacker using the gateway of access point 1because all other access points are secured separately from access point 1 that‟s why it brings stubborn to attacker as the attacker is required to visit each access point which is time consuming and it may be easy to detect him/it. To be able to attack say computers (C) protected by firewall 1 which protects computers connected to access point (1) one, so the computers in that access points may be vulnerable to attacks but all other computers connected to other access points can be attacked as the firewall 1 cannot allow access to wireless switch which links to other access points. The following figure explains very well the scenario described above in which the attacker may Figure 3: Suggested solution for small organization wireless network In figure 3, firewall 1 deals with protecting computers in access point 1 against attacks from computers from other access points, the same applies for firewalls 2, 3 and 4. International Journal of Academic Multidisciplinary Research (IJAMR) ISSN: 2000-006X Vol. 2 Issue 4, April – 2018, Pages: 19-27 www.ijeais.org/ijamr 26 3. CONCLUSION According to visited literature reviews which bring about the secondary data sources and some few primary data sources, it seems that there are still difficulties in totally securing the wireless network against attacks, threats and vulnerabilities. The purpose of this study was to visit different literature in wireless network security and propose some network security solutions which will be more capable of securing wireless network compared to the existing solutions. .Most of the literatures indicated that securing totally wireless network is not an easy job but some parts of that network can be secured but not the whole network. So figure 3 is suggested in this study even though it is expensive but it may secure some network portion as it brings challenge for the attacker to visit every node in order to access the whole network which may lead for an attacker to be detected. 4. RECOMMENDATION AND FUTURE WORK In the future, strong network security using firewall must be designed in order to avoid expenses of installing firewall in each WLAN as suggested in this study. The authors recommends the protection of data to be done in the media gateway even though it will be very difficult to monitor the whole network but some security mechanisms in the gateway may somehow reduce the expenses which many organizations are incurring now days. References [1] W. A. Arbaugh, Real 802.11 security: Wi-Fi protected access and 802.11 i: Addison-Wesley Longman Publishing Co., Inc., 2003. [2] M. Bishop, "What is computer security?," IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 99, pp. 67-69, 2003. [3] S. Khan, K.-K. Loo, T. Naeem, and M. A. Khan, "Denial of service attacks and challenges in broadband wireless networks," 8; 7, 2008. [4] K. Ren, C. Wang, and Q. Wang, "Security challenges for the public cloud," IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 16, pp. 69-73, 2012. [5] P. Brutch and C. Ko, "Challenges in intrusion detection for wireless ad-hoc networks," in Applications and the Internet Workshops, 2003. Proceedings. 2003 Symposium on, 2003, pp. 368373. [6] N. B. Salem and J.-P. Hubaux, "Securing wireless mesh networks," IEEE Wireless Communications, vol. 13, pp. 50-55, 2006. [7] I. F. Akyildiz and X. Wang, "A survey on wireless mesh networks," IEEE Communications magazine, vol. 43, pp. S23-S30, 2005. [8] T. Heer, O. Garcia-Morchon, R. Hummen, S. L. Keoh, S. S. Kumar, and K. Wehrle, "Security Challenges in the IP-based Internet of Things," Wireless Personal Communications, vol. 61, pp. 527-542, 2011. [9] S. Song, H.-K. Choi, and J.-Y. Kim, "A secure and lightweight approach for routing optimization in mobile IPv6," EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking, vol. 2009, p. 957690, 2009. [10] S. Alam and D. De, "Analysis of security threats in wireless sensor network," arXiv preprint arXiv:1406.0298, 2014. [11] Q. Jing, A. V. Vasilakos, J. Wan, J. Lu, and D. Qiu, "Security of the internet of things: Perspectives and challenges," Wireless Networks, vol. 20, pp. 24812501, 2014. [12] D. Chen and H. Zhao, "Data security and privacy protection issues in cloud computing," in Computer Science and Electronics Engineering (ICCSEE), 2012 International Conference on, 2012, pp. 647651. [13] G. Yan, D. Wen, S. Olariu, and M. C. Weigle, "Security challenges in vehicular cloud computing," IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems, vol. 14, pp. 284-294, 2013. [14] M. N. Mejri, J. Ben-Othman, and M. Hamdi, "Survey on VANET security challenges and possible cryptographic solutions," Vehicular Communications, vol. 1, pp. 53-66, 2014. [15] R. S. Raw, M. Kumar, and N. Singh, "Security challenges, issues and their solutions for VANET," International Journal of Network Security & Its Applications, vol. 5, p. 95, 2013. [16] L. Harn and W.-J. Hsin, "On the security of wireless network access with enhancements," in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Wireless security, 2003, pp. 88-95. [17] H. Boland and H. Mousavi, "Security issues of the IEEE 802.11 b wireless LAN," in Electrical and Computer Engineering, 2004. Canadian Conference on, 2004, pp. 333-336. [18] Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson, "Wormhole attacks in wireless networks," IEEE journal on selected areas in communications, vol. 24, pp. 370380, 2006. [19] T. Karygiannis and L. Owens, "Wireless Network Security 802.11 Bluetooth and Handheld Devices. National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication, 800-48," ed, 2002. [20] P. Kumar, "Analysis of different security attacks in MANETs on protocol stack A-review," in In International Journal of Engineering and Technology (IJEAT), ISSN: 2249-8958, Volume-1, Issue-5, 2012, 2012. [21] Y.-C. Hu, A. Perrig, and D. B. Johnson, "Rushing attacks and defense in wireless ad hoc network routing protocols," in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Wireless security, 2003, pp. 30-40. International Journal of Academic Multidisciplinary Research (IJAMR) ISSN: 2000-006X Vol. 2 Issue 4, April – 2018, Pages: 19-27 www.ijeais.org/ijamr 27 [22] A. H. Lashkari, M. M. S. Danesh, and B. Samadi, "A survey on wireless security protocols (WEP, WPA and WPA2/802.11 i)," in Computer Science and Information Technology, 2009. ICCSIT 2009. 2nd IEEE International Conference on, 2009, pp. 48-52. [23] V. Beal, "The 7 layers of the osi model," ed: Webopedia, 2015. [24] A. Kavianpour and M. C. Anderson, "An Overview of Wireless Network Security," in Cyber Security and Cloud Computing (CSCloud), 2017 IEEE 4th International Conference on, 2017, pp. 306-309. [25] P. Goyal, V. Parmar, and R. Rishi, "Manet: vulnerabilities, challenges, attacks, application," IJCEM International Journal of Computational Engineering & Management, vol. 11, pp. 32-37, 2011. [26] D. Reed, "Applying the OSI seven layer network model to information security," SANS GIAC GSEC Practical Assignment Version 1.4 b Option One, p. 8, 2003. [27] G. Mamatha and D. S. Sharma, "Network Layer Attacks and Defense Mechanisms in MANETS-A Survey," International Journal of Computer Applications, vol. 9, 2010. [28] X. S. Yang Xiao and D.-Z. Du, "Wireless network security," ed, 2013. [29] S. Yi, P. Naldurg, and R. Kravets, "Security-aware ad hoc routing for wireless networks," in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking & computing, 2001, pp. 299-302. [30] L. Zhou and Z. J. Haas, "Securing ad hoc networks," IEEE network, vol. 13, pp. 24-30, 1999. [31] J. T. Isaac, S. Zeadally, and J. S. Camara, "Security attacks and solutions for vehicular ad hoc networks," IET communications, vol. 4, pp. 894903, 2010. [32] L. Hu and D. Evans, "Secure aggregation for wireless networks," in Applications and the Internet Workshops, 2003. Proceedings. 2003 Symposium on, 2003, pp. 384-391. [33] J. Zhu and J. Ma, "A new authentication scheme with anonymity for wireless environments," IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics, vol. 50, pp. 231-235, 2004. [34] Y. M. Erten and E. Tomur, "A layered security architecture for corporate 802.11 wireless networks," in Wireless Telecommunications Symposium, 2004, 2004, pp. 123-128. [35] W.-F. Alliance, "Wi-Fi Protected Access: Strong, standards-based, interoperable security for today‟s Wi-Fi networks," White paper, University of Cape Town, pp. 492-495, 2003. [36] P. Guo, J. Wang, X. H. Geng, C. S. Kim, and J.-U. Kim, "A variable threshold-value authentication architecture for wireless mesh networks," 網際網路 技術學刊, vol. 15, pp. 929-935, 2014. [37] Lifewire. (2017). What Are WEP, WPA, and WPA2? Which Is Best? Available: https://www.lifewire.com/what-are-wep-wpa-andwpa2-which-is-best-2377353 [38] Lifewire. (2017). WPA2 vs. WPA for Wireless Security. Available: https://www.lifewire.com/wpa2-vs-wpa-forwireless-security-3971350 [39] Diffen. (2017). WPA vs WPA2. Available: http://www.diffen.com/difference/WPA_vs_WPA2 [40] M. Ciampa, CWSP Guide to Wireless Security: Nelson Education, 2006.

I DIE LOGISCHE STRUKTUR DES BEWUSSTSEINS Michael Starks AUS DER ENTSCHEIDUNGSFORSCHUNG Disposition zu tun* Emotion Erinnerung Wahrnehmu ng Wunsch PI * * IA * * * AKtion/ Wort Unterschwellige Effekte Nein Ja/Nein Ja Ja Nein Nein Nein Ja/Nein Assoziativ/ Regel basiert RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Kontext Dependent/ Abstrakt A CD/A Cd Cd CD/A A CD/A CD/A Seriall/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S Heuristisch/ Analytische A H/A H H H/A A A A Aktiv Erinnerung Erforderlich Ja Nein Nein Nein Nein Ja Ja Ja Hängt von der Allgemeinen Intelligenz ab Ja Nein Nein Nein Ja/Nein Ja Ja Ja Kognitive Laden Hemmt Ja Ja/Nein Nein Nein Ja Ja Ja Ja Erregung Stimuliert oder Hemmt H S/H S S H H H H Reality Press Las Vegas II © Michael Starks (2020) ISBN: 978-1-951440-79-4 Erste Ausgabe 2020 Alle Rechte vorbehalten. Kein Teil dieser Veröffentlichung darf ohne ausdrückliche Zustimmung des Autors reproduziert, verbreitet oder übertragen werden. Gedruckt und gebunden in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika. III " Aber ich habe mein Bild von der Welt nicht bekommen, indem ich mich meiner Richtigkeit befriedigt habe: und ich habe es auch nicht, weil ich mit ihrer Richtigkeit zufrieden bin. Nein, es ist der ererbte Hintergrund, vor dem ich zwischen wahr und falsch unterscheide." Wittgenstein OC 94 "Wenn es nun nicht die kausalen Zusammenhänge sind, mit denen wir uns befassen, dann liegen die Aktivitäten des Geistes vor uns." Wittgenstein "Das blaue Buch" p6 (1933) "Unsinn, Unsinn, weil sie Annahmen machen, anstatt einfach zu beschreiben. Wenn Ihr Kopf hier von Erklärungen verfolgt wird, vernachlässigen Sie es, sich an die wichtigsten Fakten zu erinnern." Wittgenstein Z 220 "Philosophie stellt einfach alles vor uns und erklärt und leitet nichts ab... Man könnte dem, was vor allen neuen Entdeckungen und Erfindungen möglich ist, den Namen 'Philosophie' geben." Wittgenstein PI 126 "Was wir liefern, sind wirklich Bemerkungen über die Naturgeschichte des Menschen, nicht Kuriositäten; sondern eher Beobachtungen zu Tatsachen, an denen niemand gezweifelt hat und die nur unbemerkt geblieben sind, weil sie immer vor unseren Augen sind." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 "Ziel der Philosophie ist es, eine Mauer an der Stelle zu errichten, an der die Sprache sowieso aufhört." Wittgenstein Philosophische Anlässe s. 187 "Die Grenze der Sprache zeigt sich darin, dass sie unmöglich ist, eine Tatsache zu beschreiben, die einem Satz entspricht (ist die Übersetzung) ohne einfach den Satz zu wiederholen (das hat mit der kantianischen Lösung des Problems der Philosophie zu tun)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) "Die grösste Gefahr besteht hier darin, sich selbst beobachten zu wollen." LWPP1, 459 "Könnte ein Maschinenprozess einen Gedankenprozessverursachen? Die Antwort lautet: Ja. Tatsächlich kann nur ein Computerprozess einen Denkprozess verursachen, und 'Berechnung' nennt keinen Computerprozess; er benennt einen Prozess, der auf einem Computer implementiert werden kann und in der Regel implementiert wird." Searle PNC p73 "... die Charakterisierung eines Prozesses als rechnerisch ist eine Charakterisierung IV eines physikalischen Systems von aussen; und die Identifizierung des Prozesses als rechnerisch identifiziert kein intrinsisches Merkmal der Physik, es ist im Wesentlichen eine Beobachter relative Charakterisierung." Searle PNC p95 "Das chinesische Raumargument hat gezeigt, dass Semantik nicht intrinsisch für die Syntax ist. Ich mache jetzt den einzelnen und anderen Punkt, dass Syntax nicht intrinsisch für die Physik ist." Searle PNC p94 "Der Versuch, den Homunculus-Trugschluss durch rekursive Zersetzung zu beseitigen, scheitert, weil der einzige Weg, die Syntax in die Physik zu bringen, darin besteht, einen Homunculus in die Physik zu setzen." Searle PNC p97 "Aber man kann ein physikalisches System wie eine Schreibmaschine oder ein Gehirn nicht erklären, indem man ein Muster identifiziert, das es mit seiner Rechensimulation teilt, weil die Existenz des Musters nicht erklärt, wie das System tatsächlich als physikalisches System funktioniert. ... Zusammenfassend ist die Tatsache, dass die Zuordnung der Syntax keine weiteren kausalen Kräfte identifiziert, fatal für die Behauptung, dass Programme kausale Erklärungen der Kognition liefern... Es gibt nur einen physischen Mechanismus, das Gehirn, mit seinen verschiedenen realen physischen und physischen/geistigen Kausalebenen der Beschreibung." Searle PNC p101-103 "Kurz gesagt, der Sinn der 'Informationsverarbeitung', der in der Kognitionswissenschaft verwendet wird, ist auf einem viel zu hohen Abstraktionsniveau, um die konkrete biologische Realität der intrinsischen Intentionalität einzufangen... Wir sind blind für diesen Unterschied durch die Tatsache, dass der gleiche Satz "Ich sehe ein Auto auf mich zukommen", verwendet werden kann, um sowohl die visuelle Intentionalität als auch die Ausgabe des Rechenmodells des Sehens aufzuzeichnen... im Sinne von "Informationen", die in der Kognitionswissenschaft verwendet werden, ist es einfach falsch zu sagen, dass das Gehirn ein Informationsverarbeitungsgerät ist." Searle PNC p104-105 "Kann es Gründe für Massnahmen geben, die für einen rationalen Agenten allein aufgrund der Art der in der Begründung berichteten Tatsache und unabhängig von den Wünschen, Werten, Einstellungen und Bewertungen? ... Das eigentliche Paradoxe der traditionellen Diskussion besteht darin, dass sie versucht, Humes Guillotine, die starre Unterscheidung zwischen Faktenund Wert, in einem Vokabular zu stellen, dessen Verwendung bereits die Falschheit der Unterscheidung voraussetzt." Searle PNC p165-171 V "... alle Statusfunktionen und damit die gesamte institutionelle Realität, mit Ausnahme der Sprache, werden durch Sprachhandlungen geschaffen, die die logische Form von Erklärungen haben... die Formen der fraglichen Statusfunktion sind fast ausnahmslos Angelegenheiten deontischer Kräfte... etwas als Recht, Pflicht, Verpflichtung, Anforderung usw. anzuerkennen, ist, einen Grund zum Handeln anzuerkennen... diese deontischen Strukturen ermöglichen lustunabhängige Handlungsgründe... Der allgemeine Punkt ist ganz klar: Die Schaffung des allgemeinen Feldes der wunschbasierten Handlungsgründe setzt die Akzeptanz eines Systems von wunschunabhängigen Handlungsgründen voraus." Searle PNC P34-49 "Einige der wichtigsten logischen Merkmale der Intentionalität liegen ausserhalb der Reichweite der Phänomenologie, weil sie keine unmittelbare phänomenologische Realität haben... Denn die Schaffung von Sinnhaftigkeit aus Bedeutungslosigkeit wird nicht bewusst erlebt... sie existiert nicht... Das ist... die phänomenologische Illusion." Searle PNC p115-117 "Bewusstsein ist kausal auf Hirnprozesse reduzierbar... und das Bewusstsein hat keine eigenen Kausalkräfte zusätzlich zu den kausalen Kräften der zugrunde liegenden Neurobiologie... Aber die kausale Reduzierbarkeit führt nicht zu einer ontologischen Reduztionibilität... Bewusstsein existiert nur als erfahren... und daher kann es nicht auf etwas reduziert werden, das eine dritte Person Ontologie hat, etwas, das unabhängig von Erfahrungen existiert." Searle PNC 155-6 "... die grundlegende absichtliche Beziehung zwischen Geist und Welt hat mit Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit zu tun. Und ein Satz ist alles, was in einem absichtlichen Verhältnis zur Welt stehen kann, und da diese absichtlichen Beziehungen immer die Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit bestimmen, und ein Satz wird definiert als alles, was ausreicht, um die Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit, stellt sich heraus, dass jede Absicht eine Frage der Sätze ist." Searle PNC p193 VI VORWORT "Wer Pavian versteht, würde mehr für die Metaphysik tun als Locke" Charles Darwin 1838 Notebook M In diesem Buch geht es um menschliches Verhalten (wie alle Bücher von irgendjemandem über irgendetwas), und damit um die Grenzen einer kürzlichen Affenabstammung (8 Millionen Jahre oder viel weniger je nach Standpunkt) und um offensichtliche Worte und Taten im Rahmen unserer angeborenen Psychologie, wie sie in der Tabelle der Intentionalität dargestellt wird. Wie der berühmte Evolutionist Richard Leakey sagt, ist es wichtig, nicht daran zu denken, dass wir uns aus Affen entwickelt haben, sondern dass wir in jeder wichtigen Weise Affen sind. Wenn jeder ein wirkliches Verständnis dafür (d.h. der menschlichen Ökologie und Psychologie) bekommen hätte, Tatsächlich geben Sie etwas Kontrolle über sich selbst), vielleicht hätte die Zivilisation eine Chance. So wie die Dinge sind, haben die Führer der Gesellschaft nicht mehr Verständnis für die Dinge als ihre Wähler und so ist ein Zusammenbruch in Anarchie und Diktatur unvermeidlich. Um einen Überblick über die logische Struktur des menschlichen Verhaltens höherer Ordnung zu geben, also über die beschreibende Psychologie des Denken höherer Ordnung (Geist, Bewusstein, Sprache, Rationalität, Persönlichkeit, Intentionalität) oder nach Wittgenstein, von Sprachspielen, I Geben Sie einen kritischen Überblick über einige der wichtigsten Ergebnisse von Ludwig Wittgenstein und John Searle, ausgehend von Wittgensteins fundamentaler Entdeckung –, dass alle wirklich "philosophischen" (d.h. höhergeordneten psychologischen) Probleme die gleichen sind - Verwechslungen. Über die Art und Weise, wie man Sprache in einem bestimmten Kontext verwendet, und so sind alle Lösungen die gleichen -, wie Sprache im Kontext verwendet werden kann, so dass ihre Wahrheitsbedingungen (Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit oder COS) klar sind. Das Grundproblem ist, dass man alles sagen kann, aber man kann nicht bedeuten, dass jede willkürliche Äusserung und Bedeutung nur in einem ganz bestimmten Kontext möglich ist. Ich gebe eine Analyse aus der jüngsten modernen Perspektive der beiden Denksysteme, die eine neue Tabelle der Intentionalität und neue Dual-System-Nomenklatur. Es ist wichtig zu verstehen, warum wir uns so verhalten, wie wir es tun, und so versuche ich, das Verhalten zu beschreiben (nicht zu erklären, wie Wittgenstein es beharrte). Ich beginne mit einem kurzen Rückblick auf die logische Struktur der Rationalität, die eine gewisse Heuristik für die Beschreibung der Sprache (Geist, Rationalität, Persönlichkeit) bietet und einige Vorschläge gibt, wie sich dies auf die Evolution des sozialen Verhaltens VII bezieht. Das dreht sich um die beiden Autoren, die ich in dieser Hinsicht am wichtigsten gefunden habe, Ludwig Wittgenstein und John Searle, deren Ideen ich im dualen System (zwei Denksysteme) zusammenbringe und ausdehne, das sich im jüngsten Verständnis von Verhalten und in der Denk-und Denkforschung als so nützlich erwiesen hat. Wie ich feststelle, gibt es meiner Ansicht nach im Wesentlichen eine völlige Überschneidung zwischen der Philosophie, im engeren Sinne der anhaltenden Fragen, die die akademische Disziplin betreffen, und der beschreibenden Psychologie des höheren Ordnungsgedankens (Verhalten). Wenn man Wittgensteins Einsicht erst einmal begriffen hat, dass es nur noch die Frage gibt, wie das Sprachspiel zu spielen ist, bestimmt man die Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit (was eine Aussage wahr oder befriedigt macht etc.) und das ist das Ende der Diskussion. Da philosophische Probleme das Ergebnis unserer angeborenen Psychologie sind, oder wie Wittgenstein es ausdrückte, aufgrund der fehlenden Sprachlosigkeit, durchlaufen sie den menschlichen Diskurs und das Verhalten, so dass es unendlich viel Notwendigkeit für philosophische Analyse gibt, nicht nur in der "menschlichen Die Wissenschaften der Philosophie, Soziologie, Anthropologie, Politikwissenschaft, Psychologie, Geschichte, Literatur, Religion, etc., aber in den "harten Wissenschaften" der Physik, Mathematik und Biologie. Es ist universell, die Fragen des Sprachspiels mit den realen wissenschaftlichen Fragen zu vermischen, was die empirischen Fakten sind. Der Wissenschaftler ist immer präsent, und der Meister hat ihn schon vor langer Zeit vor uns gelegt, also Wittgenstein (im Folgenden W), beginnend mit den Blauen und Braunbüchern in den frühen 1930er Jahren. "Philosophen sehen ständig die Methode der Wissenschaft vor ihren Augen und sind unwiderstehlich versucht, Fragen zu stellen und zu beantworten, wie es die Wissenschaft tut. Diese Tendenz ist die eigentliche Quelle der Metaphysik und führt den Philosophen in die völlige Dunkelheit. " (BBB p18) Dennoch beginnt sich ein wirkliches Verständnis von Wittgensteins Werk und damit auch von der Funktionsweise unserer Psychologie erst im zweiten Jahrzehnt des 21. Jahrhunderts auszubreiten, vor allem aufgrund von P.M.S. Hacker (im Folgenden H) und Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (im Folgenden DMS), aber auch viele andere, von denen einige der prominentesten, von denen ich in den Artikeln erwähne. Horwich Gibt die schönste Zusammenfassung, die ich je gesehen habe, wo ein Verständnis von Wittgenstein uns verlässt. VIII "Es darf keinen Versuch geben, unsere sprachlich konzeptionelle Tätigkeit (PI 126) wie in Frege es Reduktion der Arithmetik auf Logik; Kein Versuch, ihm erkenntnistheoretische Grundlagen (PI 124) wie in der Bedeutung von a priori Wissen zu geben; Kein Versuch, idealisierte Formen davon (PI 130) als im Sinne zu charakterisieren Logiken; Kein Versuch, sie zu reformieren (PI 124, 132) wie in Mackie es Fehlertheorie oder Dummetts Intuition; Kein Versuch, es zu rationalisieren (PI 133) wie in Quines Existenzbericht; Kein Versuch, es konsisteniger zu machen (PI 132) wie in Tarskis Antwort auf die Lügenparadoxien; Und kein Versuch, es vollständiger zu machen (PI 133) als bei der Beansiedlung von Fragen der persönlichen Identität für bizarre hypothetische Teleportationsszenarien. " Obwohl es unzählige Bücher und Artikel über Wittgenstein gibt, sind es meiner Meinung nach nur wenige sehr aktuelle (DMS, H, Coliva usw.) Kommen Sie in der Nähe einer vollen Wertschätzung für ihn, niemand einen ernsthaften Versuch, seine Arbeit auf eine der anderen modernen Genies des Verhaltens John Searle (im Folgenden S) zu beziehen, und niemand hat die mächtigen beiden Systeme des Denkens auf philosophische Fragen aus der Sicht der Evolutionspsychologie. Ich versuche das hier. Ich gebe einen kritischen Überblick über einige der wichtigsten Erkenntnisse von Wittgenstein und Searle über die logische Struktur der Intentionalität (Geist, Sprache, Verhalten), wobei ich als Ausgangspunkt Wittgensteins grundlegende Entdeckung –, dass alle wirklich "philosophischen" Probleme Es gibt die gleichen - Verwechslungen darüber, wie man Sprache in einem bestimmten Kontext benutzt, und so sind alle Lösungen die gleichen -, wenn man sich anschaut, wie Sprache im betreffenden Kontext verwendet werden kann, so dass ihre Wahrheitsbedingungen (Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit oder COS) klar sind. Das Grundproblem ist, dass man sagen kann Etwas Aber man kann nicht bedeuten, dass jede willkürliche Äusserung und Bedeutung nur in einem ganz bestimmten Kontext möglich ist. Ich analysiere verschiedene Schriften nach und über sie aus der Perspektive der beiden Systeme des Denkens, mit einer neuen Tabelle der Intentionalität und neue duale Systeme Nomenklatur. Als ich vor ein paar Jahren "On Certainty" las, charakterisierte ich es in einer Rezension als der Grundstein für Philosophie und Psychologie und das grundlegendste Dokument für das Verständnis des Verhaltens, und ungefähr zur gleichen Zeit schrieb DMS Artikel, in denen ich bemerkte, dass es die Jahrtausende gelöst hatte. Altes epistemologisches Problem, wie wir mit Sicherheit etwas wissen können. Ich erkannte, dass W der erste war, der das, was jetzt als die beiden Systeme oder dualen Systeme des Denkens charakterisiert wird, verfing, und ich generierte eine Doppelsysteme (S1 und S2) Terminologie, die ich fand, sehr mächtig bei der Beschreibung des Verhaltens. Ich nahm den kleinen Tisch, den John Searle (im Folgenden S) benutzt hatte, habe ihn stark IX erweitert und später festgestellt, dass er sich perfekt in den Rahmen einfügt, der von verschiedenen aktuellen Arbeitern in der Denk-und Denkforschung verwendet wird. Seit ihrer Einzelveröffentlichung habe ich versucht, die Buchbesprechungen und Artikel für sich zur Seite zu stellen, soweit dies möglich ist, und das gilt für die Wiederholung verschiedener Abschnitte, insbesondere der Tabelle und seiner Erklärung. Ich beginne mit einem kurzen Artikel, der die Tabelle der Intentionalität vorstellt und kurz ihre Terminologie und ihren Hintergrund beschreibt. Als Nächstes ist mit Abstand der längste Artikel, der eine Übersicht über die Arbeit von W und S versucht, da sie sich auf die Tabelle und damit auf ein Verständnis oder eine Beschreibung (nicht Erklärung, wie W bestand) des Verhaltens. Es ist meine Behauptung, dass die Tabelle der Intentionalität (Rationalität, Verstand, Denken, Sprache, Persönlichkeit etc.), die hier prominent ist, mehr oder weniger genau beschreibt oder zumindest als heuristisches für, wie wir denken und benehmen, und so umfasst sie nicht Sich nur Philosophie und Psychologie, aber alles andere (Geschichte, Literatur, Mathematik, Politik etc.). Beachten Sie vor allem, dass Intentionalität und Rationalität, wie ich (zusammen mit Searle, Wittgenstein und anderen) sie sehe, sowohl bewusste Überlegungen System 2 als auch unbewusste automatisierte System 1Aktionen oder Reflexe umfassen. Der scharfsinnige mag sich fragen, warum wir System 1 nicht bei der Arbeit sehen können, aber es ist eindeutig kontraproduktiv für ein Tier, an jede Handlung zu denken oder sie zu erraten, und auf jeden Fall gibt es keine Zeit, dass das langsame, massiv integrierte System 2 in den konstanten Strder eingebunden wird. Die "Entscheidungen", die wir treffen müssen, sind von der Sekunde der Sekunde. Wie W bemerkte, müssen unsere ' Gedanken ' (T1 oder die ' Gedanken ' von System 1) direkt zu Handlungen führen. Der Schlüssel zu allem, was uns betrifft, ist die Biologie, und es ist ihr Vergessenheit, die Millionen von klug gebildeten Menschen wie Obama, Chomsky, Clinton und dem Papst dazu bringt, selbstmörderische utopische Ideale zu vertreten, die unaufhaltsam direkt in die Hölle auf der Erde führen. Wie W bemerkte, ist es das, was immer vor unseren Augen ist, das am schwierigsten zu sehen ist. Wir leben in der Welt des bewussten, beratenden Sprachsystems 2, aber es ist das unbewusste, automatisch reflexive System 1, das regiert. Dies ist die Quelle der universellen Blindheit, die von Searle als The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinker als The Blank Slate beschrieben wird und Tooby Und Cosmides als The Standard Social Science Model. X Wie ich feststelle, ist die phänomenologische Illusion (Vergessen zu unserem automatisierten System 1) universell und erstreckt sich nicht nur über die Philosophie, sondern über das ganze Leben. Ich bin sicher, dass Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg und der Papst ungläubig wären, wenn ihnen gesagt würde, dass sie unter dem gleichen Problem leiden wie Hegel, Husserl und Heidegger (oder dass sie sich nur in Grad von Drogen-und Sexabhängigen unterscheiden, indem sie durch Stimulation ihrer Grenzkortikel durch die Lieferung von Dopamin (und über 100 anderen Chemikalien) über das ventrale Tegmentum und den Kern Akkumbinen), aber es ist eindeutig wahr. Während der Phänomenologen verschwendeten nur viel Zeit, sie verschwenden die Erde und die Zukunft ihres Nachwärters. Die modernen "digitalen Wahnvorstellungen" verwechseln die Sprachspiele von System 2 mit den Automatismen von System 1 und können daher biologische Maschinen (d.h. Menschen) nicht von anderen Arten von Maschinen (z.B. Computern) unterscheiden. Die "reduktionistische" Behauptung ist, dass man das Verhalten auf einer ' niedrigeren ' Ebene ' erklären kann, aber was Tatsächlich passiert Ist, dass man menschliches Verhalten nicht erklärt, sondern ein "Stand-in" dafür. Daher auch der Titel von Searles klassischer Rezension von Dennetts Buch ("Consciousness Explained") - "Consciousness Explained Away". In den meisten Kontexten Die "Reduktion" von höherem, auftauchendem Verhalten gegenüber Gehirnfunktionen, Biochemie oder Physik ist inkohärent. Auch für die "Reduktion" der Chemie oder Physik, ist der Weg durch Chaos und Unsicherheit blockiert (und Chaos-Theorie hat sich gezeigt, dass beide unvollständig in Godel es Sinnvoll und nicht dezibbar). Alles kann durch Gleichungen "repräsentiert" werden, aber wenn sie ein höheres Ordnungsverhalten "repräsentieren", ist nicht klar (und kann nicht klar gemacht werden), was die "Ergebnisse" bedeuten. Reduktionistische Metaphysik ist ein Witz, aber den meisten Wissenschaftlern und Philosophen fehlt der entsprechende Sinn für Humor. Ich hatte gehofft, meine Kommentare in ein einheitliches Ganzes zu schweissen, aber ich erkannte, wie Wittgenstein und KI-Forscher, dass der Geist (ungefähr das gleiche wie die Sprache, wie Wittgenstein uns zeigte) eine bunte von unterschiedlichen Stücken ist, die für viele Kontexte entwickelt wurden, und es gibt kein solches Ganzes o r Theorie ausser inklusiver Fitness, d.h. Evolution durch natürliche Selektion. Schliesslich habe ich, wie bei meinen 90 Artikeln und 9 anderen Büchern, und in all meinen Briefen und E-Mails und Gesprächen seit über 50 Jahren immer "sie" oder "sie" benutzt, anstatt "his/her," "she/he" oder den idiotischen Umkehrsexismus von "sie" oder "ihr" , vielleicht der einzige in diesem Teil der Galaxie, der dies tut. Die sklavische Verwendung dieser universell angewandten Ungeheuerlichkeit Vokabeln Natürlich eng verbunden mit den Mängeln in unserer Psychologie, die akademische Philosophie, Demokratie und den Zusammenbruch der industriellen Zivilisation erzeugen, und ich XI lasse die weitere Beschreibung dieser Zusammenhänge als eine Übung für den Leser. Interessenten meine anderen Schriften können Talking Monkeys 2nd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein und John Searle 3rd Hg. (2019), Selbstmord durch Demokratie 4. Auflage (2020), Selbstmord-utopische Wahnvorstellungen im 21. Jahrhundert, 5. Ausgabe (2020) und andere. Ich bin mir vieler Unvollkommenheiten und Einschränkungen meiner Arbeit bewusst und ständig Revisiere es, aber ich habe die Philosophie vor 12 Jahren mit 65 Jahren aufgenommen, so ist es wundersam, und ein beredtes Zeugnis für die Macht des System 1-Automatismen, dass ich in der Lage war, überhaupt etwas zu tun. Es waren zehn Jahre unaufhörlicher Kampf, und ich hoffe, dass die Leser es von Nutzen finden. [email protected] 12 DIE LOGISCHE STRUKTUR DES BEWUSSTSEINS "Wenn ich bezweifeln wollte, ob das meine Hand war, wie könnte ich dann vermeiden, daran zu zweifeln, ob das Wort" Hand "irgendeine Bedeutung hat? Das scheint ich ja zu wissen. " Wittgenstein ' On Certainty ' p48 "Was für ein Fortschritt ist das - das faszinierende Mysterium wurde entfernt-aber es sind keine Tiefen in Trost gestürzt worden; Nichts wurde erklärt, entdeckt oder neu konzipiert. Wie zahm und uninspirierend man denken könnte. Aber vielleicht, wie Wittgenstein nahelegt, sollten die Tugenden der Klarheit, Entmystifizierung und Wahrheit befriedigend genug gefunden werden "--Horwich ' Wittgenstein Metaphilosophie'. Lassen Sie uns zunächst an Wittgensteins (W) grundlegende Entdeckung erinnern –, dass alle wirklich "philosophischen" Probleme (d.h. jene, die nicht durch Experimente oder Datenerhebung gelöst werden) die gleichen - Verwirrung darüber sind, wie man Sprache in einem bestimmten Kontext benutzt, und so alle Lösungen sind die gleichen -, wie Sprache in dem Kontext verwendet werden kann, so dass ihre Wahrheitsbedingungen (Bedingungen von SZufriedenheit oder COS) ist klar. Das Grundproblem ist, dass man sagen kann Etwas Aber man kann nicht bedeuten, dass jede willkürliche Äusserung und Bedeutung nur in einem ganz bestimmten Kontext möglich ist. So, W in seinem letzten Meisterwerk "On Certainty" (OC) betrachtet scharfsinnige Beispiele für die unterschiedlichen Verwendungen der Wörter "wissen", "zweifeln" und "sicher", oft aus seinen drei typischen Perspektiven des Erzählers, Gesprächspartners und Kommentators, so dass der Leser die beste Verwendung zu entscheiden ( Deutlichste COS) der Sätze in jedem Kontext. Man kann nur die Verwendung verwandter Sätze beschreiben, und das ist das Ende - keine verborgenen Tiefen, keine metaphysischen Einsichten. Es gibt keine "Probleme" von ' Bewusstsein ', ' Wille ', ' Raum ', ' Zeit ' usw., sondern nur die Notwendigkeit, die Verwendung (COS) dieser Wörter klar zu halten. Es ist wirklich traurig, dass die meisten Philosophen weiterhin ihre Zeit auf die sprachlichen Verwechslungen verschwenden, die der akademischen Philosophie eigen sind, anstatt ihre Aufmerksamkeit auf die der anderen Verhaltensdisziplinen und auf die Physik, Biologie und Mathematik zu richten, wo es ist Dringend notwendig. Was hat W wirklich erreicht? So fasste ein führender Wittgenstein-Gelehrter sein Werk zusammen: "Wittgenstein hat viele der tiefen Probleme gelöst, die unser Thema seit Jahrhunderten, manchmal sogar seit mehr als zwei Jahrtausenden, Probleme mit der Natur der sprachlichen Repräsentation, gelöst haben, Über die Beziehung zwischen Denken und Sprache, über Solipsismus und Idealismus, Selbsterkenntnis und Wissen anderer Köpfe und über die Natur der notwendigen Wahrheit und der mathematischen Sätze. Er pflügte den 13 Boden der europäischen Philosophie der Logik und Sprache. Er gab uns einen Roman und eine ungeheuer fruchtbare Reihe von Einblicken in die Philosophie der Psychologie. Er versuchte, Jahrhunderte der Reflexion über die Natur der Mathematik und mathematische Wahrheit zu kippen. Er untergrub die fundamentalistische Epistemologie. Und er hinterliess uns eine Vision der Philosophie als Beitrag nicht zum menschlichen Wissen, sondern zum menschlichen Verständnis – Verständnis der Formen unseres Denkens und der konzeptuellen Verwechslungen, in die wir hineinfallen können. " - Peter Hacker--"Gordon Bakers späte Interpretation Wittgensteins" Hinzu kommt, dass W der erste war, der die beiden Systeme der durchdachten automatischen prelinguistischen S1 und der langsam reflektierenden sprachlichen Dispositive S2 klar und ausführlich beschrieb. Er erklärte, wie Verhalten nur mit einem riesigen, vererbten Hintergrund möglich ist, der die axiomatische Grundlage für das Urteilen ist und nicht angezweifelt oder beurteilt werden kann, so dass (Wahl), Bewusstsein, Selbst, Zeit und Raum angeborene wahrheitsgetreue Axiome sind. Er stellte in Tausenden von Seiten und Hunderten von Beispielen fest, dass unsere inneren mentalen Erfahrungen in der Sprache nicht beschrieben werden können, was nur für das Verhalten mit einer öffentlichen Sprache möglich ist (die Unmöglichkeit der Privatsprache). Er prophezeite den Nutzen der paraconsistenten Logik, die erst viel später auftauchte. Im Übrigen patentierte er Helikopter-Konstruktionen, die den Einsatz von Messerspitzendüsen für den Antrieb der Rotoren um drei Jahrzehnte vorwegnahmen und die Samen des Zentrifugal-Gastro-Gasturbinenmotors hatten, einen Herzschlag-Monitor entwarfen, den Bau von Ein modernistisches Haus, und skizzierte einen Beweis für Eulers Theorem, das später von anderen vollendet wurde. Er legte die psychologischen Grundlagen der Mathematik, Logik, Unvollständigkeit und Unendlichkeit. Horwich Gibt den schönsten GipfelY Dass ich je gesehen habe, wo uns ein Verständnis von Wittgenstein verlässt. "Es darf keinen Versuch geben, unsere sprachlich konzeptionelle Tätigkeit (PI 126) wie in Frege es Reduktion der Arithmetik auf Logik; Kein Versuch, ihm erkenntnistheoretische Grundlagen (PI 124) wie in der Bedeutung von a priori Wissen zu geben; Kein Versuch, idealisierte Formen davon (PI 130) als sinnliche Logik zu charakterisieren; Kein Versuch, sie zu reformieren (PI 124.132) wie in Mackie es Fehlertheorie oder Dummetts Intuition; Kein Versuch, es zu rationalisieren (PI 133) wie in Quines Existenzbericht; Kein Versuch, es konsisteniger zu machen (PI 132) wie in Tarskis Antwort auf die Lügenparadoxien; Und kein Versuch, es vollständiger zu machen (PI 133) als bei der Beansiedlung von Fragen der persönlichen Identität für bizarre hypothetische Teleportationsszenarien. " Er kann als erster evolutionärer Psychologe angesehen werden, da er ständig die Notwendigkeit des angeborenen Hintergrunds erläuterte und demonstrierte, wie er Verhalten erzeugt. Obwohl sich niemand dessen bewusst zu sein scheint, beschrieb er die Psychologie hinter dem, was später die Wason Erproben-eine grundlegende Massnahme, 14 die Jahrzehnte später in der Evolutionären Psychologie (EP) angewandt wurde. Er bemerkte die unbestimmte oder unterbestimmte Natur der Sprache und die spielartige der sozialen Interaktion. Er beschrieb und widerlegte die Vorstellungen des Geistes als Maschine und die Computertheorie des Geistes, lange vor praktischen Computern oder den berühmten Schriften von Searle. Er erfand Wahrheitstabellen für den Einsatz in Logik und Philosophie. Er legte Skepsis und Metaphysik entschieden zur Ruhe. Er zeigte, dass die Aktivitäten des Geistes, weit davon entfernt, undurchschaubar zu sein, vor uns offen liegen, eine Lektion, die nur wenige gelernt haben. Wenn ich an Wittgenstein denke, erinnere ich mich oft an den Kommentar, der Cambridge Philosophy Professor C.D. Broad (der ihn nicht verstand noch mag) zugeschrieben wurde. "Wittgenstein den Lehrstuhl für Philosophie nicht anzubieten, wäre so, als würde man Einstein den Lehrstuhl für Physik nicht anbieten!" Ich halte ihn für den Einstein der intuitiven Psychologie. Obwohl er zehn Jahre später geboren wurde, schlüpfte er ebenso Ideen über die Natur der Realität zur gleichen Zeit und im gleichen Teil der Welt und starb, wie Einstein, fast im 1. Weltkrieg. Nun nehmen wir an, Einstein sei ein selbstmörderischer homosexueller Einsiedler mit einer schwierigen Persönlichkeit, der nur eine frühe Version seiner Ideen veröffentlichte, die verwirrt und oft falsch waren, aber weltberühmt wurden; In den nächsten 30 Jahren änderte sich seine Ideen völlig, aber für die nächsten 30 Jahre veröffentlichte er nichts mehr, und das Wissen um sein neues Werk, in meist verstümmelter Form, verbreitete sich langsam von gelegentlichen Vorlesungen und Studentennotizen; Dass er 1951 starb und über 20.000 Seiten meist handgeschriebener Schriften auf Deutsch hinterliess, die aus Sätzen oder kurzen Absätzen zusammengesetzt waren, mit oft keinem klaren Verhältnis zu Sätzen vor oder nach dem Dass diese von anderen Notizbüchern, die Jahre zuvor mit Notizen am Rand geschrieben wurden, geschnitten und geklebt wurden, Unterstellungen Und durchgekreuzte Wörter, so dass viele Sätze mehrere Varianten haben; Dass seine literarischen Führungskräfte diese unverdauliche Masse zerschnitten, lässt offen, was sie wollten, und kämpft mit der monströsen Aufgabe, die richtige Bedeutung von Sätzen zu erfassen, die völlig neuartige Ansichten darüber vermitteln, wie das Universum funktioniert und dass sie Dann veröffentlichte dieses Material mit quälender Langsamkeit (nicht nach einem halben Jahrhundert fertig) mit Vorgesängen, die keine wirkliche Erklärung dafür enthielten, worum es ging; Dass er aufgrund vieler Aussagen, dass die gesamte bisherige Physik ein Fehler und sogar Unsinn war, so berühmt wie berühmt wurde, dass praktisch niemand sein Werk verstand, trotz hunderter Bücher und Zehntausender von Papieren, die darüber diskutierten; Dass viele Physiker nur seine frühe Arbeit kannten, in der er eine endgültige Zusammenfassung der Newtonschen Physik in solchen Die äusserst abstrakte und verdichtete Form, dass es schwierig war, zu entscheiden, was gesagt wurde; Dass er damals so gut wie vergessen wurde und dass die meisten Bücher und Artikel über das Wesen der Welt und die verschiedenen Themen der modernen Physik nur vorübergehende und meist fehlerhafte Bezüge zu ihm hatten, und dass viele ihn völlig ausgelassen haben; Dass es bis heute, über ein halbes Jahrhundert nach seinem Tod, nur eine Handvoll Menschen gab, die die monumentalen Folgen dessen, was er getan hatte, wirklich begriffen haben. Genau das ist, so behaupte ich, die Situation bei Wittgenstein. 15 hatte W lebte in seinen 80er Jahren, hätte er in der Lage sein, Searle (ein weiteres modernes Genie der deskriptiven Psychologie) direkt zu beeinflussen, Pinker, Tooby Und die Kosmide, Symonen und unzählige andere Studenten des Verhaltens. Wäre sein brillanter Freund Frank Ramsey in seiner Jugend nicht gestorben, wäre eine höchst fruchtbare Zusammenarbeit mit ziemlicher Sicherheit entstanden. Wäre sein Student und Kollege Alan Turing sein Liebhaber geworden, hätte sich wahrscheinlich eine der erstaunlichsten Kollaborationen aller Zeiten entwickelt. In jedem Fall wäre die intellektuelle Landschaft des 20. Jahrhunderts anders gewesen, und wenn alle drei aufgetreten wären, wäre sie mit ziemlicher Sicherheit sehr unterschiedlich gewesen. Stattdessen lebte er in relativer intellektueller Isolation, nur wenige kannten ihn gut oder hatten eine Ahnung von seinen Ideen, während er lebte, und nur eine Handvoll haben ein wirkliches Verständnis für seine Arbeit auch heute noch. Er hätte als Ingenieur, Mathematiker, Psychologe, Physiologe (er hat Kriegsforschung in ihm), ein Musiker (er spielte Instrumente und hatte ein renommiertes Talent für Pfeifen), ein Architekt (das Haus, das er entworfen und für seine Schwester noch gebaut Steht), oder ein Unternehmer (er erbte eines der grössten Vermögen der Welt, aber gab alles weg). Es ist ein Wunder, dass er die Gräben und Gefangenenlager überlebte und wiederholteLy Freiwilligenarbeit für die gefährlichste Pflicht (beim Schreiben der Tractatus) im 1. Weltkrieg, viele Jahre selbstmörderischer Depressionen (3 Brüder erlagen ihnen), vermied es, in Österreich gefangen und von den Nazis hingerichtet zu werden (er war zum Teil jüdisch und wahrscheinlich nur der Wunsch der Nazis, ihr Geld in die Hand zu legen, rettete die Familie), und dass er nicht verfolgt wurde), und dass er nicht verfolgt wurde), und dass er nicht verfolgt wurde), und dass er nicht verfolgt wurde), und dass er nicht verfolgt wurde), und dass er nicht verfolgt wurde) Für seine Homosexualität und in den Selbstmord getrieben wie sein Freund Turing. Er erkannte, dass niemand verstand, was er tat, und Vielleicht nie (nicht überraschend als Er war ein halbes Jahrhundert – oder ein ganzes Jahrhundert, abhängig von Ihrem Standpunkt, der Psychologie und Philosophie voraus zu sein, die erst vor kurzem damit begonnen haben, zu akzeptieren, dass unser Gehirn ein entwickeltes Organ wie unser Herz ist.) Ich werde zunächst einige Kommentare zur Philosophie und ihrer Beziehung zur zeitgenössischen psychologischen Forschung abgeben, wie sie in den Arbeiten von Searle (S), Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. Es wird helfen, meine Bewertungen von TLP zu sehen, Bbb PI, OC by W, and PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), Making the Social World (MSW), Seeing Things As They Are (STATA), Searle es Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy (SPCP), John R Suche – Thinking About the Real World (TARW), und andere Bücher von und über diese Genies, die eine klare Beschreibung des höheren Ordnungsverhaltens liefern, nicht in Psychologiebüchern zu finden, die ich als WS-Rahmen bezeichnen werde. Ich beginne mit eindringlichen Zitaten von W und S. 16 "Die Verwirrung und Unfruchtbarkeit der Psychologie ist nicht mit der Bezeichnung" junge Wissenschaft "zu erklären; Der Zustand ist nicht vergleichbar mit dem der Physik, zum Beispiel in ihren Anfängen. (Eher mit dem bestimmter Zweige der Mathematik. Satztheorie.) Denn in der Psychologie gibt es experimentelle Methoden und konzeptionelle Verwirrung. (Wie im anderen Fall, konzeptionelle Verwirrung und Beweismittel). Die Existenz der experimentellen Methode lässt uns denken, dass wir die Mittel haben, um die Probleme zu lösen, die uns beunruhigen; Obwohl Problem und Methode übereinander gehen. " Wittgenstein (PI S.232) "Philosophen sehen ständig die Methode der Wissenschaft vor ihren Augen und sind unwiderstehlich versucht, Fragen zu stellen und zu beantworten, wie es die Wissenschaft tut. Diese Tendenz ist die eigentliche Quelle der Metaphysik und führt den Philosophen in die völlige Dunkelheit. " (BBB p18). "Aber ich habe mein Bild von der Welt nicht bekommen, indem ich mich von seiner Richtigkeit befriedigt habe: Ich habe es auch nicht, weil ich von seiner Richtigkeit zufrieden bin. Nein: Es ist der ererbte Hintergrund, von dem ich zwischen wahr und falsch unterscheide. " Wittgenstein OC 94 "Das Ziel der Philosophie ist es, an dem Punkt, an dem die Sprache ohnehin aufhört, eine Mauer zu errichten." Wittgenstein Philosophische Besetzung p187 "Die Grenze der Sprache zeigt sich daran, dass es unmöglich ist, eine Tatsache zu beschreiben, die einem Satz entspricht (ist die Übersetzung), ohne einfach den Satz zu wiederholen ..." Wittgenstein CV p10 "Viele Worte haben dann in diesem Sinne keine strenge Bedeutung. Aber das ist kein Mangel. Zu glauben, es wäre so, als würde man sagen, dass das Licht meiner Leselampe überhaupt kein richtiges Licht ist, weil es keine scharfe Grenze hat. " BBB p27 "Jedes Zeichen ist fähig Interpretation Aber die Bedeutung darf nicht interpretationsfähig sein. Es ist die letzte Interpretation "BBB p34 "Es gibt eine Art allgemeine Denkkrankheit, die immer nach (und findet) sucht Was man einen mentalen Zustand nennen würde, aus dem alle unsere Handlungen hervorgehen, wie aus einem Reservoir. " BBB p143 "Und der Fehler, den wir hier und in tausend ähnlichen Fällen machen wollen, wird mit dem Wort" zu machen "gekennzeichnet, wie wir es in dem Satz" Es ist kein Akt der Einsicht, der uns dazu bringt, die Regel so zu benutzen, wie wir es tun " , weil es die Idee gibt, dass "etwas uns machen muss", was wir tun. Und das schliesst sich wieder der Verwechslung zwischen Ursache und Vernunft an. Wir brauchen keinen Grund, der Regel zu folgen, wie wir es tun. Die Kette der Gründe hat ein Ende. " BBB p143 17 "Wenn wir die Möglichkeit eines Bildes im Auge behalten, das zwar richtig ist, aber keine Ähnlichkeit mit seinem Objekt hat, verliert die Interpolation eines Schattens zwischen Satz und Wirklichkeit jeden Punkt. Vorerst, Der Satz selbst kann als solcher Schatten dienen. Der Satz ist genau so ein Bild, das nicht die geringste Ähnlichkeit mit dem hat, was er darstellt. " BBBp37 "So, Wir können von einigen philosophierenden Mathematikern sagen, dass sie sich offensichtlich nicht der vielen verschiedenen Verwendungsmöglichkeiten des Wortes "Beweis" bewusst sind; Und dass sie sich nicht über die Unterschiede zwischen den Verwendungen des Wortes "Art" im Klaren sind, wenn sie von Zahlenarten, Arten von Beweisen sprechen, als ob das Wort "Art" hier dasselbe bedeute wie im Kontext "Arten von Äpfeln." Oder, wie man sagen kann, sie sind sich der unterschiedlichen Bedeutungen des Wortes "Entdeckung" nicht bewusst, wenn wir in einem Fall von der Entdeckung des Fünfzeigeums sprechen und in dem anderen Fall von der Entdeckung des Südpols. " BBB p29 "Einige der wichtigsten logischen Merkmale der Intentionalität sind der Phänomenologie nicht zugänglich, weil sie keine unmittelbare phänomenologische Realität haben ... Denn die Schöpfung der Sinnhaftigkeit aus Bedeutungslosigkeit wird nicht bewusst erlebt ... Es gibt nicht ... Das ist... Die phänomenologische Illusion. " Suche PNC p115-117 "... Die grundlegende absichtliche Beziehung zwischen Geist und Welt hat mit Befriedigung zu tun. Und ein Satz ist alles, was in einem absichtlichen Verhältnis zur Welt stehen kann, und da diese absichtlichen Beziehungen immer die Bedingungen der Befriedigung bestimmen, und ein Satz als alles definiert wird, was Ausreichend Die Befriedigung der Befriedigung zu bestimmen, stellt sich heraus, dass jede Intentionalität eine Frage von Vorschlägen ist. " Suche PNC p193 "Der vorsätzliche Zustand repräsentiert seine Bedingungen der Befriedigung ... Die Menschen gehen irrtümlich davon aus, dass jede mentale Repräsentation bewusst gedacht werden muss ... Aber der Begriff der Repräsentation, wie ich sie verwende, ist ein funktionaler und kein ontologischer Begriff. Alles, was Befriedigung hat, das in einer für die Intentionalität charakteristischen Weise erfolgreich sein oder scheitern kann, ist per Definition ein Darstellung seiner Befriedigung ... Wir können die Struktur der Intentionalität sozialer Phänomene analysieren, indem wir ihre Befriedigung analysieren. " Suche MSW p28-32 "Aberglaube ist nichts anderes als der Glaube an den kausalen Nexus." TLP 5.1361 "Wenn es nun nicht die kausalen Zusammenhänge sind, um die es uns geht, dann liegen die Aktivitäten des Geistes vor uns." BBB p6 18 "Wir sind der Meinung, dass auch wenn alle möglichen wissenschaftlichen Fragen beantwortet sind, die Probleme des Lebens völlig unangetastet bleiben. Natürlich gibt es dann keine Fragen mehr, und das ist die Antwort. " TLP 6.52 "Unsinn, Nonsense, weil du Annahmen machst, anstatt einfach nur zu beschreiben. Wenn Ihr Kopf hier von Erklärungen heimgesucht wird, versäumen Sie es, sich an die wichtigsten Fakten zu erinnern. " Z 220 "Philosophie legt einfach alles vor uns und erklärt auch nichts ... Man könnte dem, was vor allen neuen Entdeckungen und Erfindungen möglich ist, den Namen "Philosophie" geben. " PI 126 "Je enger wir die eigentliche Sprache untersuchen, desto schärfer wird der Konflikt zwischen ihr und unserem Anspruch. (Denn die kristalline Reinheit der Logik war natürlich nicht das Ergebnis der Untersuchung: Sie war eine Voraussetzung.) " PI 107 "Die falsche Vorstellung, der ich mich in diesem Connexion Es folgt, dass wir etwas ganz Neues entdecken können. Das ist ein Fehler. Die Wahrheit ist, dass wir schon alles bekommen haben, und dass wir es bekommen haben Tatsächlich vorhanden; Wir brauchen nichts zu warten. Wir machen unsere Schritte im Bereich der Grammatik unserer gewöhnlichen Sprache, und diese Grammatik ist bereits da. So haben wir schon alles und müssen nicht auf die Zukunft warten. " (Sagt 1930) Waismann "Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis (1979) P183 "Hier stossen wir auf ein bemerkenswertes und charakteristisches Phänomen in der philosophischen Untersuchung: Die Schwierigkeit---könnte ich sagen---Ist Nicht die Lösung zu finden, sondern die, als die s zu erkennenEtwas, das aussieht, als Wenn es nur eine Vorstufe dazu wäre. Wir haben schon alles gesagt. ---Nicht irgendetwas, was daraus folgt, nein, das ist die Lösung! .... Ich glaube, das hängt damit zusammen, dass wir zu Unrecht eine Erklärung erwarten, während die Lösung der Schwierigkeit eine Beschreibung ist, wenn wir ihr den richtigen Platz in unseren Überlegungen geben. Wenn wir darauf wohnen und nicht versuchen, darüber hinauszukommen. " Zettel P312-314 "Unsere Methode ist rein deskriptiv, die Beschreibungen, die wir geben, sind keine Hinweise auf Erklärungen." BBB p125 Diese Zitate werden nicht zufällig ausgewählt, aber (zusammen mit den anderen in meinen Rezensionen) sind eine Skizze des Verhaltens (menschliche Natur) von zwei unserer grössten beschreibenden Psychologen. Bei der Betrachtung dieser Dinge müssen wir uns vor Augen halten, dass die Philosophie (in dem engeren Sinne, den ich hier betrachte) die beschreibende Psychologie des höheren Ordnungsgedankens (HOT) ist, eine weitere der offensichtlichen Tatsachen, die völlig übersehen werden-das heisst, ich habe sie nie klar 19 gesehen. Überall angegeben. Abgesehen davon, dass sie nicht deutlich machen, dass das, was sie tun, beschreibende Psychologie ist, geben Philosophen selten genau an, was sie erwarten, zu diesem Thema beizutragen, das andere Studenten des Verhaltens (z.B. Wissenschaftler) nicht tun, also nach der Feststellung von W es oben Ich möchte noch einmal von Hacker zitieren, der einen guten Start gibt. "Traditionelle Epistemologen wollen wissen, ob Wissen wahrer Glaube und eine weitere Bedingung ist ... oder ob Wissen nicht einmal Glauben impliziert ... Wir wollen wissen, wann Wissen es tut und wann es keine Rechtfertigung erfordert. Wir müssen uns darüber im Klaren sein, was einem Menschen zugeschrieben wird, wenn man sagt, er wisse etwas. Handelt es sich um einen ausgeprägten mentalen Zustand, eine Leistung, eine Leistung, eine Disposition oder eine Fähigkeit? Könnte man wissen oder glauben, dass p identisch mit einem Zustand des Gehirns sein? Warum kann man sagen: "Er glaubt, dass p, aber es iIst nicht der Fall, dass p ', während Man kann nicht sagen: "Ich glaube, dass p, aber es ist nicht der Fall, dass p"? Warum gibt es Wege, Methoden und Mittel, um Wissen zu erlangen, zu erlangen oder zu empfangen, aber nicht den Glauben (im Gegensatz zum Glauben)? Warum kann man wissen, aber nicht glauben, wer, was, was, wann, ob und wie? Warum kann man glauben, aber nicht von ganzem Herzen, leidenschaftlich, zögerlich, töricht, gedankenlos, fanatisch, dogmatisch oder vernünftig wissen? Warum kann man etwas ganz gut, gründlich oder im Detail kennen, aber nicht glauben? Und so weiter-durch viele Hundert ähnliche Fragen, die sich nicht nur auf Wissen und Glauben beziehen, sondern auch auf Zweifel, Gewissheit, Erinnern, Vergessen, Beobachten, Beobachten, Erkennen, Anwesenden, bewusst sein, bewusst sein, ganz zu schweigen Die zahlreichen Verben der Wahrnehmung und ihre Cognate. Was geklärt werden muss, wenn diese Fragen beantwortet werden sollen, ist das Geflecht unserer epistemischen Konzepte, die Art und Weise, wie die verschiedenen Konzepte zusammenhängen, die verschiedenen Formen ihrer Kompatibilitäten und Unvereinbarkeiten, ihr Punkt und Zweck, ihre Voraussetzungen und DiffusorenDie Kontextabhängigkeit ist nicht möglich. An Diese ehrwürdige Übung in der Bindeanalyse, in wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen, in der Psychologie, in der Neurowissenschaft und in der selbsternativen Kognitionswissenschaft kann überhaupt nichts beitragen. " (Vorbei an der naturalistischen Wendung: Auf Quines Sackgasse.(2005). Nach seinem Tod 1951 hinterliess W eine verstreute Sammlung von rund 20.000 Seiten. Ausser der TractatusSie waren unveröffentlicht und weitgehend unbekannt, obwohl einige weit verbreitet waren und gelesen wurden (wie auch Notizen, die in seinen Klassen gemacht wurden), was zu umfangreichen, aber weitgehend nicht anerkannten Einflüssen führte. Einige Werke sind dafür bekannt, verloren gegangen zu sein, und viele andere W hatten zerstört. Das meiste davon Nachlass Wurden 1968 von der Cornell University mikrovermt und Kopien von wenigen Bibliotheken gekauft. Budd-Wittgensteins Philosophie der Psychologie (1989)-wie die meisten W-Kommentatoren der Zeit, bezieht sich nicht auf den Mikrofilm. Obwohl ein Grossteil der Nachlass Wiederholend und 20 erscheint in irgendeiner Form in seinen nachträglich veröffentlichten Werken (auf die Budd Bezug nimmt), viele Variantentexte sind von grossem Interesse und es gibt substanzielles Material, das nie aus dem deutschen Originaltext übersetzt wurde oder in Buchform veröffentlicht wurde. Vorlesungen von Yorick Smithies erschienen 2018 und auch jetzt Sind In Erwartung einer scheinbar illustrierten Version des Brown Book, links mit seinem Geliebten Francis Skinner – ' Wittgenstein, Dictating Philosophy to Francis Skinner ' (Springer, 2019). 1998 wurde die Bergen CD des kompletten Nachlass Erschienen--Wittgenstein Nachlass: Text und Faksimile Version: The Bergen Electronic Edition $2500 ISBN 10:0192686917. Es ist über die Fernleihe und kostenlos im Netz als auch verfügbar. Wie die anderen CDs von W es Arbeit ist sie bei Intelex erhältlich (www.nlx.com). Es ist indiziert und durchsuchbar und die primäre W-Ressource. Meine ausführlichen Lesungen der W-Literatur zeigen jedoch, dass sich nur sehr wenige Menschen die Mühe gemacht haben, sie zu konsultieren, und so fehlt ihren Werken ein kritisches Element. Man kann Victor sehen Rodych es Papiere zu W-Bemerkungen Godel Für eine bemerkenswerte Ausnahme. Ein bedeutendes Werk aus der mittleren Zeit von W (1933), das im Jahr 2000 als Buch erschien, ist das berühmte Big Typescript. Budd ' Wittgensteins Philosophie der Psychologie (1991) ist eine der Bessere Behandlungen von W (siehe meine Rezension), aber seit er dieses Buch im Jahr 1989 beendete, standen ihm weder das Big Typescript noch die Bergen CD zur Verfügung und er vernachlässigte den Cornell-Mikrofilm. Dennoch stammen die mit Abstand wichtigsten Werke aus der 3. Periode von W (ca. 1935 bis 1951), die alle von Budd genutzt wurden. Wittgenstein es Allvoll neue Ideen und einzigartige Super-Sokratische Triloge (Mein Begriff) Und die telegraphische Schrift, gepaart mit seinem oft einsamen, fast solipsistischen Lebensstil und dem vorzeitigen Tod 1951, führte dazu, dass er nicht in seiner späteren Hinsicht etwas von seinem späteren Gedanken publizierte und nur langsam seine riesigen Nachlass Rund 20.000 Seiten wurden veröffentlicht-ein Projekt, das bis heute besteht. Die einzige Gesamtausgabe der weitgehend deutschen Nachlass Erscheint erstmals im Jahr 2000 von Oxford herausgegeben worden, und Intelex hat es nun veröffentlicht, sowie alle 14 Blackwell English Language Bücher auf einer durchsuchbaren CD. Die Blackwell-CD kostet ca. $100, aber die Oxford-CD ist über $1000 oder über 2000 $ für das Set inklusive der Bilder der Original-Manuskripte. Sie können jedoch über die Fernleihe bezogen werden. 21 Und auch, wie die meisten Bücher Und Artikel, Jetzt frei im Netz verfügbar (libgen.io, b-ok.org Und Auf P2p). das Durchsuchbare CDROM von seine Englische Bücher Als Gut Als Die des gesamten Deutschen Nachlass, Jetzt ist auf mehreren Seiten im Netz und die Bergen CD ist für eine neue Ausgabe ca. 2021-http://wab.uib.no/alois/Pichler%2020170112%20Geneva.pdf). Und Natürlich, Die meisten wissenschaftlichen Artikel und Bücher sind jetzt kostenlos online auf b-ok.org und libgen.io. Hinzu kommen grosse Probleme bei der Übersetzung seines Wiener Deutsch-Neuernen aus dem frühen 20. Jahrhundert in modernes Englisch. Um das zu tun, muss man ein Meister der englischen, deutschen und W sein, und nur sehr wenige sind daran dran. Alle Seine Arbeiten leiden unter klaren Übersetzungsfehlern, und es gibt subtilere Fragen, bei denen man den ganzen Schub seiner späteren Philosophie verstehen muss, um zu übersetzen. Da meiner Meinung nach niemand ausser Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) hat den vollen Import seiner späteren Werke begriffen (Aber natürlich hat sie vor kurzem viel veröffentlicht, und viele sind sich ihrer Ansichten inzwischen bewusst), sieht man, warum W noch nicht ganz gewürdigt ist. Auch die Mehr oder weniger gut-Bekannt Kritischer Unterschied zwischen VerständnisSatz"Als ' Satz ' (d.h. Was in vielen Zusammenhängen als A S1 Äusserung) vs ' Satz ' (z.B. In vielen Zusammenhängen a Sinnvolle S2 Äusserung Mit Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit) in verschiedenen Zusammenhängen ist in der Regel entgangen. Nur wenige bemerken (Budd p29-32, Stern und DMS in einem kürzlich erschienenen Artikel sind seltene Ausnahmen), dass W derzeit (Jahrzehnte bevor Chaos und Komplexität Wissenschaft entstanden sind) darauf hindeuteten, dass einige mentale Phänomene in chaotischen Prozessen in der Gehirn-das z.B. gibt es nicht, was einer Speicherspur entspricht. Er schlug auch mehrfach vor, dass die Kausalkette ein Ende hat, Und das könnte sowohl bedeuten, dass es (unabhängig vom Stand der Wissenschaft) nicht möglich ist, es weiter zu verfolgen., Und dass der Begriff der "Ursache" nicht mehr über einen bestimmten Punkt hinaus anwendbar ist (p34). In der Folge haben viele ähnliche Vorschläge gemacht, ohne eine Ahnung, dass W antischIptierte sie um Jahrzehnte (in der Tat Über ein Jahrhundert nun in einigen Fällen). Mit DMS betrachte ich W es letztes Buch "On Certainty" (OC) als den Grundstein für Philosophie und Psychologie. Es ist nicht wirklich ein Buch, aber Notizen, die er in den letzten zwei Jahren seines Lebens gemacht hat, während er an Prostatakrebs starb und kaum arbeiten kann. Er scheint vor allem durch die Erkenntnis motiviert gewesen zu sein, dass G.E. Moore mit seinen einfachen Bemühungen die Aufmerksamkeit auf den Kern aller Philosophie gelenkt hatte. Alles, was jeder tun kann, ist, die Funktionsweise der Sprachspiele von "wissen" und "bestimmten" und "zweifeln" genau zu untersuchen, da sie verwendet werden, um die primitiven automatisierten präinguistischen Systeme eins (S1) Funktionen unseres Gehirns zu beschreiben (meine K1, C1 und D1) und das fortgeschrittene beratende Sprachsystem zwei (S2) Funktionen (my K2, C2 und D2). 22 Natürlich, W verwendet nicht die beiden Systeme Terminologie, die only kam in den Vordergrund Die Psychologie ein halbes Jahrhundert nach seinem Tod, und hat noch nicht in die Philosophie eindringen, aber er hat klar verstanden, die beiden Systeme Rahmen (die "Grammatik") in all seinen Werken von Anfang der 30er Jahre an, und man kann deutlich sehen-Schatten In seinen frühesten Schriften. In letzter Zeit, nach einem halben Jahrhundert in relativer Vergessenheit, wurde viel über Moore und W und On Certainty (OC) geschrieben. Siehe z.B. Annalisa Coliva es "Moore und Wittgenstein" (2010), "Extended Rationality" (2015), The Varieties of Self-Knowledge2016), Brice ' s ' Exploring Certainty-2014) und Andy Hamilton ' ' ' Routledge Philosophy Guide Book to Wittgenstein and On Certainty ', Und die vielen Bücher und Papiere von Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) und Peter Hacker (PH), darunter Hacker es jüngste 3 Bände über Human Nature. DMS und PH waren die führenden Wissenschaftler des späteren W, die jeweils ein halbes Dutzend Bücher schrieben oder editieren (viele wurden von mir überprüft) und viele Papiere in den letzten zehn Jahren. Jedoch, Die Schwierigkeiten, sich mit den Grundlagen unserer höheren Ordnungspsychologie auseinanderzusetzen, d.h. wie Sprache (ungefähr die gleiche wie der Verstand, wie W uns zeigte) Werke durch Coliva, eine der brillantesten und produktivsten zeitgenössischen Philosophen, die in einem sehr aktuellen Artikel Bemerkungen machte, die zeigen, dass sie nach Jahren intensiver Arbeit am späteren W, sie Scheint nicht begriffen zu haben Dass er die grundlegendsten Probleme der Beschreibung menschlichen Verhaltens löste. Wie DMS deutlich macht, kann man nicht einmal kohärent Bedenken über die Operationen unserer Grundpsychologie äussern (W ' s ' Hinges ', die ich Gleichsetzen mit S1), ohne in Inkohärenz zu verfallen. DMS hat die Grenzen der Beides Arbeiter (Einschränkungen, die von allen Schülern des Verhaltens geteilt werden) in ihren jüngsten Artikeln, die (wie die von Coliva Und Hacker) sind frei im Netz verfügbar. DMS formuliert es so: "... Die Notizen, die sich auf Gewissheit zu revolutionieren, revolutionieren den Begriff der grundlegenden Überzeugungen und lösen sich auf SkepsisUnd sie zu einem Korrektiv zu machen, nicht nur für Moore, sondern auch für Descartes, Hume und die ganze Epistemologie. Auf Gewissheit zeigt Wittgenstein, das Problem, das er sich vorgenommen hat, um – das Problem, das Moore besetzt und geplagt Epistemologie – das der Grundlage des Wissens zu lösen. Wittgensteins revolutionäre Einsicht in Über Gewissheit ist, dass das, was Philosophen traditionell als "Grundüberzeugungen" bezeichnet haben, – jenen Überzeugungen, dass alles Wissen letztlich auf – basieren muss, sich nicht selbst auf weiter Satzungsüberzeugungen. Er kommt zu sehen, dass Grundüberzeugungen Wirklich tierisch Oder unreflektierende Handlungsweisen, die, einmal formuliert (z.B. von Philosophen), wie (empirische) Sätze aussehen. Es ist diese irreführende Erscheinung, die Philosophen glauben lässt, dass auf der Grundlage des Denkens noch mehr gedacht wird. Doch auch wenn sie oft wie empirische Schlüsse aussehen mögen, sind unsere grundlegenden Gewissheiten die ungeschminkte, nicht-Die propositionelle Untermauerung des Wissens, 23 nicht seines Objekts. Indem Wittgenstein die Grundlage des Wissens in nicht reflektierende Gewissheiten verortet, die sich als Handlungsweisen manifestieren, hat er den Ort gefunden, an dem die Rechtfertigung zu einem Ende und Das Regressproblem der Grundüberzeugungen – gelöst und nebenbei die logische Unmöglichkeit einer Hyperboliken gezeigt Skepsis. Ich glaube, dass dies eine bahnbrechende Errungenschaft für die Philosophie ist – es wert ist, On Certainty Wittgensteins "drittes Meisterwerk" zu nennen. " Ich habe vor einigen Jahren selbst zu den gleichen allgemeinen Schlussfolgerungen gekommen und in meinen Buchbesprechungen festgestellt. Sie fährt fort: " ... Genau so beschreibt Wittgenstein Moor-Typ-Scharnier-Seusheiten in On Certainty: Sie "Haben die Form von empirischen Sätzen', Aber Das sind keine empirischen Sätze. Zugegeben, diese Gewissheiten sind keine vermeintlichen metaphysischen Sätze, die die notwendigen Merkmale der Welt zu beschreiben scheinen, sondern vermeintliche empirische Sätze, die die kontingenten Merkmale der Welt zu beschreiben scheinen. Und darin liegt ein Teil der Neuheit von On Certainty. Auf Gewissheit ist kontinuierlich mit allen früheren Schriften Wittgensteins – Tractatus –, dass es am Ende eines langen, ungebrochenen Versuchs kommt, die Grammatik unserer Sprachspiele zu erklären, Grammatik von der verwendeten Sprache abzugrenzen. Baker und Hacker haben die zweite Wittgensteiner Entlarvung der grammatikalischen Die Natur metaphysischer oder superempirischer Sätze; Was auf Gewissheit auszeichnet, ist seine weitere scharfsinnige Unterscheidung zwischen einigen ' empirischen ' Sätzen und anderen ("Unsere" empirischen Sätze "bilden keine homogene Masse ' (OC 213)): Einige scheinbar empirische und kontingente Sätze sind in der Tat Nichts als Ausdruck grammatikalischer Regeln. Die Bedeutung dieser Erkenntnis besteht darin, dass sie zu der beispiellosen Einsicht führt, dass grundlegende Überzeugungen – obwohl sie wie östrommige empirische und kontingente Sätze aussehen – in der Tat Handlungsweisen sind, die, wenn sie konzeptuell erläutert werden, als Regeln gelten können. Grammatik: Sie liegen allen Gedanken zugrunde (OC 401). Damit die Scharniersicherheit "Die Erde existiert seit vielen Jahren" alles Denken und Handeln untermauert, aber nicht als einen Satz, der uns sofort als wahr erscheint; Vielmehr als eine Handlungsweise, die das, was wir tun (z.B. wir erforschen das Zeitalter der Erde) und das, was wir sagen (z.B. wir sprechen von der Erde in der Vergangenheit) untermauert: "Die Rechtfertigung von Gründen, die die Beweise rechtfertigen, geht zu Ende; – aber das Ende sind nicht bestimmte Sätze, die uns sofort als wahr auffallen, d.h. es ist keine Art von Sehen unsererseits; Es ist unser Handeln, das am unteren Ende des Sprachspiels liegt ". (OC 204) " "Die nicht-propositionelle Natur der Grundüberzeugungen macht dem Regress, der die Epistemologie geplagt hat, einen Riegel vor: Wir müssen nicht länger unhaltbare Selbstversetzungssätze auf der Grundlage des Wissens setzen. Peter Hacker erkennt die bahnbrechende Einsicht nicht an, dass unsere grundlegenden Gewissheiten Handlungsweisen sind und nicht "bestimmte Sätze, die uns treffen ... Wie wahr "(OC 204). 24 Wenn alle Wittgenstein in OC taten, war zu behaupten, dass unsere grundlegenden Überzeugungen wahre empirische Sätze sind, warum sollte man sich dann die Mühe machen? Er würde nur wiederholen, was Philosophen vor ihm seit Jahrhunderten sagen, während er einen unlösbaren, unendlichen Rückschritt beklagt. Warum nicht eher einschätzen, dass Wittgenstein den Rückschritt gestoppt hat? " ("Beyond Hacker es Wittgenstein" -(2013)). " Es ist erstaunlich (und ein Zeichen dafür, wie tief die Kluft zwischen Philosophie und Psychologie bleibt), dass ich (wie ich schon oft bemerkt habe) in einem Jahrzehnt intensiver Lektüre nicht gesehen habe, dass eine Person die offensichtliche Verbindung zwischen W ' s ' Grammatik ' und der automatischen Reflexion hergestellt hat. Funktionen unseres Gehirns, die System 1 bilden, und seine Erweiterungen in die sprachlichen Funktionen von System 2. Für jeden, der mit den beiden Systemrahmen für das Verständnis von Verhalten vertraut ist, die verschiedene Bereiche der Psychologie dominiert hat, wie die Entscheidungstheorie in den letzten Jahrzehnten, sollte es ganz offensichtlich sein, dass "grundlegende Überzeugungen" (oder wie ich sie B1 nennen) die Vererbte automatisierte, wahrheitsgetreue Struktur von S1 und dass ihre Erweiterung mit Erfahrung in wahre oder falsche Sätze (oder wie ich sie B2 nenne) das sind, was Nicht-Philosophen "Überzeugungen" nennen. Das mag einige als blosse terminologische Kleinigkeit erscheinen, aber ich habe die beiden benutzt Systemansicht und seine Tabulation unten als die logische Struktur der Rationalität für ein Jahrzehnt und betrachten es Haupt Fortschritt in das Verständnis der höheren Ordnung Verhalten, und damit von W oder jede philosophische oder Verhaltensschrift. Meiner Ansicht nach ist das Versäumnis, die fundamentale Bedeutung der Automatisierung unseres Verhaltens durch S1 zu erfassen und die daraus resultierende Zuordnung aller sozialen Interaktion (z.B. Politik) zu den Oberflächlichkeiten von S2. Kann als Verantwortlich für den unaufhaltsamen Zusammenbruch der industriellen Zivilisation. Die fast universelle Vergessenheit auf die Grundbiologie und Psychologie führt zu endlosen erfolglosen Versuchen, die Probleme der Welt über die Politik zu lösen, aber nur eine drastische Umstrukturierung der Gesellschaft mit dem Verständnis der grundlegenden Rolle der inklusiven Fitness, die sich über die das Automaten S1 hat jede Chance, die Welt zu retten. Die Vergessenheit auf S1 wurde von Searle ' The phänomenological Illusion ', von Pinker ' The Blank Slate ' und von Tooby Und Cosmides ' The Standard Social Science Model'. OC zeigt W es einzigartiger super-Sokratischen Trialog (Erzähler, Gesprächspartner, Kommentator) in voller Blüte und besser als anderswo in seinen Werken. In den späten 20er Jahren erkannte er, dass der einzige Weg, um Fortschritte zu erzielen, darin bestand, zu schauen, wie die Sprache tatsächlich funktioniert-sonst verliert man sich von den ersten Sätzen an im Labyrinth der Sprache und es gibt nicht die geringste Hoffnung, seinen Ausweg zu finden. Das ganze Buch beschäftigt sich mit verschiedenen Verwendungen des Wortes "wissen," die sich in "wissen" als intuitive "Wahrnehmungssicherheit" aufteilen, dieNicht sinnvoll befragt (my K1 Oder W es Unvergänglich) und "wissen" als Handlungsbereitschaft (mein K2 Oder W es Transitive), die das gleiche wie denken, hoffen, beurteilen, verstehen, 25 sich vorstellen, sich erinnern, glauben und viele andere dispositionale Wörter. Wie ich in meinen verschiedenen Rezensionen von W und S vorgeschlagen habe, entsprechen diese beiden Anwendungen den modernen beiden Systemen des Denkens, die so stark im Verständnis des Verhaltens ist (Geist, Sprache), und dies (und seine andere Arbeit) ist die erste bedeutende Anstrengung, um zu zeigen, wie unser Fasten , prelinguistische automatische ' mentale Zustände ' sind die unbestreitbare axiomatische Grundlage (' Scharniere ') für unsere später entwickelte, langsame, sprachliche, beratende Dispositionspsychologie. Wie ich schon oft bemerkt habe, haben weder W, noch irgendjemand anderes, dies jemals klar gesagt. Zweifellos gehen die meisten, die OC lesen, ohne klare Vorstellung davon, was er getan hat, was das normale Ergebnis der Lektüre eines seiner Werke ist. On Certainty (OC) wurde erst 1969 veröffentlicht, 18 Jahre nach Wittgensteins Tod und hat erst vor kurzem begonnen, ernsthafte Aufmerksamkeit zu erregen. Es gibt nur wenige Hinweise darauf in Searle (zusammen mit Hacker, W es Erbe offensichtlich und Einer von Der berühmteste lebende Philosophs) und man sieht ganze Bücher über W mit kaum einer Erwähnung. Es gibt jedoch einigermassen gute Bücher, die von Stroll, Svensson, Coliva, McGinn und Andere und Teile von vielen anderen Büchern und Artikeln, aber das Beste ist, dass von Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), dessen Band "Understanding Wittgenstein es On Certainty" 2004 für jeden gebildeten Menschen verpflichtend ist, ist der vielleicht beste Ausgangspunkt für das Verständnis von Wittgenstein (W), Psychologie, Philosophie und Leben. Allerdings (meiner Ansicht nach) ist jede Analyse von W nicht zu überziehen, um seine einzigartigen und revolutionären Fortschritte vollständig zu erfassen, indem es ihm nicht gelingt, das Verhalten in seinen breiten evolutionären und zeitgenössischen wissenschaftlichen Kontext zu stellen, den ich hier versuchen werde. Ich werde keine Seite für Seite erklären, da wir (wie bei jedem anderen Buch, das sich mit Verhalten befasst-also Philosophie, Psychologie, Anthropologie, Soziologie, Geschichte, Recht, Politik, Religion, Literatur etc.) die ersten Seiten nicht überstehen würden, da alle Themen Hier diskutiert, entstehen sofort in jeder Diskussion über das Verhalten. Die folgende Tabelle, die die logische Struktur der Rationalität (Beschreibung Psychologie des höheren Ordnungsgedankens) zusammenfasst, bietet einen Rahmen für diese und alle Diskussionen über das Verhalten. Im Laufe vieler Jahre lang in W, anderen Philosophen und Psychologie ausgiebig zu lesen, ist klar geworden, dass das, was er in seiner letzten Periode (und während seiner gesamten früheren Arbeit auf eine weniger klare Weise) angelegt hat, die Grundlagen dessen sind, was heute als evolutionäre bekannt ist. Psychologie (EP), oder, wenn Sie es vorziehen, kognitive Psychologie, kognitive Linguistik, Intentionalität, höhere Ordnung gedacht oder einfach nur Verhalten oder noch höhere Ordnung Tierverhalten. Leider erkennen nur wenige, dass seine Werke ein riesiges und einzigartiges Lehrbuch der beschreibenden Psychologie sind, das jetzt genauso relevant ist wie der Tag, an dem es geschrieben wurde. Er ist Fast überall ignoriert Psychologie und andere Verhaltenswissenschaften und 26 Geisteswissenschaften, und selbst diejenigen, die ihn verstanden haben, haben das Ausmass seiner Vorwegnahme der neuesten Arbeit über EP und kognitive Illusionen (z.B. das Zwei-Sein des schnellen und langsamen Denkens - siehe unten) nicht erkannt. John Searle (S), bezieht sich auf ihn selten, aber sein Werk Kann als Eine einfache Verlängerung von W ' s, obwohl er das nicht zu sehen scheint. W-Analysten wie Baker and Hacker (B & H), Read, Harre, Horwich, Stern, Hutto und Moyal-Sharrock tun wunderbar, aber meistens nicht aufhören, ihn in den Mittelpunkt der aktuellen Psychologie zu stellen, wo er sicherlich hingehört. Es sollte auch klar sein, dass, soweit sie kohärent und richtig sind, alle Berichte über höheres Ordnungsverhalten die gleichen Phänomene beschreiben und sich leicht ineinander übersetzen sollten. So, Die neuerdings angesagten Themen "Embodied Mind" und "Radical Enaktivismus"Sollte direkt von und in W es Arbeit fliessen (und das tun sie). Das Versäumnis, W es Bedeutung nicht vollständig zu erfassen, ist zum Teil auf die begrenzte Aufmerksamkeit On Certainty (0C) und seine anderen 3 zurückzuführen.Rd Die Arbeiten bis In letzter Zeit, aber noch mehr auf die Unfähigkeit vieler Philosophen und anderer zu verstehen, wie tiefgreifend sich unsere Sicht des Verhaltens ändert, sobald wir den evolutionären Rahmen annehmen. Ich nenne den Rahmen die beschreibende Psychologie der höheren Ordnung Gedanken-DPHOT-oder genauer gesagt das Studium der Sprache, die in DPHOT verwendet wird-die Searle nennt die logische Struktur der RationalLSR), die Anthropologie, Soziologie, Politik, Recht, Moral begründet , Ethik, Religion, Ästhetik, Literatur und Geschichte. Die "Evolutionstheorie" hörte vor dem Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts auf, eine Theorie für jeden normalen, rationalen, intelligenten Menschen zu sein und für Darwin mindestens ein halbes Jahrhundert früher. Man kann nicht umhin, T. rex und alles, was dafür relevant ist, über das unaufhaltsame Funktionieren von EP in unseren wahrhaft axiomatischen Hintergrund einzubinden. Sobald man die logische (psychologische) Notwendigkeit dafür bekommt, ist es wirklich verblüffend, dass selbst die hellsten und besten scheinen, diese grundlegendste Tatsache des menschlichen Lebens (mit einer Spitze des Hutes zu Kant, Searle und ein paar andere) nicht zu erfassen, die In Grosses Detail In "On Certainty". Die Gleichsetzung von Logik und unserer axiomatischen Psychologie ist übrigens wesentlich für das Verständnis von W und der menschlichen Natur (wie Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS), aber Afaik Niemand sonst, weist darauf hin). So wird der grösste Teil unserer gemeinsamen öffentlichen Erfahrung (Kultur) zu einer wahrheitsgetreuen Erweiterung unserer axiomatischen EP und kann nicht falsch gefunden werden, ohne unsere Vernunft zu bedrohen. Football oder Britney Spears können nicht einfach aus meinem oder unserem Gedächtnis und Vokabular verschwinden, da diese Konzepte, Ideen, Ereignisse, die sich aus zahllosen anderen in dem wahrhaft einzigen Netzwerk entwickelt haben und mit ihm verbunden sind, das mit der Geburt beginnt und sich in alle Richtungen ausdehnt, um einen Grossteil unserer Bewusstsein und Erinnerung. Eine Konsequenz, die von DMS schön erklärt und auf seine eigene, einzigartige Art und Weise von Searle erklärt wird, ist, dass die skeptische Sicht auf die Welt und andere Köpfe 27 (und ein Berg anderer Unsinns, einschliesslich der Blank Slate) nicht wirklich Fuss fassen kann, da "Realität" das Ergebnis von Unfreiwillig schnell denkende Axiome und nicht testbar wahre oder falsche Sätze. Die tote Hand der leeren Schiefersicht des Verhaltens ruht immer noch stark und ist die Pleite des "zweiten Selbst" des langsam denkenden Bewusstseins 2, das (ohne Bildung) nicht in der Tatsache liegt, dass die Grundlage für jedes Verhalten im unbewussten, schnellen Denken axiomatische Struktur des Systems 1 (Searle ' s ' phänomenologische Illusion '). Durchsucht fasste dies in einem sehr aufschlussreichen aktuellen Artikel zusammen, indem ich feststellte, dass viele logische Merkmale der Intentionalität ausserhalb der Reichweite der Phänomenologie liegen, weil die Schaffung von Sinnhaftigkeit (d.h. die COS von S2) aus Bedeutungslosigkeit (d.h. die Reflexe von S1) nicht aus der Bedeutungslosigkeit (d.h. die Reflexe von S1) ist Bewusst erfahren. Siehe Philosophie in einem neuen Jahrhundert (PNC) p115-117 und meine Rezension davon. Es ist wichtig, die W/S (Wittgenstein/Searle) f zu erfassenromme, so werde ich zunächst einige Kommentare zu Die Philosophie und ihre Beziehung zur zeitgenössischen psychologischen Forschung, wie sie in den Werken von Searle (S) zum Beispiel zeigt, Wittgenstein (W), Baker and Hacker (B & H), Read, Hutto, Daniele Moyal-Sharrock (DMS) et. Al. Um meine einfachen zwei Systeme Terminologie und Perspektive zu erfassen, wird es helfen, meine Rezensionen von W/S und anderen Büchern über diese Genies zu sehen, die eine klare Beschreibung des höheren Ordnungsverhaltens liefern, das in den psychologischen Büchern nicht zu finden ist. Zu sagen, dass Searle W es Arbeit erweitert hat, bedeutet nicht unbedingt, dass es sich um ein direktes Ergebnis von W-Studie handelt (und er ist eindeutig kein Wittgensteinian), sondern das, weil es nur eine menschliche Psychologie gibt (aus dem gleichen Grund gibt es nur eine menschliche Kardiologie), dass jeder, der das Verhalten genau beschreibt, eine Variante oder eine Erweiterung dessen, was W gesagt hat, ausspricht. Allerdings erwähnt S selten W und auch dann, Oft kritisch, Aber meiner Ansicht nach verfehlen seine Kritiken (wie die aller) fast immer das Ziel und er Macht Viele zweifelhafte Behauptungen, für die er oft kritisiert wird. Im vorliegenden Kontext, Ich finde die jüngsten Kritiken an DMS, Coliva Und Hacker am relevantesten. Nichtsdestotrotz ist er der erste Kandidat für die Besten, da W und ich empfehlen, die über 100 herunterzuladen Video Vorträge hat er im Netz. Im Gegensatz zu fast allen anderen Philosophievorträgen sind sie recht unterhaltsam und Informativ Und ich habe sie alle mindestens zweimal gehört. Ein wichtiges Thema in der Diskussion über menschliches Verhalten ist die Notwendigkeit, die genetisch programmierten Automatismen von S1 (was ich mit W ' s ' Scharnieren ' gleichsetze) von dem weniger mechanischen sprachlichen Dispositionsverhalten von S2 zu trennen. Um umzuformulieren: Alle Studien über höheres Ordnungsverhalten ist ein Versuch, das schnelle System 1 (S1) und das langsame System 2 (S2)-Denken zu zerschlagen-z.B. Wahrnehmungen und andere Automatismen vs. Dispositionen. Suchs 28 Arbeit Insgesamt bietet Eine verblüffende Beschreibung des sozialen Verhaltens höherer Ordnung S2 einschliesslich "Wir Intentionalität", während das spätere W zeigt, wie S2 auf wahrheitsgerechten unbewussten Axiomen von S1 basiert, die sich in der Evolution und in jeder unserer persönlichen Geschichten zu bewusster Disposition entwickelten. Propositionelles Denken (Handeln) von S2. Wittgenstein bemerkte bekanntlich, dass die Verwirrung und Unfruchtbarkeit der Psychologie nicht damit zu erklären sei, sie als junge Wissenschaft zu bezeichnen, und dass Philosophen unwiderstehlich versucht seien, Fragen zu stellen und zu beantworten, wie es die Wissenschaft tut. Er bemerkte, dass diese Tendenz die eigentliche Quelle der Metaphysik ist und führt den Philosophen in die völlige Dunkelheit. Siehe BBB p18. Ein weiterer bemerkenswerter Hinweis war, dass, wenn es nicht um "Ursachen" geht, die Aktivitäten des Geistes vor uns offen liegen – siehe BB p6 (1933). Ebenso, Die 20.000 Seiten seiner Nachlass Sein berühmtes Diktum demonstrierte Dass das Problem nicht darin besteht, die Lösung zu finden, sondern als Lösung zu erkennen, was nur eine Vorstufe zu sein scheint. Siehe seine Zettel p312-314. Und wieder Er bemerkte vor 80 Jahren, dass wir erkennen sollten, dass wir nur Beschreibungen des Verhaltens geben können und dass dies keine Hinweise auf Erklärungen sind (BBB p125). Sehen Sie sich die vollständigen Zitate an anderen Stellen in diesem Artikel an. Die gemeinsamen Ideen (z.B. der Untertitel einer der Pinkers Bücher "Das Zeug des Denkens: Sprache als Fenster in die menschliche Natur"), dass Sprache (Geist, Sprache) ein Fenster ist oder eine Art Übersetzung unseres Denkens oder sogar (Fodor es LOT, Carruthers ' ISA, etc.), dass es eine andere "Sprache des Denkens" geben muss, von der es ein TR ist, von dem es ein TR ist, von dem es ein TR ist. Die Schlägerei, wurden von W abgelehnt, der versuchte, mit Hunderten von ständig neu analysierten, anschaulichen Beispielen von Sprache in Aktion zu zeigen, dass Sprache kein Bild von, Aber ist selbst Denken oder der Verstand, und sein ganzer Korpus kann als die Entwicklung dieser Idee angesehen werden. Viele haben die Idee einer "Gedankensprache" dekonstruiert, aber meiner Meinung nach keine bessere als W in BBB p37 - "Wenn wir die Möglichkeit eines Bildes im Auge behalten, das zwar richtig ist, aber keine Ähnlichkeit mit seinem Objekt hat, verliert die Interpolation eines Schattens zwischen Satz und Wirklichkeit jeden Punkt. Vorerst, Der Satz selbst kann als solcher Schatten dienen. Der Satz ist genau so ein Bild, das nicht die geringste Ähnlichkeit mit dem hat, was er darstellt. " Also, Sprachprobleme direkt aus dem Gehirn und was könnte als Beweis für einen Vermittler gelten? W lehnte die Idee ab, dass die Bottom-Up-Ansätze der Physiologie, Psychologie und Berechnung zeigen könnten, was seine Top-Down-Analyse von Language Games (LG ' s) tat. Die Schwierigkeiten, die er bemerkte, sind, zu verstehen, was immer vor unseren Augen liegt, und Unklarheit zu erfassen – das heisst, "die grösste Schwierigkeit bei diesen Untersuchungen ist es, einen Weg zu finden, um Unklarheit zu repräsentieren" (LWPP1, 29 347). Und so, Sprache (d.h. orale Muskelkontraktionen, Die wichtigste Art und Weise, wie wir interagieren) Es ist kein Fenster in den Geist, sondern ist der Verstand selbst, der durch akustische Explosionen über die Vergangenheit ausgedrückt wird, Gegenwart und Zukunft (z.B. Unsere Rede mit den später entwickelten Sprachspielen (LG ' s) des Second selbst-die Dispositionen wie Als vorstellen, wissen, bedeuten, glauben, beabsichtigen etc.). Einige der Lieblingsthemen von W In seinem späteren zweiten und seiner Dritte Perioden sind die interdigitalen Mechanismen des schnellen und langsamen Denkens (System 1 und 2), die Bedeutungslosigkeit unseres subjektiven "mentalen Lebens" für das Funktionieren der Sprache und die Unmöglichkeit der Privatsprache. Das Fundament unseres Verhaltens ist unser unfreiwilliges, System 1, schnelles Denken, nur wahrheitsgetreue, mentale Zuständeunsere Wahrnehmungen und Erinnerungen und unfreiwilligen Handlungen, während die evolutionär späteren LG es freiwillig sind, System 2, langsames Denken, testable true oder falsche Disposition (und oft kontrafaktische) Imagination, Angenommen, Absicht, Denken, Wissen, Glauben etc. Er erkannte, dass "nichts verborgen ist" - d.h. unsere ganze Psychologie und alle Antworten auf alle philosophischen Fragen sind hier in unserer Sprache (unser Leben) und dass die Schwierigkeit nicht darin besteht, die Antworten zu finden, sondern sie wie immer hier vor uns zu erkennen - wir müssen nur noch Hören Sie auf, tiefer zu schauen (z.B. in LWPP1 "Die grösste Gefahr ist hier, sich selbst beobachten zu wollen"). W gibt keine Gesetze zur Sprache, sondern weist darauf hin, dass unser Verhalten (meist Sprache) das klarste Bild unserer Psychologie ist. FMRI, PET, TCMS, Irna, rechnerische Analoga, KI und alles andere sind faszinierende und kraftvolle Möglichkeiten, unsere angeborene axiomatische Psychologie zu beschreiben und zu erweitern, aber alles, was sie tun können, ist die physische Grundlage für unser Verhalten zu liefern, unsere Sprachspiele zu multiplizieren und S2 zu erweitern. Die wahrheitsgetreuen Axiome von ' ' On Certainty ' ' sind W ' s (und später Searle ' s) "Fundament" oder "Hintergrund," die wir jetzt evolutionäre Psychologie (EP) nennen, und die auf die automatisierten wahrheitsgetreuen Reaktionen von Bakterien zurückgeführt werden kann, die sich durch den Mechanismus von Inklusive Fitness (IF), d.h. durch natürliche Selektion. Sehen Sie sich die jüngsten Arbeiten von Trivers Für ein beliebtes Intro zu IF oder Bourkes hervorragenden "Principles of Social Evolution" für ein Pro-Intro. Die jüngste Farce des evolutionären Denkens von Nowak und Wilson hat keinerlei Auswirkungen auf die Tatsache, dass IF der wichtigste Mechanismus der Evolution durch natürliche Selektion ist (siehe meine Rezension von ' The Social Conquest of Earth ' (2012)). Während W sich in OC entwickelt, wird der grösste Teil unserer gemeinsamen öffentlichen Erfahrung (Kultur) zu einer wahrheitsgetreuen Erweiterung (d.h. S2-HHinges oder S2H) unserer axiomatischen EP (d.h. S1 Hinges oder S1H) und kann nicht "irrtümlich" gefunden werden, ohne unsere Vernunft zu gefährden - wie er bemerkte,, Ein ' Fehler ' in S1 (kein Test) hat tiefgreifende andere Folgen als in S2 (testable). Eine Folge, Schön erklärt von DMS und auf seine eigene einzigartige Art und Weise von Searle erklärt, ist, dass die skeptische 30 Sicht auf die Welt und andere Köpfe (und ein Berg von anderen Unsinn) nicht Fuss fassen kann, da "Realität" das Ergebnis unfreiwilliger "schnell denkender" Axiome ist und nicht testbar Sätze (wie ich es ausdrücken würde). Mir ist klar, dass die angeborenen wahrheitsgetreuen Axiome W während seiner gesamten Arbeit und vor allem im OC dem schnellen Denken oder System 1 entsprechen, das im Zentrum der aktuellen Forschung steht (z.B. Kahneman--"Thinking Fast and Slow", aber weder er als auch er , noch niemand Afaik, hat jede Idee W vor über 50 Jahren den Rahmen gelegt), die unfreiwillig und automatisch ist und die den mentalen Zuständen von Wahrnehmung, Emotion und Gedächtnis entspricht, wie W immer wieder anmerkt. Man könnte diese "intrazerabalen Reflexe" nennen (vielleicht 99% unseres gesamten Gehirns, wenn man sie durch Energieverbrauch im Gehirn). Unser langsames oder reflektierendes, mehr oder weniger "bewusstes" (Vorsicht ein anderes Netz von Sprachspielen!) SekundeSelbst-Hirnaktivität entspricht dem, was W als "Disposition" charakterisiertIonen "oder" Neigungen, "die Beziehen Sie sich auf Fähigkeiten oder mögliche Handlungen, sind keine mentalen Zustände, sind bewusst, bewusst und propositionell (wahr oder falsch), und haben keine bestimmte Zeit des Auftretens. Wie W anmerkt, haben Dispositionswörter mindestens zwei grundlegende Verwendungszwecke. Die eine ist eine eigentümliche, meist philosophische Anwendung (aber graduierend in alltäglichen Gebrauchsgegenständen), die sich auf die wahrheitsgetreuen Sätze bezieht, die sich aus der direkten Wahrnehmung und dem Gedächtnis ergeben, d.h. auf unsere angeborene axiomatische S1-Psychologie ("Ich weiss, das sind meine Hände"), die ursprünglich als kausal bezeichnet wurde. Selbstreferential (CSR) von Searle (jetzt aber Causally Self-Reflexive) oder reflexiv oder untransitiv in W es Blue and Brown Books (BBB), Und die S2-Nutzung, die ihr normaler Gebrauch als Dispositionen ist, die ausgespielt werden können und die wahr oder falsch werden kann ("Ich kenne meinen Weg nach Hause")- -d.h. sie haben Bedingungen für die Zufriedenheit (COS) im engeren Sinne und sind nicht CSR (in BBB als transitiv bezeichnet). Die Gleichsetzung dieser Begriffe aus der modernen Psychologie mit denen, die von W und S verwendet werden (und vieles mehr hier), ist meine Idee, also erwarten Sie nicht, sie in der Literatur zu finden (ausser meiner Bücher Artikel Und Bewertungen On viXra.org, philpapers.org, researchgate.net, academic a.edu, Amazon, libgen.io, b-ok.org etc.). Obwohl die Untersuchung des unfreiwilligen schnellen Denkens von Philosophen selten berührt wird, hat sie die Psychologie, die Ökonomie (z.B. den Nobelpreis von Kahneman) und andere Disziplinen unter Namen wie "kognitive Illusionen", "Grundierung" revolutioniert, "implizite Erkenntnis", "Framing", "Heuristik" und "Voreingenommenheit". Natürlich handelt es sich auch dabei um Sprachspiele, so dass es immer weniger nützliche Möglichkeiten geben wird, diese Wörter zu verwenden, und Studien und Diskussionen werden von "reinem" System 1 bis Kombinationen von 1 und 2 variieren (die Norm, wie W deutlich machte, aber natürlich hat er diese Terminologie nicht verwendet) , aber vermutlich auch nie nur von langsamem S2-Dispositionsdenken, da jeder Gedanke 31 (vorsätzliche Handlung) nicht eintreten kann, ohne einen Grossteil des komplizierten S1Netzwerks der "kognitiven Module", "Inferenzmotoren", "intracerebrale Reflexe", "Automatismen", " Kognitive Axiome "," Hintergrund "oder" Fundament "(wie W und Searle unsere EP nennen), die S1 auch verwenden müssen, um Muskeln zu bewegen (Aktion). Es folgt sowohl aus Ws Werk der 3. Periode als auch aus der zeitgenössischen Psychologie, dass "Wille", "Selbst" und "Bewusstsein" (die als Searle-Notizen von jeder Diskussion der Intentionalität vorausgesetzt werden) axiomatische, wahrheitsgetreue Elemente S1 sind, die aus Wahrnehmungen bestehen, Erinnerungen und Reflexe., und es gibt keine (Verständlichkeit), ihre Falschheit zu demonstrieren (zu geben). Wie W mehrfach deutlich gemacht hat, sind sie die Grundlage für das Urteil und können daher nicht beurteilt werden. Die Wahrheit nur Axiome unserer Psychologie sind nicht nachweislich. Wie er in OC p94 bekanntlich sagte - "aber ich habe mir nicht mein Bild von der Welt gemacht, indem ich mich von seiner Richtigkeit befriedigt habe: Ich habe es auch nicht, weil ich von seiner Richtigkeit zufrieden bin. -nein: Es ist der ererbte Hintergrund, von dem ich zwischen wahr und falsch unterscheide. " Ein Satz drückt einen Gedanken aus (hat eine Bedeutung), wenn er klare Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit (COS) hat, also öffentliche Wahrheitsbedingungen. Daher der Kommentar von W: "Wenn ich in der Sprache denke, gibt es neben den verbalen Ausdrücken keine ' Bedeutungen ', die mir durch den Kopf gehen: Die Sprache ist selbst das Vehikel des Denkens." Und wenn ich mit oder ohne Worte denke, ist der Gedanke, was ich (ehrlich) sage, es ist, da es kein anderes mögliches Kriterium (COS) gibt. So W es Aphorismen (p132 in Budd es schönes Buch über W) – "In der Sprache treffen sich Wunsch und Erfüllung, und wie alles metaphysische, ist die Harmonie zwischen Denken und Wirklichkeit in der Grammatik der Sprache zu finden." Und man könnte hier feststellen, dass ' Grammatik ' in W üblich istLieben als EP oder LSR übersetzt werden (DPHOT - Tabelle) und dass trotz seiner häufigen Warnungen vor der Theoretisierung und Verallgemeinerung (für die er von Searle oft falsch kritisiert wird), es sich um eine so breite Charakterisierung der höheren Ordnung beschreibender Psychologie (Philosophie) handelt, wie man sie finden kann. (Wie DMS auch anmerkt). W ist richtig, dass es keinen mentalen Zustand gibt, der Bedeutung ausmacht, und Searle stellt fest, dass es eine allgemeine Art und Weise gibt, den ac zu charakterisierent Bedeutung "Lautsprecher bedeutet ... Die Auferlegung der Bedingungen der Befriedigung auf die Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit " --die Mittel, um zu sprechen oder zu schreiben, ein gutFormierter Satz, der COS in einem Kontext ausdrückt, der wahr oder falsch sein kann, und das ist ein Akt und kein mentaler Zustand. Das heisst, wie Searle Notizen in der Philosophie in einem neuen Jahrhundert p193 - "Die grundlegende absichtliche Beziehung zwischen Geist und Welt hat mit Befriedigung zu tun. Und ein Satz ist alles, was in einem absichtlichen Verhältnis zur Welt stehen kann, und da diese absichtlichen Beziehungen immer die Bedingungen der Befriedigung bestimmen, und ein Satz als alles 32 definiert wird, was ausreicht, um die Bedingungen zu bestimmen. Zufriedenheit, es stellt sich heraus, dass jede Intentionalität eine Frage von Sätzen ist. "-Sätze sind öffentliche Ereignisse, die wahr oder falsch sein können – kontra der perversen Verwendung des Wortes für die wahrheitsgetreuen Axiome von S1 Mit Searle, Coliva Und andere. Daher der berühmte Kommentar von W aus PI p217 - "Wenn Gott in unseren Verstand geschaut hätte, hätte er dort nicht sehen können, von wem wir sprachen", und seine Bemerkungen, dass das ganze Problem der Repräsentation in "das ist er" enthalten ist, und "was dem Bild seine Interpretation gibt, ist der Weg, auf dem es liegt. , "oder wie S sagt, seine COS. Daher W es Summa (p140 Budd) –"Was es am Ende immer wieder ist, dass er ohne weitere Bedeutung den Wunsch, dass das geschehen ist, als Fall erwogen und die Frage, ob ich weiss, was ich mir wünsche, bevor mein Wunsch erfüllt wird, überhaupt nicht stellen kann. Und die Tatsache, dass irgendein Ereignis mein Wunsch stoppt, bedeutet nicht, dass es es erfüllt. Vielleicht hätte ich mich nicht damit zufrieden geben sollen, wenn mein Wunsch erfüllt gewesen wäre. Nehmen wir an, es wäre gefragt-weiss ich, worauf ich mich noch lange lasse, bevor ich es bekomme? Wenn ich das Sprechen gelernt habe, dann weiss ich es. " Eines der wiederkehrenden Themen von W heisst jetzt Theory of Mind, oder wie ich es vorziehe, Verstehen der Agentur (UA). Ian Apperly, wer UA1 und UA2 (also UA von S1 und S2) in Experimenten sorgfältig analysiert, ist sich der Arbeit von Daniel Hutto bewusst geworden, der UA1 als Fantasie charakterisiert hat (d.h., keine "Theorie" oder Repräsentation kann an UA1 beteiligt werden-die für UA2-see meine Rezension von h reserviert ist. Ist Ersten Buch mit Myin). Aber wie andere Psychologen auch Apperly Keine Ahnung, W hat den Grundstein dafür vor 80 Jahren gelegt. Es ist eine leicht vertretbare Ansicht, dass der Kern der aufkeimenden Literatur über kognitive Illusionen, implizite Erkenntnis, Automatismen und höheres Ordnungsgedanken sind kompatibel mit und direkt von W. Trotz Die meisten der oben genannten ist vielen seit Jahrzehnten bekannt (und sogar 3/4 eines Jahrhunderts im Falle einiger von W es Lehren), ich habe selten etwas gesehen, das sich einer angemessenen Diskussion in der Philosophie oder anderen behavimündliche wissenschaftliche Texte, Und in der Regel wird kaum erwähnt. Nach einem halben Jahrhundert in Vergessenheit geraten, ist die Natur des Bewusstseins heute das heisseste Thema in den Verhaltenswissenschaften und der Philosophie. Angefangen von der Pionierarbeit Ludwigs Wittgensteins in den 1930er Jahren (Blaue und Braunbücher) bis 1951 und von den 50er Jahren bis heute durch seine Nachfolger Searle, Moyal-Sharrock, Read, Hacker, Stern, Horwich, Winch, Finkelstein etc., Ich habe die folgende Tabelle als Heuristik für die Förderung dieser Studie erstellt. Die Zeilen zeigen verschiedene Aspekte oder Weisen des Studiums und die Spalten zeigen die unfreiwilligen Prozesse und freiwilligen Verhaltensweisen, die die beiden Systeme (duale Prozesse) der logischen Struktur des Bewusstseins (LSC) umfassen, die auch als die logische Struktur angesehen werden kann. Rationalität (LSR-Searle), Das Verhalten (LSB), die Persönlichkeit (LSP), der Geist (LSM), die Sprache (LSL), die Realität (LSOR), die Intentionalität (LSI)-der klassische philosophische Begriff, die beschreibende Psychologie des Bewusstseins (DPC), 33 die Beschreibung Psychologie des Denkens (DPT) – oder besser, die Sprache der beschreibenden Psychologie des Denkens (LDPT), Begriffe hier und in meinen anderen neueren Schriften eingeführt. Die Ideen für diese Tabelle stammen aus Wittgenstein, Und Eine viel einfachere Tabelle von Searle, die mit umfangreichen Tabellen und Grafiken in den drei Büchern der PostfachHypothilfen-Version von P.M.S Hacker korreliert. Die letzten 9 Zeilen stammen aus der EntscheidungsforschungHauptsächlich Johnathan St. B.T. Evans und Kollegen im Mich. System 1 ist unfreiwillige, reflexive oder automatisierte "Regeln" R1, während Denken (Kognition) keine Lücken aufweist und freiwillig oder überlegt "Regeln" R2 ist. Und Willing (Volition) hat 3 Lücken (siehe Searle). Ich schlage vor, dass wir Verhalten deutlicher beschreiben Durch die Änderung von Searle es "Befriedigung der Befriedigung", um "mentale Zustände mit der Welt zu beziehen, indem sie Muskeln bewegen" - sprich Sprechen, Schreiben und Tun, und sein "Geist in die Welt Richtung fit"Und" Welt um den Verstand "durch" Ursache entsteht im Verstand "und" Ursache stammt aus der Welt "S1 ist nur nach oben kausal (Welt für Geist) und inhaltslos (ohne Darstellungen oder Informationen), während S2 Inhalt hat und abwärts (Geist zu Welt) ). Ich habe meine Terminologie in dieser Tabelle übernommen. 34 AUS DER ANALYSE VON SPRACHENSPIELEN Disposition zu tun* Emotion Erinnerung Wahrnehmu ng Wunsch PI * * IA * * * Aktion/ Wort Ursache entsteht in * * * * Welt Welt Welt Welt Der Verstand Der Verstand Der Verstand Der Verstand Verursachen Änderungen in * * * * * nichts Der Verstand Der Verstand Der Verstand nichts Welt Welt Welt Kausal Selbstreflexiv * * * * * * Nein Ja Ja Ja Nein Ja Ja Ja Richtig oder Falsch (überprüfbar) Ja Nur Wahr Nur Wahr Nur Wahr Ja Ja Ja Ja Öffentliche Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit Ja Ja/Nein Ja/Nein Nein Jes/Nein Ja Nein Ja Beschreiben Ein psychischer Zustand Nein Ja Ja Ja Nein Nein Ja/Nein Ja Evolutionspriorität 5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 Freiwillige Inhalte Ja Nein Nein Nein Nein Ja Ja Ja Freiwillige Einweihung Jes/Nein Nein Ja Nein Jes/Nein Ja Ja Ja Kognitives System ******* 2 1 2/1 1 2/1 2 1 2 Intensität ändern Nein Ja Ja Ja Ja Nein Nein Nein Genaue Dauer Nein Ja Ja Ja Nein Nein Ja Ja Zeit Ort (Hier und Jetzt / Dort und Dann) ******** DD HJ HJ HJ DD DD HJ HJ Besondere Qualität Nein Ja Nein Ja Nein Nein Nein Nein Lokalisiert im Körper Nein Nein Nein Ja Nein Nein Nein Ja Körperliche Ausdrücke Ja Ja Nein Nein Ja Ja Ja Ja Selbstwidersprüche Nein Ja Nein Nein Ja Nein Nein Nein Braucht ein Selbst Ja Jes/Nein Nein Nein Ja Nein Nein Nein Braucht Sprache Ja Nein Nein Nein Nein Nein Nein Ja/Nein 35 AUS DER ENTSCHEIDUNGSFORSCHUNG Disposition zu tun* Emotion Erinnerung Wahrnehm ung Wunsch PI * * IA * * * AKtion/ Wort Unterschwellige Effekte Nein Ja/Nein Ja Ja Nein Nein Nein Ja/Nein Assoziativ/ Regel basiert RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB Kontext Dependent/ Abstrakt A CD/A Cd Cd CD/A A CD/A CD/A Seriall/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S Heuristisch/ Analytische A H/A H H H/A A A A Aktiv Erinnerung Erforderlich Ja Nein Nein Nein Nein Ja Ja Ja Hängt von der Allgemeinen Intelligenz ab Ja Nein Nein Nein Ja/Nein Ja Ja Ja Kognitive Laden Hemmt Ja Ja/Nein Nein Nein Ja Ja Ja Ja Erregung Stimuliert oder Hemmt H S/H S S H H H H Die öffentlichen Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit von S2 werden oft von Searle und anderen als COS, Vertretungen, bezeichnet. Wahrheitsmacher Oder Bedeutungen (oder COS2 von Mich), während die automatischen Ergebnisse von S1 als Präsentationen von anderen (oder COS1 von mir) bezeichnet werden. * Aka Neigungen, Fähigkeiten, Einstellungen, Darstellungen, mögliche Aktionen usw. ** Searles vorherige Absichten *** Searles Absicht in Aktion **** Searles Anpassungsrichtung ***** Searles Richtung der Verursachung ****** (Geisteszustand instanziiert Ursachen oder erfüllt sich selbst). Searle nannte dies früher kausal selbstreferenziell. ******* Tversky / Kahneman / Frederick / Evans / Stanovich definierten kognitive Systeme. ******** Hier und Jetzt oder Dort und Dann Es ist interessant, dies mit den verschiedenen Tabellen und Diagrammen in den letzten 3 Bänden von Peter Hacker über Human Nature zu vergleichen. Man sollte Wittgensteins 36 Entdeckung immer im Hinterkopf behalten, dass, nachdem wir die möglichen Verwendungen (Bedeutungen, Wahrheitsmacher, Bedingungen für Satisfaction) der Sprache in einem Bestimmten Kontext, haben wir sein Interesse ausgeschöpft, und Erklärungsversuche (d.h. Philosophie) bringen uns nur weiter von der Wahrheit entfernt. Er zeigte uns, dass es nur ein philosophisches Problem - die Verwendung von Sätzen (Sprachspielen) in einem unangemessenen Kontext gibt, und daher nur eine Lösung, die den richtigen Kontext -. EXPLANATION DER TABLE System 1 (d.h. Emotionen, Gedächtnis, Wahrnehmungen, Reflexe), die Teile des Gehirns, die dem Bewusstsein präsentieren, automatisiert sind und in der Regel in weniger als 500msec vorkommen, während System 2 Fähigkeiten ist, langsame, im Bewusstsein dargestellte, beratende Handlungen durchzuführen. Überlegungen (S2D-meine Terminologie), die mehr als 500msec erfordern, aber häufig wiederholte S2-Aktionen können auch automatisiert werden (S2A-my Terminology). Es gibt eine Abstufung des Bewusstseins vom Koma über die Stadien des Schlafes bis zum vollen Bewusstsein. Speicher beinhaltet Kurzzeitspeicher (Arbeitsspeicher) des Systems 2 und lange-Begriff Speicher von System 1. Für die Volitions würde man in der Regel sagen, dass sie erfolgreich sind oder nicht, und nicht wahr oder falsch. S1 ist kausal selbstreflexiv, da die Beschreibung unserer Wahrnehmungserfahrung-die Darstellung unserer Sinne zum Bewusstsein-nur mit den gleichen Worten (wie die gleiche COS-Searle) beschrieben werden kann, wie wir die Welt beschreiben, die ich lieber als die Wahrnehmungs-oder COS1 bezeichnen möchte. Unterscheiden Sie es von der Repräsentation oder der öffentlichen COS2 von S2. Natürlich, Die verschiedenen Zeilen und Spalten sind logisch und psychologisch miteinander verbunden. Z.B. Emotion, Gedächtnis und Wahrnehmung in der Wahren oder falschen Reihe wird True-Only sein, wird einen mentalen Zustand beschreiben, zum kognitiven System 1 gehören, wird in der Regel nicht freiwillig initiiert werden, sind kausal selbstreflexiv, Ursache entsteht in der Welt und verursacht Veränderungen in Der Geist, haben eine genaue Dauer, Veränderung der Intensität, treten hier und jetzt, in der Regel eine besondere Qualität, brauchen keine Sprache, sind unabhängig von der allgemeinen Intelligenz und dem Arbeitsgedächtnis, sind nicht durch kognitive Belastung behindert, wird keine freiwillige Inhalte haben, Und wird keine öffentlichen Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit usw. haben. Es wird immer Unklarheiten geben, weil die Wörter (Begriffe, Sprachspiele) nicht genau mit den tatsächlichen komplexen Funktionen des Gehirns (Verhalten) übereinstimmen können, das heisst, es gibt eine kombinatorische Explosion von Kontexten (in Sätzen und in der Welt), und im unendlichen Variationen von ' Hirnzuständen ' (' mentale Zustände oder das Muster der Aktivierungen von Milliarden von Neuronen, die dem "Sehen eines roten Apfels" entsprechen können) und dies ist eine Grund, warum es nicht möglich ist, das Verhalten höherer Ordnung auf ein "Rechtssystem" zu reduzieren, das alle möglichen Kontexte angeben müsste – daher Wittgensteins Warnungen vor Theorien. Und was als 37 "Reduktion" zählt Und als "Gesetz" und als "System" (siehe z.B. Nancy Cartwright). Dies ist ein besonderer Fall der Unumkehrbarkeit von Höheres Niveau Beschreibungen zu unteren, die von Searle, DMS, Hacker, W und anderen mehrfach erklärt wurden. Vor etwa einer Million Jahren entwickelten Primaten die Fähigkeit, ihre Kehlkopfmuskulatur zu nutzen, um komplexe Geräuschserien (d.h. primitive Sprache) zu erstellen, um gegenwärtige Ereignisse (Wahrnehmungen, Erinnerung, reflexive Aktionen) mit einigen primären oder primären Sprachspielen (PLG ' s) zu beschreiben. System 1 besteht aus schnellen, automatisierten, subkortikalen, nicht gegenständlichen, kausalselbstreflexiven, unnachgiebitiven, Informationslos, nur wahrheitsfreundlich "Mentale Zustände" Mit einer präzisen Zeit und einem genauen Ort, und im Laufe der Zeit entwickelte sich in höheren kortikalen Zentren S2 mit der weiteren Fähigkeit, Verschiebungen in Raum und Zeit der Ereignisse zu beschreiben (Vergangenheit und Zukunft und oft hypothetisch, kontrafaktisch, bedingt oder fiktiv Präferenzen, Neigungen oder Dispositionen Die sekundären oder gesichteten Sprachspiele (SLG ' s) von System 2, die langsam, kortikenreich, bewusst, Informationen enthalten, transitiv sind (mit öffentlichen Bedingungen der Satisfaction-Searle ' s Wahrheitsmacher Oder eine Bedeutung, die ich in COS1 und COS2 für private S1 und öffentliche S2 aufteile), repräsentativ (die ich wieder in R1 für S1-Darstellungen und R2 für S2 aufteile), wahres oder falsches Satzdenken, bei dem alle S2-Funktionen keine genaue Zeit-und Sing-Fähigkeit haben und Keine mentalen Zustände. Präferenzen sind Einstellungen, Tendenzen, automatische Ontologische Regeln, Verhaltensweisen, Fähigkeiten, kognitive Module, Personalien, Vorlagen, Inferenzmaschinen, Inklindungen, Verfügungen Emotionen (von Searle als aufgeregt), Propositionelle Attitüden (richtig nur, wenn sie auf Ereignisse in der Welt und nicht auf Sätze verweisen), Schutzwörungen, Kapazitäten, Hypothesen. Einige Emotionen entwickeln sich langsam und verändern die Ergebnisse von S2-Dispositionen (W - "Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie ' V2 p148), während andere typische S1 - automatisch und schnell zu erscheinen und zu verschwinden. "Ich glaube," "er liebt", "denken sie" sind Beschreibungen von möglichen öffentlichen Handlungen in der Regel dIn Raumzeiten platziert. Meine erste-Personen-Aussagen über mich selbst sind nur wahrheitsgetreue (ausschliessende Lügen) – d.h. S1, während Aussagen von Drittperson über andere wahre oder falsche – d. h. S2 (siehe meine Rezensionen von Johnston ' Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner ' und von Budd ' Wittgensteins Philosophie der Psychologie '. ). "Präferenzen" als Klasse von vorsätzlichen Zuständen-im Gegensatz zu Wahrnehmungen, reflexiven Handlungen und Erinnerungsstücken-wurden von Wittgenstein (W) in den 1930er Jahren erstmals klar beschrieben und als "Neigungen" oder "Dispositionen" bezeichnet. Sie wurden gemeinhin als "Satzhaltung" seit Russell, aber es wurde oft festgestellt, dass dies eine falsche oder irreführende Phrase sincE glauben, absichtlich, wissenErinnern etc. sind oft weder Satzung noch Haltungen, wie z.B. von W und Searle gezeigt wurde (z.B. Cf Bewusstsein und Sprache p118). Die Präferenzen sind intrinsische, beobachterunabhängige öffentliche Darstellungen (im Gegensatz zu Präsentationen oder Darstellungen von System 1 bis System 2 – Suchbewusstsein und Sprache p53). Es sind potenzielle Akte, die in Zeit oder Raum verdrängt werden, während die evolutionär 38 primitiveren S1-Wahrnehmungen Erinnerungen und reflexiven Handlungen immer hier und jetzt sind. Dies ist eine Möglichkeit, um System 2 zu charakterisieren-der zweite grosse Fortschritt in der Wirbelsäulenpsychologie nach System 1-the Fähigkeit, (staatliche öffentliche COS für) Ereignisse zu repräsentieren und zu denken, dass sie an einem anderen Ort oder an einer anderen Stelle auftreten (Searle es dritte Fähigkeit der kontrafaktischen Die Erkenntnis und der Wille ergänzen). S1 ' Gedanken "(mein T1-also der Einsatz von" Denken ", um sich auf automatische Hirnprozesse von System One zu beziehen) sind potentielle oder unbewusste mentale Zustände von S1-Searle--Phil Issues 1:45-66 (1991). Wahrnehmungen, Erinnerungen und reflexive (automatische) Aktionen können Die primäre LG es (PLG es-z.B. sehe ich den Hund) und es sind im Normalfall KEINE TESTS möglich, so dass sie True-Only-also axiomatisch sein können, wie ich es vorziehe, oder tierische Reflexe, wie W und DMS beschreiben. Dispositionen können bE beschrieben als sekundäre LG es (SLG es – z.B. ich glaube, ich sehe den Hund) und muss auch ausgehandelt werden, auch für mich in meinem eigenen Fall (d.h., wie weiss ich, was ich glaube, denke, fühle, bis ich Handeln Oder ein Ereignis tritt - sehen Sie meine Bewertungen der Bekannt Bücher über W von Johnston und Budd. Beachten Sie, dass Dispositionen zu Handlungen werden, wenn sie gesprochen oder geschrieben werden und auch auf andere Weise ausgeführt werden, und diese Ideen sind alle Wittgenstein (Mitte der 1930er Jahre) zu verdanken und sind NICHT Verhalten (Hintikka & Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,). Wittgenstein kann als Begründer der Evolutionspsychologie und seiner Arbeit als eine einzigartige Untersuchung der Funktionsweise unserer axiomatischen System-Psychologie und ihrer Interaktion mit System 2 angesehen werden. Nachdem Wittgenstein in den frühen 30er Jahren den Grundstein für die beschreibende Psychologie des höheren Ordensgedankens in den Blauen und Braunbüchern gelegt hatte, wurde sie von John Searle erweitert, der eine einfachere Version von Mein Tisch hier In seinem Klassiker Rationality in Action (2001). Diese Tabelle erweitert sich auf W es Überblick über die axiomatische Struktur der Evolutionspsychologie entwickelte sich aus seinen ersten Kommentaren im Jahr 1911 und so schön dargelegt in seinem letzten Werk "On Certainty" (OC) (geschrieben in 1950-51). OC ist der Grundstein des Verhaltens oder der Epistemologie und Ontologie (wohl das gleiche wie Semantik und Pragmatik), der kognitiven Linguistik oder des Höheren Ordensgedankens und meiner Ansicht nach das wichtigste Werk der Philosophie (Beschreibung) Psychologie) und damit in der Untersuchung des Verhaltens. Wahrnehmung, Erinnerung, Reflexive und Emotion sind primitive teils subkortikale Infreiwillige Geisteszustände, in die der Verstand automatisch in die Welt passt (präsentiert) (ist Causally Self Reflexive-Gesäss) -das Unbestreitbar, wahrhaftig, axiomatische Rationalitätsgrundlage, über die keine Kontrolle möglich ist. Präferenzen, Desires und Intentionen sind Beschreibungen von langsam denkenden bewussten Freiwilligen Fähigkeiten -, die in SLG ' s-beschrieben werden können-in denen der Verstand versucht, die Welt zu passen (zu repräsentieren). Der Verhaltensmuster und alle anderen Verwirrungen unserer Standardbeschreibungspsychologie (Philosophie) entstehen, weil wir nicht sehen können, wie S1 funktioniert und alle Handlungen als das 39 bewusste bewusste Handeln von S2 beschreiben. (Die phenomenologische Illusion - TPI - Searle). W Verstand dies und beschrieb es mit unvergleichlicher Klarheit mit Hunderten von Beispielen von Sprache (dem Verstand), die in seinen Werken in Aktion standen. Die Vernunft hat Zugang zum Gedächtnis und so verwenden wir bewusst offensichtliche, aber oft falsche Gründe, um das Verhalten zu erklären (die zwei Selbst oder Systeme oder Prozesse der aktuellen Forschung). Überzeugungen und andere Dispositionen können als Gedanken beschrieben werden, die versuchen, die Fakten der Welt (Geist zu Weltrichtung der Eignung) zu entsprechen, während Volitions Absichten zu handeln sind (Prior Intentions - PI, oder Intentions In Action – Ia Suchen) plus Acts, die versuchen, die Welt mit den Gedanken - Welt zu denken, Richtung fit - zu entsprechen., z.B. Bewusstsein und Sprache p145, 190). Manchmal gibt es Lücken in der Argumentation, um zu Glauben und anderen Dispositionen zu gelangen. Dispositionsworte können als Substantive verwendet werden, die mentale Zustände zu beschreiben scheinen (' mein Gedanke ist ..."), Oder als Verben oder Adjektive zur Beschreibung von Fähigkeiten (Agenten, wie sie handeln oder handeln können -'Ich denke, dass ...') und werden oft fälschlicherweise als "Propositional Attitudes" bezeichnet. Wahrnehmungen werden zu Erinnerungen und unsere angeborenen Programme (kognitive Module, Vorlagen, Inferenzmotoren von S1) nutzen diese, um Dispositionen zu erzeugen - (Glauben, Wissen, Verstehen, Denken, etc., -tatsächliche oder potentielle öffentliche Handlungen wie Sprache (Gedanke, Verstand) auch Inkeln, Präferenzen, Fähigkeiten, Repräsentationen von S2 genannt werden) Und die Verehrung, Und Es gibt keine Sprache (Konzept, Dachte) von "Private psychische Zustände" Für das Denken oder den Willen (Das heisst, nein Privatsprache, Gedanken oder Verstand). Höhere Tiere können denken und handeln, und insofern haben sie eine öffentliche Psychologie. PERCEPTIONEN: (X ist True): Hören, Sehen, Smell, Schmerz, Berührung, Temperatur MEMORIES: Erinnern (X war wahr) PREFFERENCESIchNCLINATIONENDISPOSITIONEN: (X könnte wahr werden): CLASS 1: PROPOSITIONAL (Wahre oder falsche) PUBLIC ACTS Der Glauben, das Gericht, das Denken, die Vertretung, das Verstehen, die Wahl, das Entwerfen, das Präferieren, Dolmetschen Wissen (Inklusive Fähigkeiten und Fähigkeiten), Attending (Lernen), Erleben, Bedeutung, Erinnerung, INtending, Considing, DesiringExPeren, Wischen, Wannen, Hoffen (Eine besondere Klasse), Seeing As (Aspekte). CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(Als ob, konditionell, hypothetisch, fiktiv)-Träumen, Imaginieren, Lügen, Prädiktieren, Doubten. CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Liebend, Hass, Angst, Trauer, Freude, Eifersucht, Depression. Ihre Funktion ist es, Präferenzen zu modulieren, um die inklusive Fitness (erwarteten 40 maximalen Nutzen) zu erhöhen, indem sie die Informationsverarbeitung von Wahrnehmungen und Erinnerungen für schnelles Handeln erleichtert. Es gibt eine gewisse Trennung zwischen S1-Emotionen wie Wut und Angst und S2 wie Liebe, Hass, Abscheu und Wut. Wir können sie als stark empfundene oder ausgeübte Wünsche betrachten. DESIRES: (Ich will, dass X wahr - Ich will chang werdenDie Welt, um meinen Gedanken zu entsprechen): Sehnsucht, Hoffen, Ausdenken, Warten, Nöten, Erfordernisfragen, verpflichtet. INTENTIONS: (Ich werde X True machen) Intending. ACTIONS: (Ich mache X wahr): Handeln, Sprechen, Lesen, Schreiben, Requeren, Überschreiten, Showing, Demonstrieren, Überzeugens, Versuchen, Versuchen, Lachen, Spielen, Essen, Trinken, Weinen, Asserting (Beschreiben, Lehren, Preditieren, ), Promising, Making oder Using Maps, Bücher, Zeichnungen, Computerprogramme – diese sind öffentlich und freiwillig und übertragen Informationen an andere, so dass sie über das Unbewusste, Unfreiwillig und Informationlos S1 Reflexe in Erklärungen des Verhaltens ((Die phenomenologische Illusion (TPI), The Blank Slate (BS) oder das Standard Social Science Model (SSSM)). Wörter drücken Handlungen aus, die verschiedene Funktionen in unserem Leben haben und weder die Namen von Objekten noch eine einzige Art von Ereignis sind. Die sozialen Wechselwirkungen des Menschen werden von kognitiven Modulen beherrscht - in etwa den Skripten oder Schemata der Sozialpsychologie (Gruppen von Neuronen, die in Inferenzmotoren organisiert sind), die mit Wahrnehmungen und Erinnerungen zur Bildung von Präferenzen, die zu Absichten und dann zu Taten führen. Intentionalität oder absichtliche Psychologie kann als all diese Prozesse oder nur Vorlieben angesehen werden, die zu Handlungen führen, und im weiteren Sinne ist das Subjekt der kognitiven Psychologie oder kognitiven Neurowissenschaften, wenn die Neurophysiologie einbezogen wird, Neurochemie und Neurogenetik. Die Evolutionäre Psychologie kann als das Studium aller vorhergehenden Funktionen oder des Betriebs der Module betrachtet werden, die Verhaltensweisen erzeugen, und ist dann in der Entwicklung, Entwicklung und individuelles Handeln mit Präferenzen, Absichten und Handlungen. Da die Axiome (Algorithmen oder kognitive Module) unserer Psychologie in unseren Genen liegen, können wir unser Verständnis erweitern und unsere Macht erhöhen, indem wir Klar Beschreibungen, wie sie arbeiten und sie (Kultur) über Biologie, Psychologie, Philosophie (beschreibende Psychologie), Mathematik, Logik, Physik und Computerprogramme erweitern können, wodurch sie schneller und effizienter werden. Hajek (2003) gibt eine Analyse der Dispositionen als bedingte Wahrscheinlichkeiten Which are Algorithmatisiert Von Rott (1999), Spohn etc. Die Intentionalität (kognitive oder evolutionäre Psychologie) besteht aus verschiedenen Aspekten des Verhaltens, die von Natur aus in kognitive Module programmiert sind, die 41 Bewusstsein, Willen und Selbst schaffen und erfordern, und bei normalen menschlichen Erwachsenen fast alle ausser Wahrnehmungen Und einige Erinnerungen sind zwecklos, erfordern öffentliche Handlungen (z.B. Sprache) und verpflichten uns zu Beziehungen, um unsere inklusive Fitness zu erhöhen (maximal erwartete Gebrauchsentführung oder bayerische Nutzlernmaximierung). Jedoch Bayesianismus Wegen starker Unterbestimmung höchst fragwürdig Das heisst, sie kann alles und damit auch nichts "erklären." Dies geschieht über Dominanz und gegenseitigen Altruismus, was oft zu "Desire Independent Reasons for Action" (Searle) führt-die ich in DIRA1 und DIRA2 für S1 und S2 aufteile) und die Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit (Sucher) auferlegt. - (i.e. bezieht Gedanken auf die Welt durch öffentliche Handlungen (Muskelbewegungen), die Produktion von Mathematik, Sprache, Kunst, Musik, Sex, Sport etc. Die Grundlagen dafür haben unser grösster Naturpsychologe Ludwig Wittgenstein aus den 1930er Jahren bis 1951 herausgefunden, aber mit klarem Vorahnung Zurück ins Jahr 1911, und mit Raffinessen von vielen, vor allem aber von John Searle ab den 1960er Jahren. "Der allgemeine Baum der psychologischen Phänomene. Ich strebe nicht nach Genauigkeit, sondern nach einem Blick auf das Ganze. " RPP Vol 1 p895, Cf Z p464. Viel Intentionalität (z.B. unsere Sprachspiele) erlaubt Abschlüsse. Wie W bemerkte, sind Neigungen manchmal bewusst und überlegt. Alle unsere Vorlagen (Funktionen, Konzepte, Sprachspiele) haben in manchen Zusammenhängen unscharfe Kanten, Da sie nützlich sein müssen. Es gibt mindestens zwei Arten des Denkens (z.B. zwei Sprachspiele oder Möglichkeiten, die Disposition v zu verwendenErb ' thinking ') - nicht-rational ohne Bewusstsein und rational mit partiellem Bewusstsein (W), jetzt als das schnelle und langsame Denken von S1 und S2 beschrieben. Es ist nützlich, diese als Sprachspiele zu betrachten und nicht als blosse Phänomene (W RPP Vol2 p129). Psychische Phänomene (unsere subjektiven oder inneren "Erfahrungen") sind epiphänomenale, fehlende Kriterien, daher fehlt es auch für sich selbst an Informationen und können daher keine Rolle in Kommunikation, Denken oder Verstand spielen. Denken wie alle Dispositionen fehlt jede Prüfung, ist kein mentaler Zustand (im Gegensatz zu Wahrnehmung von S1), Und Enthält keine Informationen, bis es zu einem öffentlichen Akt oder Ereignis wie in Sprache, Schrift oder anderen muskulären Kontraktionen. Unsere Wahrnehmungen und Erinnerungen können Informationen (also ein öffentliches COS) nur dann haben, wenn sie sich in öffentlichen Handlungen manifestieren, denn nur dann haben Denken, Fühlen etc. auch für uns selbst einen Sinn (Konsequenzen). Speicher und Wahrnehmung werden durch Module in Dispositionen integriert, die psychologisch wirksam werden, wenn sie auf - d.h. S1 erzeugt S2. Die Entwicklung der Sprache bedeutet, die angeborene Fähigkeit fortgeschrittener Menschen zu manifestieren, Wörter (feine Kontraktionen der Mund-oder manuellen Muskulatur) für Handlungen (grobe Kontraktionen der Arm-und Beinmuskulatur) zu ersetzen. TOM (Theory of Mind) wird viel besser als UA-Verständigung der Agentur (mein Begriff) und UA1 und UA2 für solche Funktionen in S1 und S2 – und kann auch als Evolutionäre Psychologie oder Intentionalität bezeichnet werden-die innate genetisch programmierte Produktion von 42 Bewusstsein, Selbst, Und Gedanken, die zu Absichten und dann zu Handlungen führen, indem sie Muskeln anziehen - d.h., Verstehen ist eine Disposition wie Denken und Wissen. "Satzhaltung" ist also ein falscher Begriff für normales intuitives beratendes S2D (d.h. das langsame beratende Funktionieren von System 2) oder automatisiertes S2A (d.h. die Umwandlung von häufig praktizierten System 2-Funktionen von Sprache und Aktion in automatische Schnelle Funktionen). Wir sehen, dass die Bemühungen der kognitiven Wissenschaft, Denken, Emotionen usw. durch das Studium der Neurophysiologie zu verstehen, uns nichts mehr darüber erzählen werden, wie der Geist (Denken, Sprache) funktioniert (im Gegensatz zu der Art und Weise, wie das Gehirn funktioniert), als wir bereits wissen, weil "Geist" ( Gedanken, Sprache) ist schon in voller Öffentlichkeit. (W) Alle ' Phänomene ', die versteckt sind in Neurophysiologie, BiochemieDie Genetik, die Quantenmechanik oder die Stringtheorie sind für unser gesellschaftliches Leben ebenso irrelevant wie die Tatsache, dass ein Tisch aus Atomen besteht, die "gehorsam" (lässt sich durch die Gesetze der Physik und Chemie beschreiben) das Mittagessen auf ihr ist. Als W so berühmt sagte: "Nichts ist verborgen". Alles, was an dem Verstand interessiert ist (Gedanke, Sprache), ist zu sehen, wenn wir nur die Funktionsweise der Sprache genau prüfen. Die Sprache (Geist, öffentliche Sprache, die mit möglichen Handlungen verbunden ist) wurde entwickelt, um die soziale Interaktion und damit das Sammeln von Ressourcen, Überleben und Reproduktion zu erleichtern. Seine Grammatik (d.h. evolutionäre Psychologie, Intentionalität) funktioniert automatisch und ist äusserst verwirrend, wenn wir versuchen, sie zu analysieren. Dies wurde häufig von Hacker, DMS und vielen anderen erklärt. Wie W mit unzähligen sorgfältig genannten Beispielen bemerkte, haben Wörter und Sätze je nach Kontext mehrere Verwendungsmöglichkeiten. Ich glaube und ich esse haben zutiefst andere Rollen als ich Glauben Und ich glaubte oder ich glaube und er glaubt. Die gegenwärtige angespannte Verwendung von Neigungsverben wie "Ich glaube" beschreibt normalerweise meine Fähigkeit, meine wahrscheinlichen Handlungen auf der Grundlage von Wissen (d.h. S2) vorherzusagen, kann aber auch (in philosophischen Kontexten) als Beschreibung meines mentalen Zustandes und damit nicht auf der Grundlage von Wissen oder Informationen (W und sehen Sie meine Rezension des Buches von Hutto und Myin). Im früheren S1-Sinne beschreibt sie keine Wahrheit, sondern macht sich in dem Akt wahr, sie zu sagen-das heisst: "Ich glaube, es regnet" macht sich wahr. Das heisst, Dispositionsverben, die in der ersten Person verwendet werden, die angespannt ist, können kausal selbstreflexiv sein-sie instanzieren sich selbst, aber dann sind sie nicht testbar (d.h. T oder F, nicht S2). Allerdings Vergangenheit oder Zukunft angespannt oder dritte Person verwenden--"Ich glaubte" oder "er glaubt" Oder "er wird glauben" enthalten oder kann resolv seinDie Informationen, die wahr sind Oder falsch, da sie öffentliche Handlungen beschreiben, die nachweisbar sind oder werden können. Ebenso hat "Ich glaube, es regnet" keine Informationen, abgesehen von den nachfolgenden Aktionen, auch nicht für mich, aber "Ich glaube, es wird regnen" oder "er wird denken, dass es regnet" sind potenziell überprüfbare öffentliche Handlungen, die in der Raumzeit verschoben werden, die beabsichtigen, Informationen zu vermitteln (oder Fehlinformation). 43 Nonreflektierende oder nicht-rationale (automatische) Wörter, die ohne Prior Intent gesprochen wurden (die ich S2A-i.e nenne., S2D automatisiert durch die Praxis) wurden von W & dann von Daniele als Wörter als Taten bezeichnet. Moyal-Sharrock in ihrem Papier in Philosophischer Psychologie im Jahr 2000). Viele So genannte Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capbilitäten sind nicht-projektbezogen (Non-Reflektiv) Einstellungen (viel nützlicher, um sie als Funktionen oder Fähigkeiten zu bezeichnen) des Systems 1 (Tversky Kahneman). Vorher Intentionen werden von Searle als mentale Staaten und damit S1 angegeben, aber ich denke, dass man PI1 und PI2 trennen muss, da unsere Vorabsichten in unserer normalen Sprache die bewussten Überlegungen von S2 sind. Wahrnehmungen, Erinnerungen, Typ-2Dispositionen (z.B. einige Emotionen) und viele Typ-1-Dispositionen werden besser als Reflexe von S1 bezeichnet und sind automatische, nicht reflektierende, NONPropositionelle und NON-Attitudinalfunktionen der Scharniere (Axiome, Algorithmen) unserer Evolutionäre Psychologie (Moyal-Sharrock nach Wittgenstein). Einige der führenden Vertreter von W es Ideen, die ich für wesentlich lesend halte, um die beschreibende Psychologie des höheren Ordnungsgedankens zu verstehen, sind Coliva, Hutto, DMS, Stern, Horwich, Finkelstein und Read, die, wie viele Wissenschaftler jetzt, die meisten ihrer Arbeiten (oft in Vordruck) kostenlos online unter Academia.edu, philpapers.org, researchgate.net, Und andere Standorte, Und natürlich kann der Fleissige Fast Alles kostenlos online Über Torrents, p2p, libgen.io, b-ok.org etc.. Baker & Hacker sind in ihren vielen gemeinsamen Arbeiten und auf Hacker es Persönliche Seite. Der verstorbene Baker ging mit einer bizarren psychoanalytischen und eher nihilistischen Interpretation über Bord, die von Hacker, dessen "Gordon Baker es Late Interpretation of Wittgenstein" ein Muss für jeden Schüler des Verhaltens ist, gekonnt widerlegt wurde. Durch den Versuch, den Gedanken der höheren Ordnung an S2 im Hinblick auf den kausalen Rahmen von S1 zu erklären, kann man endlose metaphysische reduktionistische Karikaturenansichten des Lebens finden., Welche Carruthers (C), Dennett, die Kirchenland (3 der derzeitigen Führer des Wissenschaftlerismus, des Computer-oder des materialistischen Reduktionismus--im Folgenden CDC - mein Akronym für die Zentren für (philosophische) Krankheitskontrolle) und viele andere verfolgen. Der Wissenschaftler wurde häufig entlarvt, beginnend mit W in der BBB in den 30er Jahren, als er bemerkte, dass – "Philosophen sehen ständig die Methode der Wissenschaft vor ihren Augen und sind unwiderstehlich versucht, Fragen zu stellen und zu beantworten, wie es die Wissenschaft tut. Diese Tendenz ist die eigentliche Quelle der Metaphysik und führt den Philosophen in völlige Dunkelheit "-und seitdem durch Searle, Read, Hutto, Hacker und unzählige andere. Der Versuch, S2 in kausalen Begriffen zu "erklären" (wirklich nur zu beschreiben) S2 in kausalen Begriffen, ist inkohärent und selbst für S1 äusserst komplex, und es ist nicht klar, dass die sehr unterschiedlichen Sprachspiele der "Kausalität" jemals zur Anwendung gebracht werden können (wie schon mehrfach festgestellt wurde). Auch ihre Anwendung 44 in Physik und Chemie ist variabel und oft undurchsichtig (war es Gravitation oder die Abszenissionsschicht oder Hormone oder der Wind oder alle von ihnen, die den Apfel fallen liessen, Und wann haben die Ursachen begonnen und beendet)? Aber wie W sagte - "Wenn es nun nicht die kausalen Zusammenhänge sind, um die es uns geht, dann liegen die Aktivitäten des Geistes vor uns offen". Jedoch, Ich schlage vor, dass es ein grosser Fehler ist, zu sehen W as Auf beiden Seiten, wie in der Regel stated, da seine Ansichten viel mehr sind Subtil Meistens Seine Triloge ungeklärt lassen. Man könnte es nützlich finden Mit meinen Bewertungen von W zu beginnen, S etc., und dann studieren so viel von Read, Hutto, Horwich, Coliva, Hacker, Glock, DMS, Stern, etc. wie möglich, bevor man sich in die Literatur der Kausalität und der Philosophie der Wissenschaft eingräbt, und wenn man es uninteressant findet, das zu tun, dann hat W das Ziel getroffen. Trotz der Bemühungen von W und anderen scheint es mir, dass die meisten Philosophen die Feinheit von Sprachspielen wenig verstehen (z.B. die drastisch unterschiedlichen Verwendungen von "Ich weiss, was ich meine" und "Ich weiss, was die Zeit ist") oder von der Natur der Dispositionen), oder von der Natur der Dispositionen. Und viele (z.B. CDC) stützen ihre Ideen immer noch auf Begriffe wie Privatsprache, Introspektion von ' innerer Sprache ' und Computeralismus, die W vor einem Jahrhundert 3/4 von einem Jahrhundert zur Ruhe legte. Bevor ich ein Buch lese, Ich gehe zum Index und zur Bibliographie, um zu sehen, wen sie zitieren. Oft ist die bemerkenswerteste Errungenschaft der Autoren die vollständige oder fast vollständige Unterlassung aller Autoren, die ich hier zitiere. W ist leicht der am häufigsten diskutierte moderne Philosoph mit etwa einem neuen Buch und Dutzenden von Artikeln weitgehend oder Ganz und ganz Ihm jeden Monat gewidmet. Er hat seine eigene Zeitschrift "Philosophical Investigations" und ich erwarte, dass seine Bibliographie die der nächsten Top 4 oder 5 Philosophen übertrifft. Kombiniert. Gesellen ist vielleicht der nächste unter den Modernen (und die einzige mit vielen Vorträgen auf YouTube, Vimeo, Universitäts-Websites etc. - über 100, die im Gegensatz zu fast allen anderen PhilosophieVorlesungen, sind eine Freude zu hören) und Hutto, Coliva, DMS, Hacker, Lesen, etc., sind sehr prominent mit Dutzenden von Büchern und Hunderten von Artikeln, Vorträgen und Rezensionen. Aber CDC und andere Metaphysiker ignorieren sie und die Tausenden, die ihre Arbeit für kritisch halten. Folglich ist der leistungsstarke W/S-Rahmen (wie auch im Grossen und Ganzen Als Die der modernen Forschung im Denken) ist völlig abwesend und alle Verwechslungen, die sie weggeräumt hat, sind reichlich vorhanden. Wenn Sie meine Rezensionen und die Werke selbst lesen, Hoffentlich Ihre Ansicht der meisten Schriften in dieser Arena kann ganz anders sein Von ihren. Aber wie W bestand, eine Er muss Arbeiten Sie die Beispiele durch sich selbst. Wie schon oft festgestellt, hatten seine super-Sokratien-Triloge eine therapeutische Absicht. 45 W es definitive Argumente gegen Introspektion und Privatsprache sind in meinen anderen Rezensionen vermerkt und sind sehr bekannt. Im grunde, Sie sind so einfach wie Kuchen - wir müssen einen Test haben, um zwischen A und B zu unterscheiden, und Tests können nur äusserlich und öffentlich sein. Er illustrierte dies mit dem "Käfer in der Kiste". Wenn wir alle eine Kiste haben, die nicht geöffnet oder geröntgt werden kann usw. und rufen, was in einem "Käfer" ist, Dann kann "Käfer" in der Sprache keine Rolle spielen, denn jede Box könnte eine andere Sache enthalten oder sogar leer sein. Es gibt also keine Privatsprache, die nur ich kennen kann, und keine Introspektion von ' innerer Sprache '. Wenn X nicht öffentlich nachweisbar ist, kann es kein Wort in unserer Sprache sein. Dieser schiesst ab Carruther es Die Theorie des Geistes ISA, wie auch all die anderen "inneren Sinne"Theorien, auf die er sich bezieht. Ich habe W es Demontage des Konzepts der Introspektion und des Funktionierens der Dispositionssprache (' propositionelle Einstellungen ') oben und in meinen Rezensionen von Budd, Johnston und einigen von Searle es Büchern erklärt. Siehe Stern es "Wittgenstein' S Philosophische Untersuchungen" (2004) für eine schöne Erklärung der Privatsprache anD alles von Read et al für Die Wurzeln dieser Themen zu finden, wie es nur wenige tun. CDC vermeidet die Verwendung von ' Ich ', da es die Existenz eines ' höheren Selbst ' annimmt. Aber gerade der Akt des Schreibens, des Lesens und aller Sprachen und Konzepte (Sprachspiele) setzt Selbstbewusstsein, Bewusstsein und Willen voraus, so dass solche Berichte selbstwidersprüchliche Karikaturen des Lebens ohne jeden Wert sind (und keinen Einfluss auf das tägliche Leben von irgendjemandem). W/S und andere haben seit langem festgestellt, dass die Erste Person Der Standpunkt ist einfach nicht verständlich zu beseitigen oder für eine dritte Person zu reduzieren, aber das Fehlen von Kohärenz ist kein Problem für die Karikaturenbilder des Lebens. Ebenso, Mit der Beschreibung der Gehirnfunktion oder des Verhaltens als "rechnerisch," "Informationsverarbeitung" etc., -unzählige Male von W/S, Hutto, Read, Hacker und vielen anderen gut entlarvt. Das Schreiben, das versucht, Wissenschaft mit Philosophie zu verbinden, mit der Bedeutung vieler Schlüsselbegriffe, die fast zufällig ohne Bewusstsein variieren, ist schizoid und hoffnungslos, aber es gibt Tausende von Wissenschafts-und Philosophiebüchern wie diesem. Es gibt die Beschreibung (nicht Erklärung, wie W deutlich gemacht hat) unseres Verhaltens und dann die Experimente der kognitiven Psychologie. Viele von ihnen, die sich mit menschlichem Verhalten beschäftigen, verbinden das bewusste Denken von S2 mit den unbewussten Automatismen von S1 (die Psychologie in die Physiologie absorbieren). Uns wird oft gesagt, dass Selbst-, Willenhaftigkeit und Bewusstsein Illusionen sind, da sie denken, dass sie uns die ' reale ' Bedeutung dieser Begriffe zeigen, und dass die Verwendung von Karikaturen die gültige ist. Das heisst, S2 ist "unwirklich" und muss durch die wissenschaftlichen kausalen Beschreibungen von S1 subsumiert werden. Daher a Grund für den Übergang von der Sprachphilosophie zur Philosophie des Geistes. Siehe z.B. meine Rezension von Carruther es Jüngstes "Die Deckkraft des Geistes". Auch Searle ist ein häufiger Täter hier, wie von Hacker, Bennet und Hacker, DMS, festgestellt Coliva Etc. 46 Wenn jemand sagt, dass ich nicht wählen kann, was ich zum Mittagessen haben soll, dann irrt er sich schlicht und einfach, oder wenn er nach Wahl etwas anderes meint, wie die "Wahl" als eine "Ursache"Oder dass es nicht klar ist, wie man die ' Wahl ' auf "Ursache"Also müssen wir es als illusorisch betrachten, dann ist das trivial wahr (oder inkohärent), aber unerheblich für die Art und Weise, wie wir Sprache benutzen und wie wir leben, was als der Punkt angesehen werden sollte, von dem aus wir solche Diskussionen beginnen und beenden sollten. Vielleicht könnte man es für relevant halten, dass es W war, zusammen mit Kant und Nietzsche (grosse Intellekte, aber keiner von ihnen, der viel tat, um die Probleme der Philosophie aufzulösen), die von Philosophen zum Besten aller Zeiten gewählt wurdennicht Quine, DummettPutnam Kripke Oder CDC. Man kann die Ähnlichkeit in allen philosophischen Fragen erkennen (im engeren Sinne, den ich hier betrachte, wenn man W ' Kommentar bedenkt, dass nicht alles mit dem Erscheinen einer Frage eins ist). Wir wollen verstehen, wie das Gehirn (oder das Universum) es tut, aber S2 ist ihm nicht gewachsen. Es ist alles (oder meistens) in den unbewussten Machenschaften von S1 via DNA. Wir ' wissen ' nicht, aber unsere DNA tut es, mit freundlicher Genehmigung des Todes von unzähligen Billionen von Organismen in etwa 3 Milliarden Jahren. Wir können die Welt leicht beschreiben, können uns aber oft nicht darauf einigen, wie eine "Erklärung" aussehen soll. Also, Wir kämpfen mit der Wissenschaft und beschreiben immer so langsam die Mechanismen des Geistes. Auch wenn wir uns ärrIve bei "vollständigem" Wissen Das Gehirn, wir hätten immer noch eine Beschreibung, was neuronale Musters Es entspricht dem Rot, aber es ist nicht klar, was es bedeuten würde (COS), eine "Erklärung" dafür zu haben, warum es rot ist (d.h., warum qualifiziert existiert). Wie W sagte, gehen die Erklärungen irgendwo zu Ende. Für diejenigen, die das obige erfassen, die philosophischen Teile der Carruther es "Undurchsichtigkeit des Geistes" (ein bedeutendes Werk der CDC-Schule) besteht grösstenteils aus den üblichen Verwechslungen, die daraus resultieren Aus dem Ignorieren der Arbeit von W, S Und Hunderte andere. Es kann als Wissenschaftler oder Reduktionismus bezeichnet werden und leugnet die "Realität" unseres höheren Ordnungsgedankens, Willens, Selbst und Bewusstseins, es sei denn, diese werden in der Wissenschaft ganz anders und völlig unvereinbar verwendet. Wir haben z.B. keine Handlungsgründe, nur ein Gehirn, das zu Handlungen führt usw. Sie schaffen imaginäre Probleme, indem sie versuchen, Fragen zu beantworten, die keinen klaren Sinn haben. Es sollte uns aufgefallen sein, dass diese Ansichten absolut keinen Einfluss auf das tägliche Leben derjenigen haben, die den grössten Teil ihres Erwachsenenlebens damit verbringen, sie zu fördern. Diese Situation wird von Rupert Read in seinem Artikel "Das harte Problem des Bewusstseins" gut zusammengefasst - "Das Hardcore-Problem wird immer weiter 47 entfernt, je mehr wir Aspekte des Geistes, wie Information und Wahrnehmung und Intentionalität, de-humanisieren. Das Problem wird nur dann wirklich bestehen, wenn wir es als ein "Problem" betrachten, das mit ganzen Menschen zu tun hat, die in einem Kontext (untrennbar natürlich und sozial) zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt verkörpert werden, Etc... Dann kann es einem, dass es kein Problem gibt, deutlich werden. Erst wenn man anfängt, Informationen über menschliche und nicht-menschliche Bereiche zu "theoretisieren" (angeblich mit dem Nicht-Mensch-Tier) oder der Maschine-als Paradigma gedacht, und damit die Dinge wieder nach vorne zu bringen), beginnt es, wie zu sehen, wie Wenn es ein Problem gibt ... Dass alle ' Ismen ' (Kognitivismus, Reduktionismus (zum Gehirn), Verhaltensweisen und so weiter) ... Weiter und weiter von unserer Reichweite ... Die Konzeptualisierung des Problems ist genau das, was dafür sorgt, dass das "harte Problem" unlösbar bleibt ... Es ist nie ein triftiger Grund dafür gegeben worden, dass wir glauben, dass es eine Wissenschaft von etwas geben muss, wenn es als real angesehen werden soll. Es gibt keinen triftigen Grund zu der Annahme, dass es eine Wissenschaft des Bewusstseins, des Geistes oder der Gesellschaft geben sollte, genauso wenig wie es eine Wissenschaft der Zahlen, der Universen oder der Hauptstädte oder der Spiele oder der Konstellationen oder der Objekte braucht, deren Namen mit dem Brief beginnen. ' B ' ... Wir müssen mit der Vorstellung von uns selbst als verkörperten Personen beginnen, die in einer Welt handeln, nicht mit der Vorstellung von uns selbst als Gehirn, in dem sich die Köpfe "in ihnen befinden" oder an ihnen "hängen" ... Es gibt keine Möglichkeit, dass die Wissenschaft uns helfen kann, in eine ' externe '/' objektive ' Darstellung dessen zu gelangen, was das Bewusstsein wirklich ist und wann es ist Wirklich präsent. Denn es kann uns nicht helfen, wenn es einen Kriterienkonflikt gibt, wenn unsere Maschinen mit uns selbst in Konflikt geraten, mit uns in Konflikt. Denn unsere Maschinen werden erst durch unsere Berichte kalibriert. Es kann keine äussere Perspektive geben ... Das liegt nicht daran ... Das schwierige Problem ist unlösbar, ... Vielmehr müssen wir nicht zugeben, dass ein Problem sogar Definiert ... ' transzendentaler Naturalismus ' ... Garantiert... Das Problem wird auf unbestimmte Zeit am Leben gehalten. Es bietet die ausserordentliche psychologische Befriedigung sowohl einer demütigen (noch privilegierten) "wissenschaftlichen" Erklärung der Grenzen des Verständnisses und, das Wissen um bTeil einer privilegierten Elite zu sehen, dass bei der Festlegung dieser Grenzen, kann über sie hinaus zu sehen. Es ist nicht zu sehen, was Wittgenstein im Vorwort zum Tractatus. Das Limit kann ... Nur in Sprache gezeichnet werden und was auf der anderen Seite der Grenze liegt, ist einfach Unsinn. " Viele Kommentare von W kommen mir in den Sinn. Er notierte 88 Vor Jahren, dass ' Mysterien ' die Sehnsucht nach dem Transzendenten befriedigen, und weil wir denken, dass wir die "Grenzen des menschlichen Verständnisses" sehen können, denken wir, dass wir auch über sie hinaus sehen können, und dass wir uns mit der Tatsache befassen sollten, dass wir die Grenzen der Sprache (des Geistes) in der Tatsache sehen, dass wir ca Nicht beschreiben Sie die Tatsachen, die einem Satz entsprechen, ausser durch Wiederholung des Satzes (siehe p10 etc. in seiner Kultur und Wert, geschrieben 1931). Ich finde es auch nützlich, seine Bemerkung, dass "Aberglaube nichts anderes ist als der Glaube an den kausalen Nexus", häufig zu wiederholen. -geschrieben vor einem Jahrhundert in TLP 48 5.1361. Auch, Apropos ist sein berühmter Kommentar (PI p308) über den Ursprung der philosophischen Probleme über mentale Prozesse (und alle philosophischen Probleme). "Wie entsteht das philosophische Problem der mentalen Prozesse und Zustände und des Verhaltens? Der erste Schritt ist der, der ganz und gar der Aufmerksamkeit entgeht. Wir sprechen von Prozessen und Zuständen und lassen ihre Natur unentschieden. Vielleicht wissen wir irgendwann mehr über sie-denken wir. Aber genau das verpflichtet uns zu einem Besondere Art und Weise Die Sache prüfen. Denn wir haben ein klares Konzept dafür, was es bedeutet, einen Prozess besser kennen zu lernen. (Die entscheidende Bewegung im Zaubertrick ist gemacht worden, und sie war genau die, die wir für ganz unschuldig hielten.) Und nun zerfällt die Analogie, die uns unsere Gedanken verständlich machen sollte. Also Wir müssen die noch Unverstanden Prozess im noch unerforschten Medium. Und jetzt sieht es so aus, als hätten wir mentale Prozesse bestritten. Und natürlich wollen wir sie nicht verleugnen. " Ein anderer scheinbar trivialer Kommentar von W (PI p271) bat uns, uns eine Person vorzustellen, die vergessen hat, was das Wort "Schmerz" bedeutet, aber es richtig benutzt hat – d.h. er hat es so benutzt, wie wir es tun! Relevant ist auch W ' Kommentar (TLP 6.52), dass, wenn alle wissenschaftlichen Fragen beantwortet sind, nichts mehr zu hinterfragen ist, und das ist selbst die Antwort. Und zentral Das Verständnis der Wissenschaftliche (d.h., aufgrund von Wissenschaftlertum, nicht Wissenschaft) Misserfolge von CDC et al ist seine Beobachtung, dass es sich um eine Sehr verbreiteter Fehler zu glauben, dass etwas uns dazu bringen muss, das zu tun, was wir tun, was zu einer Verwechslung zwischen Ursache und Vernunft führt. "Und der Fehler, den wir hier und in tausend ähnlichen Fällen sind Neigen zu machen ist mit dem Wort "machen", wie wir es in dem Satz "Es ist kein Akt der Einsicht, der uns dazu bringt, die Regel so zu verwenden, wie wir es tun", gekennzeichnet, weil es die Idee gibt, dass "etwas müssen uns machen" tun, was wir tun. Und das schliesst sich wieder der Verwechslung zwischen Ursache und Vernunft an. Wir brauchen keinen Grund, der Regel zu folgen, wie wir es tun. Die Kette der Gründe hat ein Ende. " BBB p143 Er hat auch kommentiert, dass die Kette der Ursachen ein Ende hat und dass es im allgemeinen Fall keinen Grund gibt, dass es sinnvoll ist, eine Ursache anzugeben. W In seinem eigenen jahrzehntelangen Kampf sah man die Notwendigkeit, die "Grammatik" selbst zu klären, indem man "scharfsinnige Beispiele" ausarbeitet, und die Sinnlosigkeit für viele, die die Antworten gesagt haben. Daher seine berühmten Kommentare über Philosophie als Therapie und "Arbeit an sich selbst". Auffallend an so vielen Philosophiebüchern (und der verdeckten Philosophie in den Verhaltenswissenschaften, Physik und Mathematik) ist, dass es oft keinen Hinweis darauf gibt, dass es andere Sichtweisen gibt - dass viele der prominentesten Philosophen die Wissenschaftliche Als inkohärent. Es gibt auch tEr Tatsache (selten erwähnt), dass, vorausgesetzt natürlich, dass wir ihre Inkohärenz ignorieren, die Reduktion hört nicht auf 49 der Ebene der Neurophysiologie auf, sondern kann leicht auf das Niveau der Chemie, Physik, Quantenmechanik, "Mathematik" oder einfach nur "Ideen" ausgedehnt werden (und war es oft auch gewesen). Was genau sollte die Neurophysiologie privilegieren? Die alten Griechen erzeugten die Idee, dass nichts Existiert Aber Ideen und Leibniz beschrieben das Universum bekanntermassen als eine Riesenmaschine. Zuletzt wurde Stephan Wolfram für seine Beschreibung des Universums als Computerautomat in "Eine neue Art der Wissenschaft" zu einer Legende in der Geschichte der Pseudowissenschaft. Materialismus, Mechanik, Idealismus, Reduktionismus, Verhaltensmuster und Dualismus in ihren vielen Formen sind kaum neu und zu einem Wittgensteinian, ziemlich tote Pferde, seit W in den 30er Jahren die Bücher Blau und Braun diktierte, oder zumindest seit der anschliessenden Veröffentlichung und ausführlichen Kommentaren zu seinen Nachlass. Aber jemanden zu überzeugen, ist eine aussichtslose Aufgabe. W Man erkennt, dass man an sich selbst arbeiten muss - Selbsttherapie durch langes hartes Durcharbeiten von "auffällige Beispiele" von Sprache (Geist) in Aktion. Ein (unbekannter) Ausdruck davon, wie axiomatische Psychologie regiert und wie einfach es ist, den Gebrauch eines Wortes zu ändern, ohne es zu wissen, hat der Physiker Sir James Jeans schon vor langer Zeit gegeben: "Das Universum beginnt eher wie ein grosser Gedanke zu aussehen als wie eine grosse Maschine". Aber "gedacht," "Maschine," "Zeit," "Raum," "Ursache"," Event ", ' Geschehen "," auftreten "," weitermachen ", etc. haben in der Wissenschaft oder Philosophie nicht die gleichen Bedeutungen (Verwendungen) wie im täglichen Leben, oder besser gesagt, sie haben die alten Verwendungen zufällig mit vielen neuen gemischt, so dass es das Aussehen von Sinn ohne Sinn gibt. Viel akademische Diskussion über Verhalten, Leben und das Universum Ist Hohe Komödie (im Gegensatz zu den niedrigen Komödie der meisten Politik, Religion und Massenmedien): "Komödie, die sich mit der höflichen Gesellschaft auseinandersetzt, die sich durch ausgeklügelte, witzige Dialoge und eine komplizierte Handlung auszeichnet"-(Dictionary.com). Aber Philosophie ist keine Zeitverschwendung-richtig gemacht, sie ist der beste Weg, Zeit zu verbringen. Wie sonst können wir das Chaos in den Verhaltenswissenschaften ausräumen oder unser mentales Leben und die höhere Ordnung an System 2 beschreiben-das komplizierteste, wunderbarste und geheimnisvollste, was es gibt? Angesichts dieses Rahmens sollte es leicht sein, OC zu verstehen, um Ws Beispielen zu folgen, die beschreiben, wie unsere angeborene Psychologie die Realitätstests von System 2 nutzt, um auf den Gewissheiten von System 1 aufzubauen, so dass wir als Individuen und als Gesellschaften eine Weltsicht erlangen. Unwiderlegbare ineinandergreifende Erfahrungen, die auf dem Fundament unserer axiomatischen genetisch programmierten reflexiven Wahrnehmung und Handlung zum erstaunlichen Gebäude der Wissenschaft und Kultur aufbauend sind. Die Evolutionstheorie und die Relativitätstheorie sind längst von etwas übergegangen, das man herausfordern könnte, zu Gewissheiten, die nur verändert werden können, und am anderen Ende des Spektrums gibt es keine Möglichkeit, herauszufinden, dass es so etwas wie Paris oder Bron nicht gibt. Tosaurier. Die skeptische Sicht ist inkohärent. Wir können sagen Etwas Aber wir können nichts bedeuten. 50 So betrachte ich OC mit DMS als Beschreibung des Grundsteins des menschlichen Verständnisses und als das grundlegendste Dokument unserer Psychologie. Obwohl in den 60er Jahren geschrieben, geistig und physisch von Krebs verwüstet, ist es so brillant wie sein anderes Werk und verändert unser Verständnis von Philosophie (die beschreibende Psychologie des höheren Ordnungsgedankens) und bringt sie nach drei Jahren endlich ins Licht. Tausend Jahre in der Höhle. Die Metaphysik ist von der Philosophie und der Physik weggefegt. "Was für ein Fortschritt ist das - das faszinierende Mysterium wurde entfernt-aber es sind keine Tiefen in Trost gestürzt worden; Nichts wurde erklärt, entdeckt oder neu konzipiert. Wie zahm und uninspirierend man denken könnte. Aber vielleicht, wie Wittgenstein nahelegt, sollten die Tugenden der Klarheit, Entmystifizierung und Wahrheit befriedigend genug gefunden werden "--Horwich ' Wittgenstein Metaphilosophie'. Lassen Sie mich vorschlagen, dass mit der Perspektive, die ich hier gefördert habe, W im Zentrum der zeitgenössischen Philosophie und Psychologie steht und nicht undurchsichtig, schwierig oder irrelevant ist, sondern funkelnde, tiefgründige und kristallklare und dass ihn zu verpassen ist, einer der grössten zu verpassen Intellektuelle Abenteuer möglich. Ein ausgezeichnetes aktuelles Werk, das viele der philosophischen Verwechslungen in einem Buch vermeintlich über Wissenschaft und Mathematik zeigt, ist Yanofsky es ' Die äusseren Grenzen von Grund: Was Wissenschaft, Mathematik und Logik uns nicht sagen können " (2013) (Siehe meine Rezension). W bemerkte, dass, wenn wir das Ende der wissenschaftlichen Kommentare erreichen, wird das Problem ein philosophisches Das heisst, eine davon, wie Sprache verständlich verwendet werden kann. YanofskyWie praktisch alle Wissenschaftler und die meisten Philosophen, nicht bekommen, dass es zwei verschiedene Arten von "Fragen" oder "Behauptungen" (z.B. Sprachspiele oder LG ' s) hier. Es gibt solche, die über die Art und Weise, wie die Welt ist, in der - sind, dass es sich um öffentlich beobachtbare, propositionelle (Wahre oder falsche) Zustände handelt, die klare Bedeutungen haben (Bedingungen der Satisfaction--COS in der Terminologie von Searle)- das heisst, wissenschaftliche Aussagen, und dann gibt es solche, die Fragen darüber sind, wie Sprache kohärent verwendet werden kann, um diese Zustände zu beschreiben, und diese können von jeder gesunden, intelligenten, gebildeten Person beantwortet werden, die wenig oder gar nicht auf die Fakten der Wissenschaft zurückgreift. Eine andere schlecht verstandene, aber kritische Tatsache ist, dass, obwohl das Denken, das Darstellen, das Einschleben, das Verständnis, die Intuition usw. (d.h. die dispositionelle Psychologie) einer wahren oder falschen Aussage eine Funktion der höheren Ordnung ist, die wir als "gewöhnlich" betrachten, Bewusstes System 2 (S2), die Entscheidung, ob "Teilchen" verstrickt sind, der Stern zeigt eine rote Verschiebung, ein Theorem ist bewiesen worden (d.h. der Teil, der darin besteht, zu sehen, dass die Symbole in jeder Zeile des Beweises korrekt verwendet 51 werden), wird immer durch das schnelle , automatisches, unbewusstes System 1 (S1) durch Sehen, Hören, Berühren etc., in dem es keine Informationsverarbeitung, keine Repräsentation (d.h. kein COS) und keine Entscheidungen in dem Sinne gibt, in dem diese in S2 geschehen (das seine Eingaben von S1 erhält). Diese beiden Systeme sind Es ist jetzt der Standardweg, um Argumentation oder Rationalität zu betrachten und ist ein entscheidender heuristischer in der Beschreibung des Verhaltens, von denen Wissenschaft, Mathematik und Philosophie sind besondere Fälle. Es gibt eine riesige und schnell wachsende Literatur über Argumentation, die für das Studium von Verhalten oder Wissenschaft unverzichtbar ist. Ein aktuelles Buch, das sich mit den Details der Argumentation beschäftigt (d.h. Sprache verwenden, um Aktionen durchzuführen - siehe W, DMS, Hacker, S etc.), ist "Human Reasoning and Cognitive Science" von Stenning Und Van Lambalgen (2008), die trotz ihrer Einschränkungen (z. B. eingeschränktes Verständnis von W/S und der breiten Struktur der intentionalen Psychologie) (ab 201) (ab 201)9) die beste Einzelquelle, die ich kenne. W schrieb viel über die Philosophie der Mathematik, da es deutlich illustrierte viele der Arten von Verwechslungen durch "wissenschaftliche" Sprachspiele erzeugt, und es gab unzählige Kommentare, viele ziemlich arm. Ich werde einige der besten Arbeiten der letzten Zeit kommentieren, da sie von der Yanofsky. Francisco Berto Hat in letzter Zeit einige eindringliche Bemerkungen gemacht. Er stellt fest, dass W die Kohärenz der Metamathematik leugnet Die Nutzung durch Godel Ein Metatheorem Sein Theorem zu beweisen, wahrscheinlich für seine "berüchtigte" Interpretation von Godel es Das Theorem als Paradoxon, und wenn wir seine Argumentation akzeptieren, denke ich, dass wir gezwungen sind, die Verständlichkeit von Metalanguages, Metatheorien und Meta alles andere zu leugnen. Wie kann es sein, dass solche Begriffe (Wörter, Sprachspiele) als Metamathematik und IncomplDie von Millionen akzeptiert (Und sogar von keinem Geringeren als Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al behauptet, grundlegende Wahrheiten über unseren Verstand oder das Universum zu enthüllen) sind einfach Missverständnisse darüber, wie Sprache funktioniert? Ist nicht der Beweis in diesem Pudding, dass, wie so viele "offenbarende" philosophische Begriffe (z.B., Geist und Wille als Illusionen – Dennett, Carruthers, der Kirchenland Sie haben keinerlei praktische Auswirkungen? Berto Summendes schön: "In diesem Rahmen kann es nicht sein, dass der gleiche Satz ... Das entpuppt sich als aussprechlich, aber nicht entzibehrlich, in einem formalen System ... Und nachweislich in einem anderen System (dem Meta-System). Wenn der Beweis, wie Wittgenstein behauptete, die eigentliche Bedeutung des erwiesenen Satzes festlegt, dann ist es nicht möglich, dass der gleiche Satz (also für einen Satz mit der gleichen Bedeutung) in einem formalen System nicht dezimierbar ist, sondern in einem anderen System entschieden wird (die Meta-System) ... Wittgenstein musste sowohl die Vorstellung, dass ein formales System syntaktisch unvollständig sein kann, als auch die platonische Konsequenz zurückweisen, dass kein formales System, das nur arithmetische Wahrheiten 52 beweisen kann, alle arithmetischen Wahrheiten beweisen kann. Wenn Beweise die Bedeutung von arithmetischen Sätzen feststellen, dann kann es keine unvollständigen Systeme geben, so wie es keine unvollständigen Bedeutungen geben kann. " Und weiter "inkonsistent Arithmetik, d.h. nicht klassisch Arithmetik Auf der Grundlage einer paraconsistenten Logik, sind heutzutage eine Realität. Wichtiger ist Die theoretischen Merkmale solcher Theorien stimmen genau überein Mit einigen der Oben genannten Wittgensteinian Intuitionen... Ihre Widersprüchlichkeit erlaubt es ihnen auch, aus Godel es Erste Theorie und aus der Unentschlossenheit der Kirche resultieren: Sie sind, das heisst, nachweislich vollständig und dezimierbar. Sie erfüllen daher genau Wittgensteins Forderung, wonach es keine mathematischen Probleme geben kann, die innerhalb des Systems sinnvoll formuliert werden können, die aber von den Regeln des Systems nicht entschieden werden können. Daher die Dekodierbarkeit von paraconsistent RechenschafeneTics Harmoniert mit einer Meinung, die Wittgenstein beibehalten hat Thoughout Seine philosophische Karriere. " W Er zeigte auch den fatalen Fehler in Bezug auf Mathematik oder Sprache oder unser Verhalten im Allgemeinen als ein einheitliches kohärentes logisches "System", anstatt als eine bunte Stücke, die durch die zufälligen Prozesse der natürlichen Selektion zusammengesetzt sind. "Godel Zeigt uns eine Unklarheit in der Begriff der "Mathematik," die durch die Tatsache, dass Mathematik wird als ein System "und wir können sagen (contra fast jeder), dass Alles was Godel Und Gregory Chaitin Zeigen. W kommentierte viele Male, dass "Wahrheit" in der Mathematik bedeutet Axiome oder die Theoreme, die von Axiomen abgeleitet werden, und "falsche" bedeutet, dass man einen Fehler bei der Verwendung der Definitionen gemacht hat, und das ist völlig anders From-empirische Angelegenheiten, bei denen man Eine Prüfung. W merkte oft an, dass, um als Mathematik im üblichen Sinne akzeptabel zu sein, muss es in anderen Nachweisen verwendbar sein und es muss reale Anwendungen haben, aber auch nicht der Fall mit Godel es Unvollständigkeit. Da es in einem konsistenten System nicht nachgewiesen werden kann (hier Peano Arithmetisch, aber eine viel breitere Arena für Chaitin), kann es nicht in Nachweisen verwendet werden und im Gegensatz zu all dem "Rest" der PA kann es nicht in der realen Welt verwendet werden Entweder. Als Sieger Rodych Notizen "... Wittgenstein vertritt die Auffassung, dass ein formales Kalkül nur dann ein mathematisches Kalkül (d.h. ein mathematisches Sprachspiel) ist, wenn es eine aussersystemische Anwendung in einem System von kontingenten Sätzen (z.B. in gewöhnlicher Zählung und Messung oder in der Physik) hat. ..." Eine andere Möglichkeit, dies zu sagen, ist, dass man einen Haftbefehl braucht, um unsere normale Verwendung von Wörtern wie "Beweis", "Satz", "wahr", "unvollständig", "Zahl" und "Mathematik" auf ein Ergebnis im Gewirr von Spielen anzuwenden, die mit "Zahlen" und "Plus" und "Minus"-Zeichen usw. erstellt wurden, und mit " Unvollständigbarkeit "dieser Haftbefehl fehlt. Rodych Aufgreift es wunderbar zusammen. "Nach Wittgensteins Darstellung gibt es so etwas wie ein unvollständiges mathematisches Kalkül nicht, weil" in der Mathematik alles Algorithmus [und Syntax] ist und nichts bedeutet [Semantik] ... " 53 W hat von der Diagonalisierung und der Satztheorie des Kantors so ziemlich dasselbe zu sagen. "Die Betrachtung des diagonalen Verfahrens zeigt Sie, dass der Begriff der" realen Zahl "viel weniger Analogie zum Begriff" Kardinalzahl "hat, als wir, die wir durch bestimmte Analogien in die Irre geführt haben, geneigt sind zu glauben" und viele andere Kommentare (siehe Rodych Und Floyd). Eine der grössten Versäumnisse aus all diesen Büchern ist die erstaunliche Arbeit des polymatischen Physikers und Entscheidungstheoretiker David Wolpert, der eine erstaunliche Unmöglichkeit oder Unvollständigkeit der Theoreme bewiesen hat (1992 bis 2008). Siehe arxiv.org) über die Grenzen der Folgerung (Berechnung), die so allgemein sind, dass sie unabhängig von dem Gerät, das die Berechnung, und sogar unabhängig von den Gesetzen der Physik, so dass sie über Computer, Physik und menschliches Verhalten, die er zusammenfasste : "Man kann keinen physischen Computer bauen, der sicher sein kann, dass Informationen schneller korrekt verarbeitet werden, als das Universum. Die Ergebnisse bedeuten auch, dass es keinen unfehlbaren, universellen Beobachtungsapparat geben kann und dass es keinen unfehlbaren, universellen Kontrollapparat geben kann. Diese Ergebnisse verlassen sich nicht auf Systeme, die unendlich, and/oder nicht-klassisch sind, and/oder gehorsam chaotischer Dynamik. Sie halten auch, wenn man einen unendlich schnellen, unendlich dichten Computer benutzt, mit Rechenfähigsten, die grösser sind als die einer Turing-Maschine. " Er veröffentlichte auch Was die erste ernsthafte Arbeit im Team oder in der kollektiven Intelligenz (COIN) zu sein scheint, die er sagt, stellt dieses Thema auf eine solide wissenschaftliche Grundlage. Obwohl er verschiedene Versionen von Diese über zwei Jahrzehnte in einigen Der renommiertesten Fachzeitschriften für Physik (z. B. Physica D 237:257-81 (2008)) sowie in NASA-Fachzeitschriften, Und hat Nachrichten in den wichtigsten Wissenschaftszeitschriften bekommen, nur wenige scheinen es bemerkt zu haben, und ich habe in Dutzenden von aktuellen Büchern über Physik, Mathematik, Entscheidungstheorie und Berechnung, ohne einen Hinweis zu finden, gesehen. Sehr unglücklich Yanofsky Und andere haben kein Bewusstsein für Wolpert, da seine Arbeit die ultimative Erweiterung von Computing, Denken, Folgerung, Unvollständigkeit und Undezibierbarkeit ist, die er erreicht (wie viele Beweise in der Turing-Maschinentheorie), indem er das Lügenparadox und die Kantoren erweitert. Diagonalisierung, um alle möglichen Universen und alle Wesen oder Mechanismen einzuschliessen und kann daher als das letzte Wort nicht nur über die Berechnung, sondern auch über die Kosmologie oder sogar die Gottheiten angesehen werden. Er erreicht diese extreme Allgemeinheit, indem er das einhängende Universum mit Weltlinien (d.h. in Bezug auf das, was es tut und nicht wie es tut), so dass seine mathematischen Beweise unabhängig von jedem Besondere körperliche Gesetze oder Rechenstrukturen bei der Festlegung der physikalischen Grenzen der Folgerung für Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft und aller möglichen Berechnungen, Beobachtung und Kontrolle. Er stellt fest, dass Laplace selbst in einem klassischen Universum falsch lag, wenn es darum ging, die Zukunft perfekt vorhersagen zu können (oder sogar die Vergangenheit oder Gegenwart perfekt darzustellen) und dass 54 seine Unmöglichkeit als "nicht-quantenmechanisches Unsicherheitsprinzip" angesehen werden kann (sprich: Es kann kein unfehlbares Beobachtungs-oder Steuergerät geben). Jede universelle physische Vorrichtung muss unendlich sein, sie kann nur in einem Moment in der Zeit sein, und keine Realität kann mehr als eine sein (das "Monotheismus-Theorem"). Da Raum und Zeit in der Definition nicht erscheinen, kann das Gerät sogar das gesamte Universum über alle Zeiten hinweg sein. Es kann als ein physischer Analog der Unvollständigkeit mit zwei Inferenzgeräten und nicht mit einem selbstreferentiellen Gerät angesehen werden. Wie er sagt, "entweder das Hamilton-It-It-Verbot unserer Konstitution eine bestimmte Art von Berechnung, oder Vorhersage Komplexität ist einzigartig (im Gegensatz zu algorithmischen Informationskomplexität), dass es eine und nur eine Version davon, die in unserem gesamten unserer Das Universum. " Eine andere Möglichkeit, dies zu sagen, ist, dass man nicht zwei physikalische Folgeregelungen (Computer) haben kann, die beide willkürliche Fragen über die Ausgabe des anderen stellen können, oder dass das Universum keinen Computer enthalten kann, auf den man beliebige Berechnungen stellen kann. Aufgabe, oder dass für jedes Paar von physischen Inferenzmotoren, gibt es immer binär geschätzte Fragen über den Zustand des Universums, die nicht einmal auf mindestens eine von ihnen gestellt werden können. Man kann keinen Computer bauen, der einen willkürlichen zukünftigen Zustand eines physischen Systems vorhersagen kann, bevor es auftritt, auch wenn die Die Bedingung ist von einer begrenzten Reihe von Aufgaben, die ihm gestellt werden können - das heisst, es kann keine Informationen verarbeiten (obwohl dies eine verärgerte Phrase ist, wie S und Lesen und andere beachten) schneller als das Universum. Der Computer und das willkürliche physikalische System es Ist Die Informatik muss nicht physisch gekoppelt werden und hält unabhängig von den Gesetzen der Physik, des Chaos, der Quantenmechanik, der Kausalität oder der Lichtkegel und sogar für eine unendliche Lichtgeschwindigkeit. Das Folgereitgerät muss nicht räumlich lokalisiert werden, sondern kann nicht-lokale dynamische Prozesse sein, die im gesamten Universum stattfinden. Er ist sich sehr wohl bewusst, dass dies die Spekulationen von Wolfram, Landauer, Fredkin, Lloyd etc., was tDas Universum als Computer oder die Grenzen der "Informationsverarbeitung", in einem neuen Licht (obwohl die Indizes ihrer Schriften keinen Hinweis auf ihn und eine andere bemerkenswerte Unterlassung ist, dass keines der oben genannten von Yanofsky Entweder). Wolpert sagt, es zeige, dass das Universum kein Foltergerät enthalten könne, das Informationen so schnell verarbeiten könne, wie es könne, und da er zeige, dass man weder ein perfektes Gedächtnis noch eine perfekte Kontrolle habe, kann sein vergangener, gegenwärtiger oder zukünftiger Zustand niemals perfekt oder vollständig sein. Abgebildet, charakterisiert, bekannt oder kopiert. Er bewies auch, dass keine Kombination von Computern mit Fehlerkorrektur-Codes diese Einschränkungen überwinden kann. Wolpert stellt auch die kritische Bedeutung des Beobachters ("der Lügner") fest, und dies verbindet uns mit den vertrauten Konundraten von Physik, Mathematik und Sprache, die betreffen Yanofsky. Wieder vgl. Floyd on W: "Er Mit anderen Worten artikuliert sich eine 55 verallgemeinerte Form der Diagonalisierung. Das Argument ist daher allgemein nicht nur auf dezimale Erweiterungen anwendbar, sondern auch auf jede angebliche Auflistung oder regelrechtlich geregelte Äusserung; Sie setzt nicht auf Besondere Notation Gerät oder bevorzugte räumliche Anordnungen von Zeichen. In diesem Sinne spricht Wittgensteins Argumentation an kein Bild, und sie ist nicht im Wesentlichen schematisch oder repräsentativ, obwohl sie schematisch und insofern dargestellt werden mag, als es ein logisches Argument ist, kann seine Logik formal dargestellt werden). Wie Turings Argumente ist es frei von einer direkten Bindung an jede Besondere Formalität. [Die Parallelen zu Wolpert liegen auf der Hand.] Im Gegensatz zu Turings Argumenten beruft sie sich explizit auf die Vorstellung eines Sprachspiels und wendet sich auf eine alltägliche Vorstellung von den Vorstellungen von Regeln und von den Menschen, die ihnen folgen. Jede Zeile in der obigen diagonalen Darstellung ist als eine Anweisung oder ein Befehl gedacht, analog zu einer Ordnung, die einem Menschen gegeben wird ... " Es sollte klar sein, wie Wolperts Arbeit eine perfekte Illustration von W ' schen Vorstellungen von den einzelnen Fragen der Wissenschaft oder Mathematik und der Philosophie (Sprachspiele) ist. Yanofsky Auch nicht deutlich machen die grossen Überschneidungen, die jetzt existiert (und sich schnell ausdehnt) zwischen Spieltheoretikern, Physikern, Ökonomen, Mathematikern, Philosophen, Entscheidungstheoretikern und anderen, die alle Seit Jahrzehnten eng verwandte Beweise für Undezibierbarkeit, Unmöglichkeit, Unrechnbarkeit, und Unvollständigkeit. Einer der skurrileren ist der jüngste Beweis von Armando Assis, dass in der relativen staatlichen Formulierung von Quantum Mechaniker kann man eineSummen Sie das Spiel zwischen dem Universum und einem Beobachter, der das Nash Equilibrium verwendet, von dem aus die Bor-Regel und der Zusammenbruch der Wellenfunktion folgen. Godel Er war der erste, der ein unübersehbares Ergebnis zu demonstrieren, und (bis die bemerkenswerten Papiere von David Wolpert - sehen Hier Und mein Rezensionsartikel) es ist die weitreichendste (oder nur trivIal/inkohärent), aber es Haben Es war eine Lawine von anderen. Einer der frühesten in der Entscheidungstheorie war der berühmte General Impossibility Theorem (GIT), der 1951 von Kenneth Arrow entdeckt wurde (für den er den Nobelpreis für Wirtschaftswissenschaften erhielt, in 1972-and fünf seiner Studenten sind heute Nobelpreisträger, also ist dies keine Randwissenschaft). Darin heisst es grob, dass kein einigermassen konsistentes und faires Abstimmungssystem (d.h. keine Methode, die Präferenzen von Individuen in Gruppenpräferenzen zusammenzufassen) zu vernünftigen Ergebnissen führen kann. Die Gruppe wird entweder von einer Person dominiert, und so wird GIT oft als "Diktator-Theorem" bezeichnet, oder es gibt unnachgiebig Vorlieben. Pfeilpapier trug den Titel "Eine Schwierigkeit im Konzept der Sozialleistungen" und lässt sich so sagen: "Icht ist unmöglich, eine Soziale VorarbeitEine Befriedigung der Vorzugsordnung, die erfüllt Alle folgenden Bedingungen: Nichtdiktatur; Individuelle Souveränität; Einstimmigkeit; Freiheit Von Irrelevante Alternativen; Einzigartigkeit des Gruppenranges. " Diejenigen, die mit der modernen Entscheidungstheorie vertraut sind, akzeptieren dies und die vielen damit verbundenen einschränkenden Theoreme als Ausgangspunkt. Diejenigen, die es nicht sind, können es finden (und all diese Theorems) unglaublich und in diesem Fall Sie müssen einen 56 Karriereweg finden, der nichts mit einemIn den oben genannten Disziplinen. Siehe "Die Pfeil Immöglichkeit Theorem"(2014) oder" Decision Making and Imperfection"(2013) unter den Legionen von Publikationen. Yanofsky Nennt die berühmte Unmöglichkeit Ergebnis von Brandenburger Und Keisler (2006) für Zwei-Personen-Spiele (aber natürlich nicht auf "Spiele" beschränkt und wie all diese Unmöglichkeit Ergebnisse gilt es im Grossen und Ganzen für Entscheidungen jeglicher Art), was zeigt, dass jedes Glaubensmodell einer bestimmten Art zu Widersprüchen führt. Eine Interpretation des Ergebnisses ist, dass, wenn die Werkzeuge des Entscheidungsanalytikers (im Grunde nur Logik) zur Verfügung stehen, um die players in einem Spiel, dann gibt es Aussagen oder Überzeugungen, die die Spieler aufschreiben oder "darüber nachdenken" können, aber nicht können Tatsächlich halten (i.e. "Ann glaubt, dass Bob davon ausgeht, dass Bob es Annahme für falsch hält" scheint ungewöhnlich und "Rekursion" (ein anderes LG) wurde in Argumentation, Linguistik, Philosophie etc. zumindest für ein Jahrhundert angenommen, aber sie zeigten, dass es unmöglich ist, für Ann und Bob, diese Überzeugungen anzunehmen. Und es gibt eine rasant wachsende Stelle solcher Unmöglichkeit Ergebnisse für 1 oder Multiplayer-Entscheidungssituationen (z.B. in Pfeil, Wolpert, Koppel und Rosser) eingravieren Etc). Für ein gutes technisches Papier Aus der Lawine auf das B & K-Paradoxon, erhalten Abramsky und Zvesper es Papier von arXiv.org, das uns zurück zum Lüsenparadox und zur Unendlichkeit des Kantors führt (wie der Titel anmerkt, handelt es sich um "interaktive Formen der Diagonalisierung und Selbstbezogenheit") und damit zu Floyd, Rodych, Berto, W und Godel. Viele dieser Papiere zitieren Yanofksy es Papier "Ein universeller Ansatz für Selbst-Referenziumsagen und Fixpunkte. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 9 (3): 362 – 386, 2003. Abramsky (ein Polymathematiker, der unter anderem ein Pionier im Quantenrechner ist) ist ein Freund, und so Yanofsky Er trägt ein Papier zur jüngsten Festschrift zu ihm "Computation, Logic, Games and Quantum Foundations" (2013) bei. Für vielleicht die beste aktuelle (2013) Kommentar zur BK und verwandten Paradoxien siehe die 165p Powerpoint Vortrag frei im Netz von Wes Holliday und Eric Pacuit "Zehn Rätsel und Paradoxien über Wissen und Glauben". Für eine gute Multi-Autorenbefragung siehe "Kollektive Entscheidungsfindung (2010). Seit Godel es Berühmte Theoreme sind Begleiterscheinungen von Chaitin es Theorem, das algorithmische "Zufälligkeit" ("Unvollständigkeit") in der gesamten Mathematik zeigt (was nur ein weiteres symbolisches System ist), scheint unausweichlich, dass Denken (Verhalten, Sprache, Verstand) voller unmöglicher, zufälliger oder unvollständiger Aussagen und Situationen ist. Da wir jede dieser Bereiche als symbolische Systeme betrachten können, die durch Zufall entwickelt wurden, um unsere Psychologie zum Funktionieren zu bringen, sollte es vielleicht als nicht überraschend angesehen werden, dass sie nicht "vollständig" sind. Für Mathematik, Chaitin sagt tSeine "Zufälligkeit" (wieder eine Gruppe von LG es) zeigt, dass es grenzenlose Theoreme gibt, die wahr, aber nicht nachweisbar sind - d.h. ohne Grund wahr. Man sollte dann in der Lage sein zu sagen, dass es grenzenlose Aussagen gibt, die einen perfekten "grammatikalischen" Sinn machen, die 57 nicht die tatsächlichen Situationen beschreiben, die in diesem Bereich erreichbar sind. Ich schlage vor, dass diese Rätsel verschwinden, wenn man W es Ansichten betrachtet. Er schrieb viele Notizen zum Thema Godel es Theorems und seine gesamte Arbeit betreffen die Plastizität, "Unvollständigkeit" und extreme Kontextempfindlichkeit von Sprache, Mathematik und Logik. Die jüngsten Papiere von Rodych, Floyd und Berto Sie sind die beste Einführung, die ich kenne An W es Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik und so auf die Philosophie. Wie bereits erwähnt, hat David Wolpert einige erstaunliche Theoreme in Turing Machine Theory und die Grenzen der Berechnung, die sehr Apropos hier sind, abgeleitet. Sie wurden fast überall ignoriert, aber nicht von Bekannt Wirtschaftswissenschaftler Koppl Und Rosser, die in ihrem berühmten 2002 erschienenen Papier "Alles, was ich sagen muss, ist schon in den Köpfen gekreuzt" drei Theoreme über die Grenzen der Rationalität, Vorhersage und Kontrolle in der Ökonomie geben. Die erste verwendet Wolperts Theorem über die Grenzen der Rechenfähigkeit, um einige logische Grenzen für die Vorhersage der Zukunft aufzuzeigen. Wolpert stellt fest, dass es als die physische Analogie von Godel es Unvollständigkeitstheorem und K und R sagen, dass ihre Variante als ihre sozialwissenschaftliches Analogie angesehen werden kann, obwohl Wolpert Gut Bewusst Der sozialen Auswirkungen. K und R 'Das zweite Theorem zeigt eine mögliche NichtKonvergenz für die bayerische (probabilistische) Vorhersage im unendlichen dimensionalen Raum. Die dritte zeigt, dass es unmöglich ist, dass ein Computer eine Wirtschaft mit Agenten, die ihr Prognoseprogramm kennen, perfekt vorhersagen kann. Der Schlummerer wird bemerken, dass diese Theoreme als Versionen des Lüsenparadoxons und der Tatsache gesehen werden können, dass wir in Unmöglichkeiten gefangen sind, wenn wir versuchen, ein System zu berechnen, das uns selbst einschliesst, wurde von Wolpert bemerkt, Koppl, Rosser und andere in diesen Zusammenhängen und wieder haben wir uns wieder zu den Rätseln der Physik umkreist, wenn der Beobachter involviert ist. K & R kommt zu dem Schluss: "Die Wirtschaftsordnung ist also zum Teil das Produkt von etwas anderem als der kalkulierenden Rationalität". Vergebene Rationalität ist jetzt ein grosses Feld in sich, die Thema von Tausenden von Papieren und Hunderten von Büchern. Argumentation ist ein anderes Wort für Denken, das eine Disposition wie Wissen, Verstehen, Urteilen etc. ist. Wittgenstein war der erste, der erläuterte, dass diese Dispositionsverben Sätze (Sätze, die wahr oder falsch sein können) beschreiben und damit das haben, was Searle als Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit (COS) bezeichnet. Das heisst, es gibt öffentliche Zustände, von denen wir erkennen, dass sie ihre Wahrheit oder Falschheit zeigen. "Jenseits der Vernunft" würde einen Satz bedeuten, dessen Wahrheitsbedingungen nicht Klar Und der Grund wäre, dass er keinen klaren Kontext hat. Es ist eine Tatsache, ob wir klare COS haben (d.h. Bedeutung), aber wir können die Beobachtung einfach nicht machen-das ist nicht jenseits der Vernunft, sondern über unsere Fähigkeit zu erreichen, aber es ist eine philosophische (sprachliche) Angelegenheit, wenn wir das COS nicht kennen. "Sind der Geist und die Computer des Universums ? "Hört sich an, als ob es einer wissenschaftlichen oder mathematischen Untersuchung bedarf, aber es ist nur notwendig, 58 den Kontext zu klären, in dem diese Sprache verwendet wird., Da es sich um gewöhnliche und unproblematische Begriffe handelt und nur ihr Kontext rätselhaft ist. Wie immer ist das erste, was man im Hinterkopf behalten sollte, W es Diktum, dass es keine neuen Entdeckungen in der Philosophie gibt, noch Erklärungen zu geben gibt, sondern nur klare Verhaltensbeschreibungen (Sprache). Wenn man einmal versteht, dass alle Probleme Verwirrung darüber sind, wie Sprache funktioniert, sind wir in Frieden, und die Philosophie in ihrem Sinne hat ihren Zweck erreicht. Wie W/S bemerkt hat, gibt es nur eine Realität, so dass es nicht mehrere Versionen des Geistes oder des Lebens oder der Welt gibt, die sinnvoll gegeben werden können, und wir können nur in unserer einen öffentlichen Sprache kommunizieren. Es kann keine Privatsprache geben, und keine "privaten inneren" Gedanken können nicht kommuniziert werden und können keine Rolle in unserem gesellschaftlichen Leben spielen. Es sollte auch sehr einfach sein, philosophische Probleme in diesem Sinne zu lösen. "Wenn es nun nicht die kausalen Zusammenhänge sind, um die es uns geht, dann liegen die Aktivitäten des Geistes vor uns." Wittgenstein "Das blaue Buch" p6 (1933) Wir haben nur eine Reihe von Genen und damit eine Sprache (Geist), ein Verhalten (menschliche Natur oder evolutionäre Psychologie), die W und S als das Fundament oder Hintergrund bezeichnen und darüber reflektieren, wir erzeugen Philosophie, die S die logische Struktur der Rationalität nennt. Und ich nenne die beschreibende Psychologie des Höhere Ordensgedankens (HOT) oder, mit dem Stichwort W, das Studium der Sprache, die HOT beschreibt. Das einzige Interesse an der Lektüre von jemandes Kommentaren zu philosophischen Aspekten menschlichen Verhaltens (HOT) ist zu sehen, ob seine Übersetzung in den W/S-Rahmen einige klare Beschreibungen gibt, die den Gebrauch von Sprache beleuchten. Wenn nicht, dann wird die Verwirrung verschlingt, wenn sie zeigen, wie sie von der Sprache verzaubert wurden. Ich wiederhole, was Horwich auf der letzten Seite seiner hervorragenden "Wittgenstein es Metaphilosophie"(Siehe meine Rezension):" Was für ein Fortschritt ist das - das faszinierende Mysterium wurde entfernt-aber es sind keine Tiefen in Trost gestürzt worden; Nichts wurde erklärt, entdeckt oder neu konzipiert. Wie zahm und uninspirierend man denken könnte. Aber vielleicht, wie Wittgenstein nahelegt, sollten die Tugenden der Klarheit, Entmystifizierung und Wahrheit befriedigend genug gefunden werden. " Nichtsdestotrotz erklären W/S viel (oder wie W schlug, dass wir sagen sollten, "beschreiben") und S besagt, dass die logische Struktur der Rationalität verschiedene Theorien ausmacht, und es gibt keinen Schaden daran, vorausgesetzt, man erkennt, dass sie aus einer Reihe von Beispielen bestehen, die Lassen Sie uns eine allgemeine Vorstellung davon bekommen, wie Sprache (der Geist) funktioniert, Und dass seine "Theorien", wie seine "Theorien" an Beispielen erklärt werden, eher den anschaulichen Beschreibungen von W ähneln. "Eine Rose mit einem anderen Namen ..." Wenn es eine Frage gibt Er muss Gehen Sie auf die Beispiele zurück oder überlegen Sie sich neue. Wie W bemerkte, ist Sprache (Leben) grenzenlos komplex und kontextsensitiv (W ist der nicht anerkannte Vater 59 des Kontextualismus), und so ist es völlig anders als die Physik, wo man oft eine Formel ableiten und auf die Notwendigkeit weiterer Beispiele verzichten kann. Der Wissenschaftler (der Gebrauch der wissenschaftlichen Sprache und der kausale Rahmen) führt uns in die Irre, indem er HOT beschreibt. Noch einmal: "Philosophen sehen ständig die Methode der Wissenschaft vor Augen und sind unwiderstehlich versucht, Fragen zu stellen und zu beantworten, wie es die Wissenschaft tut. Diese Tendenz ist die eigentliche Quelle der Metaphysik und führt den Philosophen in die völlige Dunkelheit. " (BBB p18). Im Gegensatz zu so vielen anderen hat S den wissenschaftlichen Stil weitgehend vermieden und oft abgerissen, aber es gibt einen Rückstand, der sich ausweicht, wenn er darauf besteht, dispositionale S2-Begriffe zu verwenden, die öffentliches Verhalten beschreiben (Denken, Glauben wissen etc.), um S1 ' Prozesse ' in Das Gehirn, dass wir z.B. das Bewusstsein verstehen können, indem wir das Gehirn studieren, und dass er bereit ist, Kausalität, Wille oder Verstand aufzugeben. W made it Überdeutlich, dass es sich bei solchen Wörtern um die Scharniere oder Grundsprachspiele handelt und sie aufzugeben oder gar zu verändern, ist kein schlüssiges Konzept. Wie in meinen anderen Rezensionen erwähnt, denke ich, dass die Rückstände des wissenschaftlichen Seins (und fast aller anderen Philosophen) philosophischen Lebens-sein Versagen, das spätere W ernst genug zu nehmen (W starb ein paar Jahre bevor S ging nach England, um zu studieren) und machte Der weit verbreitete fatale Fehler zu denken, er sei schlauer als W. "Hier stossen wir auf ein bemerkenswertes und charakteristisches Phänomen in der philosophischen Untersuchung: Die Schwierigkeit -Ich könnte sagen,---nicht darin besteht, die Lösung zu finden, sondern die, als die so zu erkennen.Lution etwas, das aussieht als Wenn es nur eine Vorstufe dazu wäre. Wir haben schon alles gesagt. --Daraus folgt nichts, nein, das ist die Lösung! .... Ich glaube, das hängt damit zusammen, dass wir zu Unrecht eine Erklärung erwarten, während die Lösung der Schwierigkeit eine Beschreibung ist, wenn wir ihr den richtigen Platz in unseren Überlegungen geben. Wenn wir darauf wohnen und nicht versuchen, darüber hinauszukommen. " Zettel P312-314 "Unsere Methode ist rein deskriptiv, die Beschreibungen, die wir geben, sind keine Hinweise auf Erklärungen." BBB p125 Es folgt sowohl aus W es Arbeit der 3. Periode als auch aus der zeitgenössischen Psychologie, dass ' Wille ', ' Selbst ' und ' Bewusstsein ' axiomatische, wahrhaftige Elemente des reptilischen subkortikalen Systems One (S1) sind, die aus Wahrnehmungen, Erinnerungen und Reflexen zusammengesetzt sind, und es gibt keine Möglichkeit (Verständlichkeit), ihre Falschheit zu demonstrieren (zu geben). Wie W so wunderbar klarstellte, sind sie die Grundlage für das Urteil und können daher nicht beurteilt werden. Die wahrhaftigen Axiome unserer Psychologie sind nicht nachweisbar. 60 Philosophen sind selten darüber im Klaren, was es ist, dass sie erwarten, dass sie zu tragen, dass andere Studenten des Verhaltens (z. B. Wissenschaftler) nicht, so, unter Hinweis auf W es obige Bemerkung über die Wissenschaft Neid, werde ich von P.M.S Hacker (der führende Experte für W seit vielen Jahren), der gibt Ein guter Start und ein Gegenschlag auf den wissenschaftlichen Stand. "Traditionelle Epistemologen wollen wissen, ob Wissen wahrer Glaube und eine weitere Bedingung ist ... oder ob Wissen nicht einmal Glauben impliziert ... Was geklärt werden muss, wenn diese Fragen beantwortet werden sollen, ist das Geflecht unserer epistemischen Konzepte, die Art und Weise, wie die verschiedenen Konzepte zusammenhängen, die verschiedenen Formen ihrer Kompatibilitäten und Unvereinbarkeiten, ihr Punkt und Zweck, ihre Voraussetzungen und unterschiedliche Formen der Kontextabhängigkeit. Zu dieser ehrwürdigen Übung in der verbindenden Analyse, wissenschaftlichen Kenntnissen, Psychologie, Neurowissenschaften und Die selbsternannte Kognitionswissenschaft kann überhaupt nichts beitragen. " ((Vorbei an der naturalistischen Wendung: Auf Quine Cul-de-sac-p15(2005)) Die deontischen Strukturen oder der "soziale Klebstoff" sind die automatischen Schnellaktionen von S1, die die langsamen Dispositionen von S2 erzeugen., Die sich während der persönlichen Entwicklung unaufhaltsam zu einer breiten Palette von automatischen universellen, kulturellen deontischen Beziehungen ausweiten, die von Searle so gut beschrieben werden. Ich erwarte das recht gut Abstracts the basic structure of social behavior. Mehrere Kommentare wiederholen sich. Die Erkenntnis, dass S1 nur nach oben ursächlich (Welt für Verstand) und inhaltslos (ohne Repräsentationen oder Informationen) ist, während S2 Inhalte hat (d.h. darstellerisch ist) und abwärts kausal ist (Geist für Welt) (z.B. meine Rezension von Hutto und Myin es "Radikal Enaktivismus'), würde ich die Absätze aus S es MSW p39 zu übersetzen, die "In Summe" beginnen und am Ende Pg 40 mit "Zufriedenheitsbedingungen" wie folgt. In Summe werden Wahrnehmung, Erinnerung und reflexive Vorabsätze und Handlungen ("Wille") durch das automatische Funktionieren unseres S1-Rebless-nur Axiomatischen EP, wie es durch S2 modifiziert wurde ("freier Wille"), verursacht. Wir versuchen, die Dinge so zu gestalten, wie wir sie denken. Wir sollten sehen, dass Glaube, Begehren und PhantasieWünsche, die Zeit verschoben und von der Absicht abgekoppelt-und andere S2Propositions-Dispositionen unseres langsamen Denkens, das sich später als zweites Selbst entwickelt hat, völlig abhängig sind (haben ihre Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit (COS ) aus) der Causally Self Reflexive (CSR) schnelle automatische primitive trude-nur reflexive S1. In der Sprache und der Neurophysiologie gibt es Zwischen-oder Mischfälle wie Absicht (Vorabsichten) oder Erinnern, bei denen die kausale Verbindung des COS mit S1 zeitlich verschoben ist, da sie die Vergangenheit oder die Zukunft repräsentieren, im Gegensatz zu 61 S1, das sich immer in der Anwesen. S1 und S2 füttern ineinander und werden oft nahtlos von erlernten deontischen kulturellen Beziehungen orchestriert, so dass unsere normale Erfahrung darin besteht, dass wir bewusst alles kontrollieren, was wir tun. Diese riesige Arena kognitiver Illusionen, die unser Leben Searle dominieren, hat als "Die phänomenologische Illusion" (TPI) beschrieben. "Einige der wichtigsten logischen Merkmale der Intentionalität sind der Phänomenologie nicht zugänglich, weil sie keine unmittelbare phänomenologische Realität haben ... Denn die Schöpfung der Sinnhaftigkeit aus Bedeutungslosigkeit wird nicht bewusst erlebt ... Es gibt nicht ... Das ist... Die phänomenologische Illusion. " Suche PNC p115-117 Störungsworte (Voreinstellungen--siehe oben) haben mindestens zwei grundlegende Verwendungen. Eine Bezieht sich nur auf die wahrheitsgetreuen Sätze, die unsere direkten Wahrnehmungen, Reflexe (einschliesslich der Grundsprache) und das Gedächtnis beschreiben, d.h. unsere angeborene axiomatische S1-Psychologie, die Causally Self Reflexive (CSR) ist-(in W es BBB reflexiv oder untransitiv genannt), und die S2-Verwendung als Dispositionsworte (Denken, Verstehen, Wissen etc.), die ausgespielt werden können, und die wahr oder falsch werden können ("Ich kenne meinen Weg nach Hause")-das heisst, sie haben Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit (COS) und sind nicht CSR (im BBB als transitiv bezeichnet). "Wie entsteht das philosophische Problem der mentalen Prozesse und Zustände und des Verhaltens? – Der erste Schritt ist derjenige, der ganz entgeht. Wir sprechen über Prozesse und Zustände und lassen ihre Natur unentschieden. Vielleicht werden wir irgendwann mehr über sie wissen-denken wir. Aber genau das verpflichtet uns zu einem Besondere Art und Weise Die Sache prüfen. Denn wir haben ein klares Konzept dafür, was es bedeutet, einen Prozess besser kennen zu lernen. (Die entscheidende Bewegung im Zaubertrick ist gemacht worden, und sie war genau die, die wir für ganz unschuldig hielten). - Und nun zerfällt die Analogie, die uns unsere Gedanken verständlich machen sollte. Also, Wir Muss Leugnen Sie die Unverstanden Prozess im noch unerforschten Medium. Und jetzt sieht es so aus, als hätten wir mentale Prozesse bestritten. Und natürlich wollen wir sie nicht verleugnen. W PI p308 "... Die grundlegende absichtliche Beziehung zwischen Geist und Welt hat mit Befriedigung zu tun. Und ein Satz ist alles, was in einem absichtlichen Verhältnis zur Welt stehen kann, und da diese absichtlichen Beziehungen immer die Bedingungen der Befriedigung bestimmen, und ein Satz als alles definiert wird, was Ausreichend Die Befriedigung der Befriedigung zu bestimmen, stellt sich heraus, dass jede Intentionalität eine Frage von Vorschlägen ist. " Suche PNCp193 "Der vorsätzliche Zustand repräsentiert seine Bedingungen der Befriedigung ... Die Menschen gehen irrtümlich davon aus, dass jede mentale Repräsentation bewusst gedacht werden muss ... Aber der Begriff der Repräsentation, wie ich sie verwende, ist ein 62 funktionaler und kein ontologischer Begriff. Alles, was Befriedigung hat, das in einer für die Intentionalität charakteristischen Weise erfolgreich sein oder scheitern kann, ist per Definition ein Darstellung seiner Befriedigung ... Wir können die Struktur der Intentionalität sozialer Phänomene analysieren, indem wir ihre Befriedigung analysieren. " Suche MSW p28-32 Wie Carruthers, Coliva, S und andere sagen irgendwann an (z.B. p66-67 MSW), dass S1 (z.B. Erinnerungen, Wahrnehmungen, Reflexakte) eine propositionelle (d.h. wahrheitsfalsche) Struktur hat. Wie ich oben bemerkt habe, und viele Male in meinen Rezensionen, scheint es glasklar, dass W ist Richtig, und es ist wichtig, das Verhalten zu verstehen, dass nur S2 propositionell ist und S1 axiomatisch und wahrhaftig ist. Jedoch, Da das, was S und verschiedene Autoren hier den Hintergrund (S1) nennen, S2 hervorbringt und wiederum teilweise von S2 gesteuert wird, muss es einen Sinn geben, in dem S1 propositionell werden kann und sie und die Suche bemerken, dass die unbewussten oder bewussten, aber automatisierten Aktivitäten von S1 muss in der Lage sein, die bewussten oder beratenden von S2 zu werden. Sie haben beide COS und Anleitungen von Fit (DOF), weil die genetische, axiomatische Intentionalität von S1 die von S2 erzeugt, aber wenn S1 im gleichen Sinne propositionell wäre, würde das bedeuten, dass Skepsis verständlich ist, das Chaos, das Philosophie war, bevor W zurückkehren würde, Und wenn das stimmt, wäre das Leben nicht möglich. Es würde zum Beispiel bedeuten, dass Wahrheit und Falschheit und die Fakten der Welt ohne Bewusstsein entschieden werden könnten. Wie W oft erklärte und in seinem letzten Buch "Über Gewissheit" so brillant zeigte, muss das Leben auf zertaintautomatisierten unbewussten schnellen Reaktionen basieren. Organismen, die immer einen Zweifel haben und innehalten, um zu reflektieren, werden sterben-keine Evolution, keine Menschen, keine Philosophie. Wieder, Ich werde einige entscheidende Begriffe wiederholen. Eine weitere Idee, die von S geklärt wird, ist die Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA). Ich übersetze S es Zusammenfassung der praktischen Vernunft auf p127 von MSW wie folgt: "Wir geben unseren Wünschen nach (Notwendigkeit, die Gehirnchemie zu verändern), die in der Regel Desire-Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA-d. h. Wünsche in Raum und Zeit verdrängt), die produzieren Veranlagungen zum Verhalten, die in der Regel früher oder später zu Muskelbewegungen führen, die unserer inklusiven Fitness dienen (erhöhtes Überleben für Gene in uns selbst und denen, die eng miteinander verwandt sind). " Und ich möchte seine Beschreibung auf p129 noch einmal darlegen, wie wir DIRA2 durchführen, als "Die Auflösung des Paradoxons ist, dass das unbewusste DIRA1, das langfristige inklusive Fitness dient, das bewusste DIRA2 generiert, das oft die kurzfristigen persönlichen Wünsche übersteigt." Agenten schaffen zwar bewusst die unmittelbaren Gründe von DIRA2, aber das sind sehr eingeschränkte Erweiterungen des unbewussten DIRA1 (die ultimative Ursache). Obama und der Papst wollen den Armen helfen, weil es "richtig" ist, Aber die ultimative Ursache ist eine Veränderung ihrer Gehirnchemie, die die inklusive Fitness ihrer entfernten Vorfahren erhöht. Evolution by inclusive fitness hat die unbewussten, schnellen reflexiven kausalen Handlungen von S1 programmiert, die oft das bewusste langsame 63 Denken von S2 hervorrufen, das Handlungsgründe hervorruft, die oft zur Aktivierung der Körper-und Sprachmuskulatur durch S1 führen. Aktionen verursachen. Der allgemeine Mechanismus erfolgt sowohl über die Neuroübertragung als auch über Veränderungen der Neuromodulatoren in gezielten Bereichen des Gehirns. Die allgemeine kognitive Illusion (genannt von S ' The Phenomenological Illusion ', von Pinker ' The Blank Slate ' und von Tooby Und Cosmides ' The Standard Social Science Model ') ist, dass S2 die Aktion bewusst aus Gründen, die wir voll und ganz kennen und die die Kontrolle haben, erstellt hat, aber jeder, der mit der modernen Biologie und Psychologie vertraut ist, kann sehen, dass diese Ansicht nicht glaubwürdig ist. Ein Satz drückt einen Gedanken aus (hat eine Bedeutung), wenn er klare COS hat, also öffentliche Wahrheitsbedingungen. Daher der Kommentar von W: "Wenn ich in der Sprache denke, gibt es neben den verbalen Ausdrücken keine ' Bedeutungen ', die mir durch den Kopf gehen: Die Sprache ist selbst das Vehikel des Denkens." Und wenn ich mit oder ohne Worte denke, ist der Gedanke, was ich (ehrlich) sage, es ist, wie es kein anderes mögliches Kriterium (COS). So, W es schöne Aphorismen (p132 Budd-Wittgensteins Philosophie der Psychologie) "Es ist in der Sprache, dass Wünschen Und Erfüllung treffen sich "und" Wie alles metaphysisch ist die Harmonie zwischen Denken und Wirklichkeit in der Grammatik der Sprache zu finden. " Und man könnte hier feststellen, dass "Grammatik" in W in der Regel als Evolutionäre Psychologie (EP) übersetzt werden kann und dass dies trotz seiner häufigen Warnungen vor Theoretisierung und Verallgemeinerung eine etwa so breite Charakterisierung der Beschreibung höherer Ordnung ist ( Philosophie) wie man - jenseits der ' Theorien von Searle ' (der W oft für seine berühmte antitheoretische Haltung kritisiert) finden kann. "Jedes Zeichen ist fähig Interpretation Aber die Bedeutung darf nicht interpretationsfähig sein. Es ist die letzte Interpretation "W BBB p34 "Searle es Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy" (SPCP) (2008) ist ein grossartiges und einzigartiges Buch, aber so völlig ignoriert, dass meine 2015 Bewertung war damals Die einzige! Es sollte offensichtlich sein, dass es in philosophischen Fragen immer um Fehler in der Sprache geht, die verwendet werden, um unsere universelle angeborene Psychologie zu beschreiben, und es gibt keinen nützlichen Sinn, in dem es eine chinesische, französische, christliche, feministische etc. Sicht auf sie geben kann. Solche Ansichten können von der Philosophie im weitesten Sinne existieren, aber das ist nicht das, worum es bei der Philosophie des Geistes (oder an W, S oder mir) geht. Es könnte ein ganzes Buch brauchen, um darüber zu diskutieren, und S macht eine hervorragende Arbeit, also möchte ich hier nur kommentieren, dass reKleidungsstück P35 In SPCP, Sätze sind S2 und keine mentalen Zustände, Das sind S1 als W ziemlich deutlich gemacht, Und dass sowohl Quine als auch Davidson in Bezug auf die grundlegenden Fragen, um die es hier geht, gleichermassen verwirrt waren (sowohl Searle als auch Hacker haben hervorragende Abrisse von Quine durchgeführt). Wie so oft wird S es Diskussion durch sein Versäumnis 64 getrübt, sein Verständnis von W es "Hintergrund" bis zu seinem logischen Schluss zu tragen, und so schlägt er (wie er es oft getan) vor, dass er den Begriff des freien Willens aufgeben muss - eine Vorstellung, die ich finde. (Mit W) inkohärent. Was Sind Das COS (das Wahrheitseignis, der Test oder der Beweis), das die Wahrheit gegen die Falschheit zeigen könnte, dass wir keine Wahl haben, unseren Arm zu heben? Ebenso (p62) kann niemand Argumente für den Hintergrund liefern (z.B. unsere axiomatische EP), wie wir überhaupt reden können (wie W häufig bemerkte). Es ist auch wahr, dass "Reduktion" zusammen mit "Monismus", "Realität", etc. Es handelt sich um komplexe Sprachspiele, die in kleinen Rucksäcken keine Bedeutung haben! Man muss die EINE Verwendung im Detail auflösen, um klar zu werden und dann zu sehen, wie sich eine andere Nutzung (Kontext) unterscheidet. Philosophen (und Möchtegern-Philosophen) schaffen imaginäre Probleme, indem sie versuchen, Fragen zu beantworten, die keinen klaren Sinn haben. Diese Situation wird von Finkelstein in "Holism and Animal Minds" gut analysiert Und AlAlso Bewundernswert zusammengefasst von Read in "Das harte Problem des Bewusstseins", das oben zitiert wurde. Wittgensteins "Kultur und Wert" (1980 veröffentlicht, aber Jahrzehnte früher geschrieben), obwohl es vielleicht sein am wenigsten interessantes Buch s, hat vieles, was Ist Teilend für diese Diskussion und natürlich für einen grossen Teil des modernen intellektuellen Lebens. Es gibt keine religiöse Konfession, in der der Missbrauch metaphysischer Ausdrücke Verantwortlich für so viel Sünde wie Sie hat in Mathematik. '` "' Die Leute sagen immer wieder, dass die Philosophie t wirklich Fortschritt macht, dass wir immer noch mit den gleichen philosophischen Problemen beschäftigt sind wie die Griechen. Aber die Leute, die das sagen, verstehen t, warum ist Er muss "So. Weil unsere Sprache gleich geblieben ist und uns immer wieder dazu verleitet, dieselben Fragen zu stellen. Solange es weiterhin ein Verb "zu sein" gibt, das so aussieht, als ob es so funktioniert, wie to essen und trinken, solange wir noch die Adjektive identical, true, false, possible haben, solange wir weiter von einem Fluss der Zeit sprechen. Die Menschen werden immer wieder über die gleichen rätselhaften Schwierigkeiten stolpern und auf etwas starren, das keine Erklärung zu klären scheint. Und was s mehr, befriedigt dies die Sehnsucht nach dem Transzendenten, denn insofern die Menschen denken, sie könnten "die Grenzen des menschlichen Verständnisses sehen, glauben sie natürlich, dass sie darüber hinaus sehen können. Diese ".` Ebenso sollten wir versuchen, das Wesen von zwei der jüngsten Werke von Searle zu trennen. "Kann es Handlungsgründe geben, die für einen rationalen Wirkstoff bindend sind, nur 65 aufgrund der Art der in der Begründung gemeldeten Tatsache und unabhängig von den Wünschen, Werten, Haltungen und Bewertungen des Agenten? ... Das eigentliche Paradoxon der traditionellen Diskussion ist, dass sie versucht, Humes Guillotine, die starre Tatsache, zu posieren Wertminderung in einem Vokabular, deren Verwendung bereits die Falschheit der Unterscheidung voraussetzt. " Suche PNC p165-171 "... Alle Statusfunktionen und damit die gesamte institutionelle Realität, mit Ausnahme der Sprache, werden durch Sprechakte geschaffen, die die logische Form der Deklarationen haben ... Die Formen der Statusfunktion, um die es hier geht, sind fast ausnahmslos Angelegenheiten deontischer Kräfte ... Etwas als Recht, Pflicht, Verpflichtung, Forderung und so weiter anzuerkennen, ist ein Grund zum Handeln ... Diese deontischen Strukturen ermöglichen erwünschte Handlungsgründe ... Der allgemeine Punkt ist ganz klar: Die Schaffung des allgemeinen Feldes der erwünschten Handlungsgründe setzte die Akzeptanz eines Systems der erwünschten Handlungsgründe voraus. " Suche PNC p34-49 Das heisst, das Funktionieren unseres Sprachsystems 2 setzt das unseres vorsprachigen Systems 1 voraus. Auch DIRA kann nicht akzeptiert oder abgelehnt werden1Vielmehr sind sie als Teil von S1 angeboren, und die Ablehnung von S1 ist inkohärent. "Einige der wichtigsten logischen Merkmale der Intentionalität sind der Phänomenologie nicht zugänglich, weil sie keine unmittelbare phänomenologische Realität haben ... Denn die Schöpfung der Sinnhaftigkeit aus Bedeutungslosigkeit wird nicht bewusst erlebt ... Es gibt nicht ... Das ist... Die phänomenologische Illusion. " Suche PNC p115-117 Das heisst, unsere mentale Funktion ist in der Regel so sehr mit System 2 beschäftigt, dass sie das System 1 nicht kennt. "... Die grundlegende absichtliche Beziehung zwischen Geist und Welt hat mit Befriedigung zu tun. Und ein Satz ist alles, was in einem absichtlichen Verhältnis zur Welt stehen kann, und da diese absichtlichen Beziehungen immer die Bedingungen der Befriedigung bestimmen, und ein Satz als alles definiert wird, was Ausreichend Die Befriedigung der Befriedigung zu bestimmen, stellt sich heraus, dass jede Intentionalität eine Frage von Vorschlägen ist. " Suche PNCp193 "So, Statusfunktionen sind der Klebstoff, der die Gesellschaft zusammenhält. Sie entstehen durch kollektive Intentionalität und funktionieren, indem sie deontische Kräfte tragen ... Mit der wichtigen Ausnahme der Sprache selbst, die gesamte institutionelle Realität und damit in gewissem Sinne die gesamte menschliche Zivilisation wird durch Sprechakte geschaffen, die die logische Form der Deklarationen haben ... Die gesamte menschliche institutionelle Realität wird durch (Darstellungen, die die gleiche logische Form haben wie) Statusfunktionserklärungen geschaffen und aufrechterhalten, einschliesslich der Fälle, die keine Sprechakte in der expliziten Form von Deklarationen sind. " Suche MSW p11-13 66 "Glaubenssätze, wie Aussagen, haben den Abwärts-oder Verstand (oder Wort) – An WeltRichtung fit. Und Wünsche und Absichten, wie Befehle und Verheissungen, haben die Aufwärts-oder Weltanschauung (oder Wort-) der Passform. Glaubenssätze oder Wahrnehmungen, wie Aussagen, sollen darstellen, wie die Dinge in der Welt sind, und in diesem Sinne, Sie sollen zur Welt passen; Sie haben die Richtung von Geist zu Welt. Die konative-volitionellen Zustände wie Wünsche, Vorabsichten und Handlungsabsichten, wie Befehle und Versprechungen, haben die Weltzu-Geistesrichtung. Sie sollen nicht darstellen, wie die Dinge sind, sondern wie wir sie gerne hätten oder wie wir sie machen wollen ... Neben diesen beiden Fakultäten gibt es noch eine dritte Imagination, in der der Satzgehalt nicht so der Realität entsprechen soll, wie die propositionellen Inhalte von Erkenntnis und Willen passen sollen ... Das Engagement in Bezug auf die Welt wird aufgegeben, und wir haben einen propositionellen Inhalt, ohne dass wir uns in beide Richtungen der Passform einsetzen. " Suche MSW P15 "Der vorsätzliche Zustand repräsentiert seine Bedingungen der Befriedigung ... Die Menschen gehen irrtümlich davon aus, dass jede mentale Repräsentation bewusst gedacht werden muss ... Aber der Begriff der Repräsentation, wie ich sie verwende, ist ein funktionaler und kein ontologischer Begriff. Alles, was Befriedigung hat, das in einer für die Intentionalität charakteristischen Weise erfolgreich sein oder scheitern kann, ist per Definition ein Darstellung seiner Befriedigung ... Wir können die Struktur der Intentionalität sozialer Phänomene analysieren, indem wir ihre Befriedigung analysieren. " Suche MSW p28-32 "Aber es gibt keine voringuistische Analogie für die Deklarationen. Prälinguistische vorsätzliche Zustände können in der Welt keine Fakten schaffen, indem sie diese bereits existierenden Tatsachen darstellen. Diese bemerkenswerte Leistung erfordert eine Sprache "MSW p69 "... Wenn Sie erst einmal Sprache haben, ist es unvermeidlich, dass Sie eine Deontologie haben werden, denn es gibt keine Möglichkeit, dass Sie explizite Sprechakte nach den Konventionen einer Sprache machen können, ohne Verpflichtungen einzugehen. Das gilt nicht nur für Aussagen, sondern für alle Sprachaktionen "MSW p82 Ein kritischer Begriff, der von S vor vielen Jahren eingeführt wurde, ist die Bedingung der Zufriedenheit (COS) über unsere Gedanken (Sätze von S2), die W Neigungen oder Veranlagungen zu act-genannt-immer noch mit dem unangemessenen Begriff "Satz" genannt. Einstellungen " Viele. COS werden von S vielerorts erklärt, wie zum Beispiel auf p169 der PNC: "So etwas sagen und damit gemeint, beinhaltet es zwei Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit. Erstens, die Bedingung der Befriedigung, dass die Äusserung produziert wird, und zweitens, dass die Äusserung selbst Die Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit. " S stellt es in PNC fest: "Ein Satz ist alles, was eine Bedingung der Zufriedenheit bestimmen kann ... Und eine Bedingung der Zufriedenheit ... Ist, dass es so und so ist. " Oder, muss man hinzufügen, 67 das könnte sein oder hätte man sich vorstellen können, wie er in MSW deutlich macht. In Bezug auf die Absichten: "Um befriedigt zu werden, muss die Absicht selbst bei der Produktion der Handlung kausal funktionieren." (MSWp34). "Sprecher bedeutet ... Die Auferlegung von Bedingungen der Befriedigung Die Fähigkeit dazu ist ein entscheidendes Element der menschlichen kognitiven Fähigkeiten. Es erfordert die Fähigkeit, auf zwei Ebenen gleichzeitig zu denken, und zwar auf eine Art und Weise, die für den Sprachgebrauch unerlässlich ist. Auf einer Ebene erzeugt der Sprecher absichtlich eine physische Äusserung, auf einer anderen Ebene stellt die Äusserung aber etwas dar. Und dieselbe Dualität infiziert das Symbol selbst. Auf einer Ebene, Es ist ein physisches Objekt wie jedes andere. Auf einer anderen Ebene, Es hat eine Bedeutung: Es stellt eine Art Zustand der Dinge dar "MSW p74 Eine Möglichkeit, dies zu erreichen, ist, dass das unbewusste automatische System 1 die höhere kortikalbewusste Persönlichkeit des Systems 2 aktiviert, was zu Kehlkopfmuskelkontraktionen führt, die andere darüber informieren, dass es die Welt auf bestimmte Weise sieht, die sie zu einem Potential verpflichten. Aktionen. Ein grosser Fortschritt gegenüber prelinguistischer oder proto-Sprachliche Wechselwirkungen, in denen grobe Muskelbewegungen nur sehr begrenzte Informationen über Absichten vermitteln konnten. Die meisten Menschen werden sehr davon profitieren, W es "On Certainty" oder "RPP1 and 2" oder DMS ' s zwei Bücher über OC zu lesen (siehe meine Rezensionen), da sie den Unterschied zwischen den wahrheitsgetreuen Sätzen, die S1 beschreiben, und den wahren oder falschen Sätzen, die S2 beschreiben, deutlich machen. Dies erscheint mir als eine weit überlegene Herangehensweise an Searle es S1-Wahrnehmungen als Propositional (zumindest an einigen Stellen in seinem Werk), da sie nur T oder F (aspektisch, wie S sie in MSW nennt) werden können, nachdem man in S2 anfängt, über sie nachzudenken. "Wir haben verschiedene Ebenen der Beschreibung, auf denen eine Ebene durch das Verhalten auf der unteren Ebene konstituiert wird, verschiedene Ebenen der Beschreibung in Aktion (IA). Neben dem konstitutiven in Relation haben wir auch das Kausal durch Beziehung. " (P37 MSW). "Der entscheidende Beweis dafür, dass wir eine Unterscheidung zwischen vorhergehenden Absichten und Handlungsabsichten brauchen, ist, dass die Bedingungen für die Zufriedenheit in den beiden Fällen auffallend unterschiedlich sind." (P35 MSW). Das COS der PI brauchen eine ganze Aktion, während die von IA nur eine teilweise. Er macht deutlich (z.B. p34), dass frühere Absichten (PI) mentale Zustände sind (d.h. unbewusste S1), während sie zu Intentionen-in-Aktion (IA) führen, die bewusste Handlungen sind (z.B. S2), aber beide kausal selbstreflexiv (CSR). Das kritische Argument, dass beide CSR sind, ist, dass es (im Gegensatz zu Überzeugungen und Wünschen) wichtig ist, dass sie bei der Umsetzung ihrer COS eine Rolle spielen. Diese Beschreibungen von Kognition und Willen sind in Tabelle 68 2.1 (p38 MSW) zusammengefasst, die Searle seit vielen Jahren verwendet und die Grundlage für die viel erweiterte ist, die ich hier und in meinen vielen Artikeln vorstelle. Aus meiner Sicht, Es hilft enorm, dies mit der modernen psychologischen Forschung in Verbindung zu bringen, indem ich meine S1, S2-Terminologie und W es true-only vs propositionale (dispositionale) Beschreibung verwende. So, CSR bezieht sich auf S1 wahrheitsgetreue Wahrnehmung, Gedächtnis und Intention, während S2 auf Dispositionen wie Glauben und Begehren verweist. Es folgt auf sehr einfache und unaufhaltsame Weise, sowohl aus W es Arbeit der 3. Periode als auch aus den Beobachtungen der zeitgenössischen Psychologie, dass ' Wille ', ' Selbst ' und ' Bewusstsein ' axiomatische, wahrhaftige Elemente des Systems 1 sind, wie sehen, hören usw., Und es gibt keine (Verständlichkeit), ihre Falschheit zu demonstrieren (zu geben). Wie W mehrfach so wunderbar klar gemacht hat, sind sie die Grundlage für das Urteil und können daher nicht beurteilt werden. Die wahrheitsgetreuen Axiome unserer Psychologie sind nicht nachweisbar. Es ist wichtig, den hier relevanten Begriff der "Funktion" zu verstehen. "Eine Funktion ist eine Sache, die einem Zweck dient ... In diesem Sinne sind Funktionen absichtlich und geistig-relativ und daher geistig-abhängig ... Statusfunktionen ... Erfordern... Kollektive Verhängung und Anerkennung eines status"(p59 MSW). Ich Vorschlagen, Die Übersetzung von "Die Intentionalität von Sprache ist Erstellt durch die intrinsische oder geistig unabhängige Intentionalität des Menschen "(p66 MSW) als" Das sprachliche, bewusste Disposition S2 wird durch die unbewussten axiomatischen reflexiven Funktionen von S1 "erzeugt. Das heisst, man muss sich vor Augen halten, dass das Verhalten von der Biologie programmiert ist. Wieder einmal stellt Searle (z.B. p66-67 MSW) fest, dass S1 (z.B. Erinnerungen, Wahrnehmungen, Reflexakte) eine propositionelle (d.h. wahrheitsfalsche) Struktur hat. Wie ich oben bemerkt habe, und viele Male in anderen Rezensionen, scheint es glasklar zu sein, dass W richtig ist, und es ist grundlegend, das Verhalten zu verstehen, dass nur S2 propositionell ist und S1 axiomatisch und wahrhaftig ist. Sie haben beide COS und Anleitungen von Fit (DOF), weil die genetische, axiomatische Intentionalität von S1 die von S2 erzeugt, aber wenn S1 im gleichen Sinne propositionell wäre, würde es bedeuten, dass Skepsis verständlich ist, das Chaos, das war Philosophie, bevor W zurückkehren würde, und wenn es wahr wäre, wäre das Leben nicht möglich. Wie W unzählige Male gezeigt hat und die Biologie so deutlich zeigt, muss das Leben auf zertainty-automatisierten unbewussten schnellen Reaktionen basieren. Organismen, die immer einen Zweifel haben und innehalten, um zu reflektieren, werden keine Evolution, keine Menschen, keine Philosophie sterben. Sprache und Schrift sind besonders, weil die kurze Wellenlänge der Schwingungen der 69 Stimmmuskulatur eine deutlich höhere Bandbreite der Informationsübertragung ermöglicht als die Kontraktionen anderer Muskeln und diese iIm Durchschnitt mehrere Aufträge von Grössenordnung höher für visuelle Information. S1 und S2 sind kritische Teile von Human EP und sind die Ergebnisse von Milliarden bzw. hunderten Millionen Jahren natürlicher Selektion durch inklusive Fitness. Sie erleichterten das Überleben und die Fortpflanzung im EWR (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation). Alles über uns körperlich und geistig in der Genetik. All das vage Gerede in S es MSW (z.B. p114) über "aussersprachliche Konventionen" und "extra semantische Semantik" bezieht sich in der Tat auf EP und insbesondere auf die unbewussten Automatismen von S1, die Die Grundlage für jedes Verhalten. Wie W schon oft sagte, ist das Vertraulichste aus diesem Grund unsichtbar. Auch hier meine Zusammenfassung (folgt S in MSW), wie die praktische Vernunft funktioniert: Wir geben unseren Wünschen nach (Notwendigkeit, die Gehirnchemie zu verändern), zu denen in der Regel Desire-Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA--also Wünsche in Raum und Zeit verschoben, oft für Die gegenseitigen Altruism-RA), die Veranlagungen zum Verhalten hervorrufen, die üblicherweise früher oder später zu Muskelbewegungen führen, die unserer inklusiven Fitness-IF-Produkten dienen (erhöhtes Überleben für Gene in uns selbst und denen, die eng miteinander verwandt sind). Ich denke, wenn sie entsprechend definiert ist, sind DIRA universell bei höheren Tieren und überhaupt nicht einzigartig für den Menschen (denken Sie, Mutter Henne verteidigt ihre Brut von einem Fuchs), wenn wir die automatisierten prelinguistischen Reflexe von S1 (d.h. DIRA1), aber sicherlich die höhere Ordnung DIRA von S2 (DIRA2) Die Sprache erfordern, sind einzigartig menschlich. Das Paradoxon, wie wir freiwillig DIRA2 durchführen können (d.h. die S2-Acts und ihre kulturellen Erweiterungen, die unabhängig sind), ist, dass das unbewusste DIRA1, das langfristig integrative Fitness serviert, das bewusste DIRA2 generiert, das oft kurzfristig über die Reise hinaussteigt. Persönliche unmittelbare Wünsche. Agenten schaffen zwar bewusst die unmittelbaren Gründe von DIRA2, aber das sind sehr eingeschränkte Erweiterungen von unbewussten oder nur automatisierten DIRA1 (die ultimative Ursache). Im Anschluss an W ist ganz klar, dass die Wahl Teil unserer axiomatischen S1 wahrheitsgetreue reflexive Handlungen ist und nicht ohne Widerspruch in Frage gestellt werden kann, da S1 die Grundlage ist. Für die Befragung. Sie können nicht bezweifeln, dass Sie diese Seite lesen, denn Ihr Bewusstsein dafür ist die Grundlage für Zweifel. Unweigerlich tauchen Ws berühmte Demonstrationen der Nutzlosigkeit der Introspektion und der Unmöglichkeit einer wahrhaft privaten Sprache immer wieder auf ("... Die Introspektion kann niemals zu einer Definition führen ... " P8). Die Grundlagen dieses Arguments sind äusserst einfach - kein Test, keine Sprache und ein Test kann nur öffentlich sein. Wenn ich allein auf einer Wüsteninsel ohne Bücher aufbaue und eines Tages 70 beschliesse, die runden Dinge auf die Bäume "Kokosnuss" und dann am nächsten Tag sehe ich eine und sage "Kokosnuss" es scheint, als ob ich mit einer Sprache begonnen habe. Aber nehmen wir an, was ich sage (da es keine Person oder kein Wörterbuch gibt, um mich zu korrigieren), ist "Koka" oder sogar "Apfel" und am nächsten Tag etwas anderes? Erinnerung ist notorisch Fehlbar Und wir haben grosse Schwierigkeiten, die Dinge auch bei ständiger Korrektur von anderen und mit unaufhörlichen Eingaben aus den Medien gerade zu halten. Das mag wie ein trivialer Punkt erscheinen, Aber es ist zentral für die ganze Ausgabe des Inneren und des Äusseren - d.h. unsere wahrheitsgetreuen, nicht testbaren Aussagen unserer Erfahrung gegenüber den wahren oder falschen testbaren Aussagen über alles in der Welt, einschliesslich unseres eigenen Verhaltens. Obwohl W dies mit vielen Beispielen, die vor über 3/4 eines Jahrhunderts begannen, erklärte, wurde es selten verstanden, und es ist unmöglich, mit einer Diskussion über das Verhalten sehr weit zu gehen, es sei denn, man tut es. Wie W, S, Hutto, Budd, Hacker, DMS, Johnston und andere erklärt haben, hat jeder, der denkt, dass W eine Affinität zu Skinner, Quine, Dennett, Funktionalismus hat, Oder andere verhaltensbedingte Ausscheidungen, die unser inneres Leben leugnen, muss wieder an den Anfang gehen. Budd ' Wittgensteins Philosophie der Psychologie'(1991) ist eine der besseren Werke, um Einblicke zu gewinnen, so dass ich es im Detail diskutiere (siehe meine Bewertung für mehr). Auf p21 beginnt er, Dispositionen zu diskutieren (d.h. S2-Fähigkeiten wie Denken, Wissen, Glauben), die sich auf mentale Zustände (d.h. auf S1-Automatismen beziehen) zu diskutieren, eine weitere grosse Verwirrung, die W als erstes in Gefahr brachte, das gerade machte. So, Auf p28 muss "Lesen" als eine weitere Dispositionsfähigkeit verstanden werden, die kein mentaler Zustand ist und keine bestimmte Dauer hat, wie Denken, Verstehen, Glauben usw. Wenige Hinweise (Budd p29-32, Stern, Johnston und Moyal-Sharrock sind Ausnahmen), dass W derzeit (Jahrzehnte bevor Chaos und Komplexitätswissenschaft entstanden sind) darauf hindeuteten, dass einige mentale Phänomene in chaotischen Prozessen im Gehirn entstehen können-dass es z.B. nichts gibt, was einer Gedächtnisspur entspricht. Er schlug auch mehrfach vor, dass die Kausalkette ein Ende hat, Und das könnte sowohl bedeuten, dass es (unabhängig vom Stand der Wissenschaft) nicht möglich ist, es weiter zu verfolgen oder Dass der Begriff der "Ursache" nicht mehr über einen bestimmten Punkt hinaus anwendbar ist (p34). In der Folge haben viele ähnliche Vorschläge gemacht, ohne zu wissen, dass W sie um Jahrzehnte vorwegnahm (in der Tat über ein Jahrhundert jetzt in einigen Fällen). Auf p32 beziehen sich die "kontrafaktischen Bedingungen" wieder auf Dispositionen wie "kann denken, dass es regnet", die mögliche Zustände von Angelegenheiten (oder mögliche Handlungen - Suearle es Zufriedenheitsbedingungen) sind, die im Chaos entstehen können. Es kann sinnvoll sein, dies an Searles 3 Lücken der Intentionalität zu knüpfen, die er für entscheidend notwendig hält. 71 "Der Fehler ist zu sagen, dass es alles gibt, was bedeutet, dass etwas in." Obwohl W richtig ist, dass es keinen mentalen Zustand gibt, der Bedeutung ausmacht, stellt S (wie oben zitiert) fest, dass es eine allgemeine Möglichkeit gibt, den Akt der Bedeutung zu charakterisieren-"Sprecher bedeutet ... Es ist die Auferlegung von Befriedigung auf die Bedingungen der Befriedigung, "die ein Akt ist und kein mentaler Zustand. Wie Budd auf p35 anmerkt, ist dies Kann als Eine weitere Aussage seiner Argumentation gegen die Privatsprache (persönliche Interpretationen vs öffentlich testable). Ebenso, Mit Regelfolgen und Interpretationen auf p36-41-they können nur öffentlich überprüfbare Zwecke sein-auch keine privaten Regeln oder privaten Interpretationen. Und man muss beachten, dass viele (am bekanntesten Kripke) verpassen Sie das Boot hier, indem Sie durch W es häufige Verweise auf die Gemeinschaftspraxis in den Gedanken, dass es nur willkürliche öffentliche Praxis ist, die Sprache und sozialen Konventionen zugrunde liegt. W macht oft deutlich, dass solche Konventionen nur angesichts einer angeborenen gemeinsamen Psychologie möglich sind, die er oft als Hintergrund bezeichnet. Budd weist diese Fehlinterpretation mehrfach richtig zurück (z.B., p58). In Budds nächstem Kapitel beschäftigt er sich mit Empfindungen, die in meinen Begriffen (und in der modernen Psychologie) S1 und in W ' s Worten der wahrhaft unzweifelhafte und untestbare Hintergrund sind. Sein Kommentar (p47) ..." Dass unsere Überzeugungen über unsere gegenwärtigen Empfindungen auf einer absolut sicheren Grundlage beruhender "Mythos des Gegebenen" ist eines der Hauptobjekte von Wittgensteins Angriff ... " Kann leicht missverstanden werden. Erstens macht er den universellen Fehler, diese "Überzeugungen" zu nennen, aber es ist besser, dieses Wort für S2 wahre oder falsche Dispositionen zu reservieren. Wie W sehr deutlich gemacht hat, sind die Empfindungen, Erinnerungen und reflexiven Handlungen von S1 axiomatisch und unterliegen nicht dem Glauben im üblichen Sinne, sondern sind besser als Verständnis bezeichnet (meine U1). Im Gegensatz zu unseren S2-Glaubenssätzen (auch die über andere Menschen' S1Erfahrungen), gibt es keinen Mechanismus für Zweifel. Budd erklärt das gut, wie auf p52, wo er feststellt, dass es keine mögliche Rechtfertigung dafür gibt, zu sagen, man habe Schmerzen. Das heisst, rechtfertigen bedeutet, zu testen, und das ist möglich mit S2 dispositionellen langsamen bewussten Denken, nicht S1 reflexive schnelle unbewusste Verarbeitung. Seine Diskussion darüber auf p52-56 ist hervorragend, aber meiner Meinung nach, Wie jeder, der diskutiert W Auf Regeln, Privatsprache und das Innere, alles, was er tun muss, ist zu sagen, dass In S1 gibt es keinen möglichen Test, und das ist die Bedeutung von W es berühmt der ' innere Prozess ' ist der Bedarf an äusseren Kriterien ". Das heisst, die Introspektion ist leer. Budds Fussnote 21 verwirrt die wahrheitsgetreuen kausalen Erfahrungen von S1 und die begründeten Dispositionen von S2. Der Punkt der nächsten Seiten über die Namen für "innere Objekte" (Schmerzen, Überzeugungen, Gedanken etc.) ist wieder, dass sie ihren Gebrauch haben (Bedeutung), und es ist die Benennung von Dispositionen zu handeln, oder in Searle es Begriffe, die 72 Spezifikation der Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit, die Machen Sie die Äusserung wahr. Auch hier ist Budds Diskussion über "Sensationen und Beschimmung" falsch, wenn er sagt, dass wir uns in unseren Empfindungen "selbst zuschreiben" oder "glauben" oder "Stellung beziehen" (Dennett), dass wir einen Schmerz haben oder ein Pferd sehen, sondern dass wir keine choice-S1 ist wahrhaftig und ein Fehler ist ein seltener und bizarres Vorkommen und ganz anders als ein Fehler in S2. Und S1 ist kausal im Gegensatz zu S2, was Gründe betrifft, und deshalb ist es nicht Gegenstand von Urteilen oder Fehlern, das Pferd zu sehen oder den Schmerz zu spüren oder aus dem Weg zu gehen. Aber er bekommt it Wieder richtig - "Die Unfehlbarkeit der nicht-inferentiellen Selbstzuschreibung von Schmerzen ist also mit der These vereinbar, dass eine wahre Selbsteinschreibung von Schmerzen durch ein physisches Ereignis im Körper des Subjekts verursacht werden muss, das mit dem Schmerz identisch ist, den er erfährt (p67)." Ich akzeptiere seine folgende Aussage nicht, dass W dies nicht akzeptieren würde, basierend auf ein oder zwei Kommentaren in seinem gesamten Korpus, da er in seinem späteren Werk (insbesondere OC) Hunderte von Seiten ausgibt, die die kausale automatisierte Natur von S1 beschreiben und wie sie sich in (Ursachen) S2 einspeist, was dann füttert sich zurück zu S1, um Muskelbewegungen zu verursachen (einschliesslich Sprache). Tiere überleben nur, weil ihr Leben völlig von den Phänomenen um sie herum, die sehr vorhersehbar sind (Hunde können springen, aber sie fliegen nie). Das nächste Kapitel über Sehstörungen beschreibt die ausführlichen Kommentare von W darüber, wie S1 und S2 interagieren und wo unsere Sprache in dem, was wir mit ' Sehen ' meinen können, zweideutig ist. Generell, Es ist klar, dass das "Sehen als" oder das asche Sehen Teil der langsamen S2-Gehirnaktionen ist, während nur das Sehen die wahrheitsgetreuen S1-Automatismen ist, aber sie sind so gut integriert, dass es oft möglich ist, eine Situation auf vielfältige Weise zu beschreiben, was Ws Kommentar zu p97 erklärt. Er stellt fest, dass W ausschliesslich an dem interessiert ist, was ich anderswo "Seeing2" oder "Concepts2'-i.e" genannt habe, an der aspetiven oder S2 höheren Auftragsbearbeitung von Bildern. Hier, wie in diesem Buch und in jeder Diskussion über W oder über das Verhalten, ist es von grossem Wert, sich auf Johnstons "Wittgenstein: Das Innere überdenken" (1993) zu beziehen. Und vor allem zu seinen Diskussionen über die unbestimmte Natur der Sprache. In Budds Kapitel 5 beschäftigen wir uns erneut mit einer grossen Beschäftigung von W es späterer Arbeit - den Beziehungen zwischen S1 und S2. Wie ich in meinen anderen Rezensionen festgestellt habe, haben nur wenige das spätere W vollständig verstanden und ohne den S1, S2-Rahmen ist es nicht überraschend. So, Budds Diskussion über das Sehen (automatische S1) vs Visualisierungen (bewusstes S2, das dem Willen unterworfen ist) wird stark behindert. So, Man kann verstehen, warum man sich ein Objekt nicht vorstellen kann, während man es als die Herrschaft von S2 durch S1 (p110) sieht. Und auf p115 ist es die vertraute Frage, ob es keine Prüfung für meine inneren Erfahrungen gibt, 73 also kommt mir alles, was ich sage, in den Sinn, wenn ich mir vorstellen kann, Jack ' s Gesicht zählt als das Bild von Jack. Ähnlich, Mit Lesen und Berechnung, die sich auf S1, S2 oder eine Kombination beziehen kann, und es besteht die ständige Versuchung, S2-Begriffe auf S1-Prozesse anzuwenden, bei denen dieser Mangel an Tests sie unanwendbar macht. Siehe Bennet und Hacker ' sNeurophilosophie', DMS, etc. für Diskussionen. Auf p120 et seq. Budd erwähnt zwei der berühmten Beispiele von W, die für die Bekämpfung dieser Versuchung verwendet wurden, um Tennis ohne Ball zu spielen ("S1 Tennis"), und einen Stamm, der nur S2-Berechnung hatte, so "in tEr Kopf ("S1 calculating") war Nicht möglich. "Spielen" und "Rechnen" beschreiben tatsächliche oder mögliche Handlungen - das heisst, es sind Dispositionsworte, aber mit plausiblen reflexiven S1-Anwendungen, so dass man sie, wie ich bereits gesagt habe, wirklich gerade halten sollte, indem man "Playing1" und "Playing2" usw. schreibt. Aber uns wird nicht beigebracht, dies zu tun, und deshalb wollen wir entweder ' calculating1 ' als Fantasie abtun, oder wir denken, dass wir seine Natur bis später unentschieden lassen können. Daher W es berühmter Kommentar (p120)-"Die entscheidende Bewegung im Zaubertrick ist gemacht worden, und sie war genau die, die wir für ganz unschuldig hielten. " Kapitel 6 erklärt ein weiteres häufiges Thema von W es - dass, wenn wir sprechen, die Rede selbst unser Gedanke ist und es keinen anderen früheren mentalen Prozess gibt, und dies kann als eine andere Version des Argument der privaten Sprache angesehen werdenes gibt keine Dinge wie "innere Kriterien" Die es uns ermöglichen, zu sagen, was wir dachten, bevor wir handeln (sprechen). Der Sinn von W-Kommentaren (p125) über andere denkbare Möglichkeiten, das Verb ' beabsichtige ' zu verwenden, ist, dass sie nicht die gleichen wären wie Unsere "Absicht" - also den Namen eines potenziellen Ereignisses (PE) und in der Tat ist nicht klar, was es bedeuten würde. "Ich beabsichtige zu essen" hat das COS des Essens, aber wenn es bedeutet (COS ist) essen, dann würde es nicht eine Absicht beschreiben, sondern eine Handlung, und wenn es bedeuten würde, die Worte zu sagen (COS ist Sprache), dann hätte es keine weiteren COS und wie könnte es in jedem Fall funktionieren? Auf die Frage nach p127, wann ein Satz einen Gedanken ausdrückt (einen Sinn hat), können wir sagen: "Wenn er klare COS hat" und das bedeutet, dass es öffentliche Wahrheitsbedingungen hat. Daher das Zitat von from W: "Wenn ich in der Sprache denke, gibt es keine ' Bedeutungen ', die mir zusätzlich zu den verbalen Ausdrücken durch den Kopf gehen: Die Sprache ist selbst das Vehikel des Denkens. " Und wenn ich mit oder ohne Worte denke, ist der Gedanke, was ich (ehrlich) sage, es ist, wie es kein anderes mögliches Kriterium (COS). So, W es schöne Aphorismen (p132) "Es ist in der Sprache, dass Wünschen Und Erfüllung treffen sich "und" Wie alles metaphysisch ist die Harmonie zwischen Denken und Wirklichkeit in der Grammatik der Sprache zu finden. " Und man könnte hier feststellen, dass "Grammatik" in W in der Regel mit "EP" übersetzt werden kann und dass Trotz Seine häufigen Warnungen vor Theoretisierung und 74 Verallgemeinerung, das ist etwa eine so breite Charakterisierung der Philosophie und höhere Ordnung beschreibende Psychologie, wie man finden kann. Wieder, Dies quälte Searles häufige Kritik an W als antitheoretischer - es hängt alles von der Art der Verallgemeinerung ab. Es hilft in diesem Abschnitt von Budd sehr, in diesem Abschnitt des Denkens mit der Realität (d.h., wie Dispositionen wie das Erwarten, Denken, Einstellungsdenken von Arbeitwas es bedeutet, sie auszudrücken), sie in Bezug auf S es COS zu erklären, die das PE (mögliche Ereignisse) sind, die sie wahr machen. Wenn ich sage, dass ich Jack erwarte, dann ist die COS (PE), die es wahr macht, dass Jack kommt und meine mentalen Zustände oder physisches Verhalten (Tempo den Raum, sich vorstellen Jack) sind irrelevant. Die Harmonie von Denken und Realität ist, dass Wagenheber kommt unabhängig von meinem vorherigen oder späteren Verhalten oder irgendwelchen mentalen Zuständen, die ich haben kann und Budd ist verwirrt oder zumindest verwirrend, wenn er sagt (p132 unten), dass es eine interne Beschreibung eines mentalen Zustandes, dass ca n stimmen mit der Realität überein und dass dies der Inhalt eines Gedankens ist, da diese Begriffe nur auf die Automatismen von S1 beschränkt und nie für die bewussten Funktionen von S2 verwendet werden sollten. Der Inhalt (Bedeutung) des Gedankens, dass Jack kommen wird, ist das äussere (öffentliche) Ereignis, das er kommt, und nicht irgendein inneres mentales Ereignis oder Zustand, das das Argument der Privatsprache zeigt, dass es unmöglich ist, sich mit den äusseren Ereignissen zu verbinden. Wir haben eine sehr klare Überprüfung für das äussere Ereignis, aber überhaupt keine für "innere Veranstaltungen ". Und als W und S have Wunderschön demonstriert oft, der Sprechakt der Worte "Ich erwarte, Jack kommt" nur der Gedanke (Urteil) Dass Jack wird kommen Und das COS ist das gleiche -, das Jack auch kommt. Und so sollte die Antwort auf die beiden Fragen zu p133 und der Einfuhr von W es Kommentar auf p 135 nun glasklar sein - "Aufgrund dessen, was stimmt, hat meine Erwartung diesen Inhalt?" Und "Was ist jetzt aus dem Hohlraum und dem entsprechenden Festkörper geworden?" Wie auch "... Die Interpolation eines Schattens zwischen Satz und Wirklichkeit verliert jeden Punkt. Vorerst, Der Satz selbst kann als solcher Schatten dienen. " Und damit, Es sollte auch ganz klar sein, was Budd damit meint, was es "möglich macht, dass es die erforderliche Harmonie (oder fehlende Harmonie) mit der Realität gibt". Ebenso, Was macht es wahr, dass mein Bild von Jack ein Bild von ihm ist? Imagining ist eine andere Disposition, und das COS ist, dass das Bild, das ich in meinem Kopf habe, Jack ist, und das ist der Grund, warum ich "Ja" sagen werde, wenn er sein Bild und "NEIN" zeigt, wenn einer von jemand anderem gezeigt wird. Der Test hier ist nicht, dass das Foto mit dem vagen Bild übereinstimmt, das ich hatte, sondern dass ich es (hatte das COS, das) als ein Bild von ihm wollte. Daher das berühmte Zitat aus W: "Wenn Gott uns in den Sinn gekommen wäre, hätte er dort nicht sehen können, von wem wir sprachen (PI p217)" und seine Bemerkungen, dass das ganze Problem der Repräsentation in "Das ist er" und "... Was dem Bild seine Interpretation gibt, ist der Weg, auf dem es liegt. " Daher W es Zusammenfassung (p140), dass "Was am Ende immer kommt, ist, dass er ohne weitere Bedeutung, das Geschehene den Wunsch, dass das passieren sollte, als" ... Die Frage, ob 75 ich weiss, was ich mir vor meinem Wunsch wünsche, kann sich gar nicht stellen. Und die Tatsache, dass irgendein Ereignis mein Wunsch stoppt, bedeutet nicht, dass es es erfüllt. Vielleicht hätte ich nicht zufrieden sein sollen, wenn mein Wunsch erfüllt gewesen wäre. " ... Nehmen wir an, es wurde gefragt: "Weiss ich, worauf ich mich lange, bevor ich es bekomme? Wenn ich das Sprechen gelernt habe, dann weiss ich es. " Dispositionsworte beziehen sich auf PE ' s, die ich als die Erfüllung der COS akzeptiere, und meine mentalen Zustände, Emotionen, Interessensveränderungen usw. haben keinen Einfluss auf die Art und Weise, wie Dispositionen funktionieren. Wie Budd zu Recht feststellt, hoffe ich, ich hoffe, ich hoffe, zu wünschen, zu erwarten, zu denken, zu beabsichtigen, zu begehren usw., je nachdem, in welchem Zustand ich mich selbst in-auf das COS, das ich ausdrücke. Denken und beabsichtigen sind S2-Dispositionen, die sich nur durch reflexive S1-Muskelkontraktionen ausdrücken lassen, insbesondere solche der Sprache. W Nie so viel Zeit für Emotionen aufgewendet wie für Dispositionen, so dass es weniger Substanz in Kapitel 7 gibt. Er stellt fest, dass typischerweise das Objekt und die Ursache die gleichen sind - d.h. sie sind kausal-self-referentiell (oder Kausal Selbstreflexiv Wie Searle es nun vorzieht) - ein Konzept, das von S. Wenn man auf meinen Tisch schaut, ist es klar, dass Emotionen viel mehr mit den schnellen, wahrhaftigen Automatismen von S1 gemein haben als mit dem langsamen, wahren oder falschen Denken von S2, aber natürlich S1 S2 füttert und im Gegenzug S1-Automatismen werden oft modifiziert Von S2 und S2 "Gedanken" können automatisiert werden (S2A). Die Zusammenfassung von Budd ist ein passendes Ende des Buches (p165). "Die Ablehnung des Modells von ' Objekt und Bezeichnung ' für alltägliche psychologische Wörter - die Verleugnung, dass das Bild des inneren Prozesses eine korrekte Darstellung der Grammatik solcher Worte liefert, ist nicht der einzige Grund für Wittgensteins Feindseligkeit gegenüber dem Gebrauch Selbstverachtung in der Philosophie der Psychologie. Aber es ist sein ultimatives Fundament. " Nehmen wir nun eine weitere Dosis Searle. "Aber man kann ein physisches System wie eine Schreibmaschine oder ein Gehirn nicht erklären, indem man ein Muster identifiziert, das es mit seiner Computersimulation teilt, weil das Vorhandensein des Musters nicht erklärt, wie das System tatsächlich als physisches System funktioniert. ... Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass die Tatsache, dass die Zuordnung der Syntax keine weiteren kausalen Kräfte identifiziert, fatal für die Behauptung ist, dass Programme kausale Erkenntniserklärungen liefern. ... Es gibt nur einen physischen Mechanismus, das Gehirn, mit seinen verschiedenen realen physischen und physikalisch-/mentalen Kausalwerten der Beschreibung. " Suche Philosophie in einem neuen Jahrhundert (PNC) p101-103 76 "Kurz gesagt, das Gefühl der ' Informationsverarbeitung ', das in der Kognitionswissenschaft verwendet wird, ist viel zu hoch, um die konkrete biologische Realität der inneren Intentionalität zu erfassen ... Wir sind von diesem Unterschied geblendet durch die Tatsache, dass derselbe Satz "Ich sehe ein Auto auf mich zukommen" verwendet werden kann, um sowohl die visuelle Intentionalität als auch die Ausgabe des Computermodells der Vision zu erfassen ... Im Sinne von "Information", die in der Kognitionswissenschaft verwendet wird, ist es schlicht falsch zu sagen, dass das Gehirn ein Informationsverarbeitungsgerät ist. " Suche PNC p104-105 "Der vorsätzliche Zustand repräsentiert seine Bedingungen der Befriedigung ... Die Menschen gehen irrtümlich davon aus, dass jede mentale Repräsentation bewusst gedacht werden muss ... Aber der Begriff der Repräsentation, wie ich sie verwende, ist ein funktionaler und kein ontologischer Begriff. Alles, was Befriedigung hat, das in einer für die Intentionalität charakteristischen Weise erfolgreich sein oder scheitern kann, ist per Definition ein Darstellung seiner Befriedigung ... Wir können die Struktur der Intentionalität sozialer Phänomene analysieren, indem wir ihre Befriedigung analysieren. " Suche MSW p28-32 Und noch ein Schuss von Wittgenstein. "Philosophie legt einfach alles vor uns und erklärt auch nichts ... Man könnte den Namen geben "Philosophie" zu dem, was vor allen neuen Entdeckungen und Erfindungen möglich ist. " PI 126 "Je enger wir die eigentliche Sprache untersuchen, desto schärfer wird der Konflikt zwischen ihr und unserem Anspruch. (Denn die kristalline Reinheit der Logik war natürlich nicht das Ergebnis der Untersuchung: Sie war eine Voraussetzung.) " PI 107 "Hier stossen wir auf ein bemerkenswertes und charakteristisches Phänomen in der philosophischen Untersuchung: Die Schwierigkeit---könnte ich sagen---Ist Nicht die Lösung zu finden, sondern die, als die so zu erkennenLution etwas, das aussieht als Wenn es nur eine Vorstufe dazu wäre. Wir haben schon alles gesagt. ---Nicht irgendetwas, was daraus folgt, nein, das ist die Lösung! .... Ich glaube, das hängt damit zusammen, dass wir zu Unrecht eine Erklärung erwarten, während die Lösung der Schwierigkeit eine Beschreibung ist, wenn wir ihr den richtigen Platz in unseren Überlegungen geben. Wenn wir darauf wohnen und nicht versuchen, darüber hinauszukommen. " Zettel P312-314 Ein wichtiges Thema in der Diskussion über menschliches Verhalten ist die Notwendigkeit, die gentechnisch programmierten Automatismen von den Auswirkungen der Kultur zu trennen. Alle Studien über höheres Ordnungsverhalten sind ein Bemühen, nicht nur das schnelle S1 und das langsame S2-Denken (z.B. Wahrnehmungen und andere Automatismen vs. Dispositionen), sondern auch die logischen Erweiterungen von S2 in die 77 Kultur zu zerlegen. Suchs Arbeit Insgesamt bietet Eine verblüffende Beschreibung der höheren Ordnung S2 Sozialverhalten fällig Zum jüngsten Die Entwicklung von Genen für die Dispositionspsychologie, während das spätere W zeigt, wie es auf wahrheitsgetreuen-nur unbewussten Axiomen von S1 basiert, die sich zu einem bewussten Dispositionsdenken von S2 entwickelten. Eine Sache, die man im Hinterkopf behalten sollte, ist, dass Philosophie keinerlei praktische Auswirkungen hat, ausser um Verwechslungen darüber zu beseitigen, wie Sprache verwendet wird In besonderen Fällen. Wie verschiedene "physikalische Theorien", aber im Gegensatz zu anderen Zeichentrickansichten des Lebens (religiöse, politische, psychologische, soziologische, anthropologische), ist es zu zerebral und esoterisch, um von mehr als einem winzigen Rand erfasst zu werden, und es ist so unrealistisch, dass auch seine Anhänger In ihrem Alltag völlig ignorieren. Ebenso, Mit anderen akademischen "Theorien des Lebens" wie dem Standard Social Science Model, das von Soziologie, Anthropologie, Poppsychologie, Geschichte und Literatur geteilt wird. Allerdings, Religionen gross und klein, politische Bewegungen, und manchmal Wirtschaft generieren oder umarmen oft bereits existierende Karikaturen, die Physik und Biologie (menschliche Natur) ignorieren, setzen Kräfte terrestrisch oder kosmisch, die unsere Aberglauben verstärken (EP Standardwerte ) und helfen, die Erde zu verwüsten (der eigentliche Zweck fast jeder sozialen Praxis und Institution, die dazu da sind, die Replikation von Genen und den Konsum von Ressourcen zu erleichtern). Es geht darum zu erkennen, dass diese auf einem Kontinuum mit philosophischen Karikaturen stehen und die gleiche Quelle haben (unsere entwickelte Psychologie). Wir alle könnten gesagt werden, um generate/absorbieren verschiedene Karikaturenbilder des Lebens, wenn junge und nur wenige jemals aus ihnen wachsen. Beachten Sie auch, dass, wie W schon vor langer Zeit bemerkte, das Präfix "Meta" unnötig ist und Verwirrend in den meisten (vielleicht allen) Kontexten, also für "Metakognition" überall Ersatz "Kognition" oder "Denken", da das Denken über das, was wir oder andere glauben oder wissen, wie jedes andere denken und nicht als "Denkweise" (Verständnis der Agentur oder UA in meiner Terminologie) entweder. In S es Worten sind die COS der Test für das, was gedacht wird, und sie sind identisch für "es regnet," ich glaube, es regnet "und" er glaubt, es regnet "(ebenso für" weiss ", Wünsche, Richter, versteht, etc.), nämlich dass es Regnet. Dies ist die entscheidende Tatsache, die wir in Bezug auf "Metakognition" und "Mindreading" von Dispositionen ("Satzhaltung") im Auge behalten müssen. Nun zu ein paar Auszügen aus meiner Rezension von Carruthers ' (C) ' The Opacity of Mind ' (2013), die voll ist von den klassischen Verwechslungen, die als Wissenschaft verkleidet sind. Es war das Thema eines Prepis in Gehirn-und Verhaltenswissenschaften (BBS), das man sich nicht entgehen lassen sollte. 78 Eine der Antworten in BBS war von Dennett (der die meisten der Illusionen von C teilt), der diese Ideen recht gut zu finden scheint, ausser dass C die Verwendung von ' Ich ' eliminieren sollte, da es die Existenz eines höheren Selbst annimmt (das Ziel ist die harte Reduktion von S2 auf S1). Natürlich, Schon der Akt des Schreibens, des Lesens und all der Sprache und der Konzepte von allem, was auch immer, setzt sich selbst, Bewusstsein und Willen voraus (wie S oft anmerkt), so wäre ein solcher Bericht nur eine Karikatur des Lebens ohne jeden Wert, den man von den meisten sagen könnte. Philosophische und viele "wissenschaftliche" Disquisitionen über das Verhalten. Der W/S-Rahmen hat seit langem festgestellt, dass die erste-Die Sicht der Person ist nicht zu beseitigen oder auf eine dritte Person zu reduzieren, aber das ist kein Problem für die Karikatur Sicht des Lebens. Ebenso, Mit der Beschreibung von Gehirnfunktion oder Verhalten als ' rechnerisch ', ' Information processing ' etc.,--alles gut entlarvt unzählige Male von W/S, Hutto, Read, Hacker und vielen anderen. Das Schlimmste ist die entscheidende, aber völlig unklare "Repräsentation", für die S es Verwendung als Bedingung für Zufriedenheit (COS) bei weitem die beste ist. Das heisst, die "Darstellung" von "Ich denke, es regnet" ist das COS, das es regnet. Am satt ist, dass C (wie Dennett und Searle) denkt, er sei ein Experte auf W, nachdem er ihn früh in seiner Karriere studiert und beschlossen hat, dass das Argument der Privatsprache als "Verhaltensmuster" abzulehnen ist! W berühmt-berüchtigte Verhaltensweisen und ein grosser Teil seiner Arbeit widmet sich der Beschreibung, warum es nicht als Beschreibung des Verhaltens dienen kann. "Bist du nicht wirklich ein Verhaltensforscher Verkleidet? Sagen Sie nicht im Grunde wirklich, dass alles ausser menschlichem Verhalten eine Fiktion ist? Wenn ich von einer Fiktion spreche, dann ist es eine grammatikalische Fiktion. " (PI p307) Und man kann auch auf echten Verhaltensweisen in C in seiner modernen "Computeroperationen"Form. W/S bestehen auf der Unausweichlichkeit der ersten-Personenaussicht, während C sich bei D im BBSArtikel für die Verwendung von "I" oder "Selbst". Hutto hat die grosse Kluft zwischen W und Dennett (D), die zur Charact dienen wird gezeigtAuch C, da ich D nehme Und C (zusammen mit dem Kirchenland und vielen anderen) auf der gleichen Seite zu sein. S ist einer von vielen, die D in verschiedenen deconstructed haben Schriften Und diese können alle im Gegensatz zu C gelesen werden. Und erinnern wir uns daran, dass W an Beispielen von Sprache in Aktion festhält, und wenn man einmal den Punkt bekommt, dem er meistens sehr leicht zu folgen ist, während C von der "Theoretisierung" gefesselt ist (d.h. zahlreiche Sätze ohne klare COS ketten) und sich selten mit bestimmten Sprachspielen beschäftigt. , Experimente und Beobachtungen vorzuziehen, die in keiner definitiven Weise zu interpretieren sind (siehe BBS-Antworten), die in jedem Fall keine Relevanz für Verhaltensbeschreibungen auf höherer Ebene haben (z.B., wie sie genau in die Intentionalität passen. Tabelle). Ein Buch, das er als endgültig lobt (Memory and the Computational Brain), präsentiert das Gehirn als Recheninformationsprozessor - eine sophomorische Sicht gründlich und wiederholt von S und anderen vernichtet, darunter W in Die 30er Jahre. In den letzten zehn Jahren, Ich 79 habe Tausende von Seiten von und über W gelesen und es ist ganz klar, dass C keine Ahnung hat. Darin schliesst er sich einer langen Reihe von angesehenen Philosophen an, deren Lektüre von W ergebnislos war - Russell, Quine, Dummett, Kripke, Dennett, Putnam, Chomsky etc. (obwohl Putnam später anfing, das Licht zu sehen). Sie können einfach nicht die Botschaft verstehen, dass die meisten Philosophien grammatikalische Witze und unmögliche Vignetten - eine Karikaturenansicht des Lebens sind. Bücher wie ' Die Unfähigkeit des Geistes ', die versuchen, zwei zu überbrücken Wissenschaften Oder zwei Ebenen der Beschreibung sind wirklich zwei Bücher und nicht eins. Es gibt die Beschreibung (nicht Erklärung, wie W deutlich gemacht hat) von unserem sprachlichen und nonverbalen Verhalten und dann die Experimente der kognitiven Psychologie. "Die Existenz der experimentellen Methode lässt uns denken, dass wir die Mittel haben, um die Probleme zu lösen, die uns beunruhigen; Obwohl Problem und Die Methode geht an einander vorbei. " (W PI p232), Cet Die Wissenschaft begeistert und nimmt einfach an, dass es Es ist ein grosser Fortschritt, um hoch zu heiratenNiveau-und Experimentalpsychologie auf der Ebene der Neurowissenschaften und der experimentellen Psychologie, aber W/S und viele andere haben gezeigt, dass dies ein Fehler ist. Weit davon entfernt, die Beschreibung des Verhaltens wissenschaftlich und deutlich zu machen, macht sie sie inkohärent. Und es muss durch die Gnade Gottes gewesen sein, dass Locke, Kant, Nietzsche, Hume, Wittgenstein, Searle et al in der Lage waren, solche denkwürdigen Berichte über das Verhalten ohne irgendeine experimentelle Wissenschaft zu geben. Natürlich, Wie Politiker geben Philosophen selten Fehler ein oder schliessen sich ein, so wird das aus Gründen, die W perfekt diagnostiziert hat, immer weiter weitergehen. Das Fazit Er muss Sbe sein, was nützlich und was in unserem Alltag Sinn macht. Ich schlage vor, dass die philosophischen Ansichten von CDC (Carruthers, Dennett, Churchland), im Gegensatz zu denen von W/S, nicht nützlich sind und ihre endgültigen Schlussfolgerungen, die, sich selbst und Bewusstsein sind Illusionen, die überhaupt keinen Sinn machen - d.h. sie sind bedeutungslos, haben keine klaren COS. Ob die CDC-Kommentare zur kognitiven Wissenschaft einen heuristischen Wert haben, bleibt abzuwarten. Dieses Buch (wie ein riesiger Körper anderer Schriften) versucht, das HOT anderer Tiere zu diskreditieren und das Verhalten auf Hirnfunktionen zu reduzieren (um Psychologie in die Physiologie aufzunehmen). Die Philosophie ist eine Katastrophe, aber wenn man zuerst die vielen Kritiken in der BBS liest, mag der Kommentar zur jüngsten Psychologie und Physiologie interessant sein. Wie Dennett, Kirchenland und so viele andere oft tun, offenbart C seine wahren Edelsteine nicht Til Das Ende, wenn uns gesagt wird, dass wir sagen, dass das Selbst, der Wille, das Bewusstsein Illusionen sind (angeblich im normalen Sinne dieser Worte). Dennett musste von S, Hutto et al entlarvt werden, weil er diese "Aberglauben" (d.h. den üblichen philosophischen Schachzug unternimmt, überhaupt nicht zu erklären und in der Tat auch nicht einmal zu beschreiben), sondern erstaunlicherweise zu Beginn zugibt, obwohl er natürlich denkt, er zeigt, dass er es zeigt. Wir diese Worte bedeuten nicht, was wir denken, und dass seine Zeichentrickverwendung die gültige ist. 80 Man sollte auch Bennett und Hackers Kritik an der kognitiven Wissenschaft in "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience" (2003) und ihre Auseinandersetzung mit S und Dennett in "Neurowissenschaften und Philosophie" (2009-und verpassen Sie nicht den letzten Essay von Daniel Robinson verpassen) sehen. Gut erforscht wird es auch in Hackers drei aktuellen Büchern zum Thema "Human Nature". Es gibt schon lange Bücher über chemische Physik und physikalische Chemie, aber es gibt keine Anzeichen dafür, dass die beiden verschmelzen werden (noch ist es eine kohärente Idee), noch dass die Chemie die Biochemie absorbieren wird, noch wird sie wiederum Physiologie oder Genetik absorbieren, noch dass die Biologie verschwinden wird. Es wird auch nicht die Psychologie, Soziologie usw. eliminieren. Das liegt nicht an der "Jugend" dieser Disziplinen, sondern daran, dass es sich um unterschiedliche Beschreibungsebenen mit völlig unterschiedlichen Konzepten, Daten und Erklärungsmechanismen handelt. Aber Physik Neid ist Powerful Und wir können uns einfach nicht der "Präzision" von Physik, Mathematik, Information und Berechnung gegenüber der Unbestimmtheit höherer Ebenen widersetzen. Es muss "möglich sein. Reduktionismus gedeiht Trotz Die Unverständlichkeit der Quantenmechanik, die Unsicherheit, die Wellenflurtikel, die toten Katzen, die Quantenverflechtung und die Unvollständigkeit und Zufälligkeit der Mathematik (Godel/Chaitin- sehen, meine vollständige Überprüfung der Yanofsky es "The Outer Limits of Reason" und die Auszüge hier) und seine unwiderstehliche Anziehungskraft sagen uns, dass es auf die Zahlungsausfälle der EP zurückzuführen ist. Wieder, Ein Hauch dringend benötigter frischer Luft aus W: "Denn die kristalline Reinheit der Logik war natürlich kein Ergebnis der Untersuchung: Sie war Voraussetzung". PI p107. Es ist schwer zu widerstehen, die meisten Bücher über das Verhalten herunterzuwerfen und W und S neu zu lesen. Springen Sie einfach von allem, was versucht, höher zu "erklären" Bestellverhalten z.B. dieser Zitate aus PI http://topologicalmedialab.net/xinwei/classes/readings/Wittgenstein/pi_94-138_239309.html. Mir ist klar, dass der Versuch, eine derartige, auf höherem Niveau zu spezialisierende Psychologie zu machen, bei der die gewöhnliche Sprache sich in besondere Anwendungen sowohl absichtlich als auch versehentlich verwandelt, im Wesentlichen Unmöglich (d.h. die normale Situation in Philosophie und anderen Verhaltensdisziplinen). Mit speziellen Fachwörtern (z. B. Intensionsfähigkeit, Realismus etc.) Funktioniert auch nicht, da es keine Philosophie-Polizei gibt, um eine enge Definition durchzusetzen, und die Argumente, was sie bedeuten, sind endlos. Hacker ist gut, aber seine Schrift so kostbar und dicht ist es oft schmerzhaft. Die Suche ist sehr gut, erfordert aber einige Anstrengungen, um seine Terminologie zu akzeptieren und macht einige ungeheuerliche Fehler, während W die klarsten und aufschlussreichsten Hände ist, wenn man bekommt, was er tut, und niemand hat ihm jemals nacheifern können. Seine TLP bleibt die ultimative Aussage der mechanischen reduktionistischen Sicht des Lebens, aber er sah später seinen Fehler und diagnostizierte und heilte die "Karikaturenkrankheit," aber nur wenige bekommen den 81 Punkt und am meisten einfach ignorieren ihn und die Biologie als auch, und so gibt es Zehntausende von Büchern Und Millionen von Artikeln und die meisten religiösen und politischen Organisationen (und bis vor kurzem der grösste Teil der Wirtschaft) und fast alle Menschen mit Zeichentrickbilder auf das Leben. Aber die Welt ist keine Karikatur, so dass eine grosse Tragödie als die Karikatur Ansichten des Lebens gespielt wird (z.B. Sozialismus, Demokratie, Multikulturalismus) Kollidieren mit der Realität und die universelle Blindheit und Egoismus führen zum Zusammenbruch der Zivilisation. Es scheint mir ganz offensichtlich (wie es für W war), dass die mechanische Sicht des Geistes aus dem gleichen Grund existiert wie alle grundlegenden Verhaltensweisen - es ist die Standardoperation unserer EP, die Erklärungen in Bezug auf das sucht, was wir absichtlich langsam durchdenken können. Statt in der automatisierten S1, von der wir meist nicht wissen. Es ist jedoch wahr, dass der grösste Teil des Verhaltens mechanisch ist und dass die phenomenologische Illusion von weit grösserer Reichweite ist, als Searle beschreibt. Am auffälligsten fällt es mir auf, wenn ich auf der Autobahn Auto fahre und plötzlich wieder auf S2-Bewusstsein schnappe, um zu erkennen, dass ich gerade für mehrere Minuten ohne bewusstes Bewusstsein gefahren bin. Fahrverhalten Überhaupt. Bei näherer Betrachtung kann man diesen Automatismus für fast Alle Unser Verhalten, Mit minimaler Aufsicht und Bewusstsein von S2. Ich schreibe diese Seite und Muss "Denke" (Also, lassen Sie etwas Zeit vergehen) Über das, was zu sagen ist, aber dann fliesst es einfach in meine Hände, welche tippen es und im Grossen und Ganzen ist es eine Überraschung für mich, ausser wenn ich daran denke, einen bestimmten Satz zu ändern. Und Sie lesen es geben es geben Befehle an Ihren Körper, still zu sitzen und schauen Sie sich diesen Teil der Seite, Aber die Worte fliessen einfach in dich hinein und Eine Art Verständnis Und das Gedächtnis geschieht, Aber wenn man sich nicht auf einen Satz konzentriert, gibt es nur ein vages Gefühl, irgendetwas zu tun. Ein Fussballspieler läuft das Feld hinunter und tritt den Ball und Tausende von Nervenimpulsen und Muskelkontraktionen geschickt mit Augenbewegungen abgestimmt, und Rückmeldungen von propriokeptiven und Gleichgewichtsorganen sind aufgetreten, aber es gibt nur ein vages Gefühl der Kontrolle und Hoch-Niveaubewusstsein für die Ergebnisse. S2 ist der Polizeichef, der in seinem Büro sitzt, während S1 Tausende von Offizieren hat, die die eigentliche Arbeit nach Gesetzen machen, die er meistens nicht einmal kennt. Lesen, Schreiben oder Fussball sind freiwillige Handlungen A2 aus Oben, Aber bestanden aus Tausenden von automatischen Akten A1 von unten gesehen. Ein Grossteil der zeitgenössischen Verhaltenswissenschaft beschäftigt sich mit diesen Automatismen. Es ist eine gute Idee, zumindest Kapitel 6 von Searle es PNC zu lesen, "The phenomenological Illusion" (TPI). Es ist als Kristall klar, dass TPI auf die Vergessenheit gegenüber den Automatismen von S1 zurückzuführen ist und das langsame bewusste Denken von S2 nicht nur primär, sondern als alles, was es gibt, zu betrachten. Das ist klassischer Blank-Schleidblindheit. Klar ist auch, dass W Das rund 60 Jahre Früher und gab den Grund dafür im Primat des wahrhaft unbewussten unbewussten automatischen 82 axiomatischen Netzwerks unseres angeborenen Systems 1, das die Quelle des Inneren ist. Es ist grob, dass sich die "beobachterunabhängigen" Merkmale der Welt als S1 oder The Inner und die "beobachterabhängigen" Merkmale als S2 oder The Outer als sehr aufschlussreich erweisen sollten. Wie Searle bemerkt, haben die Phänomenologen die Ontologie genau rückwärts, aber natürlich ist es aufgrund der Ausfälle ihrer EP fast jeder. Eine weitere ausgezeichnete Arbeit an W, die ein genaues Studium verdient, ist Johnstons "Wittgenstein: Das Innere überdenken" (1993). Er stellt fest, dass einige einwenden werden, dass, wenn unsere Berichte und Erinnerungen wirklich sind Untestbar Sie hätten keinen Wert, aber "Dieser Einwand verfehlt den ganzen Punkt von W es Argumentation, denn er geht davon aus, dass das, was tatsächlich passiert ist und was der Einzelne sagt, zwei verschiedene Dinge sind. Wie wir jedoch gesehen haben, bedeutet die Grammatik der psychologischen Aussagen, dass letztere die Kriterien für die ersteren darstellt. Wenn wir jemanden sehen, der einen konzentrierten Ausdruck auf ihrem Gesicht hat und wissen wollen, was in ihr vor sich geht, dann ist ihr aufrichtigerSie sagt uns, dass sie es versucht Die Antwort auf eine komplizierte Summe zu erarbeiten, sagt uns genau, was wir wissen wollen. Die Frage, ob ihre Aussage trotz ihrer Aufrichtigkeit eine ungenaue Beschreibung dessen sein könnte, was sie tut (oder tat), stellt sich nicht. Die Quelle der Verwirrung ist hier das Versäumnis zu erkennen, dass psychologische Konzepte eine andere Grammatik haben als die von Konzepten, die verwendet werden, um äussere Ereignisse zu beschreiben. Was das Innere so geheimnisvoll erscheinen lässt, ist der fehlgeleitete Versuch, ein Konzept im Sinne eines anderen zu verstehen. In der Tat unser Konzept des Inneren, was wir meinen, wenn Wir sprechen von "dem, was in ihr vor sich ging", ist nicht mit geheimnisvollen inneren Prozessen verbunden, sondern mit dem Bericht, den das Individuum ihrer Erfahrung anbietet ... Als Prozesse oder Ereignisse ist das, was im Individuum geschieht, nicht von Interesse oder vielmehr von rein medizinischem oder wissenschaftlichem Interesse "(p13-14). "Der Angriff auf die Vorstellung innerer Prozesse bedeutet nicht, dass nur der Äussere wichtig ist, im Gegenteil; Indem er die wahre Natur der Äusserungen herausbringt, unterstreicht er die Tatsache, dass wir nicht nur am Verhalten interessiert sind. Wir wollen nicht nur wissen, dass der Körper der Person in einer solchen und so Position war und dass ihre Eigenschaften so und so angeordnet waren. Wir sind vielmehr an ihrem Bericht darüber interessiert, was hinter diesem Verhalten steckt ... " (p16-17) In der Begründung von W über die Unmöglichkeit privater Regeln oder einer Privatsprache stellt er fest: "Das eigentliche Problem ist jedoch nicht nur, dass sie es versäumt, Regeln zu erlassen, sondern dass sie das im Prinzip nicht tun konnte ... Der Punkt ist, dass sie ohne öffentlich überprüfbare Verfahren nicht unterscheiden konnte, ob sie der Regel folgt, und nur glauben würde, dass sie der Regel folgt. " Auf p55 macht Johnston in Bezug auf die Vision (die in diesem und anderen Kontexten mehrfach von W und S gemacht wurde) darauf aufmerksam, dass die Diskussion über die 83 Äusseren aufgrund ihrer sehr Verständlichkeit von der Unanfechtbarkeit unserer direkten ersten Seite völlig abhängig ist.-Die Erfahrung des Inneren. Das System 2 Skeptisch Zweifel an Verstand, Willen, Sinn, Welt können ohne die wahrheitsorientierten Gewissheiten von System 1 nicht Fuss fassen, und die Gewissheit, dass ihr diese Worte jetzt liest, ist die Grundlage für das Urteil, nicht für etwas, das man selbst beurteilen kann. Dieser Fehler ist einer der grundlegendsten und häufigsten in der gesamten Philosophie. Auf p81 weist er darauf hin, dass es im Normalfall unmöglich sei, Ihre Aussagen über Ihre Dispositionen zu überprüfen (oft, aber verwirrend als "Satzhaltung" bezeichnet), wie Sie dachten oder fühlen, weit davon entfernt, ein Defekt unserer Psychologie zu sein. , ist genau das, was diese Aussagen interessiert. "Ich bin müde" erzählt uns, wie man sich fühlt, anstatt uns ein weiteres bisschen Daten über den Äusseren zu geben, wie eure langsamen Bewegungen oder die Schatten unter den Augen. Johnston macht dann eine hervorragende Arbeit, um W es Entlarvung der Idee zu erklären, dass Bedeutung oder Verständnis (und alle Dispositionen) Erfahrungen sind, die die Sprache begleiten. Wie W ausführte, betrachten Sie nur den Fall, in dem Sie denken, dass Sie verstehen, und dann herausfinden, dass Sie es nicht getan haben, um die Bedeutungslosigkeit jeder inneren Erfahrung zu sehen, um Bedeutung, Verständnis, Denken, Glauben, Wissen usw. Die Erfahrung, die zählt das Bewusstsein für das öffentliche Sprachspiel, an dem wir teilnehmen. Ähnliche Überlegungen lösen das Problem der "Blitzgeschwindigkeit des Denkens". "Der Schlüssel liegt darin, zu erkennen, dass das Denken kein Prozess oder eine Abfolge von Erfahrungen ist, sondern ein Aspekt des Lebens bewusster Wesen. Was der Blitzgeschwindigkeit des Denkens entspricht, ist die Fähigkeit des Einzelnen, jederzeit zu erklären, was sie tut oder sagt. " (P86). Und wie W sagt: "Oder, wenn man den Anfang und das Ende des Satzes den Anfang und das Ende des Gedankens nennt, dann ist nicht klar, ob man von der Erfahrung des Denkens sagen sollte, dass er in dieser Zeit einheitlich ist, oder ob es ein Prozess ist, wie der Satz zu sprechen. Selbst "(RPP2p237). Noch einmal: "Die Einzelne berichtet von dem, was sie dachte, hat die gleiche Grammatik wie ihre Darstellung dessen, was sie beabsichtigt und was sie meinte. Was uns interessiert, ist die Darstellung der Vergangenheit, die sie zu geben geneigt ist, und die Annahme, dass sie in der Lage sein wird, einen Bericht zu geben, ist Teil dessen, was damit verbunden ist, sie als bewusst zu betrachten "(S. 91). Das heisst, all diese Dispositionsverben sind Teil unserer bewussten, freiwilligen S2-Psychologie. In "Die Komplexität des Inneren" stellt er fest, dass es ironisch ist, dass unser bester Weg, das Innere zu kommunizieren, darin besteht, sich auf die Äusseren Aber ich würde sagen, es ist sowohl natürlich als auch unvermeidlich. Da es keine Privatsprache und keine Telepathie gibt, können wir nur Muskeln zusammenziehen und die mit Abstand effizienteste und tiefste Kommunikation ist durch die Kontraktion der Mundmuskulatur (Sprache). Wie W in mehreren Zusammenhängen kommentierte, sehen wir in 84 Theaterstücken (oder jetzt in Fernseh-und Filmen) Sprache (Denken) in ihrer reinsten Form. Zerstretungen wie beabsichtigt weitergehen Solange Wir ändern oder vergessen sie nicht und haben somit keine genaue Dauer sowie ein Mass an Intensität, und der Inhalt ist eine Entscheidung und somit kein genauer mentaler Zustand, so dass sie sich in all diesen Belangen von S1-Wahrnehmungen, Erinnerungen und reflexiven Reaktionen wie S1 unterscheiden. Emotionen. Der Unterschied zwischen S1 und S2 (wie ich es ausdrückte-das war keine Terminologie, die J oder W zur Verfügung stand) wird auch in der Asymmetrie der Dispositionsverben gesehen, wobei die erste Person "Ich glaube" usw. verwendet, wobei (im normalen Fall der aufrichtigen Äusserung) nur wahre Sätze gegen die th Irre Person verwendet "er glaubt" usw., wobei er wahr ist oder falsche Beweismittel. Man kann nicht sagen: "Ich glaube, es regnet und es ist nicht", aber andere Verse wie "Ich glaubte, es regnete und es war nicht" oder die dritte Person "Er glaubt, es regnet und es ist nicht" sind in Ordnung. Wie J sagt: "Die allgemeine Frage, die hier im Mittelpunkt steht, ist, ob der Einzelne seine eigenen Dispositionen beobachten kann ... Der Schlüssel zur Klärung dieses Paradoxons besteht darin, festzustellen, dass die Beschreibung ihres eigenen Geisteszustandes indirekt auch die Beschreibung eines Zustandes von Angelegenheiten... Mit anderen Worten: Jemand, der sagt, sie glaube, dass P damit verpflichtet ist, P selbst zu behaupten ... Der Grund dafür, dass das Individuum seine Überzeugung nicht einhalten kann, ist, dass durch die Annahme einer neutralen oder Auswertende Haltung gegenüber ihr, sie untergräbt sie. Jemand, der sagte "Ich glaube, es regnet, aber es ist nicht" würde damit ihre eigene Behauptung untergraben. Wie W anmerkt, kann es keine erste Person, die der dritten Person entspricht, das Verb aus dem gleichen Grund zu verwenden, dass ein Verb, das bedeutet, falsch zu glauben, eine erste Person, die ein Richtfest ... Die beiden Sätze sind nicht unabhängig, denn "die Behauptung, dass dies in mir geschieht, behauptet: Das geht ausserhalb von mir" (RPP1 p490) "(p154-56). Obwohl nicht kommentiert von W oder J, die Tatsache, dass Kinder nie solche Fehler wie "Ich will die Süssigkeiten Aber ich glaube nicht, dass ich es will "etc., zeigt, dass solche Konstruktionen in unsere Grammatik (in unsere Gene) eingebaut sind und nicht in kulturelle Ergänzungsmöglichkeiten. Er betrachtet dies dann von einem anderen Standpunkt aus, indem er W "Was wäre der Sinn, wenn ich aus meinen eigenen Worten Schlussfolgerungen zu meinem Verhalten ziehen würde, wenn ich auf jeden Fall weiss, was ich glaube? Und was ist die Manifestation meines Wissens, was ich glaube? Ist es nicht gerade in diesem manifestiert-, dass ich nicht meine Verhalten Aus meinen Worten? Das ist die Tatsache. " (RPP1 p744). Eine andere Möglichkeit, dies zu sagen, ist, dass S1 die axiomatische, wahrheitslose Grundlage für die Erkenntnis ist, und als das nicht-propositionelle Substrat zur Bestimmung von Wahrheit und Falschheit, kann nicht verständlich beurteilt werden. Er beendet das Kapitel mit wichtigen Kommentaren über die Variabilität innerhalb der LG 85 es (innerhalb unserer Psychologie) und ich schlage vor, es sorgfältig zu lesen. Johnston setzt die Diskussion in "The Inner/Outer Picture" fort, von der vieles in seinem Zitat aus W zusammengefasst wird. "Das Innere ist vor uns verborgen, bedeutet, dass es uns in dem Sinne verborgen ist, dass es nicht vor ihm verborgen ist. Und es ist nicht verborgen vor dem Besitzer in dem Sinne, dass er es zum Ausdruck bringt, und wir, unter bestimmten Bedingungen, glauben seinen Ausdruck und es, Fehler hat keinen Platz. Und diese Asymmetrie im Spiel drückt sich in dem Satz aus, dass das Innere vor anderen Menschen verborgen ist. " (LWPP2 p36). J fährt fort: "Das Problem ist nicht, dass das Innere verborgen ist, sondern dass das Sprachspiel, das es mit sich bringt, sehr anders ist als das, in dem wir normalerweise über Wissen sprechen." Und dann er Einsteigt Eines der Hauptthemen von W - den Unterschied zwischen Mensch und Maschine. "Aber mit einem Menschen geht man davon aus, dass es unmöglich ist, einen Einblick in den Mechanismus zu gewinnen. So, Unbestimmtheit postuliert ... Ich glaube, dass die Unberechenbarkeit ein wesentliches Merkmal des Inneren sein muss. Ebenso wie die unendliche Vielfalt der Ausdrucksformen. " (RPP2 P645 und LWPP2 p65). Wieder, W untersucht den Unterschied zwischen Tieren und Computern. J stellt fest, dass die Unsicherheiten in unseren LG es keine Mängel sind, sondern entscheidend für unsere Menschlichkeit. Wieder W: "[Was zählt] nicht, dass die Beweise das Gefühl (und damit das Innere) nur wahrscheinlich machen, sondern dass wir dies als Beweis für etwas Wichtiges behandeln, dass wir ein Urteil auf diese Art von Beweisen stützen, und damit solche Beweise eine besondere Bedeutung in unserem Leben und wird durch ein Konzept hervorgehoben. " (Z p554). J sieht drei Aspekte dieser Ungewissheit als das Fehlen festgelegter Kriterien oder feiner Bedeutungsschattierungen, das Fehlen einer starren Bestimmung der Folgen innerer Zustände und das Fehlen fester Beziehungen zwischen unseren Konzepten und Erfahrungen. W: "One Kann nicht sagen, was die wesentlichen beobachtbaren Folgen eines inneren Zustandes sind. Wenn er sich zum Beispiel wirklich freut, was ist dann von ihm zu erwarten, und was nicht? Es gibt natürlich solche charakteristischen Folgen, aber sie können nicht so beschrieben werden wie Reaktionen, die den Zustand eines physischen Objekts charakterisieren. " (LWPP2 p90). J "Hier ist ihr innerer Zustand nicht etwas, was wir nicht wissen können, weil wir nicht in den Schleier des Äusseren eindringen können. Es gibt vielmehr nichts Bestimmtes zu wissen. " (P195). In seinem letzten Kapitel, Er stellt fest, dass sich unsere LG es nicht ändern dürften, unabhängig vom wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt. "Obwohl es denkbar ist, dass sich das Studium der Hirnaktivität als zuverlässiger Vorhersager menschlichen Verhaltens herausstellen könnte, wäre die Art des Verständnisses menschlichen Handelns, die es gab, nicht das gleiche wie das, das in das Sprachspiel über die Absichten involviert ist. Was auch immer der Wert des Wissenschaftlers ist'Man kann nicht sagen, dass er die Absichten entdeckt hat. " (P213). 86 Diese Unbestimmtheit führt zu der Vorstellung, dass eine Korrelation von Hirnzuständen mit Dispositionen unwahrscheinlich erscheint. "Die Schwierigkeit hier ist, dass der Begriff eines Gedankens ein sehr künstlicher Begriff ist. Wie viele Gedanken gibt es in der Tractatus? Und als die Grundidee dafür W traf, war das ein Gedanke oder ein Ausschlag von ihnen? Der Begriff der Absichten schafft ähnliche Probleme ... Diese nachfolgenden Aussagen können alle Als Verstärkungen oder Erklärungen des ursprünglichen Gedankens, aber wie soll man annehmen, dass dies mit dem Hirnzustand zusammenhängt? Sollen wir uns vorstellen, dass auch sie die Antwort auf jede mögliche Frage zu dem Gedanken enthalten wird? ..Wir müssten zulassen, dass zwei signifikant unterschiedliche Gedanken mit dem gleichen Hirnzustand korreliert sind ... Worte können in einem Sinne austauschbar sein und in einem anderen Sinne nicht. Das schafft Probleme für den Versuch, Hirnzustände und Gedanken zu korrelieren ... Zwei Gedanken können die In einem Sinne und in einem anderen unterschiedlich ... Daher ist die Vorstellung eines Gedankens ein zerbrechlicher und künstlicher, und aus diesem Grund ist es schwer zu erkennen, welchen Sinn es machen könnte, von einer Eins-zu-Eins-Korrelation mit den Hirnzuständen zu sprechen. " (P218219). Das heisst, der gleiche Gedanke (COS) "Es regnet" drückt eine unendliche Anzahl von Hirnzuständen in einem oder vielen Menschen aus. Ebenso, Der ' gleiche ' Hirnzustand könnte verschiedene Gedanken (COS) in verschiedenen Kontexten ausdrücken. Ebenso bestreitet W, dass das Gedächtnis aus Spuren im Nervensystem besteht. "Hier ist die postulierte Spur wie die innere Uhr, denn wir lassen nicht mehr aus, was von einer Spur passiert ist, als wir eine innere Uhr konsultieren, um die Zeit zu erraten." Er notiert dann ein Beispiel aus W (RPP1 p908) eines Mannes, der beim Lesen spöttische Spuren markiert und den Text nicht wiederholen kann, ohne dass er Markiert Sie beziehen sich aber nicht auf den Text nach Regeln ... "Die Der Text würde nicht in den Jottings gespeichert. Und warum sollte es gelagert werden In unserem Nervensystem? "Und Auch "... Nichts erscheint mir plausibler, als dass die Menschen eines Tages zu der eindeutigen Meinung kommen werden, dass es weder im physiologischen noch im Nervensystem eine Kopie gibt, die einem bestimmten Gedanken oder einer bestimmten Vorstellung von Erinnerung entspricht "(LWPP1 p504). Das bedeutet, dass es psychologische Regelmässigkeiten geben kann, denen keine physiologischen Regelmässigkeiten entsprechen; Und wie W provokant hinzufügt: "Wenn das unsere Kausalitätskonzepte stört, dann ist es höchste Zeit, dass sie sich aufregen." " (RPP1 p905) ... "Warum sollten nicht die Anfangs-und Endzustände eines Systems durch ein Naturgesetz verbunden werden, das den Zwischenzustand nicht abdeckt? (RPP1 p909) ... [Es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, dass] es im Gehirn keinen Prozess gibt, der mit assoziiertem oder Denken korreliert, so dass es unmöglich wäre, Denkprozesse aus Gehirnprozessen abzulesen ... Warum sollte diese Ordnung sozusagen nicht aus dem Chaos herauskommen? ... Ausgleichsam kauserweise; Und es gibt keinen Grund, warum dies nicht wirklich für unsere Gedanken und damit für unser Reden und Schreiben gelten sollte.'(RPP1 p903) ... Aber muss es hier eine physiologische Erklärung geben? Warum lassen wir die Erklärung nicht einfach allein? -aber man würde nie so reden, wenn man das Verhalten einer Maschine untersucht! – Wer sagt, dass ein Lebewesen, ein tierischer Körper, eine 87 Maschine in diesem Sinne ist? " (RPPI p918) (p 220-21). Natürlich, Man kann diese Kommentare unterschiedlich nehmen, aber ein Weg ist, dass W den Aufstieg der Chaostheorie, verkörperte Geist und Selbst vorwegnimmt.-Organisation in Biologie. Da Unsicherheit, Chaos und Unberechenbarkeit heute gängige Doktrin sind, von subatomarer bis molekularer Skala, und in der Planetendynamik (Wetter etc.) und der Kosmologie, warum sollte das Gehirn eine Ausnahme sein? Die einzigen ausführlichen Bemerkungen zu diesen Bemerkungen, die ich gesehen habe, finden sich in einem kürzlich erschienenen Papier von Daniele. Moyal-Sharrock (DMS). Es ist ziemlich auffällig, dass, obwohl W es Beobachtungen sind grundlegend für alle Studien von Verhalten - Linguistik, Philosophie, Psychologie, Geschichte, Anthropologie, Politik, Soziologie und Kunst wird er in den meisten Büchern und Artikeln nicht einmal erwähnt, wobei selbst die Ausnahmen wenig zu sagen haben, und das meiste davon verzerrt oder flach falsch. Es gibt eine Flut von jüngstem Interesse, zumindest an der Philosophie, und möglicherweise wird sich diese absurde Situation ändern, aber wahrscheinlich nicht viel. Die Diskussion über den logischen (psychologischen) Unterschied zwischen den S1Ursachen und den S2-Gründen in Kapitel 7 von Hackers jüngstem Buch "Human Nature" (2011), insbesondere p226-32, ist für jeden Schüler des Verhaltens von entscheidender Bedeutung. Es ist eine fast universelle Illusion, dass "Ursache" ein exakter logisch exakter Begriff ist, während "Grund" Nicht Aber W hat das oft aufgedeckt. Natürlich, Das gleiche Problem stellt sich bei allen wissenschaftlichen und mathematischen KonzeptenS. Und natürlich muss man Immer im Hinterkopf: "Handeln", "Zustand", "Zufriedenheit", "Absicht" und sogar "und" und "," oder "," vor "," wahr "usw. sind alle komplexe Sprachspiele, die in der Lage sind, uns als W so schön in der BBB in den frühen 30er Jahren so schön beschrieben zu bereisen. Suchen machen viele interessante Bemerkungen in einem seiner jüngsten Bücher "Thinking About the Real World" (TARW)(2013),and ich die einzige Rezension geschrieben habe, werde ich sie hier ausführlich besprechen. Auf p21 von TARW stossen wir wieder auf den meiner Meinung nach eklatantesten Fehler in S es Werk, der schon längst hätte vermieden werden müssen, wenn er das spätere W und seine Kommentatoren nur noch genauer gelesen hätte. Er bezeichnet den freien Willen als eine "Annahme", dass wir vielleicht aufgeben müssen! Es ist glasklar aus W, dass wir, das Selbst, die Welt und alle Phänomene unseres Lebens, die Grundlage für das Urteilen-das axiomatische Fundament unseres Verhaltens sind und es keine Möglichkeit gibt, sie zu beurteilen. Können wir "annehmen", dass wir zwei Hände haben oder auf der Erdoberfläche leben oder dass Madonna eine Sängerin ist usw.? Vielleicht dieser grosse Fehler Mit Seine Vermischung von wahrer nur S1 und Satzung S2, die ich festgestellt habe. Erstaunlich, dass er fast alles richtig machen kann und darüber stolpert! 88 Auf p22 und anderswo verwendet er den Begriff der unbewussten Intentionalität, den er erstmals in seinem 1991 erschienenen Papier in Phil besprach. Themen, in denen er feststellte, dass dies die Art von Dingen sind, die bewusst werden könnten (z.B. Träume). W war ich der erste, der zu diesem Hinweis kommentierte, dass man, wenn man nicht von unbewussten Gedanken sprechen kann, auch nicht von bewussten (BBB) sprechen kann. Hier und während seiner Arbeit ist es unversöhnlich, dass er die S1/S2-Konzepte, da es so viel einfacher ist, die Dinge gerade zu halten, und er findet es immer noch notwendig, sich sehr un-Wittgensteinian Jargon. Z.B.: "Einmal haben Sie manipulierbar Syntaktische Elemente, Sie Kann die Intentionalität von ihren unmittelbaren Ursachen in Form von Wahrnehmungen und Erinnerungen lösen, so dass es nicht möglich ist, Abteilungen von Unsynchron Strukturierte Repräsentationselemente. " (P31) sagt nur, dass mit der Sprache die dispositionale Intentionalität von S2 kam, Wo bewusstes Denken und Vernunft (Das heisst, mögliche öffentliche Aktionen, die in der Sprache ausdrucksfähig sind) Möglich wurde. Zu Gründen und Wünschen (p39) siehe an anderer Stelle hier und meine Rezensionen seiner anderen Werke. S es fortgesetzte Bezugnahme auf Dispositionen als mentale Zustände, und seine rAbweicht zu psychischen Zuständen als Vertretungen (eigentlich ' Präsentationen ' hier) mit COS, ist (aus meiner Sicht) kontraproduktiv. Auf p25 z.B. scheint es, dass er sagen will, dass der Apfel, den wir sehen, das COS der CSR ist – (Kausal Selbst Reflexiv--d.h., Ursache ist eingebaut) Wahrnehmung des Apfels und das reflexive unbewusste Kratzen eines Juckreiz hat den gleichen Status (d.h. ein COS) wie die bewusst geplante Bewegung des Armes. So, Die mentalen Zustände von S1 sollen in die Aktionen von S2 als COS einbezogen werden. Obwohl ich den grössten Teil der Ontologie und Epistemologie von S akzeptiere, sehe ich nicht den Vorteil, aber ich habe den grössten Respekt vor ihm, also werde ich daran arbeiten. Ich habe seine Neigung (normal für andere, aber ein Fehler in der Suche) zur Kenntnis genommen, S1 und S2 zu mischen, was er auf p29 tut, wo er sich auf Glaubenssätze als mentale Zustände zu beziehen scheint. Es scheint mir ganz einfach und klar, seit W es BBB in den 30er Jahren, dass S2 keine mentalen Zustände in so etwas wie der Sinn der S1. Wir müssen immer den Unterschied zwischen den Sprachspielen von S1 und S2 klar halten und wenn er also darauf besteht, das Spiel des Glaubens in Bezug auf S1 zu verwenden, dann ist es viel klarer, wenn wir uns auf B1 und B2 beziehen, wo B2 das Wort "Glaube" ist, wie es in Bezug auf die Öffentliche sprachliche Handlungen von System 2. Der Absatz "Weil" auf p25 diskutiert die wahrhaft unbewussten Wahrnehmungen, Erinnerungen und reflexiven Handlungen von S1-i.e., unsere axiomatische Automatische Funktionen unserer entwickelten Psychologie (EP). Wie bereits erwähnt, kann man Hutto und Myin es Buch "Radikalisierung Enaktivismus: Basic Minds without Content ' (2012) Und ihre Fortsetzung Für eine ganz andere neuere Darstellung der nicht-gegenständlichen oder 89 enaktiven Natur von S1. Die Tabelle der Intentionalität auf p26 Updates, die er seit Jahrzehnten verwendet und die ich als Grundlage für meine erweiterte Tabelle oben verwendet habe. Vor fast einem halben Jahrhundert schrieb S: "Wie man daraus ableiten sollte, ist" was ein revolutionärer Fortschritt in unserem Verständnis von Verhalten war. (Allerdings weniger, wenn man W verstand). Er hat die naturalistische Beschreibung des Verhaltens weiter entwickelt und zeigt auf p39, wie Ethik in unserem angeborenen sozialen Verhalten entsteht. Und Sprache. Ein Grundkonzept ist der Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA), Was in seinen verschiedenen Büchern erklärt wird. Für einen Überblick über meine Rezensionen seiner MSW und anderen Arbeiten. Er neigt dazu, die unmittelbaren Gründe von S2 (d.h. dispositionelle Psychologie und Kultur) zu verwenden, um seine Analyse zu rahmen, aber wie bei jedem Verhalten halte ich sie für oberflächlich, es sei denn, es enthält die letzten Ursachen in S1 und so zerbreche ich seine DIRA in DIRA1 und DIRA2. Dies ermöglicht die Beschreibung in Bezug auf die unbewussten Mechanismen des gegenseitigen Altruismus und der inklusiven Fitness. So, Ich würde den letzten Satz auf p39 "... Die Menschen werden aufgefordert, ihre natürlichen Neigungen zu überschreiben, indem sie ethische Erwägungen vorherrschen lassen "wie" ... Die Menschen sind gezwungen, ihre unmittelbaren persönlichen Vorteile zu überschreiben, um durch gegenseitigen Altruismus und integrative Fitness langfristige genetische Vorteile zu sichern. " S es Vergessenheit (die er mit den meisten Philosophen teilt) gegenüber den beiden modernen Systemen Framework, Und zu den vollen Implikationen von W es "radikaler" Epistemologie, wie sie am dramatischsten in seinem letzten Werk ' On Certainty ' angegeben, ist höchst unglücklich (wie ich in vielen Rezensionen festgestellt habe). Es war W, der die erste und beste Arbeit geleistet hat, um die beiden Systeme zu beschreiben (obwohl niemand sonst bemerkt hat) und OC stellt ein grosses Ereignis in der Geistesgeschichte dar. S ist sich nicht nur nicht bewusst, dass sein Rahmen eine einfache Fortsetzung von W ist, sondern alle anderen auch, was für das Fehlen eines signifikanten Hinweises auf W in Dieses Buch. Wie üblich stellt man auch keine offensichtliche Bekanntschaft mit EP fest, die alle Verhaltensdiskussionen aufklären kann, indem sie die wirklichen ultimativen evolutionären und biologischen Erklärungen liefert und nicht die oberflächlichen nahen kulturellen. So, S es Diskussion über die beiden Arten, Empfindungen (' Erlebnisse ') auf p202 zu beschreiben, ist meiner Ansicht nach viel deutlicher, wenn man erkennt, dass das Sehen von Rot oder das Gefühl von Schmerz automatisch wahrheitsgetreue S1 ist, aber sobald wir uns bewusst darum kümmern (ca. 500) Ms Oder mehr) es wird "Sehen als" und eine propositionelle (wahre oder falsche) S2-Funktion, die öffentlich in der Sprache ausgedrückt werden kann (und andere körperliche Muskelkontraktionen als auch). So, Die S1 ' Erfahrung ', die mit Rot oder dem Schmerz gegen die S2 ' Erfahrung ' von Rot oder Schmerz 90 identisch ist, sobald wir anfangen, darüber nachzudenken, werden normalerweise zu einer ' Erfahrung ' zusammengefügt. Für mich ist der bei weitem beste Ort, um diese Themen zu verstehen, sBis in W es Schriften beginnt Mit der BBB und endet mit OC. Niemand sonst hat die Feinheiten der Sprachspiele jemals so klar beschrieben. Man muss ständig die Unbestimmtheit und die vielfältigen Bedeutungen von "Fehler", "wahr", "Erfahrung", "verstehen", "wissen", "sehen", "gleichen" usw. im Auge behalten, aber nur W war in der Lage, es zu tun, - sogar S stolpert häufig. Und es ist kein triviales Thema - es sei denn, man kann klar und deutlich sagen Alle P202, das die wahrhaft nicht urteilbare S1 von der propositionellen S2 trennt, kann man nichts über das Verhalten ohne Verwirrung sagen. Und natürlich, Sehr Oft werden (d.h. normalerweise) Wörter ohne klare Bedeutung - einem verwendet. Er muss Geben Sie an, wie "wahr" oder "folgt aus" oder "sehen" in diesem Zusammenhang verwendet werden soll, und W ist der einzige, den ich kenne, der das konsequent richtig versteht. Wieder Auf p203-206, die Diskussion der an sich vorsätzlichen automatischen Kausalen disposItionality Nur sinnvoll Ich, weil ich es nur als eine andere Art und Weise, S1 Staaten zu beschreiben, Die den Rohstoff für bewusstes S2 liefern Disposition Was muss aus biologischer evolutionärer Sicht (und was kann es noch geben?) sein. So ist sein Kommentar zu p212 richtig auf das Geld - die ultimative Erklärung (oder wie W die Beschreibung betont) nur eine eingebürgerte sein kann, die beschreibt, wie Geist, Wille, Selbst und Absicht funktionieren und sie nicht als "reale" Phänomene sinnvoll beseitigen können. Erinnern Sie sich an S es berühmte Rezension von Dennetts ' Consciousness Explained ' mit dem Titel "Das Bewusstsein wird weg erklärt". Und das macht es Umso mehr bizarr, dass S immer wieder sagen sollte, dass wir nicht sicher wissen, ob wir freien Willen haben und dass wir ein Selbst "postulieren" müssen (p218-219). Auch, Ich denke noch einmal, dass S auf dem falschen Weg ist (p214), wenn er andeutet, dass die Verwechslungen auf historische Fehler in der Philosophie wie Dualismus, Idealismus, Materialismus, Epiphänomenalismus etc. zurückzuführen sind, anstatt in der universellen Anfälligkeit für die Vorstände unserer Psychologie - "Die phänomenologische Illusion" (TPI), wie er sie nannte, und Bewitterungsweine nach Sprache, wie sie W. schön beschrieben hat. Wie er feststellt: "Die neurobiologischen Prozesse und die mentalen Phänomene sind das gleiche Ereignis, das auf verschiedenen Ebenen beschrieben wird" und "Wie können bewusste Absichten körperliche Bewegung verursachen? ... Wie kann der Hammer den Nagel bewegen, weil er fest ist? ... Analyst man, welche Solidität kausal ist ... Wenn man analysiert, was Absicht in Aktion kausal ist, sieht man analog, dass es kein philosophisches Problem gibt. " Ich würde seinen Kommentar übersetzen (p220) "Ein Sprecher kann einen Ausdruck verwenden, um sich nur zu beziehen, wenn in der Äusserung der vorlegenden Ausdrücke der Redner eine Bedingung einführt, unter der das betreffende Objekt erfüllt; Und der Bezug wird durch die Befriedigung dieser Bedingung erreicht. "Als" Bedeutung wird erreicht, indem man eine öffentlich überprüfbare Bedingung der Befriedigung 91 (Wahrheitsbedingung) angibt. " "Ich denke, es regnet" ist wahr, wenn es regnet und sonst falsch. Auch, Ich würde sagen: "Das Herzstück meiner Argumentation ist, dass unsere sprachlichen Praktiken, wie allgemein verstanden, eine Realität voraussetzen, die unabhängig von unseren Darstellungen existiert." (P223) als "Unser Leben zeigt eine Welt, die nicht von unserer Existenz abhängt und nicht verständlich herausgefordert werden kann." Zeit für ein paar weitere Zitate und eine Diskussion über sein jüngstes Buch über Nachdrucke "Philosophie in einem neuen Jahrhundert" (2008) und wie anderswo werde ich einige wiederholen Kommentare, um sie in einen anderen Kontext zu stellen. "Könnte ein Maschinenprozess einen Denkprozess verursachen? Die Antwort lautet: Ja. Tatsächlich, Nur ein Maschinenprozess kann einen Denkprozess verursachen, und die "Berechnung" nennt keinen Maschinenprozess; Es benennt einen Prozess, der auf einer Maschine implementiert werden kann und in der Regel auch umgesetzt wird. " Suche PNC p73 "... Die Charakterisierung eines Prozesses als rechnungsgemäss ist eine Charakterisierung eines physikalischen Systems von aussen; Und die Identifizierung des Prozesses als rechnungsbezogen identifiziert kein wesentliches Merkmal der Physik, sondern im Wesentlichen eine relative Charakterisierung des Beobachters. " Suche PNC p95 "Das Argument des chinesischen Zimmers zeigte, dass Semantik nicht der Syntax innewohnt. Ich mache jetzt den separaten und anderen Punkt, dass Syntax nicht der Physik eigen ist. " Suche PNC p94 "Der Versuch, den Homunculus-Trugschluss durch rekursive Zersetzung zu beseitigen, scheitert, weil der einzige Weg, die Syntax, die der Physik innewohnt, zu erreichen ist, einen Homunculus in die Physik zu bringen." Suche PNC p97 "Aber man kann ein physisches System wie eine Schreibmaschine oder ein Gehirn nicht erklären, indem man ein Muster identifiziert, das es mit seiner Computersimulation teilt, weil das Vorhandensein des Musters nicht erklärt, wie das System tatsächlich als physisches System funktioniert. ... Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass die Tatsache, dass die Zuordnung der Syntax keine weiteren kausalen Kräfte identifiziert, fatal für die Behauptung ist, dass Programme kausale Erkenntniserklärungen liefern ... Es gibt nur einen physischen Mechanismus, das Gehirn, mit seinen verschiedenen realen physischen und physikalisch-/mentalen Kausalwerten der Beschreibung. " Suche PNC p101-103 "Kurz gesagt, das Gefühl der ' Informationsverarbeitung ', das in der Kognitionswissenschaft verwendet wird, ist viel zu hoch, um die konkrete biologische Realität der inneren Intentionalität zu erfassen ... Wir sind von diesem Unterschied geblendet durch die Tatsache, dass derselbe Satz "Ich sehe ein Auto auf mich zukommen" 92 verwendet werden kann, um sowohl die visuelle Intentionalität als auch die Ausgabe des Computermodells der Vision zu erfassen ... Im Sinne von "Information", die in der Kognitionswissenschaft verwendet wird, ist es schlicht falsch zu sagen, dass das Gehirn ein Informationsverarbeitungsgerät ist. " Suche PNC p104-105 "Kann es Handlungsgründe geben, die für einen rationalen Wirkstoff bindend sind, nur aufgrund der Art der Tatsache, dass in der Begründung Aussage angegeben, Und unabhängig von den Wünschen, Werten, Einstellungen und Bewertungen? ... Das wirkliche Paradoxon der Die traditionelle Diskussion ist, dass sie versucht, Humes Guillotine, die starre Unterscheidung mit Fakten, in einem Vokabular zu präsentieren, deren Verwendung bereits die Falschheit der Unterscheidung voraussetzt. " Suche PNC p165-171 "... Alle Statusfunktionen und damit die gesamte institutionelle Realität, mit Ausnahme der Sprache, werden durch Sprechakte geschaffen, die die logische Form der Deklarationen haben ... Die Formen der Statusfunktion, um die es hier geht, sind fast ausnahmslos Angelegenheiten deontischer Kräfte ... Etwas als Recht, Pflicht, Verpflichtung, Forderung und so weiter anzuerkennen, ist ein Grund zum Handeln ... Diese deontischen Strukturen ermöglichen erwünschte Handlungsgründe ... Der allgemeine Punkt ist ganz klar: Die Schaffung des allgemeinen Feldes der erwünschten Handlungsgründe setzte die Akzeptanz eines Systems der erwünschten Handlungsgründe voraus. " Suche PNC p34-49 "Einige der wichtigsten logischen Merkmale der Intentionalität sind der Phänomenologie nicht zugänglich, weil sie keine unmittelbare phänomenologische Realität haben ... Denn die Schöpfung der Sinnhaftigkeit aus Bedeutungslosigkeit wird nicht bewusst erlebt ... Es gibt nicht ... Das ist... Die phänomenologische Illusion. " Suche PNC p115-117 "Das Bewusstsein ist kausal auf Hirnprozesse reduziert ... Und das Bewusstsein hat neben den kausalen Kräften der zugrunde liegenden Neurobiologie keine eigenen kausalen Kräfte ... Aber kausale Reproduzierbarkeit führt nicht zu ontologischer Reproduzierbarkeit ... Das Bewusstsein existiert nur als erfahren ... Und deshalb kann sie nicht auf etwas reduziert werden, das eine Antologie einer dritten Person hat, etwas, das unabhängig von Erfahrungen existiert. " Suche PNC 155-6 "... Die grundlegende absichtliche Beziehung zwischen Geist und Welt hat mit Befriedigung zu tun. Und ein Satz ist alles, was in einem absichtlichen Verhältnis zur Welt stehen kann, und da diese absichtlichen Beziehungen immer die Bedingungen der Befriedigung bestimmen, und ein Satz als alles definiert wird, was Ausreichend Die Befriedigung der Befriedigung zu bestimmen, stellt sich heraus, dass jede Intentionalität eine Frage von Vorschlägen ist. " Suche PNC p193 Obwohl S nicht sagt und weitgehend unbewusst zu sein scheint, folgt der Grossteil seiner Arbeit direkt dem von W, obwohl er ihn oft kritisiert. Zu sagen, dass Searle W es Arbeit fortgeführt hat, heisst nicht, dass es sich um ein direktes Ergebnis der W-Studie handelt, 93 sondern dass, weil es nur eine menschliche Psychologie gibt (aus dem gleichen Grund gibt es nur eine menschliche Kardiologie), dass jeder, der das Verhalten genau beschreibt, sprechen muss, som Eine Variante oder Erweiterung dessen, was W gesagt hat (wie sie müssen, wenn sie beide sind Die richtigen Verhaltensbeschreibungen). Ich finde die meisten von S in W vorhergesagt, einschliesslich Versionen des berühmten chinesischen Zimmer-Argument gegen Strong AI und verwandte Themen, die die Themen von Chaps 35 sind. Übrigens, wenn der chinesische Raum interessiert Sie, dann sollten Sie Victor lesen Rodych es Ausgezeichneter, aber nahezu unbekannter Beilage auf dem CR--"Searle Freed of Every Flaw". Rodych Hat auch eine Reihe von hervorragenden Papieren über W es Philosophie der Mathematik geschrieben-das heisst, die EP (Evolutionäre Psychologie) der axiomatischen System 1 Fähigkeit von Zählung Auf 3, wie in den endlosen System 2 SLG es (Secondary Language Games) von Mathematik erweitert. Die Einblicke in die Psychologie der Mathematik bieten einen hervorragenden Einstieg in die Intentionalität. Ich werde auch darauf hinweisen, dass niemand, der Starke KI, die vielfältigen Versionen von Verhaltensweisen, Computerfunktionalismus, CTM (Computational Theory of Mind) und Dynamic Systems Theory (DST) fördert, scheint sich bewusst zu sein, dass W es Tractatus Kann als die auffälligste und kraftvollste Aussage ihres Blickwinkels angesehen werden, die jemals geschrieben wurde (d.h. Verhalten (Denken) als logische Bearbeitung von Facten, also Informationsverarbeitung). Natürlich, Später (aber bevor der digitale Computer war ein Glanz in Turings Auge) W in beschrieben Grosses Detail Warum es sich dabei um inkohärente Beschreibungen des Geistes handelte (Denken, Verhalten) Das muss durch Psychologie ersetzt werden (oder man kann sagen, das ist alles, was er für den Rest seines Lebens getan hat). S bezieht sich jedoch wenig auf W es voraussichtliche Geisteshaltung als Mechanismus und seine Zerstörung in seinem späteren Werk. Seit W ist S zum Schulleiter geworden Dekonstruktor Von diesen mechanischen Ansichten des Verhaltens, und vielleicht der wichtigste beschreibende Psychologe (Philosoph), Aber Ist nicht klar, wie vollständig W ihn erwartet hat, noch im Grossen und Ganzen, andere (aber sehen Sie die vielen Papiere und Bücher von Proudfoot und Copeland auf W, Turing und AI). S es Arbeit ist viel einfacher zu folgen als W ' s, und obwohl es einen Jargon gibt, ist es meist spektakulär klar, wenn man es aus der richtigen Richtung herangeht. Weitere Informationen finden Sie in meinen Artikeln. Wie W gilt Searle als der beste Standup-Philosoph seiner Zeit und sein schriftliches Werk ist fest wie ein Fels und bahnbrechend durchweg. Jedoch, Sein Versäumnis, das spätere W ernst genug zu nehmen, führt zu einigen Fehlern und Verwirrungen. Auf p7 der PNC stellt er zweimal fest, dass unsere Gewissheit über grundlegende Fakten auf das überwältigende Gewicht der Vernunft zurückzuführen ist, die unsere Behauptungen stützt, aber als Coliva, DMS et al haben festgestellt, W hat in ' Auf Gewissheit ' endgültig gezeigt, dass es keine Möglichkeit gibt, an der wahrheitsgetreuen axiomatischen Struktur unseres Systems 1Wahrnehmungen, Erinnerungen und Gedanken zu zweifeln, da sie die Grundlage für das 94 Urteil ist und selbst nicht beurteilt werden kann. Im ersten Satz auf p8 sagt er uns, dass Gewissheit überprüfbar ist, aber diese Art von "Gewissheit", Das können wir Certainty2 nennen, ist das Ergebnis der Erweiterung unserer Axiomatik und Unüberprüfbar Gewissheit (Certainty1) über Erfahrung und ist völlig anders, da es propositionell ist (wahr oder falsch). Dies ist natürlich ein klassisches Beispiel für den "Kampf gegen die Verhitzung unserer Intelligenz durch die Sprache," den W demonstrierte. immer und immer wieder. Eine Wort--zwei (oder viele) unterschiedliche Verwendungen. Auf p10 keuchtet er W für seine Antipathie gegen die Theoretisierung, aber wie ich bereits erwähnt habe, ist "Theoretisierung" ein weiteres Sprachspiel (LG) und es gibt eine grosse Kluft zwischen einer allgemeinen Beschreibung des Verhaltens mit wenigen gut ausgearbeiteten Beispielen und einem, das aus Viele Das ist nicht Gegenstand vieler Gegenbeispiele. Die Evolution war in ihren Anfangsjahren eine Theorie mit begrenzten klaren Beispielen, wurde aber bald nur noch eine Zusammenfassung einer riesigen Anzahl von Beispielen und einer Theorie in einem ganz anderen Sinne. Ebenso, Mit einer Theorie könnte man als Zusammenfassung von tausend Seiten von W es Beispielen machen und eine, die sich aus zehn Seiten ergibt. Wieder Auf p12 ist ' Bewusstsein ' das Ergebnis einer automatisierten System-1-Funktion, die in mehreren ganz unterschiedlichen Sinnen "subjektiv" ist und im Normalfall keine Beweismittel, sondern ein wahres Verständnis in unserem eigenen Fall und eine wahrheitsgetreue Wahrnehmung im Fall von Andere. Als ich p13 las, dachte ich: "Kann ich quälende Schmerzen spüren und weitermachen, als ob nichts falsch ist?" Nein! - wäre das nicht "Schmerz" im gleichen Sinne. "Die innere Erfahrung braucht äussere Kriterien" (W) und Searle scheinen das zu vermissen. Siehe W oder Johnston. Als ich die nächsten paar lese Seiten Ich hatte das Gefühl, dass W die inhalts/linguale Verbindung viel besser versteht, da er sie in vielen Zusammenhängen als Synonym betrachtet, und sein Werk ist eine brillante Darstellung des Geistes, wie sie in zahlreichen anschaulichen Beispielen des Sprachgebrauchs veranschaulicht wird. Wie oben zitiert: "Wenn es nicht die kausalen Zusammenhänge sind, um die es uns geht, dann liegen die Aktivitäten des Geistes offen vor uns." Und, Wie oben erklärt, Ich habe das Gefühl, dass die Fragen, mit denen S endet Abschnitt 3 weitgehend beantwortet werden, indem W es OC aus der Sicht der beiden Systeme betrachtet wird. Ebenso, Für Abschnitt 6 zur Wissenschaftsphilosophie. Rodych Hat einen Artikel über Popper vs W gemacht, den ich damals hervorragend fand, Aber ich werde es noch einmal tun müssen, um sicher zu gehen. Schliesslich kann man bei p25 leugnen, dass jede Revision unserer Konzepte (Sprachspiele) von Kausalität oder freiem Willen notwendig oder sogar möglich ist. Sie können so gut wie jede Seite von W und viel DMS lesen, Coliva, Hacker etc. aus den Gründen. Es ist eine Sache Sagen Sie skurrile Dinge über die Welt anhand von Beispielen aus der Quantenmechanik, 95 Unsicherheit usw., aber es ist eine andere, alles zu sagen, was für unseren normalen Gebrauch von Worten relevant ist. Auf p31, 36 usw. stossen wir wieder auf die unaufhörlichen Probleme (in Philosophie und Leben) identischer Wörter, die über die grossen Unterschiede in LG ' s von "Glaube," "Sehen" usw., wie sie auf S1 angewendet werden, verglühen., Das besteht aus mentalen Zuständen nur in der Gegenwart, und S2, die nicht. Der Rest des Kapitels fasst seine Arbeit über "Sozialkleber" zusammen, die aus einer EP, Wittgensteinian Perspektive, ist die automatische schnelle Aktion von S1, die die langsamen Dispositionen von S2, die unerträglich und universell während der persönlichen Entwicklung erweitert werden In eine Vielzahl von Automaten Unbewusste deontische Beziehungen zu anderen, und willkürlich zu kulturellen Variationen auf ihnen. Die Kapitel 3 bis 5 enthalten seine bekannten Argumente gegen die mechanische Geisteshaltung, die mir endgültig erscheinen. Ich habe ganze Bücher mit Antworten auf sie gelesen, und ich stimme S zu, dass sie alle die sehr einfachen logischen (psychologischen) Punkte vermissen, die er vorbringt (und die W im Grossen und Ganzen ein halbes Jahrhundert früher gemacht hat, bevor es Computer gab). Um es mit meinen Worten auszudrücken: S1 setzt sich aus unbewussten, schnellen, physischen, kausalen, automatischen, nicht propositionellen, wahrheitsgetreuen mentalen Zuständen zusammen, während langsame S2 nur kohärent als Gründe für Handlungen beschrieben werden kann, die mehr oder weniger bewusste Dispositionen sind. Verhalten (potentielle Handlungen), die propositionell sind oder werden können (T oder F). Computer und der Rest der Natur haben nur eine von unserer Perspektive abhängige (zugeschriebene) Intentionalität abgeleitet, während höhere Tiere eine primäre Intentionalität haben, die von der Perspektive unabhängig ist. Wie S und W wissen, ist die grosse Ironie, dass diese materialistischen oder mechanischen Reduktionen der psychologischen Maskerade als Schnitt-Kantenwissenschaft, aber in Wirklichkeit sind sie völlig antiwissenschaftlich. Philosophie (beschreibende Psychologie) und kognitive Psychologie (frei vom Aberglauben) werden Hand in Hand und es sind Hofstadter, Dennett, Carruthers, Kurzweil etc., die im Regen stehen. Seite 62 fasst eine seiner Argumente gut zusammen, aber p63 zeigt, dass er den leeren Schiefer immer noch nicht ganz losgelassen hat, als er versucht, die Trends in der Gesellschaft in Bezug auf die kulturellen Erweiterungen von S2 zu erklären. Wie er es an vielen anderen Stellen in seinen Schriften tut, gibt er kulturelle, historische Gründe für den Verhaltensweisen an, aber es scheint mir (wie es W war) ziemlich offensichtlich, dass die mechanische Sicht des Geistes aus dem gleichen Grund existiert wie fast alle Verhaltensweisen - es ist die Standardoperation unserer EP. Die sucht Erklärungen in Bezug auf das, was wir bewusst langsam durchdenken können, und nicht in der automatisierten S1, von der wir meist vergessen werden. Wie bereits erwähnt, hat Searle dies als TPI bezeichnet. Wieder, Auf p65 finde ich W es Beschreibung unserer axiomatischen vererbten Psychologie und ihrer Erweiterungen in seinem OC und anderen 96 Arbeiten sind tiefer als S es (oder irgendjemand), und so sind wir NICHT ' zuversichtlich ', dass Hunde bewusst sind, sondern es ist nicht offen für Zweifel. Sehen Sie den früheren Abschnitt dieses Artikels, der sich mit OC und DMS beschäftigt. Kapitel 5 wird schön zerstört CTM, LOT etc., stellt fest, dass "computation "," Information ", ' Syntax ', ' Algorithmus ', ' Logik ', ' Programm ', etc., sind Beobachter relative (d.h. psychologische) Begriffe und haben keine physikalische oder mathematische Bedeutung (COS) in diesem psychologischen Sinne, aber natürlich gibt es andere Sinne, die sie in letzter Zeit gegeben haben, während die Wissenschaft sich entwickelt hat. Wieder werden Menschen verzaubert Die Verwendung von Das gleiche Wort, um diesen enormen Unterschied in seiner Verwendung (Bedeutung) zu ignorieren. Diese Kommentare sind alle Erweiterungen der klassischen Wittgenstein und in diesem Zusammenhang, Ich empfehle auch Hutto es und Read ' s Papiere. Kapitel 6 "Die phänomenologische Illusion" (TPI) ist bei weitem mein Favorit, und während es dieses Feld zerstört, zeigt es sowohl seine höchsten logischen Fähigkeiten als auch sein Versagen, die volle Macht des späteren W zu erfassen, und den grossen heuristischen Wert der jüngsten psychologischen Forschung auf den beiden selbst. Es ist als Kristall klar, dass TPI auf die Vergessenheit gegenüber den Automatismen von S1 zurückzuführen ist und das langsame bewusste Denken von S2 nicht nur primär, sondern als alles, was es gibt, zu betrachten. Das ist klassischer Blank-Schleidblindheit. Klar, dass W gezeigt hat Das rund 60 Jahre Früher und gab auch den Grund dafür im Primat des wahrhaft unbewussten, unbewussten automatischen axiomatischen Netzwerks unseres angeborenen Systems 1. Wie so viele andere tanzt Searle ringsum, kommt aber nie ganz dorthin. Es ist grob, dass sich die "beobachterunabhängige" Merkmale der Welt als S1 und die "beobachterabhängigen" Merkmale als S2 als sehr aufschlussreich erweisen sollten. Wie S anmerkt, haben Heidegger und die anderen die Ontologie genau rückwärts, aber natürlich auch fast jeder aufgrund der Ausfälle ihrer EP. Aber die Wirklich wichtig Es ist so, dass S nicht den nächsten Schritt macht, um zu erkennen, dass TPI nicht nur ein Versagen einiger Philosophen ist, sondern eine universelle Blindheit gegenüber unserer EP, die selbst in EP eingebaut ist. er Tatsächlich steht Das in fast diesen Worten an einer Stelle, aber wenn er es wirklich bekommen hat, wie könnte er es versäumen, auf seine immensen Auswirkungen auf die Welt hinzuweisen. Mit seltenen Ausnahmen (z.B. Jaina Tirthankaras geht über 5000 Jahre zurück zu den Anfängen der Indus-Zivilisation und zuletzt und bemerkenswert OshoBuddha, Jesus, Bodhidharma, Da Free John etc.), wir sind alle Fleischpuppen, die auf unserer genetisch programmierten Mission, die Erde zu zerstören, durchs Leben stolpern. Unsere fast totale Beschäftigung mit der Verwendung der zweiten Sel-S2-Persönlichkeit, um den kindlichen Befriedigung von S1 zu frönen, schafft die Hölle Auf Erde. Wie bei allen Organismen geht es dabei nur um Fortpflanzung und die Anhäufung von Ressourcen. Ja, viel Lärm über die globale Erwärmung und den drohenden Zusammenbruch der industriellen Zivilisation in der Im nächsten Jahrhundert dürfte es aber nichts aufhalten. S1 schreibt das Stück und S2 handelt 97 es aus. Dick und Jane wollen nur noch Haus spielen - das ist Mama Und das ist Papa und das und das ist ein Baby. Vielleicht könnte man sagen, dass TPI ist, dass wir Menschen sind und nicht nur ein anderer Primas. Kapitel 7 über die Natur des Selbst ist gut, aber nichts hat mir wirklich neu aufgefallen. Kapitel 8 über den Eigentumsdualismus ist viel interessanter, auch wenn es sich meist um eine Neuauflage seiner früheren Arbeit handelt. Das letzte seiner obigen Eröffnungszitate fasst dies zusammen, und natürlich das Beharren auf der kritischen Natur der ersten-Die Ontologie der Person ist total Wittgensteinian. Der einzige grosse Fehler, den ich sehe, ist seine leere Schieflage oder (kulturelle) Art der Erklärung auf S 158 für die Fehler des Dualismus, wenn In meinem ansehen, Es handelt sich eindeutig um ein weiteres Beispiel von TPI - ein Fehler, den er (und fast alle anderen) schon oft gemacht hat und der sich auf p177 usw. im ansonsten grossartigen Kapitel 9 wiederholt. Das Gen-Programm S1, das (meist) die Saiten (kontraiert die Muskeln) der Fleischpuppen über S2 zieht. Ende der Geschichte. Wieder, Er muss meine Kommentare oder die von DMS auf W es lesen Oc So ändert er den "guten Grund zum Glauben" unten von p171 und oben von p172 zu "weiss" (im wahrsten Sinne). Ein kritischer Punkt wird noch einmal auf p169 angesprochen. "So, Etwas zu sagen und es zu sagen, beinhaltet zwei Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit. Erstens, die Bedingung der Befriedigung, dass die Äusserung produziert wird, und zweitens, dass die Äusserung selbst Bedingungen der Befriedigung haben wird. " Eine Möglichkeit, dies zu erreichen, ist, dass das unbewusste automatische System 1 die höhere kortikalbewusste Persönlichkeit des Systems 2 aktiviert, was zu Kehlkopfmuskelkontraktionen führt, die andere darüber informieren, dass es die Welt auf bestimmte Weise sieht, die sie zu einem Potential verpflichten. Aktionen. Ein grosser Fortschritt gegenüber prelinguistischer oder protoSprachinteraktionen, in denen nur grobe Muskelbewegungen in der Lage waren, sehr begrenzte Informationen über Absichten zu vermitteln, und S macht einen ähnlichen Punkt in Kapitel 10. Das Gen-Programm S1, das (meist) die Saiten (kontraiert die Muskeln) der Fleischpuppen über S2 zieht. Ende der Geschichte. Wieder, Er muss meine Kommentare und die von DMS lesen, Coliva, Andy Hamilton etc., auf W es OC, so dass er den "guten Grund zum Glauben" am unteren Ende von p171 und der Spitze von p172 zu "weiss" (im wahrsten Sinne) ändert. Sein letztes Kapitel "Die Einheit des Propeges" (bisher unveröffentlicht) würde auch sehr von der Lektüre von W es "On Certainty" oder DMS verschiedenen Büchern und Papieren profitieren, da sie den Unterschied zwischen wahren Sätzen beschreiben, die S1 beschreiben, und wahr oder falsch machen. Sätze, die S2 beschreiben. Das erscheint mir als eine weit überlegene Herangehensweise an S es, die S1-Wahrnehmungen als Provositionen betrachten, da sie erst T oder F werden, nachdem man in S2 anfängt, über sie nachzudenken. Allerdings sein Punkt, der Erlaubt Aussagen von tatsächlicher oder potenzieller Wahrheit und Falschheit, von Vergangenheit und Zukunft und Fantasie und bieten so einen enormen Fortschritt über vor oder proto-Sprachgesellschaft, ist 98 überzeugend. Wie er es sagt: "Ein Satz ist alles, was eine Bedingung der Zufriedenheit bestimmen kann ... Und eine Bedingung der Zufriedenheit ... Ist, dass es so und so ist. " Oder muss man hinzufügen, dass das vielleicht der Fall gewesen sein könnte oder hätte man sich vorstellen können. Insgesamt ist PNC eine gute Zusammenfassung der vielen substanziellen Fortschritte über Wittgenstein, die sich aus S es halbem Jahrhundert Arbeit ergeben, aber meiner Ansicht nach ist W immer noch nicht gleichberechtigt, wenn man versteht, was er sagt. Ideal, Sie sollten gemeinsam gelesen werden: Auf der Suche nach der klaren, kohärenten Prosa und Verallgemeinerung, illustriert mit W-scharfsinnige Beispiele und brillante Aphorismen. Wenn ich viel wäre jünger Ich würde ein Buch schreiben, das genau das tut. "So, Statusfunktionen sind der Klebstoff, der die Gesellschaft zusammenhält. Sie entstehen durch kollektive Intentionalität und funktionieren, indem sie deontische Kräfte tragen ... Mit der wichtigen Ausnahme der Sprache selbst, die gesamte institutionelle Realität und damit in gewissem Sinne die gesamte menschliche Zivilisation wird durch Sprechakte geschaffen, die die logische Form der Deklarationen haben ... Die gesamte menschliche institutionelle Realität wird durch (Darstellungen, die die gleiche logische Form haben wie) Statusfunktionserklärungen geschaffen und aufrechterhalten, einschliesslich der Fälle, die keine Sprechakte in der expliziten Form von Deklarationen sind. " Suche MSWp11-13 "Glaubenssätze, wie Aussagen, haben die Abwärts-oder Geistes-(oder Wort-) Richtung der Anpassung. Und Wünsche und Absichten, wie Befehle und Verheissungen, haben die Aufwärts-oder Weltanschauung (oder Wort-) der Passform. Glaubenssätze oder Wahrnehmungen, wie Aussagen, sollen darstellen, wie die Dinge in der Welt sind, und in diesem Sinne, Sie sollen zur Welt passen; Sie haben die Richtung von Geist zu Welt. Die konative-volitionellen Zustände wie Wünsche, Vorabsichten und Handlungsabsichten, wie Befehle und Versprechungen, haben die Weltzu-Geistesrichtung. Sie sollen nicht darstellen, wie die Dinge sind, sondern wie wir sie gerne hätten oder wie wir sie machen wollen ... Neben diesen beiden Fakultäten gibt es noch eine dritte Imagination, in der der Satzgehalt nicht so der Realität entsprechen soll, wie die propositionellen Inhalte von Erkenntnis und Willen passen sollen ... Das Engagement in Bezug auf die Welt wird aufgegeben, und wir haben einen propositionellen Inhalt, ohne dass wir uns in beide Richtungen der Passform einsetzen. " Suche MSWp15 "Wie in vorsätzlichen Zuständen können wir auch hier unterscheiden zwischen der Art des Staates ... Und der Inhalt des Staates ... So in der Theorie der Sprache können wir einen Unterschied zwischen der Art der Sprache Akt ist es ... Und der Satzinhalt ... Wir haben den gleichen Satzinhalt mit unterschiedlicher psychologischer Art bei den vorsätzlichen Zuständen und unterschiedlicher illoderischer Kraft oder Art im Falle der Sprechakte. Darüber hinaus können meine Überzeugungen, so wie meine Überzeugungen wahr oder falsch sein und somit die Gedankenwelt haben, dass sie passen, so können meine Aussagen 99 wahr oder falsch sein und somit die wort-zu-welt-Richtung der Anpassung haben. Und so wie meine Wünsche oder Absichten nicht wahr oder falsch sein können, sondern auf verschiedene Weise befriedigt oder unbefriedigt sein können, so können meine Befehle und Versprechungen nicht wahr oder falsch sein, sondern können auf verschiedene Weise befriedigt oder unbefriedigt sein - wir können an all die vorsätzlichen Staaten denken, die ein Wol haben. E propositionelle Inhalte und eine Richtung der Anpassung als Darstellungen ihrer Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit. Ein Glaube repräsentiert seine Wahrheitsbedingungen, ein Wunsch repräsentiert seine Erfüllung Bedingungen, eine Absicht repräsentiert sie'Die Durchführung der Bedingungen ... Der vorsätzliche Zustand stellt seine Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit dar ... Die Menschen gehen irrtümlich davon aus, dass jede mentale Repräsentation bewusst gedacht werden muss ... Aber der Begriff der Repräsentation, wie ich sie verwende, ist ein funktionaler und kein ontologischer Begriff. Alles, was Befriedigung hat, das in einer für die Intentionalität charakteristischen Weise erfolgreich sein oder scheitern kann, ist per Definition ein Darstellung seiner Befriedigung ... Wir können die Struktur der Intentionalität sozialer Phänomene analysieren, indem wir ihre Befriedigung analysieren. " Suche MSW p28-32 "Die ersten vier Arten von Sprechakten haben exakte Analoga in vorsätzlichen Zuständen: Entsprechend Assertive Glaubensrichtungen, die den Richtlinien entsprechen, sind Wünsche, die Kommissionen Es handelt sich um Absichten und die Expressivum Die ganze Bandbreite der Emotionen und anderen vorsätzlichen Zustände, in denen die Aufstellung Passend ist das Selbstverständlichkeit. Aber es gibt keine voringuistische Analogie für die Deklarationen. Prälinguistische vorsätzliche Zustände können in der Welt keine Fakten schaffen, indem sie diese bereits existierenden Tatsachen darstellen. Diese bemerkenswerte Leistung erfordert eine Sprache "MSW p69 "Sprecher bedeutet ... Die Auferlegung von Bedingungen der Befriedigung Die Fähigkeit dazu ist ein entscheidendes Element der menschlichen kognitiven Fähigkeiten. Es erfordert die Fähigkeit, auf zwei Ebenen gleichzeitig zu denken, und zwar auf eine Art und Weise, die für den Sprachgebrauch unerlässlich ist. Auf einer Ebene erzeugt der Sprecher absichtlich eine physische Äusserung, auf einer anderen Ebene stellt die Äusserung aber etwas dar. Und dieselbe Dualität infiziert das Symbol selbst. Auf einer Ebene, Es ist ein physisches Objekt wie jedes andere. Auf einer anderen Ebene, Es hat eine Bedeutung: Es stellt eine Art Zustand der Dinge dar "MSW p74 "... Sobald Sie Sprache haben, ist es unvermeidlich, dass Sie Deontologie haben, weil es keine Möglichkeit gibt, dass Sie explizite Sprechakte nach dem con durchführenErfindungen einer Sprache ohne Verpflichtungen schaffen. Das gilt nicht nur für Aussagen, sondern für alle Sprachaktionen "MSW p82 Dies wirft einen weiteren Punkt auf, der in W zwar ausgeprägt ist, aber von S verneint wird, dass wir nur Beschreibungen geben können und nicht eine Theorie. S besteht darauf, dass er Theorien zur Verfügung stellt, aber natürlich sind "Theorie" und "Beschreibung" auch 100 Sprachspiele, und es scheint mir, dass S ' Theorie in der Regel W ' s Beschreibung - eine Rose mit einem anderen Namen ist ... W es point war, dass wir, indem wir an scharfsichtigen Beispielen festhalten, von denen wir alle wissen, dass sie wahre Berichte über unser Verhalten sind, den Treibsand der Theorien vermeiden, die versuchen, ALLE Verhaltensweisen (ALLE Sprachspiele) zu berücksichtigen, während S verallgemeinern will und unweigerlich in die Irre geht (er gibt Mehrere Beispiele für eigene Fehler in PNC). Als S und andere ihre Theorien endlos modifizieren, um die vielfältigen Sprachspiele zu berücksichtigen, Sie kommen der Beschreibung des Verhaltens durch zahlreiche Beispiele immer näher, ebenso wie W. Die Primary Language Games (PLG ' s) sind die einfachen automatisierten Äusserungen unseres unfreiwilligen Systems 1, schnelles Denken, Spiegelneuron, nur wahr, nicht propositionell, mentale Zustände-unsere Wahrnehmungen und Erinnerungen und reflexiven Handlungen (' Wille ') einschliesslich System 1 Wahrheiten Und UA1-Verständigung von Agentur 1--und Emotions1-wie Freude, Liebe, Wut, die kausal beschrieben werden kann, während die evolutionär späteren Secondary Language Games (SLG ' s) Ausdrücke oder Beschreibungen von freiwilligem, System 2, langsames Denken, Mentalisieren sind Neuronen, testbar wahr oder falsch, propositionell, Truth2 und UA2 und Emotions2-Freude, Liebe, Hass, die dispositionale (und oft kontrafaktische) Vorstellung, Annahmen, Absicht, Denken, Wissen, Glauben, etc., die nur in Begriffen beschrieben werden kann Aus Gründen (d.h., es ist eine Tatsache, dass Versuche, System 2 in Bezug auf Neurochemie, Atomphysik, Mathematik zu beschreiben, machen einfach keine Sensesiehe W für viele Beispiele und Suche nach guten Entdeckungen zu diesem). Es ist nicht möglich, die Automatismen von System 1 in begrünbegründem Sinne zu beschreiben (z.B.: "Ich sehe das als Apfel, weil ..."), es sei denn, man will einen Grund in Bezug auf EP, Genetik, Physiologie geben, und wie W wiederholt gezeigt hat, ist es sinnlos, "Erklärungen" zu geben. Mit der Massgabe, dass sie in der Zukunft Sinn machen-"Nichts ist verborgen"-, machen sie jetzt oder nie Sinn. Eine kraftvolle Heuristik ist es, Verhalten und Erfahrung in Intentionalität 1 und Intentionalität 2 (z.B. Denken 1 und Denken 2, Emotionen 1 und Emotionen 2 etc.) und sogar in Wahrheiten 1 (T nur Axiome) und Wahrheiten 2 (empirische Erweiterungen oder "Theoreme," die sich aus der logischen Erweiterung der Wahrheit 1 ergeben). W erkannt, dass "nichts verborgen ist"-d.h. unsere ganze Psychologie und alle Antworten auf alle philosophischen Fragen sind hier in unserer Sprache (unserem Leben) und dass die Schwierigkeit nicht darin besteht, die Antworten zu finden, sondern sie wie immer hier vor uns zu erkennen-wir müssen nur Hören Sie auf, tiefer zu schauen. Die Ideen hier sind bereits veröffentlicht und nichts wird für diejenigen, die mit Searles Arbeit Schritt gehalten haben, überraschen. Ich habe das Gefühl, dass W die mind/linguische Verbindung besser verstehen kann, da er 101 sie als Synonym in vielen Zusammenhängen, und sein Werk ist eine brillante Darstellung des Geistes, wie in zahlreichen scharfsinnige Beispiele für Sprachgebrauch. Wie oben zitiert: "Wenn es nicht die kausalen Zusammenhänge sind, um die es uns geht, dann liegen die Aktivitäten des Geistes offen vor uns." Man kann leugnen, dass jede Revision unserer Konzepte (Sprachspiele) von Kausalität oder freiem Willen notwendig oder sogar möglich ist. Sie können aus den Gründen so gut wie jede Seite von W lesen. Es ist eine Sache, skurrile Dinge über die Welt zu sagen, indem man Beispiele aus der Quantenmechanik, Unsicherheit usw. verwendet, aber es ist eine andere, irgendetwas zu sagen, was für unseren normalen Gebrauch von Worten relevant ist. Die deontischen Strukturen oder der "soziale Klebstoff" sind die automatischen schnellen Aktionen von S1, die die langsamen Dispositionen von S2 erzeugen, die während der persönlichen Entwicklung unaufhaltsam zu einer Vielzahl von automatischen, unbewussten universellen kulturellen deontischen Beziehungen mit Andere (S3). Obwohl dies mein "précis" des Verhaltens ist, erwarte ich, dass es S ' s Arbeit ziemlich beschreibt. Es scheint mir ganz offensichtlich (wie es für W war), dass die mechanische Sicht des Geistes existiert Aus dem gleichen Grund wie fast Alles Verhalten - es ist der Standardbetrieb unseres EP, der Erklärungen in Bezug auf das sucht, was wir absichtlich langsam durchdenken können, und nicht in der automatisierten S1, von der wir meistens nicht wissen (TPI). Ich finde W es Beschreibung unserer axiomatischen ererbten Psychologie und ihrer Erweiterungen in seinem OC und in anderen 3. Periode arbeitet, um tiefer zu sein als S (oder irgendjemand), und so sind wir NICHT ' zuversichtlich ', dass Hunde bewusst sind, sondern es ist nicht offen für (nicht möglich) Zweifel. Lassen Sie uns nun Searles brillante Zusammenfassung seiner langjährigen Arbeit an der logischen Struktur des "sozialen Klebstoffs" Revue passieren lassen, der die Gesellschaft zusammenhält, wie dargelegt, ist sein "Making the Social World" (2010). Ein kritischer Begriff, der von S vor vielen Jahren eingeführt wurde, ist die Konditionierung (COS) Zu unseren Gedanken (Sätzen von S2), die W Neigungen oder Veranlagungen zu actgenannt hat-immer noch durch den unangemessenen Begriff "propositionelle Einstellungen" von vielen genannt. COS werden von S vielerorts erklärt, wie zum Beispiel auf p169 der PNC: "So etwas sagen und damit gemeint, beinhaltet es zwei Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit. Erstens, die Bedingung der Befriedigung, dass die Äusserung produziert wird, und zweitens, dass die Äusserung selbst Bedingungen der Befriedigung haben wird. " S stellt es in PNC fest: "Ein Satz ist alles, was eine Bedingung der Zufriedenheit bestimmen kann ... Und eine Bedingung der Zufriedenheit ... Ist, dass es so und so ist. " Oder, muss man hinzufügen, das könnte sein oder hätte man sich vorstellen können, wie er in MSW deutlich macht. In Bezug auf die Absichten: "Um befriedigt zu werden, muss die Absicht selbst bei der Produktion der Handlung kausal funktionieren." (MSWp34). Die meisten werden sehr davon profitieren, W es "On Certainty" oder "RPP1 and 2" oder 102 DMS ' s zwei Bücher über OC zu lesen (siehe meine Rezensionen), da sie den Unterschied zwischen den wahrheitsgetreuen Sätzen, die S1 beschreiben, und den wahren oder falschen Sätzen, die S2 beschreiben, deutlich machen. Das erscheint mir als eine weit überlegene Herangehensweise an S es S1-Wahrnehmungen als Propositional (zumindest an einigen Stellen in seinem Werk), da sie nur T oder F (aspekt, wie S sie hier nennt) werden können, nachdem man in S2 anfängt, über sie nachzudenken. Sein Punkt in der PNC, dass Sätze erlauben Aussagen von tatsächlicher oder potenzieller Wahrheit und Falschheit, von Vergangenheit und Zukunft und Fantasie, und bieten damit einen enormen Fortschritt über vor oder proto-Sprachgesellschaft, ist überzeugend. S beschreibt oft die kritische Notwendigkeit, die verschiedenen Ebenen der Beschreibung eines Ereignisses zu beachten, So für IA (Intention in Action) "Wir haben verschiedene Ebenen der Beschreibung, wo eine Ebene durch das Verhalten auf der unteren Ebene konstituiert wird ... Neben dem konstitutiven in Relation haben wir auch das Kausal durch Beziehung. " (P37). Die S1 zu erkennen, ist also nur nach oben kausal und inhaltslos (fehlt "Vertretungen" Oder "Informationen"), während S2 "Inhalt" Und ist nach unten kausal (z.B. Hutto und Myin es "Radikal Enaktivismus') Ich würde die Absätze von p39 ändern, die "In Summe" beginnen und auf Pg 40 mit "Zufriedenheitsbedingungen" wie folgt. In Summe werden Wahrnehmung, Erinnerung und reflexive Absichten und Handlungen ("Wille") durch das automatische Funktionieren unserer S1-Relösung Axiomatik EP verursacht. Durch vorherige Absichten und Handlungsabsichten versuchen wir, die Dinge mit der unserer Meinung nach zu vereinbaren. Wir sollten sehen, dass Glaube, Begehren (und Imagination - die Zeit verschoben und so entkoppelt von der Absicht) und andere S2-Propositions-Dispositionen unseres langsamen Denkens später entwickelte zweite Selbst, sind völlig abhängig von (haben ihre COS in) die CSR (Kausally Self Reflexive) Schnelle automatisch primitive true nur reflexive S1. In der Sprache und vielleicht in der Neurophysiologie gibt es Zwischen-oder Mischfälle wie Absicht (vorherige Absichten) oder Erinnern, bei denen die kausale Verbindung mit COS (d.h. mit S1) zeitlich verschoben ist, da sie die Vergangenheit oder die Zukunft repräsentieren, im Gegensatz zu S1, das Immer in der Gegenwart. Die beiden Systeme ineinander einspeisen und Oft werden die erlernten deontischen kulturellen Beziehungen nahtlos orchestriert, so dass unsere Erfahrung ist, dass wir bewusst alles kontrollieren, was wir tun. Diese riesige Arena kognitiver Illusionen, die unser Leben dominieren, S hat als "Die phänomenologische Illusion" beschrieben. Er beendet dieses erstaunliche Kapitel, indem er vielleicht zum zehnten Mal in seinen Schriften wiederholte, was ich als einen sehr grundlegenden Fehler betrachte, den er mit fast allen teilt - die Vorstellung, dass die Erfahrung des "freien Willens" "illusorisch" sein könnte. Es folgt auf sehr einfache und unaufhaltsame Weise, sowohl aus W es Arbeit der 3. Periode als auch aus den Beobachtungen der zeitgenössischen Psychologie, dass ' Wille ', ' Selbst ' und ' Bewusstsein ' axiomatische, wahrhaftige Elemente des Systems 1 sind, wie 103 sehen, hören usw., Und es gibt keine (Verständlichkeit), ihre Falschheit zu demonstrieren (zu geben). Wie W mehrfach so wunderbar klar gemacht hat, sind sie die Grundlage für das Urteil und können daher nicht beurteilt werden. S versteht und verwendet im Grunde dieses Argument in anderen Kontexten (z.B. Skepsis, Solipsismus) oft, so dass es schon erstaunlich ist, dass er diese Analogie nicht sehen kann. Er macht diesen Fehler häufig, wenn er solche Dinge sagt, dass wir "gute Beweise" haben, dass unser Hund Bewusst Etc. Die wahrheitsgetreuen Axiome unserer Psychologie sind nicht nachweisbar. Hier haben Sie Einer von Der beste beschreibende Psychologes Seit W, Das ist also kein dummer Fehler. Seine Zusammenfassung von Dekontik Auf p50 bedarf es der Übersetzung. So "Sie müssen eine prelinguistische Form der kollektiven Intentionalität haben, auf der die sprachlichen Formen aufgebaut sind, und Sie müssen die kollektive Intentionalität des Gesprächs haben, um die Verpflichtung zu machen" ist viel klarer, wenn sie mit "Die Die prelinguistische Axiomatik von S1 liegt den sprachlichen Dispositionen von S2 (d.h. unserem EP) zugrunde, die sich während unserer Reifung in ihre kulturellen Erscheinungsformen entwickeln. " Seit Statusfunktion spielen Erklärungen eine zentrale Rolle in Dekontik Es ist wichtig, sie zu verstehen, und so erklärt er den hier relevanten Begriff der "Funktion". "Eine Funktion ist eine Sache, die einem Zweck dient ... In diesem Sinne sind Funktionen absichtlich und geistig-relativ und daher geistig-abhängig ... Statusfunktionen ... Erfordern... Kollektive Auferlegung und Anerkennung eines Status " (p59). Wieder, Ich schlage vor, die Übersetzung von "Die Intentionalität der Sprache wird durch die Eigene oder geistig unabhängige Intentionalität des Menschen "(p66) als" Das sprachliche, bewusste Disposition S2 wird durch die unbewussten axiomatischen reflexiven Funktionen von S1 "(p68) erzeugt. Das heisst, man muss sich vor Augen halten, dass das Verhalten von der Biologie programmiert ist. Jedoch, Ich widerspreche seinen Aussagen zu p66-67 und andernorts in seinen Schriften, dass S1 (d.h. Erinnerungen, Wahrnehmungen, Reflexakte) eine propositionelle (d.h. wahrheitsfalsche) Struktur hat. Wie ich oben bemerkt habe, und viele Male in anderen Rezensionen, scheint es glasklar zu sein, dass W richtig ist, und es ist grundlegend, das Verhalten zu verstehen, dass nur S2 propositionell ist und S1 axiomatisch und wahrhaftig ist. Beide haben COS und Anleitungen von Fit (DOF), weil die genetische, axiomatische Intentionalität von S1 die von S2 erzeugt., Aber wenn S1 im gleichen Sinne propositionell wäre, würde das bedeuten, dass Skepsis verständlich ist, das Chaos, das Philosophie war, bevor W zurückkehren würde., Und tatsächlich sozial Leben (Und vielleicht das gesamte Tierleben, abhängig davon, was man als "Sätze" ansieht) Wäre nicht möglich. Wie W unzählige Male gezeigt hat und die Biologie so deutlich zeigt, muss das Leben auf Gewissheit - automatisierten unbewussten Schnellreaktionen basieren. Organismen, die immer einen Zweifel haben und pausieren, um zu reflektieren, werden sterben (konnte sich nicht entwickeln). 104 Im Gegensatz zu seinen Kommentaren (p70) kann ich mir eine Sprache ohne Worte für materielle Objekte nicht mehr vorstellen, als ich mir ein visuelles System vorstellen kann, das sie nicht sehen kann, weil es die erste und grundlegendste Aufgabe der Vision ist, die Welt in Objekte zu segmentieren und damit die Sprache zu Beschreiben. Ebenso, Ich kann kein Problem mit Objekten erkennen, die im bewussten Feld in einem auffällten Objekt sind, oder mit Sätzen, die in Worte gesäht werden. Wie könnte es für Wesen mit unserer Evolutionsgeschichte anders sein? Auf p72 und andernorts wird es helfen, sich daran zu erinnern, dass Ausdrücke die primitiven reflexiven PLG ' s von S1 sind, während Darstellungen die dispositionalen SLG ' s von S2 sind. Eine weitere Übersetzung von Philosophie Ins Englische wird für den zweiten Absatz über p79 benötigt, der "So weit" beginnt und "vorher gehört" endet. "Wir vermitteln Bedeutung, indem wir eine öffentliche Sprache sprechen, die aus Wörtern in Sätzen mit einer Syntax besteht." Auf seine Fragen 4 und 5 auf p105 zur Besonderheit von Sprache und Schrift würde ich antworten: "Sie sind besonders, weil die kurze Wellenlänge der Schwingungen der Stimmmuskulatur viel höher ist. Informationsübertragung der Bandbreite Anders als Kontraktionen anderer Muskeln, und das ist im Durchschnitt mehrere Grössenordnungen höher für visuelle Informationen. " Auf p106 eine allgemeine Antwort auf Frage 2 (Wie kommen wir damit - z.B. warum Funktioniert es) ist EP und S1 und seine Aussage, dass "Meine Hauptstrategie der Exposition in diesem Buch ist es, zu versuchen, die familIar erscheinen seltsam und auffällig " Natürlich klassisch Wittgenstein. Seine Behauptung auf der nächsten Seite, dass es keine generelle Antwort darauf gebe, warum Menschen Institutionen akzeptieren, ist eindeutig falsch. Sie akzeptieren sie aus dem gleichen Grund, aus dem sie alles tun, - ihre EP das Ergebnis inklusiver Fitness ist. Sie ermöglichte das Überleben und die Fortpflanzung im EWR (Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation). Alles über uns körperlich und geistig in der Genetik. All das vage Gerede hier (z.B. p114) über "aussersprachliche Konventionen" und "extra semantische Semantik" bezieht sich in der Tat auf EP und insbesondere auf die unbewussten Automatismen von S1, die Die Grundlage für jedes Verhalten. Ja, wie W schon oft sagte, das bekannteste ist deshalb unsichtbar. S ' Vorschlag (p115), dass Sprache für Spiele unerlässlich ist, ist sicherlich falsch. Völlig analphabetische Taubstumme könnten Karten, Fussball und sogar Schach spielen, aber natürlich wäre eine minimale Zählfähigkeit notwendig. Ich stimme zu (p121), dass die Fähigkeit, so zu tun und sich vorzustellen (z.B. die kontrafaktischen oder wie wenn Vorstellungen, die mit der Zeit-und Raumverschiebung verbunden sind), in voller Form menschliche Fähigkeiten und entscheidend für das Denken der höheren Ordnung sind. Aber auch hier gibt es viele tierische Vorläufer (wie es sein muss), wie das Posen von 105 rituellen Kämpfen und Paarungänzen, die Dekoration von Paarungsstätten durch Bussvögel, die gebrochene Flügelvortäuschung von Muttervögeln, gefälschte Alarmrufe von Affen, "sauberere" Fische, die ein Bissen Sie ihre Beute und Simulation von Falken und Taubenstrategien (Betrüger) bei vielen Tieren. Für seine Diskussion über Rationalität ist mehr Übersetzung erforderlich (p126 ff.). Zu sagen, dass das Denken propositionell ist und sich mit wahren oder falschen "faktitiven Entitäten" befasst, bedeutet, dass es sich um eine typische S2-Disposition handelt, die getestet werden kann, im Gegensatz zu den wahrhaft rein automatischen kognitiven Funktionen von S1. In "Freier Wille, Rationalität und institutionelle Fakten" aktualisiert er Teile seines klassischen Buches "Rationalität in Aktion" und erstellt eine neue Terminologie, um den formalen Apparat der praktischen Gründe zu beschreiben, die ich nicht als gelungene finde. "Verunreinigter Entitäten" scheinen sich nicht von Dispositionen und "Motivatoren" (Begehren oder Verpflichtung), ' Effektor ' (Körpermuskulatur), ' konstituutor ' (Sprachmuskulatur) und ' Totalgrund ' (alle relevanten Dispositionen) zu unterscheiden, zumindest hier scheinen die Klarheit zu erhöhen (p126-132 ). Wir sollten hier etwas tun, was in Diskussionen über menschliches Verhalten selten vorkommt und uns an seine Biologie erinnern. Evolution durch inklusive Fitness hat programmiert Die unbewussten, schnellen reflexiven kausalen Handlungen von S1, die oft zum bewussten langsamen Denken von S2 führen (oft verändert durch die kulturellen Erweiterungen von S3), die Handlungsgründe hervorrufen, die oft zur Aktivierung der Körper-und Sprachmuskulatur durch S1 führen. Aktionen verursachen. Der allgemeine Mechanismus erfolgt sowohl über die Neuroübertragung als auch durch Veränderungen in verschiedenen Neuromodulatoren in gezielten Bereichen des Gehirns. Das mag unangenehm erscheinen, da Gut, aber Hat die Tugend, dass es auf der Tatsache basiert, und angesichts der Komplexität unseres höheren Ordnungsgedankens, glaube ich nicht, dass eine allgemeine Beschreibung viel einfacher werden wird. Die allgemeine kognitive Illusion (genannt von S ' Die phenomenologische Illusion ') ist, dass S2 die Aktion bewusst aus Gründen erzeugt hat, von denen wir uns voll bewusst sind und die wir in der Kontrolle haben, aber jeder, der mit der modernen Biologie und Psychologie vertraut ist, weiss, dass diese Ansicht nicht Glaubwürdige. Wieder, Ich werde einige entscheidende Begriffe wiederholen. Eine weitere Idee, die von S geklärt wird, ist die Desire Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA). Ich würde S es Zusammenfassung der praktischen Vernunft auf p127 von MSW wie folgt übersetzen: "Wir geben unseren Wünschen nach (Gentechnisch programmiert Die Gehirnchemie muss geändert werden), zu denen in der Regel Desire-Independent Reasons for Action (DIRA-) gehören. Wünsche In Raum und Zeit verdrängt), die Veranlagungen zum Verhalten hervorrufen, die üblicherweise früher oder später zu Muskelbewegungen führen, die unserer inklusiven Fitness dienen (erhöhtes Überleben für Gene in uns selbst und denen, 106 die eng miteinander verwandt sind). " Und ich möchte seine Beschreibung auf p129 noch einmal beschreiben, wie wir DIRA2 durchführen (Das Sprachspiel von DIRA in System 2) Als "Die Auflösung des Paradoxons ist, dass das unbewusste DIRA1, das langfristig integrative Fitness dient, das bewusste DIRA2 generiert, das die kurzfristigen persönlichen unmittelbaren Wünsche oft überwindet." Agenten schaffen zwar bewusst die unmittelbaren Gründe von DIRA2, aber das sind sehr eingeschränkte Erweiterungen des unbewussten DIRA1 (die ultimative Ursache). Obama und der Papst wollen den Armen helfen, weil es "richtig ist" Aber die ultimative Ursache ist eine Veränderung in ihrer Gehirnchemie, die die inklusive Fitness ihrer entfernten Vorfahren erhöht (Und auch z.B. die Neomarxist Supremacismus der Dritten Welt zerstört Amerika und die Welt). Evolution by inclusive fitness hat die unbewussten, schnellen reflexiven kausalen Handlungen von S1 programmiert., Die oft das bewusste langsame Denken von S2 hervorrufen, das Handlungsgründe hervorruft, die oft zur Aktivierung von Körperund/Sprachmuskeln durch S1 führen, die Handlungen verursachen. Der allgemeine Mechanismus erfolgt sowohl über die Neuroübertragung als auch über Veränderungen der Neuromodulatoren in gezielten Bereichen des Gehirns. Die allgemeine kognitive Illusion (genannt von S ' The Phenomenological Illusion ', von Pinker ' The Blank Slate ' und von Tooby Und Cosmides ' The Standard Social Science Model ') ist, dass S2 die Aktion bewusst aus Gründen, die wir voll und ganz kennen und die Kontrolle, aber jeder, der mit der modernen Biologie vertraut ist, und Die Psychologie kann erkennen, dass diese Sichtweise nicht glaubwürdig ist. So, Ich würde seine Zusammenfassung der praktischen Vernunft auf p127 wie folgt übersetzen: "Wir geben unseren Wünschen nach (Notwendigkeit, die Gehirnchemie zu verändern), die in der Regel Desire – Unabhängige Gründe für die Aktion (DIRA - d.h. Wünsche in Raum und Zeit verdrängt, meist für die Gegenseitigkeit. Altruismus), die Veranlagungen zum Verhalten hervorrufen, die üblicherweise früher oder später zu Muskelbewegungen führen, die unserer inklusiven Fitness dienen (erhöhtes Überleben für Gene in uns selbst und denen, die eng miteinander verwandt sind). " Im Gegensatz zu S es Kommentar zu p128 denke ich, wenn passend definiert, DIRA sind universell in höheren Tieren und überhaupt nicht einzigartig für den Menschen (denken Mutter hen verteidigt ihre Brut von einem Fuchs), wenn wir die automatisierten prelinguistischen Reflexe von S1 (dh, DIRA1), aber sicherlich die Höhere Ordnung DIRA von S2 oder DIRA2, die Sprache benötigen, sind einzigartig menschlich. Dies scheint mir eine alternative und klarere Beschreibung seiner "Erklärung" (wie W vorgeschlagen hat, diese werden viel besser als "Beschreibung" bezeichnet) auf der Unterseite von p129 des Paradoxons, wie wir freiwillig DIRA2 durchführen können (d.h. die S2-Wünsche und ihre kulturellen Erweiterungen). Das heisst: "Die Lösung des Paradoxons ist, dass die Anerkennung von wünschensunabhängigen Gründen den Wunsch begründen und damit den Wunsch hervorrufen kann, auch wenn es nicht logisch unvermeidlich ist, dass sie es 107 tun und nicht empirisch universell, dass sie es tun," kann mit "Die Die Lösung des Paradoxons ist, dass das unbewusste DIRA1, das langfristige inklusive Fitness dient, das bewusste DIRA2 generiert, das die kurzfristigen persönlichen unmittelbaren Wünsche oft überwindet. " Ebenso, Für seine Diskussion über dieses Thema in p130-31-it EP, RA, IF, S1 (Evolutionäre Psychologie, reziproprozaler Altruismus, Inklusive Fitness, System 1), die die Dispositionen und die daraus resultierenden Aktionen von S2 gründen. Auf P140 fragt er, warum wir nicht bekommen können Dekontik Aus der Biologie, aber natürlich müssen wir sie aus der Biologie bekommen, da es keine andere Möglichkeit gibt und die obige Beschreibung zeigt, wie das geschieht. Entgegen seiner Aussage herrschen immer die stärksten Neigungen, die DO (per Definition, sonst ist es nicht die stärkste), sondern Dekontik Funktioniert, weil die angeborene Programmierung von RA und IF sofort persönlich überfahren Kurzfristig Wünsche. Seine Verwechslung von Natur und Pflege, von S1 und S2, erstreckt sich bis zu den Schlussfolgerungen 2 und 3 auf p143. Agenten schaffen zwar die unmittelbaren Gründe von DIRA2, aber das sind nicht nur alles, sondern, mit wenigen Ausnahmen, sehr eingeschränkte Erweiterungen von DIRA1 (die ultimative Ursache). Wenn er wirklich bedeutet zuzuschreiben Dekontik Allein für unsere bewussten Entscheidungen ist er Opfer von ' The Phenomenological Illusion ' (TPI), den er in seinem gleichnamigen Klassiker so schön zerstört hat (siehe meine Rezension von PNC). Wie ich bereits erwähnt habe, gibt es eine riesige Anzahl von aktuellen Forschungen Auf implizite Erkenntnis Verfügbarmachen das Kognitive Illusionen, die unsere Persönlichkeit ausmachen. TPI ist nicht nur ein harmloser philosophischer Irrtum, sondern eine universelle Vergessenheit gegenüber unserer Biologie, die die Illusion erzeugt, dass wir unser Leben und unsere Gesellschaft und die Welt kontrollieren., Und die Folgen sind fast sicher Zusammenbruch der industriellen Zivilisation in den nächsten 150 Jahren. Er stellt richtig fest, dass die menschliche Rationalität ohne die "Lücke" keinen Sinn macht (Tatsächlich 3 Lücken, die er schon oft diskutiert hat). Das heisst, ohne freien Willen (d.h. die Wahl) in einem nicht trivialen Sinne wäre das alles sinnlos, und er hat zu Recht festgestellt, dass es unvorstellbar ist, dass die Evolution eine unnötige genetisch und energetisch teure Farce schaffen und aufrechterhalten könnte. Aber wie fast alle anderen kann er seinen Ausweg nicht erkennen, und so schlägt er erneut vor (p133), dass die Wahl eine Illusion sein könnte. Im Gegenteil, nach W ist ganz klar, dass die Wahl Teil unserer axiomatischen S1 wahrheitsgetreue reflexive Handlungen ist und nicht ohne Widerspruch hinterfragt werden kann, da S1 die Grundlage für die Befragung ist. Man kann nicht Im Normalfall Zweifeln Sie, dass Sie diese Seite lesen, da Ihr Bewusstsein dafür die Grundlage für Zweifel ist. Lassen Sie uns nun kurz Searle es neuestes Buch "Sehen Dinge sehen Als They Are ' (STATA2015). Weitere Kommentare finden Sie in der vollständigen Rezension. Wie man von jeder Philosophie erwartet, sind wir sofort in grossen Schwierigkeiten, denn auf Seite 4 haben wir die Begriffe ' Wahrnehmung ' und ' Objekt ', als wären sie verwendet 108 worden in Etwas normales Gefühl, Aber wir machen Philosophie, So werden wir zwischen Sprachspielen hin und her laufen Mit Keine Chance, unseren Tag für Tagesspiele von den verschiedenen philosophischen zu unterscheiden. Wieder, Sie können einige von Bennett und Hackers "Neurowissenschaften und Philosophie" oder "Philosophische Grundlagen der Neurowissenschaften" lesen, um ein Gefühl dafür zu bekommen. Leider, Wie fast alle Philosophen hat Searle (S) die beiden Systeme noch immer nicht übernommen Framework, Es ist also viel schwieriger, die Dinge gerade zu halten, als es sein muss. Auf p6 sind Believing und Asserting Teil des Systems 2, das sprachlich, überlegt, langsam ist, ohne genaue Zeit des Auftretens, Und "es regnet" ist ihre öffentliche Kondition der Zufriedenheit (COS2) (Wittgensteins transitive) – d.h. es ist propositionell und repräsentativ und kein mentaler Zustand, und wir können es nur verständlich in Bezug auf die Gründe beschreiben, während visuelle Erfahrung (VisExp) ist System 1 und erfordert daher (für die Verständlichkeit, für die Vernunft), dass es regnet (es ist COS1) und eine bestimmte Zeit des Auftretens hat, schnell (in der Regel unter 500msec), Nichttestable (Wittgensteins Wahrheit Oder unnachgiebtiv), und nicht öffentlich, automatisch und nicht sprachlich, Das heisst, nicht propositionell und prägend und nur in Bezug auf die Ursachen eines mentalen Zustandes zu beschreiben. Trotz von Dies auf p7, nachdem er den grauenhaften (aber immer noch sehr populären) Begriff "propositionelle Haltung" zerschlagen hat, sagt er, dass Wahrnehmung einen propositionellen Inhalt hat, aber ich stimme mit W überein, dass S1 nur wahrhaftig ist und daher nicht in dem Sinne von S2 propositionell sein kann, Vorschläge sind öffentliche sta(COS), die wahr sind oder FALSE. Auf p12 denken Sie daran, dass er die Automatisierung des Systems 1 (S1) beschreibt, und dann stellt er fest, dass wir, um die Welt zu beschreiben, nur die Beschreibung wiederholen können., Das W bemerkte, dass er die Grenzen der Sprache aufzeigte. Der letzte Satz zum Ende des Absatzes Mitte p13 muss übersetzt werden (wie die meisten Philosophie!), also für "Die subjektive Erfahrung hat einen Inhalt, den Philosophen einen absichtlichen Inhalt nennen und die Spezifikation der absichtlichen Inhalte ist die gleiche wie Die Beschreibung des Zustands der Dinge, die der absichtliche Inhalt Ihnen vorlegt usw. " Ich würde sagen: "Wahrnehmungen sind mentale Zustände des Systems 1, die nur in der öffentlichen Sprache von System 2 beschrieben werden können." Und wenn er zum Abschluss noch einmal die Gleichwertigkeit einer Beschreibung des Glaubens mit der einer Beschreibung unserer Wahrnehmung bemerkt, wiederholt er das, was W schon lange bemerkte., Und das liegt daran, dass S1 sprachlich nicht vorhanden ist und dass es sich bei S1 um verschiedene psychologische oder absichtliche Modi oder Sprachspiele handelt, die mit den gleichen Worten gespielt werden. Auf p23 bezieht er sich auf private "Erfahrungen", aber Worte sind S2 und beschreiben öffentliche Ereignisse, so dass das, was unsere Verwendung des Wortes für "private Erfahrungen" (sprich S1) rechtfertigt, nur ihre öffentlichen Manifestationen (S2) sein kann - d.h. Sprache, die wir alle verwenden, um öffentliche Handlungen zu beschreiben., Da ich selbst für mich selbst keine Möglichkeit habe, Sprache an etwas Innen anzuhängen. Das 109 ist natürlich W ' Argument gegen die Möglichkeit einer Privatsprache. Er erwähnt auch mehrmals, dass Halluzinationen von X sind die gleichen wie zu sehen X, Aber was kann der Test dafür sein, ausser dass wir dazu neigen, dieselben Worte zu verwenden? In diesem Fall, Sie sind die Gleiches per Definition, Also Dieses Argument klingt hohl. Auf p35 greift er erneut zu Recht auf die Verwendung von "propositioneller Haltung" an, die keine Haltung zu einem Satz ist, sondern eine Haltung (Disposition) zu ihrem öffentlichen COS, d.h. zu der Tatsache oder Wahrheitsmacher. Dann sagt er: "Wenn ich zum Beispiel einen Mann vor mir sehe, dann ist der Inhalt, dass vor mir ein Mann steht. Ziel ist der Mann selbst. Wenn ich eine entsprechende Halluzination habe, hat die Wahrnehmungserfahrung einen Inhalt, aber kein Objekt. Der Inhalt kann Genau dasselbe In den beiden Fällen bedeutet das Vorhandensein eines Inhalts nicht das Vorhandensein eines Objekts. " Die Art und Weise, wie ich das sehe, ist, dass das ' Objekt ' normalerweise in der Welt ist und den mentalen Zustand erzeugt (S1), und wenn wir das in Worte fassen, wird es S2 mit COS2 (d.h. eine Öffentlichkeit Wahrheitsmacher) und dies ist das öffentliche Objekt, aber für eine Halluzination (oder direkte Hirnstimulation etc.) ist das ' Objekt ' nur der ähnliche mentale Zustand, der sich aus der Gehirnaktivierung ergibt. Wie W uns gezeigt hat, geht es bei dem grossen Fehler nicht darum, die Wahrnehmung zu verstehen, sondern darum, Sprache zu verstehen - alle Probleme der Philosophie sind Genau dasselbe- nicht genau zu prüfen, wie die Sprache in einem bestimmten Kontext funktioniert, um klare COS zu liefern. Mitte von p61 sehen wir die Verwechslungen, die hier und überall auftreten, wenn wir S1 und S2 nicht trennen. Entweder dürfen wir uns nicht auf Darstellungen in S1 beziehen, oder wir müssen sie zumindest R1 nennen und erkennen, dass sie keine öffentlichen COS haben - also keine COS2. Bei p63 bedeutet die Nondetachbarkeit nur, dass es sich um eine verursachte automatische Funktion von S1 handelt und nicht um eine begründete, freiwillige Funktion von S2. Diese Diskussion setzt sich auf der nächsten Seite fort, ist aber natürlich relevant für das ganze Buch und für die gesamte Philosophie, und es ist so bedauerlich, dass Searle, und fast alle in den Verhaltenswissenschaften, nicht in das 21. Jahrhundert einsteigen kann und die beiden Systemterminologie verwenden kann, die Wiedergibt so viele undurchsichtige Themen sehr clOhr. Ebenso mit dem Versäumnis, zu begreifen, dass es immer nur eine Frage ist, ob es sich um eine wissenschaftliche Ausgabe oder Ein philosophisches und wenn auch philosophisch, welches Sprachspiel gespielt wird und was die COS im jeweiligen Kontext sind. Auf p64 sagt er, dass die "Erfahrung" in seinem Kopf ist, aber das ist nur das Thema - da W so deutlich gemacht hat, dass es keine Privatsprache gibt und wie Bennett und Hacker die gesamte neurowissenschaftliche Gemeinschaft zur Verantwortung ziehen, denn im normalen Gebrauch kann "Erfahrung" nur ein öffentliches Phänomen sein, für das wir Schar 110 E Kriterien, aber was ist der Test für meine Erfahrung im Kopf? Zumindest, Hier gibt es eine Unklarheit, die zu anderen führen wird. Viele Denke Das ist egal, viele denken, sie tun es. Etwas passiert im Gehirn, aber das ist eine wissenschaftliche neurophysiologische Frage, und sicherlich durch "Erfahrung" oder durch "Ich sah ein Kaninchen" bedeutet man nie die Neurophysiologie. Das ist natürlich keine Frage Wissenschaftliche Untersuchung, aber eine der Verwendung von Wörtern verständlich. Auf p65 indexikt, nicht detachierbar und präsativ sind nur mehr philosophische Jargon verwendet statt System 1 von Menschen, die nicht die beiden Systeme angenommen haben Framework Für die Beschreibung des Verhaltens (d.h. fast jeder). Ebenso, Für die folgenden Seiten, wenn wir erkennen, dass "Objekte und Zustände der Dinge", "visuelle Erfahrungen", "vollständig bestimmt" usw. sind, sind nur Sprachspiele, in denen wir entscheiden müssen, was die COS sind, und dass, wenn wir nur die Eigenschaften von S1 und S2 im Auge behalten, all dies aufgehört. E klar und Searle und alle anderen könnte aufhören, "kämpfen, um express " Es. So (p69) "Realität ist bestimmt" bedeutet nur, dass Wahrnehmungen S1 sind und so mentale Zustände, hier und jetzt, automatisch, kausal, nicht testbar (wahrhaftig nur, d.h. keine Öffentlichkeit Tests) etc. Während Überzeugungen, wie alle Dispositionen sind S2 und so nicht mentale Zustände, haben keine bestimmte Zeit, haben Gründe und nicht Ursachen, sind testbar mit COS etc. Auf p70 stellt er fest, dass die Intentionen in der Wahrnehmungswirkung (IA1 in meinen Begriffen) Teil der reflexiven Handlungen von S1 (A1 in meinen Begriffen) sind, die in S2Akten entstehen können, die reflexiv geworden sind (S2A in meiner Terminologie). Auf der Unterseite p74 auf p75, 500 Ms Oft wird als ungefähre Trennlinie zwischen Sehen (S1) und Sehen als (S2) angesehen., Das heisst, S1 übergibt die Wahrnehmung an höhere kortikale Zentren von S2, wo sie in der Sprache erwogen und ausgedrückt werden können. Auf p100-101 ist das ' subjektive Gesichtsfeld ' S2 und ' objektives Gesichtsfeld ' S1 und "Nichts wird gesehen" in S2 bedeutet, dass wir nicht das Sprachspiel des Sehens im gleichen Sinne spielen wie bei S1 und in der Tat Philosophie und ein gutes Stück Wissenschaft (z. , Physik) wäre anders, wenn die Leute erkannten, dass sie Sprachspiele spielen und keine Wissenschaft. Auf p107 ' Wahrnehmung ist transparent ', weil Sprache S2 ist und S1 keine Sprache hat, da sie automatisch und reflexiv ist, Wenn ich also sage, was ich sah, Oder um zu beschreiben, was ich gesehen habe, Ich kann nur sagen: "Ich habe eine Katze gesehen". Darauf wies W schon vor längerer Zeit hin, als er die Grenzen der Sprache aufzeige. P110 Mitte muss übersetzt werden SearleSpeak In TwoSystemsSpeak So dass "weil die präsentation der visuellen Intentionalität eine Unterart der Repräsentation ist, und weil alle Repräsentation unter Aspekten steht, werden die visuellen Darstellungen immer ihre Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit unter einigen Aspekten und nicht unter anderen 111 darstellen." "Weil die Wahrnehmungen von S1 ihre Daten auf S2 präsentieren, das öffentliche COS hat, können wir von S1 sprechen, als ob es auch öffentliche COS hat". Bei p111 bezieht sich die "Bedingung" auf die öffentliche COS von S2, d.h. die Ereignisse, die die Aussage wahr oder falsch machen, und "niedrigere Reihenfolge" und "höhere Reihenfolge" beziehen sich auf S1 und S2. Bei p112 sind die grundlegenden Handlungen und die Grundwahrnehmung isomorph, weil S1 seine Daten auf S2 einspeist, was nur durch Rückführung von S1 zur Kontraktmuskulatur und eine geringere Wahrnehmung des Niveaus zu Aktionen generieren kann. (P1) Und Höheres Niveau Wahrnehmung (P2) Kann nur in den gleichen Begriffen beschrieben werden, da es nur eine Sprache gibt, die S1 und S2 beschreibt. Auf p117 Boden wäre es viel weniger geheimnisvoll, wenn er die beiden Systeme übernehmen würde Framework, Damit statt der "internen Verbindung" mit den Befriedigung (mein COS1) eine Wahrnehmung nur als die Automatik von S1 vermerkt wird. Die einen psychischen Zustand verursacht. Bei p120 geht es darum, dass "kausale Ketten" keine Erklärungskraft haben, weil die Sprachspiele von "Ursache' Nur S1 oder andere nicht-psychologische Naturphänomene sinnvoll, während Semantik S2 ist und wir nur verständlich von Gründen für höhere Menschensche sprechen können.Das menschliche Verhalten. One way das Manifeste Das ist "Bedeutung ist nicht im Kopf", was uns in andere Sprachspiele einschmettiert. Auf p121 zu sagen, es ist wesentlich für eine Wahrnehmung (S1), dass es COS1 ("die Erfahrung") hat, beschreibt nur die Bedingungen des Sprachspiels der Wahrnehmung - es ist ein automatischer kausaler mentaler Zustand (P1) wenn wir von System 1 sprechen. Auf S 122 denke ich: "Erstens, dass etwas in der ontologisch objektiven Welt rot zu sein bedeutet, dass es in der Lage ist, ontologisch subjektive visuelle Erfahrungen wie diese zu verursachen." Ist nicht kohärent, da es nichts gibt, auf das wir uns auf "das" beziehen können. Es sollte als "Erstens: Damit etwas rot sein muss, dann ist es nur so, dass es mich dazu neigt, es "rot" zu nennen - wie üblich, hilft der Jargon überhaupt nicht, und auch der Rest des Absatzes ist unnötig. Auf p123 ist die "Hintergrunddisposition" der automatische, kausale, mentale Zustand von S1, Und wie ich in Übereinstimmung mit W, DMS und anderen oft gesagt habe, Diese können nicht verständlich als "Präpositionen" bezeichnet werden, da sie unbewusst "Scharniere" aktiviert sind, die die Grundlage für Präpositionen sind. Abschnitt VII und VIII (oder das ganze Buch oder der grösste Teil des höheren Ordnungsverhaltens oder der meisten der Philosophie im engeren Sinne) könnte mit dem Titel "Die Sprachspiele, die das Zusammenspiel der kausalen, automatischen, nichtsprachlichen Übergangszustände von S1 mit den begründeten, Bewusstes, hartnäckiges sprachliches Denken von S2 "und der Hintergrund ist nicht stillschweigend und kann auch 112 nicht als selbstverständlich angesehen werden., Aber es ist unsere axiomatische Wahrheitspsychologie (die "Scharniere" oder "Handlungsweisen" von W ' s ' Auf Gewissheit '), die allen Vermutungen zugrunde liegt. Wie aus meinen Kommentaren hervorgeht, denke ich, dass der gesamte Abschnitt, ohne die beiden Systemrahmen und W ' s Einsichten in OC verwirrt ist, wenn man davon ausgeht, dass es eine "Erklärung" der Wahrnehmung darstellt, in der es bestenfalls beschreiben kann, wie die Sprache der Wahrnehmung in verschiedenen Kontexten. Wir können nur beschreiben, wie das Wort "rot" verwendet wird, und das ist das Ende, und für den letzten Satz dieses Abschnitts könnten wir sagen, dass etwas, was ein "roter Apfel" ist, nur dazu führt, dass er normalerweise dazu führt, dass die gleichen Worte von allen benutzt werden. Apropos Scharniere, es ist traurig und ein bisschen seltsam, dass Searle nicht was eingearbeitet hat Viele ((z.B. DMS (Danielle Moyal-Sharrock) Ein bedeutender Philosoph der Gegenwart und führender W-Experte)) Als grösste Entdeckung in der modernen Philosophie - W es Revolutionierung der Epistemologie in seinem "On Certainty", Da niemand mehr Philosophie oder Psychologie auf die alte Art und Weise machen kann, ohne antiquiert zu aussehen Und verwirrt. Und obwohl Searle fast vollständig ignorierte "On Certainty" seine ganze Karriere, im Jahr 2009 (d.h. 6 Jahre vor der Veröffentlichung dieses Buches) sprach er auf einem Symposium darüber, das von der britischen Wittgenstein Society gehalten und von DMS moderiert, so ist er sicherlich der Ansicht, die Revolu hat bewusst.Genau die Themen, die er ist, tioniert Hier diskutieren. Ich glaube nicht, dass dieses Treffen veröffentlicht wurde, aber sein Vortrag kann von Vimeo heruntergeladen werden. Es handelt sich offenbar um einen alten Hund, der keine neuen Tricks lernen kann. Obwohl er wahrscheinlich Pionier in der beschreibenden Psychologie des höheren Ordnungsverhaltens als jeder andere seit Wittgenstein (Aus vielleicht Peter Hacker, dessen Schriften ziemlich dicht sind Und seine 3 Bände über die menschliche Natur), wenn er einmal gelernt hat Pfad Er neigt dazu, darauf zu bleiben, wie wir es alle tun. Wie jeder verwendet er das französische Wort Repertoire Wenn tHier ist ein leichter auszusprechen Und buchstabieren Sie das englische Wort "Repertoires" und die unangenehme "he/she" oder umgekehrt sexist ' sie ', wenn man immer "sie" oder "sie" verwenden kann. Trotz Ihre höhere Intelligenz und Bildung, Akademiker sind auch Schafe Und sie folgen fast allen den unteren Klassen Halbliterates nicht nur in schlechtes Englisch, sondern in Neomarxist Der supremacistische Faschismus der Dritten Welt. Abschnitt IX bis zum Ende des Kapitels zeigt wieder die sehr undurchsichtigen und unangenehmen Sprachspiele, in die man gezwungen ist, wenn man versucht, die Eigenschaften von S1 zu beschreiben (nicht zu erklären, wie W deutlich gemacht hat) und wie diese fe Die Daten in S2 (also sekundäre Qualitäten '), die dann zu S1 zurückfliessen müssen, um Aktionen zu generieren. Es zeigt auch die Fehler, die man begeht, indem man Wittgensteins einzigartige Sicht der "Scharnierepistemologie", die in "Über Gewissheit" präsentiert wird, nicht versteht. Um zu zeigen, wie viel klarer das mit der dualen Systemterminologie ist, müsste ich das ganze Kapitel (und einen Grossteil des Buches) umschreiben. Da ich hier mehrmals Abschnitte umgeschrieben habe, und oft in meinen 113 Rezensionen von Searles anderen Büchern, werde ich nur ein paar kurze Beispiele nennen. Der Satz auf p129 "Realität ist nicht von der Erfahrung abhängig, sondern umgekehrt. Der Begriff der Wirklichkeit, um die es hier geht, beinhaltet bereits die kausale Fähigkeit, bestimmte Arten von Erfahrungen zu produzieren. Also, Der Grund, warum diese Erfahrungen rote Objekte darstellen Ist Dass die Tatsache, ein rotes Objekt zu sein, eine Fähigkeit beinhaltet, diese Art von Erfahrung zu produzieren. Eine gerade Linie zu sein, beinhaltet die Fähigkeit, diese andere Art von Erfahrung zu produzieren. Das Fazit ist, dass Organismen diese Erfahrungen nicht machen können, ohne dass es ihnen scheint, dass sie ein rotes Objekt oder eine gerade Linie sehen, und dass "ihnen scheinbare" die innere Intentionalität der Wahrnehmungserfahrung markiert. " Kann als "S1 liefert die Eingabe für S2 und die Art und Weise, wie wir das Wort" rot "verwenden, ist es in jedem Kontext COS, also ist es das, was es bedeutet, Rot zu sehen, wenn wir diese Wörter in einer bestimmten Weise verwenden. Im Normalfall scheint es uns nicht "so zu sein, dass wir rot sehen, wir sehen nur Rot und wir verwenden" scheinen, um "Fälle zu beschreiben, in denen wir im Zweifel sind". Auf p130 "Unsere Frage ist jetzt: Gibt es einen wesentlichen Zusammenhang zwischen dem Charakter der Dinge in der Welt und dem Charakter unserer Erfahrung?" Kann übersetzt werden mit "Sind unsere öffentlichen Sprachspiele (S2) in der Beschreibung der Wahrnehmung nützlich (konsistent)?" Der erste Absatz von Abschnitt X ' The Backward Road ' ist vielleicht der wichtigste des Buches, da es für die gesamte Philosophie entscheidend ist zu verstehen, dass es keine genaue 1:1 Verbindung zwischen oder Verkleinerung von S2 zu S1 geben kann, da es viele Arten der Beschreibung in lang gibt. Ein bestimmtes Ereignis (mentaler Zustand, d.h. wahrnehmen, Gedächtnis etc.) wird verbreitet. Daher die offensichtliche Unmöglichkeit, Verhalten zu erfassen (Sprache, Denken) perfekt In Algorithmen (die Hoffnungslosigkeit der ' starken KI ') oder der Extrapolation von einem bestimmten neuronalen Muster im Gehirn zu den vielfältigen Handlungen (Sprachspiele) -d.h. Wörter in grenzenlosen Kontexten), die wir verwenden, um es zu beschreiben. Die ' Backward Road ' ist die Sprache (COS) von S2, die zur Beschreibung von S1 verwendet wird. Wieder, Ich denke, dass sein Versäumnis, die beiden Systeme zu nutzen, dies ziemlich verwirrend, wenn nicht gar undurchsichtig macht. Natürlich, Er teilt dies scheitert mit fast allen. Searle hat sich dazu schon einmal geäussert und auch andere (z.B. Hacker, W in verschiedenen Zusammenhängen), aber es scheint den meisten Philosophen und fast allen Wissenschaftlern entgangen zu sein. Wieder, Die Suche verfehlt den Punkt in Sect XI und X12 – wir nicht "sehen" rot oder "scheinen" zu sehen, eine Erinnerung zu haben oder eine Beziehung zwischen der Erfahrung und dem Wort anzunehmen, sondern wie bei all den Wahrnehmungen und Erinnerungen, die den angeborenen axiomatischen, wahrheitsgetreuen mentalen Zustand ausmachen. s von System 1, wir haben nur die Erfahrung und "es" wird nur ' rot ' etc., wenn 114 in der öffentlichen Sprache mit diesem Wort in diesem Zusammenhang durch System 2 beschrieben. Wir wissen, dass es rot ist, denn dies ist ein Scharnier - ein Axiom unserer Psychologie, das unser automatisches Handeln ist und die Grundlage für Annahmen oder Urteile oder Voraussetzungen ist und nicht verständlich beurteilt, getestet oder verändert werden kann. EineS W hat so oft darauf hingewiesen, Ein Fehler in S1 ist ganz anderer Art als ein Fehler in S2. Es sind keine Erklärungen möglich - wir können nur beschreiben, wie es funktioniert, und so gibt es keine Möglichkeit, eine nicht triviale "Erklärung" von unserer Höhere Ordnung Psychologie. Wie er es immer getan hat, macht Searle den gemeinsamen und fatalen Fehler des Denkens, er verstehe Verhalten (Sprache) besser als Wittgenstein. Nach einem Jahrzehnt, in dem ich W, S und viele andere gelesen habe, finde ich, dass W es ' anschauliche Beispiele ', Aphorismen und Triloge in der Regel eine grössere Ausleuchtung bieten als die Wortweine. Ausfälle von anderen. "We may nDer Vorstoss jeglicher Art von Theorie, tHier dürfen wir in unseren Überlegungen nichts hypothetisches sagen. Wir müssen alle Erklärungen abschaffen, und die Beschreibung allein muss es ist Platz. " (PI 109). Auf p135 ist eine Möglichkeit, die Wahrnehmung zu beschreiben, dass das Ereignis oder das Objekt ein Muster der neuronalen Aktivierung (mentaler Zustand) verursacht, dessen selbstreflexives COS1 darin besteht, dass wir eine rote Rose vor uns sehen, und in angemessenen Kontexten für einen normalen englischsprachigen Menschen führt uns dies zu Aktivieren Sie Muskelkontraktionen, die die Worte "Ich sehe eine rote Rose" hervorbringen, deren COS2 ist, dass es dort eine rote Rose gibt. Oder einfach: S2 produziert in entsprechenden Kontexten. Also, Auf p136 können wir sagen, dass S1 zu S2 führt, was wir in diesem Zusammenhang mit dem Wort "glatt" ausdrücken, das beschreibt (aber nie "erklärt"), wie das Sprachspiel von "glatt" in diesem Zusammenhang funktioniert, und wir können übersetzen "Für grundlegende Aktionen und grundlegende Wahrnehmungen ist der absichtliche Inhalt i Nental im Zusammenhang mit den Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit, auch wenn es gekennzeichnet ist, nicht Absicht, weil das Merkmal F wahrgenommen wird, besteht in der Fähigkeit, Erfahrungen dieser Art zu verursachen. Und im Falle von Aktionen, eXperiences dieser Art bestehen In ihrer Fähigkeit, diese Art von körperlicher Bewegung zu verursachen. "Als" Grundwahrnehmungen (S1) können automatisch (intern) zu grundlegenden Reflexaktionen (A1) führen (d.h. das Verbrennen eines Fingers führt zum Abzug des Armes), der erst dann ins Bewusstsein tritt, so dass er reflektiert werden kann. Und in der Sprache (S2) beschrieben. Bei p150 geht es darum, dass das Einschlagen, wie das Wissen, das Urteilen, das Denken, eine S2-Disposition ist, die in der Sprache mit öffentlichen COS ausgedrückt wird, die informativ (wahr oder falsch) sind, während Wahrnehmungen nicht-informativ sind (siehe meine Rezension von Hutto und Myin es Ersten Buch) automatisierte Antworten von S1 und es gibt keine sinnvolle Möglichkeit, ein Sprachspiel des Inferrings in S1 zu spielen. Bäume und alles, was wir sehen, ist S1 für ein paar hundert Ms Oder so und dann in der Regel S2, wo sie Sprache befestigt werden (aspektische Form oder Sehen als). 115 In Bezug auf p151 et seq., ist es traurig, dass Searle, als Teil seiner mangelnden Aufmerksamkeit für das spätere W, nie auf die wahrscheinlich eindringlichste Analyse von Farbwörtern in W es zu beziehen scheint 'Bemerkungen zum Farbe", was bei fast jeder Diskussion über das Thema, das ich gesehen habe, fehlt. Die einzige Frage ist, wie wir das Spiel mit Farbwörtern und mit "gleich", "anders", "spielen", "Erfahrung ", usw. in diesem öffentlichen sprachlichen Kontext (wahr oder falsch statements-COS2), weil es in einem privaten (S1) keine Sprache und keine Bedeutung gibt. Also, Es spielt keine Rolle (ausser den Neurowissenschaftlern), was in den mentalen Zuständen von S1 passiert, sondern nur, was wir über sie sagen, wenn sie S2 betreten. es ist Klar wie Tag, dass alle 7.8 Milliarden auf der Erde haben ein etwas anderes Muster der neuronalen Aktivierung jeder Zeit Sie sehen Rot und dass es keine Möglichkeit für eine perfekte Korrelation zwischen S1 und S2 gibt. Wie ich bereits erwähnt habe, ist es Absolut kritisch Für jeden Philosophen und Wissenschaftler, um das klar zu machen. In Bezug auf das Gehirn in einem Bottichen (p157), soweit wir die normalen Beziehungen von S1 und S2 stören oder beseitigen, verlieren wir die Sprachspiele der Intentionalität. Gleiches gilt für intelligente Maschinen, und W hat diese Situation vor über 80 Jahren endgültig beschrieben. "Nur eines Lebewesens und dem, was einem lebenden Menschen ähnelt (sich so verhält), kann man einen Sagen: Es hat Empfindungen; Er sieht; Blind; Hört; Gehörlos; Bewusst oder bewusstlos. " (PI 281) Kapitel 6: Ja Disjunktivismus (Wie fast alle philosophischen Thesen) ist inkohärent und die Tatsache, dass diese und andere Absurditäten in seiner eigenen Abteilung und sogar bei einigen seiner ehemaligen Studenten, die in seiner Philosophie der Geistes-Klassen Bestnoten erhalten haben, zeigt vielleicht, dass er, wie die meisten, auch aufgehört hat. Bald in seinem Wittgenstein-Studium. Auf p188 sind jch-nachprüfbares Sehen und "Wissen" (d.h. K1) gleich, da S1 wahrheitsgemäss ist-das heisst, es sind die schnellen, axiomatischen, kausalselbstreflexiven, automatischen mentalen Zustände, die nur mit den langsamen, beratenden öffentlichen Sprachspielen von S2 beschrieben werden können. Auf p204-5, Repräsentation ist immer unter einem Aspekt, da es sich, wie Denken, Wissen etc., um eine Disposition von S2 mit öffentlichem COS handelt, die unendlich variabel ist. Noch einmal, Ich denke, die Verwendung der beiden Systeme Framework Die Diskussion vereinfacht stark. Wenn man darauf besteht, "Repräsentation" für "Präsentationen" von S1 zu verwenden, dann sollte man sagen, dass R1 COS1 haben, die vorübergehende neurophysiologische Geisteszustände sind, und so völlig anders als R2, die COS2 (aspektuelle Formen) haben, die öffentlich sind, sprachlich Ausdrucksvolle Zustände und 116 die Vorstellung von unbewussten Geisteszuständen sind illegitim, da solchen Sprachspielen kein klares Gespür fehlt. Traurig, auf p211 Searle, Vielleicht zum zehnten Mal in seinen Schriften (und endlos in seinen Vorträgen), Sagt, dass der "freie Wille" illusorisch sein kann, aber wie W aus den 30er Jahren darauf vermerkt hat, kann man die "Scharniere", wie wir die Wahl haben, nicht kohärent leugnen oder beurteilen, noch dass wir sehen, hören, schlafen, Hände haben usw., da diese Worte die wahrheitsgetreuen Axiome unserer Psychologie, unsere automatischen Verhaltensweisen, die die Grundlage für das Handeln sind. Auf p219 unten und 222 Nach oben- es W in seiner Arbeit war, der in "Auf Gewissheit" gipfelte, der darauf hinwies, dass Verhalten keine Beweisgrundlage haben kann und dass seine Grundlage unsere tierische Gewissheit oder unser Verhalten ist, das die Grundlage des Zweifels und der Gewissheit ist und nicht angezweifelt werden kann (die Scharniere von S1). Er stellte auch oft fest, dass ein "Fehler" in unseren Grundwahrnehmungen (S1), der kein öffentliches COS hat und nicht getestet werden kann (im Gegensatz zu denen von S2), wenn er gross ist oder anhält, nicht zu weiteren Tests führt, sondern zu einem Wahnsinn. Phänomenalismus p227 top: Siehe meine ausführlichen Kommentare zu Searles ausgezeichnetem Essay "The Phenomenological Illusion" in meiner Rezension von "Philosophie in einem neuen Jahrhundert." Es gibt nicht einmal einen Haftbefehl, weil man die privaten Erfahrungen als "Phänomene", "Sehen" oder irgendetwas anderes bezeichnet. Wie W uns bekanntermassen gezeigt hat, kann Sprache nur eine öffentliche, prüfbare Tätigkeit sein (keine Privatsprache). Und bei p230 besteht das Problem nicht darin, dass die "Theorie" nicht ausreicht, sondern dass sie (wie die meisten, wenn nicht alle philosophischen Theorien) inkohärent ist. Es verwendet eine Sprache, die keine klare COS hat. Als W darauf beharrte, können wir nur beschreiben, - es die Wissenschaftler sind, die Theorien machen können. Unterm Strich handelt es sich dabei um klassische Searle - hervorragend und wahrscheinlich mindestens so gut, wie jeder andere produzieren kann, aber ohne Verständnis für die grundlegenden Einsichten des späteren Wittgensteins, und ohne Verständnis der beiden Systeme des Denkrahmens, die hätten produzieren können Brillant. I Noch einmal beachten Sie, dass W eine interessante Lösung für einige dieser "Rätsel", indem sie darauf hindeutete, dass einige "mentale Phänomene" (d.h. Wörter für Dispositionen, die zu öffentlichen Handlungen führen) in chaotischen Prozessen im Gehirn entstehen können und dass es nichts entsprechenden gibt. Eine Speicherspur, Ebenso wenig zu einem einzigen Hirnprozess, der als eine einzige Absicht oder Aktion identifizierbar ist-dass die Kausalkette spurlos endet, und dass "Ursache"," Ereignis "und" Zeit "sind nicht mehr anwendbar (nützlich - mit klaren COS). In der Folge haben viele 117 ähnliche Vorschläge gemacht, die auf der Physik und den Wissenschaften der Komplexität und des Chaos basieren. Man muss sich jedoch daran erinnern, dass "chaotisch" im modernen Sinne bedeutet, dass es durch Gesetze bestimmt, aber nicht vorhersehbar ist, und dass die Wissenschaft des Chaos erst lange nach seinem Tod existierte. Und Wieder Lassen Sie mich anmerken, dass sich die Chaostheorie als unentschieden und unvollständig erwiesen hat (in Godel es Sinn). Unser gesamtes Verhalten (oder die Gehirnfunktion, wenn Sie möchten) hat seinen Ursprung in Unsere angeborene Psychologie, So die "Humanwissenschaften" der Philosophie, Soziologie, Anthropologie, Politikwissenschaft, Psychologie, Geschichte, Literatur, Religion, etc., Und Die "hart Physik, Mathematik und BioDie logie ist ein Mix von Die Fragen zum Sprachspiel, was ich hier besprochen habe, Mit den wirklichen wissenschaftlichen Fakten, was die empirischen Fakten sind. Wissenschaftler ist immer Anwesende Und Ich wiederhole, was Wittgenstein Das hat uns schon lange gesagt. "Philosophen sehen ständig die Methode der Wissenschaft vor ihren Augen und sind unwiderstehlich versucht, Fragen zu stellen und zu beantworten, wie es die Wissenschaft tut. Diese Tendenz ist die eigentliche Quelle der Metaphysik und führt den Philosophen in die völlige Dunkelheit. " (BBB p18) Es ist meine Behauptung, dass die Tabelle der Intentionalität (Rationalität, Verstand, Denken, Sprache, Persönlichkeit etc.), die hier prominent ist, mehr oder weniger genau beschreibt oder zumindest als heuristisches für, wie wir denken und benehmen, und so umfasst sie nicht Sich nur Philosophie und Psychologie, aber alles andere (Geschichte, Literatur, Mathematik, Politik etc.). Der Schlüssel zu Gesellschaft Biologie, und es ist Vergessenheit, dass Führt den grössten Teil der Welt zu Fürtigen Sie suizidgefährdete utopische Ideale, die Führen Untrennbar zur Hölle auf der Erde. Ich beschreibe das in meinen Büchern ausführlich "Selbstmörderische utopische Wahnvorstellungen in den 21St Jahrhundert ' 4. Hg. (2019) und "Suicide by Democracy: Eine Nachruf für Amerika und die Welt ' 2Nd Hg. (2019).

Marty and Brentano Laurent Cesalli & Kevin Mulligan The Swiss philosopher Anton Marty (Schwyz, 1847 --‐ Prague, 1914) belongs, with Carl Stumpf, to the first circle of Brentano's pupils. Within Brentano's school (and, to some extent, in the secondary literature), Marty has often been considered (in particular by Meinong) a kind of would--‐be epigone of his master (Fisette & Fréchette 2007: 61--‐2). There is no doubt that Brentano's doctrine often provides Marty with his philosophical starting points. But Marty often arrives at original conclusions which are diametrically opposed to Brentano's views. This is true of his views about space and time and about judgment, emotions and intentionality. In the latter case, for example, Marty develops Brentano's view and its implications in great detail (Mulligan 1989; Rollinger 2004), but uses them to formulate a very unBrentanian account of intentionality as a relation of ideal assimilation (Chrudzimski 1999; Cesalli & Taieb 2013). Marty's philosophy of language, on the other hand, is one of the first philosophies worthy of the name. In what follows, we contrast briefly their accounts of (i) judgment and states of affairs and of (ii) emotings and value (two topics of foremost significance, for Brentano and Marty's theoretical and practical philosophies respectively) (§1), and their philosophies of language (§2). Brentano's view of language is based on his philosophy of mind. Marty takes over the latter and turns a couple of claims by Brentano about language into a sophisticated philosophy of language of a kind made familiar much later by Grice. Marty's philosophy of states of affairs and value and of the mind's relations to these also takes off from views sketched by the early Brentano, views forcefully rejected by the later Brentano. 2 1. Correctness, States of Affairs and Values Two categories prominent in twentieth--‐century philosophy are state of affairs and value. The prominence of these categories in subsequent philosophical discussion owes much to Brentano. His philosophy of what he called judgment contents, and which his students Stumpf and Husserl successfully baptised Sachverhalte, or states of affairs, and his philosophy of value, went through three phases. He initially toyed with what might be called a naively realist view of states of affairs and values: judgings are directed towards judgment--‐contents and are correct only if these obtain or exist; emotings are directed towards value and are correct only if value is exemplified.1 But predication of value, he then came to think, should be understood in terms of correct emoting and knowledge thereof (see CHAP. 23). And the distinction between correct and incorrect judging, he argued, should be understood without any reference to judgment contents or states of affairs (see CHAP. 10). These two analogous developments received further support from a final turn in his thinking about ontology. As he came to think that there are only things (i.e. real entities, res), a view sometimes called reism, he had further reasons to reject such non--‐things as states of affairs and values and value--‐properties, as well as judgings and emotings, reasons which are independent of his views about correct judging and emoting, or rather, correct judgers and emoters. In what follows, we shall pay no attention to Brentano's reism (see CHAP. 15 for discussion). The three greatest philosophers formed by Brentano, Husserl, Meinong and Marty, all came to reject his turn away from naive realism about states of affairs and values, and never endorsed his reism. They all developed versions of Brentano's early naive realism and employed Brentano's distinctions between correct and incorrect judging and emotings. The idea that not only beliefs but also non--‐intellectual mental states and acts, such as desire and choice, are correct or incorrect goes back at least to Plato and Aristotle (see for example Kraus 1937: 7--‐34, Mulligan 2017). But it surfaces only sporadically in the history of subsequent philosophy, for example in Anselm of Canterbury's De veritate, with the notion of rectitudo, and later in Aquinas, until Brentano puts it at the heart of his philosophy and so at the heart of the philosophies of his students. Naively realist views about the relations between correct judging and states of affairs were published by Husserl and Meinong at the beginning of the twentieth century. But it is Marty who published the first unified naively realist account 3 of the relation between (in)correct judging, emoting and preferring, on the one hand, and states of affairs, values and comparative values, on the other hand.2 In what follows, we first outline Brentano's early view about (in)correct judging and emotion, judgment contents and value, then Marty's 1908 development of this view, and only then Brentano's mature view. 1.1. Early Brentano In a note appended to his 1889 lecture Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, Brentano writes that truth has often been said to be an agreement of judgment and its object. He dismisses one way of understanding this dictum: "as a sort of identity between something contained in the judgment or the presentation on which the judgment is based and something which lies outside the mind". But the dictum is "in a certain sense correct" provided we bear in mind that "agreement" here means "fit" (passen), "correspond" or "be in harmony with" (in Einklang stehen, harmonieren): The concepts of existence and non--‐existence are the correlates of the concepts of the truth of (einheitlicher) affirmative and negative judgments. Just as what is judged belongs to the judgment ... so there belongs to the correctness of the affirmative judgment the existence of what is affirmatively judged, to the correctness of the negative judgment the non--‐existence of what is judged negatively, and whether I say that a negative judgment is true or that its object is non--‐ existent, in both cases I say the same thing. (Brentano 1889: 75--‐7, n. 25). It is difficult to know how Brentano thought he could reconcile the claim that the concepts of existence and of true judgment are correlatives and the claim that to say that a negative judgment is true and that its object does not exist is to say the same thing. But that is not our concern here. What is it that is judged? In his 1875 logic lectures, Brentano refers to contents of judgments (Urteilsinhalte). He also says that what one states is the content of the judgment corresponding to the statement and that this is the meaning (Bedeutung) of the statement (EL80, 13.143[3]). In 1907 Stumpf asserts that three decades earlier Brentano had sharply emphasized in his logic lectures that "to a judgment there corresponds a specific judgment content, which is to be distinguished from the content of presentation (the presentation's matter) and is expressed in that--‐clauses or 4 nominalised infinitives" (1907: 29). Stumpf also says that he himself employs for this specific judgment content the expression "Sachverhalt", or "state of affairs", and had introduced this expression in 1888 in his own logic lectures. Stumpf says that Bolzano had employed the term "Satz an sich" for what Brentano called a judgment content (Stumpf 1907: 29--‐30). But a Satz an sich consists only of concepts. Did Stumpf really want to attribute to Brentano the view that judgment contents consist only of concepts?3 Brentano's early views about the mind and value resemble his early views about mind and judgment contents. In 1866 Brentano asserted that ... the concepts of the good and the beautiful differ in that we call something good in so far as it is worthy of being desired (begehrenswert), and beautiful in so far as its appearing is worthy of being desired. (Brentano 1968: 141) In 1889 desire--‐worthiness is replaced by love--‐worthiness and correct love, where "love" comprehends all pro--‐emoting, desiring and willing: We call something good, if love of it is correct. What is to be loved with correct love, what is worthy of love, is the good in the widest sense. (Brentano 1889: 17, §23) And Brentano asserts that every loving, hating, being pleased by and being displeased by, is either correct or incorrect (Brentano 1889: 17, §22). In the same year, he also asserts that every loving and every hating is either fitting (passend) or unfitting and that accordingly, whatever is thinkable falls into two classes, one of which contains everything for which love is fitting and the other everything for which hate is fitting. We call what belongs to the first class good and what belongs to the second bad. Thus we may say, a loving and hating is correct or incorrect according to whether it is a loving of what is good or a hating of what is bad or, conversely, according to whether it is a loving of what is bad and a hating of what is good. We may also say that in cases where our behaviour (Verhalten) is correct our emotion corresponds to the object, is in harmony with its value, and that, on the other hand, in cases where behaviour is wrong (verkehrt) it is opposed (widerspreche) to its object, is in a relation of disharmony with its value. (Brentano 1930: 25, §53) In Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, Brentano is also tempted by a view of preferring and betterness very different from the view he will subsequently adopt. He there contrasts two views about correct preferences. According to the first view, certain acts of preferring are "characterised as correct", as are certain acts of liking something; our knowledge that one thing is better than another has its origin in preferrings which 5 are characterised as correct. This view is the one he will develop later. According to the second view, preferrings "are characterised as correct because they allow themselves to be guided by an already apprehended betterness". According to this second view, preferrings are not the source of our knowledge of betterness and the apprehension of betterness involves knowledge of analytic judgments. Brentano says that someone who accepts the second rather than the first view "perhaps has more right on his side" but does not endorse either view (Brentano 1889:24, §31). The harmonies between correct emoting and the exemplification of value and between correct judging and existence or truth to which Brentano refers in these passages are just that. Neither side of the harmony enjoys any priority. Brentano does not say, as a certain sort of realist does, that loving love is correct because love is valuable. 1.2. Marty Judging, choosing, desiring, acting, inferring, emoting, preferring and even sympathy, Marty thinks, are correct or incorrect. He argues, like the early Brentano, that judging and emoting are correct iff the world is a certain way. In this context, he talks of the relations of correspondence, fitting, adequation and ideal similarity between the mind and the way the world is. Unlike the early Brentano and like Husserl, Marty argues that, if emoting or judging is correct, it is correct because of the way the world is. Just as judgment contents make judgings correct or incorrect, so too, the exemplification of value of different types-"objective value situations (Wertverhalt) ... value, disvalue, lesser value" (Marty 1908: 427)-makes emoting correct or incorrect. There can only be analogues of the correctness and incorrectness of judging in the realm of interest, he argues, ... if there is something which is independent of the subjective phenomenon of loving and hating and which is in this sense objective, which grounds (begründet) this correctness of mental behaviour, just as the being of the object provides the foundation for the correctness of acceptance of this object... (Marty 1908: 370)4 6 By judgment content ... is to be understood that by which the correctness of the judgment is objectively grounded, and so what, if the uttered judgment is correct, is intimated in the proper sense of the term by the statement. (Marty 1908: 369--‐70) The "valuable is something objective, which stands in a relation to loving which is analogous to the relation between the true and what is (das Seiende)" (Marty 1908: 428). Thus: Just like certain judgments, so too, certain acts of interest are distinguished by the fact that they announce themselves as correct and thereby characterise what they love as truly valuable. (Marty 1908: 370) Marty, then, is precisely the sort of realist Brentano is not. 1.3. Brentano's Mature View Brentano's suspicions about the naive--‐realist view of value emerge clearly in a note (footnote 28) to Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis. Aristotle, he says, seems to have given in to the "understandable temptation" to think "we recognize the good as good, independently of the stimulation of affective activity" (Brentano 1889: 89).5 This, he suggests, is connected with Aristotle's claim... ... that the good and the bad are in things, unlike the true and the false6..., that although predicates such as 'true God', 'false friend' are attributed to things only in relation to certain mental acts, namely, true and false judgments, the predicates 'good' and 'bad' hold of things in a dissimilar way, that is, not merely in relation to a certain class of mental activities. (Brentano 1889: 89) But "all this", he says, is "incorrect". Indeed Hume, the Gefühlsmoralist, has the advantage over Aristotle "when he stresses: how should one recognize that something is to be loved without the experience of love?" (Brentano 1889: 90, n.28).7 The temptation to which Aristotle has succumbed is understandable: It is due to the fact that together with the experience of an emotion (Gemütstätigkeit) characterised as correct knowledge of the goodness of the object is always simultaneously given. It then easily happens that one gets the relation the wrong way round and believes that one loves here as a result of (in Folge) the knowledge and apprehends the love as correct through (an) its agreement with this, its standard (Regel). (Brentano 1889: 90) 7 The relation which those who think goodness and badness are in things get the wrong way round seems to be a relation of causal explanation. The naive realist thinks that one comes to know that an object is good, and then on this basis, comes to love the object, and then comes to grasp that this love of an object which is good is correct. Knowledge of goodness is prior to knowledge of correct emotion. Brentano's diagnosis of what he takes to be Aristotle's mistakes about goodness suggests that Brentano thought that Aristotle was wrong to treat truth and goodness in different ways and that Aristotle's account of truth was closer to the truth than his account of goodness. We see here one of the roots of Brentano's later philosophy of truth, existence and value. According to this philosophy, it is important to distinguish between two types of predicate: on the one hand, predicates such as "red", "round", "warm", "thinking"; on the other hand, predicates such as "good" and "existing", "non--‐ existing". The first group of predicates Brentano calls "sachlich", material or objective, predicates. Brentano's distinction between material or objective predicates and non--‐ objective predicates is related to the medieval distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic denominations and also to Husserl's distinction between formal and material concepts. Brentano employs his distinction as follows: If we call (nennen) an object good, ... we do not thereby want to add a further determination (Bestimmung) to the determinations of the thing in question ... If we call certain objects good, and others bad, we say no more than that whoever loves this, hates that, is correct to do so (verhalte sich richtig). (Brentano 1952: 144) Similarly, to say of something that it exists is just to say that whoever accepts it, judges truly or correctly (Ibid.).8 Here and in other places Brentano does not say that if something is good, it is good because love of it is correct; the latter claim is one he makes very rarely. Nor is he a non--‐cognitivist about value--‐claims. He thinks that axiological and ethical claims have truth--‐values.9 Even before his rejection of properties (his reist turn), he denies that being valuable is a determination of things in the sense in which redness is. There are interesting questions about the exact content of his view that to say or mean that something is valuable is just to say or mean that love of it is correct. But it is not necessary to answer these questions in order to measure the difference between Brentano's mature view and Marty. 8 1.4. Marty's Last Word In 1916, a year before Brentano's death, Marty's final verdict on Brentano's views were published posthumously: According to Brentano, the ... correctness of a judgment does not consist in its adequation to a content or state of affairs. In reality there is no such thing as contents of judgments and of relations of interest (states of affairs and values), but only differences between correct and incorrect ... psychological modes of being related.... [I]f there is no such thing as the "contents" of these relations, then what we have taken to be ... the concepts of which these contents are the objects are not truly concepts of non--‐real determinations of being nor of real determinations of being... (Marty 1916: 155) Brentano's "attempt to give an account of the objectivity of judgment and interest without any appeal to what we have called 'contents' seems to me", says Marty, "to be unsatisfactory and untenable": The only possible explanation (Erklärung) of [such] objectivity or correctness ... is that it consists in an ideal (ideellen) adequation to something (which is not merely mental and subjective, but objective, that is, independent of what is given in consciousness). In the case of judgment this is the state of affairs, in the case of interest, the value or disvalue of the object to which the judgment or interest relates. (Marty 1916: 155--‐6) Marty also, like Husserl (1988: 344), rejects Brentano's account of self--‐evidence (Evidenz): "the concept of correctness is not to be clarified by appealing to Evidenz, it is Evidenz which ... is a manifestation (kundgeben) of correctness" (Marty 1916: 157).10 2. Brentano and Marty on Language 2.1. Brentano Brentano's writings contain no detailed philosophy of language and meaning.11 But the topic is by no means absent from his work, as one would expect given the prominence there of the reform of logic and his conviction that philosophers are often misled by ordinary language. The best and most reliable source for his views on language and meaning are his logic lectures from the late 1880s (manuscript EL 80).12 9 2.1.1. Language and thought. In very general terms, Brentano characterizes language as being "essentially a sign of thinking" ("Zeichen des Denkens", EL 80, 12.978[9]). This is not to say, however, that linguistic expressions faithfully reflect thoughts. As Brentano insists in Sprechen und Denken: Language should express what we think. In such a case, the utterance corresponds to the thought. Some think therefore that in the case of truthfulness, expressions and thoughts correspond completely, and therefore also part by part. This is in no way the case. (Brentano 1905, in Srzednicki 1965: 117)13 This suspicion about the ability of linguistic expressions to reflect the way the mind works and Brentano's further suspicion about the ability of language to represent the way the world is are at the heart of Brentano's Sprachkritik, the opening shots of the Austrian critique of language to which Marty, Mauthner, Oskar and Karl Kraus and Wittgenstein will all contribute. Brentano points out that the immediate aim of language, as a sign of thinking, is the communication of thoughts (12.986[4]). Language also influences thinking, both positively and negatively. It contributes to a more fine--‐grained distinction of ideas, compensates for the shortcomings of memory, and allows for the simple expression of complex contents (sentences are useful for the logicians as symbols and written numbers are useful for the mathematician, see EL 80 12.978[7]). On the other hand, language disturbs and perturbs thinking by making equivocation and synonymy possible, thereby facilitating paralogisms and other mistakes (EL 80 12.990[2]– 12.997[2]).14 2.1.2. The nature of linguistic meaning. At several points in the first part of his logic lectures, Brentano tackles the question of what linguistic expressions mean, focusing, as one would expect, on names and statements. As it turns out, both cases are similar, with an important difference: [W]hat do names designate (bezeichnen)? The name designates in a certain way a presentation's content as such, [i.e.] the immanent object. In a certain way, [names designate] that which is presented by the content of a presentation. The former is the meaning (Bedeutung) of the name. The latter is that which the name names. Of it we say that it has the name (kommt ihm zu). It is 10 that which, when it exists, is the external object of the presentation. One names through the mediation of meaning. (EL 80:13.016[1]--‐13.018[5]; see also EL 80:13.001[3]--‐13.002[7].) What do [statements] designate (bezeichnen)? 1. When we raised that question for names, we distinguished between what they mean (bedeuten) and what they name (nennen). Here, as well, we make a distinction, but not the same one. They [i.e. the statements] mean (bedeuten), but they do not name. 2. Like names, they have a twofold relation, a, to the content of a mental phenomenon as such, and b, to possible external objects. The former is the meaning (Bedeutung). 3. But in such a case, the phenomenon at stake is not a presentation, but a judgment. The judged (Geurteilte) as such is the meaning (Bedeutung). (EL 80:13.020[1]--‐13.020[5]) Names and statements are linguistic signs and, as such, have a meaning. Both mean the content (or immanent object) of the mental phenomenon they express: the content of a presentation for names, that of a judgment for statements.15 The very nature of contents thus understood provides them with a mediating function: the content of a presentation is itself said to present the external object. The difference between the semantics of names and statements consists in the fact that names stand in a twofold semantic relation-meaning and naming-to something else, whereas statements mean judgment contents (i.e. the immanent objects of judgings), but are not semantically related to the object of the presentation on which the expressed judgment is (necessarily) based.16 It is, of course, one thing to specify what different types of linguistic expressions mean, quite another to identify the very nature of linguistic meaning as such. Unlike Marty, Brentano does not pay much attention to this crucial distinction. In one passage, however, he seems to suggest that what is meant by a statement possesses a normative feature, something that may motivate a hearer to form a judgment similar to the one expressed by the statement: ... the linguistic expression of the judgment obviously indicates in a twofold manner: 1) the judgment whose expression it is, 2) by means of the judgment, that the object is to be judged in a certain manner, to be accepted or rejected, in a word: the content of the judgment. (EL 80:13.132) Brentano's claim that among the things indicated by the expression of a judgment is a norm-"the object is to be judged in a certain manner"-is at the heart of Marty's philosophy of language. In the passage quoted, Brentano does not see that this norm is the content not of a judgment but of an intention of the speaker. The statement that 11 Socrates is wise expresses the judgment that Socrates is wise and its content, [Socrates is wise], differs from the content [Socrates is to be judged as wise]. The latter is not the content of a judgment but of an intention, the content of which is normative; in the language of Brentano's psychology, an intention is a phenomenon of interest. The recognition of this point, a point Brentano does not make, is the fundamental idea of Marty's intentionalist semantics. The passage quoted may well have been the starting point for Marty's original theory. If so, it is a hint Marty was to transform into a subtle philosophy of language. 2.2. Marty Brentano's only Swiss pupil developed a sophisticated philosophy of language (or descriptive theory of meaning) based on the psychology of his master.17 The theory contains three core ideas. We take them up in turn. 2.2.1. The empirico--teleological nature of language. As Marty showed in his first monograph-On the origin of language (1875: 64)-, the most plausible way to account for the development of language is to suppose that it progressively emerged from human interactions guided by the need to communicate (a view explicitly directed against the nativists Lazarus, Steinthal and Wundt). The resulting view is the so--‐called "empirico--‐teleological" account of language, according to which language is a vocal communication tool developed intentionally (absichtlich) but without any plan (planlos), that is, according to the principle of trial and error and thus something akin to Darwinian natural selection (see Marty 1916b, GS I.2: 157, see also Marty 1908: 89).18 Although language is directly dependent on thought,19 there is nothing like a parallelism between the two (Marty 1879; 1884--‐1892; 1893): Language is certainly not logical in the sense that it is simply the expression of our thinking, something like its immediate and necessary emanation (Ausfluss).... [L]anguage does not display any strict and trustworthy parallelism with thoughts. (Marty 1893: 99--‐100). One of the most striking examples of this absence of a strict correspondence between thought and language is the discrepancy between the logical (i.e. psychological) and the 12 grammatical (i.e. the linguistic) form of the judgment: whereas the linguistic expression of judgment is propositional, the mental act of judging is non--‐propositional (i.e. it is the mere acceptance or rejection of a presented object-Marty 1884--‐1895).20 2.2.2. The central role of intention and action in the account of meaning. Marty distinguishes three classes of linguistic tools (or means), corresponding to Brentano's threefold division of mental phenomena into presentations, judgments and emotions: names (Vorstellungssuggestive), statements (Aussagen), expressions of interest (Emotive, see Marty 1908: 224--‐7). Linguistic meaning is a functional property of certain sounds used as communication tools. It is to be explained primarily in terms of intentions. In that sense, Marty's theory can be labelled an intentionalist or intention--‐ based theory of meaning (Mulligan 2012: 101--‐24; Cesalli 2013). In that context, Marty likes to refer to the medieval principle: "voces significant res mediantibus conceptibus" ("words signify things by means of concepts", see for example Marty 1908: 436, n.1). The fact that a linguistic tool is a sign (i.e. its Zeichensein) is analysed in terms of a twofold intention: the speaker's immediate, but secondary intention to intimate or express (kundgeben) her inner life; the speaker's mediate, but primary intention to guide (or influence) the inner life of an interlocutor. The content of the primary intention possesses a normative dimension. As Marty says, what a speaker primarily intends is "that the hearer should form a mental phenomenon similar to the one expressed by the uttered expression" (cf. e.g. Marty 1908: 288). This Bedeutung is always mediated by intimation or expression and the primary intention aims at triggering in an interlocutor a mental phenomenon analogous to the one intimated by the speaker: ... in the case of voluntary speech, and thus in the case of statements as well, we always have to do with a twofold way of meaning (Bezeichnen): something which is primarily, and something which is secondarily intended, and correspondingly, something which is mediately intended, and something which is immediately intended. And just as we use the term 'to express' (Ausdrücken) or 'to intimate' (Äussern) for the latter, so, we want (as a rule) to use the term 'to mean' (Bedeuten) and 'meaning' (Bedeutung) in order to designate mediately and primarily intended sign--‐giving (Zeichengebung]). (Marty 1908: 286) "Voluntary speech" says Marty "is a special kind of action whose ultimate aim is to trigger certain mental phenomena in other beings" (Marty 1908: 284) and involves the two semantic functions of intimating and meaning (signifying). 13 One class of linguistic tools-names or, more generally, Vorstellungssuggestive- possesses a further semantic function, that of naming (Nennung). Just like meaning (Bedeutung), naming is a mediated function: However, through the intermediary of the functions of intimating (Kundgabe) and of meaning (Bedeutung), names also acquire that which we call [the property of] naming (Nennen). We speak of naming in relation to the objects which possibly do correspond in reality to the presentations produced by the names, or at least can correspond (without contradiction) to them. These <objects of the presentations> are that which is named (das Genannte). (Marty 1908: 436)21 What is named by a name is the object of the presentation it intimates and triggers. In that sense, what is named-das Genannte-can be qualified as the "objectual moment" of a name's meaning, or, as Marty himself puts it, as its meaning "in the narrow sense" (whereas a name's meaning "in the broad sense" is its Bedeutung-Marty 1908: 495--‐6). The same distinction applies for statements: in the broad sense, statements mean "that a hearer should form a judgment such that...", whereas in the narrow sense, they only mean the content of the judgment intimated and triggered: We said that in a broad sense, statements mean as a rule that the hearer should perform an act of judging whose matter and quality are identical to the ones of the act of judging which, by the utterance, is indicated as taking place in the speaker. In a narrower sense, however, ... one also calls something else the meaning of the statement ...: the statement indicates the content of the judging and, in this sense, means it. (Marty 1908: 291--‐2) 2.2.3. The hylomorphic account of language and meaning. The correlates matter and form play a crucial role in Marty's philosophy of language and, it seems, no role in Brentano's account of language. 'Form' is understood in the precise sense of container (Gefäss), and 'matter' (Stoff) as being what the container contains (Marty 1908: 101--‐20, see also Majolino 2003). This is what allows Marty to say that meaning is the matter of language. As for the form of language, one has to distinguish external (i.e. externally perceivable) and inner (i.e. only internally perceivable) linguistic form (Marty 1893: 68--‐75; Marty 1908: 121--‐50).22 From a descriptive point of view,23 inner linguistic form is constituted by auxiliary presentations which are required by (but do not constitute) meaning. They facilitate the association of the heard sound with the intended meaning. For example, the auxiliary presentation (the image) of a body in an unstable position facilitates the 14 grasping of what is meant by a speaker using an expression such as 'unstable in judgment' (schwankend im Urteil) although a body and its physical instability cannot possibly be meant by the expression at stake. The recognition of the existence, uses, misuses and effects of inner linguistic form by Marty goes well beyond Brentano's Sprachkritik in numerous directions and to great effect. In particular, Marty argues that numerous views in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics are based on misleading pictures. Thus the view that mental acts have immanent objects, a view endorsed by the early Brentano, is, Marty argues, a result of a failure to understand the role of inner linguistic form.24 Conclusion In what precedes, we have given an overview of the relationship between Brentano and the philosopher Meinong once called, in a slightly ironic and exasperated remark, Brentano's "prophet" (Fisette & Fréchette 2007: 61n). In §1, we considered the issue on which Brentano and Marty came to disagree most seriously: the account of what it means for a judgement, and an emotion, to be correct. At the end of the day, the main point of disagreement is an ontological one: if one accepts an ontology of judgment-- contents, one can describe correctness as a correlation holding between a mental phenomenon and a certain entity. Brentano held this view early in his career, and Marty maintained this realist line-although he always was and remained a nominalist with respect to universals-against the Evidenz--based new theory of later Brentano. In §2, we turned to Marty's acknowledged field of expertise-philosophy of language-in order to distinguish his Brentanian heritage from Marty's own, distinctive contribution. The result, pace Meinong, shows that Marty made an essential move, a move certainly based on Brentano (and actually more on Brentano's psychology than on what he has to say on language and meaning), but clearly absent from the master's works, namely, the conception of linguistic meaning as fundamentally intentional, that is: dependent on what language users intend to do whenever they speak.25 15 References Ahlman Erich (1926). Das normative Moment im Bedeutungsbegriff. Helsingfors: Suomalaisen Tiedeakatemian Toimituksia. Albertazzi Liliana (1989). "Brentano's and Mauthner's Sprachkritik". Brentano Studien 2, 145--‐157. Bergmann, Julius (1879) Allgemeine Logik. Erster Teil, Reine Logik, Berlin: Mittler. Brentano Franz (1905). "Sprechen und Denken", ed. and transl. by Jan Srzednicki, in Id. (1965), 115--‐121. Brentano Franz (late 1880s). Logik (EL 80), unpublished edition by Robin Rollinger. Brentano, Franz. Manuscrits inédits catégorisés selon le catalogue de Mayer--Hillebrand, 1951: EL 81 Fragmente ; M 96 Ontologie (Metaphysik). Cesalli Laurent (2013). "Anton Marty's Intentionalist Theory of Meaning", in Denis Fisette & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.). Themes from Brentano. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 139--‐163. Cesalli Laurent & Taieb Hamid (2013). "The Road to ideelle Verähnlichung. Anton Marty's Conception of Intentionality in the Light of its Brentanian Background". Quaestio 12, 25--‐86. Chrudzimski Arkadiusz (1999). "Die Intentionalitätstheorie Anton Martys". Grazer Philosophische Studien 57, 175--‐214. Fisette Denis & Fréchette Guillaume (eds.) (2007). Husserl, Stumpf, Ehrenfels, Meinong, Twardowski, Marty. A l'école de Brentano, de Würzbourg à Vienne. Paris: Vrin. Funke Otto (1924). Innere Sprachform. Eine Einführung in Anton Martys Sprachphilosophie, Reichenberg: F. Kraus. Husserl, E. 1988 Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre (1908–1914), Husserliana XXVIII, ed. U. Melle, Dordrecht, Boston : Kluwer Kastil Alfred. "Vorwort", in Marty (1918), VII--‐XXI. 16 Kraus Oskar. "Martys Leben und Werke. Eine Skizze", in Marty (1916a), 1--‐68. Kraus, Oskar. 1937 Die Werttheorien. Geschichte und Kritik, Brünn, Vienna, Leipzig: Rohrer Landgrebe, Ludwig (1934). Nennfunktion und Wortbedeutung. Eine Sstudie über Marty's Sprachphilosophie. Halle: Akademischer Verlag. Lessing, Th. 1908 „Studien zur Wertaxiomatik", Archiv für systematische Philosophie, 58--‐ 93, 226--‐257. Majolino Claudio (2003). "Remarques sur le couple forme/matière. Entre ontologie et grammaire chez Anton Marty". Les Études Philosophiques 1, p. 65--‐81. Marty Anton (1875). Über den Ursprung der Sprache, Würzburg: A. Stuber. Marty Anton (1879). Die Frage nach der geschichtlichen Entwickelung des Farbsinnes, Wien: C. Gerold. Marty Anton (1884--‐1892). Über Sprachreflex, Nativismus und absichtliche Sprachbildung, in Marty (1916b), 1--‐304. Marty Anton (1884--‐1895). Über subjectlose Sätze und das Verhältnis der Grammatik zu Logik und Psychologie, in Marty (1920), 3--‐307. Marty Anton (1893). "Über das Verhältnis von Grammatik und Logik", in Marty (1920), p. 57--‐99. Marty Anton (1908). Untersuchungen zur allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie. Halle a. S.: M. Niemeyer. Marty Anton (1916a). Gesammelte Schriften I.1 (GS I.1), ed. by Joseph Eisenmeier, Alfred Kastil & Oskard Kraus. Halle a. S.: M. Niemeyer Marty Anton (1916b). Gesammelte Schriften I.2 (GS I.2), ed. by Joseph Eisenmeier, Alfred Kastil & Oskard Kraus, Halle a. S.: M. Niemeyer. Marty Anton (1918). Gesammelte Schriften II.1 (GS II.1), ed. by Joseph Eisenmeier, Alfred Kastil & Oskard Kraus, Halle a. S.: M. Niemeyer. 17 Marty Anton (1920). Gesammelte Schriften II.2 (GS II.2), ed. by Joseph Eisenmeier, Alfred Kastil & Oskard Kraus, Halle a. S.: M. Niemeyer. Marty Anton (1940). Psyche und Sprachstruktur. Nachgelassene Schriften I (NS I), ed. by Otto Funke. Bern: Franke. Marty, Anton (1916). Raum und Zeit. Halle: Niemeyer. Miklosich Franz (1883). Subjectlose Sätze, Wien: Braumüller. Mulligan Kevin (1989). "Judgings : Their Parts and Counterparts". Topoi VI, 1, suppl. 2, 117--‐148. Mulligan Kevin (1990b). « Marty's philosophical grammar », in Id. (ed.) (1990a), 11--‐27. Mulligan Kevin (2004). "Brentano on the mind", in D. Jacquette (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Brentano. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 66--‐97. Mulligan Kevin (2012). Wittgenstein et la philosophie austro--allemande. Paris: Vrin. Mulligan Kevin (ed.) (1990a). Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics. The Philosophy and Theory of Language of Anton Marty. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Mulligan, Kevin (2004) "Husserl on the "logics" of valuing, values and norms", Fenomenologia della Ragion Pratica. L'Etica di Edmund Husserl, (eds.) B. Centi & G. Gigliotti, 177--‐225, Naples: Bibliopolis. Mulligan, Kevin (2017) "Correctness", forthcoming. Raynaud Savina (1982). Anton Marty, filosofo del linguaggio : uno strutturalismo presaussuriano, Roma: La goliardica editrice. Rollinger Robin (2004). "Austrian Theories of Judgment: Bolzano, Brentano, Meinong, and Husserl", in Arkadiusz Chrudzimski & Wolfgang Huemer Hrsg., Phenomenology and Analysis: Essays on Central European Philosophy. Frankfurt: Ontos, 257--‐284. Rollinger Robin (2009). "Brentano's Logic and Marty's Early Philosophy of Language". Brentano Studien 12, 77--‐98. Rollinger Robin (2010). Philosophy of Language and Other Matters in the Work of Anton 18 Marty. Analysis and Translations, Amsterdam: Rodopi. Rollinger Robin (2014). "Brentano and Marty on Logical Names and Linguistic Fictions: A Parting of Ways in the Philosophy of Language", in Laurent Cesalli & Janette Friedrich (eds.), Anton Marty & Karl Bühler. Between Mind and Language. Basel: Schwabe, 167--‐200. Spinicci Paolo (1991). Il significato e la forma linguistica. Pensiero, esperienza e linguaggio nella filosofia di Anton Marty, Milano: Franco Angeli. Srzednicki Jan (1965). Franz Brentano's Analysis of Truth. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Stumpf, Carl (1907) "Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen", Abhandlungen der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 3--‐39. 1 On the phase during which Brentano was prepared to allow that judgings and emotings may correspond to something, cf. Kraus 1937: 194, 182. 2 Some of Husserl's views about correct emotions and values were published in 1908 by one of his students, cf. Lessing 1908. They are now to be found in Husserl 1988, cf. Mulligan 2004. 3 Outside the Brentanian tradition, Julius Bergmann employs the term « Sachverhalt » (Bergmann 1879: 2, 4) in the same year in which Frege, in his Begriffsschrift, refers to circumstances (Umstände). 4 One may wonder what Marty took to be the relation between grounding the correctness of judging and being a necessary condition thereof. At one point he writes, "a judgment content is what objectively grounds the correctness of our judging, or to put things more exactly, is that without which that behaviour could not be correct or adequate" (Marty 1908: 295 – our emphasis). 5 Brentano refers to Aristotle, Metaphysics XII.7, 1072a29 and to De anima III.9--‐10. 6 Brentano here refers to Aristotle Metaphysics VI.4, 1027b25. 7 Brentano gives no reference here to Hume's writings. 8 For Brentano's rejection of judgment contents, cf. Brentano 1956: 38--‐40. 9 Brentano thinks that there are true ethical principles . And God, he thinks, has axiological knowledge (Brentano 1929: 477). See CHAP. 23. 10 Thanks to Guillaume Fréchette for his helpful comments on the first part of this paper. 19 11 This fact is reflected in the literature. See however Srzednicki 1965 (which contains as appendix A a transcription and translation of EL 66, Sprechen und Denken), Albertazzi 1989, as well as Rollinger 2009 and 2014. 12 Robin Rollinger provided a preliminary edition of EL 80, which, for a while, was accessible on the Web. Another thematically relevant text, which should be treated with extreme caution from an editorial point of view, is Die Lehre vom richtigen Urteil (Brentano 1956). 13 See also EL 80 12.998[1]--‐12.999[2], where Brentano (in the context of his discussion of the possibility and plausibility of a universal language) criticizes the idea that there is something common to all languages and expressible in speech in spite of the diversity of the different languages. 14 In later works, Brentano will point to a more harmful influence of language with respect to thinking, namely the fact that some expressions behave grammatically like referring expressions, but are not-see Brentano 1956. 15 For the presentation [Socrates], Socrates is the external object, and presented--‐Socrates is the immanent object. 16 Brentano, EL 80:13.127[4]: "The names name (nennen), while the statements state (sagen aus): It therefore does not follow that, because the names mean (bedeuten) the objects of the mental phenomenon of which they are the expression, the same is also true of statements: that these must therefore mean (bedeuten) the objects of the relevant judgments". 17 On Marty's philosophy of language, see Raynaud 1982, Mulligan 1990a, 1990b, Spinicci 1991, and, more recently, Rollinger 2010 and Cesalli & Friedrich 2014. The two most important developments of this philosophy are Ahlman 1926 and Landgrebe 1934. On the relations between the analyses of language of Marty, Ahlman, Bühler and Wittgenstein, see Mulligan 2012: 111--‐5, 125--‐52. 18 Brentano and his pupils, like their Scottish predecessors and Austrian contemporaries such as Carl Menger, compared the planless development of social institutions (including the legal system and economic phenomena) to that of language. See, for example, the comparison of the emergence of the Roman legal system to that of natural language in Brentano 1893a: 58. On this, see Mulligan 2004: 77--‐8. 19 Marty defines language as "the intentional indication (Kundgabe) of [one's] mental life by means of sounds, in particular by sounds which are not understandable by themselves, but only in virtue of convention and habit" (Marty 1940: 81). 20 See the series of seven articles Über subjektlose Sätze (Marty 1884--‐1895, see also Miklosich 1883, and Brentano 1889: 116--‐39 as well as Brentano 1911a, appendix). Subjectless sentences (impersonal sentences like 'it is raining'), far from being anomalies, reveal the authentic form of judgments: the postulation of the existence of the subject--‐predicate couple at the mental level is a fiction of inner linguistic form (the image at work here is that of the inherence of a quality in a substance)-see below, §2.3. 21 In that context, Marty likes to refer to the medieval principle: "voces significant res mediantibus conceptibus" ("words signify things by means of concepts", see for example Marty 1908: 436, n.1). 22 Meaning can itself be analysed in terms of matter and form: meaning's matter is constituted by the semantic value of "autosemantic" linguistic means; meaning's form by the semantic value of "synsemantic" linguistic means. A linguistic means is "autosemantic" iff it is by itself able to express a complete mental phenomenon. If a linguistic means is not "autosemantic", it is "synsemantic" (see Marty 1908: 205--‐6). 20 23 Unlike genetic approaches, the descriptive approach to a given phenomenon ignores the chain of its causal history and considers only the elements and principles at work in its present state. This fundamental methodological distinction is genuinely Brentanian (see e.g. Brentano 1889: 3; see also CHAP. 3). Inner linguistic form also plays a central role in the genetic perspective: it is the main principle at work in the development of the vocabulary and syntax of conventional linguistic means (Funke 1924: 45--‐72). On the distinction between the description of the structure of some phenomenon and hypotheses about the genesis of the phenomenon in the brentanian tradition and Wittgenstein, cf Mulligan 2012: 11--‐48. 24 Marty also thinks that the view that judging is propositional (see above, §2.1, and note 12) is due to a failure to understand the workings of inner linguistic form (see Marty 1908: 415--‐6; Marty 1884--‐1895: 256--‐7). On the relation between misleading pictures in Marty and Wittgenstein, cf Mulligan 2012: 39--‐42. 25 Work on this paper was made possible by the Swiss FNS project (2014--‐2017), Signification et intentionnalité chez Anton Marty. Aux confins de la philosophie du langage et de l'esprit.

Markets and Economic Theory Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences (Sage Publications, April 2013) Economists see markets as the primary institutional site for bilateral exchange. Market exchange is normatively significant because parties to exchange are both made better off in expected terms; and because exchange permits the separation of production and consumption activities. The first aspect allows individuals to benefit from natural differences in tastes and talents and (in the case of international trade) differences in climate and institutional arrangements. The second aspect allows individuals to take advantage of the productivity increases that specialization creates – increases that, according to Adam Smith, are the main source of human progress. In this sense, markets are first and foremost an institutional device for mobilizing the benefits of human cooperation. Cooperation rather than competition is the central feature of the market order. Because market exchange is essentially voluntary, within the bounds set by an initial assignment of rights and rules of contract (rules against fraud, for example), markets are also seen by some philosophers as instantiations of free interactions – though most economists value liberty so understood for its consequences for material well-being rather than intrinsically. A well-functioning free market performs three functions: it allocates the available supply of goods among individual demanders according to the intensity of their effective demands (their willingness to pay); it ensures that aggregate supply is distributed among suppliers so that demanders are supplied at minimal cost; and it connects demand to supply by providing both the information and the incentive that suppliers require in order to meet the prevailing demand. Non-market mechanisms for the allocation of goods (such as queuing, or rationing) will routinely fail in one or other of the three mentioned functions. Queuing, for example, may allow demanders to express their demand by waiting in line and allow suppliers to assess demand by examining the length of the queue. But in non-market institutions, the waiting time given up by queuers does not translate into any benefit to suppliers, so suppliers have no incentive to adjust supply in the light of demand conditions: the critical link between demand and supply that a market would provide is severed. The informational and incentive features of markets are worth special (and separate) emphasis. Within the free market system, prices constitute signals as to the value that others place on alternative activities that potential suppliers might engage in. Prices operate as a kind of gauge for measuring the effect that my choices have on the well-being of others (as they themselves assess it). In the absence of market prices, such information would be unavailable-a point mobilized against those who might look to socialist planning to simulate the beneficial effects of markets. Further, in the market system, each player has an incentive to act in the way that others most prefer: the beneficial effects of markets emerge invisibly-that is, without those beneficial effects being the central intention of any of the participants. Put another way, the benefits of human cooperation are reaped with only a minimal claim on the players' dispositions to act cooperatively. Achieving the beneficial effects of markets does require that participants refrain from fraud and deception-but, to some extent, markets themselves provide rewards for individuals who so refrain. A reputation for reliably good service is an asset in market transactions, especially for products whose quality is not easy to assess on inspection. Although markets work broadly in the public interest for ordinary private goods like apples and houses, they often fail to work well in the case of so-called public goods. Public goods are goods that all members of a relevant community consume in common, in such a way that none can be excluded from the benefits. More specifically, public goods have two properties: they are non-rival in the sense that each consumer enjoys full use of the good without diminishing the amount available for other users (as in the case of a concert performance, where an encore for one consumer means an encore for all others); and they are non-excludable, in the sense that individuals who do not pay cannot be prevented from consuming what is available. Both non-rivalry and non-excludability can come in degrees; and either can be present without the other. Economists often associate public goods with "market failure," since rational actors in a market will fail to produce goods for which there is potential demand when they lack the ability to charge consumers. Market failure is typically identified as providing scope for government intervention in markets. To be sure, many of the standard activities of governments – the provision of a legal system, with enforcement of rights; provision of national defense; certain kinds of public health provision (including pollution control and vaccination programs) – fit the public goods categorization. But many others (such as private health provision and public housing subsidies) appear to exemplify the public goods category much less well. In these latter cases, the standard results about market success and market failure do not support government intervention. But nor do those results in themselves argue against government intervention. Any case, for or against such intervention (in relation to public or private goods) requires a corresponding examination of the normative properties of the relevant institutional alternative. Such examination involves a specification of the incentives of agents operating in democratic political settings and an investigation of the ways in which public supply can be expected to respond to citizen demand. Undertaking this exercise has been the motivation for the development of public choice theory. The general point here is that no discussion of the normative properties of any institutional arrangement – including markets – can be undertaken without an answer to the "compared to what?" question. Claims about market success and market failure only have normative bite when the analogous analysis of alternatives (primarily government action) has been completed. Markets are often criticized – even by those who accept their many advantages – on the grounds that they give rise to distributions of income that are unjust. We do not here explore this line of criticism. We note however that, even here, the normative exercise is ultimately a comparative one: if the market fails to provide a distribution of income that meets all normative standards, it remains to be shown that the distributional modifications that emerge under alternative political institutions will predictably improve things. Jonny Anomaly and Geoffrey Brennan FURTHER READINGS Hayek, Friedrich (1945). "The Use of Knowledge in Society." American Economic Review, 35 (4) pp. 519-30. Smith, Adam. (2010). The Wealth of Nations. New York: The Modern Library. Originally published 1776.

Philosophy and the City Interdisciplinary and Transcultural Perspectives Edited by Keith Jacobs and Jeff Malpas London • New York 18_948_Jacobs.indb 3 12/10/18 5:35 AM Published by Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd. 6 Tinworth Street, London, UK, SE11 5AL www.rowmaninternational.com Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd.is an affiliate of Rowman & Littlefield 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706, USA With additional offices in Boulder, New York, Toronto (Canada), and Plymouth (UK) www.rowman.com Selection and editorial matter © 2019 by Keith Jacobs and Jeff Malpas Copyright in individual chapters is held by the respective chapter authors. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: HB 978-1-7866-0459-0 PB 978-1-7866-0460-6 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Available ISBN: 978-1-78660-459-0 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN: 978-1-78660-460-6 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN: 978-1-78660-461-3 (electronic) The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. Printed in the United States of America 18_948_Jacobs.indb 4 12/10/18 5:35 AM v Acknowledgements vii List of Figures ix Introduction: On the Philosophy of the City xi Keith Jacobs and Jeff Malpas Further Reading xxiv PART I: CITY CONCEPTS: PLACES, PROCESSES, STRUCTURES 1 Capitalism, Form and the Philosophy of the Urban 3 David Cunningham 2 The Discourses of the City 21 Kathleen Flanagan 3 The City as Wild 43 Wendy Steele 4 Urban Time and the City as Event 51 Tony Fry 5 The Immanent City 67 Simon Sadler PART II: CITY LANDSCAPES: EXPERIENCE, HISTORY, IDENTITY 6 Solar Le Corbusier 83 Allan Stoekl Contents 18_948_Jacobs.indb 5 12/10/18 5:35 AM vi Contents 7 Escaping Modernity: Renaissance Florence and the Rejection of the City 103 Katie Campbell 8 Justice as the Urban Everyday 117 Wendy Pullan 9 Gardens, Cities and Timescapes in South Asia 133 Smriti Srinivas 10 A Vertical Melbourne 147 Meg Nethercote 11 The City's Other Face: Modern Ruins and Urban Endings 165 Emma Fraser PART III: CITY FUTURES: POWER, RISK, VALUE 12 Beyond Differences of Race, Religion, Class: Making Urban Subjects 179 Saskia Sassen 13 Cities Remade: On Deciding the Fate of Building in the City 191 Janet Donohoe 14 The City as a Construct of Risk and Security 205 Yosef Jabareen and Efrat Eizenberg 15 Philosophies of Commensuration, Value and Worth in the Future City: Rethinking the Interdisciplinary 217 Michael Keith 16 Multiplying Resistance: The Power of the Urban in the Age of National Revanchism 233 Asma Mehan and Ugo Rossi 17 Urban Futures and the Dark Enlightenment 245 Roger Burrows Bibliography 259 Index 287 About the Contributors 00 18_948_Jacobs.indb 6 12/10/18 5:35 AM 233 In his book The Rebirth of History, Alain Badiou has written that in the uprisings of the Arab world in 2011 one can discern echoes of the revolutions of 1848 in Europe. For Badiou, the uprisings of the early 2010s herald a worldwide resurgence in the liberating forces of the masses (Badiou 2012). In popular uprisings, the act of rebellion originates from widespread willingness to resist injustice and extend power to the masses. In this context, urban space provides the platform, the living infrastructure for liberating the political potential of mass uprisings. As Erik Syngedouw puts it: 'the emergence of political space [. . .] unfolds through a political act that stages collectively the presumption of equality and affirms the ability of "the People" to selfmanage and organise its affairs' (2014, 131). Swyngedouw uses the phrase 'Every revolution has its square' to make sense of the revolutionary value of urban space for recent social movements across the world (Swyngedouw 2011). From this perspective, there is no restoration of national sovereignty that can be invoked in response to the crisis of Western-dominated globalization, since the nation-state with its hierarchical organization does not offer room for a radical transformation of society. The proliferation of urban insurgencies since 2011 is rather a sign of the return to a street politics of emancipation showing the continued relevance, even the centrality, of urban public space in political terms. What is specific of urban public space that leads us to postulate its primary importance? French writer Érik Orsenna once wrote a dystopian story of an island city where a dictator prohibited his people from climbing the surrounding hills, fearing that once the inhabitants could view the world beyond they would begin to question the king's absolute power (Orsenna 2004). In other words, once the people view the world, their encounters lead them to rebel against the dictator. In this sense, it can be assumed that urban public space has the Chapter Sixteen Multiplying Resistance The Power of the Urban in the Age of National Revanchism Asma Mehan and Ugo Rossi 18_948_Jacobs.indb 233 12/10/18 5:35 AM 234 Asma Mehan and Ugo Rossi power to propitiate unplanned encounters and, in doing so, to offer unexpected possibilities for a communal life. Moreover, revolutionary situations that emerge in urban settings 'naturally' tend to mobilize people from all levels of society. Historically, this propulsive force of the urban has shown itself vital in organizing and carrying out large-scale change. In his book Life as Politics, Asef Bayat has described what he calls the 'epidemic potential' of protesting on the street, this latter being understood as a 'space of movement and flow', in bringing together the 'invitees' and the 'casual passersby' (2010, 13). Bayat goes on to describe the location of Revolution Street-a site of many protests during the Revolution in Tehran-as 'a unique juncture of the rich and the poor, the elite and the ordinary, the intellectual and the lay-person, the urban and the rural'. In this interpretation, Bayat conceives of 'Street Revolution' as the prevalent phenomenon that happened in Tehran, Cairo and Istanbul where the crowd can easily gather (161–70). In this definition, the political 'community' is always in a process of becoming: never stable, always open to the future, always resisting the forces that repress and impede 'the whole of freedom' (Deleuze 1966, 112–18). So to achieve a 'new community whose members are capable of a belief in themselves, in the world and in becoming', we need both 'creativity' and 'the people' (Deleuze 1995, 176). In this sense, what is customarily defined-particularly in the US context-'the resistance' to Trump's chauvinistic populism (Cobb 2018) needs to be grounded in the street-level experience of urban public space, of its established order as well as of its possibilities for a 'reversal of perspective', as Raoul Vaneigem (2001) would put it, aimed at a reappropriation of life. In the global occupy movement and in the protests that swept across the Middle East in the early 2010s, street politics became the proverbial 'center stage' upon which people voiced their discontent with the current political situation and demanded democracy (Mehan 2017a, 167). In this chapter, we evaluate the politically generative dynamic of urban space. Notably, we put forward the notion of the 'multiplier effect' of the urban, referring to its ingrained tendency to multiply resistance to oppression and violence being exerted against minorities and subaltern minorities and, in doing so, to turn this multiplied resistance into an active force of social change. We therefore look at the twofold valence of 'resistance': negative and affirmative. Resistance initially takes form as a defensive response to oppression and violence. When this happens, the urban becomes the living platform for a multiplying dynamic of encounter and, potentially, of intergroup solidarity, thus laying the foundations for a cooperative-rather than competitive, as in neoliberal rationality, or inimical, as in national-populist reason-way of 'being together'. After having developed this argument 18_948_Jacobs.indb 234 12/10/18 5:35 AM Multiplying Resistance 235 against the backdrop of the women's movement in Tehran and the urban disobedience to anti-immigrant politics in Italy, our chapter concludes by reflecting on the multiplier effect of urban resistance within the current context of national revanchism. THE MULTIPLIER EFFECT OF RESISTANCE IN URBAN SPACE In an inspired foreword to the English-language edition of the Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari's first joint work, Michel Foucault argued that their book could be conceived as an 'Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life' understood-he explained-as an 'art of living counter to all forms of fascism, whether already present or impending' (Foucault 1983, xiii). In order to achieve a 'non-fascist life', Foucault identified 'a number of essential principles' capable of orienting action that he had acquired from Deleuze and Guattari's book, including the following two that look particularly remarkable from the perspective of this text: Withdraw allegiance from the old categories of the Negative (law, limit, castration, lack, lacuna) [. . .] Prefer what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity, flows over unities, mobile arrangements over systems. Believe that what is productive is not sedentary but nomadic. [. . .] Do not demand of politics that it restore the "rights" of the individual, as philosophy has defined them. The individual is the product of power. What is needed is to "de-individualize" by means of multiplication and displacement, diverse combinations. (Ibid.) In this commentary, Foucault looks radically different from the kind of neoWeberian theorist, analysing power relationships as an infallible iron cage, subtly seduced by aspects of liberal and even neoliberal thought that in recent times revisionist scholarship has associated with him (Zamora and Behrent 2016). On the contrary, his work along with that of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, as well as of other critics of capitalist modernization of that time, such as situationist theorist Raoul Vaneigem (see below in this section), provides us with essential insights into the conceptualization of resistance. These authors enable us to understand resistance simultaneously as a refusal of the negative (fascism in the form of today's authoritarian populism) and as an opportunity to experiment with a different use of life aimed at recreating a shared sense of 'we' (Virno 2015). What does 'nonfascist life' mean today? With the political ascent of Donald Trump after his unexpected election in 2016, the idea of a return 18_948_Jacobs.indb 235 12/10/18 5:35 AM 236 Asma Mehan and Ugo Rossi of fascism has become increasingly recurrent within public debates in the United States and elsewhere. What kind of fascism are we talking about? As Foucault underlines, by fascism it is not meant a repetition of the historical fascism of the 1930s, but the 'fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us' (Ibid.). Resistance to new forms of fascism, therefore, has to be found in the realm of everyday life, where the negative can be reversed into an affirmative reappropriation of a communal usage of life. Becoming a resistant, in this perspective, is a process that is not confined to the embrace of an ethical stance, represented for instance by an atomized act of indignation (Invisible Committee 2015), but requires a collective praxis that at the same time arises from and engages with our daily life through connection with others (Ahmed 2017). Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus as well as their sequel on 'Capitalism and Schizofrenia', Thousand Plateaus, can be used as a primer for collectively resisting the fascistization of the public sphere that we are observing in today's national-populist era. A central notion in their conceptual framework is that of multiplicity. This notion allows an understanding of the different ways in which the multiplication of resistance that we associate with urban space can transform oppression and violence against ethnic minorities and subaltern groups into a life politics of emancipation. In the introduction to this text, our starting point has been that emancipatory politics primarily originates in urban settings as urban public space serves as the key theater of contentions. In fact, as Asef Bayat argues: 'conflict originates from the active use of public space by subjects who, in the modern states, are allowed to use it only passively-through walking, driving, watching-or in other ways that the state dictates' (2010, 11). It is urban street politics that can give rise to what Raoul Vaneigem defined 'a reversal of perspective': a subjective gesture that enables the oppressed becoming a resistant to detect 'the positivity of negation' (2001, 185). In Vaneigem's view, a reversal of perspective arises from the desire to reappropriate everyday life in its entirety: 'in the sights of my insatiable desire to live, the whole of Power is merely one target in a wider horizon', Vaneigem contends (188). The question is now: how can a subjective 'desire to live' be turned into a larger emancipatory project? In this vein, this chapter aims to assess the political potential in the multiplier effect of the urban, namely how this multiplier effect can lead to a lasting project of emancipation in which cities become major sites of resistance to today's national-populist revanchism. There is no unitary pathway to emancipation, however, within a multiplicityoriented understanding of radical politics. Pursuing multiplicity through street politics aspires to move beyond both the monism and the pluralism of 18_948_Jacobs.indb 236 12/10/18 5:35 AM Multiplying Resistance 237 standard political theory with their universalizing assumptions, as regards the identification of the revolutionary 'subject' in political-ontological terms (Žižek 1999) or that of the decision-making process enabling conflicting organizations to conform to the general interest (Dahl 1978), respectively. In Thousand Plateaus, the sequel to Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari refined their understanding of multiplicity in a social-productive fashion by putting forward their famous notion of rhizome, as opposed to the Freudian sense of unity and identity symbolized by a 'tree or root, which plots a point, fixes an order' (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 0). Deleuze and Guattari believe in a processual understanding of rhizomatic multiplicity: 'the multiple must be made, not by always adding a higher dimension, but rather in the simplest of ways, by dint of sobriety, with the number of dimensions one already has available-always n 1 (the only way the one belongs to the multiple: always subtracted). Subtract the unique from the multiplicity to be constituted; write at n 1 dimensions. A system of this kind could be called a rhizome' (6). This leads them to define 'the principle of multiplicity' as follows: 'it is only when the multiple is effectively treated as a substantive, "multiplicity", that it ceases to have any relation to the One as subject or object, natural or spiritual reality, image and world. Multiplicities are rhizomatic, and expose arborescent pseudo-multiplicities for what they are. There is no unity to serve as a pivot in the object, or to divide in the subject' (8). The next two sections of this chapter will provide illustrative evidence of some ways in which the process of cities becoming multiplicities through resistance can take place. As anticipated, we will look at the resurgence of the women's movement in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region, focusing especially on the insurgence of Iranian women in Tehran, and at the urban disobedience to anti-immigrant politics in Italy. WOMEN'S LIVES MATTER: GIRLS OF REVOLUTION STREET In 2017, the day after US president Donald Trump's inauguration, the civil rights movement and the LGBTQ movement-a very diverse group of women-organized the Women's March on Washington and hundreds of sister marches across the country and around the globe that brought millions to the streets for a historic day of protest (Schnall 2017). The Women's March had the momentum to build a resistance across the United States. Following from that, in January, protesters flooded US airports by the thousands in the chaos that followed President Trump's first executive order, which banned citizens from seven Muslim-majority countries from entering the United 18_948_Jacobs.indb 237 12/10/18 5:35 AM 238 Asma Mehan and Ugo Rossi States, as well as indefinitely halting the entry of Syrian refugees.1 As the Women's March drives the resistance against the Trump administration, the #MeToo and #TimesUp movements have reached an unprecedented level of collective engagement against the commodification and victimization of women as sexual objects and the gendered power differentials that persist in ways that gravely constrain the lives of girls and women everywhere. In the MENA region, and especially in most Muslim-majority republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia of the Soviet and post-Soviet times (such as Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan), the women's movement has been intertwined with patriarchal and patrimonial patterns. Except for Tunisia, Turkey and to some extent Morocco, egalitarian reforms in family law, whether by revising and reinterpreting sharia law or by replacing it with secular law, have been painfully slow (Tohidi 2016, 78). Here, it is important to note that the type of collective actions practiced mostly in the democratic settings, which have come to dominate our conceptual universe as the women's movements, may not deliver under nondemocratic/authoritarian conditions (Bayat 2007, 160). In many authoritarian Middle Eastern states, such as Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia or the Islamic Republic of Iran, where conservative Islamic laws are in place, the state's gender ideology is grounded in the culture of patriarchy (which is entrenched in religious authoritarian polity), and justified by the patriarchal interpretation of Islam's holy sources (Barlow and Akbarzadeh 2008, 23). In an authoritarian and repressive context, 'collective activities of a large number of women organised under strong leadership, with effective networks of solidarity, procedures of membership, mechanisms of framing, and communication and publicity-the types of movements that are associated with images of marches, banners, organisations, lobbying, and the like', are not feasible (Bayat 1997, 162). Focusing on the discourse of solidarity, social movements can be defined as the 'organised set(s) of constitutes pursuing a common political agenda of change through collective action' (Batliwala 2012, 3; Mehan 2017b). In this interpretation, women's movements aim to bring women into political activities, empower women to challenge the roles they serve and create networks among women that heighten women's ability to recognize gender relations that are in dire need of change (Ferree and McClurg Muller 2004, 577). In March 2018, thousands of Turkish women flocked to Istanbul's iconic and pedestrianized İstiklal (or Independence) Avenue, for this year's International Women's Day demonstration to demand greater rights and denounce violence. Women chanted slogans including 'We are not silent, we are not scared, we are not obeying' and 'Women are strong together'. In the following weeks, women's rallies were also held in Ankara and the southeastern province of Diyarbakır.2 In a similar way, across the Arab-speaking world, 18_948_Jacobs.indb 238 12/10/18 5:35 AM Multiplying Resistance 239 the popular uprisings in 2011 showed Arab women in countries like Tunisia and Jordan that they could push for legislative advances through cross-border solidarity. In the Middle East, while Saudi Arabia lifted its ban on women's drive, women have been at the forefront of pushing for change in Iran. Feminist Bettina Aptheker has discussed the significance of the 'dailyness' or 'ordinariness' of women's resistance (Aptheker 1989). Deploying the 'power of presence' over the past three decades, Iranian women have refused to be pushed out of the public domain. In Iran, as the result of a social media campaign which was initially called My Stealthy Freedom (which was a Facebook campaign back to 2014), by using the hashtag #whitewednesdays, every Wednesday, images of Iranian women, hair uncovered and hijabs held aloft, pop up in social media.3 As we said in the previous section, in popular uprisings resistance starts as a response to oppression and violence, setting in motion a larger process of insubordination that can lead to life emancipation. In this context, we have assumed that the urban acts as a multiplier, possibly turning single acts of rebellion into larger uprisings. Women's antisystemic movement in Iran is illustrative of the multiplying dynamic of resistance that is only possible in an urban context. Spatially segregated metropolises like Tehran possess unique junctions in the form of parks, streets and squares where the encounter between different inhabitants of the city-what in the introduction we defined as 'invitees' and 'casual passersby'-can turn small protests into insurrections. Tehran expanded its spatiality of revolutions and discontents through recent protests-specifically, the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the Green Movement of 2009. The recent women's movement highlighted the sociopolitical importance of the Revolution (In Persian: Enghelab) Street and Freedom (In Persian: Azadi) Square in building and representing spaces of protests in modern Tehran. This venue in the heart of current Tehran provides accessibility in people's everyday life. However, its unique centrality, accessibility and distinctive value for national political memory have transformed this place into one of the most important venues for political gatherings in Iranian modern history. In today's new wave of women's activism in Iran, bareheaded Iranian women climb on platforms and benches in public spaces to protest daily against their lack of bodily autonomy and compulsory veiling (hijab).4 These protests were originally inspired by an Iranian woman known for standing out on the utility box in the Enghelab (Revolution Street) in Tehran on 28 December 2017. The young protesters-known as 'daughters of the revolution'-tied their white scarves to the end of poles and waved their hijab flag to protest. According to Homa Hoodfar, 'the struggle is not about a piece of cloth on a woman's head, it is about the gender politics that cloth symbolises, 18_948_Jacobs.indb 239 12/10/18 5:35 AM 240 Asma Mehan and Ugo Rossi and its use to silently and broadly communicate a rejection of state control over women's bodies' (Hoodfar 2018). After that act of insubordination, the women reenacted her protest (and posted photos of their actions), being branded as the 'Girls of Revolution Street' on social media. In this respect, the solidarity-action frame became dominant because of the activists' push for equality among all women involved in the fight for freedom. This led activists to build inclusive alliances with one another because of their collective desire for equality. As Fielding-Smith well noted, when the revolution came, no one asked about anyone's background, religious affiliation, political affiliation, regional affiliation and ethnicity (2011). The imagery of rhizomes in which centerless assemblages formed by members who engage in horizontal and nonhierarchical relations describes these revolutionary dynamics. Such organ-less bodies are all made up of a multitude of individuals that can act quite effectively as a mass without any centralized leadership. From this perspective, in order to demand democracy under authoritarian conditions, 'becoming a resistant' is prerequisite. This process of becoming involves 'people to come' who are missing or lacking in the actual world and who 'have a chance to invent themselves' by resisting what is intolerable in the present (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 110). In this interpretation, if we consider urban society and democracy as elements that are struggling to emerge, resistance movements can be viewed as essential manifestations of the constitutive dimension of politics (Elkin 1985). In this sense, subaltern groups and minorities who experience oppression and violence are not mobilizing in order to pursue defined ends, but are mobilizing primarily in order to assert the power of their presence in the public sphere (Phillips 1998), the ends being the assertion of themselves as a 'willful subjectivity', obstinately speaking out against injustices (Ahmed 2017). This vocal politics of presence is at the heart of street-level resistance turning small-scale insubordination into larger insurrections against authoritarian power. MIGRANT LIVES MATTER: CITIES AGAINST AND BEYOND THE NATIONAL FETISH In the current context of nationalist revanchism endangering liberal democracies, cities and their social environments are increasingly viewed as bastions of resistance nurtured by an everyday, cross-sectional politics of solidarity. In Europe, as well as in North America, after the economic recession of the late 2000s and the early 2010s, with its impact on urban societies in terms of job losses and public-budget cutbacks, recent years have seen a reenergized 18_948_Jacobs.indb 240 12/10/18 5:35 AM Multiplying Resistance 241 localist politics in the form of a radical municipalism, or 'communalism'. The experience of Barcelona, where the previous leader of the anti-eviction movement was elected mayor with the support of a grassroots coalition named 'Barcelona en comù', is exemplary in this respect. The pro-immigrant 'sanctuary cities' movement, which has intensified after the election of Donald Trump in 2016, as well as the Black Lives Matter mobilizations that started in 2013 in response to the killings of unarmed African Americans in different US cities, are other key manifestations of the political vitality of cities and urban social movements. On a theoretical level, municipalism draws inspiration from the work of ecological anarchist Murray Bookchin (Bookchin 1992), which is now continued by contemporary radical theorists, such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (Hardt and Negri 2017). Today's idea of 'new municipalism' invites to get rid of any nostalgia for the nation-state and to resume the local scale as 'the space of the common', of solidarity and resistance to neoliberal austerity, through a decentered network (refusing centralized leadership) of community-based assemblies and councils. While liberal advocates of city-based empowerment place at the centre of their localist project the role of political and economic leaders in taking the lead in civic coalitions and public-private partnerships (Barber 2013; Katz and Nowak 2017), municipalists look at leaderless alliances comprising both social movements and city administrators who share a belief in an intersectional politics of solidarity among subaltern minorities. Undocumented migrants, ethnic and racial minorities and a revitalized women's movement are at the heart of this politics of solidarity in today's reactionary moment in which a male-dominated ethnic-majority revanchism has become politically prevalent in a growing number of countries across the globe. The political potential of neomunicipalism associated with what we define here as the 'multiplier effect' of the urban can be appreciated by taking a closer look at the current political situation in Italy. In this country, the general election of March 2018 resulted in a political impasse that lasted two months and was resolved through a coalition government formed in June 2018 by the League and the Five Star Movement, two parties variously associated with the new populist tide. The former is a regionalist-devolutionist party that has recently embraced a sovereign-nationalist, more explicitly right-leaning position; the latter is an online-based, postideological political movement characterized by fierce antiestablishment propaganda but also for engagement in environmentalist campaigns at the local level against ecologically disruptive infrastructure projects. The leader of the League-Matteo Salvini, an ambitious politician known for his xenophobic positions, as well as his intensive use of social media-was appointed Minister of the Interior, 18_948_Jacobs.indb 241 12/10/18 5:35 AM 242 Asma Mehan and Ugo Rossi pledging to adopt a muscular approach to vexed questions of crime, security and irregular immigration in Italy. From the very start, Salvini's main target has been the humanitarian organizations operating migrant rescue ships in the Mediterranean. Previously, also Luigi Di Maio-the young leader of the Five Star Movement and currently deputy prime minister along with Salvini-openly stigmatized NGOs, accusing them of speculating over 'the immigration business' and colluding with people smugglers in the southern Mediterranean (Rossi 2018), even though he subsequently softened his position. Social movements and pro-migrant activists responded to these claims, denouncing anti-NGO discourse as a 'criminalisation of solidarity' (Collettivo Euronomade 2018). Once appointed as Interior Minister in June 2018, Salvini immediately refused port access to migrant rescue ships, blaming the so-called Dublin Regulation on asylum seekers for overburdening Italy and other countries at EU's external frontiers with a disproportionate number of migrants and refugees. The historical defeat in the general election deeply weakened the political left in Italy, which remained almost silent about Salvini's obsessive anti-immigrant discourse. On 10 June 2018, after having rescued about six hundred migrants, the Aquarius-a rescue ship operated by SOS Méditerranée and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF)-was turned away by Italian authorities, struggling for many days to find another port of arrival. At the peak of the humanitarian emergency, the mayor of Naples-Luigi de Magistris-publicly declared that he would have disobeyed the government's decision to refuse port access to the Aquarius. De Magistris proudly announced that migrants would be always welcome in the city of Naples. His stance was widely endorsed on social media where the hashtags #umanitàperta (open humanity), #apriteiporti (keep ports open), and #Aquarius became highly popular in response to Salvini's #chiudiamoiporti (keep ports shut). The resulting enthusiasm induced local politicians across the country to embrace de Magistris's position: mayors of major port cities such as Palermo, Messina, Reggio Calabria, Taranto, Cagliari, but even of small towns like Sapri in the southern Campania region sided with Naples' mayor despite their different political affiliations (De Magistris is left-oriented but politically independent). Even the Five Star mayor of the port city of Livorno initially joined the campaign, but had to hastily withdraw his support due to pressures from his party. The multiplier effect of the urban, therefore, unfolded at an interurban level, setting in motion a multiplying dynamic that involved mayors and other local administrators in different cities. Two days later, left-leaning parties, movements and unions finally broke the silence, calling for demonstrations in several Italian cities to protest against the xenophobic drift in Italy: an indefinite number of cities comprising Milan, Naples, Trento, Genoa, Turin, Como, Pisa, Florence, 18_948_Jacobs.indb 242 12/10/18 5:35 AM Multiplying Resistance 243 Brescia, La Spezia, Modena, Ferrara, Parma, Ancona, Lucca and Venice witnessed public gatherings of various sizes. Cities that took part in the protest were many and uncoordinated but altogether they formed a sparse, still embryonic multiplicity of dissenting voices collectively resonating on social media through the #apriteiporti (keep ports open) hashtag. The mayors' disobedience and the subsequent wave of mobilizations, therefore, brought to the fore the multiplier effect of city-based resistance, thanks also to the amplifying power of social media, in opposing the exclusionary politics of nationalist revanchism. However, one should not attribute the merits for this crucial role of cities in resisting xenophobic discourse and policies (only) to a narrow circle of enlightened mayors and city managers. As spaces of transit, temporary refuge or settlement at the same time, cities and urban environments boast unique institutional thickness in terms of agglomeration and diversity: local welfare services and a myriad of associations, social movements, independent activists and volunteers, as well as countless socially minded singularities. The political potential of cities lies in the contagious vitality of these 'ecosystems of solidarity' grounded in urban everyday life, providing what can be defined 'ius domicilii' urban citizenship in contrast to the exclusionary character of national citizenship (Rossi and Vanolo 2012). In this sense, the value of cities and urban environments largely exceeds the sphere of local government, offering so far unspoilt possibilities for a refounding from below of democracy and community beyond the national fetish. CONCLUSION This chapter has theorized the multiplier effect of the urban in instigating a multiplication of resistance processes within the contemporary context of nationalist revanchism and authoritarian populism. In the social sciences, the notion of 'multiplier effect' is customarily associated with the work of economists dealing with economic development issues, especially under conditions of recession or so-called underdevelopment. Writing in the aftermath of the 'great crash' of 1929, Richard Kahn detailed the Keynes-inspired idea of the multiplier, which he understood as an effect of an increase of 'home investment' (typically an increase in government spending) on aggregate demand (1931). In the 1960s, industrial economist François Perroux applied the notion of the multiplier to his theory of growth poles, arguing that investment in new industry has multiplier and accelerator effects on other sectors of the same regional economy (Perroux 1966). In recent years, writing after the 'great contraction' of 2008–2009, Enrico Moretti has amended Perroux's 18_948_Jacobs.indb 243 12/10/18 5:35 AM 244 Asma Mehan and Ugo Rossi position, showing how the multiplier effect is more significant in sectors based on high-skill jobs (2010). Economic theorizations of the multiplier effect are conceived as countercyclical policies tackling conditions of economic slowdown and insufficient demand in structurally depressed areas. Keynes's statement that is usually summarized as 'The government should pay people to dig holes in the ground and then fill them up'5 is illustrative of this idea of the economy that thrives through activity, which means subordinating public interest to the imperative of economic recovery. Within today's 'reactionary cycle' characterized by national revanchism and the crisis of liberal democracies in the West and across the world, an unconditional pursuit of resistance is vital to the recovery of democracy and even to its expansion, which occurs when small-scale or individual resistance unexpectedly gives rise to larger uprisings, as we have seen. To paraphrase Keynes, it can be concluded that in the current political context progressive political actors and social movements should experiment with small-scale resistance that can lead to the happy event of mass uprisings reclaiming democracy and justice. Under these circumstances, the urban has the distinctive capacity to multiply the effects of resistance on politics and society, turning it into an active force of social and political change. NOTES 1. See CNN Politics: https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2018/politics/women -who-march-the-movement/. 2. See Hürriyet Daily News: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-women -flock-to-istanbuls-center-to-demand-greater-rights-denounce-violence-128484. 3. See Global News: https://globalnews.ca/news/4014971/iran-hijab-whitewednes days-girls-of-revolution-street-protest/. 4. The hijab was officially forbidden for women to wear head scarves in 1936 during the reign of Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty. However, a few months after the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, a law forcing women to not only cover their heads, but also wear loose clothing to hide their figures, came into effect. 5. Keynes's full sentence reads as follows: 'If the Treasury were to fill old bottles with banknotes, bury them at suitable depths in disused coalmines which are then filled up to the surface with town rubbish, and leave it to private enterprise on welltried principles of laissez-faire to dig the notes up again' (1964, 129). 18_948_Jacobs.indb 244 12/10/18 5:35 AM References Ahmed, S., 2017. Living a Feminist Life. Durham (NC): Duke University Press. Aptheker, B., 1989. Tapestries of life: Women's work, Women's Conciousness, and the meaning of daily life. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Badiou, A., 2012. The Rebirth of History: Times of Riots and Uprisings. London: Verso. Barber, B., 2013. If Mayors Ruled the World: Dysfunctional Nations, Rising Cities, New Haven (CT): Yale University Press. Barlow, R. & Akbarzadeh, S., 2008. Prospects for Feminism in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Human Rights Quately, 30(1), pp. 21-40. Batliwala, S., 2012. Changing their World: Concepts and Practices of Women's Movements, Association for Women's Rights in Development. Bayat, A., 1997. Street Politics: Poor People's Movements in Iran. New York: Columbia University Press. Bayat, A., 2007. A Women's Non-Movement: What It Means to Be a Woman Activist in an Islamic State. Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 27(1), pp. 160172. Bayat, A., 2010. Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Bookchin, M. 1992. Urbanization Without Cities: The Rise and Decline of Citizenship. New York: Black Rose Books. Cobb, J., 2018. State of the resistance. The New Yorker, February 12 & 19. Available at: https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/02/12/state-of-the-resistance Collettivo Euronomade (2018) Criminalisation of solidarity, right to escape, solidarity cities. Available at: http://www.euronomade.info/?p=10517 Dahl, R.A., 1978. Pluralism revisited. Comparative Politics 10(2), pp. 191-213. Deleuze, G., 1966. Le Bergsonisme. Paris: Presses universitaries de France. Deleuze, G., 1995. Negotiations. New York: Colombia University Press. Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F., 1994. What is Philosophy? New York: Columbia University Press. Deleuze, G. & Guttari, F., 1987. A thousand plateaus. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Elkin, S.L., 1985. Economic and political rationality. Polity 18(2), pp. 253-271. Ferree, M. M. & McClurg Muller, C., 2004. Feminism and the Womens Movement: A Global Perspective. In: D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule & H. Kriesi, eds. The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pp. 576-607. Fielding-Smith, A., 2011. The Face of Freedom: Stories, Financial Times. Foucault, M., 1983. Preface. In: G. Deleuze & F. Guttari, eds. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: University of Minesota Press, pp. xl-xiil. Hardt, M. & Negri, A., 2017. Assembly. New York: Oxford University Press. Hoodfar, H., 2018. Daughters of the revolution: The Iranian women who risk arrest for protesting against hijab laws and demanding equal rights. The Conversation, available at: http://theconversation.com/iranian-women-risk-arrest-daughters-of-the-revolution-92880 Invisible Committee, The. 2015. To Our Friends. Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e). Kahn, R., 1931. The relation of home investment to unemployment. The Economic Journal 41(162), pp. 173-198. Katz, B. & Nowak, J., 2017. The New Localism: How Cities Can Thrive in the Age of Populism, Washington DC: Brooking Institution. Keynes, J.M., 1964. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money, London: Harvest/HBJ Book. Mehan, A., 2017a. The Empty Locus of Power: Production of Political Urbanism in Modern Tehran, Unpublished PhD Dissertation: Politecnico di Torino. Mehan, A., 2017b. Review of "The Empty Place: Democracy and Public Space" by Teresa Hoskyns. ID: International Dialogue, A Multidisciplinary Journal of World Affairs, Volume 7, pp. 86-90. Moretti, E. 2010. Local multipliers. American Economic Review 100(2), pp. 373-377. Orsenna, É., 2004. Les Chavaliers du Subjonctif. Paris: Stock. Perroux, F., 1966. Le multiplicateur d'investissement dans les pays sous-développés. Revue Tiers Monde 7(27), pp. 511-532 Phillips, A. 1998. The Politics of Presence. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 13 Rossi, U., 2018. The populist eruption and the urban question. Urban Geography, 39(9), pp. 1425-1430. Rossi, U. & Vanolo, A., 2012. Urban Political Geographies. A Global Perspective. London: Sage. Schnall, M., 2017. 2018 will be the year of women. [Online] Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2017/12/14/opinions/2018-will-be-the-year-of-womenschnall/index.html [Accessed 26 July 2018]. Swyngedouw, E., 2011 'Every revolution has its squares': Politicising the post-political city. In M. Gandy, ed., Urban Constellations. Berlin: Jovis, pp. 22-25. Swyngedouw, E., 2014. Where is the political? Insurgent mobilisations and the incipient 'return of the political'. Space and Polity 18(2), pp. 122-136. Tohidi, N., 2016. Women's Rights and Feminist Movements in Iran. SUR 24, 13(24), pp. 75-89. Vaneigem, R. 2001. The Revolution of Everyday Life. London: Rebel Press. Virno, P. 2015. L'usage de la vie. Multitudes 58, pp. 143-158. Zamora, D. & M. Behrent, eds. 2016. Foucault and Neoliberalism. Cambridge: Polity. Žižek, S. 1999. The Ticklish Subject. The Absent Centre of Political Ontology. London: Verso. View publication stats

Julian Fink Das Parlamentsgebäude mit einer Statue Lenins in Tiraspol, der Hauptstadt der Pridnestrowischen Moldauischen Republik (Foto: Pe3k / Shutterstock.com); unten deren offizielle Flagge (Abb: wikimedia commons / public domain). Die Rationalität eingefrorener Konflikte Ein Blick Richtung Osten Konflikte & Strategien 47Ausgabe 2 . 2018 o nah und doch so fern: Europa ist den meisten von uns weniger vertraut, als wir vielleicht glauben. Skopje, Podgorica, Chişinău? Selbst auf dem Campus einer Universität ist längst nicht allen bewusst, dass es sich hierbei um Hauptstädte europäischer Staaten handelt. Ein noch dunklerer Schleier des Nichtwissens legt sich über Territorien, die sich zwar selbst als souveräne Staaten proklamieren, jedoch von der Weltgemeinschaft nicht als solche anerkannt werden. Auch diese gibt es in Europa. Ignoranz gegenüber diesen Regionen ist jedoch unangebracht, wie das folgende Beispiel des eingefrorenen Konflikts zwischen der Republik Moldau und Russland zeigen soll. In der bitteren Logik dieses mehr als zwei Jahrzehnte währenden Konflikts spiegelt sich nicht zuletzt der aktuelle russisch-ukrainische Konflikt um die Region Donbass fast perfekt wider. Das kalkulierte Einfrieren eines bewaffneten Konflikts Im August 1991, vier Monate vor dem endgültigen Zerfall der Sowjetunion, erklärt die Republik Moldau ihren Austritt aus der Sowjetunion. Doch die neu erlangte Unabhängigkeit löst nicht nur Begeisterung aus. Vor allem die russischstämmige Bevölkerung in Transnistrien, dem Landesteil östlich des Dnister, fühlt sich von einer möglichen Vereinigung der Republik Moldau mit dem westlichen Nachbarn Rumänien bedroht. Die Befürchtungen werden dadurch verstärkt, dass Rumänisch zur einzigen Amtssprache erklärt wird. Das von breiten Bevölkerungsteilen gesprochene Russisch verliert diesen Status. Als Konsequenz erklärt sich 1991 auch Transnistrien für unabhängig. Die moldauische Regierung will diese Abspaltung von ihrem Staatsgebiet jedoch nicht akzeptieren und startet im März 1992 eine Militäroffensive gegen Transnistrien. Der bewaffnete Konflikt erfasst auch die Zivilgesellschaft. Lehrer, Richter und andere Staatsbedienstete beider Seiten, oft ohne militärische Erfahrung, greifen zu den Waffen und beginnen aufeinander zu schiessen. Hunderte von Menschen kommen dabei ums Leben. Erst durch das Eingreifen der 14. Russischen Armee werden die Kriegsparteien getrennt. Transnistrien lässt Grenzbalken installieren und präsentiert sich mit eigenem Präsidenten, Parlament und Militär als souveräne sozialistische Republik, die sich offiziell „Pridnestrowische Moldauische Republik" nennt. Der Konflikt wird nie gelöst; die Republik Moldau beansprucht dieses Territorium, das grösser ist als Luxemburg, bis heute. Kein Staat, auch Russland nicht, erkennt die „Geisterrepublik" an, die sich als Kleptokratie und Schmugglerstaat mit finanzieller Hilfe aus Russland ihr Überleben sichert. Die Bevölkerung zahlt dafür einen hohen Preis. Ihre Währung ist nicht devisenfähig, ihre Pässe sind international ungültig. Menschenrechtsverletzungen stehen an der Tagesordnung, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Rechtssicherheit existieren nur eingeschränkt. Seit 1989 ist die Bevölkerungszahl der Region um ein Drittel gesunken, viele der in dieser „Wendezeit" geborenen Menschen empfinden sich als verlorene Generation. Weshalb kommt der Konflikt zu keiner Lösung? Eine tiefere Ursache liegt in der Logik eingefrorener Konflikte, von der sich Russland seit mehr als zwei Jahrzehnten leiten lässt. Grundsätzlich gäbe es drei Möglichkeiten, den Konflikt zu beenden: die Unabhängigkeit Transnistriens, die faktische Rückkehr zur Republik Moldau oder die Eingliederung in die Russische Föderation. Die russische Regierung hält dabei mehr oder weniger die Kontrolle über alle drei Optionen: Sie könnte mit Unterstützung der russischstämmigen Bevölkerungsteile darauf hinarbeiten, Transnistrien zum russischen Staatsgebiet zu machen; sie könnte ein unabhängiges Transnistrien fördern und S „Eine fortwährende Blockade eigener ökonomischer, kultureller und politischer Entfaltungsmöglichkeiten." Abb. 1: Karte der Republik Moldau und der Pridnestrowischen Moldauischen Republik (Grafik: Julia Blauhut, UBT). Autor Prof. Dr. Julian Fink ist Professor für Praktische Philosophie an der Universität Bayreuth. 48 Ausgabe 2 . 2018 dessen Grenzen militärisch absichern; und ebenso gäbe es die Möglichkeit, die politische und wirtschaftliche Unterstützung aufzugeben und damit die Rückkehr zur Republik Moldau zu forcieren. Dennoch beharrt Russland auf der Nichtlösung des Konflikts. Die Kosten dieser Politik sind für Russland nicht unerheblich. Denn der Status quo lässt sich nur aufrechterhalten, solange die Bevölkerung Transnistriens das Gefühl hat, dass sich ihre Lebensverhältnisse im Falle einer Wiedereingliederung in die Republik Moldau verschlechtern würden. Zu diesem Zweck subventioniert Russland Renten und staatliche Löhne für die Bevölkerung, die überwiegend im öffentlichen Sektor arbeitet, und finanziert das Militär. Es gewährleistet weiterhin Gaslieferungen, auch wenn die Rechnungen seit 2006 nicht mehr beglichen werden. Insgesamt belaufen sich die Zahlungen aus Russland nach Transnistrien auf rund die Hälfte des jährlichen Budgets dieser „eingefrorenen Region". Wofür zahlt Russland einen so hohen Preis? Die Erklärung liegt darin, dass die russische Regierung die EU und die NATO als bedrohlich empfindet. Vor allem wenn Staaten in der unmittelbaren Nachbarschaft diesen Organisationen beitreten wollen, fürchtet sie eine Schwächung ihres ökonomischen und militärischen Einflusses. Hinzu kommt die – durchaus berechtigte – Einschätzung, dass jedwede Lösung des Transnistrien-Konflikts einer Erweiterung von EU und NATO nach Osten den Weg ebnen würde. Nur die Nichtlösung blockiert diese Option. Dies ist der Aufnahmelogik der NATO und EU geschuldet, denn beide ermöglichen nur konfliktfreien Staaten den Beitritt.1 So könnte sich ein unabhängiges befriedetes Transnistrien durchaus zu einem Beitrittskandidaten entwickeln. Vor allem eine Republik Moldau, die nach einer Eingliederung Transnistriens in die Russische Föderation oder umgekehrt nach einer Wiedereingliederung Transnistriens in das eigene Territorium politisch konsolidiert wäre, könnte damit rechnen, langfristig in die EU und die NATO aufgenommen zu werden. Vor diesem Hintergrund kalkuliert Russland, dass der Nutzen, der in der Sicherung seines Einflusses in Osteuropa liegt, die hohen Kosten des Einfrierens übersteigt. Diese werden als Investitionen in den eigenen Machtstatus gerechtfertigt. Unterdessen zahlen die Menschen in Transnistrien und der Republik Moldau dafür den Preis: eine fortwährende Blockade eigener ökonomischer, kultureller und politischer Entfaltungsmöglichkeiten. Rationalität und Rechtfertigung Wie steht es um die Rationalität der russischen Politik? Gibt es eine stichhaltige Rechtfertigung? Zunächst einmal kann man das Verhalten Russlands als instrumentell rational bewerten. Folgt man dem Prinzip der wohlwollenden Interpretation und lässt den Nutzen beiseite, den die russische Regierung aus den kleptokratischen Strukturen in Transnistrien ziehen mag, scheint ihre Politik von der Absicht geprägt, Gefahren für die Sicherheit des eigenen Landes abzuwehren. Zugleich ist sie überzeugt, dieses Ziel lasse sich allein dadurch erreichen, dass EU und NATO keine weiteren osteuropäischen Staaten als Mitglieder aufnehmen. Daher greift sie zum einzigen Mittel, das die Nichtmitgliedschaft der Republik Moldau garantiert: die Einfrierung des transnistrischen Konfliktes. Kurz gesagt, Russland verhält sich ZielMittel-rational. Doch ist dieses Verhalten deswegen auch gerechtfertigt? Die Rationalitätsforschung hat darauf eine eindeutige Antwort: nein. Aus subjektiven Absichten und Überzeugungen lässt sich keine normative Rechtfertigung einer bestimmten Handlungsweise ableiAbb. 2: Militärparade in Tiraspol am 9. Mai 2017, dem Jahrestag des Sieges der Sowjetunion im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Foto: annva / Shutterstock.com) Abb. 3: Dreisprachiges Ortsschild – moldauisch, russisch, ukrainisch – vor Tiraspol, der Hauptstadt Transnistriens (Foto: Julian Nitzsche / wikimedia commons / CC-BY-SA-4.0) Konflikte & Strategien 49Ausgabe 2 . 2018 ten. Formaler ausgedrückt: Die Tatsache, dass ich m als Mittel für mein beabsichtigtes Ziel identifiziere, kann vielleicht Teil einer Erklärung sein, warum ich m ergreife; sie liefert jedoch keine Begründung dafür, dass ich stichhaltige Gründe habe, wenn ich m ergreife. Andernfalls könnte jeder Mensch für alles, was er aufgrund eigener Absichten und Überzeugungen tut und lässt, normative Rechtfertigungen produzieren.2 Das aber ist nicht möglich – genauso wie sich Baron Münchhausen nicht am eigenen Schopf aus dem Sumpf ziehen konnte (sein Ritt auf der Kanonenkugel ging übrigens der Legende nach von der Festung Bender in Transnistrien aus). Würden Menschen allein schon dadurch, dass sie instrumentell rational handeln, auch schon richtig handeln, wären Rechtfertigungen viel zu leicht zu bekommen. Eine geradezu abartige Proliferation von Entlastungen und Entschuldigungen wäre die Folge. Analog verhält es sich auf der Ebene von Staaten. Russland kann die instrumentelle Rationalität des Einfrierens eines Konflikts nicht als Rechtfertigung dieser Politik ins Feld führen – auch wenn Relativisten und Vertreter eines sogenannten „Realismus" in den internationalen Beziehungen anderer Meinung sein mögen. Kosten-Nutzen-Rechnungen sind ebenfalls keine zureichende Basis für eine normative Rechtfertigung. Zunächst einmal ist es keineswegs ausgeschlossen, dass sich die russische Regierung verkalkuliert, wenn sie den Nutzen des eingefrorenen Konflikts deutlich höher als deren Kosten bemisst. Aber selbst wenn diese Bilanz stimmen würde: Die Politik des Einfrierens ist ethisch fragwürdig – denn Russland „erkauft" sich den angestrebten Gewinn auf Kosten der Menschen, die in der Republik Moldau und in Transnistrien leben. Nun könnten Vertreter einer utilitaristischen Ethik einwenden, dass die Politik des Einfrierens möglicherweise zu einer Maximierung des Gesamtwohls führe. Die Vorteile, die diese Politik für die Menschen in den am Konflikt beteiligten Ländern insgesamt hervorbringe, übertreffe die insgesamt entstehenden Kosten und sei daher einer auf Konfliktlösung ausgerichteten Politik vorzuziehen. Eine solche utilitaristische Wohlfahrtsbilanz addiert den Nutzen und die Kosten, die für die Menschen in den beteiligten Ländern entstehen, und rechnet sie gegeneinander auf. Genau hier aber liegt der entscheidende Schwachpunkt, den der US-amerikanische Philosoph John Rawls in seiner berühmten Theorie der Gerechtigkeit herausgearbeitet hat:3 Eine derartige Kosten-Nutzen-Bilanz missachtet die Separatheit (separateness) der Wohlfahrtssubjekte. Diese müssen von der Ethik prinzipiell als eigenständige, autonome und gleichberechtigte Individuen anerkannt werden. Andernfalls werden einzelne Personen oder Gruppen im Namen der Wohlfahrtsmaximierung instrumentalisiert. Ein Beispiel aus der Medizin kann dies verdeutlichen: Wenn ich vor der Wahl stehe, entweder zu sterben oder mir einen Teil meiner Lunge entfernen zu lassen, ist der Kosten-Nutzen-Vergleich – der nur mich selbst betrifft – ein angemessenes Mittel der Entscheidungsfindung. Wenn ich jedoch vor der Wahl stehe, entweder zu sterben oder einer anderen Person einen Teil ihrer Lunge entfernen und mir implantieren zu lassen, taugt die Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse zur Entscheidungsfindung nicht. Analog gilt dies auch auf der Ebene der internationalen Politik: Russland verletzt mit der Politik des Einfrierens die Autonomie ganzer Regionen und enthält ihnen das Recht auf freie Entfaltung vor. Fazit Das Beispiel des eingefrorenen Konflikts in und um Transnistrien zeigt: Überlegungen zur instrumentellen Rationalität und zu staatenübergreifenden Kosten-Nutzen-Bilanzen eignen sich nicht zur normativen Bewertung und Rechtfertigung politischen Handelns. Dies gilt gerade auch für den Umgang mit zwischenstaatlichen Konflikten. Russland sollte davon Abstand nehmen, noch weitere Konflikte in seiner Nachbarschaft in das Gefrierfach zu legen. Abb. 4: Die Festung Bender am östlichen Ufer des Dnister aus dem 16. Jahrhundert (sst). Abb. 5: Grenzpfahl zwischen der Ukraine und der Pridnestrowischen Moldauischen Republik (sst). 1 Die Aufnahme eines Staates in die NATO, der sich im Konflikt mit einem anderen Staat befindet, ist mit dem Risiko verbunden, dass eine militärische Eskalation den Bündnisfall und Beistandsverpflichtungen auslöst. 2 Die Rationalitätsforschung bezeichnet eine Herleitung vermeintlicher normativer Rechtfertigungen aus Absichten und Überzeugungen als Bootstrapping. Vgl. z.B. C. Piller: The Bootstrapping Objection. Organon (2013), F 20 (4), 612-631. – J. Broome: Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with immensurable values, in: In C.W. Morris, A. Ripstein (eds.): Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier. Cambridge 2001, 98-120. 3 J. Rawls: Eine Theorie der Gerechtigkeit. Frankfurt am Main 1979 (Übers. der 1971 veröffentlichten Originalausgabe). – D. Brink: The separateness of persons, distributive norms, and moral theory, in: R. G. Frey, C. Morris (eds.), Value, Welfare, and Morality. Cambridge 1993, 252-289. Konflikte & Strategien

Mediterranea. International journal for the transfer of knowledge, 4 (2019), p. 57–74 ISSN: 2445-2378 © The author(s). Published by UCOPress. Cordoba University Press. All rights reserved. SEARCHING FOR THE ROUTES OF PHILOSOPHY MARSILIO FICINO ON HERACLITUS GEORGIOS STEIRIS NATIONAL AND KAPODISTRIAN UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS Abstract Marsilio Ficino is well known for his efforts to expand the philosophical canon of his time. He exhibited great interest in Platonism and Neoplatonism, but also endeavoured to recover understudied philosophical traditions of the ancient world. In his Theologia platonica de immortalitate animorum, he commented on the Presocratics. Ficino thought of the Presocratics as authorities and possessors of undisputed wisdom. This article seeks to explore the way in which Ficino treated the philosophy of Heraclitus in the Theologia platonica in order to formulate his own philosophical ideas. Key Words Presocratics, Heraclitus, Ficino, Renaissance Philosophy. ! During the fifteenth century, interest in Presocratic philosophy became more intense in part because of the aversion felt by early humanists towards Scholastic philosophy, but mainly due to the availability of texts and intentional return to classical philosophical thought. Fifteenth century humanists, notably Marsilio Ficino (1433– 1499) and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494), reappraised the importance of Presocratic philosophy and acknowledged its influence on ancient Greek philosophy. Ficino's work could not possibly lack any references to Presocratic philosophers since the Florentine humanist attempted to broaden his philosophical scope by systematically dealing with Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophical literature. Since the terminus technicus 'Presocratic' was a later invention, Ficino commented at length on a number of philosophers who predated Socrates, including the Eleatics and the Pythagoreans. Furthermore, he incorporated into his understanding of Presocratic Georgios Steiris 58 philosophy a number of later works attributed to figures who allegedly predate Socrates – including Zoroaster, Hermes Trismegistus, and Orpheus. Ficino considered the Presocratic as authorities to whom he could resort in order to support and strengthen his positions. Moreover, in Ficino's thought, there is clearly an eternal and indestructible continuity entity in knowledge, which starts from the distant past and continues into the future.1 Namely, Ficino holds that Plato was merely a link in a much older succession of theologians and transmitters of wisdom. The Ionian, Italic, Thracian, Egyptian and Chaldean sources shaped Platonic philosophy.2 In this article, I focus on the Theologia Platonica de immortalitate animorum (1482) – Ficino's opus magnum – so as to present and analyse the way he deals with the philosophy of Heraclitus, a leading representative of the Ionian school, in order to assess Ficino's approach to Presocratic philosophy. In this study, I will rely predominantly on the Theologia Platonica because in this specific book Ficino analytically presented his own philosophical views. I must admit that Ficino referred to Heraclitus and to other Presocratic thinkers also in his other numerous commentaries and translations; but, in these cases, he primarily reacted to the references of the original author. Here, his comments lack the profundity and the originality of his arguments and insights found in the Theologia Platonica, where Ficino articulated his magnificent philosophical synopsis. Thus, the scattered references to the rest of the Ficinian corpus that are included in this article aim rather at the elucidation of his view on Heraclitus in the Theologia Platonica, and do not represent an attempt to present a complete record of Ficino's references to the Ephesian philosopher. However, omission does not indicate insignificance, for in addition to his studies, Ficino's admiration for Heraclitus is proved by the fact that he decorated his lodge at Careggi with a painting that depicted Democritus and Heraclitus, where the latter weeps over the misfortunes of humanity.3 1 MOSHE IDEL, « Prisca Theologia in Marsilio Ficino and some Jewish Treatments », in MICHAEL J. B. ALLEN, VALERY REES, MARTIN DAVIES (eds.), Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy, Brill, Leiden–Boston–Köln 2002 (Brill's studies in intellectual history, 108), p. 137–158; DANIEL P. WALKER, « Prisca Theologia e Philosophia Perennis: Due temi del Rinascimento italiano e loro fortuna », in GIOVANNANGIOLA TARUGI (ed.), Il pensiero italiano di Rinascimento e il tempo nostro. Atti del V Convegno internazionale del Centro di studi umanistici. Montepulciano 8–13 agosto 1968, Leo S. Olschki, Firenze 1970, p. 211–236. 2 MICHAEL J. B. ALLEN, « Pythagoras in the Early Renaissance », in CARL A. HUFFMAN (ed.), A History of Pythagoreanism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014, p. 435–437, 453; CHRISTOPHER S. CELENZA, Piety and Pythagoras in Renaissance Florence: The Symbolum Nesianum, Brill, Leiden 2001 (Studies in the history of Christian thought, 101), p. 2–4, 16–25; DENIS J.-J. ROBICHAUD, Plato's Persona: Marsilio Ficino, Renaissance Humanism, and Platonic Traditions, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2018, p. 153. 3 ALBERT BLANKERT, « Heraclitus en Democritus bij Marsilio Ficino », Simiolus: Netherlands Quarterly for the History of Art, 1/3 (1966–1967), p. 128–135; EUGENIO GARIN, « The Philosopher and the Searching for the Routes of Philosophy 59 As it will be shown in this article, Heraclitus's philosophy was crucial for Ficino, because it offered to the Florentine philosopher critical concepts for his metaphysics of light and the understanding of becoming. Since this article is part of a broader research project on the reception of the Presocratics by Ficino, I focus on exemplary cases that allow the reader to draw some preliminary conclusions. In addition, I attempt to trace Ficino's possible sources and evaluate his proper knowledge, understanding, and treatment of the philosophy of Heraclitus. The extent of his faithfulness to Heraclitus's quotes is crucial, because it provides the opportunity to understand Ficino's approach to the Presocratics. I argue that Ficino did not think of himself as a mere exegete or a commentator; rather he creatively reappraised ancient Greek philosophy so as to reinforce his own views. I In addition to Plato and the Neoplatonists, Ficino was interested in almost all influential ancient intellectual traditions, including magic and mysticism. Ficino's works marked a new and innovative reading of the Presocratics. In the very first pages of the Theologia Platonica, there are already references to Heraclitus. More specifically, while investigating immortality, Ficino attempted to prove that, apart from the inert mass of the bodies – to which the followers of Democritus, Cyrenaics, and Epicurus restricted their thinking – there is an active quality or power towards which the Stoics and Cynics oriented their research. Furthermore, apart from this quality, which is divisible according to the dimensions of matter and is subject to all modes of change, there is a higher sort of form, which does not promote the division in the body despite being variable in some aspect. According to Ficino, the ancient theologians held that this form constitutes the seat of the rational soul.4 Ficino argued that a similar view is found in the works of Heraclitus, Marcus Varro, and Marcus Manilius. Lucia Saudelli argues that Ficino resorted to Heraclitus in order to substantiate his view that the soul is placed in the center of the physical universe and the metaphysical order.5 Magus », in EUGENIO GARIN (ed.), Renaissance Characters, trans. LYDIA G. COCHRANE, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1991, p. 125; PAUL O. KRISTELLER, Marsilio Ficino and His Work after Five Hundred Years, Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1987 (Istituto nazionale di studi sul Rinascimento. Quaderni di Rinascimento, 7), p. 11; JOHN L. LEPAGE, The Revival of Antique Philosophy in the Renaissance, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2012, p. 106. 4 MARSILIUS FICINUS. Theologia Platonica, I.1.2 ( = MARSILIO FICINO, Platonic Theology, ed. JAMES HANKINS and trans. MICHAEL J. B. ALLEN, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 2001); CHRISTIAN K. KLEINBUB, Vision and the Visionary in Raphael,: Penn State Press, University Park, PA 2011, p. 65–66. 5 LUCIA SAUDELLI, « Lux sicca Marsile Ficin exegete d'Héraclite », Accademia, 10 (2008), p. 38. Georgios Steiris 60 According to Michael J. B. Allen and James Hankins,6 Ficino's position was based on Aristotle's De Anima.7 In Aristotle's text, Heraclitus seems to argue that the soul flows and moves. According to Ficino, this movement was interpreted as a kind of change. It is important to clarify here that the Aristotelian text refers to the soul and not to the Heraclitean Logos (Λόγος), which is a concept that could be interpreted as a unifying or symmetrical arrangement of things, but also as a real component of physical objects that has the same area of application as the primary cosmic element, namely fire.8 Ficino continued along the same lines. Specifically, he stated that the essence of the rational soul remains unchanged, which can be proved by stability of memory and the will. However, the soul practically tends to change because it thinks everything over gradually and not instantaneously. The same happens with its contribution to the growth of the body: physical power remains unchanged because it grows constantly neither being able to increase nor to disappear. Nonetheless, acquired power changes because it is moved from potentiality to actuality, and from actuality to habit, and so on. Once more, Ficino considered this to be the position of Heraclitus, Marcus Terentius Varro (116–127 BC), and Marcus Manilius (1st century AD).9 Heraclitus actually thought that the soul is mutable since it originates from humidity, falls into fire in its proper functioning and ends as liquid in the phase of its decline. In addition, the soul moves within the body. According to Heraclitus, the human intellect should be located in the soul.10 However, a more careful study of Ficino's text shows that the Florentine philosopher does not faithfully interpret Heraclitus's views. In particular, Ficino understands Heraclitus's soul as the seat of 6 FICINO, Platonic Theology, p. 323. 7 ARISTOTELES. De anima, 405a28–31: καὶ Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φησι ψυχήν, εἴπερ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν, ἐξ ἧς τἆλλα συνίστησιν· καὶ ἀσωματώτατόν τε καὶ ῥέον ἀεί· τὸ δὲ κινούμενον κινουμένῳ γινώσκεσθαι· ἐν κινήσει δ' εἶναι τὰ ὄντα κἀκεῖνος ᾤετο καὶ οἱ πολλοί. 8 THEODOROS CHRISTIDIS, DEMETRIUS ATHANASSAKIS, « On Heraclitus' Concept of λόγοϛ », Philosophical Inquiry, 32 (2010), p. 61–71; ARISTOTELES, Physics Book VIII, ed. DANIEL W. GRAHAM, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1999, p. 66–67, 155; GEOFFREY S. KIRK, JOHN E. RAVEN, MALCOM SCHOFIELD, The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995, p. 204; ADAM DROZDEK, Greek Philosophers as Theologians: The Divine Arche, Ashgate, Aldershot 2007, p. 31–32; RONALD POLANSKY, Aristotle's De Anima: A Critical Commentary, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007, p. 79; KEVIN ROBB, « Psyche and Logos in the Fragments of Heraclitus », The Monist, 69 (1986), p. 315–351; THOMAS M. ROBINSON, « Heraclitus on Soul », The Monist, 69 (1986), p. 305–314; ID., « Heraclitus and Logos – again », ΣΧΟΛΗ: Ancient Philosophy and The Classical Tradition, 7 (2013), p. 318–326. 9 FICINUS. Theologia Platonica, I.5.1. 10 ARYEH FINKELBERG, Heraclitus and Thales' Conceptual Scheme: A Historical Study, Brill, Leiden–Boston 2017 (Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture, 23), p. 84–125; GEOFFREY S. KIRK, Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1954, p. 339–342; GABOR BETEGH, « On the Physical Aspect of Heraclitus' Psychology », Phronesis, 52 (2007), p. 3–32. Searching for the Routes of Philosophy 61 rational soul, not as the soul per se, as Heraclitus had suggested.11 Furthermore, according to Ficino, the angelic mind – which is the only mind, which remains unchanged – exists beyond the rational soul. Heraclitus does not understand the Logos according to the Neoplatonic way in which Ficino understands the rational soul or the angelic mind. It is a matter of one concept with different semantic content; indeed the Logos may even constitute the composing element of material things. On the other hand, Heraclitus's soul – which has no limits – cannot be separated from the human mind.12 Thus, Ficino's interpretation is not entirely consistent with Heraclitus's philosophy. Furthermore, Ficino resorted to Heraclitus on other different topics related to the soul.13 In particular, Ficino used Heraclitus's quote: αὐγὴ ξηρὴ, ψυχή σοφωτάτη.14 Ficino's translation is: « dry light, the wisest soul » (Lux sicca, anima sapientissima). It is worth noting that Ficino does not reproduce the most common variations15 of the Heraclitean quote (αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη and αὔη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη)16 and draws instead from the Neoplatonist Hermias (5th cent. AD), namely, the only author who separates the phrase with a comma and presents a shorter variation of the quote.17 The Florentine Platonist prefers the same translation (Lux sicca, anima sapientissima) of the Heraclitean passage in his De vita libri tres (1489).18 11 MARK JOHNSTONE, « On ‛Logos' in Heraclitus' », in BRAD INWOOD (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. XLVII, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014, p. 18–19. 12 PAUL S. MACDONALD, History of the Concept of Mind, vol. I: Speculations About Soul, Mind and Spirit from Homer to Hume, Routledge, Abington 2017, p. 28–35; GIANNIS STAMATELOS, Plotinus and the Presocratics: A Philosophical Study of Presocratic Influences in Plotinus' Enneads, State University of New York Press, Albany 2012 (SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy), p. 174. 13 FICINUS. Theologia Platonica, VI.2.20. 14 DK12 B118. 15 ROBERT B. ENGLISH, « Heraclitus and the Soul », Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, 44 (1913), p. 176–177. The Byzantine scholar Michael Glykas (12th century) gives a diferrent version of the Heraclitean quote: ψυχή ξηροτέρη σοφωτέρη. SERGE MOURAVIEV, Héraclite d'Éphèse. La tradition antique et médiévale, vol. IV: De Maxime le Confesseur à Marsile Ficin, Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin 2003 (Heraclitea. 2: Traditio. A. Témoignages et citations), p. 826. 16 SAUDELLI, « Lux sicca », p. 32. 17 HERMIAS. In Platonis Phaedrum scholia, 1.29.28; MICHAEL J. B. ALLEN, « Two commentaries on the Phaedrus: Ficino's indebtedness to Hermias », Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 43 (1980), p. 110–129; ID., « The Soul as Rhapsode: Marsilio Ficino's Interpretation of Plato's Ion », in JOHN W. O'MALLEY, THOMAS M. IZBICKI, GERALD CHRISTIANSON (eds.), Humanity and Divinity in Renaissance and Reformation: Essays in Honor of Charles Trinkaus, Brill, Leiden 1993 (Studies in the History of Christian Thought, 51), p. 132; ANNE SHEPPARD, « The Influence of Hermias on Marsilio Ficino's Doctrine of Inspiration », Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 43 (1980), p. 97–109. 18 MARSILIO FICINO, Three Books on Life, I.5, ed. CAROL V. KASKE, JOHN R. CLARK, Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Tempe, AZ 1998 (Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 57), p. 74–75. Georgios Steiris 62 According to the vast majority of the ancient scholars who commented on Heraclitus' quote, the Ephesian philosopher intended to show that the dry soul is the wisest and best. It is obvious that Ficino's view on Heraclitus is mediated by the approach of the Neoplatonists. Nevertheless, Ficino's aim here is to prove that souls exist in heavenly orbits and are enclosed spheres of light. Thus, Ficino misinterprets Heraclitus's philosophy, following Hermias's, Galen's and Macrobius's interpretation of the Heraclitean quote.19 The Greek philosopher argued that the dry soul is the wisest and the best, and likewise the burning soul is capable and active. The liquid soul loses much of its ability.20 Conversely, Ficino puts Heraclitus's position in the frame of a Neoplatonic type of metaphysics of light. In particular, he claims that nothing offers more pleasure to the soul than light. Even during its dwelling on earth, it craves the light of spiritual beings. Ficino's inaccurate interpretation of the specific passage from Heraclitus is repeated later when Ficino states that, according to Orpheus's disciples and to Heraclitus, « light is nothing else than the visible soul (all things return to life because of this) and the soul is invisible light ».21 This particular argument is used by Ficino to prove the invariance of the mind. Once more, Ficino interprets Heraclitus's passage with a very loose and inaccurate way in order to adapt it to what he desired to support. While Allen and Hankins believe that, at this point, Ficino freely reproduces the aforementioned passage from Aristotle's De Anima,22 there is another possible interpretation. Since Ficino refers, in the same paragraph, to the spiritual, intangible sunlight, which originates from the soul of the sun, it is likely that the connection that Ficino is trying to make to Heraclitus's philosophy comes from the passage from Diogenes Laertius where the soul is attributed to the sun.23 Similarly, 19 SAUDELLI, « Lux sicca », p. 32–33. 20 JONATHAN BARNES, The Presocratic Philosophers, Routledge, London–New York 1982, p. 43–62; FINKELBERG, Heraclitus and Thales, p. 85–87; CHARLES H. KAHN, The Art and Though of Heraclitus, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1981, p. 245–246; RICHARD D. MCKIRAHAN, Philosophy Before Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentary, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis–Cambridge 2011, p. 139–141; MARTHA NUSSBAUM, « Psychê in Heraclitus », Phronesis, 17 (1972), p. 1–16, 153–70; Heraclitus, Fragments, A Text and Translation with a Commentary, ed. THOMAS M. ROBINSON, University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1991, p. 158–159. 21 FICINUS. Theologia Platonica, VIII.13.1. 22 ARISTOTELES. De anima, 405a28–31. 23 DK12 A1 56.12–13: ὅτι τε ὁ ἥλιός ἐστι τὸ μέγεθος οἷος φαίνεται. λέγεται δὲ καί* 'ψυχῆς [...] ἔχει ALEXANDER MOURELATOS, The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2014, p. 223–224. Ficino, in De sole, supported that Heraclitus called the sun fountain of celestial light (cf. Marsilio Ficino, Liber de sole et lumine, VI, Antonio di Bartolommeo Miscomini, Florence 1493). Searching for the Routes of Philosophy 63 the distinction that Ficino attempts to make between the immaterial and material light is attributed to Heraclitus by Clement of Alexandria.24 Saudelli maintains that although Ficino draws from pre-Platonic sources, he interprets them through the lens of Christian Platonism so to establish his « psychology of the light ».25 It is well known that the Light is a key concept of Ficino's metaphysics. Heraclitus's views on the soul enable the Florentine philosopher to explain the diffusion of light in the created universe within the broader context of his theology. Later on, dealing with Plato's positions on the soul, Ficino asserts that the Athenian philosopher expressed truths related to the soul. However, the way Plato interpreted the paths of the soul was poetic and metaphorical, and hence the true meaning, hidden behind the words, must be sought. Indeed, Ficino notes that Plato was not the one who conceived these paths; rather, he simply reproduced them. The first ones to speak about the soul's paths were the Egyptian priests who defined them through the process of the purification of the soul. Orpheus, Empedocles, and Heraclitus held similar views, in a poetic and lyrical way.26 According to Heraclitus's philosophy, the soul constitutes the vehicle of personal identity and character, and it is the center that coordinates people's thoughts and actions. In fact, the soul constitutes the essence of man. Death cannot exist as a permanent condition. Instead, it is an instantaneous phase in an ultimate limit of the cycle. Life and death are the same since, when these change, others happen and when other change, these happen, as Heraclitus characteristically states.27 Death could mean the advanced decay of the body and mind, even in case the human being has not actually died. On the contrary, the kind of death that occurs heroically in the peak of life is not thought of as death because the soul continues to exist in an excellent condition. The corpse – a body without a soul – has absolutely no value and is equated with compost.28 According to Heraclitus, the soul is simultaneously mortal and immortal; also, it is continuously subject to death and can get back to life at any time.29 Consequently, Ficino's interpretation 24 CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS. Paedagogus, II.10.99.5.: Λήσεται μὲν γὰρ ἴσως τὸ αἰσθητὸν φῶς τις, τὸ δὲ νοητὸν ἀδύνατον ἐστιν, ἢ ὡς φησιν Ἡράκλειτος* τὸ μὴ δῦνόν ποτε πῶς ἂν τις λάθοι; JAAP MANSFELD, « On Two Fragments of Heraclitus in Clement of Alexandria », Mnemosyne, 37 (1984), p. 447–451. 25 SAUDELLI, « Lux Sicca », p. 39–41. 26 FICINUS. Theologia Platonica, XVII.4.1; DK12 A15 ARIST. De anima A 2. 405a 24: καὶ Ἡ. δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φησι ψυχήν (wie Diogenes 64 A 20), εἴπερ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν [B 12], ἐξ ἧς τἆλλα συνίστησιν. MACROB. S. Scip. 14, 19 (animam) H. physicus scintillam stellaris essentiae. AËT. IV 3, 12 (D. 389) Ἡ. τὴν μὲν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν ἀναθυμίασιν ἐκ τῶν ἐν αὐτῶι ὑγρῶν, τὴν δὲ ἐν τοῖς ζώιοις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκτὸς καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναθυμιάσεως, ὁμογενῆ. 27 DK12 B88: E ταὐτό τ' ἔνι ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκὸς καὶ [τὸ] ἐγρηγορὸς καὶ καθεῦδον καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν* τάδε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκεῖνά ἐστι κἀκεῖνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα. 28 DK12 B96: νέκυες γὰρ κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι. 29 DK12 B62: ἀθάνατοι θνητοί, θνητοὶ ἀθάνατοι, ζῶντες τὸν ἐκείνων θάνατον, τὸν δὲ ἐκείνων βίον τεθνεῶτες. Georgios Steiris 64 is designated to the side that relates Heraclitus's philosophy to Plato's concerning the immortality of the soul. Of course, all these are in the broader context of the philosophical thought of Heraclitus and Plato, since, in the details, their opinions do not coincide with Ficino's. Ficino seems to differ again from the ancient sources, since he claims that Heraclitus's poetic mood, in his works, is more efficient. This is not correct, since Heraclitus – unlike Empedocles and Parmenides – does not seem to articulate his philosophy in verse form. Moreover, it is well known that Heraclitus had repeatedly disputed the poets.30 On the topic of the invisibly articulated and allusive philosophy of Heraclitus, Ficino follows the ancient sources. Particularly, Diogenes Laertius, Timon Phliasius and Cicero31 referred, among many others, to Heraclitus's secrecy since his aim was that powerful and influential people understand his work, not the mob. Nonetheless, the indirect association of Heraclitus with the Egyptian priests and Orpheus is interesting. This demonstrates that Ficino thought of Heraclitus as a mystic and continuer of hidden religious currents of the popular Greek religion.32 II Apart from psychology, Ficino regarded Heraclitus as a valuable ally to prove that the mind is the subject of eternal truth and connects to an eternal object, accepting the immaterial kind and the eternal rational principles. This view of Ficino was based on the volatility of the natural world. In particular, Ficino held that the starry night sky fills a stream with the images of its stars reflected on water. Even though the ignorant ones considered that the images of the stars remain unchanged in water, they were actually continuously renewed as the water changes. Similarly, God, congested with Ideas, emanates images of his Ideas in constantly changing matter. According to the Platonists,33 these Ideas remain simply images, and not true species, although some natural philosophers believe 30 GLENN MOST, « What Ancient Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry? », in PIERRE DESTRÉE, FRITZGREGOR HERRMANN (eds.), Plato and the Poets, Brill, Leiden 2011 (Mnemosyne. Supplementum, 328), p. 5. 31 CICERO. De Finibus, II.15: « quod duobus modis sine reprehensione fit, si aut de industria facias, ut Heraclitus, 'cognomento qui skoteinρw perhibetur, quia de natura nimis obscure memoravit', aut cum rerum obscuritas, non verborum, facit ut non intellegatur oratio, qualis est in Timaeo Platonis »; DK12 A1, 54.42–55.4: τὸ δὲ φερόμενον αὐτοῦ βιβλίον ἐστὶ μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ συνέχοντος Περὶ φύσεως, διήιρηται δὲ εἰς τρεῖς λόγους, εἴς τε τὸν περὶ τοῦ παντὸς καὶ πολιτικὸν καὶ θεολογικόν. ἀνέθηκε δ' αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος ἱερόν, ὡς μέν τινες, ἐπιτηδεύσας ἀσαφέστερον γράψαι, ὅπως οἱ δυνάμενοι <μόνοι> προσίοιεν αὐτῶι καὶ μὴ ἐκ τοῦ δημώδους εὐκαταφρόνητον ἦι. τοῦτον δὲ καὶ ὁ Τίμων [fr. 43 D.] ὑπογράφει λέγων* 'τοῖς δ' ἔνι κοκκυστὴς ὀχλολοίδορος Ἡράκλειτος αἰνικτὴς ἀνόρουσε. 32 Censorinus (3rd c. AD) also connected Heraclitus to Orpheus. Cf. KIRK, Heraclitus, 300. 33 DIONYSIUS PSEUDO AREOPAGITA. De divinis nominibus, 869D. Searching for the Routes of Philosophy 65 that they are true species.34 Ficino resorts to Heraclitus so as to prove that even these images do not remain constant; rather, they constantly change since matter – despite the beliefs of the ignorant ones – constantly changes.35 A few paragraphs later Ficino returns to the same subject.36 Specifically, Ficino claims that, according to Heraclitus, we cannot pass through the same water of a river twice or similarly touch the same place of a moving wheel; thus, the disposition of the body does not remain stable from one moment to another.37 Ficino cites Plutarch38 and Proclus39 as proponents of this view. In Allen and Hankins's edition, it is wrongly indicated that Ficino copies at this point from Plato's Cratylus40 and Theaetetus41 where the famous view of Heraclitus is explained. Ficino's wording, associated with Heraclitus's philosophy, suggests that we cannot enter twice in the same waters, but we can enter twice in the same river. The river will be the same while the waters will have changed. According to Daniel W. Graham's interpretation of the passages A6, B12, B49a and B91a from Heraclitus, some things can remain the same while changing. Had the water of the river not changed, it would no longer be a river, but a lake.42 This interpretation leads us to a more careful reading, which demonstrates that not only does Ficino base his wordings on Plato's Cratylus, but also on Aristotle's Metaphysics.43 Initially, Ficino differs from Plato's Cratylus not only in the syntax, but also in what refers to the water of the river and not to the river itself. Plato uses the optative mood, namely potential optative, which indicates the possible. Conversely, Aristotle chooses a syntax – verb and infinitive – where absolute certainty is highlighted. Ficino follows Aristotle's syntax (non possumus bis intrare). In his own version, Aristotle argues that, according to the fifth-century philosopher Cratylus, you cannot enter even once into the same river, while Plato, in the dialogue Cratylus, holds that you cannot enter into the same river twice, 34 FICINUS. Theologia Platonica, XI.4.15. 35 PLATO. Cratylus, 402a8–10: Λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι "πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει," καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς "δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης". 36 FICINUS. Theologia Platonica, XI.6.4 37 FICINO, Platonic Theology, vol. III, p. 301. 38 PLUTARCHUS. De E apud Delphos, 392b7–c1: ποταμῷ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ' καθ' Ἡράκλειτον οὐδὲ θνητῆς οὐσίας δὶς ἅψασθαι κατὰ ἕξιν* ἀλλ' ὀξύτητι καὶ τάχει μεταβολῆς 'σκίδνησι καὶ πάλιν συνάγει', μᾶλλον δ' οὐδὲ πάλιν οὐδ' ὕστερον ἀλλ' ἅμα συνίσταται καὶ ἀπολείπει καὶ 'πρόσεισι καὶ ἄπεισιν. 39 PROCLUS. In Platonis Cratylum commentaria, 142.1–11. 40 PLATO. Cratylus, 402a8–10. 41 PLATO. Thaetetus, 160d6–8: κατὰ μὲν Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φῦλον οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα. 42 DANIEL W. GRAHAM, « Heraclitus », The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/heraclitus/> (Accessed October 2018). 43 ARISTOTELES. Metaphysica, 1010a13–15: ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον, καὶ Ἡρακλείτῳ ἐπετίμα εἰπόντι ὅτι δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι* αὐτὸς γὰρ ᾤετο οὐδ' ἅπαξ. Georgios Steiris 66 without making reference to the water of the river. Ficino copies the syntax of Aristotle, but departs conceptually from both Aristotle and Plato. Plutarch, whom Ficino mentions, also follows the syntax of Aristotle.44 Moreover, a byzantine Scholion in Plutarchum follows the interpretation of Heraclitus's quote, according to which we cannot enter twice the same river.45 It is worth noting that Ficino's view is in agreement with the author of the Scholion in Georgium Pachymerem, who claims that, according to Heraclitus, we cannot put our finger twice into the same water of a river.46 Thomas Aquinas, from his part, supports that « Heraclitus dixit quod non est possibile aquam fluvii currentis bis tangere ».47 Furthermore, in his Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics Aquinas presents a slightly different version of the Heraclitean quote, which lies closer to the Ficinian version: « non potest homo bis intrare in eodem flumine, quia antequam intret secondo, aqua quae erat fluminis iam defluxerat ».48 In the fourteenth century, also Petrarch comments on Heraclitus passage. His translation is: « in ipsum flumen bis descendimus et non descendimus ». Petrarch resorts to Seneca's comments in order to hold that the river is the same, while the water has changed.49 Several scholars50 think it is very likely that Aristotle's variation, the syntax of which Ficino follows, is not necessarily based on the version of Plato's Cratylus; rather, it is based on the same source of the version of Arius Didymus, a Stoic philosopher of the first century BC, as it was delivered to us by Eusebius (260/65– 339/40) in Evangelical Preparation.51 The Platonic version of the sentence indicates that the river is not the same for two consecutive moments and everything in nature resembles the river, since everything is in constantly flux. In the wording of Arius Didymus, the river is the same, but different. The wording of Arius Didymus is consistent with other passages from Heraclitus where the philosopher supports the concurrence of opposites. However, even from a literature point of view, the version of Arius Didymus seems more authentic. The versions of Plato and Arius Didymus lead to the conclusion that Heraclitus meant that the world remains the same while its constituent parts change incessantly.52 44 PLUTARCHUS. De E apud Delphos, 392b8: "ποταμῷ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ" καθ' Ἡράκλειτον. 45 MOURAVIEV, Héraclite, p. 884. 46 Ibid., p. 889. 47 THOMAS DE AQUINO. Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 84, art. 1 and 3. 48 ID. In Arist. Metaph. Expos. IV.12, 684. 49 MOURAVIEV, Héraclite, p. 945–948. 50 KIRK, Heraclitus, p. 366–384; LEONARDO TARÁN, « Heraclitus: The River Fragments and Their Implications », Elenchos, 20 (1999), p. 9–52. 51 DK12 B12: ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἐμβαίνουσιν ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ. 52 BARNES, The Presocratic, p. 49–52; FRANCESCO FRONTEROTTA, « Heraclitus, the Becoming and the Platonic-Aristotelian Doxography », Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental, 15 (2015), p. 117–128; DANIEL W. GRAHAM, « Heraclitus: Flux, Order, and Knowledge », in Searching for the Routes of Philosophy 67 From his side, Ficino argues that, within temporality, the heavens continue moving forward without stopping although the super-celestials remain unchanged in their eternity. According to Ficino, since the heavenly order does not remain constant, the same phenomenon is observed with a greater intensity in the sublunary world under the influence of the heavens. Consequently, the location of the body can never remain exactly the same or similar as time goes by. Therefore, one quality said to exist, could at the same time been said not to exist. It switches instantly from non-being to non-being. Since time is running faster than language and thought, at the time when something is said, it exists and does not exist. Therefore, change and becoming, in the manner described above, seem to actually exist and not exist. The rest of Ficino's argument proves that the Italian philosopher deals with the views of the philosopher Cratylus, whose interpretation Aristotle reproduces in his Metaphysics. The former had argued that the continuous flow was associated also with the language that made communication difficult.53 In other words, Cratylus did endorse an early form of skepticism, which Ficino does not seem to accept. It is clear then that Cratylus's view misinterprets and distorts Heraclitus's philosophy. In fact, Ficino approaches, without probably realizing it, the deeper meaning of the philosophy of Heraclitus who does not challenge the senses at any point in the rest of his surviving or attributable work; rather, he considers their cooperation with the mind as necessary for the formation of knowledge. Heraclitus appears to argue that he prefers what is learnt by sight and hearing, and that people, who seek wisdom, must investigate many things.54 Human experience cannot be exceeded.55 In reality, Ficino distances himself, on this point, from Plato's reading of Heraclitus's philosophy in the Cratylus. Ficino is closer, than anyone before him, to the authentic and unmediated ontology of the Ephesian. Heraclitus argued that everything is an eternal fire and everything ends up in fire through visible but not real changes, as demonstrated by Jonathan Barnes.56 The world as a whole is a huge PATRICIA CURD, DANIEL W. GRAHAM (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy, Oxford University Press, New York 2008, p. 169–188; MARY M. MACKENZIE, « Heraclitus and the Art of Paradox », in JULIA ANNAS (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. VI, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1988, p. 1–37; DAVID G. STERN, « Heraclitus' and Wittgenstein's River Images: Stepping Twice into the Same River », The Monist, 74 (1991), p. 579–604. 53 PLATO. Cratylus, 435d–440e; BRIAN CALVERT, « Forms and Flux in Plato's Cratylus », Phronesis, 15 (1970), p. 26–47; BERNARD WILLIAMS, « Cratylus' theory of names and its refutation », in MALCOM SCHOFIELD, MARTHA NUSSBAUM (eds.), Language and Logos, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009, p. 83–93. 54 DK12 B35. 55 DK12 B3, B102; EDWARD HUSSEY, « Heraclitus », in ANTHONY A. LONG (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999 (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy), p. 93–94. 56 BARNES, The Presocratic, p. 45–48. Georgios Steiris 68 fire whose parts are switched on, while others respectively are switched off, such as the entire fire does not burn simultaneously.57 Not only does the fire ensure the contrast of the opposites, but it also ensures their unity through competition. The other cosmic composing elements, namely water, air, the ethereal fire and earth, are considered as forms of fire – πυρός τροπαί – as Heraclitus puts it.58 In De Caelo, Aristotle expresses in the strongest possible way Heraclitus's view that, while other things are in the process of creation and flow and no one subsists in one specific way, only one thing continues to exist as a substrate and all the other things undergo its natural reconstitution.59 Logos never changes; it is eternal because changes do not disrupt the overall ratio, and the Logos is closely related to the fire. Across the range of secular change, one quantity of equivalent fire remains continually alive. Heraclitus tried to discern the way with which people perceive things by their true nature; Ficino attempted to do exactly the same. III Furthermore, Ficino dealt with the life of Heraclitus.60 Namely, he asserted that Heraclitus, like many other great philosophers, had tendencies of seclusion. In particular, he abandoned civic life due to the intensity of his study. Ficino presented his own version of the story, which is entirely different from that of Diogenes Laertius whose work is the most important and extensive source available about Heraclitus's life and philosophical teachings. Diogenes Laertius explains his departure because of his aversion of the politically organized life in Ephesus and of people in general.61 Ficino deliberately misinterprets Diogenes Laertius's report in order to support his general argument on the Greek philosophers and their aversion to the material life. I could argue that Ficino interprets Heraclitus in correspondence to the testimonies of Neoplatonists from the life of Plotinus and other proponents of this stream. 57 DK12 B30. 58 DK12 B31, B90; RICHARD NEELS, « Elements and Opposites in Heraclitus », Apeiron, 4 (2018), Retrieved 18 Oct. 2018, from doi:10.1515/apeiron-2017-0029. 59 ARISTOTELES. De caelo, 298b29–32: Οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα γίνεσθαί φασι καὶ ῥεῖν, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐθέν, ἓν δέ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν* ὅπερ ἐοίκασι βούλεσθαι λέγειν ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος. 60 FICINUS. Theologia Platonica, XIII.2.2. 61 DIOGENES LAERTIUS. Vitae Philosophorum, 9.3: κεκρατῆσθαι τῇ πονηρᾷ πολιτείᾳ τὴν πόλιν. ἀναχωρήσας δ' εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος μετὰ τῶν παίδων ἠστραγάλιζε* περιστάντων δ' αὐτὸν τῶν Ἐφεσίων, "τί, ὦ κάκιστοι, θαυμάζετε;", εἶπεν* "ἢ οὐ κρεῖττον τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν πολιτεύεσθαι;" Καὶ τέλος μισανθρωπήσας καὶ ἐκπατήσας ἐν τοῖς ὄρεσι διῃτᾶτο, πόας σιτούμενος καὶ βοτάνας. καὶ μέντοι καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περιτραπεὶς εἰς ὕδερον κατῆλθεν εἰς ἄστυ καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν αἰνιγματωδῶς ἐπυνθάνετο εἰ δύναιντο ἐξ ἐπομβρίας αὐχμὸν ποιῆσαι* τῶν δὲ μὴ συνιέντων, αὑτὸν εἰς βούστασιν κατορύξας τῇ τῶν βολίτων ἀλέᾳ ἤλπισεν ἐξατμισθήσεσθαι. οὐδὲν δ' ἀνύων οὐδ' οὕτως, ἐτελεύτα βιοὺς ἔτη ἑξήκοντα. Searching for the Routes of Philosophy 69 Moreover, Ficino argues that many people who excel in some art are melancholic by their nature, like Heraclitus, Aristotle and Chryssipus or they become so, like Democritus, Zeno of Citium, Avempace the Arab and Averroes.62 Ficino's source is a passage from Diogenes Laertius.63 It is clear that Ficino misinterprets once more. Following Aristotle's interpretation of the word melancholy, Theophrastus does not grant it the meaning intended by Ficino.64 When referring to melancholy, Aristotle and Theophrastus mean impulsivity, which Heraclitus understood as such.65 IV In conclusion, it is worth noting that Ficino resorted to Heraclitus in order to renew and enrich his philosophy. In this endeavor, he resorted mainly to Neoplatonic commentaries and Diogenes Laertius. His predilection for Hermias's version of the Heraclitean passage on the soul is indicative. Furthermore, Ficino interpreted the philosophy of Heraclitus through a Neoplatonic lens, because he wished to have his Platonism vindicated. He used the Presocratics as authority, as sages of the ancient world who confirmed his philosophy, something that exuded a strong flavor of Platonism and Neoplatonism. As a result, Ficino's philosophical insights on Heraclitus are partial as he missed the chance to evaluate Heraclitus's thought per se. Although Ficino had the opportunity to examine in depth ancient philosophical traditions and offer new interpretations that would have advance philosophical discussions, – as it is demonstrated by his comments on Heraclitus and Cratylus – he was not always interested in such an endeavor. Going as far as justifying his own Platonism through authority of the Presocratics was more than enough for him. Pico della Mirandola would only come later to make the first attempts to incorporate Presocratic thought in a concrete philosophy. 62 FICINUS. Theologia Platonica, XIV.10.5; Ficino commented on Heraclitus's alleged melancholy also in his letters (cf. LEPAGE, The Revival, p. 106–107). 63 DIOGENES LAERTIUS. Vitae Philosophorum, 9.6.4–9: τοῦτον δὲ καὶ ὁ Τίμων ὑπογράφει λέγων τοῖς δ' ἔνι κοκκυστής, ὀχλολοίδορος Ἡράκλειτος, αἰνικτὴς ἀνόρουσε. Θεόφραστος δέ φησιν ὑπὸ μελαγχολίας τὰ μὲν ἡμιτελῆ, τὰ δ'ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἔχοντα γράψαι. 64 JAMES HANKINS, « 'Major Melancholy': Ficino and the Physiological Cause of Atheism », Rinascimento, 47 (2007), p. 3–23. 65 ARISTOTELES. Ethica Nicomachea, 1150b25. Georgios Steiris 70 Bibliography Aristoteles, De anima, ed. William David Ross, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1961 (repr. 1967). - Du ciel, ed. Paul Moraux, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1965 (Collection des universités de France). - Ethica Nicomachea, ed. Ingram Bywater, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1894 (repr. 1962). - Metaphysics, 2 vols., Clarendon Press, Oxford 1924 (repr. 1970 [of 1953 corr. edn.]). - Physics Book VIII, ed. Daniel W. Graham, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1999. M. Tullius Cicero, De finibus bonorum et malorum libri quinque, ed. Leighton D. Reynolds, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998 (Scriptorum classicorum bibliotheca Oxoniensis). Clément d'Alexandrie, Le pédagogue, ed. Harl, Marguerite, Marrou, Henri-Irénée, Matray, Chantai and Mondésert, Claude (eds.), 3 vols., Éditions du Cerf, Paris 1960– 1970 (Sources chrétiennes, 70, 108, 158). Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, De divinis nominibus, ed. Beate Regina Suchla, de Gruyter, Berlin 1990 (Patristische Texte und Studien 33). Heraclitus, Fragments. A Text and Translation with a Commentary, ed. Thomas M. Robinson, University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1991. Hermias Alexandrinus, In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia, ed. Carlo M. Lucarini, Claudio Moreschini, de Gruyter, Berlin: 2012 (Bibliotheca scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana, 2010). Marsilius Ficinus, Liber de sole et lumine, Antonio di Bartolommeo Miscomini, Florence 1493. - Platonic Theology, ed. James Hankins and trans. Michael J. B. Allen, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 2001. - Three Books on Life, I.5, ed. Carol V. Kaske, John R. Clark, Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, Tempe, AZ 1998 (Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 57). Plato, Cratylus, in Platonis opera, ed. John Burnet, vol. I, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1900 (repr. 1967). - Thaetetus, in Platonis opera, ed. John Burnet, vol. I, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1900 (repr. 1967). Searching for the Routes of Philosophy 71 Plutarchus, De E apud Delphos, in Plutarchi moralia, ed. Wilhelm Sieveking, vol. III, Teubner, Leipzig 1929 (repr. 1972). Proclus Diadochus, In Platonis Cratylum commentaria, ed. Giorgio Pasquali, Teubner, Leipzig 1908. Thomas de Aquino Opera omnia iussu impensaque Leonis XIII P. M. edita, vol. IV–V: Pars prima Summae theologiae, ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide, Romae, 1888–1889. - In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, ed. Marie-Raymond Cathala, Raimondo. M. Spiazzi, Marietti, Torino, 19712. Modern Authors (after 1789) Allen, Michael J. B., « Two commentaries on the Phaedrus: Ficino's indebtedness to Hermias», Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 43 (1980), p. 110–129. - « The Soul as Rhapsode: Marsilio Ficino's Interpretation of Plato's Ion », in John W. O'Malley, Thomas M. Izbicki, Gerald Christianson (eds.), Humanity and Divinity in Renaissance and Reformation: Essays in Honor of Charles Trinkaus, Brill, Leiden 1993 (Studies in the History of Christian Thought, 51), p. 125–148. - « Pythagoras in the Early Renaissance », in Carl A. Huffman (ed.), A History of Pythagoreanism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014, p. 435–453. Barnes, Jonathan, The Presocratic Philosophers, Routledge, London–New York 1982. Blankert, Albert, « Heraclitus en Democritus bij Marsilio Ficino », Simiolus: Netherlands Quarterly for the History of Art, 1/3 (1966–1967), p. 128–135. Betegh, Gabor, « On the Physical Aspect of Heraclitus' Psychology », Phronesis, 52 (2007), p. 3–32. Calvert, Brian, « Forms and Flux in Plato's Cratylus », Phronesis, 15 (1970), p. 26–47. Celenza, Christopher, Piety and Pythagoras in Renaissance Florence: The Symbolum Nesianum, Brill, Leiden 2001 (Studies in the history of Christian thought, 101). Christidis, Theodoros, Demetrius Athanassakis, « On Heraclitus' Concept of λόγοϛ », Philosophical Inquiry, 32 (2010), p. 61–71. Diels, Hermann, Walther Kranz (eds.), Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker griechisch und deutsch, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, Berlin 1903. Drozdek, Adam, Greek Philosophers as Theologians: The Divine Arche, Ashgate, Aldershot 2007. Georgios Steiris 72 English, Robert B., « Heraclitus and the Soul », Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association, 44 (1913), p. 163–184. Finkelberg, Aryeh, Heraclitus and Thales' Conceptual Scheme: A Historical Study, Brill, Leiden–Boston 2017 (Jerusalem Studies in Religion and Culture, 23). Fronterotta, Francesco, « Heraclitus, the Becoming and the Platonic-Aristotelian Doxography », Archai: Revista de Estudos Sobre as Origens Do Pensamento Ocidental, 15 (2015), p. 117–128. Garin, Eugenio, « The Philosopher and the Magus », in Eugenio Garin (ed.), Renaissance Characters, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1991, p. 123–153. Graham, Daniel W., « Heraclitus: Flux, Order, and Knowledge », in PATRICIA CURD, DANIEL W. GRAHAM (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Presocratic Philosophy, Oxford University Press, New York 2008, p. 169–188. Graham, Daniel W., « Heraclitus », The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), E. N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011 /entries/heraclitus/> (Accessed October 2018). Hankins, James, « 'Major Melancholy': Ficino and the Physiological Cause of Atheism », Rinascimento, 47 (2007), p. 3–23. Hussey, Edward, « Heraclitus », in Anthony A. Long (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999 (Cambridge Companions to Philosophy), p. 93–94. Idel, Moshe, « Prisca Theologia in Marsilio Ficino and some Jewish Treatments », in Michael J. B. Allen, Valery Rees, Martin Davies (eds.), Marsilio Ficino: His Theology, His Philosophy, His Legacy, Brill, Leiden–Boston–Köln 2002 (Brill's studies in intellectual history, 108), P. 137–158. Johnstone, Mark, « On 'Logos' in Heraclitus », in Brad Inwood (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. XLVII, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2014, p. 1–29. Kahn, Charles H., The Art and Though of Heraclitus, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1981. Kirk, Geoffrey S., Heraclitus: The Cosmic Fragments, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1954. Kirk, Geoffrey S., John E. Raven, Malcom Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995. Kleinbub, Christian K., Vision and the Visionary in Raphael,: Penn State Press, University Park, PA 2011. Searching for the Routes of Philosophy 73 Kristeller, Paul O., Marsilio Ficino and His Work after Five Hundred Years, Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1987 (Istituto nazionale di studi sul Rinascimento. Quaderni di Rinascimento, 7). Lepage, John L., The Revival of Antique Philosophy in the Renaissance, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2012. Long, Herbert Strainge (ed.), Diogenis Laertii vitae philosophorum, 2 vols, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964 (repr. 1966), 1:1–246; 2:247–565. Macdonald, Paul S., History of the Concept of Mind, vol. I: Speculations About Soul, Mind and Spirit from Homer to Hume, Routledge, Abington 2017. Mackenzie, Mary M., « Heraclitus and the Art of Paradox », in JULIA ANNAS (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. VI, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1988, p. 1–37. Mansfeld, Jaap, « On Two Fragments of Heraclitus in Clement of Alexandria », Mnemosyne, 37 (1984), p. 447–451. McKirahan, Richard D., Philosophy Before Socrates: An Introduction with Texts and Commentary, Hackett Publishing, Indianapolis–Cambridge 2011. Most, Glenn, « What Ancient Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry? », in Pierre Destrée, Fritz-Gregor Herrmann (eds.), Plato and the Poets, Brill, Leiden 2011 (Mnemosyne. Supplementum, 328), p. 1–20. Mouraviev, Serge, Héraclite d'Éphèse. La tradition antique et médiévale, vol. IV: De Maxime le Confesseur à Marsile Ficin, Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin 2003 (Heraclitea. 2: Traditio. A. Témoignages et citations). Mourelatos, Alexander, The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2014. Neels, Richard, « Elements and Opposites in Heraclitus », Apeiron, 4 (2018), Retrieved 18 Oct. 2018, from doi:10.1515/apeiron-2017-0029. Nussbaum, Martha, « Psychê in Heraclitus », Phronesis, 17 (1972), p. 1–16, 153–70. Polansky, Ronald, Aristotle's De Anima: A Critical Commentary, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007. Robb, Kevin, « Psyche and Logos in the Fragments of Heraclitus », The Monist, 69 (1986), p. 315–351. Robichaud, Denis J.-J., Plato's Persona: Marsilio Ficino, Renaissance Humanism, and Platonic Traditions, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2018. Robinson, Thomas M., « Heraclitus on Soul », The Monist, 69 (1986), p. 305–314. Georgios Steiris 74 - « Heraclitus and Logos – again », ΣΧΟΛΗ: Ancient Philosophy and The Classical Tradition, 7 (2013), p. 318–326. Saudelli, Lucia, « Lux sicca Marsile Ficin exegete d'Héraclite », Accademia, 10 (2008), p. 29–42. Sheppard, Anne, « The Influence of Hermias on Marsilio Ficino's Doctrine of Inspiration », Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes, 43 (1980), p. 97–109. Stamatelos, Giannis, Plotinus and the Presocratics: A Philosophical Study of Presocratic Influences in Plotinus' Enneads, State University of New York Press, Albany 2012 (SUNY Series in Ancient Greek Philosophy). Stern, David G., « Heraclitus' and Wittgenstein's River Images: Stepping Twice into the Same River », The Monist, 74 (1991), p. 579–604. Tarán, Leonardo, « Heraclitus: The River Fragments and Their Implications », Elenchos, 20 (1999), p. 9–52. Walker, Daniel P., « Prisca Theologia e Philosophia Perennis: Due temi del Rinascimento italiano e loro fortuna », in Giovannangiola Tarugi (ed.), Il pensiero italiano di Rinascimento e il tempo nostro. Atti del V Convegno internazionale del Centro di studi umanistici. Montepulciano 8–13 agosto 1968, Leo S. Olschki, Firenze 1970, p. 211– 236. Williams, Bernard, « Cratylus' theory of names and its refutation », in Malcom Schofield, Martha Nussbaum (eds.), Language and Logos, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009, p. 83–93.

chapter 3 Are facts about matter primitive? Jessica Gelber In his biological treatises, Aristotle often appeals to some feature of an organism's body in order to explain why it has some other attribute. For example, in Generation of Animals ii.1 Aristotle appeals to variations in degrees of heat, dryness, and fluidity to explain variations in modes of reproduction – why some animals are livebearers and others are egg-producers. He says that some animals produce "complete" offspring because they are hotter (thermotera) and more fluid (hugrotera) (732b31–32), whereas other animals produce only "incomplete" eggs since they are either colder (psuchrotera) and more fluid, or hotter but drier (xêrotera) (733a4–6). In such contexts, Aristotle treats those bodily features as the primary explanantia of the relevant explananda. That Aristotle treats certain bodily features – what I will call "facts about matter"1 – as explanantia in particular explanatory contexts is relatively uncontroversial. Recently, however, scholars have been claiming not only that Aristotle uses such facts about matter as explanantia in particular explanatory contexts, but also that Aristotle considers those facts to be unexplained.2 A kind's possession of a certain bodily constitution, for 1 I have some reservations about calling these facts about matter, since I do not think that all of Aristotle's references to elemental forces such as heat and cold are references to the matter of a living organism, if this is understood as that "out of which" its body parts are formed (as, e.g., Ebrey understands it in this volume). I will overlook this for the purposes of this discussion, however. Following those scholars whose claims I am disputing, I will call such features as heat and cold "material" features. 2 For instance, D. Charles claims that Aristotle "takes as basic" (2000: 334) and treats as "brute physical facts" (ibid.: 335) the differences in degrees of heat and fluidity in fish. According to J. Lennox, there are "certain material facts about certain kinds of animals that are as explanatorily primitive as are other facts about their living functions" (2001c: 183), and that, in particular, "the amount and kind of elementally distinct materials available in the nutritional make-up of animals is taken as a given" (ibid.: 186). A. Gotthelf claims that the fact that lunged organisms have a high degree of heat is, for Aristotle, "explanatorily fundamental" and not "explained in terms of anything more basic about these animals" (1985: 54, n. 24). In the same vein, D. Henry (2008: 59) and M. Leunissen (2010: 97) speak of an organism's material nature making contributions "independently" of the actions of its formal nature. I gather that their thought is that the material nature of a kind not only makes 46 use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295155.003 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Pittsburgh, on 31 Oct 2017 at 19:27:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of Are facts about matter primitive? 47 instance, is said to be "explanatorily primitive" in that (1) the bodily constitution is appealed to in explaining other features of the kind and (2) there is no explanation for why the kind has that particular bodily constitution.3 Not every attribute that functions as a starting point in some particular explanatory context is an unexplained or primitive one, of course. For example, we might appeal to the nature of iron to explain why axe blades rust. But that does not entail that it is a primitive fact – one that is not itself explained – that axe blades are made of iron. So, the fact that Aristotle appeals to bodily features (such as temperature or humidity) to explain why a kind of organism has some other attribute (such as its mode of reproduction) does not alone entail that he considers the possession of those bodily features to be primitive. Yet, if Aristotle thinks there is an explanation for the presence of those bodily features, one would hope that he would indicate what that is. And in these specific cases, he does not. Given Aristotle's silence, it is reasonable to conclude that these facts are indeed primitive. It would be problematic, however, if this were Aristotle's view. First, the idea that facts about matter are "as explanatorily primitive" as facts about soul would constitute a radical departure from views that Aristotle expresses elsewhere. There is some consensus, at any rate, that Aristotle considers explanatory primitiveness – that is, something's explaining other facts but not itself being explained by anything else – to be a guide to essence.4 However, if an organism's matter were part of its essence, this would be in tension with Aristotle's claim in de Anima that soul, not body, is an organism's essence.5 Second, the idea that facts about a kind's matter or bodily features are "on the same level"6 as facts about its form or soul conflicts with the positive contributions, but that these contributions are completely "independent" of form in the sense that the presence of the matter is not explained or caused by form. If the form explained why that matter is present, matter would not be contributing independently, but rather would be dependent on form. 3 See D. Henry (2013: esp. 238–39 and n. 25) for a clear statement of this view. 4 The connection between explanatory primitiveness and essence is, for example, the subject of the investigation in Charles (2000). As Gotthelf puts the idea, unexplained features are "prime candidates for being part of the essence of the animal in question" (1985: 29). This same assumption is implicit in phrases such as "explanatorily fundamental and thus parts of the ousia" (ibid.: 53, n. 20) and "explanatorily basic and thus essential" (Gotthelf 1997 [2012]: 86). See also Lennox (2001c: 202): "If Aristotle is inclined to decide what is in the account of a thing's being on the basis of explanatory primitiveness, and if he is willing, in natural science, to include matter in definitions, then we could expect that being blooded or being bloodless would indeed be in the substantial being of animals identified at a sufficiently general level." 5 DA ii.1, 412b11–13; DA ii.4, 415b8–12. 6 Charles (2000: 340): "Degrees of heat are taken as explanatory givens on the same level as soul functions, pattern of movement, or being a land animal." use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295155.003 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Pittsburgh, on 31 Oct 2017 at 19:27:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of 48 jessica gelber programmatic remarks Aristotle makes within his biological treatises. On the basis of the introductory book of Parts of Animals, for example, it is natural to suppose that facts about a kind's matter are going to be explained by facts about the kind's soul: Since every instrument is for the sake of something, and each of the parts of the body is for the sake of something, and that for whose sake they are is some activity, it is clear that the composite body, too, is constituted for the sake of some complex activity. For, sawing has not come to be for the sake of the saw, but the saw for the sake of sawing; for sawing is a certain use. So, also, the body is in a way for the sake of the soul, and the parts for the sake of the functions for which each has naturally developed. (PA 1.5, 645b14–20)7 Rather than indicating that facts about a kind's body or matter are primitive, Aristotle appears to say that facts about a kind's body depend on facts about the kind's soul: The body as a whole, as well as each of the parts of the body, naturally develop for the sake of the psychic functions they are used to perform. So, one expects that in the biological explanations that follow, facts about the form or soul – an organism's psychic capacities and functions – will have explanatory priority over facts about its body. But according to several scholars, this is not what we find. In response to this, we might simply give up hope of finding consistency between Aristotle's theoretical commitments, as traditionally understood, and his scientific practices. We might conclude that the results of empirical research led to the demise of Aristotle's "brilliant research programme."8 However, I do not think we need to conclude this. Instead, I here offer three reasons to doubt that Aristotle treats facts about matter – in particular, facts about degrees of heat, dryness, fluidity, etc. – as explanatorily primitive. First, there is evidence that those putative unexplained facts about degrees of heat, dryness, fluidity, etc. are, in fact, explained. Second, there are certain cases, such as human intelligence, where Aristotle seems to think there is a causal explanation proceeding from facts about matter, but which we have good reason to doubt are intended as proceeding from a primitive fact. Third, the idea that facts about matter are as explanatorily primitive as facts about form requires a particular conception of the causal processes that the explanations mirror. But this conception of the causal 7 Cf. PA 1.1, 642a9–13: For, just as it is necessary that an axe be hard, since it needs to cleave, and if hard, made of bronze or iron, so also – since the body is an instrument (for, each of the parts is for the sake of something, and so likewise the whole) – it must be like this and made out of these materials, if that [for the sake of which they are] is to be. 8 Charles (2000: 336). use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295155.003 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Pittsburgh, on 31 Oct 2017 at 19:27:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of Are facts about matter primitive? 49 processes conflicts with the way Aristotle characterizes them. In Generation of Animals, for example, heat is not treated as a causal factor that works "independently" of soul, but is subservient to soul. In my view, these three considerations provide compelling reason to reject the claim that Aristotle's biology treats facts about matter as primitive. Hot, cold, earthy, and fluid natures When Aristotle talks about a type of organism's matter, he is sometimes talking about its body, in contrast to its soul. Other times, he describes the parts of which the whole body is composed as the matter. Those body parts, moreover, are discussed at three levels of generality. There are the "non-uniform" parts, such as limbs and organs, the "uniform" parts, such as flesh and bone that the limbs and organs are made out of, and the elemental potentials that make up the latter. For instance, at the beginning of GA Aristotle puts the point as follows: . . . and the matter in animals is the parts, the non-uniform parts [are the matter] for every whole [animal], the uniform parts [are the matter] for the non-uniform, and the so-called elements of the bodies [are the matter] for these. (GA i.1, 715a9–11)9 Not only the body as a whole, but also the non-uniform limbs and organs, the tissues, bone, and other uniform parts those are made of, and the elemental bodies (or, more precisely, the elemental powers) are considered by Aristotle to be an organism's matter. Here I will focus on matter at that lowest level, the bodily blend or krasis of elemental powers in an organism's blood (or the analogous substance in non-blooded organisms). I will focus on matter at this level because it is the strongest candidate for being a primitive fact about matter. For, as the lowest level of composition, the elemental powers are the matter out of which the primary uniform part, blood (or the analogous substance in bloodless animals), is composed. Since blood is constituted by a particular combination of elemental powers, differences in blood are due to differences in the proportions of the elemental powers composing it, that is, by its krasis. For instance, blood can be more fluid 9 Cf. PA ii.1, 646a12–24 (Lennox trans.): Since there are three compositions, one might put first composition from what some people call the elements, e.g., earth, air, water, and fire. And yet, perhaps it is better to speak of composition from the potentials . . . That is, moist, dry, hot, and cold are the matter of the composite bodies . . . Second is the composition of the nature of the uniform parts within the animal – e.g., of bone, flesh, and the other things of this sort – out of the primary things. Third and last in the series is the composition of the nature of the non-uniform parts – e.g., of face, hand, and such parts. use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295155.003 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Pittsburgh, on 31 Oct 2017 at 19:27:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of 50 jessica gelber or more solid, hotter or less hot, depending on its proportion of elemental powers. Blood, moreover, is the matter and nourishment for the rest of the parts,10 and thus blood (or the analogous uniform part in bloodless organisms) is said to be the cause of many other features. The nature of the blood is the cause of many features of animals with respect to both character and perception, as is reasonable, since blood is the matter of the entire body; for nourishment is matter, and blood is the last stage of nourishment. It therefore makes a great difference whether it is hot or cold, thin or thick, turbid or pure. (PA ii.4, 651a12–17) In Aristotle's view, characteristics such as the "heaviness, lightness, density, rarity, roughness, and smoothness" of parts and limbs (PA ii.1, 646a18– 20) "follow from" the particular krasis that makes up the blood and so determines its quality. More earthy blood will give rise to parts that are, for instance, rougher rather than smooth.11 In addition, krasis of blood is correlated with character traits (ethê). For example, Aristotle says that timid animals have excessively watery blood, whereas organisms with more earthy blood are more passionate (PA ii.4, 650b27 ff ). Further, there is some indication that Aristotle thinks krasis determines what kind of food an organism eats, or at least what it finds pleasant (HA vii[ viii].2, 589a8–9; 590a10–11).12 A kind's krasis, then, is identified by Aristotle as a cause of many other attributes of the kind. Characteristics such as skin texture, aspects of the kind's character, and phenomena constitutive of the kind's life (such as its mode of reproduction) all appear to be due to the particular krasis of blood that organisms of that kind have. Is a kind's possession of a particular krasis of blood a primitive, unexplained fact about the kind? If one accepts the following principle, the answer is no: P: If X is said to be present for the sake of Y, then X's presence is explained by Y. Aristotle's views about explanation are complex, but I think it is safe to assume that he thinks that one explains why something is the case by citing causes. And, famously, Aristotle recognizes "that for the sake of which" as a type of cause. Given this, it follows that to cite the purpose for which 10 PA ii.3, 650b2–3, b12–13: "It is, then, apparent from these and like considerations that blood is present in blooded animals for the sake of nourishment . . . blood is for the sake of nourishment, i.e. the nourishment of the parts." 11 See PA ii.9, 655a26–28 with iv.13, 697a7–9 on the selachian's rough skin. 12 See also the various remarks about the connection between krasis and an organism's way of life in vii[ viii].2. use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295155.003 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Pittsburgh, on 31 Oct 2017 at 19:27:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of Are facts about matter primitive? 51 something is the case is, for Aristotle, to render that thing at least partially explained.13 Assuming that Aristotle is committed to P, then the discussion of the levels of composition in PA ii.1 is evidence that a kind's krasis of blood is not, for Aristotle, explanatorily primitive. For, Aristotle explicitly says there that a kind's krasis is for the sake of something. Thus the matter of the elements is necessary for the sake of the uniform parts, since these are later in generation than the elements, and later than the uniform parts are the non-uniform parts. (PA ii.1, 646b5–8 (Lennox trans.)) Let me state very briefly what I take Aristotle to be saying in the surrounding context. The highest of the three levels of material composition of living bodies – the instrumental, non-uniform parts such as eyes and hands – have functions. And it is for the sake of performing those functions that they are present in an organism. For instance, birds have wings because they are flyers, since wings are the instruments required for flying (PA iv.12, 693b11–13). And sensory organs are present because they are required for performing perceptual activities. Flesh, for instance, is the organ of the primary sense – touch – that animals must have since they are by definition perceptive living things (PA ii.8, 653b22–24).14 Most variations,15 such as variations in size or quality of the instrumental parts and sensory organs, are explained by the functional needs of the particular kind of organism.16 For instance, some birds (such as the carnivores 13 I say "at least partially" because Aristotle says at APo. ii.11, 94a20–27 that one should give demonstrations "through" each of the four causes to fully explain something. I cannot address here the complicated issues about Aristotle's conception of explanation. It is sufficient for my purposes to note that there is a difference between cases in which there is a demonstration through some cause or other, and cases in which there simply is no cause to cite and so no demonstration to give, for example, in the case of indemonstrable statements of essence. There will be material and efficient causal explanations of how organisms perform the activities constitutive of their essence, of course, but that does not render the fact that the organisms have those essential activities explained. That is, there is no explanation of why they have the essential activities and functions that they do. 14 It is uncertain how, exactly, Aristotle is thinking of the role that flesh plays in tactile sensation. See Lennox (2001a: 213) for a discussion of this. At any rate, it is clear that Aristotle thinks that flesh is necessary for touch, so this complication does not matter for my purposes here. 15 Two exceptions come to mind: Aristotle says that a certain octopus has a slender body and that the elephant has a large size, but does not give any explanation for these facts. The slenderness of the octopus explains its having only a single row of suckers (PA iv.9, 685b12–16), and the elephant's large size explains its having a trunk (PA ii.16, 658b33 ff ). It is not clear how Aristotle is conceiving of size or other "dimensional" features, though there is some reason to be cautious about calling these features "material" ones. In de Anima ii.4, 416a16–18 Aristotle claims that the "limit and logos of size and growth" is "of soul" and more "of account" than "of matter." 16 In other cases, differences are explained by the kind's krasis. The number of gills that a kind of fish has, for instance, is due to its degree of heat (since gills are the instruments for cooling in use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295155.003 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Pittsburgh, on 31 Oct 2017 at 19:27:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of 52 jessica gelber with crooked talons) have larger wings with plentiful feathers (PA iv.12, 693b27–694a4) because they need to be good flyers (presumably because of the way they catch their food, by chasing down rodents and grabbing them). In order to perform their functions, the instrumental parts must have certain powers or capabilities. The human hand, for instance, "needs one power (dunamis) for the action of compressing and another for that of grasping" (PA ii.1, 646b23–25). In order to have such powers, the hand must be made of appropriate uniform matter, for example, matter that has what I will call "dispositional properties" such as hardness, softness, elasticity, and flexibility.17 Uniform parts, considered as parts with certain dispositional properties, are the parts that meet the functional requirements of the non-uniform parts they compose.18 This is why the uniform parts are said to be for the sake of the non-uniform. Finally, the dispositional properties of uniform parts are brought about by particular kinds of elemental blends. As we learn in Meteorology iv, dispositional properties (called pathêmata in Meteorology) are the results of the interactions of the active powers – the hot and the cold – and the passive powers – the moist and the dry. Particular proportions of those elemental powers give rise to those dispositional properties by which uniform substances such as flesh, bone, and wood are distinguished from one another, such as solubility, solidity, and flexibility. When a particular elemental blend is the right one to bring about the uniform parts (considered water-dwellers, and so hotter ones need more gills to cool them) (PA iv.13, 696b12–23). But, again, the fact that krasis explains other features does not entail that the presence of that particular krasis is a basic, unexplained feature. 17 PA ii.1, 646b10–27: Now animals are composed out of both of these two sorts of parts, uniform and nonuniform; the former, however, are for the sake of the latter, as it is to the latter that actions and operations belong (e.g. eye, nose, the face as a whole, finger, hand, the arm as a whole). And inasmuch as the actions and movements both of an animal as a whole and of its parts are complex, the substances out of which these are composed must of necessity possess distinct dunameis. Softness is useful for some purposes, hardness for others; some parts must be able to stretch, some to bend. In the uniform parts, then, such dunameis are found apportioned out separately: one of the parts, for instance, will be soft, another hard, while one is fluid, another solid; one viscous, another brittle. In the non-uniform parts, on the other hand, these dunameis are found in combination, not singly. For example, the hand needs one dunamis for the action of compressing and another for that of grasping. Hence it is that the instrumental parts of the body are composed of bones, sinews, flesh, and the rest of them, and not the other way around. 18 Lips and nostrils, for instance, are "fleshy" (sarkina) because the dispositional features of flesh are required by the functions that lips and nostrils perform in living organisms that have them (see PA ii.16, 660a8–11). The function of lips in all animals that have them is to protect the teeth. In humans, in addition to this function, lips also help enable speech (PA ii.16, 659b30–34). The function of nostrils in organisms that have lungs is to enable breathing (PA ii.16, 659a30–31). use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295155.003 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Pittsburgh, on 31 Oct 2017 at 19:27:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of Are facts about matter primitive? 53 as parts with certain dispositional features), that blend is required by, and so present for the sake of, the presence of the uniform parts. Each level of bodily composition is said to be for the sake of the one above. The matter for the instrumental parts – the uniform parts – must have specific dispositional features appropriate to their functions. And the uniform parts, considered as parts with distinctive dispositional features, must be composed of specific elemental blends that give rise to those dispositional features. For this reason, the particular elemental composition of the blood is for the sake of the parts that come to be formed out it. Thus, if we accept principle P, Aristotle's discussion in PA ii.1 gives us grounds for thinking that a kind's krasis is not primitive. In sum, a kind's particular krasis can give rise to various features (such as hard eyelids) because of the nature of that elemental blend, and thus krasis can explain (in a given explanatory context) other features. And certain features, such as the dispositional properties that the uniform parts need to have, may come to be formed "of necessity" (as described in Meteorology iv), because the material at the lowest level of composition naturally has certain effects. But this does not make it a "brute" or "primitive" fact that an organismal kind has that particular composition or blend. It might be a brute or primitive fact that the elements have the causal powers that they do, but asking why the elements have the causal powers they do is different than asking why some particular elemental blends are present in a kind of organism's blood.19 As I understand it, Aristotle's view is that the presence of a particular krasis in an organism's blood is explained teleologically, by reference to the dispositional properties that the kind's uniform parts must have. Uniform parts must have certain dispositional properties, given the functions that the non-uniform parts they constitute must perform. If this is correct, then a kind's krasis is not a primitive, unexplained fact. Heat and human intelligence The argument offered in the last section relied on the claim that krasis is said to be for the sake of something in PA ii. According to what I called principle P, this renders the presence of the krasis explained, and not primitive. But one might deny that Aristotle is really saying that krasis is for the sake of something in the strong sense that makes P sound like a 19 On this point, see Cooper (1987: 261): "if an animal of a certain kind is to be constituted these certain amounts of certain elements must be present for use: in effect, for this creature those elements are hypothetically necessitated. But plainly that presupposes, and does nothing to explain, the natural powers of the elements concerned." use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295155.003 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Pittsburgh, on 31 Oct 2017 at 19:27:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of 54 jessica gelber plausible principle. In this section I offer a second reason for rejecting the idea that the possession of a particular krasis is primitive, which reason does not rely on the claim that krasis is for the sake of the parts formed out of it. Suppose that Aristotle thinks that a kind's krasis explains why the kind has the mode of reproduction that it does, and that there is no further explanation for the kind having that particular krasis. Suppose the possession of a particular krasis, that is, is explanatorily primitive. Now explanatory primitiveness in the sense at issue here is not relative to an explanatory context. So, if the particular krasis an organism has is being treated as a primitive fact about the kind in the explanation of its mode of reproduction, then it must also be primitive in any other explanation. Yet, some of the causal connections that Aristotle cites between a kind's krasis and other features are such that it would be surprising if krasis – as opposed to the feature that the particular krasis is causally connected to – were being treated as explanatorily primitive. Consider, for example, the connection between krasis and human rational activity: . . . in man the brain is more fluid and greater in volume than in any other animal, and the reason of this, in its turn, is that the heat in the heart is purest in man. The fineness of the blend (eukrasian) in man is shown by his possession of intellect: there is no other animal which is so intelligent. (GA ii.6, 744a26–31 (Peck trans.)) Humans, Aristotle says, have the highest degree of heat of any living organism. That we have the most heat explains, among other things, why humans alone have an upright posture. For heat promotes growth, and a profusion of blood is a sign of heat. And further, the bodies of those that are hotter are more erect, which is why mankind is the most erect of the animals. (PA iii.6, 669b3–6 (Lennox trans.)) Being able to stand upright, moreover, allows humans to engage in rational activities: Mankind, however, instead of forelimbs and forefeet has arms and what are called hands. For it alone of the animals is upright, on account of the fact that its nature and substantial being are divine; and it is a function of that which is most divine to reason (noein) and to think (phronein). But this is not easy when much of the body is pressing down from above, since the weight makes thought and common sense sluggish. (PA iv.10, 686a25–32 (Lennox trans.)) And engaging in rational activities is what distinguishes humans from other animals. Being able to do so is part of human nature, and actually doing so is our natural end or purpose (telos): use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295155.003 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Pittsburgh, on 31 Oct 2017 at 19:27:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of Are facts about matter primitive? 55 Reason (logos) and intellect (nous) are for us the goal of nature. (Pol vii.15, 1334b15)20 It is reasonable to suppose that a kind's telos, for example that the human telos is rational activity, is a primitive fact. For, what something is, essentially, and what it is for the sake of, Aristotle says, are the same.21 And what something is, essentially, has no further explanation.22 If possessing a high degree of heat were simply a primitive fact about humans, rather than something that is conditionally necessary for rational activity, then part of the essence of human beings (rational activity) and a fact about the human body's material composition (high degree of heat) would be two independent facts. That the two facts are coordinated so well – that is, that the material composition is conducive to some part of the essence – would then turn out to be due to chance. But this fortuitous coordination occurs regularly, and Aristotle denies that regularly occurring, beneficial outcomes could be merely due to chance.23 Further, it is not solely human rationality that Aristotle correlates with the krasis of a kind's blood (or the analogous substance in bloodless organism). First, differences in krasis are also linked to the intelligence and perceptive capacities of non-human organisms, such as bees: Thicker (pachuteron) and hotter blood is more productive of strength, while thinner (leptoteron) and cooler blood is more perceptive and intelligent (noerôteron).24 And the same difference obtains among the attributes analogous to blood. This is why both bees and other such animals are wiser (phronimôtera) in their nature than many blooded animals, and why among blooded animals those having cold and thin blood are wiser than their opposites. But those with hot, thin, and pure (katharon) blood are best; for such animals are at once in a good state relative to both courage and wisdom (phronêsin). (PA ii.2, 648a2–11 (Lennox trans., modified)) 20 Cf. NE x.8, 1178b21–23: "So, then, the activity of a god, superior as it is in blessedness, will be theoretical activity; and so, too, the human activity that has the greatest affinity to this one will be more productive of eudaimonia." 21 Phys. ii.7, 198a24–27. Cf. GA i.1, 715a8–9: "the logos and that for the sake of which as end are the same (tauton)." 22 Of course, how a kind achieves its telos will have a material and efficient causal explanation. But what it is does not. 23 Aristotle argues in Phys. ii.8 against an opponent of natural teleology by arguing that regularly occurring, beneficial natural phenomena cannot be due to chance, and that consequently they are finally caused. 24 I am taking references to "thick" and "thin" blood as references to blood that is drier and more fluid, respectively. In GC ii.2, 329b17–330a10, Aristotle says that thick (pachu) and thin (lepton) are 'of ' dry and fluid, respectively. What exactly this amounts to is not important for my purposes. I am solely interested in the connections drawn there between thickness and dryness, and thinness and fluidity. use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295155.003 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Pittsburgh, on 31 Oct 2017 at 19:27:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of 56 jessica gelber And heat seems to be correlated with other ways that Aristotle ranks animals: The reason why some creatures have this part, and why those having it need respiration, is that the more honorable animals have a greater proportion of heat. (de Resp. 477a14–16 (Ross trans.)) In my view, Aristotle is not ordering animals on the scale of honor or value on the basis of how much heat their bodies happen to have, as a primitive fact. If this is so, we have good reason to doubt that Aristotle considers a kind's krasis to be primitive. Tools In this section, I offer a third reason for doubting that Aristotle considers facts about matter to be primitive. In short, this reason is that in Aristotle's biological account of animal generation, the elemental powers such as heat and cold do not operate independently of, but rather are subordinate to, an organism's soul. Given that elemental powers play this subordinate causal role, I will argue, facts about matter cannot be primitive in Aristotle's biological explanations. Before arguing for this, I should emphasize that the idea that Aristotle thinks facts about matter are primitive is by no means unmotivated. For example, Aristotle claims in Physics ii.2 and PA i.1 that it is incumbent on the natural scientist to understand the matter as well as form, since both the matter and form are said to be a thing's nature. A natural scientist, Aristotle thinks, must understand the material basis for the exercise of the various vital capacities (with the exception of nous) that make up an organism's soul and essence. One cannot make sense of life and living things without understanding the nature "as matter." Aristotle also claims that natural beings are analogous to "the snub" in that they cannot be defined without reference to the matter, just as snubness cannot be defined without reference to the nose. And there are indications that Aristotle considers some bodily features to be in the being (ousia) or included in the definition (logos tês ousias) of the kind.25 When we add to all of this Aristotle's appeals to the necessary interactions of heat and cold, for instance, in explaining various features of living organisms, it is not unreasonable to think that Aristotle is treating facts about matter as explanatorily primitive. 25 Gotthelf (1985) discusses in detail the passages where some bodily feature seems to be treated as included in the essence or definition. See, however, note 15, above. use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295155.003 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Pittsburgh, on 31 Oct 2017 at 19:27:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of Are facts about matter primitive? 57 The idea that matter is explanatorily primitive, however, requires a certain picture of the causal processes that the scientific explanations mirror. On the interpretation of material facts as primitive, there are, as it were, two independent sets of explanations; some explanations proceed from form or soul, and some proceed from matter. Corresponding to those explanations that proceed from the form or formal nature there is one causal process, and corresponding to those explanations that proceed from matter is another. Proponents of the interpretation of material facts as primitive think that in addition to the goal-directed causal processes, there is also "a necessity rooted in the material nature of an animal, which constrains, and perhaps acts independently of, the actions of its formal nature."26 There is an alternative picture, however, that more accurately portrays matter's role. This alternative can accommodate the fact that the matter of a living organism is in a sense its nature, insofar as it is a source of change and rest that belongs to it non-accidentally. And this picture also allows for certain features of living organisms to be formed "of necessity" because of the interactions of the material elements. Nevertheless, this alternative does not construe matter as operating independently of form or soul, or treat the presence of matter as primitive. This is the picture that emerges in Generation of Animals. In GA, Aristotle is explaining how the efficient cause of generation (the father or the father's nature or soul) conveys the form (which he has in actuality) to the matter provided by the mother, and how the embryo is then formed. To do so, Aristotle must explain the material basis by which form is conveyed, and then how the embryo's tissues, bones, limbs, and organs are constructed. That material basis, as it turns out, is what we might think of as metabolic processes – heating and cooling – in the spermatic residues and nutritive (and growth promoting) blood.27 When Aristotle describes this process, he sometimes refers to heat and cold as the tools of soul. Elsewhere, Aristotle also describes the body as a tool of soul.28 Insofar as Aristotle is conceiving of soul as a living substance's capacities for engaging in vital activities, it is natural to understand such descriptions as indicating that the body parts are the means or instruments by which vital activities are performed, much like an artisan's tools are the means by which the artisan's technê is carried out. And for parts that have functions, the description seems apt. Eyes, for instance, are the tools by 26 Lennox (2001c: 187). 27 See, for example, GA ii.6, 743a36–b5 and GA ii.1, 734b28–735a4, both quoted below. 28 For example, PA i.1, 642a9–13; PA ii.7, 652b7–15; and DA 2.4, 415b18–20: "all natural bodies are tools of soul, as those of animals, so too, those of plants, as being for the sake of soul." use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295155.003 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Pittsburgh, on 31 Oct 2017 at 19:27:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of 58 jessica gelber which an organism engages in seeing; hands are tools by which we grasp and press things. But heat and cold are less obviously analogous to the craftsman's tools than are functional organs and limbs. And Aristotle is aware of this, which is why he modifies the analogy with craft production when explaining how nutritive soul uses heat and cold as tools: . . . as the products of art are made by means of the tools of the artisan, or to put it more truly by means of their movement, and this is the activity (energeia) of the art, and the art is the form of what is made in something else, so is it with the power of nutritive soul. As later on in the case of mature animals and plants this soul causes growth from the nutriment, using heat and cold as its tools (for the movement of the soul is in these), and each thing comes into being in accordance with a certain formula, so also from the beginning does it form the product of nature. (GA ii.4, 740b25–34 (Platt trans., modified)) Here Aristotle compares heat and cold not to an artisan's tools but to their movements, that is, the tools as they are being used. These movements of the artisan's tools, Aristotle says, are the energeia or activity of the artisan's technê. This suggests that the important point of the analogy between the movements of the artisan's tools and the heating and cooling in blood is that each is the activity or energeia of some dunamis. In living organisms, the heating and cooling are the activities of soul capacities; these are how those vital activities are carried out. If we grant that Aristotle is thinking of heat and cold in this way – that is, as tools by which soul capacities are exercised – two points follow. First, it follows from the idea that heat and cold are tools or instruments that their causal role is thereby a subsidiary one. They are sunaitia, not aitia.29 And subsidiary causes never operate independently of the first or primary cause to which they are subordinate. Consequently, as subsidiary causes, the elemental powers in living organisms' bodies do not operate independently of, but are rather subordinate to form or soul.30 Second, auxiliary causes can have their own per se effects. The drugs that the doctor prescribes, for instance, have powers "of necessity" to alter the patient's body. Those powers the drugs have are not working independently of the doctor's art, however; the drugs are present in the patient's body (they have been ingested, that is) only because the doctor prescribed them. Nevertheless, the powers in the drugs cause changes in the patient. 29 Cf. DA ii.4, 416a13–14. 30 Balme (1987: 276) also makes the point that as sunaitia, the matter's "natural action and movement" will not produce its effects unless "nature causes it to do so." use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295155.003 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Pittsburgh, on 31 Oct 2017 at 19:27:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of Are facts about matter primitive? 59 Similarly, heat and cold in living organisms have powers, grounded in necessity, of producing features (softness, hardness, etc.) of the body, just as they do in craft production. Heat and cold (which is deprivation of heat) are both employed by Nature. Each has the power, grounded in necessity, of making one thing into this and another thing into that; but in the case of the forming of the embryo it is for a purpose that their power of heating and cooling make it such, partly owing to necessity, partly for a purpose – sinew solid and elastic, bone solid and brittle. (GA ii.6, 743a36–b5 (Peck trans.)) As tools of soul, and so subsidiary causes, heat and cold can cause changes in the embryo's body. But still, just as in the case of craft production, heat and cold do not operate on their own. And as in speaking of an axe or any other instrument, we should not say that it was made solely by fire, so we should not say this about a foot or a hand, nor, similarly, of flesh either, because there is a function of this also. As for hardness, softness, toughness, brittleness and the rest of such qualities which belong to the parts that have soul in them, heat and cold may very well produce these, but they certainly do not produce the logos in virtue of which the one is now flesh and the other bone. Rather, the movement derived from the generator who is in actuality that which the material out of which the offspring is formed is in potential. The very same thing applies to things formed in accordance with art. For, heat and cold may soften and harden the iron, but they do not produce the sword. This is done by the movement of the tools, which has the logos of the art. For the art is the principle and form of the thing being made, but in another. But nature's movement is in [the product being formed], derived from another natural being having the form in actuality. (GA ii.1, 734b28–735a4) Viewed from this perspective, the idea that matter operates independently of soul does not really get a foothold. Rather, matter is always operating as a tool of soul, and so subordinate to it. Accordingly, facts about matter in the scientific demonstrations that display the causes will also be subordinate to facts about form or soul, and not "as explanatorily primitive" as them. Conclusion I began by noting a recent trend to interpret Aristotle's biological explanations as treating facts about matter as explanatorily primitive. This interpretation, however, is in tension with what we would have expected, given what Aristotle says outside the biological works. And, I argued, it is far use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295155.003 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Pittsburgh, on 31 Oct 2017 at 19:27:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of 60 jessica gelber from obvious that the biological explanations treat facts about matter as primitive. I offered the following three considerations. First, from Aristotle's discussions in PA ii.1, it would seem that matter at the lowest level of composition – an organism's bodily blend or krasis – is not primitive, at least not if one accepts that citing what something is for the sake of entails that it is explained. Second, there is reason to think that certain appeals to krasis are not intended as references to primitive facts. For Aristotle correlates facts about a kind's krasis with facts about human rationality. If human rational capacities are part of human essence, this would render the coordination between essence and matter a coincidence. But I do not think that this can be Aristotle's view. Third and finally, I have tried to indicate the way in which Aristotle's conception of the metabolic processes – the heating and cooling involved in reproduction, development, and maintenance – imbeds the actions of the elemental powers into the activity of the soul or form of the organism. Heat and cold are tools by which soul activities are carried out. This bars them from being "independently" operative in the way that has been suggested in the recent literature. use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107295155.003 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Univ of Pittsburgh, on 31 Oct 2017 at 19:27:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of

UNIVERSIDADE ESTADUAL PAULISTA Instituto de Geociências e Ciências Exatas Campus de Rio Claro Zaqueu Vieira Oliveira As Relações entre a Matemática e a Astronomia no Século XVI: tradução e comentários da obra Ouranographia de Adriaan van Roomen Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto de Geociências e Ciências Exatas do Campus de Rio Claro da Universidade Estadual Paulista Júlio de Mesquita Filho, como parte dos requisitos para obtenção do título de Mestre em Educação Matemática. Orientador: Prof. Dr. Marcos Vieira Teixeira Apoio: FAPESP. Processo no 2009/12574-6 Rio Claro SP 2011 Zaqueu Vieira Oliveira As Relações entre a Matemática e a Astronomia no Século XVI: tradução e comentários da obra Ouranographia de Adriaan van Roomen Dissertação de Mestrado apresentada ao Instituto de Geociências e Ciências Exatas do Campus de Rio Claro da Universidade Estadual Paulista Júlio de Mesquita Filho, como parte dos requisitos para obtenção do título de Mestre em Educação Matemática. Apoio: FAPESP. Processo no 2009/12574-6 Comissão Examinadora Prof. Dr. Marcos Vieira Teixeira (Orientador) – IGCE-UNESP-Rio Claro Prof. Dr. Irineu Bicudo – IGCE-UNESP-Rio Claro Prof. Dr. Carlos Henrique Barbosa Gonçalves – EACH-USP-São Paulo Prof. Dr. Sérgio Roberto Nobre (Suplente) – IGCE-UNESP-Rio Claro Prof. Dr. Thomás Augusto Santoro Haddad (Suplente) – EACH-USP-São Paulo Resultado: Aprovado Rio Claro, SP 22 de dezembro de 2011. AGRADECIMENTOS Inicialmente agradeço a Deus por ter iluminado meus caminhos; por ter me dado coragem e perserverança para transpor os obstáculos que não cessam de aparecer e para enfrentar todos os empecílios que a vida me trouxe; por ter colocado ao meu lado inúmeras pessoas especiais, estas servem de ponte para atravessar o lamaçal das dificuldades; e por ter me dado grandes dádivas, como a de executar este trabalho. À minha mãe Eurides Pereira Vieira Oliveira, minha irmã Juliane Vieira Olieira e meu saudoso pai José de Oliveira Vieira por serem pessoas ajudadoras, especiais e exemplos de família bondosa, humilde e unida; por terem me incentivado a seguir caminhos retos; e por terem me ensinado a respeitar, a amar e a ter fé em Deus. À minha namorada Diana Borges dos Santos, que antes de tudo é minha grande amiga, uma pessoa leal, companheira e paciente e que com muito carinho e amor me apoia, tanto na vida acadêmica quanto na vida pessoal; agradeço também por suas palavras sempre sinceras, puras e humildes. Ao Prof. Dr. Marcos Vieira Teixeira pelos preciosos ensinamentos; pela amizade e hospitalidade com que me recebeu na cidade de Rio Claro; pelo carinho e paciência ao me acolher como seu orientando; e pelos inúmeros momentos que nos reunimos para elaborar, discutir e decidir os rumos deste trabalho. Ao Prof. Dr. Carlos Henrique Barbosa Gonçalves que com tanto carinho e amor me ajudou e me apoiou nesta tradução; pelo apoio durante a graduação, onde calma e insistentemente me ensinou e continua ensinando os caminhos pelos quais eu devo seguir; pela paciência com que me acolheu e entendeu meus problemas pessoais. À Profa. Dra. María Elena Infante-Malachias, para mim, modelo de educadora, pelos seus conselhos divinos que só uma pessoa sábia, carismática, carinhosa e iluminada por Deus pode transmitir. Aos Profs. Dr. Fábio Maia Bertato, Dr. Fumikazu Saito, Dr. Irineu Bicudo, Dr. Sérgio Roberto Nobre, Dr. Thomás Augusto Santoro Haddad e Dr. Ubiratan D'Ambrósio pelos valiosos conselhos e pelo grande apoio que me forneceram para a realização desta pesquisa. Aos meus amigos e minhas amigas Aline de Freitas Leal, Alisson Mansano de Oliveira, Amanda Cristina da Silva, Cícera da Silva, Flávio Luiz Corrêa dos Santos, Gisele dos Santos Custódio, Juliana Rodrigues, Karen Massae Nashiro, Lúcia Alves da Silva, Marcos Santos Barbosa, Tábata Ribeiro Lemes, Talita Eloá Mansano Navarro e Valnice Corrêa dos Santos que são as verdadeiras colunas que me firmam nos momentos mais difíceis de minha vida e me trazem inúmeros momentos de alegria. Aos meus amigos de mestrado Aldo Ivan Parra Sanches, Elaine Caire e Elmha Coelho Martins Moura por me auxiliarem e me acolherem enormemente no decorrer do mestrado. Agradeço a todos os meus demais amigos, professores e familiares; estes são muitos e – com um pouco de exagero – eu escreveria mais nomes do que a quantidade de palavras desta dissertação. Também agrdeço à Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) pelo financimanto dos primeiros cinco meses desta pesqusia com uma bolsa Demanda Social. E finalmente agradeço à Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) por ter financiado esta pesquisa durante os dezessete meses finais, pois sem isto, esta não teria sido realizada. Processo no 2009/12574-6. « As 'situações-limite' não são a fronteira entre o 'ser' e o 'nada', mas a fronteira entre o 'ser' e o 'mais ser'; (...) não são o contorno infraqueável onde terminam todas as possibilidades, mas a margem real de onde começam as mais ricas possibilidades. » Álvaro Vieira Pinto RESUMO Durante a Idade Média a astronomia era estudada como uma das disciplinas do quadrivium, parte das artes liberais onde se abordava o conjunto das "matemáticas", e no Renascimento o estudo da astronomia como parte das "disciplinas matemáticas" perdurou ainda por algum tempo e diversos estudiosos continuaram a se dedicar à publicação de obras sobre o assunto. Adriaan van Roomen (1561-1615), matemático e médico renascentista, escreveu alguns trabalhos referentes à astronomia, dentre os quais podemos citar a sua Ouranographia sive caeli descriptio (1591). Neste trabalho, apresentamos a primeira tradução da Ouranographia direta do latim para o português e acrescentamos notas e comentários acerca dos assuntos tratados em alguns dos capítulos da obra. Na Ouranographia, percebemos claramente o entrelaçamento entre diversas áreas da ciência, não só no que consideramos como matemática e astronomia, mas também no que diz respeito à astrologia, à filosofia e à história. A Ouranographia de van Roomen é constituída por três livros: no liber primus, descreve genericamente a máquina celeste, sua matéria e forma, seus movimentos e orbes; no liber secundus, descreve o primeiro céu e as linhas e círculos celestes que usamos para nos referenciar estando aqui da Terra; no liber tertius, explica o primeiro móvel, seus círculos e movimentos. Percebemos que van Roomen faz uma compilação de boa parte do conhecimento existente sobre o tema desde a Antiguidade até seu tempo e, através de suas citações, percebemos ainda que ele teve contato com obras de inúmeros autores, se mostrando um grande intelectual. Palavras-chave: Adriaan van Roomen. História da Astronomia. História da Matemática. História da Ciência. Renascimento. ABSTRACT During the Middle Ages the astronomy was studied as one of the disciplines of the quadrivium, part of the liberal arts where they approached the "math", and in the Renaissance the study of astronomy as part of the "mathematical disciplines" went even on for some time and several scholars have continued to devote himself to the publication of works on the subject. Adriaan van Roomen (1561-1615), renaissance mathematician and physician, wrote several works about to astronomy, among which we mention its Ouranographia sive caeli descriptio (1591). In this work we present the first direct translation from Latin to Portuguese of the Ouranographia and add notes and comments on the issues addressed in some of the chapters of the work. In the Ouranographia, we clearly see the interconnectedness of different fields of science, not only in what we consider as mathematics and astronomy, but also with regard to astrology, philosophy and history. The van Roomen' Ouranographia consists of three books: in the liber primus, describes generally the heaven machine, its matter and form, their movements and orbs; in the liber secundus, describes the heaven first and the celestial circles and lines that we use to refer being here on Earth, in the liber tertius, explains the mobile first, their movements and circles. We perceive that van Roomen makes a compilation of much of the existing knowledge on the subject from antiquity to his time, and through their citations, we perceive still that he had contact with works by several authors, is showing a great intellectual. Key-words: Adriaan van Roomen. History of Astronomy. History of Mathematics. History of Science. Renaissance. SUMÁRIO INTRODUÇÃO ............................................................................................................................ 15 PARTE 1: ADRIAAN VAN ROOMEN, A MATEMÁTICA E A ASTRONOMIA NO SÉCULO XVI ..... 19 CAPÍTULO 1: A MATEMÁTICA E SUAS RELAÇÕES COM A ASTRONOMIA ............................... 21 Um Pouco de História ........................................................................................................... 21 As Disciplinas Matemáticas no Renascimento ..................................................................... 25 CAPÍTULO 2: BIOGRAFIA DE VAN ROOMEN ............................................................................ 29 CAPÍTULO 3: INTERESSES MATEMÁTICOS E ASTRONÔMICOS DE VAN ROOMEN .................. 35 CAPÍTULO 4: OBRAS, MANUSCRITOS E CORRESPONDÊNCIA DE VAN ROOMEN..................... 43 Obras de van Roomen ........................................................................................................... 44 Manuscritos de van Roomen ................................................................................................. 47 Correspondência de van Roomen ......................................................................................... 47 PARTE 2: TRANSCRIÇÃO E TRADUÇÃO DA OURANOGRAPHIA DE VAN ROOMEN .................... 51 CAPÍTULO 5: O PROCESSO DE TRADUÇÃO .............................................................................. 53 CAPÍTULO 6: NOTAS SOBRE A EDIÇÃO DO TEXTO .................................................................. 55 OURANOGRAPHIA SIUE CAELI DESCIPTIO: TRANSCRIÇÃO E TRADUÇÃO .................................. 59 PARTE 3: NOTAS E COMENTÁRIOS À OURANOGRAPHIA DE VAN ROOMEN ........................... 181 CAPÍTULO 7: NOTAS À OURANOGRAPHIA .............................................................................. 183 Notas Iniciais ...................................................................................................................... 183 Notas ao Primeiro Livro da Ouranographia ....................................................................... 184 Notas ao Segundo Livro da Ouranographia ....................................................................... 188 Notas ao Terceiro Livro da Ouranographia ....................................................................... 189 CAPÍTULO 8: COMENTÁRIOS À OURANOGRAPHIA ................................................................. 191 O que significa Ouranographia? ........................................................................................ 191 As Partes da Uranografia de van Roomen ......................................................................... 192 Comentários ao Primeiro Livro da Ouranographia............................................................ 193 Comentários ao Segundo Livro da Ouranographia............................................................ 222 Comentários ao Terceiro Livro da Ouranographia ............................................................ 234 CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS ........................................................................................................ 239 REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS ............................................................................................ 245 ANEXO: LISTA DAS OBRAS DE ADRIAAN VAN ROOMEN ....................................................... 251 15 INTRODUÇÃO Adriaan van Roomen, também conhecido pelo nome latino Adrianus Romanus, nasceu em 1561, em Louvain, na atual Bélgica, faleceu em 1615 em Mainz, na Alemanha, e foi matemático e médico. Como matemático, é comumente lembrado por seu cálculo para o número π com 16 casas decimais, por seus métodos para calcular tabelas trigonométricas e por suas ideias sobre a mathesis universalis e, como médico, foi o primeiro professor de medicina da Universidade de Wurceburgo na Alemanha. Muitas de suas obras são compilações de trabalhos da Antiguidade, da Idade Média e de seu período. Manteve um amplo contato com estudiosos de seu tempo, tanto através de visitas pessoais, quanto de Correspondência. Apesar de possivelmente ter sido um personagem importante para o desenvolvimento científico de sua região naquele período da história, até hoje ainda existem poucos estudos referentes à sua vida e obra. Os trabalhos mais importantes acerca de van Roomen são os artigos do bibliotecário da Universidade de Louvain, Anton Ruland (1867) e os do historiador e matemático Paul Bockstaele (1966; 1976; 1981; 1992; 1992a; 2009). A nossa ideia de pesquisar a vida e obra de van Roomen – principalemente no respeitante à Geometria e à Astronomia – se originou ainda na graduação ao cursar a disciplina História e Filosofia da Ciência, do curso de Licenciatura em Ciências da Natureza (LCN), e o curso de difusão cultural de Introdução à Leitura do Latim com Ênfase em Temas da Filosofia Natural, oferecidos na Escola de Artes, Ciências e Humanidades (EACH) da Universidade de São Paulo (USP). Em 2007, iniciamos o projeto de Iniciação Científica Um Episódio da História da Ciência nos Séculos XVI e XVII: Adriaan van Roomen, a Matemática e a Astronomia sob orientação do Prof. Dr. Carlos Henrique Barbosa Gonçalves, traduzindo e estudando a carta de 1 de julho de 1597 de van Roomen para o padre jesuíta Christoph Clavius (1537-1612). Nos anos de 2008 e 2009, realizamos o projeto Geometria e Astronomia na Correspondência de Adriaan van Roomen também sob orientação do Prof. Carlos e com o financiamento da Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)1. Nesse último, estudamos mais sete cartas de van Roomen para Clavius e duas entre van Roomen e Joseph Justus Scaliger (1540-1609). 1 Processo FAPESP no: 2007/07333-4. 16 Esses projetos de pesquisa deram origem a dois artigos: Geometria, Reforma e Contra-Reforma na Carta de 1 de Julho de 1597, de Adriaan van Roomen para Clavius (GONÇALVES & OLIVEIRA, 2007) e A Atividade Matemática de Adriaan van Roomen (GONÇALVES & OLIVEIRA, 2010). No último ano de graduação, fomos encorajados pelos Prof. Carlos Gonçalves e Prof. Dr. Ubiratan D'Ambrósio a dar continuidade aos estudos relacionados à vida e obra de van Roomen e cursar o Programa de Pós-Graduação em Educação Matemática (PPGEM) da Universidade Estadual Paulista "Júlio de Mesquita Filho" (UNESP), no campus de Rio Claro, devido ao influente Grupo de Pesquisa em História da Matemática (GPHM), do qual o Prof. Ubiratan é integrante, juntamente com o Prof. Dr. Marcos Vieira Teixeira que gentilmente nos orientou durante a execução desta pesquisa. Para dar continuidade aos estudos citados, elaboramos um projeto de pesquisa no qual os principais objetivos eram realizar a tradução e elaborar comentários da obra Ouranographia sive caeli descriptio ou, em português, Uranografia ou a Descrição do Céu. Os resultados desenvolvidos no decorrer da execução desta pesquisa serão abordados nesta dissertação em três partes distintas. A primeira parte, intitulada Adriaan van Roomen, a Matemática e a Astronomia no Sèculo XVI, contém quatro capítulos: no primeiro, traremos algumas considerações da história da matemática e da astronomia e suas relações no século XVI; no segundo, apresentaremos uma biografia de van Roomen; no terceiro, abordaremos as questões referentes à matemática e à astronomia do interesse de van Roomen; e no quarto, arrolaremos algumas das obras, manuscritos e Correspondência deixados por van Roomen. A segunda parte contém a transcrição do texto latino da Ouranographia de van Roomen e a tradução realizada por nós no decorrer desta pesquisa. As páginas da transcrição e da tradução foram intercaladas, de modo que aquele leitor que conheça a língua latina possa ler ao mesmo tempo o texto latino e o texto em português na página ao lado. Desde já, antecipamos que esta tradução é passível de pequenos erros e o autor está seguro de que sugestões e críticas serão muito importantes para o desenvolvimento e fortalecimento deste trabalho. A terceira parte contém as notas e comentários à Ouranographia. As notas se referem à questões relacionadas à tradução propriamente dita e os comentários à explanações acerca dos assuntos tratados em alguns dos capítulos da obra sempre dialogadas com a bibliografia pertinente. No final dessa parte acrescentamos as considerações finais a fim de deixar algumas conclusões da importância e relevância deste estudo. 17 Em anexo, consta uma listagem com os títulos das obras deixadas por van Roomen. 19 PARTE 1: ADRIAAN VAN ROOMEN, A MATEMÁTICA E A ASTRONOMIA NO SÉCULO XVI 21 Capítulo 1 A MATEMÁTICA E SUAS RELAÇÕES COM A ASTRONOMIA Logo de início, deixamos claro que neste capítulo não temos o intuito de fazer uma descrição detalhada da história da matemática, nem da astronomia desde a Antiguidade até o Renascimento. Aqui pretendemos escrever superficialmente sobre alguns personagens e algumas de suas obras que eventualmente poderão ajudar o leitor deste trabalho a entender o momento histórico em que van Roomen escreveu sua obra Ouranographia. A Ouranographia possui diversas carcaterísticas – que serão discutidas posteriormente – que têm como base não só o pensamento científico de seu período, mas também uma grande influência da filosofia Antiga e Medieval. Então, nas linhas que se seguem, faremos um breve histórico acerca da matemática, da astronomia e da filosofia e das influências que esses períodos históricos – Antiguidade e Idade Média – podem ter tido sobre o pensamento renascentista e, consequentemente, sobre o pensamento de van Roomen. Um Pouco de História O pensamento de alguns filósofos e cientistas da Antiguidade foi crucial para o desenvolvimento científico por longos anos. Tanto para as questões filosóficas, quanto para as científicas, as obras de Platão e Aristóteles foram importantíssimas. Elas criaram uma geração de estudiosos – uns se diziam platônicos (como Plotino, Porfírio e Proclo) e outros aristotélicos (como Teofrasto) – que prosseguiram com grande força na Europa durante toda a Idade Média e só começaram a entrar em declinío no final do Renascimento, mas até os tempos atuais nunca deixaram de ser reconhecidas como obras admiráveis. Nomes como, por exemplo, o de Euclides e Arquimedes para a matemática e o de Ptolomeu para a astronomia também foram respeitados por muitos séculos. Muitas obras de matemática e astronomia do Renascimento – como a Ouranographia de van Roomen – tiveram como base para seus estudos as obras desses e de muitos outros personagens da Antiguidade. Como dissemos anteriormente, uma figura importante para o pensamento filosófico e científico, não só na Antiguidade, mas por muitos séculos, foi o filósofo Aristóteles. Sobre sua vida sabe-se muito pouco. Ele nasceu em 384 a.C em Estagira na Calcídica e aos dezessete anos mudou-se para Atenas, onde foi estudar na Academia de Platão. Após a morte 22 desse, em 347 a.C, mudou-se para Assos e, posteriormente, para Mitilene, uma ilha vizinha a Lesbos. Em 336 a.C. voltou a Atenas e começou a lecionar independentemente no Liceu, onde ele escolheu "um lugar de passeio (peripatos) para nele filosofar com seus discípulos, passeando. Foi por isso que a sua escola foi chamada de peripatética". Em 323 a.C. após a morte do rei Alexandre, com quem Aristóteles manteve grandes vínculos, mudou-se para a ilha de Eubéia, onde faleceu um ano depois. As suas obras foram deixadas para seu discípulo Teofrasto que o sucedeu na escola peripatética (ARISTÓTELES, 2001, p. 15-17; BITTAR, 2003; ROSS, 1995). A principal divergência entre Aristóteles e seu mestre Platão e também entre seus seguidores foi a discussão de quais elementos deveriam compor as esferas celestes. Segundo Platão, os mesmos quatro elementos componentes do mundo terrestre – terra, ar, fogo e água – estariam presentes em todo o universo, enquanto, Aristóteles estabelecia a existência de um quinto elemento, incorruptível e ingênito – o que foi denominado pelos medievais de éter – que existiria somente nas esferas supralunares. Mas, segundo alguns autores, a distância entre o pensamento filosófico de Aristóteles e de Platão "talvez foi superestimada, pois as ideias aristotélicas germinaram, por quase vinte anos, à sombra das de Platão". Parece que dentre os objetivos de Aristóteles um deles "seria manter a refinada estrutura de raciocínio que dará sustentação à filosofia de seu velho mestre" (ARISTÓTELES, 2001, p. 10-11). Dentre as obras deixadas por Aristóteles, podemos citar a Física, o Sobre o Céu, os Meterológicos e o Sobre a Geração e a Corrupção, "uma gama de estudos que vão dos movimentos celestes aos movimentos naturais, e da constituição dos elementos à sua elabarada composição e papel na natureza" (ARISTÓTELES, 2001, p. 12). O conjunto de tratados relativos à physica foi um dos primeiros passos de Aristóteles na direção de reconstruir, em novas bases, a antiga 'filosofia natural' grega, daqueles filósofos conhecidos então como physicos. Relacionados de maneira primorosamente orgânica – aliás procedimento que se estende à obra toda – os tratados em physica terão sua continuidade natural naqueles que trabalham fenômenos particulares e específicos, sobretudo relativos aos seres vivos, como no De partibus animalium ou no De generatione animalium, mas também naqueles preocupados com fenômenos de outra ordem como no Parva naturalia, onde se estabelece o estudo da memória e dos sonhos (ARISTÓTELES, 2001, p. 12). Dentre inúmeras obras deixadas por Aristóteles, também tiveram grande importância sobre o pensamento filosófico e científico a Metafísica, o Órganon, o Sobre a Alma, a Retórica, a Poética, a Política e a Ética. Outro personagem importante foi Ptolomeu. Possivelmente ele tenha sido o maior nome para a astronomia durante toda a Idade Média, pois seu sistema de mundo – que 23 estabelecia esferas concêntricas à Terra, todas girando circularmente – foi estudado e desenvolvido por inúmeros estudiosos. A esse sistema foram atreladas as ideias filosóficas de Aristóeles de que as esferas celestes seriam compostas por um quinto elemento. Até mesmo o sistema copernicano foi baseado nele, pois não excluiu de tudo as características principais do sistema ptolomaico. Ptolomeu (latinizado como Claudius Ptolemaeus) foi um dos maiores estudiosos da antiguidade, e a astronomia matemática foi dominada por suas ideias por aproximadamente 1500 anos após sua morte. Pouco se sabe sobre sua vida, mas ele ensinou em Alexandria e juntou os resultados de suas observações entre 127 e 141. Ele foi responsável por um grande número de obras (LINTON, 2004, p. 60, tradução nossa). Dentre suas obras, podemos citar o Tetrabiblos que trata de astrologia e a Geografia, mas, sem dúvida alguma, a mais importante para a astronomia e para a matemática foi o Almagesto. Segundo Linton (2004, p. 61), o nome Almagesto foi traduzido erroneamente. "O título grego original traduzido é Síntaxe matemática ou Coleção matemática". Nessa obra, Ptolomeu mostra que tem grande habilidade para converter dados de observações em valores numéricos e estabelecer um sistema planetário baseado nessas observações. Durante a Idade Média, o pensamento filosófico e científico de personagens da Antiguidade, como Aristóteles e Ptolomeu, continuaram servindo de base. Johannes de Sacrobosco (c. 1195-c. 1256), por exemplo, escreveu o Tratado da Esfera que: (...) foi um dos textos astronômicos mais famosos de todos os tempos. Escrito aproximadamente em 1230, era uma obra curta, não matemática, que procurava explicar os principais fenômenos astronômicos. Apresentava uma visão geral do universo, sendo baseado principalmente em Ptolomeu e Alfragano (MARTINS, 2008, p. 373). Essa obra também serviu de base para muitos escritos astronômicos por muitos séculos e diversos autores da Idade Média e Moderna escreveram inúmeros comentários acerca dela. Entre 1472 e 1664 (ou 1673) foram publicadas mais de 250 edições, comentários e/ou traduções dessa obra (MARTINS, 2008, p. 374). O esquema de ensino na Idade Média ainda tinha grande influência dos moldes de ensino anteriores. De modo geral, primeiramente, estudavam-se as artes liberais, começando pelas disciplinas do trivium (gramática, retórica e dialética) e depois as do quadrivium (aritmética, geometria, música e astronomia). Em seguida, escolhia-se entre uma das três disciplinas superiores – direito, medicina ou teologia. 24 Durante a Idade Média nasceram as primeiras universidades na Europa e em poucos anos elas se multiplicaram por diversas cidades. Segundo Rossi (2001, 15), as primeiras surgiram nas cidades de Bolonha, Paris e Oxford no final do século XII. As universidades se tornaram os lugares privilegiados de um saber que se configura como digno de reconhecimento social, merecedor de uma remuneração, um saber que tem leis próprias, que são minuciosamente determinadas (LE GOFF, 1977, p. 153-170 apud ROSSI, 2001, p. 16). Essas universidades, algumas vezes eram dedicadas a uma única disciplina da formação superior daquele tempo – direito em Bolonha, medicina em Montpellier – mas, em outros casos, havia uma faculdade preparatória que ensinava as disciplinas das artes liberais e outra com as três disciplinas superiores numa mesma universidade – como Paris e Oxford (VERGER, 1999). Segundo Verger (1999), os homens letrados da Idade Média, para poderem se inserir em ambientes intelectuais, como as universidades, deveriam possuir dois conhecimentos básicos: primeiro, eles deveriam saber a língua latina e, em segundo lugar, tinham que conhecer os trabalhos de Aristóteles. Como esse mesmo autor escreve, no período de criação das universidades já não se falava o latim como língua oficial em parte alguma da Europa, pois já há muito tempo haviam nascido uma diversidade enorme de línguas vernáculas. Porém, "o estatuto da língua vernácula mantinha-se discutível e sua dignidade contestada". De fato, o latim ainda era considerado importantíssimo, tanto porque era a língua sagrada, "aquela das Escrituras, aquela da liturgia, do culto e dos sacramentos" quanto porque os gramáticos consideravam que a língua vernácula tinha uma "relativa pobreza no léxico (...), incertezas morfológicas, talvez sintáticas, e instabilidade ortográfica" (VERGER, 1999, p. 24-25). O latim era, por outro lado, a língua portadora de toda a herança da Antiguidade. Quer se tratasse de obras latinas originais ou de obras gregas traduzidas em latim desde a Antiguidade ou durante a Idade Média (diretamente ou pela mediação de intermediários árabes), quase tudo que o Ocidente possuía no fim da Idade Média em matéria de gramática, de filosofia, de ciência (ciências naturias, matemática, astronomia, cosmologia, etc.), de direito, de medicina, de história antiga, sem falar nos Padres da Igreja, era tudo ainda em latim (VERGER, 1999, p. 25-26). As primeiras traduções datam do século XIII e XIV, mas essas deveriam ter uma autorização real para serem publicadas. Como consequência de sua predominância, o latim foi também a língua do ensino. Para cursar qualquer disciplina erudita era necessário antes de tudo dominar o latim, pois o ensino dependia exclusivamente dos livros escritos que 25 raramente estavam em outra língua, senão o latim. Outro fato importante é que as aulas nas universidades também eram ministradas em latim. Na Idade Moderna, as universidades passaram a entrar em declínio. Embora quase todos os cientistas do século XVII tivessem estudado em uma universidade, são poucos os nomes de cientistas cuja carreira se tenha desenvolvido inteira ou prevalentemente no âmbito da universidade. Na verdade, as universidades não estiveram no centro da pesquisa científica (ROSSI, 2001, p. 10). Para muitos intelectuais da Modernidade, o lugar de desenvolvimento científco poderia ser uma corte onde alguém da nobreza fornecia recursos para serem desenvolvidas certas pesquisas, ou então, dentro de outros ambientes, como os colégios religiosos, por exemplo, os jesuítas que estudavam no Colégio Romano. Apesar das inúmeras mudanças que estavam ocorrendo nas ciências e no sistema de ensino renascentista, "os humanistas dos séculos XV e XVI serão profundamente tributários de autores gregos e latinos, de cujas lições eles apreenderão não somente o estilo, mas a estética e moral" (VERGER, 1999, p. 40). As Disciplinas Matemáticas no Renascimento No Renascimento, as disciplinas científicas, se é que podemos denominar desta forma, passaram por grandes mudanças. Naquele tempo, muitos homens de saber se preocuparam em estudar e entender a classificação das disciplinas, suas particularidades, especificidades e diferenças. Na matemática, alguns estudiosos, tais como Alessandro Piccolomini (1508-1579) e Christoph Clavius, se debruçaram sobre o tema, tanto para tentar classificar aquelas que eles chamavam de "disciplinas matemáticas" quanto para estabelecer relações com outras áreas da ciência (MOTA, 2008). A classificação tripartida de demonstração é proposta por Alessandro Piccolomini (1508-1578) em um tratado publicado em 1547 com o título Commentarium de Certitudine Mathematicarum Disciplinarum. Nesse trabalho, Piccolomini desafiou o argumento tradicional de que as ciências matemáticas possuem o mais alto graude certeza, porque usam o mais alto tipo de demonstração, a demonstração potissima, definida por ele com aquela que dá, de uma vez, a causa e o efeito (simul et quia et propter quid) )MANCOSU, 1996, p. 12). Ao estudar as relações existentes entre a matemática e a astronomia naquele período, percebemos que diversos estudiosos têm conhecimento e até mesmo obras publicadas tratando das duas disciplinas. Um dos exemplos que podemos citar é Johannes Kepler (1531-1630), cujo nome normalmente está associado aos seus trabalhos de astronomia e aos seus estudos das leis para o movimento elíptico dos planetas. Contudo, ele também estudou assuntos 26 relacionados à matemática no que diz respeito ao cálculo de volume de sólidos, conforme pode ser visto em sua obra Nova Stereometria Doliorum Vinariorum publicada em Linz em 1615 (MOURA; OLIVEIRA, 2011). Outro exemplo é o matemático Adriaan van Roomen (1561-1615) que publicou obras de astronomia, Ouranographia sive caeli descriptio (1591) e Speculum astronomicum (1606), além da tese de seu aluno Lambertus Croppet De corporum mundanorum simplicium distinctione et numero (1598). Além disso, obras daquele tempo que atualmente nos parecem ser de astronomia nem sempre tratam somente da astronomia propriamente dita, mas foram escritas com um conjunto de elementos de diversas áreas da ciência entre elas, assuntos que hoje denominamos de matemática, principalmente no que concerne à geometria e trigonometria. Essa classificação onde se inserem a astronomia e diversas outras disciplinas como "matemáticas" tem uma origem bem antiga. Segundo Bertato (2008), a menção mais antiga de um quadrivium – parte das artes liberais onde se estudava a aritmética, geometria, música e astronomia, disciplinas consideradas "matemáticas" – está em um fragmento de Árquitas de Tarento (c. 428 a.C-c.347 a.C). Bertato (2008), ao se referir aos estudos de Proclus (412 d.C485 d.C) escreve: De acordo com Proclus, o estóico Geminus (c. 10 a.C-c. 60 d.C) considera, em sua divisão das matemáticas, por um lado, as ciências concernentes com as coisas inteligíveis, Aritmética e Geometria e, por outro, as concernentes com as coisas sensíveis, Mecânica, Astronomia, Ótica, Geodésia, Canônica e Logistica. Anatólio faz a mesma classificação (BERTATO, 2008). Durante a Idade Média, as disciplinas matemáticas que se consolidaram foram aquelas estudadas no quadrivium, mas com o tempo, outras disciplinas foram acrescentadas a estas para formar um rol muito maior das ditas "matemáticas". A disciplina matemática no século XVI era considerada, mais comumente, matemáticas, no plural, pelo que se entendia um conjunto de disciplinas relacionadas. Essa multiplicidade das matemáticas provinha de uma tradição antiga, que, dentre outras coisas, intentava determinar uma classificação para as disciplinas matemáticas. (...) O conceito de quadrivium ilustra bem a situação. Suas partes são, na classificação mais comum, exatamente as disciplinas matemáticas: aritmética, geometria, música e astronomia. Entretanto, van Roomen vive em uma época de desagregação do currículo tradicional, tornando difícil uma classificação sem ambigüidades das disciplinas matemáticas bem como das demais (GONÇALVES & OLIVEIRA, 2010). Nos prolegômenos da obra Euclidis Elementorum Libri XV, Christoph Clavius (15381612) traz uma breve explicação de tais disciplinas e de suas divisões. Ele tenta mostrar o 27 porquê dessas disciplinas serem chamadas "matemáticas", sua divisão, seus inventores e os usos destas disciplinas (CLAESSENS, 2009). Nos capítulos inicias de sua obra De Divina Proportione (1509), o frade e matemático Luca Pacioli escreve sobre as disciplinas que ele considera fazer parte das "matemáticas". Ele acrescenta às disciplinas do quadirvium a Astrologia, a Pespectiva, a Arquitetura e a Cosmografia (BERTATO, 2008). Adriaan van Roomen, na primeira parte de sua obra Mathesis Polemica (1605), escreveu detalhadamente sobre aquelas disciplinas que ele considerava parte das "matemáticas", descrevendo, dentre outras coisas, o objeto de estudo, os princípios, o locus que ocupa nas "matemáticas" e a utilidade de cada uma. Na primeira parte da obra, ele divide e classifica as disciplinas matemáticas conforme podemos observar na figura 1. Figura 1: Classificação das Matemáticas por van Roomen. 28 A classificação presente no diagrama da obra pode ser simplificada da seguinte maneira. As disciplinas matemáticas são: 1. Principais (A) Puras: (i) Suputatrice, ou computo, computação; (ii) Prima mathesis; (iii) Aritmética e; (iv) Geometria. (B) Mistas: (i) Cosmografia; (ii) Uranografia; (iii) Geografia; (iv) Astronomia; (v) Cronologia; (vi) Gedésia; (vii) Ótica; (viii) Eutimetria e; (ix) Música. 2. Mecânicas (A) Esferopoética; (B) Manganária; (C) Mecanopoética; (D) Organopoética e; (E) Automatopoética. Então, como é possível perceber, naquele período não podemos utilizar a palavra matemática para designar uma única disciplina, mas um conjunto, em que no mínimo incluiriam as disciplinas do quadrvium. Contudo, cada autor poderia ter sua classificação própria. 29 Capítulo 2 BIOGRAFIA DE VAN ROOMEN Os estudos acerca da vida de van Roomen ainda são escassos e muitas informações de sua vida ainda não estão bem esclarecidas. Neste capítulo traremos uma pequena biografia de van Roomen que foi baseada em dois artigos do matemático e historiador Paul Bockstaele (1966, 1976), na biografia do Dictionary of Scientific Biography (BUSARD, 1981), em um artigo de Anton Ruland (1867), nos artigos elaborados por nós durante a execução dos projetos de Iniciação Científica citados anteriormente na Introdução (GONÇALVES & OLIVEIRA, 2007; 2010) e no trabalho publicado no decorrer da execução desta pesquisa (OLIVEIRA, 2011). O pai de van Roomen também se chamava Adriaan e, provavelmente por algum tempo, foi comerciante em Antuérpia, faleceu em 1588 e foi sepultado na Igreja de Santa Gertrudes. A mãe de van Roomen se chamava Maria van den Daele e teve três filhos, Jan, Maria e Adriaan (BOCKSTAELE, 1966; BUSARD, 1981). Adriaan van Roomen, também conhecido pelo seu nome latino Adrianus Romanus, ou ainda pelo nome afrancesado Adrien Romain, nasceu em 29 de setembro de 1561, em Louvain na atual Bélgica, e faleceu em Mainz na Alemanha, no dia 04 de maio de 1615, ao retornar de Wurceburgo para a Holanda numa viagem que realizava a fim de cuidar de sua saúde debilitada (BOCKSTAELE, 1966; 1976; BUSARD, 1981). Não existem informações de sua infância e juventude. Sabe-se que por volta de 1593, casou-se com Anna Steeg, sobrinha de Godfried Steeg, médico do princípe-bispo de Wurceburgo, Julius Echter von Mespelbrunn (1545-1617). Ela morreu pouco antes de 1604. Van Roomen teve dois filhos ilegítimos com Cathanna Trautmann: Jacob (falecido em Louvain em 1635) e Conrad (nascido em Nuremberg e falecido em Louvain em 1668) (BOCKSTAELE, 1966). De acordo com a dedicatória de sua obra Ideae mathematicae pars prima (1593), van Roomen estudou matemática e filosofia no Colégio dos Jesuítas em Colônia. Depois disso, estudou medicina primeiro em Colônia, depois na Universidade de Louvain e se aperfeiçoou em Bolonha na Itália (BOCKSTAELE, 1966; 1976; BUSARD, 1981). Na carta de 11 de maio de 1592 de van Roomen para Christoph Clavius (1537-1612), ele se refere a uma viagem que realizou em abril de 1585 para Roma: 30 Reverendo padre, ainda que agora talvez eu te pareça desconhecido, contudo, estando em Roma, vacante o assento por causa da morte de Gregório XIII, eu estava habituado a reunir-me a vossa reverência, então também tratávamos das coisas Aritméticas e principalmente das Algébricas (BOCKSTAELE, 1976, tradução nossa)2. Foi naquela viagem em que conheceu Clavius e provavelmente quando recebeu o grau de licenciado em medicina (medicinae licenciatus) (BOCKSTAELE, 1976). Entre 1586 e 1592, foi professor de matemática e medicina na Universidade de Louvain3, sendo que, durante o ano de 1592, foi reitor dessa Universidade por seis meses (BOCKSTAELE, 1966; 1976; BUSARD, 1981). No início de 1593, tornou-se o primeiro professor de medicina da recémfundada Universidade de Wurceburgo4 (Fig. 2), onde deu sua primeira aula em 17 de maio desse ano e por dez anos se dedicou a essa atividade – nem sempre com entusiasmo, como podemos ver na carta de 11 de novembro de 1593 para Clavius – e teve pouco tempo para os estudos matemáticos (BOCKSTAELE, 1966, 1976; BUSARD, 1981). No que se refere a meus estudos, muito a profissão médica me retarda as matemáticas, porque aqui eu sozinho exerço o cargo de professor, de outro modo, teria feito maiores progressos na tabela de senos; contudo, lentamente progrido, em breve com a ajuda da graça divina, haverei de editar algum espécime, só a falta de impressores convenientes me retarda (BOCKSTAELE, 1976, tradução nossa)5. 2 "Reverende Pater, licet hoc forsan tibi ignotus sim, sede tamen ob mortem Gregorij xiij vacante, Romae existens, Reverentiam vestram convenire solitus eram; tum quoque agebamus de rebus Arithmeticis, et potissimum Algebraicis". 3 A Universidade de Louvain é considerada a universidade católica mais antiga do mundo; foi fundada em dezembro de 1425 pelo Papa Martin V; durante as duas guerras mundiais sua biblioteca foi incendiada e muitíssimos exemplares de livros raros foram perdidos. Em 1968, a universidade foi dividia em duas: a Universitè Catholique de Louvain, tendo a língua francesa como oficial e sediando o novo campus, e; a Katholieke Universiteit Leuven tendo como língua oficial o alemão e permanecendo no prédio histórico (HISTORY, 2009; SIX, 2009). 4 A Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg, também chamada de Universidade de Wurceburgo, foi fundada em 1402, mas teve uma curta duração. A Universidade foi fundada novamente em 1582 por Julius Echter von Mespelbrunn com os cursos de Teologia e Filosofia, e pouco tempo depois foram incluídos os cursos de Direito e de Medicina (TRADITION, 2009). 5 "Ad studia mea quod attinet, valde me in mathematicis profession Medica retardat, quod solus adhuc hic professorem agam, alioqui majors progressus fecissem in tabula sinuum; lente tames progredior, brevi aliquod specimen divina adjuvante gratia editurus, solus typorum convenientium defectus me retardat". Figura 2: Universidade de Wurceburgo no tempo de van Roomen 31 Por três vezes, em 1596, 1599 e 1602, foi decano6 da faculdade de medicina (BOCKSTAELE, 1966). No dia 8 de julho de 1594, recebeu o diploma de doutor em medicina em Bolonha. Em 1596, foi para Genebra para discutir questões sobre a publicação de sua obra In Archimedis circuli dimensionem (BOCKSTAELE, 1976). Entre 1596 e 1603, foi matemático do capítulo7 da Catedral de Wurceburgo e entre suas obrigações incluía-se a elaboração do calendário anual (BOCKSTAELE, 1966; 1976; BUSARD, 1981). Durante o verão de 1598, van Roomen foi a Praga, onde o Imperador Rudolph II (1552-1612) muito provavelmente lhe deu o título de Conde Palatino (comes palatinus) e Médico Imperial (medicus caesareus). Em 1599 ou 1600, voltou a essa cidade e se encontrou com Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) e prossivelmente com Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) (BOCKSTAELE, 1976; BUSARD, 1981). Na carta de 10 de fevereiro de 1598, van Roomen diz a Clavius que irá visitar Roma no Jubileu de 1600, mas não há nenhuma informação se isso realmente aconteceu (BOCKSTAELE, 1976). Em 1601, foi à França por três meses e durante sua estada visitou François Viète (1540-1603). Nessa viagem, van Roomen foi cuidar de seus problemas de saúde e dentre os lugares por que passou, foi tomar banhos nas águas termais de Schwaalbach perto de Wiesbaden (BOCKSTAELE, 1876; BUSARD, 1981). Devido a sua saúde debilitada, ficou ausente da Universidade de Wurceburgo por algum tempo em 1603. No final de 1604 ou no início de 1605, na sua volta para Louvain, ele foi ordenado sacerdote (BOCKSTAELE, 1966; 1976; BUSARD, 1981). Em 1605, ao voltar para Wurceburgo, tornou-se cânone extra capitular (canocicus extra capitularis) do Capítulo da igreja de Neumünster. Durante os anos seguintes, van Roomen viveu nas duas cidades – Louvain e Wurceburgo – contudo, pediu a renuncia de seu cargo como professor em Wurceburgo em 1607. Devido a suas muitas viagens, foi sempre 6 Dentro de uma universidade, o decano é o membro mais antigo da congregação dos professores que auxilia na contratação de novos professores e em outros processos administrativos. 7 O Capítulo é um corpo eclesiástico ou uma associação de clérigos de uma certa igreja formando um corpo moral com o intuito de ajudar o bispo na condução dos assuntos eclesiásticos. A autorização para que uma igreja tenha um Capítulo e a nomeação de seu chefe só pode ser feita pelo papa. À frente do Capítulo normalmente está um decano e a ele cabe a convocação e presídio das reuniões capitulares. No Capítulo existem também um tesoureiro, um secretário e um sacristão. Os demais funcionários do Capítulos são denominados pelo nome geral cânone e as suas funções variam de acordo com a igreja. O cânone extra capitular é uma espécie de "cânone substituto". (FANNING, 1908). 32 muito difícil exercer as suas atividades como cânone (BOCKSTAELE, 1966; 1976; BUSARD, 1981). Entre setembro de 1610 e julho 1612, foi a Zamosc na Polônia para ensinar matemática a Thomas Zamojski, filho do estadista e fundador do colégio dessa cidade Jam Zamojski. Durante sua estada na Polônia tornou-se conhecido do matemático polonês Jan Brożek (1585-1652), com quem manteve contato através de Correspondência (BOCKSTAELE, 1976; BUSARD, 1981). Van Roomen foi um visitante regular das feiras semianuais, antes da Páscoa e no fim de setembro, nas cidades de Frankfurt e Mainz e diligentemente procurava informar-se sobre as novas publicações e estudos nas áreas de seu interesse (BOCKSTAELE, 1966; 1976; BUSARD, 1981). Outra atividade que fazia parte de seu feitio era enviar cartas aos autores de obras que lia, a fim de mostrar eventuais erros, para que eles pudessem escrever novas edições contendo tais correções. Na carta de 11 de maio de 1592, ele escreve acerca de uma obra de Guido Ubaldo: Li, em viagem, dois livros dos planisféricos de Guido Ubaldo, mas lembro-me, contudo, de ter notado um erro na demonstração da construção da elipse, que eu indicaria ao autor, se me constasse, por ventura, que esteja, até agora, no meio dos vivos ou não. Tive isso, de fato, e ainda agora tenho por habitual os erros menos comportantes, e que acontecem por descuido, indicar aos próprios autores, se até agora estejam no meio dos vivos para que eles próprios possam publicar finalmente seus livros mais corretamente. Somos, de fato, humanos, e todos facilmente erramos (BOCKSTAELE, 1976, tradução nossa)8. Contudo, nem todos os autores aceitavam isso de bom grado, como foi o caso de Joseph Scaliger, sobre quem comentaremos mais abaixo. Van Roomen também se mostra interessado pelo estudo de lingüística, como podemos ver neste trecho da carta de 11 de maio de 1592 para Clavius: Estou muito encantado por um mínimo conhecimento grosseiro das várias línguas da Europa, principalmente das muito diferentes, donde procurei várias instruções. E são desejadas para mim daquela língua grega que hoje entre os gregos está em uso; da arábica (tenho um alfabeto arábico de Christmann9), da pérsica ou turca, da tartárica, etíope, eslava ou ilírica, ou dalmática, da polonesa, da húngara, da gótica, da moscovita, da armênia, da prussiana e assim por diante. Por isso, se forem encontradas por aí algumas instruções dessas línguas ou diálogos ou ainda alguns 8 "Legi duos planisphaeriorum libros Guidiubaldi sed obiter, verum unum me animadvertisse errorem memini in demonstratione constructionis ellypsis, quem authori indicarem, si mihi constaret, num ad huc in vivis sit vel non. Id enim mihi fuit, estque etaimnum consuetum errata leviora et quae per incuriam acciderunt, significare ipsis authoribus, si adhuc in vivis sint, ut ipsi tandem suos libros correctius edere possint. Homines enim sumus, facileque omnes labimur". 9 A obra citada aqui é o Alphabetum arabicum cum isagoge scribendi legendique Arabique publicada em Neustadt em 1582 por Jacob Christmann (1554-1613). 33 livretos (...) como sermões (...) com alguma interpretação em alguma língua européia ou ainda grega, ou hebraica, gostarias que me indicasses os autores, com o local e data da edição (BOCKSTAELE, 1976, tradução nossa)10. Ainda no que diz respeito ao seu interesse pela lingüística, nas cartas de 1 de julho de 1597 e de 10 de fevereiro de 1598, van Roomen comenta a tradução da obra Estática de Simon Stevin (1548/49-1620) que estava realizando. O círculo de amizades de van Roomen foi muito grande e podemos dizer que seus estudos podem ter tido influência de diversos estudiosos daquele período. Duas evidências relevantes acerca disso são a Correspondência deixada por ele e os relatos de suas inúmeras viagens. Sabemos que dentre suas diversas viagens conheceu o padre, matemático e astrônomo Christoph Clavius, os astrônomos Tycho Brahe, Johannes Kepler e Giovanni Antonio Magini (1555-1617), os matemáticos Ludolph van Ceulen (1540-1610), François Viète (1540-1603) e Jan Brożek e muitos outros estudiosos são mencionados em suas cartas. Além disso, podemos especular que ele provavelmente pode ter tido um papel importante para o desenvolvimento científico de sua região, principalmente nas universidades em que trabalhou. De modo geral, van Roomen teve grande interesse e dedicou toda a sua vida aos assuntos científicos de sua época. Seus escritos abarcam diversas áreas da ciência, como a matemática, a astronomia, a física, a meteorologia, a geografia, a cronologia, a medicina e outros assuntos dentre os quais a pirotécnica, a farmacologia e a botânica. Muitas de suas obras são compilações de trabalhos de outros autores mostrando um amplo conhecimento da literatura, da ciência e da filosofia da Antiguidade, da Idade Média e de seus contemporâneos. Mas, em matemática, isto é bem diferente, pois ele mostra um pensamento original tanto através das suas ideias sobre a mathesis universalis11 quanto nas obras sobre trigonometria, 10 "Delectatus sum plurimum rudi saltem cognitione variarum languarum ab Europaeis praecipue valde differentium, unde institutiones varias quaesivi. Desiderantur autem mihi linguae Grecae illius quae hodie apud Graecos in usu est; Arabicae (Habeo alphabetum Arabicum Christmanni), Persicae sive Turchiae, Tartaricae, Aethiopicae, Slavinicae sive Illyricae, sive Dalmaticae, Polonicaeve, Hungaricae, Gothicae, Moscoviticae, Armeniacae, Prutenicae et similium. Quare si institutuiones aliquae harum linguarum, vel colloquia vel etiam libelli pij aliqui uti praecationes vel catechismi cum interpretatione aliqua per Europeam aliquam linguam aut etiam Graecam, Hebreamve ibi reperiantur, velim authores, cum loco et tempore editionis mihi significes". 11 Uma discusssão sobre um "conhecimento universal" remonta a Proclus que em seu Comentário ao primeiro livro dos Elementos de Euclides dicute diversas opiniões sobre a matemática dando ênfase aos princípios e teoremas comuns para as diferentes disciplinas matemáticas. Nos séculos XV e XVI, o assunto volta à tona, através de publicações, traduções e comentários a esta obra de Proclus. A partir destas discussões, surgiram várias ideias modernas para uma ciência que embasa todo o conehcimento matemático, seus princípios e suas propriedades. Os estudiosos do período se referiram a tal assunto por diversos nomes, entre eles: matemática geral (mathematica generalis), conhecimento principal (prima mathesis) e conhecimento universal (Mathesis Universalis). Van Roomen publicou a primeira parte de suas ideias acerca do assunto em In Archimedis Circuli Dimensionem de 1597 e uma parte mais aprimorada foi escrita, mas não publicada, no manuscrito In Mahumedis arabis algebram prolegomena (BOCKSTAELE, 2009). 34 como no seu cálculo para o número π com 16 casas decimais, nas quais mostra-se um exímio calculador. Como dissemos anteriormente, como médico, foi o primeiro professor do curso de medicina na Universidade de Wurceburgo. Foi respeitado por seus colegas e honrado como um homem de ensino e um matemático competente (BOCKSTAELE, 1976). 35 Capítulo 3 INTERESSES MATEMÁTICOS E ASTRONÔMICOS DE VAN ROOMEN Van Roomen teve grande interesse pelas disciplinas matemáticas estudadas em seu período. A partir de suas publicações e de sua Correspondência percebemos que os assuntos matemáticos que mais lhe interessavam eram a geometria, a álgebra e a astronomia. Em sua primeira obra publicada – a Ouranographia de 1591 – van Roomen traz uma compilação de parte significativa do que havia sido publicado até aquele momento no que diz respeito à astronomia. Apesar de van Roomen se basear principalmente na filosofia aristotélica, ele cita inúmeras obras da Antiguidade, da Idade Média e de seu tempo. Ainda no que diz respeito á astronomia, van Roomen publicou outras duas obras: a tese de seu aluno Lambertus Croppet De corporum mundanorum simplicium distinctione et numero (1598) e o Speculum astronomicum (1606). Além disso, manteve contato através de visitas pessoais e Correspondência com Johannes Kepler e Tycho Brahe, astrônomos importantes do período. No primeiro parágrafo da carta datada de 11 de maio de 1592, van Roomen comenta a Clavius que quando esteve em Roma, eles haviam conversado sobre álgebra e aritmética e que Clavius havia prometido uma obra de álgebra, mas que ainda não tinha vindo ao lume. Hoje sabemos da existência de uma obra intitulada Algebra de Clavius, mas que só foi publicada em Roma em 1608. Ainda naquele parágrafo, van Roomen menciona os trabalhos de álgebra e aritmética que estão sendo escritos por Ludolph van Ceulen e Simon Stevin: Na Bélgica temos pouquíssimos que se alegram com essas coisas impenetráveis12; desses cuja fama chega a mim, Ludolph van Ceulen e Simon Stevin são tidos por superiores aos outros. O primeiro deles pode ser tido como versadíssimo em álgebra entre todos os que conheci, como pude perceber a partir de sua disseminada fama, bem como a partir de suas cartas escritas a mim; tanto que confessa sobre si, não poder ser encontrada nenhuma equação em álgebra cuja resolução ele não obtenha até o valor da raiz ou do quadrado, mesmo se oito ou nove quantidades sejam equacionadas entre si; mas esse homem que é versado somente na língua alemã e belga, não publicou nada até agora, mas como entendo haverá de lançar alguma [coisa]. Mas o outro, quer dizer Simon Stevin, redigiu em língua francesa uma aritmética inteira (que também é contida pela álgebra geral): Se vossa Reverência não a tiver, eu enviarei. Escreveu também certos problemas por um belíssimo método geométrico, e esse é novo. Mas, entre os seus trabalhos restantes, o mais recomendado é um certo trabalho novo dito De wegkunst, isto é, Estática. Em cuja 12 Aqui van Roomen se refere à álgebra como "as coisas impenetráveis", 36 obra se pode distinguir tentativas dele, sem dúvida quis mostrar a excelência e a riqueza da língua belga (...); além disso, o esforço (e de modo feliz o bastante) de trazer o entendimento perfeito da Estática a partir de princípios próprios correspondendo otimamente à experiência. (BOCKSTAELE, 1976, tradução e colchetes nossos)13. Como podemos perceber, van Roomen tem grande apreço por Ludolph van Ceulen e Simon Stevin e, por isso, comenta fervorosamente dos seus feitos. A álgebra continua a ser um tema recorrente na Correspondência de van Roomen. Na carta de 1 de julho de 1597 volta a escrever sobre a Algebra de van Ceulen e a de François Viète: Ludolph van Ceulen está ocupado na produção de sua Álgebra e na disposição em que deve ser escrita. A obra será grande, o método verdadeiro, o modo como escreve não douto, mas fácil. Também o próprio Viète promete uma Álgebra. Depois que cada um publicar suas coisas, o método de Viète (Pois eu dificilmente espero dele mais do que um Método) deverá facilmente acomodar a doutrina ludolfiana, que não duvido que seja sólida e exata (ainda que somente sejam escritas em uma língua bárbara) (BOCKSTAELE, 1976, tradução nossa)14. Em uma das cartas de van Roomen para Kepler, ele trata de uma demonstração algébrica para uma comparação entre o raio do círculo e o lado de plígonos com 4, 7, 9, 11 e 13 lados e também a relação entre os lados de dois polígonos regulares inscritos em um círculo. Os assuntos referentes à trigonometria, sem dúvida alguma, são os mais recorrentes em sua Correspondência. Na carta de 11 de maio de 1592, escreve a Clavius sobre os seus cálculos de tabelas trigonométricas, contudo, esses estudos não passavam de exercícios: Mas, brevemente eu levo ao público algo de meus estudos. Eu calculei precisamente a razão da circunferência ao diâmetro em relação ao diâmetro de 2x1016 partes. Trabalhei muitíssimo na construção de uma tabela de senos, não a ponto de encontrar um método de construção, pois esse já foi descrito por muitos, mas antes 13 "In Belgio qui rebus illis abstrusis gaudeant, hactenus paucissimus; inter eos quorum fama ad me pervenit ceteris excellentiores videntur Ludolf van Collen et Simon Stevinius, quorum prior ut ex fama de eo sparsa, tum ex litteris eius ad me scriptis animadvertere potui versatissimus inter omnes quos novi in Algebra haberi potest: ita ut ipse de se profiteatur non posse reperiri aequationem ullam in Algebra, etiam si octo vel novem quantitates inter se aequarentus, cuius non inveniat resolutionem usque ad valorem radicis, vel quadrati: verum hic vir solam Germanicam et Belgicam linguam callens nihil hactenus in lucem emisit, iam quaedam missurus est ut intelligo. Alter vero videlicet Simon Stevinius Arithmeticam integram (qua etiam universa continetur Algebra) sermone conscripsit Gallico: Si Reveresntia vestra illam non habeat, ego mittam. Scripsit quoque problemata quaedam Geometrica pulcherrima methodo, eaque nova. Sed inter cetera eius opera, maxime commendatur opus quoddam novum. De Wegkusnt dictum hoc est Statice. In quo opere duos illius cernere licet conatus, nimirum ostendere voluit excellentiam (...); preterea conatus est (atque satis faeliciter) tradere perfectam cognitionem staticae ex principiis propriis experientiae optime respondentibus" (BOCKSTAELE, 1976). 14 "Ludolfus van Collen occupatur in Algebra sua concinnanda, et in ordinem redigenda. Opus erit magnum, doctrina vera, stÿlus, ut scribit, non doctus, sed tamen facilis. Vieta et ipse Algebram promittit. Postquam ediderit uterque sua, facile erit Methodo Vietanae (Nam ego vix plura quam Methodum ab eo expecto) doctrinam accomodare Ludolfianam, quam solidam et exactam (licet barbaro more uti hactenus conscripta sunt) fore non dubito" (BOCKSTAELE, 1976). 37 para que me exercitasse na própria construção (BOCKSTAELE, 1976, tradução nossa)15. Entretanto, esses exercícios matemáticos passaram a ocupar a mente de van Roomen e passou a trabalhar na elaboração de tabelas trigonométricas cada vez mais precisas. Na carta de 17 de março de 1593, van Roomen comenta a Clavius os inúmeros erros contidos nas tabelas de diversos autores e que talvez a tabela de Regiomontanus seja a melhor, por não possuir grandes erros. Também escreve que começou a trabalhar na construção de tabelas mais precisas. Uma carta sem data, mas que segundo Bockstaele (1976), provavelmente foi enviada a Clavius no ano de 1601, trata exclusivamente dos temas trigonométricos. Essa pode ser dividida em três partes, conforme vemos abaixo: Censura de Adrianus Romanus às tabelas de tangentes e secantes que devem ser compostas pelo Reverendo Padre Christoph Grienberger, professor de matemática no Colégio da Companhia de Jesus em Roma. Regra universal necessária para que os erros sejam evitados nos cálculos de tangentes e secantes. Censura de Adrianus Romanus à tabela de tangentes e secantes de Georg Joachim Rheticus calculada segundo o raio de 1010 partes, compreendida por três proposições (BOCKSTAELE, 1976, tradução nossa)16. As críticas e as regras elaboradas por van Roomen as tabelas trigonométricas de Rheticus (1514-1574) são detalhadas em Bockstaele (1992). Outro assunto de grande interesse de van Roomen foram os problemas matemáticos gregos, dentre eles a Quadratura do Círculo e o Problema de Apolônio. Na carta de 4 de outubro de 1594, van Roomen escreve a Scaliger sobre sua viagem à Frankfurt após a feira do livro onde encontrou o livro Cyclometrica elementa duo (1594), no qual Scaliger expõe sua resolução para a quadratura do círculo: Homem ilustríssimo, já terminada a feira de Frankfurt, vim [novamente] a Frankfurt, onde entre o que sobrou da feira encontrei o livro escrito por vossa Excelência sobre a quadratura do círculo, que na verdade desejamos já há muito tempo. Por outro lado, nada escrevo sobre isso neste momento; quando tiver encontrado tempo eu o 15 "Sed ut breviter aliquid de meis studijs in medium proferam. Ego rationem peripheriae ad diametrum calculatus sum exquisitissime respectu diametri 20000,0000,0000,0000, partium. In constructione tabulae sinuum plurimum labovari, non ades ut rationem constructionis invenirem" (BOCKSTAELE, 1976). 16 "Adriani Romani Censura in tabulas tangentium et secantium a Reverendo Patre Christophoro Gruenbergero. Romae in Collegio Societatis Jesu Matheseos professore, componendas" "Regula universalis ad evitandos errores in calculo tangentium et secantium necessaria" "Adriani Romani Censura in tabulam tangentium et secantium a Georgio Joachimo Rhetico secundum radium 10000.0000.00 partium supputatam tribus propositionibus comprehensa" (BOCKSTAELE, 1976). 38 lerei todo, e por outro lado, transcreverei brevemente o que pensar sobre a quadratura encontrada (BOCKSTAELE, 1992a, tradução nossa)17. Não sabemos, quando van Roomen fez a leitura da obra, nem possuímos um exemplar da carta em que ele escreve a sua opinião sobre a quadratura de Scaliger. Contudo, em 31 de março de 1595, Scaliger escreve para van Roomen dizendo que realmente tinha errado e que fez as correções que achou necessário na obra Appendix ad Cyclometria sua (1595). Isso nos mostra que van Roomen deve ter lido a obra neste tempo e enviado alguma carta referente à erros na obra de Scaliger. Contudo, as correções de Scaliger ainda são bastante superficiais. Na carta de 17 de setembro de 1597, van Roomen comenta a Clavius sobre a publicação de sua obra In Archimedis circuli dimensionem (1597), na qual van Roomen refuta os argumentos de Scaliger e de outros estudiosos que dizem ter quadrado o círculo. Nessa obra, percebemos que van Roomen não tem uma boa relação com Scaliger, como é possível ver a partir do termo "frívolo" e do trecho "rebaixei suficientemente o elevado ânimo dele". Van Roomen, católico, também comenta das dificuldades de se publicar uma obra numa cidade calvinista demonstrando os erros de Scaliger, também calvinista: Envio minha análise do pequeno tratado de Arquimedes, juntamente com exercícios cíclicos, nos quais verás frivolidades, mas com os frívolos foi conveniente ser frívolo. (...) Verás também que eu rebaixei suficientemente o elevado ânimo dele. Pois, quase não omiti nenhum ponto que eu não demonstre ser de falsidade. Esperarei o que ele haverá de responder a isso (BOCKSTAELE, 1976, tradução nossa). Mas escuta que coisa graciosa. Eu fiz um acordo de impressão com um tipógrafo calvinista genebrino para que produzisse o livro (O fato é que os de Frankfurt descuidaram de minha esperança). Dificilmente os calvinistas suportaram que eu, católico, rejeitasse a doutrina do mais célebre entre os calvinistas, ponto de que muitos me tinham encorajado que desistisse desde o início. E muito mais dificilmente suportaram que aquele livro contra um calvinista fosse impresso na principal cidade dos calvinistas. Assim um tumulto surgiu entre os estudiosos de Genebra, quiseram proibir a impressão do livro e até quiseram que o original fosse suprimido (Eu certamente, de fato descrevera com uma apressada pena, e não tive o tempo necessário para reescrever). Mas o tipógrafo (como foi relatado por mim tanto por ele mesmo como por outros) da obra empreendida pôs-se à disposição do fiel contratador (como eu a ele antes informara). Defendeu que nada estava contido na obra que dissesse respeito à religião ou à saúde da república. O livro foi examinado e, como o tipógrafo defendeu, assim também fora julgado pelos censores. Por isso, tendo (?) todos os estudiosos dedicadíssimos a Scaliger, o tipógrafo recorreu à autoridade de imprimir e produziu mesmo o livro sob o título da cidade de Wurceburgo (como também eu acordara com ele). Mas não pouco errou o tipógrafo no título quando chama a mim professor de matemática aqui em Wurceburgo, porque é nula para mim aqui tal profissão, mas somente de medicina. Chamou-me 17 "Clarissime vir, finitis jam Francofurtanis nundinis, Francofurtum veni, ubi inter nundinarum reliquias inveni librum ab Ecc. vestra conscriptum de quadratura circuli, quem sanè longo jam tempore desideravimus. Nihil autem de eo hoc tempore scribo; ubi ocium [otium?] nactus fuero totum perlegam, atque quid de quadratura inventa sentiam breviter perscribam" (BOCKSTAELE, 1992). 39 também "excelentíssimo", o que para minha modéstia costuma ser estranhíssimo. Mas ele dirige a causa do erro para mim, porque eu tinha escrito simplesmente "pelo autor A. Romanus". De fato, ele considerou que esse título é excessivamente de pouco valor (BOCKSTAELE, 1976, tradução nossa)18. O interesse pela quadratura do círculo é mencionado em diversas outras passagens, como na carta de 11 de maio de 1592: Recentemente Nicolas Raymarus Ursus editou certo tratado em que atribuiu a Simon du Chesne a invenção de uma certa quadratura: mas expõe a falsidade dela não apenas à circunscrição de polígonos, mas também aos limites de Arquimedes (BOCKSTAELE, 1976, tradução nossa)19. E também na carta de 1 de julho de 1597, quando van Roomen comenta sobre o envio de cartas juntamente com alguns livros a Clavius: Sei que enviei através do livreiro belga de sobrenome Brechtanum – que mantém negócios com o Basseus em Frankfurt –, na última feira do outono, cartas, juntamente com uns poucos livros, a saber, o livro de Jacob Christmann sobre a quadratura do círculo e a Trigonometria de um certo Pitiscus, mas não sei de nenhuma outra coisa (BOCKSTAELE, 1976, tradução nossa)20. Já o problema de Apolônio foi estudado por van Roomen como desafio proposto por François Viète. Em 1593, van Roomen, em sua obra Ideae mathematicae pars prima, propõe um desafio a todos os matemáticos do mundo que posteriormente foi resolvido por Viète que em contrapartida enviou o Problema como desafio a van Roomen. Em 1596, van Roomen publicou a obra Problema Apolloniacum que continha inúmeros erros. Na carta de 1 de julho de 1597, van Roomen ainda conta com a ajuda de Clavius para o estudo de tal problema. 18 "Mitto meam in Archimedis libellum analysin, una cum exercitationibus cyclicis, in quibus videbis nugas, at cum nugatoribus nugari oportuit. (...) Videbis me etiam satis ejus elatum animum depressisse. Nam vix punctulum unum omisi quod falsitatis non arguerim. Ego quid ad haec sit responsurus expectabo" "Sed audi lepidum quid. Ego de impressione conveni cum Typographo Genevensi Calviniano ut librum excuderet (Francofurtani namque me luserunt spe). Aegre tulerunt Calviniani, me Catholicum, rejicere doctrinam celeberrimi inter Calvinianos, ideo multi me fuerunt hortati ut ab incepto desisterem. At vero multo egrius tulerunt librum illum contra Calvinianum, imprimi in civitate Calvinianorum capite. Ideo inter studiosos Genevenses tumultus ortus est, libri impressionem prohibere voluerunt imo et exemplar supprimi (Ego sane aliud non habui festinanti enim calamo descripseram, neque transcribendi fuit ocium). At Typographus (uti mihi tum per ipsum tum per alios relatum fuit) suscepti operis fidelem sese praestitit patronum. Nil (uti ego eum antea informaram) in opere contineri quod concerneret religionem aut Reipublicae salutem asseruit. Liber examinatus fuit et ut asseruit Typographus ita quoque a censoribus fuit judicatum. Quare fredentibus omnibus studiosis Scaligero addictissimis, Typographus extorsit authoritatem imprimendi et excusus est imo (uti etiam cum eo conveneram) sub titulo civitatis Wurceburgensis. At vero non parum erravit Typographus in Titulo dum me professorem Matheseos hic Wurceburgi vocat cum nulla mihi hic talis sit professio sed dumtaxat Medicinae. Vocavit et Excellentissimum, quod a mea modestia solet esse alienissimum. Verum causam erroris in me conjicit quod ego simpliciter scripserim authore A. Romano. Existimavit enim eum titulum nimis esse vilem" (BOCKSTAELE, 1976). 19 "Nuper Nicolaus Raymarus Ursus edidit tractatum quendam in quo Simoni a Quercu tribuit inventionem quadraturae cuiusdam: sed illius falsitatem ostendit non tantum polygonorum circumscriptio sed at termini Archimedis" (BOCKSTAELE, 1976). 20 O original latino é: "Scio, me nundinis ultimis autumnalibus per Bibliopolam Belgam cognomine Brechtanum qui negocia Basae agit Francofurti, misisse literas, una cum libellis exiguis, nempe Jacobi Christmanni librum de circuli quadratura, et Petisci cujusdam Trigonometriam, nescio an aliqua alia" (BOCKSTAELE, 1976). 40 Contudo, em 1600, Viète publica a sua resposta em Apolonius Gallus (GONÇALVES & OLIVEIRA, 2010). As figuras isoperimétricas também são objetos de estudo de van Roomen durante alguns anos de sua vida. Exemplo disso foi parte de sua obra Ideae mathematica pars prima (1593) e comentários sobre o assunto em sua Correspondência. Este assunto é explorado por Bockstaele (1981). Ainda sobre as figuras isoperimétricas, em uma de suas cartas, Brożek fala a van Roomen sobre a disputa entre os astrônomos Giovanni Antonio Magini e David Origanus com relação a esse tema e também relata sobre um teorema referente à figuras isoperimétricas tratado na Geometria de Petrus Ramus. A resposta de van Roomen para esta carta foi publicada por Brożek em sua Epistolae (Cracóvia, 1615) e em sua Apologia (Danzig, 1652) (BOCKSTAELE, 1976; BUSARD, 1981). Outro assunto de interesse de van Roomen é o cálculo do número π. Na introdução da obra Ideae mathematicae pars prima (1593), van Roomen mostra o número π com 16 casas decimais, sendo que atualmente sabemos que 15 delas estão corretas e somente a última delas está incorreta (ROOMEN, 1593). Na carta de 10 de fevereiro de 1598 para Clavius, van Roomen escreve que Ludolph van Ceulen diz ter calculado o número π com mais de 20 casas decimais, enquanto que Christoph Grienberger calculou com 24 dígitos. Van Roomen diz não acreditar que Ludolph possa superar Grienberger em tal feito e diz que enviará a Ludolph o cálculo de Grienberger com 23 casas para ver qual será a resposta. Nas cartas estudadas não encontramos mais menção aos trabalhos de Ludolph com relação a isso, mas sabemos que antes disso, em 1596, ele já havia publicado o número π com 36 casas decimais em sua obra Van den Circkel. Outros temas do interesse de van Roomen são a mathesis universalis e a classificação das disciplinas matemáticas em seu período. As primeiras ideias de van Roomen sobre uma scientia mathematica universalis foi publicada primeiro na sua obra Ideae mathematicae pars prima (1593) e depois em In Archimedis Circuli dimensionem (1597). Ele compôs uma versão mais elaborada sobre o tema, mas este texto não foi efetivamente publicado e somente parte dele esteve presente no manuscrito In Mahumedis arabis algebram prolegomena. Van Roomen planejou, desde muito cedo, publicar obras sobre uma visão geral de todo o campo da matemática, totius mathesis idea. Na obra Mathesis polemica (1605), ele traz novamente comentários gerais sobre cada uma das disciplinas matemáticas incluindo a mathesis universalis (BOCKSTAELE, 2009). 41 A Mathesis Polemica de van Roomen não é só importante para entender o que são as "matemáticas", mas também introduz a problemática da instrumentação matemática, outro assunto de interesse de van Roomen. Outros assuntos referentes à atividade matemática de van Roomen são explorados por Gonçalves e Oliveira (2010). 43 Capítulo 4 OBRAS, MANUSCRITOS E CORRESPONDÊNCIA DE VAN ROOMEN Embora van Roomen tenha ensinado principalmente assuntos que dizem respeito à medicina, seu mérito principal ainda é em matemática. A obra matemática dele não é tão vasta, mas trazem contribuições para o cálculo de tabelas trigonométricas tanto com seus métodos quanto no que diz respeito à sugestões para que tabelas de outros estudiosos fossem melhoradas. Ainda no que diz respeito à trigonometria, van Roomen criou métodos para cálculo de áreas de figuras isoperimétricas, fez críticas aos estudiosos de seu tempo que diziam ter quadrado o círculo e calculou o número π com 16 casas decimais. Através de seus cálculos bastante apurados van Roomen se mostra um grande calculador. Além disso, as suas obras matemáticas contêm suas ideias acerca da mathesis universalis. Enquanto suas publicações médicas são em grande parte as teses que seus alunos defenderam, a maior parte dos trabalhos sobre astronomia, cronologia, meteorologia, geografia e botânica são compilações de obras da Antiguidade, da Idade Média e de seu tempo. Entretanto, apesar desse ser um trabalho que parece não ter originalidade alguma, esse tipo de compilação mostra: Em primeiro lugar, quais obras um estudioso daquele tempo tinha acesso e quais as obras que eventualmente eram reconhecidas naquele grupo de estudiosos no qual van Roomen estava inserido; Além disso, em segundo lugar, demonstra a intelectualidade de van Roomen, nos evidenciando que ele tinha conchecimento de inúmeras obras literarias, científicas e filosóficas publicadas desde a Antiguidade até seu tempo, tanto pelos gregos, quanto pelos latinos e árabes. Já os manuscritos, todos foram perdidos nos incêndios ocorridos em diversas bibliotecas da Europa durante as duas Guerras Mundiais, entretanto, parte da Correspondência ainda existente foi editada por Paul Bockstaele (1976; 1992a), mas muitas delas também foram perdidas. Neste capítulo faremos um levantamento de algumas das obras, dos manuscritos e da Correspondência deixados por van Roomen e, na medida do possível, traremos algum comentário geral sobre elas. 44 Obras de van Roomen Abaixo estão arroladas algumas das principais obras de van Roomen com uma pequena explicação do conteúdo presente nelas. (1591) – Ouranographia sive caeli descriptio. A Ouranographia é objeto de estudo desta dissertação. Na Parte 2, traremos a sua trasncrição e tradução para o português e, na Parte 3, estão as notas e comentários referentes a nossa analise da obra. (1593) – Ideae mathematicae pars prima (Fig. 3). Essa obra foi dedicada ao padre Christoph Clavius e é entendida como a primeira parte de um grande trabalho de van Roomen sobre o cálculo de cordas no círculo e a quadratura do círculo (BUSARD, 1981). Na introdução, van Roomen escreve que por alguns anos tentou descobrir uma regra geral para o cálculo de lados de todos os polígonos regulares. Ele descobriu três métodos dos quais um em que usa equações algébricas, para todo polígono regular desde um triângulo até um polígono de oitenta lados, ele obteve as equações e as enviou para Ludolph van Ceulen. Nessa obra, van Roomen mostra, sem nenhuma prova, os cálculos para 32 casas decimais dos lados dos polígonos regulares de três, quatro, cinco e quinze lados e dos polígonos derivados destes dobrando continuamente o número de lados. Ele continou esses cálculos até os polígonos com 15x260 lados e com a ajuda do polígono de 251.658.240 lados, calcula o número π com 16 casas decimais, 15 delas corretas (BUSARD, 1981). Figura 3: Frontispício da obra Ideae mathematicae pars prima. 45 No início dessa obra, van Roomen propõe como desafio a todos os matemáticos do mundo uma equação de grau 45. Um embaixador da Holanda diz ao Rei Henry IV que a França não possuia nenhum geômetra capaz de resolver esse problema. Henry o envia a Viète que dá uma resolução para o problema em vinte e dois dias depois de tê-lo recebido. Em seu retorno, Viète porpõe como desafio a van Roomen o Problema de Apolônio (BUSARD, 1981). (1595) – Parvum Theatrum Urbium (Fig. 4). (1596) – Problema Apolloniacum. No prefácio da obra Ideae mathematicae pars prima (1593), van Roomen desafiou todos os matemáticos do mundo a resolverem uma equação de grau 45 (BOCKSTAELE, 1976). Em termos modernos a equação dada por van Roomen é a seguinte: x45 – 45x43 + 945x41 – 12300x39 + ... + 95634x5 – 3795x3 + 45x = alguma constante (BIEN, 2007, p. 51) Viète resolveu o problema e publicou a sua resposta em Ad problema quod omnibus mathematicis e no final de sua obra desafiou van Roomen com o problema – conhecido como Problema de Apolônio – da construção de um círculo tangente a outros três círculos dados. Van Roomen publicou sua resposta em Problema Apolloniacum (1596). A solução de van Roomen é dada usando hipérboles e Viète mostra que a solução dada por van Roomen é impossível de ser construída com régua e compasso. Mesmo após a publicação, van Roomen ainda continuou estudando o problema e se comunicando com Figura 4: Frontispício da obra Parvum theatrum urbium. 46 Clavius acerca dele. Numa dessas cartas, Clavius mostra alguns casos que van Roomen não havia previsto (BOCKSTAELE, 1976). (1597) – In Archimedis Circuli dimensionem. Em 1594, Scaliger publicou sua Cyclometrica elementa duo na qual tenta provar que a aproximação do número π por Arquimedes estava incorreta. Ele foi atacado por muitos matemáticos, entre eles van Ceulen e Viète, e também por van Roomen. A primeira parte dessa obra – In Archimedis circuli dimensionem – contém uma reedição do texto grego Sobre a medida do círculo de Arquimedes, com uma tradução para o latim e uma análise elaborada. Na segunda parte, Apologia pro Archiimede ad clarissimum virum Josephum Scaligerum, van Roomen refuta as objeções de Scaliger. Na terceira parte, ele refuta, em dez diálogos, as quadraturas de Oronce Finé, Simon van der Eycke, Raymarus Ursus e Scaliger (BUSARD, 1981). (1602) – Idea Matheseos universae. (1602) – Chordarum arcubus circuli. Van Roomen gostava muito de cálculos extensos. Nessa obra, van Roomen mostra raízes quadradas com 220 ou 300 casas decimais necessárias para o cálculo do polígono regular de trinta lados. De certo modo, essa obra contém uma continuação dos estudos de van Roomen publicados em 1593 em Ideae mathematicae pars prima (BUSARD, 1981). (1605) – Mathesis Polemica. (1606) – Speculum astronomicum. Essa, e também a obra Canon triangulorum sphaericorum (1609), são as primeiras obras a trazerem o uso sistemático da notação trigonométrica. Elas tratam de trigonometria plana e esférica (BUSARD, 1981). (1609) –Canon Triangulorum sphaericorum. Em sua terminologia, van Roomen imitou Viète, usando as expressões prosinus e transinuosa para tangente e secante, respectivamente. As tabelas de senos, tangentes e secantes, juntamente com suas co-funções, são emprestadas de Clavius (BUSARD, 1981). 47 (1609) – Mathematicae analyseos triumphus. Essa é a útlima contribuição de van Roomen para o porjeto desenvolvido em Ideae mathematicae pars prima (1593). Nesse trabalho, van Roomen calcula os lados de polígonos regulares de nove a oitenta lados com 108 casas decimais (BUSARD, 1981). Uma lista com os títulos originais das obras de van Roomen em ordem de publicação estão no anexo 1. Manuscritos de van Roomen Abaixo seguem os títulos dos quatro manuscritos atibuídos a van Roomen, contudo, estes foram perdidos nos incêndios à algumas bibliotecas europeias ocorridos durante as duas Guerras Mundiais. 1 – In Mahumedis arabis Algebram Prolegomena. Nesse manuscrito, van Roomen escreveu um comentário sobre a Álgebra de alKhwārizmī. Existiam duas cópias desse manuscrito os quais foram perdidos: a cópia da Universidade de Louvain foi destruída em 1914 e a de Douai em 1944 (BUSARD, 1981). 2 – Tractatus de notatione numerorum, authore Adriano Romano, equite aurato. 3 – Nova multiplicandi, dividendi, quadrata componendi, radices extrahendi ratio, multo quam pervulgata certior, facilior, et majoribus maxime numeris accommodatior, authore A. Romano, E. A. Esse trabalho lida com o cálculo com números grandes e foi publicado postumamente em 1904 por Henri Bosmans (BUSARD, 1981). 4 – Tractatus de formatione corporis humani in utero. Correspondência de van Roomen A Correspondência de van Roomen ainda existente foi editada nos volumes 3 e 19 do LIAS – Sources and Documents Relating to the Early Modern History of the Ideas (BOCKSTAELE, 1976; 1992a) e totalizam 47 cartas. A lista desta Correspondência está na tabela abaixo: 48 Tabela 1: Índice da Correspondência de van Roomen.21 No22 Remetente Destinatário Data 1 Van Roomen Louvain Clavius Roma 11/05/1592 2 Van Roomen Louvain Clavius Roma 12/09/1592 3 Van Roomen Louvain Joannes Moretus Antuérpia 07 e 10/01/1593 4 Joannes Moretus Antuérpia Van Roomen Louvain 13/01/1593 5 Van Roomen Louvain Clavius Roma 17/03/1593 6 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Clavius Roma 30/06/1593 7 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Clavius Roma 20/09/1593 8 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Clavius Roma 11/11/1593 9 Justus Lipsius Louvain Van Roomen Wurceburgo 21/11/1593 10 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Julius Echter Wurceburgo 01/01/1594 10a Van Roomen Frankfurt Scaliger Leiden 04/10/1594 11 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Clavius Roma 20/11/1594 12 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Ulisse Aldrovandi Bolonha Entre __/07/1594 e __/06/1595 13 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Justus Lipsius Louvain 08/02/1595 14 Scaliger Leiden Van Roomen Wurceburgo 31/03/1595 15 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Clavius Roma 03/10/1595 16 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Joannes Moretus Antuérpia 24/10/1595 17 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Joannes Moretus Antuérpia 23/11/1595 18 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Clavius Roma 01/07/1597 19 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Clavius Roma 17/09/1597 20 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Grienberger Roma 10/02/1598 21 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Clavius Roma 10/02/1598 21a Van Roomen Wurceburgo J. G. Herwart von Hohenburg Munique 01/07/1598 21b J. G. Herwart von Hohenburg Van Roomen __/__/1598 21c Van Roomen J.G. Herwart von Hohenburg Munique __/__/1598 22 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Clavius Roma 15/10/1598 23 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Grienberger Roma 15/10/1598 24 Van Roomen Clavius Roma 25 Van Roomen Frankfurt Clavius Roma __/04/1601 26 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Joannes Faber Roma 25/10/1601 27 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Clavius Roma 25/10/1601 28 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Clavius Roma 01/11/1601 28a Wendelinus Jung Van Roomen 14/01/1602 29 Van Roomen Frankfurt Clavius Roma 10/04/1602 30 Van Roomen Frankfurt Magini Bolonha 10/04/1602 31 Van Roomen Frankfurt Magini Bolonha 26/09/1602 32 Van Roomen Frankfurt Clavius Roma 26/09/1602 21 As cartas que aparecem em negrito foram traduzidas e estudadas em dois projetos de Iniciação Científica – Um Episódio da História da Ciência nos Séculos XVI e XVII: Adriaan van Roomen, a Matemática e a Astronomia (entre 2007 e 2008) e Geometria e Astronomia na Correspondência de Adriaan van Roomen (entre 2008 e 2009) sob orientação do Prof. Dr. Carlos Henrique Barbosa Gonçalves sendo que o último teve financiamento da FAPESP. As cartas indicadas por itálico foram traduzidas anteriormente a esses projetos pelo Prof. Carlos. Os assuntos tratados na Correspondência estudada podem ser vistos nos artigos de Gonçalves e Oliveira (2007; 2010) e também em boa parte dos capítulos anteriores. 22 Os números das cartas são os mesmos usados por Bockstaele (1976; 1992a) em sua edição crítica para a Correspondência de van Roomen. 49 33 Magini Bolonha Van Roomen Wurceburgo 10/03/1603 34 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Julius Echter Wurceburgo 19/03/1603 35 Van Roomen Louvain Clavius Roma 28/12/1604 36 Van Roomen Frankfurt Magini Bolonha __/09/1595 37 Van Roomen Louvain Kepler Praga 13/05/1609 38 Van Roomen Praga Kepler Praga Entre 1600 e 1612 39 Brozek Cracóvia Van Roomen Zamosc 01/10/1610 40 Van Roomen Zamosc Brozek Cracóvia 05/02/1611 41 Brozek Cracóvia Van Roomen Zamosc __/01/1612 42 Van Roomen Wurceburgo Johann Hartmann Beyer Frankfurt 24/03/1615 A lista de correspondentes de van Roomen pode ser aumentada se incluirmos as cartas presentes nas dedicatórias de suas obras e outros correspondentes citados nas suas próprias cartas. Assim pooderiamos incluir os seguintes nomes: Caesar Baronius, cardeal no Vaticano; Flaminio Moro; Valentinus Otho, discípulo de George Joachim Rheticus; Frans van Raphelengius, humanista; Ludolph van Ceulen, matemático; Philip van Lansberge, astrônomo e matemático; Jan Lasicki, nobre polonês; Antonio van Heetveldio, prefeito de Louvain; Pietro Galesini; Julius Goltzius; o impressor Nicolas Bassaeus de Frankfurt; o augustiniano Angelus Rocca, diretor da impressora do Vaticano; Girolamo Mercuriali, professor de medicina em Pádua; Guido Ubaldo; o matemático francês François Viète; Enea Vizanius; Gaspard van den Wouwer; Achillus ab Hensperg, vereador de Frankfurt; o nobre polonês Nicholas Koriczinski; Alexander duque de Ostrog; Ernest arcebispo de Colonia; Maximilian I, duque da Áustria; o Arquiduque Albert da Áustria; o Imperador Rudolph II; e com certeza, esta lista continua incompleta (BOCKSTAELE, 1976). Nomes como o de Viète, van Ceulen, Kepler e Clavius, mostram que a Correspondência de van Roomen pode trazer informações de interesse para os estudos de história da matemática, da astronomia e da ciência durante a Renascença. Contudo, o resultado da pesquisa feita por Bockstaele é desapontador: a Correspondência de van Roomen com van Ceulen, van Lansberge, del Monte e Viète encontra-se completamente perdida. Somente as 47 cartas citadas acima e as cartas inclusas nas dedicatórias de seus livros estão preservadas (BOCKSTAELE, 1976). 51 PARTE 2: TRANSCRIÇÃO E TRADUÇÃO DA OURANOGRAPHIA DE VAN ROOMEN 53 Capítulo 5 O PROCESSO DE TRADUÇÃO23 A tradução da Ouranographia de van Roomen inicialmente foi feita em um documento de texto contendo tabela com duas colunas, sendo que na primeira transcrevemos o texto latino e na segunda escrevemos a tradução para o português. Utilizamos esse "método" simplesmente pelo fato de que facilita a comparação entre a transcrição e a tradução. Somente após possuirmos todo o texto transcrito e traduzido, ele foi colocado nos moldes que serão mencionados no próximo capítulo. Durante o processo de tradução sempre surgem trechos complicados. As citações de obras feitas por van Roomen, sem dúvida alguma, foi o maior problema encontrado durante esse processo. Essas citações são desde trechos das obras de Aristóteles, Platão e outros autores da Antiguidade até trechos de Tomás de Aquino, Johannes de Sacrobosco e outros estudiosos medievais. Esses trechos, na medida do possível, foram procurados nas obras originais para uma eventual comparação do texto latino ou traduções para nos auxiliar no processo de tradução, mas nem todos os trechos foram encontrados. Pensamos que alguns trechos não foram encontrados, pois as obras que van Roomen possuía eventualmente poderiam não ser originais, mas somente comentários ou traduções, o que permite que o trecho citado possa estar diferente daquele como foi escrito originalmente. Além disso, é possível que van Roomen tenha citado tais trechos a partir de sua memória, o que facilita a escrita errônea dos mesmos. Além do mais, o tipógrafo pode ter cometido alguns erros ao imprimir a obra facilitando a escrita errônea de alguns trechos. No momento em que realizamos a tradução, algumas vezes é necessária a inserção de palavras que não se encontram no original para que ajude o leitor no entendimento do sentido do texto. Estas inserções são feitas com as palavras entre colchetes [...]. É importante mencionar que o Prof. Carlos teve papel fundamental durante a revisão de nossa tradução e também contribuiu imensamente ao nos ajudar a traduzir os trechos mais complexos da obra e no entendimento daqueles escritos em língua grega. 23 As cópias da obra que estudamos e traduzimos foram adquiridas: uma pelo Prof. Carlos Gonçalves na Biblioteca Nacional da Áustria em Viena e a outra é uma versão digitalizada disponível no site do Centro de Digitalização da Biblioteca do Estado da Baviera na Alemanha <http://daten.digitalesammlungen.de/~db/0002/bsb00023986/images/>. 54 Os trechos em língua grega não foram traduzidos, pois normalmente o próprio van Roomen explica o significado em latim, desse modo, o trecho em grego pode ser entendido sem que seja necessário realizar a sua tradução. 55 Capítulo 6 NOTAS SOBRE A EDIÇÃO DO TEXTO Muitos trabalhos da Idade Moderna possuem características tipográficas próprias do período. Em nossa transcrição, optamos por transcrever o mais próximo possível do original. Nas linhas seguintes, descreveremos algumas dessas particularidades presentes na Ouranographia de van Roomen. Na obra de van Roomen, a letra "s" é representada pelo símbolo "s". O "s" aparece somente no final das palavras e naquelas escritas em maiúsculas. Ex: secundum, corpus, esse; A palavra et algumas vezes aparece com o símbolo "&". Também aparece a abreviação "&c" que significa et cetera; O encontro vocálico entre as letras "a" e "e" é representado por "ae" em minúsculas e "AE" em maiúsculas. O encontro dessas vogais algumas vezes também aparece com o símbolo "ę". Ex: CAELI, ouranographiae, quę; Algumas vezes as vogais "a", "e", "o" e "u" seguidas por "m" ou "n" aparecem com um "~" em cima e se suprime o "m" ou "n" que viria em seguida, desta forma: "ã", "ẽ", "õ" ou "ũ". Ex: caelũ, cõsiderantur; Algumas vezes a partícula enclítica "-que" aparece somente com a letra "q" seguida de ";", desta forma, "-q;". Normalemente, quando a partícula enclítica "-que" aparece, no original é possível perceber que logo acima da letra "q" aparece um acento grave "`", mas que, devido às limitações do editor de texto usado, transcreveremos sem o acento. Além dessas particularidades tipográficas que tivemos o cuidado de trazer o mais próximo do original, também colocamos o texto dentro de tabelas para que sua aparência se assemelhasse ao original, além disso, utilizarmos fontes que reproduzem fontes tipográficas do período e imagens originais da obra. Veja abaixo uma comparação do frontispício original da Ouranographia, a nossa transcrição e a tradução (Fig. 5). Figura 5: Comparação entre o frontispício do original, a transcrição e a tradução. 57 Cada página da obra de van Roomen é composta pelos seguinte elementos: Cabeçalho: Aqui está indicada a parte da obra que o leitor está lendo, por exemplo: Liber Primus Ouranographiae. Além disso, no cabeçalho, o leitor encontra a numeração de página da obra que só começa a ser contada a partir do Liber Primus; Parte central: Aqui está o conteúdo propriamente dito. As citações diretas feitas por van Roomen aparecem em itálico. Cada citação (direta ou indireta) é indicada com letras sobrescritas acima da palavra ou trecho a que se referem e o texto concernente à nota aparece na marginália da página. As nossas notas de tradução aparecem com um número sobrescrito acima da palavra ou trecho a que se referem e o texto respeitante a essas poderá ser consultado em um capítulo separado na terceira parte deste trabalho; Rodapé: Aqui o leitor encontra a primeira palavra da página seguinte ou pelo menos trecho dela. Nessa parte, o leitor também encontra uma inscrição – que tem algum tipo de função para o tipógrafo ou impressor da obra, mas que não tem relevância para a leitura – com letras que vão de "A" até "H". Essas letras aparecem sempre nas páginas ímpares, primeiramente sozinhas e depois seguida pelos números romanos "ij" e "iij", nem mais nem menos que isso, por exemplo: o "C" aparece na página 9, o "C ij" na 11 e o "C iij" na 13. Entre o fim das marcações com uma determinada letra e o começo de outra, sempre tem uma página (ímpar) sem nenhuma indicação, por exemplo: o "B iij" aparece na página 5, o "C" deveria aparecer na 7, mas aparecerá somente na 9. A letra "A" foje dos padrões acima, pois não aparece o "A" e o "A iij". As letras aparecerão na transcrição, mas em minha tradução, preferi por omitir tais letras. Marginália: Aqui o leitor encontra as referências que van Roomen cita (direta ou indiretamente) no texto com uma letra sobrescrita. As indicações em itálico sem a letra sobrescrita, são subseções de cada capítulo. As páginas da trasncrição e as da tradução serão intercaladas a fim de que aquele leitor conhecedor da língua latina possa ter a oportunidade de fazer eventuais comparações entre os textos e, como já foi mencionado anteriormente, o autor desta pesquisa sente-se à vontade para receber eventuais críticas e sugestões referentes ao trabalho. Então, finalmente, nas páginas que seguem, o leitor terá a oportunidade de ler a transcrição e a primeira tradução para o português da obra Ouranographia de Adriaan van Roomen. OURANOGRAPHIA SIUE CAELI DESCRIPTIO: TRANSCRIÇÃO E TRADUÇÃO Figura 6: Frontispício da Ouranographia siue caeli descriptio. O V R A N O G R A P H I A S I V E CAELI DESCRIPTIO. In qua praeter alia, caelorum numerus & ordo methodo inquiruntur, omniaque ea quae ad primum cęlum, primumque mobile ab eo distinctum spectant, dilucidè explicantur, nominibusque aptè fictis distinguuntur, Opus omnibus Astronomiae Physicaeque studiosis vtillissimum. A V T H O R E D . A D R I A N O R O M A N O I N A L M A L O V A N I E N S I A C A D E M I A , M E - D I C I N A E E T M A T H E M A T I C I S professore. A N T V E R P I A E , Apud Ioannem Keerbergium Typographum Iuratum. A N N O M . D . X C I . C V M G R A T I A E T P R I V I L E G I O . U R A N O G R A F I A O U A DESCRIÇÃO DO CÉU. Na qual, além de outras coisas, são investigados com método, o número e a ordem dos céus e todas aquelas que são concernentes ao primeiro céu e ao primeiro móvel distinto dele; são explicadas claramente e são distinguidas convenientemente por nomes inventados. Uma obra utilíssima para todos os estudiosos da astronomia e da física. PELO AUTOR SR. ADRIAAN VAN ROOMEN, Professor de M E D I C I N A E M A T E M Á T I C A N A AC A DE MI A P R O P Í C I A DE LO U V A I N . A N T U É R P I A , Pelo tipógrafo juramentado Johannes Keerbergius1. N O A N O 1 5 9 1 . 2 C O M G R A Ç A E P R I V I L É G I O . P CENSVRA. Ouranographiam Adriani Romani Medici Louanieñ. ego subscriptus probaui, & praelo dignam iudicaui, Hac 5 Decemb. 1590. H. CVYCKIVS. Decanus S. Petri Louanij, & Pontificius ac Regius librorum Censor. P R I V I L EG I I S VM M A . HILIPPVS Dei gratia Hispaniarum Rex &c. Dux Brabantiae, &c. Priuilegio cõcessit Adriano Romano Louaniensi, Medecinae Licentiato, authoritatem edendi librum cui titulus est. O V R A N O G R A P H I A sive C AE L I D E S C R I P T I O , idque per quemcumque voluerit Typographum vt latiùs patet in originali Priuilegio, dato Bruxellae, Anno 1590. Die 7. Mensis Nouembris. Susignatum De Roij. F CENSURA. Eu, subscrito, examinei e indiquei digna para o prelo a Uranographia de Adrianus Romanus, médico de Louvain, neste, 5 de dezembro de 1590. H. C U Y C K I U S.1 Decano e pontífice de São Pedro de Louvain, e censor régio dos livros. RESUMO DO PRIVILÉGIO. ILIPE1, rei da Espanha com a graça de Deus, etc., duque de Brabante, etc., concedeu com privilégio a Adrianus Romanus de Louvain, licenciado em medicina, a autoridade de imprimir o livro cujo título é U R A N O G R A F I A ou A D E S C R I Ç Ã O D O C É U , e isso por qualquer tipógrafo que ele queira, como mais amplamente está exposto no privilégio original, dado em Bruxelas, no ano 1590, no dia 7 do mês de novembro. Subscreve O Rei. O V R A N O G R A P H I AE N O S T R AE P A R T I T I O G E N E R A L I S. Tractatus nostri ouranographici agunt, vel de Vniversa machina caelesti L I B E R P R I M V S. Particulari orbe caelesti, qui sit vel caelum Empyreũ siue primũ. L I B. I I. AEthereũ idq; vel primũ mobile. LIB E R I I I. ex secũdis mobilibus aliquod; de quib' bre ui spero tractatus non ingratos, vnà cum cata-logo stellarum fixarum exhibebimus. L I B R O - P A R T I Ç Â O G E R A L D A N O S S A U R A N O G R A F I A.1 Nossos tratados uranográficos tratam ou sobre A máquina geral celeste. P R I M E I R O L I V R O. Um orbe particular celeste, que seja ou O primeiro céu ou empíreo. S E G U N D O L I V R O. O próprio céu etéreo ou o primeiro móvel. TERCEIRO L I V R O. algum dentre os segundos móveis; sobre os quais espero que em breve exibiremos tratados não desagradáveis, juntamente com um catálogo das estrelas fixas. D I S T I N- L I B R O R V M D I S T I N C T I O P A R T I C V L A R I S . Distributio capitum libri Primi. Vide A. Secundi & Tertij necessaria non est. Etenim iis duobus praeter circulos vix aliquid traditur. Circulorum autem tum primi caeli, tum primi mobilis catalogum, tabella quadam in primo vtriusque libri capite exhibuimus, cuius ordinem in sequentibus capitibus secuti sumus, quare de ordine duorum illorumlibrorũ quicquam in medium adferre superfluum esset. A Caeli compages vniuersa consideratur à nobis, vel Vnita, atque vel secudum Essentiã, vti sunt quid esse C A P V T 1. Cõpositio secudum Platonem eiusque sequaces 2. Peripateticos quod sit 3. qualis respectu materiae 4. formae 5. Accidentia, vti sunt Qualitates 6. Actiones, vt motus localis quod sit 7. quotuplex sit 8. quis sit 9. à quo sit 10. qualis sit 11. cuius partis sit 12. Diuisibilis in partes Continuas toti, vti sint partes caeli densae. s. stellae 13. Rarae. 14. Cõtiguas, vti sunt orbes, in quibus cõsideram Distin ctionẽ Quod sit 15. Qualis sit secun dum motũ traditurq quantũ ad numerũ secũdũ mẽtem ordinem recentiorũ 16. veterũ 17. ordinem 18. quantũ ad Numerum 19. Ordinem 20. Concentum sive musas 21. Circulos. 22. OVRA- D I S T I N Ç Ã O P A R T I C U L A R D O S L I V R O S . Distribuição dos capítulos do livro Primeiro. Veja A. Segundo e Terceiro não são necessários. Na verdade, por estes dois quase nada além dos círculos é trazido. Por outro lado, exibimos o catálogo dos círculos tanto do primeiro céu, quanto do primeiro móvel, por uma tabela no primeiro capítulo de cada um dos dois livros, razão pela qual, trazer a público algo sobre a ordem daqueles dois livros seria supérfluo. A A união geral do céu por nós é considerada ou una, e além disso, segundo a essencia, são o que é. CAPÍTULO 1. uma composição segundo Platão e seus seguidores 2. os peripatéticos como são. 3. a respeito da natureza da matéria 4. da forma 5. os acidentes, como são as qualidades 6. as ações, como movimento local como são. 7. quão múltiplos são. 8. o que são. 9. pelo que são. 10. de que tipo são. 11. cujas partes são. 12. Divisível em partes todas contínuas, como são as partes do céu densas ou estrelas 13. rarefeitas 14. contíguas, como são os orbes, nos quais tomaram assento pela distinção de como são 15. de que tipo são segundo o movimento é levado e quanto ao número e à ordem segundo a mente dos recentes 16 dos antigos 17. à ordem 18. quanto ao número 19. à ordem 20. a harmonia ou as musas 21. Círculos 22. PRIMEI- 1 Quid caelũ Est corpus a Aristot. 5 phys. tex. 8. b Aristot. 7 metaphys. tex. 8 c Aristot. 5 phys. tex. 3. d Ibidem Naturale e 1 cęli tex. 5. vsq; ad 17 3 caeli tex. 1 1. part. animal. ca. 5. 8 metaphy. tex. 1 & 12 12 metaph. tex. 5. f 8 physic. Simplex Lucidũ & incorrupt. O V R A N O G R A P H I AE L I B E R P R I M V S . AVTHORE A D R I A N O R O M A N O L O V A N I E N S I . Quid caelum secundum peripateticorum doctrinam. CAPVT PRIMVM. AELUM est corpus naturale, simplex, lucidum, incorruptibile. Corpus quidem est perfectum, non autem materia siue pura potentia, aut forma siue purus actus. Materia quidem non est, quia Materia per se non mouetur,a Caelum per se mouetur. ergo. Similiter Materia per se non est actu hoc aliquid,b Caelum per se est actu hoc aliquid. ergo. Item Materia per se non agit, Caelum agit in haec inferiora. ergo. Nec quoque caelum est pura forma siue purus actus, quia Forma per se non mouetur,c Caelum mouetur localiter. Ergo. Sic Forma per se non est quanta,d Caelum est quantum. ergo. Caelum autem non quoduis est corpus, sed naturale: vti variis locise testatur Aristoteles: licet de caelo empyreo qui motu locali caret aliquis dubitare possit, quem scrupulum vt eximamus notandum est tria genera rerum naturalium poni à Philosophof; vnum earum quae semper mouentur, alterum earum quae semper quiescunt. Tertium earum quae partim mouentur partim quiescunt. Priores1 generis sunt caeli omnes aetherei, secundi generis caelum empyreum, cum terra quae si non secũdum omnes partes, saltem secundum se totam quiescit, tertij verò planetae & animalia. Simplex quoque corpus statuunt Peripatetici cęlum, licet Platonici aliter sentiat; vti sequenti capite docebimus. Demum lucidum & incorruptibile est; quorum posterius nullis alijs competit corporibus. B Caelum 1 Porque o céu é um corpo a Aristóteles, Física, Livro 5, Texto 83. b Aristóteles, Metafísica, Livro 7, Texto 8. c Aristóteles, Física, Livro 5, Texto 3. d O mesmo. Natural e Sobre o Cèu, Livro 1, Texto 5 continuamente até o 17; Sobre o Céu, Livro 3, Texto 1; Sobre as Partes dos Animais, Livro 1, Capítulo 5; Metafísica, Livro 8, Texto 1 e 12; Metafísica, Livro 12, Texto 5. f Física, Livro 8. Simples Luminoso e incorrup. P R I M E I R O L I V R O D A U R A N O G R A F I A . PELO AUTOR ADRIAAN VAN ROOMEN DE LOUVAIN. PRIMEIRO CAPÍTULO. Do que é [feito] o céu segundo a doutrina dos peripatéticos. Céu é um corpo natural, simples, luminoso, incorruptível. Corpo que certamente é perfeito, porém, não é matéria ou pura potência ou forma ou puro ato. Na verdade, não é matéria por que: A matéria não se move por sia; O céu se move por si. Por isso!2 Semelhantemente, a matéria não é por si em ato hoc aliquidb; O céu é por si em ato hoc aliquid. Por isso! Do mesmo modo, a matéria não age por si; O céu age nas coisas inferiores. Por isso! Nem também, o céu é pura forma ou ato puro, por que: A forma não se move por sic; O céu se move localmente. Por isso! Assim, a forma não tem tamanho por sid; O céu tem tamanho. Por isso! Por outro lado, o céu não é um corpo qualquer, mas natural, como Aristóteles afirma em vários lugarese: é possível que alguém possa duvidar, sobre o céu empíreo que carece de movimento local, o qual escrúpulo para que o suprimamos, deve-se notar que são postos pelo Filósofo três gêneros de coisas naturaisf: um das coisas que sempre se movem; outro das coisas que sempre estão em repouso; o terceiro das coisas que parcialmente se movem, parcialmente estão em repouso. Do primeiro [gênero], são todos os céus etéreos. Do segundo é o céu empíreo, com a Terra, que se não está em repouso segundo todas as partes, pelo menos está em repouso segundo ela toda. E do terceiro, os planetas e os animais. O céu também é um corpo simples, afirmam os peripatéticos, embora os platônicos pensem diferentemente, como ensinaremos no capítulo seguinte. Enfim, é luminoso e incorruptível, dos quais o último não corresponde a nenhum dos outros corpos. CAPÍTULO Aristoteles eiusque sequaces. Plato a In Timęo b In Timęo Taurus c 1. com. in Timaeũ. in expositione verborũ prius citatorũ. 2 OVRANOGRAPHIAE Caelum secundum Aristotelem esse corpus simplex : secundum Platonem verò compositum ex elementis. C A P V T S E C V N D V M . Ristoteles eiusque discipulus Theophrastus posterioresque omnes Peripathetici, vnanimiter caelum simplex corpus ab elementis diuersum statuũt, ideoq; & quintũ corpus quintamq; essentiam nuncupant. Plato autẽ existimauit caelum totumq; mundum ex quatuor elementis esse coagmentatũ, vti ex iis quae subiungam manifestum euadit: inquit enim Platoa, ut hic mundus esset animanti absoluto similimus, hoc ipso quod ipse solus, atque unus esset, iccirco singularem Deus hunc mundum atque unigenum procreauit. Corporeum autem atque aspectabile omne necesse est esse quod natum est. Nihil porro igni vacuum videri potest, nec verò tangi quod careat solido: solidum autem nihil quod terrae sic expers. Quamobrem mundum efficere moliens Deus, terram primum ignemq iungebat1, & quae sequũtur vsque ad illa verba. Earum autem quatuor rerum quas supra dixi, sic in omni mundo partes omnes colocatae sunt, vt nulla pars cuiusuis generis excederet extra, atque in hoc vniuerso inessent genera illa vniuersa2. Ex quibus verbis apertum est Platonem & caelum & totum mũdum, ex quatuor elementis constituere. In caelo quoque plurimum igneae esse substantiae dixit. His accedit quod Plato non agnouerit corpus aliud simplex, sic enim inquitb: dicendum est igitur cuiusmodi potissimum quatuor corpora fiant: Nam si hoc semel erimus consecuti, procreationis terrae & ignis, & eorum quae pro rata portione in medio eorum interiecta sunt, veritatem facilè consequemur: tum enim nemini concedemus, pulchriora ijs, quae sub aspectum cadant, corpora vsquam inueniri quorum quoaq ad suum genus referatur3. Si igitur Plato negat vllum corpus esse pulchrius his quatuor elementis, aut his quae fiunt ex ipsis, proculdubio non putauit caelum esse omninò diuersum ab illis. Platonis quoque interpretes idem sensisse Platonem asserunt. Taurus enim (vt refert Philoponus) non modo vult caelum & mundum totum, secundum Platonem ex elementis constare, sed & Theophrasto quintum corpus introducenti adversatur, ita postquam locum Platonis priùs allegatum exposuisset, scribensc: Theophrastus, inquit, quod si aspectabile & tractabile ex terra sunt & igni, & his caelum A Aristóteles e seus seguidores Platão a No Timeu b No Timeu Taurus c Comentário ao Timeu, Livro 1, na explicação das palavras citadas anteriormente. 2 DA URANOGRAFIA. SEGUNDO CAPÍTULO. Segundo Aristóteles, o céu é um corpo simples, mas segundo Platão, é composto a partir de elementos. Ristóteles e seu discípulo Teofrasto e todos os peripatéticos posteriores afirmam unanimemente que o céu é um corpo simples, diferente dos elementos, e por esse motivo invocam também um quinto corpo e uma quinta essência. Por outro lado, Platão pensou que o céu e o mundo todo sejam ligados a partir dos quatro elementos, porque claramente ele vem a ser a partir das coisas que ele subordine. Na verdade, Platão diza: "para que este mundo fosse o mais semelhante a esse mesmo vivente absoluto, em que fosse só e [ele mesmo] único, por esse motivo, Deus procriou este mundo singular e unigênito. Mas corpóreo e visível assim como palpável é necessário que seja tudo o que nasceu. Ora nada vazio de fogo pode ser olhado e visto e, na verdade, nem tocado o que carece de sólido, porém não há nada sólido que seja desprovido de terra. E diante disso, ao empenhar-se em fazer o mundo, a divindade foi ajuntando primeiro a terra e o fogo".4 E que são seguidas sempre por estas palavras: "No entanto, desses quatro elementos que disse acima, assim todas as partes foram colocadas em todo o mundo, de tal modo que nenhuma parte dessa espécie sobrasse do lado de fora e que também aquelas espécies em totalidade estivessem dentro deste universo".5 A partir dessas palavras é claro que Platão constitui o céu e o mundo todo a partir dos quatro elementos. No céu também disse existir grande quantidade da substância ígnea. A essas coisas acresce o fato que Platão não reconheceu outro corpo simples. Assim, de fato, dizb: "É necessário que se diga então como são esses quatro corpos mais belos, dissemelhantes uns em relação aos outros, e que têm a capacidade de se gerarem uns aos outros, se porventura forem dissolvidos. Se o conseguirmos, obteremos a verdade sobre a geração da terra, do fogo e dos elementos intermediários que estão entre eles segundo a proporção. E não aceitaremos a ninguém a seguinte argumentação: que existem e podem ser observados corpos mais belos do que estes, cada um correspondendo a um só género". Se Platão, consequentemente, nega que algum corpo é mais belo do que os quatro elementos, ou das coisas que são feitas a partir deles, sem dúvida nenhuma, não considerou o céu ser inteiramente diferente destes. Os comentadores platônicos também reivindicam ter pensado o mesmo que Platão. Na verdade, Taurus (como se refere Filoponus) de nenhum modo deseja que o céu e o mundo todo, segundo Platão, constituam-se a partir dos elementos, mas também se opõe a Teofrasto que introduz um quinto corpo, depois, como segue, anteriormente Platão expôs no lugar alegado, que escrevec: "Teofrasto diz porque se são tratáveis6 e vistos a partir da terra e do fogo, também constituem esse A L I B E R P R I M V S . 3 Porphiri. d in expositione eorun dẽ verborũ post multa. Proclus. e In expositione Timaei in libro qui inscribitur Observationes eorum, in quibus Platonis Timaeo cõtradixit Arist. Plotinus. f Libr. de mundo a Aristot. 2 de anima tex. 2. b 2. de generat. 53. 3 Phys. 17. c 1. Meteor. cap. 2. d Auerroës 1. caeli cõ. 91 caelum & astra constabunt: non sunt autem haec inquit ex illis quintum corpus introducens quod versatur in orbem. verum vbi quintum corpus esse docuerit, tunc hisce contradicat7. Haec Taurus. Porphirius idem quoque sentit, ita scribensd: Mundum ex quatuor consitutum esse elementis, disertè dicit Plato quasi quintum illud corpus quod ab Aristotele & Archita inducitur, non esse putauerit. Proclus postquã multis verbis explicauit quomodo vniuersum ex quatuor elementis constet, caelum astraque ex igni, haec postremò subiungite: Non igitur quasi peregrinam in vniuerso caelorum naturam inducere oportet, sed illic summam perfectionem naturae eorum quae hic visuntur constituentes per illam, eamq quae illis sit cognata his corporibus ortum tribuere. Plotinus eandem sententiam Platoni tribuit, quam multis verbis & explicat & tuetur aduersus Aristotelem, cuius verbaf ne prolixus sim omitto. Constat itaque Platonem quatuor tantum corpora, quibus totus constat mundus cognouisse, Aristotelem autem quintum ab his diuersum corpus introduxisse. Caelum constare materia & forma. CAPVT TERTIVM. AElum constare materia & forma Platonicorum schola negare non potest, cum id ex elementis compositum asserat. Idem quoque Peripateticorum dogmatibus consentaneum esse hae ostendunt rationes. I. Caelum vel est materia vel forma, vel compositum, quia omnis substantia vnum ex hisce tribus esta. Caelum non est materia vel forma, vti primo capite ostendimus. Ergo caelum est compositum ex materia & forma. II. Quidquid mouet aut mouetur, id habet materiam & formam: Nan moueri est materiae, mouere autem formaeb. Sed caelum mouetur localiter, & mouet ac regit hunc mundum inferioremc. Ergo caelum habeat materiam & formam. III. Quidquid est sensibile & intelligibile, id habet materiam & formam: Nan vnum quodque est sensibile propter materiam, intelligibile propter formamd. B ij Sed C P R I M E I R O L I V R O 3 Porfírio d na explicação das mesmas palavras depois de muitas coisas. Proclo e Na explicação do Timeu no livro que está escrito estas observações, na qual o Timeu de Platão contradiz Aristóteles. Plotino f Livro sobre o Mundo a Aristóteles, Sobre a Alma, Livro 2, Texto 2 b Sobre a Geração, Livro 2. Texto 53; Física, Livro 3, Texto 172 c Meteológicos, Livro 1, Capítulo 2 d Averróis, Sobre o Céu, Livro 1, Comentário 91. esse céu e os astros; por outro lado, essas coisas não são ditas a partir desse quinto corpo que foi introduzido no orbe, na verdade, como ensinará ser o quinto corpo, então contradiz este8." Eis Taurus. Porfírio também pensa o mesmo escrevendo assimd: "Platão diz claramente que o mundo é constituído a partir dos quatro elementos como se tivesse pensado não existir aquele quinto corpo que é introduzido por Aristóteles e Arquitas". Depois, Proclo com muitas palavras explica de que modo o universo consta a partir dos quatro elementos, o céu e os astros a partir do fogo, finalmente acrescenta estas coisase: "Não convém, portanto, introduzir uma natureza como que peregrina no universo dos céus, mas atribuir naquele lugar uma suma perfeição da natureza deles que através dela aqui parecem constituintes". Plotino atribuí a Platão a mesma sentença, que com muitas palavras ele explica e defende contra Aristóteles, cujas palavrasf nem prolixo, está omitido. E assim, é claro que Platão conheceu somente quatro corpos, dos quais consta o mundo todo, e por outro lado, que Aristóteles introduziu um quinto corpo diferente desses. TERCEIRO CAPÍTULO. O céu se constitui de matéria e forma. Escola dos platônicos não pode negar que o céu se constitui de matéria e forma, porque reivindica que ele é composto a partir dos elementos. Do mesmo modo, também, estas razões1 mostram que está de acordo com os preceitos dos peripatéticos: I. O céu é ou matéria, ou forma, ou composto, porque toda substância é algo a partir desses três.a O céu não é matéria ou forma, como expusemos no primeiro capítulo. Portanto, o céu é composto a partir de matéria e de forma. II. Tudo aquilo que move ou é movido, este tem matéria e forma: em verdade, ser movido é da matéria; por outro lado mover é da forma.b Mas o céu é movido localmente, e move e rege este mundo inferior.c Portanto, o céu teria matéria e forma. III. Tudo aquilo que é sensível e inteligível, este tem matéria e forma: em verdade, cada um é sensível por causa da matéria; e inteligível por causa da forma.d Mas o A e Aristotel. 2 Physic. 4 OVRANOGRAPHIAE Sed caelum est sensibile & intelligibile: sensibile quidem, quia sensu visus percipitur: intelligibile autem, quia eius est scientia vt Physica & Astronomica. Ergo caelum habet materiam & formam. IIII. Quidquid vel naturã habet vel ipsa natura est, id hábet materiã & formam. pars prior probatur Quidquid mouet & mouetur habet materiam et formam. Sed quod habet naturam, id etiam mouet & mouetur, mouet quidem quatenus natura, mouetur autem quatenus id in quo est natura. Cum natura sit causa vt id moueatur in quo este. Ergo quod habet naturam, id habet materiam & formam. Altera pars probatur Quidquid habet naturam, id habet materiam & formam: vt iam ostensum est. Natura semper est in aliquo habente eam: Nã est causa, vt moueatur id in quo est. Ergo quidquid natura est, habet materiam & formam. Caelum vel est natura vel habet naturam, Omne corpus naturale est vel natura, vel habet naturam. Ergo & caelum est tale. Caelum itaque habet materiam & formam. V. Gradum compositionis nullum natura negauit. At compositionis gradus sunt quatuor, videlicet ex forma corruptibili, & materia corruptibili, vt in équo. incorruptibili, vt in elementis. incorruptibili, & materia corruptibili, vt in homine. incorrptibili. Compositio itaque è quarto gradu, tollenda è rerum natura non est videlicet è materia & forma incorruptilibus. Ea autem compositio nulli rei praeter caelum assignari potest. Ergo caelum est compositum ex materia & forma. Comfirmatur. Si quod minus est naturae congruum non tollatur è rerum vniversitate, etiam quod magis congruum est tolli non debet. At com- e Aristóteles, Física, Livro 2. 4 DA URANOGRAFIA. Mas o céu é sensível e inteligível: certamente é sensível porque é percebido pelo sentido da visão; por outro lado, é inteligível porque dele é a ciência tanto física como astronômica. Portanto, o céu tem matéria e forma. IV. Tudo aquilo que ou tem natureza ou ele próprio é natureza, este tem matéria e forma. a primeira parte é provada [da seguinte maneira] Tudo aquilo que move e é movido tem matéria e forma. Mas o que tem natureza, esse também move e é movido: certamente move enquanto natureza, por outro lado, esse é movido enquanto aquilo em que está a natureza. Porque a natureza seja a causa que esse será movido no que estáe. Portanto, o que tem natureza, esse tem matéria e forma. a outra parte é provada [da seguinte maneira] Tudo aquilo que tem natureza, esse tem matéria e forma, como já foi exposto. A natureza sempre está em algo que a tem, pois é causa para que seja movido aquilo em que está. Portanto, tudo aquilo que é natureza tem matéria e forma. O Céu ou é natureza ou tem natureza. Todo corpo natural ou é natureza, ou tem natureza. Portanto, o céu também é um tal. Desta maneira, o céu tem matéria e forma. V. A natureza não negou nenhum grau da composição. E são quatro graus da composição, a saber: a partir da forma corruptível, e da matéria corruptível, como no cavalo. e da matéria incorruptível, como nos elementos. a partir da forma incorruptível, e da matéria corruptível, como no homem. e da matéria incorruptível. Desta maneira, a composição a partir do quarto grau não deve ser tomada a partir da natureza das coisas, a saber, a partir da matéria e da forma incorruptíveis. Por outro lado, essa composição não pode ser atribuída a nenhuma coisa além do céu. Portanto, o céu é composto a partir de matéria e de forma. Está confirmado. Se o que é menos conforme à natureza não é tomado a partir da generalidade das coisas, também o que é mais conforme não deve ser tomado. E a com- L I B E R P R I M V S . 5 f Aristot. 2 Phys. 26 a In quodã tractatu de materia caeli, & aliis multis locis. At compositio quę minus naturae côngrua est, quam ea quae est ex materia & forma incorruptilibibus, non tollitur è rerum vniversitate. Compositio ex materia corruptibili & forma incorruptibili non tollitur è rerum natura. Sed cõpositio ex materia corruptibili & forma incorruptibili est minus naturę cõgrua quam cõpositio ex materia & forma incorruptilibus. Proportio materiae ad formam est naturae magis congrua quam disproportio, quia materia & forma sunt ad aliquidf: Sed in compositione ex materia & forma incorruptilibus est proportio materiae ad formã (quia materia & forma sunt simul vnaq; frustra sine alia) in altera autem compositione est disproportio. Ergo compositio ex materia & forma incorruptilibus est naturae magis cõgrua quam ex vna corruptibili & altera incorruptibili. Ergo compositio quae minus naturae comgrua est quam cõpositio ex materia & forma incorruptilibus non tollitur è rerum vniuersitate. Ergo compositio ex materia & forma incorruptilibus negari non debet. Plures aliae rationes tum & Philosoforum authoritates adduci possent: sed quae iam dicta sunt à nobis, sufficient; restat autem inquirendum qualis sit haec materia. Qualis materia caeli. CAPVT QVARTVM. AEli materia à sublunarium materia non differre AEgidiusa variis probat rationibus quas breuitatis gratia iam omittimus: Idem sensisse dicuntur Plato, Philoponus & Auicenna. Nos tamen Principiis Aristotelicis insistentes eam à materia sublunari plurimum differre, hac vnica ostendemus ratione. B iij Si maC P R I M E I R O L I V R O 5 f Aristóteles, Física, Livro 2, Texto 26. a Em algum tratado sobre a matéria do céu e em muito outros lugares E a composição que é menos conforme à natureza, do que aquela que é a partir da matéria e da forma incorruptíveis, não é tomada a partir da generalidade das coisas. A composição a partir da matéria corruptível e da forma incorruptível não é tomada a partir da natureza das coisas. Mas, a composição a partir da matéria corruptível e da forma incorruptível é menos comforme à natureza do que a composição a partir da matéria e da forma incorruptíveis. A proporção da matéria para a forma é mais conforme à natureza do que a desproporção, porque a matéria e a forma são junto a algof: Mas, na composição a partir da matéria e da forma incorruptíveis existe a proporção da matéria para a forma (porque a matéria e a forma são juntas e uma é inútil sem a outra) na outra composição; por outro lado, existe a desproporção. Portanto, a composição a partir da matéria e da forma incorruptíveis é mais conforme à natureza do que a partir de uma corruptível e outra incorruptível. Portanto, a composição que é menos conforme à natureza do que a composição a partir da matéria e da forma incorruptíveis não é tomada a partir da generalidade das coisas. Portanto, a composição a partir da matéria e forma incorruptíveis não deve ser negada. Várias outras razões, bem como autoridades dos filósofos, poderiam ser trazidas, mas, as que já foram ditas serão suficientes para nós, por outro lado, resta pesquisar o que é esta matéria. QUARTO CAPÍTULO. Qual a matéria do céu. Matéria do céu não difere da matéria sublunar, prova Egídioa com várias razões, as quais, para fins de brevidade aqui omitimos. Dizem que Platão, Filoponus e Avicenna pensavam do mesmo modo. Nós ainda nos apoiando nos princípios aristotélicos, mostraremos que ela difere em muito da matéria sublunar por esta única razão. Se a maA OVRANOGRAPHIAE Si materia caeli per se sumpta nõ differret à materia inferiorũ, tũc materia cae li formas suas mutaret. Nã siue dicatur quod materiae caelo cù elementis communis potentia propter excelentiam formae quam possidt expleri & exhauriri, ideoq; cessare nõ possit, vti reuera non expletur vlla potẽtia sublunaris, tùc necessariò materia caeli susciperet formas sublunares. Nulla potentia naturalis est frustra: verum ad actum omnis aliquando reduci debet. Sed si mate ria caeli per se sumpta nõ differat à materia sublunari erit per se ac essentialiter ad formas sublunares. Ad quem formam in potentia est vna materia ad eandem est & altera eiusdem naturae. Sed nateria sublunaris per se ac essentialiter est in potentia ad formas sublunares. Materia caeli si non differat à materia sublunari erit per se & essentialiter ad formas sublunares. Ergo si materia caeli per se sumpta non differt à materia sublunari ea aliquãdo susciperet formas sublunares. possit, vti imaginatur AEgidius (licet nõ bene cum materiae sub lunari, ideoque & caelesti, si eadem est, per se ac essentialiter potentia ad formas sublunares cõueniat) tùc hoc concesso, materia caelestis aliquando mutabit formam suam. Omnis potẽtia naturalis ad actum reduci debet aliquando. Sed materia sublunaris habet potentiam ad aliquam, saltem nobiliorem (vt sentit AEgigius) si itaq; caeli materia eadem est cù materia sublunari ea quoque habebit potentiam tum ad formam hominis, tùm ad formã caelorum superiorum quę omnes nobiliores sunt forma caeli infimi videlicet Lunae. Ergo si materia caeli Lunae nõ differt à mateira sublunari, tùc materia Lunae reciperet aliquando formam vel hominis vel caelorù superiorum. Ergo si materia cęli per se sumpta nõ differret à materia sublunari tunc fieret substantialis mutatio orbium, hoc est generatio & corruptio: Quod Philosophiae Peripateticae aduersatur. Idpsum 6 DA URANOGRAFIA. Se a matéria do céu por si tomada não diferisse da matéria das coisas inferiores, então, a matéria do céu mudaria suas formas. Pois, se por outro lado, for dito que a matéria do céu com elementos comuns em potência por causa da excelência da forma que possui, não pode ser completada e exaurida e mesmo cessar, como de fato não é completada nenhu ma potência sublunar, então necessariamente a matéria do céu assumirá as formas sublunares. Nenhuma potência natural é em vão, mas algumas vezes deve ser apresentada toda em ato. Mas, se a matéria do céu por si tomada não diferir da matéria sublunar, existirá por si e essencialmente junto às formas sublunares. Junto a essa forma uma matéria é em potência, junto a mesma [forma] também outra [matéria] é de mesma natureza. Mas a matéria sublunar por si e essencialmente é em potencia junto às formas sublunares. A matéria do céu se não deferir da matéria sublunar, existirá por si e essencialmente junto às formas sublunares. Portanto, se a matéria do céu por si tomada não difere da matéria sublunar, esta alguma vezes assumirá as formas sublunares. pode ser completada e exaurida e mesmo cessar, como imagina Egídio (a potência juntará por si essencialmente para as formas sublunares, embora não bem com as formas lunares e portanto a celeste, se é a mesma) então, isto concedido, a matéria celeste às vezes mudará sua forma. Toda potencia natural deve em algum momento ser apresentada em ato. Mas a matéria sublunar tem potencia junto a alguma forma até mais nobre (como pensa Egídio). Assim, se a mesma matéria do céu existe junto com a matéria sublunar, ela própria terá potência, ora junto a forma do homem, ora junto a forma dos céus superiores, que são todos mais nobres do que a forma do céu ínfimo, a saber, da Lua. Portanto, se a matéria do céu da Lua não difere da matéria sublunar, então a matéria da Lua recebe algumas vezes a forma ou do homem, ou dos céus superiores. Portanto, se a matéria do céu por si tomada não diferisse da matéria sublunar, então haveria uma mudança substancial dos orbes, isto é, geração e corrupção, o que se opõe à filosofia peripatética. Exatamente L I B E R P R I M V S. 7 a 8. metap. tex. 12. 12 metaph. text. 10. 9 metaphy. text. 17. Aristotel. b 1. de gener. tex. 43 Themistius c 8. metap. com. 12. a 2. de caelo tex. 13. & 61 Idipsum & variis locisa tradit Aristoteles; imò reprehendit Diogenem quod diceret vnum & idem esse subiectum atque materiam rerum, affirmansb id verum esse in iis quae inuicem transmutantur, in aliis autem minimè. Themistius quoq; (vt refert) Auerrhoesc ait caelestia corpora aut esse formas sine materia, aut habere materiã secundù aequivocationem. Qualis forma caeli. CAPVT QVINTVM. AElo veluti aliis corporibus naturalibus sua adest forma, eaq; perfecta quae caelo essentiae causa est: quae à caelo cuius forma est omnino inseparabilis est: licet Antonius Mirandulanus nostrae aetatis Philosophus non spernendus formã ei tribuat, quę natura sua separata est à materia, intelligentiã videlicet: verum id neq; veritati, neque doctrinae Peripateticae, (ex cuius fundamentis suam astruere nititur opinionem) consonum est. Etenim Primò. Forma caeli mouetur motu locali caeli. Intelligentia nõ mouetur per se aut per accidens: tũ quia nõ comprehenditur loco, tũ quod diuisibilis non sit, partesq; habeat quantas. Intelligentia ergo forma caeli non est. Secundò. Si intelligẽtia informat caelum, vel informabit ratione sui vel ratione caeli quod vt moueatur informari debet. Sed non informat ut ratione Sui, quia tunc informaret vel propter Esse summ: sed hoc non, cum sit immaterialis. actiones suas, quas vt perficeret indigeret corpore vel Subiectiuè: sed hoc non, quia intellectio intelligentiarum est immaterialis. Obiectiuè: sed nec hoc pacto quia intellectio intelligentiarum nõ eget sensibus aut phantasmatibus. caeli, quod moueatur informari desiderat1. Sed nec hoc. Quia intelligentia potest mouere caelum assistendo, & mouẽdo sicuti naturae eius aptum est licet nõ informet. Ergo intelligentia nullo modo informat caelum. Constat itaque nouã eam opinionẽ ferendã non esse; Nã haec cęlum animatũ statuit ita vt à seipso moueatur. Nõ tamẽ hoc prętereũdũ est cęlũ apud Philosophũa animatũ aliquãdo vocari; verũm nõ propiè capiẽdo videlicet cęlũ pro coniũcto & aggregato ex orbe & intelligẽtia. QuaC P R I M E I R O L I V R O 7 a Aristóteles, Metafísica, Livro 8, Texto 12; Metafísica, Livro 9, Texto 17; Metafísica, Livro 12, Texto 10. b Sobre a Geração e a Corrupção, Livro 1, Texto 43. Temístio c Metafísica, Livro 8, Comentário 12. a Sobre o Céu, Livro 2, Texto 13 e 61. Aristóteles também diz exatamente isso em vários lugaresa, e até repreende Diógenes que tinha dito que único e o mesmo é o sujeito e a matéria das coisas, afirmandob que isto é verdade, onde naqueles que são transmutados reciprocamente, mas de nenhum modo nos outros. Temístio e também (como refere) Averróisc diz que os corpos celestes ou são formas sem matéria, ou tem matéria segundo a equivocação. QUINTO CAPÍTULO. Qual a forma do céu. Ua forma está presente no céu, assim como em outros corpos naturais, e ela, que é a causa da essência do céu, é perfeita; [e ela] é totalmente inseparável do céu do qual é a forma. Embora Antonius Mirandulanus, filósofo de nosso tempo que não deve ser desprezado, atribui a ele uma forma que por sua natureza é separada da matéria, a saber, uma inteligência. Mas isto não é consonante nem com a verdade, nem com a doutrina peripetética (a partir de cujos fundamentos esforça-se por prover sua opinião). Na verdade, Primeiro: a forma do céu se move pelo movimento local do céu. A inteligência não se move por si ou por acidente; tanto porque não é compreendida por um lugar, tanto porque não seja divisível, e tenha tantas partes. Portanto, a forma do céu não é uma inteligência. Segundo: se a inteligência modela o céu, ou modelará em razão de si ou em razão do céu, que deve ser modelado para que seja movido. Mas, não modela nem em razão de si, porque emtão modelará ou por causa de seu ser. Mas isto não, porque é imaterial. de suas ações, as quais para completar necessitaria de um corpo ou subjetivamente: mas isto não, porque a intelecção das inteligências é imaterial. ou objetivamente: mas nem este acordo [existe], porque a intelecção das inteligências não necessita de sentidos ou de espíritos. nem em razão do céu que deseja modelar para que se mova. Mas nem isto, porque a inteligência pode mover o céu pelo estar presente e do mesmo modo pelo mover está ligado à matéria dela ainda que não modele. Portanto, a inteligência de nenhum modo modela o céu. Assim, está seguro desta nova opinião não ser trazida. De fato, essa estabelece o céu animado como que se movesse por ele próprio. Todavia, isto não deve ser preterido: o Filósofoa2 às vezes chama o céu animado, mas não propriamente, entendendo que é o céu diante do conjunto e do agregado a partir do orbe e da inteligência. SEXS Lux Sonus. Odor. Sapor. Calor. Frigus. Siccitas. Humiditas. Raritas. Densitas. Actiones caeli quae? 8 OVRANOGRAPHIAE Qualitates caeli. CAPVT SEXTVM. Valitates in caelo sensibiles esse aliquas, ostendit visus solus penetrans caelestem machinam, qui in ea lucem contemplatur, qualitatem certè nobilissimam mediãte qua caelum potissimùm in haec inferiora agit: quae cùm nullam habeat qualitatem contrariam, à nulla etiam re in ipsa actione potest suscipere detrimentum; vti nec ipsa rem vllam ad corruptionem perducit, quin potius in his rebus inferioribus vitam, virtutem, & durationem instillat: vti manifesta nos docet experientia, Solis & cęterorum astrorum luce cuncta in terris produci, & meliùs sese habere, nullam verò ex eius actione fieri corruptionem. Sonum autem atque odorem in caelo nullum esse qui saltem pateat hominibus, praeter omnium philosophorum vnanimem consensum ipsa testatur experientia. Licet Poëtae caelorum motibus miros concentus, de quibus posteà, tribuerint. Gustabiles qualitates quis in caelo nisi mentis inops collocauerit? Tactiles qualitates & praecipuè calorẽ plurimi veterum caelo tribuerunt: Qualitates tamen tactiles omnes (raritate & densitate exceptis) Philosophi à caelo remouent, dicẽtes Solem quidem effectiuè esse calidum, essentialiter verò nequaquam. Sic Planetis singulis Astrologi suas tribuunt qualitates, vti Lunę frigiditatem cum humiditate, Soli vti & Marti calorem. Saturno siccitatem cum frigiditate, variasque alias de quibus posteà; non quod Planetas talibus existiment esse qualitatibus praeditos, sed quod tales in hoc mundo sublunari efficere qualitates obseruauerint. Raritatem tamen & densitatem caelo tribuunt Peripatetici visu id docente, nõ quod haec visus sint obiecta, sed quod sint certae quędam conditiones insequentes tùm media, tùm obiecta visus, vti ex Optica patet. De actionibus caeli. CAPVT SEPTIMVM. AElo non inesse motum aliquem generationis aut corruptionis, augmentationis aut diminutionis, vti nec alterationis vnanimiter sentiunt omnes & probant Peripatetici . Motum localem nullus nisi oculis captus negauerit: Huic influentias adiunQ C A Luz. O Som. O Cheiro. O Sabor. O Calor. O Frio. A Secura. A Umidade. A Raridade. A Densidade. Quais as ações do céu? 8 DA URANOGRAFIA. SEXTO CAPÍTULO. As Qualidades do Céu. Visão sozinha, penetrando a máquina celeste, mostra que há algumas qualidades sensíveis no céu. Que [a visão] nela contempla a luz, certamente uma qualidade nobríssima, mediante a qual o céu age principalmente nas coisas inferiores, a qual porque não tenha nenhuma qualidade contraria, também não pode receber um detrimento por nenhuma coisa em uma mesma ação. Da mesma forma, nem ela mesma conduz alguma coisa para a corrupção, porém, mais fortemente induz a vida, a virtude e a duração nestas coisas inferiores. Da mesma forma, a experiência manifesta do Sol e dos astros restantes nos ensina [que] pela luz toda junta na Terra se produz e melhor se fica, mas nenhuma corrupção se faz a partir desta ação. Por outro lado, o som e o cheiro no céu, pelo menos ao homem, parece ser nulo, além disso, a própria experiência de todos os filósofos testemunha unânime consenso. Embora os poetas atribuem acordos admiráveis ao movimento dos céus, sobre os quais posteriormente [mostraremos]. Quem, senão o pobre de espírito, colocaria no céu qualidades palatáveis? Muitos dos antigos atribuem ao céu qualidades táteis, especialmente o calor. Contudo, os filósofos removem do céu todas as qualidades táteis (exceto a raridade e a densidade), e dizem que o Sol é em si efetivamente quente, mas, de forma alguma, essencialmente. Assim, os astrólogos atribuem suas qualidades à cada planeta, como à Lua o frio com a umidade, assim como ao Sol e Marte o calor, à Saturno a secura com o frio, e diversas outras sobre as quais posteriormente [escreveremos], não porque considerem que os planetas mencionados existam por tais qualidades, mas porque teriam observado que tais qualidades agem neste mundo sublunar. Todavia, os peripatéticos atribuem a raridade e a densidade ao céu, por esta visão que ensina, não porque estas visões sejam apresentadas, mas porque sejam certas consequências de certas condições, seja a partir do meio, seja a partir do objeto da visão, como é patente a partir da Ótica. SÉTIMO CAPÍTULO. Sobre as ações do céu. Odos os peripatéticos provam e pensam unanimemente que não existe no céu nenhum movimento de geração ou de corrupção, de aumento ou de diminuição, nem como de alteração. Ninguém negaria o movimento local, a não ser [que estivesse] tomado dos olhos1. Os astrólogos ligam A T L I B E R P R I M V S. 9 Motus localis. Causa motus localis caeli. 1. 2. Caeli motus est simplex & circularis. adiungunt Astrologi. Pauciores itaque sunt actiones cęli quam rerum sublunarium. Etenim res quae superiores sunt atque perfectiores eae pauciores habent actiones. Primum enim caelum influentiam tantum continet, primum mobile vnico simplicique motu cietur, inferiores caeli pluribus. Hinc Theologi imprimis nobiles affirmãt, quo angeli superiores atque praestantiores sunt, eo minorem habere tum intellectionum tum specierum intelligibilium multitudinem ac veritatem: cùm enim dignitate & similitudine Deo propiores sint, magis etiam diuinam vnitatem atque simplicitatem imitantur. E contrariò sese habent res in sublunaribus, in quibus quae praestantiores sunt, eas videmus pluribus actionibus abundare. Motum autem localem in caelo esse aliquem docet à stellis desumpta experientia. Etenim quotidie Solem, Lunã, & reliquas stellas ab occasu in ortum tendere vulgo etiam notissimum est. Neque certè valere potest eorum sententia qui stellas in caelo fixas non comstituunt, vnde stellas quidem moueri, caelum verò quiescere autumant: stellas enim cum caelo sicuti clauum cum rota moueri, omnis schola tùm Philosophorum tùm Astronomorum iudicat. Motus caelestis probabiles quidem variae, necessaria autem vix vlla adferri potest causa. Aliqui enim ideò moueri existimant caelum vt conferuet suam perfectionem. Alij (& rectiùs) vt cęlum per talem motum assimilitur Deo, cuius intelligibilem motum mirificè aemulatur cęlum motu suo, quòd (vt sequenti capite dicemus) is circularis sit: Secundariò autem vt vniuersa virtus inferioris mundi comseruetur atque gubernetur. Licet enim caelum in his sublunaribus reliqua omnia absque motu efficere posset: generationem tamen & corruptionem absque motu perficere haudquaquam poterit. Nam quod motu caret, id semper vniformiter se habet. Quamobrem si caelum non moueretur, tunc res omnes naturales semper eodem sese haberent modo, quod fieri non expedit: Motum ideò caelo largitus est Omnipotens. Motus localis quis caelo competat. CAPVT OCTAVVM. Vm caelum sit corpus simplex secundum Peripateticorum doctrinam, si moueatur (vti illud moueri iam docuimus) simplici aliquo motu id moueri necesse est. Motus autem C ex comC P R I M E I R O L I V R O 9 O movimento local. A causa do movimento local do céu. 1. 2. O movimento do céu é simples e circular. O movimento do céu é simples e circular. ligam as influências a ele. Deste modo, são menos numerosas as ações do céu do que as das coisas sublunares. Na verdade, as coisas que são superiores e mais perfeitas, essas têm menos ações. De fato, o primeiro céu contém somente influência, o primeiro móvel é movido por um movimento único e simples, os céus inferiores por muitos. De onde os nobres teólogos afirmam principalmente que, porque os anjos são superiores e mais notáveis, eles têm menor quantidade e variedade, tanto de intelecções, como de formas inteligíveis, porque estão mais perto de Deus em dignidade e semelhança, muito mais imitam a unidade e simplicidade divina. E contrariamente às coisas [que] ocorrem nos sublunares, nos quais as que são mais notáveis, estas vemos abundar com muitas ações. Por outro lado, a experiência tomada a partir das estrelas ensina que existe no céu algum movimento local. Na verdade, é notabilíssimo também ao vulgo o Sol, a Lua e as estrelas restantes tender quotidianamente do ocaso ao nascente. E certamente, não pode valer a opinião deles, que não dispõem estrelas fixas no céu, do que dizem que as próprias estrelas se movem, mas o céu está em repouso. De fato, toda a escola seja dos filósofos, seja dos astrônomos, julga que as estrelas se movem com o céu, como o prego na roda. Em verdade, várias causas prováveis do movimento celeste podem ser trazidas, mas quase nenhuma é necessária. Na verdade, por esta razão, alguns afirmam o céu ser movido para consolidar sua perfeição. Outros (e mais corretamente) [afirmam] que o céu por tal movimento se assimila a Deus, cujo movimento inteligível o céu maravilhosamente emula com seu movimento, porque (como diremos no capítulo seguinte) ele é circular; e secundariamente, para que a virtude geral do mundo inferior seja conservada e governada. De fato, ainda que o céu possa, em seus sublunares, efetuar todos as coisas restantes sem movimento, ainda de nenhuma maneira poderá completar a geração e a corrupção sem movimento. De fato, o que carece de movimento, sempre ocorre uniformemente. Eis porque se o céu não se movesse então todas as coisas naturais ocorreriam sempre do mesmo modo, o que não é necessário acontecer. Por esta razão, o Onipotente concede movimento ao céu. OITAVO CAPÍTULO. O movimento local que compete ao céu. Omo o céu é um corpo simples segundo a doutrina dos peripatéticos, caso se mova (como já ensinamos que ele se move), é necessário moverse com algum outro movimento simples. Por outro lado, a partir da C Motus diurnus. Motus planetarũ 10 OVRANOGRAPHIAE ex communi Philosophorum omnium sentẽtia est circularis. Sicuti autem ex stellis ipsis caelum moueri deprehensum est, ita ex iisdem quoque circulariter moueri. Atque primùm si comsideremus stellas fixas quae nobis aliquando comspicuae sunt, aliquando occultae, verbi gratia: Cor Leonis, spicam Virginis, similesque videbimus certè eas primùm supra terram comspectui nostro sese offerre, siue oriri, deinde paulatim eleuari, atque ad caeli medium tendere: quò cùm peruenerint, incipiunt paulatim descẽdere, donec iterum occidant: tùm latentes aliquamdiù sub terra, posteà iterum comspectui nostro sese offerunt: neque ínterim habitudo aut distantia à terra diuersa obseruatur. Hinc ergo manifestum est caelum in quo stellae eae sunt, motu circulari agitari. Si verò eas intueri libeat stellas, quae semper nobis apparent, vti illas quae polo Septentrionali vicinae sunt, vel ab eo non vltra quinquaginta & duos gradus distant, circulos circa polum describere animaduertemus. Si itaque partes eas circulariter moueri constet, reliquas partes quae ad hasce sese eodem semper habent modo, indeque totum caelum in quo stellae eae sunt, circulariter moueri necessum est. Idem etiam patet de stellis erraticis, sed praecipuè de Sole; cuius motus circularis nulli non est quam notissimus. Motum circularem quo machina caelestis mouetur non esse vnicum. CAPVT NONVM. Otum in caelo non esse vnicum sed varium, ipsa docuit ex stellis desumpta experientia. Nam pręter vnicum illum diurnum quo omnes stellae ab ortu in occasum feruntur, alius etiam obseruatur, huic ferè contrarius, quem ne rude vulgus negare poterit: quòd Planetae non similiter ac stellae fixae eandem vel inter se, vel cum stellis fixis feruent distantiam, sed aliâs maiore aliâs minore absint spacio, ac sensim ab occasu in ortum progressi, stellas reliquas post se deserant, & rursus easdem comsequantur; vt ex concitatissimo Lunae motu vel breui tempore obseruari potest: nec non ex Veneris propinquitate ad Solem: Aliquando enim Solem praecedit, aliquando eundem sequitur, vti & vulgo notissimum est, quod eam mane ante Solem orientem Luciferum: vesperi verò post Solem occumbentem, Hesperum vocare comsueuit. Comstat itaque M O Movimento Diurno. O Movimento dos Planetas. 10 DA URANOGRAFIA. a partir da opnião comum de todos os filósofos, o movimento é circular. E do mesmo modo, o céu se move, o que se depreende a partir das próprias estrelas. Dessa forma, depreende-se a partir delas também, que ele se move circularmente. E primeiramente, se considerarmos as estrelas fixas que algumas vezes são visíveis para nós, outras vezes são ocultas – por exemplo: o coração do Leão, a espiga da Virgem, e semelhantes – veremos certamente que elas primeiramente se oferecem acima da Terra à nossa vista, ou nascem, depois paulatinamente elevam-se e tendem ao meio do céu, onde, como tenham chegado, começam a descer paulatinamente até se pôr novamente, então latentes por algum tempo sob a Terra, em seguida, mais uma vez ofecerem-se à nossa vista, e não se observa diferente posição ou distância da Terra. Daqui, portanto, é claro que o céu, no qual estas estrelas estão, é conduzido por um movimento circular. Mas, se agradar olhar atentamente essas estrelas, as quais sempre aparecem a nós, como aqueles que são vizinhas do polo setentrional, ou distam não mais que cinquenta e dois graus dele, observaremos que elas descrevem circulos ao redor do polo. Se, desta forma, é evidente que essas partes se movem circularmente, também as partes restantes que em relação a elas mesmas sempre se colocam do mesmo modo (se movem circularmente). E disso, é necessário que todo o céu, no qual essas estrelas estão, se mova circularmente. O mesmo também é patente sobre as estrelas erráticas, mas principalmente sobre o Sol, cujo movimento circular não é senão muito notável. NONO CAPÍTULO. O movimento circular pelo qual a máquina celeste é movida não é único. Própria experiência tomada a partir das estrelas ensinou que o movimento no céu não é único, mas variado. De fato, além daquele único [movimento] diurno pelo qual todas as estrelas são carregadas do nascente para o poente, também outro é observado, inteiramente contrario a ele, o que nem o rude populacho poderia negar; porque os planetas e as estrelas fixas não carregam semelhantemente a mesma distância seja entre si, seja com as estrelas fixas, mas distanciam-se ora por um espaço maior, ora por um espaço menor, e tendo progredido gradualmente do ocaso ao nascente, deixam para trás de si as estrelas restantes, e prosseguem de volta a elas, como pode ser observado a partir do movimento violentíssimo da Lua ou em um tempo pequeno; nem a partir das proximidades de Vênus para o Sol, de fato, algumas vezes precede o Sol, outras vezes ele o segue, como também para o vulgo é notabilíssimo, que se acostumou a chamar de manhã, antes do Sol nascente, Lucífero1, mas a tarde, depois do Sol poente, Héspero2. Assim, é certo A L I B E R P R I M V S. 11 a 1. caeli, com. 5. 2. cęli. cõ. 3. 14. disput. contra Algazalem. 2. 3. 4. b locis citatis. Motus caeli cur naturalis. itaque caelestem machinam non vnico circulari motu agitari. Caeli motum circularem ab intelligentia effeci. CAPVT DECIMVM. Atura & ratio circularis motus poscunt, vt intelligentia & non aliud sit mouens: vti fusè variis in locis docet Auerrhoesa; quod sanè his rationibus erit manifestum. Primò. Cęlũ mouetur ab alio ente corporeo vel incorporeo Omne corpus simplex motum, ab alio mouetur (quia à seipso moueri nequit) eoque corporeo vel incorporeo. Cęlum est corpus simplex motum. Ergo Caelum mouetur ab alio ente corporeo vel incorporeo. Caelum non mouetur ab ente corporeo. Quia caelum est primum omnium corporum, & sic res procederet in infinitum. Ergo Caelum mouetur ab incorporeo ente, puta intelligentia. Secundò: Motus perpetuus quiq; principio & fine caret, non potest fieri nisi per intelligentiam Motus perpetuus nõ fit nisi per ens intellectu. Talis est intelligentia. Ergo Motus perpetuus fieri debet ab intelligentia. Caeli motus perpettus est, principioque & fine caret. Ergo motus caeli non potest fieri nisi per intelligentiam. Tertiò. Quia nulla res potest seipsam in suo loco naturali perfectè mouere. Adhaec sublato hoc atque ab intelligentiis separato, eae nullam viderentur habere cum hoc mundo sensibili & mobili coniunctionem atque connexionem. Plura scribit Auerrhoësb, sed haec sufficiant. Motum circularem caelo naturalem esse. CAPVT VNDECIMVM. Icet Auicenna, Scotus, Albertus, Durandus, & alij quidam Philosophi, motũ hunc caelo esse naturalem, pertinaciter negent. Graeci tamen vti & Auerrhoës cum Diuo Thoma eum esse naturalem defendunt, qui licet varias adferant rationes, hae duae tamen sufficient. C ij Motus N L P R I M E I R O L I V R O 11 a Sobre o Céu, Livro 1, Comentário 5; Sobre o Céu, Livro 2, Comentário 3; Discussões comtra Algazalem, 14. 2. 3. 4. b nos lugares citados. Por que razão o movimento do céu é natural é certo que a maquina celeste se agita com movimento circular não único. DÉCIMO CAPÍTULO. Pela inteligência se produz o movimento circular do céu. Natureza e a razão dos movimentos circulares pedem que uma inteligência seja o movente e não outra [coisa], como Averróis ensina largamente em vários lugaresa, que será manifesto sensivelmente com estas razões. Primeiramente: o céu é movido por outro ente corpóreo ou incorpóreo Todo corpo simples posto em movimento, é movido por outro (porque por si não pode ser movido) e esse é corpóreo ou incorpóreo. O céu é um corpo simples posto em movimento. Portanto, O céu é movido por algum ente corporeo ou incorpóreo. O céu não é movido por um ente corpóreo, porque o céu é o primeiro de todos os corpos, e assim a coisa continuaria ao infinito. Portanto, O céu é movido por um ente incorpóreo, a saber, uma inteligência. Em segundo lugar: o movimento perpétuo e que carece de princípio e fim, não pode ser feito a não ser através de uma inteligência. O movimento perpétuo não se faz a não ser por um ente no intelecto. Tal é uma inteligência. Portanto, O movimento perpétuo deve ser feito por uma inteligência. O movimento do céu é perpétuo, e carece de princípio e fim. Portanto, o movimento do céu não pode ser feito a não ser através de uma inteligência. Em terceiro lugar: porque nenhuma coisa pode mover perfeitamente a si mesma em seu lugar natural. Junto a estas coisas, por ele trazido e separado das inteligências, elas pareceriam não ter nenhuma ligação e conexão com este mundo sensível e móvel. Averróis escreve muitas coisasb, mas estas são suficientes. UNDÉCIMO CAPÍTULO. O movimento circular é natural ao céu. Mbora Avicena, Escotus, Alberto, Durandus e outros certos filósofos, neguem com perseverança que este movimento é natural ao céu, ainda assim, os gregos e também Averróis com o Divino Tomás defendem que ele é natural, que embora tragam várias razões, estas duas, entretanto, serão suficientes. O moviA E 1. a Aristot. 1. de caelo b 1 de caelo. 2. Quomodo sit naturalis. c 2 Physic. tex. 2. d 1. par. qu. 70. artic. 3. ad 4. e 1. parte quaest. 70. art. 3 ad 5. 12 OVRANOGRAPHIAE Motus circularis quo caelum voluitur, aut est ei naturalis aut innaturalis. Non est innaturalis. Quia Primò. Nullum violentum diuturnum. Secundò Motus vni corpori praeter naturam, alteri est naturalisa. Motus circularis si non caelo, nulli certè corpori est naturalis. Ergo Motus circularis non est caelo praeter naturam. Ergo motus circularis est caelo naturalis. Atque tota haec argumentatio est Aristotelisb. Ad haec. Quae necessaria sunt ad motum cęli circularem efficiendum, ea omnia naturaliter cęlo insunt. Nã caelo inest figura rotunda, abest grauitas & leuitas, est substantia incorruptibilis, carensq; contrario, quę omnia requiruntur ad efficiendum motum cęli circularẽ. Ergo motus circularis quo ipsum mouetur est ei naturalis. Quomodo autem sit naturalis explicat D. Thomasc ratione principij passiui id fieri dicens his verbis: Motus localis corporum caelestium est naturalis, licet sic à motore separato, in quantum in ipso corpore caeli est potentia naturalis ad talem motum. & alibid motus corporis caelestis est naturalis, non propter principium actiuum, sed propter principium passiuum: quia scilicet habet in sua natura aptitudinem vt tali motu ab intellectu moueatur. Est itaque motus caeli absolutè naturalis ratione principij passiui. Verum ratione principij actiui aliquo modo naturalis est, absolutè tamen nequaquam. Etenim intelligentia, si propriè loquamur, non est natura caeli, est tamen aliquo modo natura, quia perficit caelum. Etenim absque ea caelum, cuius naturam comsequitur ille motus, careret eo, ideoque imperfectum esset: accedit quod intelligentia mouet caelum secundum differentias positionis debitas, & tanta celeritate nec maiori nec minori quam conueniat naturali propensioni. Quod & voluit D. Thomas inquiense: Caelum dicitur mouere seipsum, in quantum componitur ex motore & mobili, non sicut ex materia & forma, sed secundum contactum virtutis, vt dictũ est: & hoc etiam modo potest dici, quod eius motor est principium intrinsecum; vt sic etiam motus caeli possit dici naturalis ex parte principij actiui, sicut motus voluntarius dicitur esse motus naturalis animali in quantũ est animal, vt dicitur in 8 Physic. Haec D. Thomas. Caele- 1. a Aristóteles, Sobre o Céu, Livro 1. b Sobre o céu. Livro 1. 2. De que modo seria natural. c Física, Livro 2, Texto 2 d Suma Teológica, Primeira parte da Questão 70, Artigo 3, Quanto ao 4o e Primeira Parte da Questão 70, Artigo 3, Quanto ao 5o 12 DA URANOGRAFIA. O movimento circular pelo qual o céu gira ou é natural a ele ou inatural. Não é inatural. Porque Primeiramente: Nenhum [movimento] violento é de longa duração. Em segundo lugar: O movimento para um corpo está além da natureza, para outro é naturala. O movimento circular se não é natural ao céu, certamente não é a nenhum corpo. Portanto, o movimento circular não está para o céu além da natureza. Portanto, o movimento circular é natural ao céu. E toda essa argumentação é de Aristótelesb. Além disso, as coisas que são necessárias para que o movimento circular do céu seja feito estão todas naturalmente no céu. Pois, não há no céu uma figura rotunda; está ausente o peso e a leveza; está a substância incorruptível; também carecendo de contrário; todas as coisas que são requeridas para efetuar o movimento circular do céu. Portanto, o movimento circular com o qual move a si mesmo é natural a ele. Por outro lado, de que modo seja natural, isto se faz pela razão do princípio passivo, explica o Divino. Tomásc dizendo estas palavras: "o movimento local dos corpos celestes é natural, apesar de um motor separado, no mesmo corpo celeste existe uma apotência natural para este movimento.1" E em outro lugard "o movimento do corpo celeste é natural, não por causa de um pincípio ativo, mas devido ao princípio passivo, porque tem em sua natureza a aptidão de ser movido pelo intelecto por tal movimento2". Assim, o movimento do céu é absolutamente natural pela razão do princípio passivo. Mas, pela razão do princípio ativo, de algum modo é natural, entretanto, de jeito nenhum de modo absoluto. E de fato, a inteligêncIa se falarmos propriamente não é natural do céu. É, entretanto, de um certo modo natural, porque completa o céu. E de fato, sem ela o céu, cujo aquele movimento segue-se da natureza, careceria dele, pelo que seria imperfeito. Acresce que a inteligência move o céu segundo as diferenças de posição devidas, e com tanta velocidade, nem maior, nem menor do que convenha à propensão natural. O que também desejou o Divino Tomás dizendoe: "o céu move-se a si mesmo, enquanto é composto de motor e móvel, não como de matéria e forma, mas por contato de influxo, como foi dito. Assim também se pode dizer que seu motor é um princípio intrínseco, de modo que o movimento do céu possa ser chamado natural quanto ao princípio ativo, como se diz que o movimento voluntário é natural ao animal enquanto animal, como se diz no livro VIII da Física3". Este é o Divino Tomás. DUODÉ- L I B E R P R I M V S. 13 Effectus à caelo in certas terrae plagas prouenientes. a Aristot. 1. Meteor. cap. 2. 3. Physic. 2. de cęlo. 2. de gener. & corrupt. b lib. 8. c. 16 Caelestem machinam non totam moueri. CAPVT DVODECIMVM. AElum quod quintum corpus ab Elemẽtis diuersum statuitur, non totum moueri, sed aliquam eius partem (non dico axim quę línea tantum est) quiescere, ratione naturali ex effectibus eius desumpta potest doceri. Effectus fixi in certis terrae regionibus à causa procedunt immobili fixàve. Sed in hisce sublunaribus, multi effectus fixi sunt, hoc est, qui in vna regione sunt, in altera verò nequaquam. Effectus igitur ij à causa immobili procedunt necessariò. Causam autem effectuum sublunarium caelum statuunt Philosophia: necessariò itaque caeli aliqua régio fixa immobilisque statuenda est. Effectus autem vários esse fixos ex effectibus, qui in diuersis regionibus eiusdem paraleli fiunt, ostendi potest. Nam Brixia & Lugdunum sunt sub eodem parallelo, videlicet decimo quinto, quare eaedem partes caelestis machinae quae moueri possunt, motu primi mobilis in eas regiones aequaliter agere possunt: Brixia tamen oleis abundat, quibus caret Lugdunum. Sic in Europa (Plinio referenteb) inter Acheloum & Nestum amnes procreantur Leones longe viribus praestantiores iis, quos Aphrica aut Syria gignit: Cùm tamen nisi aliqua caelestis machinae pars quiescens id efficeret suo influxu, in Toto illo tractu ab Oriente versus Occidentem fieri deberet. Sic in Hungaria sub latitudine 47 grad.equi velocissimi procreãtur & validissimi, qui in aliis regionibus eiusdem latitudinis minimè producuntur. Sic in Mauritania innumerę quasi simiae generãtur, in aliis regionibus plurimis eiusdẽ latitudinis minimè. Sicque in omnibus terrae partibus effectus fixi similes reperiũtur, vnde caelestis machinae pars fixa & immobilis terram ambiens est statuenda, à qua in terram manent tales effectus: Respondebunt forsan aliqui hanc diuersitatem effectuum in eodem climate pendere totam ex varia dispositione terrae, tunc hoc libenter concesso, dicimus terrae illam dispositionem à caelo prouenire: Etenim sufficiens causa reddi non potest, cur in eodem climate eadem non sit dispositio: quandoquidem omnes partes eiusdem climatis respectu machinae caelestis mobilis eosdem habeat aspectu sucessiuè. Sed ad alia veniamus. C iij De C P R I M E I R O L I V R O 13 Os efeitos em certos territórios da Terra são provenientes do céu. a Aristóteles, Meteorológicos, Livro 1, Capítulo 2; Física, Livro 3; Sobre o Cèu, Livro 2; Sobre a Geração e a Corrupção, Livro 2. b Livro 8, Capítulo 16. DUODÉCIMO CAPÍTULO. A máquina celeste não se move toda. Stá estabelecido que o céu, que é um quinto corpo, diferente dos elementos, não se move todo, mas alguma parte dele repousa (não digo o eixo que é apenas uma linha), [isso] pode ser ensinado por uma razão natural tomada a partir dos efeitos dele. Os efeitos fixos em certas regiões da Terra procedem de uma causa imóvel ou fixa. Mas, nestas [regiões] sublunares, os efeitos fixos são muitos, isto é, que existem em uma região, mas, de forma alguma em outra. Portanto, esses efeitos procedem necessariamente de uma causa imóvel. Por outro lado, os filósofos afirmam que o céu é a causa dos efeitos sublunaresa e assim, necessariamente deve-se afirmar que alguma região do céu é fixa e imóvel. E pode ser mostrado que vários efeitos são fixos a partir dos efeitos que ocorrem em diversas regiões do mesmo paralelo. Pois, Bréscia e Lion estão sobre o mesmo paralelo, a saber, o décimo quinto, por isso, as mesmas partes da máquina celeste que podem ser movidas pelo movimento do primeiro móvel, podem agir nestas regiões igualmente. A Bréscia, entretanto, abunda em olivas, das quais Lion carece. Assim, na Europa (com referência a Plíniob), entre os rios Achelou e Nesto, procriam-se leões de longe mais notáveis pelo vigor do que aqueles que a África ou a Síria geram. Entretanto, a menos que alguma parte parada da maquina celeste fizesse isso por seu influxo, deveria acontecer em todo aquele trecho do Oriente até o Ocidente. Assim, na Hungria sob a latitude de 47 graus, cavalos velocíssimos e vigorosíssimo procriam-se, que em outras regiões de mesma latitude minimamente reproduzem-se. Assim, na Mauritânia, do mesmo modo, inúmeros símios são gerados, em outras muitas regiões da mesma latitude minimamente. E assim, em todas as partes da Terra são encontrados efeitos fixos parecidos, do que deve-se afirmar que uma parte fixa e imóvel da máquina celeste circunda a Terra, pela qual permanecem tais efeitos na Terra. Alguns talvez responderão que esta diversidade toda de efeitos no mesmo clima depende de uma disposição variada da Terra, então, isso tendo sido concedido de boa vontade, dizemos que aquela disposição da Terra provém do céu. E de fato, não pode ser apresentada uma causa suficiente, de porque no mesmo clima não seja a mesma disposição, já que todas as partes do mesmo clima em relação à máquina celeste móvel têm sucessivamente os mesmos aspectos. Mas vamos para outras coisas. CAPÍTULO E Stella quid? a 1. Meteor. 2. de caelo. Densa pars caeli. Fabula. Figura. Lumen vnde. b Lib. de. diuinis nomi. c Senten. dist. 15. q. 1. art. 1. ad. 4. 14 OVRANOGRAPHIAE De Stellis. CAPVT XIII. Tella sanioris mentis Philosophisa est densior pars sui orbis. Graeci stellas ς ς vocant ὸ ς , hoc est à fulgore. ς verò quasi ς dicitur ς , quod ad se visum conuertat. Aliqui tamen ς ex pluribus stellis coactas & conformatas imagines nominare malunt; vti Latini sydera. Cùm autem stella orbis pars sit, patet impropriè nomen id tribui stellis deciduis & crinitis cum partes caeli non sint, sed in aere tantum comsistant. Deciduas quidem intelligunt quas noctu videmus è caelo cadere: crinitas verò quas cometas Graeci dicunt: Nec verò quaeuis caeli pars stella est, sed densa eiusdemq; cum caelo toto naturae; densum enim & rarum naturam rei non mutat. Antiquorum aliqui autumarũt stellas esse corpora animata propter alimentũ suo motu terram perambulantia, vt scilicet humidum aqueum ad se velut in potum, & siccum terrestre in cibum attraherent. Quemadmodum videmus progressiuo motu animália quae apud nos sunt, moueri ad querendum alimenta cibum atque potum. Sed hoc sigmentum planè poëticum est, neque quicquam habet verisimilitudinis. Stellae autem ab omnibus ponuntur rotundae figurae, quod etiam sensus ipse iudicare videtur ni forte ob nímia distantiam decipiatur. Lumen autem recipiunt omnes à Sole vti Peripatetici fere omnes cum Dionysiob (quem D. Thomas adducitc) sentiunt; quod hisce rationibus ab aliquibus adductis probaliter ostendi potest. Lunae & caeterarum stellarum quãtum ad lumen eadem est ratio. Sed Luna mutuatur lumen suum à Sole, vti patet ex eius augmẽto, decremento & eclypsi. Ergo & reliquae stellae à Sole lumen suum mutuantur. Sic Primum in vnoquoq; genere est causa omnium eorum quae sunt illius generis. Sol in genere lucidorum est primum Quidquid in ordine plurium est maximè tale id primo, & per se est tale. Solinter lucida est lucidissimus. Sol itaque in genere lucidorum est primum. Sol itaque causa est luminis in omnibus stellis. Hoc quoque inde aliqui colligunt quod planetae qui Soli viciniores sunt, S O que é a estrela? a Meteorológicos, Livro 1; Sobre o Céu, Livro 2. A parte densa do céu. Fábula. Figura. De onde é a Luz. b Livro sobre os nomes divinos. c [Comentário sobre] as Sentenças [de Pedro Lombardo], distinçao 15, questão 1, artigo 1, quanto ao 4o. 14 DA URANOGRAFIA. CAPÍTULO XIII. Sobre as Estrelas. Strela, para os filósofos de mente sãa, é uma parte mais densa de seu orbe. Os gregos chamam as estrelas , isto é, de fulgor. Mas ς como que ς é dito ς , o que se vira para o olhar. Outros ainda querem nomear ς as imagens juntadas e formadas a partir de várias estrelas, como os latinos [chamam] constelações. Mas, como a estrela é parte do orbe, parece esse nome ser impropriamente atribuido ás estrelas decíduas e cabeludas por que não são partes do céu, mas existem somente no ar. Eles, de fato, entendem por decíduas as que vemos de noite cair do céu; mas, as [estrelas] cabeludas as que os gregos dizem cometas. Porém uma estrela não é qualquer parte do céu, mas uma [parte] densa do mesmo e da natureza com o céu todo. De fato, o denso e o rarefeito não muda a natureza da coisa. Alguns dos antigos pensaram que as estrelas eram corpos animados perambulando com seu movimento a Terra por causa do alimento, para atraírem o humido aquoso para si como em uma bebida, e o seco terrestre como em uma comida. Do mesmo modo vemos os animais, que estão junto a nós, com um movimento progressivo, serem movidos para os alimentos que querem, como comida e bebida. Mas, isto é claramente uma invenção poética e não tem qualquer verossemelhança. Por outro lado, as estrelas são postas de figura rotunda por todos, o que também o próprio sentido parece julgar, senão, é enganado por causa da distância excessiva. Por outro lado, todas recebem a luz do Sol, como pensam quase todos os peripatéticos com Dionísiob (que o Divino Thomas apresentac), o que pode ser provavelmente mostrado por estas razões trazidas por outros. A razão da Lua e das demais estrelas quanto a luz é a mesma. Mas, a Lua toma emprestada sua luz do Sol, como é claro a partir de seu aumento, diminuição e eclipse. Portanto, também as estrelas tomam emprestada sua luz do Sol. Assim, O primeiro em cada gênero é a causa de todos esses que são daquele gênero. O Sol é o primeiro do gênero dos luminosos O que quer que em uma ordem de vários é máximo tal é esse primeiro, e por si é o tal. O Sol entre os luminosos é luminosíssimo. E assim, o Sol é o primeiro no gênero dos luminosos. E assim o Sol é a causa da luz em todas as estrelas. Disso, alguns compreendem também que os planetas que são mais E L I B E R P R I M V S. 15 Quotuplex Dignotio. Partes à stellis reliqua sunt rarae. a 52. perspectiuae. res sunt, vehementius illuminetur, vti apparet in Marte & Venere. Stellae in duplici sunt differentia: Etenim aliae fixae sunt, aliae erraticae: fixae quidem , erraticae verò vocari sunt solitae. Fixae dicuntur nõ quod nullum habeatn motum aut quod motus sint tardissimi: sed quod earum distantias à seinuicem ad hunc vsque diem, artífices diligentiores repererint inuariabiles atque easdem. Planetę verò neque à seinuicem, neque à stellis fixis aequaliter distant. Sed nunc quidem ad inuicem accedunt, nunc ab inuicem recedunt, nunc hic illum praecedit, nunc sequitur. Distinguuntur autem stellae fixae à Planetis scintillatione: Omnes enim stellę fixae scintillare videntur; quod alij quidem propter longinguam nimis distantiam & visus nostri debilitatem euenire putant: alij propter motum caeli cõtinuò ângulos irradiationis variantem. Verum eius rei nos rationem in Optica reddemus. Soli Planetae non scintillant, nisi forte Saturnus interdum, quem dicunt flante Borea non nihil scintillare, id quod hac ratione, & quibusdam aliis praetereundum scintillationem talem nihil in ipsa stella scintillante esse: sed tantum secundum apparentiam euenire. De partibus caeli raris. CAPVT XIIII. Artes caeli rarae non videntur ob earum perspicuitatem. Luminosi quidem sunt caeli secundum omnes partes, lumine ipsarum partium substantiam penetrante: Siquidem tam per noctem quàm oer diem Sol orbes caelesties illuminat: neq; potst interpositio terrae (quę non nisi punctus est caeli respectu) eorum illuminationem impedire. Non sunt tamen nisi ratione stellarum lucidi, vt lúmen possint de se transfundere, alioqui Nec nox noc tenebrae haberent locum, tanto corpore lumen suum perpetuò spargente. Ratio autem huius appatentiae est haec: Quidquid videtur id densum est. Nam partes rarae penetrantur à lumine, Nec acceptum lúmen reflectunt. Caeli partes à stellis diuersa non sunt densae: quia rationes sunt quouis elemento. Ergo Caeli partes à stellis diuersae non videntur. Similiter Quidquid videtur, id per medium rarius videri debeta: Sed P P R I M E I R O L I V R O 15 Quão multiplas são. Distinção As partes restantes longe das estrelas são rarefeitas. a 52 da Perspectiva. mais vizinos ao Sol são iluminados mais veementemente, como aparece em Marte e Vênus. As estrelas são diferencidas em duas coisas. Na verdade, algumas são fixas, outras erraticas: costuma-se chamar as fixas , mas as erraticas . Dizerm-se fixas não porque não tem movimento, ou porque o movimento é lentíssimo, mas porque as distâncias delas de umas às outras até este dia os mais diligentes artífices encontraram invariaveis e as mesmas. Mas, o planetas não distam igualmente nem entre si, nem das estrelas fixas. Mas, ora aproxima-se uns dos outros, ora afastam-se, ora este precede aquele, ora [o] segue. Por outro lado, as estrelas fixas distiguem-se dos planetas pela cintilação. De fato, todas as estrelas fixas parecem cintilar, por que alguns pensam acontecer por causa da distância excessivamente longingua e a fraqueza da nossa visão, outros por causa do movimento do céu que varia continuamente os ângulos de irradiação. Mas, nós apresentaremos a razão desta coisa na Ótica. Somente os planetas não cintilam, a não ser Saturno de tempos em tempos, que dizem cintilar um pouvo quando Boreas sopra, o que por esta razão, pode acontecer alguns outros planetas, como ensinaremos na Ótica. Por outro lado, não se deve desconsiderar que tal cintilação não é nada em uma estrela própria cintilante, mas acontece somente segundo uma aparência. CAPÍTULO XIV. Sobre as Partes Rarefeitas do Cèu. S partes rarefeitas do céu não são vistas por causa da trasnparência delas. No entanto, os céus são luminosos segundo todas as partes, com a luz penetrando a substância das próprias partes. Visto que, tanto à noite, quanto de dia, o Sol ilumina os orbes celestes e a interposição da Terra (que é se não um ponto em relação ao céu) não pode impedir a sua iluminação. Entretanto, não são iluminados a não ser em razão das estrelas, porque podem transvazar a luz, aliás, nem a noite, nem a escuridão teriam lugar, com um tão grande corpo perpetuamente espalhando sua luz. Por outro lado, a razão desta aparência é esta: Tudo aquilo que é visto é denso. De fato, as partes rarefeitas são penetradas pela luminosidade, e não refletem a luz recebida. As partes do céu diferentes das estrelas não são densas, porque são mais rarefeitas do que qualquer elemento. Portanto, As partes do céu diferentes das estrelas não são vistas. Semelhantemente, Tudo aquilo que é visto, este deve ser visto através de um meio mais rarefeitoa: Mas A 16 OVRANOGRAPHIAE Sed partibus caeli quae à stellis diuersae sunt, omnia media sunt densora. Ergo Partes caeli à stellis diuersę non videntur. Sed viam lacteam nobis ibijciet quis, cuius partes etiam à stellis diuersę videntur: huic responsum velim hanc caeli octaui partem esse vel multitudinem stellarum fixarum minimarum, quę ad visum nostrum distinctę non perueniunt, vti aliqui voluerunt, vel saltem (quod doctiorib.magis probatur) partem octaui caeli continuam & densiorem aliis partibus, licet non conformiter sit densa, ita vt lumẽ Solis recipere possit: non tamen ea abundantia, qua aliae stellae quae sunt eiusdem firmamenti partes multò densiores & inter se distantes. Itaque siue stellae sint siue non, comstat esse partes densas, quare more stellarum posse lúmen de se transfundere & videri. Caelum non esse vnum corpus continuum, sed in orbes distinctum. CAPVT XV. X iis quae de motu & quiete caelestis machinae ostensa sunt, patet caelum vnum no esse corpus continuum: Hac enim ratione, mota vna parte, necessariò omnes partes mouerentur. Itaque partes necessariò statuendae quae continuae non sint, ita tamen vt partes eae quae quiescunt motum aliarum non impediant. Cùm autem tum partes quiescentes, tum partes motae terram circundent, eas esse orbiculares necesse est, ita vt vna circundet aliam: Alia enim ratio excogitari non potest, qua partes quaedam motae terram circundantes, non impediantur ab immotis quę similiter terram circundant, nisi vna pars statuatur supra aliam. Neque veró machina caelestis mobilis vnũ remanet corpus, sed & ipsa propter motus diuersos in ea repertos (quorũ aliqui anteà sunt à nobis ostensi) discontinua est. Nam cum simplici corpori motus conueniat simplex, certè omnes stellae quę in machina caelesti moueri cernuntur, si in vno continuo existerent corpore, vno etiam eodemque motu cierentur: cuius contrarium iam ante docuimus. Partes hásce móbiles terram circuire a nobis etiam fuit ostensum: quare ne vna pars tardiùs mota velocitatem alterius impediret, eas discontinuas atque orbiculares statuit Deus, cùm nec hîc alia ratio (vti in comparatione immobilis cum mobili diximus) motuum pluralitatem saluandi E 16 DA URANOGRAFIA. Mas todos os meios são mais densos do que as partes do céu que são diferentes das estrelas. Portanto, As partes do céu diferentes das estrelas não são vistas. Mas, alguém apresentaria a nós a via láctea, cujas partes também diferentes das estrelas são vistas; eu responderia a ele que esta [a via láctea] é parte do oitavo céu ou uma multidão de estrelas fixas mínimas, que não chegam distintamnete à nossa visão, como outros desejariam, ou pelo menos (o que é demonstrado pelos grandes doutores) uma parte contínua do oitavo céu e mais densa do que as outras partes, ainda que não seja conformemente densa, ainda assim possa receber a luz do Sol. Entretanto, [recebem] não com essa abundância, que outras estrelas que são partes muito mais densas do mesmo firmamento e distantes entre si. E, dessa forma, sejam estrelas ou não, é claro que são partes densas, porque à moda das estrelas pode tranvazar a luz de si e ser vista. CAPÍTULO XV. O Cèu não é um corpo contínuo, mas distinto em orbes. Partir daquelas coisas que são mostradas sobre o movimento e o repouso da máquina celeste, é claro que o céu não é um único corpo contínuo. De fato, por esta razão, tendo sido movida uma parte, necessariamente todas as partes mover-se-iam. E assim, necessariamente devem ser estabelecida partes que não sejam continuas, de forma que essas partes que repousam ainda assim não impeçam o movimento das outras. Por outro lado, como tanto as partes que repousam, quanto as partes movidas circundam a Terra, é necessário que estas sejam orbiculares, de forma que assim uma circunde a outra. De fato, outra razão não pode ser imaginada, pela qual certas partes movidas que circundam a Terra, não sejam impedidas pelas imóveis que semelhantemente circundam a Terra, a não ser que uma parte seja fixada sobre a outra. Mas, nem a máquina celeste móvel permanerce um corpo único, nem também ela mesma, por causa dos diversos movimentos encontrados (dos quais alguns foram mostrados por nós anteriormente) nela, é descontínua. Pois, como a um corpo simples convém um movimento simples, certamente todas as estrelas que vemos mover-se na máquina celeste, se existisse em um único corpo contínuo, também agitar-se-iam por um único e mesmo movimento, o contrário do que anteriormente já ensinamos. Também foi mostrado por nós que estas mesmas partes móveis circulam a Terra, a fim de que uma parte movida mais lentamente não impeça uma velocidade de outra forma, Deus as estabeleceu descontínuas e orbiculares, porque nenhuma outra razão (como dissemos na comparação do imóvel com o móvel) pode ser imaginada para salvar a pluralidade A L I B E R P R I M V S. 17 uandi possit excogitari. Vnde si numerum corporum caelestium mobilium à numero motuum simplicium in caelo repertorum desumamus, certè tot orbes móbiles statuere oportebit, quot motus diuersos: his si vnum immobilem (plures enim immobiles vt statuamus quaenam nos coget ratio?) addamus, habebimus numerum integrum orbium caelestium; quem sequenti explicabimus capite. Distinctio caeli secundum recentiores Cosmographos & Astronomos. CAPVT XVI. AElum aliud Empyreum, aliud AEthereum. Empyreum est id quod immobile esse praecedenti capite diximus, omnium supremum ideoque primum. Caelum AEthereum primaria ratione ab omnibus tum antiquis tum recẽtioribus in primum mobile & secunda mobilia distinctum fuit. Primum mobile id caelum dicitur à quo motus diurnus, qui omnium primum est, maximeque comspicuus proficiscitur. Secunda vero mobilia ea sunt, quae praeter motum illum diurnum, quem primum mobile iis largitur, habent praetereà & alium motum huic ferè contrarium, qualem motum in caelo obseruari anteà docuimus. Itaque ratione duplicis huius motus videlicet motus diurni, atque alterius cuiusuis ab eo diuersi, statuitur haec distinctio caelorum mobilium in móbile primum, & mobilia secunda. Primum autem móbile supra secunda statuitur: quod sphaera superior possit mouere & rapere secum inferiorem, non autem contrà. Mobile secundum est vel christallinum siue aqueum, vel stellarum. Quod stellarum est continet stellas vel fixas vel errantes: fixis vnum tribuitur caelum, propter motus earum similitudinem: errantibus verò septem, propter septuplicem motuum differentiam. Vnde colliguntur mouem sphaereae secũdae mobiles. Harum omnium sphaerarum ordo hac continetur tabella. D Caelum C P R I M E I R O L I V R O 17 pluralidade dos movimentos. Daí se tomarmos o número dos corpos celestes móveis do número dos movimentos simples encontrados no céu, certamente será conveniente estabelecer tantos orbes móveis, quantos movimentos distintos [existirem]. A esses [orbes] se adicionamos um único imóvel (De fato, que razão nos mandará estabelecer um maior número de [orbes] imóveis?), teremos o número inteiro dos orbes celestes, que explicaremos no capítulo seguinte. CAPÍTULO XVI. Distinção do céu segundo os Cosmógrafos e os Astrônomos mais recentes. Céu, um empíreo, outro etéreo. O empíreo é aquele que dissemos ser imóvel no capítulo precedente, o mais alto de todos e, por isso, o primeiro. O céu etéreo foi separado por uma razão primária por todos, tanto antigos, quanto pelos mais recentes, em primeiro móvel e segundos móveis. O primeiro móvel é dito o céu do qual começa o movimento diurno, que é o primeiro de todos, e maximamente observado. Mas, os segundos móveis são aqueles que além daquele movimento diurno, que o primeiro móvel lhes distribui, tem, além disso, também outro movimento quase contrário aquele tipo de movimento que é observado no céu que ensinamos anteriormente. E assim, em razão deste movimento duplo, a saber, do movimento diurno e de outro qualquer diverso dele, é estabelecida esta distinção dos céus móveis em primeiro e segundos móveis. Por outro lado, o primeiro móvel é estabelecido acima dos segundos, para que a esfera superior possa mover e arrastar consigo a inferior, e não contrariamente. Um segundo móvel é ou cristalino (ou aquoso) ou estrelado. O que é estrelado contém estrelas ou fixas ou errantes: um único céu é atrbuído às fixas, por causa da similitude do movimento delas; mas, às errantes sete [céus], por causa da diferença sétupla dos movimentos. Donde nove esferas segundas móveis são juntadas. A ordem de todas as esferas esta contida nesta tabela. O Céu O a 2. De diuinatione. 18 OVRANOGRAPHIAE Caelum vel est Empyreum, siue immobile, siue primũ Sphaera vndecima AEthe reum siue mobile Primum decima secũ dum Cristallinum, siue aqueum nona stella rum, stellis fixis. Firmamentum octaua erran tibus atq; vel planetis superio ribus Saturno septima Ioue sexta Marte quinta planeta medio videlicet Sole quarta planetis inferio ribus Venere tertia Mercurio secũda Luna infima Manilius ordinem Planetarum hisce duobus complexus est versibus: Saturni, Iouis, & Martis, Solisq sub illis, Mercurius, Venerem inter agit, Lunamq locatus2. Ad quem ordinem Planetarum memoriae faciliùs mandadum, seruit & sequens versiculus, Planetarum ab imo ad summum ordinem complectens: Cinthia, Mercurius, Venus, & Sol, Mars, Ioue, Satur. Vbi per Cinthiam intellige Lunam, per Satur Saturnum. Distinctio caeli secundum antiquos tum Philosophos , tum historicos, tum Poëtas. CAPVT XVII. Eteres Sphaeram nonam, decima, vti & immobilem omnino ignorasse videmur, vnde octauam sphaeram primum vocarunt caelum, reliquos qui sunt planetarum, secunda mobilia; vti abunde testatur Cicero ita scribensa: Docet ratio Mathematicorum quanta humilitate Luna feratur terra pene contigens, quantum absit à proxima Mercurij stella: multo autẽ longiùs à Veneris: deinde alio interuallo distat à Sole, cuius lumine illustrari putatur. Reliqua verò tria interualla infinita & immensa à Sole ad Martis, deinde ad Iouis, ab eo ad Saturni stellam, inde ad caelum ipsum quod extremum atque vltimum mundi est1. Eosdem V a Sobre a Adivinhação, Livro 2. 18 DA URANOGRAFIA. O céu é ou Empíreo, ou imóvel, ou primeiro. Esfera undécima Etéreo ou primeiro móvel décima segundo móvel Cristalino, ou aquoso. nona estrelado, com estrelas fixas. Firmamento oitava erran tes e ou com os planetas superiores com Saturno sétima com Júpiter sexta com Marte quinta com o planeta médio, a saber, com o Sol. quarta com os planetas inferiores com Vênus terceira com Mercúrio segunda com a Lua Ínfima Manilius abarcou a ordem dos planetas com estes dois versos: De Saturno, de Júpter, e de Marte e do Sol sob eles, Mercúrio está localizado entre Vênus e a Lua. Para quem quer que seja enviada à memória a ordem dos planetas, mais facilmente serve também o seguinte versinho, compreendendo a ordem dos plnetas de baixo para cima. Cíntia, Mercúrio, Vênus, e Sol, Marte, Júpiter, Satur. Onde por Cíntia entende-se Lua, por Satur, Saturno. CAPÍTULO XVII. Distinção do céu segundo os antigos tanto filósofos, como os histoóriadores, como os poetas. S antigos parecem ter ignorado totalmente a nona, décima, como também a esfera imóvel, por isso chamaram a oitava esfera de primeiro céu, e os restantes que são dos planetas, segundos móveis. Como Cícero abundantemente afirma escrevendo assima: "A razão dos matemáticos ensina que a Lua com tão baixa elevação é conduzida quase tocando a Terra, o quão se afasta da estrela próxima de Mercúrio, e muito mais longe de Vênus, depois com outro intervalo dista do Sol, com cuja luz se pensa que [a Lua] é iluminada. Mas, os três intervalos restantes são infinitos e imensos, do Sol para Marte, depois para Júpiter, deste para a estrela de Saturno, daí para o próprio céu que é o extremo e o último do mundo". Os mesmos O L I B E R P R I M V S. 19 b In Somniũ Scipionis. Eosdẽ orbes vnà cum terra idẽ Cicero álibi numerat ita scribẽsb: Nouem orbibus, vel potiùs globis conexa sunt omnia, quorum vnus est caelestis eximus qui reliquos complectitur omnes, summus ille Deus atcẽs & cõtinens caeteros, in quo sunt in fixi illi qui voluuntur stellarum cursus sempiterni. Cui subiecti sunt septem, qui versantur retrò, contrario motu atque caelum. Ex quibus vnum globum possidet ille quem in terris Saturnum nominant. Deinde Hominum generi prosper & salutaris ille fulgor, qui dicitur Iouis. Tùm rutilus horribi.lisque terris, quem Martem dicitis. Deinde subtermediam ferè regionem Sol obtinet, Dux & Princeps & moderator luminum reliquorum, mens mundi atque temperatio, tanta magnitudine, vt cuncta sua luce lustret & completat. Hunc vt comites subsequuntur Veneris alter, alter Mercurij cursus. In infimoque orbe Luna radiis Solis accensa couertitur. Infrà autem eam nihil est nisi mortale & caducum, praeter ânimos munere Deorum hominum generi datos. Supra Lunam sunt omni aeterna. Nam ea quae est media & nona tellus, neque mouetur & ínfima est, & in eam feruntur omnia nutu suo pundera2. Haec Cicero. Quis ordo caelorum. CAPVT XVIII. Votquot hactenus alicuius nominis extinere Mathematici ij vnanimi comsensu stellas fixas supra Planetas omnes collocauerunt. Praetereà dempto Motrodoro & Crate Solem & Lunam supremo loco ponentibus, reliqui omnes sub firmamento Saturnum hinc Iouem inde Martem collocauere. Planetarum reliquorum Solis, Veneris, Mercurij, & Lunae situs fuit conrrouersus apud vitos magni nominis. Aristarchus Samius quadringentis ante Ptolomaeum annis cum aliquot sequacibus, & Nicolao Copernico Solem immobilem in medio mundi statuit, circa quem orbis Mercurij, deinde orbi Veneris, circa hunc orbis Magnus, terram vnà cum elementis & Luna continens, circa quem orbis Martis, deinde caelum Iouis: posteà globus Saturni, vltimò tandem stellarum fixarum sphaera sequatur. quem ordinem Cornelius Gemma nostro tempore Medicus & Methematicus celebris complexus est his versibus: Alma Dei, mundo cum mens infusa caleret, Multipliceq; vago, volueret orbe vices: D ij CrediQ P R I M E I R O L I V R O 19 b No Sonho de Cipião. Os mesmos orbes juntamente com a Terra, do mesmo modo, Cícero, em outro lugar, enumera escrevendo assimb: "todas as coisas estão conectadas aos nove orbes, ou melhor globos, dos quais um é o extremo celeste que envolve todos os restantes, aquele Deus supremo encerrando e contendo os demais, no qual estão fixados aqueles caminhos eternos das estrelas que são girados. A ele estão sujeitos um céu e sete [globos], que são lançados para trás com movimento contrário. Aquele, que na Terra nomeiam Saturno, ocupa um globo. Depois, aquele brilho que é dito Júpiter é próspero e saudável para o gênero dos homens. Então, a terra rútila e horrível que é dita Marte. Em seguida, o Sol, chefe e príncipe e moderador das luzes restantes, mente e emperança do mundo, com tanto tamanho, que ilumina e completa com sua luz todas as coisas, ocupa uma região quase submédia. Daí, como companheiros, seguem os caminhos às vezes de Vênus, às vezes de Mercúrio. No orbe ínfimo, a Lua se torna acesa com os raios do Sol. E abaixo dela não é nada que não seja mortal e caduco, além exceto as almas dadas como presente dos deuses ao gênero dos homens. Acima da Lua todas as coisas são eternas. Pois a Terra, nona [esfera], que está no meio de tudo, e não se move e é ínfima, e nela todas as coisas em sua ordem são carregadas"3. Cícero diz essas coisas. CAPÍTULO XVIII. Qual a Ordem dos Céus. Uantos quer que sejam os matemáticos de algum nome que até aqui se destacaram, eles colocaram com consenso unânime as estrelas fixas acima de todos os planetas. Além disso, com exceção de Metrodoro e Crates, que põem a Lua e o Sol no lugar supremo, todos os restantes colocaram sob o firmamento, Saturno daí Júpiter e, em seguida, Marte. A posição dos planetas restantes, do Sol, de Vênus, de Mercúrio e da Lua, foi controversa entre os homens de grande nome. Aristarco de Samos, quatrocentos snos antes de Ptolomeu, com alguns seguidores, e Nicolau Copérnico, estabeleceram o Sol imóvel no meio do mundo, o orbe de Mercúrio em volta dele, depois o orbe de Vênus, o orbe maior em volta desse, contendo a Terra juntamente com os elementos e a Lua, o orbe de Marte em volta dele, depois o céu de Júpiter, em seguida o globo de Saturno, finalmente por último é seguida pela esfera das estrelas fixas. Cornélio Gemma, médico e matemático célebre de nosso tempo, compreende esta ordem com estes versos: Alma Dei, mundo cum mens infusa caleret, Multipliceq; vago, volueret orbe vices: Q a Lib. 9. Epit. prop. 1. b In Timęo c 2. de caelo cap. 12. 1. Meteor. cap. 4. d In Alma e De diuinatione. In Somniũ Scipionis. Stellarum orbes octo cur. 20 OVRANOGRAPHIAE Creditur ingentis medio suspensa theatri Terra diu stabilem continuisse totam. Creditur & Titan circum, Titaneaq; Astra Natura stratas legibus isse vias. Nunc tellus ô Phaebe tuo se credere caelo Et currus & equos ausa subire tuos. Audet, quas verita est quondam, Phaëtentis habens, Supplicium casu mox luitura pari. Implicat hac Lunae mediam concentricus orbis, Ingenij, & motus lubricitate sequax. Altius incedunt Saturnus, Iupiter & Mars, Mercurius, Venus his inferiora tenent. Stellarum vlterior regio comsueta moueri, Mobilibus stabili nunc face signat iter. Sors eadem Soli, sed terrarum hospita sedes Annuit, & solitus non placet ille labor. Prouebimur circum nobis ea signa recedunt, Vt littus pronae quam vehit vnda rati. Vnde nec ad caeli motus elementa trahuntur Amplius, at terrae nutibus astra Meant. Reliqui verò quotquot fuere celebres Lunam imo loco collocauere: sed res dúbia maximè fuit in situ Mercurij, Veneris ac Solis quod aequali velocitate moueri videãntur. Democritus quidem Muercurium faciebat Sole superiorem: vti & Alpetragius referente Regiomontanoa, eodem (Sole inquam) altiorem facit Venerem. Platob autem eiusque discipulus Aristotelesc vtrumque planetam supra Solem statuunt. Prolomaeus tamend & ante eum celebres aliquot Mathematici vna cũ Ciceronee statuunt supra Lunam immediatè Mercurium, hinc Venerem, inde Solem: Hanc etiam sententiam, recentiores vti magis experientiis congruam, amplectuntur. Qua ratione decem sphaerae mobiles inuentae sint. CAPVT XIX. Niuersam caeli machinam vnum continuum corpus non e s se anteà ex diuers is motibus o stendimus, vnde à motuum diuer s i tate orbium mobil ium numerum de sumi debere cõ clusi V a Epitome ao Almagesto, Livro 9, Proposição 1. b No Timeu c Sobre o Céu, Livro 2, Capítulo 12; Meteorológicos, Livro 1, Capítulo 4 d Sobre a Alma e Sobre a Adivinhação; O Sonho de Cipião Porque oito orbes das estrelas 20 DA URANOGRAFIA. Creditur ingentis medio suspensa theatri Terra diu stabilem continuisse totam. Creditur & Titan circum, Titaneaq; Astra Natura stratas legibus isse vias. Nunc tellus ô Phaebe tuo se credere caelo Et currus & equos ausa subire tuos. Audet, quas verita est quondam, Phaëtentis habens, Supplicium casu mox luitura pari. Implicat hac Lunae mediam concentricus orbis, Ingenij, & motus lubricitate sequax. Altius incedunt Saturnus, Iupiter & Mars, Mercurius, Venus his inferiora tenent. Stellarum vlterior regio comsueta moueri, Mobilibus stabili nunc face signat iter. Sors eadem Soli, sed terrarum hospita sedes Annuit, & solitus non placet ille labor. Prouebimur circum nobis ea signa recedunt, Vt littus pronae quam vehit vnda rati. Vnde nec ad caeli motus elementa trahuntur Amplius, at terrae nutibus astra Meant.1 Mas, quantos querem que sejam os restantes que foram celebres colocaram a Lua no lugar mais baixo. Mas, a duvida maior foi a respeito do lugar de Mercúrio, de Vênus e do Sol, porque parecem mover-se com igual velocidade. Na verdade, Demócrito fazia Mercúrio superior ao Sol, como também Alpetrágio se referindo a Regiomontanoa faz Vênus superior ao mesmo (O Sol, eu digo). Por outro lado, Platãob e seu discípulo Aristótelesc estabelecem um e outro planeta acima do Sol. Ptolomeud e alguns celebres matemáticas ainda antes dele juntamente com Cíceroe estabelecem Mercúrio imediatamente acima da Lua, daí Vênus e depois o Sol. Também os mais recentes abraçam esta opinião como mais congruente com as experiências. CAPÍTULO XIX. Por que razão são obtidas as dez esferas móveis. Máquina geral do céu não é um único corpo contínuo a partir de diferentes movimentos como mostramos anteriormente, donde concluímos [que] o número dos orbes móveis deve ser obtido pela A L I B E R P R I M V S. 21 Nona sphaera cur Decima sphaera cur Ptolomaei excusatio. Fundamẽ ta demonstrationis. clusimus: Verum longa experientia comstat singulos Planetas próprio quodam motu in orbem moueri. Consequens igitur fuit singulis Planetis singulas esse assignandas sphaeras. Rursus quia syderum fixorum motus à Planetarum motu diuersus est, dubitari nõ potest, quin praeter Planetarum sphaeras, alia quaedam sit in qua stellae fixae moueantur. Ptolomaeus videns in sphaera octaua motum alium praeter diurnum, nimirum centenis annis sydera incessu obliquo ab occasu in ortum super polis Zodiaci singulas ferè peragrare partes, excogitauit rationem qua hic nonus motus saluandus illi esset: Cumque corpori simplici vnus & simplex tantum conueniat motus, commodiùs motum hunc saluare non potuit, quam per additionem alicuius sphaerae, cui per se alter ille motus competeret. Ptolomaeo verò posteriores obseruarũt stellis fixis praetereà alium inesse motum, videlicet à septentrione in ortum, quem ex máxima Solis declinatione, quae hactenus decreuit, nuncque iterum crescit, collegerunt; vnde duos alios ab eo quem singulis diebus absoluit esse octauae sphaerae motus, ac proinde orbes totidem concluserunt. Eosdem autem orbes supra firmamentum nona utem infra posuerunt, ideò quod orbis nullus ab alio possit circum agi, nisi ab qo qui ampliori spacio illum complectitur. Caeterum non cogitet quis Ptolomaeum summum artificem hunc motum à posterioribus obseruatum omnino ignorasse, cum portiùs crediderim Ptolomaeum eum maluisse dissimulare, quam incerti aliquid in medium proferre, praecipuè cum ei deessent priorum sufficientes obseruationes, Nec in paucis annis ob nimiam tarditatem obseruari possit. Demonstratio autem atque fundamenta recentiorum, atque etiam Ptlomaei haec sunt. 1. Omne corpus simplex quod pluribus mouetur motibus habet vnumper se, reliquos per accidens. 2. Omnis motus vni corpori per accidens est alteri corpori per se. 3. stellę mouentur ad motum caeli sicut clauus cum rota. 4. sphaera superior potest mouere & rapere secum secum inferiorem: non autem contra. 5. Sphaera quaelibet caelestis est corpus simplex. D iij Si sphae- P R I M E I R O L I V R O 21 Porque uma nona esfera Porque uma décima esfera Justificativa à Ptolomeu Fundamentos da demonstração pela diversidade de movimento. Em verdade, a longa ezperiência confirma que cada um dos planetas move-se com um certo movimento em um orbe. Portanto, a consequência foi existir esferas separadas que devem ser atribuídas para cada planeta. Recirpocamente porque o movimento dos astros fixos é diferente do movimento dos planetas, não pode ser duvidado, que além das esferas dos planetas, exista alguma outra na qual movem-se as estrelas fixas. Ptolomeu, vendo na oitava esfera outro movimento além do diurno, a saber, que em cem anos os astros certamente percorrem cada uma das partes1 com um caminho oblíquo do poente ao nascente acima dos pólos do Zodíaco, imaginou uma razão pela qual ele salvaria este nono movimento: E como somente o movimento uno e simples convêm ao corpo simples, ele não pode mais comodamente salvar este movimento, a não ser pela adição de alguma esfera, com a qual aquele outro movimento por si coincidiria. Mas, os que vieram depois de Ptolomeu observaram que existia nas estrelas fixas outro movimento além desses, a saber, do setentrião para o nascente, que colheram a partir da declinação máxima do Sol, que ora decresce e ora cresce de novo. Do que concluíram que existem dois outros movimentos da oitava esfera além daquele que ocorre a cada dia e daí o mesmo número de orbes. Colocaram esses orbes acima do firmamento, mas não abaixo, mesmo porque nenhum orbe pode ser levado em círculo por outro, a não ser por aquele que o compreende em um espaço mais amplo. De resto ninguém pense que Ptolomeu, o sumo artífice, tenha ignorado completamente este movimento observado pelos posteriores, porque eu acreditaria que Ptolomeu o tenha preferido dissimular a apresentar ao público algo de incerto, principalmente porque a ele faltassem observações suficientes dos anteriores, e em poucos anos, por causa da ínfima lentidão, não podia ser observado. Por outro lado, a demonstração e os fundamentos dos recentes e também de Ptolomeu são estes. 1. Todo corpo simples que é movido por muitos movimentos tem um único por si, os restantes por acidente. 2. Todo movimento de um corpo por acidente é de outro corpo por si. 3. As estrelas são movidas pelo movimento do céu assim como o prego com a roda. 4. A esfera superior pode mover e arrastar consigo a inferior, mas não o contrário. 5. Qualquer que seja a esfera celeste é um corpo simples. Se algu- Demonstratio. Fontes rationum. 22 OVRANOGRAPHIAE Si sphaera aliqua moueatur tribus motib2 duo ex iis conueniunt duabus sphęris superioribus per se Motus plures vni sphaerae per accidens, sunt sphęris superiorib3 per se Motus plures vni sphaerae per accidẽs sunt aliis sphęris per se. per secundũ. Sed non inferioribus; quia sphęra inferior no potest mouere superiorem. per quartum. Ergo motus plures vni sphęrae per accidens sunt sphaeris superioribus per se. Sed si sphaera aliqua tribus moueatur motibus erũt necessariò duo motus illi sphęrę per accidens Corporis vnius simplicis quod pluribus mouetur motibus, vnicus est motus per se, reliqui per accidens. per primum. Sed quaelibet sphaera cęlestis est corpus vnum, idque simplex. per quintum. Ergo sphaerae cuiuslibet caelestis vnus motus est per se, reliqui verò per accidens. Ergo si sphęra aliqua moueatur tribus motibus, duo ex iis conueniunt duabus sphaeris superioribus per se. Sed sphaerae octauae tríplex est motus. Quotuplex est motus stellatum fixarum, totuplex est & caeli eius in quo ponũtur videlicet sphaerae octauae, quia stellae caeli in quo sunt, motum sequuntur, per tertium. Sed stellarum octauae sphęrae motus est tríplex, vt testatur obseruatio tum Ptolomęi tum recentiorum, Ergo octauae sphaerae tríplex est motus. Ergo duo ex motibus octauae sphaerae, conueniunt per se duabus sphaeris octauâ superioribus: vnde duas sphęras móbiles supra octauam collocari necesse est. Quod erat demonstrandum. Qua ratione ordo caelorum sit inuentus. CAPVT VIGESIMVM. Ationem ex quibus ordo cęlorum indagari potest quinque sunt fontes, videlicet motus diuersitas quatenus per se vel per aliud, quatenus velox vel tardus, diuersitas aspectus, eclypsis R Demonstração. Fontes da razão. 22 DA URANOGRAFIA. Se alguma esfera fosse movida por três movimentos, dois deles convêm à duas esferas superiores por si Muitos movimentos de uma única esfera por acidente são por si em relação as esferas superiores Muitos movimentos de uma única esfera por acidente são de outras esferas por si. Pelo segundo [fundamento]. Mas não pelas inferiores, porque a esfera inferior não pode mover a superior. Pelo quarto [fundamento]. Portanto, muitos movimentos de uma única esfera por acidente são por si pelas esferas superiores. Mas se alguma esfera fosse movida por três movimentos haveriam necessáriamente dois movimentos por acidente em relação a esta esfera De um único corpo simples que é movido por muitos movimentos, um único movimento existe por si, os restantes por acidente. Pelo primeiro [fundamento]. Mas qualquer que seja a esfera celeste, esta é um único corpo e simples. Pelo quinto [fundamento]. Portanto, de qualquer que seja a esfera celeste existe um único moviemnto por si, mas os restantes por acidente. Portanto, se alguma esfera é movida por três movimentos, dois deles convêm à duas esferas superiores por si mesmo. Mas, o movimento da oitava esfera é triplo Quão múltiplo é o movimento das estrelas fixas, tão múltiplo é também o desse céu no qual são colocadas, a saber, o da oitava esfera, porque as estrelas seguem o moviemtno do céu no qual estão. Pelo terceiro [fundamento]. Mas o movimento da oitava esfera das estrelas é triplo, como testemunha a observação tanto de Ptolomeu, quanto dos mais recentes. Portanto, o movimento da oitava esfera é triplo. Portanto, dois dos movimentos da oitava esfera convem por si a duas esferas superiores à oitava; do que é necessário colocar duas esferas móveis sobre a oitava. Como devia ser demonstrado. CAPÍTULO VIGÉSIMO. Por que razão a ordem dos céus é obtida. Inco são as fontes das razões a partir das quais a ordem dos céus pode ser indagada, a saber, a diversidade de movimento no que diz respeito a ser por si ou por outro, no que diz respeito a ser veloz ou lento, a diversidade do aspecto, os eclipses C L I B E R P R I M V S. 23 Proporsitiones. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Primum mobile. Caelũ cristallinum. Firmamentum. Saturnus. Iupiter. Mars. Luna. Sol. Venus. Mercur. clypses seu occultationes Planetarum, demum vmbrae quantitas. Hinc quinque statui potest proporsitiones, ex quibus ordo corporum caelestium colligendus est. Sphaera superior potest mouere & rapere secum inferiorum, non autem contrà. Stella quae terrae vicinior est, caeteris paribus maiorem habet diuersitatem aspectus. Quò magis caelum à natura & conditione primi mobilis recedit, eo etiam loco inferiori ponendum. Id astrum est inferius quod alterum nobis occultat. Demum: Corpus lucidum, quò altius & remorius est à terra, eò vmbrae corporum opacorum minores apparent in plano horizontis, & quò propinquius terrę est corpus luminosum, eò lõgiores vmbras corpora opaca proijciunt. His positis facile caelorum venabimur ordinem. Nam primum móbile cum caelo ristallino supra sphęram octauam sunt collocanda, per primam proporsitionem. Firmamentum supra Planetas poni debet, per tertiam & Quartam: Nam caelum stellarũ minùs à conditione primi monilis recedit reliquis, cum contra eius motum tardissimè moueatur: Deinde Planetae possunt occultare stellas fixas, non autem contra. Infra firmamentum locandae sunt sphaerae Saturni, Iouis & Martis, per tertiam: Nam inter Planetas contra motum primi mobilis tardissimè mouetur Saturnus, inde Iupiter, posteà Mars. Imo loco collocanda Luna per secundam: Nam Luna maximam deprehensa est pati aspectus diuersitatem: tum per tertiam, quod celerrimè primo mobili cõtranitatur: adhaec per quartam, Etenim Luna quando cum aliis Planetis coniungitur interdum eos è visu nobis eripit: Demum per quintam, Etenim vmbra gnomonis erecti splendente Sole maior est, quam vmbra eiusdem gnomonis Luna lucente, caeteris omnibus paribus existentibus (id est, aequalibus cum Sole gradibus) diuerso tamen tempore ab Horizonte distantibus. Itaque Solis sphaera superior est sphaera Lanuae. Sol supra Venerem & Mercurium collocari debet, per secundam. Etenim Mercurius & Venus maiorem patiuntur aspectus diuersitatem quam sol. His adiungi possunt & aliae rationes probabiles. Etenim Sol est Rex & quasi cor omnium Plabetarum, quare nõ immeritò in P R I M E I R O L I V R O 23 Propozições 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Primeiro Móvel. Céu Cristalino. Firmamento. Saturno. Júpiter. Marte. Lua. Sol. Vênus Mercúrio. eclipses ou ocultações dos planetas, finalmente, a quantidade de sombra. Daí pode ser estabelecida cinco proposições a partir das quais a ordem dos corpos celestes deve ser juntada. A esfera superior pode mover e arrastar consigo a inferior, e não o contrário. Mantidas as demais condições, uma estrela que é mais vizinha à Terra tem maior diversidade de aspecto. Quão mais o céu afasta-se da natureza e da condição do primeiro móvel, também deve ser posto em um lugar mais baixo. O astro que oculta outro de nós é inferior. Finalmente, quando o corpo luminoso está mais alto e mais remoto em relação à Terra, as sombras dos corpos opacos aparecem menores no plano horizontal e, quando o corpo iluminado está mais perto da Terra, os corpos opacos projetam sombras maiores. Tendo sido postas estas coisas facilmente procuramos a ordem dos céus. De fato, o primeiro móvel com o céu cristalino deve ser colocado acima da oitava esfera, pela primeira proposição. O firmamento deve ser posto acima dos planetas, pela terceira e quarta [proposições]: Na verdade, o céu estrelado afasta-se menos da condição do primeiro móvel do que os demais, porque move-se lentamente contra o movimento dele. Depois os planetas podem ocultar as estrelas fixas, e não o contrário. Abaixo do firmamento devem estar localizados as esferas de Saturno, de Júpier e de Marte, pela terceira [proposição]: De fato, Saturno se move lentamente entre os planetas contra o movimento do primeiro móvel, daí Júpier, depois Marte. A Lua deve ser colocada no lugar mais baixo, pela segunda [proposição]: de fato, depreende-se que a Lua sofre a máxima diversidade de aspecto. Além disso, pela terceira [proposição], porque rapidissimamente esforça-se contra o primeiro móvel. Em relação a estas coisas, pela quarta [proposição], na verdade, a Lua quando se conjuga com outros planetas então arranca-os de nossa visão. Finalmente, pela quinta [proposição] e, de fato, a sombra do gnômon, estando o Sol alto e brilhando, é maior do que a sombra do mesmo gnômon, estando a Lua iluminada, mantendo-se iguais todas as outras coisas existentes (isto é, com graus iguais com o Sol) ainda que tenham demorado um tempo diferente desde o horizonte. E assim, a esfera do Sol é superior à esfera da Lua. O Sol deve estar colocado acima de Vênus e de Mercúrio, pela segunda [proposição]. E de fato, Mercúrio e Vênus sofrem uma diversidade de aspecto maior do que a do Sol. A essas coisas podem ser adicionadas também outras razões prováveis. De fato, o Sol é rei e, de algum modo, coração de todos os planetas, como um rei é colocado no meio do reino, e um coração no meio do animal, por a In suo introductorio magno tractatu 3. b 2. Metamorphos. c Lib. 9. Epitomes propos. 1. d Dist. 5. cap. 15. 24 OVRANOGRAPHIAE ritò in medio illorum comstituetur, quemadmodum rex in medio regni, & cor in medio animalis collocatur. Adiungit & hanc rationem Albumasara, quod ob id Deus gloriosus Solem Planetarũ nobilissimum in medio aliorum Planetarum collocauerit, quia si immediatè comstitutus fuisset infra caelum octauum, & supra Saturnum, non posset ob nimiam distantiam à terra commodè in hęc inferiora agere: si verò immediatè supra Lunam positus fuisset, etiam non fatis commodè suo motu in haec inferiora ageret, quia tunc nimis tarde ab ortu in occasum moueretur; adde quod tum Sol ob nimiam vicinitatem ad terram omnia haec inferiora combureret. Quamobrem in medio Planetarum congruè ponitur, vt actionem habeat temperatam, & hisce inferioribus magis accommodatam: vt nõ temerè apud Ouidium Phoebus Phaëtontem filium quadirgam Solis temerariè conscensurum commonueir, dicensb: Altius egressus caelestia signa cremabis: Inferius terras: medio turissimus íbis. Sed ratio nulla validior ea quam adfert Ioannes Regiomontanusc cum Ptomomęod, estq; haec: Distantia Solis à centro terrae, quãdo mínima est (id est, quãdo Sol est in Augis opposito) continet terrae semidiametros 1070. Distantia Lunae à centro terrae quando ea est máxima (id est, quando in auge existit) continet semidiametros terrae solũ modo 64. vnde differentia inter solis minimam, & Lunae maximam continebit terrae semidiametros 1006. Cùm itaque inter caelum Lunę ac cęlum Solis vacuum concedi non possit, neque rationi comsentaneum sit deferentes augium Solis & Lunae tanta esse mole pręditos (cum prorsus tanta moles esst inutilis & superuacanea) iure optimo ac cõuentissimè, tantum spacium intermedium tribuetur orbibus Mercurij ac veneris. Mercurius quoque conuenientes statim supra Lunam & sub Venere collocari videtur ob tertiam, cum multo magis irregularis in suo motu sit quam Venus: vnde Astronomi tribuerunt Mercurio quinque orbes & epicyclum, Veneri autem tres tantũ orbes & epycyclum. Consentaneum itaque rationi esse videtur potius Mercurium supra Lunam constitui, quam Venerem. DE a No seu Grande Tratado Introdutório, Livro 3. b Metamorfoses. Livro 2. c Epitome ao Almagesto, Livro 9, Proposição 1. d Distinção 5, Capítulo 15. 24 DA URANOGRAFIA. por isso, está estabelecido no meio deles não injustamente. Albumasara juntou também esta razão: por que diante disso o Deus glorioso teria colocado o Sol, o mais nobre dos planetas, no meio dos outros planetas, porque se tivesse sido constituído imediatamente abaixo do oitavo céu, e acima de Saturno, não poderia agir comodamente nas coisas inferiores diante da excessiva distância da Terra; mas, se tivesse sido posto imediatamente acima da Lua, também não agiria suficientemente comodamente com seu movimento nas coisas inferiores, porque então seria movido muito lentamente do nascente ao ocaso; junte-se a isso, que o Sol, por causa da excessiva proximidade da Terra, incineraria todas as coisas inferiores. Dessa forma, é posto convenientemente no meio dos planetas, para que tenha uma ação moderada e mais apropriada a essas coisas inferiores, pelo que dificilmente Febo aconselhe o filho Faetonte a subir temerariamente na quadriga do Sol, dizendob: Tendo saído mais alto, queimarás os signos celestes; Mais baixo, a Terra; no meio, seguirás com toda a segurança. Mas nenhuma razão mais válida do que essa que Johannes Regiomontanoc com Ptolomeud traz e [ela] é a seguinte: A distância do Sol ao centro da Terra, quando é mínima (isto é, quando o Sol está no oposto do auge) contem 1070 semidiâmetros da Terra. A distância da Lua ao centro da Terra quando essa é máxima (isto é, quando está no auge) contém somente 64 semidiâmetros da Terra, donde a diferença entre [a distância] mínima do Sol e máxima da Lua conterá 1006 semidiâmetros da Terra. E assim porque entre o céu da Lua e o céu do Sol não pode ser concedido vácuo, e não é apropriado a razão que os deferentes citados dos auges do Sol e da Lua existam com tanta massa (porque tão grande massa seria completamente inútil e supérflua) legitimamente e convenientemente, será atribuído um tão grande espaço intermediário para os orbes de Mercúrio e Vênus. Mercúrio também parece ser colocado convenientemente imediatamente acima da Lua e sob Vênus, pela terceira [proposição], porque seja muito mais irregular em seu movimento do que Vênus: donde os atrônomos atribuíram a Mercúrio cinco orbes e um epiciclo, mas a Vênus somente três orbes e um epiciclo. Parece ser mais apropriado a razão que Mercúrio seja constituído acima da Lua do que Vênus. CA- L I B E R P R I M V S. 191 a In Theogonia. De octo sphaerarum stellarum quae Solae veteribus fuere notae concentu. Ex loachimo Fortio. CAPVT XXI. Vemadmodum ab aere virga percusso strepitus quidam audiri solet, ita ex velocissimo singularũ orbis partium cursu, singulos edi concentus vel sonos antiquitas putauitm quos musas appelamus: Sint igitur musae concentus, qui eduntur ex circumactu syderum. Veteres tamen ex orbibus octo, nouem finxerunt Deas; quae eius rei causa sit, aperiam. Tradidere ex horum circulorum motu nonum quendam alium concentum qui ex reliquis comstaret effici: sicuti apud nos pueris octo canentibus, vbi praeter singulorum vocês nonum quendam concẽtum ex omnibus habemus. Haesiodusa Musarum ordinem versibus tribus est complexus. Quos versus sit Latinè reddimus. Clioq, Euterpeq, Thaliaq, Melpomeneq Terpsichoreq, Eratoq, Polymniaq,Ouraniaq Calliopeq: haec longe alias praeponderat omnes. Primo ob rerum gestarum quas canit celebritatem noncupatur: cognominatur ab Ouidio cândida à syderis, Lunae colore candido. Secunda ab oblectando . Tertia , vel à lascciuia cantus, vel à virendo germininandoque quod Veneris natura Plinio authore, cuncta in terris generentur. Quarta, à canendo dicta. Quinta à delectandis choreis. Sexta , vel ab amoribus canendis, vel quod Iouis signum benignum & salutate sit. Septima ab hymnorum multitudine. Octaua à firmamenti vel caeli vertigine. Nonam à vocis suauitate atque dulcedine dixerunt. Quare autem mundi sonitum illum non audiamus, ratio tríplex redditur. E Prima Q P R I M E I R O L I V R O 25 a Na Teogonia. CAPÍTULO XXI. Sobre oito das esferas estreladas que sozinhas [eram] conhecidas pelos antigos pela harmonia. A partir de Joaquim Fortis2. O mesmo modo que, tendo sido percutida uma vara pelo ar algum estrépido costuma ser ouvido, assim, a partir do curso velocíssimo de cada uma das partes de um orbe, a antiguidade pensou que cada um dos harmônicos ou sons é consumido, os quais chamamos musas. As musas são, portanto, harmônicos que são consumidos a partir da rotação dos astros. Os antigos, ainda a partir de oito orbes, cunharam nove deusas e o que seja a causa dessa coisa contarei. Relataram a partir do movimento destes círculos algum outro nono harmônico que claramente podia ser obitido a partir dos restantes, como se fosse junto a nós estando cantando oito meninos, onde além das vozes de cada um temos algum nono harmônico a partir de todos. Hesíodoa compôs em três versos a ordem das musas. Os quais versos assim traduzimos em português3: Gloria, Alegria, Festa, Dançarina. Alegra-ouro, Amorosa, Hinária, Celeste e Belavoz, que dentre todas vem a frente4. A primeira é nomeada Clío por causa da celebridade das façanhas que canta, nomeada clara por Ovídio, pela cor clara de um astro, a Lua. A Segunda, Euterpe pelo alegrar. A terceira, Tália, ou pelo lascívia do canto, ou pelo verdejar e germinar que pela natureza de Vênus, segundo Plínio, são produzidos na Terra toda. A quarta é dita Merpomene pelo cantar. A quinta, Terpsicore por agradar aos coros. A sexta, Erato, ou por cantar amores, ou porque seja um sinal benigno e salutar de Júpiter. A sétima, Polimnia pela multidão dos hinos. A oitava, Urania pelo girar vertiginoso do firmamento e do céu. A nona chamaram Caliope pela suavidade e doçura da voz. Porém, porque não escutamos aquele barulho do mundo, uma razão tripla é apresentada. A primeira D a Cap. 1. 26 OVRANOGRAPHIAE Prrma quod tanta eius magnitudo sit vt aurium angustiae non capiant. Quemadmodum gentes quae Nili seu accolunt, sensu audiendi propter sonitus magnitudinem carent. Secunda causa est concentus suauitas incredibilis, qua auriũ sensus sopitus est. Tertia quòd à Natali die assuefacti simus, ac ideò non audeamus sicuti enim in aedibus horologia principiò vicinos turbare solent postea vix audiri: ita consuetudine perpetua sentiendi vim extingui putant. De circulis caelestibus. CAPVT XXII. Irculus in Sphaera duobus modis capi potest: Primò est línea quaedam circularis in superficie sphaerae descripta, diuidens superficiem in duas partes, siue eae aequales sint siue inaequales. Id quod in capacitatis eius quae hac línea circulari comprehenditur medio cõtinetur, centrum circuli vocatur: sic accepit nomen circuli Hyginusa. Significationes quaedam in circumductione sphaerae circuli appellantur. Secundò: Circulus est superficies quaedam cuius peripheria est in eius sphaerae conuexo cuius est circulus, habens centrum in sui medio; sic imaginamur circulum non esse tantum lineam circularem sed superficiem. Vnde circulum secare sphaeram in partes, etiam duobus modis intelligi potest, vel vt superficiem secet, vel vt totam sphaeram secet: vtro modo capiatur parum refert. Prior tamen acceptio magis est in vsu. Posterior verò planum circuli vocari solet. Axis circuli est línea transiens per centrum circuli, secãs planum eiusdem ad angulos rectos. Poli circulorum sunt extremitates axis eorũdem: non tamen hîc capimus axin aut oikis proutaxis sphaerę sumitur, ita vt circuli super axi moueantur, poli verò immobiles sint. Nam hoc pacto soli ij circuli quorum axis communis est cu maxi mundi in sphaeris mobilib. vti sunt aequator & quatuor circuli minores, dicerentur habere axin & polos, reliqui verò circuli nequaquam. Vnde constat poli nomen impropriè hic sumi, cum deductum, id sit circa quod aliquid voluitur. Circulorum distinctio (praeter aliam de qua in primo mobili) haec est C a [De Astronomia], Capítulo 1. 26 DA URANOGRAFIA. A primeira, porque a magnitude dele seja tão grande de forma que a estreiteza dos ouvidos não capta. Do mesmo modo que as pessoas que vivem perto das cataratas ou cachoeiras do Nilo, carecem do sentido de ouvir por causa da magnitude do barulho. A segunda causa é a suavidade incrível da harmonia, pela qual o sentido dos ouvidos adormeceu. A terceira, porque desde o dia do nascimento estamos acostumados e, por isso, não ouvimos. De fato, da mesma forma que as horológias nos templos costumam pertubar os vizinhos no início, depois quase não são ouvidas. Assim pensam que a força do sentir é extinta pelo costume perpétuo. Sobre os círculos celestes. CAPÍTULO XXII. Círculo na Esfera pode ser tomado de dois modos: Primeiramente: é alguma linha circular descrita na superfície da esfera, que divide a superfície em duas partes, essas ou seriam iguais ou desiguais. Aquilo que é contido no meio dessa área, que é compreendida por esta linha circular, é chamado centro do círculo. Assim Higino denomina o nome do círculoa: "Círculos são chamadas certas manifestações na circuncondução da esfera"; Em segundo lugar: o círculo é uma certa superfície cuja periferia está no convexo dessa esfera da qual é o círculo, tendo o centro em seu meio. Assim imaginamos um circulo não ser somente uma linha circular mas uma superfície. Assim pode se entender que o círculo corta a esfera em partes, ou que cortaria a superfície, ou que cortaria a esfera toda: Ser tomado em qualquer um dos dois modos pouco importa. A primeira acepção é mais usada, mas a posterior costuma ser chamada plano do círculo. O eixo do círculo é uma linha que atravessa pelo centro do círculo, que corta seu plano em ângulos retos. Os pólos dos círculos são extremidades do eixo dele, aqui não tomamos, entretanto, o eixo ou os pólos exatamente como o eixo da esfera é aceito, de modo que os círculos são movidos acima do eixo, mas os pólos são imóveis. Pois, por este acordo, somente esses círculos dos quais o eixo é comum com o eixo do mundo nas esferas móveis, como são o Equador e os quatro círculos menores, seriam ditos ter eixo e pólos, mas de modo nenhum os círculos restantes. Do que aqui é claro que o nome do pólo é tomado impropriamente, como deduzido , isto seria relativo ao que circunda alguma coisa. Uma distinção dos círculos (além de outra sobre a qual está no [caO L I B E R P R I M V S. 27 b Lib. de vigore naturę haec est vulgarissima omnibus sphaeris communis: Circulorum alij maiores alij minores. Circulorum autem esse maiorem vel minorem altero, tribus modis potest intelligi: primo quidem modo respectu circulorum diuersarum sphaerarum, reliquis vero respectu circulorum eiusdem sphaerae. Primo itaque modo dicitur circulus Magnus ratione magnitudinis corporis, cui imaginamur inesse, sic aequator primi mobilis maior est aequatore octauae sphaerae, ob id quod primum móbile est omnium corporum mobilium maximum. Secundò ratione virtutis, sic Zodiacus est circulus maximus propter virtutem actiuam potentissimam in haec inferiora, quia sub eo sol reliquiq; planetae mundum totum regunt. Vnde Hipparchusb Zodiacum vocat vitam omnium quae in mundo sunt. Tertiò, ratione longitudinis vel quantitatis diametri & peripherię, vt horizon, aequator, verticalis & Omnes reliqui cuiusq; sphęrae per centrum eius transeuntes. Atq; hoc modo hîc capimus magnitudinem quando circulum magnũ vel paruum esse dicimus vt Magnus sit qui per centrum sphaerae transit, vel qui sphaeram secat bifariam; minora utem contra qui per centrum sphaerae non transit vel sphaeram in partes secat inaequales. Circulorum habitudo vnà cum distantia, hac continetur tabella. C ir cu lu s om ni s Maior est ad alium Maiorẽ Rectus, dicitur à me Transpolaris, quorum distantia est quadrans. obliquus horum similem vtrã que distantiã metitur circul9 per vtriusque polum ductus. Minorẽ parallelus inclinatus nõ tãgẽs: horũ diuersam tangens: horum simplicem tantũ Minor ad aliũ minorem est Parallelus horũ distantiã, vt ante, metitur circulus per vtriusque polũ ductus. inclinatus tangens nõ tangẽs LIBRI PRIMI FINIS. E ij OVRA- P R I M E I R O L I V R O 27 b Livro Sobre o Vigor da Natureza [capítulo] sobre o primeiro móvel) é esta conhecidíssima, comum a todas as esferas: alguns dos círculos são maiores, outros são menores. Mas, de três modos pode se entender que um círculo é maior e outro é menor: no primeiro modo a respeito dos círculos das diversas esferas, mas nos restantes a respeito dos círculos de uma mesma esfera. E assim, do primeiro modo um círculo é dito grande em razão da magnitude do corpo, no qual imaginamos existir, assim o equador do primeiro móvel é maior do que o equador da oitava esfera, isto porque o primeiro móvel é o maior de todos os corpos moveis. Do segundo [modo], em razão da força, assim o Zodíaco é o círculo máximo por causa da força potentíssima ativa nas coisas inferiores, porque sob ele o Sol e os planetas restantes regem o mundo todo. Daí Hiparcob chama Zodíaco a vida de todos que estão no mundo. Do terceiro [modo], em razão da longitude ou da quantidade do diâmetro e da periferia, como o horiaonte, o equador, a vertical e todas as restantes de qualquer esfera que atravessam o centro dele. E deste modo, aqui tomamos a magnitude quando dizemos que um círculo ou pequeno de forma que seja grande o que passa pelo centro da esfera ou que corta a esfera em duas; por outro lado, para que seja pequena ao contrário o que não passa pelo centro da esfera ou corta a esfera em parte desiguais. O modo de ser dos círculos juntamente com a distância, estão contidos nesta tabela: To do c ír cu lo Maior é em relação a outro Maior Reto, é dito por mim Transpolar, dos quais a distância é um quadrante. oblíquo dos quais a distância semelhante e qualquer é medida pelo círculo conduzido de qualquer um dos dois. Menor Paralelo inclinado não tangente: dos quais a distância diversa e tangente: dos quais a distância somente simples Menor em relação a outro menor é Paralelo cuja distância, como antes, é medida pelo círculo conduzido de qualquer um dos dois. Inclinado tangente não tangente FIM DO PRIMEIRO LIVRO. SEGUN- 28 Prim caelum quid. Varia nomina. Quibus notum. a 1. qq. 66. art. 6. b 1. caeli. cap. 9. c Libro de mundo. O V R A N O G R A P H I AE L I B E R S E C V N D V S A V T H O R E A D R I A N O R O M A N O . Quid primum caelum. CAPVT PRIMVM. AELUM primum est orbis extimus, saltem secundum superficiem concauam mundo concentricus, immobilis; hoc Christianis Empyreum dici consueuit, Domicilium Dei, Angelorum, & Sanctorum; caelum etiam caelorum quibusdam, nec non & tertium illud in quod Diuus Paulus raptus fuisse scribitur. Dicitur autem Empyreum, hoc est igneum, à splendore, non autem à calore. Licet autem D. Thomasa caelum hoc à Theologis solis videlicet, Basilio, & Diuo Augustino positum dicat, tamen locum aliquem supra cęlos mobiles Aristotelem agnouisse crediderim, cumb diuina supra mundum & caelum entia collocat, immutabilia & imparibilia, optimamque & beatissimam vitã sempiterno aeuo degentia vnde caeteris rebus praesterur, aliis quidem pleniùs, aliis obscuriùs & essentia ac vita. Et alibic: Omissis autem quae de primo hoc caelo à Theologis traduntur, círculos tantum qui Astronomicae sunt comsiderationis trademus. Circu- 28 O que é o primeiro céu. Os vários nomes. Notado pelos quais. a [Suma Teológica], Questão 66, Artigo 6. b Sobre o céu, Livro 1, Capítulo 9. c Libro sobre o mundo. S E G U N D O L I V R O D A U R A N O G R A F I A . PE L O A U TO R A D R I A A N V AN RO O M E N . PRIMEIRO CAPÌTULO O que é o Primeiro Céu. PRIMEIRO Céu é o orbe mais afastado, imóvel, pelo menos segundo a superfície côncava é concêntrico ao mundo; esse os cristãos costumam dizer empíreo, morada de Deus, dos anjos e dos santos; também o céu dos vários céus, (...). Mas, é dito empíreo, isto é, ígneo, pelo brilho, e não pelo calor. Ainda que o Divino Tomása diz que esse céu é posto somente pelos teólogos, a saber, Basílio e o Divino Augustinho, ainda que acreditassem que Aristótelesb tivesse conhecido algum lugar acima dos céus móveis, porque coloca os entes divinos acima do mundo e do céu, as coisas imutáveis e as diferentes, a vida sempiterna e beatíssima (...) com o tempo sempiterno, é melhor do que as coisa restantes, mais pleno do que algumas coisas, mais obscuro do que outras coisas também a essência e a vida. E em outro lugarc: Por outro lado, tendo sido omitidas as coisas que são trazidas pelos teólogos a respeito deste primeiro céu, traremos aqui somente os círculos que são de consideração astronômica. Alguns L I B E R S E C V N D V S. 29 AEquator quid. Varia eius nomina. a Higinus in Astron. Poet. cap. de polo. b 2. dict. cap. 6. c 9. Pharsa ticon1 De AEquatore. CAPVT SECVNDVM. Quator est circulus magnus, cuius partes omnes aequo spacio ab vtroq; mundi polo distant. Hic quibusdam vocatur AEquator diei & noctis: dicitur & AEquinoctialis duabus potissimũ de causis, tùm quòd sub ea in quacunq; caeli parte Sol fuerit semper aequinoctium sit, tùm quòd Sole meante sub illo, dies noctesque pares in omnibus terrae oris sint, vnde & à Gaecis a vocatur ab , id est aequalis & , hoc est dies. ad cuius nominis similitudinem aliqui latinum finxerunt nomen AEquidialem & AEquidium vocitantes. Vocatur & ob easdem causas linea aequalitatis diei, & Linea aequationis diei, siue Orbis aequationis diei à Ptolomaeob. Vocatur & circulus alti solstitij: Vnde Lucanus describens aduentum Catonis in sphaeram rectam, inquitc: Deprehensum est hunc esse locum, quo circulus alti Solstitij, medium signorum percurit orbem. Dicitur & cingulum primi caeli, quia sicut cingulum siue corrigia2 Circulorum primi caeli alij sũt Anonymi: qui certa conditione exprimi debent. Fa m os i absoluti: à nullo alio circulo depen-dentes, iiq; duo sunt: quorum alius est immutabilis. AEquator. mutabilis. Hoizon. relati ad cir culũ aliquem, atque vel primarij qui respectu vnius ex praecedentibus eiusdemq; circuli, singuli tantum sunt Meridianus, Verticalis, Rector. secundarij qui respectu eiusdem circuli, siue absoluti, siue relati primarij plures sũt, ijsque vel minores paralleli aequatoris, horizontis, meridianis, verticalis, rectoris. m ai or es , a lij v el tr an sp ol ar es aequatoris. Horarij. horizontis. Descensiui. meridiani. Hectemorij. verticalis. Positionum vel horarum communium. cõtigentes. horarij obliqui E iij diuidit AE S E G U N D O L I V R O 29 O que é o Equador. Os vários nomes dele. a Higino, Astrônomo Poeta, Capítulo sobre o pólo. b 2. dict. cap. 6. c 9. Pharsaticon CAPÍTULO SEGUNDO. Sobre o Equador. Equador é um círculo maior, cujo todas as partes distam com igual espaço de qualquer dos dois pólos do mundo. Esse é chamado por alguns igualador do dia e da noite. É dito também equinocial, principalmente por duas causas: tanto porque se o Sol estiver sob ele em qualquer que seja a parte do céu faz-se um equinócio; quanto porque o Sol passando sob ele, existem dias e noites iguais em todos os lugares da terra. Donde em grego é chamado também a a partir de , isto é igual, e , isto é dia, à semelhança de cujo nome alguns dos latinos imaginaram chamando o nome equidialem e equidium. Devido à essas causas é chamado também linha da igualdade do dia e linha da distribuição do dia, ou, por Ptolomeub, orbe da distribuição do dia. É chamado também circulo do alto solstício. Onde Lucanus, descrevendo a chegada de Catão na esfera reta, dizc: Depreeende-se ser esse lugar, que o círculo do alto solstício percorre ao meio o orbe dos signos. É dito também cintura do primeiro céu, porque assim como Alguns dos círculos do primeiro céu são anônimos: que devem ser representados com uma certa condição. fa m os os absolutos: que não dependem de nenhum outro círculo, e esses são dois: dos quais um é imutável. O equador. mutável. O horizonte. relativo a algum círculo e são ou primários: que são somente singulares em relação a um único dos círculos precedentes. O meridiano, O vertical, O reitor. secundários: que são vários em relação ao mesmo círculo, ou absolutos ou relativos primários, e eles são ou menores paralelos do equador, do horizonte, do meridiano, do vertical, do reitor. m ai or es , a lg u n s ou tr an sp ol ar es do equador. Dos horarios. do horizonte. Dos descensivos. do meridiano. Dos Hectemorii1. do vertical. Das posições ou das horas comuns. contigentes. Dos horarios oblíquos. a cintura O d 2 histor. natur. ca. 19 Poli & axis Usus 1. 2. 30 OVRANOGRAPHIAE diuidit corpus nostrum per medium, sic circulus ille diuidit caelum primum per medium: vocatur & Centrum terrae Plinio tested: hac forsan de causa, quod sicuti reliqui omnes paralelli à centro Solis, motu primi mobilis descripti, centra sua habeant extra terram, ita solus aequator (qui tum cum Sol fuerit in principio Arietis aut Librę, primi mobilis motu describi imaginatur) habet idem centrũ cum terra, per quod planum aequatoris tum temporis transire intelligitur. Poli eius & axis iidem sunt cum polis & axibus mundi. Hunc circulũ quotidie describit media stella cinguli Orionis, vti & Sol tempore aequinoctij. AEquator seruit ad distantiarum horariarum quas continet inuentionem, ideoque fixus à me contra omnium Mathematicorum opinionem est statutus: quod hac ostendemus ratione. Quicunque horarum termini, siue inchoãtes siue terminãtes, respectu eiusdem horizõtis, vel alterius plani sunt immobiles, inuariabiles, & fixi. Quaecunq; in subiecto immobili notari possunt, ea sunt immobiblia, inuariabilia & fixa respectu illius subiecti. Sed termini inchoantes & finientes horarũ respectu eiusdem horizontis vel alterius plani notari possunt in subiecto immobili. Ergo termini inchoantes & finientes horarum respectu eiusdem horizontis vel alterius plani sunt immobiles, inuariabiles & fixi. Sed circuli aequatoris puncta sunt termini inchoantes & finientes horarum rectarum & obliquarum. Ergo circuli aequatoris puncta respectu eiusdem horizontis vel alterius plani sunt immobilia, inuariabilia & fixa, quare & totus aequator fixus est. AEquator est is quo caelum quodcunq; aethereum coaptatur caelo primo, mediante circulo primi mobilis mediatore à nobis dicto, qui nihil aliud est quam aequator mobilis. Habita enim declinatione alicuius stellę à mediatore, ea aequalis est altitudini supra aequatorem, Deinde habita hora vel altitudine supra quemcunque alterum circulum primi caeli, inde reliqua omnia quae in doctrina orimi caeli consideranda sunt venabimur. vti aliâs ostensuri sumus. DE d História da Natureza, Livro 2, Capítulo 19. Os pólos e o eixo. Os usos 1. 2. 30 DA URANOGRAFIA. a cintura ou o cinto divide o nosso corpo ao meio, assim esse circulo divide o primeio céu ao meio. É chamado também centro da Terra pelo testemunho de Plíniod, talvez por esta causa: porque assim como todos os paralelos restantes, descritos pelo movimento do primeiro móvel pelo centro do Sol, tem seus centros fora da terra, assim somente o equador (que é imaginado ser descrito pelo movimento do primeiro móvel, quando o Sol estiver no princípio de Áries ou de Libra) tem o mesmo centro que a Terra, pelo qual o plano do equador é entendido transitar ao longo do tempo. Seus pólos e os eixos dele estão com os pólos e os eixos do mundo. A estrela média da cintura de Órion descreve esse circulo diariamente, como também o Sol no tempo do equinócio. O equador serve para a obtenção das distâncias horárias que [ele] contém, e está estabelecido fixo por mim mesmo contra a opinião de todos os matemáticos, para o que mostraremos esta razão: Quaisquer que sejam os limites das horas, sejam os [limites] iniciais, sejam os finais, em relação ao mesmo horizonte ou a outro plano, são imóveis, invariáveis e fixos. Quaisquer coisas que podem ser notadas no sujeito imóvel, elas são imóveis, invariáveis e fixas em relação aquele sujeito. Mas, os limites iniciais e finais das horas em relação ao mesmo horizonte ou outro plano podem ser notadas no sujeito imóvel. Portanto, os limites iniciais e finais das horas em relação ao mesmo horizonte ou outro plano são imóveis, invariáveis ou fixos. Mas, os limites iniciais e finais das horas retas e oblíquas são pontos do círculo do equador. Portanto, os pontos do círculo do equador em relação ao mesmo horizonte ou outro plano são imóveis, invariáveis e fixos, razão pela qual também todo o equador é fixo. O equador é aquele em que qualquer céu etéreo se encaixa no primeiro céu, o círculo do primeiro móvel mediando chamado por nós mediador, que não é nada senão o equador do móvel. De fato, sendo tido a declinação de qualquer estrela a partir do mediador, ela é igual a altitude acima do equador, além disso, sendo tido a hora ou a altitude sobre qualquer que seja outro círculo do primeiro céu, então todas as coisas restantes que devem consideradas na doutrina do primeiro céu procuraremos, como em outro lugar haveremos de mostrar. CAPÍ- L I B E R S E C V N D V S. 31 Horizon quid. Vnde nomen. Varia nomina. a Alphragano. b Macrobio c Manilio Quotuplex. d Ptolomaeo. Cleomede. Proclo. Quotuplex rationalis. De Horizonte. CAPVT TERTIVM. Orizon est circulus magnus qui comspectam mundi partem ab inconspecta, in vnaquaque regione diuidit. Hoc est: Horizon est circulus is qui vnicuique in loco plano existenti, hemisphaerium superius quod oculis nostris semper & in omni planitie existenti subiectum est, ab infeiori quod Antipodibus comspectum est dirimit: autem Graecis quod determinare, definire siue designare interpretari licet: vel , id est, termino siue fine, eo quod visum terminet dicitur. Vox enim Horizon Graeca est non Latina, vt quidam existimasse videntur, qui horizontem Orientis zonam interpretantur, indique nomen sumpsisse dicunt. Dicitur & circulus hemisphaerija aliis terminus caelib ex veterum forte, existere caelum in comspectu nostro totum, infraque terram, non caelum sed mare, quò sese Sol & stellae in occasu mergerent, existimantium fabula. Vocatur & gyrusc aliquibus. Quamuis autem duplex horizon ab authoribusd tradatur rationalis, videlicet sensibilis. Hîc tamen de rationali tantum agimus, sensibilem ad tractatum de terra referentes. Dicitur autem rationalis siue naturalis (vt quibusdam placet) quia cùm acies oculorum, neque excurrat ad extremum caelum, neque hanc caeli in aequales medietates diuisionem percipiat, mens tamen ratiocinando eandem colligit. Nam cùm homines nocturno & sereno tempore locoque libero constituti, viderent in oriente stellas emergere ad visum, quae paulò ante visui nõ apparebant: deinde easdem motu primo ad occidentem delapsas ruere, mergi, ac easdem amplius non apparere, sed alias atque alias, concluserunt esse in caelo circulum terminantem resvisas à non visis. Idem & mens humana collegit ex sex signis Zodiaci quę perpetuò supra horizontem eminere deprehendit. Dicitur & aritifialis, quod videlicet per artem (Astronomiam intelligo) introductus sit, cùm alter qui sensibilis dicitur, ipso sensu pateat. Horizon autem naturalis, siue rationalis, siue artificialis (nam de eo hic tantùm agimus) est duplex; rectus & obliquus. Rectus est cuius plano vterque mundi polus comsistit, hic est perpetuò vniformis. Horizon obliquus est supra cuius planum alter mundi polus H S E G U N D O L I V R O 31 O que é o Horizonte. Daí [vem] o nome. Os vários nomes. a Alfragano. b Macróbio c Manílio Quão múltiplos são. d Ptolomeu. Cleomedes. Proclo. Quão múltiplos são os racionais. CAPÍTULO TERCEIRO. Sobre o Horizonte. Horizonte é um círculo maior que divide, em qualquer que seja a região, a parte observada do mundo da não observada. Isto é, o horizonte é aquele círculo que distingue, em cada lugar, existindo um plano, o hemisfério superior, que está sempre sujeito aos nossos olhos em toda a planura existente, do inferior, que é visto pelos antípodas. E dito , em grego , que pode ser interpretado como determinar, definir ou designar, ou , isto é, limite ou fim, porque nele termina a visão. De fato, a palavra grega horizon não é latina, como alguns pareceria julgar que interpretam o horiaonte a região do oriente, e daí dizem o nome ter sido tirado. É dito também circulo do hemisférioa, por outros, casualmente o limite do céub a partir dos antigos, [é dito] existir todo o céu na nossa vista, abaixo da terra, não céu, mas mar, no qual o Sol e as estrelas mergulham no ocaso, pela fábula dos que afirmam [isso]. É chamado também giroc por outros. Mas, de qualquer forma, o horizonte duplo por alguns autoresd é trazido, a saber, racional e sensivel. Aqui, entretanto, tratamos apenas do racional referindo o sensível ao tratado sobre a terra. E é dito racional ou natural (como agrada alguns) porque enquanto a penetração dos olhos nem se estenda ao extremo céu, nem perceba a divisão deste céu em metades iguais, ainda assim a mente raciocinando conclui a mesma coisa. Pois, como os homens fixados em um tempo noturno e sereno e num lugar livre, veriam no oriente as estrelas emergir para a visão, que um pouco antes não apareciam a visão; em seguida, [veriam] as mesmas pelo primeiro movimento caídas juntas ao aociente mergulharem, e as mesmas não apareceriam mais, mas outras e outras; concluiriam existir no céu um círculo limitando as coisas vistas das não vistas. A mesma coisa também a mente humana conclui a partir dos seis signos do Zodiaco que perpetuamente. Por outro lado, o horizonte natural (ou racional) ou artificial (pois somente sobre este aqui tratamos) é duplo: reto e obliquo. Reto é [aquele] em cujo plano cada um dos dois pólos do mundo se sustenta, este é perpetuamente uniforme. O Horizonte O Horizõtis partes. Axis & poli. Usus 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Meridianus Quid. 32 OVRANOGRAPHIAE polus eleuatur, alter verò infra idem deprimitur. Hic continuò variatur inter ortum & ocasum, inter austrum & septentrionem. Horizontis partes duae suut1, Ortiua & Occidua: Ortiua ea dicitur medietas quae ad ortum vergit, ea videlicet plaga horizontis, vbi sidera supra horizontem oriuntur. Occidua quae ad occasum, vbi videlicet sydera sub horizonte deprimuntur. Prior graecis dicitur, Latinis Cardo Orientis: altera verò & Cardo Occidentis. Axis horizontis est linea recta perpendiculares, cuiq; loco extremitates suas caelo extimo applicans: ea videlicet linea quae corpus nostrum atque antipodum nostrorum secũdum longitudinem pertransit. Huius polus superior siue punctum extremum supra caput nostrum existens, punctus verticalis Latinis dicitur, Graecis , Arabibus Zenith. Polus verò inferior qui antipodum capita, à nobis punctum pedum: Arabibus Nadir vocatur. Horizon separat oculta & abdita in hęmispherio inferiore, à cõspicuis & apparentibus in haemisphaerio superiore. Ortus & occasus tam stellarum, siue fixarum siue erraticarum, quam Zodiaci partium ad horizontem referuntur, ex quibus Poëtae temporum descriptiones mutuantur. Hinc etiam determinat quantitatem diei artificialis & noctis. Stellarum ab hoc tríplex desumitur genus: stellarum videlicet perpetuae apparitionis, perpetuae occultationis, & mediarum, quae videlicet neque perpetuae sunt apparitionis, neque perpetuae occultationis, sed aliquando apparent, aliquando occultatur. Horizon causa est rectae & obliquae sphaerae. Horizon continet amplitudinem ortiuam & occiduam. Terminat ascensionem regionis, altitudinemq; supra horizontem. De Meridiano. CAPVT QVARTVM. Eridianus est circulus magnus, qui per polos mundi & cuiuscunque circuli tanquam horizontis ductus, partem cęli orientalem ab occidentali diuidit. Dicitur autem Meridianus quod vbique terrarũ, & quocunque anni tempore, quando Sol motu primi mobilis peruenit ad Meridianum supra terram, efficiat M As partes do horizonte. O eixo e os pólos. Os usos. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. O que é o Meridiano. 32 DA URANOGRAFIA. O horizonte obliquo é [aquele] de cujo plano um dos pólos do mundo se eleva, mas o outro é submergido abaixo do mesmo. Este é variado continuamente entre o nascer e o ocaso, entre o austro e o septentrião. As partes do horizonte são duas: a nascente e a poente. A nascente é dita aquela metade que se inclina para o nascente, a saber, aquela extenção do horizonte onde os astros nascem acima do horizonte. A poente [é aquela] que [se inclina] para o ocaso, a saber, onde os astros são submergidos sob o horizonte. A primeira é dita pelos gregos , pelos latinos o ponto cardeal do oriente; mas a outra e ponto cardeal do ocidente. O eixo do horizonte é uma linha reta perpendicular e ao qual lugar aplica suas extremidades no último céu: a saber, aquela linha que atravessa o nosso corpo e dos nossos antípodas segundo a longitude. Aquele pólo superior ou ponto extremo existente acima de nossa cabeça, é dito pelos latinos ponto vertical, pelos gregos , pelos árabes zênite. Mas, o pólo inferior que está acima das cabeças dos antípodas, o ponto do pé para nós, em árabe é chamado nadir. O horizonte separa as coisas ocultas e escondidas no hemisfério inferior das visíveis e aparentes no hemisfério superior. O nascente e o ocaso tanto das estrelas – ou fixas ou erráticas – quanto das partes do Zodiaco são referidas ao horizonte, a partir das quais os poetas emprestam as descrições dos tempos. Daí também determina a quantidade do dia artificial e da noite. O gênero das estrelas é triplo escolhido disto, a saber: das estrelas de aparição perpétua, de ocultação perpétua e das médias, que, a saber, nem são de aparição perpétua, nem de ocultação perpétua, mas algumas vezes aparecem, algumas vezes ocutam-se. O horizonte é a causa da esfera reta e da obliqua. O horizonte contem a amplitude nascente e poente. [O horizonte] delimita a ascenção da região e a altitude acima do horizonte. CAPÍTULO QUARTO. Sobre o Meridiano. Meridiano é um círculo gramde, que conduzido pelos pólos do mundo e de qualquer círculo como o horizonte, divide a parte oriental do céu da ocidental. Mas é dito meridiano porque em qualquer lugar da Terra e em qualquer ano do tempo, quando chega pelo movimento do primeiro móvel ao meridiano sobre a terra, faz-se O L I B E R S E C V N D V S. 33 Varia nomina. Quotuplex. Meridiani partes. Quot meridiani. efficiat meridiem. Eadem ratione circulus medij diei quibusdam dicitur, alijs medij caeli, cuspis regalis; Graecis . Meridianus simplex est atque vnius generis: Non enim in rationalem & sensibilem diuidi potest; neque etiam in rectum & obliquum: sed in omni Meridiano polus mundi existit. Variantur autem Meridiani, non nisi inter ortum & occasum, vnde comstantires sunt horizontibus. Nam licet plures regiones quàm duę (vnaquaq; videlicet cum diametraliter oppsita regione, quae Antípodam est) eundem non habeant horizontem, possunt tamen eundem habere Meridianum; & ob id eodem tempore, siue eodem temporis momento, médios dies mediasque noctes habent illae quibus illa diuersitas orientis & occidentis non est, hoc est, quae aequaliter ab ortu & occaesu iacent; quantumuis vna magis quam altera austrina aut septentrionalis fuerit. Meridianus autem omnis intersecat horizontem suum, intersecatur ad eodem ad ângulos rectos sphaerales. Quia cum Meridianus circulus sit magnus transiens per polos horizontis, necesse est & horizontem transire per polos Meridiani, atque vtrumque ab altero ad angulos rectos secari. Meridiani pars quae consistit in haemisphaerio superiore dicitur & , Latinis medium, culmen, seu fastigium caeli. Altera verò pars quae est in inferior seu opposito haemisphaerio vocatur siue imum caeli. Etsi autem directè ab ortu in occasum progredientibus, vel econtrà continue mutentur puncta verticalia, simulque ideo Meridiani, vnde numerus Meridianorum infinitus sit, tamen certus eorundem numerus quoad diuersitas eorundem vsum statui potest. Quod itaq; ad locorum longitudinem & vmbrarum rationem attinent sufficiunt Meridiani 360. Quod autem ad apparentias caelestes, hoc est ad ortus & occasus stellarum, sufficiunt 96. Nam tùm demum nouus Meridianus constituitur, cùm fit variatio principij diei secundũ quadrantem horae, hoc est, in locis quae distant ab inuicem gradibus 3 & 45 minutis: Tanto enim interuallo fit aliqua variatio ascensionum & descensionum signorum. Axis Meridiani est linea recta horizonti incumbẽs, cuius vna pars versus ortum, altera versus occasum tendit. Huius extremitates siue F poli S E G U N D O L I V R O 33 Os vários nomes. Quão múltiplos são. As partes do meridiano. Quantos meridianos [existem]. faz-se meio-dia. Pela mesma razão é dito por alguns círculo do meio dia, por outros do meio do céu, lança real, pelos gregos . Um meridiano e de gênero único. Na verdade, não pode ser dividido em racional e sensível, e nem tampouco em reto e obliquo, mas o pólo do mundo está em todo meridiano. E os meridianos não variam, a não ser entre o nascente e o poente, do que são mais constantes do que os horizontes. Pois mesmo que mais regiões do que duas (a saber, cada uma das duas com uma região oposta diametralmente, que é o atípoda) não tenham o mesmo horizonte, podem ainda ter o mesmo meridiano. E por causa disto, aquelas – as quais aquela diversidade de oriente e ocidente não existe, isto é, que dispõem-se igualmente do nascente e do ocaso ainda que uma mais do que a outra seja austrina ou setentrional – têm no mesmo tempo ou no mesmo momento de tempo meios-dias e meias-noites. Por outro lado, todo meridiano corta seu horizonte, é cortado pelo mesmo por ângulos retos esferais. Porque como o meridiano é um círculo grande que atravessa pelos pólos do horizonte, também é necessário que o horizonte passe pelos polos do meridiano e um seja cortado pelo outro em ângulos retos. A parte do meridiano que consiste no hemisfério superior é dita e , pelos latinos meio, cume, ou fastígio do céu. Mas a outra parte que está no hemisfério inferior ou oposto é chamada ou o fim do céu. Embora, progredindo diretamente do nascente ao poente, ou ao contrário, continuamente seriam mudados os pontos verticais, e da mesma forma até os meridianos, donde o número dos meridianos seja infinito, ainda assim, um certo número deles pode ser estabelecido em relação ao uso da diversidade deles. E assim, no que se refere a longitude dos lugares e razão das sombras são suficientes 360 meridianos. Mas no que se refere as aparências celestes, isto é, do nascente ao poente das estrelas, são suficientes 96. Pois, então finalmente, um novo meridiano é constituído, porque conforme a variação do princípio do dia segundo o quadrante da hora faz(?), isto é, em lugares que distam entre si por 3 graus e 45 minutos. De fato, outra variação faz a ascenção e descenção dos signos com tamanho intervalo. O eixo do meridiano é uma linha reta deitada sobre o horizonte, da qual uma parte tende na direção do nascente, a outra Meridiani vsus. 1. 2. 3. Verticalis quid. Quotuplex. 34 OVRANOGRAPHIAE poli sunt oriens verum & occidens verum. Vnde si quispiam polum septentrionalem erectè spectans brachia extendat, quae cum totó corpore crucem forment, tũc brachium vtrumque axim meridiani representabit, sigulaeque manus polos singulos, atque dextera quidem oriens verum, sinistra autem occidens verum. Meridianus diuidit spacia diurna & nocturna in medietates aequales. Diurnum quidem in tempus antemeridianum & pomeridianum: nocturnum autem in tempus mediam noctem antecedens & comsequens: vnde quidam, Hic paribus spaciis occasum cernit & ortum Circulus, & gemino concurrit semper in axe, Discernitq; diem variatq; Mesembrinus orbem. Iis qui habent horizontem obliquum, repraesentat horizõtem rectum: Comstituit enim cum hrizonte obliquo (aequè atque cum recto) angulos rectos, ob quos minor contingit variatio inclinationis Zodiaci ad Meridianos, quàm ad horizontes oblíquos. Ac propter eandem causam Astronomi ordiuntur diem non ab ortu Solis, sed ab accessu eius meridianum. Meridianus continet declinationem stellarum quando eae sunt in meridie, altitudinem poli mundi latitudinem regionis, &c. Meridianus terminat longitudinem loci cuiusuis atq; differentiam longitudinis. De Verticali. CAPVT QVINTVM. Erticalis est circulus magnus, qui per polos cuiuscunq; circuli tanquam horizõtis, & Meridiani eiusdem ductus, partem hemispherij vtriusq; Australẽ à Spetentrionali diuidit. Dicitur verticalis, quòd per verticẽ capitis nostri necessariò trãseat. Verticalis (quem iam definiui, non autem círculos Azimut, quos plerique hoc nomine appelãt, intelligo) simplex est: Si quis tamen eum in rectum & obliquum secet, non omnino errabit. Rectus erit is qui à polo mundi vtroque aequaliter vbique distat: Siue cuius polus cum mundi polo coincidit: siue ad cuius planum axis mundi rectus est: obliquus contrà. Rectus est horizontis recti, sicuti & obliquus horizontis obliqui. Hic variatur tùm inter Septentrionem & Austrum, tùm inter ortum & occasum. Nam à Septentrione in Austrum, vel ob ortu in occasum progredientes, sub vno eodemq; vertiticali V Os usos do meridiano. 1. 2. 3. O que é o vertical. Quão múltiplos são. 34 DA URANOGRAFIA. a outra na direção do poente. As extremidades dele ou os pólos são o oriente verdadeiro e ocidente verdadeiro, do que se alguém de pé observando o pólo setentrional estende os braços, que formem com o corpo todo uma cruz, então cada braço representará o eixo do meridiano e cada mão um pólo e a destra o verdadeiro oriente, mas a sinistra o verdadeiro ocidente. O meridiano divide os espaços diurnos e noturnos em metades iguais. O diurno, na verdade, em um tempo antemeridiano e posmerididano; e o noturno em um tempo que antecede e sucede a meia noite. Donde alguém [disse]: "Esse círculo separa o poente do nascente em espaços pares, E sempre avança no eixo duplo, E discerne o dia e muda o orbe Mesembrinus".1 Para aqueles que têm o horizonte oblíquo, [o meridiano] representa o horizonte reto. Na verdade, constitui angulos retos com o horizonte oblíquo (e igualmente com o reto), por causa dos quais uma menor variação da inclinação do zodíaco cabe aos meridianos, do que [cabe] aos horizontes oblíquos. E por causa disso, os astrônomos começam o dia não do nascente do Sol, mas da chegada meridiana dele. O meridiano contem a declinação das estrelas quando elas estão no meio dia, a altitude do pólio do mundo, a latitude da região, etc. O meridiano delimita a longitude de qualquer que seja o local e a diferença de longitude. CAPÍTULO QUINTO. Sobre o Vertical. Vertical é um círculo grande que – conduzido através dos pólos de qualquer círculo como um horizonte e seu meridiano – divide uma parte austral da setentrional de cada hemisfério. É dito vertical, porque necessariamente cruza pelo cume de nossa cabeça. O vertical (que já defini, no entanto, eu penso não [é] os círculos do azimute, os quais a maioria chamam por esse nome) é simples. Se alguém entretanto o separar em reto e obliquo não errará totalemtne. Reto será aquele que distar do pólo do mundo e do outro igualmente por toda parte, ou cujo pólo coincide com o pólo do mundo, ou em relação a cujo plano o eixo do mundo é reto, o obliquo ao contrário. Reto é do horizonte reto, assim como o oblíquo do horizonte oblíquo. Esse varia tanto entre o setentrião e o austro, quanto entre o nascente e o poente. Pois, não podem permanecer sob um único vertical O L I B E R S E C V N D V S. 35 Axis & poli. Usus. 1. 2. 3. Rector quid. Nomina. Axis & poli. Usus. 1. 2. 3. Parallelus quid. Axis & poli. Quorũ circulorum. cali permanere non possunt: praeterquam horizontem rectum incolentes qui ab ortu in occasum progredientes verticalem non mutant. Cum omnis horizontes recti vnum eundemque habeant verticalem. Hic verticalis secat meridianum & horizontem, atque ab iisdem intersecatur ad angulos rectos. Axis verticalis est linea recta horizonti incumbẽs, cuius vna pars versus Septentrionem, altera versus Austrum temdit. Huius extremitates siue poli sunt septentrio & meridies. Verticalis distinguit altitudines supra horizontem, & depressiones sub horizonte, Septentrionales ab Australibus. Ostendit Oriens & Occidens verum, Terminat latitudinem regionum. De rectori circuli. CAPVT SEXTVM. Ector circuli est circulus magnus transiens per polos mundi, & polos meridiani illius circuli cuius est rector. Dicitur à nobis rector, quòd sit norma & regula cuiuscunque circuli per polos mũdi non transeuntis pro ascensionibus & similibus. Potest non incommodè vocari horizon aequatus, quia ex obliquo ad rectum est reductus. Dicitur communiter circulus horae sextae, quia est vnus inter circulos horarum Astronomicarum, horam sextã ante & post meridiem ostendens. Poli huius in Meridiano sunt distantes per quadrantem circuli à polis mundi. Hinc patet axis. Variantur rectores sicuti & Meridiani, non nisi inter ortum & occasum, ideoque comstantiores sunt horizontibus & verticalibus. Horizon rectus semper coincidit cum rectore suo. Rector circuli est cuiuscunque circuli per polos mũdi non transeuntis norma, pro ascensionibus supra circulum proporsitum: Seruit in vnaquaque regione pro horizonte recto. Circulus est ex horarijs vnus. De parallelis siue minoribus. CAPVT. VII. Arallelis est circulus minor, aequaliter ab aliquo circulo maiori distans. Axis & poli horum iidem sunt cum axi & polis circuli cuius sunt paralleli. Paralleli possunt statui quorumcunque circulorum maiorum, vti F ij aequaR P S E G U N D O L I V R O 35 O eixo e os pólos. Os usos. 1. 2. 3. O que é o reitor. Os nomes. O eixo e os pólos. Os usos. 1. 2. 3. O que é o paralelo. O eixo e os pólos. De quais círculos. cal, os progridem do setentrião ao austro, ou do nascente ao ocaso, exceto os habitantes do horizonte reto que progredindo do nascente ao poente não mudam o vertical. Porque todos os horizontes retos tem um único e mesmo vertical. Esse vertical corta o meridiano e o horizonte, e é interceptado pelos mesmos com angulos retos. O eixo do vertical é um linha reta deitada sobre o horizonte, da qual uma parte tende para o lado setentrional, a outra para o lado austral. As extremidades dele ou os pólos são o setentrião e o meio-dia. O vertical distingue as altitudes acima do horizonte e as profundidades sob o horizonte, setentrionais e austrais. Mostra o oriente e o ocidente verdadeiro. Delimita a latitude das regiões. CAPÍTULO SEXTO. Sobre o Círculo Reitor. Círculo reitor é um círculo grande passando pelos pólos do mundo e pelos pólos do merididano daquele círculo do qual ele é o reitor. É dito por nós reitor, porque é a norma e a regra para as ascensões e semelhantes de qualquer círculo que não transita pelos pólos do mundo. Pode sem incomodo ser chamado horizonte igualado, porque é reduzido a partir do obliquo para o reto. É dito comumente círculo da hora sexta, porque é o único entre os círculos das horas astronômicas que mostra a hora sexta antes e depois do meio dia. Os pólos dele distam no meridiano por um quadrante de círculo dos pólos do mundo. Daí fica claro o eixo. Os reitores não variam como os meridianos, a não ser entre o nascente e o poente, e até são mais constantes do que os horizontes e os verticais. O horizonte reto sempre coincide com seu reitor. O reitor de um círculo é qualquer círculo que não transita pelos pólos do mundo, estabelecido como norma para as ascensões acima do círculo: Serve em cada região para horizonte reto. O círculo é único a partir dos horários. CAPÍTULO VII. Sobre os [círculos] paralelos ou menores. Paralelo é um círculo menor, que dista igualmente de algum círculo maior. O eixo e os pólos destes são os mêsmos que o eixo e os pólos do círculo do qual são paralelos. Os paralelos podem ser estabelecidos de quaisquer círculos maiores, como do O O Nomina particularia. Parallelus Crepuscu. Paralleli variabiles & inuariabiles. Paralleli ex circuli primi caeli. Polaris horizontis. Usus 1. 2. Polaris verticalis. Usus 1. 36 OVRANOGRAPHIAE aequatoris, horizontis, meridiani, verticalis, rectoris & similium. Communiter tamen aequatori & horizonti paralleli tribuuntur; Horizontis paralleli latinè circuli altitudinum & depressionum, Almicantharar Arabicè vocatur; qui in Astrolabis notari solent: AEquatoris autem paralleli absolutè paralleli, vocantur vel paralleli aequatoris, vel paralleli mundi. Vniuscuiusque autem circuli maioris paralleli nomina, sumũtur à graduum numero quo distant à circulo magno cuius sunt paralleli: hincque nonaginta statuuntur communiter, totque etiam in instrumentis planis (quando eorum magnitudo fert) notari solent; si singuli gradus in minuta secentur, perque singula paralleli ducantur multo plures erunt, quorum nomina à gradibus vnà cum minutis adiunctis, quibus à circulo magno aequidistant, desumuntur. Horizontis vnus est celebris parallelus Crepusculinus dictus, qui sub horizonte latet. Qualis autem est circulus magnus, tales etiam, sunt paralleli quoad variationem & immutabilitatem: vnde cum aequator nullam suscipiat variationem ratione diuersi situs terrestris, ita nec parallelis eius in diuersis mundi plagis diuersi erunt, sed semper iidem. Contrà autem paralleli horizontis reliquorumque circulorum variantur pro vario horizonte aut simili circulo. Sunt tamen paralleli aliqui aequatoris non fixi, qui à circulis aliis iisque vel primi caeli vel primi mobilis huic tribuuntur. A circulis quidem primi caeli duo sunt paralleli quos polares appelare sum solitus, quod per polos circulorum primi cęli describi intelligãtur: Polaris videlicet horizontis & polaris verticalis. Polaris horizontis vel horizontalis est circulus parallelus (intellige mundi) per polum horizontis ductus, siue verticalem tangens: In hoc circulo notãtur poli circulorũ hoariorũ obliquorũ. Ostendit etiã stellas semper boreales, semper meridionales, & cõmunes. Nam quaecunque inter polum Arcticum & proximum polarem horizontalem continentur: eae sunt boreales semper: quae verò inter polum Austrinum & polarem horizontalem proximum eae semper meridionales. Reliquae vero omnes sunt communes, hoc est, modo boreales, modo verò meridionales. Polaris verticalis est circulus parallelus per polum verticalis ductus: siue horizontem tangens. Hic circulus horas terminat: Nam in eo notantur in sphaera ob liqua Os nomes partículares. O paralelo crepusculino. Os paralelos variáveis e invariáveis. Os paralelos a partir do circulo do primeiro céu. O polar do horizonte. Usos. 1. 2. O polar do vertical. Usos. 1. 36 DA URANOGRAFIA. como do equador, do horizonte, do meridiano, do vertical, do reitor e dos semelhantes. Contudo, comumente são atribuídos ao equador e ao horizonte: os paralelos do horizonte são chamados em latim círculos da altitude e da profundidade, em árabe almicântara, que costuma ser anotado nos astrolábios. Por outro lado, os paralelos do equador são chamados absolutamente paralelos, ou paralelos do equador ou paralelos do mundo. Por outro lado, os nomes de cada paralelo do círculo maior são tomados do número de graus que distam do círculo grande do qual são paralelos, e dai também comumente são estabelecidos noventa [círculos], e tal quantidade costuma ser anotada nos instrumentos planos (quando traz a magnitude deles). Se cada grau fosse cortado em minutos, e por cada um paralelos fossem conduzidos, seriam muito mais numerosos, dos quais os nomes são tomados dos graus junto com minutos, pelos quais equidistam do círculo grande. Um único paralelo do horizonte é celebre, o dito crepúsculino, que está escondido sob o horizonte. Por outro lado, tais qual é o círculo grande também são os paralelos no que diz respeito a variação e a imutabilidade, do que como o Equador não admite nenhuma variação em razão de um lugar diferente da Terrra, assim os paralelos deles em regiões diferentes do mundo não serão diversos, mas sempre os mesmos. Mas ao contrário, os paralelos do horizonte de dos círculos restantes são variados de acordo com um horizonte vário ou um círculo semelhante. Há ainda alguns paralelos do Equador não fixos, que ali são atribuídos por outros círculos ou do primeiro céu ou do primeiro móvel. Exatamente aos círculos do primeiro céu há dois paralelos que costumo chamar polares, porque são entendidos sendo descritos através dos pólos dos círculos do primeiro céu, a saber, polar do horizonte e polar do vertical. O polar do horizonte ou horizontal é um círculo paralelo (entenda do mundo) conduzido pelo polo do horizonte ou tangente ao vertical. Neste círculo são anotados os pólos dos círculos das horas obliquas. Mostra também as estrelas sempre boreais, as sempre meridionais e as comuns. Pois, quaisquer [estrelas] que estejam contidas entre o pólo ártico e o [círculo] polar horizontal próximo sempre são boreais; mas as que [estejam contidas] entre o pólo austrino e o [círculo] polar horizontal próximo [são] sempre meridionais. Mas todas as retantes são comuns, isto é, às vezes boreais, às vezes meridionais. O polar do vertical é um círculo paralelo conduzido através do pólo do vertical ou tangente ao horizonte. Este círculo delimita as horas, pois, nele são anotados na esfera obliqua L I B E R S E C V N D V S. 37 2. Polaris horizõtis & verticalis mutuus cõsensus. Paralleli ex circulis primi mobilis. Transpolaris quid. Poli. Transpol. aequatoris. liqua termini horarum Astronomicarum, sicuti & in quolibet alio paralelo possunt. Notantur & in eo termini horarum obliquarum. Ostendit etiam stellas sempternae apparitionis & occultationis omnes enim stellae quae inter polum eleuatum & polarem verticalem proximum continẽtur semper apparent: quae verò inter polum depressum & polarẽ verticalem proximũ semper occultae sunt: reliquae mediae sunt, hoc est, aliquando apparent, aliquãdo occultae sunt. Horum duorum polarium videlicet horizontalis & verticalis distantiae à polo mundi (vti & distantiae ab aequatore) simul iunctae quadrãtem conficiunt: vnde si polaris vnus sit quadrans (vtiest polaris horizontalis in horizonte recto: & Polaris verticalis in habitatione ea quae est sub polo) tunc alter nullus erit. Si quoque polaris vnus distet à polo quadraginta quinq; gradibus, totidem etiam gradibus distabit alter à polo, quare vnus idemque erit polaris verticalis & horizontalis: Quando verò vnius distantia à polo augetur, alterius minuitur. vnde à polo versus aequatorem procedentibus, polares horizontales crescunt, verticales decrescunt: A medio mundi versus polos procedentibus contrà. Polarem verticalem Proclus in Graecia per priorẽ Helices pedem describi ait: cuiús etiã distantiam à polo & tropicis describit, ita inquiẽs: Dissecto in partes sexaginta Meridiano quouis circulo, arctici orbes (polares nostro verticales intelligit) vtrinque à vértice sexagesimarũ partium sex, & ab vtroq; tropico quinq; interuallo absistunt. Paralleli aequatoris à primo mobili impressi, sunt circuli paralleli, Zodiaci circuli puncta quęlibet, eiusque etiã polos transeuntes, quorum priores arcus diurni vocari solẽt, posteriores polares primi mobilis, de quibus in tractatu de primo mobili. De circulis maioribus transpolaribus. CAP. VIII. Irculus transpolaris primi caeli est circulus magnus ductus per polũ circuli primi caeli, cuius est transpolaris & punctũ quoduis assignatum. Secatq; circulum eum cuiús est transpolaris, secaturque ab eodem ad angulos rectos. Poli circulorũ transpolatium sunt in circulo eo cuius sunt transpolares. Si quidem transpolares sint aequatoris, vocantur horarij absolutè vel horarij recti: quod horas distinguunt Astronomicas, quae initium sumunt ab aliquo horizonte sphaerae rectae. F iij HoC S E G U N D O L I V R O 37 2. Acordo mútuo do polar do horizonte e do vertical Os paralelos a partir do círculo do primeiro móvel. O que é um transpolar. Os pólos. Os transpolares do equador. obliqua os limites das horas astronômicas, como também o podem em qualquer outro paralelo. São anotados também nele os limites das horas obliquas. Mostra também as estrelas de aparição e de ocultação eterna, defato, todas as estrelas que estão contidas entre o pólo elevado e o polar vertical próximo aparecem; mas as que [estão contidas] entre pólo profundo e o polar vertical próximo sempre estão ocultas; as restantes são médias, isto é, ora aparecem, ora estão ocultas. As distâncias ao pólo do mundo (como também as distâncias do Equador) destes dois polares, a saber, do horizontal e do vertical, ao mesmo tempo junta perfazem um quadrante, do que se [a distância] do polar for um quadrante (como é [a distância] do polar horizonte no horizonte reto; e do polar vertical naquela habitação que está sob o pólo) então o outro [círculo] será nulo. Se também um polar ditar do pólo quarenta e conco graus, o outro distará também a mesma quantidade de graus do pólo, razão pela qual o polar vertical e o horizontal serão único e o mesmo, mas quando uma distância do pólo aumentar a outra diminuirá, do que procedendo do pólo em direção ao equador, os polares horizontais crescem e os verticais decrescem; Procedendo do meio do mundo em direção aos pólos [ocorre] o contrário. Proclo na Grécia diz que o polar vertical é descrito pela pata da frente da Ursa Maior; cuja distância ao polo e aos trópicos descreve, dizendo: cortado qualquer círculo Meridiano em sessenta partes, os orbes articos (entenda-se nossos plares verticais) afastam-se de cada vértice um intervalo de seis das sessenta partes e cinco de cada trópico. Os paralelos do Equador impressos pelo primeiro móvel são círculos paralelos do Zodíaco passando por pontos quaisquer e também pelos polos dele, dos quais os primeiros costumam ser chamados arcos diurnos; os posteriores, polares do primeiro móvel, sobre os quais [falarei] no tratado sobre o primeiro móvel. CAP. VIII. Sobre os círculos maiores transpolares. Círculo transpolar do primeiro céu é um círculo grande conduzido por um pólo do círculo do primeiro céu, do qual é transpolar, e por um ponto qualquer atribuído. E corta aquele círculo do qual é transpolar, e é cortado por ele por ângulos retos. Os pólos dos círculos transpolares estão naquele círculo dos quais são transpolares. Se de fato os transpolares sejam do equador, são chamados absolutamente horários ou horários retos, porque distinguem as horas astronômicas, que tomam início a partir de algum horizonte da esfera reta. A diverO OVRANOGRAPHIAE H or ar ij ci rc ul i d iu er sit as e st pe ne s d at um , q uo d es t v el punctum: Circulus horarius est circulus transpolaris aequatoris, transiens per punctum quoduis assignatum. ho ra in te gr a, e aq ue v el in genere: Circuli horarum integrarum sunt circuli transpolares aequatoris, quorum duo sunt rector & meridianus, secantes aequatorem & paralelos quoscunque in vigintiquatuor partes aequales. Tales circuli sunt duodecim, vnde semicirculi viginti quatuor, horas diei viginti quatuor ostendentes, quorum termini sunt poli mundi. Specie vbi magna diuersitas ratione principij, vnde horarũ initium sumitur, vel enĩ initiũ sumitur à semicirculo. m er id ia ni Su pe ri or i: di cu nt ur q; h or ae à m er id ie , v nd e ci rc ul us h or ae primae est transpolaris aequatoris, transiens per pũctũ aequatoris distans ab intersectione aequatoris cum Meridiani semicircul o superiore, secundum ordinẽ primi mobilis, gradibus quindecim 1 secundae triginta 2 tertiae quadraginta quinque 3 quartae sexaginta 4 quintae septuaginta quinque 5 sextae nonaginta 6 septimae centum & quiinque 7 octauae centum & viginti 8 nonae centum & triginta quinq; 9 decimae centum & quinquaginta 10 vndecimae centũ & sexaginta quinq; 11 duodecimae centum & octoginta 12 decimae tertiae centũ & nonaginta quinq; 13 decimae quartae ducentis & decem 14 decimae quintae ducentis & viginti quinq; 15 decimae sextae ducentis & quadraginta 16 decimae septimę duc. & quinquaginta quinq; 17 decimae octauae ducentis & septuaginta 18 decimae nonae ducẽtis & octaginta quinq; 19 vigesimae trecentis 20 vigesimae primae trecentis & quindecim 21 vigesimae secũdę trecentis & triginta 22 vigesimae tertiae trecẽ. & quadraginta quinq; 23 vigesimae quartae est semicirculus meridiani superior. 24 inferiori: dicunturq; horę à meridie nocte. Circulus horae primae est transpolaris aequatoris, transiens per punctum aequatoris distãs ab intersectione aequatoris cum meridiani semicirculo inferiori, secũdum ordinem primi mobilis, gradibus 15 secundae 30 tertiae 45 quartae 60 quintae 75 sextae 90 septimae 105 &c. &c. vigesimae quartae est semicirculus meridiani inferior. rectoris. A horae pars: si vltra gradus horis integris debitos addantur partes, tunc pro dimidia hora, septem, gradus cum dimidio: pro quadrante, tres gradus cum minutis quadraginta quinque, & sic deiceps addantur, atque per terminum transpolares ducantur, habebimus horarum circulum cuiuscunque partis horae Recto- 38 DA URANOGRAFIA. A d iv er si da de d o cí rc ul o ho rá rio e st á en tr e o da do , p or qu e é ou um ponto: O círuclo horário é um círculo transpolar do equador, que passa por um ponto qualquer atribuido. um a ho ra in te ir a, e e la é o u em gênero: Os círculos das horas inteiras são círculos transpolares do Equador, dos quais dois são o reitor e o meridiano, que cortam o Equador e quaisquer paralelos em vinte e quatro partes iguais. Tais círculos são doze, daí vinte e quatro semicírculos, que mostram as vinte e quatro horas do dia, dos quais os limites são os pólos do mundo. espécie, onde uma grande diversidade de em razão do princípio, de onde o início das horas é tomado, ou, na verdade, [o início é tomado a partir do semicírculo d o m er id ia no su pe ri or : a s h or as sã o di ta s a p ar tir d o m ei odi a, d o qu e o cí rc ul o da h or a primeira é transpolar do equador, que passa por um ponto do equador que dista da intersecção do equador com o semicírculo superior do Meridiano, segundo a ordem do primeiro móvel, com quinze graus 1 segunda trinta graus 2 terceira quarenta e cinco graus 3 quarta sescenta graus 4 quinta setenta e cinco graus 5 sexta noventa graus 6 sétima cento e cinco graus 7 oitava cento e vinte graus 8 nona cento e trinta e cinco graus 9 décima cento e cinquenta graus 10 undécima cento e sescenta e cinco graus 11 duodécima cento e oitenta graus 12 décima terceira cento e noventa e cinco graus 13 décima quarta duzentos e dez graus 14 décima quinta duzentos e vinte e cinco graus 15 décima sexta duzentos e quarenta graus 16 décima sétima duz. e cinq. e cinco graus 17 décima oitava duzentos e setenta graus 18 décima nona duz. e oitenta e cinco graus 19 vigésima trezentos graus 20 vig. primeira trezentos e quinze graus 21 vig. segunda trezentos e trinta graus 22 vig. terceira trez. e quarenta e cinco graus 23 vigésima quarta é o semicírculo superior do meridiano. 24 inferior: as horas são ditas a partir da meianoite. O círculo da hora primeira é transpolar do Equador, que passa por um ponto do equador que dista da intersecção do equador com o semicírculo inferior do meridiano, segundo a ordem do primeiro móvel, com 15° segunda 30° terceira 45° quarta 60° quinta 75° sexta 90° sétima 105° etc. etc. vigésima quarta é o semicírculo inferior do meridiano. do reitor. [Veja] A parte da hora: se além dos graus são adicionadas as devidas partes às horas inteira, então para meia hora são adicionados sete graus e meio, para o quadrante [são adicionados] três graus e quarenta e cinco minutos e assim por diante, e os transpolares são conduzidos pelo limite, teremos um círculo horário de qualquer parte da hora. Recto- L I B E R S E C V N D V S. 39 Transpol. horizõtis. a Ptolomę in Analemate. Transpol. meridiani. b In Analẽmate. c Commẽt. in 3 lib. meteororum Aristotelis. Transpol. verticalis. d In Analemmate. A Rectoris orientali: dicũturq; horę ab ortu recto: Circulus itaq; horę primae est transpolaris aequatoris, trãsiens per punctum aequatoris distans ab intersectione aequatoris cum rectoris semicirculo orientali, secundum ordinem primi mobilis, gradibus 15 secundae 30 tertiae 45 quartae 60 quintae 75 sextae 90 septimae 105 octaua 120 &c. &c. vigesimae quartae est semicirculus rectoris orientalis. occidẽtali: dicũturq; horę ab occasu recto Circulus itaq; horę primae est circulus trãspolaris aequatoris, transiens per punctum aequatoris, distans ab intersectione ęquatoris cum semicirculo rectoris occidentali, secundum ordinem primi mobilis, gradibus 15 secundae 30 tertiae 45 quartae 60 quintae 75 sextae 90 &c. &c. vigesimae quartae est circulus rectoris Si verò transpolaris sit cuiuscunque circuli tanquam horizontis, vocatur Latinis descensiuus, Graecis similiter a, quia ostendit descensum Solis & reliquarum stellarum à summo vértice ad eum, cum horiozntis descensiuus altitudinem supra horiozntis contineat. Huius diuerstas sumitur penes punctum datum, quod est vel polus alicuius alterius circuli tanquam horizontis: diciturq; Circulus distantiae locorum. aliud quodcunque; Arabibus dicitur Azimuth. Transpolaris Meridiani vocatur à Ptolomaeob , quia (vt Olimpiodurusc scirbit) sex positiones inter se distantes in die assumit, ob sex horas inaequales, quae quolibet die ab ortu vsque ad meridiem, & à meridie vsque ad occasum numerabuntur ab antiquis: sed nomen id transpolari Verticalis rectiùs conuenit. Transpolaris Verticalis vocatur communiter circulus positionum aut stationum. Non rectè (meo iudicio) à Ptolomaeod meridianus mobilis vocatur, cùm in nulla regione transpolatiũ verticalium nostrorum vllus, praeter vnicũ eumq; fixũ, meridiani vice fungi possit Circuli S E G U N D O L I V R O 39 Transpolar do equador. a Ptolomeu, Analema Transpolar do meridiano. b No Analema. c Comentário ao Livro 3 dos meteorológicos de Aristóteles. Transpolar do vertical. d No Analema. A Do reitor oriental: e são ditas horas do nascente reto: E assim, o círculo da hora primeira é transpolar do équador, que passa pelo ponto do equador que dista da intersecção do eqaudor com o semicírculo oriental do reitor, segundo a ordem do primeiro móvel, com 15° segunda 30° terceira 45° quarta 60° quinta 75° sexta 90° sétima 105° oitava 120° etc. etc. vigésima quarta é o semicírculo oriental do reitor. ocidental: e são ditas horas do ocaso reto: E assim, o círculo da hora primeira é um círculo transpolar do equador, que passa pelo ponto do equador, que dista da intersecção do équador com o semicírculo ocidental do reitor, segundo a ordem do primeir móvel, com 15° segunda 30° terceira 45° quarta 60° quinta 75° sexta 90° etc. etc. vigésima quarta é o semicírculo do reitor. Mas, se um transpolar é de qulauqer círculo como o horizonte, é chamado em latim descensivus, em grego semelhantemente a, porque mostra a descenção do Sol e das estrelas restantes do vértice superior até ele, porque o descensivus do horizonte contem a altitude sobre o horizonte. Cuja diversidade é tomada entre o ponto dado, que ou é um pólo de algum outro círculo como do horizonte: e é dito círculo da distância dos lugares. ou outro qualque, dito pelos árabes azimute. O Transpolar do meridiano é chamado por Ptolomeu , porque (como escreve Olimpiodoro) assume em um dia seis posições que distam entre si, por causa de seis horas desiguais, que são numerqadas pelos antigos em qualquer dia do nascente ao meio-dia e do meio-dia até o ocaso. Mas este nome convém mais corretamente ao transpolar vertical. O transpolar do vertical é chamado comumente círculo das posições ou estações. Incorretamente (de acordo com meu juízo) é chamado por Ptolomeu meridiano móvel, porque em nenhuma região nenhum dos nossos transpolares verticais, exceto aquele único e fixo. A diversi- a Firmicus b 2 rerum caelestium cap. 4. 40 OVRANOGRAPHIAE Circuli position diuersitas est penes datum siue proporsit , quod est vel Punctum. Circulus positionis cuiuscumque puncti est circulus transpolaris verticalis transiens per p ctum propositum. Domus, sunt autem domus caelestes duodecim partes caeliope sex circulorum positionis distinctae. Hasce aliquia vocant stationes & loca. Erigere autem, constituere, stabilire, aut aequare duodecim domicilia, nihil aliud significat, quam duodecim harum domorum initia inuenire, quae initia cuspides vocantur. Harum duodecim domiciliorum quatuor puncta praecipua sunt, tum horizontis tum Meridiani ope distinctae, quarum anteà meminimus, videlicet ortus, occasus, médium caeli, imum caeli. Quo autem comsilio fabrica caelestis in duodecim domicilia sit distributa, copiosè explicãt Astrologi: Imprimis Pontanusb. Sicuti enim sig-niferum non tantum in quatuor partes, nimirum duo aequinoctia & totidẽ solstitia, sed natura duce in duodecim loca distinguunt artífices, ita caelum duodecim domiciliis dispescunt. Repererunt enim non solum quatuor mundi cardines dare stellis magnam virium aut accessionem aut remissionem: sed esse praetereà alia quaedam loca intermedia, vnde stellis mira significationis accederet mutatio, nunc in commodum, nunc in dispendium variarum rerum. Ordo autem domorum hic est, vt initium sumãt ab horizonte ortiuo, deinde per haemisphaerium inferius progrediantur, vt ad horizontẽ occiduum, inde per médium caeli ad ortum perueniant. Distinctio domorum ex sequenti patet tabela. B Hora duodenaria. D Domus a {Júlio] Firmico b Das Coisas Celestes, Livro 2, Capítulo 4. 40 DA URANOGRAFIA. A diversidade das posições do círculo está entre o dado ou proposto, porque ou é Um ponto. O círculo da posição de qualquer ponto é um círculo transpolar do vertical que passa pelo ponto proposto. Uma casa. Mas as casas celestes são doze partes do céu com a ajuda de seis círculos de posição distinta. Essas algunsa chamam estações e lugares. Por outro lado, erigir, constituir, estabelecer ou igualar doze domicílios, não significa nada além do que encontrar os inícios dessas doze casas, que são chamados cúspides. Destes doze domicílios, quatro pontos com esforço bem ordenado são principais, tanto do horizonte, quanto do meridiano, dos quais anteriormente nos lembramos, a saber, o nascente, o poente, o meio do céu e o fundo do céu. E por qual consideração a estrutura do céu é distribuída em doze domicílios, abundantemente expicam os astrólogos, em primeiro lugar Pontanusb. Assim como os artífices distinguem o signífero não somente em quatro partes, a saber, dois equinócios e a mesma quantidade de solstícios, mas em doze lugares pela natureza guia, assim separam o céu em doze domicilios. Encontraram, de fato, que não somente quatro pontas do mundo dão às estrelas uma grande força ou uma aproximação ou um afastamento: mas existem além daquelas certos lugares intermediários, donde a mudança extrema de significação chega às estrelas, às vezes na comodidade das várias coisas, ora no dispendio delas. Por outro lado, a ordem dos domicílios, é esta, que obtém o início do horizonte nascente, depois progridem inferiormente pelo hemisfério, para que cheguem ao horizonte poente, daí pelo meio do céu ao nascente. A distinção das casas mostra a tabela B no que segue. Uma hora duodenária. [Tabela] D As casas L I B E R S E C V N D V S. 41 B Domus diuersae sunt sumpta distinctione à n om in ib u s, q u ae t ri pl ic i r at io n e in st it u ta r ep er io Primò: vt Domus tribus nominibus describatur, quae sunt cardo siue angulos, succedens & cadens: verùm hisce additur denominatio ratione quartae in qua sunt. Denominatio autẽ sumitur à puncto illo à quo quarta incipit. Sunt autẽ haec 1 Cardo O ri en ti s 7 Cardo O cc id ẽs 2 Succe Dens 8 Succe dens 3 Cadẽs 9 Cadẽs 4 Cardo i m i c ae li 10 Cardo m ed ij cae li 5 Succe Dens 11 Succe dens 6 Cadẽs 12 Cadẽs Secundò: sex ferè nominibus quę hoc rudi versiculo possunt comprehendi. Ascendens (& descendens) porta (inferna & superna) Dea (& Deus) caeli imum (& médium) bona (fortuna & dęmon) mala (fortuna & daemon) 1 Ascendens 7 Occasus 2 Porta inferna. 8 Porta superna 3 Dea. 9 Deus. 4 Caeli imum 10 medium caeli 5 Bona fortuna 11 Bonus daemon. 6 Mala fortuna 12 Malus daemon. Tertiò: ex significatis duodecim domiciliorum praecipuis, ad quae faciliùs memorię mandanda hos olim composuimus versiculos: Vita & opes fraterq; parens natiq; valete, Coniunx, mors, iter & regnum, benefactor & hostis. 1 Vita 2 Speslucrum 3 Fratres 4 Parentes 5 Filij 6 Valetudo 7 Coniunx 8 Mors 9 Religio & iter 10 Regnum 11 Benefactor 12 Inimici & carcer circulorum positionum distinctione. C G Circuli S E G U N D O L I V R O 41 B As casas diversas são obtidas pela distinção p el os n om es , q u e en co n tr o in st it u id a po r tr ês r az õe s Primeiramente: porque a casa por três nomes era descrita, que são a ponta ou ângulos, a sucessiva e a cadente. Mas, a esses [nomes] é adicionada uma denominação em razão da quarta na qual estão. Mas a denominação é tomada daquele ponto a partir do qual começa a quarta. E são estes: 1 A ponta D o or ie nt e 7 A ponta D o oc id en te 2 A sucessiva 8 A sucessiva 3 A cadente 9 A cadente 4 A ponta do d im d o cé u 10 A ponta do m ei o do c éu 5 A sucessiva 11 A sucessiva 6 A cadente 12 A cadente Em segundo lugar: geralmente podem ser compreendidos por seis nomes que este rude versículo. Ascendente (& descendente) porta (inferior & superior) Deusa (e Deus) o fundo do céu (e o meio) baa (fortuna e espírito) má (fortuna e espírito) 1 Ascendente 7 Ocaso 2 Porta inferior. 8 Porta superior 3 Deusa. 9 Deus. 4 Fundo do céu 10 O meio do céu 5 A boa fortuna 11 O bom espírito. 6 A má fortuna 12 O mau espírito. Em terceiro lugar: a partir dos significados principais dos doze domicilios, para que sejam mais facilmente colocados na memória compusemos outrora estes versículos: Vita & opes fraterq; parens natiq; valete, Coniunx, mors, iter & regnum, benefactor & hostis. 1 A vida 2 A esperança-lucro 3 Os irmãos 4 Os pais 5 Os filhos 6 A saúde 7 O conjuge 8 A morte 9 A Relig. e o cam.1 10 O governo 11 O bemfeitor 12 Os ini. e a prisão.2 pela distinção das posições do círculos. [Tabela] C Os círculos 42 OVRANOGRAPHIAE C Circuli positionum domorum initia ostendentes, distinguῦtur, vel per aequales partes verticalis: hęc distinctio domor dicitur AEqualis, quia oẽs domus inter sese s t aequales, quar cognitio in genere. Circuli inchoantes domos caelestes sunt circuli transpolares verticalis sex, quorum duo sunt horizon & meridianus, secantes verticalem induodecim partes aequales: vnde semicirculi duodecim, domos duodecim inchoantes, quorum termini sunt poli verticalis. specie; vt circulus inchoans domus primae est semicirculus horizontis ortiuus. secundae Est semitranspolaris verticalis, trãsiens per punctum verticalis distans ab intersectiõe verticalis cum horizonte ortiuo, cõtra ordinem primi mobilis gradibus 30 tertiae 60 quartae 90 imũ cęli quintae 120 sextae 150 septimae 180 hor.occ. octauae 210 nonae 240 decimae 270 med.cęli vndecimae 300 duodecimę 330 aequatoris haec distinctio dicitur Rationalis, quia per rationẽ inuenta est, horum cognitio in genere. Circuli inchoantes domos caelestes sunt circuli transpolares verticalis sex, quorum duo sunt horizon & meridianus secantes aequatorem induodecim partes aequales: vnde semicirculi duodecim, domus duodecim inchoantes, quor termini sunt poli verticalis. specie; vt circulus inchoans domus primae est semicirculus horizontis ortiuus. secundae est semitranspolaris verticalis transiẽs per punctum aequatoris distans ab intersectione aequatoris cum horizonte ortiuo, cõtra ordinem primi mobilis gradibus 30 tertiae 60 quartae 90 imũ cęli quintae 120 sextae 150 septimae 180 hor.occ. octauae 210 nonae 240 decimae 270 med.cęli vndecimae 300 duodecimę 330 Hora 42 DA URANOGRAFIA. C Os círculos mostrando os inícios das posições das casas, são distinguidos, ou por partes iguais do vertical: esta distinção das casas é dita igual, porque todas as casas entre si são iguais, das quais o entendimento se dá em gênero: Os círculos que começam as casas celestes são seis círculos transpolares do vertical, dos quais dois são o horizonte e o meridiano, que cortam o vertical em doze partes iguais. Do que doze semicírculos, começando doze casas, cujos limites são os pólos do vertical. espécie: Porque o círculo que começa a casa primeira é um semicirculo nascente do horizonte. segunda é um semitranspolar do vertical, que passa pelo ponto do vertical que dita da dista da intersecção do vertical com o horizonte nascente, contrariamente a ordem do primeiro móvel, em graus, 30 terceira 60 quarta 90 Fundo do céu quinta 120 sexta 150 sétima 180 Horiz. poente oitava 210 nona 240 décima 270 Meio do céu undécima 300 duodécima 330 do equador: esta distinção é dita racional, porque é encontrada pela razão, cujo entendimento se dá em gênero: Os círculos que começam as casas celestes são seis círculos transpolares do vertical, dos quais dois são o horizonte e o meridiano, que cortam o equador em doze partes iguais. Do que doze semicírculos, começando doze casas, cujos limites são os pólos do vertical. espécie: Porque o círculo que começa a casa primeira é um semicirculo nascente do horizonte. segunda é um semitranspolar do vertical, que passa pelo ponto do equador que dita dista da intersecção do equador com o horizonte nascente, contrariamente a ordem do primeiro móvel, em graus, 30 terceira 60 quarta 90 Fundo do céu quinta 120 sexta 150 sétima 180 Horiz. poente oitava 210 nona 240 décima 270 Meio do céu undécima 300 duodécima 330 Uma hora L I B E R S E C V N D V S. 43 Trãspolares rectoris. Vsus. D Hora duodenaria est duodecima pars arcus diurni, nocturnive: haec est vel integra in genere: Circuli horarum duodenariarum integrarum sunt circuli transpolares verticalis, quorum duo sunt horizon & meridianus, secantes aequatorem in viginti quatuor parte aequales; vnde semicirculi vigintiquatuor, horas diei vigintiquatuor ostendentes; quorum termini sunt poli vericalis circuli. specie: vel enim horarum duodenariarum initium desumitur, à semicirculo horizontis orientali, dic turq; horae diurnae: vnde semicirculus horae duodenariae diurnae primae est transpolaris verticalis, trãsiens per punctum aequatorem distans ab intersectione aequatoris cum horizonte ortiuo, secundum ordinem primi motus gradibus 15 secundae 30 tertiae 45 quartae 60 quintae 75 sextae 90 septimae 105 octauae 120 nonae 135 decimae 150 vndecimae 165 duodecimae est semicirculus horizontis occiduus. occidentali, & dic tur horae nocturnę; vnde semicirculus horae duodenariae nocturnae primae est transpolaris verticalis, trãsiens per punctum aequatorem distans ab intersectione aequatoris cum horizonte occiduo, secundum ordinem primi motus gradibus 15 secundae 30 tertiae 45 quartae 60 quintae 75 sextae 90 septimae 105 octauae 120 nonae 135 decimae 150 vndecimae 165 duodecimae est semicirculus horizontis occiduus. non integra. Si vltra gradus aequatoris horis integris debitos addantur pro dimidia hora, septem gradus cum medio, pro quadrante, tres gradus cum minuto quadragintaquinque, & sic deinceps, atque per terminum ipsum transpolaris verticalis ducatur, habebimus circulum horarium duodenarium propositum. Transpolares rectoris peculiare nomen, quod sciam, non habent, nec vsus eorum magnus est. Transpolares continẽt altitudinem supra circulum cuius sunt transpolares, Horarius horas terminat Astronomicas. terminat amplitudinem horizontalem, continereq; potest duorum locorum distantiam. Positionis circulus tùm horas duodenarias terminat, tùm domos distinguit, varijque est vsus in rebus Astrologicis. G ij DE S E G U N D O L I V R O 43 Os transpolares do reitor. Os usos. D Uma hora duodenaria é a duodécima parte do arco diurno ou notur no: esta ou é inteira em gênero: Os círculos das horas duodenárias inteiras são círculos transpolares do vertical, dois dos quais são o horizonte e o meridiano, que cortam o equador em vinte e quatro partes iguais, daí vinte e quatro semicírculos, que mostram as vinte e quatro horas do dia, dos quais os limites são os pólos do círculo do vertical. em espécie: na verdade o ínício das horas duodenárias é tomado, a partir do semicírculo do horizonte ou oriental, e são ditas horas diurnas, daí o semicírculo da hora duodenária diurna primeira é um transpolar do vertical, que passa pelo ponto do equador que dista da intersecção do equador com o horizonte nascente, segundo a ordem do primeiro movimento, em graus 15 segunda 30 terceira 45 quarta 60 quinta 75 sexta 90 sétima 105 oitava 120 nona 135 décima 150 undécima 165 duodécima é o semicírculo do horizonte poente. ocidental, e são ditas horas noturnas, daí o semicírculo da hora duodenária noturna primeira é um transpolar do vertical, que passa pelo ponto do equador que dista da intersecção do equador com o horizonte poente, segundo a ordem do primeiro movimento, em graus 15 segunda 30 terceira 45 quarta 60 quinta 75 sexta 90 sétima 105 oitava 120 nona 135 décima 150 undécima 165 duodécima é o semicírculo do horizonte poente. não inteira. Se além disso, os graus devidos do equador são adicionados às horas inteiras, para cada meia hora, sete graus e meio, para cada quadrante, três graus e quarenta e cinco minutos, e assim sucessivamente, e seja conduzido pelo próprio limite do transpolar do vertical, teremos o círculo proposto das horas duodenárias. Os transpolares do reitor não tem nome peculiar, o quanto eu saiba, e o uso dele não é grande. Os transpolares contém a altitude acima do círculo do qual são transpolares, o horário determina as horas astronômicas. determina a amplitude horizontal e pode conter a distância dos dois locais. O círculo das posições, tanto determina as horas duodenárias, como distingue as casas, e vários são usos nas coisas astrológicas. CAPÍ- 44 OVRANOGRAPHIAE De circulis maioribus contingentibus: videlicet horarijs obliquis. CAPVT NONVM. Horarij obliqui diuersitas est penes datum siue proposit , quod est vel punctum: Circulus horarius obliquus est circulus maximus tangens polarem verticalis, & transiens per punctum proporsitum. hora integra, eaque vel in genere: Circuli horarum integrarum ab ortu vel occasu sunt circuli magni, quorum vnus est horizon, tangentes polarem verticalis, terminatique in viginti quatuor punctis, quibus diuiditur à circulis earundem horarum rectarum. Horum poli sunt puncta polaris horizontis, quibus diuiditur à circulis earundem horarum rectarum. Specie: vel enĩ horar obliquar initi capitur à semicirculo horizõ tis orientali, & dicitur horae ab ortu: vnde semicirculus horae ab ortu primae est medietas circuli horarij obliqui, post horizõtem orientalem secundum ordinẽ primi motus prior, terminata circulo horae à meridie primae secundae secundae tertiae tertiae quartae quartae quintae quintae sextae sextae septimae septimae octauae octauae nonae nonae decimae decimae vndecimae vndecimae duodecimae duodecimae dec. tertiae dec. tertiae dec. quartae dec. quartae &c. &c. vigesimae quartae est horizon ortiuus. occidentali, & dic tur horae ab occasu: vnde semicirculus horae ab occasu primae est medietas circuli horarij obliqui, post horizontem orientalem sec dum ordinem primi motus posterior, terminata circulo horae à meridie primae secundae secundae tertiae tertiae quartae quartae quintae quintae sextae sextae septimae septimae octauae octauae nonae nonae decimae decimae vndecimae vndecimae duodecimae duodecimae &c. &c. vigesimae quartae est horizon occiduus. non integra. Si circulus horarius rectus per horam non integram transeat, tunc circulus horarius obliquus eandem horam non integram significabit, atque pars prior horam ab ortu, posterior ab occasu. LIBRI SECVNDI FINIS. OVRA- 44 DA URANOGRAFIA. CAPÍTULO NONO. Sobre os círculos maiores contingentes, a saber, os horários oblíquos. A diversidade dos horarios oblíquos está entre o dado ou propos -to, porque ou é um ponto: O círculo horário oblíquo é um círculo máximo que toca o polar do vertical e passa pelo ponto proposto. uma hora intei ra, e esta ou é em gênero: Os círculos das horas inteiras do nascente ou do poente são círculos grandes, dos quais um é o horizonte, que tocam o polar do vertical, e determinados em vinte e quatro pontos, com os quais é dividido pelos círculos das horas retas. Os pólos deles são pontos do polar do horizonte, com os quais é divido pelos círculos das mesmas horas retas. espécie: na verdade, o início das horas oblíquas é tomado a partir do semicírculo do horizonte ou oriental, também são ditos da hora do nascente, daí o semicírculo do nascente da hora primeira é a metade do circulo horário oblíquo, depois do horizonte oriental segundo a ordem do primeiro movimento anterior, determinada a partir do meio-dia pelo circulo da hora primeira segunda segunda terceira terceira quarta quarta quinta quinta sexta sexta sétima sétima oitava oitava nona nona décima décima undécima undécima duodécima duodécima d. terceira d. terceira d. quarta d. quarta etc. etc. vigésima quarta é o horizonte nascente. ocidental, também são ditos da hora do poente, daí o semicírculo do ocaso da hora primeira é a metade do circulo horário oblíquo, depois do horizonte oriental segundo a ordem do primeiro movimento posterior, determinada a partir do meio-dia pelo circulo da hora primeira segunda segunda terceira terceira quarta quarta quinta quinta sexta sexta sétima sétima oitava oitava nona nona décima décima undécima undécima duodécima duodécima etc. etc. vigésima quarta é o horizonte poente. não inteira. Se o círculo horário reto passa pela hora não inteira, então o círculo horário oblíquo significará a mesma hora não inteira, e a parte anterior da hora do nascente, a posterior do poente. FIM DO SEGUNDO LIVRO. TER- 45 Primum mobile quid. Motus primi mobilis velociss. Simplex. Vniformis. Motus nomina. Axis primi mobilis. Enumeratio circulorum primi mobilis. O V R A N O G R A P H I AE L I B E R T E R T I V S. A V T H O R E A D R I A N O R O M A N O . Primi mobilis situs, motus & circuli. CAPVT PRIMVM. Rimum mobile est orbis aethereus, mobilium omnium extimus, mundo concentricus. In hoc caelo nulla est stella, vti anteà docuimus, sed motum in eo tantum, quem omnibus sphaeris inferioribus largitur, consideramus. Motus eius est volocissimus1, perficiturque vigintiquatuor horarum spacio, ideoque reliquorum omnium notissimus, etiam vulgo, quod eum in sole diem & noctem distinguente, maximè notat; Est enim totius machinae caelestis maximus ac praecipuus. Quantum autem corpora reliqua caelestia ad hac sphaera magis distant, tanto tardius eo motu mouentur, quod potissimm apparet in Luna: haec ernim intra vigintiocto fere dies, totam circuitionem perdit. Est etiam hic motus simplex & vniformis, regularisque, quod videlicet vno tempore velocior non sit quam alio. Solet autem communiter vocari Diurnus, quod videlicet vno die naturali, qui viginti quatuor horis constat, perficiatur. Vocatur & primus motus, tum quod sit simplex, ideoq; reliquis prior; tum quod sit primi corporis mobilis: prodit autem hic motus ab ortu, per medium caeli, in occasum, vt inde iterum per imum caeli, ab ortum redeat. Axis primi motus est eadem cum axi mundi siue aequatoris. Circuli primi mobilis sunt vel primarij, qui sunt singuli, ac veluti regulae motus primi: Mediator. secundi: Zodiacus. secundarij, qui sunt plures, iique ve minores, vti sunt paralleli Mediatoris. Zodiaci. maiores transpolares Mediatoris, siue Circuli declinationum. Zodiaci, siue Circuli latitudinum. G iij Inter 45 O que é o primeiro móvel. O movimento do primeiro móvel é velocíssimo Simples. Uniforme. Os nomes do movimento. Eixo do primeiro móvel. Enumeração dos círculos do primeiro móvel. T E R C E I R O L I V R O D A U R A N O G R A F I A. P E L O A U T O R A D R I A N U S R O M A N U S . PRIMEIRO CAPÍTULO. Posição, movimento e círculos do primeiro móvel. Primeiro móvel é um orbe etéreo, o mais externo de todos os móveis, concêntrico ao mundo. Neste céu, não há estrela, como antes ensinamos, mas consideramos nele somente o movimento, que transmite à todas as esferas inferiores. O movimento dele é velocíssimo, e no espaço de vinte e quatro horas é finalizado e, do mesmo modo, é o mais notado de todos os restantes, também pelo homem comum, porque muitíssimo o percebe, distinguindo no Sol o dia e a noite. Na verdade, é o maior e o principal de toda a máquina celeste. Por outro lado, quanto mais os corpos celestes restantes se distanciam desta esfera, tanto mais lentamente são movidos por esse movimento, o que aparece principalmente na Lua. Na verdade, ela completa toda a volta dentro de quase vinte e oito dias. Além disso, este movimento é simples, uniforme e regular, porque certamente em um tempo não seja mais veloz que em outro. Por outro lado, costuma comumente ser chamado Diurno, porque certamente seria completo em um dia natural, que tem vinte e quatro horas. É chamado também primeiro movimento, porque seja simples, e por causa disso, anterior aos restantes; porque seja o movimento do primeiro corpo. Por outro lado, este movimento sai do nascente, através do meio do céu, para o poente, de forma que de lá mais uma vez através do fundo do céu, regresse ao nascente. O eixo do primeiro móvel é o mesmo com o eixo do mundo ou do equador. Os círculos do primeiro móvel são ou primários, os quais são singulares, e como que regras do primeiro movimento: Mediador. segundo movimento: Zodíaco. secundários, os quais são muitos e estes ou são menores, como são os paralelos do Mediador. do Zodíaco. maiores transpolares do Mediador ou os círculos das declinações. do Zodíaco ou os círculos das latitudes. O lado Distinctio circulorum primi mobilis propria. a 1. in Som nium Scip. Mediator quis circulus. Ratio nominis. Poli Usus. 1. 46 OVRANOGRAPHIAE Inter hos omnes primi mobilis círculos vnus est latus, reliqui omnes latitudinis expertes: Quia vt ante monuimus circulum hic non adeò praecisè capimus, vti à Geometris accipitur, sed multò latius: Hanc distinctionem Macrobius innuit dicensa: Natura caelestium circulorum Scipionis incorporalis est línea, quae ita mente concipitur, vt sola longitudine censeatur, latum habere nõ possit Zodiaco latitudinem, signorum capacitas exigebat2, &c. Sed ad circulorum singulorum explicationem veniemus. De Mediatore. CAPVT II. Ediator circulus maior est primi mobilis, cuius partes omnes aequo spacio, ab vtroque mundi polo distant. Nomen à nobis hac de causa id illi tributum est; quia eo mediante sphaerae inferiores, supremae coaptantur: ita vt si ex inferioribus ad supremam tendere velimus; verbi gratia, si ex cognito alicuius planetae loco secundum longitudinem & latitudinem, vnà cum altitudine eiusdem supra horizontem, propositum sit indagare eiusdem planetae distantiam ab aliquo horario, necessarium est id mediante hoc circulo fieri. Oportet enim ex longitudine & latitudine datis, indagare mediationem & declinationem; his habitis facilè iam est in cognitionem distantiae ab aliquo circulo horario peruenire. Sic si à sphaera suprema libeat ad inferiores peruenire: Nam primò oportet ex datis quibuscunque, indagare altitudinem supra aequatorem, quae aequatur declinationi, atque distantiam à Meridiano, ex qua deinde in cognitionem mediationis perueniemus: habita autem declinatione & mediatione, longitudo & latitudo ignota esse non possunt: Haecq; ratio nominis à nobis impositi: si quis AEquatorem mobilem appelare maluerit, nõ quidem errauerit, quia ab eo solum modo differt mobilitate, cum AEquator circulus primi caeli, atque immobilis sit, vti anteà docuimus: sed nos maluimus nomina distincta iis imponere. Poli eius & axis iidem sunt cum polis & axi Mundi. Mediator est mensura motus primi mobilis. Cum enim à polis Mundi (circa quos primum móbile voluitur) aequalibus vndique spaciis disiungatur, nec angulum quem cum horizonte facit, vnquam mutet, eadem etiam lege, eodemque motu, primum móbile circumferri demonstrat. Nam singulis horis quindecim eius gradus emerM Distinção própria dos círculos do primeiro móvel. a No [Comentário ao] Sonho de Cipião, [Livro] 1. Que círculo é o Mediador? Razão do nome. Os usos do pólo. 1. 46 DA URANOGRAFIA. Entre todos os círculos do primeiro móvel, o lado é uno, e todos os restantes desprovidos de latitude. Porque como antes lembramos, até certo ponto este círculo não tomamos precisamente, como é aceito para a geometria, mas com muitos lados. Esta distinção Macrobius acena dizendoa: "A natureza dos círculos celestes de Cipião é uma linha incorpórea, a qual assim se forma com a mente, de forma que seja avaliada somente com a longitude, não pode ter largura, Mas no Zodíaco a capacidade dos signos exigia uma latitude, etc." Mas voltemos para a explicação dos círculos singulares. SEGUNDO CAPÍTULO. Sobre o Mediador. Mediador é um círculo maior do primeiro móvel, do qual todas as partes se distanciam com espaço igual dos dois pólos do mundo. Esse nome é atribuído a ele por nós por esta razão: porque as esferas inferiores são ligadas à suprema mediante ele. De modo que assim se quisermos nos dirigir a partir das inferiores para a suprema. Por exemplo, se a partir de um lugar conhecido de algum planeta segundo a longitude e a latitude, juntamente com a altitude do mesmo acima do horizonte, for proposto procurar a distância do mesmo planeta a partir de outro horário, é necessário que isso seja feito mediante esse círculo. Na verdade, é necessário procurar a mediação e a declinação a partir da longitude e latitude dadas. Tidas estas coisas é então fácil atingir o conhecimento da distância a algum outro circulo horário. Assim, se agradar atingir as inferiores a partir da esfera suprema. Pois, primeiramente é necessário a partir de dados quaisquer procurar a altitude acima do equador, que se iguala à declinação, e a distância ao Meridiano a partir da qual, em seguida, chegaremos ao conhecimento da mediação. Tidas a declinação e a mediação, a longitude e a latitude não podem ser desconhecidas. E esta é a razão do nome colocado por nós: se alguém preferisse nomear o móvel Equador, não erraria exatamente, porque difere dele unicamente na mobilidade, porque o Equador é um círculo do primeiro céu, e é imóvel, como ensinamos anteriormente, mas nós preferimos colocar nomes distintos a eles. Os pólos e o eixo dele são os mesmos que os pólos e o eixo do mundo. O Mediador é a medida do movimento do primeiro móvel. Como, na verdade, está separado dos pólos do mundo (em redor dos quais o primeiro móvel gira) em todas as direções por espaços iguais, e não faz ângulo algum com o horizonte, toda vez que muda, demonstra que o primeiro móvel circuncarregado também pela mesma lei e pelo mesmo movimento. Assim, a cada hora quinze de seus graus O L I B E R T E R T I V S. 47 2. 3. 4. Zodiacus quid. Nomina Zodiacus. a Iulius Firmicus lib. 2 cap. 1. emergunt, totidemque ex adverso decumbunt, vnde omnes 360 partes mediatoris, horis vigintiquatuor conuerruntur. Mediator est regula inaequalitatis Zodiaci, quam habet ex obliquo positu circa polos mundi: hinc vt ex Solis motu spacia horarum cognoscamus, id mediante hoc circulo fieri debet. Et si enim Solis motus accidentarius (quem ab hac sphaera habet) & proprius in Zodiaco producãt diem, tamen cùm partes Zodiaci irregulariter eleuentur supra horizontem, partes inde colligi non possent, nisi cõferrentur ad Mediatorem, quo mediante spacia horarum metienda sunt. Ostendit aequinoctia: Intersecat enim Zodiacum in duobus punctis, quae cum Sol occupat, efficit spacia diurna nocturnis aequalia. Ab hoc etiam circulo, tanquam à termino à quo, numeratur quarumcumque partium eclypticae, stellarum, aliorúmve punctorum declinatio. De Zodiaco. CAPVT TERTIVM. Odiacus est circulus maior, latus, inter mundi polos obliqúe situs, mediatorem in partes aequales secans, cuius vna medietas vergit ad Septentrionem, altera verò ad Austrum. Graecis dicitur, vel , hoc est, à vita; vel , hoc est, ab animalibus. A vita quidem, quia res inferiores vitam suam habent ex motu planetarum sub illo circulo. Vnde Hipparchus, inquit, hunc circulum esse vitam omnium rerum quae in mundo sunt. Ab animalibus hac fortassis ratione cùm Zodiacus distribuatur in duodecim partes, singulae eae, praeter septimam, nomem alicuius habent animalis, idque vel quia stellae suo situ talia representant animalia (quod ad imagines octauae sphaerae, quam veteres primũ appelarunt mobile, spectat), vel quia talem qualitatem habent partes Zodiaci, qualis in illis animalibus reperitur. Vnde Astrologi volunt signa rationalia (qualia sunt Gemini, Virgo, & medietas Sagitarij) respicere rationalitatem hominis, eosq; quibus haec signa sunt in horoscopo, ratione plurima pollere, hominumque societate delectari: Quid vero in horoscopo, habent signa syluestria, esse vt plurimum solitarios, nisi forte Planetarum locus impediuerit: Sed quid de Astrologorum placitis sentiam, aliâs ostendam. Haec de ratione nominis Zodiaci, quo vtuntur Mathematicia ferè omnes: vti & MacroZ T E R C E I R O L I V R O 47 2. 3. 4. O Que é o Zodíaco? Os Nomes do Zodíaco. a Júlio Fírmico, Livro 2, Capítulo 1. graus emergem, e a mesma quantidade a partir do lado oposto decai, donde todas as 360 partes do mediador são varridas em vinte e quatro horas. O Mediador é uma regra de desigualdade do Zodíaco, que se acha em posição oblíqua ao redor dos pólos do mundo. Disso, para que conheçamos os espaços das horas a partir do movimento do Sol, isto deve ser feito mediante este círculo. E, na verdade, se o movimento mais acidental do Sol (que tem por esta esfera) e mais próprio no Zodíaco produzem o dia, ainda assim, como as partes do Zodíaco são elevadas acima do horizonte irregularmente, a partir daí, as partes não podem ser juntadas, a não ser que fossem juntadas ao Mediador, onde devem ser medidas mediante o espaço das horas. Apresenta os equinócios. Na verdade, intercepta o Zodíaco em dois pontos, que quando o Sol ocupa, faz os espaços diurnos iguais aos noturnos. Também por este círculo, assim como pelo limite dele, é numerada a declinação de quaisquer partes da eclíptica, das estrelas ou de outros pontos. TERCEIRO CAPÍTULO. Sobre o Zodíaco. Zodíaco é um círculo maior, largo, situado entre os pólos do mundo obliquamente, que divide o mediador em partes iguais, do qual uma metade inclina para a região setentrional, e a outra para a região austral. Ζωδιακὀς é dito pelos gregos; ou , isto é, da vida; ou , isto é, dos animais: certamente da vida, porque as coisas inferiores têm sua vida a partir do movimento dos planetas sob aquele círculo, donde Hiparco diz, este círculo é a vida de todas as coisas que existem no mundo; dos animais, possivelmente, com esta razão porque o Zodíaco é distribuído em doze partes, cada uma delas, exceto a sétima, tem o nome de algum animal, e isto ou porque tais estrelas com sua posição representam animais (no que diz respeito às imagens da oitava esfera, que os antigos chamaram de primeiro móvel), ou porque as partes do zodíaco têm qualidades tais, quais são encontradas nesses animais. Donde os astrólogos querem que os signos racionais (quais são Gêmeos, Virgem e metade de Sagitário) digam respeito à racionalidade do homem, que eles exerçam influencia naqueles [homens] pelos quais esses signos estão no horóscopo por muitíssimas razões. Mas, os que no horóscopo têm signos silvestres, eles querem que sejam muito solitários, a não ser que talvez a posição dos planetas impeça. Mas o que eu penso sobre as máximas dos astrólogos, em outro lugar mostrarei. Eis as coisas da razão do nome do Zodíaco, o qual quase todos os matemáticosa usam, como também diz MacroO b Lib. 1. in Som. Scipi. Obliquus circulus. c In Astronomico Poëtico cap. 1. d 2 de generatiõ. ca. 10. f Histor. natur. li. 2. c. 4. Signifer. Orbis sign. g In suis fragmentis in Aratum. Pol. signif. h Pharsalicon, lib. 3. Baltheus stellatus. Fascia circul. signor. i Isago. lib. in Astrono. diff. 1. ca. de diuis. circu. Nitach. Obliquit. Zodiaci. k lib. 2. ca. 8. 48 OVRANOGRAPHIAE Macrobius dicensb: Decem autem alij (vt diximus) circulis sunt, quorum vnus est ipse Zodiacus, &c. Vocatur & à Graecis λοξὸς, id est obliquus, siue inflexus Hygino referentec: Qui (scilicet Zodiacus) quod non vt caeteri circuli, certa dimensione finitur, & clinatior alijs videtur, λοξὸς à Graecis est dicitus. Ita & eum vocat Aristotelesd. Cuius nominis, ratio potest esse duplex, una quam hic innuit Hyginus, videlicet habitudo ad mediatorem, cum quo facit angulum obliquũ: altera vero motus diurnus obliquus siue irregularis: haud enim regulariter ascendit & descendit, secundum suas partes, quemadmodum mediator. Hinc enim signa obliqua vocat Poëta dicense1: via secta per ambas, Obliquus qua se signorum verteret ordo. Latinè signifer dictus est, à signis ferendis, in quae hic circulus dividitur: Hoc nomine vtitur Pliniusf, vti & Claudianus de sphaera Arquimedis loquens: Percurrit proprium mentitus signifer annum, Et simulata nouo cynthia mense redit. Tullius vocat orbem signiferum ita inquensg: Zodiacum hunc Graeci vocitant, nostriq Latini Orbem signiferum perhibebunt nomine vero: Nam gerit hic voluens bis sex ardentia signa. Lucanoh polus signifer appelatur: AEthiopumq solum quod non premeretur ab vlla Signiferi regione poli. _______ Manilio dicitur aliquando baltheus stellatus, aliquando fascia Sed nitet ingenti stellatus baltheus orbe. Et post pauca: Bis sex latescit fascia parties. Quibusdam dicitur circulus signorum: Arabicè vel Chaldaicè dicitur Nitach teste Alkabitio, cuius interpres inquiti, Nitach, id est circulus signorum, diuiditur in duodecim partes aequales. Obliquitatem eius fertur primum animaduertisse Anaximander Milesius Olympiade 38. & ob id à Pliniok dicitur fores rerum aperuisse. Nam hac obliquitate inuenta subtiliùs de inferiorum orbium motu agi ceptum est. Causa autem obliquitatis eius est duplex, altera vt stellae erraticae (quae sub hoc circulo vagantur) faciliùs nitantur aduersus motum extremi orbis; altera vero atque praecipua, vt eadem nunc in Austrum, nunc in Septentrionem proficisci queant, & omnes b [Comentário] ao Sonho de Cipião, Livro 1. O Círculo Oblíquo. c No Astrônomo Poeta, Capítulo 1. d Sobre a Geração, Livro 2, Capítulo 10. [e Virgílio, Geórgicas.] f História Natural, Livro 2, Capítulo 4. O Signífero. O Orbe do Signífero. g Em seus fragmentos nos [Phaenomena] de Arato. O Pólo Signífero. h Pharsalia, Livro 3. O Cinturão Estrelado. Faixa Circular dos Sígnos. i Isago. lib. in Astrono. diff. Livro 1, Capítulo sobre a divisão dos círculos. Nitach. A Obliquidade do Zodíaco. k Livro 2, Capítulo 8. 48 DA URANOGRAFIA. diz Macrobiusb: "No entanto, (como dissemos) os outros círculos são dez, dos quais, um é o próprio Zodíaco, etc." Também é chamado pelos gregos λοξὸς, isto é oblíquo, ou dobrado, referindo-se Higinoc: "Aquele (a saber, o Zodíaco) que não [é] como os outros círculos, limitado por uma certa dimensão, e é visto mais inclinado do [que] os outros, λοξὸς é dito pelos gregos". Assim também Aristótelesd o chama. A razão desse nome pode ser dupla: uma com que Higino concorda, a saber, o modo de ser para o mediador, com que faz um ângulo obliquo; mas a outra é o movimento diurno obliquo ou irregular. Na verdade, não desce e sobe regularmente, segundo suas partes, da mesma forma que o mediador. Na verdade, daqui o Poeta chama os signos oblíquos dizendoe: "E através delas, uma estrada celeste passa, onde obliquamente gira a procissão dos signos para as estações dadas."2 É dito em latim Signífero por causa dos signos que são carregados, nos quais este círculo é dividido. Plínio usa este nomef, assim também Claudianus no Sobre a Esfera de Arquimedes fala: "Um falso zodíaco percorre o próprio ano, E uma Lua simulada retorna no novo mês."3 Túlio [Cícero] chama o orbe signífero assim dizendog: "Os gregos chamam este Zodíaco, e nós latinos empregaremos o orbe do signífero como nome verdadeiro. Pois, ele girando gera duas vezes seis signos ardentes."4 É chamado pólo signífero por Lucanoh: "E a Etiópia sozinha porque não seria perseguida por nenhuma região do pólo signifero."5 Algumas vezes é dito por Manílio cinturão estrelado, outrora faixa: "Mas, o citurão estrelado brilha em um enorme orbe." E pouco depois: "A faixa dividida amplia-se em duas vezes seis."6 O círculo dos signos é dito para alguns. Em árabe ou em caldeu é dito Nitach como testemunha Alkabitio, cujo intéprete dizi, "Nitach, isto é, o círculo dos signos, dividido em doze partes iguais". Em primeiro lugar, Anaximander de Mileto no [ano] 38 das Olimpiadas é levado a observar a obliquidade dele, e por causa disso é dito por Plíniok abrir as porta das coisas. Pois, tendo sido descoberta esta obliqüidade mais sutilmente é tomada pelo movimento é conduzido sobre os orbes inferiores. No entanto, a causa dessa obliqüidade é dupla: uma que as estrelas errantes (que vagam sob este círculo) inclinam-se mais facilmente contra o movimento do orbe extremo; mas, a outra e principal, para que essas possam sair ora no austro, ora no setentrião, e visitar todos os habitantes da Terra, em caso contrário, não haveria nenhuma vicissitude das coisas e nenhuma troca de verão e inverno. Este cír- L I B E R T E R T I V S. 49 Latitudo zodiaci secundum veteres. a 1. Meteororum. b vt antea. c anno 1531 die 10 mẽsis Martijin 20 vsque. Anno 1532 die 10 Oct. Anno 1540 die 1 Octo. Anno 1547 die 10 Mar. Anno 1548 die 1 Octobris. Latitudo zodiaci secundum recẽtiores. d anno 1529 die 10 Iulij in 50 ferè dies. Axis & Poli. Vsus zodiaci. 1. 2. & omnes terrae incolas inuisere, alioqui nulla rerum esset vicissitudo nulla aestatis hyemisque commutatio. Circulus hic (quod reliquis omnibus negatum est) latitudinem habet; vnde eum Cleomedes imaginatur esse Compositum ex tribus circulus ita scribensa: Huius (nempe Zodiaci) satis amplam habentur latitudinem, partes aliae sunt Septentrionales, aliae Australes, aliae inter hasce mediae: ideò etiam tribus scribuntur circulis, quorum medius Solaris nuncupatur, alij altrinsecus, quorum vnus Septentrionalis, alius Australis. Latitudinem hanc partium duodecim statuerunt veteres, vt aequalis sit tricesimae parti longitudinis: vnde Marcus Maniliusb: Bis sex latescit fascia parteis. Itaque imaginandus est Zodiacus secundum quorũdam sententiam vt caseus Placentinus, vel lapis molaris. Causa autem latitudinis eius est haec, vt latiori spacio aberrantes vltro citroque planetas complecteretur. Etenim cum omnes planetae sub Zodiaco decurrant, tanta esse debet Zodiaci latitudo, quanta planetarum vagatio; sed planerarũ aliqui per differentiam sex graduum à medio vagãtur, ideò bis sex graduum latitudo ei tributa est: hanc causam reddunt Cleomedes, Manilius, & alij quamplurimi. Recentiores verò binis vtrinque adiectis partibus eundem auxerunt, ita vt non duodecim, sed sedecim partium esse statuant, ratioq eorum eodem quo veterum nititur fundamento, tantam videlicet esse Zodiaci latitudinem, quanta planetarum diuagatio: sed ab iis obseruatum fuit Veneremc & Martemd vltra illos sex gradus à medio Zodiaci vagari, imò ipsum octauum ferè perficere. Nam Veneris maxima obseruata fuit diuagatio 7 graduum & 22 vel 23 minutorum. Martis verò septem graduum & 7 minutorum. Sed de latitudinibus planetarum posteà acturi sumus, sufficiet iam cognoscere planetas aliquando egredi vltra sex gradus à medio, ne veterum autoritate decipiamur. Poli huius sunt à polis mundi siue aequatoris, siue mediatoris, distantes hoc tempore paulo plus 23 graduum & 30 minutorum spacio. Hinc patet axis. Officium eius est viam septem syderum errantium ostendere. Obliquitas eius causat diuersitatem dierum & noctium, anníque partium. Reliqui vsus qui ad medium eius pertinent, posteà adferentur. H Diuisio T E R C E I R O L I V R O 49 A Latitude do Zodíaco Segundo os Antigos. a 1. Meteororum. b como antes. c continuamente do dia 10 a 20 do mês de março do ano de 1531. No dia 10 de outubro do ano de 1532. No dia 1 de outubro do ano de 1540. No dia 10 de março do ano de 1547. No dia 1 de outubro do ano de 1548. A latitude do zodíaco segundo os recentes. d No dia 10 de julho do ano de 1529 por aproximadamente 50 dias. O eixo e os pólos. Os usos do zodíaco. 1. 2. Este círculo (que é negado por todos os restantes) tem a latitude, daí Cleomedes imagina ele ser composto a partir de três círculos, escrevendo assim: "Deste (a saber do Zodíaco) são tidas latitudes amplas o suficiente, algumas partes são setentrionais, outras austrais, outras são médias entre essas. Por essa razão, também são escritas pelos três círculos, dos quais o médio é invocado pelo Sol, os outros de um e de outro lado, dos quais, um é setentrional, o outro austral". Os antigos estabeleceram essa latitude em doze partes, para que seja igual a trigésima parte da longitude. Daí Marcus Manilius [diz]: "A faixa dividida amplia-se em duas vezes seis." E assim o Zodíaco deve ser imaginado, segundo a opinião de alguns, como um queijo achatado ou uma pedra de moinho. Por outro lado, a causa da latitude é esta, para que incorporasse de um lado e de outro planetas aberrantes com espaço mais largo. Na verdade, como todos os planetas percorrem sob o Zodíaco, a latitude do Zodíaco deve ser tanta, quanto o vagar dos planetas. Mas, alguns dos planetas vagam por uma diferença de seis graus a partir do meio, do mesmo modo, a latitude atribuída a ele é duas vezes seis graus. Cleomedes, Manilius e muitos outros restabelevem essa causa. Mas, os mais recentes aumentaram-no dos dois lados com partes adjascentes, de forma que assim estabelecem não doze dessas partes, mas dezesseis, e a razão deles aproxima-se ao mesmo fundamento dos antigos, a saber, tão grande é a latitude do Zodíaco, quanto o vagar dos planetas, mas por eles foi observado que Vênus e Marte vaga para além daqueles seis graus a partir do meio do Zodiaco, e mesmo quase perfazem o próprio oitavo. Pois, o afastamento máximo observado de Vênus foi de 7 graus e 22 ou 23 minutos. Mas, o de Marte 7 graus e 7 minutos. Mas, sobre as latitudes dos planetas haveremos de tratar depois, seja suficiente agora saber que os planetas de vez em quando ultrapassam os 6 graus a partir do meio, para que não sejamos iludidos pela autoridade dos antigos. Os pólos dele estão com os pólos do mundo ou do equador, ou do mediador, distantes neste tempo com espaço de pouco mais de 23 graus e 30 minutos. Daí o eixo está patente. O ofício dele é mostrar o caminho dos sete astros errantes. A obliqüidade dele causa a diversidade dos dias e das noites, e das partes do ano. Os usos restantes que estendem-se do meio dele, serão trazidos posteriormente. QUARTO Ecliptica quid. a In Somn. Scipionis. b 2. Meteor. ca. de Lunę proprietat. Varia eclíptica nomina. c Plinius li. 2. cap. 70. secundum veterẽ textum vel nouum capite 56. d Cleomedes 1 meteororũ ca. de signifero. Vsus. 1. 2. 3. 4. 50 OVRANOGRAPHIAE Diuisio Zodiaci secundum latitudinem, siue de Ecliptica. CAPVT QVARTVM. Odiacus per medium latitudinis diuiditur à circulo quodam quem Eclipticam vocant. Est ideò Ecliptica circulus maior, latitudinem Zodiaci in duas partes aequales diuidẽs. Nomen autem sumpsit hic circulus à luminarium defectu, quia Solis & Lunae eclipses nunquam contingant, nisi sub hoc circulo ambo corpora, Solis videlicet & Lunę consistãt. Ita hunc circulum vocat Macrobiusa, vnde & à Cleomedeb lócus eclipticus vocatur. Dicitur & via, siue orbitac, siue semita, siue inter Solis, vti & circulus Solaris, Graecis . Sol enim sub eo circulo semper medius incedit, neque vsquam vltrò citroque deflectitur, deuiatque. Ptolomaeus à situ vocat . Distat hic circulus à Mediatore hoc tempore, gradibus 23 cum semisse, vel vt obseruationes quorundam testantur 23 graduum, 31 minutorum & 25 secundorum spacio. Huius circuli beneficio, vera loca omnium stellarum tam fixarum quàm erraticarum inueniuntur, tam secundum longitudinem, quàm latitudinem. Ostendit quoque iter Solis, vnde & nomina pleraque anteà tradita profecta sunt. Ostendit similiter locum eclipsis Solaris & Lunaris. Demum est is circulus quo mediante omnes sphaerae inferiores coaptantur primo mobili. Etenim licet cognita haberemus loca planetarum in suis excentricis & epicyclis, non tamen ex iis aliquem respectum ad horizontem, meridianum, verticalem & similes inuenire liceret, nisi mediante ecliptica: vt in vsu secundorum mobilium planum faciemus. Distictio Zodiaci secundum longitudinem, siue de signis Zodiaci. CAPVT V. Odiacus secundum longitudinem diuiditur in duodecim partes, quas Latini signa vocant. Signorum autem nomina sumuntur aliquando pro duodecim partibus aequalibus, vt cum Solem dicimus esse in tertia vel quarta parte Tauri; interdum pro picturis siue simu Z Z O que é a Eclíptica. a No Sonho de Cipião. b Meteorológicos, Livro 2, Capítulo sobre as Propriedades da Lua. Os Vários Nomes Eclípticos. c Plínio, Livro 2, Capítulo 70 segundo o texto antigo ou Capítulo 56 [segundo] o novo. d Cleomedes, Meteorológicos, Livro 1, Capítulo sobre o Singnífero. Os Usos. 1. 2. 3. 4. 50 DA URANOGRAFIA. QUARTO CAPÍTULO. Divisão do Zodíaco segundo a latitude, ou sobre a Eclíptica. Zodíaco é dividido pelo meio da latitude por um certo círculo o qual chamam de eclíptica. Do mesmo modo, a eclíptica é um circulo maior, que divide a latitude do Zodíaco em duas partes iguais. Por outro lado, esse círculo assumiu o nome pela ausência dos luminares, porque os eclipses do Sol e da Lua nunca acontecem, a não ser que coloquem-se sob esse círculo ao mesmo tempo os dois corpos, a saber do Sol e da Lua. Assim, Macrobius chamaa este círculo, donde também é chamado por Cleomedesb o lugar eclíptico. Também é dito, caminho, ou órbitac, ou trajetória, ou caminho do Sol, e também círculo solar, em grego . De fato, o Sol caminha sempre sob esse círculo sempre no meio, e nunca devia e é mudado em qualquer lugar para qualquer dos dois lados. Ptolomeu pela posição chama . Nesse tempo, esse círculo dista do Mediador, 23 graus e meio, ou como atenstam as observações de alguns, com um espaço de 23 graus, 31 minutos e 25 segundos. Com o emprego desse círculo, são encontrados os verdadeiros locais de todas as estrelas tanto das fixas, quanto das errantes, tanto segundo a longitude, quanto a latitude. Também mostra o caminho do Sol, do que provem também grande parte dos nomes até agora trazidos. Semelhantemente, mostra o lugar dos eclipses solares e lunares. Finalmente, é esse círculo mediante o qual todas as esferas inferiores estão presas ao primeiro móvel. E de fato, ainda que tivessemos conhecidos os lugares dos planetas em seus excêntricos e epiciclos, não seria possível encontrar a partir deles algo a respeito do horizonte, do meridiano, do vertical e dos semelhantes, a não ser mediante a eclíptica, de forma que faremos um plano no uso dos segundos móveis. CAPÍTULO V. Distinção do Zodíaco segundo a longitude, ou sobre os signos do Zodíaco. Zodíaco é dividido segundo a longitude em doze partes, que os latinos chamam signos. Por outro lado, os nomes dos signos algumas vezes são assumidos diante de doze partes iguais, como quando dizemos que o Sol está na terceira ou quarta parte de Touro; algumas vezes diante de pinturas ou esculturas O O L I B E R T E R T I V S. 51 Nomen signi unde? a 2. lib. ca. 8 b 1. Georg. Quatuor modi imaginandi signa. simulachris quae in octauo caelo collocantur, quorum aliqua minorem Zodiaci partem occupant (vt Pisces, Aries, Gemini) aliqua maiorem (vt Leo & Virgo) ea de causa Virgilius Leonem & Virginem menses tardos, id est, signa longa nuncupat, dicens: Anne nouum tardis sidus te mensibus addas Qua locus Erigonem inter chelasque sequentes Panditur. ___ De imaginibus posteà, nunc de partibus aequalibus, qua in primo mobili imaginamur, sermo erit. Has generali nomine signa vocant, vel quia à Sole peragratae varia nobis videantur significare tempora, vel quod motus omnium planetarum in iisdem partibus signentur: Graeci (vti Proclus) hasce partes ? vocant. Ptolomeus verò exactius . Primus inuentor nominum signorum dicitur fuisse Cleostrotus, vnde Pliniusa: Obliquitatem eius (scz1 signiferi) intelexisse Anaximander Milesius traditur, primus Olympiade 58. Signa deinde in eo Cleostrotus, & primum Arietis & Sagitarij. Signa autem veteres constituerunt duodecim; quorum nomina tum Graeca tum Latina haec sunt. Aries . Libra Taurus Scorpius Gemini Sagittarius Cancer Capricornus Leo Aquarius Virgo Pisces Quae nomina suo ordine hoc Latino disticho continentur. Sunt Aries, Taurus, Gemini, Cancer, Leo, Virgo Libraque, Scorpius, Arcitenens, Caper, Amphora, Pisces. Per Arcitenentem intelligendus Sagitarius, per Caprum Capricornus: denique amphoram Aquarius. Diuisionis huius praeter alios, meminit Virgiliusb: Iccirco2 certis dimensum partibus orbem Per duodena regit mundi Sol aureus Astra. Quomodo signa Zodiaci sint imaginanda, deque aliquot signorum distinctionibu. CAP. VI. Oannes de Sacrobusto in Sphaera sua tradit quadruplicem modum haec signa imaginandi, quorum duo ponunt signa superficies, alij vero duo figuras corporeas. H ij Primus I T E R C E I R O L I V R O 51 De onde [vem] o nome dos sígnos? a Livro 2, Capítulo 8. b Geórgicas, Livro I. Os signos devem ser imaginados de quatro modos esculturas que estão colocadas no oitavo céu, das quais algumas ocupam uma parte menor do Zodíaco (como Peixes, Áries e Gêmeos), outras [uma parte] maior (como Leão e Virgem) sobre esta causa Virgílio chama Leão e Virgem meses tardios, isto é, chama-os signos longos, dizendoa: "Em um ano adicione um novo astro aos meses tardios Onde o lugar estende-se entre Virgem e as garras [de Escorpião] seguintes". ___ A discussão será, agora sobre as partes iguais, as quais imaginamos no primeiro móvel, posteriormente sobre as imagens. Chamam esses signos com um nome geral, ou porque percorridos pelo Sol parecem significar para nós vários tempos, ou porque o movimento de todos os planetas sejam assinalados as mesmas partes. Os gregos (como Proclus) chamam estas partes ? . Mas, Ptolomeu é mais exato [ao chamar] . O primeiro inventor dos nomes dos signos dizem ter sido Cleostrotus, onde Plínioa: "Relata-se que Anaximander de Mileto, primeiramente no [ano] 58 das olimpíadas, tenha entendido a obliquidade dele (a saber, do signífero), em seguida Cleostrotus [coloca] os sígnos nele, e primeiramente o de Áries e o de Sagitário". Por outro lado, os antigos constituem doze signos, dos quais os nomes, tanto gregos, quanto latinos, são estes. Áries . Libra Touro Escorpião Gêmeos Sagitário Câncer Capricórnio Leão Aquário Virgem Peixe Nomes que são contidos com sua ordem neste dístico latino. "São Áries, Touro, Gêmeos, Câncer, Leão, Virgem. Libra, Escorpião, Arqueiro, Cabra, Ânfora, Peixes." Por Arqueiro deve ser entendido Sagitário, por Cabra Capricórnio e finalmente por Ânfora Aquário. Virgílio, além de outros, lembra desta divisãob: "Portanto, o áureo Sol rege o robe medido do mundo, Por certas partes através de doze astros". CAPÍTULO VI. De que modo os signos do Zodíaco devem ser imaginados, e sobre algumas distinções dos signos. Ohannes de Sacrobosco em sua Esfera traz um modo quadruplo de imaginar esses signos, dos quais dois especificam signos superfícies, mas os outros dois figuras corpóreas. Desta J 1. 2. 3. 4. Quid esse in aliquo signo. Signorum varia distinctiones 1. 2. 52 OVRANOGRAPHIAE Primus itaque modus est, vt signa sint superficies duodecim quadridaterae longae 30 gradus, latae 161. Secundus est, vt signa sint corpora pyramidalia, quorum bases sunt signa primi modi, conus verò omnibus communis centrum vniuersi, à quo latera ad bases quaterna demittantur. Tertius est, vt signa sint duodecim superficies primi mobilis, distinctae duodecim semicircumferentiis circulorum maiorum concurrentibus in polis Zodiaci, transeuntibusque per principia signorum primi significati. Vltimus est, vt signa sint corporeae formae duodecim, distinctae duodecim semiplanis circulorum maiorum concurrentibus in polis Zodiaci: Ita vt communis terminus omnium sit axis Zodiaci, à quo ad singula signa tertij modi demittantur superficies, siue plana circulorum, illa absument ex sphaera signa duodecim quarti modi. Itaque primo & secundo modo ea possunt esse in signo quae latitudinem Zodiaci non excedunt. Tertio autem & quarto quaeunque sunt in vniuerso. Verùm primo & tertio modo cùm stellas vel simile quid extra primum mobile constitutum esse in aliquo signo dicimus, tùm sub sgno intelligimus. Secundo autem & quarto modo cùm in aliquo signo quid esse dicimus propriè loquimur, in signo esse, tanquam intra signi limites contineri, intelligentes. Signorum variae distinctiones ab Astrologia adferuntur, verùm eae solae quae à situ desumuntur, instituto nostro seruiunt. Prima itaque est in Septentrionalia & Meridionalia: Septentrionalia sunt ea quae in medietate Zodiaci quae intercipitur inter mediatiorem & polum Septentrionalem, continẽtur. Meridionalia quae in altera medietate, quae videlicet inter mediatorem & polum Austrinum continetur, comprehenduntur. Septentrionalia priori versu signorum à nobis anteà tradito continẽtur: Meridionalia posteriori. Altera est in mobilia, firma, & media. Mobilia, quae & cardinalia dicuntur, sunt quę quatuor punctis cardinalibus proximè succedũt, vt sunt Aries, Cancer, Libra, & Capricornus. Firma (quae etiam fixa seu solida, ) sunt, cardinalibus próxima, quia cum Sol in his moratur vehementionem, percipimus aëris caliditatem, frigiditatem, humiditatem, & siccitatem quam cum esset 1. 2. 3. 4. O que existe em algum sígno. As várias distinções dos signos 1. 2. 52 DA URANOGRAFIA. Desta maneira, o primeiro modo é que os signos sejam doze superfícies quadriláteras longas de 30 graus, de lado 16. O segundo é que os signos sejam corpos piramidais, dos quais as bases são os signos do primeiro modo, mas o cone [é] o centro do universo comum à todos, pelo que os quatro lados das bases seriam rebaixados. O terceiro é que os signos sejam doze superfícies do primeiro móvel, distinguidas pelas doze semicircunferências dos círculos maiores concerrentes no pólo do Zodíaco e que passam pelos princípios dos signos do primeiro significado. O último é que os signos sejam doze formas corpóreas, distinguidas pelos doze semiplanos dos círculos maiores concorrentes no pólo do Zodíaco. De forma que assim, o limite comum de todos seja o eixo do Zodíaco; de onde as superfícies ou os planos dos círculos do terceiro modo sejam rebaixadas para cada signo, aquelas tomam a partir da esfera os doze signos do quarto modo. Dessa maneira, aqueles que não exedem a latitude do Zodíaco, esses podem estar no signo pelo primeiro e segundo modo. Mas, quaisquer que estão no universo, [estão] pelo terceiro e quarto [modo]. Mas, pelo primeiro e terceiro modo, quando dizemos que estrelas ou algo semelhante estão constituídas em algum signo fora do primeiro móvel, então entendemos [que eles estão] sob o signo. Mas, pelo segundo e quarto modo, quando dizemos que algo está em algum signo, falamos propriamente que está no signo, entendendo exatamente que estão contidas entre os limites dos signos. As varias distinções dos signos são transmitidas pelos astrólogos, mas elss sozinhas que são estabelecidas pela posição, servem para nosso princípio. E assim, a primeira deve ser compreendida em setentrionais e meridionais: Setentrionais são aquelas que estão contidas na metade do zodíaco que é interceptado entre o mediador e o pólo setentrional; Meridionais são aquelas que [estão] na outra metade, a saber, os que estão contidos entre o mediador e o pólo austral. Os setentrionais são contidos pelo primeiro verso dos signos trazido por nós anteriormente; os meridionais pelo [verso] posterior. A outra estão nos móveis, nos firmes e nos médios: Móveis, que também são ditos cardinais, são os que sucedem imediatamente aos quatro pontos cardinais, como são Áries, Câncer, Libra e Capricórnio. Os firmes (que também são fixos ou sólidos, ) estão próximos aos cardinais, porque quando o Sol demora-se neles, percebemos o calor, o frio, a umidade e a secura do ar mais veementes do que quando está L I B E R T E R T I V S. 53 Paralleli primi mobilis. Paralleli mediaoris ad primũ caelum cogitatiõs transferri debent. Tropici. esset in signis cardinalibus, vt sunt Taurus, Leo, Scorpius, & Aquarius. Communia (quae & media, bicorporea, ) sunt reliqua quatuor, quae naturam vtrisque prioribus communem sortita sunt, videlicet Gemini, Virgo, Sagitarius & Pisces. Cardinalia autem possunt subdiuidi in signa aequinoctialia & solstitialia, vnde versus: Hac duo solstitium faciunt Cancer, Capricornus. Sed noctes aequant Aries & Libra diebus. Hactenus de circulis primariis, nunc de secundariis agendum. De Circulis Parallelis primi mobilis. CAPVT. VII. Arallelus primi mobilis est circulus minor aequaliter ab aliquo circulo maiori primi mobilis distans. Parallelorum alij sunt Mediatoris alij Eclyptiae1. Vtriusque possunt statui nonaginta per íntegros gradus procedentes: Loco tamen parallelorũ mediatoris (quod motum eorundem vix curemus) nos parallelos fixos aequatoris praecedenti libro explicatos capimus. Sunt & alij paralleli mediatoris, qui per graduum eclyptiae2 términos transeunt: Horum vsus in gnomonice Magnus est: Hos autem immobiles & à primo mobili in primũ caelum cogitatione mallem translatos: Etenim eorum mobilitas vsus nullius est. Inter hos qui per principia signorum solstitialium transeunt, Tropici vocantur: suntque duo Cancri videlicet & Capricorni. Tropicus Cancri, dicitur etiam aestiuus , quòd Sol in Cancro existens, quod tempore aestiuo necessariò contingit, eum describat: Tropicus Capricorni, similiter dicitur hybernus, Graecis , quòd Sol hyberno tempore eum describat. Prudentius tropicum Capricorni vocat circulum arctum, quòd partem in horizõte nostro angustam relinquat, ita dicens: Quid est quòd arctum circulum Sol iam decurrens deserit? Nomen autem deducitur , hoc est, à conuersione, quòd in illis Solis sydus, ad alias plagas sese vertat. Dicuntur autem & tropici, circuli solstitiales, quòd in iis Solstitia fiant. Etenim fit Solstitium aestiuum siue , quando Sol perueniens ad Cancrum, describit tropicum Cancri. Solstitium verò hyemale , quãdo Sol perueniẽs ad Capricornum, describit H iij tropiP T E R C E I R O L I V R O 53 Os paralelos do primeiro móvel. Os paralelos do mediador devem ad primũ caelum cogitatiõs transferri debent. Os trópicos. está nos signos cardinais, como são Touro, Leão, Escorpião e Aquário. Comuns (que também são médios, bicorpóreos, ) são os quatro restantes, que escolheram uma natureza comum de cada um dos anteriores, a saber, de Gêmeos, de Virgem, de Sagitário e de Peixes. Por outro lado, os cardianis podem ser subdivididos em signos equinociais e solsticiais, daí o verso: "Esses fazem os dois solatícios, Câncer e Caprincórnio. Mas Áries e Libra igualam as noites com os dias." Até aqui [escrevo] sobre os círculos primários, agora deve-se tratar dos secundários. CAPÌTULO VIII. Sobre os círculos paralelos do primeio móvel. Paralelo do primeiro móvel é um círculo menor que dista igualmente de algum círculo maior do primeiro móvel. Alguns dos paralelos são do mediador, outros da eclíptica. Um e outro podem ser estabelecidos avançando noventa graus inteiros. No lugar, contudo, dos paralelos do mediador (porque mal cuidaremos do movimento deles) nós tomamos os paralelos fixos do equador explicados no livro precedente. Existem também outros paralelos do mediador que passam pelos limites dos graus da eclíptica. O uso deles é grande na gnomônica. Em meu pensar, eu os preferiria contudo imóveis e carregados pelo primeiro móvel no primeiro céu. E, de fato, a mobilidade deles não tem utilidade. Entre estes, os que passam pelos princípios dos signos solsticiais, são chamados trópicos, e são dois, a saber, de Câncer e de Capricórnio. O trópico de Câncer é dito também do verão [ou] , porque o Sol estando em Câncer, o que necessariamente ocorre no tempo do verão, o descreve. O trópico de Capricórnio, semelhan-temente é dito do inverno, pelos gregos , porque o Sol o descreve no tempo do inverno. O mais prudente chama o trópico de Capricórnio, círculo ártico, porque deixa a parte estreita em nosso horizonte, dizendo assim: "O que é que o Sol já descendo o círculo ártico deixa?" Por outro lado, o nome τροπιχοῦ é deduzido de ἀπὸ τῆς τροπῆς, isto é, pela conversão, porque naqueles o astro do Sol volta-se de algumas regiões. Por outro lado, os trópicos também são ditos círculos solsticiais, porque os solstícios ocorrem neles. E, na verdade, o solstício de verão ou τροπὴ θερινὴ se faz quando o Sol, que chega a Câncer, descreve o trópico de Câncer. Mas, o solstício de inverno [ou] τροπὴ χειμερινὴ, quando o Sol que chega a Capricórnio, descreve o trópiO Tropici quãdo integri visantur & quãdo nõ. a In Phaenomenis. Polares eclipticae. 54 OVRANOGRAPHIAE tropicum Capricorni. Tropicus Cancri totus comspicuus est iis, quibus polus Septentrionalis non minus quam 66 gradibus cum dimidio eleuatur, in aliis autem regionibus diuiditur ab horizonte: vnde Aratusa in Graecia, eũ hoc pacto à finitore3 diuidi ait, vt circulo Toto disfecto in octo partes, quinque supra terram visantur, infra terram reliquae sint. Huius versus à festo Auieno latini facti sunt hi: ___ Orbita porro Ista poli partes si discernatur in octo, Quinque superupluit se partibus: At tribus alti Intrat stagna sali. ___ Sic de tropico Capricorni subiungit: Partibus iste tribus tantum se circulus effert. Quinque latet, creperi succedens stagna profundi. Sic quoque Cicero in fragmentis suis canit: Hunc octo in parteis diuisum noscere circum Si potes, inuentes supero conuersiter orbe Quinque pari spacio parteis: tres esse relictas Tempore nocturno, quas vis inferna frequentet. Sed de Capricorni tropico: ___ Huic orbi quinque tributa Nocturna partes, supra tres luce dicantur. Ex hoc situ facilè est colligere diem longissimum, noctemq; breuissimam, & contrà. Nam circuli huius in octo partes diuisi, partes quinque ostendũt diem longissimum horarum quindecim, noctem verò horarum nouem: Quia partes singulae horas ternas complectuntur. Arati interpres Hellespontio ist haec esse accommodata, ait his verbis? . hoc est, ad Hellesponti & Lacedemonis clima, phaenomena videtur composuisse. Verùm quomodo ex hac vel simili descriptione clima sit indagandum, nos Deo Dante in Astronomia nostra docebimus. Praeter hos parallelos sunt duo magni nominis polares ab aliquibus, à nobis autem polares Eclipticae vocari. Suntque circuli memediatoris paralleli, per polos eclipticae ducti, siue sunt circuli duo, quos poli eclipticae motu diurno primi mobilis describunt; suntque duo, arcticus & antarcticus; Polaris arcticus (qui etiam simpliciter arcticus circulus vocatur) est parallelus mediatoris per polum Eclipticae Quando os trópicos são vistos inteiros e quando não. a Na Phaenomena. Os polares da ecliptica. 54 DA URANOGRAFIA. o trópico de Capricórnio. O trópico de câncer é todo visível para eles, pelos quais o pólo setentrional se eleva não menos que 66 graus e meio, por outro lado, em algumas regiões é dividido pelo horizonte, daí Aratus diz que na Grécia ele se divide mais limitadamente, de forma que o círculo todo é cortado em oito partes, cinco são vistas sobre a terra, as restantes estão abaixo da terra. Os versos dele estão traduzidos para a latim por Festo Avineo aqui: ____ "Se nós dividirmos em oito partes esta região do céu, cinco giram na região superior, três são mergulhadas nas águas salgadas do mar".4 ___ Assim, acrecenta sobre o trópico de Capricórnio: "Três partes somente desse círculo se mostram de dia. Cinco estão escondidas, sepultadas nas águas do mar inconstante".5 Assim também Cìcero em seus fragmentos canta: "Se podes reocnhecer esse círculo divido em oito partes, tu encontras no orbe superior que está convertido em cinco partes de igual espaço, três são as restantes no tempo noturno, que a força inferior frequenta". Mas sobre o trópico de Capricórnio: ___ "Cinco partes desse orbe são Atribuídas à noite, três mostram-se no dia". A partir disso, é fácil deduzir o dia longuissimo e a noite brevíssima, bem como, o contrário. Pois, os círculos dele são divididos em oito partes, cinco partes mostram o dia longuíssimo de quinze horas, mas a noite de nove horas. Porque cada uma das partes compreende três horas. O tradutor de Aratus diz que em Helesponto essas coisas estão acomodadas: , isto é, no clima do Helesponto e dos Lacedemonios os fenômenos parecem ter sido compostos. Mas de que modo a partir dessa descrição ou similar o clima possa ser invéstigado, nós ensinaremos na nossa astronomia se Deus ajudar. Além desses paralelos, existem dois polares grandes de nome para alguns, e são chamados por nós polares da eclíp-tica. E são círculos paralelos do mediador, conduzidos pelos pólos da eclíptica, ou são dois círculos que são descritos pelo movimento diurno do pólo da eclíptica do primeiro móvel. E são dois, o ártico e o antártico. O polar ártico (que também é chamado simplesmente círculo ártico) é um paralelo do mediador conduzido pelo pólo L I B E R T E R T I V S. 55 Usus parallelorũ. 1. 2. 3. 4. Transpol. primi mobilis. Mediatoris. Coluri. pticae arcticum ductus. Antarctus verò parallelus eiusdem est mediatoris per polum eclipticae antarcticum ductus. Arcticus ab arcto, hoc est vrsa, cui vicinus est, nomẽ deducit. Antarctus verò quòd polo qui arctico oppositus est, proximus sit, nomen habet. Arcticus semper conspicuus est, antarcticus verò contra sub horizonte totus delitescit, quibus polus Septentrionalis non minus 23 gradibus cum dimidio eleuatur. Nos hos polares vti & trópicos imaginatione caelo primo iscriptos maluimus. Etenim motus eorum nullius plane est vsus: Distant autem tropici à mediatore, vti & polares à polis, secundum distantiam maximam eclipticae à mediatore, hoc est Paulo plus 23 gradibus cum dimidio. Vtilitas parallelorum mediatoris maxima est in quãtitate dierum longissimorũ indaganda, in arcubus diurnus, & distantia meridiana quarumcunque stellarum. Tropicorum autem & polarium vsus hic est communis, quòd totum caeli globum in quinque Zonas distinguant. Tropici peculiariter sunt limites itineris Solaris versus septentrionem & Austrum, quos Sol non superat, vnde & termini sunt diei longissimae & breuissimae. Parallelorum tum mediatoris tum eclipticae vsus Magnus est in instrumentis primi caeli. De circulis maioribus transpolaribus. CAPVT OCTAVVM. Irculus transpolaris primi mobilis est circulus Magnus, ductus per polum circuli primi mobilis, & Punctum quoduis in primo mobili assignatum. Transpolaris hic duplex est, Mediatoris videlicet & eclipticae. Transpolares mediatoris vocari non ineptè possunt circuli declinationum. Inter hos duo sunt celebres Coluri dicti: sunt autem coluri circuli maiores duo, qui ad angulos rectos sphaerales sese intersecant in polis mundi, distinguuntque eclipticae & mediatoris quadrantes. Nomen sumpsisse volunt ab imperfectione, quod videlicet in mundi conuersione nunquam integri cernantur supra horizontem, sed mutili & dimidiari: enim seu mutilus est, & cauda, quasi mutila cauda sit: Verum quare id hoc circulo prae aliis omniC T E R C E I R O L I V R O 55 Os usos dos paralelos. 1. 2. 3. 4. Os transpolares do primeiro móvel. Do mediador. Os coluros. pólo ártico da eclíptica. Mas, o antártico é um paralelo do mesmo mediador conduzido pelo pólo antártico da eclíptica. Ártico deduz o nome de arcto, isto é, ursa, a qual ele é vizinho. Mas o antártico tem o nome está próximo ao pólo que é oposto ao ártico. O ártico sempre é visível, mas o antártico ao contrário esconde-se todo sob o horizonte, em relação aos quais o pólo setentrional não menos do que 23 graus e meio. Nós preferimos esses polares inscritos como também os trópicos pela imaginação no primeiro céu. E de fato, o movimento deles não tem claramente nenhum uso. E os trópicos distam do mediador, como também os polares do pólo, segundo a distância máxima da eclíptica ao mediador, isto é, um pouco mais de 23 graus e meio. A utilidade máxima dos paralelos do mediador deve ser procurada na quantidade dos dias longíssimos, nos arcos diurnos e na distância meridiana de quaisquer estrelas. Por outro lado, esse uso dos trópicos e dos polares é comum, porque distinguem todo o globo do céu em cinco regiões. Peculiarmente, os trópcos são os limites do percurso solar na direção do setentrião e do austro, os quais o Sol não supera, daí são também os limites dos dias longíssimos e brevíssimos. O uso dos paralelos, tanto do mediador, quanto da eclíptica, é grande nos instrumentos do primeiro céu. CAPÍTULO OITAVO. Sobre os círculos maiores transpolares. M círculo transpolar do primeiro móvel é um círculo grande, conduzido pelo pólo do círculo do primeiro móvel e por um ponto qualquer assinalado no primeiro móvel. Esse transpolar é duplo, a saber do mediador e da ecliptica. Os transpolares do mediador podem ser chamados não absurdamente círculos das declinações. Entre esses dois são celebres, os ditos coluros: por outro lado, os coluros são dois círculo maiores, que se interseptam por angulos retos esféricos nos pólos do mundo, e distinguem os quadrantes da eclíptica e do mediador. Querem que o nome tenha sido tomado a partir de uma imperfeição, porque a saber na conversão do mundo os inteiros nunca são distinguidos acima do horizonte, mas os mutilados e divididos ao meio: de fato, ou é mutilado, e cauda, como se a causa fosse mutilada: Mas por que este círculo antes U Transpol. Eclypticae. Usus trãspolarium. 1. 2. 3. 56 OVRANOGRAPHIAE omnibus maioribus magis conueniat, non intelligo: Omnis enim circulus maior ab horizonte bifariam secatur. Colurorum vnus aequinoctiorum, alter Solstitiorum vocatur. Colurus aequinoctiorum est transpolaris Mediatoris per principia Arietis & Librae transiens; facit autem hic cum eclyptica angulos obliquos. Colurus Solstitiorum est transpoalris mediatoris per principia Cancri & Capricorni transiens. Hic transit per pólos eclypticę, ideoque cum ea angulos facit rectos. Horum vtriusque polus est in altero vbi secatur à mediatore. Transpolares eclypticae circuli latitudinum vocari solent. Inter hos sex vocari possunt circuli signorum, quia signorũ terminos tùm inchoantes, tùm finientes ostendunt, inter hos vnus est colurus Solstitiorum. Officium transpolarium mediatoris est continere declinationem & terminare mediationem. Colurorum officia sunt partim Cõmunia vtrique Vterque diuidit eclypticam & mediatorẽ in duas medietates aequales (quod commune est omnib. circulis maioribus sese intersecãtibus) atq; ambo simul eosdem dirimũt in quatuor quadrantes aequales. Vterque fungitur aliquãdo officio circuli primi caeli, videlicet meridiani, cũ vterq; bis quotidie sub meridiano consistat. Propria Colurus aequinoctiorum ostendit puncta aequinoctialia. Colurus solstitiorum ostendit puncta Solstitialia. Transpolares eclypticae continent latitudinem, terminantque longitudinem. Hactenus de circulis primi mobilis. FINIS LIBRI TERTII. Os transpolares da eclíptica. Os usos dos transpolares. 1. 2. 3. 56 DA URANOGRAFIA. antes de todos os outros maiores seja mais conveniente, não entendo: Na verdade, todo círculo maior é cortado pelo horizonte em duas partes. Um dos coluros é chamado dos equinócios o outro dos solstícios. O coluro dos equinócios é um transpolar do mediador que passa pelos princípios de Áries e de Libra e esse faz angulos oblíquos com a eclíptica. O coluro dos solstítcios é um transpolar do mediador que passa pelos princípios de Câncer e de Capricórnio. Ele passa pelos pólos da eclíptica e o mesmo faz ângulos retos com ela [a eclíptica]. O pólo de cada um deles está no outro onde é cortado pelo mediador. Os transpolares da eclíptica costumam ser chamados círculos das latitudes. Entre eles seis podem ser chamados círculos dos signos, porque mostram tanto os limites iniciais, como os finais, dos signos, entre eles um é o coluro dos solstícios. O ofício dos transpolares do mediador é conter a declinação e determinar a mediação. Os ofícios dos coluros são em parte Comum a qualquer dos dois Qualquer dos dois divide a eclíptica e o mediador em duas metades iguais (porque é comum a todos os círculos maiores que se interceptam) e ao mesmo tempo que ambos dividem os mesmos em quatro quadrantes iguais. Qualquer um dos dois algumas vezes está envolvido com o oficio do círculo do primeiro céu, a saber, do meridiano, porque qualquer dos dois detem-se duas vezes por dia sob o meridiano. Próprios O coluro dos equinócios mostra os pontos equinociais. O coluro dos solstícios mostra os pontos solsticiais. Os transpolares da eclíptica contem a latitude e determinam a longitude. [Escrevo] somente até aqui sobre os círculos do primeiro móvel. FIM DO TERCEIRO LIVRO. 181 PARTE 3: NOTAS E COMENTÁRIOS À OURANOGRAPHIA DE VAN ROOMEN 183 Capítulo 7 NOTAS À OURANOGRAPHIA As notas à tradução e transcrição da Ouranographia são referentes a: Nomes de alguns personagens que aparecem no decorrer do texto; Explicações sobre prováveis erros tipográficos da Ouranographia; Comparações entre as citações feitas por van Roomen e as referidas obras consultadas por nós; Significado de algumas palavras que aparecem no texto. Tanto na transcrição quanto na tradução, as notas são trazidas com um número sobrescrito à palavra ou ao trecho do texto a ser notado. Notas Iniciais Frontispício 1 Johannes Keerbergius (1565-1624), tipógrafo da Ouranographia, também conhecido pelo nome Jan van Keerbergen, se estabeleceu como livreiro em 1586 e como tipógrafo a partir de 1587 (ROUZET, 1975, p. 107 apud MACHIELSEN, 2010). 2 Segundo Busard (1981), a Ouranographia pode ter sido publicada em Louvain, e não em Antuérpia como está no frontispício, mas não apresenta nenhum argumento para tal hipótese. Censura 1 Segundo informações do site da Diocése de Roermond na Holanda, Henricus Cuyckius (1546-1606) foi nomeado professor de filosofia da Universidade de Louvain em 1572 e, em 1581, reitor. Também foi decano da Igreja de São Pedro de Louvain e, entre 1596 e 1606, foi bispo da Diocése de Roermond (HENRICUS, 2011). Resumo do Privilégio 1 Filipe II (1527-1598), "monarca das Espanhas, o filho de Carlos V, foi também senhor do mundo. De facto, o aro geográfico do seu poder, tendo como epicentro a Peninsula Ibérica, estendia-se na Europa para além dos Pirinéus e dos Alpes e abrangia vastas regiões das 184 Américas, da África e da Ásia". Ele também foi rei de Portugal por 18 anos entre 1580 e 1598 como Filipe I (SILVA, 2000). Partição Geral de Nossa Uranografia 1 A Partição Geral de Nossa Uranografia, escrita na foram de três diagramas, mostra uma espécie de sumário dos conteúdos presentes na obra. O primeiro diagrama indica a divisão geral da obra. O segundo, Distinção Particular dos Livros, complementa o primeiro, indicando que o primeiro livro está resumido no diagrama A e que o segundo e terceiro livros estão explicadaos através de diagramas presentes no primeiro capítulo de cada livro. O diagrama A resume os assuntos tratados em cada capítulo do primeiro livro. Notas ao Primeiro Livro da Ouranographia Capítulo Primeiro 1 O correto parece ser prioris, genitivo singular neutro de prior, prius. 2 Segundo Ernesto Faria (1956), a palavra ergo tem como tradução "portanto, por conseguinte, pois, logo", mas supomos que quando van Roomen a utiliza no final de uma frase, ele a usa com o sentido de ter demonstrado ou concluído uma ideia descrita anteriormente. Sendo assim, optamos por traduzir como "por isso!". 3 O Livro 5 da Fìsica de Aristóteles não possui o texto 8 (ARISTÓTELES, 1995). Na verdade, em vários trechos da Ouranographia, van Roomen cita alguns textos com números diferentes dos "padrões" que utilizamos atualmente. Dentre diversos motivos, pensamos que isso pode ter ocorrido, pois van Roomen utilizava edições que possuíam as indicações de capítulos diferentes dos padrões atuais, ou então, pelo fato de ter citado a partir de sua memória. Capítulo Segundo 1 Não sabemos qual edição do Timeu van Roomen teve acesso. Uma das versões bastante utilizada ao longo da história foi a tradução latina a partir do grego feita por Marco Túlio Cícero (106 a.C-43 a.C) a qual acreditamos que tenha sido utilizada por van Roomen. Dessa forma, para realizar a tradução dos trechos referentes ao Timeu, nos baseamos principalmente na dissertação de France Murachco (2004) que estudou e traduziu para o português a versão latina do Timeu escrita por Cícero. Contudo, salientamos que usamos para comparação a 185 tradução espanhola e portuguesa do próprio Timeu de Platão (1992; 2011). Segundo Murachco (2004), o texto latino correto é: (...) ut hic mundus esset animanti absoluto simillimus, hoc ipso quod solus atque unus esset, idcirco singularem Deus hunc mundum atque unigenam procreauit. Corporeum autem et aspectabile idemque tractabile omne necesse est esse quod natum est. Nihil porro igni vacuum aspici ac videri potest, nec vero tangi quod careat solido: solidum autem nihil quod terrae sic expers. Quamobrem mundum efficere moliens Deus terram primum ignemq iungebat. 2 Segundo Murachco (2004), o texto latino correto é: Earum autem quattuor rerum quas supra dixi sic in omni mundo partes omnes colocatae sunt, vt nulla pars huiusce generis excederet extra atque ut in hoc vniuerso inessent genera illa vniuersa. 3 Esse trecho que van Roomen diz estar escrito no Timeu não foi encontrado na dissertação de Murachco (2004). Isso pode ter ocorrido, pois segundo a própria autora, a tradução de Cícero não contempla toda a obra de Platão. Contudo, outros autores (GENOVESI, 1786, p. 160; PERERA, 1579, p. 807; FILOPONUS, 1557, p. 241) citaram a mesma coisa em obras que se remetem à Sobre a Eternidade do Mundo de Proclo, o qual também escreve que esse trecho está no Timeu. Ao pesquisar no próprio Timeu, esse trecho se refere à passagem 53e, a qual utilizamos para a nossa tradução (PLATÃO, 2011, p. 141). 4 A tradução desse trecho foi retirada da Dissertação de Murachco (2004). 5 A tradução desse trecho também foi retirada da Dissertação de Murachco (2004). 6 Aqui "tratáveis" tem sentido de "palpáveis, manuseáveis". Van Roomen escreve sobre o fato de que os platônicos acreditavam que o céu tivesse qualidades sensíveis: ele seria visto por nós devido ao fogo e palpável por causa da terra que está presente em sua composição. 7 Esse trecho está na obra De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum de Johannes Filoponus (~490-570). Aqui usamos uma versão de 1557, na qual está escrito que o texto correto é: Teophrastus ait, quòd si aspectabile & tractabile ex terra sunt & ignis, ex his coelum & astra constabunt. Non sunt autem, haec dicit, quintum corpus introducens, quod versatur in orbem: Verùm vbi corpus illud esse docuerit, tum hisce contradicat (FILOPONUS, 1557, p. 237). 8 "Contradiz" o primeiro trecho da citação de van Roomen, o fato de que o céu e os astros são constituídos pelos elementos. Capítulo Terceiro 1 As cinco razões que van Roomen tratará nos parágrafos seguintes. 186 2 O Livro 3 da Física de Aristóteles não possui texto 17, mas aqui provavelmente van Roomen se refere aos três primeiros textos do Livro 3 da Física que trata sobre a definição do termo "movimento" (ARISTÓTELES, 1995). Capítulo Quinto 1 A frase correta parece ser quod vt moueatur informari desiderat. 2 Para os inúmeros seguidores da filosofia peripatética, foi comum o uso da palavra "Filósofo" – iniciando com maiúscula – para se referir a Aristóteles, mostrando a importância dada a ele e a seus escritos. Dentre diversos exemplos, podemos citar o seguinte trecho presente na Questão 19, Artigo 4 da Suma Teológica de Tomás de Aquino, o qual escreve: "Além disso, o Filósofo no Livro III da Alma (...). Ademais, o Filósofo diz (...)" (AQUINO, 2003, p. 442). Capítulo Sétimo 1 A expressão "tomado dos olhos" significa uma pessoa cega. Capítulo Nono 1 Lucífero, segundo Ernesto Faria (1956), "era o nome que se dava ao planeta Vênus por trazer a luz matutina". 2 Héspero, novamente segundo Ernesto Faria (1956) "personificava o planeta Vênus, considerado como 'estrela da tarde'". Capítulo Undécimo 1 A tradução desse trecho foi baseada em Tomás de Aquino (2004, p. 254-255). 2 Tradução baseada em Tomás de Aquino (2003, p. 328). 3 Tradução baseada em Tomás de Aquino (2003, p. 328). Capítulo XVI 1 O correto é 2 Aqui van Roomen cita as linhas 805-806 do primeiro livro das Astronomicas de Marcus Manilius (FERNANDES, 2006). Capítulo XVII 1 Segundo o site The Latin Library (2011), o trecho completo é: 187 Docet enim ratio mathematicorum, quam istis notam esse oportebat, quanta humilitate luna feratur terram paene contingens, quantum absit a proxuma Mercuri stella, multo autem longius a Veneris, deinde alio intervallo distet a sole, cuius lumine conlustrari putatur; reliqua vero tria intervalla infinita et immensa, a sole ad Martis, inde ad Iovis, ab eo ad Saturni stellam; inde ad caelum ipsum, quod extremum atque ultumum mundi est. 2 Ainda segundo o site The Latin Library (2011), o trecho completo é: Novem tibi orbibus vel potius globis conexa sunt omnia, quorum unus est caelestis, extimus, qui reliquos omnes complectitur, summus ipse deus arcens et continens ceteros; in quo sunt infixi illi, qui volvuntur, stellarum cursus sempiterni. Cui subiecti sunt septem, qui versantur retro contrario motu atque caelum. Ex quibus summum globum possidet illa, quam in terris Saturniam nominant. Deinde est hominum generi prosperus et salutaris ille fulgor, qui dicitur Iovis; tum rutilus horribilisque terris, quem Martium dicitis; deinde subter mediam fere regionem Sol obtinet, dux et princeps et moderator luminum reliquorum, mens mundi et temperatio, tanta magnitudine, ut cuncta sua luce lustret et compleat. Hunc ut comites consequuntur Veneris alter, alter Mercurii cursus, in infimoque orbe Luna radiis solis accensa convertitur. Infra autem iam nihil est nisi mortale et caducum praeter animos munere deorum hominum generi datos; supra Lunam sunt aeterna omnia. Nam ea, quae est media et nona, Tellus, neque movetur et infima est, et in eam feruntur omnia nutu suo pondera. 3 Na obra Da Republica (CÍCERO, 2000), esse trecho é citado da seguinte maneira: Estão diante de ti nove globos, ou antes, nove esferas, que compõem enlaçadas o Universo, e o que ocupa um lugar excelso nas alturas, o mais longínquo, o que dirige, contém e abraça todos os outros, é o próprio Deus soberano, no qual se fixam, em seu movimento, todos os astros seguindo o seu curso sempiterno; mais abaixo, resplandecem sete estrelas impelidas num curso retrógrado, em oposição ao movimento dos céus. Uma dessas pedras miliárias é chamada Saturno na terra; propício e saudável ao gênero humano é aquele fogo que se chama Júpiter; mais além, está Marte, horrível e sangrento para a terra; perto, no centro dessa esplendente região, ergue-se o Sol, príncipe e moderador das outras luminárias, alma e princípio regulador do mundo, que com sua luz fulgente completa e ilustra tanta magnitude e tanta grandeza. Atrás dele, qual cortejo brilhante, seguem seu curso Vênus e Mercúrio, e, por fim, banhada pelos raios solares, em último lugar, com majestade serena, roda a Lua. Mais abaixo, nada é senão mortal e caduco, exceto as almas, que os homens devem à munificência dos deuses; sobre a Lua, tudo é eterno. A Terra, por sua parte, nona esfera, colocada na região central do mundo e do céu a mais distante, ínfima e imóvel, sente o peso de todos os astros que sobre ela gravitam (CÍCERO, 2000). Capítulo XVIII 1 O trecho citado por van Roomen provavelmente se refere a um trecho da obra De Arte Cyclognomica de Cornelius Gemma. Um estudo sobre este poema pode ser visto em um artigo de Fernand Hallyn (2008), o qual não tivemos acesso até a conclusão deste trabalho. 188 Capítulo XIX 1 Quando van Roomen escreve que "em cem anos os astros (...) percorrem cada uma das partes" quer dizer que nesse período de tempo as estrelas percorrem um grau (1°) na esfera celeste. A explicação para este movimento está nos comentários. 2 O correto é motibus. 3 O correto é superioribus. Capítulo XXI 1 O número de página correto é "25". 2 Não encontramos esse nome em diversas biografias e não sabemos a quem van Roomen está se referindo. 3 A tradução correta seria "em latim", mas para se adequar melhor, optamos por traduzir "em português". 4 Nos baseamos na tradução da Teogonia, a Origem dos Deuses de Jaa Torrano (HESÍODO, 1995). Notas ao Segundo Livro da Ouranographia Capítulo Primeiro 1 Segundo a Encyclopedia Britannica, "as horas antigas foram chamadas hectemoria pelos gregos, porque elas eram a sexta parte de um arco semidiurno", entretanto, parece que este termo não foi largamente utilizado por eles (NAPIER, 1842). Capítulo Segundo 1 O correto é Pharsalicon. Este termo se refere à obra Pharsalia de Lucano. 2 O correto parece ser corrigia. Nos dicionários, a tradução para esse termo normalmente é trazida como "laço de sapato ou qualquer tipo de corda" (FARIA, 1956). Contudo, pensamos que a tradução mais adequada para esse trecho seja a palavra "cinto", assim como Lellia Cracco Ruggini (1995, p. 66) justifica em seu trabalho. Capítulo Terceiro 1 O correto é sunt. 189 Capítulo Quinto 1 Esse trecho se encontra no início do primeiro livro da obra Rudimentorum Cosmographicum de Johannes Honter (1498-1549). Capítulo Oitavo 1 O trecho não abreviado é "A religião e o caminho". 2 O trecho sem abreviação é "Os inimigos e a prisão". Notas ao Terceiro Livro da Ouranographia Capítulo Primeiro 1 Aqui provavelmente ocorreu um erro tipográfico, o correto deve ser velocíssimus. 2 Na Primeiro Livro do Comentário ao Sonho de Cipião (Com. 15, 9) de Macrobius (1963), o trecho correto é: "natura caelestium circulorum incorporalis est linea quae ita mente concipitur ut sola longitudine censeatur, latum habere non possit; sed in zodíaco latitudinem signorum capacitas exigebat." Capítulo Terceiro 1 Na obra original de van Roomen não aparece a nota marginal referente a letra e, contudo, aqui ele se refere às Geórgicas de Virgílio. 2 Esse trecho se encontra nas linhas 238 e 239 das Geórgicas de Virgílio e a nossa tradução foi baseada na inglesa de Arthur S. Way (VIRGÍLIO, 1912). 3 Aqui van Roomen cita as linhas 9 e 10 do poema LI intitulado Sobre a Esfera de Aquimedes o qual se encontra na obra Pequenos Poemas de Claudius Claudianus (1972). 4 Esse trecho se encontra nas linhas 567 a 569 da tradução latina feita por Cìcero da obra Phaenomena de Aratus. 5 Esse trecho se encontra nas linhas 253 e 254 do Livro III da obra Pharsalia de Lucano. 6 Aqui van Roomen cita primeiro a linha 679 e depois a 682 do Livro I da obra Astronomica de Manilius. Capítulo Quinto 1 Scz é uma abreviação para a palavra latina scilicet. 190 2 O correto parece ser idcirco. Capítulo Sexto 1 O correto deve ser latae 12 conforme descrito no terceiro capítulo desse livro. Capítulo Sétimo 1 O correto parece ser Eclypticae. 2 O correto parece ser Eclypticae. 3 O correto parece ser finiotiore. 4 A tradução desse trecho foi baseada numa tradução francesa (AVENIUS, 1843). 5 A tradução desse trecho também foi baseada na tradução francesa (AVENIUS, 1843). 191 Capítulo 8 COMENTÁRIOS À OURANOGRAPHIA Nesta seção, estão os comentários e especulações acerca dos assuntos tratados em alguns dos capítulos da Ouranographia, os quais se referem a: Explicações gerais sobre os conceitos (matemáticos, astronômicos, históricos e filosóficos) abordados; Descrições do funcionamento do sistema de mundo adotado por van Roomen e por outros autores; Comparações dos diferentes pontos de vista entre o pensamento de van Roomen e de autores da Antiguidade, da Idade Média e da Modernidade citados (ou não) na obra. O que significa Ouranographia? A palavra latina ouranus,-i ou também uranus,-i deriva da grega que na mitologia grega significa "Urano, pai de Sautrno", entretanto, também pode denotar "o céu" ou "a personificação dos céus". Por conseguinte, a palavra ouranographia,-ae significa "uma construção da representação celeste" ou, como diz o próprio título da obra de van Roomen, "uma descrição do céu". Segundo van Roomen, no terceiro capítulo do primeiro livro de sua obra Mathesis Polemica (1605): A astronomia é a ciência do movimento dos corpos celestes. A uranografia distingue o céu em suas partes, tanto sensíveis, quanto inteligíveis: Sensíveis são as estrelas e a via láctea; mas, inteligíveis são as esferas e os círculos. A uranografia é uma parte à frente da astronomia, na verdade, também é a principal (ROOMEN, 1605, tradução e colchetes nossos)24. Como podemos perceber, segundo a classificação de van Roomen, a uranografia tem um lugar especial em relação à astronomia. Ainda em sua Mathesis Polemica, van Roomen escreve que são necessários os conhecimentos da aritmética e da geometria para se estudar os assuntos relativos à uranografia. 24 O trecho em latim é: "Astronomia scientia est motus corporum caelestium. Ouranographia coelum in suas partes distinguit tum sensibilis, tum intelligibiles. Sensibilies sunt stellae & via láctea, intelligibiles vero spaerae & circuli. Est porro Ouranographia pars Astronomiae, & quidem prima". 192 As Partes da Uranografia de van Roomen A Ouranographia é constituída por uma parte introdutória e por três livros. A parte introdutória é composta pelo frontispício; pela censura e pelo resumo do privilégio, trechos dos documentos que contém a autorização do rei para a publicação da obra; pela carta e dedicatória a Antonio Heetveldio, prefeito de Louvain; pelo prefácio e; pela Partição Geral de Nossa Uranografia, uma espécie de sumário ao conteúdo presente na obra. Em seguida, está a parte intitulada Liber prmus ou Primeiro livro que contém vinte e dois capítulos e, de modo geral, tratam exclusivamente sobre a matéria, a forma e a organização dos orbes celestes. Depois, o Liber secundus ou Segundo livro que contém nove capítulos, esses tratam sobre os círculos do Primeiro Céu. E finalmente, o Liber tertius ou Terceiro livro que contém oito capítulos e descrevem os círculos do Primétio Móvel. 193 Comentários ao Primeiro Livro da Ouranographia As filosofias aristotélica e platônica e a astrologia influenciaram enormemente o pensamento científico sobre longos períodos, principalmente na Idade Média, no Renascimento e na Idade Moderna. Aristóteles (384 a.C-322 a.C) foi considerado por muitos um filósofo de suma importância no que diz respeito às explicações das leis da natureza. Para os peripatéticos, o céu é ingênito e incorruptível, composto por uma quinta essência, denominada éter pelos medievais, diferente dos quatro elementos presentes aqui no mundo terrestre. Neste mundo inferior prevalecem a corrupção e a geração, causando os efeitos meteorológicos, as mudanças geológicas, o nascimento e morte dos animais e plantas, etc., de modo que, tudo que acontece aqui tem uma causa remota e primária nos corpos celestes. Esse céu que possui movimento perfeito, circular e eterno, de algum modo, rege e governa o nosso mundo terrestre, inclusive o próprio homem (ROSSI, 1992). Contudo, não podemos negar que também existia uma parcela significativa de astrônomos e de estudiosos que acreditavam na filosofia de Platão (428/7 a.C-248/7 a.C). Para eles, o céu não possui algo tão especial como diziam os aristotélicos e, tanto o mundo inferior quanto as esferas superiores, tudo era composto pelos quatro elementos – terra, água, fogo e ar. Além disso, segundo os seguidores de Platão, é justamente pelo fato de os céus serem compostos pelos mesmos elementos existentes no mundo inferior que tudo que acontece aqui está intimamente ligado aos movimentos dos corpos celestes. A astrologia, hoje vulgarizada, no período que vai da Idade Antiga até a Moderna era considerada uma legítima forma de conhecimento científico. Para boa parte dos astrólogos daquele período, assim como para os peripatéticos, as estrelas, os planetas e as constelações zodiacais regem todos os eventos terrestres e humanos (ROSSI, 1992). É justamente devido à perfeição atribuída aos corpos celestes e aos seus movimentos que os astrólogos acreditavam que somente tais corpos seriam capazes de provocar todos os acontecimentos terrenos. Dentre os diversos assuntos abordados por van Roomen no Liber Primus de sua Ouranographia, boa parte deles foram tratados justamente fundamentando-se na filosofia aristotélica e, em algumas situações, na filosofia platônica e na astrologia trazendo diferentes percepções sobre a descrição dos céus. Além disso, em alguns capítulos ele se baseia em obras de grandes teólogos e poetas. Nesse primeiro livro, van Roomen descreve a matéria, a forma, as qualidades, os movimentos, as partes, a ordem e os orbes do céu: nos cinco primeiros capítulos, ele discute sobre qual matéria e forma constituem o céu, perpassando pelas diferenças entre as filosofias aristotélica e platônica; no sexto e sétimo capítulos, discute as qualidades e ações do céu; do 194 oitavo ao duodécimo capítulo, explica os movimentos do céu; do décimo terceiro ao vigésimo segundo capítulo, explana sobre as partes e a ordem dos orbes das esferas celestes mostrando diferentes ponto de vista sobre o assunto. Nesse livro é possível perceber que van Roomen possui um conhecimento muito amplo sobre a astronomia que o precede e aquela praticada em seu tempo e faz uma compilação de boa parte do que havia sido publicado em astronomia até aquele período. Ao descrever o céu, van Roomen cita obras importantes tais como a Física, a Metafísica, o Sobre o Cèu, o Sobre a Alma e o Sobre a Geração e a Corrupção de Aristóteles, o Sobre a Substância do Orbe de Averróis, o Sonho de Cipião e Sobre a Adivinhação de Cícero, o Timeu de Platão e a Física e a Suma Teológica de Tomás de Aquino. Além disso, van Roomen cita diversos outros nomes tais como: Plínio, o velho (23-79), Ptolomeu (90-168), Plotino (205-270), Porfírio (c. 232-304), Proclo (412-405) e Cornélio Gemma (1535-1578). É importante salientar que van Roomen é adepto do sitema aristotélico-ptolomaico (geocêntrico), mas não deixa de escrever rapidamente que existem astrônomos que acreditam no sistema heliocêntrico como Nicolau Copernico (1473-1543). A obra de van Roomen serve de exemplo para mostrar que a cosmologia copernicana não foi aceita tão rapidamente quanto se pensa, mas praticamente 50 anos após a publicação do De revolutionibus orbium caelestium (1543), ainda existem obras astronômicas sendo publicadas que têm como base o sistema geocêntrico de Ptolomeu. Capítulo Primeiro Nesse capítulo, van Roomen tenta definir, de modo geral, do que o céu é constituído. A hipótese dele é de que o céu seja um corpo (i) simples, (ii) natural, (iii) luminoso e (iv) incorruptível, e para demonstrar esta afirmação, ele recorre à filosfia aristotélica, que como já dissemos, é nela que se baseará em boa parte desse livro. Contudo, antes de defender a afirmação acima – de que o céu é um corpo natural, simples, luminoso e incorruptível – ele escreve que o céu é um corpo perfeito, mas que não é composto somente de matéria ou potência ou forma ou ato. Essas duplas de palavras – potência e ato e, matéria e forma – são conceitos aristotélicos normalmente estudados em conjunto e tem significados bastantes amplos. O primeiro par de palavras – potência e ato – é usado por Aristóteles para designar as mudanças que podem ocorrer caso um determinado "ser" que tenha a potência de "ser algo" mude para o ato de "sê-lo". "Então, se ocorre uma determinada mudança, deve haver algo que possui uma propriedade ou se acha num estado que pode possuir outra propriedade ou passar 195 a outro estado". Essa propriedade posterior é o ato de uma potência prévia (ABBAGNANO, 2007; MORA, 2011). Segundo a filosofia aristotélica, existem dois tipos de mudanças: as acidentais e as substanciais: No que concerne às transformações acidentais o sujeito da modificação existe em ato. Porém, quando a modificação se dá na substância, o sujeito desta mesma, para receber uma nova forma substancial, deve necessariamente estar em potência, pois não pode receber uma forma atualizada quando já possui outra em ato (AVERRÓIS, 2006, p. 22). A mudança do que é em potência para o que será em ato requer certas condições: São cinco os [fatores] comuns inerentes à mudança substancial e acidental. (i) É, de fato, comum a esses dois modos haver um único sujeito que recebe a mudança. (ii) É necessário, além disso, que o não-ser preceda o ser da coisa gerada e corruptível, e (iii) que ele seja totalmente inerente àquilo que vem a ser, pois, nada vem a ser o que não é. Ora, de modo semelhante descobre-se que o possível necessariamente precede o ser no sujeito, num e noutro modo da realização, pois o que é impossível não vem a ser. Ainda mais, descobre-se que necessariamente aquilo do qual procede a realização da coisa e aquilo para o que ela é feita (iv) são contrários e (v) tem o mesmo gênero, e que essa contrariedade se reduz a uma contrariedade primária, a saber, não-ser e forma (AVERRÓIS, 2006, p. 65, colchetes do tradutor, parênteses nosso). Já no que se refere á segunda dupla de palavras – matéria e forma – segundo o pensamento aristotélico, "matéria é o sujeito primeiro de uma coisa, a partir da qual a coisa não pode ser gerada acidentalnmente; é aquilo que permanece através das mudanças opostas; essa é desporovida de forma, é indeterminada, portanto incognoscível por si mesma" Enquanto que a forma, essa "não se opõe a matéria, mas a pressupõe". A forma é a "essência ou substância das coisas que têm matéria; é causa ou razão de ser da coisa; aquilo em virtude do que uma coisa é o que é". Para Aristóteles, "forma é mais 'natureza' que a matéria, uma vez que de uma coisa diz-se aquilo que ela é em ato e não o que é em potência" (ABBAGNANO, 2007). Van Roomen, ao afirmar que o céu não é composto somente de matéria, utiliza duas afirmações: primeiro dizendo que o céu não poderia ser constituído somente de matéria, porque a matéria por si mesma não possui movimento enquanto que o céu possui movimento. Em segundo lugar, diz que o céu também não pode ser composto somente de matéria, pois a matéria por si não é em ato hoc aliquid, mas o céu é em ato hoc aliquid. O termo hoc aliquid é uma tradução latina para o termo grego τόδε τι utilizado por Aristóteles e pode ter dois significados atribuídos a ele: (...) o primeiro diz respeito a algo que subsiste, e este exclui a possibilidade de um acidente ou de uma forma material e; o segundo significado é relativo a algo 196 completo numa natureza específica, o qual exclui a possibilidade da existência da imperfeição de alguma parte sua (CARTWRIGHT, 1996, p. 450). Então, quando van Roomen diz que o céu é em ato hoc aliquid, quer dizer que ele é perfeito e que nele não ocorrem acidentes ou nenhuma mudança substancial de modo que ele é ingênito e incorruptível. Segundo van Roomen, o céu também não pode ser pura forma ou puro ato, pois a forma por si não age, enquanto que o céu age nas esferas inferiores, além de que a forma não possui um tamanho e o céu possui tamanho. Depois dessas afirmações, van Roomen volta a tratar de sua hipótese inicial. i. Van Roomen escreve que apesar de o céu não ser constituído somente de matéria ou forma, ou ato, ou potência, ele não é um corpo qualquer, porém natural. No texto 1 do Livro III do Sobre o Céu (298a 27-36), Aristóteles afirma que as coisas naturais: Umas são entidades, outras são operações e propriedades daquelas {das coisas naturais} (chamo "entidades" aos corpos simples como, por exemplo, o fogo e a terra e os [demais corpos] do mesmo ramo, assim como todos os [compostos] deles, por exemplo: o céu inteiro e suas partes; [chamo] propriedades e operações aos movimentos de cada um daqueles {dos corpos naturais} e de todos os demais que aqueles {os corpos naturais} são causa com arranjo à potencia própria deles, também das alterações e mutações recíprocas (ARISTÓTELES, 1996, parênteses e colchetes do tradutor, chaves e tradução nossa). Desta forma Aristóteles justifica o fato de o céu ser um copo natural. Primeiro, por ele ser uma entidade, ou seja, ser feito por um corpo simples e, em segundo lugar, por ele ser uma propriedade, ou seja, por possuir o movimento circular atribuído somente ao quinto elemento, o corpo simples do qual o céu é composto. ii. Para van Roomen, o céu é um corpo simples, constituído por um quinto elemento, conforme afirma Aristóteles e os seguidores de sua filosofia, contrariando os platônicos que dizem que o todo o universo é composto pelos quatro elementos – terra, água, ar e fogo. Contudo, o assunto só será tratado com mais detalhes no próximo capítulo. iii. [e iv] Van Roomen também não detalha o porquê de o céu ser um corpo luminoso e incorruptível, mas estes assuntos voltarão a ser tratados em diversos capítulos mais à frente. Esse capítulo, na verdade, serve como uma introdução de parte do que van Roomen quer discutir nesse primeiro livro da Ouranographia. Muitas das justificativas para as hipóteses dadas nesse capítulo estarão presentes nos seguintes. 197 Capítulo Segundo Nesse capítulo, van Roomen discute sobre o pensamento dos filósofos platônicos de que os céus são constituídos pelos mesmos elementos que compõem o mundo sublunar. Logo de início, faz uma comparação com a filosofia de Aristóteles, mas se contenta em afirmar que o céu é um corpo simples e não traz mais detalhes, isso se deve ao fato de que boa parte de suas justificativas para esta afirmação estará contida nos capítulos seguintes. Ao escrever esse capítulo, van Roomen tem a intenção de mostrar o que Platão e seus seguidores pensam sobre o assunto. No Livro I da obra Sobre o Céu (268b 11 – 269b 17), Aristóteles afirma que os corpos simples "são todos aqueles que comportam por natureza um princípio de movimento, como o fogo, a terra, suas variedades e (elementos) afins". Além disso, diz que os corpos simples possuem movimentos simples, e são movimentos simples o retilíneo, o circular e a mistura destes. Os quatro elementos presentes aqui no mundo inferior têm o movimento retilíneo – o ar e o fogo movem-se para cima e a água e a terra para baixo. Mas, o céu possui movimento circular, movimento que nenhum dos elementos sublunares possuem. "A partir disto, é claro, então, que existe por natureza alguma outra entidade separada das formações daqui, mais divina e anterior a todas elas". Além disso, o movimento simples que compete ao céu carece de contrário, sendo assim, o movimento circular dos céus é perfeito (ARISTÓTELES, 1996, p. 44-49). Em contrapartida, para demonstrar os fundamentos da filosofia platônica de que o céu é composto a partir dos quatro elementos, van Roomen recorre a citações de diversos autores platônicos, primeiro cita trechos do próprio Timeu de Platão e, em seguida, trechos de obras de Taurus, Porfírio, Proclus e Plotino, seguidores da filosofia platônica. No Timeu (29d-32c), Platão afirma: A causa do nascimento do mundo é a bondade do que o constituiu, que excluiu quanto possível, toda imperfeição no mundo (...). O mundo é único de sua espécie (...). O mundo é corpóreo, visível e tocável, constituído harmoniosamente pelas proporções que definem o sólido a partir dos quatro elementos: fogo, terra, ar e água (...). Esses elementos foram usados totalmente, de modo que não subsista nada fora do mundo e que ele seja isento de qualquer corrupção (MURACHCO, 2004). Além disso, em outro trecho do Timeu (33d), Platão escreve que o mundo é esférico e seu movimento é circular. Sua figura é esférica porque é a mais perfeita e contém todas as figuras; a superfície é perfeitamente polida já que não precisa de nenhum órgão; enfim basta-se a si mesmo, e tem o único movimento que lhe convém, a rotação sobre si mesmo (MURACHCO, 2004). 198 Como é possível perceber, no primeiro trecho citado por van Roomen, Platão acredita que a principio todos os corpos têm que ser formados pelo fogo, para que sejam visíveis, e pela terra, para que sejam tocáveis. Em outra parte do TImeu (32 b-c) Platão afirma: Pois bem, se o corpo do todo precisasse ser plano e sem nenhuma profundidade, uma única mediedade bastaria para amarrar ela própria e as coisas junto com ela. Agora convinha-lhe ser de aspecto sólido, de fato, e nunca é uma mediedade mas sempre duas que harmonizam os sólidos; assim então, depois de ter colocado água e ar no meio de fogo e terra e realizado as coisas umas para com as outras quanto era possível segundo a mesma razão, isto é, o que o fogo é para com o ar, o ar o é para com a agua, e o que o ar é para com a agua, a água o é para com a terra, amarrou e constituiu um céu visível e tangível. E por causa disso e a partir das coisas desse tipo e que são em número de quatro, o corpo do cosmos foi gerado, estando de acordo por uma analogia e tirou disso uma união consigo mesmo a ponto, tendo-se encontrado a si mesmo em si mesmo, de tornar-se indissolúvel por outro, a não ser por quem o amarrou. (MURACHCO, 2004). E a ideia de van Roomen se completa na segunda e terceira citações do Timeu, quando escreve que todo o universo é formado pelos quatro elementos. A quarta citação se refere a um trecho da obra De Aeternitate Mundi contra Proclum de Filoponus provavelmente se referindo à obra Commentarium in Platonis Timaeum de Taurus25. O trecho seguinte – citação da obra In Platonis Timaeum Commentaria de Porfírio – também é encontrado na obra de Filoponus (1557, p. 238). Ambos os trechos se referem somente a diferença do pensamento aristotélico e platônico no que diz respeito aos elementos formadores do universo. A citação seguinte provavelmente se refere ao Comentário ao Timeu de Proclus e no último parágrafo no qual van Roomen escreve sobre Plotino, provavelmente está mencionando um trecho do segundo livro das Enéadas, no qual Plotino descreve as características dos céus (PLOTINO, 2004). Capítulo Terceiro Nesse capítulo, van Roomen discute que o céu deve ser constituído de matéria e forma – o assunto continuará ainda no quarto e quinto capítulos. No final desse capítulo, escreve que existem diversas razões que provam que o céu é constituído de matéria e forma, mas ele se embasará somente em cinco razões: 1. Van Roomen escreve inicialmente que "o céu é (i) ou matéria, (ii) ou forma, (iii) ou composto" desses dois. Aristóteles, no Livro II da obra Sobre a Alma (414a 14-16), realmente afirma que toda "substância [é dita] de três modos, como já mencionado, 25 A obra de Taurus é difícil de ser encontrada. Marie-Luise Lakmann (1994) mostra alguns trechos da obra dele, mas sempre referindo-se à citações de obras de outros autores, como Filoponus. 199 dos quais um é a forma, outro a matéria e, por fim, o composto de ambas – e, destes, a matéria é potência e a forma, por sua vez, é atualidade" (ARISTÓTELES, 2006, colchetes nossos). Van Roomen demonstrou no Capítulo Primeiro que o céu não pode ser formado somente de matéria ou somente de forma, logo, ele deve ser composto por ambas. 2. "Tudo aquilo que move ou é movido, este tem matéria e forma". Além disso, ser movido é próprio da matéria e mover-se é da forma. Contudo, o céu é movido localmente e move o mundo inferior. Sendo assim, como ele (o céu) move e é movido ao mesmo tempo, esse deve ser composto por matéria e forma. As duas naturezas (forma e matéria) existem nos corpos terrestres por via da geração e da corrupção neles, enquanto, nos corpos celestes, as duas naturezas existem por via do movimento local que há neles. Provas: 1) Primeira premissa: Os corpos celestes têm movimento em virtude deles próprios (ARISTÓTELES. De Caelo I, 2): coisas com movimento natural possuem tal movimento em virtude delas próprias (ARISTÓTELES. Física VIII, 4, 254b 12-15) 2) Segunda premissa: Algo movido por si próprio é composto de duas naturezas. Esta premissa está fundamentada em duas proposições subordinadas: a) todo movido tem um movente (ARISTÓTELES. Física VII, 1, 241b 24 – 242a); b) uma coisa não pode ser movida e movente simultaneamente, proposição evidente para algo movido por outro, também se aplica para algo movido por si (ARISTÓTELES. Física VIII, 5, 257a 31 – 258a 2): algo movido por si é composto de duas naturezas: uma passiva (recebe o movimento) e outra ativa (produz movimento) (AVERRÓIS, 2006, p. 27, citações da autora). Como dissemos anteriormente, o céu se move localmente. O movimento local que Aristóteles e van Roomen atribuem ao céu é o tipo de movimento mais importante para a física aristotélica. É através dele que se explicam os demais tipos de movimentos, os quais são quatro: (i) substancial: geração e corrupção; (ii) qualitativo: mudança; (iii) quantitativo: aumento ou diminuição: e (iv) local, também chamado de translação. A determinação das várias substâncias físicas deve, por isso, ser feita com base no movimento de translação [local] que é próprio de cada uma delas. O movimento de translação é de três espécies: do alto para o centro do mundo, do centro para o alto, em torno do centro ou circular. Os primeiros dois movimentos são contrários entre si e (como a geração e a corrupção consistem na passagem de um contrário ao outro) próprios dos corpos sujeitos à geração e à corrupção, ou seja, dos corpos terrestres ou sublunares (ABBAGNANO, 2007, colchetes nossos). O movimento do alto para o centro do mundo e seu contrário é atribuído aos quatro elementos. Entretanto, o movimento circular não possui contrário, sendo assim, o atribuímos aos corpos celestes, ingênitos, incorruptíveis e carentes de contrário. No texto 2 do Livro I dos Meteorológicos (339a 22-24), Aristóteles afirma que "este mundo está necessariamente em contato direto com as translações [das esferas] 200 superiores, de modo que, toda a sua potência é governada desde lá" (ARISTÓTELES, 1996, colchetes nossos). O texto 3 do mesmo Livro trata justamente sobre a influência do céu sobre os elementos sublunares. Como o céu move e é movido ao mesmo tempo, então ele tem matéria e forma. 3. A terceira razão dada por van Roomen diz que "tudo aquilo que é sensível e inteligível, este tem matéria e forma". Além disso, van Roomen escreve que (i) aquilo que é sensível tem esta característica por causa de sua matéria e (ii) o que é inteligível possui esta característica por causa da forma que lhe é atribuída. Nesse trecho, van Roomen se remete ao Comentum Magnum Super Libro de Caelo et Mundo Aristotelis de Averróis. Para Aristóteles, todos os entes são (i) sensíveis, quando são objeto dos sentidos ou (ii) inteligíveis, quando são objeto do intelecto. Como o céu pode ser visto, então, ele é sensível, ao mesmo tempo em que serve de objeto para os estudos físicos e astronômicos, logo ele também é inteligível. Como o céu é sensível e inteligível, logo ele tem matéria e forma. 4. A quarta razão traz o conceito de natureza. Para van Roomen, "tudo aquilo que ou tem natureza ou ele próprio é natureza, esse tem matéria e forma". Nos comentários ao Livro 2 da Física de Aristóteles (2009, p. 195-198), Lucas Angioni escreve que existem diferentes usos para o termo natureza (physis) na obra de Aristóteles. Um deles é usado "como princípio 'de onde se dá o movimento primeiro em cada ente natural em si mesmo, enquanto ele é ele mesmo'". Esse sentido ainda é subdivido em dois: (i) "physis" como princípio no sentido de "ítem primeiro do qual vem a ser ou é um ente natural, e que estava desarranjado e não sofre a mudança por sua própria capacidade" (Metafísica V, 4, 1014b 26-8), isto é, no sentido de "matéria" (Metafísica V, 4, 1015a 7, 15-6); (ii) "physis" como princípio no sentido de "essênmcia dos entes naturais" (Metafísica V, 4, 1014b 35-6; Física II, 1, 193a 9-10; As Partes dos Animais 641a 27), a qual é senão a forma (Metafísica V, 4, 1015a 5; As Partes dos Animais 641a 27) e o acabamento da geração (Metafísica V, 4, 1015a 1) (ARISTÓTELES, 2009, p. 196, citações do autor). No Livro II da Fìsica, Aristóteles se interessa por definir quais os princípios – matéria e forma – atribuídos aos entes naturais e determinar como esses princípios se interrelacionam. Aristóteles procura determinar que coisa ou tipo de coisa poderia satisfazer a definição de natureza, e obtém duas respostas: de um lado, na opnião de alguns, seria natureza a matéria, entendida como elemento constituinte e imanente da coisa natural (Física II, 1, 193a 9-28); de outro, seria natureza a configuração ou forma 201 pela qual definimos o que cada coisa é (Fìsica II, 1, 193a 28 b 6) (ARISTÓTELES, 2009, p. 197, citações do autor). "A natureza é o princípio e causa do movimento e do repouso da coisa à qual ela inere primariamente e por si, e não por acidente" (Física II, 1, 192b 20). A natureza também pode ser matéria, a admitir-se, como faziam os pré-socraticos, que a matéria tem em si própria um princípio de movimento e de mutação; mas é realmente esse mesmo princípio, portanto a forma ou a substância em virtude da qual a coisa se desenvolve e torna-se o que é (Física II, 1, 193a 28). (...) uma coisa possui sua natureza quando alcançou sua forma, quando é perfeita em sua substância (ABBAGNANO, 2007, p. 699, citações do autor). Para Aristóteles, no Livro II da Fìsica (192b 8-38): (...) entre os entes, uns são por natureza, outros são por outras causas; por natureza são os animais e suas partes, bem como as plantas e os corpos simples, isto é, terra, fogo, ar e água (de fato, dizemos que essas e tais coisas são por natureza), e todos eles se manifestam diferentes em comparação com os que não se constituem por natureza, pois cada um deles tem em si mesmo princípio de movimento e respouso (...) pois a natureza é certo princípio ou causa pela qual aquilo em que primeiramente se encontra se move ou repousa em si mesmo e não por concomitância. (...) Natureza é isso que foi dito; por sua vez, tem natureza tudo quanto tem tal princípio. Todas essas coisas são substância, pois são um subjacente, e a natureza sempre reside num subjacente. São 'conforme à natureza' tais coisas e tudo que lhe pertence devido a elas mesmas – por exemplo, para o fogo, locomoverse para o alto: de fato, isso não é natureza, nem tem natureza, mas é por natureza e conforme à natureza (ARISTÓTELES, 2009). Sendo assim, podemos dizer que "o céu ou é natureza ou tem natureza", pois ele é um corpo natural, composto por um elemento simples, e tal elemento é algo natural, por consequência, todo corpo natural é natureza ou tem natureza, concordando com a filsosfia aristotélica. Então, como o próprio Aristóteles afirma, os entes naturais são constituídos por dois princípios, a matéria e a forma. Como o céu é um ente natural, logo ele também é constituído por matéra e forma. 5. Van Roomen afirma ainda que os entes naturais podem ser compostos por matéria e forma em quatro graus diferentes (Tabela 2). Tabela 2: Graus de Composição dos Entes Naturais Forma Corrptível Incorruptível Matéria Corruptível Cavalo Homem Incorruptível Elementos Céu Segundo Grant (1996): Aristóteles distinguiu dois tipos de incorruptibilidade: um associado com a eternidade e a imutabilidade, o outro ligado com a eternidade e a mutabilidade. O cosmos, que para Aristóteles era ingênito, eterno e idestrutível, continha em si mesmo ambos os tipos de incorruptiblidade, associados a cada uma das duas partes radicalmente diferentes em que ele assumiu que o mundo estava dividido, chamadas 202 de região sublunar e celeste. Dados como um todo, os quatro elementos da [região] sublunar, ou terrestre, são indestrutíveis assim como o quinto elemento, o éter, da região celeste. A totalidade da matéria terrestre que é composta de quatro elementos é constante e eterna, sem início ou fim. Embora, os quatro elementos são eternos, incorruptíveis e indestrutíveis como um todo, eles estão sempre mudando, um para o outro (GRANT, 1996, p. 192, tradução nossa). Como pode ser observado na descrição de van Roomen o céu deve ser composto de matéria e forma incorruptíveis. Capítulo Quarto Nesse capítulo, van Roomen trata exclusivamente sobre a matéria que compõe o céu. Inicialmente escreve que Egídio Romano (c 1243-1316), Platão, Filoponus e Avicenna (c. 980-1037) afirmam que a matéria que compõe o céu não difere da sublunar. Apesar disso, van Roomen prefere omitir quaisquer explicações sobre o pensamento desses homens de saber – pois já foram comentados no segundo capítulo – e diz que se apoiorá somente nos princípios aristotélicos para definir qual a matéria celeste. Para os peripatéticos, a matéria supralunar difere da sublunar por diversos motivos, mas van Roomen se detem sobre uma única razão – se a matéria do céu não diferisse da matéria terrestre, então, o céu mudaria suas formas. De fato, a matéria que compõe as coisas terrenas é corruptível e gerável, podendo mudar suas formas. Se o céu fosse composto pelos mesmos quatro elementos, ele também sofreria mudanças, o que não ocorre. No último parágrafo, van Roomen se refere a Temístio (317-c. 387) e a Averróis em seu Comentário à Metasfísica de Aristóteles, os quais afirmam que os corpos celestes ou são (i) formas sem matéria ou (ii) têm matéria segundo a equivocação. Averróis, em sua obra Exposição sobre a Substância do Orbe, diz que a matéria e a forma que compõem o céu são diferentes das terrestres e, além disso: (...) se os termos 'matéria' e 'forma' puderem designar a reunião do que constitui a substância celeste, isto só poderá ser feito por homonímia [equivocação – chama-se homônimo àquilo que apenas tem em comum um nome, sendo diferente a definição da essência associada ao nome, como acontece com o animal, que tanto é o homem quanto uma pintura (ARISTÓTELES, Categorias I, 1a)] ou por uma analogia que confere prioridade ontológica à matéria e à forma celestes [segundo o anterior e o posterior – diz-se que uma coisa é anterior a outra de quatro maneiras: (1) segundo o tempo; (2) segundo o que não tem reciproco de acordo com a sequência da existência, como o um é anterior ao dois; (3) segundo uma certa ordem, como acontece nas ciências e nos discursos; (4) segundo o melhor e os mais digno (ARISTÓTELES, Categorias XII, 14a 26ss.)] em relação à matéria e à forma dos corpos sublunares (AVERRÓIS, 2006, p. 28, citações do tradutor). 203 Então, para Averróis e Temístio, em (ii) – que o céu tem matéria segundo a equivocação – o nome "matéria" é usado equivocadamente, de modo que, o céu deve ser composto somente por forma, como em (i). Capítulo Quinto No quinto capítulo, van Roomen trata da forma do céu que, segundo ele, é perfeita, causa de sua própria existência e totalmente inseparável dele. Segundo van Roomen, Antonio Bernardo Mirandulano publicou em uma de suas obras, seguindo a doutrina aristotélica, que a forma celeste se deve a uma inteligência. Segundo Abbagnano (2007, 571), o intelecto pode significar, de modo genérico, "a faculdade de pensar em geral", ou então, especificamente como "uma atividade ou técnica particular de pensar", vindo a ser o entendimento, a inteligência ou a intelecção das coisas. Paltão e Aristóteles definem em geral o intelecto como faculdade de penasr. (...) Aristóteles declara entender por intelecto "aquilo graças a que a alma raciocina e compreende" (De Anima, III, 429a 23). (...) Para todos aqueles que, (...) atribuíram ao intelecto a função de ordenar o universo não o entendendo como atividade especifica, mas no significado mais genérico de atividade pensante, capaz de escolher, coordenar e subordinar (ABBAGNANO, 2007, p. 571, citação do autor). Contudo, segundo van Roomen, a inteligência, no sentido aristotélico, não pode modelar o céu, pois não é aquilo que está fundamentado na razão que justifica a forma atribuída às coisas, mas sim a sua natureza, conforme foi explicado por ele na quarta razão do terceiro capítulo. Capítulo Sexto No terceiro capítulo, van Roomen afirma que para Aristóteles os entes podem ser sensíveis e inteligíveis. Para ele, o céu teria estes dois tipos de qualidades. Nesse capítulo, ele trata justamente de algumas das qualidades sensíveis existentes no céu. Segundo van Roomen, a visão humana contempla a luz emitida pelos astros. Essa luz, "certamente uma qualidade nobríssima, mediante a qual o céu age nas coisas inferiores", que "mais fortemente induz a vida, a virtude e a duração nestas coisas inferiores". Van Roomen afirma em seguida que segundo o pensamento filosófico, o céu não possui as qualidades olfativas, auditivas e gustativas, apesar de alguns poetas terem escritos que no céu há cheiro e som. 204 Sétimo Capítulo Van Roomen utiliza este capítulo para descrever as ações do céu. Segundo Abbagnanno (2007) a palavra ação tem um sentido genérico "que denota qualquer operação considerada sob o aspecto do termo a partir do qual tem início ou iniciativa". Desse modo, nos parece que van Roomen atribui ações no sentido de quais operações são iniciadas a partir do céu, ou seja, quais movimentos são iniciados nele e como são transmitidos. Inicialmente, escreve que, segundo a filosofia peripatética, ao céu compete somente um único movimento, o local, e é devido a ele que os astrólogos atribuem influências celestes às coisas terrenas. Devido ao fato de que as esferas celestes não possuem nenhum dos outros três tipos de movimento – (i) substancial: geração e corrupção; (ii) qualitativo: mudança; (iii) quantitativo: aumento ou diminuição – as coisas superiores são consideradas mais perfeitas e mais belas do que as inferiores. Isso significa que quanto menos ações tiverem, ou seja, quanto menos movimentos possuírem, tais coisas são mais perfeitas. Van Roomen, prova essa afirmação dizendo que ao primeiro céu, realmente não é atribuído nenhum movimento, mas somente influência. Além disso, segundo van Roomen, os teólogos afirmam: (...) principalmente que, porque os anjos são superiores e mais notáveis, eles têm menor quantidade e variedade, tanto de intelecções, como de formas inteligíveis, porque estão mais perto de Deus em dignidade e semelhança, muito mais imitam a unidade e simplicidade divina (ROOMEN, 1591). Mas nas coisas terrenas, as mais notáveis, contrariamente às celestes, devem pussir um número maior de ações. Contudo, como dissemos anteriormente, a esfera celeste possui o movimento local, circular, e que as suas causas seriam duas: (i) para consolidar a perfeição e (ii) porque tal movimento se assemelha à Deus. Oitavo Capítulo O assunto tratado nesse capítulo – e também no próximo – já foi comentado nos anteriores, por isso, comentaremos somente algumas características básicas dele. Aos corpos simples somente podem se atribuídos movimento simples. Como o céu é composto de um elmento simples, o quinto elemento, a ele devemos atribuir um movimento simples, o qual os filósofos afirmam que seja circular. Isso pode ser provado observando o movimento diurno das estrelas que se movem de leste para oeste. Esse movimento também é percebido nos planetas, os quais também se movem de leste para oeste (relembrando que os 205 planetas também possuem outro movimento, diferente do diurno, normalmente de oeste para leste, com relação às estrelas fixas). Nono Capítulo Nesse capítulo, van Roomen descreve os diferentes movimentos atribuídos às esferas celestes. As estrelas fixas se movimentam pelo movimento diurno, de leste para oeste, como dito anteriormente. Contudo, os planetas possuem movimentos diversos. Se observarmos diariamente um determinado planeta veremos que ele faz um movimento de oeste para leste mudando de posição com relação aos demais planetas e também com relação às estrelas fixas. Apesar disso, percebemos ainda que o movimento – que normalmente é de oeste para leste – de um planeta em determinado momento (que pode durar meses) muda de leste para oeste, mas depois de algum tempo retoma para aquele de oeste para leste. As diversas tentativas de vários astrônomos a fim de criar um sistema que explicasse o movimento retrógrado dos planetas ficaram conhecidas pelos historiadores da ciência como "o problema dos planetas". Para que tais movimentos fossem melhor explicados (mas ainda assim contendo erros) num sistema geocêntrico foram criados os conceitos de deferentes, epiciclos e equante (os quais explicaremos com um pouco mais de detalhes nos comentários ao décimo nono capítulo). O movimento retrógrado dos planetas também é circular, concordando com os preceitos aristotélicos, mas diferente do movimento realizado pelas estrelas fixas e fica bastante perceptível principalmente na Lua e nos planetas mais próximos da Terra, como Mercúrio e Vênus. [...] Capítulo XIII Nesse capítulo, van Roomen introduz os conceitos aristotélicos de raridade e densidade. Em sua obra Sobre o Céu, no Livro III (299b 8-10), Aristóteles afirma que: (..) o grave [pesado] é de certo modo denso e o leve, raro: o denso se diferencia do raro pelo (que) em igual volume há mais quantidade; assim, pois, o ponto é pesado ou leve, é também denso ou raro. Porém, o denso é divisível e o ponto é indivisível (ARISTÒTELES, 1996, p. 167, colchetes e tradução nossa). 206 Desse modo, temos como ponto de partida de que o denso se diferencia do raro pela quantidade de matéria existente num mesmo volume e que o denso também é divisível, ou seja, é composto por muitas partes. Contudo, Aristóteles no Livro IV do Sobre o Cèu (309a 611) demonstra que existem corpos com pequeno volume que são mais densos do que corpos com volumes maiores. (...) na realidade, dizem que o vazio incluso nos corpos fazem que os maiores as vezes sejam mais leves, pois, contém mais vazio. E por isso, na verdade, são também maiores em volume, (corpos) compostos muitas vezes de igual ou mesmo menor número de sólidos. E, em geral, que a causa de todo corpo que seja mais leve é que há nele mais vazio (ARISTÓTELES, 1996, p. 205, tradução nossa). Como van Roomen irá afirmar mais a frente nesse capítulo, o raro ou o denso não mudam a natureza da coisa, pois a matéria que o constitui não muda, mas somente a sua ordenação. Aqui, nos remetemos a origem das discussões sobre o átomo. Na Antiguidade. Leucipo de Mileto (c. 500 a.C), Demócrito de Abdera (c. 460 a.C-c. 370 a.C) e Aristóteles chegaram a escrever algumas coisas sobre o assunto. O átomo é um elemento corpóreo, invisível pela sua pequenez e não divisível. Os átomos diferem só pela forma e pela grandeza; unindo-se e desunindo-se no vácuo; determinam o nascimento e morte das coisas; e dispondo-se diferentemente determinam a sua diversidade. Aristóteles (Metafísica, I, 4, 985b) comparou-os às letras do alfabeto, que diferem entre si pela forma e dão lugar a palavras e a discursos diferentes, dispondo-se e combinando-se diferentemente. As qualidades dos corpos dependem, portanto, da configuração, da ordem ou do movimento dos átomos (ABBAGNANO, 2007, citação do autor). Com relação às configurações dos átomos, estas são as responsáveis não somente pela raridade ou densidade (de acordo com a distância entre eles), mas também pela forma, dureza, número e movimento dos corpos, tanto celestes quanto terrestres. As qualidades do calor, do frio, do sabor, da cor e do odor também são "aparências sensíveis, provocadas por configurações ou combinações especiais dos átomos" (ABBAGNANO, 2007). Em termos atronômicos, Aristóteles afirma que as estrelas e planetas são uma parte mais densa de seus orbes, enquanto que as partes que estão mais distantes das estrelas são rarefeitas. Nesse capítulo, van Roomen afirma ainda que o nome estrela provém de uma palavra grega que significa fulgor. As estrelas cadentes e os cometas eram chamados pelos latinos como estrelas cabeludas e decíduas, respectivamente, mas, segundo van Roomen, eles utilizavam a palavra "estrela" impropriamente, pois os cometas e estrelas cadentes não estão no primeiro céu, nem em nenhuma das esferas celeste, mas é somente um dos fenômenos 207 atmosféricos. Os textos 4 e 6 do Livro I dos Meteorológicos de Aristóteles trata sobre as estrelas cadentes e cometas, respectivamente. [...] Capítulo XVI Nesse e nos dois próximos capítulos, van Roomen escreve sobre como alguns autores organizaram as esferas em alguns dos diversos sistemas de mundo estudados ao longo da história. Nesse capítulo, mostra como os astrônomos e cosmógrafos contemporâneos seus escreveram sobre tal assunto e, no capítulo seguinte, como os Antigos estabeleceram a ordem das esferas celestes. Figura 7: Esquema das Esferas Celestes presente na Cosmografia de Petrus Apianus (1531), mesmo sistema estudado por van Roomen na Ouranographia. 208 No final da Idade Média, inúmeros astrônomos árabes e jesuítas fizeram observações para melhorar as tabelas astronômicas existentes até então. Além disso, muitos trabalhos da Antiguidade Grega foram redescobertos e inicialmente traduzidos para o árabe e, posteriormente, para o latim. Apesar disso, a astronomia não perdeu seu caráter fundamental, o fato de ser aristotélico-ptolomaica, no qual a Terra, imóvel, estava no centro do universo, finito e esférico, composto por esferas concêntricas ao mundo onde estavam as estrelas e os planetas. O astrônomo alemão Georg von Peurbach (1423-1461) em sua Theoricae Novae Planetarum, assim como Johannes de Sacrobosco em seu Tractatus de Sphaera, mostraram sistemas de mundo baseados no ptolomaico – o qual comentaremos com mais detalhes no próximo capítulo – mas acrescentaram, além das esferas atribuídas por Ptolomeu, outra esfera acima das estrelas fixas, o primum mobile. (MAOR, 2006). Petrus Apianus (1495-1552), em sua Cosmographia, acrescentou ainda o caelum empyreum (MAOR, 2006) que será tratado em detalhes no segundo livro da Ouranographia. No décimo sexto capítulo, van Roomen ao explicar os trabalhos dos cosmógrafos e astrônomos mais recentes faz uma distribuição das esferas celestes igual a de Apianus (Fig. 7). Para van Roomen, os céus podem ser de dois tipos: ou empíreo, ou etéreo. O céu empíreo, imóvel e o mais alto de todos os céus, é aquele que segundo a Cosmographia de Petrus Apianus é a "habitação de Deus e de todos os eleitos". O céu etéreo é divido em primeiro e segundos móveis. O primeiro móvel é aquele no qual se observa o primeiro movimento, o movimento diurno, que é distribuído para todas as esferas inferiores. Os segundos móveis estão logo abaixo do primeiro móvel e possuem além do movimento diurno, outro movimento normalmente contrário a esse. Os segundos móveis, por sua vez, podem ser divididos ainda em dois tipos: cristalino ou estrelado. Os segundos móveis estrelados podem ser das estrelas fixas ou das errantes. Destes, somente um é o orbe atribuídos às estrelas fixas, pois elas realizam seu movimento similarmente umas em relação às outras, e os outros sete são das estrelas errantes, pois elas realizam movimentos diferentes das fixas e das demais. Os corpos celestes que possuíam movimentos diferentes daquele realizado pelas estrelas fixas eram chamados pelos latinos de estrelas errantes, forma traduzida para o termo grego "planeta". 209 Para que o leitor saiba a ordem das esferas na qual se encontram os planetas, van Roomen cita um trecho da obra Astronomica de Marcus Manilius (c. século I d.C) e, em seguida, outro versinho, o qual não encontramos a obra procedente. A ordem dessas esferas, de cima para baixo, são primeiro a de Saturno, depois a de Júpiter, a de Marte, a do Sol, a de Vênus, a de Mercúrio e, por último, a da Lua, a mais próxima da Terra. Acima da esfera de Saturno estão: o firmamento ou o céu das estrelas fixas, o cristalino, o primeiro móvel e, por último, o céu empíreo. No entanto, apesar da predominância do sistema ptolomaico no pensamento Medieval e Renascentista, existem sistemas completamente diferentes. Nicolaus de Cusa (1401-1464), em sua obra De Docta Ignorantia, declara que o universo pode ser infinito e, vai mais além, dizendo que ele pode não ser esférico e não ter um centro. A justificativa para tal sistema é teológica, pois o autor acreditava que a onipotência do Criador não poderia tolerar barreiras (MAOR, 2006). Outro sistema relativamente diferente dos aceitos até então foi o sistema heliocêntrico (Fig. 8) de Nicolau Copérnico (1473-1543). Em seu De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium Copérnico afirma que: 1. O Sol, e não a Terra, está no centro do universo; 2. Todos os planetas – incluindo a Terra – giram em torno do Sol; 3. É a rotação da Terra sobre o seu eixo – e não a rotação do firmamento ao redor da Terra – que causa a alternância entre o dia e a noite (MAOR, 2006, p. 192-193, tradução nossa). Além disso, para Copérnico "os céus são imensos em comparação com a Terra" e "a órbita da Terra ao redor do Sol não é nada em comparação com a esfera das estrelas fixas" Esta última afirmação foi escrita porque os astrônomos não conseguiam calcular uma paralaxe para as estrelas fixas, logo a distância entre a Terra e tais estrelas deveria ser muitíssimo Figura 8: Esquema das Esferas Celestes presente no De Revolutionibus de Copérnico (1996). 210 grande e, como consequência, o universo deveria ser muito maior do que o pensado anteriormente (MAOR, 2006, p. 193, tradução nossa). Pelo fato desse sistema possuir mudanças significativas em relação aos anteriores, alguns autores afirmam que o universo copernicano (em conjunto com as ideias de Johannes Kepler, Galileo Galileu e Issac Newton) pode ser pensado como algo revolucionário para seu período (KUHN, 1990). No entanto, outros autores afirmam que tais mudanças não tiraram as características fundamentais do sistema ptolomaico, pois o universo continuou a ser finito, composto por várias esferas concêntricas que giram em torno de um centro imóvel, dessa vez o Sol (MAOR, 2006). Apesar de somente o primeiro dos seis livros do De Revolutionibus conter em linhas gerais a nova teoria e boa parte dela já estar escrita em 1533, Copérnico foi relutante em publicar a obra com receio do que ela poderia provocar dentro da Igreja Católica. A obra só foi impressa pouco tempo antes de sua morte, em 1543, e entrou para a difícil fase de Figura 9: Esquema das Esferas Celestes presente na obra de Thomas Digges. 211 aceitação. Um dos poucos proponentes iniciais do copernicanismo foi Thomas Digges (15461595) que em 1576 publicou uma obra sobre esse sistema (Fig. 9). Para Digges, as estrelas fixas estão localizadas bem distantes dos demais orbes e são imóveis (MAOR, 2006). Capítulo XVII Nesse capítulo, van Roomen pretende elucidar exemplos de sistemas de mundo exibidos pelos poetas, historiadores e filósofos da Antiguidade, contudo ele se baseia somente nas obras Sobre a Adivinhação e O Sonho de Cipião de Marcus Tulius Cícero. O trecho citado inicialmente está no Livro II da obra Sobre a Adivinhação (91) de Cìcero, onde nessa passagem ele critica a astrologia dos caldeus. Não se deve acreditar nos caldeus quanto à predição e ao horóscopo de cada um a partir do dia de nascimento. (...) Cílax de Halicarnasso, amigo íntimo de Panécio, notável na astrologia e ele mesmo o principal no governo de sua cidade, repudiou todo esse modo caldaico de predizer. Mas para que utilizemos a razão, deixando de lado os depoimentos, assim discorrem aqueles que defendem essas predições natalícias dos caldeus. Dizem que há uma certa força na faixa que carrega as constelações, que é chamado Zodíaco (...), julgam não apenas verossímil, mas até mesmo verdadeiro que as crianças adquiram certa disposição e constituição de acordo com a conformação do céu e a partir disso são dispostos os caracteres, os costumes, a alma, o corpo, a ação na vida, os acontecimentos e eventos de cada um. Oh! delírio inacreditável! (...) Procles e Eurístenes, reis dos lacedemônios, eram irmãos gêmeos. Mas eles nem viveram a mesma quantidade de anos, pois a vida de Procles foi um ano mais curta e ele muito excedeu o irmão na glória de seus feitos. (...) Pois, como eles mesmos dizem, governando a lua a origem dos que nascem e os caldeus observando e anotando os astros que presidem o nascimento e todos aqueles que parecem juntos à lua, julgam com o mais enganador dos sentidos, os olhos, aquilo que deviam ver com a razão e com a mente. Pois o cálculo dos matemáticos, o qual era preciso que eles conhecessem, ensina a quão pequena distância a lua se eleva da terra, quase tocando-a, o quanto está longe da próxima estrela, a de Mercúrio, mas muito mais longe de Vênus, depois com outro intervalo dista do sol, com cujo brilho se julga que é iluminada; na verdade, outros três intervalos ilimitados e imensos, do sol até Marte, dali até Júpiter, dele até a estrela de Saturno, dali até o próprio céu, que está na extremidade do mundo e mais afastado. Portanto, que influência pode haver, a partir de um intervalo quase infinito, na lua ou, antes, na terra? (GRATTI, 2009, p. 143-144, grifo nosso). O Sonho de Cipião foi a única parte da obra Da República de Cícero conhecida por longos tempos. Depois do restante da obra ter sido redescoberta, o Sonho de Cipião passou a ser conhecido como o Livro VI Da República. Nesse livro – O Sonho de Cipião – Cícero se dedica a demonstrar a existência de Deus e a imortalidade da alma (CÍCERO, 2000). Conforme a nota 3 desse capítulo, é possível perceber que Cícero afirma que a Terra também ocupa uma esfera, a nona esfera imóvel e ínfima, os planetas ocupam outras sete esferas e o próprio céu, ou céu das estrelas fixas, ocupa a primeira de todas as esferas. 212 Capítulo XVIII Van Roomen dedica esse capítulo a mostrar a controvérsia entre diversos autores com relação à ordem das esferas celestes. Van Roomen escreve que todos os matemáticos que tenham algum reconhecimento estabeleceram que a esfera das estrelas fixas está localizada acima de todas as outras esferas, num lugar supremo, abaixo dela a de Saturno, em seguida, a de Júpiter e depois a de Marte. Contudo, ele cita os exemplos de Metrodoro de Lampsaco (c.330 a.C-c.277 a.C), discipulo de Epicuro (341 a.C-270 a.C), e de Crates de Tebas (c. 365 a.C-c. 285 a.C), os quais colocaram o Sol e a Lua acima das demais esferas. Escreve ainda que existem grandes controvérsias no que diz respeito à ordem das esferas inferiores – a do Sol, de Vênus, de Mercúrio e da Lua. Comenta sobre o sistema estudado por Aristarco de Samos (310 a.C-230 a.C), por seus seguidores e por Copernico que tem o Sol imóvel em seu centro e com as demais esferas ao redor (Fig. 4). Ele ainda cita o trecho da obra De Arte Cyclognomica de Cornélio Gemma (1535-1578) que também aceita o sistema heliocêntrico como verdadeiro (Fig. 10). Figura 10: Esquema das esferas celestes presente na obra de Cornélio Gemma. 213 Segundo van Roomen, todos os astrônomos restantes estabeleceram que a Lua está na esfera mais baixa, mas a posição do Sol, de Mercúrio e de Vênus foi a mior controvérsia de todas, pois a velocidade de seus movimentos é muito parecida, o que impedia uma determinação precisa da ordem de suas esferas. Para Demócrito de Abdera (460 a.C-370 a.C), Mercúrio está numa esfera superior ao Sol, enquanto que para Johannes Regiomontano (14361476) em sua obra Epitome in Almagestum se referindo a obras de Alpetrágio (c. 1204), astrônomo e filósofo árabe, Vênus está superior ao Sol. Para Platão, no Timeu (38c-d) (MURACHCO, 2004) e Aristóteles, no Livro II do Sobre o Céu (191b 35-192a 14), ambos, Vênus e Mercúrio, estão acima do Sol. Ainda segundo van Roomen, Ptolomeu, na obra Sobre a Alma, e Cìcero, nas obras Sobre a Adivinhação e O Sonho de Cipião, conforme citamos no capítulo anterior, colocam Mercúrio acima da Lua, em seguida, Vênus e depois o Sol. Os astrônomos mais recentes, segundo van Roomen, aceitam justamente esta opinião. Um exemplo interessante de sitema ptolomaico, que não é tratado na Ouranographia, é o da obra Cosmografia (Fig, 11) do astrônomo e cartógrafo português Bartholomeu Velho Figura 11: Ilustração de Bartholomeu Velho. 214 (1568), que coloca, além das esferas celestes, as distâncias de cada esfera em relação à terra e a duração de seus períodos de revolução. Capítulo XIX Nesse capítulo, van Roomen mostrará os motivos que fizeram os astrônomos ao longo da história acrescentarem a nona e décima esferas no sistema ptolomaico, além disso, apresentará argumentos a favor de Ptolomeu pelo fato dele não ter colocado tais esferas em seu sistema. Inicialmente, van Roomen retoma o fato de que a esfera celeste não é um corpo contínuo, mas composto por diversos orbes, pois possuem diversos movimentos. Ele afirma que às estrelas fixas e à cada planeta deve se atribuir uma esfera diferente devido aos seus movimentos diversos: Às estrelas fixas deve-se estabelcer uma única esfera, pois elas se movimentam com espaços iguais de leste para oeste, o movimento diurno; Aos planetas devese atribuir uma esfera para cada, pois cada um deles possuem, além do movimento diurno, outro movimento diverso, normalmente contrário ao diurno e diferente para cada planeta. Como esses movimentos foram estudados em capítulos anteriores, optamos por explicar somente os movimentos que justificam o acréscimo da nona e décima esferas. É importante salientar que o movimento diurno, antes atribuído à oitava esfera, após a descoberta dos outros dois movimentos das estrelas fixas, ficou sendo atribuído à decima esfera. O acréscimo de uma nona esfera é justificado pelo fato de que, além do movimento diurno que as estrelas fazem, é observado outro movimento, bem lento, atualmente chamado de precessão dos equinócios. Hiparco (190 a.C-126 a.C), utilizando dados deixados por alguns astrônomos antecessores de aproximadamente um século antes do seu, tais como os de Timocharis (360 a.C-260 a.C), percebeu que os pontos onde a eclíptica cruza o equador celeste – chamados pontos equinociais, ou quando se trata do ponto equinocial da primavera boreal, chamamos de ponto γ (Fig. 12) – mudaram ao longo dos anos, de modo que a longitude eclíptica26 (Fig. 13) de uma determinada estrela havia variado ao longo do tempo. Esse movimento causa, além de uma mudança no ponto γ, uma modificação no pólo norte celeste e nos demais pontos de referência sobre a esfera celeste (Fig. 14 e 15). Segundo as conclusões feitas por Hiparco, o 26 A eclíptica – caminho aparente que o Sol faz entre os astros durante um ano – cruza o equador celeste em dois pontos, os pontos equinociais. O ponto equinocial da primavera boreal é chamado atualmente de ponto γ. A distância angular sobre o equador celeste entre o ponto γ e a determinada estrela é chamada de longitude eclíptica. Trataremos com mais detalhes sobre o círculo da eclíptica nos comentários ao capítulo quarto do terceiro livro da Ouranographia. 215 ponto γ retrogradou no sentido oposto ao do movimento anual do Sol, cerca de 1° em 100 anos e esse movimento demoraria cerca de 36000 anos para dar uma volta completa (BOCZKO, 1984; LINTON, 2004). O movimento de precessão faz com que haja um deslocamento dos pólos celestes em forma de cone em torno de um eixo fixo no espaço. Atualmente sabe-se que a retrogradação do ponto γ é de aproximadamente 50,2" a cada ano e que o movimento completa uma volta em cerca de 26000 anos (Fig. 16) (BOCZKO, 1984; LINTON, 2004). Figura 12: Movimento anual aparente do Sol e ponto γ. Figura 13: Longitude ecliptica (l) de uma estrela. Figura 15: Mudança do pólo norte ao longo do tempo. Figura 14: Mudança do ponto γ e do pólo norte do Equador devido ao movimento de precessão. 216 Além desse movimento, ocorre também outro que ficou sendo atribuído à oitava esfera, o movimento de trepidação das estrelas. Este consiste no movimento circular dos pontos equinociais verdadeiro da oitava esfera fazendo dois pequenos círculos na nona esfera cujo centro seriam os inícios de Áries e de Libra na nona esfera. Para Pedro Nunes, em sua Teórica do Sol, esse movimento teria uma duração de 7000 anos (Fig. 17) (SILVA, 1972). Esse movimento atualmente é denominado como de nutação, mas com o acréscimo de movimentos muito mais complexos do que os conhecidos no Renascimento27. Van Roomen escreve uma justificativa a Ptolomeu dizendo que ele provavelmente conhecia tais movimentos, mas que optou por não divulgá-los pelo fato de ter um número insuficiente de dados que seus antecessores o deixaram e que ele próprio não poderia verificar com certeza, pois esses dois movimentos são extremamente lentos e precisaria de séculos de observações. Em seguida, van Roomen apresenta cinco fundamentos para demonstrar que esses dois movimentos, exceto o diurno, não poderiam ser atribuídos à oitava esfera. São estes: 27 Para maiores detalhes sobre o movimento de trepidação, veja Silva (1972) e sobre como entendemos o movimento de nutação atualmente, veja Boczko (1984) e Olivera Filho & Saraiva (2004). Figura 16: Movimento de precessão ao longo de 13000 anos. Figura 17: Figura de Pedro Nunes representando o movimento de trepidação das estrelas 217 1. Todo corpo simples que é movido por muitos movimentos tem um único por si mesmo, os restantes por acidente. 2. Todo movimento de um corpo por acidente é de outro corpo por si mesmo. 3. As estrelas são movidas pelo movimento do céu assim como o prego com a roda. 4. A esfera superior pode mover e arrastar consigo a inferior, mas não o contrário. 5. Qualquer que seja a esfera celeste é um corpo simples. Van Roomen utiliza tais fundamentos para demonstar que se uma esfera possui três movimentos – como os que são observados nas estrelas fixas – dois deles têm que ser transmitidos por duas esferas superiores. Ele inicia utilizando (1) para mostrar que somente um dos movimentos da oitava esfera pode ser atribuído a ela mesma, os outros devem ser por acidente. Mas, utilizando (4), conclui que esses movimentos não podem ser provenientes de esferas inferiores. Em seguida, utilizando (1) e (5), escreve que qualquer que seja a esfera celeste, a esta podemos atribuir somente um único movimento por si mesmo, os demais são por acidente. Para finalizar o pensamento, van Roomen, utilizando (3), diz que todos os movimentos realizados pelas estrelas fixas devem ser realizados pelo céu onde elas estão fixadas, mas como podemos atribuir somente um movimento a cada esfera, convém que sejam acrescentadas duas esferas superiores, para que elas possam ser a causa de dois movimentos por acidente na oitava esfera. Capítulo XX Nesse capítulo, van Roomen traz as razões pelas quais são obtidas a ordem das esferas celestes mostrada nos capítulos anteriores. Para ele, existem cinco razões: a) A diversidade de movimentos: por si mesmo ou por acidente; b) A velocidade do movimento: veloz ou lento; c) A diversidade do aspecto, atualmente conhecida como paralaxe; d) Os eclipses ou ocultações dos planetas por outros; e) E a quantidade de sombra. Destas cinco razões, van Roomen traz cinco proposições: (i) A esfera superior pode mover e arrastar consigo a inferior, e não o contrário. (ii) Mantidas as demais condições, uma estrela mais vizinha à Terra tem maior diversidade de aspecto. (iii) Quão mais o céu afasta-se da natureza e da condição do primeiro móvel, também deve ser posto em um lugar mais baixo. (iv) O astro que oculta outro de nós é inferior. (v) Finalmente, quando o corpo luminoso está mais alto e mais remoto em relação à Terra, as sombras dos corpos opacos aparecem menores no plano horizontal e, quando o corpo iluminado está mais perto da Terra, os corpos opacos projetam sombras maiores. 218 A primeira proposição (i) se liga diretamente à primeira razão (a) e sobre esse fato – de que uma esfera superior pode arrastar a inferior e não o contrário – comentamos no capítulo anterior. A segunda proposição (ii) está fundamentada na terceira razão (c). A diversidade de aspecto, ou paralaxe, é a diferença de posição de um determinado astro em relação aos demais quando observado ao mesmo tempo em diferentes pontos da Terra. Se um determinado astro está mais próximo da Terra, ele terá uma maior diversidade de aspecto, enquanto que, um astro com uma distância muito grande terá uma diversidade menor (Fig. 18). A terceira proposição (iii) está fundamentada principalmente na primeira (a) e na segunda razão (b). Se um astro, por exemplo, possui um movimento mais lento do que outro, esse deve ter tal movimento pela tendência de um movimento próprio e de um ou poucos por acidente proveniente de uma esfera superior. De modo que, uma das condições que se assemelha ao primeiro móvel seria ter uma menor quantidade de movimentos por acidente. A quarta proposição (iv) se baseia na quarta razão (d) e diz que aquele astro que causa um eclipse ou oculta outro, o primeiro deve estar mais próximo da Terra do que o segundo. A quinta proposição (v) está ligada à quinta razão (e) que diz que um astro que se encontra mais distante da Terra ao passar em frente a outro causa sombras menores do que astros que estiverem mais próximos. Segundo van Roomen, o primeiro móvel e, em seguida, o cristalino devem estar acima de todas as demais esferas, a partir da proposição (i), pois são justamente essas duas que causam os movimentos diurno e de precessão dos equinócios, respectivamente, na esfera das estrelas fixas, como explicamos no capítulo anteior. O firmamento, ou esfera das estrelas fixas, deve ser posto logo em seguida e superior aos planetas, a partir das proposições (iii) e (iv). Van Roomen argumenta que a esfera das estrelas fixas move-se lentamente contra o primeiro móvel, afastando-se das condições dele. Além disso, os planetas podem ocultar uma estrela fixa e não o contrário, logo, eles devem ficar em esferas abaixo das estrelas. Figura 18: Paralaxe das estrelas A – mais próxima – e B – mais distante – para os observadores O e O'. 219 Utilizando as mesmas proposições – (iii e iv) – van Roomen escreve que a esfera de Saturno deve vir abaixo do firmamento, depois a de Júpiter e, em seguida, a de Marte. O Sol, por (ii), deve estar acima de Vênus e de Mercúrio, pois eles tem maior paralaxe que o Sol. Além disso, van Roomen diz que, por diversas razões, algumas delas apresentadas na obra Liber Introductorii Maioris as Scientiam judiciorum astrorum de Albumasar (787886), outras no Livro II (136-137) das Metamorfoses de Ovídio (43 a.C-17/8 d.C), o Sol deve ocupar tal posição, pois ele "é rei e (...) coração de todos os planetas". Van Roomen afirma também que o espaço existente entre o Sol e a Lua é muito grande e como não pode haver vácuo entre eles, logo, os orbes de Vênus e Mercúrio devem ocupar tal espaço. Segundo van Roomen, Johannes Regiomontano (1436-1476) (e Ptolomeu) afirmaram que quando a Lua está no auge (ou seja, em sua posição mais próxima a Terra), ela dista 64 raios terrestre do centro da Terra, e quando o Sol está na posição mais afastada da Terra, ele dista 1070 raios terrestres do centro da Terra. Sendo assim, a distância entre a Lua e o Sol são 1006 raios terrestres. Utilizando a proposição (iii), van Roomen afirma que Vênus deve vir logo abaixo do Sol e acima de Vênus, este último deve estar acima da esfera da Lua. A característica que afasta Mercúrio das condições do primeiro móvel é o fato dele possuir cinco orbes e um epiciclo para justificar seus movimentos, enquanto Vênus possui três orbes e um epiciclo. O movimento dos planetas normalmente ocorre de oeste à leste, oposto ao movimento diurno das estrelas, mas em determinadas épocas, os planetas passam a executar um movimento de leste à oeste (podendo durar meses de acordo com o planeta). A explicação para o movimento dos planetas é simples num sistema heliocêntrico, mas não é fácil ao se admitir o geocentrismo. Ptolomeu explicou o movimento dos planetas através de uma combinação de círculos: o planeta se move ao longo de um pequeno círculo chamado epiciclo, cujo centro se move em um círculo maior chamado deferente. A Terra fica numa posição um pouco afastada do centro do deferente (portanto, o deferente é um círculo excêntrico em relação à Terra). Até aqui, o modelo de Ptolomeu não diferia do modelo usado por Hiparco aproximadamente 250 anos antes. A novidade introduzida por Ptolomeu foi o equante, que é um ponto ao lado do centro do deferente oposto em relação à Terra, em relação ao qual o centro do epiciclo se move a uma taxa uniforme, e que tinha o objetivo de dar conta do movimento não uniforme dos planetas (Fig. 19) (OLIVEIRA FILHO; SARAIVA, 2004, p. 49). Quanto mais deferentes e epicíclos fossem necessários para se explicar o movimento de um planeta, significaria que ele estava mais afastado do primeiro móvel. A palavra orbe Figura 19: Epiciclo, deferente e equante de um determinado planeta. 220 utilizada por van Roomen provavelmente significa deferente, do mesmo modo como Copérnico os denominou. E finalmente, como a Lua tem uma maior paralaxe, ela deve estar na esfera mais próxima à Terra, a mais baixa. Além disso, utilizando (iii), ela apresenta um movimento extremamente distinto dentre todos os planetas e em relação ao movimento do primeiro móvel. E também, por (iv), ao se conjugar com outro planeta ou estrela, a Lua sempre oculta os demais. E pela última proposição (v), van Roomen escreve que ao comparar, por exemplo, a sombra da Lua com a do Sol, a da Lua é maior que a do Sol. Capítulo XXI Nesse capítulo, van Roomen retoma um assunto tratado no sexto capítulo: os sons emitidos pelas esferas celestes. Alguns poetas gregos, como Homero e Hesíodo, tratam em algumas de suas obras sobre a origem dos deuses e suas influencias sobre os homens. As "musas", sobre quem esses autores escreveram, são: As Musas, segundo a tradição mais corrente que vem de Hesíodo, são filhas de Zeus. Com efeito, após a vitória sobre os Titãs, o rei dos deuses teve o desejo de distrair os Olímpicos com jovens beldades que, por meio do canto e da dança, lhes recordassem as suas acções valorosas. Então dirigiu-se a Píero (Macedónia), onde se encontrava Mnemósine, divindade da memória, irmã dos Titãs (as Titânides não tinham tomado parte no conflito). Passou com ela nove noites e gerou as nove Musas, que passarão a constituir o coro artístico com que ele sonhara (HESÍODO, 1995). No texto de van Roomen, as musas são associadas às esferas celestes devido às suas qualidades. No final do capítulo, van Roomen escreve três prováveis razões dadas pelos poetas para que tais sons não sejam ouvidos por nós. Segundo ele, nossos ouvidos não conseguem captar o som: (i) porque ele é muito alto; (ii) por causa da suavidade da harmonia ou; (iii) devido ao costume, pelo fato de o ouvirmos desde o nosso nascimento. Capítulo XXII No último capítulo do primeiro livro, van Roomen traz uma descrição dos tipos de círculos existentes nas esferas celestes. Essas definições serão usadas posteriormente no segundo e terceiro livros da obra. Inicialmente ele se interessa por definir o que é um círculo. Segundo ele, existem dois modos de definir este objeto geométrico. 1. Na primeira acepção, o círculo é uma linha circular que divide uma esfera em partes iguais ou desiguais e o meio desta área é chamado de "centro do círculo". 221 2. Na outra, diz que o círculo pode ser entendido como uma superfície cujo perímetro é o limite com a esfera. Desse segundo modo, o círculo também pode ser chamado de "plano do círculo" (Fig. 20). O eixo de um círculo é a linha que corta o centro dele com ângulos iguais. E os pólos do círculo são as duas extremidades do eixo que tocam a esfera (Fig. 20). Em seguida, van Roomen descreve dois tipos de círculos: os maiores e os menores. Os círculos maiores são aqueles que dividem a esfera em duas partes iguais, enquanto que os menores são aqueles que a dividem em partes desiguais (Fig. 21 e 22). Posteriormente, van Roomen diz que se podem comparar os círculos maiores e menores de três modos: 1. Pela magnitude da esfera em que estão: No sistema ptolomaico-aristotelico as esferas celestes são concêntricas, então, um círculo maior de uma esfera mais externa necessariamente deverá ser maior do que um círculo maior de uma esfera mais interna. 2. Pela força: Aqui força é entendida como alguma potência que pode ser transmitida às esferas inferiores ou aos seres existentes nelas. Como está escrito no próprio exemplo de van Roomen, o círculo (ou faixa) do zodíaco localizado no primeiro móvel governa a vida de todos os seres vivos aqui da Terra. 3. Pelo tamanho do diânmetro ou da circunferência. Deste modo, é fácil perceber a diferença de tamanho, pois um círculo é maior quando o seu plano passa pelo centro da esfera, enquanto um círculo menor é aquele que não passa pelo centro da esfera. Para finalizar, em um diagrama, van Roomen faz uma comparação entre os círculos maiores e menores e como é medida a distância entre ambos. Figura 22: Círculo Menor. Figura 21: Círculo Maior. Figura 20: Pólos, eixo e plano do círculo. 222 Comentários ao Segundo Livro da Ouranographia O segundo livro tratará exclusivamente do primeiro céu e de seus círculos. No primeiro capítulo, van Roomen descreve superficialmente sobre algumas consideraçãoes que os poetas e teólogos escreveram sobre ele e, em mais detalhes, sobre os círculos utilizados pelos astrônomos existentes nesse céu. Nos demais capítulos, ele se prende às explicações dos significados dos nomes que foram atribuídos aos círculos por diversos autores e povos ao longo da história, às funções e aos usos de cada círculo presente na esfera do primeiro céu. É interessante notar que atualmente não consideramos como verdadeiro o sistema geocêntrico, mas muitas daquelas definições utilizadas naquele período ainda são úteis para os astrônomos posicionais. Os sistemas de referência utilizados na Astronomia Posicional – tais como o Sistema de Coordenadas Equatorial, o Horizontal e o Eclíptico – são baseados em diversos conceitos daquele tempo. Capítulo Primeiro O primeiro céu, o mais externo de todos, é imóvel e concetrico ao mundo. Segundo van Roomen, os cristãos o chamam de "empíreo, morada de Deus, dos anjos e dos santos". A palavra empíreo significa "celeste, divino e supremo", mas, segundo van Roomen, o chamam por esse nome por ser ígneo, não pelo fato de ser quente, mas devido ao brilho que emite. Van Roomen comenta rapidamente sobre as palavras de Tomás de Aquino em sua obra Suma Teológica, na questão 66, artigo 6, dizendo que o primeiro céu foi estabelecido pelos teólogos para justificar o fato de que deveria existir um lugar no qual seria a morada de Deus, de seus anjos e de todos aqueles que fossem eleitos por Ele. Nesse trecho, Tomás de Aquino descreve o céu empíreo, dizendo: 1. Com efeito, se o céu empíreo existe, deve ser um corpo sensível. Ora, todo corpo sensível pode ser movido. Mas o céu empíreo não é movido, porque seu movimento seria conhecido pelo movimento de algum corpo visível, o que não acontece. Logo, o céu empíreo não foi concriado com a matéria informe. 2. Além disso, diz agostinho: "Os corpos inferiores são dirigidos ordenadamente pelos superiores". Se o céu empíreo é algum corpo supremo, deverá ter alguma influência nos corpos inferiores. Ora, isso não se observa, sobretudo se se afirma imóvel, porque nenhum corpo move a não ser que seja movido. Logo o céu empíreo não foi concriado com a matéria informe. 3. Ademais, se for afirmado que o céu empíreo é o lugar da contemplação, não ordenado a efeitos naturais, isso contradiz Agostinho: "Não estamos neste mundo quando aprendemos algo de eterno". Por onde fica claro que a contemplação eleva o espírito acima dos corpos. Logo um lugar corpóreo não é próprio para a contemplação. 4. Ademais, nos corpos celestes há um que é em parte diáfano, em parte luminoso, a saber, o céu sidéreo. Há também um céu totalmente diáfano, que alguns chamam de céu aquoso ou cristalino. Ora, se existe ainda um céu superior, deverá ser totalmente luminoso. Mas isso é impossível, porque a atmosfera estaria então continuamente 223 iluminada e não haveria noite. Logo, não foi o céu empíreo concriado com a matéria informe. Em sentido contrário, são palavras de Estrabão: quando se lê "No princípio Deus criou o céu e a terra", "céu não significa o firmamento visível, mas o empíreo, a saber, o ígneo". Respondo. O céu empíreo não se encontra afirmado senão pela autoridade de Estrabão, de Beda e também de Basílio, enquanto concordam ser aquele céu o lugar dos bem-aventurados. Afirmava Estrabão, e também Beda: "Imediatamente, após ter sido criado, encheu-se o céu de anjos". E Basílio disse que, "assim como os condenados são jogados nas trevas últimas, também a recompensa das boas obras será restabelecida na luz que está fora do mundo, onde os bem-aventurados encontrarão sua morada de paz" (AQUINO, 2003). Segundo van Roomen, somente os teólogos afirmaram a existência desse céu, contudo, alguns filósofos, como Aristóteles no livro I da obra Sobre o Céu (278b 12-16), também acreditavam na existência de um lugar supremo onde estariam as coisas divinas. Chamamos, pois, céu em um sentido a entidade do orbe extremo do universo, ou ao corpo natural que (se fala) no orbe extremo do universo: geralmente, com efeito, chamar céu a extremidade (do universo) e ao mais alto, donde dizemos também que reside toda divindade (ARISTÓTELES, 1996, parênteses do autor, tradução nossa). Entretanto, van Roomen prefere omitir as informações que os teólogos escreveram sobre o primeiro céu e diz que tratará exclusivamente sobre seus círculos. Em seguida, em um diagrama, escreve sobre os círculos astronômicos presentes nesse céu, os quais serão tratados nos próximos capítulos desse livro. Os círculos do primeiro céu são divididos em duas categorias: (i) os anônimos, que se referem àqueles "que devem ser representados com uma certa condição", esses não serão tratados na obra de van Roomen, pois são círculos particulares muitas vezes atribuídos por um único astrônomo na hora de explicar determinado fenômeno e (ii) os famosos, ou seja, aqueles que já são conhecidos pelos astrônomos. Os famosos são divididos em: 1. Absolutos: aqueles que independem de outro círculo para serem definidos. Os círculos absolutos são somente dois, (i) o equador [Segundo Capítulo], que é imutável, pois não importa a posição em que o observador esteja na Terra, ele sempre estará imóvel com relação ao mundo e (ii) o horizonte [Terceiro Capítulo], que mudará de acordo com a posição do observador na Terra. 2. Relativos: aqueles que dependem de outros círculos para serem definidos. Esses são divididos em dois subtipos: a. Primários: aqueles que são únicos em relação a algum círculo absoluto e são três: (i) o meridiano [Quarto Capítulo], (ii) o vertical [Quinto Capítulo] e (iii) o reitor [Sexto Capítulo]. 224 b. Secundários: são vários em relação a algum círculo absoluto ou a algum relativo primário. Podem ser: (i) os menores paralelos [Sétimo Capítulo] do eqaudor, do hozrizonte, do meridiano, do vertical e do reitor; (ii) os maiores transpolares [Oitavo Capítulo] do equador, do horizonte, do meridiano e do vertical; e (iii) os maiores contingentes [Nono Capítulo]. Segundo Capítulo Nesse capítulo, van Roomen define o círculo do equador. Ele é um círculo maior que se distancia igualmente dos dois pólos do mundo. Utilizando a definição de círculo maior dada por van Roomen no vigésimo segundo capítulo do primeiro livro, sabemos que um círculo maior necessariamente divide a sua esfera em duas partes iguais e o centro de seu plano passa pelo centro da esfera. Desta forma, o equador divide o primeiro céu em duas partes iguais, o hemisfério norte e o hemisfério sul, e passa pelo centro do mundo, ou seja, o centro do círculo do equador é o centro da Terra. E, como van Roomen dirá mais a frente, os pólos e o eixo do equador são os mesmos pólos e eixo do mundo, ou seja, o eixo do primeiro céu é o eixo do equador (Fig. 23). O equador tem este nome porque quando o Sol – em sua trajetória anual, a eclíptica (Fig. 24) – passa por ele, ocorrem os equinócios e, por isso, a duração do dia e da noite são iguais em toda a Terra. Van Roomen enumera os diversos nomes atribuídos ao equador devido a esse mesmo motivo: igualador do dia e da noite, equinocial, equidialem, equidium, linha da igualdade do dia, linha da distribuição do dia e orbe da distribuição do dia (nome dado por Ptolomeu). Figura 23: O Equador, seus pólos, eixo e hemisférios. Figura 24: O Equador, seus pólos, eixo e hemisférios. 225 O trecho citado por van Roomen referente ao nome dado por Lucano ao equador, alto solstício, é explicado por Jahannes de Sacrobosco no Tratado da Esfera: Havemos de saber que os que vivem debaixo da equinocial tem o Sol na cabeça duas vezes no ano, convém a saber: quando [o Sol] está no princípio de Áries e quando está no prinxípio de Libra; e tem nestes tempos dois solstítcios altos porque lhes passa o Sol diretamente por cima de sua cabeça (...). E daqui teremos declaração por aqueles versos de Lucano em que dizia: "Sabido temos ser este o lugar no qual o círculo do alto solstítcio corta em duas metades o círculo dos signos" (Pharsalia IX, 531-532). Chama Lucano nestes versos círculo do alto solstício a equinocial, na qual se fazem dois altos solstícios aos que vivem debaixo dela, e chama círculo dos signos o zodíaco, ao qual a equinocial divide em duas metades (SACROBOSCO, 1991, p. 59, citação do tradutor). Por dividir o primeiro céu em duas metades, é chamado cintura do primeiro céu, e devido seu plano passar pelo centro da Terra é chamado também centro da Terra (nome dado por Plínio). O equador é descrito pela trajetória do Sol nos dias de equinócio e também pelo movimento diário da estrela média da cintura da constelação de Órion, também chamada de Alnilam. Mais corretamente, seria que a estrela chamada Mintaka está mais próxima do equador do que Alnilam (Fig. 25). Segundo van Roomen, o equador serve para medir as distâncias horarias de uma estrela. Para que este assunto seja entendido com mais facilidade é necessário ter o conhecimento do que são os círculos horários que serão tratados no capítulo oitavo. Mas, para fins de entendimento desse capítulo, basta saber que os círculos horários são círculos que cortam o equador com ângulos retos esferais e passam pelos pólos dele. O ângulo horário é medido sobre o equador entre o círculo horário que passa o ponto γ e o círculo horário da estrela que se quer determinar a distância horária. O ângulo horário atualmente também é Figura 25: O Equador e a constelação de Órion. Figura 26: Ângulo Horario ao Ascenção Reta de uma estrela. 226 chamado de ascenção reta (α) ou longitude astrônomica (λ) de uma estrela (Fig, 26). A medida é feita no sentido anti-horário quando vista do pólo norte e pode variar de 0° a 360°. Também é comum usar a medida angular em horas, tendo por definição que 1h é igual a 15°, podendo variar de 0 a 24h (BOCZKO, 1984). Van Roomen finaliza esse capítulo com duas afirmações: (i) o equador é o lugar no qual os céus etéreos se encaixam ao primeiro céu e (ii) o círculo mediador do primeiro móvel é um "equador" daquela esfera. Van Roomen associa as funções destes dois – equador do primeiro céu e mediador do primeiro móvel – escrevendo que a altitude (em relação ao equador) de uma estrela é igual a sua declinação (em relação ao mediador). Terceiro Capítulo Nesse capítulo, van Roomen traz a definição do círculo do horizonte. Esse círculo absoluto é variável, pois não é o mesmo em todas as regiões da Terra, mas depende do local onde se encontra o observador. Ele também é um círculo maior, pois divide a esfera do primeiro céu em duas partes iguais, a parte visível pelo observador, também chamada de hemisfério superior, e a parte não visível do céu, chamada de hemisfério inferior (Fig. 27). Van Roomen também cita que alguns antigos, dentre eles Ambrósio Teodósio Macróbio, chamam o horizonte de "limite do céu", pois acreditavam que o que vemos no hemisfério superior é o céu todo e abaixo do horizonte não existe céu, mas somente água, onde o Sol e as demais estrelas mergulham no ocaso e se levantam do outro lado no nascente. O eixo do horizonte é a linha que atravessa o corpo do observador e vai até o primeiro céu, onde seus pólos se fixam. O pólo que está acima da cabeça do observador é o ponto vertical, mais comumente chamado de zênite, e o pólo que está abaixo do pé do observador é o nadir (Fig. 27). Segundo van Roomen, o círculo do horizonte pode ser entendido de dois modos: 1. Horizonte sensível ou artificial: Van Roomen omite as informações sobre esse tipo de horizonte. Nesse trecho, ele se refere ao horizonte que é percebido pelos sentidos, na Figura 27: O horizonte, seus pólos, eixo e hemisférios. 227 verdade, o que é observado pela nossa visão. Esse horizonte não divide o céu em parte iguais, pois normalmente o horizonte é cortado por barreiras naturais, como montanhas ou florestas, ou também por construções humanas, o que deixa limitada a parte observada do céu e não divide a esfera celeste em parte iguais. 2. Horizonte racional ou natural: É chamado desta forma, pois nossos olhos não conseguem distinguir de maneira precisa onde está o limite entre o hemisfério superior e o inferior – pelo fato de existiram montanhas ou contruções humanas – mas, mesmo assim, afirmamos a existência desse círculo imaginário dividindo a esfera celeste em duas metades iguais. O horizonte ainda pode ser de dois tipos: 1. Reto: Para que um observador tenha o horizonte reto, ele precisa estar na região do equador terrestre. Para esse observador, a esfera celeste é denominada esfera reta, e nela estão o eixo e os dois pólos do mundo – os quais coincidem com os pontos cardeais norte e sul – e os círculos formados pelo movimento diurno das estrelas estão perpendiculares ao plano do horizonte (Fig. 28) 2. Oblíquo: É o horioznte observado em todas as demias regiões da Terra, pois nesses lugares, como van Roomen escreve, "o horizonte oblíquo é [aquele] de cujo plano um dos pólos do mundo se eleva, mas o outro é submergido abaixo do mesmo". Para esses observadores a esfera é chamada esfera oblíqua, com exceção dos moradores dos pólos, cuja esfera seria chamada paralela, mas van Roomen não comenta sobre estes casos (Fig. 29). O horioznte é dividido em duas partes: (i) a nascente, ou seja, onde os astros nascem, voltada para o lado oriental, e a poente, onde os astros se põem, voltada para o lado ociedental. O nascente e ocaso das estrelas e dos demais astros celestes é sempre se referido ao horizonte (Fig. 30). Segundo van Roomen, o horizonte tem seis usos, dos quais já vimos três: 1. Separar a parte visível da não visível do céu; 2. Mostrar o nascente e o ocaso das estrelas; 3. Além disso, o horizonte pode servir como ponto de referência para se determinar o gênero das estrelas, que podem ser de três tipos: a. As estrelas de aparição perpétua: aquelas que sempre estão acima do horizonte. Atualmente estas estrelas são chamadas circumpolares, pelo fato de sempre estarem girando ao redor do pólo celeste e nunca se porem sob o horizonte (BOCZKO, 1984); 228 b. As esterlas de ocultação perpétua: aquelas que sempre estão abaixo do horizonte e nunca podem ser vistas pelo observador; c. As estrelas médias: aquelas que ora estão acima do horizonte, ora estão abaixo dele (Fig. 31). 4. Ele é a causa da esfera reta e da obliqua, já explicados anteriormente; 5. Contem a amplitude nascente e poente das estrelas; 6. Delimita a ascenção da região e a altitude acima do horizonte. Figura 28: Horizonte reto. Figura 29: Horizonte paralelo. Figura 30: Partes nascente e poente do horizonte. Figura 31: Gênero das estrelas. 229 Quarto Capítulo Nos dois capítulos anteriores, van Roomen explicou os dois círculos absolutos – o equador e o horizonte – e, a partir de agora, passa a descrever os círculos relativos, começando pelo meridiano. O meridiano possui este nome, pois quando o Sol, em qualquer época e lugar da Terra, passa por ele ocorre o meio-dia. Ele passa pelos pólos do mundo e do horizonte e corta o horizonte do observador em ângulos retos dividindo a esfera celeste em duas partes: a oriental e a ocidental. Assim como o meridiano passa pelos pólos do horizonte, o horizonte também passa pelos pólos do meridiano. O eixo do meridiano está deitado sobre o plano do horizonte na direção leste-oeste, de modo que os pólos do meridiano, indicam os pontos cardeais leste e oeste (Fig. 32). O ponto do meridiano que está na parte superior da esfera celeste é chamada de meio, cume ou fastígio do céu, esse mesmo ponto, em relação ao horizonte, é chamado de zênite. Já o ponto do meridiano que está na parte inferior da esfera celeste é denominado fim do céu, o qual, em relação ao horizonte, é chamado nadir. Van Roomen explica que o meridiano não pode ser classificado como sensível ou racioanal, nem como reto ou oblíquo. Diferente do horizonte, o meridiano é mais constante, ou seja, ele tem menos variações, pois todo meridiano passa pelos pólos do mundo, somente variando nas direções nascente e poente. Um exemplo, de que ele tem menos variações, é o fato de observadores localizados em posições diametralmente opostas na Terra, os quais, não tem o mesmo horizonte, mas tem o mesmo meridiano. Para finalizar, van Roomen enumera os quatro usos do meridiano. 1. O meridiano divide ao meio os espaços diurno e noturno da esfera celeste; 2. Representa o horizonte reto para todos aqueles que tem o horizonte oblíquo. Isso se justifica pelo fato de que qualquer meridiano passa pelos pólos do mundo e contém os eixos do mundo, do mesmo modo que o horizonte reto; Figura 32: Meridiano, eixo e pólos. 230 3. Contém a declinação das estrelas quando elas estão no meio-dia. De fato, pois o meridiano é um círculo horário do equador. Além disso, o ângulo medido sobre o meridiano desde o horizonte até o pólo celeste mostra a altitude do pólo. Essa altitude á igual a latitude terrestre do lugar em que o observador se encontra. 4. Numa quarta acepção, o meridiano ainda serve para determinar a longitude terrestre do local onde o observador se encontra. Quinto Capítulo Neste capítulo, van Roomen trata sobre o círculo vertical o qual passa pelos pólos do horizonte e do meridiano dividindo a esfera celeste em duas partes: a austral e a setentrional. O eixo do vertical é uma linha reta deitada sobre o plano do horizonte e os pólos dele são os pontos cadeais norte e sul. Os pólos do horizonte passam pelo vertical, assim como os pólos do vertical passam pelo horioznte, de modo que, os dois são interceptados por ângulos retos (Fig. 33). Segundo van Roomen, o nome vertical é usado pelo fato de que necessariamente ele cruza o ponto na esfera celeste acima de nossa cabeça. Além disso, van Roomen afirma que o vertical pode ser reto ou obliquo: 1. Reto: Será aquele vertical que cortar o eixo do mundo em ângulos retos, distando igualmente dos dois pólos do mundo. Para esse observador o eixo do mundo coincidirá com o eixo do vertical. Uma consequencia disso é que para ter um vertical reto, o observador terá que estar numa região de horizonte reto, pois em tais regiões o eixo do mundo estará deitado sobre o horizonte e, dessa forma, cortará o vertical em ângulos retos (Fig. 34). 2. Oblíquo: Estando numa região de horizonte obliquo, o vertical será obliquo, pois os eixos do mundo cortarão o plano do vertical obliquamente (Fig. 33). Figura 33: Vertical, eixo e pólos. Figura 34: Vertical reto. 231 O vertical tem três usos: 1. Distingue as altitudes acima do horizonte e as profundidades abaixo dele, setentrionais e austrais. 2. Mostra o ocidente e o oriente verdadeiro, ou seja, mostra a posição exata dos pontos cardeais leste e oeste, respectivamente. Os pontos cardeias leste e oeste estarão onde o vertical cortar o círculo do horizonte (Fig. 33). 3. Delimita a latitude de cada região. Para isso, basta calcular o ângulo entre o equador e o vertical. [...] Sétimo Capítulo Este é o primeiro capítulo que van Roomen tratará sobre alguns dos círculos menores do primeiro céu. Nesse caso, ele descreverá os círculos paralelos. Os círculos paralelos são aqueles que distam igualmente de algum círculo maior, ou seja, são paralelos de algum círculo maior. De modo geral, poderiam ser estabelecidos paralelos a qualquer círculo maior, mas comumente são atribuídos somente ao equador e ao horizonte. Os eixos e os pólos de um paralelo são os mesmos que o eixo e os pólos do círculo do qual são paralelos (Fig. 35). Os nomes de cada paralelo são dados a partir da sua distância em graus em relação ao círculoa maior do qual são paralelos. De modo geral, são atribuídos somente 90 paralelos na direção de um pólo do círculo maior – e outros 90 paralelos na direção do outro pólo – um paralelo para cada um dos 90° que dista do círculo maior. Mas, van Roomen escreve ainda que a quantidade de paralelos poderia ser muito mais numerosa se fossem considerados cada minuto de grau. Em seguida, van Roomen escreve sobre o único paralelo famoso do horizonte, o crepúsculino. Esse círculo está localizado há 18° abaixo do horizxonte e se diz crepusculino, pois quando o Sol está entre ele e o horizonte, ocorre o crepúsculo (Fig. 36). Figura 35: Equador, eixo, pólos e paralelos. 232 No terceiro livro, van Roomen descreverá os círculos que atualmente dizemos ser paralelos do equador – círculos polares ártico e antártico e trópicos de capricórnio e de câncer – mas que naquele período eram atribuídos ao círculo mediador do primeiro móvel. Os paralelos podem ser variáveis ou invariáveis, de acordo com a variabilidade do círculo grande do qual são paralelos, por exemplo: um paralelo do equador não é varíavel, contudo, os do horizonte são devido a sua variação em relação ao lugar onde o observador se encontra. Contudo, há alguns círculos paralelos do equador que são variáveis. Eles são paralelos ao equador, mas são definidos por algum outro círculo ou do primeiro céu ou do primeiro móvel. Para exemplificar, van Roomen escreve sobre os polares do horizonte e do vertical, que são paralelos do equador, mas que são variáveis devido as diferentes posições do observador sobre a Terra. 1. O polar do horizonte ou polar horizontal é aquele círculo paralelo ao equador que passa pelo pólo do horizonte ou tangente ao vertical (Fig. 37). Esse círculo tem dois usos: a. Nele estão os pólos das horas obliquas; b. Mostra as estrelas (i) boreais – aquelas que estão entre o pólo ártico e o círculo polar horizontal próximo – (ii) austrais – aquelas que estão entre o pólo antártico e o círculo polar horizontal próximo – e (iii) as comuns – aquelas que estão sentre os dois círculos polares horizontais – que ora são boreais, ora austrais. 2. O polar do vertical é aquele círculo paralelo do equador que passa pelo pólo do vertical ou tangente ao horizonte (Fig. 37). Esse círculo também tem dois usos: a. Delimita as horas; Figura 36: Círculo crepusculino. Figura 37: Polar horizontal e vertical. 233 b. Mostra as estrelas de (i) aparição perpétua – aquelas que estão entre o pólo elevado e o círculo polar do vertical próximo – as quais sempre estão acima do horizonte, e as de (ii) ocultação perpétua – aquelas que estão entre o pólo profundo e o círculo polar do vertical próximo – as quais sempre estão ocultas sob o horizonte (Fig. 31). Em seguida, van Roomen relaciona as distâncias e posições entre o equador e os pólos do mundo e os polares do horizonte e do vertical. 1. Observador no equador terrestre: Para tal observador, o horizonte é reto. A distância entre o seu horizonte e o polar horizontal será de 90°, de modo que, o polar do horizonte será somente um ponto que conincide com os pólos do mundo. Além disso, para esse mesmo observador, o círculo polar do vertical coincidirá com o equador celeste. 2. Observador nos pólos: Para tais habitantes, a distância entre o seu vertical e o polar do vertical será de 90°, de modo que, o polar do vertical será somente um ponto. Além do mais, para esse mesmo habitante, o seu horizonte coincidirá com o equador. 3. Observador há 45° dos pólos ou do equador: Para esse observador, um círculo polar (tanto do horizonte, quanto do vertical) dista do pólo do mundo em 45°, consequentemente, o outro polar (do vertical ou do horizonte, respectivamente) também distará do pólo em 45°. Quando a distância entre o pólo do mundo e um polar (do horizonte ou do vertical) aumentar, então a distância entre o pólo do mundo e ou outro polar (do vertical ou do horizonte, respectivamente) diminuirá. Os círculos paralelos do equador que são mutáveis com relação a algum círculo do primeiro móvel serão tratados no terceiro livro. 234 Comentários ao Terceiro Livro da Ouranographia Como é possível observar em nossa trasncrição e tradução, van Roomen não mostra em sua Ouranographia nenhuma figura da organização e ordem das esferas celestes, mas conforme está escrito no décimo sexto capítulo do primeiro livro, ele mostra a partir de um diagrama que o Universo é composto por onze esferas, todas concêntricas, tendo como centro a Terra. De baixo para cima a ordem das esferas é a seguinte: a primeira esfera é da Lua, a segunda de Mercúrio, a terceira de Vênus, a quarta do Sol, a quinta de Marte, a sexta de Júpiter, a sétima de Saturno, a oitava o firmamento, a nona o cristalino, a décima o primeiro móvel e a undécima o céu empíreo. Esta última esfera, o céu empíreo – sobre o qual comentamos no segundo livro – segundo a ilustração da Cosmographia de Petrus Apianus, é a "habitação de Deus e de todos os eleitos", enquanto que, as outras dez esferas são céus etéreos, sendo que "o primeiro móvel é o orbe [etéreo] mais externo de todos os móveis". Essa ordenação dos orbes dada por van Roomen não foi comum a todos os astrônomos ao longo da história, como também já comentamos. Ele mesmo compara os sistemas de mundo de diferentes autores entre os capítulos dezesseis e dezoito do primeiro livro. Na cosmologia renascentista, para aqueles estudiosos que acreditavam que a Terra estava no centro do Universo, o primeiro móvel, localizado abaixo do primeiro céu, era considerado o responsável pelo movimento das nove esferas abaixo dele, daí o nome de primeiro móvel e é sobre essa esfera e seus círculos que van Roomen trata em seu terceiro livro da Ouranographia. Capítulo Primeiro O primeiro capítulo, Posição, movimento e círculos do primeiro móvel, dá uma visão geral do que é essa esfera. Para van Roomen e diversos estudiosos do período, esse céu é o mais externo de todos os céus móveis e nele não há estrelas, mas somente movimento. Tal movimento é trasnmitido às esferas inferiores, de forma que elas se movimentam a partir do movimento exercido pelo primeiro móvel. Tal movimento não é qualquer, mas um movimento simples, circular, usando as palavras de van Roomen "é um movimento velocíssimo" e que dá um giro completo em 24 horas, por esse motivo, costuma ser chamado diurno. E conforme esse movimento é transmitido às esferas inferiores, ele perde velocidade, de modo que a esfera da Lua demora quase 28 dias para completar uma volta. E por que esse movimento é transmitido às esferas inferiores, por ser simples e por ser anterior aos restantes, ele é chamado primeiro movimento. 235 Este movimento é realizado do nascente ao poente e, além disso, é uniforme e regular, pois não muda de velocidade nem direção ao longo do tempo. O eixo do primeiro móvel é o mesmo eixo do mundo, ou seja, é o mesmo do primeiro céu estudado no segundo livro. Segundo van Roomen os círculos do primeiro móvel são de dois tipos: 1. Primários: Aqueles que são únicos. Estes são dois: a. O mediador [Segundo Capítulo]; b. O zodíaco {Terceiro ao Sexto Capítulo]; 2. Secundários: Aqueles que são múltiplos. Estes podem ser de dois tipos: a. Círculos menores: como por exemplo os paralelos do mediador e do zodíaco [Sétimo Capítulo]; b. Círculos maiores: por exemplo, os traspolares do mediador e do zodíaco [Oitavo Capítulo]. Segundo Capítulo Nesse capítulo, van Roomen trata sobre o círculo do mediador, mas segundo as palavras dele, não são necessários maiores explicações sobre ele, pois o mediador tem as mesmas características do equador do primeiro céu e sua única diferença seria a mobilidade, pois o mediador é móvel por estar ligado ao primeiro móvel, enquanto que o equador é fixo, pois está no primeiro céu. Ele recebe o nome demediador, pois todas as esferas inferiores estão ligadas ao primeiro móvel mediante ele. Terceiro Capítulo Nesse capítulo – e nos próximos três – van Roomen descreve o zodíaco, seus nomes e suas divisões. O zodíaco é um círculo maior – é chamado de círculo erroneamente, pois, na verdade, é uma faixa com 12° de largura e não uma linha circular – que está situado obliquamente em relação aos pólos do mundo. Ele corta o mediador em duas metades iguais, uma parte inclinada para a região austral e outra para a setentrional (Fig. 38). Van Roomen cita diversos nomes e obras para mostrar a diversidade dos nomes atribuídos ao zodíaco desde a Antiguidade. Começa pelos nomes gregos os quais designam o zodíaco como algo relacionado a vida ou aos animais. O primeiro caso se justifica pelo fato de que todos os planetas fazem seu movimento sob o zodíaco, e a vida das coisas inferiores é 236 proveniente de tal movimento. O segundo caso é relacionado aos animais pelo fato de todos os signos terem nomes de ou relativo aos animais, com exceção de libra. Em seguida, ele menciona as denominações astrológicas de "signos racionais" – pessoas que nascem sob estes signos são mais racionais do que emotivas – e "signos silvestres" – aqueles que nascem nesses signos são pessoas solitárias. Van Roomen não se dedica a trazer mais explicações astrológicas para os signos. É importante mencionar que para os astrólogos, não somente os signos têm influência sobre as atitudes, pensamentos e hábitos das pessoas, mas dizem que os planetas e os elementos também exercem diversas influências, contudo, aqui também não nos dedicaremos a explicações astrológicas28. Por causa de dois motivos, Higino, Virgílio e Aristóteles chamam o zodíaco de círculo oblíquo: primeiro porque ele faz um ângulo obliquo com o mediador e outro, consequência do primeiro, porque o movimento diurno dele é obliquo. Dentre outros diversos nomes, os latinos, como Plínio e Claudianus, o chamam signífero; Marco Tulio Cìcero orbe signífero; Lucano pólo signifero; Manílio cinturão estrelado ou faixa; os árabes, como Alkabitio, nitach. Segundo van Roomen, a causa da obliquidade do zodíaco em relação ao mediador são duas: 1. Porque os planetas inclinam-se contra o movimento do primeiro móvel; 2. Como o zodíaco é a causa da vida na Terra, sendo assim, para que haja mudança nos climas, ele se inclina na direção do austro e do setentrião para "visitar todos os habitantes da Terra". Quarto Capítulo No quarto capítulo, van Roomen tratará da elcíptica, a qual divide o zodíaco na direção das latitudes ao meio em duas partes iguais, uma setentrional, outra austral. 28 Para maiores informações sobre os signos e a astrologia leia An Introduction to Astrology (LILLY, 1852). Figura 38: O Zodíaco e sua posição com relação ao mediador e à ecliptica. 237 Esse círculo recebe este nome, pois os eclipeses tanto solares quanto lunares só ocorrem quando ambos os astros estão ao mesmo tempo sob esse círculo. Também é nomeado lugar eclíptico (por Cleomedes), caminho, órbita, trajetória, caminho do Sol, trajetória solar. Esses últimos nomes são devidos ao fato de que a trajetória anual do Sol sempre ocorre sob esse círculo. Segundo van Roomen, naquele tempo a eclíptica – assim como a faixa do zodíaco – tinha um ângulo de inclinação em relação ao mediador de 23°31'25", mas normalmente os autores colocam como aproximadamente 23,5°. Atualmente o ângulo de inclinação é de 23°26'21,418" (OLIVEIRA FILHO; SARAIVA, 2004). Segundo van Roomen, a eclíptica tem quatro usos astronômicos: 1. Usa-se este círculo para encontrar a latitude e a longitude das estrelas e dos planetas; 2. Mostra o caminho anual do Sol; 3. Mostra o lugar onde ocorrem os eclipses solares e lunares; 4. O lugar onde todas as esferas inferiores estão presas ao primeiro móvel. [...] 239 CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS A partir da tradução, das notas e dos comentários à Ouranographia de van Roomen é possível chegar a algumas considerações sobre este estudo. Para iniciar minha análise final, quero colocar uma questão: Que descrição dos céus a uranografia (tanto como disciplina matemática do século XVI, quanto na obra de van Roomen) traz? A etimologia da palavra uranografia, como é trazida nos dicionários, deixa vago o entendimento do que pode ser tratado em uma obra sobre esse assunto. Para tentar aprofundar a discussão, quero repetir o trecho do terceiro capítulo da primeira parte da Mathesis Polemica, na qual van Roomen diferencia duas das disciplinas matemáticas: a astronomia e a uranografia: A astronomia é a ciência do movimento dos corpos celestes. A uranografia distingue o céu em suas partes, tanto sensíveis, quanto inteligíveis: Sensíveis são as estrelas e a via láctea; mas, inteligíveis são as esferas e os círculos. A uranografia é uma parte à frente da astronomia, na verdade, também é a principal (ROOMEN, 1605, tradução e colchetes nossos)29. Como podemos perceber, para van Roomen, a uranografia tem um papel principal frente à astronomia. Ao se preocupar com as distinções entre partes sensíveis e inteligíveis dos céus, está bastante ligada a conceitos filosóficos. Os conceitos de sensibilidade e inteligibilidade foram utilizados largamente nas obras de Aristóteles e de inúmeros seguidores de sua doutrina e, como dissemos anteriormente, servem para distinguir aquilo que pode ser percebido pelos sentidos humanos, daquilo que só pode ser objeto do intelecto, tanto na astronomia, quanto nas diversas ciências. Com relação às coisas sensíveis existentes na região supralunar, van Roomen comenta sobre a matéria e forma delas nos primeiros capítulos do primeiro livro. Para ele, tais entes são corpos simples, compostos de uma quinta essência, diferente dos quatro elementos terrestres. As partículas desse quinto elemento que compõem cada corpo celeste podem estar mais próximos ou mais distantes entre si, o que ele denomina densidade ou raridade, respectivamente. As partes mais densas de um corpo tornam-se visíveis para nós aqui da Terra, como as estrelas e os planetas, mas as partes menos densas não podem ser vistas. Como essas não são vistas, são objetos do intelecto humano; elas não são sensíveis, pelo menos 29 O trecho em latim é: "Astronomia scientia est motus corporum caelestium. Ouranographia coelum in suas partes distinguit tum sensibilis, tum intelligibiles. Sensibilies sunt stellae & via láctea, intelligibiles vero spaerae & circuli. Est porro Ouranographia pars Astronomiae, & quidem prima". 240 segundo a visão, mas são inteligíveis. A Via Láctea seria um caso intermediário entre uma estrela (parte densa) e uma região não vista do universo (parte rarefeita). É interessante notar também que as explicações sobre raridade e densidade no pensamento aristotélico nos remetem às discussões histórico-filosóficas sobre o atomismo, conforme comentamos anteriormente. O conceito de inteligibilidade aplicado aos corpos celestes também é utilizado por van Roomen para explicar a existência, por exemplo, do primeiro céu, imóvel, que não possui nem estrelas, nem planetas, local criado pelos teólogos e filósofos com a intenção de colocar nele as coisas divinas. Para um cientista atual, esta afirmação pareceria algo fictício, mais ligada a crenças populares ou religiosas, mas para um astrônomo daquele período, a explicação para a existência desse céu – mesmo que seja ligada a teologia, que pregava a existência de um lugar divino e supremo, onde habitaria Deus, seus anjos e todos aqueles eleitos por Ele – não é fictícia, mas real. As explicações para as coisas divinas ligadas à teologia, não são somente assuntos para teólogos da Antiguidade, mas também são trazidas inúmeras discussões por grandes filósofos. Outro assunto tratado demasiadamente por van Roomen, são as explicações para os movimentos das esferas celestes. Segundo ele, o primeiro móvel é o responsável por todos os movimentos restantes e, cada esfera, ao estar ligada à superior, gira e é girada ao mesmo tempo. A única esfera que possui movimento próprio, não influenciado por outra esfera, é o primeiro móvel. Ao tratar de movimentos, parece que entramos no âmbito da disciplina da astronomia citada por van Roomen na obra Mathesis Polemica. A astronomia, ao se preocupar com os movimentos dos corpos celestes, não deixa de estar ligada à filosofia, contudo, para van Roomen, a astronomia não está preocupada com as causas filosóficas de tais movimentos, mas (i) com que movimentos cada esfera e corpos celestes realizam; (ii) como vemos tais movimentos nas diferentes regiões da Terra; (iii) como se explica matematicamente tais movimentos; e (iv) que usos cada movimento pode ter no dia-a-dia, por exemplo, marcar as horas, mostrar a latitude ou longitude de um lugar, dentre outras características que não convém detalhar. A primeira parte da Ouranographia, em minha opinião, mesmo que contenha um aparato astronômico considerável, está mais ligada ao que van Roomen denomina de uranografia. Nela, ele também se mostra um grande filósofo aristotélico, conhecedor das obras dele e, mesmo que escreveu em pequena escala sobre outras opiniões filosóficas, também demonstra-se sabedor de diversas ideias sobre o assunto. 241 Não podemos deixar de mencionar que van Roomen conhece não só aquilo que denominamos filosofia Antiga e Medieval, mas também grandes obras literárias, como as de Cìcero e de Virgílio, teológicas, como as de Tomás de Aquino, e até mesmo, astrológicas. Van Roomen, na segunda e terceira partes da Ouranographia, dedica-se principalmente a explanações sobre os círculos do primeiro céu e do primeiro móvel, respectivamente. Mesmo que nos capítulos iniciais de cada parte e em algum outro trecho cite obras filosóficas, nessas partes ele parece bem mais interessado em astronomia, no sentido de explicar os movimentos e os usos de cada um dos círculos, do que na uranografia, no sentido de tentar buscar uma causa filosófica sobre a inteligibilidade ou a sensibilidade deles. Agora quero retomar alguns assuntos tratados nos capítulos da Primeira Parte desta dissertação, principalmente aqueles abordados no Capítulo 1. A princípio, quero afirmar que não tenho a intenção de delimitar em que ano começa e termina a Idade Média, o Renascimento e a Idade Moderna, mas somente comentar sobre algumas características que os historiadores atribuem a tais períodos e tentar inserir van Roomen e sua obra nelas. Durante a Idade Média, mais especificamente nos séculos XIII e XIV, surgiram as primeiras universidades na Europa. Nelas, o ensino geralmente era concentrado inicialmente nas Artes Liberais: primeiro estudava-se as disciplinas do trivium – gramática, retórica e dialética – e, em seguida, as do quadirvium – aritmética, música, geometria e astronomia. Essas quatro últimas, conforme também já dissemos, foram chamadas por diversos estudiosos "disciplinas matemáticas". As Artes Liberais tinham como fonte principal para seus estudos as obras da Antiguidade, principalmente as de Aristóteles. Os estudos das Artes Liberais eram seguidos por outra fase em que os estudantes decidiam seguir entre três carreiras superiores: o direito, a medicina ou a teologia. Para alguns autores, o Renascimento, mesmo com as diferenças dependendo da época e região em que se toma como ponto de partida, possui algumas características próprias. As mudanças significativas no esquema de ensino medieval fez com que durante o Renascimento e, posteriormente, na Idade Moderna, as universidades passassem a ter um papel menos importante para muitos estudiosos e surgissem outros locais onde os estudos e pesquisas se desenvolvessem com muito mais força. As cortes, por exemplo, foram centros importantes de pesquisa. Tycho Brahe, apesar de ter feito seus estudos iniciais nas Universidades de Copenhague e Leipzig, teve seu maior desenvolvimento científico no tempo em que esteve a serviço de Frederico II da Dinamarca e de Rudolph II da Hungria. Tal atividade é chamada de mecenato, onde um burguês, na intenção de vangloriar as suas cortes, financiava artistas ou cientistas. 242 Outro local de desenvolvimento científico importante no Renascimento foram os colégios jesuítas. O Colégio Romano, onde Christoph Clavius foi professor e diretor durante a maior parte de sua vida, foi um importante centro de formação e de estudos e diversos nomes importantes para a ciência jesuíta se desenvolveram ali. A formação inicial de van Roomen se deu justamente em um colégio jesuíta, o da cidade de Colônia na Alemanha, e sua formação superior em medicina ocorreu nas Universidades de Louvian e de Bolonha. Durante o Renascimento, entre os intelectuais, o interesse maior era a visão antropocêntrica de mundo, deixando de lado o teocentrismo medieval. Não podemos dizer que as questões religiosas foram abandonadas, mas o centro das atenções com certeza foram as ciências, as artes e a técnica. Com relação à área da matemática durante o Renascimento, Bockstaele (1976) arrola três atributos típicos para caracterizar os matemáticos renascentistas. Segundo ele (BOCKSTAELE, 1976), os matemáticos daquele período tiveram como interesses principais: (i) a redescoberta dos trabalhos matemáticos da Antiga Grécia, (ii) as relações entre Matemática e outras áreas da ciência e (iii) as práticas científicas. (i) Na Ouranographia, é possível perceber através de seus comentários sobre obras da Antiguidade, que ele tem um grande interesse sobre o assunto. Ele mostra-se um conhecedor profundo do aristotelismo e de outras doutrinas filosóficas Antigas. Além disso, como foi possível perceber nos estudos sobre a Correspondência com Clavius (GONÇALVES; OLIVEIRA, 2007), ele frequenta assiduamente as feiras de livro de Frankfurt para ficar inteirado do que está sendo publicado naquele momento, se interessa por aprender diversas línguas, tanto às clássicas, quanto as vernáculas, provavelmente a fim de poder ler não somente obras da Antiguidade, mas também traduções e comentários nas diferentes línguas. Ainda no que diz respeito à esse ponto, van Roomen publicou algumas obras matemáticas em que seu intuito era comentar obras de grandes autores da Antiguidade, por exemplo, a obra In Archimedis circuli dimensionem de 1597 (GONÇALVES; OLIVEIRA, 2010). (ii) Naquele período, a palavra "matemática" tinha um uso muito amplo, podendo ser atribuída a diversas disciplinas, não somente às do quadrivium, mas a um número bem grande de disciplinas que variava de acordo com a interpretação de cada estudioso (BERTATO, 2010; MOTA, 2008; ROOMEN, 1605). A uranografia, tema da obra objeto de estudo desta dissertação, é justamente uma dessas disciplinas matemáticas, como mostramos anteriormente. 243 (iii) As práticas científicas não foram abordadas por van Roomen em sua Ouranographia, mas a sua Correspondência atesta alguns interesses pelas práticas científicas relacionadas à matemática (GONÇALVES; OLIVEIRA, 2010). Ainda nos remetendo ás discussões sobre o interesse de van Roomen pelo aristotelismo, é interessante comentar sobre o trecho do primeiro capítulo do primeiro livro em que chama Aristóteles de "O Filósofo". Alguns autores medievais que se embasavam justamente na doutrina peripatética também tinham tal costume. Até no modo como van Roomen se propõe a provar ou demonstrar suas afirmações, muitas vezes ele segue o esquema silogístico de Aristóteles. Van Roomen se interessou imensamente pelos estudos matemáticos, contudo, ele dedicou sua vida profissional principalmente ao ensino de medicina, sendo professor nesta área nas Universidades de Wurceburgo e de Louvian. Dentre o enorme número de trabalhos publicado durante sua vida, a maior parte desses livros foram publicações de teses em conjunto com seus alunos (cf. Anexo). Contudo, a partir das obras e da atividade profissional exercida por van Roomen, é um assunto delicado afirmar que ele foi um astrônomo, um médico ou mesmo um matemático. O mais correto, em minha opinião, é afirmar que ele teve seu papel como estudioso ou como homem de saber renascentista. Sua ligação com estudiosos influentes daquele período o torna uma pessoa importante para que seja dada continuidade nos estudos sobre sua vida e obra. A Ouranographia de van Roomen também merece um tempo maior de dedicação, pois ela mostra não somente boa parte do que havia sido publicado sobre astronomia até aquele tempo, mas também uma visão geral sobre o pensamento aristotélico relacionado aos corpos celestes. Os assuntos aqui discutidos por mim devem ser melhor estudados e elaborados, por isso, apresentei aqui somente algumas considerações, nenhuma das minhas afirmativas tiveram alguma ideia conclusiva. 245 REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS ABBAGNANO, Nicola. Dicionário de Filosofia. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2007. APIANUS, Petrus. Cosmographia. Antuérpia: Christopher Plantin, 1531. AQUINO, Tomás de. Suma Teológica. São Paulo: Loyola, v. 2, 2003. _____________. Commento alla Fisica di Aristotele e Testo Integrale di Aristotele. Bolonha: Edizioni Studio Domenicano, v. 1, 2004. ARISTÓTELES. Física. Trad. y Notas de Guilhermo R. de Echandía. Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1995. _____________. Acerca del Cielo; Meteorológicos. Introd., Trad. y Notas de Miguel Candel. Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1996. _____________. Da geração e da Corrupção seguido de Convite à Filosofia. Trad. de Renata Maria Parreira Cordeiro. Apres. de Ana Maria Alfonso Goldfarb. São Paulo: Landy Editora, 2001. _____________. Metafísica. Introd., Trad. e Com. de Giovanni Reale. São Paulo: Loyola, 3 vols., 2005. _____________. De Anima. Apres., Trad. e Notas de Maria Cecília Gomes dos Reis. São Paulo: Editora 34, 2006. _____________. Física I e II. Pref., Introd., Trad. e Com. de Lucas Angioni. Campinas: Editora da UNICAMP, 2009. AVIENUS, Rufus Festus. Phénomènes et Pronostics d'Aratus, 1843. Disponível em: <http://remacle.org/bloodwolf/erudits/avienus/phenomenes.htm> Acesso em: 24 nov. 2011. AVERRÓIS. Exposição sobre a Substância do Orbe. Trad. Anna Lia A. de Almeida Prado e Rosalie Helena de Souza Pereira. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 2006. BERTATO, Fabio Maia. A "De Divina Proportione" de Luca Pacioli. Tradução anotada e comentada. Coleção CLE, v. 56. Campinas: UNICAMP, 2010. BIEN, Reinhold. Viète's Controversy with Clavius Over the Truly Gregorian Calendar. In: Archive for the History of Exact Science, v. 61, p. 39-66, 2007. BITTAR, Eduardo Carlos Bianca. Curso de Filosofia Aristotélica: leitura e interpretação do pensamento aristotélico. Barueri: Manole. 2003. BOCKSTAELE, Paul Petrus. Roomen, Adriaan van. In: Nationaal Biografisch Woordenboek. Bruxelas. v. 2, p.751-755, 1966. 246 _____________. The Correspndence of Adriaan van Roomen. In: LIAS – Sources and Documents Relating to the Early Modern History of the Ideas. Amsterdã: Holland University Press, v. 3, p. 85-129 e 249-299, 1976. _____________. Adrianus Romanus and Giovanni Camilo Glorioso on Isoperimetric figures. In: DAUBEN, J. W. Mathematical Perpectives: essays on mathematics and its historical development. New York: Academic Press, p. 1-11, 1981. _____________, Adrianus Romanus and the Trigonometric Tables of Georg Joachim Rheticus. In: DEMIDOV, S. S. et al (ed.). Amphora: Festschrift für Hans Wussing zu seinem 65. Basel: Birkhäuser, p. 55-66, 1992. _____________. The Correspndence of Adriaan van Roomen – Corrections and Additions. In: LIAS – Sources and Documents Relating to the Early Modern History of the Ideas. Amsterdã: Holland University Press, v. 19, p. 3-20, 1992a. _____________. Between Viète and Descartes: Adriaan van Roomen and the Mathesis Universalis. In: Archive for History of Exact Sciences, v. 63, n. 4, p. 433-470, 2009. BOCZKO, Roberto. Conceitos de Astronomia. São Paulo: Edgard Blücher, 1984. BUSARD, H. L. L. Roomen, Adriaan van, In: GILLISPIE, C. C. (ed.). Dictionary of Scientific Biography. New York: Scribner. v. 11, p. 532-534, 1981. CARTWRIGHT, R. L. Aquinas on What Could Have Been. In: Noûs. v. 30, Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, 10, Metaphysics, p. 447-458, 1996. CÍCERO. Da República. Coleção "Ridendo Castigat Mores". Nélson Jahr Garcia (Org.), 2000. E-book disponível em: <http://virtualbooks.terra.com.br/freebook/colecaoridendo/da_republica.htm>. Acesso em: 04 set. 2011. CLAESSENS, Guy. "Clavius, Proclus, and the Limits of Interpretations: SnapshotIdealization versus Projectionism", Hist. Sci. n. 47, 2009. CLAUDIANUS. Claudian. Trad. Maurice Platinauer. Série The Loeb Classical Library. Latin Authors, v. 12. Cambridge, Mass: Harward University Press, 1972. COPÉRNICO, Nicolau. As Revoluções dos Orbes Celestes. Trad. de A. Dias Gomes e Gabriel Domingues. 2a Ed. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 1996. FANNING, W. Chapter. In: The Catholic Encyclopedia. New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1908. Disponível em New Advent: <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03582b.htm>. Acesso em: 13 nov. 2011. FARIA, Ernesto. Dicionário Escolar Latino-Português. Rio de Janeiro: Ministério da Educação e Cultura, 1956. 247 FERNANDES, Marcelo Vieira. Manílio: Astronômicas. Dissertação de Mestrado. São Paulo: Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas da Universidade de São Paulo, 2006. FILOPONUS, Joannes. In Procli Diadochi Duodeviginti Argumenta. Lion: Nicolaus Edoardus, 1557. GENOVESI, Antonio. Disciplinarum Metaphysicarum Elementa. Veneza: Thomam Bettinelli, 1786. GONÇALVES, Carlos Henrique Barbosa; OLIVEIRA, Zaqueu Vieira. Geometria, Reforma e Contra-Reforma na Carta de 1 de julho de 1597, de Adriaan van Roomen para Clavius. In: Circumscribere – International Journal for the History of Science. v. 3, p. 11-19, 2007. Disponível em: <http://revistas.pucsp.br/index.php/circumhc>. Acesso em: 26 mar. 2011. _____________. A Atividade Matemática de Adriaan van Roomen. In: Revista Brasileira de História da Matemática. v. 10, n. 20, p. 151-168, 2010. GRANT, Edward. Celestial Orbs in the Latin Middle Ages. In: Isis. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. v. 78, n. 2, p. 152-173, 1987. _____________. Planets, Stars and Orbs: The Medieval Cosmos, 1200-1687. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2 v., 1996. GRATTI, Beatris Riberio. Sobre a Adivinhação, de Marco Túlio Cìcero. Dissertação de Mestrado. Campinas: Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem da Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 2009. HALLYN, Fernand. A Poem on the Copernican System: Cornelius Gemma and his Cosmocritical Art. In: HIRAI, Hiro (ed.) Cornelius Gemma: Cosmology, Medicine and Natural Philosophy in Renaissance Louvain. Suplemento de Bruniana & Campanelliana, 10, Pisa-Roma: Fabrizio Serra, 2008. HENRICUS Cuyckius (1546-1606). Bisdom Roermond. Disponível em: <http://www.bisdomroermond.nl/single/index.php?ID=545> Acesso em: 27 jul. 2011. HESÍODO. Teogonia: a Origem dos Deuses. Est. e Trad. Jaa Torrano. São Paulo: Iluminuras, 1995. HISTORY of K. U. Leuven. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. Louvain, 21 set. 2009. Disponível em: <http://www.kuleuven.be/about/history.html>. Acesso em: 20 mar. 2011. KUHN, Thomas Samuel. A Revolução Copernicana: a astronomia planetária no desenvolvimento do pensamento ocidental. Lisboa: Edições 70, 1990. LAKMANN, Marie-Luise. Der Platoniker Tauros in der Darstellung des Aulus Gellius. Leiden-New York: E. J. Brill, 1994. LATIN Library, The. Disponível em: < http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/index.html> Acesso em: 15 out. 2011. 248 LATTIS, James M. Between Copernicus and Galileo: Christoph Clavius and the Collapse of Ptolomaic Cosmology. Chicago-London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994. LILLY, William. An Introduction to Astrology. Primeira impressão em 1647. London: Forgotten Books, 1852. LINTON, Christopher M. From Eudoxus to Einstein: a History of Mathematical Astronomy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. MACHIELSEN, Jan. How (not) to Get Published: The Plantin Press in the Early 1590. In: Dutch Crossing. v. 34, n. 2, p. 99-114, 2010. MACROBIUS, Ambrosius Aurelius Theodosius. Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis. Edidit Iacobus Willis. Série Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana. Stutgardiae e Lipsiae: In aedibus B. G. Teubneri, v. 2, 1963. MANCOSU, Paolo. Philosophy of Mathematics and Mathematical Practice in the Seventeenth Century. New York – Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. MAOR, Eli. The New Cosmology. In: To Infinity and Beyond: A Cultural History of the Infinite. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 190-198, 2006. MARTINS, Roberto de Andrade. A herança de Sacrobosco e seus comentadores: desenvolvimentos e erros na astronomia geocêntrica do século XVI. In: MARTINS, Roberto de Andrade; SILVA, Cibelle Celestino; FERREIRA, Juliana Mesquita Hidalgo; MARTINS, Lilian Al-Chueyr Pereira (orgs.). Filosofia e História da Ciência no Cone Sul. Seleção de Trabalhos do 5o Encontro. Campinas: Associação de Filosofia e História da Ciência do Cone Sul (AFHIC), p. 373-382, 2008. MORA, José Ferrater. Dicionário de Filosofia. São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 4 vols, 2001. MOTA, Bernardo Machado. O Estatuto da Matemática em Portugal nos Séculos XVI e XVII. Tese de Doutorado em Estudos Clássicos. Universidade de Lisboa, 2008. MOURA, Elmha Coelho Martins; OLIVEIRA, Zaqueu Vieira. O Método de Integração de Kepler. In: Anais do IX Seminário Nacional de História da Matemática. Aracaju: UFS, 2011. Disponível em: <http://www.each.usp.br/ixsnhm/Anaisixsnhm/index.php> Acesso em: 25 jul. 2011. MURACHCO, France Y. Cícero e o Timeu. Dissertação de Mestrado. São Paulo: Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas da Universidade de São Paulo, 2004. NAPIER, Macvey (ed.). The Encyclopedia Britannica: na dictionary of arts, sciences, literature and general information. Edinburgh: A & C Black, v. 7, 1842. NUNES, Pedro. Obras: Tratado da Sphera e Astronomici Introductorii de Spaera Epitome. Lisboa: Academia das Ciências de Lisboa e Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2002. 249 OLIVEIRA, Zaqueu Vieira. Vida e Obra de Adriaan van Roomen. In: Anais do IX Seminário Nacional de História da Matemática. Aracaju: UFS, 2011. Disponível em: <http://www.each.usp.br/ixsnhm/Anaisixsnhm/index.php> Acesso em: 25 jul. 2011. OLIVEIRA FILHO, Kepler de Souza; SARAIVA, Maria de Fátima Oliveira. Astronomia e Astrofísica. São Paulo: Editora Livraria da Fìsica, 2004. Também disponível em: <http://astro.if.ufrgs.br/> Acesso em: 14 nov. 2011. PERERA, Benito. De Communibus Omnium Rerum Naturalium Principiis & Affectionibus. Paris: Micaèlem Sonnium, 1579. PLATÃO. Diálogos – Filebo, Timeo, Crítias. Trad., Introd. y Notas Maria Ángeles Durán y Francisco Lisi. Madrid: Gredos, 1992. _____________. Timeu-Crítias. Trad., Introd. e Notas de Rodolfo Lopes. Coimbra: Centro de Estudos Clássicos e Humanísticos da Universidade de Coimbra, 2011. PLOTINO. The Six Eneads. Montana: Kessinger Publishing, 2004. ROOMEN, Adriaan van. Ouranographia sive Caeli Descriptio. Antuérpia: Johannes Keerbergius, 1591. _____________. Ideae Mathematicae Pars Prima. Antuérpia: Johannes Keerbergius, 1593. _____________. Mathesis Polemica. Frankfurt: Lavinio Hulsi, 1605. ROSS, David. Aristotle. Introd. de John L. Ackrill. London – New York: Routeledge, 6a ed., 1995. ROSSI, Paolo. A Ciência e a Filosofia dos Modernos: Aspectos da Revolução Científica. Trad. Álvaro Lorencini. São Paulo: Editora da UNESP, 1992. _____________. O Nascimento da Ciência Moderna na Europa. Bauru: EDUSC, 2001. RUGGINI, Lellia Cracco. Economia e Società nell'"Italia annonaria": raporti fra agicoltura e commercio dal IV al VI secolo. Milão: Edipuglia, 1995. RULAND, Anton. Adrien Romanus Premier Professor à la Faculté de Médicine de Würzbourg. In: Le Bibliophile Belge, v. 2, p. 56-100, 161-187, 256-269, 1867. SACROBOSCO, Johannes de. Tratado da Esfera. Trad. de Pedro Nunes e Carlos Ziller Camenietzi. São Paulo: Editora da UNESP, 1991. SILVA, Luciano Pererira da. A Astronomia de "Os Lusíadas". Lisboa: Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, 1972. Também disponível em: <http://cvc.institutocamoes.pt/bdc/pensamento/astronomialusiadas/> Acesso em: 21 nov. 2011. SILVA, Francisco Ribeiro da. Filipe II de Espanha, Rei de Portugal: coletânea de documentos filipinos em arquivos portugueses. Zamora: Fundación Rei Afonso Henriques, 2000. 250 SIX Centuries of History. Universitè Catholique de Louvain. Louvain, 9 nov. 2006. Disponível em: <http://www.uclouvain.be/en-814.html>. Acesso em: 20 mar. 2011. TRADITION with Perspectives, A. Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg. Wurceburgo, 4 mar. 2010. Disponível em: <http://www.uniwuerzburg.de/en/ueber/university_of_wuerzburg/history/>. Acesso em: 20 mar. 2011. VERGER, Jacques. Homens e Saber na Idade Média. Bauru: EDUSC, 1999. VIRGÍLIO. The Georgics of Virgil. Trad. Arthur S. Way. Londres: Macmillan and Co., 1912. Disponível em: < http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/1174>. Acesso em: 28 abr. 2011. 251 Anexo LISTA DAS OBRAS DE ADRIAAN VAN ROOMEN Baseado no artigo "Adrien Romanus Premier Professor à la Faculté de Médicine de Würzbourg", publicado no segundo volume do periódico Le Bibliophile Belge (RULAND, 1867), abaixo estão listadas os títulos originais das obras de van Roomen por ordem de publicação. 1 (Sem data) – Canon triangulorum rectangulorum tam sphaericorum, quam rectilineorum, methodo brevíssima eaque facillima comprehensa, authore A. Romano Medico et Mathematico. 2 (Sem data) – Tabula quadratorum et cuborum. 3 (1591) – Ouranographia sive caeli descriptio. In qua praeter alia, caelorum numerus et ordo methodo inquiruntur, omniaque ea quae ad primum caelum, primumque móbile ab eo distinctum spectant dilucide explicantur, nominibusque apte fictis distinguuntur. Opus omnibus astronomiae physicaeque studiosis utilissimum, authore D. Adriano Romano in alma Louvaniensi academia, medicinae et mathematices professore. – Antverpiae, apud Joannem Keerbergium typographum juratum, anno M. D. XCI. Cum gratia et privilegio. 4 (1593) – Ideae mathematicae pars prima, sive methodus polygonorum qua laterum, perimetrorum et arearum cujuscunque polygoni investigandorum ratio exactissima et certíssima, uma cum circuli quadratura continentur. Authore Adriano Romano Louvaniensi Medico et mathematico. – Antwerpiae apud Joannem Keerbergium. Anno CIƆ. IƆ. XCIII. 5 (1594) – Disputatio medica de humoribus quam sub initio anni millesimi quingentesimi nonagesimi quarti Februarij in celebri ac orthodoxa Herbipolensium Academia, pro virili defendere conabitur ingenuus ac eruditus Liberalium artium ac Philosophiae Magister Paulus Stromair Ingolstadiensis, sub praesidio Expertissimi 252 Doctissimique viri D. Adriani Romani medicinae Professoris ordinarii. – Herbipoli, e typographio Georgii Fleischmanni, anno 1594. 6 (1594) – Disputatio medica et physica de Elementis quam anno Christi 1594, Pridie cal. Septembr. Dei Opt. Max. Adjuvante gratia, in catholica et celebérrima Herbipolensi Universitate Praeside Clarissimo Viro D. Adriano Romano medicinae doctore et professore ordinário, pro acquirendo primo medicinae gradu defendet Heuningus Scheuneman Halberstadiensis Saxo. – Wirceburgi, apud Georgium Fleischmann, anno 1594. 7 (1594) – Theoria Calendariorum quam contra quoscumque impugnare volentes in catholica et celeberrima Herbipolensi Academia praeside clarissimo viro A. Romano L. E. A., defendet nobilis et eruditus Juvenis Adamus Swinarski cathedralis Ecclesiae Posnaniae canonicus. – Wirceburgi qpus Georgium Fleischman, ao 1594. 8 (1595) – Supputatio ecclesiastica secundum novam et antiquam calendarii rationem. Huic accessit Theoria Calendariorum authore A. Romano L. E. A. – Wirceburgi, apud Georgium Fleischmann, anno 1595. 9 (1595) – Auspice Deo Trino et Uno praeside claríssimo peritissimoque viro ac domino Adriano Romano artis medicae doctore et Professore ordinário, fidelíssimo observandissimoque hás propositiones de semine saguineque materno in amplíssimo, celebérrimo, catholicissimoque medicorum acroatirio Herbipolensi, pro prima láurea assequenda, ad discutiendum propositas defendere conabitur Joannes Birenstil Herbipolensis Franco. IIII. non. Martii, ipsa S. Adriani festivitate. – Wirceburgi, typis Georgii Fleischmann, anno 1595. 10 (1595) – Parvum Theatrum Urbium sive Urbium praecipuarum totius orbis brevis et methodica descriptio. Authore Adriano Romano. E. A. Cum gratia et privilegio Caesareae Majestatis speciali ad decennium. – Francoforti, ex officina typographica Nicolai Bassaei. Anno MDXCV. 11 (1595) – Almanach Wurtzburger Bisthumbs, auff das Jar nach Christi unsers Seligmachers Gebürt 1596. Von Erschaffung der Welt 5558. Von der Sündflüt 3902. 253 In welchem ist die Gülden Zal 1. Der Sonnen Circkel 9. Der Römer Zinsszal 9. Epactae 1. Sontags Buchstaben G. f. Zwischen Weihenachten und der Herren Facssnacht 8 Wochen, 6 Tag. Andere bewegliche und unbewegliche Fest, sampt den fürnambsten Aspecten der Planeten, Gewitter und gemeinen Erwählungen, etc., seynd in volgendem Calender ordentlich verzeichnet. Zu unterthänigem Gehorsam und Ehren dem Hochwirdigen Fürsten und Herrn, Herr Julio, Bischoffen zu Würtzburg, und Hertogen zu Francken, etc. Auch dem Hochwirdigen Fürsten Herrn, Herrn Neithard Bischoffen zu Bamberg, und Domprobst zu Wirtzburg. Den auch Ehrwirdigen, Wolgebornen, und Edlen Herren Domdechant, Seniorn: und anderen Herren dess Ehrwirdigen Domcapitels daselbst, seinen gnädigen Fürsten und Herren durch Adrianum Romanum gestellt, und in Trück gegeben. Gerechnet auf elevationem Poli 50 Grad. – Getrückt zu Würtzburg durch Georgium Fleischmann, cum gratia et privilegio Caes. Maiest. 12 (1596) – Theoria ventorum quam Divina adiuvante gratia sub praesidio nobilis clarissimique viri D. Adriani Romani L. E. A. defendere conabitur in catholica et celebri Herbipolensium Academia nobilis Andreas Mirowski. – Wurceburgi, Excudebat Georgius Fleischmann, anno Domini MDXCVI. 13 (1596) – Ventorum secundum recentiores distinctorum usus. Quo Anemoscopium et Quadratum nauticum explicantur, miraeque eorundem utilitates proponuntur. Authore Adriano Romano. E. A. – Wirceburgi, Ex officina typographica Georgii Fleischmanni. Anno MDXCVI. 14 (1596) – Spygmilogia id est Theses medicae de pulsibus quas, divina adspirante gratia, 10 Junii anni 1596, sub praesidio nob. clarissimi et expertissimi Domini Adriani Roamni E. A., Philosophiae et Medicinae doctoris, et pro tempore medicae facultatis Decani, in catholica et celebri Herbipolensium Universitate, pro virium modulo, publice defendet M. Christophorus Upilio Herbip. Medicinae Studiosus. – Wirceburgi, Excudebat Georgius Fleischmann, 1596. 15 (1596) – Problema Apolloniacum quo datis tribus circulis, quaritur quartus eos contigens, antea ab illustri viro D. Francisco Vieta, consiliário Regis Galliarum, ac Libellorum supplicum in Regia magistro, omnibu Mathematicis sed potissimum Belgii 254 ad construendum propositum, jam vero per Belgam Adrianum Romanum constructum. – Wirceburgi, Typis Georgii Fleischmanni. Anno MDXCVI. 16 (1597) – In Archimedis Circuli dimensionem Expositio et analysis. Apologia pro Archimede ad clariss. Virum Josephum Scaligerum. Exercitationes Cyclicae, contra Josephum Scaligerum, Orontium Finaeum et Raymarum Ursum, in decem dialogos distinctae. Authore Adriano Romano Equite Aurato, Matheseun Excellentissimo Professore in Academia Wurceburgensi. – Wurceburgi, anno CIƆ IƆ XCVII. 17 (1597) – Theses medicae de febre pútrida et febre pestilentiali quas divina Dei Opt. Max. Adjuvante gratia sub praesidio clarissimi atque doctissimi viri domini Adriani Romani medicinae doctoris et professoris ordinarii, pro primo medicinae gradu acquirendo defendere conabitur in medico catholicae et celebris Herbipolensium Academiae auditório Joannes Faber Bambergensis ejusdem Facultatis studiosus. – Wirceburgi, Excudebat Georgius Fleischmann. Anno Domini MDXCVII. 18 (1597) – Almanach Wurtzbürger Bisthumbs auff das Jar nach der allerheiligsten Gebürt unsers Heilands und Erlösers Jesu Christi M. D. XCVIII....... Durch Adrianum Romanum Philosophiae et Medicinae Doctorem.... – Getrücht zu Würtzburg durch Georgium Fleischmann, cum gratia et privilegio Caes. Maiest. 19 (1597) – Newer und Alter Schreib Calender auff das M. D. XCVIII. Jar, durch Adrianum Romanum Philosophiae ac Medicinae Doctorem gestellet und in Trück verfertiget. Darbey auch die Sontags, sampt der fürnembsten Festen Evangelia verzeichnet. Auff Polushöhe 50 Grad: Dem gantzen Frankenland nützlich und dienstlich zu gebrauchen. – Getrückt in der Fürstlichen Statt Würtzburg durch Georgium Fleischmann. Cum gratia et privilegio Caes. Maiest. 20 (1598) – Theses Astronomicae quibus proponitur nonnulla de corporum mundanuorum simplicium distinctione et numero, juxta tum veterum, tum recentiorum bene Philosophantium sententiam, relictis ínterim Coenophilorum nonnullorum opinionibus. Praeterea Specimen constructionis magnae chordarum tabulae, quae uti unicum est totius Matheseos fundamentum, ita et quam máxime desiderata, a nemine tamen ob summas quas continet difficultates sufficienter hactenus proposita. Quae 255 quidam omnia die Sabbathi próximo, qui est 18 Julii, hora octava antemeridiana, in schola medica, sub praesidio clarissimi Viri Domini A. Romani Medicinae Doctoris Professorisque ordinarii et Equitis, ex cujus lectionibus privatis fere sunt excerpta, pro viribus defendere conabitur, Clarissimus Vir D. Lambertus Croppet Lugdunensis I. V. Doctor. Nunc vero in publica totius Vniversitatis solenniter ad actum doctoralem dicti D. Lamberti convocatae facie, omnibusque quarumcumque facultatum antesignanis, professoribus et discipulis offeruntur, ut ii quibus Mathesis cordi est ínterim ea per se examinent, quae vero thesibus nostris repugnantia invenerint die disputationis dicto proponere non graventur. – Wirceburgi, apud Georgium Fleischmann, 1598. 21 (1598) – Phytologia sive Theses de Plantis quatenus medicis materiam subministrant remediorum. Quas in catholica et celebérrima Herbipolensi Academia sub Praesidio Clarissimi Viri Domini A. Romani. Medicinae practicae professoris ordinarii pro gradu Baccalaureatus in Madicina adipiscendo, contra quoscumque oppugnare volentes defendere conabitur Petrus Pion, I. V. Doctor. Die 13 octobris anno 1598. – Wirceburgi, Excudebat Georgius Fleischmann. 22 (1598) – Newer und Alter Schreib Calender auff das MDXCIX Jar durch Adrianum Romanum Philosophiae ac Medicinae Doctorem. – Getrückt in der Fürstlichen Statt Wurzburg durch Georgium Fleischmann. Cum gratia et privilegio Caes. Maiest. 23 (1599) – Osteologia humana sive de Scheleto quod totius anatomes praecipuum fundamentum at basis existit assertiones quas Dei Trini et Unius ope adjutus, praeside claríssimo atque doctissimo viro Domino Adriano Romano Equite Aurato, Medicinae Doctore et Professore ordinário, nec non pro tempore, ejusdem facultatis Decano vigilantissimo, ex cujus praelectionibus anatomicis potissimum fuerunt decerptae, in celebri atque orthodoxa Herbipolensi Franconiae Academia defendere conabitur M. Jahannes Fuchsius Geysanus Bucho, ejusdem facultatis studiosus. – Wirceburgi. E Typographia Georgii Fleischmanni. 1599. 24 (1599) – Theses medicae de Sanitatis et Morbi communi natura quas sub praesidio nobilissisimi et clarissimi viri Domini Adriani Romani, Equitis aurati, nec non ejusdem pro tempore facultatis Decani vigilantissimi, pro Baccalaureatus gradu defendere conbitur in alma ac celebri Herbipolensi Academia Andreas Dollweg, 256 Ingolstaadianus Boius ejusdem facultatis studiosus. – Wurceburgi. Typis Georgii Fleischmanni. Anno 1599. 25 (1599) – Almanach Würtzburger Bisthumbs auff das Jar nach der heilsamen Geburt Jesu Christi MDC......... Durch Adrianum Romanum....... – Getruckt zu Wurtzburg durch Georgium Fleischmann. 26 (1599) – Newer und Alter Schreib Calender auff das M. DC. Jar durch Adrianum Romanum Philosophiae ac medicinaew Doctorem... – Getruckt in der Fürstlichen Statt Wurtzburg durch Georgium Fleichmann. Cum gratia et privilegio Caes. Maiest. 27 (1599) – Prognosticon Astrologicum oder Teutsche Practica auff das Jar nach der allein seligmachenden Gebürt Unsers Heylands Jesu Christi M. DC. auff kurzest MIT sonderem Fleiss beschrieben, und in Trück verfertigt, zu Underthanigstem Gehorsam und Ehren, auch glückseliger Regierung. Dem Hochwürdigen Fürsten und Herrn Herrn Julio, Bischoffen zu Würtzburg, und Hertzogen zu Francken. Auch den Hoch und Ehrwürdigen, Wolgebornen, Edlen Herrn, Hernn Wolff Albert Von Würtzburg, Domprobst, Herrn Johann Conrad Von Stein, Seniori und Jubilaeo, und andern Herrn dess Ehrwürdigen und Hochlöblichen Domcapittels daselbsten, etc. Seinen gnadigen, genietenden Fürsten und Herrn. Durch Adrianum Romanum, Philosophiae ac Medicinae Doctorem. – Getruckt zu Wurtzburg, durch Georgium Fleischmann. Cum gratia et privilegio Caesareae Maiestatis. 28 (1600) – Theses medicae de totius Corporis humani affectibus interioribus quas divina Dei ter Optimi Maximi adjutrice gratia sub praesidio clarissimi atque expertissimi Viri ac Domini Adriani Romani Equitis Aurati, medicinae doctoris, nec non ejusdem facultatis in celebri atque orthodoxa Herbipolensi Academia praxeos professore ordinário, defendere conabitur Joannes Nicolaus Fischer Mogund. Medicinae stud. – Wurceburgi. Typis Georgii Fleischmann. Anno Domini M.D.C. 29 (1600) – Newer und Alter Schireib Calender auff das M. DCI. Jar, durch Adrianum Romanum Philosophiae ac Medicinae Doctorem. – Getruck in der Fürstlichen Statt Wurtzburg, dusch Georgium Fleixhmann. 257 30 (1600) – Prognosticon Astrologicum oder Teutsche Practica auss das Jar nach der Glorwürdigen Gebürt Jesu Christi M. DCI.. durch Adrianum Romanum Philosophiae et Medicinae Doctorem. – Getruckt zu Wurtzburg, durch Georgium Fleischmann. Cum gratia et privilegio Caes. Maiest. 31 (1601) – De simlicium medicamentorum facultatibus. Theses medicae quas aspirante Divino numine, sub praesidio nob., clarissimi et expertissimi Domini Adriani Romani, Equitis Aurati, Comitis Palatini, Medici Caesarei, ac Medicinae in alma ac celebri Herbipol. Universitate Professoris primarii, defendere ibidem publice conanabitur Die Aprilis M. Wendelinus Jung Franco, Medicinae studiosus. Wurceburgi. Typis Georgii Fleischmann. Anno 1601. 32 (1601) – Disputatio medica de Cerebri anatome, ejusque administrandi ratione. Quam annuente sanctissima Trinitate, praesidente vero nobili ac omni scientiarum genere claríssimo viro, D. Adriano Romano, Equite Aurato, comitê Palatino, Medico Caesareo, Mathematico exímio, Philosophiae ac Medicinae Doctore celebérrimo, nec non in alma ac orthodoxa Würtzeburgensi Academia Professore primário, publice ibidem defendet Joannes Conradus Burckhardus Rotenburgo Tuberanus. Medicinae studiosus. Mense Julio, die, hora et loco consueto. – Wirceburgo, Typis Georgii Fleischmanni, 1601. 33 (1601) – Vroscopia seu de Urinis theses medicae quas a nobilíssimo, claríssimo et multae experientiae omniumque scientiarum viro, Dn. Adriano Romano, Equite Aurato, Comite Palatino, Medico Caesareo. Artium ac medicinae artis doctore, et ejusdem in celebri gymnasio Würtzburgensi Professore et Antecessore celebérrimo propositas, Sebastianus Trostlerus Venningensis Nemetanus Art. LL. Magister φιλιατρός publici exercitii loco, in Acroatirio medico discutiendas proponet, proque ingenii tenuitate tueri conabitur. "Ex urinis coniectari oportet, id quod futurum est." – Hippoc. lib. 4. de rat. vict. in morb. acut. text. 50. – Wirceburgi, Typis Georgii Fleischmanni. 1601. 34 (1601) – Disceptationes anatomicae de partibus humani corporis similaribus quas coelestibus auspiciis sub praesidio... Dn. D. Adriani Romani.... publice ibidem 258 discutiendas dabit 20 novem: M. Joannes Theodorus Schönlinus Wirceburgensis Medicinae studiosus. – Wirceburgi, Typis Georgii Fleischmanni. 1601. 35 (1601) – Almanach Würtzburger Bisthumbs auff das Jar nach der heilsamen Gebürt Jesu Christi M. DC.II..... Durch Adrianum Roamnum. – Getruckt zu Wurtzburg durch Georgium Fleischmann. 36 (1601) – Newer und Alter Schreib Calender auff das M. DC. II. Jar durch Adrianum Romanum, Philosophiae ac Medicinae Docotorem...... – Getruckt in der Fürstlichen Statt Wurtzburg durch Georgium Fleischmann. 37 (1601) – Prognosticon astrologicum oder teutsche Practica auff das M. DC. II. Jar,nach der Gebürt unsers Erlösers und Se-ligmachers Jesu Christi, MIT allem Fleiss auffs kürtzest beschriben und gestellt zu unterthänigem, gehorsam und Ehren und gluckseliger Regierung. Dem Hochwirdigen Fürsten und Herrn Herrn Julio Bixchoffen zu Würzburg, und Hertzogen zu Francken. Auch den Elirwirdigen, Wolgebornen, Edlen Herren Domprobst, Domdechant, Seniorn, und anderen Herren dês Ehrwirdigen Dom Capittels daselsbsten Seinen Gnädigen Fürsten und Herren durch Adrianum Roamanum Philosophiae ac Medicinae Doctorem. Auff Poli Höhe 50 Grad. – Getruckt zu Wurtzburg, durch Georgium Fleischmann. Cum gratia et privilegio Caes. Maiest. 38 (1602) – Idea Matheseos universae: De Mathematicae natura, praestantia et usu. Herbipoli, 1602. 39 (1602) – Chordarum arcubus circuli primariis, quibus videlicet is in triginta dirimitur partes, subtensarum resolutio uti exactissima ita quoque laboriosissima authore A. Romano, Romano Equite, comitê palatino et medico caesareo. – Wirceburgi, Excudebat Georgius Fleischmann. Anno 1602. 40 (1602) – Disceptatio anatômica de partibus thoracis earumque convenienti administrandi ratione quam adjuvante Dei gratia sub praesidio nobilis, clarissimi et expertissimi Domini D. Adriani Roamni Equitis Aurati, comitis palatini, Médici caesaraei, mathematici celeberrimi ac medicinae in alma et orthodoxa Herbipolensi 259 Academia professoris primarii, nec non pro tempore ejusdem Facultatis decani spectatissimi, publice ibidem defendere conabitur... die mensis... M. Casparus Fridericus herbipolensis Med. studiosus. – Wirceburgi, Typis Georgii Fleischmann. Anno M. DC. II. 41 (1602) – De divinoquod in morbis inveniri, cujusque providentia medicum tum admirationem consequi, tum bonum judicari scribit Hippocrates. Assertiones medicae, quas divino sanctissimae Trinitatis numine assistente nobilissimi, clarissimi, et doctissimi Viri ac Domini Adriani Romani, Equitis Aurati, comiti palatini, Médici caesarei, mathematici eximii, Philosophiae et Medicinae Doctoris celeberrimi, necnon ejusdem Facultatis pro tempore decani dignissimi, in alma ac orthodoxa Herpibolensi Academia publice tueri et defendere conabitur Wolffgangus Rotkirch Bambergensis, Medicinae studiosus die... mensis Martii. – Wirceburgi, Typis Georgii Fleischmanni. Anno 1602. 42 (1602) – De salubri olerum usu. Theses medicae quas sub praesidio... Adriani Romani defendere conabitur... die mensis Aprilis M. Joannes Farbach Renershavsensis, Medicinae studiosus. – Wirceburgi, Typis Georgii Fleischmanni. Anno 1602. 43 (1602) – Theses chirurgicae de ulcerum simplicium methodica curatione quas sub praesidio.... Adriani Romani publice ibidem defendere conabitur die... mensis septembris Franciscus Lequius Dolianensis Pedemontanus, medicinae et chieuegiae studiosus. – Wirceburgi, Typis Georgii Fleischmanni. Anno M. DC. II. 44 (1602) – Assertionum medicarum in celebri Herbipolensi Academia a diversis medicinae studiosis magna cum laude publico examini propositarum Fasciculus primus quo continentur Disceptationes Anatomiam attinentes, quarum 1. de partibus similaribus. 2. de scheleto. 3. de cerebri Anatome. – Wirceburgi, Typis Georgii Fleischmann. Anno M. DC. II. Fasciculus secundus quo continentur Disceptationes Pathologicen et Simioticen attinentes, quarum 1. de totius corporis humani affectibus. 2. de sanitatis et morbi communi natura. 3. de divino in morbo considerando. 4. de urinis. 260 Fasciculus tertius quo continentur Disceptationes Hygienes et Therapenticen attinentes, quarum. 1. de salubri oleum usu. 2. de plantis. 3. de simplicium facultatis. 4. de ulcerum et vulnerum curatione. 45 (1602) – Newer und Alter Schreib Calender auff das M. DC. III. Jar durch Adrianum Romanum. – Getrückt in der Fürstlichen Statt Wurzburg durch Georgium Fleischmann. 46 (1602) – Prognosticon Astrologicon oder Teutsche Practica auff das Jar, nach der Frewdenreichen Geburt unsers Erlösers und Seligmachers Jesu Christi, M. DC. III. – Durch Adrianum Romanum, Philosophiae ac medicinae doctorem. – Getrückt zu Würtzburg, durch Georgium Fleischmann. Cum gratia et privilegio Caesareae Maiestatis. 47 (1603) – Theses medicae de purgatione quas sub praesidio.... Adriani Romani, Equitis Aurati, comitis palatini, medici caesarei, mathematici celeberrimi, ac Medicinae in alma Herbipolensi Academia professori primarii, publice ibidem defendere conabitur die... mensis Februarii M. Jodocus Hartlieb Holfeldensis, Philiatrus. – Wirceburgi, Typis Georgii Fleischmanni. Anno 1603. 48 (1603) – Disputatio anatomica de partibus corporibus nutritioni discatis, earumque administrandi ratione, quam divina favente clementia, Praeside viro nobilíssimo, claríssimo et expertissimo Domino D. Adriano Romano, D. in Hoeberg, Equite Aurato, Comite palatino, Medico caesareo, Mathematico exímio, Philosophiae ac medicinae Doctore celebérrimo, nec non in alma ac orthodoxa Herbip. Academia Professore primario, publice pro supremo in Medica facultate gradu adipiscendo defendet Joannes Conradus Burckhardus Rotenburgo Tuberanus Medicinae Baccalaureus Die 11 Martii, loco et horis solitis. – Wirceburgi, Typis Georgii Fleischmanni. Anno 1603. 49 (1603) – Arithmeticae quatuor instrumenta nova Methodo ac forma patente exhibita. Herbipoli, 1603. 261 50 (1605) – Mathesis Polemica. Qua primo tractat de scientiis et artibus Duci necessariis. II. proponit lemmatibus aliquot rationem dimetiendi loca inaccessibilia. III. tradit proposita militaria Mathesin Requirentia. Francofurti, 1605. 51 (1606) – Speculum astronomicum sive organum forma mappae expressum in quo licet immobili omnes qui in primo coelo primoque mobili spectari solent motus, per cânones ea de re conscriptos, planissime sine ullius regulae aut volvelli beneficio repraesentantur authore A. Romano, Equite aurato, comitê Palatino, Medico Caesareo: atque ad D. Joannis Novi Monasterii Herbipoli canônico. – Lovanii ex officina Joannis Masii, sub viridi Cruce, anno 1606. – Sumptibus authoris. Prostat Francofurti apud Levinum Hulsium. 52 (1607) – Methodus exprimendi numeros quamtumvis máximos cifris vulgaribus notatos, juxta gentium fere omnium consuetudinem. Lovanii, 1607. 53 (1608) – Parvum Theatrum urbium sive Urbium praecipuarum totius orbis brevis et methodica Descriptio. Authore Adriano Romano, E. A. Cum gratia et privilegio Caes. Maiest. speciali ad decennium. – Francofurti, ex officina typographica Wolffgangi Richteri, sumptibus omnium heredum Nicolai Bassaei. M. DC. VIII. 54 (1609) – Adriani Romani Canon Triangulorum sphaericorum brevissimus simul ac facilimus quamplurimisque exemplis optice projectis illustratus, in gratiam Astronomiae, Cosmographiae, Geographiae, Horologiographiae, etc., studiosorum iam primum editus. Accessere plenioris usus ergo tabulae sinuum, tajgentium et secantium ex opere Rdi atque Eximii Patris Christophori Clavii S. I. Mathematici celeberrimi desumptae. Moguntiae. Ex officina Joannis Albini. Anno M. DC. IX. 55 (1609) – Mathematicae analyseos triumphus.

i Northern Caribbean University School of Religion and Theology THE SAPIR-WHORF HYPOTHESIS/ LINGUISTIC RELATIVISM IN THE NEW TESTAMENT AUTOGRAPHS An Assignment Presented in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for the course HIST 315: Language, Culture and Society Lecturer: Prof. Mario Castillo Rangel By Lascelles James Original draft July 2007 Edited January 2016 ii CONTENTS INTRODUCTION...................................................................................1 TRANSCRIPTION OF ORAL TRADITION....................................................4 Influence of Oral Tradition on Form and Style of Autographs........................4 Constraints of Transcription...............................................................6 Emancipatory aspects of Transcription...................................................7 INFLUENCE OF LANGUAGE ON THE AUTOGRAPHS...................................9 Evidence of Pragmatic Linguistics.......................................................9 Language Sophistication..................................................................10 Hellenistic Hedgemony....................................................................12 IMPLICATIONS OF LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY FOR EXEGESIS.....................14 Idioms and Discourse Accents............................................................14 Discourse Analysis in Exegesis..........................................................15 Words, Concepts and Realities............................................................16 CONCLUSION......................................................................................18 WORKS CITED.....................................................................................19 1 INTRODUCTION Friedrich Schleiermacher opines that, "human beings are on the one hand, in the power of the language they speak; their whole thinking is a product of it. The form of their concepts and the ways and means of connecting them, are outlined to them through the language in which they are born and educated; intellect and imagination are bound by it. On the other hand, however, freethinking and intellectually spontaneous human beings also form the language themselves. Through these influences, the language grows from its first raw state to its more perfect formation in scholarship and art. 1 The Piraha, members of a hunter gatherer tribe live in the rain forest of northwestern Brazil. In a 2007 New Yorker article John Colapinto explains that they have have no numbers, no fixed color terms, no perfect tense, no deep memory, no tradition of art or drawing. The tribe embodies a living-in-the-present ethos so powerful that it has affected every aspect of the people's lives. Committed to an existence in which only observable experience is real, the Piraha do not think, or speak, in abstractions. It has been suggested that the Piraha's dedication to empirical reality or "immediacy-ofexperience principle" explains their resistance to Christianity. 2 1 Friedrich Schleiermacher, "On the Different Methods of Translating", Theories of Translation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 38. The original German was published as Über die verschiedenen Methoden des Übersetzens and reprinted in Sämtliche Werke, Dritte Abteilung: Zur Philosophie, Vol. 2. (Berlin: Reimer, 1838), 207-245. 2 John Colapinto, "The Interpreter: Has a Remote Amazonian Tribe upended our Understanding of Language?" (The New Yorker, April 16, 2007. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/04/16/070416fa_fact_colapinto) July 23, 2007 2 If the language of the Piraha can reflect their culture so effectively, then what of the languages that the New Testament authors used? How were they affected by these languages? Or how did they affect the languages? It is advisable that any worthwhile study of these texts entail consideration of the linguistic hypothesis proposed by Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf who were the proposers of the theory of linguistic relativity. These contemporaries suggested a direct relationship between language and culture; their proposition became known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The hypothesis expostulates how the syntactic-semantic structure of a language becomes a framework for the culture and world-view of a people. The idea has been questioned by many linguists and who proposition that there is not enough empirical evidence to support it. John Lucy argues in his abstract on Linguistic Relativity that: Despite long-standing historical interest in the hypothesis, there is relatively little empirical research directly addressing it...a theoretical account needs to articulate exactly how languages interpret experiences and how those interpretations influence thought. This will entail integrating theory and data concerning both the general relation of language and thought and the shaping influence of specific discursive structures and practices. 3 Despite the need for more study on the theory, this analysis may help towards understanding the inter-relatedness of society, culture, and language by looking at the phenomenon of linguistic relativity as it may have affected New Testament writers. The ideas discussed should provide useful information for further research into the application 3 John A. Lucy, "Linguistic Relativity," (Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 26: 291-312, October 1997 DOI: 10.1146/annurev.anthro.26.1.291); http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.anthro.26.1.291?journalCode=anthro 3 of modern linguistics to New Testament hermeneutics, systematic theology, and biblical exegesis. The implications of linguistic relativity theory applied to this genre of literature are of extreme importance in light of resurgence in interest and work in biblical languages and modern linguistics in the last quarter of a century. It is deliberate that this discussion will be tripartite, encompassing the salient elements of the Sapir/Whorf hypothesis and its application to New Testament autographs by focusing on: transcription of oral tradition, the influence of languages on the autographs, and the implications of linguistic relativity for exegesis. . 4 TRANSCRIPTION OF ORAL TRADITION TO AUTOGRAPHS In the creation of the autographs or original manuscripts of the New Testament the writers encountered the difficulty of interpreting what pre-existed as oral tradition for their readers. The purpose, aim and objective of writing may have determined to some extent what was written. Implicit in their writing was the need to reach beyond then existent boundaries of politics, religion, and culture. They had to make this tradition understandable universally to enhance its portability between cultures. Michael Lucy indicates that: In our interactions with others, we are necessarily involved in ongoing acts of negotiation, contestation, and translation – not only between languages, but also often between implicit arrays of cultural concepts that we use to make the world intelligible to ourselves. Socio-conceptual structures of various kinds are immanent in, implicit in, everyone's speech; we could say that those structures are indexed by or invoked through what we say. The more indiosyncratic our speech seems, the more risks we take with intelligibility. 4 According to Claire Kramsch, oral cultures have their own forms and styles and ways of emancipating and constraining their members. 5 Influence of Oral Tradition on Form and Style of Autographs Whereas a good understanding of the literary genre is very important, Carson, Moo, and Morris in An Introduction to the New Testament, contend that most New Testament form critics have not sufficiently appreciated the dynamics and nature of oral 4 See Michael Lucy, "Translating Sexuality Contextually" (Talk for a panel at UC Berkeley on Gender in Translation, December 10, 2015); http://criticaltheory.berkeley.edu/events/event/gender-intranslation/ 5 Claire Kramsch, Language and Culture. (London: Oxford University Press, 1998), 5. 5 transmission. 6 For example, the Apostle Paul expected the vast majority of the recipients of his letters to hear, not read them. He structured his compositions for the ear rather then for the eye. Pauline audiences would hear clues to meaning and structure because they had learned to communicate in a world where those clues were essential to understanding. Casey Davis believes that over ninety percent of Paul's audience was illiterate and so recognizable structures and patterns were essential for listeners to organize what they heard in order to follow, to predict and to remember the flow of communication. These patterns were as much a part of oral communication in the first century Greco-Roman culture as periods and paragraph indentations are in modern English literature. 7 In a primary oral culture says Walter Ong, in order to solve effectively the problem of retaining and retrieving carefully articulated thought, thinking must be in mnemonic patterns, shaped for ready oral recurrence. Thought must come into being in heavily rhythmic, balanced patterns, in repetitions or antithesis, in alliterations, assonances, and in proverbs which are constantly heard by everyone so that they come to mind readily and which themselves are patterned for retention and ready recall, or in other mnemonic form. 8 Oral compositions in the form of poetry and song are present in all societies and the reciprocal influence which flows between literature and oral artistry must not be 6 D. Carson, Douglas Moo, and Leon Morris, An Introduction to the New Testament (Zondervan Publishing House, 1992), 24. 7 Casey W. Davis, "Oral Biblical Criticism." Linguistics and the New Testament. Ed. Stanley E. Porter and D.A. Carson ( Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999), 96. 8 Walter Ong, Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the World (New York: Methuen Press, 1982), 34. 6 underestimated. This is especially true in cultures with a high degree of residual orality, such as those which produced the Bible and early Church literature. 9 The documents of the New Testament were written by authors who were influenced by their own literacy. However, these authors never seemed to lose track of the fact that they were addressing hearing audiences. As such, aural structural and mnemonic clues were just as important in the literary compositions of the first two centuries A.D., as in oral compositions in primary-oral societies. Constraints of Transcription It is highly probable that New Testament narratives were handed down orally. The laws of the formation of oral tradition are of special importance. The transition from oral to written form did not take place without interruption and led to abridgement of the oral narratives. Every tradition, especially those handed down orally, stands in an immediate relationship with the community that shapes tradition, thus reflecting the language, the society and culture of that group. In other words, the tradition itself allows certain inferences about the particular situation in the formation of tradition. 10 Juxtaposing the Hellenistic Palestinian Jews of the era of the autographs, with the present-day Piraha tribe members of Amazonian South America, the problems of oral transcription become more lucid. The South American Piraha's speech sounds like a profusion of exotic songbirds, or a melodic chattering scarcely discernible, to the uninitiated, as human speech. Their language is unrelated to any other extant tongue, and is based on eight consonants and three vowels. It possesses a complex array of tones, 9 Greene, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology (Harvard: Harvard Press, 1951), 31. 10 Conzelmann, Hans and Andreas Lindermann. Interpreting The New Testament (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1992), 62-63. 7 stresses, and syllable lengths so that its speakers can dispense with their vowels and consonants altogether and sing, hum, or whistle conversations. 11 It is impossible to make their oral culture literate without losing much of the meaning of its utterances. In a similar manner, the authors of the autographs had to transcribe oral culture with its codes which were locked in the languages and culture of the time, into literate culture. The constraint was probably most felt in recording the sayings of Jesus, whose activities reportedly inspired the autographs but who – according to Bible scholars – never wrote an autobiography. There was probably much that Jesus said in Aramaic, Hebrew or Greek dialect that were expressed orally in these languages, but defy transcription due to the limitations of the literate language. Emancipatory Aspects of Transcription It is a peculiar advantage that we have in the New Testament the impression made by Jesus upon minds endowed with a determination to teach his sayings and expound on Christian ethos. There may be in the writings of Paul and John, a certain element that is derived from the current ideas of the time, but behind and beneath this element we can see a fresh and vivid impression that comes straight from the facts. 12 The existence of a stock of positively evaluated and oft-repeated discourses in any society is a phenomenon made possible by an oral tradition. Dogs and apes, have no language, and as a consequence no literature. One of the most important things about human language is that it serves as the medium for literature. The literary tradition of a 11 John Colapinto, "The Interpreter: Has a Remote Amazonian Tribe upended our Understanding of Language?" 12 William Sanday, "Interpretation of the Gospels" Essays in Biblical Criticism and Exegesis (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001), 36. 8 community, in turn, is a vital mechanism in the training of the young in culturally approved attitudes and patterns of behaviour; it serves to transmit the moral fiber of the community from one generation to the next. 13 A deeper perspective may include consideration that though their minds were impressed by Jesus these authors had to write in a language that had its own cultural bias which was freely imposed by what is now known as redaction on their autographs. Third century theologian, Tertullian advocated that thought and language are inseparable. 13 Charles F. Hockett, A Course in Modern Linguistics (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1968), 564. 9 INFLUENCE OF LANGUAGE ON THE AUTOGRAPHS Tertullian deals with the question of how the Logos (word) of God can be spoken of as something proceeding from God and yet also be called God Himself (the prologue of John's Gospel). He explains that it is because the very thoughts of God take shape in discourse, the "Word" being none other than the objectified form of God's thoughts. Whatever you think, there is a word; whatever you conceive, there is reason. You must needs speak it in your mind; and while you are speaking, you admit speech as an interlocutor with you, involved in which there is this very reason, whereby, while in thought you are holding converse with your word, you are (by reciprocal action) producing thought by means of that converse with your word. 14 The autographs were written for a multi-ethnic society emerging from Jews, Greeks, Romans, Persians, Orientals and possibly others. The chief languages were Hebrew, Aramaic, Koine Greek, Latin and Persian. However the language of the Greeks was enjoying a hegemony and hence the New Testament autographs were written in Koine Greek, the lingua franca of the 1 st century A.D in the Roman Empire. Evidence of Pragmatic Linguistics The writings collected in the NT are representative, not so much of the formal or artistic, but of the popular type of literature. The Koine Greek was the vernacular of that era, by virtue of the fact that it had developed into a global language in the wake of the worldwide expansion of Greek tradition during the period of "Hellenism". A. T. 14 Peter Holmes, Against Praxeas The Ante-Nicene Christian Library: Translations of the Fathers down to A.D. 325, vol. XV (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1870), 170. 10 Robertson suggests that Greek literature is the one entirely original literature of Europe. Homer, Aristotle, Plato, not to say Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides are still the modern masters of the intellect. The Greek language remains the most perfect organ of human speech and largely because they studied diligently how to talk. 15 Christianity experienced its Genesis at a time when the Koine dialect of Greek epitomized the modern principles of pragmatic linguistics. It may be debated that Greek verbs are the most expressive of all languages, but their participles have no match. Indeed it was a most suitable language to espouse Christianity, with its many performative utterances purported by Christ, such as, "I will come again and receive you unto myself." The authors were able to verbalize their recollections of Jesus and their own thoughts quite comprehensively. Other characteristics, such as the replacement of infinitives as verbal complements by subordinate clauses and the formation of the future with auxiliary 'will', are ascribed to the influence of Greek. 16 Language Sophistication The concept of the equation of language and culture maintains that a language's structure tends to condition the ways its speakers think, for example, the way a people views time and punctuality may be influenced by the types of verb tenses in its language. New Testament autographs reflected (especially the texts of St. Luke and Hebrews) a high level of language sophistication. This is an indication that the authors possessed well-developed cognitive and communication skills. Their copious use of recursion to 15 Robertson, A. T. The Grammar of the New Testament Greek in the Light of Historical Research (Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1934), 46. 16 Turner, Nigel, J. H. A Grammar of the New Testament Greek J.H Moulton Volume III. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 40. 11 add depth and give clarity to utterances, also may attest to their heuristic skills, as in, (Ephesians 4:11-14) "It was he who gave some to be apostles, some to be prophets, some to be evangelists, and some to be pastors and teachers, 12 to prepare God's people for works of service, so that the body of Christ may be built up 13 until we all reach unity in the faith and in the knowledge of the Son of God and become mature, attaining to the whole measure of the fullness of Christ. 14 Then we will no longer be infants, tossed back and forth by the waves, and blown here and there by every wind of teaching and by the cunning and craftiness of men in their deceitful scheming." On the other hand, the language of the Piraha lacks recursion and other elements of cognition and communication. The Piraha do not make long or medium term plans, and they have no knowledge of their history or origin. They provide support for Whorf's argument that the words in our vocabulary are an indication of how we think. They do not have words for numbers above two and thus they have limited ability to work with quantities greater than that. 17 The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis may be applied to shed light on the philosophical or theological tradition of Greek New Testament autographs the same manner that the hypothesis is employed to explain the differences between German, French and English philosophical traditions. German philosophy's idealist, unitary and systematic tendencies are attributed to German's end-verbs, case system, root morphemes and initial qualifiers. French philosophy's dualism and rationalist analysis are ascribed to that language's more abstract signifiers and its description by progressive discrete divisions. And English philosophy's skeptical materialist empiricism is attributed to English's mixing of French 17 John Colapinto, "The Interpreter: Has a remote Amazonian tribe upended our understanding of language?" 12 and German syntax and lexicons, and to the higher incidence of passive constructions in English. 18 Hellenistic Hegemony The Near East as a whole and Palestine and its Jewish residents more particularly first came under Greek influence in the fourteenth century B.C. E. As trade connections increased, this influence became much more extensive, and during the Persian period Greek coinage became the standard in the Land of Israel. The cultural phenomenon called Hellenism had a lasting impact on Judaism and the Jewish people. Hellenism was a synthesis of Greek (Hellenic) culture with the native cultures of the Near East. It was a dynamic phenomenon, with the ever-evolving Hellenistic culture continually becoming the raw material for new synthesis with other native cultures not yet under its sway. 19 People who identify themselves as members of a society acquire common ways of viewing the world through their interactions with other members of the society. Common attitudes, beliefs and values are reflected in the way the members use language. The idea of commonality also manifests in the diachronic view of culture whereby societies represent themselves in their technological achievements, their monuments, their works of art, and their popular culture. This material culture is reproduced and preserved through institutional mechanisms that are a part of the culture. The Greek language played a major role in the perpetuation and preservation of Hellenistic culture, particularly in its printed form. 20 18 William Harvey, "Linguistic relativity in French, English, and German philosophy," Philosophy Today( 40: 273-288,1996). 19 Lawrence H. Schiffman, From Text to Tradition, (New Jersey: Ktav Publishing House Ltd, 1991), 60. 20 Claire Kramsch, Language and Culture. (London: Oxford University Press, 1998), 7. 13 Hellenistic dominance was hegemonic and authoritative in representing and speaking for the other cultures. It is reckoned that New Testament autographs were coloured by the Hellenistic worldview which pervaded the social order in that era. The textual data were acquired and disseminated within the periphery of the Hellenistic domain. An example of this was the rise of many of the elements of classical antiSemitism having its root in Hellenism. From a later perspective, anti-Semitism has two basic features; one is economic and social, and the other is the later motif of the Jew as a Christ-killer. Judaism was regarded as a barbarous superstition, and the Jews were said to be misanthropes who hated all other people. The narratives of the New Testament that characterize the Pharisees and the Sadducees (the guardians of Judaism) as adversaries of Christianity may have been a consequence of Hellenistic hedgemony. Nevertheless Hellenistic interests sought to synthesize the ancient traditions of the people of Israel with the new "modern life" of the Hellenistic world. 21 The didactic quote from Matthew 22:21 "Give to Caesar what is Caesar's, and to God what is God's", exemplifies this desire for synthesis. 21 Lawrence H. Schiffman, 90. 14 IMPLICATIONS OF LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY FOR EXEGESIS Idioms and Discourse Accents Idioms are speech forms of a given language that are peculiar to themselves grammatically, while idiomatic expressions are peculiar to, or characteristic of a given language. 22 Some theorists maintain that the peculiarities of a given language do not significantly affect the thinking of those who speak or write in that language, and so the differences between languages are largely accidental or irrelevant to the meaning of the text. These theorists have a very optimistic view of the ability of translators to put the meaning of a text into different languages in ways that are perfectly natural or idiomatic for the "receptor" languages. Thus although it is true that the meanings of words only partially overlap between languages, nevertheless all languages can talk about the same meaning, and possibly about all meanings; it is just that translators may have to use entirely different constructions, or resort to paraphrases. 23 Other writers maintain that differences between languages are such that an accurate translation must frequently be unidiomatic in the receptor language, because the idiomatic constructions and usages of the receptor language cannot capture the foreign modes of thought which are inherent in the language of the original text. The difficulty of idioms may be resolved by the exegete's appreciation for the speech community in which the idiom originated. The religious community of Christians had their own rhetoric which gave them their peculiar discourse accent shared within the community of Christians. 24 22 The American Heritage College Dictionary (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993), 674. 23 D.A. Carson, Exegeitcal Fallacies (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984), 63. 24 Claire Kramsch, Language and Culture (London: Oxford University Press, 1998), 6. 15 Words such as salvation, faith, and the cross had their own connotations within the community and the exegete must be familiar with the relevant hermeneutics. No one who knows Hebrew or another Semitic language can fail to be impressed by the Semitic tone and flavour of the New Testament. It would seem that there are places in the New Testament which are so heavily Semitic that they cannot be understood within the normal rules of Greek grammar. For exegesis, such passages would need to be understood using the grammatical rules of Hebrew or Aramaic. 25 Discourse Analysis in Exegesis Questions regarding linguistic relativity and exegesis must extend to textual coherence. This has been the focus of a recently developing field of study within modern linguistics known as discourse analysis. Broadly defined, discourse analysis is founded on two fundamental assumptions. First, analysis of language, especially discourse, must take into consideration the functional nature of language. Humans principally use language in a cultural context. These values must be factored into any analysis of the use of language. The linguistic data under inspection should consist of actual instances of language used in socio-cultural contexts. Secondly analysis of any language must be performed from the vista of complete discourses, as opposed to single sentences, clauses, or words, and even pericopes. 26 The process of discourse analysis liberates the exegete of the nuance of translating or interpreting each word as they appear. He must view the language as an instrument of thought or as the primary domain of the theology being espoused in the discourse. He 25 D.A. Carson, Exegetcal Fallacies (Grand Rapids: Baker Press, 1984), 187. 26 Stanley E. Porter and D.A. Carson (Eds.), Biblical Greek Language and Linguistics: Open Questions in Current Research (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993), 92-93. 16 must understand how things were said, and why they were said in a specific context of situation as well as in the larger context of culture. The exegete may then culturally realize the pragmatic meaning for a proper interpretation. 27 Words, Concepts, and Realities in Exegesis Although there are no extensive discussion of the ways in which language influences thought in the philosophical literature of ancient times, it is apparent that one of Plato's chief concerns was to examine how words might relate to concepts and to realities, and to show how men go astray in their thinking when they use words without adequate analysis of the concepts they are supposed to express. 28 Similarly, the concepts and realities typical of the New Testament autographs were explicitly expressed in terminology that was uncharacteristic of ordinary language. It would appear that there was a gradual development of Christian vocabulary which diverged from the ordinary vernacular language of the time as the authors defined their words instead of resorting to naïve and common expressions. This process must be reciprocated as the concepts and realities are expressed in words during exegesis/interpretation. The exegete must therefore be concerned that ordinary language is not sufficiently exact or unambiguous for exegetical purposes and must use the "technical" vocabulary commensurate for the task. Many of the terms used by theologians today (e.g. propitiation, omnipotence) were taken directly from ecclesiastical Latin without ever having been part of a vernacular tongue. The exegete must explore the connection between language and mode 27 Claire Kramsch, Language and Culture (London: Oxford University Press, 1998), 25. 28 Frederick J. Church, The Trial and Death of Socrates, being the Euthyphron, Apology, Crito and Phaedo of Plato, translated into English by F. J. Church (London: Macmillan & Co., 1880), Introduction, xli. 17 of thought. By surveying the whole scope of a language, fields of thoughts are surveyed, and as the individual learns to express himself with exactness, a treasure of determinate concepts will be gathered. 29 29 Michael N. Forster, "Herder's Philosophy of Language, Interpretation, and Translation: Three Fundamental Principles," The Review of Metaphysics 56 (December 2002). 18 CONCLUSION In review, the research has explored the "trinity" of language, culture and society using the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis as its locus. The tri-axial discussion may have provided enough food for a linguistic foray into the fabric of the New Testament. The dimensions considered in brief were oral to written tradition, influence of language, and exegetical implications. Each triad was further triangulated to provide argumentation for: form and style of autographs, pragmatics, hedgemony, discourse analysis and the proper use of words. The phenomenon of linguistic relativity in New Testament autographs may raise theological questions that pertain to the accuracy of the transcription of oral tradition and the thoughts of the authors. Scriptural hermeneutics may benefit from exegetical methods that are commensurate with linguistic relativism. The arguments presented may help towards a better understanding of the inter-relatedness of the "trinity". This research should provide useful information for further research into the application of modern linguistics to supplement conventional systematic theology and traditional methods of biblical exegesis. The implications of the linguistic relativity theory applied to this genre of literature are of extreme importance in light of dynamic studies in the language of the autographs. It is desired that these ideas may prompt linguistic and theological responses towards linguistic relativity and the New Testament in the form of research and the development of more eclectic approaches in order to achieve balance. 19 WORKS CITED Carson, D.A., Exegeitcal Fallacies. Grand Rapids: Baker Press, 1984. Carson, D.A., Douglas Moo, and Leon Morris. An Introduction to the New Testament. Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1992. Church, Frederick J. The Trial and Death of Socrates, being the Euthyphron, Apology, Crito and Phaedo of Plato, translated into English by F. J. Church London: Macmillan & Co., 1880, Introduction, xli. Colapinto, John, "The Interpreter: Has a Remote Amazonian Tribe upended our Understanding of Language?" (The New Yorker, April 16, 2007. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/04/16/070416fa_fact_colapinto) July 23, 2007. Conzelmann, Hans and Andreas Lindermann. Interpreting The New Testament. Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1992. Davis, Casey W. "Oral Biblical Criticism." Linguistics and the New Testament. Ed. Stanley E. Porter and D.A. Carson. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999. Forster, Michael N. "Herder's Philosophy of Language, Interpretation, and Translation: Three Fundamental Principles," The Review of Metaphysics 56 (December 2002). Greene W.C. "The Spoken and Written Word" Harvard Studies in Classical Philology. Harvard: Harvard Press, 1951. Harvey,William. "Linguistic relativity in French, English, and German philosophy," Philosophy Today, 1996. Hockett, Charles F. A Course in Modern Linguistics. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1968. Holmes, Peter. Against Praxeas The Ante-Nicene Christian Library: Translations of the Fathers down to A.D. 325, vol. XV. Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1870. Kramsch, Claire. Language and Culture. London: Oxford University Press, 1998. Lucy, A. John, "Linguistic Relativity." Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 26: , October 1997 DOI: 10.1146/annurev.anthro.26.1.291); http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.anthro.26.1.291?journalC ode=anthro Lucy, Michael. "Translating Sexuality Contextually." Talk for a panel at UC Berkeley on Gender in Translation, December 10, 2015); http://criticaltheory.berkeley.edu/events/event/gender-in-translation/ Ong, Walter. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the World. New York: Methuen Press, 1982. Porter, Stanley E. and D.A. Carson (Eds.), Biblical Greek Language and Linguistics: Open Questions in Current Research. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1993. Robertson, A. T. The Grammar of the New Testament Greek in the Light of Historical Research. Nashville: Broadman Press, 1934. Sanday, William. Essays in Biblical Criticism and Exegesis. Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001. Schiffman, Lawrence H. From Text to Tradition. New Jersey: Ktav Publishing House Ltd, 1991. Schleiermacher, Friedrich, "On the Different Methods of Translating", Theories of Translation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 38. The American Heritage College Dictionary. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993. Turner, Nigel, J. H. A Grammar of the New Testament Greek J.H Moulton Volume III. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998.

Copyright© 2015 dos Autores Editora: Scientific/SciBooks www.scientific.com.br Expediente: Revisão de texto: SciBooks Capa e diagramação: Isabel Kubaski Dados Internacionais de Catalogação R565l Rigatti, Pietra Cassol Livros que seu aluno pode ler: formação do leitor na educação básica / Pietra Cassol Rigatti; Filipe Róger Vuaden; Márcia Ivana de Lima e Silva (organizadores). – Porto Alegre: Sci Books, 2015. v.2. 156 p. ISBN 978-85-99706-06-0 1. Educação. 2. Incentivo à leitura. 3. Multidisciplinaridade. 4. Crianças Escrita. I. Vuaden, Filipe Róger. II. Lima e Silva, Márcia Ivana de. III. Título. CDU: 37 Elaborado pela bibliotecária Karin Lorien Menoncin – CRB 10/2147 Sumário APRESENTAÇÃO ..................................................................................... 7 MÁRCIA IVANA DE LIMA E SILVA BIOLOGIA E GEOGRAFIA ..................................................................... 11 Distante viagem para o próximo ...................................................................... 11 PROF. DR. NELSON REGO A janela da Biologia aberta para narrativas de outros tempos e lugares ........................................................................................................................ 27 PROFA. DRA. RUSSEL TERESINHA DUTRA DA ROSA DANÇA/ARTES VISUAIS ....................................................................... 49 Dança e a investigação de suas possibilidades no Ensino Médio ........ 49 PROFA. DRA. FLAVIA PILLA DO VALLE Livros de arte, livros sobre arte, livros de artista: múltiplas leituras .... 63 PROFA. DRA. LUCIANA GRUPPELLI LOPONTE LÍNGUA PORTUGUESA ........................................................................ 73 Uma conversa sobre aula de Português ........................................................ 73 PROFA. DRA. LUCIENE JULIANO SIMÕES LITERATURA PARA O ENSINO MÉDIO ................................................ 89 Abrindo as páginas de O animal agonizante ............................................... 89 PROF. DR. ANTÔNIO MARCOS VIEIRA SANSEVERINO LITERATURA PARA O ENSINO FUNDAMENTAL............................... 111 Do substantivo ao adjetivo: os clássicos que nos cercam .....................111 PROFA. DRA. MÁRCIA IVANA DE LIMA E SILVA FILOSOFIA ........................................................................................... 127 Diálogos que nossos alunos podem ler .......................................................127 PROFA. DRA. GISELE DALVA SECCO Livros que seu aluno pode ler Filosofia Diálogos que nossos alunos podem ler PROFA. DRA. GISELE DALVA SECCO1 Inicio agradecendo o convite por parte do pessoal do Programa de Educação Tutorial (PET) Letras, que gentilmente aceitou as indicações do meu nome como o de alguém que poderia contribuir para essa belíssima iniciativa, Livros que seu aluno pode ler. Convidar para conversar sobre esse tema pessoas que se preocupam ou que se dedicam a pensar ocasiões alternativas às leituras proporcionadas pelos livros didáticos merece reconhecimento por si mesmo. No caso específico da Filosofia, entretanto, considero que esta iniciativa merece um louvor ainda maior, dada a necessidade que temos não 1 Licenciada e mestre em Filosofia pela Universidade Federal de Santa Maria. Doutora em Filosofia pela Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, com período de doutoramento sanduíche na Universidade de Paris I – Pantheón Sorbonne. Sua tese de doutorado recebeu o Prêmio Capes de Tese 2014 da área de Filosofia. Atualmente é professora adjunta do departamento de Filosofia da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, desenvolvendo pesquisas em Filosofia das Ciências Formais e Ensino de Filosofia. É coordenadora do subprojeto Pibid Interdisciplinar UFRGS – Campus do Vale. 128 Filosofia só de pensar em alternativas, mas também de complementar o conteúdo dos livros didáticos de Filosofia disponíveis nas escolas do Ensino Médio, em razão de algumas inadequações e irregularidades que eles possuem. É importante que fique claro desde o começo que vou me referir somente ao contexto do Ensino Médio, no qual a Filosofia voltou a ser curricularmente obrigatória em 2008. Ora, uma vez que a Filosofia é há pouco uma disciplina obrigatória no currículo básico brasileiro, a agenda de debates sobre seu ensino está relativamente assoberbada, quer dizer, ainda temos muito a discutir. Debate-se "de um tudo". E como talvez não pudesse deixar de ser, em se tratando de filósofos, nós mesmos, às vezes, não nos entendemos muito bem sobre as coisas mais fundamentais. Uma delas, inclusive, é a própria possibilidade de ensinar filosofia. Outras são questões mais pedestres, como discussões em torno de exemplos concretos de práticas didáticas potencialmente frutíferas ou sobre como e por que incorporar ou ignorar a dimensão textual tradicional (quais critérios para a escolha de autores, estilos de texto, quais áreas da filosofia privilegiar – se é que se deve privilegiar alguma). Então, como se vê, a variação é bastante ampla entre os temas que se discutem quando o assunto é o ensino de filosofia. O trabalho de escrutínio dos vícios e virtudes de cada um dos três livros que hoje estão disponíveis para o trabalho didático com Filosofia nas escolas ainda está para ser bem feito – e felizmente novas atualizações destes manuais, bem como novos livros selecionados no último edital do PNLD/EM,2 estão para chegar em breve (no ano de 2015) às escolas brasileiras. Tudo isso para dizer que para nós, da Filosofia, é importante pensar em alternativas de leitura aos materiais didáticos, talvez de maneira um pouco diferente das outras disciplinas, porque nossa tradição de elaboração de livros didáticos tem um caráter menos maduro do que no caso das demais disciplinas do currículo. Sobre a aposta de fundo do que eu vou apresentar aqui, composta de ideias bem recentes, devo logo dizer que nenhuma "novidade virá dar à nossa praia", no fim das contas. E isso porque pode parecer trivial defender 2 Pode-se com proveito recorrer ao Guia de livros didáticos: PNLD 2015: filosofia: Ensino Médio (BRASIL, 2014), produzido pela comissão de avaliação do MEC e publicado ainda em 2014. Livros que seu aluno pode ler Volume 2 129 que, nas aprendizagens filosóficas dos adolescentes, possamos – não sem uma cuidadosa atenção – ler Platão. Talvez o mais importante não seja o tipo de texto que estou sugerindo que leiamos, mas o tipo de preparação que nós, professores, precisamos realizar para contribuir, para enriquecer essas leituras, a fim de que elas façam sentido para os nossos alunos. Então, mais do que sustentar a tese de que "devemos ler Platão", quero mostrar o que me parece razoável fazer para preparar a leitura de Platão no Ensino Médio, caso se reconheça a potência didático-filosófica de seus diálogos. Dividi esta apresentação em três momentos. O primeiro é super-rápido, destinado a explicitar dois de meus pressupostos fundamentais: por um lado, a compreensão da aula de filosofia como ocasião na qual se articulam três eixos ou núcleos conceituais; por outro, mencionarei a questão da multiplicidade de estilos literários da filosofia, sem a colocação da qual a escolha dos diálogos platônicos como forma didaticamente privilegiada de leitura filosófica carece de justificação. A parte mais relevante talvez seja a segunda, na qual vou falar um pouco sobre os aspectos que considero ser relevantemente didáticos do texto do Platão, destacando suas feições de jogo argumentativo. Gostaria então de enfatizar o tipo de preparação que o professor precisa realizar para o cumprimento de sua principal função na empreitada de leitura dessa modalidade de texto filosófico – ou, mais precisamente, da inaugural modalidade platônica, pois se sabe que muitos outros filósofos escolheram diálogos como forma literária (menciono Hume e Wittgenstein, para citar apenas dois). Por fim, trabalharemos in concreto com um trecho de diálogo, a fim de oferecer uma amostra de uso possível destes textos em sala de aula, destacando a importância dos seus aspectos narrativos dramáticos, associados aos aspectos lógicos, para a boa compreensão dos mesmos. 1 Dois pressupostos 1.1 Das formas literárias da Filosofia Quando estudamos Filosofia, nos deparamos com uma considerável variedade de estilos de texto, produzidos e acumulados ao longo de mais 130 Filosofia de dois mil anos de história. E não se trata meramente de uma grande quantidade, mas de uma variação estilística, literária mesmo, muito grande. Apesar de não haver muitas coisas publicadas sobre esse tópico, há ao menos dois textos disponíveis em língua portuguesa em que o tema da variedade de estilos literários da Filosofia ocorre e nos quais vou me basear aqui. Menciono esta discussão como pano de fundo para a tentativa de justificar por que ler os diálogos platônicos em sala de aula. Você pode, por exemplo, visualizar um cenário desta riqueza a partir do elenco que os professores Danilo Marcondes e Irley Franco, da Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), fornecem em um capítulo de A filosofia: o que é? Para que serve? (MARCONDES; FRANCO, 2011), no qual encontramos os seguintes sete estilos (Figura 1): Figura 1 Esquema da variedade das formas da escrita filosófica inspirado na discussão de Marcondes e Franco (2011). Fonte: Do autor. Livros que seu aluno pode ler Volume 2 131 O que justifica a escolha dos diálogos de Platão diante dessa variação? Aos que respondem que "nem são tantos estilos assim", eu trouxe uma citação de um filósofo americano, o Arthur Danto. Em uma resenha de um livro do Stanley Cavell,3 ele diz o seguinte: A história da literatura filosófica é a história dos diálogos, notas de conferência, fragmentos, poemas, exames, ensaios, meditações, discursos, críticas, cartas, summae, enciclopédias, testamentos, comentários, investigações, Vorlesungen, Aufbauen, prolegomena, parerga, pensées, tractati, confissões, sententiae, inquiries, aforismos, commonplace books, e um turbilhão de outras formas mais sutis, nunca nomeadas. A Phenomenologie des Geistes especifica um gênero que só ela ocupa, cujo parente mais próximo é o Bildungsroman, e nada é comparável a Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung. Derrida inventou tantas formas, abrigando sabe-se lá o quê, que há uma forte probabilidade de que cada uma seja seu próprio conteúdo, permitindo-lhe ser a um tempo criativo e vazio. A classe dos textos filosóficos, em suma, resiste a qualquer generalização fácil, e a questão mais profunda de saber o que é a filosofia talvez devesse ser diferida até que estivesse claro por que essa extraordinária profusão grafomórfica é necessária. Em todo caso, devemos considerar a possibilidade de que, a menos que um filósofo tenha sido compelido a encontrar uma nova forma de apresentação, ele não tem nada de novo a dizer em filosofia (DANTO, 1982, p. 7-8, grifos meus). Essa última parte da citação não importa muito aqui (de qualquer maneira, é provocativa a ideia de que enquanto não decidirmos por que é assim, quer dizer, por que existem tantos tipos literários na Filosofia, talvez não seja possível responder o que é a própria Filosofia). Assim, o esquema que apresentei na figura acima talvez não seja o mais feliz para mostrar o que Danto chama de "profusão grafomórfica da Filosofia", e que nos importa, porque ela de fato põe um problema para o professor de Filosofia, sobre os critérios de escolha dos textos a serem trabalhados com seus alunos. Trago ainda outro trecho, de uma das publicações às quais me referi há pouco. O texto é da professora Jeanne-Marie Gagnebin, da Unicamp, 3 A tradução é do professor Paulo Faria, colega do Departamento de Filosofia da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS). 132 Filosofia e se chama As formas literárias da filosofia. É o último capítulo do livro Lembrar, escrever, esquecer (GAGNEBIN, 2006). O tema do texto é o mesmo, a profusão grafomórfica da Filosofia, sua variedade de estilos literários: Não há o mesmo tipo de argumentação nas Confissões de Santo Agostinho, na Crítica da razão pura ou em Além do bem e do mal – e isso não só porque Agostinho, Kant e Nietzsche são três pensadores individuais diferentes, mas também porque as formas literárias confessional, sistemática e aforística implicam exigências específicas. Como entender, por exemplo, o florescimento do gênero "diálogo" ou "carta" na Antiguidade, sua transformação no Renascimento e seu quase completo desaparecimento na filosofia contemporânea? Podemos observar igualmente que, no interior da obra de um mesmo filósofo, a passagem de uma forma para outra também assinala transformações nada acidentais do pensamento: o Wittgenstein do Tractatus e o Wittgenstein das Investigações filosóficas é o mesmo pensador em termos de pessoa individual, mas não é o mesmo pensador em termos de concepção filosófica. Enfim, uma reflexão mais apurada sobre a historicidade das formas literárias da filosofia nos ajuda a compreender melhor a historicidade da própria filosofia, este estranho exercício em torno de algumas questões e de alguns conceitos, sempre retomados e recolocados, sempre deslocados e reinventados (GAGNEBIN, 2006, p. 207-208, grifos meus). O que gostaria destacar aqui é a ideia de que cada forma literária acarreta exigências específicas – evidentemente tanto para quem escreve quanto para quem lê. É disso que vou tratar: quais são as exigências específicas para a leitura dos diálogos platônicos em contextos do Ensino Médio. Deixo, portanto, deliberadamente de lado a discussão acerca das notas distintivas de um ensino de filosofia para adolescentes com relação ao público dos níveis Fundamental e Superior. O que há de relevantemente similar em todo e qualquer nível de ensino e aprendizagem filosófico é que se trata de uma atividade a ser realizada junto com os alunos. Há que se fazer, ao menos um pouco de, Filosofia na sala de aula. O que estou dizendo pode parecer muito trivial, muito simples: é como em qualquer outra arte. Ernst Tugendhat sugere, por exemplo, uma comparação com o professor de violino tocando o instrumento com seu aprendiz para ensiná-lo. Podemos pensar no professor de Matemática, que ensina Livros que seu aluno pode ler Volume 2 133 fazendo as operações matemáticas, ou no professor de Dança realizando movimentos. O professor de Filosofia ensina fazendo filosofia. Mas como assim, fazer filosofia com uma turma de trinta adolescentes de 14 anos? Bom, apesar de singelo, quando eu digo "fazer um pouco de filosofia", quero me contrapor à ideia de que apenas podemos "simular" o pensamento filosófico nas salas de aula do Ensino Médio. Fazemos (ou deveríamos fazer) exercícios de pensamento filosófico, colocando em jogo suas variadas formas, embora primando (ou devendo primar) por formas mais adequadas ao contexto de ensino em questão. Quero dizer, você não faz como no Ensino Superior, muitas vezes, iniciando suas sequências didáticas diretamente com análise dos textos. E isso porque nesse caso os alunos já escolheram se envolver com questões filosóficas, cujas respostas são consideradas bem elaboradas quando colocadas contra o pano de fundo dos textos da tradição. Os alunos do ensino superior, supostamente, já estão dispostos a ler buscando maneiras de resolvê-las com apoio nos textos. Aposto, portanto, na ideia de que nós temos que praticar, fazer exercícios de filosofia junto com nossos alunos do Ensino Médio, e os diálogos platônicos são uma boa maneira de iniciá-los nesta prática, por serem um gênero literário no qual ela é instanciada – podendo então servir como modelo. 1.2 Dos núcleos de uma aula de Filosofia Uma das coisas nas quais tenho me baseado para pensar esses assuntos é a ideia de articulação entre três eixos, ou três núcleos conceituais, que uma boa aula de Filosofia para o Ensino Médio deve comportar. Ela vem do trabalho do professor Ronai Pires da Rocha, da Universidade Federal de Santa Maria. Em uma imagem sinóptica, a tríade se apresenta assim: 134 Filosofia Figura 2 – Os núcleos conceituais de uma aula de Filosofia inspirada em Rocha (2008). Fonte: Do autor. Mesmo correndo o risco de fazer "chover no molhado", afirmo que para uma aula (qualquer) fazer sentido para os estudantes, ela precisa ter alguma conexão com problemas típicos de suas vidas e seus mundos. E nós estamos falando de estudantes que têm entre 14 e 18 anos, provavelmente. Então uma aula de Filosofia tem mais chances de fazer sentido para eles quando esses núcleos são articulados entre si, sendo o primeiro deles bem importante. Temos, assim, um núcleo problemático ou temático, que diz respeito a determinados problemas de natureza conceitual que concernem de alguma maneira, que preocupam ou que tocam os estudantes – temas como a natureza do amor ou da amizade, perguntas sobre a legitimidade das relações de poder na família e na sociedade, questões relacionadas Livros que seu aluno pode ler Volume 2 135 à diversidade das visões estéticas e éticas do mundo etc. Este eixo contempla a pretensão de universalidade que a Filosofia carrega consigo, de tratamento de questões e problemas que em alguma medida tocam a todos – o que Kant chama de "dimensão cosmopolítica da filosofia" – e é conceitual na medida em que não se trata de pesquisar empiricamente o mundo para descobrir maneiras de resolver tais problemas e questões (embora seja importante levar em conta resultados de pesquisas empíricas!), mas, sim, de refletir sobre como pensamos nas coisas. O segundo é um núcleo metodológico, por assim dizer, composto de certos instrumentos conceituais, lógicos e argumentativos, cujo uso o professor de Filosofia pode, como nenhum outro, exercitar com os seus alunos para enfrentar os problemas e conceitos tematizados no primeiro núcleo. E ele faz isso tentando abordá-los de maneira um pouco mais clara do que comumente se faz na vida cotidiana. Para resolver certos problemas (filosóficos, conceituais, lógicos), muitas vezes distinções precisam ser feitas: é necessário prestar atenção em como nós usamos a linguagem na enunciação de certas opiniões ou em determinados argumentos; é preciso atentar para algumas diferenças entre discursos mera ou predominantemente retóricos e discursos mais logicamente construídos, entre estar de posse de opiniões e de justificativas para as mesmas, entre tipos de normas às quais as ações humanas estão sujeitas e, inclusive, precisamos da distinção entre problemas propriamente conceituais e empíricos, da qual falei há pouco. Por fim, mas não menos importante (não estou prescrevendo uma ordem para acionar os núcleos em sequências didáticas específicas), temos a dimensão histórica – que é a dimensão vasta e rica que constitui a literatura filosófica herdada de nossa tradição, e já mencionada no tópico anterior. Os diálogos platônicos são evidentemente constitutivos deste núcleo ou eixo histórico, dos textos clássicos. Gostaria de mostrar, entretanto, que eles podem compor de maneira muito feliz os outros dois eixos, especialmente por contemplarem uma diversidade bastante atual de temas, problemas e conceitos. Já dei exemplos de temas, como o que é a amizade, o que é o amor, mas pensemos em questões como se é possível ser uma boa pessoa, como é possível ser uma boa pessoa, qual é a melhor 136 Filosofia maneira de se organizar para viver junto, em sociedade, o que é ter corpo e ter alma e quais as relações entre ambos (são coisas separadas?), qual é o destino da alma depois que morremos etc. São problemas constantemente tematizados pelos personagens platônicos, e que constantemente se reatualizam para boa parte dos seres humanos. E a adolescência é uma fase em que algumas dessas questões se destacam ou, por assim dizer, se potencializam. Gostaria de defender a ideia de que nós podemos introduzir os diálogos como um mundo no universo de questões vivido pelos adolescentes e jovens em contato com a disciplina, uma vez que seu escopo temático é vasto e rico, colocando-os, então, como excelentes figurantes do núcleo ou eixo conceitual, temático, problemático de uma aula de filosofia. Ocorre que os diálogos platônicos também podem figurar no eixo ou núcleo instrumental da aula de filosofia na medida em que neles vemos operar certas metodologias de investigação filosófica, sobre as quais logo discorrerei. Gostaria de mostrar como isso é possível, dadas certas condições de dedicação por parte dos professores, sendo a primeira delas o reconhecimento de que os jogos dialéticos encenados pelos personagens platônicos tem um potencial didático-filosófico maior do que meramente servir como ilustração da variedade de textos da tradição. Assim, diálogos platônicos são, desde de uma perspectiva como esta, aqui apresentada, textos didaticamente completos para aulas de Filosofia no Ensino Médio, pois figuram em todos os eixos preconizados desde esta perspectiva. 2 Da potência pedagógica dos diálogos platônicos Como dito, o foco desta apresentação está nas exigências específicas para a leitura dos diálogos de Platão com alunos do Ensino Médio. E o que encontramos nos diálogos? Bom, em geral, um personagem principal, e em muitos deles se trata de Sócrates – que sabe-se ter sido um personagem histórico, que viveu em Atenas por volta do século IV a.c., que lutou na guerra do Peloponeso e que tinha o hábito de questionar, de peculiar Livros que seu aluno pode ler Volume 2 137 maneira, os rapazes, os filhos da aristocracia ateniense com quem ele convivia em sua pólis. O que interessa aqui é que como personagem dos diálogos, desses dramas filosóficos, Sócrates se engaja com os demais em um tipo de exame, de inquérito, que por vezes tem sido chamado de "jogo dialético". Para contextualizar a discussão acerca deste tópico, há um quadro de reflexões especializadas sobre a melhor maneira de se interpretar o assim chamado "método dos elencos". De acordo com uma determinada e tradicional interpretação da obra de Platão, trata-se do procedimento através do qual a personagem de Sócrates, em alguns mais do que em outros dos diálogos,4 submete seus interlocutores a uma série de questionamentos que, invariavelmente, os acaba constrangendo a reconhecer que aquilo que supunham saber – e que se manifesta em uma tese qualquer sobre, digamos, a natureza da justiça ou da coragem ou da amizade – não é objeto de conhecimento genuíno. Sócrates procede de modo a mostrar a falsidade da tese inicialmente assumida e a verdade da tese contraditória àquela. (Outra coisa que pode acontecer é o interlocutor se reservar o direito de abandonar a discussão sem o reconhecimento da falsidade de sua tese.) Tradicionalmente, portanto, compreende-se o que faz Sócrates como a aplicação de um método de refutação de seus oponentes. Quando faz isso, quando refuta o oponente, quando mostra ao interlocutor, pelo inquérito, que a tese que ele sustentara é uma tese falsa, Sócrates de imediato também acaba forçando o interlocutor a reconhecer que aquilo que julgava correto, ou dizia saber, não é objeto de 4 Disse "em alguns mais do que em outros dos diálogos" porque também é uma tese comumente aceita a de que se pode distinguir os diálogos em três grandes grupos, cronologicamente seriados – os diálogos socráticos ou "de juventude" (como a famosa Apologia; diz-se ainda da possibilidade de identificar um subgrupo de diálogos ditos "em busca de uma definição" – como o Eutífron, sobre o que é a piedade, ou o Lísis, sobre a natureza da amizade); os diálogos do período intermediário ou maduro de Platão, no qual aos poucos a influência de Sócrates vai sendo mitigada (fariam parte desse grupo diálogos como o Mênon, o Banquete e o monumental República); por fim, defende-se que na fase final da vida filosófica de Platão, a personagem de Sócrates perde significativamente seu status anterior, sendo inclusive o principal interlocutor dos diálogos não mais nomeado Sócrates, senão apenas chamado de "o ateniense". Seriam parte desta leva de diálogos obras complexas como o Político, o Sofista, o Timeu, isso sem contar a famosa Carta VII e o que se considera sem muita dúvida como último dos diálogos, Leis. Vale notar, entretanto, que mesmo este tipo de classificação dos diálogos é fonte de discórdia, havendo aqueles que sustentam ser a ordem dramática dos diálogos a mais adequada para sua compreensão conjunta. 138 Filosofia conhecimento genuíno. Quando refuta, Sócrates acaba fazendo a pessoa reconhecer que era ignorante em relação àquilo que julgava saber, mas que se mostrou falso. Agora, independentemente de se essa é a maneira correta de ser interpretado o "método dos elencos", o que me interessa deste quadro de discussões é que se a interpretação do objetivo de Sócrates nos diálogos em que ele opera por elencos – e, como disse, ele o faz em alguns mais do que em outros –; se for assim que nós interpretamos o método dos elencos, então o que se pode chamar de potência pedagógica ou didáticofilosófica dos diálogos fica um tanto esvaziado de sentido. Se o que o Sócrates faz nos diálogos, sobretudo nos que nos interessam (que são esses dos elencos), se o que ele faz é simplesmente refutar o interlocutor, esses textos não teriam, digamos, graça didática nenhuma. Porque, afinal de contas – outra coisa pressuposta – é que, ao menos às vezes, há um paralelo entre o professor de Filosofia e Sócrates, certo? Ao menos alguns de nós gostaríamos de nos entender um pouco como aquele que pretende fazer com seus alunos o que Sócrates fazia com seus interlocutores, ou seja, submetê-los com algum sucesso ao exame dos pressupostos conceituais, sejam teóricos ou práticos, das próprias vidas. Então, que sentido didático tem imaginar que o professor de Filosofia quer refutar os alunos e, portanto, mostrar que o que eles acham que sabem, eles de fato não sabem? O que sai, didaticamente falando, disso? O que nós ganharíamos em termos de aprendizagem filosófica, de exercício introdutório à prática filosófica, se fosse só refutar o adversário? O ponto, portanto, é que, com base na intepretação tradicional, pode haver uma tendência a desconsiderar a relevância didática e filosófica da dialética socrática. Imaginem que alguém sustenta que a coragem é tal coisa (digamos, não ter medo de nada). Nós vamos conversar sobre isso, o professor faz um monte de perguntas e leva o interlocutor a ver que não é bem assim, que há outras manifestações consideradas corajosas, mas que incluem a possibilidade de ter medo etc., com isso o oponente reconhece que não sabia o que achava que sabia e..., como se encaminha isso? Vejamos o que pode acontecer desde outra perspectiva. Recentes pesquisas empreendidas por especialistas em lógica e em filosofia antiga têm mostrado que a tradução mesma da expressão grega para "elenco" Livros que seu aluno pode ler Volume 2 139 (elenchus) como "refutação" não é adequada, na medida em que quando observados de modo cuidadoso (ou seja, levando-se em conta não apenas o que Sócrates de fato faz com seus parceiros de conversa, mas também os sentidos da evolução filológica da expressão elenchus no grego antigo), os diálogos platônicos mostram um Sócrates muito mais preocupado com uma espécie de teste de consistência de um determinado conjunto de crenças dos interlocutores sobre um assunto – a coragem, a amizade, o amor, dentre tantos outros – do que com a mera refutação de suas teses (crenças ou opiniões, não os distingo aqui). Preciso dizer ainda que, em termos estritamente lógicos, uma refutação consiste num raciocínio através do qual fica estabelecida a negação de uma tese. Se defendo, por exemplo, que os homens são moralmente superiores às mulheres, uma refutação desta tese consiste em mostrar "por A + B", como se diz, apresentando razões, que ela é falsa. A questão que se coloca para os especialistas que mencionei é, portanto, se ao inquirir aqueles que com ele se dispunham a conversar, Sócrates tinha como objetivo refutálos ou operar ainda outro procedimento. Como já disse, as respostas a esta questão apontam com relativa força para a tese de que o que está em jogo nos interrogatórios socráticos é um teste de consistência de crenças. Mas o que isso quer dizer? Consistência é uma noção lógica fundamental, relacionada com um princípio cardeal do pensamento, o princípio da não contradição. Ele reza que uma proposição não pode ser verdadeira e falsa ao mesmo tempo sob os mesmos aspectos. Um exemplo: se digo, por exemplo, que "não tenho nada contra" um determinado tipo de pessoa (gremistas, digamos), não posso ao mesmo tempo afirmar que "só não quero que cheguem perto de mim", pois ao dizer que não quero que um determinado tipo de pessoa chegue perto de mim, estou afirmando que algo nelas me incomoda (do contrário, por que diabos não quero que cheguem perto de mim?) e, portanto, tenho "alguma coisa contra" esse tipo de pessoa. Quem afirma "não tenho nada contra x, só não quero que chegue perto de mim" está, dizemos, enunciando proferimentos logicamente inconsistentes, e que no limite nem sequer fazem sentido conjuntamente. Assim, de acordo com a interpretação dos pesquisadores que mencionei há pouco, Sócrates não buscava refutar os oponentes, não se trata de 140 Filosofia dizer "você está dizendo A, eu vou te provar que não-A". Começa-se com "você está dizendo A" e aí aplica-se as regras do jogo das perguntas e das respostas. Vou mostrar algumas regras daqui a pouco. Entra-se no jogo, de modo que você não só afirma que acredita na verdade de A, como ao afirmar isso você também acaba assumindo a verdade de B, C, D..., o interlocutor vai concedendo estas coisas como consequência "lógica" da primeira assunção e das perguntas de Sócrates, e, depois de alguns desses passos, Sócrates sugere: "Então agora vamos 'silogizar' sobre isso o que dissemos? Vamos raciocinar? Vamos ver se tudo junto faz sentido?" "Opa... parece que não dá...!" E por quê? Porque aparece uma inconsistência, uma contradição. Alguém poderia perguntar: qual o problema com a inconsistência? O que dizer dos adolescentes com os quais trabalhamos nas salas de aula do Ensino Médio: não estariam eles vivendo justamente uma fase psicológica e socialmente cheia de naturais contradições? (O que, portanto, faria das tentativas de realizar com eles os tais testes de consistência socráticos uma tarefa com poucas chances de sucesso.) O problema principal é que, apesar de que, sim, a adolescência é um momento no qual a vida das pessoas se encontra em constante mutação (de ordem biológica, psicológica, social, e todas elas em relação umas com as outras), contradições engendram confusões que podem gerar incômodos ou mesmo sofrimentos desnecessários. E quem gosta de conviver com eles? Caso queiram procurar, o título de um dos textos relacionados às pesquisas que mencionei é Dialectical games in the academy, facilmente acessível na rede. No texto se explica a motivação do projeto de pesquisa dos autores sobre este ponto e se explicitam as regras do jogo dialético. Uma das coisas interessantes a observar é que, nos diálogos platônicos, o jogo não começa com um interlocutor convidando explicitamente o outro para jogar. Há todo um contexto dramático importante a ser observado. E isso é interessante porque pode indicar ao professor que também ele não precisa começar protocolarmente, mas envolvendo seus alunos em situações nas quais uma discussão ou debate faça sentido. Vejamos o caso de República, por exemplo. Na cena inicial, Sócrates está com Glauco voltando do porto, do Pireu, onde eles tinham ido dirigir preces a uma deusa e assistir à festa em sua homenagem, quando são vistos por Livros que seu aluno pode ler Volume 2 141 alguns concidadãos que os interpelam (não desconsiderem que o que se segue é uma glosa, por favor): "Ô, Sócrates, já está voltando para a cidade?" "É, já estou indo para casa." "Que é isso?! Não, fiquem conosco. Afinal nós somos maioria e queremos que vocês fiquem." Então Sócrates sugere: "E se eu convencer vocês de que devem nos deixar ir?", ou seja, ele sugere que os demais o escutem, para que ele tente persuadi-los a ir embora, mas eles respondem que não, não vão nem sequer ouvi-lo. Dizem ainda que logo mais, à noite, vai ter uma corrida de cavalos, seguida de uma festa cheia de jovens a conversar, e Sócrates e Glauco acabam vencidos, indo, então, até a casa de Polemarco (o personagem que havia mandado seu escravo fazer Sócrates interromper seu retorno à cidade), onde encontrarão os demais personagens do diálogo. A casa de Polemarco é também o local onde todo o diálogo se passa. República é o maior diálogo de Platão, o mais rico tematicamente, repleto de complexidades interpretativas, de imagens maravilhosas, alegorias, mitos, sutilezas históricas. Do ponto de vista dramático, entretanto, não é nada mais do que uma conversa entre certos homens atenienses que durou... uma noite! No início desta conversa, ao se falar sobre os prazeres de se conversar com pessoas de mais idade, surge a questão sobre o que é a justiça, tema dos quatro primeiros livros (capítulos) da obra. Esta questão passa, no diálogo platônico, pela discussão sobre o que é ter uma alma justa até chegar na discussão sobre a cidade justa, idealmente justa. A conversa começa dramaticamente "como quem não quer nada", as pessoas não estão ali para fazer aquilo – discutir o que é a justiça –, estão ali para conversar umas com as outras sobre qualquer coisa, e quando você vê, já estão, sob a batuta de Sócrates, jogando o jogo dialético – e daqui a pouco um se chateia e vai embora, volta o outro, joga mais um pouco. Note-se, ainda, que as primeiras palavras trocadas pelas personagens no diálogo envolvem a imposição da vontade de uma maioria, justamente em um texto no qual se elabora uma forte crítica à democracia vigente na Atenas de então. Esse tipo de detalhe dramático me parece bastante relevante a ser considerado quando se opta pelo trabalho com este gênero ou forma literária nas aulas de filosofia. Mas vamos lá, quais são as regras desses jogos? Vejamos algumas delas (valendo observar que nem todos os exemplos de jogos dialéticos nos diálogos de Platão as seguem exatamente): 142 Filosofia (i) Os jogos envolvem sempre dois jogadores: um proponente P e um oponente O, diante de uma audiência – em geral o oponente é Sócrates, mas os papéis podem ser trocados ao longo da conversa; (ii) Um jogo começa com O extraindo de P seu comprometimento com uma asserção ou tese A – uma tese sobre qualquer assunto, mas em geral se trata de opiniões aceitas por todos, ou a maioria, ou por entendidos, que são chamadas de endoxas. (iii) O jogo segue com uma série de perguntas e repostas alternadas. O pergunta de modo que P possa dar "repostas curtas", "sim" ou "não"; (iv) Assim procedendo, O extrai de P o comprometimento com outras asserções, B, C, etc., que podem ser consideradas como acréscimos a seu "fundo de comprometimentos" – com esta regra se forma o "conjunto" de opiniões ou teses que vão passar pelo "teste de consistência" (CASTELNÉRAC; MARION, 2009, p. 54 e 56, tradução minha). Só com estas primeiras regras já se pode perceber que há um potencial didático bem interessante nos textos em que esses jogos ocorrem, não é mesmo? Tomemos a regra (ii), por exemplo, que vemos ser executada a partir de teses que são mais ou menos o que chamaríamos de "senso comum": quando trabalhamos com adolescentes, podemos pensar em acionar o eixo conceitual, temático ou problemático de que falei acima justamente a partir do que eles consideram ser verdades admitidas, asserções que operam cotidianamente em suas vidas, mas que podem muito bem ser "testadas" por jogos dialéticos ("cada um tem a sua verdade", "gosto não se discute", "o futuro a Deus pertence" ou "o que acontece 'era para ser assim'" são exemplos típicos). Além disso, é possível compreender melhor por que razão muitas vezes as personagens com quem a de Sócrates está conversando só concordam ou discordam dele, sem dizer muito mais (cf. regra iii). Ou qual o objetivo de Sócrates quando vai adicionando asserções àquela inicialmente proposta por seu interlocutor (regra iv). Há, ainda, algumas regras para permitir que o proponente da tese ajuste ou esclareça concessões feitas, que ele possa protestar contra as perguntas formulando objeções (às quais o oponente responde, abrindo-se um "subjogo" dentro do jogo, no qual os papéis são invertidos temporariamente), e ainda uma regra que exige que ele responda as questões do oponente caso sejam admissíveis. Quero destacar ainda duas Livros que seu aluno pode ler Volume 2 143 regras importantes e que foram formalizadas por Castelnérac e Marion (2009, p. 60, tradução minha): (viii) O não pode introduzir qualquer tese que não seja aceita explicitamente por P; (ix) Tendo extraído de P o comprometimento com, digamos, B e C, O pode propor que eles raciocinem sobre a consistência do conjunto formado por A, B e C. Essa é uma regra importante. O oponente (Sócrates) não pode introduzir uma tese que o interlocutor não aceita. É proibido, por assim dizer, que posteriormente, no raciocínio que se elabora para testar a consistência das crenças do indivíduo – ou das asserções correspondentes ao que diz acreditar – seja inserida uma premissa que o oponente não aceitou. Então só vale incluir teses que são aceitas explicitamente pelo oponente. Cada passo do diálogo, avançado pela pergunta do oponente, tem que ser um passo assentido pelo proponente. Creio que já é possível sublinhar o que chamei de potência pedagógica dos diálogos que incluem estes jogos. Boas aprendizagens surgem do gosto que temos em sermos de algum modo ativos, e jogos como esses, ou inspirados nesses, podem ser ferramentas didáticas cuja utilização impõe dinâmicas, aprendizagens ativas em aulas de Filosofia. Parece bom um projeto de trabalho inventar jogos similares, diferentes versões, para serem jogados na sala de aula, e não somente em aulas de Filosofia. Como, então, a gente faz para ler os diálogos platônicos com nossos alunos? Uma vez que se trata de um gênero literário que é dramático, precisamos deixar claro, de algum modo, quem são as personagens e em que contexto suas ações se desenvolvem. Quem são as personagens dos diálogos? De um modo geral, se pode dizer que não são representações fiéis de personagens históricas, mas "versões platonizadas" dessas personagens. A ideia é que, já que se trata de um drama, temos que montar o cenário. E não apenas montá-lo uma vez e começar a leitura, como constantemente lembrar de quem se trata quando algo curioso ou intrigante sai da boca de uma personagem. E suponha que você já está lendo o segundo diálogo com os seus alunos, quando, digamos, Sócrates afirma algo, e o aluno consegue perceber que a personagem está dizendo 144 Filosofia uma coisa que, no outro diálogo, disse diferente. Isso pode acontecer, isso de fato acontece. "E agora? O Sócrates está dizendo coisas completamente diferentes, professora!" Ao que podemos responder que sim, está, mas agora ele está dizendo isso porque está conversando com outra pessoa, em outra ocasião, e que talvez haja uma razão não negligenciável para este tipo de diferença. Muitas vezes se procura nos diálogos essas "inconsistências", para tentar mostrar que Platão mudou de ideia com relação a algum tema ou mesmo que ele (via a personagem socrática) se contradiz. Não considero que este tipo de estratégia seja relevante para fins de didática filosófica no nível médio de ensino. Se o que você está procurando no texto são teses platônicas e se quer ler um texto do Platão buscando fazer uma formalização de um argumento, talvez realmente as personagens, Sócrates sobretudo, se contradigam, porque em um lugar dizem uma coisa e no outro dizem outra, inconsistente com aquela primeira. Mas aí você não está lendo o diálogo como drama, você não está levando em conta o cenário, os personagens, suas ações ou discursos, você não está levando em conta nuances importantes para a compreensão do texto. Existem muitas formalizações, ao estilo da lógica simbólica, de raciocínios desenvolvidos em diálogos platônicos. Não me oponho à estratégia, em princípio. Apenas gostaria de destacar que, ao adotála, está-se deliberadamente deixando de lado aspectos literários que são muito importantes para a interpretação desses textos, fechandose, como consequência, a porta para trabalhos interdisciplinares com as disciplinas de Língua Portuguesa e Literatura. Então, retomando: do ponto de vista didático, a primeira coisa a ser feita é montar o cenário, apresentar as personagens e recorrentemente fazer o aluno lembrar quem está dizendo o que, por que aquilo está sendo dito por aquela personagem, percebendo que este, quando diz essa palavra, não a está usando com o mesmo sentido que a outra.5 5 Pode-se aprofundar um pouco esta discussão com a leitura de Cornelli (2010) e Scolnicov (2003). Livros que seu aluno pode ler Volume 2 145 3 Uma amostra Finalmente, um exemplo. Vamos ler um trechinho do diálogo Mênon, utilizando a tradução da professora Maura Iglésias, da PUC-Rio. Existem, evidentemente, muitas traduções, é possível encontrar quase todos os diálogos no Domínio Público (site). Estou usando a tradução da professora Iglésias em primeiro lugar porque é bilíngue, e a tradução é direta do grego – o que pode incitar as curiosidades das pessoas pela língua de Platão. Esta edição do Mênon está publicada pela série Biblioteca Antiqua, uma série de traduções feitas por uma equipe da PUC-Rio e da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). Depois, há notas explicativas bastante úteis, porque em algum momento Sócrates elabora um raciocínio matemático com o escravo da personagem Mênon, desenhando na areia as figuras geométricas, e as notas ajudam a "ver" o que ele está mostrando matematicamente. Vamos tentar fazer o que eu estou sugerindo de maneira notavelmente muito reduzida, só para "dar um gostinho". De acordo com o texto, a conversa ocorre na casa de Ânito, uma das personagens, onde Mênon, a personagem do título, está hospedado. E sobre o que se conversa? Em princípio, sobre se é possível ensinar alguém a ser bom. Dizemos, normalmente, que o Mênon é um diálogo sobre a virtude. O que Mênon inicia perguntando é sobre a possibilidade de a virtude ser ensinada. Agora, a palavra "virtude" não é muito utilizada hoje em dia, não é mesmo? Isso é tão trivial, mas não irrelevante: alguns professores parecem não ser sensíveis ao fato de que em Filosofia, no mais das vezes, utilizamos um vocabulário não muito comum para tratar de coisas que são comuns, como a pergunta sobre como ensinar alguém a ser uma boa pessoa (embora se deva observar que, na época de Platão, a palavra que ele usou, areté, era de uso comum!). Nesses casos, de início, os professores já não conseguem se conectar com os adolescentes porque utilizam o vocabulário mais técnico – mesmo que sejam palavras do comércio comum, cotidiano, elas são usadas em sentidos específicos e incomuns – muitas vezes optando por definir os termos da discussão antes do seu início, enquanto poderiam partir de uma compreensão cotidiana das palavras para construir os sentidos mais precisos em um processo. Este é um ponto muito importante para a 146 Filosofia didática da Filosofia, e talvez para as demais didáticas específicas: começar com definições, sem levar em conta os sentidos comuns que as palavras possuem, o modo como transitam pelos discursos da vida cotidiana, é uma estratégia bastante artificial e, consequentemente, tende a não fazer efeito do ponto de vista das aprendizagens significativas que buscamos. Começar definindo os termos é coisa que fazem os matemáticos (não necessariamente os professores de Matemática, vale notar), pois seu modo de proceder é inteiramente peculiar e depende disso. Mas em Filosofia as coisas não funcionam assim, e essa é inclusive uma das razões pelas quais ela é uma empreitada intelectual das mais fascinantes: buscamos esclarecer, ou às vezes criar, sentidos para coisas que já conhecemos, ideias encorpadas em palavras que usamos para entender e viver o mundo, não palavras artificialmente definidas para fins de homogeneização de sentidos e raciocínios matematicamente construídos. Mas voltemos à virtude: até se usa, às vezes, uma palavra relacionada, para falar de alguém que é excelente em alguma coisa: do Yamandu Costa não se diz que é um virtuose no violão? Ele é excelente! A pergunta do Mênon, entretanto, é: a virtude "em geral", no sentido de "ser uma boa pessoa" pode ser ensinada? Dá para ensinar alguém a ser uma boa pessoa? Sim ou não? Muitas vezes essa pergunta é respondida: "Sim, através do exemplo." Outras vezes se diz "Não, a gente tem uma índole, é o que é, como era para ser." Se a aula começa com esta discussão, com os alunos fornecendo respostas diferentes, o ambiente está pronto para o jogo. O professor pode optar por realizar primeiro uma prévia, fazendo perguntas e colocando os alunos em estado de contestação (uns para com os outros), para depois mostrar como a conversa sobre o tema abordado se dá no diálogo, ou ler primeiro e depois discutir. Não quero propor um roteiro, apenas sugerir abordagens possíveis de serem testadas. Deixemme mostrar como começa o diálogo, com Mênon perguntando: "Podes dizer-me, Sócrates: a virtude é coisa que se ensina? Ou não é coisa que se ensina, mas que se adquire pelo exercício? Ou nem coisa que se adquire pelo exercício nem coisa que se aprende, mas algo que advém aos homens por natureza ou por alguma outra maneira?" (PLATÃO, 2001, 70a). Vejam que riqueza: as perguntas que Mênon coloca na abertura do diálogo já contêm muitas das posições que as pessoas comuns fornecem Livros que seu aluno pode ler Volume 2 147 quando se pergunta "É possível ensinar alguém a ser uma boa pessoa?" É a isso que, no capítulo Do substantivo ao adjetivo: os clássicos que nos cercam, a professora Márcia Ivana se refere quando diz que ser bom é algo que se ensina pelo exemplo. Imagina se não é possível realizar ótimas aulas sobre este tema com uma turma de adolescentes – que certamente terão posições distintas das personagens, o que é outra fonte de riqueza didático-filosófica, pois podemos engendrar situações de confronto de suas posições com as das personagens, comparações, justificativas distintas para as posições etc. Infelizmente, para encurtar nossa conversa, vou ter que contar o final do diálogo (desculpem o spoiler!): a "resposta" de Sócrates ao interrogatório de Mênon não é bem uma resposta. Isso porque se trata, como muitos outros, de um diálogo aporético, vocês já ouviram falar disso? Os aporéticos são os diálogos que terminam em aporia, como que sem saída, numa situação de incerteza ou hesitação, de não saber. Eles terminam no mesmo espírito que se impõe inúmeras vezes às personagens em diálogo com Sócrates (no caso de Mênon, tanto a personagem título quanto a personagem do escravo "caem" em aporia), que é o de sentir-se, ao final da jornada, novamente no ponto de partida: sem saber o que se julgava saber, com as mesmas perguntas (embora, claro – e isso é importantíssimo para a didática da filosofia – o processo tenha modificado mais ou menos os participantes da jornada), sem uma conclusão estabelecida. O reconhecimento, em virtude das inconsistências encontradas, de que não se sabe o que se julgava saber é crucial. E a ele se chega justamente através do "jogo" de perguntas e respostas há pouco apresentado. A última fala de Sócrates no diálogo, enfim, é esta: "Assim sendo, Mênon, é por concessão divina que a virtude nos aparece como advindo, àqueles a quem advenha." Atenção ao "assim sendo": se tudo que se disse há pouco está OK, quer dizer, que não se ensina pelo exemplo porque mesmo quando se dá o exemplo não necessariamente se aprende, ou que não se ensina por ter crenças verdadeiras acerca das coisas em questão (a serem ensinadas), ou qualquer uma das outras alternativas que foram exploradas ao longo do diálogo, então é-se virtuoso porque os deuses nos dão a virtude. Assim, então, segue Sócrates: 148 Filosofia o que é certo sobre isso saberemos quando, antes de "empreendermos saber" de que maneira a virtude advém aos homens, primeiro empreendermos pesquisar o que afinal é a virtude em si e por si mesma. Mas agora é hora para mim de ir a outra parte. Tu, porém, dessas coisas de que estás persuadido persuade também o teu anfitrião Ânito para que fiques bem calmo, pois se o persuadires, terá prestado também um grande serviço aos atenienses [...] (PLATÃO, 2001, 100 b-c). O diálogo termina com Sócrates afirmando que é preciso investigar mais sobre a natureza da virtude (e que consiste ser uma boa pessoa?). Mas não apenas isto. Do ponto de vista dramático ele nos diz mais: que Mênon – que parece ter se convencido de que muitas das suas opiniões sobre conhecimento e sobre ética não eram adequadas – tente convencer seu anfitrião, Ânito, das coisas de que ele foi convencido, porque com isso ele estará praticando um bem a seus concidadãos. Comentando esta passagem final eu pretendo concluir estas breves e preliminares observações. Lembremos que Platão era um crítico radical da democracia vigente em Atenas, dentre outras coisas, porque sob este regime o Sócrates real foi condenado à morte depois de julgado culpado de perverter a juventude e desrespeitar os deuses da cidade. Ânito, tanto quanto Sócrates e Mênon, é uma personagem "baseada em fatos reais", um dos acusadores de Sócrates. Além disso, Ânito é um dos membros do grupo que destituiu o governo dos trinta tiranos, ele é um dos novos políticos da cidade, é um dos que ficava irritado porque Sócrates pervertia a juventude e era ímpio, falava mal dos deuses. Essa era a acusação que, dentre outros, Ânito direcionou a Sócrates. Então, ao final do diálogo, você tem Sócrates dizendo a Mênon que convença um dos governantes não somente de tudo o que foi posto em jogo ao longo da conversa, mas também da importância deste tipo de conversa, ela mesma, do jogo dialético como algo que tem a capacidade de fazer bem aos cidadãos – não podemos interpretar assim? Creio ser possível perceber, então, a variedade de sutilezas que acabam sendo muitas vezes aplainadas no trabalho com este tipo de texto em sala da aula. Não poderei entrar em muitos detalhes, mas vejam: a escolha mesma de Mênon, personagem histórica, como personagem de um diálogo sobre a virtude, não é um acaso. Mênon pertencia a uma Livros que seu aluno pode ler Volume 2 149 família da nobreza, teve importantes ligações com a Pérsia e também com Atenas, e alguns registros o pintam como alguém "inescrupuloso, desleal, interesseiro e ambicioso" (cf. a nota da tradutora em Platão, 2001, p. 15). Não é relevante que a mesma pessoa que questiona a possibilidade de a virtude ser ensinada seja um conhecido patife? O que isso representa em termos dramáticos? Mênon representa o grupo das pessoas que acredita que a virtude pode ser ensinada e, mais do que isso, que ela é ensinada pelos sofistas, os famosos "mestres da Grécia". Mênon acredita que a virtude pode ser ensinada, que faz sentido você pagar uma grana para o Górgias, por exemplo, ensinar você a ser bom. Ele representa, então, essa associação entre virtude e poder, um poder de persuasão, de convencimento das pessoas que, certamente, se reflete na vida política. Além disso, e passando para uma outra perspectiva do diálogo (não ética, mas epistemológica), o Mênon, como personagem do diálogo, parece ter dificuldades de aprendizagem. Sócrates vai e volta, o jogo com ele é meio truncado, porque ele não entende as coisas, então Sócrates dá muitos exemplos, chega a ser engraçado em alguns momentos. Assim, em algum momento, da pergunta sobre se a virtude pode ser ensinada passa-se ao questionamento acerca da natureza da virtude, o que é ser uma boa pessoa. De novo, o Mênon vai dando respostas, e Sócrates vai dizendo: "Não, mas essa resposta não dá. Primeira coisa: o que é a virtude?", "Ah, virtude é o seguinte: a virtude é, a mulher é virtuosa quando cuida bem da casa, o escravo é virtuoso quando obedece ao patrão", e o Sócrates: "Não, mas espera aí, você está me dando um monte de exemplos, não quero exemplos, eu quero saber o que é a virtude, não adianta ficar me dando exemplo." Aí ele volta e tenta: "Não, a virtude é você comandar os outros." "Não, espera aí, virtude é comandar os outros... Mas a mulher pode ser virtuosa ou não pode?", "Pode.", "E ela comanda os outros?", "Não.", "Então...", e ele vai dando exemplos para mostrar que a ideia de que a virtude é saber comandar não é adequada. Ao longo da conversa, o tema passa a ser a possibilidade de ensinar, não somente a virtude, mas qualquer coisa, e aí você tem uma mudança importante, que nos força a rever a ideia de que o Mênon é um diálogo sobre a virtude e que, portanto, ele é um diálogo a ser trabalhado somente em aulas de ética. A questão é que, se você vai lendo e vai vendo tudo que acontece ali, o escopo do diálogo é muito rico, não é somente para ser trabalhado em 150 Filosofia aulas de ética. Você tem a questão ética, que é trata da possibilidade de ensinar alguém a ser bom. Você tem uma questão metodológica, porque o Mênon é um diálogo "de transição" em comparação com aqueles que são considerados os primeiros que Platão escreveu, e nos quais o método de interrogação era o método dos elencos mais "puro e simples", por assim dizer. Sócrates, nestes diálogos, passa o tempo inteiro mostrando a inconsistência dos conjuntos de crença dos seus interlocutores. Nesse diálogo, Mênon, ele começa a mudar um pouco de método. Ele faz elencos com a personagem de Mênon, mas ele também introduz o assim chamado método das hipóteses, que basicamente consiste na utilização de formulações condicionais, do tipo "Se isso, então isto." Ele começa a usar esse método, que é "importado" da prática geométrica, da prática dos matemáticos da Grécia Antiga. Então esse seria uma espécie de escopo metodológico do diálogo. Você tem também um escopo epistemológico, e por quê? Nessa coisa de tentar buscar uma definição do que é a virtude, eles começam a discutir sobre o que é conhecer, o que é saber o que é a virtude, o que é o conhecimento. Então você tem toda uma seção do diálogo sobre o que é e como se adquire conhecimento, independentemente do objeto a ser conhecido. É esse o contexto da famosa passagem em que Sócrates chama um escravo, personagem que não tem nome, é apenas "um escravo", ele é simplesmente alguém que fala grego – que é o minimum minimorum para jogar o jogo, dominar a própria língua. Sócrates chama o escravo para mostrar para o Mênon que conhecer é rememorar coisas que estão "guardadas na nossa alma", introduz-se aqui a famosa doutrina da reminiscência. Outro dos aspectos interessantes do Mênon, conectado com o que acabei de dizer, é que ele é o primeiro diálogo em que começam a aparecer teses que não são teses socráticas, advindas do pitagorismo, como a tese da imortalidade da alma, que por sua vez implica a possibilidade de você falar que o conhecimento é rememoração: é porque a alma já viveu em outro plano que há coisas "guardadas" nela para serem rememoradas. É claro que com alunos do Ensino Médio você não precisa (embora possa, se quiser, se julgar que faz sentido para a aprendizagem) entrar nesses detalhes. Você pode, por exemplo, ler a doutrina da reminiscência de uma maneira "não pitagórica", como uma espécie de explicação da tese de Livros que seu aluno pode ler Volume 2 151 que as coisas estão em potencial na alma, e conversando, jogando o jogo dialético, os alunos vão se despertando. Então, quando ele chama o escravo e propõe um problema matemático para o escravo, que é o problema da duplicação da área de um quadrado dado, Sócrates desenha o quadrado para o escravo e diz: "Se esse quadrado aqui tiver um lado medindo dois e outro lado medindo dois, que tamanho tem que ter a figura que vai ser o dobro desse quadrado? Tu sabes a resposta, rapaz?", ele diz "Sei."; "Qual é o tamanho da área desse quadrado?"; "Dois vezes dois é quatro."; "Certo. Então o quadrado que tem o dobro desse quadrado tem qual área?"; "Ah, oito."; "E em cima de qual dessas linhas do quadrado tu vais construir o quadrado que tem o dobro da área?"; e aí ele responde: "Ah, em cima desse lado aqui."; "Tem certeza?"; "Tenho"; aí o Sócrates constrói o quadrado em cima do dobro da linha, mas como o dobro de dois é quatro, e quatro vezes quatro é dezesseis... "Ah, então não pode ser em cima dessa linha que se constrói o quadrado que tem a área o dobro dessa." E Sócrates vai, por perguntas e respostas, mostrando que as alternativas que o escravo tem não são certas, até que o escravo consegue descobrir que é em cima da diagonal que se constrói o quadrado com área que mede o dobro da área do original. E aí ele diz: "Ah, estás vendo, Mênon? Conhecer é algo desse tipo, é uma lembrança." E, além disso, ele ainda sublinha o quão importante é, para o aprendizado do escravo, que ele reconheça que não sabe, que a aporia é constitutiva do processo de aprendizagem. Depois dessa volta, Sócrates propõe: "Então agora vamos voltar para a questão da virtude?", "Vamos.", aceita Mênon, e segue o diálogo. Então, além do escopo ético e metodológico, tem todo esse escopo epistemológico, essa discussão sobre o que é conhecer, se conhecer é rememorar ou não. Por fim, ainda se pode observar um escopo político, que é justamente aquela fase final do diálogo, da qual li apenas o último trecho, mas onde o que está em jogo é se seriam os políticos os mestres da virtude, se poderiam ser os homens que governam as cidades aqueles que ensinam os outros a serem bons. Nesse trecho o que está em jogo é se os sofistas seriam os mestres da virtude. Eles estão conversando novamente – depois da apresentação da doutrina da reminiscência com o escravo, da discussão epistemológica sobre a possibilidade de ensinar – sobre a questão de ser ou não possível ensinar a virtude, e aí se perguntam: "Ah, será que não 152 Filosofia seriam os sofistas esses professores a que se dá dinheiro para ensinar coisas? Será que não seriam eles os mestres da virtude?" Então o Ânito, lembrem-se de que ele é o dono da casa, diz "Não, não poderiam ser eles."; "Ah, por que não? Será que quando eles dizem que podem ensinar, eles são loucos?"; "Não, eles não são loucos, imagina, loucos eles não são."; "Como tu sabes que eles não são loucos?", pergunta o Sócrates, "Tu já chegaste perto de algum?", ele falou "Não! Por Zeus Sócrates." Sócrates está perguntando para ele assim: "Tu estás dizendo que eles não são os mestres da virtude, mas tu conheces algum sofista?"; ele: "Eu não, nunca cheguei perto"; "E como tu podes conhecer alguma coisa da qual tu nunca chegaste perto?" E aí eles vão conversando para testar a hipótese de que são os sofistas os mestres da virtude. E depois partem para o teste da hipótese de que são os homens virtuosos os próprios mestres da virtude, ensinando através do exemplo. Mas elas se mostram falsas, ambas as hipóteses. "O Temístocles não é um homem bom?"; "É."; "Temístocles conseguiu ensinar os filhos a serem bons?"; "Não."; "O Péricles não é um homem bom?"; "É."; "O Péricles conseguiu ensinar..."; "Não." Eles dão quatro ou cinco exemplos de homens que são considerados pelo Ânito, pelo interlocutor, homens bons, e Sócrates mostra com os exemplos que eles não são bons. E qual é a conclusão no final desse trecho todo? O Ânito fica irritado e vai embora. Na última vez em que ele aparece, diz a Sócrates que tome cuidado pois "parece-me que levianamente fala mal das pessoas", e isso, claro, não pega bem. O que ocorre é que Ânito não entende que o Sócrates está simplesmente dizendo "Olha só, eu não estou dizendo que eles, esses homens que citamos, não são bons. Eu estou dizendo que eles são bons, mas que eles não conseguem ensinar os filhos a serem bons." O Ânito fica brabo e diz: "Ai, tu estás falando mal deles." Ele não estava denegrindo, ele estava simplesmente dizendo que apesar de eles serem bons, não conseguiam ensinar os filhos a serem bons. "Em segundo lugar, ele está irritado porque julga que também é um desses homens. Mas", diz o Sócrates, "se algum dia souber (o Ânito) o que é falar mal de alguém, ele não vai mais ficar irritado. Agora, porém, ele o ignora." Estão vendo o que ele está dizendo? Ele está dizendo "O meu interlocutor acha que sabe o que é falar mal de alguém e além de tudo acha que eu estou falando mal de homens como ele. Se algum dia ele descobrir o que é falar mal de alguém, ele não vai mais ficar irritado." É meio assim: vai lá na fonte Livros que seu aluno pode ler Volume 2 153 do problema e elimina-o. Então isso é o que eu gostaria de mostrar para vocês: o método de Sócrates, das perguntas e das respostas, pode irritar e incomodar, mas quando bem jogado, pode ser o maior barato filosófico. Para terminar, eu gostaria de dizer o que fica na agenda, o que precisa ser feito em termos de construção de estratégias didáticas para trabalhar com diálogos platônicos no Ensino Médio. Tudo aqui são meras ideias, nunca as coloquei em prática em sala de aula de Ensino Médio. Nem tampouco falei desde o lugar de especialista na obra de Platão. Mas posso imaginar uma série de tarefas que, caso se pense em colocar alguma dessas ideias em prática, a gente poderia realizar. Por exemplo: temos que pensar em como introduzir o jogo, se primeiro colocando problemas conceituais ou criando situações que conduzam a problemas conceituais e a discussões subsequentes, para que a necessidade de regras para a discussão apareça na situação didática. Depois pensar em como apresentar as regras, se as construiremos junto com os alunos, com base nos exemplos extraídos dos diálogos, ou se criaremos regras distintas que depois serão comparadas com as que saem dos diálogos (tais como formalizadas por Castelnérac e Marion). É preciso, ainda, pensar nas dinâmicas em sala de aula: os alunos vão conversar entre si sobre os temas escolhidos? Ou com o professor? Quem realizará o papel de Sócrates? Qual o melhor momento para a introdução do texto? Podemos trabalhar interdisciplinarmente com quais outros colegas? Quer dizer, são muito mais perguntas para serem respondidas com a auxílio de experiências efetivas de leitura e trabalho com esses textos do que qualquer prescrição acerca de como fazer. A aposta é a de que é possível trabalhar com diálogos platônicos em sala se aula, desde que se prepare de modo adequado essas leituras, combinando elementos de lógica (especialmente de dialógica) e de, digamos, retórica literária (a dimensão da consideração dos aspectos dramáticos dos textos, suas nuances) e teoria da argumentação. Parece-me, por fim, que Nietzsche tem uma intuição a ser levada em conta nesse contexto, quando afirma que O diálogo é a conversa perfeita, porque tudo o que uma pessoa diz recebe sua cor definida, seu tom, seu gesto de acompanhamento, em estrita referência àquele com quem fala, ou seja, tal como sucede na troca epistolar, em que a mesma 154 Filosofia pessoa tem dez maneiras de exprimir sua alma, conforme escreva a este ou àquele indivíduo. No diálogo há uma única refração do pensamento: ela é produzida pelo interlocutor como o espelho no qual desejamos ver nossos pensamentos refletidos do modo mais belo possível. Mas como se dá com dois, três ou mais interlocutores? Então a conversa perde necessariamente em finura individualizadora, as várias referências se cruzam e se anulam; a locução que agrada a um não satisfaz a índole de outro. Por isso o indivíduo é forçado, lidando com muitos, a se recolher em si mesmo, a apresentar os fatos como são, mas tira dos assuntos o lúdico ar de humanidade que faz da conversa uma das coisas mais agradáveis do mundo. Ouçase o tom em que homens que lidam com grupos inteiros de homens costumam falar, é como se o baixo-contínuo de todo o discurso fosse: "este sou eu, isto sou eu que digo, pensem disso o que quiserem!" (NIETZSCHE, 2005, p. 196). Que os diálogos escritos por Platão possam nos servir como instrumentos didáticos frutíferos em situações de ensino e aprendizagem filosófica no nível médio, quer me parecer, depende de algumas das coisas de que falei acima, em termos de condições de dedicação por parte do professor, tanto no que se refere à abertura para a leitura atenta destes dramas filosóficos originários quando para a incorporação de seus melhores elementos pedagógicos ao cotidiano da sala de aula. Referências BRASIL. Ministério da Educação. Guia de livros didáticos: PNLD 2015: filosofia: ensino médio. Brasília: Ministério da Educação, 2014. CASTELNÉRAC, B.; MARION, M. Arguing for inconsistency: dialectical games in the academy. In: PRIMIERO, G.; RAHMAN, S. (Eds.). Acts of knowledge: history, philosophy and logic. essays dedicated to Göran Sundholm. London: College Publications, 2009. p. 37-76. CORNELLI, Gabriele. História da filosofia antiga: começar pelo diálogo. In: CORNELLI, G.; CARVALHO, M.; DABELON, M. (Coords.). Filosofia: ensino médio. Brasília: Ministério da Educação, 2010. p. 45-58. DANTO, Arthur. Review: Philosophy and/as film and/as if philosophy. October, v. 23, p. 4-14, winter 1982. GAGNEBIN, Jeanne Marie. As formas literárias da filosofia. In:______. Lembrar, escrever, esquecer. São Paulo: Ed. 34, 2006. p. 201-210. Livros que seu aluno pode ler Volume 2 155 MARCONDES, Danilo; FRANCO, Irley. Os estilos literários da filosofia. In:______. A filosofia: o que é? Para que serve? Rio de Janeiro: Zahar: PUC-Rio, 2011. NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. Humano, demasiado humano: um livro para espíritos livres. São Paulo: Companhia da Letras, 2005. PLATÃO. Mênon. Rio de Janeiro: PUC-Rio, 2001. ROCHA, Ronai Pires da. Ensino de filosofia e currículo. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2008. SCOLNICOV, Samuel. Como ler um diálogo platônico. Hypnos, São Paulo, ano 8, n. 11, p. 49-59, 2003.

BIEN, SPHERES ET HEBDOMADES : L'ART D'ECRIRE CHEZ BOECE ET PROCLUS Bien que de tailles fort différentes, la Consolatio Philosophiae et le Quomodo substantiae sont deux oeuvres majeures de Boèce qui se signalent au moins par leur originalité formelle. Il est possible de rendre compte de quelques unes de leurs particularités d'expression et de raisonnement en les rapportant à des auteurs néoplatoniciens, principalement Proclus 1, dont les indications méthodologiques, particulièrement dans ses commentaires sur les textes de Platon, définissent ce qu'on pourrait appeler un art d'écrire: un art d'écrire tel qu'en parle le Phèdre, c'est-à-dire non pas considéré du point de vue de la stylistique, mais du point de vue de la réflexion de la philosophie sur son propre mode de discours. I - LA DIVINE SPHERE 1. - Le cercle vertueux de Philosophie Au livre III de la Consolatio (livre lui-même central), la dernière prose contient le passage capital où Philosophie livre la clé de sa consolation: l'univers n'est pas abandonné à un désordre arbitraire et au mal, mais est gouverné par la raison et la bonté divines; c'est pour avoir oublié cette vérité que l'ex-Maître des Offices souffre inutilement 2. Le début de cette prose 12 est placée sous le signe de Platon, dont la doctrine de la réminiscence, justement, a été évoquée dans le poème précédent 3. La fin en est constituée par une séquence qui s'ouvre et se termine par une double référence à Platon également, l'une implicite, l'autre explicite 4. Celles-ci encadrent une réflexion méthodologique cruciale, qui est aussi un épisode dramatique, puisque c'est le premier endroit où Boèce se rebelle devant le remède que lui administre Philosophie. En effet, jusqu'alors, et surtout au cours de ce livre III où elle l'interroge plus souvent, Boèce a manifesté régulièrement, à chaque étape importante, son accord avec la démonstration de sa consolatrice 5. Comme le font les interlocuteurs de Socrate dans les Dialogues platoniciens, il ponctuait de son assentiment chaque idée nouvelle, constatant qu'elle était bien déduite des précédentes. Mais soudainement, après avoir pourtant obtenu une conclusion essentielle qui emporte non seulement l'adhésion de Boèce mais son admiration et sa résipiscence 6, Philosophie 1 Ceci ne vaut strictement que pour ce que nous essayerons de démontrer ici, et qui porte sur certains schèmes de pensée. Il faut concéder à S. Gersh que, sur le fond, Boèce est bien loin d'être un proclusien orthodoxe (Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. The Latin Tradition, vol. II, University of Notre Dame Press, Indiana, 1986, pp.701-705). Mais nous supposons qu'il est un auteur original, qui a pu s'inspirer sans s'inféoder. Par ailleurs, lorsque nous écrivons «Proclus», nous laissons ouverte la possibilité qu'une source éventuelle de Boèce soit en fait un prédécesseur ou un successeur immédiats du Diadoque (cf. infra n.33). Cependant, il se fait que de ce dernier sont les textes qui, d'une part nous sont parvenus, d'autre part s'avèrent indispensables pour éclairer ceux de Boèce. 2 Cf. (2e éd. Bieler, Corpus Christianorum, Brepols, Turnhout, 1984; les références indiquent: livre, prose ou mètre, lignes) I.6 l.40-46 et III.IX l.1, III.12 l.6-7, 33-36, 54-55. 3 III.XI l.11-16, III.12 l.1-4. 4 III.12 l.59-96 5 Voir III.10 l.19, 33-34, 56-58, 67-68, 101-102, 120-121; III.11 l.1-2, 7, 16, 24, 91-92; III.12 l.1-4, 37-38, 55-58. 6 III.12 l.54-58: «Est igitur summum, inquit, bonum quod regit cuncta fortiter suaviterque disponit. Tum ego: Quam, inquam, me non modo ea quae conclusa est summa rationum, verum multo magis haec ipsa quibus uteris verba delectant, ut tandem aliquando stultitiam magna lacerantem sui pudeat». J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 2 propose que son discours prenne un tour plus agonistique, fondé sur la confrontation des raisons. La nouvelle orientation de sa consolation répond au programme que Philosophie a tracé au départ et qui est sans cesse rappelé: au vu de l'état du malade, il a fallu commencer par des remèdes doux et en venir progressivement à de plus énergiques 7. Mais cette suggestion se présente aussi comme une invitation à accéder à une étape supérieure, après que Philosophie a rappelé, sur le mode mythique, que le bien vient à bout du mal 8. «Visne rationes ipsas invicem collidamus ?», demande-t-elle donc 9. Suit immédiatement la première référence, allusive mais claire, à Platon: un choc de ce genre peut produire des étincelles de vérité 10. Philosophie rappelle alors que Dieu étant tout-puissant, rien ne peut lui faire obstacle, et que lui-même ne peut faire le mal puisqu'il est le Bien. Par conséquent, lâche-t-elle abruptement, «le mal n'est rien» 11. Devant l'énormité de cette affirmation, que semble démentir son amère expérience personnelle, Boèce se cabre pour la première fois: «Te joues-tu de moi ?», demande-til 12. Il se plaint ensuite d'être enfermé dans un «inextricable labyrinthe» par les «raisons» que «tisse» Philosophie. Venue le visiter dans sa cellule de détenu, elle semble l'enfermer dans une nouvelle prison. Cette impression d'égarement résulte de la circularité de son discours, plus exactement du fait que chacune des thèses soutenues est alternativement une entrée et une sortie, un principe et une conclusion. Le désormais deux fois prisonnier résume ainsi les tours et les détours par lesquels il est passé et repassé dans ce livre III 13: - En prenant pour point de départ le bonheur, on a déduit: 1/ qu'il est le souverain Bien (pr. 2), 2/ qu'il réside dans le Dieu souverain (pr. 10, l.1-34) 14. - En prenant pour point de départ Dieu, on a déduit: 1/ qu'il est le souverain Bien (pr. 10, l.34-53), 2/ qu'il est le bonheur parfait (l.54-68), et l'on a posé comme corollaire que l'homme heureux est divin (l.69-79). - En prenant pour point de départ le Bien, on a déduit qu'il est la substance même du bonheur (l.80-120) et de Dieu (l.121-124). - En prenant pour point de départ l'Un, on a déduit qu'il est le Bien recherché par toutes choses (pr. 11), c'est-àdire également le parfait bonheur ou Dieu, et donc que toutes choses désirent Dieu. - En prenant pour point de départ Dieu, on a montré qu'il dirige toutes choses selon le Bien, et que toutes choses se laissent ainsi gouverner (pr. 12, l.1-58). Les quatre notions, impliquées les unes dans les autres parce qu'elles sont fondamentalement identiques, sont ainsi reliées par un lacis inextricable de relations, que l'on peut parcourir dans tous les sens, en revenant toujours au point d'où l'on est parti. Quelle signification et quelle valeur accorder à cette circularité ? Cercle vicieux ou vertueux ? Il faut prendre acte que Philosophie voit dans le palindrome démonstratif une garantie supplémentaire de certitude. C'est ainsi qu'elle justifie, au livre IV, la réversibilité d'une de ses démonstrations (on peut prouver la puissance du bien à partir de la fragilité du mal, ou la fragilité du mal à partir de la puissance du bien). Elle annonce qu'elle 7 I.6 l.48-54; II.1 l.16-19, II.5 l.1-2; III.1 l.6-8, 11-13. 8 III.12 l.59-61. Ces deux lignes seront traitées infra, dans notre conclusion. 9 III.12 l.61. 10 III.12 l.62-63: «Forsitan ex huiusmodi conflictatione pulchra quaedam veritatis scintilla dissiliat». Cf. Rép. 435a 13, Lettre VII, 344b 3 c 1. 11 III.12 l.68-69. 12 III.12 l.70. 13 III.12 l.73-83. 14 Les proses 3 à 9 sont consacrées à dénoncer les faux biens. J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 3 parcourra les deux chemins, ou plutôt cette voie dans les deux sens, pour plus de sûreté 15. Mais dans le passage du livre III qui nous retient, il y a plus. Que non seulement la circularité ne soit pas une faute logique, qu'elle ait même une signification métaphysique, voire théologique, le vers de Parménide cité dans cette séquence dont les extrêmes sont placés sous l'autorité de Platon, en est l'indice majestueux: Πάντοθεν εὐχ ύχλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγχιον ογχω16. Telle est, selon Philosophie, la «forme de la substance divine»: une sphère parfaite. Toutefois la référence à Parménide va au-delà de cette comparaison de Dieu à une sphère, somme toute traditionnelle 17. Remarquons d'abord qu'il se peut que la problématique même dont naissent ces réflexions ait appelé d'emblée une réminiscence de l'Eléate. Si en effet le mal est néant 18, dire que le mal existe serait non seulement un erreur, mais reviendrait à transgresser l'interdit parménidien fondamental; au contraire, soutenir comme Philosophie que le mal n'est pas, c'est se souvenir que le non-être n'est pas. Ensuite, l'ambivalence de la circularité se trouve déjà dans le poème de Parménide. Dans le fragment VI, le chemin de la foule indécise des «double têtes» (ceux pour qui l'être et le non-être à la fois sont et ne sont pas le même) est qualifié de τροπόσ»: qui avance et qui revient en arrière, qui va dans les deux sens. Cela correspond bien à l'impression première que retire Boèce de la démonstration de Philosophie: on peut parcourir ses voies dans tous les sens, comme dans un dédale dont on ne sort jamais. Mais surtout, la déesse qui enseigne Parménide lui annonce qu'elle lui apprendra «la vérité bellement circulaire» » (εὒχυχλος, encore) 19; et en des paroles qui nous sont connues par Proclus, elle affirme: «Il m'est égal / De devoir commencer par un point ou un autre / A ce point de nouveau je reviendrai encore» 20. «Bellement circulaires» sont donc, à titre égal, la vérité et l'être lui-même 21. Ce dernier, simple, continu et homogène, parfaitement un, est toujours identique par où qu'on le prenne 22. Le discours véridique qui l'exprime n'a pas non plus de commencement ni de fin uniques; comme lui il est une sphère idéale, dont la rotondité fait que tous les points de la surface sont équivalents, et qu'en partant de n'importe lequel on y revient forcément en suivant un cercle. Philosophie, chez Boèce, peut par conséquent transposer à Dieu ce que la déesse, chez Parménide, attribue à l'être, mais aussi ce qu'elle précise quant au discours qui convient pour dire l'être, à savoir que chaque point en est indifféremment début, étape ou terme. Comme le pressent Boèce lui-même, au moment où il exprime son désarroi dans la prose 12, la circularité des preuves que l'on peut parcourir indéfiniment pourrait être, interprétée en bonne 15 IV.2 l.8-10: «Sed uti nostrae sententiae fides abundantior sit, alterutro calle procedam nunc hinc nunc inde proposita confirmans». 16 III.12 l.91 = Diels, frag. B VIII l.43. 17 Voir O. J. Brendel, Symbolism of the Sphere. A Contribution to the History of Earlier Greek Philosophy, Leiden, Brill, 1977, p.24 sq. La comparaison est déjà attestée chez Xénophane (le maître de Parménide ?), frag. A XXVIII 7, XXXI, XXXIII 2, XXXIV, XXXV, XXXVI, ou, plus proche de Boèce, chez Marius Victorinus, Adv. Ar. I.60, 20-21 et 27. Cf. le Livre des XXIV Philosophes, II, XIV, XVIII. 18 Cf. S. Augustin, Enchiridion, III.11, Conf., VII.xii.18, Solil. I.ii.2. 19 Frag. B I l.29. 20 Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon, éd. V. Cousin (1864), dans Procli Opera inedita, pars IIIa, réimpr. G. Olms, Hildesheim, 1961, col. 708, l.16, = frag. B V. Voir: Parmenide : Poema sulla natura, G. Reale et L. Ruggiu, Milan, Rusconi, 1991 (I Classici del Pensiero), p.252-255; Etudes sur Parménide, ss. dir. P. Aubenque, Paris, Vrin, 1987 (Bibl. d'Hist. de la Philosophie), t.I, p.235-236; Parmenides of Elea. Fragmenta, éd. et trad. D. Gallop, University of Toronto Press, 1984, p.19. 21 Frag. B I l.29 et VIII l.43. 22 Frag. B VIII, passim. J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 4 part, une imitation de «l'orbe admirable de la simplicité divine» 23. C'est ce que confirmera Philosophie, en invoquant une expression fameuse du Timée: «cum Platone sanciente didiceris cognatos de quibus loquuntur rebus oportere esse sermones» 24. C'est là la seconde et conclusive référence à Platon, dans le passage qui nous occupe. Le discours doit être apparentée à la nature de son objet. Cette citation est un lieu commun (au sens propre, non pas une trivialité) des exposés néoplatoniciens. C'est grâce à elle que, vers la même époque que Boèce, le manuel alexandrin intitulé Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon justifiera l'existence même de textes du maître, ainsi que leur forme dialoguée 25. Mais auparavant, Proclus en a fait aussi grand usage. D'après son Commentaire du Timée, alors que la première partie du prologue du discours de Timée (27d 5 29b 2) a été consacrée à présenter les principes fondamentaux qui seront appliqués dans la cosmogenèse, la seconde partie (29b 2 29d 4) est une remarque méthodologique sur le genre de raisonnement qui sera employé. Cela équivaut, pour Proclus, à distinguer science en soi et discours d'enseignement, mais sans les opposer, puisqu'au contraire ils vont se correspondre. Proclus fait alors de la remarque-clé de 29b 4-5 (sur l'apparentement du discours à la réalité) l'axiome même, la toute première proposition dont part l'exposé didactique. Selon une réflexivité parfaite, appliquant immédiatement la consigne au moment même où il l'énonce, Timée l'élève au rang de principe universel en la choisissant pour point de départ de sa reconstruction de l'ordre naturel, qui sera à l'imitation de ce dont elle parle, l'origine du monde 26: «De même que la procession des Etres découle d'une unité avant de passer à la multiplicité et que la procession des êtres encosmiques part d'une monade pour aboutir au nombre approprié, de même aussi l'exposé de Timée, se rendant semblable, comme il le dit lui-même, aux réalités commence par l'axiome unique et universel pour introduire ensuite la division dans le discours. Quel est donc ici l'axiome unique et commun ? C'est que le discours doit avoir correspondance naturelle avec les réalités qu'il interprète» 27. Autrement dit, puisque le réel procède de l'Un vers le multiple, Timée (qui est une figure du Démiurge parce qu'il re-produit le Monde dans son discours 28) commence son discours, appelé à se ramifier, par un principe unique, qui pose justement que le discours doit ressembler à ce dont il parle. Ce faisant, il satisfait à cette autre proposition, qui fonctionne comme une sorte de méta-règle: il faut commencer par le commencement naturel (29b 2-3). Elle vaut non 23 I.12 l.72-73. L'orbe divine laquelle a aussi pour image l'ordre que suit la Nature: tout est cycle, toute chose finit par retourner à son origine («Repetunt proprios quaeque recursus / Redituque suo singula gaudent / Nec manet ulli traditus ordo / Nisi quod fini iunxerit ortum / Stabilemque sui fecerit orbem», III.II l.34-38; cf. III.IX l.21-28). Voir Proclus, In Timaeum II, éd. Diehl (Leipzig, Teubner, 1903) t.I p.210 l.10-11, trad. fr. A. J. Festugière (Paris, Vrin-CNRS, 1966-68), t.II p.31: la conversion constitutive des étants fait «de leur course une sorte de cercle, qui part des dieux et qui s'achève chez les dieux». On peut exprimer aussi que tous les êtres sont dans la manence en disant qu'ils sont «encerclés par les dieux» (id., p.209 l.27, trad. p.30), et qu'ils font retour à cette manence en disant que la Lumière divine nous encercle (id., p.211 l.28, trad. p.33). 24 III.12 l.95-96. Cf.Tim. 29b 4-5: ... ὡς ᾱρα τοὺς, ὼνπέρ εἱσιν ἑξηγηταί, τοὐτων αὐτῶν χαί συγγενεις οντας». Pour ce qui est fixe, stable et translucide à l'intellect, à savoir l'être vrai et l'intelligible, il faut des raisonnements fixes et assurés, irréfutables et inébranlables, alors que pour ce qui n'est qu'image de l'être, pour ce qui est en devenir, le vraisemblable suffit (id., 29b 6 c 2). 25 Ed. et trad. Westerink–Trouillard–Segonds, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1990, III.13, p.20, IV.15, p.22, p.23 l.40-48, VIII.20, p.30 l.12. 26 Cf. Critias, 106a 3-4: «Ce Dieu [le Monde], qui jadis naquit un jour réellement, et qui vient à l'instant de naître encore en paroles (...)». 27 In Tim. II, t.I p.340 l.16-23, trad. t.II p.200 (modif.). Peu auparavant, Proclus a expliqué que la distinction préalable des types de discours est analogue à l'établissement des principes invisibles de la réalité, et le déploiement du discours à la manifestation de la réalité visible : «Pour ma part, je dirais que l'exposé imite l'ordre même de la création. Car de même que celleci produit d'abord les principes invisibles de la vie dans le Monde, puis fait exister la réalité visible, et contient de cette réalité aussi la définition avant que n'existe le Monde en sa totalité, de même aussi Timée s'applique d'abord à la considération des réalités et adapte ensuite aux réalités le caractère du discours, mais avant tout l'ensemble du traité il conçoit et définit le mode des différents exposés, afin d'ajuster à cette définition tout le cours de l'instruction» (p.339, l.21-29, trad. p.199). 28 In Tim. I, t.I p.9 l.15-17, p.73 l.16-17, p.95 l.3-18. J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 5 seulement des exposés, dit Proclus, mais de «toute l'oeuvre même de la création», et elle fixe la relation de tout commencement à l'égard de ce qui le suit, à savoir non pas un rapport extrinsèque mais un statut de source ou de racine. Parallèlement, donc, l'Univers sort de la cause première (qui est aussi cause finale), les démonstrations des principes de base, et l'exposé didactique de la «détermination du caractère de l'instruction» 29, en l'occurrence la proposition première (en apparence purement formelle) qui impose la correspondance du discours à la réalité et donc la distinction des deux types de discours, et qui par conséquent enveloppe tous les développements futurs de la cosmogonie de Timée: «Car, de même que toutes les choses de l'Univers procèdent à partir du commencement conforme à la nature, je veux dire de l'éternité des Dieux et de la Source des êtres, de même aussi le discours scientifique, s'il jaillit, comme d'une racine, du commencement conforme à la nature, fait correspondre ensuite avec ce commencement les raisonnements où il fait voir la cause, et la science elle-même part des axiomes propres pour en déduire les conclusions propres. La science ne fait donc que suivre l'ordre des réalités, et elle est suivie à son tour par le discours d'enseignement. Et c'est là, pour ce discours, "la chose la plus importante", d'abord parce qu'il imite ainsi l'ensemble du réel et la procession des êtres (...)» 30. L'insistance particulière de Proclus sur le rôle de ce principe doit être rapprochée de la fonction méthodologique que lui attribue aussi Boèce. Incontestablement, la référence au Timée est capitale dans le livre III de la Consolatio. Nommément cité un peu auparavant (prose 9), au moment décisif où s'avère nécessaire une prière invoquant l'assistance divine (invocation rappelée précisément dans le passage que nous étudions) 31, ce dialogue (27c-42d) et son commentaire proclusien inspirent fortement le poème suivant (m. IX) 32. Il n'est donc pas étonnant de retrouver la fameuse citation de 29b 4-5 en conclusion de la séquence dont nous parlons (prose 12, qui contient déjà, en son commencement et en son milieu, deux références à Platon, ainsi que nous l'avons remarqué), après que Philosophie a invoqué le vers de Parménide (Πάντοθεν εὒχ θχλου σφαίρης...) pour justifier la conformité circulaire de sa démonstration à son objet 33. Ce double appel à Parménide et à Platon, plus précisément à un Parménide encadré par Platon, correspond parfaitement à l'éducation de Boèce que rappelle Philosophie lorsqu'elle le dépeint au livre I: 29 T.I p.338 l.26-29, trad. t.II p.198. 30 T.1 p.337, l.29 p.338, l.7, trad. t.II p.197-198. 31 III.9 l.86-91; rappelé en III.12 l. 86-87: «dei munere quem dudum deprecabamur». 32 Voir F. Klingner, De Boethii consolatione philosophiae, Berlin, 1921, p.40 sq. 33 P. Courcelle (La Consolation de Philosophie dans la tradition littéraire, Paris, Etudes augustiniennes, 1967, p.165) a supposé que Boèce, en mentionnant ce même passage du Timée 29b 4-5 dans son commentaire du De Interpretatione (ed. sec., éd. Meiser, p.246, l.20 sq.), suit Ammonius (CAG t.IV, 5, p.154, l.16 sq.), qui interprète à l'aide de cette référence la théorie aristotélicienne de la correspondance entre la vérité du discours et celle des choses. Mais Boèce ne songe pas forcément ici au contexte du De Int., puisqu'il reprend un lieu commun de l'exégèse néoplatonicienne, ayant peut-être à l'esprit soit le texte de Platon lui-même, soit celui du Diadoque (cf. In Tim., t.I p.8, l.9-13, p.340, l.19-22), ou encore les deux (selon Klingner, op. cit. p.74, oportere, dans la citation de Boèce, ne vient ni du Timée ni des traductions de Cicéron ou Chalcidius, mais du commentaire de Proclus). De toute façon, l'hypothèse de Courcelle est infirmée par J. Shiel, "Boethius' Commentaries on Aristotle", in Aristotle Transformed, ed. R. Sorabji, London, duckworth, 1990, p.355-358, 362-363, 366, 369-370, qui rattache Boèce plutôt à Syrianus et Proclus. On peut aussi remarquer que P. Courcelle (Les Lettres grecques en Occident, Paris, E. de Boccard, 1943, p.285; cf. p.288289), qui avait lui-même établi un autre parallèle textuel entre Boèce (Cons. IV.3, 12) et l'In Timaeum de Proclus (t.I, p.378 l.18), ajoutait (sur la base de la remarque ci-dessus discutée): «On se demandera pourtant si les emprunts de Boèce à Proclus sont toujours directs ou si ce n'est pas plutôt son disciple Ammonius qui a conduit Boèce à citer le Timée (...)» (ibid.). Cependant, il avait écrit plus haut: «Ammonius lui-même plagie certainement des commentaires grecs antérieurs, perdus aujourd'hui, entre autres ceux de Jamblique et de Proclus; on devra toujours se demander si les parallèles qu'il est possible de noter entre les commentaires de Boèce et d'Ammonius ne viennent pas de ce qu'ils dérivent d'une source commune, sans qu'Ammonius soit nécessairement la source directe de Boèce» (id., p.269). La question est en effet indécidable. On peut seulement faire valoir, à la suite de P. Courcelle (id., p.268) que Boèce connaît le commentaire de Syrianus, le maître de Proclus, sur le De Interpretatione, et que rien n'exclut «un contact direct entre Boèce et les commentateurs grecs contemporains, issus de l'école de Syrianus». Proclus J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 6 «Hunc vero Eleaticis atque Academicis studiis innutritum» 34. Mais à vrai dire, c'est de l'Académie néoplatonicienne qu'il s'agit. Cela n'exclut absolument pas un rapport de Boèce à la tradition latine du Timée 35. Mais c'est chez Proclus que l'on trouve cette conjonction de l'Eléate et du Platon du Timée, maître en l'art d'écrire. En effet le Diadoque, toujours dans son Commentaire du Timée, en argumentant à partie de la convenance dans un passage consacré aux perfections divines de la sphère, cite précisément le Πάντοθεν εὒχ θχλου σφαίρης... de Parménide 36. Par ailleurs, au moment où il rappelle le même principe de 29b 4-5 en l'appliquant à 29c 1-3 37, Proclus introduit à titre d'illustration (sur l'opposition de science et opinion) deux autres extraits de Parménide 38. Il y a donc une affinité bien établie entre le mot d'ordre platonicien et la référence à Parménide, que reprend Boèce à sa manière. Il paraît plus que vraisemblable que ce dernier doive aux néoplatoniciens la théorie de son art d'écrire en rond. Cependant, pourrait-on objecter, chez Proclus le principe d'apparentement est l'axiome d'un développement linéaire, alors que chez Boèce il sert à rendre compte d'une forme circulaire. Nous verrons tout à l'heure qu'en fait, l'écriture rectiligne, voire axiomatique, n'est pas absente chez Boèce, et se concilie avec le modèle orbiculaire. Remarquons pour l'instant que, inversement, tout prend forme circulaire chez Proclus aussi. Platon, dans le Timée, a ouvert la voie en expliquant que le Démiurge a donné au monde la figure qui lui est apparentée (συγγενές, 33b 2, qui est précisément le terme employé pour désigner la correspondance entre le discours et son objet, 29b 5): la sphère. D'une part en effet, de même que le monde, comme totalité vivante et une, enveloppe tous les êtres vivants, la sphère inclut toutes les figures géométriques possibles 39. D'autre part, la sphère, dont tous les points sont équidistants du centre, est la figure «la plus parfaite et le plus semblable à elle-même» 40, et ainsi le monde est le plus beau possible 41. Proclus développe cette idée en disant que la sphère a la propriété divine d'embrasser la multiplicité dans l'unité 42, et qu'elle se trouve à chaque plan de la procession, celle que forme le monde n'étant que la copie des supérieures: dans le Démiurge lui-même qui inclut intellectivement toutes choses, dans les Dieux Intellectifs, dans le meurt en 485, Ammonius fils d'Hermias, son disciple, s'établit à Alexandrie vers 470, Boèce naît vers 480, ses premières oeuvres paraissent vers 500. 34 I.1 l.33-34. 35 Il faut toutefois remarquer que la traduction donnée par Boèce de Tim. 29b 4-5 n'est pas celle de Chalcidius, moins fidèle («Causae quae, cur unaquaeque res sit, ostendunt, earundem rerum consanguinae sunt»). 36 In Tim. III, t.II p.69 l.20, trad. cit. t.III p.102. Il est hautement probable que Boèce ait en fait lu ce vers chez Proclus ou un autre néoplatonicien. D'une part Simplicius nous dit que les exemplaires du Poème étaient rares à son époque (In Phys., CAG t.IX, p.144 l.25-28; je dois cette remarque à M. Ph. Hoffmann), d'autre part Proclus cite ce même vers deux fois (In Tim. t.II p.69, l.20, Théol. plat. III.20), et Simplicius pas moins de sept fois dans son commentaire de la Physique, comme l'a remarqué P. Courcelle (Les idées grecques ..., p.287). Il semble donc être une sorte de lieu commun dans l'Ecole. Boèce a pu le trouver aussi dans le Sophiste, 244e 3; mais le contexte n'est pas le même, alors que chez Proclus le vers figure dans un passage consacré explicitement à la sphéricité, dont les propriétés sont celles-mêmes que peut invoquer Philosophie dans sa réponse. 37 «Platon donc a fait correspondre ouvertement les discours et les modes de connaissance avec les objets connus», In Tim. II, t.I p.345 l.11-12, trad. t.II p.205. 38 Id., l.15-27 = frag. B I l.29 sq. et frag. II. 39 33b 2-4. 40 «en tant qu'elle est en continuité avec elle-même, égale à elle-même, coordonnée à elle-même», commente Proclus (t.II p.72 l.4-5, trad. t.III p.105). 41 33b 4-8. On peut noter aussi que s'il reste stable, toujours identique à lui-même (32c 1-4, 33a 2 b 1), c'est qu'il a été soumis au plus beau des liens, la proportion (31c 2-4). Or en celle-ci les termes sont permutables et sont alternativement premier et dernier (32a 1-7) - comme les étapes du raisonnement de Philosophie. 42 In Tim. III, t.II p.72 l.29-30, trad. t.III p.106. Voir id., p.68-69, trad. p.102, et p.78 l.5-10, trad. p.113: «Il y a du moins correspondance entre le semblable à soi-même et l'unité, entre le parfait et le bien: en sorte que, par ces deux termes, Platon a rapporté le sphérique à ce qui est premier, le dénommant "le plus semblable à soi-même" et "le plus parfait" comme s'il avait dit "le plus unifié" et "le plus boniforme"». Cf. id., IV, t.III p.143 l.9-10: la forme sphérique «est propre à ce qui relève de la conversion». J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 7 modèle, le Vivant intelligible qui enveloppe tous les vivants intelligibles (cf. 30c 9 d 2), dans le «Diacosmos caché» ... 43. Ou inversement, c'est-à-dire en suivant l'ordre de la procession: «Ce qu'en effet, parmi les Dieux, est l'Un, ce qu'est parmi les Vivants Intelligibles le Vivant-en-soi un, ce qu'est parmi les Démiurges le Créateur et Père un, la sphère l'est parmi les figures solides. Car l'Un embrasse les multiples hénades, le Vivant-en-soi les Vivants Intelligibles, le Démiurge un les multiples causes, et la figure sphérique embrasse toutes les figures» 44. L'Intelligible est «tout entier pareil à la sphère, de tout côté en connivence avec lui-même», dit encore Proclus 45 (et c'est immédiatement après qu'il cite le vers de Parménide dont Boèce fera état). Pareillement, l'Intellect relève de la même figure. «Là où il y a Intellect, là aussi se trouve la propriété du sphérique», explique Proclus, car: «le fait de se contracter en soi-même, d'être en chacune de ses parties comme de la même couleur que le reste de soi-même, et de tenir toutes les puissances en soi rassemblées et ramenées à sa propre unité, c'est là la sphéricité propre à l'Intellect» 46. Il en va de même du point de vue de ses opérations. Une autre perfection de la sphère est en effet qu'elle est seule susceptible d'une sorte de mouvement immobile, un mouvement qui demeure parfaitement dans le même lieu: la rotation 47. C'est pourquoi Platon peut dire que l'Intellect se meut sur place, d'un mouvement circulaire uniforme, comme «une sphère faite au tour» 48. Ou encore, d'après le Timée, le Démiurge a donné au monde visible «le mouvement corporel qui lui convenait», à savoir le mouvement circulaire, la rotation sur soi-même et en soi-même 49, parce qu'il est «celui des sept mouvements qui concerne au plus haut point l'intellect et l'entendement». En effet, commente Proclus: «le circulaire imite l'Intellect et la vie intellective qui demeure stable "au même point, en application au même objet, selon un seul et même rapport et une seule et même ordonnance", et qui a son mouvement maîtrisé par la stabilité (...)» 50. L'intellection est contemplation stable tendant à l'unité, et non discursivité éparpillante, et c'est donc le mouvement circulaire qui la symbolise le mieux, la rotation de la sphère dont une des perfections consiste en ce que le même point y est le terme et le départ de son mouvement 51. Il en va ainsi non seulement pour l'intellection de 43 In Tim. III, t.II p.70 l.1-20, p.77 l.5-8. Plus on montera, plus la cohésion et l'unification de la sphère seront fortes, jusqu'à ce qu'on ne puisse plus distinguer entre le centre et la sphère (id., p.77 l.30-31). Proclus justifie ainsi le recours à l'image pour représenter l'intelligible: «La figure est comme une représentation visible de l'essence, une forme de la Forme» (id., p.74, l.23-24, trad. t.III p.109). La sphère sensible n'est d'ailleurs que «sphéroïde», comparée à la vraie sphère, «intelligible ou intellective» (id., p.77 l.14-16). 44 In Tim. III, t.II p.69 l.2-8, trad. t.III p.102. 45 In Tim. III, t.II p.69 l.14, trad. cit. p.102. 46 In Tim. III, t.II p.77 l.8 et 26-29, trad. t.III p.112-113. Id., p.215 l.2-3, trad. p.261: «le Corps du Monde, qui est sphérique, est dit être, du fait de la forme sphérique, une copie de l'Intellect». Cf. Théol. plat. IV.38 (éd. Saffrey-Westerink, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1987), p.110 l.12-21. 47 Car ses parties ne font que prendre la place d'autres de ses parties, à la différence de toute figure angulaire (cf. Proclus, In Tim. III, trad. t.III p.107 n.3). 48 Lois X 898b 2. L'auteur de cette comparaison se qualifie lui-même, à la ligne suivante, d'habile {䥧∑ ƒz∫», cependant que la même image est employée dans le Timée, 33b 5, à propos du corps du Monde façonné par le Démiurge... 49 34a 1-5. Cf. Boèce, Cons. III.12 l.92-93: «rerum orbem mobilem rotat, dum se immobilem ipsa conservat»; id., III.IX l.3: «(...) stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri». 50 In Tim. III, t.II p.94 l.20-24, trad. t.III p.130. Référence à Lois X, 898a sq. Les six autres sont: vers le haut et vers le bas, vers la droite et vers la gauche, vers l'avant et vers l'arrière, qui chacun ont donc un contraire, alors que le circulaire n'en a pas, et engendre et maintient tous les mouvements rectilignes. Voir S. Gersh, LKOHTKT ALKOHVQT. A Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus, Leiden, Brill, 1973. 51In Tim. III, t.II p.72 l.3, trad. t.III p.105. J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 8 l'Intellect, mais aussi pour l'intellection de toute instance participante. Cette propriété exprime en effet une loi ontologique universelle: «dans le cercle, c'est le même point qui est fin et commencement, de même que dans ce qui se retourne vers soi, qui a son point de départ en soi-même et qui s'achève à soi-même» 52. La forme circulaire manifeste ainsi la solidarité et la simultanéité de la procession et de la conversion qui constituent toutes choses, chaque être s'éloigne de son origine en y faisant retour, en un cercle plus ou moins vaste selon le degré de multiplicité auquel il descend 53. La même figure s'applique successivement aux réalités ordonnées hiérarchiquement, la supérieure étant un point central dont émane concentriquement l'inférieure. L'Intellect est cercle par rapport à l'Un-centre, l'Ame étant à son tour cercle par rapport à l'Intellect-centre: «Quant à l'Intellect lui-même, il est fermement établi en lui-même, il intellige tranquillement toutes choses, étant, comparé à l'Ame, point et centre: car si l'Ame est cercle, il est, lui, le centre, la puissance du cercle, et si l'Ame est ligne, il est, lui, le point (...) étant cercle lui-même si on le compare à la nature du Bien, vers laquelle, de chacun de ses points, il converge par la nostalgie de l'Un et du contact avec l'Un» 54. Si «le cercle est l'image de l'intellect (ὀ μέν χύχλος είχῶν ἐστι νοῦ)55, pareillement l'Ame du Monde, en tant qu'intellective, obéit à la même loi 56: «"Tournant bien rond" est la faculté intellective (εὒτροχον δὲ τὸ νοερόν) [de l'Ame]» 57. Notre intellection elle-même, ou plus exactement le λόγος qui est «cette partie en nous qui intellige les Intelligibles» 58, est décrite également comme un mouvement circulaire: 52 In Tim. III, t.II p.245 l.5-14, trad. t.III p.289. 53 «(...) puisqu'il y a continuité entre les processions et les conversions, lesquelles rappellent de nouveau au même point ce qui a précédé, Platon dit que les droites ont été recourbées en cercles [Tim. 36c 1]» (In Tim. III, t.II p.248 l.16-18, trad. t.III p.292). 54 In Tim. III, t.II p.243 l.6-17, trad. t.III p.287. Si l'Ame a une nature d'abord linéaire, elle est ensuite recourbée en cercle, et est animée d'un mouvement de rotation sur elle-même (non pas matériellement, bien sûr, puisqu'elle est incorporelle: id., p.249 31 sq., trad. p.293; p.286 l.12-22, trad. p.330): «la ligne droite représente la discursivité de ces puissances [cognitives et vitales de l'Ame], le cercle leur automotricité» (id., p.244 l.28-29, trad. p.288-289). Ou encore le cercle est «l'image de la vie qui retourne vers elle-même» (id., p.245 l.16, trad. p.289), ainsi que «la conversion intellective» (id., p.244 l.17, trad. p.288). C'est toujours la même propriété du cercle qui est mise en valeur: «le cercle montre de quelle sorte est le forme de vie de l'Ame, qu'elle est un mû par soi-même ayant son point de départ en lui-même et se retournant vers lui-même, et que cette sorte de vie n'est pas pareille à la vie des animaux, laquelle se porte vers l'extérieur comme une droite (...) C'est pourquoi aussi cette forme de vie est circulaire: car, dans le cercle, c'est le même point qui est fin et commencement, de même que dans ce qui se retourne vers soi, qui a son point de départ en soi-même et qui s'achève à soi-même» (id., p.245 l.5-14, trad. p.289); «la rotation indiquant à la fois l'intellectivité et le fait de revenir au même point» (id., p.286 l.19-20). L'Ame est imitée en cela par la sphère du cosmos qu'elle enveloppe (36b 6 e 5): «ce Tout visible imite la révolution invisible de l'Ame par le moyen du circuit corporel approprié et il retourne au même point de façon locale simultanément avec le retour au même point de l'Ame, qu'elle accomplit de façon intellective (νοετιχῶς)» (p.290 l.18-20, trad. modif. p.334). 55 In Rempublicam, XIII.36, éd. Kroll (Leipzig, Teubner, 1899), t.II p.46 l.18-21, trad. fr. A. J. Festugière (Paris, Vrin-CNRS, 1970) t.II p.153. 56 Cf. In Rem., XIII.36, t.II p.47 l.2-3, trad. t.II p.154: «Selon qu'elle est image [de l'intellect], Platon la ramène à un cercle». Voir de même ce qui est dit du temps, qui pousse «les êtres perfectionnés par lui à imiter, par leur révolution circulaire, la condition plus auguste des principes éternels» (In Tim. IV, t.III p.20 l.8-10, trad. t.IV p.38; cf. id., p.21 l.1-2: τό γὰρ πάλιν χαὶ πάλιν ἀναχυχλεῖν ἀπειροδυναμίας ἐστι). Il est lui-même monade éternelle en son essence, mais cercle par son activité, et comme tel est appelé νους προϊῶν, «Intellect procédant» (id., p.26 l.30 p.27 l.4, trad. p.45). Ainsi, «possédant une nature intellective, il mène circulairement tous les êtres qui participent à lui, et particulièrement les âmes» (id., p.27 l.24-26, trad. p.45), car χρόνος est en fait χορόνοος, «Intellect dansant en rond» (p.28 l.1-2) - mais qui «danse en demeurant en repos» (id., l.15). 57 In Tim. III, t.II p.312 l.22-26, trad. t.III p.358. Faculté, continue Proclus, «qui ne rencontre nul empêchement dans sa démarche transitive (έν τῆ μεταβάσει), qui comporte le caractère du cercle dans son passage d'un point à un autre, qui, dans ses intellections, possède vigueur, perfection, activité qui a pour objet le Divin, boniformité, motion autour de l'intelligible comme autour d'un centre». 58 In Tim. II, t.I p.246 l.29-30, trad. t.II p.83. J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 9 «(...) puisque le logos circule autour de l'Intelligible et qu'il exerce son activité et son mouvement comme autour d'un centre, dans ces conditions il contemple l'Intelligible, l'intellection connaissant l'Intelligible de manière indiscursive et indivisible, le logos évoluant en cercle autour de l'essence de l'Intelligible et développant au fur et à mesure la nature substantielle de toutes choses qui se trouve unifiée dans l'Intelligible» 59. Selon le Phèdre, l'âme, debout sur le dos de la voûte céleste en mouvement, contemple successivement les réalités intelligibles, «jusqu'au moment où la révolution circulaire la ramène au même point» (247d 5-6). Socrate dit ici, explique Proclus, «que les âmes se meuvent en cercle puisque, tandis qu'elles sont nourries par les Intelligibles comme objets de désirs, elles reçoivent l'influence bénéfique tantôt de tel Intelligible tantôt de tel autre et reviennent aux points mêmes d'où elles étaient parties» 60. Au contraire, «toute connaissance ou appétition irrationnelle va d'un point à un point différent en se hâtant vers l'extérieur, car l'objet auquel elle aspire ou qu'elle connaît est extérieure à elle-même» 61. L'âme qui connaît l'intelligible en elle-même, telle celle de Boèce qui écoute sa consolatrice, parcourt donc un cercle, revenant au départ de son processus discursif. C'est d'ailleurs à se recourber sur elle-même que Philosophie l'avait invitée dès le poème précédent la prose 12: «Quisquis profunda mente vestigat verum cupitque nullis ille deviis falli, in se revolvat intimi lucem visus longosque in orbem cogat inflectens motus» 62. C'est bien ce qui convient, d'après le Timée 63, pour guérir les perturbations dont souffre l'âme. En rétablissant et stabilisant la régularité du mouvement des cercles du Même et de l'Autre en son âme, en reproduisant en son propre intellect les révolutions de l'intelligence céleste, l'homme cessera d'errer follement, s'assimilera à Dieu et s'immortalisera dans toute la mesure possible, il échappera à la misère de sa condition mortelle, au mal et à la souffrance, il trouvera le bonheur. N'est-ce point là précisément le remède adapté à la situation de Boèce ? Il n'est par conséquent pas étonnant que les preuves de Philosophie soient circulaires, puisque, si l'on ose dire, l'Intellect lui-même, et par conséquent toute intellection, tourne en rond. C'est particulièrement le fait de revenir au même point qui imite la manence de l'Intellect 64. Le fait que la sphère n'ait ni fin ni commencement l'a rendue propre à symboliser le divin en son éternité et sa plénitude, dans une tradition qui a perduré jusqu'à l'âge moderne. L'Intelligible et l'Intellect l'imitent, et de même le discours qui vise à démontrer l'identité de Dieu, du Bien, de l'Un et du bonheur, prend une forme circulaire, à l'image de la «forme de la substance divine». Les différentes sphères s'emboîtent en effet, et la circularité descend jusqu'aux processus discursifs qui tournent autour de l'objet à 59 In Tim. II, t.I p.248 l.1-6, trad. t.II p.5. Cf. In Tim. IV, t.III p.149 l.24-26, trad. t.IV p.191: «les "choeurs de danse" [des astres: 40c 3] sont les transports sacrés des âmes autour de l'Intelligible et leurs révolutions et retours intellectifs au même point». L'Ame et les âmes partielles connaissent les intelligibles par le cercle du Même, et les sensibles par le cercle de l'Autre (In Tim. III, t.II p.309 l.25 p.314 l.31, trad. t.III pp. 355-360; cf. id., t.II p.257 l.19-24, trad. t.III p.300). 60 In Tim. III, t.II p.245 l.20-23, trad. t.III p.289. Cf. id., p.248 l.18-23, trad. p.292: «Et puisque la force vitale () de l'Ame a capacité intellective (), qu'elle est récurrente () et déroule en son cours la multiplicité intelligible, cette force revient de nouveau au même point, pour cela et aussi parce que l'Ame meut les mus par un autre en se retournant vers elle-même et en se mouvant elle-même. C'est pour toutes ces raisons en effet que le circulaire convient à l'Ame» (cf. id., p.290 l.4-17, trad. p.333-334). 61 In Tim. V, t.III p.346 l.24-26, trad. t.V p.228. Ce mouvement est une perversion de la révolution des cercles du Même et de l'Autre, ajoute Proclus, et est le vrai sens de la Gigantomachie. Sur l'intériorité, voir ci-après les «lieux intrinsèques». 62 Cons. III.XI l.1-4. Cf. III.IX l.15-18 63 42c 4 d 2, 43a 5 44c 4, 47b 7 c 4, 90b 2 d 7. 64 In Tim. IV, t.III p.28 l.24-26, trad. t.IV p.47. J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 10 contempler 65. On la repère encore au principe même de la démonstration de Philosophie, dans la prose 9 du livre III: la solidarité réciproque de tous les aspects du bonheur (indépendance, pouvoir, considération, gloire, joie) fait qu'on ne peut avoir l'un sans avoir les autres 66. L'erreur fondamentale est de les imaginer séparés, alors qu'ils ne sont qu'une seule et même nature, une chose simple 67. En voulant saisir une partie seulement d'une chose qui en réalité n'en comporte pas, on n'attrape ni une partie ni le tout ni donc la chose elle-même 68. Or, aucun bien matériel ne pouvant apporter tous ces aspects à la fois pas plus qu'un seul d'entre eux 69, il est clair qu'on ne peut trouver par eux le bonheur. A contrario, le vrai bonheur se laisse reconnaître à cela: «ea vera est et perfecta felicitas quae sufficientem, potentem, reverendum, celebrem laetumque perficiat» 70. Ce qui peut procurer réellement un seul de ces aspects, peut les procurer tous, puisqu'ils sont une seule et même chose; ce sera alors la plénitude du bonheur 71. Le critère formel permettant d'identifier le vrai bonheur fait donc appel à la circularité qu'est l'entre-implication de tous ses traits essentiels 72. Peu importe par lequel on commencera, en tenir un c'est les tenir finalement tous, puisqu'en chacun sont contenus les autres. Ainsi, les permutations auxquelles se livre Philosophie dans la prose 9 pour l'analyse du vrai bonheur, sont formellement équivalentes au «labyrinthe» tissé dans tout le livre III sur le plan métaphysico-théologique. L'explication unique (puisqu'au fond le bonheur, le Bien et Dieu sont identiques) en est que les raisons discursives qui parcourent ce qui est simple et homogène (comme l'est une sphère), ne peuvent que s'assembler circulairement. 2. - Les lieux intrinsèques de Philosophie On peut observer, dans le même passage de la Consolation, une autre application du principe (néo)platonicien d'adéquation du discours à son objet, et cela toujours en référence au modèle parménidien. Chez l'Eléate, l'être est comparé à une sphère parce que comme elle, étant parfaitement égal dans toutes les directions à partir du centre 73, rien ne peut lui être ajouté ou retiré; il est achevé, toujours parfaitement identique à lui-même, il ne peut subir aucune variation, car en dehors de lui il n'y a rien 74. De même, d'après Philosophie: 65 Les Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon représentent l'intellect universel et indivisible comme le centre d'un cercle, autour duquel se disposent les processus discursifs de l'âme,les démonstrations, «à la façon d'une circonférence qui se déroule autour du centre» (éd. cit., V.17, p.28). Comme l'explique Plotin (Enn. II.2, 1, l.31-34), dans un cercle le centre est naturellement immobile, mais si la circonférence l'était aussi, elle ne serait qu'un grand centre; il est donc mieux qu'elle tourne autour du centre. 66 Cons. III.9 l.55-57. 67 «Hoc igitur quod est unum simplexque natura, pravitas humana dispertit (...)» (III.9 l.39-40. Cf. id., l.15 et 35-38). 68 III.9 l.40-42. 69 III.9 l.59-63. 70 III.9 l.69-71. 71 III.9 l.71-74. 72 Cf. Macrobe, In Somn. I.22, 1-2: «Illae vere insolubiles causae sunt, quae mutuis in vicem nexibus vinciuntur, et dum altera alteram facit ac vicissim de se nascuntur, numquam a naturalis societatis amplexibus separantur». Le raisonnement qui suit immédiatement met alors en oeuvre cette détermination réciproque: «Talia sunt vincula quibus terram natura constrinxit. Nam ideo in eam feruntur omnia quia ut media non movetur, ideo autem non movetur quia infima est, nec poterat infima non esse in quam omnia feruntur». Il ne faut pas se hâter de qualifier cette "démonstration" de cercle vicieux comme si sa circularité était naïve (W. H. Stahl, Roman Science, 1962, p.163, cité par J. Flamant, Macrobe et le néo-platonisme latin, Brill, Leiden, 1977, p.461). Les auteurs antiques obéissent à des règles d'écriture expressive qui ne sont plus les nôtres. Voir aussi un exemple de texte circulaire dans J. Brendel, Symbolism of the Sphere..., op. cit. pp.23 et 27. 73 Frag. B VIII l.44. 74 Id., l.44-49. J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 11 «Ea est enim divinae forma substantiae ut neque in externa dilabatur nec in se externum aliquid ipsa suscipiat» 75. D'où la nécessité, par apparentement, que dans le discours qui en traite, les raisons utilisées aussi ne soient pas empruntées à l'extérieur mais trouvées à l'intérieur du sujet étudié: «Quod si rationes quoque non extra petitas sed intra rei quam tractabamus ambitum collocatas agitavimus, nihil est quod admirere (...)»76 comme le souligne Philosophie en réponse à l'étonnement qu'avait manifesté Boèce en remarquant: «Atque haec nullis extrinsecus sumptis sed ex altero altero fidem trahente insitis domesticisque probationibus explicabas» 77. La notion d'extrinséité d'un argument, qu'évoque ici Boèce, n'apparaît pas par hasard. Elle appartient au vocabulaire codifié de l'art rhétorique. Aristote distinguait deux sortes de preuves: non-techniques et techniques 78. Non-techniques sont les faits, les témoignages, les aveux, etc., c'est-à-dire les preuves dont l'origine se trouve hors du discours; techniques celles qui relèvent de l'art du discours proprement dit 79. Cette distinction est reprise par Cicéron, mais est dans ses Topiques transposée au niveau des «lieux», c'est-à-dire au niveau des types ou plutôt des fondements où l'on peut trouver des arguments ou raisons probantes 80. Certains lieux ont un rapport direct, «sont inhérents», au sujet de la discussion: ainsi la définition des termes utilisés dans la question, leurs rapports de genre à espèce, etc 81. D'autres sont «extrinsèques», c'est-à-dire font appel à des considérations extérieures au sujet. D'après Cicéron, ce sont en fait les «arguments d'autorité» 82, et les témoignages 83 de sources et de poids divers 84. Dans son Commentaire des Topiques de Cicéron comme dans ses Différences topiques, Boèce s'inscrit évidemment d'abord dans cette tradition. Mais la définition rhétorico-juridique de l'argument extrinsèque n'est pas suffisante pour comprendre les allusions méthodologiques de la Consolatio, et il nous faut regarder de plus près ce que Boèce en dit dans ses ouvrages consacrés à l'«ars inveniendi», et plus particulièrement dans le De Differentiis topicis. 75 III.12 l.87-89. Voir aussi frag. B VIII l.7 («d'où s'accroîtrait-il ?»), l.22-24, l.27-28. Cf. encore Cons. III.12 l.92-93 («se immobilem ipsa conservat»), et frag. B VIII l.29-30 («Identique à lui-même, en lui-même il repose; Il est là en lui-même immobile en son lieu»). 76 III.12 l.93-95. 77 III.12 l.83-85. Philosophie l'avait déjà incité, dans le poème précédent, en évoquant la doctrine de la réminiscence, à ne chercher qu'en lui-même la vérité: «Quisquis profunda mente vestigat verum / (...) / animumque doceat quicquid extra molitur / suis retrusum possidere thesauris» (III.XI l.1-7). Cf. ce que Proclus dit de l'Ame connaissante : «Dans le temps donc où elle se voit elle-même et se déroule elle-même, elle connaît toutes choses "sans aucunement sortir de son propre caractère", c'est en s'intelligeant elle-même qu'elle les voit» (In Tim. III, t.II p.296 l.14-18, trad. t.III p.340). 78 Rhet. I.2, 1355b 35. 79 Ces dernières ont une extension assez vaste. Par exemple, que l'orateur inspire confiance à son auditoire est une preuve relevant de l'art si cette confiance est «l'effet du discours, non d'une prévention sur le caractère de l'orateur» (id., 1356a 8-9). De même mettre l'auditoire dans des dispositions favorables d'écoute, si on suscite les passions adéquates (l'amitié et non la haine; ibid., 14-16), mais non si, par exemple, on utilise un appel à la pitié, tiré d'un sujet hors de la cause (le fait d'avoir une famille à nourrir, etc.). 80 Cf. Cicéron, Top. II.8: «Itaque licet definire locum esse argumenti sedem, argumentum autem, rationem quae rei dubiae faciat fidem. Sed ex his locis in quibus argumenta inclusa sunt, alii in eo ipso de quo agitur haerent, alii adsumuntur extrinsecus. In ipso, tum ex toto, tum ex partibus eius, tum ex nota, tum ex eis rebus quae quodammodo adfectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur. Extrinsecus autem ea ducuntur, quae absunt longeque disiuncta sunt». 81 Voir ibid., II.9 III.23. 82 Id., III.24: «Quae autem adsumuntur extrinsecus, ea maxime ex auctoritate ducuntur. Itaque Graeci talis argumentationes a...Ä€μ∑» uocant, id est artis expertis». 83 Id., XIX.73: «Haec ergo argumentatio quae dicitur artis expers, in testimonio posita est. Testimonium autem nunc dicimus omne quod ab aliqua re externa sumitur ad faciendam fidem». 84 Voir id., XIX.73-78. J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 12 Reprenant pour définir le lieu l'expression «sedes argumenti» 85, il oriente bientôt son analyse dans une direction relevant davantage de la logique 86, et précise que le lieu est une proposition connue par soi, qui n'a donc pas besoin d'être prouvée et même est indémontrable. Elle est une «propositio maxima» ou «principalis», en somme une maxime, ou dirait-on plutôt aujourd'hui, un axiome 87. Cette proposition est le nerf de l'argument, et c'est par là qu'elle mérite le nom de «lieu»: comme un lieu physique contient le corps, elle contient la preuve 88. Elle contient aussi d'avance, par conséquent, toutes les propositions qui seront déduites: «Ideo et universales et maximae propositiones loci sunt dictae, quoniam ipsae sunt quae continent caeteras propositiones, et per eas fit consequens et rata conclusio. Ac sicut locus in se corporis continet quantitatem, ita hae propositiones quae sunt maximae, intra se omnem vim posteriorum atque ipsius conclusionis consequentiam tenet (...)» 89. Une première distinction entre extrinséité et intrinséité est alors proposée. En effet, soit le lieu est un axiome explicitement contenu dans le raisonnement à titre de prémisse du syllogisme; ce sera alors un lieu intrinsèque 90. Soit il est un axiome implicitement utilisé, non formulé dans le raisonnement, donc "posé en dehors": ce sera alors un lieu extrinsèque - mais il n'en fournit pas moins la raison décisive de l'argument 91. Dans les deux cas, cette proposition a le rôle principal, la seule différence réside donc dans son explicitation ou non à l'intérieur de la mise en forme du raisonnement 92. Mais ce n'est certainement pas de cette distinction qu'il est question dans la Consolatio, car la plupart des raisonnements n'omettent pas leur lieu, bien au contraire, comme nous le verrons. Cependant il existe des lieux encore supérieurs à ces maximes ou propositions générales: ce sont leurs «différences» 93. En effet, de même que les espèces diffèrent entre elles par des différences spécifiques, ces ...τόποι que sont les maximes diffèrent par des «différences topiques» 94, puisque les uns expriment un règle portant sur la 85 Diff. Top., PL 64, L.I, 1174 C, L.II, 1185 A-B. Cf. Cons. III.2 l.1-2: «velut in augustam suae mentis sedem recepta, sic coepit (...)»; les profondeurs de l'esprit de Philosophie sont le "lieu" de toute l'argumentation qui va suivre. 86 Dans le De Diff. top., il s'agit d'ailleurs d'abord de lieux dialectiques, et seulement au L.IV des lieux rhétoriques. Si Boèce reprend, au L.III, la définition cicéronienne du «locus extrinsecus», il la déplace du contexte rhétorique vers la problématique de la topique. Autrement dit, ce qui est de l'ordre du fait ou du témoignage judiciaire disparaît au profit de ce qu'Aristote appelle le «probable» (ενοοξον) ou proposition dialectique: «Restat is locus quem extrinsecus dixit assumi, hic iudicio nititur et auctoritate, et totus probabilis est, nihil continens necessarium. Probabile autem est quod videtur vel omnibus, vel pluribus, vel doctis et sapientibus, et inter hos claris atque praestantibus, vel his qui secundum unamquamque artem peritiam consecuti sunt, ut medico in medicina, geometrae in geometria» (1199 C-D). Cf. id., 1180 D, Topicorum Aristotelis Interpretatio, 910 D, 916 A, et Aristote, Top. I.1, 100b 21-23; I.10, 104a 8-10. 87 Cf. Diff. Top., L.I, 1176 C-D, In Top. Cic. Comm., 1051 C: «Supremas igitur ac maximas propositiones vocamus, quae et universales sunt, et ita notae atque manifestae, ut probatione non egeant, eaque potius quae in dubitatione sunt probent. Nam quae indubitata sunt, ambiguorum demonstrationi solent esse principia, qualis est, omnem numerum vel parem esse vel imparem (...)». 88 «haec propositio totam continet probationem, et cum inde nascitur argumentum, recte locus, id est argumenti sedes vocatur» (1185 C). 89 1185 D 1186 A. Cf. In Top. Cic. Comm., 1051 D: «Maximas igitur, id est universales ac notissimas propositiones, ex quibus syllogismorum conclusio descendit, in Topicis ab Aristotele conscriptis locos appellatos esse perspeximus; quod enim maximae sunt, id est universales propositiones, reliquas in se velut loci corpora complectuntur (...)». 90 «locus insertus» (1185 C). 91 «Ut vero extra posita propositio maxima vires afferat argumento (...)» (1185 C). Cf. In Top. Cic. Comm., 1052 A. Ce raisonnement n'est pas pour autant un enthymème (cf. 1050 B): il ne manque aucune prémisse, mais la règle justifiant l'inférence n'est pas explicitée. Ainsi, pour montrer que le sage n'est pas jaloux, on pose le syllogisme complet: «est jaloux celui qui s'attriste du bonheur d'autrui; or le sage ne s'attriste pas du bonheur d'autrui; donc le sage n'est pas jaloux». La maxime implicite («qui syllogismo tamen vires ministrat») en est: «quorum diversae sunt definitiones, diversas esse substantias». 92 «Est igitur uno quidem modo locus (ut dictum est) maxima et universalis, et principalis, et indemonstrabilis, atque per se nota propositio, quae in argumentationibus, vel inter ipsas propositiones, vel extrinsecus posita, vim tamen argumentis et propositionibus subministrat» (1185 D). 93 Elles sont donc en droit des «différences topiques», mais peuvent également être appelées «lieux»: «Loci superior differentia, qui locus nihilominus nuncupatur (...)» (1187 A). 94 1186 A-B. J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 13 définition d'une chose, d'autres sur sa cause, d'autres sur ses parties, etc. Et comme les différences spécifiques à l'égard des espèces (e.g. la rationalité par rapport à la nature humaine), les différences topiques sont plus universelles que les maximes, et donc moins nombreuses 95. Ce sont aussi les genres suprêmes 96 de toutes les règles logiques qui peuvent être utilisées dans une démonstration, la méta-topique 97, qui guide le dialecticien dans l'inventio, la recherche des maximes. Finalement, tout raisonnement élémentaire relève de trois caractérisations. Premièrement, le type de la question posée. Toute proposition prédicative étant réductible à la relation entre un prédicat et un sujet, toute question porte sur la nature de cette relation: conformément à l'énumération aristotélicienne des prédicables 98, le prédicat peut être un genre, un accident, un propre ou une définition – exprimant en principe l'espèce – 99. Deuxièmement, le lieu ou la maxime, la règle logique, utilisée. Troisièmement, la différence topique, le lieu supérieur, où l'on va chercher cette règle. Par exemple, quand on demande si les arbres sont des animaux, et si l'on pose le syllogisme suivant: «un animal est une substance animée sensible, un arbre n'est pas une substance animée sensible, donc un arbre n'est pas un animal», la question est «de genere», le lieu (proposition universelle) implicite est: «cui generis diffinitio non convenit, id eius cuius ea diffinitio est, species non est», et la différence constitutive de ce lieu est d'être «a diffinitione» 100. Quand on demande si la justice est naturelle, et que l'on répond: «la vie en commun des hommes est naturelle, la justice est ce qui rend possible la vie en commun des hommes, donc la justice est naturelle», la question est «de accidente», la maxime est: «est naturel ce dont les causes efficientes sont naturelles», et la différence topique est «ab efficientibus causis» 101. Boèce propose ensuite une classification des différences topiques qu'il dit emprunter à Thémistius 102 et qui assez différente de celle de Cicéron, bien qu'il s'efforce ensuite de démontrer qu'elles sont conciliables 103. Les différences topiques peuvent d'abord être prises des termes mêmes, sujet ou prédicat, qui figurent dans la question 104. Dans ce cas, elles concernent soit leur essence, d'où deux lieux: définition et description 105; soit de ce qui accompagne toujours l'essence, d'où: le tout, les parties, les causes; soit ce qui suit de l'essence, d'où: les effets, les corruptions, les utilisations, les accidents communs 106. Tous ces lieux, puisqu'ils orientent la recherche sur l'essence des choses qui sont unies par le jugement conclusif, peuvent être considérés comme intrinsèques, par opposition au second membre 95 «omnia enim quae universaliora sunt, pauciora semper esse contingit» (1186 B). Par conséquent, elles sont commodément énumérables et mémorisables (id.). Cf. In Top. Cic. Comm., 1052 B: «Possumus enim (...) omnium maximarum atque universalium propositionum differentias perpendere, atque innumerabilem maximarum propositionum ac per se notarum multitudinem in paucas atque universales colligere differentias (...)». 96 Cf. In Top. Cic. Comm., 1052 C: «Sed istae locorum, id est propositionum maximarum, differentiae (...), possunt subiectarum propositionum etiam genera nuncupari. Nam differentiae continentes etiam genera communiter possunt videri (...)». 97 Cf. In Top. Cic. Comm., 1052 C: «Et sicut illae reliquarum propositionum loci esse dicebantur, quod eas intra suum ambitum continerent, ita ipsarum maximarum atque universalium propositionum, quas minorum propositionum locos esse praediximus, illae differentiae, et si non vere, tamen quaedam veluti imagine, loci esse videbuntur, in quas fuerint convenienti ratione reductae». Plus loin, Boèce dit qu'on pourrait songer à les appeler des lieux de lieux, mais que cela n'est pas pertinent car un lieu contient en fait un argument (1058 B). Ces lieux supérieurs, les différences topiques, peuvent toutefois aussi être dit inclure des arguments (1058 C). 98 Aristote, Top. I.4-5, 101b 16 102b 26. 99 1186 C. 100 1187 A. 101 1189 C. 102 1194 B. 103 Dans les Topiques, Aristote classe les lieux directement à partir des prédicables. 104 1186 D. Cf. In Top. Cic. Comm., 1055 D: «(praedicatum et subiectum) cum per se res sint, ipsi quidem argumentum esse non possunt, habere autem in se quaedam possunt, in quibus argumenta sint collocata, et quae sedes argumentorum esse intelligantur». 105 1187 A -1188 A. 106 1188 A 1190 B. J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 14 de la division, qui regroupe les lieux extrinsèques, c'est-à-dire ceux qui au contraire font intervenir une notion qui n'est pas directement impliquée dans la proposition examinée 107: «ex rei iudicio» 108, par la similitude («ex similibus», soit selon la qualité soit selon la quantité), selon le plus et le moins, par analogie («a proportione»), selon les opposés (qui sont des contraires, la privation et l'habitus, les relatifs, l'affirmation et la négation), par transposition à quelque chose de plus connu («ex transumptione») 109. Il existe enfin un troisième groupe, intermédiaire entre les deux précédents, qui contient les lieux fondés sur les cas grammaticaux et sur les différents types de division 110. Bien que les lieux «ex rei iudicio», c'est-à-dire fondés sur une autorité, soient seuls proprement a-techniques, suivant l'expression d'Aristote et Cicéron 111, tous les lieux extrinsèques et les mixtes, dans la classification de Thémistius, sont réservés aux discussions dialectiques, qui se contentent du probable 112, tandis que les lieux intrinsèques trouvent leur emploi dans le discours scientifique, en dirigeant des syllogismes démonstratifs 113. Autrement dit, un certain nombre de lieux que Cicéron considérait comme intrinsèques, sont renvoyés du côté de l'extrinséité, et donc du discours non scientifique: similitudes, oppositions, etc. 114. En revanche, seuls relèvent du mode scientifique les lieux intrinsèques c'est-à-dire ce qui concerne l'essence et les dépendances de l'essence 115. C'est certainement cette distinction qu'a en vue Philosophie dans la consolation qu'elle dispense à Boèce. De fait, les raisons employées dans la démonstration même qui se déploie circulairement au cours du livre III, non seulement ne sont pas des arguments d'autorité (à quoi on ne doit pas assimiler les références à Platon, extérieures au raisonnement proprement dit), mais procèdent de l'analyse interne des notions convoquées: bonheur, souverain Bien, Dieu, etc., et de règles qui ont valeur de lieux ou d'axiomes. Par exemple, de la règle: «Omne enim quod inperfectum esse dicitur, id inminutione perfecti inperfectum esse perhibetur», est tiré le "théorème" suivant: l'existence de l'imparfait implique l'existence du parfait 116. De même, la «notion commune» (communis conceptio) «nihil deo 107 Toutefois, ils ne sont bien sûr pas sans relation avec ce qui est en question: «Ea enim quae extrinsecus assumuntur, non sunt ita separata atque disiuncta, ut non aliquo modo quasi e regione quadam ea quae quaeruntur aspiciant. Nam et similitudines et opposita ad ea sine dubio referuntur quibus similia vel opposita sunt, licet iure atque ordine videantur extrinsece collocata» (1194 D). Ils n'en gouvernent pas moins les raisonnements: «licet extrinsecus positi, argumenta tamen quaestionibus subministrant» (1190 B). 108 Ce qui correspond bien à ce qu'Aristote dit de l'opinion probable et de la proposition dialectique, c'est-à-dire tirées soit de l'opinion commune, soit des opinions autorisées des sages, ou des plus savants (1190 C). 109 1190 C 1192 B. 110 1192 B -1194 A. Cette triple répartition est évidemment exhaustive: «De quo enim in qualibet quaestione dubitatur, id ita firmabitur argumentis, ut ea vel ex ipsis sumantur quae in quaestione sunt constituta, vel extrinsecus ducantur, vel quasi in confinio horum posita vestingentur. Ac praeter hanc quidem diffinitionem nihil extra inveniri potest» (1194 B). 111 «Ex rei vero iudicio quae sunt argumenta quasi testimonium praebent et sunt inartificiales loci, atque omnino disiuncti, nec rem potius quam iudicium opinionemque sectantes» (1195 A). Cf. 1199 D: «hic etiam inartificialis et artis expers vocatur, quoniam non sibi hinc ipse conficit argumentum orator, sed peractis positisque utitur testimonis». 112 Dans la classification de Cicéron aussi, ou plutôt a fortiori, puisque le lieu extrinsèque est borné au témoignage ou à l'autorité: «Restat is locus quem extrinsecus dixit assumi, hic iudicio nititur et auctoritate, et totus probabilis est, nihil continens necessarium» (1199 C). 113 «Sed ea quidem quae ex diffinitione, vel genere, vel differentia, vel causis argumenta ducuntur, demonstrativis maxime syllogismis vires atque ordinem subministrant, reliqua verisimilibus ac dialecticis. Atque hi loci qui maxime in eorum substantia sunt de quibus in quaestione dubitatur, ad praedicativos ac simplices, reliqui ad hypotheticos et conditionales respiciunt syllogismos» (1195 A 1196 A). Cf. Aristote, Top. I.1, 100a 25 30. 114 Cf. Cicéron, Top. III.11 («quae quodammodo adfectae sunt ad id de quo quaeritur»). 115 «Eos igitur locos, qui positi sunt in terminis de quibus in quaestione dubitatur, priore partitione Themistius tum in substantia posuit, tum in substantiae consequentia» (1200 D). 116 Cons. III.10 l.8-12; cf. id., l.28-29. J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 15 melius excogitari queat», permet de montrer que Dieu est le Bien parfait et donc le véritable bonheur 117. Autant de lieux dont Philosophie justifie l'intrinséité (confere le «insitis domesticisque probationibus») en soulignant que le caractère apodicitique de la démonstration est celui qui convient à son objet, Dieu lui-même, être nécessaire et immuable, sur lequel peut porter une science théologique, alors que l'extrinséité des arguments la rabaisserait au niveau de l'art du probable et des apparences 118 - ce qui correspond bien, encore une fois, au requisit du Timée (29b 6-9), selon lequel le discours qui porte sur ce qui demeure, doit être lui-même stable et inébranlable. Autrement dit, que le discours soit clos comme la sphère parménidienne et n'emprunte rien "à l'extérieur" du sujet («nullis extrinsecus sumptis probationibus», «rationes quoque non extra petitas»), le rend autosuffisant, à l'image du souverain Bien, le vrai bonheur, dont l'indépendance est un trait essentiel 119 et qui, incluant en lui tous les biens comme la sphère comprend toutes les figures, ne laisse rien à désirer en dehors de lui : «Quod quidem est omnium summum bonorum cunctaque intra se bona continens; cui si quid aforet summum esse non posset, quoniam relinqueretur extrinsecus quod posset optari» 120. Le Bien et le bonheur s'identifiant également Dieu, ce discours est donc aussi à l'image de Dieu, qui, en tant que principe de toutes choses, n'a rien en lui qu'il ait reçu de l'extérieur, c'est-à-dire d'un autre être qui serait alors supérieur à lui: «Ne hunc rerum omnium patrem illud summum bonum quo plenus esse perhibetur vel extrinsecus accepisse vel ita naturaliter habere praesumas quasi habentis dei habitaeque beatitudinis diversam cogites esse substantiam. Nam si extrinsecus acceptum putes, praestantius id quod dederit ab eo quod acceperit existimare possis; sed hunc esse rerum omnium praecellentissimum dignissime confitemur» 121. 3. - Le tissage de Philosophie Une troisième et une quatrième applications du principe d'apparentement du discours à son objet peuvent être discernées. Il est dit des preuves intrinsèques dont nous venons de parler qu'elles tirent leur certitude les unes des autres 122, en une continuité bien liée, formant un tout unifié. C'est aussi par cette cohésion interne, que l'argumentation de Philosophie sur le Souverain Bien imite du mieux qu'elle peut la nature de cela même qui est le Souverain Bien: l'Un en son indépendance divine, Dieu en son autosuffisance unitaire et sa nécessité. De même que 117 Cons. III.10 l.25-33. Autres exemples d'axiomes: «nullius rei natura suo principio melior poterit exsistere» (III.10 l.50-51); «quae discrepant bona, non esse alterum quod sit alterum liquet» (III.10 l.60-61), d'où est tiré qu'il ne peut y avoir deux biens parfaits; «eadem namque substantia est eorum quorum naturaliter non est diversus effectus» (III.11 l.22-24). 118 Cf. Cons. V.4 l.33-36: «Iam vero probationem firma ratione subnixam constat non ex signis neque petitis extrinsecus argumentis sed ex convenientibus necessarisque causis esse ducendam». Cf. Proclus, In Tim. II, t.I p.251 l.25-26, trad. t.II p.89: «l'Intelligible est "enveloppé" (περιλμπτόν) par le logos, l'être devenu n'est que "saisi par la doxa" (δοξαστόν): en effet, l'objet connu est extérieur à la doxa, et non pas au-dedans d'elle, comme l'Intelligible est au-dedans du logos»; id., p.244 l.23-24, trad. p.80: «c'est là précisément un attribut commun de toute intellection, le fait de posséder l'objet connu à l'intérieur: c'est par là même, je présume, que l'intellection diffère de la sensation». 119 Cons. III.9, passim; III.3 l.23-24 («sibi ipse sufficiens»), et, a contrario, l.34: «Egebit igitur, inquit, extrinsecus petito praesidio (...)». Telle est aussi la sphère du monde ou du ciel selon le Timée, 34b 5-9: «unique, seul de son espèce, solitaire, mais capable en raison de son excellence de vivre en union avec lui-même, sans avoir besoin de quoi que ce soit d'autre, se suffisant à lui-même comme connaissance et comme ami. C'est en procédant ainsi que le démiurge fit naître le monde, qui est un dieu bienheureux» (trad. L. Brisson, Paris, GF-Flammarion, 1992, p.123). 120 Cons. III.2 l.8. Cf. ce que Proclus dit du cinquième don fait au monde par le démiurge: «il est cause de l'autosuffisance du tout et de son mouvement circulaire sur lui-même, de telle sorte que (...) il n'ait besoin de rien de ce qui est extérieur» (Théol. plat. V.20, p.73 l.18-21; In Tim. II, p.86 l.1 p.92 l.9). 121 Cons. III.10 l.37-44. 122 «ex altero altero fidem trahente» (Cons. III.12 l.84) J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 16 les Prolégomènes voient une des supériorités de Platon en ce qu'il donne toujours une démonstration 123, Boèce insiste sur le caractère apodictique des discours de Philosophie, c'est-à-dire sur l'enchaînement serré et continu des conclusions à partir des prémisses, qui pallie par la force de la connexion le fait de déployer discursivement ce qui relève de l'unité: «Assentior, inquam, cuncta enim firmissimis nexa rationibus constant»; «Ista quidem consequentia sunt eis quae paulo ante conclusa sunt» 124. Cette rigueur déductive s'impose bien sûr dans un genre scientifique, où comme nous l'avons vu les preuves sont intrinsèques. Le paradigme géométrique devient même explicite, lorsqu'est rappelé que les propositions déduites peuvent à leur tour servir de points de départ pour démontrer des corollaires: «Super haec, inquit, igitur veluti geometrae solent demonstratis propositis aliquid inferre quae porismata ipsi vocant, ita ego quoque tibi veluti corollarium dabo» 125. Le thème revient à plusieurs reprises, car il s'agit de rappeler que l'évidence rationnelle est supérieure à l'évidence sensible. En dépit de l'opinion commune, en dépit du constat, fondé sur les apparences, que le désordre règne dans le monde et qu'il est préférable de commettre l'injustice que de la subir, il faut se laisser convaincre du contraire par la raison, puisqu'une proposition correctement déduite de prémisses vraies est absolument irréfutable, même si elle est contredite par l'observation empirique 126. Il vaut mieux s'en remettre à la force de la logique qu'au préjugé ou à la croyance spontanée 127. La démonstration est censée forger des chaînes infrangibles de raisons qui doivent assujettir le jugement, imposer la conviction, contre la douloureuse expérience personnelle de Boèce lui-même. Ce dernier d'ailleurs, fait part de son écartèlement entre l'évidence rationnelle et l'opinion commune, qui jugera les paradoxes de Philosophie non seulement invraisemblables mais tout simplement inécoutables 128. Mais, répond imperturbablement celle-ci, c'est seulement tant que l'on prête attention davantage à ses affects qu'à l'ordre des 123 Ed. cit., II.7, p.11 l.23. 124 Cons. III.11 l.1-2, et IV.4 l.63-64. 125 Cons. III.10 l.69-71. P. Courcelle (La Cons. de Phil. dans la tradition..., op. cit. p.162 n.4) remarque que le terme de πόρισμα est employé volontiers par Proclus (In Tim.) et Ammonius (cf. In De Int., p.248, l.2), mais pas par Porphyre dans ses oeuvres logiques. L'usage de concepts géométriques semble être un lieu commun du néoplatonisme tardif: voir H. Chadwick, Boethius. The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981, pp.106-107, 210-211. 126 Cf. le frag. B VII de Parménide: «Résiste à l'habitude, aux abondants prétextes, / Qui pourraient t'entraîner à suivre ce chemin, / Où oeil aveugle, sourde oreille et langue encore / Régentent tout; plutôt, juge avec ta raison / La réfutation pleine de controverse / Que je viens d'exposer» (trad. J.-P. Dumont, Les Présocratiques, Paris, Gallimard (Bibl. de la Pléiade), 1988, p.260). 127 «Mira quidem, inquam, et concessu difficilis inlatio, sed his eam quae prius concessa sunt nimium convenire cognosco. Recte, inquit, aestimas. Sed qui conclusioni accedere durum putat, aequum est vel falsum aliquid praecessisse demonstret vel collocationem propositionum non esse efficacem necessariae conclusionis ostendat; alioquin concessis praecedentibus nihil prorsus est quod de inlatione causetur. Nam hoc quoque quod dicam non minus mirum videatur, sed ex his quae sumpta sunt aeque est necessarium» (Cons. IV.4 l.27-36). La déduction nécessaire doit emporter la conviction, même si elle ne recueille pas de prime abord l'assentiment, comme tels ou tels théorèmes de géométrie. Cf. De diff. top. l.I, 1180 D 1181 A: «Necessarium vero est quod ut dicitur, ita est, atque aliter esse non potest (...) Necessaria vero ac non probabilia sunt quae ita ut dicuntur sese habere necesse est, sed his facile non consentit auditor, ut est hoc, obiectu lunaris corporis solis euenire defectum»; 1181 B-C: «Ea sunt enim probabilia, quibus sponte atque ultro consensus adiungitur, scilicet ut mox ac audita sunt approbentur. Quae vero necessaria sunt ac non probabilia, aliis probabilibus ac necessariis argumentis antea demonstrantur, cognitaque et credita ad alterius rei de qua dubitatur fidem trahuntur, ut sunt speculationes, id est theoremata quae in geometria considerantur. Nam quae illic proponuntur talia non sunt, ut his sponte animus discentis accedat, sed quoniam demonstrantur aliis argumentis, illa quoque scita et cognita, ad aliarum speculationum fidem ducuntur». 1182 A: «Philosophus vero ac demonstrator de sola tantum veritate pertractat, atque sint probabilia sive non sint, nihil refert, dummodo sint necessaria». 128 «Cum tuas, inquam, rationes considero, nihil dici verius puto. At si ad hominum iudicia revertar, quis ille cui haec non credenda modo sed saltem audienda videantur» (Cons. IV.4 l.80-83). J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 17 choses, qu'on se croit heureux de pouvoir commettre le mal et d'en être impuni 129. L'apparent désordre moral de l'univers, comme le désordre physique, n'est qu'une impression qui résulte de l'ignorance de l'ordre fixé par la Providence, de l'étroite concaténation des causes et des effets par laquelle elle gouverne tout sans rien abandonner au hasard 130. L'illusion du chaos sera dissipée par une démonstration ordonnée, dont la consécution inexorable se veut l'image de l'ordre sans faille de la création. C'est là encore une autre adéquation du discours à son objet. Dans son long discours sur la Providence, en effet, Philosophie «tisse ensemble les arguments enchaînés selon leur ordre propre»: «nexas sibi ordine contexo rationes» 131, pour rendre compte de l'entrelacement des suites d'événements soumis à la fatalité: «fatalis series texitur» 132. Le maillage serré du raisonnement, un par son intention, multiple par ses étapes, contraignant en tout cas, est à la ressemblance de l'unité de l'ordre immuable que fixe la Providence et que le destin développe temporellement en un tissu d'événements nécessaires 133. Dans cette métaphore du tissage, valant principe herméneutique du réel comme du texte, sans doute faut-il encore voir l'influence de Proclus. Ce dernier met en parallèle, selon une série de relations d'imitation, le texte habilement ourdi par Platon dans le Timée, le péplos des relations tissé dans le Tout du Monde par l'Athéna démiurgique, et le péplos des rapports intelligibles préétabli dans les causes exemplaires et contenu dans l'intellection unique d'Athéna 134. Or on se rappellera qu'on peut reconnaître dans la robe de Philosophie, décrite au livre I, le péplos d'Athéna. En effet, une des caractéristiques de la déesse est d'avoir tissé son propre vêtement, ainsi que le rappelle Proclus, et il est par deux fois signalé par Boèce que Philosophie a fait de même 135. Il y a là certainement plus qu'une coïncidence, qui explique l'insistance de Boèce sur la correspondance entre l'entrecroisement des séries causales, et l'entrelacement des raisonnements, qu'il s'est donné comme règle d'écriture imitative - apportant par là un raffinement tout particulier à la rédaction de son texte. II - LES DIVINES HEBDOMADES 1. - Ordre déductif et procession 129 «Dum enim non rerum ordinem, sed suos intuentur affectus, vel licentiam vel impunitatem scelerum putant esse felicem» (Cons. IV.4 l.86-87). 130 Cons. IV.6. 131 Cons. IV.6 l.17. Déjà dans en III.12, Boèce avait observé: «inextricabilem labyrinthum rationibus texens» (l.70-71). Cf. In Top. Cic. comm., 1053 B: «(...) contextio ipsa propositionum cum maximis propositionibus (...)». 132 Cons. IV.6 l.48. 133 «illud certe manifestum est immobilem simplicemque gerendarum formam rerum esse providentiam, fatum vero eorum quae divina simplicitas gerenda disposuit mobilem nexum atque ordinem temporalem» (Cons. IV.6 l.48-52). Le rapport entre le destin et la Providence est d'ailleurs comparé (ce qui nous ramène au point de départ de nos analyses) à celui d'un cercle et de son centre (Cons. IV.6 l.70-72), image qui selon P. Courcelle (Les Lettres grecques ..., op. cit., p.288-289) est empruntée à Proclus (De decem dubit.). 134 In Tim. I, t.I p.134-135, trad. t.I p.182-183. 135 Cf. Iliade V.734, cité par Proclus, In Tim. I, t.I p.167 l.17-18, trad. t.I p.222, et Cons. I.1 l.14, I.3 l.21-22. J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 18 L'autre ouvrage de Boèce dont nous avons à parler, le Quomodo substantiae, est non moins remarquable du point de vue du mode d'écriture. Pourtant, il semble relever d'une conception radicalement différente de celle d'un discours dont l'organisation est guidée par l'idée d'appropriation à l'objet. Son modèle formel est annoncé clairement comme étant mathématique: «Ut igitur in mathematica fieri solet, caeterisque etiam disciplinis, proposui terminos regulasque quibus cuncta quae sequitur efficiam» 136. Aucune allusion au fameux principe du Timée 29b 4-5 ne semble transparaître là. Le seul but avoué de cet habillage méthodologique est de mettre de sublimes réflexions hors de portée de ceux qui sont indignes de les entendre et qui risqueraient de les tourner en dérision 137. Néanmoins, l'opuscule de Boèce n'est pas sans antécédents dans le néoplatonisme grec. On l'a bien souvent rapproché des Eléments de Théologie de Proclus pour ce qui est du mos geometricus. Or, précisément, c'est encore au nom du même principe de l'apparentement du discours et de son objet, que Proclus justifie la forme hypothéticodéductive des démonstrations du Parménide, ainsi que le mode axiomatique qu'il emploie dans les Eléments de Théologie. Dans son commentaire des Eléments de Géométrie d'Euclide, il montre qu'un caractère essentiel des mathématiques est la continuité (συνέχεια) qui lie principes et théorèmes dans une unité sans faille. Le déroulement des démonstrations est sans lacune, nécessaire, ne laissant pas de place au hasard. Il ressemble ainsi à l'émanation du cosmos à partir de l'Un, allant sans solution de continuité du plus simple au plus complexe: «de même qu'il y a des principes primordiaux les plus simples et indivisibles de l'élocution littérale auxquels nous donnons le nom d'éléments, et de même que nous constituons tous les mots et tout le discours au moyen de ceux-ci, il y a de même certains théorèmes appelés éléments qui sont à la tête de toute la géométrie, ont rapport de principe avec les théorèmes venant à leur suite, se répandent dans tous et fournissent les démonstrations de beaucoup de leurs cas» 138. Les λόγοι géométriques préexistent à l'état latent dans la διάνοια, qui les déplie, les ex-plique dans l'espace et la représentation (θαντασία) 139. D'où la valeur paradigmatique de la structure axiomatique. Dans l'axiome ou l'élément, comme dans l'Un, est enveloppé tout ce qui le suit: 136 Ed. Stewart-Rand, dans The Theological Tractates, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Harvard University Press / London, W. Heinemann, 1973, l. 14-17. 137 Id., l.8-15. Cf. (éd. Stewart-Rand, dans The Theological Tractates), De Trinitate, l.12-22, et Contra Eutychen, l.5-6, l.3145. Le moins qu'on puisse dire est que Boèce est méfiant à l'égard de toute vulgarisation et qu'il ne veut s'adresser qu'aux "happy few". Sur le choix de ce mode d'écriture mathématique, sélectif à l'égard du lecteur parce que hermétique, voir A. Galonnier, "«Axiomatique» et théologie dans le De hebdomadibus de Boèce", in Langages et Philosophie. Hommage à Jean Jolivet, , Paris, Vrin, 1997, p.311-330, et ma propre étude, "Néoplatonisme et rhétorique : Gilles de Rome et la première proposition du De causis", dans Néoplatonisme et Philosophie médiévale, éd. L. Benakis, Turnhout, Brepols ("Rencontres de Philosophie médiévale", n°6), 1997 p.188-190. Sur l'état de la culture mathématique vers la fin de l'Antiquité, voir les remarques de I. Mueller dans "Mathematics and Philosophy in Proclus' Commentary on Book I of Euclid's Elements", in Proclus lecteur et interprète des Anciens, éd. J. Pépin et H. D. Saffrey, Paris, Editions du CNRS, 1987, p.306-308. Selon Proclus, dans le Timée, Platon, «par souci de secret, s'est servi des termes mathématiques comme de "couvertures" de la vérité inhérente aux choses, de même que les Théologiens se servent des mythes et les Pythagoriciens des symboles» (In Tim. III, t.II p.246 l.4-7, trad. t.III p.290). Platon, même s'il ne songe pas à un ordre axiomatique d'ensemble, fait allusion plusieurs fois à telle ou telle méthode ou technique particulière des "géomètres", qu'il se propose d'employer : le raisonnement par hypothèse (Ménon 86e 3-5), la proportionnalité (Gorgias 465b 9). 138 In Primum Euclidis Elementorum Librum Commentarii, éd. Friedlein (Leipzig, Teubner, 1873), p.72, l.6-13, trad. P. Ver Eecke, Bruges, Desclée De Brouwer, 1948, p.65. Id. p.65-66: «le premier élément est un élément du second élément et le quatrième élément un élément du cinquième élément. C'est ainsi que beaucoup de choses sont dites les éléments des uns des autres, parce qu'elles se construisent les unes en vertu des autres». 139 Cf. In Rem., XII: «l'âme possède en elle-même les principes des [objets de pensée] discursifs (τοῦς λόγος τῶν διανοετῶν) que la géométrie et l'arithmétique examinent» (t.I p.293 l.27-28), et elle doit les contempler «en elle-même, où ils sont comme repliés ensemble et dans un état d'indivision: et c'est précisément en explicitant ces discursifs que la pensée discursive a enfanté J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 19 «les théorèmes de la science contiennent chacun l'ensemble de la science» 140. La totalité ordonnée est déjà là dès le point de départ, implicite, c'est-à-dire repliée sur elle-même; elle doit être déroulée, comme un volumen, et la suite entière n'est que le déploiement de ses potentialités. C'est pourquoi Proclus écrit des Eléments de Théologie, à l'instar de l'oeuvre d'Euclide 141. Le procédé axiomatico-déductif est le langage adéquat de la philosophie première, parce qu'il reflète l'ordre même du réel. Proclus le légitime bien ainsi dans sa Théologie platonicienne, en se référant au Parménide: «(...) les discours procurent une image des réalités dont ils sont les interprètes, et (...) il y a une correspondance nécessaire entre le déroulement des démonstrations et la hiérarchie des réalités mises en évidence (...)» 142; «l'évidence des premières conclusions dépend immédiatement du plus petit nombre possible de notions qui soient en même temps les plus simples possibles et les plus connues possibles, pour ainsi dire des notions communes; les conclusions qui suivent ces premières dépendent d'un plus grand nombre de notions plus compliquées; car Parménide [le personnage du dialogue de Platon] fait toujours usage des conclusions antécédentes pour la démonstration des conclusions suivantes, et il présente la concaténation de ces conclusions comme un exemple dans le domaine de l'intellect de l'ordre qu'on trouve en géométrie et dans les autres disciplines mathématiques» 143. L'ordre géométrique est donc parfaitement adéquat en métaphysique parce qu'il est à l'imitation (notion capitale, s'il en est, dans le platonisme) du processus qu'il doit décrire. De plus, il remplit le requisit du Timée (29b 6-9), selon lequel le discours qui porte sur ce qui demeure, doit être lui-même stable et inébranlable: quoi de plus solide que les chaînes de raisons ainsi constituées, sur un modèle mathématique 144 ? En annonçant qu'il résoudra le problème métaphysique posé par le diacre Jean au moyen de principes ou axiomes qu'il appelle «hebdomades», Boèce semble se rallier à ce procédé de présentation qui finalement relève bien de la maxime de l'apparentement du discours à son objet. Mais nous devons maintenant nous demander comment il se peut que cette règle d'écriture rende compte de formes littéraires aussi différentes, du moins en apparence, qu'un raisonnement circulaire, et des chaînes déductives d'allure géométrique. Quelle cohérence trouver entre ces modes d'écriture ? N'y a-t-il pas là des paradigmes irréductibles les uns aux autres ? L'ordre unidirectionnel de la forme axiomatico-déductive ne s'oppose-t-il pas soit à la circularité soit même à l'entrecroisement des raisonnements ? un si grand nombre de théorèmes» (id., p.294 l.2-4, trad. t.II p.102). Théol. plat. V.18, p.65 l.26-28: «les discours sont des images des intellections parce qu'ils déroulent ce qu'il y a de ramassé dans les intelligibles». In Tim. II, t.I p.341 l.6-9, trad. t.II p.201: «Ce qu'est la chose de façon contractée, le discours doit l'être de façon développée, pour que le discours fasse apparaître la chose et se subordonne à la nature de la chose». 140 Proclus, In Tim. III, t.II p.193 l.31-32 (τοῖς τῆς ὲπιστήμης θεωρήμασιν, ὠς ἐχάστου τἠν ὄλην εχοντος). 141 Proclus est également l'auteur d'Éléments de Physique. 142 I.10, p.46 l.2-5. 143 Id., p.45 l.21 p.46 l.2. 144 In Tim. II, t.I p.296 l.15-20, trad. modif. t.II p.148: «Le raisonnement marche en conjonction avec les hypothèses, ou plutôt avec l'ordre même des réalités à partir desquelles on avait assumé ces hypothèses. Car, de même que, partout, la forme dépend de la cause efficiente, de même aussi les premières hypothèses sont-elles en continuité avec les secondes et fournissent-elles, pour les démonstrations, un point de départ à celles qui les suivent». Cf. la métaphore des statues de Dédale dans le Ménon 97d 9 98a 8. J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 20 2. - Axiomatique et topique On l'a souvent noté, l'intention méthodique, chez Boèce comme chez Proclus, n'obéit pas réellement à la rigueur technique de l'appareil mathématique. Les propositions utilisées comme axiomes par Boèce et Proclus sont effectivement fondamentales, mais relèvent de ce qu'on pourrait appeler plus généralement des thèses philosophiques, posées comme principielles, c'est-à-dire, littéralement, des hypothèses 145. Par exemple, le principe énonçant que «les discours doivent être apparentés aux réalités dont ils sont les interprètes» est lui-même présenté comme un ἀξίωμα par Proclus 146 ! De même le principe du commencement χατὰ φύσιν 147, ou un énoncé aristotélicien comme «tout engendré est périssable» 148. Le concept d'axiome est donc assez étendu, et recouvre des propositions dont le degré d'évidence est pour le moins variable. Boèce précise bien que les unes sont saisissables par tout le monde, fondées qu'elles sont sur l'expérience empirique, les autres ne sont reconnues que par un intellect exercé 149. Ensuite, les prémisses des deux auteurs ne se répartissent pas dans les trois catégories bien distinguées par les géomètres: définitions (ὄροι), postulats (αἱτήματα), et notions communes (χοιναί ἕννοιαι). Boèce ne renvoie qu'à cette seule dernière: «Communis animi conceptio est enuntiatio quam quisque probat auditam» 150. C'est sans doute que Proclus lui-même passe régulièrement de άξιώματα ἕννοια 151. Par exemple, le principe «tout ce qui vient à l'être, vient à l'être par une cause», qui est annoncé comme le troisième axiome de la démonstration du Timée 152, est appelé aussi bien par Proclus, lorsqu'il est effectivement introduit (28a 4-6), «notion commune», ou plutôt χοιναὶ ἕννοιαι, car il est composé de deux propositions liées 153. Κοιναί ἕννοιαι, άξιώματα et ύποθέσεις signifient donc en fait la même chose 154. Les hebdomades ont ce même statut chez Boèce, puisque leur définition recourt à l'idée de notion commune, et que leur usage en fait bien des axiomes ou des hypothèses. 145 Voir A. Szabó, Les Débuts des Mathématiques grecques, Paris, Vrin, 1977, p.244: Proclus entend par «hypothèses» les principes non démontrés en général (conformément à Rep. VI, 510c-d), ce qu'il appelle aussi aƒ€`ß. Cf. In Primum Euclidis Elementarum librum, p.77 l.2: πολλάλις δέ χαί πᾶντα ταῦτα (τάς άρχὰς τῆς έπιστεἠμης) χαλοῡσιν ύποθέσεις. Υποθέσις a aussi le sens plus précis de "définition" (p.76 l.4, p.178 l.1): cf. Szabó, pp.245-246. 146 In Tim. II, t.I p.340 l.18-23. L'appellation d' "axiomes" donnée à des énoncés qui ne sont pas de simples vérités logiques évidentes, mais ont un contenu qui est déjà une prise de position philosophique, n'est pas particulière à Proclus. Par exemple Galien compte parmi les άξιώματα des anciens philosophes l'idée que rien ne se fait à partir de rien (De methodo medendi, I.4.10, éd. Kühn, réimpr. Hildesheim, 1965, vol. X, 36.19-37.1). Cf. le troisième principe du Timée, 28a 4-6. Galien donne aussi comme axiomes des vérités plus formelles telles que: des quantités égales ajoutées à des quantités égales donnent des quantités égales (cf. Boèce, Quomodo susbt., l.21-22), qu'il distingue encore (à la différence de Proclus) de simples définitions comme: «j'appelle ligne une longueur sans épaisseur» (id., I.4.6). 147 In Tim. II, t.I p.337 l.25. 148 In Rem., XIII, t.II p.9 l.26-27 (cf. De Caelo I.12). Ou encore, une idée telle que «la providence est cause des biens pour ceux sur qui elle s'exerce» est comptée parmi les νοιναί ἕννοιαι, du moins d'après le plagiat par Isaac Comnème du De providentia et fato de Proclus. Voir Proclus, Trois Etudes sur la providence, , t.II, éd. et trad. D. Isaac, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1979, p.109 l.9-10 (cf. pp.32-33). 149 Quomodo substantiae, l.19-27. Cf. Proclus, In Tim. II, p.258 l.24-25, p.259 l.4 sq. 150 Quomodo subst. l.18-19. Cf. A. Szabo, op. cit., pp.244 et 334: la nomenclature des principes mathématiques est loin d'être fixée, à l'époque posteuclidienne, surtout que les commentateurs tardifs d'Euclide et Archimède cherchent à metre au point une terminologie d'inspiration aristotélicienne. 151 C'est bien le sens que donne Aristote à ce terme, remarque A. Szabo, op. cit. p.251, et c'est une constante chez Proclus que d'appeler les νοιναί ἕννοιαι d'Euclide des Τα θτον γάρ ὲστιν χατά τούτος άξίψμα χαί ἕννοια χοινή (In Eucl., p.194 l.8-9, cité par Szabo p.308). 152 In Tim. II, t.I p.236 l.1-2, 10-12, 23-24 153 Id., p.258 l.12-16. 154 Cf. id., p.265 l.3-9. De plus, des propositions de ce genre peuvent être qualifiées de «définitions» (p.283 l.16-17). J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 21 Enfin, toujours contrairement au canon mathématique, la vérité de ces axiomes peut être rendue manifeste par un développement 155. Les propositions du "second axiome" du Timée sont présentées selon un syllogisme 156. D'une manière générale, ces axiomes ont été présentés en usant de toutes les ressources de la dialectique 157. Davantage: ils ne sont pas absolument indémontrables. On le voit bien, chez Proclus 158, avec la proposition (qualifiée de χοινή ἕννοια): il existe un Etre qui est toujours. Lorsqu'il la formule la première fois (Tim. 27d 6), explique Proclus, Platon ne la prouve pas, il l'a établie comme hypothèse (ὠς ύπόθεσις λαβών), à la manière du géomètre qui a posé par hypothèse le point, car «la théorie de la Nature est elle aussi une science à base d'hypothèses (έξ ύποθέσεως)». En revanche, «lorsqu'il aura repris la question après l'exposé général sur la création du Monde [27d 542e 6], cela même il le démontrera, que l'Etre qui est toujours existe». Une même notion peut donc être posée comme principe indémontré à tel moment, puis être démontrée plus tard. Les ωοιναί ἕννοιαι utilisées en ce sens sont bien des "hypothèses", des thèses prises comme points de départ. Le fait de procéder more geometrico consiste ici seulement à poser des propositions premières indémontrées, et non pas indémontrables, à partir desquelles procèdent les démonstrations 159. L'analogie avec la mathématique consiste plus précisément en ce que Platon définit ses notions premières sans démontrer l'existence de leurs objets, de même que le géomètre explique ce que sont le point et la ligne mais présuppose leur existence, établissant le τί έστι et non le ὅτι έστι160. Il se donne comme accordée l'existence de ses objets, car il est dans sa compétence seulement de définir leur essence, et non d'en établir la vérité: «comment en effet resterait-il géomètre s'il mettait en discussion les principes de sa propre science ?» 161. Il en va pareillement pour le «physicien» 162. Seulement, Timée (sive Platon) n'est pas un physicien ordinaire, mais un physicien pythagoricien, aussi prouvera-t-il plus tard que l'Etre réellement être existe 163. Par là, il fera oeuvre de véritable science, puisque toute discipline qui se contente de partir d'hypothèses n'est pas digne de ce nom 164. Les axiomes sont donc à un moment donné posés comme indémontrés, à titre d'hypothèses, mais reçoivent ailleurs une démonstration. Leur statut n'est pas fixe, ni leur place à l'intérieur du discours. Par conséquent, l'enchaînement des propositions ne se réduit pas à un ordre figé, comme en mathématiques, mais est susceptible de multiples parcours, où la même thèse peut se trouver placée au début ou à la fin, comme c'est le cas dans la Consolatio. Nous avons d'ailleurs vu que la référence géométrique n'est pas absente de ce texte. Outre qu'il y est rappelé que les 155 Id., p.265 l.10 266 l.21. 156 Id., p.258 l.25-32. 157 Id., p.276 l.10-14. 158 Id., p.228 l.12 229 l.3. Cf. id., p.265 l.10 266 l.21, p.258 l.25-32, p.276 l.10-14. 159 «Platon procède à la manière des géomètres quand il assume, avant les démonstrations, des définitions et des hypothèses, grâce auxquelles il accomplira les démonstrations, et quand, en tête de toute la science de la Nature, il place comme fondements une série de principes (άρχαί)» (id., p.236 l.15-18, trad. modif. t.II pp.66-67). Il en va ainsi d'ailleurs pour d'autres disciplines, constituées sur des corps de principes: «de même qu'il y a des principes propres pour la musique et d'autres pour la médecine, et pareillement pour l'arithmétique et la mécanique, de même aussi la science de la Nature prise comme tout comporte-t-elle certains principes» (id., p.236 l.18-30, trad. p.67). 160 Id., p.236 l.28-32, trad. p.67. 161 Ibid., l.32-33. 162 Id., p.237 l.1-3. Une comparaison est faite d'ailleurs avec les principes de la physique et de la cosmologie d'Aristote (id., p.237 l.17 238 l.2, trad. p.68-69). 163 Id., p.237 l.3-8, trad. p.68. 164 Cf. Rep. VII, 533b 1 sq. La seule science réelle est celle qui remonte à l'άρχή άνυπόθετος» (cf. Rep. VI, 510b 7, 511b 6). Néanmoins, s'il peut y avoir une science de l'anhypothétique est une question aporétique, comme l'a remarqué Proclus (In Rem., XI, t.I p.283-285). Si en effet, toute science connaît ses objets par leur cause ou principe supérieur, le Bien, dont il n'y a pas de principe, n'est pas objet de science. Tout ce que l'on peut faire est de le connaître selon la via negativa, par l'aphairesis de tout ce qui n'est pas lui (id., p.285), ou encore par ce qui dans l'Intelligible et Connaissable y participe en premier, le manifeste ainsi le mieux (bien que n'étant que le «vestibule» du Bien), à savoir la Vérité, la Beauté et la Proportion (id., XII, t.I p.295-296). J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 22 propositions déduites peuvent à leur tour servir de points de départ pour démontrer des corollaires, les prémisses de certaines déductions, comme le principe «nihil deo melius excogitari queat», sont appelées «notion commune» (communis conceptio) 165, expression qui définit aussi les hebdomades. D'autres, comme la toute-puissance divine, font appel implicitement à la même idée d'évidence per se nota 166. On peut donc dire que dans la Consolatio il est fait usage d'hebdomades, et comme telles, elles correspondent tout à fait à ce que Proclus entend par νοινα ἕννοιαι, άξι ψματα, ou ὐποθέσεις 167 - y compris par le fait que leur ordre n'est pas inamovible. Réciproquement, dans le Quomodo substantiae, Boèce a en réalité une conception topique des «hebdomades», c'est-à-dire les présente comme "lieux" d'argumentation, plutôt que comme les axiomes d'un système hypothéticodéductif au sens moderne, i.e. ne varietur. Ce qu'il retient du mos mathematicorum, c'est que ces règles ne font pas seulement l'objet d'un consensus social (comme les lieux dialectiques), mais sont des évidences intelligibles, et qui doivent être placées en tête d'un raisonnement qui n'a rien de rhétorique. Mais Boèce semble satisfaire ici à la nécessité méthodologique qu'il évoque en commentant les Topiques de Cicéron: est indispensable une «discipline» telle que «sine ullo errore ad argumentorum inventionem via quadam et recto filo atque artificio veniretur» 168. C'est parce qu'il a en vue une semblable topique, recueil de maximes applicables à un problème (telles les Sentences de Porphyre), qu'il conclut l'exposé de ses hebdomades par: «a prudente uero rationis interprete suis unumquodque aptabitur argumentis» 169. Le philosophe a à sa disposition un stock de ces principes, qu'il peut combiner à sa guise et appliquer aux sujets qu'il étudie. Il n'est pas tenu à un ordre unique comme celui du géomètre. Qu'une telle topique serve à traiter un problème métaphysico-théologique n'est pas étranger, bien au contraire, à la conception boécienne du "lieu", qui, comme nous l'avons constaté dans la Consolatio, contient les arguments, et qui, lorsqu'il est une propositio maxima, contient les propositions subséquentes 170. On rejoint en cela aussi bien la réflexion de Proclus sur le statut de la proposition première et son analogie avec l'Un. Si de plus il arrive que la conclusion soit indiquée au début de la démonstration - et nous retrouvons là le schème de circularité -, c'est que 165 Voir supra p. ???. Cf. Saloustios, Des Dieux et du Monde, I.1-2. 166 Cf. Cons. III.12 l.64-66: «Deum, inquit, esse omnium potentem nemo dubitaverit. Qui quidem, inquam, mente consistat, nullus prorsus ambigat». 167 Proclus entend de son côté formaliser un texte comme le Timée et y trouver pas moins de cinq άρχαί (In Tim. II, t.I p.236 l.21-27, trad. t.II p.67): 1/ l'être qui est toujours est appréhendé par une intellection conjointement à une définition (28a 1-2); 2/ l'être devenu est appréhendé par une conjecture fondée sur une sensation irraisonnée (28a 2-4); 3/ tout ce qui vient à l'être le fait à partir d'une cause (28a 4-6); 4/ ce qui a pour modèle l'Etre éternel est nécessairement beau (28a 6 b 3); 5/ le nom de l'Univers est Ciel ou Monde (28b 3-5). Puis, toujours selon Proclus (id., p.348 l.13-15), trois λήμματα, trois "théorèmes auxiliaires", en sont déduits: 1/ le Monde est né (28b-c); 2/ le Monde a eu besoin d'un créateur (28c); 3/ ce créateur a pris un modèle éternel (28c 29a ). 168 PL 64, 1043 A. Cf. le début de sa traduction des Topiques d'Aristote: «Propositum quidem negotii est methodum inuenire per quam poterimus syllogizare de omni proposito problemata ex probabilibus, et ipsi disputationem sustinentes, nihil dicemus repugnans» (PL 64, 909 D). Voir aussi, dans l'In Topica Ciceronis: «ut certis regulis tractatus insisteret, visum est antiquae philosophiae ducibus, ut ipsarum ratiocinationum, quibus aliquid inquirendum esset, naturam penitus ante discuterent, ut his purgatis atque compositis, vel in speculatione veritatis, vel in exercendis virtutibus uteremur» (1044 D-1045 A). 169 L.53-55. De même la distinction qu'il fait entre la «communis animi acceptio» évidente pour tous les hommes, et celle évidente seulement pour les «doctes», semble renvoyer aux niveaux d'ἕνδοξα, d'opinions probables, distingués par Aristote: «Probabilia autem sunt quae uidentur omnibus, aut plurimis, aut sapientibus, et his uel omnibus, aut plurimis, uel maxime familiaribus et probatis» (Top. I.1, 100b 21-23, trad. de Boèce PL 64, 910 D). Cette analogie n'est cependant que formelle, car pour Boèce les hebdomades ne sont justement pas des probabilités mais des certitudes («enuntiatio, quam quisque probat auditam», «nullus id intelligens neget»). Mais tout se passe comme si Boèce transposait la conception topique du niveau dialectique au niveau apodictique. 170 In Top. Cic. Comm., 1051 D : «quod enim maximae sunt, id est universales propositiones, reliquas in se velut loci corpora complectuntur» (cf. 1052C) ; id., 1053 A: «Nam si argumentum omne per propositiones ad conlusionem usque perducitur, omnes vero reliquae propositiones in prima maximaque propositione continentur (...)». J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 23 l'intellect perçoit d'une manière unifiée, rassemblée, ce que la raison discursive va dérouler par étapes 171. Ainsi, selon Proclus, Timée, au début de son exposé, a enveloppé tout sa doctrine sur le Monde en un seul mot: Γέγονεν, «Il est né» (28b 8). De la sorte, il imite par son discours l'intuition intellectuelle, puis le développement de celle-ci en argumentation, ce qui est aussi une imitation de l'ordre même des choses: «Tout d'abord, il a rassemblé toute sa doctrine sous un seul vocable, et il a proclamé ouvertement la conclusion avant la démonstration, à la manière des gens divinement inspirés, qui voient à la fois tout l'ensemble et qui, d'un seul coup d'oeil spirituel, embrassent le dernier terme d'un processus avant même que l'événement n'ait eu lieu, car ils voient toutes choses ensemble comme présentes. Puis, se mettant à raisonner, il descend de l'intuition intellectuelle au déroulement de l'argumentation logique et à la démonstration qui lui permettra de saisir la nature du Cosmos» 172. Autrement dit, que le raisonnement prenne forme de cercle est impliqué par le fait que l'âme déploie ce qui est un pour l'intellect, et que l'axiome contient d'avance l'ensemble des conséquences, ainsi que nous l'avons vu, par congruence avec la procession. C'est pourquoi il n'y a pas d'opposition entre le procédé mathématisant du Quomodo substantiae et les formes d'écriture de la Consolatio. La solidarité sans faille et l'homogénéité des arguments, tout en étant une interdépendance forte, ne se développe pas selon un sens unique, dans lequel prémisses et conclusions sont fixées une fois pour toutes et n'échangent pas leurs places. Ils forment plutôt un système clos mais non-linéaire, que l'on parcourir indéfiniment en de multiples sens. Il en va de même que chez Proclus. Conversion oblige, l'ordre même du réel, la linéarité de la hiérarchie, est en même temps cyclique (ou, inversement, le cercle est une ligne fermée): «Dans toutes les processions divines il y a assimilation des fins aux principes, et celle-ci, par cette conversion vers les principes, soutient un processus circulaire sans commencement ni fin» 173. 3. - Sur le sens de «hebdomades» S'il est possible de trouver dans la Consolatio des hebdomades et d'y expliquer le statut des axiomes par la réflexion de Proclus sur les hypothèses du Timée, en sens inverse, Proclus encore, et toujours surtout son Commentaire du Timée, avec l'usage qui en est fait dans la Consolatio, peuvent faire la lumière sur le choix même du terme de hebdomades. La métaphore du tissage nous invite à entrecroiser à notre tour les textes. Ἐβδομάς, qui n'a pas un sens différent de έπτάς 174, désigne généralement un groupe de sept. Mais sept quoi ? En prenant ce terme comme désignant effectivement une quantité, on a longtemps cherché quelles choses pouvaient être 171 In Tim. III, t.II p.243 l.18-25, trad. t.III p.287-288 : «L'Intellect, même si on lui donne un mouvement, conserve cette activité sans discursus (άμετάβατον). Car il contemple à la fois tout l'Intelligible, puisque, ayant sa vie dans l'Eternel, il exerce son activité sur les mêmes objets dans le même lieu de manière uniforme. L'Ame en revanche agit moyennant un discursus. Car, même si tu parles de l'Ame du Tout, elle approche tantôt une Forme, tantôt une autre: c'est là en effet le propre de l'Ame, exercer son activité dans une suite de moments temporels, comme Platon le dit dans le Phèdre [247d 1 sq.]». Cf. id., t.II p.96 l.25-27, p.97 l.30 p.98 l.3,; In Tim. II, t.I p.244 l.16-19. 172 In Tim. II, t.I p.283 l.5-12, trad. t.II p.130. Pareillement, à propos de la phrase conclusive résumant l'exposé sur la fabrication du cosmos (34a 9 b 2) (et qui rappelle la sphéricité parfaite de ce dernier), Proclus explique que: «Imitant l'Intellect unique et la manière dont il embrasse l'intellection de toutes choses dans l'unicité d'un même acte, le discours résume tout l'ensemble en une même formule et le ramène à un seul chapitre, la création de l'assemblage corporel» (In Tim. III, t.II p.98 l.1821, trad. t.III p.134). 173 El. theol., prop.146, trad. J. Trouillard, Paris, Aubier (Bibliothèque philosophique]), 1965, p.148. 174 Cf. par exemple In Tim. III, t.II p.94 l.30 p.95 l.7, et In Rem., XVI, t.II p.192 l.14, passages cités ci-après. Le Thesaurus linguae graecae donne chez Proclus 24 occurrences pour ἐπτάς et 13 pour ἐβδομάς. Les Theologoumena arithmeticae du pseudoJ.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 24 comptées au nombre de sept: les règles elles-mêmes énoncées dans l'opuscule (mais elles sont neuf, selon le dénombrement habituel), les parties d'un ouvrage perdu dont elles proviendraient, le nombre de jours requis pour la réflexion, etc.175 Peut-être vaudrait-il mieux renoncer à y voir une indication vraiment quantitative, et prendre le terme dans son sens symbolique. Proclus peut nous mettre sur la piste d'une solution à cette quaestio vexata. En expliquant pourquoi le Démiurge a donné à la sphère du monde visible une rotation sur elle-même, parmi les sept mouvements possibles 176, il ajoute que l'on peut compter indifféremment ce mouvement circulaire comme le premier ou le septième, car «il est approprié à l'Intellect selon l'un et l'autre nombre». En effet: «la monade et l'heptade sont des nombres en relation avec l'Intellect: la monade est précisément l'Intellect, l'heptade est la lumière issue de l'Intellect. C'est pour cela aussi que l'Intellect Cosmique est monadique et hebdomadique, comme dit Orphée [Orph. fr. 210b]. En outre la monade est Apolloniaque, l'heptade Athénaïque, donc de nouveau "intellect et entendement", en sorte que, par le moyen des nombres aussi, le mouvement circulaire se montre suspendu à l'intellect et à l'entendement» 177. L'Intellect et le mouvement circulaire sont donc représentés arithmologiquement par la monade et l'heptade. En particulier, l'heptade d'une part est un nombre qui «mène à perfection les révolutions et les ramène à leur point de départ (ἁποχαταστατιχός ἁριθεος)» 178. D'autre part, elle est le nombre qui désigne la manifestation de l'Intellect dans l'illumination qui descend dans l'âme 179. Cette dernière idée est d'origine pythagoricienne selon Proclus 180, mais en tout état de cause abondamment reprise par lui. L'hebdomade fait partie des ψυχιχοι λόγοι , illuminations de l'âme par les dieux (τῆς ἁπό τῶν θεῶν ... ἑλλάμψεως), «qui perfectionnent soit la partie proprement intellective, soit la partie vitale, soit l'être substantiel même des âmes et l'existence qui est en elles; et disons que l'hebdomade [est déterminative] de la partie intellective (...)» 181. Ou encore: «Les dieux excitent la faculté cognitive des âmes au moyen de la lumière hebdomadique» 182. Pourquoi le septénaire a-t-il été choisi pour symboliser l'illumination intellective ? Pour qu'on puisse y répondre, cette question doit être décomposée en deux sous-questions. D'abord: quel est le rapport entre le chiffre sept et l'intellect ? Ensuite: comment l'hebdomade, issue des dieux, descend-elle sur le mode illuminatif jusque dans nos âmes ? Premier point: d'une manière générale, le degré intellectif possède une structure hebdomadique, que Proclus expose au livre V de sa Théologie platonicienne. Mais il la considère là comme un fait, dont il ne fournit pas les Jamblique utilisent ἐβδομάς, de même que par exemple Posidonius, Fragmenta, éd. Theiler (Berlin, De Gruyter, 1982), n° 392 l.3-4, Syrianus, In Met., CAG t.VI.1, p.145 l.28, p.146 l.2, p.147 l.25, Asclepius, In Met., CAG t.VI.2, p.34 l.27, p.36 l.3-5, Simplicius, In Phys., CAG t.X, p.616 l.7, p.616 l.27, p.764 l.11, p.770 l.12, p.770 l.35, p.771 l.3, In De Caelo, CAG t.VII, p.504 l.1, Philopon, In Phys., CAG t.XVII, p.777 l.33, p.782 l.22. La forme latine est hebdomas plutôt que heptas; dans la littérature patristique, le terme désigne le plus souvent la semaine, les sept jours, mais cela pour des raisons évidentes de références bibliques (Origène emploie généralement ἐβδομάς, Clément d'Alexandrie aussi sauf en Pedag. 3.12.87.4.4). 175 Voir les trad. de L. Obertello (La Consolazione della Philosophia. Gli Opuscoli teologici, Milan, 1979, p. 379, n. * ), et de H. Merle (Courts Traités de Théologie, Paris, Cerf, 1991, pp. 90-91), ainsi que les études d'A. Galonnier («"Axiomatique" et théologie dans le De hebdomadibus de Boèce», art. cit., pp. 311-312), et F. Hudry ("L'«hebdomade» et les règles. Survivances du débat scolaire alexandrin", dans Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale, VIII, Brepols, 1997, p.319-337). 176 voir supra p.???. 177 In Tim. III, t.II p.94 l.30 p.95 l.7, trad. t.III p.130-131. 178 Id. t.II p.270 l.14-15, trad. p.314. 179 «l'heptade est la lumière issue de l'Intellect»; id. chez Damascius, In Parmenidem, éd. Ruelle, Paris, 1889, [t.II] p.131 sq. 180 Cf. Theol. plat. V.2, p.14: χαί οἵ γε Πυθαγόρειοι τό χατά νόον φῶς τήν ἑπτάδα προσαγορεύοντες νοεράν αύτῆς δήπου τήν ὕπαρηιν εῖναι σγχωοῦσι. Cf. In Tim. III, t.II p.270 l.5-9, trad. t.III p.314, et Philolaos, frag. A XII. 181 In Rem., XVI, t.II p.192 l.13-17, trad.t.III p.139. 182 In Rem., XVI, t.II p.193 l.14-15, trad. t.III p.140-141. J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 25 raisons, pas plus que dans son Commentaire du Timée. Peut-être en donnait-il une justification spéculative dans son Commentaire des Oracles chaldaïques ou du Commentaire du Parménide, dans la fin de la section portant sur la deuxième hypothèse (145b 6 147b 8); mais ces textes sont perdus 183. Il semble cependant que cette doctrine ait été avant tout considérée par les néoplatoniciens comme «théologique», c'est-à-dire fondée sur les traditions orphique et chaldaïque 184. Il leur fallait également rendre compte du donné cosmologique, tel qu'enseigné par le Timée, comme le fait que l'Ame du monde est composée de sept parts et qu'il existe sept sphères planétaires 185. Cette organisation hebdomadique du cosmos devait forcément trouver son fondement dans l'ordre immédiatement supérieur, c'est-à-dire dans les causes créatrices, qui dès lors devaient être caractérisées aussi par le sept 186. Or ces instances démiurgiques, qui se trouvent à la jointure du monde transcendant et de l'ordre cosmique, agissent selon l'intellect 187. Cet ultime degré de la procession supracosmique est donc celui des dieux intellectifs, desquels l'heptade est par conséquent le principe organisateur. Nous retrouvons là d'ailleurs, en cohérence parfaite, les schèmes circulaire et sphérique. Une des fonctions de cette troisième et dernière classe de dieux transcendants est de retourner la procession divine vers son principe et d'en faire par là un cercle parfait 188. Leur distinction étant en même temps une unification, ils forment une sphère, qui est le modèle de la sphère d'ici-bas: «En effet, tous les êtres intellectifs s'interpénètrent les uns les autres et sont les uns dans les autres par l'effet d'une certaine communion admirable, en imitant l'unité des êtres intelligibles par le moyen de leur présence mutuelle et de leur fusion. Et le Sphairos de là-bas est le monde intellectif, parce qu'il agit en luimême et en référence à lui-même, et il procède vers lui-même sous le mode de l'hebdomade, étant monade et hebdomade parfaite, parce qu'il est image, si on peut dire, de la monade intelligible, qui révèle l'unité cachée de cette monade par le moyen de la procession et de la distinction» 189. Nous ne suivrons pas Proclus dans les subdivisions qu'il introduit a priori 190, ni dans les équivalences qu'il tente d'établir a posteriori avec les divinités mentionnées par Platon. Remarquons simplement qu'Athéna figure en bonne place parmi ces dieux intellectifs, en tant que hénade de la seconde triade, celle des Courètes (qui préservent la pureté 183 On peut toutefois essayer de reconstruire cette partie du Commentaire du Parménide de Proclus à partir de celui de Damascius: voir l'introduction de H.-D. Saffrey et L. G. Westerink au L. V de la Théologie platonicienne, p.XI sq. 184 Selon Jamblique, la septième triade est la triade intellective: cf. Proclus In Tim. II, t.I p.308 l.22, trad. t.II p.164. Damascius reconnaît que l'attribution du nombre sept à l'ordre de l'intellectif est en premier lieu fondé sur une révélation divine: «ce sont les dieux eux-mêmes qui révèlent les nombres divins qui les concernent (...) la raison humaine ne saurait avoir l'audace de les contredire sur ce point en quoi que ce soit (...) que le degré d'être intelligible soit monadique, le degré d'être intelligibleintellectif, triadique, le degré d'être intellectif, hebdomadique, qui pourrait le conjecturer, et même s'il l'avait conjecturé, qui pourrait soutenir absolument qu'il en est bien ainsi, à moins de pouvoir s'appuyer sur les révélations divines ?» (In Parm. p.131; trad. H. D. Saffrey et L. G. Westerink, dans Proclus, Théol. plat., L. V, p.XII). 185 Le Timée est précisément une des sources essentielles du L. V de la Théol. plat. 186 Proclus indique explicitement, pour justifier la nature hebdomadique de la procession des dieux intellectifs, qu'il recourt à la «méthode des images» c'est-à-dire à une remontée par similitude de l'effet au modèle (Théol. plat. V.4, p.19). 187 «D'une manière générale, le démiurge de l'univers est appelé par Timée intellect, et il est dit souvent voir, découvrir et raisonner» (Théol. plat. V.14, p.49 l.18-20). 188 Théol. plat. V.1, p.6 l.7-10: la classe intellective «marque le terme de l'ensemble des processions des êtres divins, les convertit vers le principe et achève le cercle unique des degrés primordiaux et parfaits». D'après Damascius, l'argument proclien «du point de vue du nombre», pour expliquer l'hebdomade intellective, était que «la procession ayant procédé d'une monade vers une triade, puis s'étant convertie vers une monade, devient alors une hebdomade; en effet, l'intellect ayant procédé à partir de l'intelligible et s'étant converti vers lui, devient alors un intellect uni à l'intelligible, ce qui fait: une monade, une dyade, une triade; ensuite, redevenu monade, l'intellect fait venir à l'existence l'hebdomade» (In Parm. p.131, trad. Saffrey-Westerink, dans Théol. plat. V, p.XIV). 189 Théol. plat. V.2, p.11 l.15-23. 190 Chaque monade de la première hebdomade des dieux intellectifs est elle-même à la tête d'une hebdomade subordonnée, et ordonnée sur le même modèle: deux triades de monades disposées hiérarchiquement, reproduisant en abîme les trois ordres de dieux: intelligible, intelligible/intellectif et intellectif, et une dernière monade séparative (Théol. plat. V.2, p.11 l.24 p.14 l.17). J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 26 de la transcendance des dieux de la première triade) 191. Par ailleurs, Proclus lui attribue un rôle de première importance dans la procession universelle 192: elle est la médiation, après la source primordiale, où se déploie et se communique l'intelligible. Cette indication nous mène à notre second point: comment le septénaire se manifeste-t-il comme illumination pour ce qui est inférieur au degré des dieux intellectifs ? Nous venons de voir que pour Proclus, c'est une donnée de fait que le cosmos soit réglé par le nombre sept, à partir de laquelle il est remonté à la cause intellective. Nous allons maintenant suivre avec lui l'ordre inverse (et l'on ne trouvera pas à redire si ce parcours est circulaire...): l'heptade descend depuis l'Intellect hypercosmique jusque dans la région encosmique, elle organise le monde tout entier et finit sa course sur le mode cognitif dans nos âmes. L'Ame du Monde, d'abord, est hebdomadique dans la mesure où elle manifeste l'intellectivité qui procède de l'intellect démiurgique 193. De même que l'hebdomade n'est en fait qu'un déploiement de la monade et entretient avec celle-ci un rapport privilégié 194, l'Ame dépend de l'Intellect. Par conséquent: ἐβδοματιχή τ ς ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία τῆς ψυχῆς 195. Mais si l'Ame dérive ainsi, en tant qu'hebdomade, de la monade Intellect et y participe, elle possède en elle quelque chose de cette monade: la procession ne tolérant pas de rupture, le supérieur se trouve sous quelque forme dans l'inférieur. Cette présence de la monade en elle a pour support l'un des deux cercles dont elle est constituée, celui du Même, tandis que le second, celui de l'Autre, en est l'aspect hebdomadique, conduisant à la multiplicité 196. Le premier participe à l'Intellect selon le mouvement, le second étant la lumière intellective qui en émane 197. L'Ame est donc, elle aussi, à la fois monade et hebdomade, et elle transmet à son tour à ce qu'elle engendre la vertu unifiante de la monade dans la forme multiple de l'hebdomade 198. Proclus rapporte que selon son maître, Syrianus, c'est par l'heptade que l'Ame veille sur les choses qu'elles dirigent selon une «providence intellective» 199. Elle communique 191 Théol. plat. V.33-35, VI.13, p.66 l.17 p.67 l.2. 192 Voir In Tim. I, t.I p.84-85, sur le double rôle démiurgique (dans l'Intelligible et le sensible) et conservateur, unificateur d'Athéna (id., p.135 l.1-2: « ποιήσισ d'Athéna sur le Tout»). Id., p.169 l.16-20, pour le rapport entre le Démiurge et Athéna. 193 In Tim. III, t.II p.273 l.15-16, trad. t.III p.317: «En tant que l'Ame a reçu des puissances et monadiques et hebdomadiques, nous la rapporterons à l'hebdomade intellective». Cf. Théol. plat. V.15, p.51 l.26-29: «avant toutes les autres choses, le démiurge fait exister l'intellect participé, comme le dit Timée: car c'est après avoir placé l'intellect dans l'âme, et l'âme, dans un corps, qu'il a fabriqué le tout». Id., V.8, p.28-29: les âmes sont les «nourrissons de Cronos», le principe de l'heptade des dieux intellectifs, «et puisqu'il remplit les âmes non pas des intelligibles tout premiers et unitaires, mais de ses intelligibles à lui, qui sont multipliés par la cause de la distinction, on dit qu'il fait paître les âmes, c'est-à-dire qu'il les rassasie sous un mode pour ainsi dire divisé». 194 Cf. In Parm., éd. Cousin, col.767 l.33-36: «L'heptade [allusion au nombre des interlocuteurs du Parménide: "puisqu'ici nous sommes sept", 129d 1] est là pour [indiquer] l'Un; car elle est monadique, elle est engendrée par la monade seule (πρός δέ τέν τοῦ ἐνός ἡ ἑπτάς), et d'une manière générale l'impair est du côté de l'Un». Cf. Théol. plat. V.2, p.14 l.15-17. 195 In Tim. III, t.II p.271 l.15-16. «L'Ame, par tout son être, est hebdomadique, dans les portions [les portions du mélange primordial d'Etre, de Même et d'Autre dont elle est constituée: 35b 2 c 2], dans les rapports [qui régissent les intervalles entre les portions; 36a 2 b 5], dans les cercles [36d 2], étant composée de sept parts, de sept rapports, de sept cercles. Si en effet l'Intellect démiurgique est une monade, et si l'Ame émane en premier lieu de l'Intellect, elle a raison d'hebdomade par rapport à lui: car l'hebdomade a seulement un père et pas de mère» (id., p.203 l.1-6, trad. t.III p.250). Cf. In Rem. XVI, t.II p.216 l.18 p .217 l.18. 196 Cf. Théol. plat. V.4, p.20 l.1-4. 197 In Tim. III, t.II p.271 l.16-19. Cf. In Tim. IV, t.III p.90 l.10-15, trad. t.IV p.118: «Platon nomme "rotation unique et la plus intelligente" [39c 2-3] la révolution du Même, comme uniforme, intellective, la plus apparentée à la stabilité et à l'identité de l'Intellect, et comme tenant l'unicité de la forme du Principe un, l'intellectualité de l'Intellect, la rotation de la propriété particulière de l'Ame». 198 Cf. In Tim. III, t.II p.272 l.1, trad. t.III p.315: l'hebdomade et son carré conviennent aux «puissances divisives». 199 In Tim. III, t.II p.221 l.20, trad. t.III p.267. Id., p.240 l.30-31, trad. p.285: «dans les choses encosmiques aussi, on a la monade, puis la dyade, puis l'heptade». Cf. Syrianus, In Met., p.146 l.3-4, p.196 l.9-10, et pseudo-Jamblique, Theologoumena arithmeticae (éd. De Falco, Leipzig, Teubner, 1922), p.58: l'heptade est un moyen pour Dieu de gouverner l'univers à partir de l'Un premier-né, car sept est avec quatre une médiété importante de la décade. Dans la série 1, 4, 7, 10, la somme des médiétés est égale à la somme des extrêmes (4+7 = 1+10), 4 excède 1 comme 10 excède 7, 10 excède 4 comme 7 excède 1. Les nombres de la J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 27 l'hebdomade, c'est-à-dire les raisons intelligibles, qu'elle porte en elle, aux êtres de la nature dont la constitution est réglée par ce nombre 200. Ce dernier point est un lieu commun, une observation que se sont plu à le relever tous les traités d'arithmologie et les auteurs qui s'en inspirent : les planètes, le corps humain, son développement, ses maladies, etc., obéissent à un rythme septénaire. L'hebdomade se transmet donc dans la procession à la suite de l'Ame, jusqu'à subsister dans les âmes humaines uniquement d'une manière cognitive, et non plus productive de surcroît. Cela signifie que dans les âmes humaines les intelligibles sont connus seulement, mais ne procèdent pas plus loin: «[le Démiurge] a progressé selon l'hebdomade, en tant que l'Ame fait se retourner toutes choses vers la monade, à laquelle précisément se ramène l'hebdomade, qui seule est sans mère et non féminine. En outre ce nombre subsiste, dans l'Ame du Monde, de façon totale, dans les âmes divines, en tant qu'elles agissent en se référant à l'Ame du Monde, de façon totale et de façon partielle, dans les âmes démoniques à l'inverse, en tant qu'elles agissent plus partiellement encore, de façon partielle et de façon totale, dans les âmes humaines seulement de façon partielle et seulement de façon cognitive (γνωστιχῶς): car c'est de façon cognitive que toutes les formes résident dans les âmes humaines, par exemple la forme d'homme, de démon, de dieu, afin qu'elles connaissent toutes choses au moyen de ces formes, lesquelles, dans les êtres supérieurs, résident à la fois de façon créative (ποιητιχῶς) et de façon cognitive» 201. L'hebdomade est donc principe de connaissance en nous, terme de la procession des intelligibles, et par conséquent résultat d'une illumination divine. Or c'est bien en ce sens d'intelligibles, ou d'intellections, présents dans son esprit, que Boèce présente ses hebdomades. Il était pertinent d'appeler ainsi ces axiomes évidents (à des degrés divers) servant de règles universelles de résolution pour des problèmes métaphysiques. L'hebdomade connote en effet particulièrement, chez Proclus, la spéculation philosophique. Nous avons vu quel rôle celui-ci attribue à Athéna comme intermédiaire dans la procession de l'intelligible. D'autre part, le septénaire, bien qu'il caractérise tout l'ordre intellectif, lui est spécialement associé: «l'heptade est absolument Athénaïque»202. Il y a là encore une donnée de l'arithmologie traditionnelle. Le sept est en effet le nombre "vierge", ne prenant part à aucune union et ne provenant d'aucune union, car il est le seul de la décade (i.e. des nombres de 1 à 10) à posséder tétrade sont potentiellement la décade (1+2+3+4 = 10), et 7 est la moyenne arithmétique entre cette décade potentielle et la décade en acte ([4+10]/2). 200 «Comme l'Ame de l'Univers contient les principes (λόγοις) et les forces productives de tous les êtres encosmiques, il faut nécessairement qu'elle contienne les causes intellectives non seulement de l'homme, du cheval et de tous les autres vivants, mais encore, avant cela, de toutes les régions du Monde, je veux dire de la sphère même des fixes et de celle des planètes. Il faut (...) qu'avant les sept planètes subsiste le septénaire réel qui préexiste dans l'Ame antérieurement à la réalité phénoménale (...) Car de même que notre nature produit deux yeux, cinq doigts, sept organes intestinaux selon les principes qui sont en elle (...) de même aussi le cercle de l'Autre a embrassé en lui-même les causes primaires des sept cercles (...)» (In Tim. III, t.II p.310 l.1-20, trad. modifiée t.III p.310). «On pourrait encore dire de manière plus parfaite que, grâce à cette monade et cette heptade des cercles, l'Ame de l'Univers embrasse toutes les parties du Monde. Car, de même qu'il y a dans le Ciel monade et heptade, de même y a-til les analogues dans la sphère de l'éther, les uns correspondant au cercle des fixes, les autres au cercle des planètes, et il y a là aussi toute l'ordonnance cosmique, imitant le Ciel sous un mode éthérien, dans la profondeur de l'air et dans les masses de l'eau aussi bien que dans les cavités de la terre: car ce n'est pas seulement la terre qui a été divisée en analogie avec le Ciel, mais les autres éléments aussi, et il y a en chacun d'eux des monades et des heptades, qui comprennent tout ce qu'il y a en eux de classes d'êtres qui les remplissent entièrement, êtres ignés, aériens, aquatiques. Toutes ces monades donc et toutes ces heptades ont été préassumées par les cercles de l'Ame sous le mode causal, les unes par le cercle du Même, les autres par le cercle de l'Autre» (id., t.II p. 268 l.15-28, trad. III p.312). 201 In Tim. III, t.II p.236 l.18-27, trad.t.III p.281-282. 202 In Tim. I, t.I p.151 l.12-13. J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 28 ces deux propriétés à la fois 203: n'avoir pour multiple aucun nombre compris dans la décade, et (en tant que nombre premier, dirions-nous) n'être le multiple d'aucun des nombres de la décade, mis à part le un, qui n'est pas vraiment un nombre mais ce qui engendre les nombres c'est-à-dire des multiplicités 204. Ces caractéristiques lui confèrent un statut particulier et fondent l'assimilation à Athéna: l'heptade sort directement de la monade comme la Vierge sans mère est sortie de la tête de Zeus 205. L'ordre de l'intellectif est donc représenté par l'hebdomade, c'est-à-dire par Athéna, qui personnifie ce nombre. Plus précisément, Athéna est associée à l'heptade en tant qu'elle est créatrice et dispensatrice de la lumière intelligible 206. Unique est l'essence divine (θεότης) qui se dévoile dans tous les êtres divins, dit Proclus, et «tous les Théologiens la nomment Athéna, en tant qu'elle jaillit de la tête du Père et demeure en lui, puisqu'elle est la Pensée démiurgique séparée et immatérielle» 207. En se manifestant comme «heptade impolluée», elle est Korè, et «elle fait luire de l'intelligence et une vie immaculée sur les êtres de second rang» 208. Cette illumination, ou plutôt ces illuminations 209, descendent jusqu'à l'âme du spéculatif, qui adresse à la déesse «gardienne de la vie intellective» 210 cette prière emplie de piété philosophique: «Puisse-t-elle donc, nous étant favorable, nous donner part à la sagesse pure et nous remplir de force intellective (...) éveillant en nous des notions (ἕννοιαι) pures (...) et faisant luire sur nous la lumière divine qui jaillit d'elle. Car elle est Porte-lumière (φωσφόρος), comme faisant s'étendre partout la lumière intellective (...)» 211. On ne sera pas alors surpris que le chiffre sept soit celui de la philosophie même, puisqu'il est celui d'Athéna φωσφόρος, incarnation non seulement de la μῆτις mais aussi de la φρόνεσις, pourvoyeuse des ἕννοιαι et de la lumière qui nourrissent la spéculation philosophique. Reprenant la formule du Timée (24d 1): φιλόσοφος γἁρ ἅμα 203 Cf. Théon de Smyrne, Des connaissances mathématiques utiles pour la lecture de Platon (éd. et trad. J. Dupuis, Paris, 1892, réimpr. Culture et Civilisation, Bruxelles, 1966), B.μς», trad. p.169-171; Martianus Capella De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii (éd. Eyssenhardt, Leipzig, 1866), VI.738 l.10-15, Calcidius, Timaeus, XXXVI (éd. Jensen-Waszink, Leiden, Brill, 1962), p.85. 204 Cf. Théon, A.z, trad. p.29: «Le nombre est une collection de monades, ou une progression de la multitude commençant et revenant à la monade. Quant à la monade, c'est la quantité terminante - principe et éléments des nombres - qui, une fois débarrassée de la multitude par soustraction, et privée de tout nombre, demeure ferme et fixe». 205 Cf. Damascius, In Parm., p.133: «le caractère de l'hebdomade (...) est d'avoir la forme de la monade et de procéder de la seule monade». Voir pseudo-Jamblique (qui suit Nicomaque de Gérase), Theologoumena arithmeticae, p.71. Contrairement à Théon (ainsi semble-t-il qu'à Nicomaque in pseudo-Jamblique, ibid.), et bien qu'il dise la même chose que lui dans Leg. all. I.15, Philon écrit explicitement dans le De opif. (100) que ce sont des philosophes autres que les Pythagoriciens qui appellent l'hebdomade «vierge sans mère» sortie de la tête de Zeus, et que les Pythagoriciens, eux, l'appellent «guide de l'univers» (ἡγεμῶν τῶν συμπάντων), «dieu qui est pour l'éternité durable, immuable, semblable à lui-même, différent de tous les autres», «vénérable chef et guide» (ὁ πρεσβύτερος ᾰρχων χαί ἡγεμὠν) «dont on pourrait justement dire que l'hebdomade est l'image». 206 Cf. In Tim. I, t.I p.135 l.3, trad. t.I p.183: «la lumière intellective d'Athéna», et In Tim. III, t.II p.95 l.1-2, trad. t.III p.130: «la monade est immédiatement l'Intellect, l'heptade est la lumière issue de l'Intellect (ἡ δὲ ἑπτάς τό χατά νοῦν φῶς)». 207 In Tim. I, t.I p.166 l.10-13, trad. p.220. Cf. Crat. 407b 4-8 : Socrate fait venir Ἁθενᾶς de ἅ θεονόα, c'est-à-dire θεονόη, ou de τά Θεῖα νοούσης, c'est-à-dire ...». 208 Id., l.26-29, trad. p.221. Cf. Théol. plat. V.35, p.129 l.7-16, et VI.11, p.51 l.15 p.53 l.2. 209 «le propre de l'intellect, c'est partout de diviser et de manifester la multiplicité, c'est-à-dire les plénitudes de la vie et les unités des intelligibles» (Théol. plat. V.12, p.41 l.7-10; cf. id., V.17, p.62 l.9-15). 210 In Tim. I, t.I p.173 l.15. On sait la dévotion particulière de Proclus envers la déesse, qui est venue habiter chez lui après l'enlèvement de sa statue de l'Acropole (voir Marinus, Vita Procli, éd. Boissonade, réimpr. Hakkert, Amsterdam, 1966, §§ 6 et 30). 211 In Tim. I, t.I p.168 l.21-28, trad. t.I p.223-224. Mais cette illumination athénaïque passe par de nombreuses médiations, de sorte que nous autres hommes dépendons plus directement de l'Intellect particulier qui est au-dessus de nous: «l'Intellect particulier est établi immédiatement au-dessus de notre essence, il l'élève et la perfectionne, lui vers lequel nous nous tournons quand nous sommes purifiés par la philosophie et que nous avons lié notre faculté intellective à son intellection à lui» (In Tim. II, t.I p.245 l.13-17, trad. t.II p.81). «Il verse sa lumière sur nos âmes quand nous nous tournons vers lui et que nous avons rendu intellectif le logos qui est en nous» (id., l.24-25, trad. p.82). J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 29 χαί φιλοπόλεμος ἥδε ἥ θεός 212, Proclus explique qu'elle est φιλόσοφος, «amie de la sagesse», parce qu'elle «contient unitivement toute la sagesse du Père» 213. C'est en tant qu'elle est sa déesse tutélaire qu'il écrit: «(...) l'heptade est consacrée à Athéna, notre souveraine» 214. Il est donc évident que, dans la mesure où il est associée à Athéna, le terme d'hebdomade renvoie à tout un champ conceptuel afférent aux idées d'intellection, contemplation, pensée, bref à l'activité philosophique. Or il est difficile de ne pas rapprocher «Athéna notre souveraine», patronne des philosophes, du personnage de Philosophie mis en scène par Boèce. Celle-ci a les yeux ardents de la Vierge guerrière, γλαυχῶπις 215, et, comme nous l'avons déjà noté, on doit reconnaître dans la robe de Philosophie le péplos de la déesse εργάνη, inventrice du tissage 216. On peut donc appliquer à la première ce que dit Proclus de la seconde: «Par le péplos qu'elle confectionne et produit elle-même par ses intellections, il faut entendre sa sagesse intellective» 217. Et cette sagesse intellective est par elle communiquée à ses fidèles par une illumination dont sept est le nombre symbolique. Autrement dit, en tant qu'elles sont dispensées par Athéna-Philosophie, les hebdomades dont parle Boèce (définies aussi comme des ἕννοιαι) dans le Quomodo substantiae pourraient être simplement une manière un peu précieuse, à tout le moins codée, destinée aux membres d'un cénacle néoplatonisant, de désigner des thèses philosophiques, des "philosophèmes" 218. Ce n'est nullement prétendre que Boèce laisse entendre par là son adhésion secrète au paganisme philosophique; il peut s'agir simplement d'un clin d'oeil d'érudit, dévoilant ses sources à qui le comprendra 219. Boèce a pu reprendre le symbolisme orphico-pythagorico-platonicien attaché au chiffre sept dans sa dimension métaphysique, en le détachant de ses implications religieuses. C'est ce qu'avait déjà fait Philon d'Alexandrie, qui se garde bien sûr de tout référence à Athéna, mais pour qui demeurent attachées au septénaire, considéré comme sacré 220, les notions de lumière et d'intellection. Dans son commentaire de la création, Philon a évidemment à traiter du septième jour comme moment culminant et à part des autres. Ce jour particulier est celui d'une lumière divine et parfaite, parachevant l'oeuvre de la création («lumière véritablement divine du septième jour», «lumière parfaite du septième jour» 221). En effet, elle se lève après que tous les êtres matériels ont été produits, elle inaugure donc ce qui se trouve au-dessus de la condition 212 In Tim. I, t.I p.85 l.11-12, trad. t.I p.122. Athéna est amie de la guerre en tant qu'elle gouverne et harmonise les oppositions (voir infra notre conclusion). 213 In Tim. I, t.I p.166 l.19-20, trad. p.221. Cf. Théol. plat. VI.11, p.53 l.8-18. 214 In Parm., col.768 l.3. Cf. Théol. plat.V.35, p.128 l.12-13: ...τήν δέσποιναν ἥμῶν Ἅθηνᾶν . 215 Cons. I.1 l.4. 216 Voir supra p.???. Elle est εργάνη «en tant que présidant aux oeuvres démiurgiques», dit encore Proclus (In Tim. I, p.168 l.30 p.169 l.1). 217 In Tim. I, t.I p.167 l.22-23, trad. t.I p.222. Cf. id., p.135 l.3, trad. p.183 : «le péplos tissé dans le Tout par la lumière intellective d'Athéna». 218 On peut les rapprocher des λόγοι ἁπὀ τοῦ νοῦ qui «illuminent à partir de l'intellect les êtres inférieurs à lui», comme il existe aussi des λὀγοι φυσιχοί et des λόγοι ἁπό τῆς ψυχῆς, notions ou «principes créatifs» (cf. Théol. plat.V.18, p.66 l.2-18, In Tim. V, t.III p.197 l.28 p.198 l.16). 219 Cf. De Trin., l.17-22: «ex intimis sumpta philosophiae disciplinis novorum verborum significationibus velo, ut haec mihi tantum vobisque, si quando ad ea convertitis oculos, conloquantur; ceteros vero ita submovimus, ut qui capere intellectu nequiverint ad ea etiam legenda videantur indigni». Voir supra n.137. 220 De spec. leg. II.214, De opif. 99. Cf. De opif. 90: la nature de l'hebdomade est «supérieure à tout discours». 221 Leg. All. I.17-18. Cf. De spec. leg. II.57: l'hebdomade est «accomplissement et parachèvement», «car les choses que l'hexade avait produites, l'hebdomade les fit voir dans leur perfection» ; elle est donc «lumière du six», c'est-à-dire lumière intelligible qui éclaire les oeuvres matérielles. J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 30 mortelle et matérielle, bref elle ouvre le royaume de l'intelligible 222. Dieu, en ce septième jour, ne cesse pas d'agir, mais «commence la production d'autres choses» 223. Il s'agit de la production de l'Intellect ou λόγος: «Cette raison parfaite mue selon l'hebdomade est le principe de la génération de l'intelligence rangée parmi les idées, et de la sensation qui est, si l'on peut dire, intelligible et rangée parmi les idées 224». Cette "intelligence" est le λὸγος même de Dieu, «livre» (d'après Gen. 2,4) «sur lequel se trouve inscrite et gravée la formation des autres êtres» 225, Raison universelle contenant les raisons de toutes choses, appelée aussi «jour» (d'après Gen. 2, 4-5) car «par son Logos très brillant et très éclatant, Dieu fait les deux choses, l'idée de l'intelligence, appelée symboliquement ciel, et l'idée de la sensation, désignée par le nom de terre» 226. Le fruit de ce νοῦς premier est l'intelligible, et de même que les intelligences particulières proviennent de l'intelligence première, idée et paradigme, les intelligibles particuliers résultent de l'intelligible en soi, générique, le «tout» 227. Les intelligibles structurant le monde matériel, on peut dire aussi que l'hebdomade descend organiser le monde: «la raison de l'hebdomade (ὁ τῆς ἐβδομάδος λόγος), ayant tiré son origine des sphères supérieures, est descendue vers nous, en entrant en rapport avec les races mortelles» 228, de sorte que la répartition en septénaires ou le rythme hebdomadique se retrouve un peu partout dans la nature 229. Mais de plus, l'âme humaine qui conçoit l'hebdomade participe à l'intelligible, se haussant au plan de l'éternel et devenant elle-même λόγος: «lorsque dans l'âme se réalise le ἅγιος λόγοσ conforme à l'hebdomade, l'hexade s'arrête et toutes les choses mortelles que celle-ci semble y produire» 230. Ces considérations de Philon sur l'hebdomade sont d'ailleurs si proches du statut qu'on est en droit de leur attribuer chez Boèce, qu'on pourrait être tenté de penser qu'il est une source de ce dernier pour l'usage du mot. Sans rejeter cette éventualité, il nous semble pourtant que Proclus fournit de l'hebdomade et de sa communication une analyse plus précise, qui rend encore mieux compte du sens que peut avoir ce terme dans l'oeuvre de Boèce. De plus, c'est sur l'ensemble des rapports entre les deux auteurs qu'il faut juger, et compte tenu des nombreux points de contact enregistrés, la source néoplatonicienne paraît être plus plausible. Il faut remarquer alors que, si notre déduction est juste, Boèce fait allusion à une signification de «hebdomade» qui ne se trouve pas exposée aussi clairement à notre connaissance chez les latins qui parlent du septénaire, que ce soit Calcidius, Martianus Capella, Favonius Eulogius, Macrobe ou Varron 231. Les trois premiers mentionnent bien sa qualité de «nombre vierge» 232 et 222 «(...) est béni et saint celui qui se conduit conformément au septième, lumière parfaite, puisque, dans cette nature, cesse la formation des êtres mortels. Et il en est bien ainsi: lorsque montent (dans l'âme) les rayons très brillants et vraiment divins de la vertu, la génération de la nature contraire s'arrête» (Leg. All., I.18). 223 Ibid. 224 Id., I.19. Cf. chez Proclus les cercles du Même et de l'Autre, qui déterminent l'intellect et la sensation, l'hebdomade étant par ailleurs le nombre de l'Ame. 225 Id., I.19. 226 Id., I.21. 227 Id., I.22. φέγει γάρ ὁ μέν νοῦς χαρπόν τά ἑν τῶ νοεῖν. 228 De opif. 117. 229 De opif. 101-128. «Mais sa nature [de l'hebdomade] s'étend également à toute substance visible (...) Se trouve-t-il parmi les êtres de ce monde une partie qui n'aime pas l'hebdomade ?» (id., 111). Cf. De spec. leg. II.57: en particulier, «les plus importants des phénomènes sensibles», à savoir les phénomènes astronomiques, «participent de l'hebdomade»; en tant que mouvements les plus réguliers, ils manifestent au mieux l'intelligibilité que transmet l'hebdomade. 230 Leg. all. I.16. Cf. Proclus, In Tim. II, t.I p.246 l.31-32, trad. t.II p.83: «C'est cela donc qu'est le logos: cette partie en nous qui intellige les Intelligibles». 231 Respectivement: Tim., c.XXV-XXXVII, De nupt., VII.738-739, Disputatio de Somnio Scipionis, éd. Holder p.7-10, In Somn., 1.6.45 sq., ap. Aulu-Gelle, Noct. Att. 3.10. 232 Cf. Proclus, In Tim. I, t.I p.151 l.13, trad. t.I p.203: «C'est là une des vérités partout répétées (...)». J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 31 par là la correspondance avec Athéna, mais non sa fonction illuminatrice d'une manière précise 233. Tous ces auteurs parlent abondamment de la symbolique cosmologique, astronomique, biologique, médicale, de l'heptade, c'est-à-dire de sa présence dans la nature 234, mais non de sa signification proprement métaphysique. Il en va de même d'ailleurs chez certains Grecs, tel Théon de Smyrne, ou l'auteur des Theologoumena. Il faut donc en conclure que Boèce se rattacherait alors à une ligne d'interprétation particulière, qui ne s'en tient pas à la vulgate arithmologique mais la développe en un sens spéculatif. Au total, le plus vraisemblable (sans exclure Philon, encore une fois) est qu'il s'agit de celle de Proclus, ou peut-être d'une commune source, mais en tout cas très proche, au vu des autres correspondances que nous avons relevées entre les textes de Boèce et le commentaire du Diadoque sur le Timée 235. Dans ce cas, donc, Boèce indiquerait ainsi clairement sa filiation à l'égard de l'école néoplatonicienne grecque. Quoiqu'il en soit de la diversité des sources dont Boèce a pu s'inspirer, il nous paraît assuré que, en résumé, l'hebdomade est la procession de l'Intellect dans l'Ame intellective, jusqu'aux âmes humaines 236. C'est la lumière de l'intellect descendant dans l'âme connaissante qui fixe son regard sur l'intelligible 237. Ou encore, sept est le nombre de l'âme recevant une illumination intellectuelle. On peut donc traduire «hebdomades» par "intellections", 233 On trouve seulement chez Martianus Capella que Pallas est «rationis apex diuumque hominumque sacer νοῦς (VI.567). Maîtresse de la sagesse et des arts, elle préside aux sept arts libéraux, qui en quelque sorte émanent d'elle: «Musis mens omnibus una». 234 Comme le dit Philon : «la Nature se réjouit de l'hebdomade», Leg. All. I.8. Cf. Asclépius, In Met. p.36 l.5: δοχεὶ γάρ τά φυσιχά τούς τελείος ῐσχειν χαιρούς χαί γενέσεως χαί τελειώσεως χατά ἑβδομάδα, ώς ἑπ ἁνθρώπου (voir aussi p.34 l.27, p.36 l.3, p.65 l.7). Clément d'Alexandrie, Strom. VII.14, 85.2: οῖον χατά πάντα τὸν βίον χαί χαθ ὅλην τήν χοσμιχήν τεριήλυσιν ἑβδομάσιν ἁριθμουμέναις σημαινομένην; VI.16, 143.1: Ηδη δέ χαί ἑν ἑβδομάσι πᾶς ὁ χὸσμος χθχλεῖται τῶν ζωογονουμένων χαί τῶν φυομένυν ἁπάντων. 235 Cela n'exclut bien sûr pas que Boèce ait utilisé directement des manuels d'arithmologie tels que les Theologoumena arithmeticae. Un indice peut en effet faire penser à ce texte ou son semblable. Nicomaque de Gérase (d'après le pseudoJamblique, pp.56-57) attribuait au septénaire une épithète d'Athéna, ἁγελαῖα, car il rassemble la multiplicité d'une manière comparable à l'unité (il existe, nous l'avons vu, une affinité spéciale entre la monade et l'heptade, celle-ci procédant directement de celui-là; d'après Philon aussi, De Decalogo 159, l'hebdomade a deux formes, le sept et le un). Par exemple, les sept planètes forment un troupeau, ou une troupe bien unie (ἁγέλη). Ceci correspond bien à ce que dit Proclus de l'heptade-Athéna: «C'est elle [Athéna] qui nous fait remonter de la pluralité à l'Un, qui procure la communauté dans la pluralité aux intelligibles et à tous les êtres» (In Parm., col.768 l.3-6; le champ sémantique de ἁγέλη (troupe et conducteur) se trouve bien représenté dans la cosmologie et la démonologie proclusiennes: voir In Tim., t.I p.90 l.18-19, t.III pp.131 l.21, 132 l.3, 260 l.17, 265 l.8, 279 l.13, 308 l.26). Mais les Theologoumena enchaînent en disant que l'heptade, si l'on réinsère un z prétendument perdu, est un ange (ᾰγγελος). En effet, «les corps célestes et les esprits qui mènent ces troupes sont appelés anges et archanges, et ils sont au nombre de sept, ce qui a pour conséquence que l'heptade est, à cet égard, plus exactement un message (ἁγελαῖα`)». On ne forcerait pas beaucoup les choses en disant que pour Boèce, l'hebdomade est justement un "message" de l'Intellect en nos âmes, une descente illuminative de l'intelligible. On pourrait ajouter, sous toutes réserves (cela aurait cependant le mérite d'éclairer de façon intéressante ce passage du Quomodo substantiae), que Boèce à son tour joue sur les mots, et passe de ἁγελαῖα ἁγέλοιος, c'est-à-dire «non-risible». Par là il renforcerait subtilement sa réticence lorsque qu'il dit préférer garder les hebdomades en sa mémoire plutôt que de les livrer à «l'un de ceux dont la lascivité et l'impudence ne supportent rien qui ne soit sujet à plaisanterie et rire» (l.11). Γέλοιος s'oppose chez Platon à σπουδαῖος, par exemple dans Lois VII, 816d 5 e 2, Rep. V, 452d 8 e 2. On nous permettra peut-être une autre supputation, encore plus aventureuse. D'après Philon (De opif. 98), parce qu'elle est composée de la triade (désignant les surfaces) et de la tétrade (désignant les solides), «l'essence de l'hebdomade est le principe de la géométrie et de la stéréométrie, en un mot des incorporels en même temps que des corps». C'est peut-être pourquoi (entre autres raisons, c'est-à-dire nonobstant une allusion aux Sententiae, 1, de Porphyre) le second exemple d'hebdomade qui vient à l'esprit de Boèce est là règle portant sur les incorporels (l.25-26). 236 Puisqu'il y a continuité, nous pouvons en retour nous hausser par l'intellect jusqu'à la connaissance transcendante. Cf. Proclus, Théol. plat. V.1: «tendons l'intellect qui est en nous vers l'intellect imparticipable et divin» (p.6 l.10-12); In Rem. XVI, t.II p.191 l.10-11: «les âmes éthérées sont mues par l'hebdomade pour leur voyage vers le haut». 237 «(...) quantum nostrae mentis igniculum lux divina dignata est» (Boèce, De Trin. l.1-2). Cf. Proclus, In Rem. XII, t.I p.295 l.16-18, trad. t.II p.104 : «Car la lumière qui est dans l'Intelligible, la lumière intelligible, est plus divine que celle qui est dans ceux qui intelligent, de même que la lumière qui est dans les astres est plus divine que celle qui est dans les yeux de ceux qui contemplent les astres». Théol. plat. V.18, p.65 l.5-7: «l'intellect [démiurgique] par lui-même rend ces êtres [qu'il crée] intellectifs en faisant pour ainsi dire briller la lumière de l'intellection qui est en lui-même et en la transmettant aux autres». J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 32 "illuminations", "contemplations". Si on les considère en tant qu'objet de la θεωρία 238, on pourrait aussi les appeler θεώρμυατα, et il nous serait loisible de les rendre par "théorèmes", ce qui correspond tout à fait à la fonction que Boèce assigne à ces règles dans le type de démarche qu'il propose. Par ailleurs, sachant qu'il traduit θεωρητιχή par «speculativa» 239, on constatera que la clé de l'énigmatique sens de «hebdomades» était finalement, comme la lettre volée de Poe, bien en évidence dans le texte du Quomodo substantiae. Boèce en donne lui-même l'équivalent latin, «speculata», à quelques mots de distance, dans la même phrase de son opuscule... : «Hebdomadas vero ego mihi ipse commentor potiusque ad memoriam meam speculata conservo» 240 ! III - CONCLUSION : BOECE ET L'HELLENISME Notre parcours nous a conduits d'une première référence au Timée 241, à propos d'une curieuse forme démonstrative, jusqu'à la signification de ces «hebdomades» qui fondent un autre procédé démonstratif. Ces réflexions sur la méthode de la philosophie, qui est aussi un art d'écrire, ont constamment été éclairées par la médiation de Proclus et son Commentaire du Timée 242. Outre la constance de certains schèmes comme la sphère et le cercle, l'intrinséité des lieux, s'est détachée la figure d'Athéna à laquelle s'identifie le personnage de Philosophie, dont le rôle est primordial tant pour expliquer la Consolatio que le Quomodo substantiae. Quoi d'étonnant à cela ? Le Timée est une référence centrale, or l'entretien se déroule pendant la fête de la déesse, et se trouve donc placé sous son signe 243. Selon l'interprétation de Proclus, elle y est à la fois l'Athéna dispensatrice des illuminations intellectuelles 244 et l'Athéna démiurgique qui ourdit le cosmos comme un péplos 245. La valeur symbolique de ce vêtement nous pousse à revenir, à notre tour, à notre point de départ, à savoir la prose 12 du livre III de la Consolation. Qu'est-ce en effet qui était représenté sur le péplos porté en procession lors de la fête d'Athéna 246 ? La victoire des Olympiens sur les Géants, rappelle Proclus 247. Dans cette lutte, Athéna a pris une part décisive, aux côtés de Zeus 248. Or le tournant du discours de Philosophie, au moment où elle va régler la question du mal en montrant qu'il 238 Cf. In Tim. I, t.I p.197 l.7-10, trad. t.I p.225: «puisque la déesse (Athéna) est cause de contemplation et d'action (θεωρίας ναί πράηεως αἱτία), nous imitons par la cérémonie son activité pratique (τήν πραχτιχήν αὑτῆς ἑνέργειαν), par l'hymne son activité contemplative (τήν θεωρητιχήν)». 239 In Porph. Dial. I, PL 64, col.11 A-B. Ibid., Boèce donne «contemplativa» comme synonyme de «speculativa». 240 L. 8-9. 241 Cons. III.12 l.95-96. 242 Ce commentaire est celui de ses ouvrages que Proclus préférait (Marinus, Vie de Proclus, § 38). 243 Tim. 21a 2-3, 26e 4. 244 Athéna enseigne les sciences aux Athéniens, Tim. 23d sq. 245 Elle est par là à la fois Providence et Fatalité, distinction que reprendra justement Boèce (Cons. IV.11). Son «chitôn guerrier» représente «la Providence démiurgique qui, sans changer elle-même, prend soin des choses encosmiques et fait que les entités plus divines dominent toujours sur les réalités du monde» (In Tim. I, t.I p.167 l.24-26, trad. t.I p.222). Comme «Porteégide», elle «met en branle l'entière Fatalité et en guide les activités» (id., p.169 l.8-9, trad. p.224; cf. le «fatalis series texitur» de Cons. IV.6 l.48). 246 Peu importe que la fête dont il est question dans le Timée soit les Panathénées comme le croit Proclus, ou les Plynteria si on veut accorder la chronologie avec celle de la République (voir In Tim. I, trad. t.I p.55 n.1, et l'introduction de L. Brisson à sa trad. du Timée, p.71). Dans les deux cas, le péplos d'Athéna était concerné. 247 In Tim. I, t.I p.85 l.14-15, trad. t.I p.122. 248 In Tim. I, t.I l.16-17, trad. t.I p.223: elle «lutte avec son Père contre les Géants». J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 33 n'est rien - ce qui provoquera le sursaut de Boèce -, commence justement par le rappel du mythe de la Gigantomachie: «Accepisti, inquit, in fabulis lacessentes caelum Gigantes» 249. Cette évocation s'explique par le fait que les Géants représentent le désordre, la rébellion, la démesure, la matière 250. Ils ont été vaincus par les dieux, qui ont ainsi rétabli l'ordre dans l'univers. Leur mention n'est donc pas incongrue dans le discours de Philosophie, qui entend précisément montrer que le gouvernement du Bien ne laisse pas s'installer le désordre. Mais quelle était la nécessité de ce rappel ? On vient d'expliquer le sous-entendu, mais il faut encore rendre compte de son utilité dans l'économie du discours, si du moins on admet que l'auteur, dans une démonstration jusqu'ici serrée, ne se contente pas de faire de gratuites allusions érudites. Philosophie n'évoque les fables sur les Géants que pour les écarter aussitôt et passer à un débat rationnel («Sed visne rationes ipsas ...»). Le mythe est délaissé au profit de la raison. Boèce semble répondre au voeu de Proclus: pour traiter du mal, il faut recourir au pur discours scientifique de Platon, et non aux fables gigantomachiques 251. Celles-ci risqueraient de laisser entendre que le mal, comme les Géants, a une réalité, est une entité, alors qu'il n'est pas - ce que veut montrer Philosophie 252. Mais de plus, cette progression correspond à l'ordre du Timée lui-même, c'est-àdire à l'articulation de la première partie (17b 5 26c 5) et de l'exposé cosmogonique, telle que l'interprète Proclus: «la reprise de la République et la fable (μῦθος) de l'Atlantide sont, par mode d'images, un reflet de la théorie du Monde» 253. Ainsi, la guerre des Athéniens contre les Atlantins est une image de «l'opposition qui pénètre tout le réel», du conflit du limitant et de l'illimitation, de l'identité et de l'altérité, du rationnel et de l'irrationnel 254. Mieux: toujours selon Proclus, le récit "historique" de la guerre des Athéniens contre les Atlantins est substituée à... la lutte d'Athéna contre les Géants et les Titans, parce que Platon n'a pas jugé décent de recourir aux fables des poètes après les avoir condamnées dans la République 255. Les Atlantins ont tous les caractères de la démesure gigantique, tandis que les Athéniens sont évidemment les «nourrissons d'Athéna». Proclus fonde toute son exégèse sur l'articulation que nous avons mentionnée. Par conséquent, ce qui est dit des classes de l'Etat idéal (dont l'Athènes archaïque est un exemple), dans le rappel des acquis de la République, s'applique, d'un point de vue cosmologique, aux dieux. Or Platon dit des gardiens de la Cité qu'ils doivent: «faire respecter la justice avec douceur (πράως) chez ceux auxquels ils commandent et qui sont par nature leurs amis, mais être terribles dans les combats contre les ennemis qu'ils y rencontrent» 256. 249 Cons. III.12 l.59-60. 250 La guerre des Géants symbolise aussi la lutte entre les parties rationnelle et irrationnelle de l'âme (In Tim. V, t.III, p.346 l.24 p.347 l.2). 251 Théol. plat. I.18, p.88 l.1-10. 252 Proclus ne dit pas exactement que le mal n'est rien, mais qu'il a une pseudo-existence, παρυπόστασις (Théol. plat. I.18, p.84 l.22). Son propos est plutôt de montrer que le mal ne vient pas des dieux. Mais il est en somme contradictoire de dire qu'il existe un mal purement mauvais, car s'il est, il est en quelque chose bon. Il est donc, mais comme «entrelacé au bien». De point de vue de la chose particulière qui en est affectée, il est mauvais; du point de vue du Tout, il est bon, en tant qu'il participe à l'ordre universel. Plus exactement, le mal, qui dérive des causes partielles et indéterminées et de leur impuissance, est rendu bon par la providence. Le Démiurge «met les couleurs du bien sur le mal même, il ne reste plus rien de mauvais (...)» (In Tim. II, t.I p.374 l.30-31, trad. t.II p.236). 253 In Tim. I, t.I p.4 l.11-13, trad. modif. t.I p.27. Cf. id., p.30 l.4-18. 254 In Tim. I, t.I p.78 l.11, p.57 l.6-17, p.130 l.4-15, p.131 l.8-12, p.132 l.10-24, p.176 l.15 p.177 l.2, p.182 l.19 p.183 l.10. 255 In Tim. I, t.I p.79 l.27-29, p.172 l.14 p.173 l.27. 256 Tim. 17d 4 18a 3. J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 34 Pareillement, au plan universel, les «Gardes de Zeus» aident ce dernier à combattre les Géants (alias les Atlantins), et à maintenir l'ordre cosmique: «ils enlèvent au Tout l'irrégularité et le désordre», en traitant avec douceur et justice les âmes, et avec sévérité la matière 257. Or ces dieux gardiens, inflexibles et terribles, sont les Courètes, dans la seconde triade des dieux intellectifs, dont nous avons vu que l'Athéna en armes est la monade 258. C'est bien la même Vierge Souveraine qui, par ailleurs, possède la fonction illuminatrice que nous avons vue: précisément en tant qu'elle fait luire la lumière intellective, en tant qu'elle éveille en nous les hebdomades, les «notions pures», elle «chasse loin de nous les phantasmes Gigantiques liés à la génération» 259. Ou encore, la descente du péplos vers le Pirée «signifie le bon ordre qui descend de l'Intellect dans le Monde», et «son inexorabilité est intellective» 260. On peut donc tout à fait lui imputer d'être l'instrument du traitement réservé aux Géants selon Boèce: «Sed illos quoque, ut condignum fuit, benigna fortitudo disposuit» 261. Autrement dit, juste avant l'allusion platonicienne du «Sed visne rationes ipsas invicem collidamus...», Athéna 262 est déjà évoquée au moment du rappel par Philosophie des fables gigantomachiques: non seulement parce que son péplos portait une représentation de ce combat 263, mais parce que, certes bienfaisante, φωσφόρος χαί φιλόσοφος, elle est aussi la déesse inexorable, φιλοπόλεμος, qui réduit avec rigueur ce qui se rebelle contre l'intelligibilité et le bon ordre du Monde 264. Elle est la benigna fortitudo 265 qui anéantit le mal. Elle collabore donc au premier chef à l'état de fait, dont Philosophie cherche à persuader Boèce, et que Proclus décrit ainsi: «toutes choses ont été mis en ordre (πάντα χεχόσμηται) par l'Etre Créateur, et toute l'organisation du Monde est éternellement permanente grâce à la vigilance immuable qui est en lui, tout désordre étant entièrement anéanti» 266. Le πάντα χεχόσμηται que nous venons de lire se traduirait par: «cuncta disposuit», ce qui nous renvoie bien sûr aux lignes 60-61 de la prose 12. Mais on pense tout aussitôt aux lignes 54-55 également, d'autant que, comme nous l'avons vu, l'action des gardiens est caractérisée par la force, mais aussi par la douceur: or le πράως de Platon se 257 In Tim. I, t.I p.37 l.22 p.38 l.28. 258 Théol. plat. V.33-35. Cf. In Tim. I, t.I p.157 l.1-11, et l'Hymne à Athéna, n°VII, l.1-8, dans Proclus, Hymnes et prières, trad. H. D. Saffrey, Paris, Arfuyen, 1994, p.48. 259 In Tim. I, t.I p.168 l.24-25, trad. t.I p.224. 260 In Tim. I, t.I p.85 l.9-10, trad.t.I p.122, et p.167 l.6. Cf. id., p.132 l.10-19, trad. p.180: les oppositions universelles, exprimées par le mythe de l'Atlantide, sont réduites par elle, et d'une manière générale, «en vertu de l'action intelligente d'Athéna, l'inférieur est subordonné au supérieur». 261 Cons. III.12 l.60-61. Cf. Cons. III.IX l.20: «lege benigna», et In Tim. I, t.I p.150 l.13-18, trad. t.I p.202: «Les lois, partant d'Athéna, s'étendent au Cosmos tout entier. Car toute loi est dite, et justement dite, "une régulation de l'Intellect" [Lois IV 714a 2] (...) telles sont bien aussi les lois de l'Univers, puisqu'elles sont déterminées en conformité avec l'Intellect démiurgique unique et l'unique providence d'Athéna». 262 Et donc le Timée proclusien, ce qui est en cohérence avec la citation finale (Tim. 29b 4-5, relu par Proclus) de la séquence que nous étudions, Cons. III.12 l.95-96. 263 Cf. In Tim. I, p.134 l.26-29, trad. t.I p.182-183: «le péplos est la dernière copie, je veux dire le péplos qui est l'oeuvre du tissage, qui porte une copie de la guerre cosmique que la Déesse machine avec son Père et de l'ordonnance démiurgique qui descend d'elle jusqu'au Tout». 264 Cf. In Tim. I, t.I p.167 l., trad. t.I p.222: «Homère établit aussi Athéna l'alliée des Grecs contre les Barbares, de même qu'ici Platon l'alliée des Athéniens contre les Atlantins, pour que partout les entités plus intellectives et plus divines l'emportent sur les moins raisonnables et les moins nobles». Cf. id., p.175 l.5 p.176 l.6, p.184 l.27 p.185 l.12. 265 Cf. In Tim. I, p.191 l.6-9: τῆς μέν Ἁθηναϊχῆς σειρᾶς μονίμως χαί ἡγεμονιχῶς χαί χρατητιχῶς τὰ πάντα χοσμούης. 266 In Tim. I, t.I p.38 l.21-24, trad. t.I p.70. Cf. id., p.84 l.14-17, trad. p.121: «N'est-ce pas en effet cette déesse qui maintient toute la création, elle qui a en elle-même et des forces vitales intellectives, par quoi elle construit le Tout, et des puissances unifiantes, par quoi elle gouverne les antithèses du Cosmos ?». Id., p.169 l.4-5, trad. p.224: elle est «Créatrice de belles oeuvres (χαλλίεργος), comme maintenant par la beauté intellective tous les ouvrages du Père». J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110. 35 laisserait traduire par «suaviter». «Cuncta regit fortiter suaviterque disponit», pourrait-on dire d'Athéna, et au-delà du Bien dont elle est l'exécutante 267. La comparaison des deux phrases s'impose donc. Si l'on omet la réponse admirative et repentante de Boèce - tout en remarquant qu'il souligne que plus encore que l'idée, ce sont «les mots mêmes» employés par sa consolatrice qui le réjouissent - 268, Philosophie enchaîne en fait deux propositions très similaires: «Est igitur summum bonum quod regit cuncta fortiter suaviterque disponit» (l.54-55); «Sed illos (Gigantas) quoque (...) benigna fortitudo disposuit» (l.60-61). La seconde est comme un contraction de la première, dont elle reprend les notions essentielles: la force du gouvernement du Bien 269, qui n'exclut pas la douceur, établit un ordre universel qui exclut le mal. Mais la seconde phrase est une allusion à la mythologie païenne, tandis que la première est la seule allusion clairement chrétienne de la Consolatio, citation muette liturgique sinon biblique 270. Cette dernière constatation, qui est peut-être un indice de l'importance du passage, n'a pas manqué de susciter le trouble des lecteurs de Boèce: pourquoi si peu de christianisme chez un supposé chrétien dans l'épreuve et proche de la mort ? Il y là en tout cas, avec ces deux références d'expression quasi-identique, une rencontre aussi conflictuelle, apparemment, que la confrontation que propose ensuite Philosophie, et dont il doit sortir des étincelles de vérité. Mais cette juxtaposition n'est pas une incohérence. Entre les deux allusions, se trouvent Athéna-Philosophie, le Timée, Proclus et son commentaire, qui expliquent le passage de l'une à l'autre. Quel est le sens de cette transition ? Boèce a emporté sa conviction intime dans la tombe. Peut-être a-t-il voulu indiquer que ce qu'enseigne la Révélation chrétienne n'ajoutait rien à ce que l'hellénisme avait déjà établi. Mais on peut aussi penser que par ce rapprochement détonnant, Boèce rappelle son programme intellectuel: absorber dans une culture chrétienne l'apport des arts libéraux profanes, et spécialement de la philosophie grecque, dans sa figure suprême, néoplatonicienne. Le "dernier des Romains", des Romains hellénisés, tâchait de faire, en Occident, et à sa manière, ce qu'en Orient accomplissait de son côté le pseudo-Denys l'Aréopagite. Jean-Luc Solère C.N.R.S. (Paris) / Université Catholique de Louvain 267 Cf. Proclus, In Tim. I, t.I p.166 l.15-17, trad. t.I p.221: Athéna «organise l'Univers avec le Démiurge unique et range en ordre de bataille (τ ττουσαν), avec le Père, tout l'ensemble des choses». 268 Cons. III.12, l.55-58. L.57: «multo magis haec ipsa quibus uteris verba delectant». 269 Cf. id., l.64: «Deum esse omnium potentem nemo dubitaverit». 270 Sap. 8, 1; voir la note de Bieler dans son édition. J.-L. Solère, "Bien, Sphères et Hebdomades", in: A. Galonnier, éd., "Boèce ou la Chaîne des Savoirs", Leuven / Louvain-la-Neuve, 2003, p.55-110.

A. Klimczuk, Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa (Solidarity between Generations in Strategic Perspective of State), [in:] A. Kubów, J. Szczepaniak-Sienniak, Polityka rodzinna a polityka rynku pracy w kontekście zmian demograficznych, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu" Issue 292, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2013, pp. 190-205. 1 Andrzej Klimczuk Szkoła Główna Handlowa w Warszawie Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa Streszczenie: Celem artykułu jest przybliżenie koncepcji solidarności pokoleń w kontekście wyzwań procesu starzenia się ludności na początku XXI wieku. Utrzymanie pozbawionych konfliktów relacji pokoleniowych jest kwestią wymagającą wspólnych interwencji podmiotów publicznych, komercyjnych i pozarządowych. Dlatego też w opracowaniu, po omówieniu znaczeń pojęcia pokolenie i typów relacji międzypokoleniowych, zostaną wskazane modele polityki relacji międzypokoleniowych. Opis uwzględnia działania na poziomie międzynarodowym, krajowym oraz regionalnym i lokalnym. W dalszej części analizie poddane zostaną główne założenia działań na rzecz solidarności pokoleniowej z wybranych dokumentów projektu cywilizacyjnego „Polska 2030. Trzecia fala nowoczesności". Podsumowanie obejmie rekomendacje praktyczne i badawcze w zakresie polityki rodzinnej i rynku pracy. Słowa kluczowe: perspektywa cyklu życia, polityka społeczna wobec starości i ludzi starych, społeczeństwo dla ludzi w każdym wieku, „srebrna gospodarka" 1. Wprowadzenie Obserwacja długookresowych tendencji demograficznych stanowi przesłankę do bliższego zainteresowania demografią relacji międzypokoleniowych. W artykule zwrócono uwagę na koncepcję solidarności pokoleń (dalej: SP). Zostanie omówiona zwłaszcza w odniesieniu do wyłaniających się na początku XXI wieku wyzwań dla rodzin i rynku pracy związanych z procesem starzenia się ludności. W tym kontekście SP jest stanem wymagającym działań ukierunkowanych na utrzymanie pozytywnych relacji między generacjami. Zapobieganie konfliktom pokoleń, dyskryminacji ze względu na wiek i innym przejawom dezintegracji można uznać za kwestię socjalną, której rozwiązaniu sprzyja współpraca podmiotów publicznych, komercyjnych i pozarządowych. Podjęta zostanie próba konceptualizacji pojęć dotyczących pokolenia i relacji międzypokoleniowych. Następnie omówione zostaną możliwości interwencji w ramach A. Klimczuk, Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa (Solidarity between Generations in Strategic Perspective of State), [in:] A. Kubów, J. Szczepaniak-Sienniak, Polityka rodzinna a polityka rynku pracy w kontekście zmian demograficznych, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu" Issue 292, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2013, pp. 190-205. 2 różnych modeli polityki relacji międzypokoleniowych (dalej: PRM) i główne cechy działań w tym zakresie na poziomie międzynarodowym, krajowym, regionalnym i lokalnym na podstawie publikacji i dokumentów krajowych i zagranicznych instytucji badawczych, jednostek administracyjnych i ośrodków eksperckich. Ostatnią część opracowania stanowi krytyczna analiza głównych założeń SP uwzględnionych w wybranych dokumentach projektu cywilizacyjnego „Polska 2030. Trzecia fala nowoczesności" oraz dokumentów strategicznych rządu polskiego. W zakończeniu zostaną omówione najważniejsze wnioski oraz możliwe kierunki dalszych badań dotyczące styku polityki rodzinnej i rynku pracy. 2. Koncepcja pokolenia i solidarności pokoleń Pojęcie pokolenia (generacji) nie jest wykorzystywane w literaturze przedmiotu w sposób jednoznaczny. Na wielość interpretacji pojęcia wskazuje klasyczna typologia autorstwa M. Ossowskiej 1 . Poszczególne sposoby określania różnią się cechami jednostek i grup, które to pojęcie może obejmować, a w konsekwencji zakresem analizy (tab. 1). Współcześnie proponowane są zbliżone ujęcia 2 . Tabela 1. Główne znaczenia, cechy i wymiary pojęcia pokolenie Znaczenie Główne cechy Zakres analizy Ogniwo w ciągu genealogicznym biologiczna zależność pomiędzy rodzicami a dziećmi; miejsce w schemacie pokrewieństwa rodzina Ogniwo w ciągu kulturowym podział ról społecznych analogiczny do relacji rodzice-dzieci, np. nauczyciel-uczeń krąg kulturowy Zbiór osób w zbliżonym wieku, w przedziale trzeciej części stulecia założenie, że ojciec jest przeciętnie o 33 lata starszy od dzieci społeczeństwo Zbiór osób w poszczególnych fazach życia ujęcie ahistoryczne; porównywanie analogicznych grup wieku w różnych epokach i społeczeństwach; przechodzenie tych samych osób przez różne fazy ich życia społeczeństwo Wspólnota postaw i hierarchii wartości ujęcie historyczne; wspólne przeżycia i doświadczenia, np. wojna, przełom ustrojowy społeczeństwo Źródło: opracowanie na podstawie M. Ossowska, Koncepcja pokolenia, „Studia Socjologiczne" 1963, nr 2, s. 62. 1 M. Ossowska, Koncepcja pokolenia, „Studia Socjologiczne" 1963, nr 2, s. 47-51 (cyt. za: B. SzaturJaworska, Ludzie starzy i starość w polityce społecznej, ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2000, s. 62). 2 Por. P. Szukalski, Solidarność pokoleń. Dylematy relacji międzypokoleniowych, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2012, s. 12-14. A. Klimczuk, Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa (Solidarity between Generations in Strategic Perspective of State), [in:] A. Kubów, J. Szczepaniak-Sienniak, Polityka rodzinna a polityka rynku pracy w kontekście zmian demograficznych, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu" Issue 292, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2013, pp. 190-205. 3 Zdaniem Ossowskiej trzecie rozumienie – zbiór osób w zbliżonym wieku, określonym w przedziale trzeciej części stulecia – jest sztuczne i nieużyteczne. Do tego, choć podejścia akcentujące „poszczególne fazy życia" oraz „wspólnotę postaw i hierarchii wartości" dotyczą analiz większych zbiorowości, jednak służą innym celom. Pierwsze jest ahistoryczne, przez co pozwala na analizy demograficzne i ekonomiczne istotne na gruncie polityki społecznej. Znaczenie to można odnosić do stosowanego w krajowej statystyce publicznej rozkładu ludności według wieku ekonomicznego, czyli podziału na ludność w wieku przedprodukcyjnym (0-17 lat), produkcyjnym (18-59/64 lat; po reformie emerytalnej 18-67 dla obu płci) i poprodukcyjnym (60+/65+; po reformie emerytalnej 67+). Pokolenie w ujęciu historycznym odnosi się zaś do mniej uchwytnych, subiektywnych cech, jakimi są przeżycia i doświadczenia wspólne dla szerszej zbiorowości. W tym znaczeniu termin ten zbliża się do pojęć „grupy wieku" i „kategorii społecznej", choć nie jest z nimi tożsamy 3 . Tak rozumiane pokolenie to nie zbiorowość, lecz zachowanie zbiorowe – forma aktywności o mniejszej złożoności niż działania zbiorowe, ruchy społeczne i działania zorganizowane 4 . Odróżnia je od nich kolejno brak: wspólnych celów i koordynacji, ukierunkowania na zmianę społeczną oraz instytucjonalizacji. Fenomen pokolenia może jednak pozwolić na wyłonienie się tych cech, a przez to wyższych poziomów organizacji. Próby uporządkowania pojęć dotyczących relacji międzypokoleniowych podjął P. Szukalski 5 . Za istotne uznaje się rozróżnienie znaczeń terminów: relacja, więź, solidarność i kontrakt międzypokoleniowy (tab. 2). Relacje i kontrakt są wolne od wartościowania, podczas gdy więź i solidarność są nacechowane pozytywnie. Istnieją też pojęcia pochodne o konotacjach pozytywnych (integracja) i negatywnych (wojna, konflikt, dezintegracja) 6 . Występowanie sprzeczności prowadzi do ambiwalencji międzypokoleniowej – współistnienia odmiennych postaw i sposobów myślenia o relacjach pokoleniowych na poziomie mikro (poszczególnych rodzin) i makro (całych społeczeństw). 3 Zob. A. Klimczuk, Kapitał społeczny ludzi starych na przykładzie mieszkańców miasta Białystok, Wiedza i Edukacja, Lublin 2012, s. 19-23. 4 P. Sztompka, Socjologia. Analiza społeczeństwa, Znak, Kraków 2002, s. 175, 154, 173. 5 P. Szukalski, Czym jest solidarność międzypokoleniowa?, [w:] D. Kałuża, P. Szukalski (red.), Jakość życia seniorów w XXI wieku z perspektywy polityki społecznej, Wyd. Biblioteka, Łódź 2010, s. 74-91; P. Szukalski, Solidarność pokoleń..., s. 47-80. 6 P. Szukalski, Solidarność pokoleń..., s. 49-50. A. Klimczuk, Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa (Solidarity between Generations in Strategic Perspective of State), [in:] A. Kubów, J. Szczepaniak-Sienniak, Polityka rodzinna a polityka rynku pracy w kontekście zmian demograficznych, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu" Issue 292, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2013, pp. 190-205. 4 Tabela 2. Typy relacji międzypokoleniowych i zakres ich obowiązywania Pojęcie Główne cechy Zakres zobowiązań Relacja ogół stosunków pomiędzy jednostkami lub grupami z różnych pokoleń; interakcje, opinie, postawy, stereotypy brak zobowiązań Więź poczucie łączności biologicznej, kulturowej, ekonomicznej z innymi pokoleniami; pozytywne nastawienie wobec jednostek należących do innych pokoleń postawa „powinniśmy coś zrobić" Solidarność wzajemna odpowiedzialność wobec innych pokoleń; uwzględnianie w podejmowanych działaniach interesów, potrzeb i opinii innych generacji postawa „musimy coś zrobić" Kontrakt/umowa spisane lub nie reguły redystrybucji wyznaczników statusu społecznego (bogactwo, władza, prestiż) pomiędzy pokoleniami postawa „zróbmy to i to" Źródło: opracowanie na podstawie P. Szukalski, Czym jest solidarność międzypokoleniowa?, [w:] D. Kałuża, P. Szukalski (red.), Jakość życia seniorów w XXI wieku z perspektywy polityki społecznej, Wyd. Biblioteka, Łódź 2010, s. 87-88; P. Szukalski, Solidarność pokoleń. Dylematy relacji międzypokoleniowych, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2012, s. 47-49. P. Szukalski wyróżnia trzy perspektywy definiowania SP – nauk o: rodzinie, ekonomii i polityce społecznej 7 . W artykule przyjęto ostatnią, która dotyczy polityki wobec starości i ludzi starych, potencjału opiekuńczego rodziny oraz tworzenia i wdrażania zbiorów działań na rzecz pokojowych relacji międzypokoleniowych. Zasadna jest bowiem analiza interwencji ograniczających dezintegrację i konflikty międzypokoleniowe postrzegane jako istotna kwestia socjalna w ujęciu przedmiotowym 8 . Świadczy o tym złożoność skutków procesu starzenia się ludności, a zarazem wyzwań wymagających współdziałania podmiotów publicznych, komercyjnych i pozarządowych. Kluczowy jest tu wskaźnik „obciążenia" ludności w wieku produkcyjnym ludnością w wieku poprodukcyjnym. Wzrost jego wartości dotyczy negatywnych i konfliktogennych zmian w relacjach, jak: utrata stabilności finansów publicznych, wzrost obciążeń osób młodych podatkami i składkami na ubezpieczenia zdrowotne, różnicowanie hierarchii 7 Zob. P. Szukalski, Czym jest solidarność..., s. 78-84; P. Szukalski, Solidarność pokoleń... , s. 53-58. 8 Zob. J. Auleytner, K. Głąbicka, Polskie kwestie socjalne na przełomie wieków, Elipsa, Warszawa 2001, s. 12-13. A. Klimczuk, Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa (Solidarity between Generations in Strategic Perspective of State), [in:] A. Kubów, J. Szczepaniak-Sienniak, Polityka rodzinna a polityka rynku pracy w kontekście zmian demograficznych, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu" Issue 292, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2013, pp. 190-205. 5 wartości i preferencji politycznych 9 . Zmianom tym towarzyszą procesy integracji systemowej (przeciwne integracji społecznej; dotyczą instrumentalizacji i urynkowienia relacji i działań zastępujących wartości, normy i porozumienia zapośredniczone przez świadomość ludzi) 10 i występowanie wielokierunkowej dyskryminacji ze względu na wiek (współistnienie dyskryminacji okazywanej przez osoby młode, dorosłe i starsze) 11 . Jednocześnie kryterium „obciążenia" jest krytykowane, gdyż, jako określone w połowie XX wieku, staje się mniej użyteczne w analizach społeczeństw postindustrialnych 12 . Zakłada się też, że obserwowane zmiany demograficzne doprowadzą do wzrostu wielopokoleniowości i wymuszą współpracę pokoleń 13 . Na przełomie XX i XXI wieku obserwuje się też przemiany w cyklu życia. Kolejne generacje cechuje: skrócenie okresu aktywności ekonomicznej i jego zbliżenie wśród kobiet i mężczyzn, wydłużenie faz edukacji i emerytury, wzrost elastyczności i różnorodności godzin i warunków pracy 14 . Etapy edukacji, pracy i wypoczynku przebiegają bardziej równolegle i sekwencyjnie, przez co instytucje polityki społecznej powinny uwzględniać swobodę tworzenia jednostkowych biografii. 3. Modele polityki relacji międzypokoleniowych Poprzez politykę relacji międzypokoleniowych (PRM) rozumieć można zbiory działań ukierunkowane na kształtowanie i wdrażanie określonego kontraktu między pokoleniami. Dotyczy ona ustanawiania i utrzymywania „reżimu" – zasad określających kształt relacji międzypokoleniowych, spisanych lub nie, zasad obecnych w prawie, religii, etyce i obyczaju 15 . PRM to prowadzenie dyskursu (negocjowanie z wykorzystaniem argumentów etycznych i ideologicznych) nad skalami, kierunkami i środkami redystrybucji zasobów między generacjami. Może być narzucana siłą lub przemocą symboliczną przez jedne pokolenia innym lub tworzona wspólnie poprzez dialog. 9 Zob. A. Klimczuk, Bariery i perspektywy integracji międzypokoleniowej we współczesnej Polsce, [w:] D. Kałuża, P. Szukalski (red.), Jakość życia seniorów w XXI wieku z perspektywy polityki społecznej, Wyd. Biblioteka, Łódź 2010, s. 95-99. 10 Tamże, s. 99-101. 11 Tamże, s. 101-103. 12 Zob. A. Klimczuk, Kapitał społeczny..., s. 32. 13 Szczegółową analizę przeprowadził P. Szukalski, Solidarność pokoleń..., s. 22-43. 14 G. Naegele i wsp., A new organisation of time over working life, Eurofound, Dublin 2003, s. 37-43. 15 Por. P. Szukalski, Solidarność pokoleń..., s. 48. A. Klimczuk, Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa (Solidarity between Generations in Strategic Perspective of State), [in:] A. Kubów, J. Szczepaniak-Sienniak, Polityka rodzinna a polityka rynku pracy w kontekście zmian demograficznych, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu" Issue 292, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2013, pp. 190-205. 6 Pojęciem zbliżonym, lecz o węższym zakresie, jest integracja międzypokoleniowa 16 . Dotyczy działań na rzecz scalania, łączenia jednostek i grup reprezentujących odmienne pokolenia, a przez to wzrostu siły więzi i SP. Działania te dotyczą zwiększania świadomości współzależności pokoleń i uwzględniania efektów wyborów i działań osób i grup z jednych pokoleń na inne. Integracja pośrednio wpływa na reguły kontraktu. Do jej analiz można stosować koncepcję C. Offe, który wskazuje na kulturowe, gospodarcze i polityczne formy integracji oraz przejawy na poziomach makro-, mezoi mikrostrukturalnych (tab. 3) 17 . Podejście to wzbogaca analizę w ujęciu historycznym i ahistorycznym oraz akcentuje poziom mezo – między państwem i rodziną, a przez to badania i działania w społecznościach lokalnych, partiach politycznych, organizacjach pozarządowych i korporacjach zawodowych 18 . Tabela 3. Formy i poziomy integracji społecznej Formy integracji Przejawy integracji na poziomach społeczeństwa makro mezo mikro Kulturowa świadomość jedności znajdująca odbicie w historii, języku, tradycji, religii występowanie ideologii i partii, które w swoim działaniu i programach kierują się wartościami kulturowymi antropologiczna podstawa do działania społecznego, czyli kulturowa tradycja kształtująca tożsamość jednostek Gospodarcza zdolności wytwórcze do zaspokojenia potrzeb materialnych i poziomu bezpieczeństwa socjalnego występowanie partii i organizacji, które swoją tożsamość i program ujmują w kategoriach ekonomicznych racjonalnie realizowane interesy i potrzeby klientów państwa opiekuńczego Polityczna powszechność instytucji zdolnych do tłumienia, regulowania i centralizacji konfliktów politycznych drogą konstytucyjnych regulacji prawnych koncentracja partii i organizacji na pewnych zasadach oraz instytucjach ładu prawnego i konstytucyjnego zdolność obywateli do zapewnienia sobie ochrony swych praw w działaniu rozumnym i regulowanym przez instytucje Źródło: C. Offe, Drogi transformacji, PWN, Kraków 1999, s. 184. Za szerszą koncepcję pozwalającą na projektowanie i analizę PRM można uznać model zaproponowany przez Z. Woźniaka dotyczący polityki społecznej wobec starości i 16 Por. P. Szukalski, Czym jest solidarność..., s. 87; P. Szukalski, Solidarność pokoleń..., s. 49. 17 C. Offe, Drogi transformacji, PWN, Kraków 1999, s. 183-184. 18 Por. A. Klimczuk, Bariery i perspektywy..., s. 94-95, 103. A. Klimczuk, Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa (Solidarity between Generations in Strategic Perspective of State), [in:] A. Kubów, J. Szczepaniak-Sienniak, Polityka rodzinna a polityka rynku pracy w kontekście zmian demograficznych, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu" Issue 292, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2013, pp. 190-205. 7 ludzi starych 19 . Model zakłada połączenie czterech strategii, które powinny obejmować ogólne i szczegółowe zadania (rys. 1). Są to: (1) dodawać lat do życia – krótkoterminowa, interwencyjno-asekuracyjna, likwidowanie niedoborów, uzupełnianie deficytów, ratownictwo; (2) dodawać zdrowia do lat – średnioterminowa (5-10 lat), asekuracyjnokompensacyjna, programy profilaktyczno-promocyjne, wyprzedzanie zjawisk, zdarzeń i procesów niekorzystnych, głównie w zakresie zdrowia; (3) dodawać życia do lat – wieloletnia, kompensacyjno-partycypacyjna, programy profilaktyczne, przygotowanie do starości, zdolności do samoopieki, poprawa jakości życia najstarszych seniorów; (4) ku międzypokoleniowej solidarności – długoterminowa, partycypacyjno-integracyjna, wykorzystująca koncepcję „społeczeństwa dla ludzi w każdym wieku". Zmierza do dostosowania działań do potrzeb, możliwości i umiejętności wszystkich obywateli oraz uaktywniania i wykorzystania potencjału różnych pokoleń. PRM może być zatem rozpatrywana jako element łączący kilka podejść i kierunek przemian w konstruowaniu programów i strategii. Rys. 1. Modelowe strategie polityki społecznej wobec starości i ludzi starych Źródło: Z. Woźniak, Priorytety w programach gerontologicznych organizacji międzynarodowych i struktur europejskich jako przesłanka budowy polityki społecznej wobec starości i osób starszych, [w:] M. Szlązak (red.), Starzenie się populacji wyzwaniem dla polityki społecznej. Materiały konferencyjne, ROPS, Kraków 2003, s. 28. 19 Z. Woźniak, Priorytety w programach gerontologicznych organizacji międzynarodowych i struktur europejskich jako przesłanka budowy polityki społecznej wobec starości i osób starszych, [w:] M. Szlązak (red.), Starzenie się populacji wyzwaniem dla polityki społecznej. Materiały konferencyjne, ROPS, Kraków 2003, s. 28. RATOWNICTWO LIKWIDACJA LUK I NIEDOBORÓW ANTYCYPACJA WYPRZEDZANIE ZDARZEŃ DYSTRYBUCYJNY SOLIDARYZM INTEGRACJA SPOŁECZNA GOSPODARKA RYNEK PRACY, DÓBR, USŁUG I ŚWIADCZEŃ STRATEGIE POLITYKI SPOŁECZNEJ WOBEC SENIORÓW INTERWENCJA Dodawać lat do życia POTRZEBY WARTOŚCI PROCESY POLITYCZNE USTRÓJ ASEKURACJA KOMPENSACJA Ku międzypokoleniowej solidarności Dodawać zdrowia do lat PARTYCYPACJA Dodawać życia do lat A. Klimczuk, Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa (Solidarity between Generations in Strategic Perspective of State), [in:] A. Kubów, J. Szczepaniak-Sienniak, Polityka rodzinna a polityka rynku pracy w kontekście zmian demograficznych, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu" Issue 292, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2013, pp. 190-205. 8 Odmienne podejście proponują J. Sáez, S. Pinazo i M. Sánchez, wskazując na wymiary PRM 20 . Zdaniem badaczy idea ta wyłania się na drodze realizacji projektów rozwoju kontaktów i współpracy pokoleń oraz z badań nad prowadzącymi je podmiotami. Współzależność pokoleń odnosi się do integracji trzech wymiarów życia: jego przestrzeni, cyklu i projektu (rys. 2). Odpowiadają im: miejsca sprzyjające międzypokoleniowości, interpretacje i stereotypy etapów życia oraz wizje przyszłości wskazujące jednostkom szanse i prawa w razie utraty różnego rodzaju zasobów. PRM powinna obejmować połączone ze sobą strategie i programy kolejno na rzecz: przestrzeni i architektury, kultury i edukacji oraz gospodarki, rynku pracy oraz zdrowia publicznego. Ponadto powinna uwzględniać decyzje uzgodnione przez wielu interesariuszy, etyczne uzasadnienia działań oraz praktyczne możliwości ich wdrażania 21 . Rys. 2. Główne wymiary międzypokoleniowej polityki społecznej Źródło: J. Sáez, S. Pinazo, M. Sánchez, Fostering intergenerational policies, [w:] M. Sánchez (eds.), Intergenerational programmes. Towards a society for all ages, „la Caixa" Foundation, Barcelona 2007, s. 202. 20 J. Sáez, S. Pinazo, M. Sánchez, Fostering intergenerational policies, [w:] M. Sánchez (ed.), Intergenerational programmes. Towards a society for all ages, „la Caixa" Foundation, Barcelona 2007, s. 186-191. 21 Tamże, s. 200. Polityka społeczna oparta na czynnikach międzypokoleniowych Polityka ochrony środowiska Polityka architektoniczna/urbanistyczna Polityka (między) kulturowa Polityka edukacyjna Polityka gospodarcza Polityka rynku pracy Polityka zdrowotna (MIĘDZY)POKOLENIOWOŚĆ Współzależność między pokoleniami Polityka społeczna związana z miejscem życia (przestrzeń międzypokoleniowego poczucia przynależności do miejsca/środowiska) Polityka społeczna związana z cyklem życia (czas relacji międzypokoleniowych jako kontinuum) Polityka społeczna związana z projektem życia (projekt zabezpieczenia praw ludzi, zwłaszcza tych, którzy je tracą) A. Klimczuk, Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa (Solidarity between Generations in Strategic Perspective of State), [in:] A. Kubów, J. Szczepaniak-Sienniak, Polityka rodzinna a polityka rynku pracy w kontekście zmian demograficznych, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu" Issue 292, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2013, pp. 190-205. 9 Omówiona koncepcja może być wykorzystywana do analiz polityki na poziomie centralnym, regionalnym i lokalnym. Pośrednio wskazuje też na budowanie SP poprzez dostosowanie do osób w każdym wieku nie tylko warunków życia poszczególnych rodzin, ale też przestrzeni publicznych istotnych dla społeczności lokalnych (gmin, dzielnic). Możliwe jest też tworzenie (lub przekształcanie istniejących) placówek i instytucji jako „wspólnych przestrzeni międzypokoleniowych", czyli odpowiadających potrzebom dzieci i młodzieży oraz seniorów, a zarazem kształtujących ich wzajemne relacje 22 . Może to być np. łączne prowadzenie domów pomocy społecznej i przedszkoli, klubów seniora i szkół, domów dla seniorów i bezdomnych matek, dziennej opieki dla seniorów i centrów rozwoju dzieci, wspólnot emerytalnych i akademickich. Programy te pozwalają na pobudzanie wymiany między pokoleniami i generowanie wielu korzyści dla uczestników i otoczenia 23 . Koncepcje działań na rzecz SP są też tworzone przez organizacje międzynarodowe. W tym miejscu należy jedynie zwrócić uwagę na najważniejsze z nich. Przede wszystkim PRM towarzyszy promocji aktywnego starzenia się – koncepcji upowszechnianej od ostatniej dekady ubiegłego stulecia głównie pod wpływem Światowej Organizacji Zdrowia, która łączy dążenie do podtrzymywania produktywności osób starszych z ich jakością życia oraz dobrostanem psychicznym i fizycznym. Polityka ta zwraca uwagę na potrzebę ograniczania dyskryminacji ze względu na wiek, wielowymiarowej edukacji i aktywizacji obywatelskiej w zabezpieczaniu praw ekonomicznych, politycznych i społecznych osób starszych, co ma sprzyjać poprawie stanu zdrowia oraz rozwiązywaniu problemów rodzinnych i lokalnych 24 . 22 S.E. Jarrott, A.P.C. Weintraub, Intergenerational shared sites: A practical model, [w:] M. Sánchez (eds.), Intergenerational programmes. Towards a society for all ages, „la Caixa" Foundation, Barcelona 2007, s. 139. 23 Zob. S. Pinazo, M. Kaplan, The benefits of intergenerational programmes, [w:] M. Sánchez (ed.), Intergenerational programmes. Towards a society for all ages, „la Caixa" Foundation, Barcelona 2007, s. 72, 75, 84. 24 Active Ageing. A Policy Framework, WHO, Geneva 2002. A. Klimczuk, Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa (Solidarity between Generations in Strategic Perspective of State), [in:] A. Kubów, J. Szczepaniak-Sienniak, Polityka rodzinna a polityka rynku pracy w kontekście zmian demograficznych, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu" Issue 292, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2013, pp. 190-205. 10 Rys. 3. Przepływy między kapitałami w „społeczeństwie dla ludzi w każdym wieku" Źródło: Highlights of an expert consultation on developing a policy framework for a society for all ages, United Nations, www.un.org/esa/socdev/ageing/policyframework.html [dostęp: 04.01.2011]. Na poziomie globalnym polityce aktywnego starzenia i PRM służy Międzynarodowy Plan Działania nt. Aktywnego Starzenia się koordynowany od 2002 roku przez Organizację Narodów Zjednoczonych 25 , który zawiera rekomendacje dla rządów krajowych. Rdzeń tych podejść stanowi kreowana od lat dziewięćdziesiątych XX wieku przez ONZ koncepcja „budowy społeczeństwa dla ludzi w każdym wieku" 26 (rys. 3). Najogólniej zakłada ona: wykorzystanie i reinwestycję w cyklu życia kapitału ludzkiego, społeczno-kulturowego, ekonomicznego i przyrodniczego; adaptację rodzin, społeczności i infrastruktury krajów do struktury demograficznej; oraz prowadzenie działań na rzecz aktywnego starzenia się, edukacji ustawicznej, promocji zdrowego stylu życia, integracji 25 Report of the Second World Assembly on Ageing Madrid. Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing, United Nations, New York 2002. 26 Highlights of an expert consultation on developing a policy framework for a society for all ages, United Nations, www.un.org/esa/socdev/ageing/policyframework.html [dostęp: 04.01.2011]. Osoby starsze Cykl życia Rodziny, społeczności Instytucje i struktury makrospołeczne Inwestycje w osoby starsze, na wcześniejszych etapach życia, w rodzinach i społecznościach oraz na poziomie instytucji makrospołecznych mogą kształtować kapitał na rzecz utrzymania osób starszych jako podmiotów i beneficjentów działań oraz umożliwiać reinwestycje do społeczeństwa celem rozwoju Generowanie KAPITAŁU LUDZKI SPOŁECZNY I KULTUROWY ŚRODOWISKOWY EKONOMICZY REINWESTYCJA A. Klimczuk, Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa (Solidarity between Generations in Strategic Perspective of State), [in:] A. Kubów, J. Szczepaniak-Sienniak, Polityka rodzinna a polityka rynku pracy w kontekście zmian demograficznych, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu" Issue 292, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2013, pp. 190-205. 11 międzypokoleniowej, elastyczności rynków pracy, kształtowania przestrzeni przyjaznych seniorom, rozwoju społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, zrównoważonej polityki społecznej, zapobiegania ubóstwu i wykluczeniu osób starszych. W Unii Europejskiej debata na temat aktywnego starzenia się trwa od lat dziewięćdziesiątych XX w., a za główne etapy zaangażowania w nią różnych podmiotów i nadania problemowi wysokiej rangi można uznać ogłoszenie w 1999 roku komunikatu „Towards a Europe for All Ages – Promoting Prosperity and Intergenerational Solidarity" 27 , przy okazji obchodów, z inicjatywy ONZ, Międzynarodowego Roku Seniorów, oraz ogłoszenie 2012 roku Europejskiego Roku Aktywności Osób Starszych i Solidarności Międzypokoleniowej 28 . PRM i polityka aktywnego starzenia się są upowszechniane w odniesieniu do wielu sfer życia społeczno-gospodarczego 29 . Warte podkreślenia w odniesieniu do rynku pracy są programy zarządzania wiekiem w organizacjach stanowiące element szerszych strategii zarządzania różnorodnością 30 . Ich istotą jest uwzględnianie różnic w wieku pracowników w procesach: rekrutacji; szkolenia, rozwoju i awansów; elastycznych form zatrudnienia; ergonomii i projektowania stanowisk pracy; zmiany postaw wobec starszych pracowników. Innym zalecanym przez Komisję Europejską podejściem jest budowa „srebrnej gospodarki" 31 . Jak zauważają badacze tego zjawiska, nie jest to tylko rynek dóbr, wartości i usług dla zamożnych osób starszych, ale też specjalne rozwiązania w handlu między podmiotami gospodarczymi umożliwiające adaptację do starzejących się zasobów pracy oraz idee „projektowania uniwersalnego" i „międzypokoleniowego", których celem 27 Communication from the Commission. Towards a Europe for All Ages – Promoting Prosperity and Intergenerational Solidarity, COM(1999) 221, Brussels, 21.05.1999. 28 Przyjęte w Polsce tłumaczenie nie odpowiada oryginalnemu sformułowaniu – koncepcji „aktywnego starzenia się" całego społeczeństwa, a nie jedynie osób starszych – tym samym może zawężać analizy i politykę publiczną. Zob. Krajowy Plan Działania na rzecz Europejskiego Roku Aktywności Osób Starszych i Solidarności Międzypokoleniowej 2012 w Polsce, MPiPS, Warszawa 2012. 29 PRM i aktywnego starzenia się w UE uwzględniają: Europejska Strategia Zatrudnienia, Otwarta Metoda Koordynacji w zakresie ochrony socjalnej i integracji społecznej, walka z dyskryminacją ze względu na wiek, polityka równych szans dla osób niepełnosprawnych i równości płci oraz promocja: innowacji społecznych, zdrowia publicznego i aktywności fizycznej, dostępności i mobilności, technologii telekomunikacyjnych dla osób starszych, kształcenia przez całe życie. Zob. The EU contribution to active ageing and solidarity between generations, European Commission, Luxembourg 2012. 30 A. Walker, Active ageing in employment. Its meaning and potential, „Asia-Pacific Review" 2006, vol. 13, no 1, s. 89. 31 Według Komisji Europejskiej „srebrna gospodarka" to koncepcja odnosząca się do „kombinacji dobrych warunków dostaw (wysoki poziom edukacji, badań i rozwoju, wrażliwe i elastyczne rynki) z rosnącą siłą nabywczą starszych konsumentów, która oferuje nowe ogromne możliwości wzrostu ekonomicznego". Zob. Europe's demographic future. Facts and figures on challenges and opportunities, European Commission, Luxembourg 2007, s. 96. A. Klimczuk, Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa (Solidarity between Generations in Strategic Perspective of State), [in:] A. Kubów, J. Szczepaniak-Sienniak, Polityka rodzinna a polityka rynku pracy w kontekście zmian demograficznych, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu" Issue 292, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2013, pp. 190-205. 12 jest adaptacja dóbr i usług do osób o różnym wieku, kondycji fizycznej i możliwościach poznawczych, co może prowadzić do poprawy integracji społecznej 32 . 4. Solidarność pokoleń (SP) w wybranych krajowych dokumentach strategicznych Dalsza część artykułu obejmuje analizę założeń działań na rzecz SP wskazanych w wybranych dokumentach projektu cywilizacyjnego „Polska 2030. Trzecia fala nowoczesności". Za podstawowy uznaje się przyjęty w 2008 roku program rządowy „Solidarność pokoleń" 33 . Jego główny cel to wzrost do 2020 roku wskaźnika zatrudnienia ludności znajdującej się między 55 a 64 rokiem życia do poziomu 50%. Wyróżniono działania z zakresu polityki rynku pracy i ograniczające dezaktywizację zawodową starszych pracowników. Przyjęto dążenie do wydłużania i wyrównywania wieku emerytalnego kobiet i mężczyzn celem zmniejszenia transferów do seniorów, co umożliwi zwiększenie wsparcia dzieci i młodzieży, które są najbardziej zagrożone ubóstwem. Uznano za istotne kierowanie się zasadami polityki aktywnego starzenia się, która nie jest nakierowana tylko na osoby 50+, lecz na cały cykl życia ludzkiego oraz modelu flexicurity obejmującego kształcenie ustawiczne i rozwiązania prawne umożliwiające godzenie pracy z obowiązkami prywatnym i rodzinnymi 34 . Podejście to ma uruchomić „pozytywny krąg" działań wzajemnie wspierających pozytywne efekty i dla starszych, i dla młodszych pokoleń, przy jednoczesnym zaangażowaniu programów i przywództwa rządowego, działań w przedsiębiorstwach oraz indywidualnej odpowiedzialności obywateli (np. promocja zdrowia i bezpieczeństwa pracowników, prewencja problemów związanych z wiekiem, ograniczenie zachęt do wcześniejszego przechodzenia na emeryturę) 35 . Kontynuację powyższej perspektywy stanowi „Raport o kapitale intelektualnym Polski". Na jego potrzeby przygotowano indeks kapitału intelektualnego dla poszczególnych pokoleń w 16 krajach europejskich. Poszczególne pokolenia Polski zajęły w nim kolejno: 13 miejsce – dzieci i młodzież; 13 miejsce – studenci; 14 dorośli; 16 – seniorzy. Za kluczowe wyzwanie uznano przejście od pasywnej polityki „transferów socjalnych na rzecz pokolenia seniorów", przez aktywną politykę wykorzystującą rosnący 32 F. Kohlbacher, C. Herstatt, Preface and Introduction, [w:] F. Kohlbacher, C. Herstatt (eds.), The Silver Market Phenomenon. Business Opportunities in an Era of Demographic Change, Springer, Heidelberg 2008, s. xi-xxv. 33 Program Solidarność pokoleń. Działania dla zwiększenia aktywności zawodowej osób w wieku 50+, MPiPS, Warszawa 2008. 34 Tamże, s. 6. 35 Tamże, s. 7-8. A. Klimczuk, Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa (Solidarity between Generations in Strategic Perspective of State), [in:] A. Kubów, J. Szczepaniak-Sienniak, Polityka rodzinna a polityka rynku pracy w kontekście zmian demograficznych, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu" Issue 292, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2013, pp. 190-205. 13 popyt seniorów, do stworzenia nowych usług i produktów oraz wykorzystania ich kapitału intelektualnego 36 . Powtórzono rekomendacje z programu „Solidarność pokoleń" i zalecono m.in. stworzenie paktu na rzecz aktywności osób 50+, działania na rzecz zmiany postaw wobec seniorów, dostosowanie oferty edukacyjnej, w tym wdrażanie programów przygotowania do emerytury, popularyzację zarządzania wiekiem, reformę emerytalną 37 . W raporcie „Polska 2030" stwierdzono, że uwzględnianie perspektyw SP i cyklu życia – przynajmniej jednego przyszłego pokolenia – ma pozwolić na odejście od „rządów przypadku" obejmujących horyzont czasu kalendarza wyborczego, na rzecz przywództwa strategicznego umożliwiającego uniknięcie dryfu rozwojowego kraju i realizację projektu cywilizacyjnego, wykraczającego poza transformację systemową realizowaną od początku lat dziewięćdziesiątych XX wieku 38 . Omówiona wcześniej aktywizacja osób 50+ została poszerzona o promocję budowy „srebrnej gospodarki" 39 . SP uznano dodatkowo za element budowy opiekuńczego społeczeństwa, które ma uzupełniać tworzenie państwa wspierającego pracę. Przyjęto, że współcześnie rosną „pokolenia aspiracji", które zderzają się swoją mobilnością i adaptacyjnością z „pokoleniami roszczeniowymi" 40 . Podziałowi temu towarzyszy luka pokoleniowa dotycząca kompetencji cyfrowych – po 1989 roku urodziły się pokolenia nieznające świata bez m.in. komputera i Internetu, wymagające dostosowania instytucji edukacji i kultury do nowych technologii 41 . Podkreślono też, iż społeczne koszty restrukturyzacji z początku lat dziewięćdziesiątych ubiegłego stulecia obejmują dziedziczenie niskiego statusu społeczno-ekonomicznego i bierności z pokolenia na pokolenie 42 . SP, obok solidarności terytorialnej (między regionami) i solidarności innowacyjnej (między wyrównywaniem szans i konkurencyjnością), stanowi jedną z trzech głównych zasad rozwoju kraju, na których opiera się projekt „Długookresowej strategii rozwoju kraju" 43 . Za kluczowe uznano tworzenie warunków współpracy i uniknięcia konfliktu pokoleń między przedstawicielami pierwszego powojennego wyżu demograficznego (analogowego), którzy będą zmniejszać swoje zaangażowanie publiczne i aktywność 36 M. Boni (red.), Raport o kapitale intelektualnym Polski, KPRM, Warszawa 2008, s. 15. 37 Tamże, s. 137. 38 M. Boni (red.), Raport Polska 2030. Wyzwania rozwojowe, KPRM, Warszawa 2009, s. 2-6, 275. 39 Tamże, s. 17. 40 Tamże, s. 10. 41 Tamże, s. 153, 347, 363. 42 Tamże, s. 256. 43 M. Boni (red.), Długookresowa strategia rozwoju kraju. Projekt. Część I, MAiC, Warszawa 09.05.2012, s. 17. A. Klimczuk, Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa (Solidarity between Generations in Strategic Perspective of State), [in:] A. Kubów, J. Szczepaniak-Sienniak, Polityka rodzinna a polityka rynku pracy w kontekście zmian demograficznych, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu" Issue 292, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2013, pp. 190-205. 14 zawodową, oraz drugiego powojennego wyżu demograficznego (cyfrowego), którzy współcześnie wkraczają w życie zawodowe i publiczne. Działania te mają prowadzić do budowy „srebrnej gospodarki" i wielopokoleniowego społeczeństwa sieci 44 . Podkreślono stymulowanie otwartości pokoleń na wymianę i wzrost jakości kapitału społecznego 45 i działania na rzecz zachowania zasobów przyrodniczych i geologicznych kraju dla przyszłych pokoleń 46 . Projekt „Strategii rozwoju kraju 2020" wskazuje na SP w ramach celów: II.4: „Rozwój kapitału ludzkiego", II.5: „Zwiększenie wykorzystania technologii cyfrowych", II.6: „Efektywność energetyczna i poprawa stanu środowiska", III.1: „Integracja społeczna" 47 . Spośród podporządkowanych długoi średniookresowej strategii rozwoju kraju zintegrowanych strategii na SP pokrótce wskazuje „Krajowa strategia rozwoju regionalnego" w odniesieniu do aktywizacji osób starszych, promocji uczenia się przez całe życie i wydłużania aktywności zawodowej 48 . Projekt „Strategii rozwoju kapitału społecznego" obejmuje zaś kierunki działań: 1.2.2. „Rozwój kompetencji medialnych w uczeniu się innym niż formalne, szczególnie wśród osób w wieku 50+ i na obszarach wiejskich" i 4.1.1: „Tworzenie warunków dla wzmacniania tożsamości i uczestnictwa w kulturze na poziomie lokalnym, regionalnym i krajowym", które obejmują wsparcie międzypokoleniowej edukacji medialnej i dialogu pokoleń 49 . Koncepcję SP odmiennie uwzględnia projekt „Strategia rozwoju kapitału ludzkiego", w którym poszczególne cele i narzędzia podzielono z uwagi na fazy życia obywateli: wczesne dzieciństwo; edukacja szkolna; edukacja na poziomie wyższym; aktywność zawodowa, uczenie się dorosłych i rodzicielstwo; starość 50 . Analiza spójności tego dokumentu powinna być jednak przedmiotem odrębnego opracowania. 5. Podsumowanie i wnioski Utrzymanie SP stanowi istotną kwestię socjalną oraz perspektywę analiz, konstruowania i oceny polityki publicznej. W opracowaniu przybliżono główne znaczenia, 44 Tamże, s. 20, 119; M. Boni (red.), Długookresowa strategia rozwoju kraju. Projekt. Część II, MAiC, Warszawa 09.05.2012, s. 59-61. 45 M. Boni (red.), Długookresowa strategia rozwoju kraju. Projekt. Część II, ..., s. 290. 46 Tamże, s. 218. 47 Strategia rozwoju kraju 2020. Projekt, MRR, Warszawa, listopad 2011, s. 66, 73, 85, 93, 130. 48 Krajowa strategia rozwoju regionalnego 2010-2020: Regiony. Miasta. Obszary wiejskie, MRR, Warszawa 2010, s. 25, 43-46 49 Strategia rozwoju kapitału społecznego. Projekt, MKiDN, Warszawa 01.06.2012, s. 50, 84. 50 Strategia rozwoju kapitału ludzkiego. Projekt, MPiPS, Warszawa 01.08.2012, s. 39. A. Klimczuk, Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa (Solidarity between Generations in Strategic Perspective of State), [in:] A. Kubów, J. Szczepaniak-Sienniak, Polityka rodzinna a polityka rynku pracy w kontekście zmian demograficznych, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu" Issue 292, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2013, pp. 190-205. 15 cechy i wymiary pojęcia pokolenie oraz typy relacji międzypokoleniowych i zakres ich obowiązywania. Wskazano na cechy SP istotne z perspektywy polityki społecznej wraz z odniesieniem do zmian w cyklu życia. Zarysowano modele PRM i koncepcje przyjmowane współcześnie przez organizacje międzynarodowe. Wskazano na cechy koncepcji SP w rządowych dokumentach strategicznych. Perspektywa SP pozwala na łączenie koncepcji dotyczących polityki rodzinnej i rynku pracy poprzez wskazanie wspólnych wymiarów działań i ich współzależności. Umożliwia większą spójność proponowanych i realizowanych działań w warunkach starzenia się populacji. Podjęta analiza pozwala zaryzykować twierdzenie, iż w opracowaniach strategicznych państwa koncepcja ta jest podporządkowana raczej zadaniom polityki rynku pracy. Dopiero osiągnięcie jej celów, głównie poprzez zwiększenie zatrudnienia osób 50+, ma prowadzić do poprawy szans rozwojowych dzieci i młodzieży, ograniczając ryzyko ich ubóstwa, jako wybranego celu polityki rodzinnej. Dodatkowo stawia się nacisk na zwiększenie możliwości zatrudnienia kobiet przez rozwój usług pozwalających na godzenie pracy i życia rodzinnego. Przeprowadzony przegląd pozwala na sformułowanie pięciu rekomendacji dla działań praktycznych, które powinny być uwzględniane zwłaszcza przy godzeniu priorytetów polityki rodzinnej i rynku pracy. Mianowicie: 1. Wobec wzrostu wielopokoleniowości zasadne jest dalsze wspieranie działań integracji i PRM. Podejście to powinno być uwzględniane w szczegółowych dziedzinach polityki społecznej (m.in. ludnościowej, rodzinnej, edukacyjnej, migracyjnej, rynku pracy, ochrony zdrowia). 2. Niezbędne jest odniesienie perspektywy SP z dokumentów rządowych do programowania regionalnego i lokalnego. 3. Istotne jest podjęcie działań na rzecz budowy krajowego modelu „srebrnej gospodarki" uwzględniającego w większym stopniu działania zgodne z polityką innowacji. 4. PRM powinna zmierzać do zwiększania korzyści z współpracy dla osób starych (dziadków) i młodych (wnuków) oraz ich otoczenia społecznego. 5. Zasadne jest uwzględnianie rozwiązań na rzecz niwelowania nakładających się podziałów pokoleniowych, dotyczących także warunków życia rodzin, na terytorialne i dotyczące sytuacji na rynku pracy. Dalsze badania dotyczące SP na gruncie analiz zarówno polityki rodzinnej, jak i rynku pracy, mogą dotyczyć siedmiu kierunków: (1) skali i przejawów dezintegracji A. Klimczuk, Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa (Solidarity between Generations in Strategic Perspective of State), [in:] A. Kubów, J. Szczepaniak-Sienniak, Polityka rodzinna a polityka rynku pracy w kontekście zmian demograficznych, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu" Issue 292, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2013, pp. 190-205. 16 międzypokoleniowej w poszczególnych sferach życia społecznego, kulturalnego, gospodarczego i politycznego; (2) dyskursu dotyczącego konstruowania polityki i kontraktów międzypokoleniowych; (3) przemian relacji międzypokoleniowych w cyklu życia z uwzględnieniem przemian modelu rodziny; (4) zgodności krajowych dokumentów strategicznych dotyczących SP z rekomendacjami organizacji międzynarodowych; (5) możliwości kształtowania wspólnych przestrzeni międzypokoleniowych; (6) relacji między pokoleniem cyfrowym i analogowym; (7) przejawów wielokierunkowej dyskryminacji ze względu na wiek. Literatura Active Ageing. A Policy Framework, WHO, Geneva 2002. Auleytner J., Głąbicka K., Polskie kwestie socjalne na przełomie wieków, Elipsa, Warszawa 2001. Boni M. (red.), Długookresowa strategia rozwoju kraju. Projekt. Część I, MAiC, Warszawa 09.05.2012. Boni M. (red.), Długookresowa strategia rozwoju kraju. Projekt. Część II, MAiC, Warszawa 09.05.2012. Boni M. (red.), Raport o kapitale intelektualnym Polski, KPRM, Warszawa 2008. Boni M. (red.), Raport Polska 2030. Wyzwania rozwojowe, KPRM, Warszawa 2009. Communication from the Commission. Towards a Europe for All Ages – Promoting Prosperity and Intergenerational Solidarity, COM(1999) 221, Brussels, 21.05.1999. Europe's demographic future. Facts and figures on challenges and opportunities, European Commission, Luxembourg 2007. Highlights of an expert consultation on developing a policy framework for a society for all ages, United Nations, www.un.org/esa/socdev/ageing/policyframework.html [dostęp: 04.01.2011]. Jarrott S.E., Weintraub A.P.C., Intergenerational shared sites: A practical model, [w:] M. Sánchez (ed.), Intergenerational programmes. Towards a society for all ages, „la Caixa" Foundation, Barcelona 2007. Klimczuk A., Bariery i perspektywy integracji międzypokoleniowej we współczesnej Polsce, [w:] D. Kałuża, P. Szukalski (red.), Jakość życia seniorów w XXI wieku z perspektywy polityki społecznej, Wyd. Biblioteka, Łódź 2010. A. Klimczuk, Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa (Solidarity between Generations in Strategic Perspective of State), [in:] A. Kubów, J. Szczepaniak-Sienniak, Polityka rodzinna a polityka rynku pracy w kontekście zmian demograficznych, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu" Issue 292, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2013, pp. 190-205. 17 Klimczuk A., Kapitał społeczny ludzi starych na przykładzie mieszkańców miasta Białystok, Wiedza i Edukacja, Lublin 2012. Kohlbacher F., Herstatt C., Preface and Introduction, [w:] F. Kohlbacher, C. Herstatt (eds.), The Silver Market Phenomenon. Business Opportunities in an Era of Demographic Change, Springer, Heidelberg 2008. Krajowa strategia rozwoju regionalnego 2010-2020: Regiony. Miasta. Obszary wiejskie, MRR, Warszawa 2010. Krajowy plan działania na rzecz europejskiego roku aktywności osób starszych i solidarności międzypokoleniowej 2012 w Polsce, MPiPS, Warszawa 2012. Naegele G. i wsp., A new organisation of time over working life, Eurofound, Dublin 2003. Offe C., Drogi transformacji, PWN, Kraków 1999. Pinazo S., Kaplan M., The benefits of intergenerational programmes, [w:] M. Sánchez (ed.), Intergenerational programmes. Towards a society for all ages, „la Caixa" Foundation, Barcelona 2007. Program Solidarność pokoleń. Działania dla zwiększenia aktywności zawodowej osób w wieku 50+, MPiPS, Warszawa 2008. Report of the Second World Assembly on Ageing Madrid. Madrid International Plan of Action on Ageing, United Nations, New York 2002. Sáez J., Pinazo S., Sánchez M., Fostering intergenerational policies, [w:] M. Sánchez (ed.), Intergenerational programmes. Towards a society for all ages, „la Caixa" Foundation, Barcelona 2007. Strategia rozwoju kapitału ludzkiego. Projekt, MPiPS, Warszawa 01.08.2012. Strategia rozwoju kraju 2020. Projekt, MRR, Warszawa, listopad 2011. Szatur-Jaworska B., Ludzie starzy i starość w polityce społecznej, ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2000. Sztompka P., Socjologia. Analiza społeczeństwa, Znak, Kraków 2002. Szukalski P., Czym jest solidarność międzypokoleniowa?, [w:] D. Kałuża, P. Szukalski (red.), Jakość życia seniorów w XXI wieku z perspektywy polityki społecznej, Wyd. Biblioteka, Łódź 2010. Szukalski P., Solidarność pokoleń. Dylematy relacji międzypokoleniowych, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, Łódź 2012. The EU contribution to active ageing and solidarity between generations, European Commission, Luxembourg 2012. A. Klimczuk, Solidarność pokoleń w perspektywie strategicznej państwa (Solidarity between Generations in Strategic Perspective of State), [in:] A. Kubów, J. Szczepaniak-Sienniak, Polityka rodzinna a polityka rynku pracy w kontekście zmian demograficznych, "Prace Naukowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu" Issue 292, Wyd. Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2013, pp. 190-205. 18 Walker A., Active ageing in employment. Its meaning and potential, „Asia-Pacific Review" 2006, vol. 13, no 1, Woźniak Z., Priorytety w programach gerontologicznych organizacji międzynarodowych i struktur europejskich jako przesłanka budowy polityki społecznej wobec starości i osób starszych, [w:] M. Szlązak (red.), Starzenie się populacji wyzwaniem dla polityki społecznej. Materiały konferencyjne, ROPS, Kraków 2003. Solidarity between generations in strategic perspective of state Summary: The aim of this article is to introduce a concept of "solidarity of generations" in the context of challenges of population ageing at the beginning of the XXI century. Maintaining relationships without generational conflict is a matter requiring joint intervention of public, market and social sectors entities. After the discussion of generation meaning and types of relationships between generations, intergenerational policies models were identified. The description included activities at the international, national, regional and local levels. Later in the article activities assumptions for the solidarity of generations included in the selected documents of civilization project "Poland 2030. The Third Wave of Modernity" were critically analyzed of the main approaches. Conclusions provided recommendations for practical action and further research. Keywords: life-cycle perspective, social policy towards ageing and older people, society for all ages, silver economy.

EDITORIAL This year marks the 50th anniversary of the founding of Estetika in 1964. During the first half of its existence, the journal was, for various political and editorial reasons, largely focused on readers from Czechoslovakia. But, in more recent times, it has turned into an internationally well-established and appreciated journal which publishes articles by scholars from many different countries in Europe and beyond. On the occasion of my assumption of the role of Editor-inChief, I already described some of the reasons for this turn in fortunes, many of which are due to changes in policy already initiated by my predecessor, Professor Tomáš Hlobil, and his editorial staff (see the editorial in Estetika 49, no. 1, 2012). This time, I should like to turn to what lies ahead. The present issue of Estetika is meant to celebrate the jubilee by exhibiting how the current editorial staff envisages the future of the journal. The selection of the invited contributions was primarily guided by our views on what excellent philosophy ought to look like, and we believe that the articles represent different promising avenues of research and give a good idea of how philosophical aesthetics could, and should, develop in the years to come. As with aesthetic merit, it is often very difficult to determine what excellence in philosophy consists in, and it is rather demanding to ensure that it is achieved. None the less, there is a continual need for asking the question and making the effort, not least by the editors of academic journals with the same high ambitions as Estetika. And one way of doing so is – again as with aesthetics – by providing outstanding exemplars of academic work that display the significance, depth, and originality, as well as the clarity and rigour, which are characteristic of high-quality research, whether in philosophy or other humanities or sciences. Of course, since this anniversary issue provides room only for a limited number of essays, it is by no means able to display the full variety of themes and approaches that we would like to see published in future editions of Estetika. In particular, we intend to continue our tradition of promoting specifically historically minded research and of course also to welcome contributions that strongly disagree with the positions and perspectives adopted by the authors of this issue (for example, Budd's or Seel's conceptions of the value of art, or Gardner's pro-metaphysical stance). None the less, we hope that the issue provides the reader with a good idea of what we take to be contemporary examples of excellent and exciting research in aesthetics. Ken Wilder Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, LI/VII, 2014, No. 2, 50th Anniversary Issue, 167–69 167 Zlom2_2014_Sestava 1 29.10.14 10:10 Stránka 167 Malcolm Budd's essay is generally concerned with the question of what justifies our love of, and engagement with, art. He critically discusses and rejects the idea that this justification is due to art's distinctive social, moral, or ethical value. Instead, Budd argues that we are right in taking art to be worthy of our attention because it enhances our lives in its own special way, by offering us intrinsically valuable experiences that we would not be able to have independently of art. The essay by Jason Gaiger questions the feasibility and significance of a universal Bildwissenschaft (science of images), which is defined by its openness towards its subject matter (for example, by including non-artistic, non-visual, and non-physical images) and its methodology (for example, by combining conceptual inquiries with empirical and historical approaches), and thus presents itself as an alternative to traditionally more confined disciplines, especially philosophy and art history. While he acknowledges that Bildwissenschaft, thus understood, may ultimately be unable to provide a unified body of knowledge or identify the shared essence of images, its attention to individual artworks (and groups of artworks) and its inclusion of theoretical considerations still promise that it can – in ways yet to be clarified – contribute to the philosophical project of determining the nature of images. In his contribution, Sebastian Gardner traces, and provides a detailed criticism of, the history of the widespread inclination in analytic aesthetics to assume substantial metaphysical questions and views to be irrelevant (or even detrimental to) philosophical reflections on art and the aesthetic. Central to his argument is the observation that proponents of analytic aesthetics tend to dismiss the possibility of (essentialist) truths about art that are neither empirical nor commonsensical or otherwise conceptual, without realizing that their dismissal already constitutes a substantial metaphysical commitment and, indeed, arguably overlooks the fact that our ordinary understanding of art and the aesthetic – even when supplemented by empirical investigation or conceptual analysis – cannot adequately capture its subject matter. Eileen John has contributed an essay that develops a novel conception of artistic value, according to which artistic achievement is a matter not of producing good art or a good instance of a particular art form, but rather of deliberately and reflectively producing something that has some value or other. Her main case in point is meals, which, for her, can possess artistic value without counting as art. Hence, by turning our attention to a rather neglected aspect of everyday aesthetics, John makes a strong case against art-centred accounts of artistic production and artistic value. Finally, Martin Seel uses his programmatic essay to outline a theory of aesthetic freedom and to locate it in its historical context, particularly with reference to Editorial 168 Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, LI/VII, 2014, No. 2, 50th Anniversary Issue, 00–00 Zlom2_2014_Sestava 1 29.10.14 10:10 Stránka 168 the writings of Kant, Hegel, and Adorno. What Seel takes to be central to freedom, understood as self-determination, is the idea of 'active passivity', that is, our ability deliberately to let ourselves be determined by something else – in this case, artworks or other aesthetic objects. The distinctively aesthetic variety of selfdetermination is said to be special and valuable because its considerable disconnection from our daily life allows us to become aware of, test out, and take pleasure in our potential both for shaping the world and for being shaped by it, without having to face the practical consequences of making real use of this potential. In particular, by momentarily 'losing ourselves' in our receptive or productive engagement with art and thereby confronting the possible and unaccustomed, we are able to 'find ourselves' – especially as ethical agents – in the sense of reminding and reassuring ourselves of our capacity for questioning and defining our own normative attitudes and commitments. Our choice of authors is meant to reflect the future of Estetika not only thematically but also in another sense. Estetika is still in a period of transition from a regional to an international journal. As part of this development, we are in the process of appointing a new editorial board and also enlarging our current advisory board. All five contributors to the anniversary issue have kindly agreed to join one of the two boards and will thus help us to shape the future of Estetika, for which we are very grateful. Especially the new members of the small editorial board will closely accompany and attend to the important stages in the further evolution of the journal, whether they concern matters of editorial policy or institutional setting. In conclusion, it only remains for the editorial staff and me to thank the very many people and institutions that have enabled the journal to flourish over the last decades. Both the intellectual input of authors, referees, and advisers and the infrastructural and financial contributions of the organizations involved – namely, the Department of Aesthetics and the Faculty of Arts at Charles University, Prague, the Institute of Art History at the Czech Academy of Sciences, and the International Visegrad Fund – have been indispensable for the continuous existence of Estetika, and vital to its continuing development. Fabian Dorsch [email protected] Editorial Estetika: The Central European Journal of Aesthetics, LI/VII, 2014, No. 2, 50th Anniversary Issue, 00–00 169 Zlom2_2014_Sestava 1 29.10.14 10:10 Stránka

Isonomia – Epistemologica Volume 2 COMPLESSITÀ E RIDUZIONISMO Volume 1 Il Realismo Scientifico di Evandro Agazzi Mario Alai, ed. Volume 2 Complessità e Riduzionismo Vincenzo Fano, Enrico Giannetto, Giulia Giannini, Pierluigi Graziani, eds. ISONOMIA Epistemologica Series Editor Gino Tarozzi [email protected] COMPLESSITÀ E RIDUZIONISMO a cura di Vincenzo Fano Enrico Giannetto Giulia Giannini Pierluigi Graziani © ISONOMIA – Epistemologica All rights reserved. ISSN 2037-4348 Scientific Director: Gino Tarozzi Managing Director: Pierluigi Graziani Department of Foundation of Sciences P.za della Repubblica, 13 – 61029 Urbino (PU) http://isonomia.uniurb.it/ Design by [email protected] All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form, or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without prior permission, in writing, from the publisher. Sommario VINCENZO FANO, ENRICO GIANNETTO, GIULIA GIANNINI, PIERLUIGI GRAZIANI Riflettendo su complessità e riduzionismo ................................................................ 1 GIAN-ITALO BISCHI Modelli dinamici per le scienze sociali ..................................................................... 7 LUCIANO BOI Remarks on the geometry of complex systems and self-organization ..................... 21 CLAUDIO CALOSI, VINCENZO FANO Coscienza e fisicalismo minimale ........................................................................... 37 SALVO D'AGOSTINO Newton, Ampère, Maxwell, Einstein: sulla deduzione dei fenomeni ...................... 47 PIERLUIGI GRAZIANI Elementare ma complessa: la prospettiva della complessità computazionale attraverso il caso studio della geometria di Tarski ................................................ 59 ARCANGELO ROSSI Dai modelli riduzionistici della realtà fisica nella scienza classica alla complessità nella scienza contemporanea .............................................................. 75 ROBERTO SERRA Complex Systems Biology ....................................................................................... 93 GIORGIO TURCHETTI Dai modelli fisici ai sistemi complessi .................................................................. 101 SERGIO CHIBBARO, LAMBERTO RONDONI, ANGELO VULPIANI Considerazioni sui fondamenti della meccanica statistica ............................... © 2012Vincenzo Fano, Enrico Giannetto, Giulia Giannini, Pierluigi Graziani "Riflettendo su complessità e riduzionismo", in Complessità e riduzionismo, pp. 1-5 Published by Isonomia, Rivista online di Filosofia – Epistemologica – ISSN 2037-4348 Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo http://isonomia.uniurb.it/epistemologica 1 Riflettendo su complessità e riduzionismo Vincenzo Fano Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo [email protected] Enrico Giannetto Università degli Studi di Bergamo [email protected] Giulia Giannini Centre Alexandre Koyré, Paris [email protected] Pierluigi Graziani Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo [email protected] Il volume raccoglie gli atti della XIII Scuola Estiva di Filosofia della Fisica, tenutasi a Cesena dal 13 al 18 settembre 2010. A partire dal 1998, il Centro Interuniversitario di ricerca in Filosofia e Fondamenti della Fisica (Urbino, Bologna, Salento e Insubria) organizza annualmente una scuola estiva in collaborazione con la Società Italiana di Logica e Filosofia delle Scienze (SILFS) e il Comune di Cesena. La scuola, diventata ormai punto di riferimento annuale per studenti, insegnanti e studiosi di varie discipline, affronta ogni anno un tema differente invitando i maggiori esperti italiani sull'argomento. Dedicata a "Complessità e Riduzionismo", l'edizione del 2010 si è avvalsa anche della collaborazione della Scuola di Dottorato in Antropologia ed Epistemologia della Complessità dell'Università degli Complessità e riduzionismo 2 Studi di Bergamo che, dal 2002, promuove in Italia e nel mondo la formazione e il perfezionamento di ricercatori esperti nella complessità storica, filosofica e antropologica delle scienze naturali e umane. Come mostrano i contributi qui raccolti, durante i lavori della scuola, complessità e riduzionismo sono stati affrontati dai relatori a partire da prospettive diverse e sotto differenti punti di vista. Gian-Italo Bischi, dopo aver brevemente delineato la storia della progressiva matematizzazione dell'economia, si è concentrato soprattutto sull'utilizzo di modelli dinamici non lineari. Sviluppati inizialmente in ambito fisico e basati su equazioni di evoluzione, tali modelli deterministici vengono utilizzati per prevedere – ed eventualmente controllare – l'evoluzione temporale di sistemi reali. Secondo Bischi, la scoperta che modelli dinamici non lineari (tipici dei sistemi sociali che presentano continue interazioni e meccanismi di feed-back) possono esibire comportamenti di caos deterministico, caratterizzato dalla proprietà di amplificare in modo difficilmente prevedibile perturbazioni arbitrariamente piccole, ha suscitato un certo imbarazzo e nel contempo creato nuove possibilità. Imbarazzo perché la presenza di caos deterministico rende insostenibile l'ipotesi dell'agente economico razionale, ovvero capace di prevedere correttamente; ma apre anche nuove possibilità, poiché tale scoperta mostra che quei sistemi economici e sociali caratterizzati da fluttuazioni in apparenza casuali potrebbero in realtà essere governati da leggi del moto deterministiche (anche se non lineari). Se Bischi ha affrontato il tema della complessità in ambito economico, Salvo D'Agostino ha invece introdotto e approfondito il problema dei successi e dei fallimenti dell'assiomatizzazione in campo fisico. Uno degli aspetti più dibattuti della complessità sul versante scientifico e filosofico è infatti quello della supposta rinuncia a una generalizzazione dei procedimenti assiomatico-deduttivi come metodo generale della ricerca scientifica. A partire dalla considerazione che la fisica pre-relativistica è spesso stata considerata fondata prevalentemente sul trionfo di tale metodo, D'Agostino ha evidenziato la presenza di una posizione antagonista presente già in Newton e ripresa successivamente da Ampère e Maxwell. Alternativa al metodo assiomatico-deduttivo, tale prospettiva si fonda sul ricorso alla cosiddetta deduzione dai fenomeni. Una variazione sul tema, è stata individuata da D'Agostino anche nel contributo di Einstein in cui alla celebrazione del metodo assiomatico-deduttivo si contrappone una lode dell'osservazione dei fenomeni e della riflessione sugli esperimenti: è proprio ponendo il problema di una scelta o conciliazione fra le due che Fano, Giannetto, Giannini, Graziani: Riflettendo su complessità e riduzionismo 3 Einstein avrebbe, secondo D'Agostino, il merito di aver aperto la via al pensiero scientifico moderno. Sempre in ambito fisico, Arcangelo Rossi ha tracciato, da un punto di vista storico, il passaggio dai modelli riduzionistici che hanno caratterizzato lo studio delle realtà fisica nella scienza classica all'emergere della questione della complessità nella scienza contemporanea. In particolare, a partire dall'affermazione di Ernst Cassirer secondo cui la piena transizione da un'accezione sostantiva ed esplicativa dei modelli a una formale e funzionale sarebbe rintracciabile già alle origini della scienza moderna, Rossi ha mostrato come la visione della natura che emerge dalla scienza classica illuminista fosse comunque realista e riduzionista. Benché alcuni aspetti e alcune visioni non propriamente qualificabili come riduzioniste e meccaniciste siano già presenti all'interno della scienza classica, la tematica della complessità comincia a svilupparsi in fisica solo alla fine dell'Ottocento. Sergio Chibarro, Lamberto Rondoni e Angelo Vulpiani hanno affrontato il ruolo del caos e l'emergenza di proprietà collettive all'interno della meccanica statistica. In particolare, hanno mostrato l'esistenza di due posizioni nettamente diverse: da una parte il punto di vista "tradizionale", risalente a Boltzmann e parzialmente formalizzato da Khinchin, secondo cui la meccanica statistica sarebbe caratterizzata in primo luogo dall'enorme numero di gradi di libertà; dall'altro la scuola "moderna" cresciuta intorno a Prigogine e ai suoi collaboratori, che considera il caos come l'ingrediente fondamentale. Anche attraverso alcune simulazioni numeriche, gli autori hanno mostrato come anche all'interno della meccanica statistica si faccia avanti il problema della complessità e del riduzionismo. Sebbene i risultati di Khinchin non siano in grado di rispondere in modo definitivo a tutti i problemi sollevati dalla relazione fra termodinamica e meccanica statistica, il numero estremamente grande di gradi di libertà che tale approccio prende in considerazione permette l'emergere, nei sistemi macroscopici, di proprietà del tutto assenti in sistemi piccoli. Giorgio Turchetti ha introdotto il problema del passaggio dai modelli fisici ai sistemi complessi mostrando come i limiti che il disegno riduzionista incontra già per i sistemi fisici diventino decisamente più forti nel caso dei sistemi complessi. La grande differenza tra un sistema fisico e un sistema complesso risiederebbe infatti, secondo Turchetti, nel fatto che il primo, fissate le condizioni esterne, ha sempre le medesime proprietà, mentre il secondo cambia con il fluire del tempo, perché la sua organizzazione interna muta non solo al cambiare di fattori ambientali ma anche con il succedersi delle generazioni. È in tale prospettiva che egli Complessità e riduzionismo 4 giunge a definire complessi non tanto i sistemi caratterizzati da proprietà emergenti e da interazioni non lineari tra i loro componenti (definibili come sistemi dinamici), ma piuttosto i sistemi viventi o quelli di vita artificiale che ne condividono le proprietà essenziali. Il problema di complessità e riduzionismo in campo biologico è stato poi affrontato in maniera diretta da Luciano Boi e da Roberto Serra. Il primo ha mostrato come lo studio del comportamento dinamico delle strutture cellulari non possa essere descritto con sufficiente accuratezza né dalla convenzionale dinamica dell'equilibrio né da modelli statici e richieda quindi nuovi strumenti. In particolare, egli ha affrontato la necessità – per una comprensione del comportamento dei sistemi (dinamici) complessi – di un'adeguata conoscenza delle caratteristiche cinetiche e topologiche delle loro componenti. A differenza dello studio dei meccanismi molecolari, l'analisi del comportamento dinamico delle strutture cellulari non necessita tanto di una profonda e dettagliata conoscenza del comportamento di ogni singola molecola, ma piuttosto delle regole che governano il comportamento globale e collettivo dei sistemi. In consonanza con il contributo di Boi, Serra ha spiegato come la scienza dei sistemi complessi abbia mostrato l'esistenza di "leggi" in gran parte indipendenti dalle specifiche caratteristiche delle entità microscopiche che tuttavia ne descrivono il comportamento e l'interazione. Se la ricerca di proprietà generali ha ormai assunto una grande rilevanza in ambito fisico, nelle scienze biologiche si trova ancora nei suoi primi stadi di vita. Attraverso una serie di esempi, Serra ha mostrato come tale approccio, da considerarsi non in opposizione alla biologia molecolare classica ma a essa complementare, sembra però portare anche in ambito biologico a importanti e promettenti risultati. Emblematico in questo senso è per Serra il lavoro di Kauffman che rivela come un sistema dinamico di geni che interagiscono fra loro mostri delle proprietà di auto-organizzazione che spiegano alcuni aspetti della vita, fra cui l'esistenza di un numero limitato di tipi cellulari in ogni organismo multicellulare. Pierluigi Graziani ha affrontato invece il problema della complessità computazionale in riferimento alla decidibilità della geometria elementare di Tarski. A partire soprattutto dai lavori di Fisher, Rabin e Meyers e in confronto con il lavoro di Tarski, Graziani ha analizzato come il problema della decisione si trasformi nella determinazione di quanto tempo e spazio di memoria impieghi un algoritmo di decisione per una teoria a determinare se un enunciato della teoria ne sia o meno un teorema. In teoria della complessità computazionale, infatti, si assume che siano computazionalmente intrattabili quei compiti che richiedono risorse di Fano, Giannetto, Giannini, Graziani: Riflettendo su complessità e riduzionismo 5 tempo e spazio di memoria (le cosiddette risorse computazionali) che crescono esponenzialmente con la lunghezza dell'input; e che siano computazionalmente trattabili quelli che richiedono risorse che crescono al più in modo polinomiale con la lunghezza dell'input. In tale prospettiva, la complessità computazionale non concerne dunque quante risorse richiede lo svolgere un determinato compito, bensì quanto aumentano le risorse richieste al crescere delle dimensioni dei dati. Claudio Calosi e Vincenzo Fano hanno mostrato come il problema della complessità e del riduzionismo riguardi anche il rapporto fra psicologia e fisica. In particolare, hanno proposto qui un nuovo esperimento mentale che hanno chiamato Shem-Shaun – dal nome dei due gemelli protagonisti del Finnegan's Wake di Joyce – e che solleva un problema per il Fisicalismo minimale in filosofia della mente. Il fisicalismo minimale viene infatti caratterizzato come quella tesi secondo cui le proprietà mentali sopravvengono nomologicamente sulla proprietà fisiche, una forma di riduzionismo per cui, stabilite le proprietà fisiche del mondo, quelle mentali sarebbero necessariamente determinate. Gli autori sostengono che, o il Fisicalismo minimale è incapace di dare un resoconto adeguato dell'esperimento Shem-Shaun o ne deve dare un resoconto che è in forte tensione con la nostra attuale immagine scientifica del mondo. Nel loro insieme, i lavori presentati testimoniano da un lato la vivacità degli studi epistemologici sulla complessità e dall'altro l'importanza del concetto di complessità per la filosofia della scienza e, in particolare, della fisica. © 2012 Gian-Italo Bischi "Modelli dinamici per le scienze sociali", in Complessità e riduzionismo, pp. 7-19 Published by Isonomia, Rivista online di Filosofia – Epistemologica – ISSN 2037-4348 Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo http://isonomia.uniurb.it/epistemologica 7 Modelli dinamici per le scienze sociali Razionalità (limitata), interazione, aspettative Gian-Italo Bischi Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo [email protected] 1. Introduzione Nel corso del Novecento l'uso dei modelli matematici, che si era già rivelato così utile in fisica e ingegneria, è stato introdotto, talvolta con difficoltà non trascurabili, anche in discipline tradizionalmente considerate poco adatte ad un simile approccio, quali l'economia, la sociologia, la biologia. Un percorso che inizia prendendo a prestito molte delle idee e dei modelli della fisica, tanto che nel discorso inaugurale dell'anno accademico 1901-1902 all'Università di Roma il grande fisico matematico Vito Volterra (18601940) pronunciava le seguenti parole: «è intorno a quelle scienze nelle quali le matematiche solo da poco tempo hanno tentato d'introdursi, le scienze biologiche e sociali, che è più intensa la curiosità, giacché è forte il desiderio di assicurarsi se i metodi classici, i quali hanno dato così grandi risultati nelle scienze meccanico-fisiche, sono suscettibili di essere trasportati con pari successo nei nuovi ed inesplorati campi che si dischiudono loro dinanzi». In effetti l'economia arriverà, nel corso della prima metà del secolo, a un'elegante formulazione assiomatico-deduttiva della teoria dell'equilibrio economico, con l'utilizzo di metodi matematici eleganti e sofisticati. Ma le ipotesi di base, che coinvolgono concetti legati alle scelte degli individui influenzate dal loro livello di razionalità, influenzate da componenti psicologiche e interazioni sociali, condizionano fortemente i risultati ottenuti, e tuttora molti ritengono che il fatto che i metodi matematici si Complessità e riduzionismo 8 siano rivelati così utili in fisica non implica che lo siano anche per l'economia e le scienze sociali. La formalizzazione sempre più astratta di tali modelli, insieme alla loro difficoltà a spiegare e prevedere alcuni fenomeni economici e sociali osservati, ha portato a frequenti polemiche sulla reale opportunità di trasformare le discipline sociali in teorie matematiche, con strumenti che talvolta sembrano impiegati come fine a se stessi. In questo articolo, dopo aver brevemente delineato la storia della progressiva matematizzazione dell'economia, ci si concentrerà soprattutto sull'utilizzo in economia dei modelli dinamici non lineari, anche questi sviluppati inizialmente in fisica. Si tratta di modelli deterministici utilizzati per prevedere, ed eventualmente controllare, l'evoluzione temporale di sistemi reali. Basati su equazioni di evoluzione, espresse mediante equazioni differenziali o alle differenze a seconda che si consideri il tempo continuo o discreto, il loro studio qualitativo permette di ottenere informazioni sul tipo di comportamento che emergerà nel lungo periodo, e di come questo è influenzato dai principali parametri. La scoperta che modelli dinamici non lineari (che sono la regola nei sistemi sociali, caratterizzati da interazioni e meccanismi di feed-back) possono esibire comportamenti denotati col termine di caos deterministico per la proprietà di amplificare in modo difficilmente prevedibile perturbazioni arbitrariamente piccole (la cosiddetta sensitività rispetto alle condizioni iniziali, o "effetto farfalla") ha suscitato un certo imbarazzo e nel contempo creato nuove possibilità. L'imbarazzo è dovuto al fatto che, come descriveremo meglio in seguito, la presenza di caos deterministico rende insostenibile l'ipotesi di agente economico razionale, ovvero capace di prevedere correttamente. Le nuove possibilità sono legate al fatto che quei sistemi economici e sociali caratterizzati da fluttuazioni in apparenza casuali potrebbero essere governati da leggi del moto deterministiche (anche se non lineari). In ogni caso, gli studi sui sistemi dinamici non lineari hanno portato a distinguere fra la rappresentazione matematica deterministica e la prevedibilità. L'attuale crisi economica ha senz'altro contribuito a riaccendere il dibattito sul modo di studiare i sistemi economici e sociali e la capacità di spiegare e prevedere. Le scienze sociali, e in particolare l'economia, sono davvero una scienza? Come può una scienza non prevedere e non accorgersi di quello che sta succedendo? Si tratta, come vedremo nel seguito, di domande ricorrenti, e anche in questa occasione qualcuno ha detto che, inseguendo i formalismi matematici, si sta perdendo di vista la realtà, mentre altri sostengono che il problema sta negli specifici formalismi adottati, che quelli usati sono superati, legati ad una matematica "vecchia", Bischi: Modelli dinamici per le scienze sociali 9 magari mutuata in modo acritico da altre discipline. La speranza è allora che la crisi economica comporti un cambio di paradigma anche nella modellizzazione matematica. 2. La matematizzazione dell'economia Nonostante ci sia un importante precursore, costituito dal testo Récherches sur les principes matématiques de la théorie de la richesse pubblicato a Parigi da A.A. Cournot nel 1838, la nascita dell'economia matematica viene fatta risalire a tre opere che escono, quasi contemporaneamente, trent'anni dopo: si tratta di The Theory of Political Economy, pubblicata da W.S. Jevons nel 1871 a Londra; Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre (Principi di Economia) pubblicata da C. Menger a Vienna anch'essa nel 1871 e Eléments d'économie politique pure di L.Walras, Losanna 1877. In queste opere c'è un nuovo ruolo svolto dalla Matematica, non più semplice strumento per il calcolo algebrico ma elemento costitutivo e parte integrante dell'analisi economica, che segna la trasmigrazione dell'economia dal novero delle scienze morali a quello delle discipline scientifiche. Queste opere segnano l'inizio della cosiddetta "rivoluzione marginalista", ovvero la formulazione delle leggi dell'economia attraverso problemi di massimo e di minimo. In particolare, il principio che si assume come forza motrice è quello della massimizzazione dell'utilità attesa dagli individui, con funzioni di utilità di tipo ordinale definite sulla base di certi assiomi di scelta. Principi di minimizzazione o massimizzazione già permeavano tutta la fisica dell'epoca, e Walras, probabilmente il più rappresentativo dei tre autori, sostenne sempre l'esistenza di una stretta analogia tra l'economia e le scienze fisico-matematiche. Una spinta ancor più decisiva in tale direzione sarà poi data da Vilfredo Pareto, che dopo aver studiato Matematica a Torino nel 1892 succede a Walras sulla cattedra di Losanna. Il modello seguito rimane comunque la fisica, in particolare la meccanica, con i principi di massimo e di minimo che determinano i movimenti e gli equilibri. Pareto procede a partire da pochi assiomi iniziali, considerati incontrovertibili nella loro evidenza, che sviluppa poi con un rigoroso ragionamento deduttivo, per arrivare a concetti quali l'equilibrio economico generale. Pareto intende «disinquinare la scienza economica da politica e filosofia» prendendo come modello la meccanica razionale. Ovviamente questo suscitò non poche polemiche fra gli studiosi di discipline sociali, i quali si chiedevano se fosse possibile Complessità e riduzionismo 10 trasformare in quantitativa una scienza umana come l'economia, i cui procedimenti e le cui conclusioni coinvolgono pesantemente pregiudizi storici, culturali e politici. C'era inoltre il timore che l'impiego della matematica fornisse all'economia una particolare autorevolezza, che rischia di trasformarsi in presunta oggettività e che comunque rende difficile l'individuazione dei suoi condizionamenti ideologici Queste polemiche non scoraggiarono Pareto, che affermava: «L'economia non abbia timore di diventare un sistema assiomaticodeduttivo, ipotizzando agenti e processi economici idealizzati, così come la fisica utilizza con grande profitto entità come i corpi rigidi, i fili inestensibili e privi di massa, i gas perfetti, le superfici prive di attrito...». Famosi i suoi "specchietti" (in doppia colonna) che presentano gli elementi alla base dello studio dei fenomeni meccanici e i loro corrispondenti per quelli economici. C'è da notare che questa impostazione dell'economia ha costituito a sua volta un fattore decisivo per la definitiva affermazione in matematica dei sistemi formali, in quanto per la prima volta il metodo assiomaticodeduttivo veniva applicato al di fuori dei tradizionali contesti della geometria o della fisica. Questa affermazione diventa ancor più vera con le opere di Gerard Debreu (1921–2004), premio Nobel per l'economia nel 1983, che nella prefazione della sua opera The Theory of Value (1959) scrive: «la teoria del valore è trattata qui secondo gli standard di rigore dell'attuale scuola formalista di Matematica. La fedeltà all'esigenza del rigore impone all'analisi una forma assiomatica in cui la vera e propria teoria rimane completamente separata dalle sue interpretazioni». In questo volume, che ha fatto parlare di bourbakismo in economia, all'utilizzo del calcolo differenziale e dell'algebra delle matrici si aggiungono quelli dell'analisi convessa, la teoria degli insiemi, la topologia, la teoria della misura, gli spazi vettoriali, l'analisi globale. Lo standard di rigore logico della matematica è ormai la regola, non più l'eccezione. Ma lo stesso Debreu scriveva anche che «la seduzione della forma matematica può diventare quasi irresistibile. Nel perseguimento di tale forma, può darsi che il ricercatore sia tentato di dimenticare il contenuto economico e di evitare quei problemi economici che non siano direttamente assoggettabili a matematizzazione»1. C'è poi il solito problema che, a differenza degli oggetti della fisica, il comportamento di esseri umani è più difficile da descrivere mediante modelli matematici. Come amava stigmatizzare il grande economista John Maynard Keynes (1883–1946) non basta semplicemente adattare i metodi e 1 Citazione tratta da Gandolfo (1989). Bischi: Modelli dinamici per le scienze sociali 11 i ragionamenti della fisica alla modellizzazione dell'economia perché «L'economia è una scienza morale [...] essa ha a che vedere con motivazioni, aspettative, incertezze psicologiche. Si deve essere costantemente attenti a non trattare questo materiale come se fosse costante ed omogeneo. È come se la caduta della mela al suolo dipendesse dalle aspirazioni della mela, se per lei sia conveniente o meno cadere a terra, se il suolo vuole che essa cada, e se vi sono stati errori di calcolo da parte della mela sulla sua reale distanza dal centro del pianeta»2. E si potrebbe anche aggiungere: come e quanto la mela si fa condizionare dal comportamento delle altre mele, le aspettative che la mela ha sugli esiti della sua caduta, le informazioni che la mela ha sulle decisioni delle altre mele e sulle condizioni del suolo su cui andrà a cadere, ecc. Questi problemi erano stati chiaramente delineati già agli albori dell'economia matematica, in una famosa lettera di Jules Henri Poincaré (1854–1912) a Léon Walras, in cui si trova il seguente passo: «Ho pensato che all'inizio di ogni speculazione matematica ci sono delle ipotesi e che, perché questa speculazione sia fruttuosa occorre, come del resto nelle applicazioni della Fisica, che ci si renda conto di queste ipotesi. Per esempio, in Meccanica si trascura spesso l'attrito e si guarda ai corpi come infinitamente lisci. Lei guarda agli uomini come infinitamente egoisti ed infinitamente perspicaci. La prima ipotesi può essere accettata come prima approssimazione, ma la seconda necessiterebbe forse di qualche cautela»3. Il problema evidenziato da Poincaré nasce dal tentativo di Walras (e del marginalismo in generale) di introdurre l'ipotesi della perfetta razionalità, col solo fine di ottenere risultati formali. In effetti nei modelli dei marginalisti, in cui si assume che gli agenti prendano decisioni in modo da massimizzare l'utilità attesa, occorre qualche ipotesi sulla distribuzione di probabilità dei possibili stati futuri dell'economia. L'ipotesi di "homo oeconomicus", l'agente idealizzato perfettamente razionale e informato, in grado di risolvere problemi di ottimizzazione e capace di prevedere gli sviluppi futuri dell'economia in quanto ne conosce le leggi così come un fisico conosce le leggi della natura, è in contrasto con gli studi in cui si evidenzia che la componente psicologica e le limitate capacità e informazioni hanno un ruolo fondamentale nel comportamento degli agenti economici. 2 Questi passaggi sono riportati nel vol. XIV dei Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Keynes (1973, 296-300). 3 Lettera ricevuta da Walras il 1° ottobre 1901, riportata in Elèments d'économie politique pure, 4 ed.. Complessità e riduzionismo 12 Anche Herbert Simon (1916–2001), Nobel per l'Economia nel 1978, aveva parlato, negli anni 50, di agenti economici limitatamente razionali affermando che «Non è empiricamente evidente che gli imprenditori e i consumatori nel prendere decisioni seguano i principi di massimizzazione dell'utilità richiesti dai modelli dei marginalisti, in parte perché non hanno informazioni sufficienti, o le necessarie capacità di calcolo. Quindi nei modelli occorre prevedere che gli agenti siano incerti sul futuro e occorre includere i costi per reperire informazioni. Questi fattori limitano le capacità degli agenti nel fare previsioni». Inoltre l'ipotesi che tutti gli agenti siano razionali comporta anche che possono essere rappresentati da un unico prototipo, chiamato agente razionale "rappresentativo", mentre nella realtà ogni comunità di operatori economici si presenta estremamente variegata, e in modelli non lineari l'azione congiunta di agenti eterogenei non può essere sostituita con il comportamento medio di un ipotetico agente rappresentativo. Nonostante queste obiezioni, l'ipotesi dell'agente rappresentativo razionale è diventata dominante dagli anni '60 in poi, e questo solleva molti dubbi, anche logici, dato che l'agente economico è parte del sistema che studia, un problema che i fisici hanno per la prima incontrato nello studio della meccanica quantistica e che si è portato dietro molte conseguenze, paradossi e interpretazioni che fanno tuttora discutere. Il principale motivo per cui il paradigma dell'agente razionale rappresentativo, associato a quello dei mercati efficienti, è diventato il modello teorico dominante (modello neoclassico) è che esso prevede che l'economia raggiungerà un equilibrio in cui tutte le relazioni economiche necessarie (come ad esempio i vincoli di bilancio) saranno rispettate. Questo approccio, fortemente radicato nei metodi di ottimizzazione che portano alla teoria dell'equilibrio generale, porta alla convinzione che i mercati sono in grado di auto-correggersi e che il ruolo dei governi è tutt'al più quello di "regolatori dalla mano leggera". Questo punto di vista è diventato via via più articolato, e hanno cominciato a farsi strada modelli intrinsecamente dinamici, con agenti limitatamente razionali, eterogenei, che prendono decisioni sulla base di un set informativo limitato, talvolta asimmetrico, attraverso procedimenti adattivi basati su meccanismi di "trial and error". Simili modelli, come vedremo nel prossimo paragrafo, possono condurre ad evoluzioni temporali che non si assestano mai su un equilibrio stazionario, e possono facilmente condurre a oscillazioni del sistema economico, con alti e bassi che si generano endogenamente, ovvero senza shock esterni, attraverso Bischi: Modelli dinamici per le scienze sociali 13 procedimenti non lineari tipici dei sistemi dissipativi che operano in condizioni di disequilibrio. 3. Modelli dinamici in economia e scienze sociali Un sistema dinamico viene identificato mediante un certo numero di grandezze misurabili, dette variabili di stato, ciascuna delle quali è una funzione della variabile t, che rappresenta il tempo. Esse possono essere raccolte in un vettore a n componenti x(t)=[(x1(t), x2(t), ..., xn(t)], punto geometrico in uno spazio a n dimensioni, detto spazio degli stati, che in ogni istante t si assume rappresenti il sistema. Assegnato il vettore di stato x0 ad un istante iniziale t0, l'evoluzione del sistema dinamico è idealmente rappresentata da un operatore x(t)=Φ (t0, x0; t) che permette di determinare lo stato del sistema ad ogni istante di tempo successivo, ovvero la traiettoria del sistema. La variabile tempo può essere pensata come un numero reale, e allora diremo che il tempo varia in modo continuo, oppure come un numero naturale, e allora diremo che il tempo varia in modo discreto, cioè assumendo valori multipli di una data unità di misura. Nel caso di tempo continuo vengono definite delle equazioni locali di evoluzione, o equazioni del moto, mediante equazioni differenziali che descrivono come la rapidità di variazione di ciascuna variabile di stato (espressa dalla derivata prima rispetto al tempo) dipende da se stessa e dalle altre variabili: ( )1 2, ,..., ; 1,...,i i n dx f x x x i n dt α= = ; xi(0) assegnati, dove fi è la funzione che determina l'evoluzione della i ma variabile di stato, α rappresenta l'insieme dei parametri da cui dipende la legge del moto. In pratica, dalla conoscenza delle variabili di stato e dei loro tassi di variazione (o velocità) in un istante di tempo, si può calcolare lo stato a un istante successivo e così via. Invece nel caso di tempo discreto la legge del moto, che "trasforma" lo stato del sistema al tempo t nello stato al tempo successivo t+1, viene rappresentata sotto forma di equazioni alle differenze: xi (t+1) = fi ( x(t), α ), i=1,...,n; xi(0) assegnati. Il fatto che il tempo possa essere considerato una variabile discreta può sembrare strano, eppure costituisce una buona rappresentazione del fatto che Complessità e riduzionismo 14 in certi contesti il tempo viene scandito da eventi, in genere decisioni che non possono essere rivedute in ogni istante: l'impresa che assume operai o l'agricoltore che semina una determinata quantità di grano non possono modificare la propria decisione in ogni momento, in quanto l'azienda dovrà attendere il successivo consiglio d'amministrazione e l'agricoltore la successiva stagione di semina. Le equazioni del moto di un sistema dinamico sono quindi perfettamente deterministiche, simili a quelle usate in meccanica celeste per descrivere e prevedere il moto di pianeti e comete. Questi modelli avevano portato Laplace a enunciare, nel 1776, quello che sarebbe poi diventato il manifesto del determinismo4: «Lo stato attuale del sistema della natura consegue evidentemente da quello che era all'istante precedente e se noi immaginassimo un'intelligenza che a un istante dato comprendesse tutte le relazioni fra le entità di questo universo, essa potrebbe conoscere le rispettive posizioni, i moti e le disposizioni generali di tutte quelle entità in qualunque istante del futuro». Parole quasi identiche erano state usate circa un secolo prima da Leibniz, che scriveva «Vediamo allora che ogni cosa procede in modo matematico – cioè infallibilmente – nel mondo intero, in modo che se qualcuno avesse una sufficiente capacità di conoscere a fondo le cose, e avesse abbastanza intelligenza e memoria per considerare tutte le circostanze e tenerne conto, questi potrebbe essere un profeta e potrebbe vedere il futuro nel presente come in uno specchio».5 Queste affermazioni così evidenti nel mondo della fisica, non lo sono in economia e nelle scienze sociali, in quanto in questi contesti lo stato attuale consegue sì da quelli del passato, ma dipende anche dalle decisioni degli individui che lo compongono, decisioni che sono influenzate dalle aspettative che essi hanno sul futuro. Si rende quindi necessario formulare dei modelli in cui le aspettative degli agenti sul futuro si riflettono sul modo in cui i sistemi evolvono. Si ottengono quindi modelli "con aspettative", che possiamo immaginare formulati in uno dei modi seguenti: xt+1=f( )( 1 e tx + ) oppure xt=f( )( 1 e tx + ), 4 Laplace (1776). 5 Cassirer (1956), traduzione mia. Bischi: Modelli dinamici per le scienze sociali 15 dove l'apice (e) significa expected. In altre parole, il paradigma classico "Lo stato attuale di un sistema deriva dagli stati precedenti" si modifica nel seguente "Lo stato attuale di un sistema deriva dalle aspettative che gli agenti hanno sul futuro del sistema stesso", affermazione che rischia di portarsi dietro non pochi paradossi e meccanismi autoreferenziali. I sistemi dinamici, sia deterministici che stocastici, hanno svolto un ruolo di primaria importanza nello sviluppo dell'economia matematica, soprattutto in connessione con l'esigenza di prevedere e controllare l'evoluzione temporale dei sistemi economici e sociali. In particolare, a partire dagli anni '30, un tema ricorrente nella letteratura è stato il confronto fra modelli deterministici e stocastici come possibili strumenti per descrivere le oscillazioni irregolari e persistenti osservate nei sistemi economici, in netto contrasto sia con la convergenza a un equilibrio stazionario prevista dai modelli lineari dell'equilibrio economico, che con la periodicità delle oscillazioni endogene previste dai primi modelli deterministici non lineari del ciclo economico. Questo aveva portato a una crescente popolarità dei modelli lineari stabili arricchiti da termini stocastici per rappresentare continui shock esogeni, la cui presenza è in grado di provocare le oscillazioni persistenti che si osservano nei dati reali. Tuttavia, un altro importante aspetto, intimamente legato allo studio dei sistemi dinamici non lineari, ha acquisito fondamentale importanza. Si tratta del fenomeno del caos deterministico6, un apparente ossimoro che indica la possibilità di generare, mediante modelli deterministici non lineari, evoluzioni temporali praticamente indistinguibili da traiettorie casuali (ed estremamente sensibili a variazioni, anche impercettibili, delle condizioni iniziali). Lo descriviamo utilizzando le parole di Poincaré (1903)7, che esprimono la prima chiara distinzione fra caso e caos deterministico: Una causa minima, che ci sfugge, determina un effetto considerevole, del quale non possiamo non accorgerci: diciamo allora che questo effetto è dovuto al caso. Se conoscessimo esattamente le leggi della natura e la situazione dell'universo all'istante iniziale, potremmo prevedere esattamente la situazione dello stesso universo in un instante successivo. Ma se pure accadesse che le leggi naturali non avessero più alcun segreto per noi, anche in tal caso potremmo conoscere la situazione iniziale solo approssimativamente. Se questo ci permettesse di prevedere la situazione successiva con la stessa approssimazione, non ci occorrerebbe di più e dovremmo dire che il fenomeno è stato previsto. Ma non è sempre così; può accadere che piccole differenze nelle condizioni iniziali ne producano di grandissime nei fenomeni 6 Si veda ad esempio Bischi, G.I., Carini, R., Gardini, L., Tenti P. (2004). 7 Il passo è tratto da Poincaré (1997, 56). Complessità e riduzionismo 16 finali. Un piccolo errore nelle prime produce un errore enorme nei secondi. La previsione diviene impossibile [...]. Quindi la capacità di effettuare previsioni mediante modelli dinamici non lineari in regime caotico è piuttosto limitata a causa di quella che è stata poi chiamata sensitività rispetto alle condizioni iniziali, o anche effetto farfalla dopo la metafora coniata nel 1972 dal meteorologo Edward Lorenz. Negli anni '70 del secolo scorso la crescente diffusione dei concetti e delle tecniche matematiche legate al caos deterministico ha mostrato la possibilità di generare fluttuazioni irregolari senza bisogno di termini stocastici, suggerendo quindi che nei sistemi economici reali ci possono essere meccanismi endogeni capaci di creare il disordine osservato nell'economia reale, senza bisogno di eventi che scuotano i sistemi dall'esterno. La scoperta che anche modelli dinamici molto semplici sono in grado di generare caos deterministico, unitamente alla constatazione che modelli di questo genere possono essere facilmente ottenuti con ipotesi del tutto standard di equilibrio economico generale e di competizione perfetta, di informazione completa e aspettative razionali, ha scosso le basi di molte delle idee alle quali si erano abituati gli economisti, in quanto ha spezzato il legame fra determinismo e prevedibilità, creando nel contempo un'imbarazzante antinomia fra dinamiche caotiche e aspettative razionali.8 Infatti, se un modello economico presenta dinamiche caotiche ipotizzando che gli agenti economici siano razionali, allora per definizione di caos deterministico essi in realtà non possono in alcun modo raggiungere nelle loro previsioni la precisione infinita richiesta per evitare gli effetti dell'estrema sensitività delle dinamiche caotiche. In altre parole, se si parte da un modello con aspettative razionali e si scopre che esso genera caos deterministico, allora le previsioni non possono essere razionali (cioè perfette)9. Inoltre, una delle peculiarità dei modelli dinamici utilizzati in economia, e nelle scienze sociali in genere, consiste nel considerare il tempo discreto (event-driven time) ovvero leggi del moto espresse mediante equazioni alle differenze anziché equazioni differenziali. Questo porta ad ottenere con maggior facilità dinamiche caotiche, in quanto la dinamica a tempo discreto può condurre a oscillazioni legate a eccessiva reattività degli agenti, detti anche fenomeni di "overshooting", e quindi a dinamiche più irregolari di quelli a tempo continuo. 8 Si veda: Bischi, G.I., (2010). 9 Si vedano ad esempio tre celebri articoli: Benhabib, Day (1982), Boldrin, Montrucchio, (1986), Grandmont, (1985). Bischi: Modelli dinamici per le scienze sociali 17 4. Conclusioni In questo articolo si è brevemente delineato il percorso attraverso il quale l'economia si è trasformata da scienza morale a scienza formale, dotandosi di un formalismo matematico ipotetico-deduttivo simile a quello della meccanica razionale. Il paradigma neoclassico, fondato sulle ipotesi di mercati efficienti e agente rappresentativo dotato di aspettative razionali, sta mostrando diversi punti di debolezza di fronte ai fenomeni osservati nell'evoluzione dei sistemi economici reali, e nuove ipotesi di carattere psicologico, economico e sociale, unitamente a nuove tecniche matematiche, sono state chiamate in causa come risposta all'incapacità mostrata dagli attuali modelli di prevedere e proporre rimedi alla crisi economica e finanziaria in atto. Ai modelli dinamici con agenti limitatamente razionali ed eterogenei si aggiungono modelli evolutivi basati su reti di agenti interagenti i cui microcomportamenti, basati su interazioni strategiche individuali, portano nel lungo periodo, e su larga scala, a far emergere macrocomportamenti collettivi10. Si stanno così facendo strada modelli in cui gli agenti sono limitatamente razionali e procedono in modo adattivo, ovvero attraverso tipici processi di "trial and error". Ci si chiede innanzi tutto sotto quali condizioni, da tali modelli, possono emergere nel lungo periodo comportamenti simili a quelli di agenti dotati di razionalità perfetta. Talvolta esistono diversi tipi di possibili evoluzioni di lungo periodo, cioè diversi attrattori, alcuni di tipo razionale, ovvero in cui le aspettative vengono confermate, e altri di tipo "perverso", cioè diversi rispetto alle aspettative. In questi casi il tipo di evoluzione diventa path-dependent, cioè condizionato da shock esterni. Un ruolo sempre più importante nella modellistica economica è svolto dalla teoria dei giochi11, un settore della matematica in grande espansione il cui testo fondante Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, di John Von Neumann e Oskar Morgenstern, è stato pubblicato nel 1944. Si tratta, forse per la prima volta, di un settore della matematica nato appositamente per la modellizzazione delle scienze sociali, in quanto creato proprio per descrivere l'interazione strategica fra soggetti umani, quindi non 10 Si veda Schelling (1978). 11 Per una introduzione elementare si veda Bischi, (2010b). Complessità e riduzionismo 18 semplicemente mutuato dalla fisica. Anche in questo caso si stanno diffondendo in letteratura modelli basati sulla teoria dei giochi in cui gli agenti sono considerati limitatamente razionali e con un set informativo incompleto. Sicuramente interessanti, in simili contesti, le situazioni in cui il comportamento di ogni individuo è influenzato dalla società in cui vive, essendo poi la società, ovviamente, costituita dai singoli individui. Questo porta a un trade-offs fra comportamenti individuali e proprietà sociali emergenti. Infine, c'è attualmente una generale impressione che la crisi economica possa portare a un cambio di paradigma anche nel modo di fare modelli matematici nelle scienze sociali, spostandolo sempre più verso temi e metodi legati alla teoria della complessità, dalla meccanica statistica alla simulazione ad agenti, modelli dinamici di reti sociali (social networks) e giochi evolutivi. Da questo punto di vista, possiamo dire che sicuramente «viviamo tempi interessanti»12. Riferimenti Benhabib, J. e Day, R., 1982, «A characterization of erratic dynamics in the overlapping generations model», Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 4, pp. 37-55. Bischi, G.I., Carini, R., Gardini, L., Tenti P., 2004, Sulle Orme del Caos. Comportamenti complessi in modelli matematici semplici, Bruno Mondadori Editore, Milano. Bischi, G.I., 2010a, «Caos deterministico, modelli matematici e prevedibilità», APhEx, Il portale italiano di filosofia analitica, Giornale di Filosofia n. 2, http://www.aphex.it/index.php?Temi=557D030122027403210304767 773. Bischi, G.I., 2010b, «Decisioni strategiche e dilemmi sociali. Orientarsi fra le scelte con la teoria dei giochi», Thauma n. 04, Thauma Edizioni, Pesaro, pp. 151-177. Boldrin, M. e Montrucchio, L., 1986, «On the Indeterminacy of Capital Accumulation Paths», Journal of Economic Theory 40, pp. 26-39. Cassirer, E., 1956, Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics, Yale University Press, New Haven. 12 Affermazione contenuta nell'articolo di Chiarella (2010). Si veda anche, nello stesso volume, Landini (2010) e Terna (2010). Bischi: Modelli dinamici per le scienze sociali 19 Chiarella, C., 2010, «What's beyond? Alcuni punti di vista sul futuro dell'economia matematica» in: Bischi, G.I., Guerraggio, A., «L'economia matematica. La sua storia nel Novecento, il suo presente», Lettera Matematica Pristem, n.74-75. Gandolfo, G., 1989, «Sull'uso della matematica in economia», Bollettino U.M.I., (7) 3-A, pp. 250-278. Grandmont, J.M., 1985, «Endogenous Competitive Business Cycles», Econometrica 53, pp. 995-1045. Keynes, J. M., 1973, Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, a cura di D. E. Moggridge, Macmillan e Cambridge University Press, pp. 296300. Landini, S., 2010, «Tra complessità e reti: un approccio fisico-statistico alle scienze sociali» in: Bischi, G.I., Guerraggio, A., «L'economia matematica. La sua storia nel Novecento, il suo presente», Lettera Matematica Pristem, n.74-75. Laplace, P. S., (1776), Théorie analytique des probabilitiés, V. Courcier, Paris 1820. Poincaré, H., 1997, Scienza e metodo, Einaudi, Torino. Schelling, T., 1978, Micromotives and Macrobehavior, W. W. Norton, New York. Terna, P., 2010, «Complessità, evoluzione e simulazione ad agenti in economia» in: Bischi, G.I., Guerraggio, A., «L'economia matematica. La sua storia nel Novecento, il suo presente», Lettera Matematica Pristem, n.74-75. © 2012 Luciano Boi "Remarks on the Geometry of Complex Systems and Self-Organisation" in Complessità e riduzionismo, pp. 21-36 Published by Isonomia, Rivista online di Filosofia – Epistemologica – ISSN 2037-4348 Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo http://isonomia.uniurb.it/epistemologica 21 Remarks on the Geometry of Complex Systems and Self-Organization Luciano Boi École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris [email protected] 1. Introductory remarks on the geometry of complexity Let us start by some general definitions of the concept of complexity. We take a complex system to be one composed by a large number of parts, and whose properties are not fully explained by an understanding of its components parts. Studies of complex systems recognized the importance of "wholeness", defined as problems of organization (and of regulation), phenomena non resolvable into local events, dynamics interactions in the difference of behaviour of parts when isolated or in higher configuration, etc., in short, systems of various orders (or levels) not understandable by investigation of their respective parts in isolation. In a complex system it is essential to distinguish between 'global' and 'local' properties. Theoretical physicists in the last two decades have discovered that the collective behaviour of a macro-system, i.e. a system composed of many objects, does not change qualitatively when the behaviour of single components are modified slightly. Conversely, it has been also found that the behaviour of single components does change when the overall behaviour of the system is modified. There are many universal classes which describe the collective behaviour of the system, and each class has its own characteristics; the universal classes do not change when we perturb the system. The most interesting and rewarding work consists in finding these universal classes Complessità e riduzionismo 22 and in spelling out their properties. This conception has been followed in studies done in the last twenty years on second order phase transitions. The objective, which has been mostly achieved, was to classify all possible types of phase transitions in different universality classes and to compute the parameters that control the behaviour of the system near the transition (or critical or bifurcation) point as a function of the universality class. This point of view is not very different from the one expressed by Thom in the introduction of Structural Stability and Morphogenesis (1975). It differs from Thom's program because there is no a priori idea of the mathematical framework which should be used. Indeed Thom considers only a restricted class of models (ordinary differential equations in low dimensional spaces) while we do not have any prejudice regarding which models should be accepted. One of the most interesting and surprising results obtained by studying complex systems is the possibility of classifying the configurations of the system taxonomically. It is well-known that a well founded taxonomy is possible only if the objects we want to classify have some unique properties, i.e. species may be introduced in an objective way only if it is impossible to go continuously from one specie to another; in a more mathematical language, we say that objects must have the property of ultrametricity. More precisely, it was discovered that there are conditions under which a class of complex systems may only exist in configurations that have the ultrametricity property and consequently they can be classified in a hierarchical way. Indeed, it has been found that only this ultrametricity property is shared by the near-optimal solutions of many optimization problems of complex functions, i.e. corrugated landscapes in Kauffman's language. These results are derived from the study of spin glass model, but they have wider implications. It is possible that the kind of structures that arise in these cases is present in many other apparently unrelated problems. Before to go on with our considerations, we have to pick in mind two main complementary ideas about complexity. (i) According to the prevalent and usual point of view, the essence of complex systems lies in the emergence of complex structures from the non-linear interaction of many simple elements that obey simple rules. Typically, these rules consist of 0–1 alternatives selected in response to the input received, as in many prototypes like cellular automata, Boolean networks, spin systems, etc. Quite intricate patterns and structures can occur in such systems. However, what can be also said is that these are toy systems, and the systems occurring in reality rather consist of elements that individually are quite complex themselves. (ii) So, this bring a new aspect that seems essential and indispensable to the Boi: Remarks on the Geometry of Complex Systems and Self-Organization 23 emergence and functioning of complex systems, namely the coordination of individual agents or elements that themselves are complex at their own scale of operation. This coordination dramatically reduces the degree of freedom of those participating agents. Even the constituents of molecules, i.e. the atoms, are rather complicated conglomerations of subatomic particles, perhaps ultimately excitations of patterns of superstrings. Genes, the elementary biochemical coding units, are very complex macromolecular strings, as are the metabolic units, the proteins. Neurons, the basic elements of cognitive networks, themselves are cells. In those mentioned and in other complex systems, it is an important feature that the potential complexity of the behaviour of the individual agents gets dramatically simplified through the global interactions within the system. The individual degrees of freedom are drastically reduced, or, in a more formal terminology, the factual space of the system is much smaller than the product of the state space of the individual elements. That is one key aspect. The other one is that on this basis, that is utilizing the coordination between the activities of its members, the system then becomes able to develop and express a coherent structure at a higher level, that is, an emergent behaviour (and emergent properties) that transcends what each element is individually capable of. 2. Complex systems There are many different definitions of a complex system. It may range from the classical algorithmic complexity (Kolmogorov, Chaitin) to more recent and sophisticated definitions, such as: chemical definitions, statistical-physics definitions, topological-dynamic definitions, biological definition, etc. We already have given the most common and general definition in the literature of complex systems. It should be clear, however, that any given definition (especially a mathematical one) couldn't capture all the complex meaning we associate with the word complexity. One interesting definition rest on the basic idea that the more complex the system, the more can be said about. I am excluding the factual description of the system, which may be very long. I refer only to the global characteristics. A few examples will help clarify this point. If I have a sequence of randomly tossed coins, 50% probability head, I have described the system. The only improvement would be the knowledge of the sequence itself. If on the contrary the sequence of bits represents a book, there is much more information, such as style, choice of words, the plot and so on. Complessità e riduzionismo 24 If the book is really deep, complex, there are a very large number of things that can be said about it. Sometimes the complexity is related to the existence of different levels of description: one can describe an Escherichia coli at the molecular level, at the biochemical level, and at the functional level. If we move towards a mathematical definition, we must realize that the concept of complexity, like entropy, is of probabilistic nature and it can be defined more precisely if we try to define the complexity of ensembles of objects of the same category. This is related to the notion of classification. The meaning of a complex classification is quite clear intuitively: a classification is very complex if there are many levels (i.e. orders, families, genera) and there are many elements in each level. Consequently a reasonable mathematical definition of the complexity of a classification should be possible. 3. External and internal complexity Let's now introduce the notions of external and internal complexity of complex adaptive systems. These concepts are especially useful to analyze relations between an adaptive system and its environment. All open systems, let they be either thermodynamics, biological or cognitive, are chiefly concerned with this relation. A complex adaptive system is situated in an environment. That environment is always more complex than the system itself, and therefore, it can never be completely predictable for the system, but the system depends on regularities of the environment for maintaining its energy supply needed to support its internal structure. One important hypothesis one can suggest is that complex adaptive systems try to increase their external complexity and to reduce internal complexity. Each of two processes will operate on its own scale, but they are also intricately linked and mutually dependent upon each other. The increase of internal complexity can for example occur through the creation of redundancy, e.g. duplication of some internal units or structures. The property of redundancy is very important in biological systems at the genetic level as well as at other more complex levels; for example, a same gene may realize different functions and, on the other hand, many genes may accomplish the same function. Upon this redundancy, a process of differentiation or specialization can operate, through controlled random mechanisms or internal selection, so that the system will become able to Boi: Remarks on the Geometry of Complex Systems and Self-Organization 25 handle more diverse input and thereby increase its external complexity. Once this happened, the system can then again try to represent this newly acquired input more efficiently and thus decrease its internal complexity. Conversely, for the decrease of internal complexity, the system can also find some of its input as irrelevant and meaningless for its purposes and thus decrease the external complexity. As first definition, one can say that external complexity measures the amount of input, information, energy obtained from the environment that the system is capable of handling, processing. It is important that this can be measured as an entropy – and therefore, terms like "energy" need some qualification when employed in this context. In this sense, external complexity is data complexity. Internal complexity can be defined as what that measures the complexity of the representation of this input by the system. In this sense, internal complexity is model complexity. The system will try to increase (or maximize) its external complexity, and to reduce (or minimize) its internal complexity. We now proceed to give formal definitions of our complexity notions based on the concept of entropy from statistical mechanics and information theory. Given a model θ, the system can model data as X(θ), with X = (X1,..., Xk), and we assume that X(θ) introduces an internal probability distribution P(X(θ)) so that an entropy can be computed in (1) bellow. Our hypothesis then is that the system will try to maximize the external complexity, – ∑ki=1 P(Xi(θ)) log2 P(Xi(θ)). (1) The purpose of the probability distribution P(X(θ)) is simply to qualify the information value of the data X(θ). In principle, this quantification is also possible through other means, for example, through the length of the representation of the data in the internal code of the system. If we assume optimal coding, however, which is a consequence of the minimization of internal complexity, then the length of the representation of a datum Xi(θ) behaves like log2 P(Xi(θ)) (a code is god if frequent inputs are represented by short code words.) The system can try to increase the amount of information X(θ) that is meaningful within the given model θ on a short time scale, or it can adapt the model θ on a larger time scale so as to be able to process more inputs as meaningful. When the input is given, however, for example when the Complessità e riduzionismo 26 system has gathered input on a time scale when the distribution of input patterns ε1 becomes stationary, then the model should be improved to handle that input as efficiently as possible, i.e. to decrease the internal complexity which we now define as follows = – ∑ki=1 P(εi(θ)) log2 P(εi/(θ)) – log2 P(θ). (2) The variation is given by minθ (– log2 P(ε/θ) – log2 P(θ)). (3) The expression to be minimized now consists of two terms, the first measuring how efficiently the data are encoded by the model, and the second one how complicated the model is. Of course the probability P(θ) assigned to a model depends on the internal structure of the system, and in principle, that internal structure then also became subject to optimization, in the sense that frequently used or otherwise important models get higher probabilities than obscure ones. 3.1. Pattern recognition in a neural network We only mention the principle according to which a neural network can recognize patterns on the basis of a selective evaluation of inputs features via an internal feedback loop. (No detailed description will be presented here). We assume that the network or system has stored or identified a collection of patterns labelled by i = 1,..., n. These patterns might correspond to faces, visual shapes or other geometric objects; for thinking about this example, it is probably useful to think about patterns to be recognized in visual scenes. Also, on its input, the system can evaluate certain features α = 1,..., m, like edges, corners, or better, features of a somewhat higher level, like specific distribution of input pixels on some small sub-regions of the retina, or relative distances between certain conspicuous points of the scene. It is important for understanding the purpose of the network (the system) that we assume to in a situation where the network is not capable of evaluating all the possible features 1 We use a different letter now to denote the inputs because we are now considering patterns on a different time scale. Boi: Remarks on the Geometry of Complex Systems and Self-Organization 27 simultaneously in its inputs, simply because there are typically far too many possibilities. Rather the idea is that the network will selectively perform observations, that is, evaluate those features that have the highest potential for discriminating between these patterns that are probable candidates on the basis of the observations already performed. Thus, the basic design principle is a feedback loop between observations that affect the probability distribution in the space of patterns and the selection of further observations on the basis of that probability distribution. We first need to implement the relationship between patterns and features. This can be done on the basis of supervised learning as is standard in neural networks. So, the observed values xα of the features induces activations yi of the patterns: yi : ƒ( α Σ wiα xα), (4) where ƒ might be a sigmoid function ƒ(s) = 1/1+e–ks, where for our purpose a rather large value of the parameter k might be best so as to get a sharp threshold later on. Namely, we call a pattern i activated if yi > θ is some threshold that we can turn to our convenience, perhaps again by supervised learning. The wiα are weights that can likewise be learned through supervised Hebbian learning. The essential point is that they should be positive, and perhaps large, if feature α occurs in pattern i, and 0 or negative if not. 4. Examples of complex systems Let us now give briefly some examples of complex systems took from different disciplines: chemistry, biology and physics. In all this examples, understanding how parts of a living system – genes or molecules – interacts is just as important as understanding the parts themselves. In Chemistry the word complexity present some ambiguity and it is highly dependent on context. In one characterization a complex system is: (i) one whose evolution is very sensitive to initial conditions or to small perturbations; (ii) one in which the number of independent interacting components is large; (iii) or, one in which there are multiple pathways by which the system can evolve. Analytical descriptions of such systems typically require nonlinear differential equations. In chemistry, almost every thing of interest is complex by one or both definitions. Complessità e riduzionismo 28 We are here concerned with "tractable complexity": a subset of complex problems (for example, oscillating reactions) provides classical examples of complex systems in the sense that they can be described analytically by relative simple sets of nonlinear differential equations. But, there are other complex problems of general importance for which there are no simple general solutions. In the sequence of complexity – from static equilibrium, to dynamic steady state, to dynamic complexity, to chaos – there are chosen sets of chemical reactions whose properties make them appropriate as case studies in complexity. Oscillating reactions of the type represented by the Belousov-Zhabotinsky reaction are perhaps the best-known example. This class of chemical reactions has the characteristic that the simultaneous operation of two processes, reaction and diffusion, results in a system in which the concentration of reactants and products oscillate temporally and spatially and in which this oscillation can result in ordered patterns. In other words, coupled chemical reactions cause changes in concentration of the reagents that, in turn, cause local changes in the oxidation potential of the solution. These potentials can be visualized as oscillating travelling waves in such a reaction. These reactions can be described mathematically by a system of nonlinear equations of greater or lesser complexity, but equations bellow represent a minimum set of two reaction-diffusion equations ∂u/∂t = F(u, v) + Du ∇2u (5.1) ∂v/∂t = εG(u, v) + Dv ∇2v (5.2) Here, u is the concentration of a species that catalyze reaction; v is the concentration of a species that inhibits reactions; ∂u/∂t and ∂v/∂t describe changes in concentration of u and v, respectively with time; F(u, v) and εG(u, v) characterize reactions between u and v, respectively; and Du and Dv are the diffusion coefficients of u and v, respectively. An important motivation in chemistry of studying complexity has been to learn about processes in living systems. One of the most striking characteristics of cells is the sheer complexity of metabolism. The human genome probably has on the order of 105 expressed gene products; many of these proteins are enzymes, receptors, and members of signalling sequences, that is, functional parts of metabolism. Understanding a system with this many interacting components is clearly out of the question. A more tractable problem is to examine discrete, relatively self-contained sections of metabolism. One metabolic cycle that has been studied in substantial detail Boi: Remarks on the Geometry of Complex Systems and Self-Organization 29 is glycolysis, that is, the conversion of glucose to pyruvate with the production of adenosine 5′-triphosphate and the reduced form of nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide (NAD)2. This sequence of reactions involves 10 enzymes, with various levels of modulation of the catalytic activities of some of these enzymes by the products of others. The second example of complexity I would like to mention concerns biological signalling systems. Biological signalling pathways interact with one another to form complex networks. Complexity arises from the large number of components, many with isomorphs that have partially overlapping functions; from the connections among components; and forms the spatial relationship between components. Signalling in biological systems occurs at multiple levels. Already compartmentalization introduces several levels of complexity. First, many signalling components and their substrates are anchored in the plasma membrane. The plasma membrane provides a milieu for biochemical reactions that is quite distinct from the cytoplasm in its properties. The lipid environment enables a new class of reactions involving hydrophobic interactions. Organelle formation leads to a further expansion of the possible cellular microenvironments, each with different biochemical properties and signalling capabilities. Second, the separation of reactions in space allows the same molecules in the same cell to carry entirely different signals. In other words, we already have signalling "wires" distinguished by the identity of the molecules in the pathways. Compartmentalization duplicates these existing wires and separates them in space. This multiplies the number of signals they can carry about. In addition to sub-cellular compartmentalization recent research has highlighted the role of molecular scaffolds that provide regional organization by assembling signalling components into functional complexes. The cytoskeleton is a dynamic framework on which the cell builds this regional organization. The most dramatic example of its dynamism is cell division. In the quiescent cell, it is both the substrate and the scaffold for signalling processes. 2 Nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide (NAD and its relative nicotinamide adenine dinucleotide phosphate (NADP) are two of the most important coenzymes in the cell. NADP is simply NAD with a third phosphate group attached. NAD participates in many redox reactions in cells, including those in glycolysis, and most of those in the citric acid cycle of cellular respiration. NADP is the reducing agent produced by the light reactions of photosynthesis, consumed in the Calvin cycle of photosynthesis, and used in many other anabolic reactions in both plants and animals. Complessità e riduzionismo 30 A prime example of its dual role is its synapse. Here the cytoskeleton, in particular the preand postsynaptic structures, are the anchors for a wide array of synaptic signalling molecules. Consequently, modifications of the synaptic cytoskeleton are a likely candidate for causing long-term changes in synaptic efficacy. To conclude this section, we point out some theoretical remarks about characteristic properties of complex living systems. Let's start with some observations. 4.1. Network behaviours and emergent properties 1. Today, it is clear that the specificity of a complex biological activity does not arise from the specificity of the individual molecules that are involved, as these components frequently work in many different processes. For instance, genes that affect memory formation in the fruit fly encode proteins in the cyclic adenosine monophosphate (cAMP)3 signalling pathway that are not specific to memory. Biological specificity results from the way in which these components assemble and work together. Interactions between the parts, as well as influences from the environment, give rise to new features, such as network behaviour. 2. Consequently, "emergence" has appeared as a new concept that complements "reduction" when reduction fails. Emergent properties resist any attempt at being predicted or deduced by explicit calculation or any other means. In this regard, emergent properties differ from resultant properties, which usually can be predicted from lower-level information. For example the resultant mass of a multi-component protein assembly is simply equal to the sum of the masses of each individual component. However, the way in which we test the saltiness of sodium chloride is not reducible to the properties of sodium and chlorine gas. An important aspect of emergent properties is that they have their own causal powers, which are not reducible to the powers of their constituents. For instance, the experience of pain can alter human behaviour, but the 3 Cyclic adenosine monophosphate (cAMP, cyclic AMP or 3′-5′-cyclic adenosine monophosphate) is a second messenger important in many biological processes. cAMP is derived from adenosine triphosphate (ATP) and used for intracellular signal transduction in many different organisms, conveying the cAMP-dependent pathway. One important intracellular signal transduction is the transferring of the effects of hormones like glucagon and adrenaline, which cannot pass through the cell membrane. It is involved in the activation of protein kinases and regulates the effects of adrenaline and glucagon. It also regulates the passage of Ca2+ through ion channels. Boi: Remarks on the Geometry of Complex Systems and Self-Organization 31 lower-level chemical reactions in the neurons that are involved in the perception of pain are not the cause of the altered behaviour as the pain itself has causal efficacy. It should be added that the concept of emergence implies "down-ward causation" by which higher-level systems influence lower-level con figurations. 3. The constituents of complex systems interact in many ways, including negative feedback and feed-forward control, which lead to dynamic features (i.e., evolving in time and changing with time) that cannot be predicted satisfactorily by linear mathematical models that disregard cooperativity and non-additive effects. 4. Robustness is another essential property of biological systems. Understanding the mechanisms and principles underlying biological robustness is necessary for an in-depth understanding of biology at the system level. The phenomenological properties exhibited by robust systems can be classified into three areas: (i) adaptation, which denotes the ability to cope with environmental changes; (ii) parameter insensitivity, which indicate a system's relative insensitivity to specific kinetic parameters; (iii) graceful degradation, which reflects the characteristic slow degradation of a system's functions after damage, rather than catastrophic failure. In other systems, such as fluid-mechanics systems, and also engineering systems, robustness is attained by using the following properties: (a) the capability to form a system control such as negative feedback and feedforward control; (b) redundancy, whereby multiple components with equivalent functions are introduced for backup; (c) structural stability, where intrinsic mechanisms are built to promote stability; and (d) modularity, where sub-systems are physically or functionally insulated so that failure in one module does not spread to other parts an lead to systemwide catastrophe. 5. Remarks about the property of structural stability and on selforganization It remains an open question whether the property of structural stability used in the biological context present some similar characteristics with respect to the concept of structural stability as it has been defined in differential topology in the 1960s by R. Thom and S. Smale. Intuitively, a phase portrait (i.e. all the qualitatively different trajectories of the system) is structural stable if its topology cannot be changed by an arbitrarily small perturbation to the vector field. For instance, Complessità e riduzionismo 32 the phase portrait of a saddle point is structurally stable, but that of a center is not: an arbitrarily small amount of damping converts the center to a spiral. Related to the concept of structural stability, we have the notions of attractor and strange attractor. The term attractor is difficult to define in a rigorous way. Loosely speaking, an attractor is a set to which all neighbouring trajectories converge. More precisely, we define an attractor to be a closed set A with the following properties: (i) A is an invariant set: any trajectory x(t) that starts in A stays in A for all times; (ii) A attracts an open set of initial conditions: there is an open set U containing A such that if x(0) ∈ U, then the distance from x(t) to A tends to zero as t → ∞. This means that A attracts all trajectories that start sufficiently close to it. The largest such U is called the basin of attraction of A; (iii) A is minimal: there is no proper subset of A that satisfies conditions (i) and (ii). Finally, we define a strange attractor to be an attractor that exhibits sensitive dependence on initial conditions. Examples of strange attractors are fractal sets and also chaotic attractors. Just to conclude this section, let us remark that the four properties listed above are also found in biological systems. Bacterial chemotaxis4 is an example of negative feedback that attains all three aspects of robustness. Redundancy is seen at the gene level, where it functions in control of the cell cycle and circadian rhythms, and at the circuit level, where it operates in alternative metabolic pathways in E. coli. Structural stability provides insensitivity to parameter changes in the network responsible for segment formation in Drosophila. And modularity is exploited at various scales, from the cell itself to compartmentalized yet interacting signal-transduction cascades. Lastly, the concept of self-organization in cellular architecture is linked to the complexity of biological systems. A central question in modern cell biology is how large, macroscopic cellular structures are formed and maintained. It is unknown what determines the different shapes and sizes of cellular organelles, why specific structures form in particular places, and how cellular architecture is affected by function and vice-versa. 4 Chemotaxis is the phenomenon in which somatic cells, bacteria, and other single-cell or multicellular organisms direct their movements according to certain chemicals in their environment. This is important for bacteria to find food (for example, glucose) by swimming towards the highest concentration of food molecules, or to flee from poisons (for example, phenol). In multicellular organisms, chemotaxis is critical to early development (e.g. movement of sperm towards the egg during fertilization) and subsequent phases of development (e.g. migration of neurons or lymphocytes) as well as in normal functions. In addition, it has been recognized that mechanisms that allows chemotaxis in animals can be subverted during cancer metastasis. Boi: Remarks on the Geometry of Complex Systems and Self-Organization 33 Two fundamentally different mechanisms exist to generate macromolecular structures: self-assembly and self-organization. Whereas self-assembly involves the physical association of molecules into an equilibrium structure, self-organization involves the physical interaction of molecules in a steady-state structure. For example, virus and phage proteins self-assemble to true equilibrium and form stable, static structures. In contrast, most cellular structures (i.e., the cytoskeleton, nuclear compartments, or endocytic compartments) are open for exchange of energy and matter and are governed by steady-state dynamics. The concept of self-organization is based on observations of chemical reactions far from equilibrium, and it is well established in chemistry, physics and ecology. Self-organization in the context of cell biology can be defined as the capacity of a macromolecular complex or organelle to determine is own structure based on the functional interactions of its components. In a self-organized system, the interactions of its molecular parts (and not the molecular parts them-selves) determine its architectural and functional features. The processes that occur within a self-organized structure are not underpinned by a rigid architectural framework; rather, they determine its organization. For self-organization to act on macroscopic cellular structures, three requirements must be fulfilled: (i) a cellular structure must be dynamic; (ii) matter and energy must be continuously exchanged; (iii) overall stable configuration must be generated from dynamic components. Recent studies indicate that many cellular structures fulfil the requirements for self-organization. Particularly, self-organization seems to play an important role in the construction and dynamics of three major macroscopic cellular structures: namely the cytoskeleton, the cell nucleus, and the Golgi complex. Why self-organization? And why self-organization is related to complexity? To answer these questions, consider the followings facts. Macroscopic cellular structures are characterized by two apparently contradictory properties. On one hand, they must be architecturally stable; on the other hand, they must be flexible and prepared for change. Selforganization ensures structural stability without loss of plasticity. Fluctuations in the interactions properties of its components do not have deleterious effects on the structure as a whole. However, global and persistent changes rapidly result in morphological transformations. The basis for the responsiveness of self-organized structures is the transient nature of the interactions among their components. Complessità e riduzionismo 34 The dynamic interplay of components generates frequent windows of opportunity during which proteins can change their interaction partners or be modified. The effective availability of components is controlled by posttranslational modifications via signal transduction pathways. Self-organization is an elegant, efficient way to organize complex structures. The properties that determine the organization are the intrinsic properties of the structure's components. In protein polymers, the proteinprotein interaction properties determine the architecture; in membrane structures the flow of membranes determines the architecture. Thus, selforganization is a simple but effective way to optimally organize cellular structures. The study of complex dynamic behaviour of cellular structures requires new tools. The behaviour of dynamic cellular structures cannot be described accurately by conventional equilibrium dynamics or by static models. To understand the behaviour of complex (dynamic) systems, the kinetic and topological characteristics of their components must be known. In contrast to the study of molecular mechanisms, isn't must sufficient to understand in detail the behaviour of single molecules; rather, the rules that govern the global and collective behaviour of systems must be uncovered. Reference Atay, F. M., Jost, J., 2004, «On the emergence of complex systems on the basis of the coordination of complex behaviours of their elements: synchronization and complexity», Complexity, 10(1), pp. 815-867. Ballerini, M., et al., 2008, «Interaction Ruling Animal Collective Behaviour Depends on Topological rather than Metric Distance: Evidence from a Field Study», Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA, 105, pp. 237-248. Boi, L., 2006a, «Topological knot theory and macroscopic physics» in Encyclopaedia of Mathematical Physics, J.-P. Françoise, G. Naber and T.S. Sun (Eds.), Elsevier, Oxford, pp. 271-277. Boi, L., 2006b, «Géométrie, dynamique et auto-organisation dans la nature et le vivant» in Symétries, Brisures de Symétries et Complexité en Mathématiques, Physique et Biologie, L. Boi (Ed.), Peter Lang, Bern, pp. 9-19. Boi, L., 2007, «Geometrical and topological modelling of supercoiling in supramolecular structures», Biophysical Reviews and Letters, 2 (3/4), pp. 287-299. Boi: Remarks on the Geometry of Complex Systems and Self-Organization 35 Boi, L., 2008, «Topological ideas and structures in fluid dynamics», JP Journal of Geometry and Topology, 8 (2), pp. 151-184. Boi, L., 2011a, «When Topology Meets Biology 'For Life'. The Interaction Between Topological Forms and Biological Functions» in New Trends in Geometry. Their Role in the Natural and Life Sciences, C. Bartocci, L. Boi, C. Sinigaglia, Imperial College Press, London, pp. 241-302. Boi, L., 2011b, «Geometry of dynamical systems and topological stability: from bifurcations, chaos and fractals to dynamics in natural and life sciences», International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos, 21 (3), pp. 1-52. Boi, L., 2011c, «Plasticity and Complexity in Biology: Topological Organization, Regulatory Protein Network, and Mechanisms of Genetic Expression» in Information and Biological Systems. Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives, G. Terzis and R. Arp (eds.), The MIT. Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 234-279. Bocchi, G., and Ceruti, M. (Eds.), 1985, La sfida della complessità, Feltrinelli, Milan. Cencini, M., Cecconi, F., and Vulpiani, V., 2009, Chaos: From Simple Models to Complex Systems, World Scientific, Singapore. Cornish-Bowden, A., and M.L. Cárdenas, 2005, «System biology may work when we learn to understand the parts in terms of the whole», Biochemical Society Transactions, 33, pp. 516-519. Del Re, G., 1996, «Organization, Information, Autopoiesis: From Molecules to Life» in The Emergence of Complexity in Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, and Biology, B. Pullman (Ed.), Pontificia Academia Scientiarum, Vatican City/Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp. 277-305. Gell-Mann, 1995, «What is Complexity?», Complexity, 1, pp.16-19. Jost, J., 1998, «On the notion of complexity», Theory in Biosciences, 117, pp. 161-171. Kauffman, S., 1993, The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Kauffman, S., 1995, At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of SelfOrganization and Complexity, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Nedelec, F., Surrey, T., and E. Karsenti, 2003, «Self-organization and forces in the microtubule cytoskeleton», Curr. Opin. Cell Biol., 15 (1), pp. 118-124. Mastelli, T., 2001, «The concept of self-organization in cellular architecture», The Journal of Cell Biology, 155 (2), pp. 181-185. Complessità e riduzionismo 36 May, R. M., 1976, «Simple mathematical models with very complicated dynamics», Nature, 261, pp. 459-464. Meinhardt, H., 2000, «Biological Pattern Formation as a Complex Dynamic Phenomena» in Pattern Formation in Biology, Vision and Dynamics, A. Carbone, M. Gromov, P. Prusinkiewicz (Eds.), World Scientific, Singapore, pp. 97-132. Nicolis, G., Prigogine, I., 1989, Exploring Complexity: An Introduction, Freeman, New York. Parisi, G., 1988, Statistical Field Theory, Addison-Wesley, Redwood City, CA. Prigogine, I., Nicolis, G., 1977, Self-Organization in Non-Equilibrium Systems, Wiley, New York. Smale, S., 1980, The Mathematics of Time. Essays on Dynamical Systems, Economics Processes, and Related Topics, Springer-Verlag, New York. Strogatz, S. H., 1994, Nonlinear dynamics and chaos. With applications to physics, biology, chemistry, and engineering, Perseus Publishing, New York. Thom, R., 1994, Stabilité structurelle et morphogenèse, W. A. Benjamin, New York. Tononi, G., Sporns, O, Edelman, G., 1944, «A measure for brain complexity: relating functional segregation and integration in the nervous system», Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA, 91, pp. 5033-5037. Wang, L. et al., 2005, «Cyclic AMP (cAMP) and cAMP Receptor Protein Influence both Synthesis and Uptake of Extracellular Autoinducer 2 in Escherichia coli», Journal of Bacteriology, 187(6), pp. 2066-2076. © 2012 Claudio Calosi, Vincenzo Fano "Coscienza e fisicalismo minimale", in Complessità e riduzionismo, pp. 37-46 Published by Isonomia, Rivista online di Filosofia – Epistemologica – ISSN 2037-4348 Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo http://isonomia.uniurb.it/epistemologica 37 Coscienza e fisicalismo minimale Claudio Calosi Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo [email protected] Vincenzo Fano Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo [email protected] Introduzione In questo lavoro si presenta un nuovo esperimento mentale che solleva un particolare problema per quello che possiamo chiamare "fisicalismo minimale" in filosofia della mente. In particolare si argomenta che il fisicalismo minimale o i) non è in grado di fornirne un resoconto adeguato dell'esperimento mentale presentato, o ii) viene costretto a fornire un resoconto che è fortemente in contrasto con la nostra immagine scientifica del mondo. Il problema sollevato è un particolare esempio di quelli che Chalmers (1996) definisce hard problems in filosofia della mente. Questa è la struttura del lavoro. Nella sezione 2. si presenta l'esperimento mentale, che chiameremo di Shem-Shaun1. Nella sezione 3. illustriamo il nostro argomento principale contro il fisicalismo minimale a partire dall'esperimento mentale della sezione precedente. Nella sezione conclusiva si discutono diversi modi di controbattere all'argomento principale e le sue conseguenze per il fisicalismo. 1 Abbiamo ripreso i nomi dai due gemelli protagonisti di Finnegan's Wake di James Joyce. Complessità e riduzionismo 38 1. L'Esperimento Mentale Shem-Shaun Si considerino due gemelli identici, Shem e Shaun. Si immagini adesso che Shem e Shaun siano più che gemelli identici. Siano duplicati – abbiano cioè esattamente le stesse proprietà intrinseche – nel senso di Lewis (1986, p. 61), per prendere in prestito un termine familiare in metafisica analitica. Anzi, siano Shem e Shaun due individui numericamente diversi ma indistinguibili se non per la loro collocazione spaziale. Non entriamo qui nella delicata questione della validità del principio di identità degli indiscernibili. Si assume però che una situazione del genere sia fisicamente possibile. Coloro che volessero sostenere che tale assunzione è controversa, e che Shem e Shaun sarebbero numericamente identici, e con questo bloccare il nostro argomento sul nascere, dovrebbero anche essere disposti a sostenere che nel mondo esisterebbero solo sei quark, up, down, top, bottom, strange e charme, dato che nulla distingue due quark dello stesso tipo se non la loro collocazione spaziale. Dunque Shem e Shaun sono due individui numericamente diversi ma indistinguibili. Siano messi, immediatamente dopo la nascita in due stanze diverse, Stanza-Shem e Stanza-Shaun rispettivamente. Si assuma che la Stanza-Shem e la Stanza-Shaun siano esse stesse perfetti duplicati. I due gemelli vengano legati a due sedie nella stessa collocazione spaziale relativa. Le sedie sono esse stesse l'una il duplicato dell'altra. Siano legati alle sedie e impossibilitati a compiere un qualsiasi movimento. Si supponga inoltre che a t0 le due stanze siano completamente nel buio e nel silenzio. Si supponga che a t1 una luce rossa di una particolare frequenza, la si chiami Luce-Rossa-Shem, collocata in una particolare posizione spaziale su una parete, venga accesa nella Stanza-Shem per 3 secondi. Allora a t1 una luce rossa, la si chiami, Luce-Rossa-Shaun, che è un perfetto duplicato della Luce-Rossa-Shem, viene accesa per 3 secondi nella stessa collocazione spaziale relativa nella Stanza-Shaun. Si supponga che a t2 un suono di un particolare tono, intensità e timbro, lo si chiami Suono-Shem, venga emesso da una sorgente collocata in una determinata posizione spaziale e venga udito per 3 secondi nella StanzaShem. Allora un suono dello stesso tono, intensità e timbro, lo si chiami Suono-Shaun, che è un perfetto duplicato del Suono-Shem, viene emesso da un duplicato naturale della sorgente menzionata sopra collocata nella stessa posizione spaziale relativa, e viene udito nella Stanza-Shaun per 3 secondi. Questo dovrebbe essere sufficiente per far comprendere il setting dell'esperimento mentale. Per dirla brevemente, si chiami World-Shem (WShem), l'insieme della Stanza-Shem e di tutti gli oggetti fisici ed eventi che Calosi, Fano: Coscienza e fisicalismo minimale 39 vi sono collocati. Si chiami invece World-Shaun (W-Shaun), l'insieme della Stanza-Shaun e di tutti gli oggetti fisici ed eventi che vi sono collocati. Allora W-Shem e W-Shaun sono perfetti duplicati, anzi possono essere considerati due individui numericamente diversi e indistinguibili se non per la collocazione spaziale. Ne segue che per ogni caratteristica fisica2 f-Shem in W-Shem esiste una caratteristica fisica f-Shaun in W-Shaun che è un perfetto duplicato della prima. Da questo deriva a sua volta l'indistinguibilità fisica di W-Shem e W-Shaun: (Indistinguibilità Fisica IF): Non esiste una caratteristica fisica f tale che W-Shem e W-Shaun sono distinguibili rispetto a f, tranne la collocazione spaziale. Questo è, brevemente, l'esperimento mentale Shem-Shaun. Nella sezione successiva si argomenterà che, dato IF, tale esperimento solleva un importante problema per il fisicalismo minimale. 2. Fisicalismo Minimale, Sopravvenienza e coscienza Ci sono naturalmente diverse varianti di Fisicalismo3. È possibile definire quello che chiameremo Fisicalismo Minimale, in quanto è una delle sue forme più deboli. A tal fine useremo la nozione di sopravvenienza nel modo seguente: (Fisicalismo Minimale FM): Ogni proprietà mentale M o insieme di proprietà mentali M sopravviene su un qualche insieme di proprietà fisiche P. È bene essere espliciti riguardo alle nozioni e alle assunzioni dell'argomento che stiamo andando a proporre. Una di queste assunzioni è una certa caratterizzazione standard della nozione di "sopravvenienza", che serve per la comprensione stessa di FM. La definizione seguente è stata adattata da Kim (1984): (Sopravvenienza delle Proprietà Mentali SPM): Sia M1...Mn un insieme M di proprietà (monadiche o poliadiche) mentali e siano x1...xo individui che 2 Siamo deliberatamente vaghi a questo stadio iniziale dell'argomento. 3 Si veda ad esempio Chalmers (1996), Horgan (1982), Jackson (1994), Kim (1984) e Lewis (1983) per nominarne solo alcuni. Complessità e riduzionismo 40 possano istanziare tali proprietà. Sia inoltre P1...Pm un insieme P di proprietà (monadiche o poliadiche) fisiche che possono essere istanziate dagli stessi individui. Allora, per ogni coppia Mi, Mj con Mi, Mj∈M e Mi ≠ Mj, se Mi(xi1...xik) e Mj(xj1....xjl), allora esistono due proprietà fisiche Pi e Pj tali che valgono tutte le seguenti condizioni: i) Pi ≠ Pj ii) Pi(xi1...xik) e Pj(xj1....xjl) iii) necessariamente Pi(xi1...xik) → Mi(xi1...xik) e necessariamente Pj(xj1....xjl) → Mj(xj1....xjl), dove il senso di "necessariamente" deve essere adeguatamente specificato. Differenti caratterizzazioni di tale necessità, logica, metafisica o nomologica, comportano diversi concetti di sopravvenienza. Nel seguito intenderemo tale necessità in senso nomologico, cioè esistono una o più leggi di natura che giustificano le implicazioni iii). In altre parole, se due gruppi di individui xi1...xik e xj1....xjl hanno distinte proprietà mentali Mi e Mj devono esistere due proprietà fisiche Pi e Pj tali che xi1...xik e xj1....xjl hanno Pi e Pj rispettivamente e tali che l'istanziazione di tali proprietà da parte di xi1...xik e xj1....xjl implichi nomologicamente l'istanziazione delle rispettive proprietà mentali. SPM chiarisce come interpretare FM. In pratica: nessuna M-differenza senza una P-differenza4. Notiamo inoltre che i termini "mentale" e "fisico" vanno intesi non come caratterizzazioni strettamente ontologiche, ma come predicati d'uso scientifico. Ovvero una proprietà è mentale quando è il riferimento di un termine che compare in modo essenziale nelle nostre migliori teorie psicologiche5. "Essenziale" significa che non è sostituibile con un tipo di comportamento o con un parametro neurofisiologico. Qualcosa di simile si può dire del termine "proprietà fisiche". Sono proprietà fisiche la concentrazione della serotonina in una sinapsi, il potenziale d'azione di un neurone, la lunghezza di un assone, il numero di dendriti di un neurone ecc. Per proseguire la nostra argomentazione, abbiamo bisogno di chiarire alcune nozioni di filosofia della mente. Intendiamo per essere senziente un individuo che è in qualche modo in grado di istanziare un qualche insieme di proprietà mentali M1...Mn. Un essere cosciente è, invece, un essere senziente che, a volte, quando istanzia una particolare proprietà mentale Mi, 4 Shem e Shaun sono immersi in situazioni fisicamente indistinguibili, per cui è qui irrilevante se le loro proprietà mentali abbiano o meno caratteristiche esternaliste. 5 Assumiamo qui il realismo delle proprietà, ma probabilmente il nostro argomento potrebbe essere riformulato senza, anche se in modo più complicato. Calosi, Fano: Coscienza e fisicalismo minimale 41 istanzia anche la proprietà mentale Self (Mi) relativa alla proprietà mentale Mi, cioè l'essere cosciente di Mi. E' chiaro che con questo non abbiamo specificato in che cosa consista questa nuova proprietà. Le proprietà mentali M1....Mn vengono chiamate proprietà mentali del primo ordine. Resta il problema di comprendere che cosa sia la proprietà mentale Self (Mi). Non abbiamo qui bisogno di una precisa caratterizzazione di tale proprietà, che, come è noto, è molto difficile da individuare. E' sufficiente la seguente assunzione: Principio dell'io penso (PIP). Se Q possiede la proprietà Self (Mi), allora Self (Mi) è del tutto determinata da Mi. In pratica, stiamo assumendo che l'individuo Q può essere cosciente di Mi in un solo modo. È chiaro che se Q cambia nel tempo anche il suo modo di essere cosciente cambierà. Tutto ciò è molto ragionevole e non ha bisogno di ulteriori giustificazioni6. L'abbiamo chiamato "Principio dell'Io Penso" perché ricorda Kant nella misura in cui la coscienza è una vuota funzione dei nostri vissuti o proprietà mentali del primo ordine. A differenza però del filosofo tedesco la nostra coscienza non è sempre la stessa funzione nel tempo. Si supponga adesso che M1...Mn esauriscano tutte le proprietà mentali del primo ordine di un particolare individuo X a un certo istante t. Allora Self (M1...Mn) viene detta coscienza massimale di X. Le proprietà mentali di tipo Self possiamo chiamarle invece del secondo ordine. È ragionevole supporre che la proprietà Self massimale cambia se cambia l'individuo a cui pertiene. Ovvero individui diversi hanno coscienza massimale diversa: (Identità Numerica Individui Coscienze INIC): Per tutti gli individui coscienti numericamente distinti n esistono n distinte proprietà di avere una coscienza massimale. In altre parole INIC coglie una particolare caratteristica della proprietà mentale del secondo ordine di avere una coscienza massimale, il fatto che ogni distinto individuo cosciente ha una sua propria distinta coscienza 6 PIP non è in contrasto con i diversi tipi di personalità multipla noti in letteratura, da quelli dovuti alla recisione del corpo calloso a quelli causati da gravi traumi infantili, poiché in questi casi una stessa situazione mentale conterrà allo stesso tempo due o più coscienze separate, ma questo non significa che la stessa situazione mentale può dare origine a coscienze diverse. Complessità e riduzionismo 42 massimale tra le proprie proprietà mentali. Supponiamo, ad esempio, che Anna Livia Plurabelle7 sia una individuo cosciente. Allora non è possibile per lei istanziare la proprietà di avere la coscienza massimale di James Joyce, o di qualunque altro individuo. Adesso tutto è pronto per formulare l'argomento principale da cui deriva che il Fisicalismo Minimale FM non sarebbe in grado di fornire un adeguato resoconto dell'esperimento ShemShaun. Ecco il ragionamento: 1. Si supponga che Shem e Shaun abbiano le seguenti proprietà mentali del primo ordine rispettivamente, {M1 Shem, ..., Mn Shem} e {M1 Shaun, ..., Mn Shaun}. Si chiami il primo insieme M-Shem e il secondo M-Shaun. 2. Il setting è costituito in modo che fra W-Shem e W-Shaun sussiste Indistiguibilità Fisica. Dunque, se vale il Fisicalsimo minimale, si conclude che M-Shem = M-Shaun. 3. Si supponga adesso che sia Shem che Shaun siano due esseri coscienti. Allora esistono due proprietà mentali del secondo ordine Self (M-Shem) e Self (M-Shaun). Tali proprietà non sono infatti altro che l'avere la coscienza massimale di Shem e Shaun rispettivamente. 4. A questo punto, da INIC possiamo dedurre che Self (M-Shem) ≠ Self (M-Shaun). Tali proprietà mentali sono proprietà mentali degli stessi individui delle quali sono determinate, cioè Self (M-Shem) è una proprietà di Shem e Self (M-Shaun) è una proprietà di Shaun. 5. Allora, dato il Fisicalismo Minimale e la caratterizzazione di sopravvenienza in SPM devono esistere due proprietà8 fisiche Pi e Pj tali che Pi ≠ Pj e valga Pi (Shem) e Pj (Shaun), cioè Pi è proprietà di Shem e Pj è proprietà di Shaun. 6. Ma segue naturalmente dall'indistinguibilità fisica IF di W-Shem e WShaun che non esistono tali proprietà. Abbiamo dunque dedotto una contraddizione dal Fisicalismo Minimale (FM), dall'Identità Numerica Individui Coscienze (INIC) e dal Principio dell'Io Penso (PIP). E' molto difficile sostenere che individui diversi possano avere la stessa coscienza nel senso numerico del termine (non 7 Abbiamo sempre ripreso da Finnegan's Wake. 8 Possono essere naturalmente due insiemi di proprietà. Siccome nulla dipende da questo nell'argomento ci si riferisce al caso semplice di due proprietà. Calosi, Fano: Coscienza e fisicalismo minimale 43 INIC). E' anche abbastanza strano sostenere che si possa essere in stati coscienti diversi senza cambiare alcuna proprietà mentale (non PIP). Dunque l'anello debole sembra essere proprio il Fisicalismo Minimale, che quindi viene messo in discussione da questo esempio. Esiste tuttavia una replica a questa prima formulazione dell'argomento che un fisicalista potrebbe avanzare. Il fisicalista potrebbe infatti argomentare che siamo stati troppo frettolosi nel sostenere il principio di Indistinguibilità Fisica per W-Shem e W-Shaun. In realtà, prosegue il fisicalista, esiste, anche nell'esperimento Shem-Shaun, una caratteristica fisica in grado di distinguere W-Shem e W-Shaun. Anzi, è proprio quella caratteristica fisica che ha garantito che si potessero considerare Shem e Shaun come due individui numericamente distinti in prima battuta. Stiamo naturalmente parlando della loro collocazione spaziale9. Si usi la seguente notazione: ExL-R(x) per x è esattamente collocato nella regione R10. Allora, continua il fisicalista, esiste una caratteristica fisica che distingue WShem e W-Shaun dopotutto, ed è il fatto che Shem e Shaun godono di proprietà del genere di ExL-R diverse. Tale differenza viene poi usata per rendere conto della diversità nelle proprietà mentali di Shem e Shaun, salvando in questo modo il Fisicalismo Minimale dal nostro argomento. Questa replica, per quanto ragionevole, non risolve tuttavia i problemi per il fisicalismo, ma li rimanda solamente. O almeno questo è quello che si cerca di argomentare nel seguito della sezione. Prima di tutto è da notare un dettaglio che potrebbe apparire almeno controverso. Il nostro argomento implica non solo che deve esserci una caratteristica fisica in grado di distinguere W-Shem da W-Shaun, ma la conseguenza più forte che esistano due proprietà fisiche diverse instanziate da Shem e Shaun rispettivamente. Allora il fiscalista è costretto a sostenere che l'esatta collocazione di Shem e Shaun è da contarsi tra le loro proprietà fisiche. Questo è di per sé già abbastanza controverso. Per dare comunque al fisicalista la maggiore possibilità di difesa, si conceda che questo possa essere consistentemente sostenuto, ad esempio invocando particolari interpretazioni delle nostre migliori teorie spazio- 9 Considerare la collocazione spaziale o spaziotemporale risulta irrilevante ai fini dell'argomento. Ci si riferisce dunque al caso della sola collocazione spaziale. 10 Nulla nell'argomento dipende dal fatto che si considera l'esatta collocazione come una proprietà monadica piuttosto che una relazione a due posti che intercorre tra un oggetto e una regione spaziale. Complessità e riduzionismo 44 temporali11. Ne segue comunque che esistono due proprietà fisiche ExL-R Shem e ExL-R Shaun tali che ExL-R Shem ≠ ExL-R Shaun e ExL-R Shem (Shem), ExL-R Shaun (Shaun) valgono entrambe. La distinzione nelle proprietà mentali tra Shem e Shaun dipende in qualche modo dalla distinzione indotta da queste proprietà fisiche, contrariamente alla nostra conclusione. Il problema con questa linea di difesa è che i sostenitori del Fisicalismo Minimale devono intendere tale dipendenza nei termini della sopravvenienza delineata in SPM. Ma una stretta applicazione di SPM implica il seguente principio, che sembra essere non solo veramente controverso di per sé, ma anche fortemente in contrasto con la nostra immagine scientifica del mondo. Tale principio può venire formulato nel modo seguente: (Collocazione Necessariamente Implica Coscienza CoNIC): è necessario che ExL-R Shem (Shem) → Self(M-Shem) (Shem) ed è necessario che ExL-R Shaun (Shaun) → Self(M-Shaun) (Shaun). Come si è già detto diverse interpretazioni dell'operatore di necessità danno vita a diverse forme di sopravvenienza e conseguentemente a diverse letture di principi quali CoNIC. Ma è facile vedere che anche la lettura più debole di tale operatore, quella nomologica, rende un principio come CoNIC in contrasto con la nostra immagine scientifica del mondo. Infatti, secondo tale lettura, esisterebbe una legge di natura tale che una particolare collocazione spaziale implicherebbe l'avere una particolare coscienza. In altre parole, che Shem abbia la sua particolare coscienza massimale dipende dal fatto che Shem è collocato dove è collocato. Lo stesso vale per Shaun. Se Shaun fosse stato collocato nella stanza di Shem avrebbe avuto una coscienza diversa. E lo stesso vale per Shem. Qualunque teoria filosofica che abbia come conseguenza un principio come CoNIC dovrebbe essere ritenuta fortemente problematica, proprio perché contraria all'immagine scientifica del mondo, almeno al grado di conoscenza attuale. E abbiamo appena argomentato che il Fisicalismo Minimale, se vuole dare un resoconto dell'esperimento ShemShaun, implica esattamente tale conseguenza. 3. Conclusione 11 Ci si potrebbe riferire al fatto che ogni punto dello spazio-tempo in relatività generale può avere metrica diversa. Calosi, Fano: Coscienza e fisicalismo minimale 45 Per concludere è bene considerare alcuni modi di evitare l'argomento presentato e alcune delle sue conseguenze. Un primo modo molto generale è naturalmente dato dallo scetticismo sul ruolo epistemologico degli esperimenti mentali in filosofia della mente. Non è possibile tentare una difesa di tale ruolo in questa sede. Ci si limita dunque ad osservare che il ricorso ad esperimenti mentali è pratica notevolmente diffusa. Basti ricordare l'esperimento mentale della neurofisiologa della visione Mary in Jackson (1982) e Jackson (1984) e quello sulla possibilità logica degli zombie in Chalmers (1996) per fare solo pochi, famosi esempi. Tuttavia questo aspetto meriterebbe un'ulteriore discussione. Una seconda possibilità è data dall'obiettare alla nostra definizione di sopravvenienza o alla particolare interpretazione nomologica che si è attribuita a tale nozione. Due cose sono però da osservare. La prima, più generale, è che la definizione usata è quella standard, ormai ampiamente accettata e condivisa. Quanto alla sua interpretazione in senso nomologico si osserva solamente che questa è in definitiva quella più debole. Dunque se il nostro argomento presenta una effettiva difficoltà per il fisicalismo lo farà a maggior ragione per una qualunque interpretazione della sopravvenienza che invece faccia ricorso a nozioni di necessità più forti, quali quella logica o metafisica. Da notare che si è opportunamente qualificato il fisicalismo come minimale anche per questa ragione. Paradossalmente si potrebbe tentare di salvare il fisicalismo non indebolendo, ma rafforzando la sua formulazione. Si supponga infatti di sostenere la seguente versione del fisicalismo: (Fisicalismo dell'Identità dei Tipi FIT): Per ogni proprietà mentale Mi esiste una proprietà fisica Pi o un insieme di proprietà fisiche {Pi1...Pin} tali che o Mi = Pi o Mi = {Pi1...Pin}. La prima cosa da notare é che, di per sé, FIT non implica alcuna istanza eliminativista nei confronti delle proprietà mentali. Vediamo poi perché FIT é immune dal nostro argomento. Siano Self(M1...Mm) e Self(Mn...Mz) le coscienze massimali di due individui distinti. Allora, dato FIT esisteranno proprietà fisiche, siano per semplicità P1 e P2, tali che Self(M1...Mm) = P1 e Self(Mn...Mz) = P2. Abbiamo ipotizzato che non sia possibile che due individui abbiano la stessa coscienza, cioè INIC. Si può vedere, però, che se vale l'identità dei tipi, cioè FIT, allora INIC può venir violato. Infatti, si supponga che P1 = P2. Allora banalmente, Self(M1...Mm) = Self(Mn...Mz). Ma una stessa proprietà fisica, come P1 (=P2) può essere istanziata da individui diversi. Si pensi, ad esempio, alla proprietà di non avere massa. Tutti i fotoni istanziano questa proprietà. Dunque sarebbe possibile, dato Complessità e riduzionismo 46 FIT, per diversi individui istanziare la proprietà di avere la stessa coscienza massimale. In altre parole, FIT permette di salvare il fisicalismo abbandonando INIC. Resta da valutare quanto l'abbandono di INIC sia un prezzo troppo alto da pagare per salvare il fisicalismo. Per finire si deve considerare la seguente domanda. Supponiamo che l'argomento presentato mostri effettivamente una difficoltà per il fisicalismo anche minimale. Ne segue che tale tesi è falsa? Questo sarebbe a dir poco affrettato. Ne segue soltanto che, date le nostre conoscenze scientifiche attuali, non si conoscono effettivamente leggi di natura che in qualche modo riescano a dare una spiegazione convincente della ragione per cui l'istanziazione di determinate proprietà fisiche porti all'istanziazione di determinate proprietà mentali, quali la coscienza. Si identifica spesso il fisicalismo con un atteggiamento naturalista in senso lato, cioè un atteggiamento che sarebbe in qualche modo più vicino alla scienza. In questa caso invece un naturalismo correttamente interpretato sembra per ora suggerire maggiore cautela. Riferimenti Chalmers D., 1996, The Conscious Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Horgan, T., 1982, «Supervenience and Microphysics», Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 63, pp. 29-43. Horgan, T., 1984, «Functionalism, Qualia and the Inverted Spectrum», Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44, pp. 453-469. Jackson, F., 1982, «Epiphenomenal Qualia», Philosophical Quarterly, 32, pp. 127-136. Jackson, F., 1984, What Mary Didn't Know, Journal of Philosophy 83, pp. 291-295. Jackson, F., 1994, «Finding the Mind in the Natural World» in: R. Casati, B. Smith and G. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, Holder-Pilcher-Tempsky, Vienna, pp.483-492. Kim J., 1984, «Concepts of Supervenience», Philosophy and Philosophical Research, 45, pp. 153-176. Lewis D., 1983, «New Work for a Theory of Universals», Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61, pp. 343-377. Lewis D., 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Blackwell, Oxford. © 2012 Salvo D'Agostino Newton, Ampère, Maxwell, Einstein: sulla deduzione dei fenomeni", in Complessità e riduzionismo, pp. 47-56 Published by Isonomia, Rivista online di Filosofia – Epistemologica – ISSN 2037-4348 Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo http://isonomia.uniurb.it/epistemologica 47 Newton, Ampère, Maxwell, Einstein: sulla deduzione dei fenomeni Salvo D'Agostino Università di Roma "La Sapienza" [email protected] 1. Introduzione Il tema della complessità della scienza è stato da qualche decennio oggetto di una vasta letteratura sia sul versante più strettamente scientifico, sia sul piano filosofico. Un argomento emerso con notevole interesse ha riguardato un aspetto della complessità inteso come rinuncia a una generalizzazione dei procedimenti assiomatico-deduttivi come metodo generale della ricerca scientifica. È stata espressa la convinzione che la fisica pre-relativistica sia stata fondata prevalentemente sul trionfo di questo metodo, sulla scia, fra l'altro, della gloriosa tradizione dei Principia newtoniani. Pur riconoscendo la sua imponenza storica e concettuale, che ha condotto spesso a una sua identificazione con la stessa tradizione della scienza occidentale, la mia ricerca storica ha evidenziato una posizione antagonista presente nelle idee di Newton, e ripresa da due grandi fisici ottocenteschi, Ampere e Maxwell, posizione consistente in un ricorso alla cosiddetta deduzione dai fenomeni, un metodo di ricerca che rappresenta un'importante alternativa rispetto al metodo assiomatico-deduttivo. Nei primi decenni del nuovo secolo, si impongono poi progressivamente le idee di Einstein, che sul problema del metodo presentano un'irrisolta problematica. La celebrazione del metodo assiomatico-deduttivo si contrappone ad una lode dell'osservazione dei fenomeni e della riflessione sugli esperimenti, una variazione sul tema della deduzione dai fenomeni. Seppure i contributi del grande scienziato alle teorie derivate dagli assiomi del campo generalizzato non portarono a teorie Complessità e riduzionismo 48 conclusive, le sue idee in merito contribuirono enormemente alla moderna riflessione storico-epistemologica sulla scienza. 2. Newton: la deduzione dai fenomeni si accorda con la proibizione delle ipotesi Un'attenta lettura della grande opera di Newton, Principia Mathematica Philosophiae Naturalis1, il primo caso storico nella scienza moderna di una parziale assiomatizzazione della meccanica celeste, mostra che ai capitoli di una scienza dei principi si alternano procedimenti indicati da Newton come deduzione dai fenomeni. È notevole, ma, a mia conoscenza ignorato dalla storiografia, che la tematica della deduzione dai fenomeni si accordi in Newton con la sua ben nota proibizione delle ipotesi. Una sua chiara affermazione figura in un passo del Libro Terzo dell'opera, Il Sistema del Mondo: Ma sino ad ora non sono stato capace di scoprire attraverso i fenomeni la causa di quelle proprietà della gravità e non escogito [«I frame not»] ipotesi; perché qualsiasi cosa che non è dedotta dai fenomeni, deve chiamarsi un'ipotesi, e le ipotesi, sia metafisiche sia fisiche sia delle qualità occulte sia meccaniche, non devono figurare nelle filosofia sperimentale.2 Si noti che nel passo citato Newton fa coincidere il metodo della deduzione dai fenomeni con quello della proibizione delle ipotesi. Secondo la logica newtoniana, infatti, è il metodo di deduzione dai fenomeni che evita ricerca e introduzione di ipotesi. Il metodo di deduzione dai fenomeni é quindi il metodo della filosofia naturale perché esente da ipotesi. Il metodo della induzione dai fenomeni é viceversa affermato nella IV Regola del Filosofare, una delle regole del metodo scientifico, premessa allo stesso Terzo Libro: Nella filosofia sperimentale dobbiamo riguardare le proposizioni inferite attraverso la induzione generale dai fenomeni come vere con precisione o con approssimazione, nonostante ogni ipotesi contraria che possa essere immaginata, sino a quando non si presentino altri fenomeni con i quali essi [le proposizioni] possono essere o rese più accurate o difettose. Dobbiamo 1 Newton (1729). 2 Newton (1729, 371) D'Agostino: Newton, Ampère, Maxwell, Einstein: sulla deduzione dei fenomeni 49 seguire questa regola affinché il metodo [«the argument»] dell'induzione non possa essere aggirato con delle ipotesi [corsivo nel testo].3 I due metodi, che indicherò qui per brevità come deduttivo e induttivo, possono presentarsi a una prima lettura come antitetici, ma si deve tener presente che Newton li considera complementari, nel senso che per vie diverse giungono allo stesso risultato, la scoperta delle leggi dei fenomeni. Infatti, tutti e due sono presentati come due diversi procedimenti nell'applicazione delle leggi del moto. Ma un privilegio per la deduzione da principi matematici, il tema evidenziato anche nel titolo del grande libro, sembra potersi evidenziare dal passo seguente: Presento questo libro come i principi matematici della filosofia perché tutto il compito della filosofia sembra consistere in questo dai fenomeni del moto investigare le forze della natura e poi da queste forze dimostrare gli altri fenomeni; a questo scopo sono rivolte le proposizioni generali del primo e secondo libro. Nel terzo libro presento un esempio della spiegazione del Sistema del Mondo, perché dalle proposizioni dimostrate matematicamente nei libri precedenti, nel Terzo derivo dai fenomeni celesti le forze della gravità ... e poi da queste forze deduco il moto dei pianeti.4 Nel procedimento newtoniano per la ricerca delle forze gravitazionali attraverso la loro deduzione dai fenomeni celesti, la deduzione si presenta quindi con un ruolo privilegiato rispetto alla induzione, ma un ruolo speciale sembra essere attribuito a una speciale deduzione, la deduzione dai fenomeni. Considero una conferma indiretta di questa tesi il fatto che il metodo é applicato da Newton nelle argomentazioni sul celebre esperimento del secchio, nel senso che esse si ricollegano al precedente metodo della deduzione dai fenomeni. L'esperimento é collocato all'inizio dei Principia, nello Scholium che segue le definizioni, nella parte cioè destinata a costituire l'ossatura concettualmente portante dell'opera, con lo scopo di distinguere il moto assoluto dal relativo, problema che è di immediato impatto sulla teoria newtoniana eliocentrica5. Anche il rapido esame, in questa sede, dell'esperimento ci porta a concludere che esso presenta una situazione nella quale la rotazione relativa dell'acqua rispetto al secchio non è simmetrica, a parità di moto relativo, rispetto alla rotazione del secchio 3 Newton (1729, 271). 4 Newton (1687), Prefazione alla prima edizione. 5 Newton (1687, 11). Mediante l'esperimento Newton vuole mostrare che distinguere le forze impresse o forze vere o assolute dalle forze insite o forze relative, non è poi «una cosa del tutto disperata». L'effetto della rotazione assoluta è la forza insita che produce la curvatura dell'acqua. Per maggiori dettagli, cfr. D'Agostino (1978, 275-290). Complessità e riduzionismo 50 rispetto all'osservatore. Da questo esperimento, che Newton afferma di aver effettivamente eseguito, egli vuol dedurre che l'acqua si muove di moto assoluto. Lasciando aperto il problema del carattere pensato o effettivamente eseguito dell'esperimento, un'attenta lettura di quello che si può considerare come uno delle più interessanti pagine dell'opera, porta a concludere che nell'argomentazione della deduzione del moto assoluto Newton ricorre soltanto a considerazioni di logica relazionale, nel senso che il suo argomento si fonda sulla mancanza di simmetria nei due moti relativi. Effettivamente, egli si limita a postulare che l'asimmetria dei risultati richiede una spiegazione, che nel contesto dei Principia, egli attribuisce agli effetti del moto assoluto. Non una dimostrazione quindi del moto assoluto ma una sua "postulazione". L'argomento è esente da quelle ipotesi che invece si richiederebbero in un possibile, ma alternativo, metodo induttivo o deduttivo dalle ipotesi. In termini moderni, si direbbe che l'argomento newtoniano procede in conseguenza di una rottura di simmetrie. L'asimmetria rilevata da Newton lo convince a postulare il moto circolare assoluto dell'acqua6. Queste pagine dei Principia hanno costituito per due secoli oggetto di controversie riguardanti o l'accusa di inconsistenza della dimostrazione newtoniana,7 oppure le sue difese8. Dirò in breve, che le accuse rivolte a Newton riguardavano la sua pretesa di aver dimostrato il moto assoluto, accuse che cadono se si accetta la tesi che il procedimento newtoniano non é una dimostrazione del moto assoluto ma una sua "postulazione". 3. Ampère e Maxwell sulla deduzione dai fenomeni Nell'ambito delle considerazioni di questo articolo è interessante rilevare che il metodo Newtoniano della deduzione dai fenomeni viene privilegiato a 6 La spiegazione dell'asimmetria fra moti inerziali e moti accelerati é ancora oggetto del Principio di Mach e della teoria della Relatività Generale. 7 La critica di Berkeley a Newton è principalmente nel saggio: The Principles of human knowledgell in Berkeley (1948-1957). Per quanto riguarda l'esperimento del secchie, secondo Berkeley: «A riguardo di ciò che si dice (nei Principia) della forza centrifuga, cioè che essa non appartiene affatto al moto relativo circolare, io non capisco ' come ciò possa seguire dall'esperimento che si porta avanti per provare ciò ...(è citato l'esp. del secchio). Perché proprio al tempo in cui si dice che l'acqua del secchio ha il suo maggiore moto circolare relativo proprio allora io credo che non si muova affatto». 8 Secondo Sciama, la dimostrazione newtoniana non è una spiegazione fisica del ruolo privilegiato dei riferimenti inerziali ma un'affermazione della loro esistenza. Cfr. Sciama (1972, 23-24). D'Agostino: Newton, Ampère, Maxwell, Einstein: sulla deduzione dei fenomeni 51 distanza di più di cento anni da Ampére e da Maxwell. Ampère apre la sua Théorie des phénomènes électrodynamiques, uniquement déduite de l'expérience9, con un'apologia di Newton. Il tempo di Newton rappresenta nella storia della scienza quello in cui ebbe luogo la più importante delle scoperte fatte dall'uomo sulla causa dei grandi fenomeni dalla natura, ed anche l'epoca in cui allo spirito umano si è aperto un nuovo metodo nelle scienze che hanno per oggetto lo studio di questi fenomeni. Segue la considerazione il metodo di Newton, la deduzione dagli esperimenti, lo ha guidato nella scoperta della legge elementare dell' elettrodinamica. Nella sua ricerca di esperimenti da cui dedurre la legge – si noti la variazione rispetto ai fenomeni newtoniani – Ampére inventa forme di circuiti mobili che siano in equilibrio sotto l'azione di altri circuiti, le cosiddette "bilance di Ampère". Con una sorprendente ripresa del celebre tema newtoniano, afferma che il metodo ha il merito di escludere per sempre le ipotesi: «[...] il principale vantaggio delle formule che così si raggiungono [...] è di restare indipendente sia dalle ipotesi che possono essere servite ai loro autori durante la ricerca, sia di quelle altre che, nel seguito, vi si sono sostituite»10. Si noti che il carattere formale della legge é collegato al modo della sua deduzione, ed è questa che gli attribuisce requisiti di perenne validità, prescindendo dalle particolari ipotesi fisiche esplicative, il cui carattere aleatorio contrasterebbe la generalità: «Qualunque sia la causa fisica alla quale si vogliano riportare i fenomeni prodotti da questa azione, la formula che io ho ottenuto resterà sempre l'espressione dei fatti». Insistendo su questa interessante identificazione del formale e del fattuale puro, aggiunge: «Qualsiasi ricerca sulle cause non cambierà per niente i risultati del mio lavoro, perché, per accordarsi con i fatti, l'ipotesi adottata deve sempre accordarsi con le formule che così completamente le rappresentano»11. Senza nulla togliere ai grandi contributi di Ampère all' elettrodinamica, lodati dallo stesso Maxwell, lo storico deve constatare che la stessa scelta a favore del formalismo matematico che lo aveva guidato ai grandi successi, rappresentò per lo scienziato francese un impedimento per la scoperta della propagazione delle forze elettriche, teoria che pure egli riteneva del più grande interesse per il progresso della scienza. Così infatti egli deplora la matematica troppo vaga dell'etere: «[...] in assenza di una conoscenza matematica degli effetti dei movimenti dei fluidi, [...] le considerazioni 9 Ampère (1826). 10 Ampère (1826, 10). 11 Ampère (1826, 8). Complessità e riduzionismo 52 sull'etere [...] sono troppo vaghe per servire di base ad una legge la cui esattezza possa essere provata con delle esperienze dirette e precise»12. Sappiamo che ci sarebbe voluto un Faraday, qualche tempo dopo e in una differente cultura, quella dell' Inghilterra di metà ottocento, per proporre una ardita concezione del mezzo, anche se la matematica non riusciva, per il momento, a trovarvi posto. In seguito le idee di Faraday sarebbero riuscite a provocare i grandi matematici suoi contemporanei William Thomson e James Clerk Maxwell, che nella matematica dei mezzi continui trovarono il modo di esprimere la concezione fisica della priorità delle forze nel mezzo attorno al filo conduttore e della loro diffusione nello spazio. Ma con un'originale sintesi fra empirismo e deduttivismo anche Maxwell elogia il metodo della deduzione dai fenomeni: [...] il vero metodo del ragionamento fisico è quello di iniziare con i fenomeni e attraverso un'applicazione diretta delle equazioni del moto dedurne le forze [...] il calcolo del moto quando sono note le forze, oltre che essere più difficile, non é così importante ne così facile per essere applicato ai metodi analitici della scienza fisica.13 Nessun miglior commento a questa fondamentale posizione maxwelliana che la considerazione del procedimento mediante il quale lo scienziato scozzese capovolge il metodo seguito da Hermann Helmholtz e da William Thomson per derivare la legge dell'induzione elettromagnetica scoperta da Faraday. Helmholtz nel 1847, e un anno dopo Thomson, avevano dedotto la legge dalle "azioni meccaniche esercitate dai circuiti", ma Maxwell segue la strada inversa, deducendo l'azione meccanica dal fenomeno d'induzione14. Secondo lo scienziato scozzese, infatti, i procedimenti di Thomson ed Helmholtz, ipotizzando che tutta l'energia in gioco fosse quella meccanica dei circuiti elettrici (forza x spostamento), introducevano in partenza ipotesi meccaniche troppo restrittive, inficiando così la stessa generalità del metodo deduttivo. Oggi comprendiamo che il potere euristico del metodo di Maxwell è legato al procedimento di correlare l'energia del sistema elettromagnetico non più al lavoro meccanico esterno, ma al lavoro delle forze interne di campo, rappresentate dal potenziale vettore, rifacendosi quindi a un'espressione di una energia più generale di quella meccanica, l'energia elettromagnetica, un concetto fondamentale della maxwelliana teoria di campo. 12 Blondel (1989, 133). 13 Maxwell (1876, 208-209). 14 Maxwell (1996, 9-10). D'Agostino: Newton, Ampère, Maxwell, Einstein: sulla deduzione dei fenomeni 53 4. Einstein: la fisica dei principi contrapposta alla deduzione dai fenomeni In un passaggio della Spenser Lecture, Albert Einstein esprime la convinzione che il pensiero puro ha la potenza di dominare la realtà: Ora, stabilito che il fondamento assiomatico della fisica teorica non è deducibile dall'esperienza, ma è viceversa creato liberamente dall'intelletto, sussiste la speranza di trovare la strada giusta ? ... La mia risposta è che, a mio avviso, la strada giusta esiste e che è possibile trovarla ... io sono convinto che per mezzo di costruzioni puramente matematiche è possibile scoprire quei concetti che ci danno la chiave ... è nella matematica che risiede il principio creatore. Io sono portato a credere nella capacità, in certo senso, del pensiero puro a dominare la realtà, proprio come pensavano gli antichi.15 In altre parti dei suoi scritti epistemologici notiamo che Einstein elogia i metodi empirici. Valga in questa sede, fra i tanti possibili riferimenti, una lettera all'amico Besso, nel quale il grande fisico teorico rivaluta I fondamenti empirici delle geometria di Riemann: Le tue osservazioni al riguardo del ruolo dell'esperienza e della speculazione mi sono molto piaciute. Vorrei soltanto aggiungere che non è ammissibile considerare i risultati di Riemann come pure speculazioni. Il contributo di Gauss è di aver formulato le leggi dello spostamento di piccole sbarrette rigide su una data superficie, i suoi ds sono la piccola sbarretta, senza questa rappresentazione concreta tutta il ragionamento sarebbe rimasto impossibile. La generalizzazione a uno spazio a n dimensioni fatta da Riemann è, senza dubbio, un fatto puramente speculativo, ma riposa anch'essa sulla concezione gaussiana della sbarretta "etalon". Dimenticando l'origine terrestre del ds2 i successori non hanno certamente compiuto un progresso. Nel suo bel libro Weyl chiama a ragione la teoria di Riemann la geodesia delle costruzioni pluridimensionali.16 Si noti il sorpreso commento di Pais che aveva sopravvalutato l'atteggiamento empirico di Einstein: «non riesco a credere che questo fosse lo stesso Einstein che nel 1917 aveva messo in guardia Felix Klein dal sopravvalutare la portata dei punti di vista formali, che falliscono quasi sempre come strumenti euristici »17. Si deve così riconoscere che la filosofia di Einstein, specie negli scritti della maturità, si muove attorno a una irrisolta problematica: l'esigenza che una base empirico-strumentale debba 15 Einstein (1933). 16 Einstein A., Besso M., (1972, 138). 17 Pais (1986, 372). Complessità e riduzionismo 54 porsi a fondamento delle teorie si contrappone alla convinzione della potenza del pensiero puro di dominare la realtà. Egli stesso riconobbe il problema in risposta a una provocazione di Margenau: «Margenau: La posizione di Einstein ... contiene caratteristiche di razionalismo e di estremo empirismo ». Risposta di Einstein: Questo è corretto. Ma da dove deriva questa fluttuazione? (Da una parte) la fisica come sistema logico-concettuale trova un pericoloso ostacolo nell'arbitrarietà di questa scelta. Quindi il fisico cerca di connettere il più possibile i suoi concetti con il mondo empirico. Qualche volta ci riesce, ma è sempre esposto al dubbio che questa connessione dipenda a sua volta dall'intero sistema. [...] Quindi egli diventa ancor più razionalista riconoscendo l'indipendenza logica del sistema, ma così rischia di perdere contatto con il mondo empirico. Un ondeggiare fra questi due estremi mi sembra inevitabile18. 5. Conclusioni In questo lavoro ho messo in evidenza che nelle riflessioni metodologiche di grandi scienziati si nota una differenza, se non una contraddizione, fra due metodi di ricerca caratterizzati come scienza dei principi e deduzione dai fenomeni. È noto che la scienza dei principi ha avuto una millenaria storia nel pensiero occidentale, a cominciare dalla geometria di Euclide, con il seguito dei Principia newtoniani e delle generalizzazioni non-euclidee della geometria. Non è stato facile resistere alla sua estremizzazione, come al fascino delle capacità del pensiero puro di afferrare la realtà, a cui lo stesso Einstein non si era sottratto. Ma si farebbe un torto alla realtà storica della scienza ignorando o sottovalutando l'altra esigenza, da me qui sottolineata, di un rifugio nella realtà fenomenica, lodato per la sua pregevoli caratteristica di evitare ipotesi non giustificate (Newton), di risalire alla forma matematica delle leggi (Ampère), di mantenere un giusto equilibrio fra concezioni fisiche -i modelli con i quali Maxwell aveva costruito le sue equazioni –e le teorie matematiche. Ho notato che il metodo si sviluppa con l'elaborazione di proprietà di simmetria dei fenomeni, come nel caso di Newton e di Ampère. Da notare che il metodo delle simmetrie é aleatorio, nel senso che ogni simmetria si riferisce a casi particolari, o, ugualmente , ogni modello ha una valenza limitata spazialmente e temporalmente. Il metodo é quindi difficilmente riconducibile a processi assiomaticodeduttivi, per cui era giustificata la sorpresa di Poincarè nel trovare 18 Einstein (1949, 679-680). D'Agostino: Newton, Ampère, Maxwell, Einstein: sulla deduzione dei fenomeni 55 nell'opera di Maxwell più che un trattato di fisica un elenco di macchine e strumenti di officina. In quest'ultimo caso, si tratta di accettare la coesistenza, in un complesso rapporto interno, di ambiti riduzionistici limitati che si può intendere come aprire una via ai problemi della complessità. L'ondeggiare fra le due vedute del metodo della scienza, evidenziato da Einstein, se pure tollerato pragmaticamente nell'avanzamento della ricerca, si riflette però sul livello della filosofia ponendo un drammatico dilemma: si può dire che nel sostenere la tesi dello "a-priori puro", Einstein rischiava di mettere in dubbio la sua adesione a Kant, decisamente affermata, fra l'altro, in un passaggio di Reply to Criticism. È notevole che il dibattito sui due metodi non sia oggi concluso, e che il premio Nobel P. W. Anderson l'abbia rivitalizzato con la sua ammissione di due vie per la ricerca, da lui titolate "Bottom-up" e "Upper-down". La sua manifesta preferenza per la prima alternativa, un risalire dai fenomeni è anche un dedurre da essi le leggi. La problematicità della scelta é però un aspetto delle idee e teorie della complessità che oggi hanno fatto ingresso nelle idee di molti fisici. Ma ciò non implica che l'esigenza di una scienza deduttiva, una scienza dei principia, che caratterizza secondo Einstein la sua teoria, sia da considerare contraddittoria alla sua antagonista, una scienza fenomenologica, su modelli matematici non necessariamente generalizzabili, ma accettabili, come nella tesi di Poincaré19, pur nella loro limitata generalizzabilità. Ponendo il problema di una scelta fra le due le oscillazioni, Einstein ha avuto anche il grande merito di aver aperto la via al pensiero scientifico moderno. Riferimenti Ampère A. M., 1826, Théorie des phénomènes électrodynamique uniquement déduite de l'expérience, Paris. Berkeley, G., 1948-1957, The Works of George Berkeley, Edinburgh. Blondel, C., 1989, «Vision physique 'éthérien' et mathématisation 'laplacienne': l'électrodynamique d'Ampère», Rev, Hist. Sc., XLII/ 12. D'Agostino S., (1978), «Il problema del moto assoluto e della distinzione fra forze impresse e forze insite (inerziali) nei Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy di Isaac Newton», Giornale di Astronomia, pp. 275-290. 19 Poincaré (1900). Complessità e riduzionismo 56 D'Agostino, S., 1991, «Einstein e Kant: la teoria fisica contro il logico ma vuoto schema dei concetti» in: Petruccioli S, (a cura di) Immagini, Linguaggi, Concetti, Theoria Roma, pp. 197-220. D'Agostino, S., 1990, «Matematica ed Elettrodinamica nell'opera di Ampère Lo sviluppo delle teorie dell'elettromagnetismo», Cultura e Scuola, n.116, Ott-Dic. pp. 261-271. D'Agostino, S., 1989, «Fisica e Filosofia in James Clerk Maxwell», Nuova Civiltà delle Macchine, vol 26 N.2, pp. 83-91. D'Agostino, S., 1995, «Einstein's Life-Long Doubts in the Physical Foundations of the General Relativity and Unified Field Theories» in: Garola C, and Rossi A. (Eds), The Foundations of Quantum Mechanics-Historical Analysis and Open Questions, Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995, pp.167-178. Einstein, A., 1933, On the Method of Theoretical Physics, The Herbert Spencer Lecture delivered at Oxford, June 10, 1933, Oxford Clarendon Press 15 1933; ristampa in Philosoph. of Science, vol.1, 1934, pp. 162-169. Einstein, A., 1949, «Reply to Criticism» in: Albert Einstein Philosopher Scientist, Harpers and Brothers Pbl, N.Y., Vol. 2, pp. 665-688. Einstein A., Besso M., 1972, Correspondence 1903-1955, trad. di Pierre Speziali con note e introduzione, Hermann Paris. Maxwell J. C., 1876, On the Proof of the Equations of Motion of a connected System», in The Scientific Papers of James Clerk Maxwell, Edited by W. B. Niven, Dover publications, N.Y. Maxwell, J.C., 1996, Una teoria dinamica del campo elettromagnetico, traduzione italiana dall'originale: Maxwell J.C, A Dynamical Theory of the Electromagnetic Field, a cura di D'Agostino S., Edizioni Teknos, pp. 1-107. Pais, H., 1986, Sottile è il Signore. La Scienza e la Vita di Albert Einstein, Boringhieri, Torino. Poincaré, H., 1900, Electricité et Optique, Carré et Noud, Paris. Rossi A., 2006, «Mathematical Models and Physical Reality from Classical to Quantum Physics», in: Garola G., .Rossi A., Sozzo S. (Eds) The Foundations of Quantum Mechanics-Historical Analysis and Open Questions, Cesena 2004, World Scientific, London-Singapore 2006, pp. 293-300. Sciama, T. W,1972, La relatività generale, Bologna, Zanichelli. Vizgin V., 1986, «Einstein, Hilbert, and Weyl: the Genesis of the General Relativity» in Howard D., Stachel .J. (Edits) Einstein and the History D'Agostino: Newton, Ampère, Maxwell, Einstein: sulla deduzione dei fenomeni 57 of General Relativity, Einstein Studies, Vol. 1, Birkhäuser 1986, pp. 300-314. © 2012 Pierluigi Graziani "Elementare ma complessa: la prospettiva della complessità computazionale attraverso il caso studio della geometria di Tarski", in Complessità e riduzionismo, pp. 57-72 Published by Isonomia, Rivista online di Filosofia – Epistemologica – ISSN 2037-4348 Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo http://isonomia.uniurb.it/epistemologica 59 Elementare ma complessa: la prospettiva della complessità computazionale attraverso il caso studio della geometria di Tarski Pierluigi Graziani Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo [email protected] Sul finire degli anni venti dello scorso secolo, nei suoi corsi all'Università di Varsavia, Alfred Tarski elaborò un sistema di assiomi per la geometria elementare (lo indicheremo con 2GET ) che presentò, con diverse semplificavzioni ed aggiunte, nei lavori The completeness of elementary algebra and geometry del 1940 (ma pubblicato solo nel 1967), A decision method for elementary algebra and geometry del 1948 e What is elementary geometry? del 19591. Il sistema elaborato da Tarski è per molte ragioni differente da quello hilbertiano2 e da altre assiomatizzazioni storicamente presentate3. Tale sistema, infatti, descrive un universo contenente solo punti e due relazioni tra elementi primitivi: quella di essere tra e quella di equidistanza. Tale scelta caratterizza una visione della geometria in cui le linee e i piani sono insiemi di punti e rende più facile il confronto con l'approccio algebrico in cui tutte le figure sono appunto viste come luoghi di punti, insiemi definibili di punti (nel piano, insiemi di coppie di numeri). Tuttavia, quella di Tarski è un'assiomatizzazione per la geometria elementare euclidea ovvero per quella parte della geometria euclidea non basata su nozioni insiemistiche e 1 Per un'analisi storica dell'assiomatizzazione tarskiana si veda l'articolo di Alfred Tarski e Steven Givant (1999). 2 Hilbert (2009). 3 Vedi Graziani (2001). Complessità e riduzionismo 60 che può essere sviluppata in un linguaggio in cui non si suppone – come nel linguaggio della geometria hilbertiana – di poter quantificare sui numeri naturali o su insiemi qualunque di punti4. Dunque, tutte le variabili x,y,z,... che occorrono in questa teoria sono assunte variare sopra elementi (punti) di un insieme fissato (spazio). Le costanti logiche della teoria sono i connettivi , , , , , ,¬ ⊃ ∨ ∧ ∃ ∀ e lo speciale predicato binario =, mentre come costanti non logiche o simboli primitivi della teoria abbiamo il predicato ternario β usato per denotare la relazione di essere tra ed il predicato quaternario δ usato per denotare la relazione di equidistanza. Leggeremo, dunque, la formula ( )xyzβ come y giace tra x e z (senza escludere il caso in cui y coincide con x o z); e la formula ( ), , ,x y z uδ come x è distante da y come z da u, vale a dire il segmento xy è congruo al segmento zu . Diamo dunque gli assiomi del sistema tarskiano, considerando per semplicità, l'assiomatizzazione per la geometria elementare del piano presentata in What is elementary geometry?.5 A1 (Assioma di identità per la relazione β ) ( ) ( )xy xyx x yβ∀ ⊃ =   A2 (Assioma di transitività per la relazione β ) ( ) ( ) ( )xyzu xyu yzu xyzβ β β∀ ∧ ⊃   A3 (Assioma di connessione per β ) 4 In 2GET non possiamo avere enunciati del tipo "per ogni poligono", ma solo enunciati che riguardano poligoni con un numero fissato di vertici. Per avere, infatti, enunciati del tipo "per ogni poligono" si dovrebbe arricchire il linguaggio di 2GET con nuove variabili X,Y,... varianti su insiemi finiti di punti. Ciò consentirebbe di avere simboli per denotare figure geometriche (insiemi di punti), classi di figure geometriche etc. L'assioma di continuità, che daremo tra breve, stabilisce l'esistenza su di una retta r di un minimo confine superiore per ogni insieme X definibile, non per insiemi arbitrari, dove dire che X è definibile significa che esiste una formula 1( , ,..., )nx y yα ed individui 1,..., nb b per cui in ogni modello A , [ ]{ }1: , ,..., ka a b b Xα∈ =A A ⊨ . Dai risultati di Tarski segue che in questa teoria non sono definibili i numeri naturali, altrimenti, via Teorema di Gödel, essa sarebbe incompleta. 5 È possibile estendere i risultati tarskiani per la geometria bidimensionale al caso di geometrie n dimensionali per un intero positivo n, modificando gli assiomi A11 e A12. Per maggiori delucidazioni su tali argomenti si veda l'articolo di Tarski e Givant (1999). Graziani: Elementare ma complessa 61 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )xyzu xyz xyu x y xzu xuzβ β β β∀ ∧ ∧ ≠ ⊃ ∨   A4 (Assioma di riflessività per δ ) ( )xy xyyxδ∀    A5 (Assioma di identità per δ ) ( ) ( )xyz xyzz x yδ∀ ⊃ =   A6 (Assioma di transitività per δ ) ( ) ( ) ( )xyzuvw xyzu xyvw zuvwδ δ δ∀ ∧ ⊃   A7 (Assioma di Pasch) A8 (Assioma di Euclide) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )txyzu vw xut yuz x y xzv xyw vtwβ β β β β∀ ∃ ∧ ∧ ≠ ⊃ ∧ ∧   A9 (Assioma dei cinque segmenti) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] xx yy zz uu xyx y yzy z xux u yuy u xyz x y z x y zuz u δ δ δ δ β β δ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′∀ ∧ ∧ ∧ ∧ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′∧ ∧ ∧ ≠ ⊃ A10 (Assioma di costruzione per segmenti) ( ) ( )xyuv z xyz yzuvβ δ∀ ∃ ∧   A11 (Assioma inferiore di dimensionalità) ( ) ( ) ( )xyz xyz yzx zxyβ β β∃ ¬ ∧ ¬ ∧ ¬   A12 (Assioma superiore di dimensionalità) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )xyzuv xuxv yuyv zuzv u v xyz yzx zxyδ δ δ β β β∀ ∧ ∧ ∧ ≠ ⊃ ∨ ∨   A13 (Assiomi elementari di continuità) Tutti gli enunciati della forma ( ) ( ){ }...vw z xy zxy u xy xuyφ ψ β φ ψ β∀ ∃ ∀ ∧ ⊃ ⊃ ∃ ∀ ∧ ⊃       ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )txyzu v xtu yuz xvy ztvβ β β β∀ ∃ ∧ ⊃ ∧   Complessità e riduzionismo 62 dove φ sta per una formula nella quale le variabili x,v,w,..., ma né y, né z, né u, occorrono libere, e similmente per ψ , con x ed y interscambiati. In generale – come in Hilbert l'assioma di continuità è un enunciato non elementare poiché contiene variabili del secondo ordine che variano su insiemi arbitrari di punti (in aggiunta a variabili del primo ordine che variano su punti), ovvero l'assioma di continuità può essere formulato come ( ) ( ){ }XY z xy x X y Y zxy u xy x X y Y xuyβ β∀ ∃ ∀ ∈ ∧ ∈ ⊃ ⊃ ∃ ∀ ∈ ∧ ∈ ⊃       e asserisce che due insiemi X e Y tali che gli elementi di X precedono gli elementi di Y rispetto ad un punto a (cioè ( )zxyβ ogni qual volta x è in X e y è in Y) sono separati da un punto u. Tarski sostituì questo assioma con A13, ovvero con una collezione infinita di assiomi elementari di continuità che ci danno la completezza di Dedekind solo per insiemi definibili. Dal punto di vista analitico, come Tarski dimostra, ciò significa che i modelli di 2GET saranno isomorfi a spazi cartesiani su campi che non necessariamente coincidono con R , ma con quelli che sono noti come campi reali chiusi. Torneremo più avanti su questo punto. Come è noto, l'importanza del sistema tarskiano risiede anche e soprattutto nel fatto che per esso è possibile dimostrare la coerenza, la completezza e la decidibilità. Intuitivamente, l'idea di Tarski è quella, dimostrata la coerenza, completezza e decidibilità della teoria dei campi reali chiusi ( CRCOT ), di interpretare 2GET in CRCOT provando la trasferibilità dei risultati di coerenza, completezza e decidibilità da CRCOT a 2 GET . In generale, dimostrando che CRCOT ha l'eliminazione dei quantificatori 6 Tarski dimostra la decidibilità dei campi reali chiusi. Per il fatto poi che: se CRCOT ha l'eliminazione dei quantificatori allora è model-completa e se è model-completa avendo un modello primo (un modello cioè che è sottostruttura elementare di ogni modello) allora è completa, Tarski dimostra anche la completezza di CRCOT . 6 Per chiarezza ricordiamo che una formula α è equivalente alla formula γ nella teoria T se α γ↔ T ⊢ e che T quindi ammette l'eliminazione dei quantificatori se ogni formula di T è equivalente in T ad una formula aperta. Per una introduzione alla Teoria dei Modelli si veda Hodges (1993); Keisler (1977). Per un'introduzione alla decidibilità si veda Rabin (1977). Si veda anche Renegar (1992). Graziani: Elementare ma complessa 63 La coerenza discende immediatamente dalla esistenza di un modello di CRCOT . 7 Più in dettaglio, per poter interpretare 2GET in CRCOT provando la trasferibilità dei risultati di coerenza, completezza e decidibilità da CRCOT a 2 GET , il primo passo da fare è risolvere il cosiddetto problema di rappresentazione per 2GET che consiste nel caratterizzare tutti i modelli di 2 GET , M,B,D=< >M tali che: (i) M è un insieme non vuoto; (ii) B e D sono, rispettivamente, una relazione ternaria e quaternaria su M; (iii) Tutti gli assiomi di 2GET valgono in M se tutte le variabili sono assunte variare su elementi di M e le costanti β e δ denotano, rispettivamente, le relazioni B e D. 7 Senza però ricorrere, come fa Tarski, al teorema di Sturm (si vedano, oltre ai lavori di Tarski: Jacobson 1985, vol. I, cap. 5; Prestel 1984), per dimostrare che CRCOT ha l'eliminazione dei quantificatori, è necessario e sufficiente, come mostrato da Shoenfield (1967), provare che essa soddisfa le due condizioni seguenti: Condizione dell'isomorfismo: per ogni due modelli A ed ∗ A di CRCOT e ogni isomorfismo φ di una sottostruttura di A e una sottostruttura di ∗A , esiste un'estensione di φ che è un isomorfismo di un sottomodello di A ed un sottomodello di ∗A ; Condizione del sottomodello: per ogni modello B di CRCOT , ogni sottomodello ∗ B di B e ogni formula chiusa semplicemente esistenziale α di ∗ B L abbiamo α α∗ ≡⊨ ⊨B B . Dimostrato che CRCOT soddisfa le due condizioni precedenti, è possibile dimostrare la model-completezza di CRCOT . Poiché è dimostrabile che se una teoria è model-completa ed ha un modello primo allora è completa, CRCOT è anche completa. La decidibilità di CRCOT scende dal fatto che la teoria è completa e assiomatizzata o dal fatto che la teoria dei campi ordinati reali chiusi ha l'eliminazione dei quantificatori. Attraverso l'eliminazione dei quantificatori, infatti, trasformiamo un dato enunciato α di T in un altro enunciato γ di T tale che T α γ↔⊢ e γ appartiene ad un insieme K di enunciati per i membri del quale possiamo in un numero finito di passi determinare se sono teoremi di T o no. Complessità e riduzionismo 64 Come evidenziato, i più familiari modelli di 2GET sono certamente gli spazi cartesiani bidimensionali (che indicheremo con C 2F ) su particolari campi ordinati F, , , , ,0,1=< + ⋅ − ≤ >F (dove F è appunto un insieme non vuoto) che soddisfano il teorema di Bolzano ristretto alle funzioni polinomiali. Sono questi i campi reali chiusi. Tarski riesce a dimostrare che tutti e soli i modelli di 2GET sono isomorfi a spazi cartesiani di questo tipo dove l'assioma elementare di continuità corrisponde alla proprietà di Bolzano per i polinomi: Teorema di Rappresentazione Affinché M sia un modello di 2GET è necessario e sufficiente che M sia isomorfo allo spazio cartesiano su un campo reale chiuso C ∗ 2 F . Risolto il problema della rappresentazione è possibile per Traski passare al problema della completezza e decidibilità di 2GET . Come anticipato, sfruttando il teorema di Sturm, Tarski può dimostrare che in CRCOT ogni formula è equivalente a una priva di quantificatori e provare che CRCOT è completa e decidibile. Il lavoro è quello di trasportare queste proprietà da CRCOT a 2 GET . Per comodità tipografica invece di scrivere C 2 F scriveremo U e consideriamo CRCOTU ⊨ , a partire da U per il linguaggio formale L possiamo, dunque, come si è visto, costruire una struttura , ,M D B=< >U U U U M M M M , per il linguaggio formale ∗L , che sia modello di 2 GET ed il modo in cui abbiamo costruito MU da U ha come correlato sintattico la definizione di una traduzione di 2GET in CRCOT . Possiamo, infatti, associare ad ogni formula α di ∗L una formula αɶ di L tale che [ ]1 1... n na a a aα ′ ′ɶU ⊨ sse 1 1 ... n na a a aα ′ ′  MU ⊨ 8 8 Dove αɶ ha 2n variabili libere, se α ne ha n. Conveniamo per ogni variabile x di ∗L di scegliere due variabili ,x x′ di L : intuitivamente ciò significa che mentre in ∗L parliamo di punti ,j ja a′< > , in L parliamo di coordinate ja e ja′ . Vedi Tarski e Givant 1999, 201, per una descrizione intuitiva. Graziani: Elementare ma complessa 65 definendo una traduzione : Form Formλ ∗ → LL ponendo, ove si supponga , 'x x x=< > e , 'y y y=< > , che per le formule atomiche: ( ) ( )x y x y x yλ ′ ′= = = ∧ = ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 2 2 2( ( , , , ))D x y z w x y x y z w z wλ ′ ′ ′ ′= − + − = − + − ( ( , , )) [( ) ( ) ( ) ( )] [0 ( ) ( )] [0 ( ) ( )]B x y z x y y z x y y z x y y z x y y zλ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= − ⋅ − = − ⋅ − ∧ ≤ − ⋅ − ∧ ≤ − ⋅ − Figura 1. La definizione di equidistanza nel piano cartesiano Complessità e riduzionismo 66 Figura 2. La definizione di essere tra nel piano cartesiano. e supponendola letterale per le altre formule: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) x x x x λ α γ λα λγ λ α γ λα λγ λ α γ λα λγ λ α λα λ α λα λ α λα ∧ = ∧ ∨ = ∨ → = → ¬ = ¬ ∃ = ∃ ∀ = ∀ Sia ora α λα=ɶ . Posto ciò è possibile dimostrare il seguente Teorema di Interpretazione: Per ogni enunciato α di ∗L , 2GE CRCOT Tα α⇒ ɶ⊢ ⊢ Dimostrato il teorema di interpretazione9 disponiamo di una traduzione di ∗ L in L per cui vale 2GE CRCOT Tα α⊃ ɶ⊢ ⊢ , ovvero disponiamo di una 9 Ogni traduzione di ∗ L in L per cui valga 2GE CRCOT Tα α⊃ ɶ⊢ ⊢ sarà chiamata interpretazione di 2GET in CRCOT . Graziani: Elementare ma complessa 67 interpretazione di 2GET in CRCOT . Ciò ci consente di dimostrare la coerenza di 2 GET , ma non ancora di trasferire i risultati di completezza e decidibilità da CRCOT a 2 GET . Per poter trasferire la completezza e la decidibilità da CRCOT a 2 GET è necessario non solo che la nostra traduzione sia una interpretazione, ma anche che la nostra interpretazione sia fedele ovvero che valga il seguente teorema: Teorema di fedeltà dell'interpretazione 2 GE CRCOT Tα α↔ ɶ⊢ ⊢ la cui dimostrazione utilizza il teorema di rappresentazione ed il teorema di interpretazione. Posto che la traduzione λ è un'interpretazione fedele, è possibile provare la trasferibilità dei risultati di completezza e decidibilità da CRCOT a 2 GET . La decidibilità è ovvia – tenuto conto dell'assiomatizzabilità una volta provata la completezza. Per avere la completezza, posta la coerenza di 2 GET , si supponga 2 GET α⊬ , dove α è un enunciato di ∗ L , allora si deve provare che 2GET α¬⊢ . Per la fedeltà si ha che CRCOT αɶ⊬ e, poiché CRCOT è completa, CRCOT α¬ ɶ⊢ . Per definizione ( )α α¬ = ¬ɶ , così ( )CRCOT α¬⊢ e poiché λ è fedele 2GET α¬⊢ . Sebbene i risultati di coerenza e di completezza siano già di grande rilievo per un sistema assiomatico, l'interesse per il sistema tarskiano deriva soprattutto dalla possibilità di poter dimostrare per esso anche la proprietà di decidibilità che, dopo la famosa conferenza di Parigi di Hilbert, era divenuto uno dei problemi di maggiore interesse e indagine da parte dei matematici e logici. Fu proprio il tentativo di analizzare tale concetto che condusse a raffinatissimi contributi non solo nel campo della teoria dei modelli, ma anche in quello della teoria della ricorsività10. Uno dei grandi problemi degli studi fondazionale posti da Hilbert era, infatti, la questione di decidere per ogni teoria T quali sono i suoi teoremi. E' questo il cosiddetto Entscheidungsproblem o problema della decisione. La riflessione su tale nozione portò subito in primo piano la necessità di una chiara definizione del concetto di algoritmo di decisione o di computo ovvero la necessità di definire, relativamente a problemi differenti, un 10 Si veda Rabin (1977). Complessità e riduzionismo 68 complesso di istruzioni deterministiche, meccaniche e generali. Esempi noti di tali procedure sono l'algoritmo euclideo per la ricerca del massimo comune divisore fra due numeri naturali o l'algoritmo delle tavole di verità mediante cui stabilire se una data formula proposizionale è o no una tautologia. Sebbene in matematica ed in logica esistano numerosi esempi di algoritmi, l'importanza della ricerca di tali procedure risiede nel fatto che esistono altrettanti problemi noti per i quali non conosciamo un algoritmo in grado di offrirci una soluzione, ad esempio il problema della decisione per la logica del primo ordine (LP): data una qualunque formula α scritta nel linguaggio della logica del primo ordine, è possibile decidere in un numero finito di passi se α è un teorema o meno del sistema considerato? Ovvero, considerata la classe C di tutte le formule di LP è possibile dare un algoritmo per isolare in essa una sottoclasse T costituita da tutte e sole quelle formule che sono teoremi di LP? Ovvero è possibile decidere per ogni formula α di LP se Tα ∈ oppure no? Un errore molto facile in cui è possibile cadere è quello di pensare che tale algoritmo esista11 e che sia proprio rappresentato da un sistema di assiomi per LP con le sue regole di derivazione; infatti è possibile decidere per ogni formula α di LP se essa è o no un assioma ed è anche possibile decidere se, data una successione finita di formule, essa è una derivazione di formule in LP. Ma ciò non dà affatto una risposta alla domanda dell' Entscheidungsproblem. Per determinare quando una data formula è un teorema dobbiamo essere in grado di sapere se esiste una sua dimostrazione, ciò significa che dobbiamo in qualche modo avere a che fare con il dominio infinito delle dimostrazioni. Il carattere effettivo delle regole di derivazione e della proprietà di essere assioma ci consente di determinare, data una successione di formule, se essa è una dimostrazione, ma non di sapere se, data una formula α , esiste una successione di formule che sia una sua dimostrazione. Una semplice riflessione ci mostra allora che per la decidibilità di una teoria è sufficiente che sia assiomatizzabile e completa. Ciò che, dunque, Tarski riuscì a dimostrare per 2GET è che l'insieme dei teoremi di 2 GET è decidibile, cioè data una qualunque formula di ∗L siamo in grado in un numero finito di passi e del tutto meccanicamente di stabilire se essa è o no un teorema di 2GET . Questo discende dalla completezza di 2GET e dalla sua assiomatizzabilità. Alternativamente possiamo sfruttare la decidibilità di CRCOT e la traduzione 11 A. Church diede una risposta negativa al problema della decisione per la logica del primo ordine. Vedi Church (1936a); (1936b). Graziani: Elementare ma complessa 69 λ . Il risultato dimostrato da Tarski è che l'interpretazione : Form Formλ ∗ → LL è effettiva, ovvero dato α di ∗ L è possibile, in un numero finito di passi, determinare αɶ di L . Dato α in ∗L si deve decidere se 2GET α⊢ o no. Applicando λ , dopo un numero finito di passi abbiamo αɶ . Poiché CRCOT è decidibile, dopo un numero finito di passi sappiamo se CRCOT αɶ⊬ o no. Per fedeltà sappiamo se 2 GET α⊢ o no. In una certa ampia misura, come correttamente sottolinea Rabin12, sino agli anni sessanta dello scorso secolo «in the spirit of Hilbert's Program and of Turing's analysis of computabilità, it is tacitly assumed that for a theory T proved decidable, the question whether a given sentence is a theorem of T is a trivial one. For one needs only to mechanically apply the decision procedure in order to answer any such question. No creative or intelligent thinking is required for this process». Tale prospettiva iniziò a modificarsi sotto la spinta dei lavori di Fisher, di Rabin13 e Meyers14 che posero l'attenzione in modo particolare sulla complessità computazionale della soluzione di problemi di decisione15. Così, la questione non era più quella del problema della decisione, bensì la seguente: dato un algoritmo di decisione per una teoria T, quanto tempo e spazio di memoria16 tale algoritmo impiega per decidere se un enunciato della teoria è un suo teorema? In teoria della complessità computazionale si assume che siano computazionalmente intrattabili quei compiti che richiedono risorse di tempo e spazio di memoria (le cosiddette risorse computazionali) che 12 Rabin (1977, 599). 13 Fischer and Rabin (1974). 14 Meyer (1975). 15 Vedi anche Stockmeyer (1987). Si veda anche Papadimitriou (1994); Sipser (2005). 16 Come opportunamente sottolineato da Frixione e Palladino (2004, 381): «queste due risorse hanno un ruolo, per così dire, 'asimmetrico': in un certo senso il tempo di calcolo è prioritario rispetto allo spazio di memoria, in quanto, se un calcolo richiede un certo spazio di memoria, esso deve necessariamente richiedere un tempo che sia almeno dello stesso ordine di grandezza. Se ad esempio un calcolo richiede uno spazio di memoria che cresce esponenzialmente, esso deve impiegare un numero di passi di calcolo almeno esponenziale, in quanto altrimenti non avrebbe il tempo sufficiente per operare su tutta la memoria richiesta. Non è detto però che valga il viceversa. Un calcolo può richiedere un tempo esponenziale anche se gli è sufficiente uno spazio di memoria polinomiale». Ovviamente, come Frixione e Palladino notano, questo vale certamente per computazioni sequenziali, nel caso del calcolo parallelo le cose meritano analisi ulteriori. Complessità e riduzionismo 70 crescono esponenzialmente con la lunghezza dell'input17; e che siano computazionalmente trattabili quelli che richiedono risorse che crescono al più in modo polinomiale18 con la lunghezza dell'input. In tale prospettiva, come correttamente si dice, la complessità computazionale non concerne quante risorse richiede di svolgere un determinato compito, bensì quanto aumentano le risorse richieste al crescere delle dimensioni dei dati. Il confronto della nuova prospettiva con il lavoro tarskiano sembrò da subito fondamentale. Proprio studiando la complessità computazionale degli algoritmi di decisione, nel 1974, Fischer e Rabin provarono in primis per l'aritmetica di Presburger (dimostrata decidibile) che per ogni algoritmo di decisione esistono enunciati α di misura (numero dei simboli) n tali che l'algoritmo richiede 22 n passi per decidere α ; ed in secondo luogo che l'algoritmo tarskiano19 per la geometria elementare è inefficiente in quanto esponenzialmente complesso: essi mostrarono, infatti, che dato un qualunque algoritmo per la geometria euclidea elementare esistono infiniti enunciati della teoria tali che l'algoritmo non è in grado di decidere se è oppure no un teorema della teoria in meno di 2cn passi, dove 0c > (c dipende dalla codificazione usata) ed n la lunghezza dell'enunciato; e posero (senza dimostrazione) che esiste un 0c > tale che l'algoritmo di Tarski verificherà o refuterà un enunciato della geometria elementare di lunghezza n in al più 2b passi con 2cnb = . Dunque, dal punto di vista della complessità computazionale, ciò significa, come evidenziato da Stockmeyer, che la usuale distinzione tra teorie decidibili ed indecidibili viene ad offuscarsi in quanto per un essere umano le teorie decidibili che ammettono algoritmi inefficienti equivalgono a teorie indecidibili: The fact that ( , )Th R + and ( , , )Th R + ⋅ are decidible is of little use in designing practical decision algorithms. The exponential growth of the time required to accept ( , )Th R + suggests that any decision procedure for this problem will use hopelessly large amounts of time on relatively short 17 Tali lunghezze sono misurate in modo opportuno ed in maniera diversa a seconda dei casi: nel caso in questione potremmo considerare il numero di simboli ricorrenti nell'enunciato da decidere. 18 Dunque un algoritmo è considerato efficiente se esiste una funzione polinomiale P tale che, per ogni enunciato della teoria in questione, l'algoritmo richiede un numero di passi minori o uguale a P(n) (dove n è la lunghezza dell'enunciato) per decidere se l'enunciato è o meno un teorema della teoria. 19 Per ulteriori dettagli storici si veda Stockmeyer (1987). Un secondo interessante caso studio è quello proposto da D'Agostino (1992). Graziani: Elementare ma complessa 71 sentences, and therefore that ( , )Th R + is "practically undecidable" even thoug it is tecnically decidable. Even though the value of c and the density of sentences for which the theorem applies have not yet been determined well enough to draw solid conclusions, the term practical undecidability seems apt, since classical undecidability results are prone to similar objections. At the very least, an exponential lower bound on the time complexity of a problem serves as a warning not to seek a uniformly efficient decision algorithm but either to settle for an algorithm which does not work in all cases or to simplify the problem so that it becomes tractable.20 Tali risultati, ovviamente, non implicano una rinuncia a lavorare sulla geometria tarskiana dal punto di vista della dimostrazione automatica21, perché in generale questo tipo di applicazioni è motivato anche dall'obiettivo di verificare la validità di nuovi algoritmi. In conclusione, la teoria della complessità computazionale non ci insegna qualcosa di importante e di cui tener conto solo per la progettazione di nuovi algoritmi22 e per l'informatica tout court, ma qualcosa che deve spronarci ad una riflessione più generale che senza dubbio raffinerebbe le analisi di molti problemi filosofici: dalla filosofia del linguaggio alla filosofia della matematica, dalla filosofia della fisica alla filosofia dell'economia, dalla filosofia della mente alla filosofia della biologia23. Ringraziamenti Ringrazio Silvio Bozzi per avermi introdotto a queste tematiche negli anni di insegnamento all'Università di Urbino: questo testo ha un grande debito con i suoi insegnamenti; ringrazio, inoltre, Fabio Acerbi, Giulia Giannini, Paolo Stellari, Angelo Vistoli, Massimo Sangoi per i loro utilissimi commenti. 20 Stockmeyer (1987, 3). 21 Vedi Quaife (1989); Narboux (2007). 22 Rabin (1974); Simon, (1995). 23 Si veda l'importante lavoro di Aaronson (2012); si veda anche Cherniak (1984); D'Agostino, Mondadori (1999). Complessità e riduzionismo 72 Riferimenti Aaronson, S., 2012, «Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity» in: B. J. Copeland, C. Posy, O. Shagrir (a cura di), Computability: Gödel, Turing, Church and Beyond, MIT Press. Caviness, B.F., Johnson, J.R., 1998, Quantifier Elimination and Cylindrical Algebraic Decomposition, Texts and Monographs in Symbolic Computation. Springer-Verlag. Cherniak, C., 1984, «Computational Complexity and the Universal Acceptance of Logic», The Journal of Philosophy, LXXXI, n. 12, pp. 739-758. Church, A., 1936a, «An Unsolvable Problem of Elementary Number Theory», American Journal of Mathematics, 58, pp. 345-363, e "A Correction", ivi, pp. 101-102. Church , A., 1936b, «A note on Entscheidungsproblem», The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1, n. 1, pp. 40-41. D'Agostino, M., 1992, «Are tableaux an improvement on truth-tables? Cutfree proofs and bivalence», Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 1, pp. 235-252. D'Agostino, M., Mondadori, M., 1999, «La logica è davvero analitica?», Bollettino Filosofico del Dipartimento di Filosofia dell'Università della Calabria, 15, pp. 283-306. Reperibile presso: www.rescogitans.it/download.php?attachment_id=457 Doner, J., Hodges, W., 1988, «Alfred Tarski and Decidible Theories», The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 53, n. 1, pp. 20-35. Fischer, M.J., Rabin, M.O., 1974, «Super-exponential complexity of Pressburger arithmetic», Complexity of Computation (AMS-SIAM Proceedings), pp. 7-41, 1974. Frixione, M., Palladino, D., 2004, Funzioni, Macchine, Algoritmi. Introduzione alla Teoria della Computabilità, Carocci, Roma. Graziani, P., 2001, Analisi e Sintesi in Geometria. La Prospettiva della Teoria Intuizionista dei Tipi, Università degli Studi di Urbino. Hilbert, D., 2009, Fondamenti della geometria, Franco Angeli, Milano. Hodges, W., 1993, Model Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Jacobson, N., 1985, Basic Algebra, 2 vols., W. H. Freeman and Company, New York. Keisler, H.J., 1977, «Fundamentals of model theory» in Handbook of Mathematical Logic, J. Barwise (a cura di), North Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, pp. 47-103. Graziani: Elementare ma complessa 73 Meyer, A.R., 1974, «The inherent complexity of theories of ordered sets», Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematics, Canadian Mathematical Congress, Vancouver, pp. 477-482. Narboux, J., 2007, «Mechanical Theorem Proving in Tarski's Geometry» in Automated Deduction in Geometry, F. Botana and T. Recio eds., Springer-Verlag, Berlin-Heidelberg, pp.139-156. Papadimitriou, C.H., 1994, Computational Complexity, Addison-Wesley. Prestel, A., 1984, Lectures on Formally Real Fields, Springer-Verlag. Quaife, A., 1989, «Automated Development of Tarski's Geometry», Journal of Automated Reasoning, 5, pp. 97-118. Rabin, M.O., 1974, «Theoretical Impediments to Artificial Intelligence» in: Rosenfeld J. L. (a cura di) Information Processing 74: Proceedings of IFIP Congress 74, North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 615-619. Rabin, M.O., 1977, «Decidable Theories» in Handbook of Mathematical Logic, J. Barwise (a cura di), North Holland Publishing Company, pp. 595-629. Renegar, J., 1992, «On the Computational Complexity and Geometry of the First-order Theory of the Reals, Part I: Introduction. Preliminaries. The Geometry of Semi-algebraic Sets. The Decision Problem for the Existential Theory of the Reals», Journal of Symbolic Computation, 13, pp. 255-299. Renegar, J., 1992, «On the Computational Complexity and Geometry o the First-order Theory of the Reals. Part II: The General Decision Problem. Preliminaries for Quantifier Elimination», Journal of Symbolic Computation, 13, pp. 301-327. Renegar, J., 1992, «On the Computational Complexity and Geometry of the First-order Theory of the Reals. Part III: Quantifier Elimination», Journal of Symbolic Computation, 13, pp. 329-352. Shoenfield, J.R., 1967, Mathematical Logic, Addison-Wesley, Reading (Mass.). Simon, H.A., 1995, «Artificial Intelligence: an empirical science», Artificial Intelligence, 77, pp. 95-127. Stockmeyer, L., 1987, «Classifing the Computational Complexity of Problems», The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 52, N. 1, pp. 1-43. Sipser, M., 2005, Introduction to the Theory of Computation (second Edition), Course Technology. Szczerba, L.W., 1986, «Tarski and geometry», The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 51, N. 4, pp. 907-912. Complessità e riduzionismo 74 Tarski, A., 1951, A Decision Method for Elementary Algebra and Geometry, second edition, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press. Tarski, A., 1959, «What is Elementary Geometry?» in: The Axiomatic Method, with Special Reference to Geometry and Physics, L. Henkin, P. Suppes, and A. Tarski eds., amsterdam, North Holland. Tarski, A., Givant, S., 1999, «Tarski's System of Geometry», The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 5, n. 2, pp. 175-214. Van Den Dries, L., 1988, «Alfred Tarski's Elimination Theory for Real Closed Fields», The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 53, n. 1, pp. 7-19. © 2012 Arcangelo Rossi "Dai modelli riduzionistici della realtà fisica nella scienza classica alla complessità nella scienza moderna", in Complessità e riduzionismo, pp. 73-89 Published by Isonomia, Rivista online di Filosofia – Epistemologica – ISSN 2037-4348 Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo http://isonomia.uniurb.it/epistemologica 75 Dai modelli riduzionistici della realtà fisica nella scienza classica alla complessità nella scienza contemporanea Arcangelo Rossi Università del Salento [email protected] Anacronisticamente, l'illustre storico e filosofo neokantiano Ernst Cassirer attribuiva già alle origini della scienza moderna, in particolare a Galileo, la piena transizione da un'accezione sostantiva ed esplicativa dei modelli usati dagli scienziati ad una (da lui assunta come propriamente scientifica) formale e funzionale1. Questa, rispondendo a domande relative al "come" e non al "perché" dei fenomeni, riguarderebbe solo la descrizione dei comportamenti e delle relazioni quantitative tra gli stessi, senza fornire alcuna interpretazione relativa alla natura degli enti in gioco e alle loro relazioni causali, qualitative e sostanziali. Già con Galileo, per Cassirer, si attuerebbe cioè in pieno il passaggio dalla sostanza alla funzione nella scienza, come testimonierebbe, nel Dialogo dei Massimi Sistemi in particolare, la sua rinuncia a cercare la causa della gravità per limitarsi a cercarne invece i sintomi e gli effetti in termini sperimentali e quantitativi, prediligendo in sostanza la cinematica alla dinamica, i fenomeni alle spiegazioni2. Sarebbe tuttavia sbagliato ritenere che Galileo, nel cercare relazioni funzionali tra parametri empirici del moto, ad esempio, di caduta dei gravi, rinunciasse alla loro spiegazione causale, considerando egli comunque le 1 Cassirer (1973). 2 Galilei (1998, 253-254). Complessità e riduzionismo 76 leggi matematiche espressioni di qualità sostanziali, non solo empiriche e formali. Per lui infatti le relazioni funzionali erano non semplici espressioni di percezioni empiriche, ma frutto di astrazione e selezione, trattandosi di enti ideali, le cosiddette qualità primarie matematizzate che dovrebbero spiegare le stesse proprietà empiriche come risultato dell'interazione di quelle qualità primarie con i nostri organi di senso (cfr. Il saggiatore)3. Infatti le qualità primarie, espresse in linguaggio matematico, sarebbero comprensibili in termini geometrici intuitivi e meccanici, quindi causali, pur in assenza di una spiegazione completa della realtà fisica. Non vi è cioè in Galileo ancora una distinzione tra modelli formali e funzionali e modelli sostantivi, trattandosi sempre di modelli matematizzati più o meno parziali e più o meno in grado di farci conoscere la realtà. L'unica possibilità di sviluppo ulteriore della conoscenza consisteva per lui nell'estendere ulteriormente la portata dei modelli, insieme matematici e meccanici, comunque perfetti pur nella loro parzialità. Nel metodo galileiano e nella sua ispirazione realista in termini di modelli sostantivi, sia pur sempre espressi in linguaggio matematico formale, vi è comunque un aspetto che impedisce di attribuire a Galileo una concezione puramente funzionalista dei modelli e che consiste nella profonda convinzione di Galileo stesso che la conoscenza umana sia intensive, cioè in riferimento alla sua esattezza nel conoscere particolari «affezioni» o proprietà fisiche matematicamente, tanto esatta quanto la conoscenza divina, anche se non è certo confrontabile extensive con essa, nel senso che le conosca tutte, conoscendone essa sempre solo alcune4. Come è noto, Cartesio criticò Galileo per aver costruito «senza fondamenti», per essersi limitato a poche «affezioni» accessibili e non aver cercato di conoscerle tutte attraverso i modelli sostantivi pur da lui utilizzati5. Cartesio riteneva cioè, in contrasto con Galileo, di poter conoscere già subito integralmente le essenze universali delle cose, laddove Galileo ammetteva che pretendere tanto – «tentar le essenze» –6 fosse impossibile, per limitarsi alle poche regolarità matematiche accessibili attraverso un processo di idealizzazione a partire dall'esperienza sensoriale (in ogni caso non per mera induzione), fino a giungere a spiegazioni causali, geometriche e meccaniche, in termini di modelli sostantivi e non solo formali. Cartesio, assumendo come Galileo la priorità delle proprietà 3 Galilei (1968, 187-188). 4 Galilei, G., Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi cit., p. 112. 5 Descartes, R., Lettera a Mersenne dell'11 ottobre 1638 in Tutte le lettere 1619-1650, a cura di G. Belgioioso, Bompiani, Milano 2005, pp. 878-899. 6 Galilei, G., Opere cit., vol. V, pp. 187-1188. Rossi: Dai modelli riduzionistici della realtà fisica alla complessità 77 geometriche e meccaniche come base di spiegazione dei fenomeni in generale in termini di modelli riduzionistici, pretendeva, a differenza di Galileo, di fornire direttamente ed esaustivamente le cause dei fenomeni senza limitarsi a poche regolarità matematiche accessibili. Il suo obiettivo era infatti addirittura sostituire integralmente le cause finali e qualità essenziali aristoteliche con cause meccaniche universali, in termini di azioni di contatto meccaniche come cause nascoste delle stesse regolarità. In realtà però queste cause erano concepite mediante immaginazione analogica e idee di senso comune, spesso erronee nonostante la pretesa di validità matematica, piuttosto che da calcoli e osservazioni accurate, essendo esse matematiche e quantitative solo in linea di principio7. Il passo successivo fu compiuto da Newton con nuovi modelli, essenzialmente ma non solo di azione a distanza, che complementavano la trattazione meccanica e geometrica dei fenomeni di Cartesio con una dimensione qualitativa irriducibile, mettendo così in discussione la fisica di Cartesio che tendeva a escludere ogni elemento qualitativo dalla meccanica e quindi, riduzionisticamente, da tutta la fisica. Newton riusciva invece a ricavare da quella dimensione qualitativa effetti non solo spirituali e mentali, ma anche direttamente osservabili e calcolabili. Introduceva infatti potenze e cause dinamiche agenti anche a distanza sulla materia e indipendenti da essa8. Queste forze avevano per Newton carattere istantaneo, propagandosi impulsivamente nello spazio e nel tempo, sensorium Dei nel cui quadro Dio ricarica la macchina del mondo, destinata altrimenti ad arrestarsi, con sempre nuovi impulsi di potenza. Il riduzionismo newtoniano delle forze a distanza come impulsi di potenza, ad esempio direttamente proporzionali alle quantità di materia ed inversamente proporzionali al quadrato delle distanze, configurava dunque le forze stesse come direttamente agenti sulla materia e al tempo stesso come indipendenti da essa, a produrre i fenomeni, tali comunque da non essere più spiegabili nei termini di Cartesio di azioni di contatto materiali tra corpi, ma richiedenti un'indipendenza dinamica, in particolare in termini di gravitazione universale9. A differenza della forza di Newton, la vis viva del suo grande rivale Leibniz era intrinseca alla realtà fisica e materiale, concepita peraltro come continua, a differenza della materia di Newton concepita atomisticamente. Dunque la vis viva di Leibniz era sì elemento creativo, anch'esso di origine 7 Descartes, R, La Diottrica e Le Meteore, in Opere scientifiche, volume secondo, a cura di E. Lojacono, UTET, Torino 1983, pp. 175-508. 8 Koyré, A., Studi newtoniani, Einaudi, Torino 1972. 9 Koyré, A., Dal cosmo chiuso all'universo infinito, Feltrinelli, Milano 1970. Complessità e riduzionismo 78 divina, ma interno al mondo e conoscibile anche a priori e non solo per esperienza, a posteriori: la monade in cui l'intera realtà si riflette in continuità e conservazione delle sue proprietà dinamiche10. Per una piena comprensione del contrasto scientifico-filosofico tra Newton e Leibniz in termini di diversità di concezione riduzionistica dei due grandi padri della scienza classica, occorre considerare anche le loro diverse e perfino opposte interpretazioni delle nozioni fondamentali del calcolo infinitesimale, cioè di quel linguaggio matematico nuovo da essi sviluppato insieme e oltre quello geometrico e aritmetico della tradizione. Coerentemente con le loro diverse visioni, mentre Newton concepiva il calcolo come espressione di fenomeni fisici (ad esempio la derivata o «flussione» come velocità di variazione e la derivata seconda o «flussione di flussione» come accelerazione), Leibniz interpretava l'infinitesimo come punto metafisico, la monade in cui si concentra l'intera realtà per produrre ogni possibile grandezza. In un caso quindi la nuova matematica era basata sull'analogia fisica e un empirismo, espressione della libera volontà di Dio, irriducibile all'astratta ragione, mentre, nell'altro, era basata su essenze metafisiche precostituite, al tempo stesso meccaniche e quantitative e finali e qualitative11. Queste ultime quindi al tempo stesso spiegavano deterministicamente e orientavano finalisticamente l'intera realtà in modo ritenuto infallibile, assumendosi che una spiegazione puramente meccanica dei fenomeni nel senso di Cartesio, basata sulle sole collisioni per contatto, fosse insufficiente senza ricorrere ad un'animazione universale della realtà soggetta a continuità e conservazione assolute12. La grande Meccanica razionale del XVIII secolo tentò quindi di fare sintesi tra evidenza empirica delle discontinuità e perdite di potenza manifestate nello studio delle apparenze, da cui Newton aveva ricavato le forze come elementi discontinui separati dalla materia ma direttamente attivi su di essa, e invarianza dei processi dinamici continui suggerita da Leibniz. Tale sintesi che unificava i fenomeni fisici discontinui in termini di principi di continuità e conservazione, fu poi di fatto adattata da Kant al suo criticismo nei Primi Principi Metafisici della Scienze della Natura, tentando di dedurla dai più generali principi della Ragion Pura13. Proprio allo scopo di unificare concettualmente il molteplice dei fenomeni, la Meccanica 10 Costabel, P., Leibniz et la dynamique en 1692. Textes et commentaires, Hermann, Paris 1969. 11 Hall, A. R., Philosophers at war. The Quarrel between Newton and Leibniz, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge 1989. 12 Drago, A., La riforma della dinamica secondo G. W. Leibniz, Hevelius Edizioni, Benevento 2003. 13 Kant, I, Primi principi metafisici della scienza della natura, Cappelli, Bologna 1959. Rossi: Dai modelli riduzionistici della realtà fisica alla complessità 79 razionale del XVIII secolo la giustificava invece ancora in termini ontologici leibniziani. Esempi ne sono il concetto di forza di Euler e il principio di conservazione di d'Alembert 14. A Euler dobbiamo la prima formulazione differenziale rigorosa del II principio della dinamica in termine di variazioni continue come cause ultime delle variazioni discontinue finite osservabili, variazioni dinamiche messe in evidenza da Newton senza far ricorso al calcolo differenziale e alla continuità di Leibniz. In effetti Euler per primo combinò rigorosamente i concetti fisici di Newton e le nozioni filosofico-matematiche del calcolo infinitesimale di Leibniz. Il carattere invariantivo delle variazioni dinamiche a confronto con le perdite apparenti di potenza sottolineate da Newton e per lui compensate da acquisizioni sovrannaturali di potenza, fu inoltre chiarificato da d'Alembert, ugualmente a priori in senso riduzionistico, interpretando le discontinuità di urti bruschi di corpi duri, chiaramente implicate dalla meccanica a livello empirico, solo come limiti di variazioni infinitesimali continue al livello inosservabile subiacente (cioè «per gradi insensibili»), con l'effetto di escludere perdite assolute di potenza. Contrariamente agli sviluppi successivi, influenzati da punti di vista positivistici e fenomenistici e dal criticismo kantiano, la visione della natura che emerge dalla scienza classica illuminista era comunque realista e riduzionista. In particolare, il suo punto di vista deterministico-causale aveva sì la sua base in un'interpretazione ontologica leibniziana della realtà, ma questa, pur pienamente determinista, non era a sua volta riducibile a catene causali separate tra loro, di carattere puramente meccanico, in una parola non era propriamente meccanicista e riduzionista, data la visione continua e olistica insieme, addirittura finalistica della realtà che la caratterizzava, per cui ogni elemento conteneva tutti gli altri e ne era causalmente contenuto. In ogni caso, l'aspetto deterministico-causale della visione di Leibniz, pur non potendo qualificarsi propriamente come riduzionista e meccanicista, influenzò decisamente il punto di vista della scienza classica, in particolare la Meccanica razionale, a sua volta indiscutibilmente realista e riduzionista. In realtà la visione ontologica leibniziana come concezione deterministica "complessa" della realtà arrivò a favorire anche sviluppi non semplicemente meccanicisti e riduzionisti della Scienza classica15. Solo in seguito però essa fu interpretata da positivisti e fenomenisti come mera conoscenza empirica governata da mere regolarità matematiche. E ciò non avvenne prima dell''800, non ancora ad 14 Truesdell, C., Essays in the History of Mechanics, Springer Verlag, Berlin 1968. 15 Brunet, P., Etude historique sur le principe de moindre action, Hermann, Paris 1938. Complessità e riduzionismo 80 esempio in Lagrange, che si vantava di poter evitare rappresentazioni visive nella sua opera matematica proprio perché essa era esplicitamente basata sui principi a priori della conservazione della forza viva e della continuità ontologico-matematica, sebbene poi gli oggetti fisici cui essi venivano applicati fossero quelli della fisica newtoniana 16. Subito dopo però, già Laplace identificava tout court la realtà con il mondo di Newton in termini atomico-molecolari così come sarebbe suggerito dall'esperienza o almeno approssimato da essa, mentre i principi esprimevano per lui le regolarità matematiche delle interazioni a distanza newtoniane, non già strutture ontologiche continue cartesiane o leibniziane. Egli salvaguardava tuttavia il carattere unificante di quei principi matematici. Così essi erano, contrariamente a Leibniz, interpretati come principi deterministici in senso anti-finalistico, comunque ancora unificanti e traducibili in modelli riduzionistici elementari di tipo meccanicistico, in termini di atomi e forze di interazione17. Laplace stesso tuttavia, pur convinto della validità del suo riduzionismo meccanicistico, del suo potere unificante e della sua capacità previsionale, ammetteva che in generale i mezzi di calcolo richiesti e la conoscenza dello stato iniziale di un sistema fisico per determinarne esattamente l'evoluzione successiva, non erano a nostra disposizione tanto da permettere una previsione di assoluta precisione. Ciò naturalmente minava la fiducia nel determinismo meccanicistico che tuttavia Laplace compensava con il ricorso alla probabilità come strumento di approssimazione e «rimedio dell'ignoranza», rinunciando a una conoscenza di dettaglio assoluta e completa, attribuibile solo a un'ipotetica intelligenza matematica dotata di una potenza di calcolo e una capacità di osservazione infinite e non umane18. Diversa fu la reazione dei fenomenisti e dei positivisti in generale alla crisi del riduzionismo meccanicistico classico quale si esprimeva nell'impossibilità di realizzare lo stesso programma riduzionistico classico, non disponendosi delle risorse matematiche e sperimentali necessarie richieste, supposte infinite. Essi reagirono attribuendo un carattere interamente empirico, formale e funzionale alle leggi e uniformità matematiche che, nella sua visione riduzionista, Laplace interpretava ancora meccanicisticamente. In tal modo, per Fourier, Ampère, Fresnel le leggi matematiche «unicamente dedotte dall'esperienza», come recita il titolo del lavoro fondamentale di Ampère sull'elettrodinamica, 16 Capecchi, D., e Drago, A., Lagrange e la storia della meccanica, Progedit, Bari 2005. 17 Laplace, P. S., Exposition du système du monde, in OEuvres, Gauthier-Villars, Paris 1909. 18 Laplace, P. S., Essai philosophique sur les probabilités, Courcier, Paris 1814. Rossi: Dai modelli riduzionistici della realtà fisica alla complessità 81 erano non modelli sostantivi, ma empirici e funzionali, di carattere strumentale rispetto a esigenze specifiche di correlazione empirica19. Tuttavia, la fisica teorica successiva tentò ancora di dare fondamenti ontologici alla fisica classica in termini di modelli sostantivi riduzionistici e analogico-modellistici. Ma, al tempo stesso, essa preparò il terreno per le rivoluzioni scientifiche della fisica del XX secolo che proprio quei termini finirono per mettere in discussione . Così, in particolare J. C. Maxwell, pur partito dal programma riduzionistico forte di costruire una dinamica dell'etere come oggetto fisico fondamentale, "portatore" meccanico dei fenomeni elettromagnetici, per cui si sarebbe dovuto spiegare nei termini delle proprietà e dei comportamenti di tale oggetto l'intera fenomenologia del campo elettromagnetico, era giunto invece a elaborare in termini sempre più formali e funzionali e sempre meno sostantivi tale visione analogica, il cosiddetto «metodo delle analogie fisiche». Questo riduceva essenzialmente il contenuto dei modelli, se non alle mere correlazioni empirico-formali dei positivisti matematici, a strutture matematiche generali, unificanti sì diversi campi fenomenici, meccanici ed elettromagnetici in particolare, ma senza identificarne i supposti "portatori". Questi apparivano sempre più irriducibili a oggetti specifici, come appunto l'ipotetico etere, nonostante l'uso euristico e matematico che, in termini di correlazioni funzionali, ne veniva fatto nella Dynamical Theory maxwelliana. Questa era peraltro ispirata alla visione continuista e matematica a priori di Lagrange, ma liberata dei suoi aspetti ontologico-metafisici per assumere una connotazione sempre più solo euristico-funzionale. Occorre comunque sottolineare che, per quanto riguarda invece l'altra teoria fisica elaborata da Maxwell in termini di modelli, la teoria cinetica dei gas, Maxwell restò più vicino alla tradizione riduzionista, ad esempio laplaciana. L'oggetto "portatore" del modello, in questo caso la molecola, si trasformava però sempre più in relazione funzionale, senza poter più fornire una base interpretativa strutturale stabile dei fenomeni trattati20. Come A. Einstein e L. Infeld avevano interpretato l'evoluzione della fisica tra '800 e '900 quale sviluppo di indizi non subito compresi alla luce di teorie e principi non ancora esplicitamente elaborati, ma comunque contenenti indicazioni che andavano nella direzione di quelle teorie e principi21, anche l'emergere della complessità nella scienza contemporanea 19 D'Agostino, S., Part One: From Mechanics to Electrodynamics, in Id., A History of the Ideas of Theoretical Physics, Essays on the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Physics, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 200, pp 103-106. 20 Ibid., Part Two: Electromagnetic Waves, pp. 109-216. 21 Einstein, A., Infeld, L., L'evoluzione della fisica, Einaudi, Torino 1948. Complessità e riduzionismo 82 non fu subito compreso nel suo pieno significato e tardò a svilupparsi quindi sino alla seconda metà del '900. Lo stesso Poincaré, che più di tutti affrontò direttamente alla fine dell''800 il tema dell'imprevedibilità dell'evoluzione di sistemi pur dotati di pochi gradi di libertà (tipicamente: i tre corpi interagenti della meccanica newtoniana), non maturò subito la trattazione "caotica" del fenomeno, in quanto troppo difficile da superare era anche per lui l'idea preconcetta in genere negli scienziati classici, della stabilità dell'evoluzione di un simile sistema, e quindi della possibilità di approssimare sempre una soluzione periodica stabile e confinata in una superficie chiusa dello spazio delle fasi. Fu solo a un secondo tentativo che Poincaré. si rese conto che invece la traiettoria del sistema non era contenuta in una superficie chiusa dello spazio delle fasi ma era caotica, pertanto irriducibile a soluzioni periodiche stabili22. Quindi un altro grande matematico francese, J. Hadamard, ispirandosi allo stesso Poincaré, applicò il punto di vista caotico a fenomeni meccanici ordinari, in particolare allo studio del moto di palle di biliardo che percorrono geodetiche, divergendo sempre più nelle loro traiettorie per minime incontrollabili variazioni delle condizioni iniziali del loro moto23. Ma il persistere, nonostante tutto, del punto di vista classico, con un ritardato sviluppo della nuova impostazione, è dimostrato dal fatto che ancora negli anni '40 del '900 prevaleva, ad esempio nello studio, da parte del grande L. Landau, della turbolenza, tipico fenomeno caotico, l'approccio all'irregolarità e instabilità del fenomeno stesso in termini di sovrapposizione di oscillazioni armoniche semplici, ancora secondo il punto di vista meccanicistico che interpretava i fenomeni complessi in generale, pur dipendenti da relazioni funzionali irriducibili, come mera somma di "mattoni elementari"24. Solo negli anni '60, a opera, tra gli altri, di un esperto dei fenomeni atmosferici, E. Lorenz, si mostrò che l'irregolarità di tali fenomeni di moti fluidi non dipende dal gran numero di variabili in gioco, ma dal caos deterministico che interviene, come dipendenza sensibile da piccole variazioni delle condizioni iniziali, anche in sistemi all'apparenza semplici e con pochi gradi di libertà25, esattamente come avevano teorizzato Poincaré e Hadamard molti anni prima. Pur senza negare affatto il determinismo dell'evoluzione del sistema studiato, quanto 22 Poincaré, J. H., Sur le probleme des trois corps et les equations de la dynamique, in Oeuvres, Gauthier-Villars, vol. VII, pp. 262-479. 23 Hadamard, J., Les surfaces à courbures opposées a leur lignes géodésiques, in Oeuvres, CNRS, Paris 1968, vol 2, pp. 729-75. 24 Landau, L. D., Sul problema della turbolenza (in russo), «Dokl. Akad. Nauk. SSSR», vol 44, 8, 339-42 (1994). 25 Lorenz, E., Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow, «J. Atmos. Sci.» 20, 130 (1963). Rossi: Dai modelli riduzionistici della realtà fisica alla complessità 83 piuttosto la possibilità di controllarlo, ci si limitava a riconoscerne la tendenza evolutiva asintotica in termini di diversi attrattori o bacini di attrazione in cui il sistema potrebbe riversarsi nella sua evoluzione26. Il punto è che le equazioni differenziali operanti per questi sistemi esprimono sì un andamento totalmente deterministico ma, come Poincaré in particolare evidenziò, al tempo stesso non lineare, tanto da dover contemplare una rapida evoluzione divergente degli effetti, appunto anche per piccole differenze nelle condizioni iniziali. Solo a partire dagli anni '60 del '900 comunque il comportamento caotico in meccanica riscosse sempre più l'interesse dei fisici. Per la verità, come nota D. Ruelle27, anche nell'ambito della meccanica e della fisica le idee avanzatissime, perfino rivoluzionarie di Poincaré sul caso, che anticiparono in modo sorprendentemente moderno le attuali concezioni, tardarono molto a diffondersi e a essere riconosciute, nonostante la loro consapevolezza e modernità. Vi fu infatti una polarizzazione dei fisici, in generale, sulla nuova meccanica quantistica in quanto nuova teoria del caso che avrebbe superato completamente la meccanica deterministica classica, cui invece la teoria di Poincaré era vista, nonostante tutto, ancora subordinata, come teoria deterministica in cui il caso appariva comunque in un quadro deterministico, benché non riduzionistico e controllabile. Un altro motivo per cui la teoria di Poincaré non ebbe seguito immediato come teoria fisica, anche se, dato il grande prestigio matematico del suo autore, si impose come pura matematica, è da individuare nel carattere spesso ancora intuitivo e qualitativo delle sue idee prima che si sviluppassero strumenti matematici per la fisica più adeguati, come la teoria della misura e il teorema ergodico, oltre che mezzi di calcolo più potenti nel trattamento di grandi quantità di dati esprimenti minime variazioni di condizioni iniziali dei sistemi caotici da cui ricavare effetti sensibili macroscopici. Com'è noto, tali mezzi più potenti cominciarono a essere sviluppati solo trenta/quaranta anni dopo la morte di Poincaré: i primi calcolatori elettronici in grado di elaborare in tempi ragionevoli enormi quantità di dati numerici28. Un altro aspetto problematico della nuova teoria nella sua applicazione ai casi di dipendenza sensibile dalle condizioni iniziali era poi espresso dalla critica convenzionalista mossa dal grande fisico ed epistemologo P. Duhem secondo cui la teoria stessa era poco utilizzabile, dato che non permetteva di fare previsioni a lungo termine29.Vi è tuttavia la possibilità di definire il grado di caoticità e quindi di 26 Vulpiani, A., Determinismo e caos, La Nuova Italia Scientifica, Roma 1994. 27 Ruelle, D., Caso e caos, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino 1992. 28 Ibid., p. 58. 29 Ibid., p. 56. Complessità e riduzionismo 84 imprevedibilità di un sistema attraverso i cosiddetti esponenti caratteristici di Lyapunov30. Questi permettono di descrivere gli attrattori in cui tendono a collocarsi nello spazio delle fasi i sistemi dotati di sensibilità alle condizioni iniziali, fornendo informazioni anche di carattere quantitativo e non solo qualitativo, in particolare quella espressa nei termini dell'entropia di Kolmogorov-Sinai come grado di caoticità di un sistema31, potendosi definire anche la dimensione geometrica "frattale" degli attrattori, senza tuttavia potersi prevedere se non con un'incertezza ineliminabile, se il sistema finirà in uno o in un altro32. Il contributo di Kolmogorov e in generale della scuola matematica sovietica è stato quello di fornire una definizione quantitativa e formale della complessità in generale, sottratta ad ambiguità e imprecisioni che facilmente emergono in un campo tuttora oggetto di discussioni. Basti pensare al conflitto che vi fu negli anni '90 tra I. Prigogine e R. Thom sul carattere deterministico per Thom e aleatorio e indeterministico per Prigogine della complessità33. Ebbene, l'introduzione dell'incompressibilità algoritmica come misura della complessità dovuta a Kolmogorov et al.34, pur senza dirimere la diatriba determinismo-indeterminismo, la riconduceva entro limiti ragionevoli, definendo rigorosamente un campo semantico, quello della complessità appunto, condivisibile da parte di punti di vista anche diversi e opposti, tale da comprenderne ed esprimerne gli aspetti fondamentali, invarianti e comuni, un po' come peraltro fece lo stesso Kolmogorov a proposito di un altro fondamentale concetto, la probabilità. Secondo la nuova definizione di complessità, si tratta di determinare il numero di bit o unità di informazione minime in termini di comandi al computer per generare una serie di cifre binarie (0,1), numero al disotto del quale la serie non sarebbe generabile. La complessità corrisponderebbe in sostanza all'incompressibilità algoritmica della sequenza. Sarebbe dunque complesso un sistema che non si lasci catturare subito da semplici regole per essere prodotto in modo semplice, preciso e non ambiguo. Come si diceva, al disotto di un numero di bit che ne esprimerebbe il grado di complessità, il 30 Vulpiani, A., op. cit., pp. 66-69. 31 Ibid., p. 67. 32 Ibid., pp. 69-73. 33 Pomian, K., (a cura di), Sul Determinismo, Il Saggiatore, Milano 1991. 34 Solomonoff, R. J., A formal theory of inductive inference, «Inform. and Control», vol 7 (1964), pp. 1-22, 224-54; Kolmogorov, A. N., Tre approcci alla definizione del concetto di quantità di informazione, «Probl. Peredachi Inform.», vol 1 (1965), pp. 3-11; Chaitin, G. J., On the length of programs for computing finite binary sequences, «J. ACM», vol 13 (1966), pp. 547-69. Rossi: Dai modelli riduzionistici della realtà fisica alla complessità 85 sistema è dunque irriproducibile. Non è quindi possibile comprimere oltre quel limite l'algoritmo di istruzioni per generare il sistema, mentre in alcuni casi dobbiamo addirittura rassegnarci ad identificare l'algoritmo generatore della sequenza con l' elenco completo, eventualmente infinito, dei termini della sequenza. In ogni caso, la caoticità dipende causalmente, deterministicamente, dalle condizioni iniziali ed è quindi oggettiva, ma è al tempo stesso anche epistemica, in quanto dovuta all'incapacità dell'osservatore di determinare esattamente lo stato iniziale del sistema e quindi di effettuare previsioni a lungo termine, pur essendo le condizioni iniziali stesse oggettive e deterministicamente operanti. Si tratta di una situazione di indecidibilità che richiama il teorema di incompletezza di Gödel35. Il problema è che non è possibile determinare le condizioni iniziali con precisione arbitraria, ed effettuare una previsione con l'accuratezza desiderata, così come non è possibile dimostrare simultaneamente la completezza e la non contraddittorietà dell'aritmetica elementare. Il carattere indubbiamente deterministico, dal punto di vista ontico, dello stato di un sistema, almeno apparentemente contrasta dunque con l'imprevedibilità di principio dell'evoluzione di quel sistema, La contraddizione tuttavia si può e si deve superare assumendo come del tutto sensato non identificare il carattere deterministico con la possibilità di previsione esatta, contrariamente a quanto afferma Popper nel Poscritto alla Logica della scoperta scientifica36. Secondo lui infatti il punto di vista indeterministico sarebbe letteralmente dimostrato dai casi di impossibilità di previsione, come se non fosse possibile che il determinismo ontico conviva senza contraddizione con l'imprevedibilità epistemica. La situazione è simile a quella dell'irreversibilità, che può coesistere oggettivamente in un sistema, senza contraddizione, con la reversibilità meccanica delle leggi che governano lo stesso sistema, in quanto si tratta sempre del fatto che, come nel caso dell'interpretazione meccanica della termodinamica, il numero delle condizioni iniziali che implicano l'irreversibilità è incommensurabilmente maggiore di quello delle condizioni iniziali che implicano la reversibilità, pur non essendovi alcuna contraddizione di principio tra l'uno e l'altro. Analogamente, il numero delle condizioni iniziali che implicano l'imprevedibilità è, nel caso dei processi caotici, maggiore di quello delle condizioni iniziali che non l'implicano, senza che vi sia alcuna contraddizione tra l'uno e l'altro. In particolare, R. Thom ha sottolineato, in 35 Ford, J., How random is a coin toss?, «Physics Today», 36 (1983), 40. 36 Popper, K.R., Poscritto alla Logica della scoperta scientifica, II. L'universo aperto. Un argomento per l'Indeterminismo, Il Saggiatore, Milano 1984. Complessità e riduzionismo 86 polemica con I. Prigogine, che il determinismo è inevitabile per la scienza ed esprime la necessaria causalità dei processi fisici, senza che ciò impedisca di definire alcuni di tali processi al tempo stesso del tutto deterministici e oggettivamente imprevedibili, data la complessità e irregolarità degli stessi. Nei termini appunto di un caos deterministico rigorosamente definibile in un'accezione causale necessaria e, se non prevedibile, non perciò contraddittoria rispetto a quei diversi processi che siano anch'essi deterministici, ma al tempo stesso oggettivamente prevedibili. Essa non costituirà quindi alcuna alternativa, se non in termini di maggiore complessità oggettiva, rispetto al determinismo classico, riduzionistico e, almeno in linea di principio, prevedibile37. Entra in gioco a questo punto la trattazione statistica e probabilistica sviluppata in fisica soprattutto a partire da Maxwell e Boltzmann per superare la difficoltà di previsione nell'evoluzione di un sistema con molti gradi di libertà, per cui ci si accontenta di una previsione più grossolana, o meglio si sostituisce alla determinazione esatta delle condizioni iniziali una determinazione solo statistica e probabilistica. Diverso, come sappiamo, è il caso della meccanica quantistica che, almeno nella sua interpretazione ortodossa, assume la probabilità come irriducibile anche in linea di principio, secondo il principio di indeterminazione di Heisenberg. Il caos deterministico ripropone quindi piuttosto il punto di vista di Maxwell e Boltzmann in quanto non pone un limite assoluto, ontologico alla possibilità di determinazione delle condizioni iniziali, ma piuttosto un limite dovuto, nel caso della meccanica statistica, all'alto numero di particelle coinvolte e, nel caso del caos deterministico, nei sistemi caotici, all'oggettiva dipendenza sensibile dalle piccole variazioni delle condizioni iniziali, sempre però da un punto di vista deterministico38. A tale proposito, occorre evitare, anche nello studio della complessità, di confondere conoscenza ed ignoranza. Pur riconoscendo il progresso dovuto allo studio del caos, della turbolenza, dei sistemi fuori dall'equilibrio, non siamo in grado di estrarre da questo studio con certezza la chiave dei processi creativi emergenti come autentiche novità irriducibili, dovute ad una loro produzione spontanea a partire da processi e fenomeni di più basso livello. Per definire matematicamente il difficile rapporto tra caos e determinismo come base per poter riuscire a spiegare i processi creativi, si è quindi tentato, sulla scia di Poincaré, di fare ricorso alla relazione tra 37 Thom, R., in Pomian, K., cit. 38 Sinai, Ya. G., L'aléatoire du non-aléatoire in A. Daham-Dalmedico, J.L. Chabert e K. Chemla (a cura di), Chaos et determinisme, Editions du Seuil, Paris 1992. Rossi: Dai modelli riduzionistici della realtà fisica alla complessità 87 lineare e non lineare come opposte linee di analisi matematica, essendo la non linearità più adatta a render conto matematicamente proprio dei processi più imprevedibili ed incontrollabili, dato che i sistemi non lineari hanno appunto, come si sa, conseguenze non banalmente proporzionali alle condizioni iniziali. In essi a piccole variazioni di queste si avrebbero effetti sensibili appunto non lineari. Si deve effettivamente ammettere che prima che si sviluppasse alla fine dell''800 la tematica della complessità in fisica vi era una netta tendenza alla linearizzazione nello studio delle equazioni differenziali ordinarie. Resta comunque tuttora problematica la pretesa della teoria della complessità di rendere conto dell'emergere di nuove proprietà, a partire da livelli inferiori, a livelli superiori, dalla materia bruta alla vita e alla coscienza, prima in genere supposte non trattabili in senso riduzionistico finché, a partire dal XIX secolo, si pensò appunto di poterle trattare mediante approcci matematici deterministici e probabilistici come vie per pervenire dal semplice al complesso39. In particolare, il problema di trattare le proprietà di memoria dei sistemi mediante i metodi di isteresi o retroazione, oltre l'approccio meccanico tradizionale, rappresentò un terreno importante di approfondimento della dimensione storica e autoorganizzativa di sistemi non solo fisici, ma senza con questo riuscire a spiegare nei limiti della teoria della complessità l'aspetto creativo e finalistico di tali sistemi. Va anzitutto attribuito a Boltzmann40 il primo tentativo di trattazione matematico-formale dei fenomeni fisici di elasticità con memoria, per cui l'evoluzione di un sistema non dipende da un solo stato iniziale come nell'impostazione riduzionistica classica, ma da tutta la storia pregressa del sistema, tanto da richiedere l'impiego di strumenti analitici nuovi, le equazioni integro-differenziali la cui formulazione completa dobbiamo al grande V. Volterra41, lo stesso che, come l'americano A. J. Lotka, mise a punto anche le equazioni differenziali non lineari per lo studio dell'interazione tra specie predatrici e specie predate, alla base dei processi di evoluzione biologica42. 39 Israel, G., Some critical observations on the science of complexity, in P. Freguglia et al. (a cura di), The Science of Complexity: chimera or reality?, Società Editrice Esculapio, Bologna 2005, pp. 150-70. 40 Ianniello, M. G., Il contributo di Boltzmann alla teoria dei fenomeni di elasticità «con memoria», «Giornale di Fisica», XXXVI, Aprile-Giugno 1995, pp. 121-150 41 Volterra, V., Theory of Functionals and of Integro-Differential Equations, Dover, New York 1965. 42 Volterra, V., Leçons sur la theorie mathematique de la lutte pur la vie, Gauthier-Villars, Paris 1931. Complessità e riduzionismo 88 In ogni caso, né le equazioni differenziali lineari per lo studio dei sistemi dotati di memoria, né le equazioni differenziali non lineari per lo studio delle interazioni prede-predatori, per quanto ampliassero la portata dell'analisi nel senso della complessità dei processi studiati da un punto di vista statistico o deterministico, possono rendere conto di quegli obiettivi e finalità che pure si assumono alla base dei processi studiati. Il fatto è che obiettivi e finalità non si lasciano ridurre ai meccanismi deterministici e alle relazioni statistiche obiettive che pure contribuiscono alla loro affermazione. Se poi si allarga lo sguardo ai fenomeni sociali e umani, volendo rappresentarli unicamente mediante algoritmi deterministici o probabilistici alla stregua di fenomeni fisici da cui si vogliano far emergere fenomeni nuovi e creativi, in realtà si avrà solo una loro rappresentazione del tutto inadeguata, estremamente povera in termini di movimenti del tutto casuali del tipo dei moti "browniani" di un marinaio ubriaco incerto sulla strada da prendere come l'asino di Buridano, secondo Thom43 per il quale nulla può essere più lontano dalle decisioni e scelte di un soggetto cosciente. Si potrà al massimo riuscire a enunciare leggi fisiche impersonali attraverso una loro riduzione ai soli aspetti universali legali, seguendo la raccomandazione di Galileo di «difalcare gli impedimenti»44. Lo studio dei comportamenti coscienti orientati ad uno scopo potrà invece progredire solo se evita di appiattirsi sul modello metodologico deterministico causale o statistico casuale allo scopo di conseguire conclusioni puramente obiettive su comportamenti soggettivi, e se cerca di ridimensionare la procedura fisica galileiana di «difalcare gli impedimenti». In ogni caso, la formalizzazione nelle scienze che hanno attinenza con la storia, con gli scopi e le decisioni e, prima ancora, con le dinamiche dell'evoluzione biologica (in particolare con il tentativo di tradurre, come si è visto, in linguaggio modellistico analiticoformale i contenuti dei processi genetico-evolutivi), non potrà certo assumere mai le stesse dimensioni che ha assunto nella fisica, in termini di espansione/applicazione di procedure matematico-formali. Peraltro neppure nella fisica, a rigore, nonostante gli sviluppi positivi della scienza della complessità, questa deve rischiare, attraverso la matematizzazione/ formalizzazione, di presentarsi come una versione solo un po' aggiornata del riduzionismo classico. In definitiva, pur coesistendo proficuamente anche con il riduzionismo classico, la scienza della complessità se ne deve differenziare, per cooperare anche con altre forme cognitive diverse dalla 43 Thom, R., Introduction a P. S. Laplace, Essai philosophique sur la proabilité, Bourgois, Paris 1986. 44 Galilei, G., Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi cit., p. 224. Rossi: Dai modelli riduzionistici della realtà fisica alla complessità 89 pura formalizzazione e matematizzazione, in termini di storicità e soggettività, dato che neanche le leggi più formali della storia possono essere banalmente ricavate dai sistemi dinamici deterministici, in particolare sul modello della fisica. Quindi si tratta di riconoscere l'apporto conoscitivo autonomo di settori di cultura e conoscenza anche diversi dalla fisicamatematica, anche storico-filosofici e perfino artistico-letterari. Settori che cercano anch'essi di stabilire forme proprie di ordine e obiettività anche quantitative e di trarre insegnamenti da esempi e generalità tipizzate dall'esperienza, in forme comunque autonome e diverse da quelle proprie della fisica-matematica, pur coesistendo con essa. Questa tende invece talvolta, problematicamente, perfino a cercare di ridurre quelle diverse forme cognitive al proprio modello metodologico di scienza della complessità, su basi comunque totalmente formali-matematiche e pertanto certamente non sufficienti45. Riferimenti Brunet, P., 1938, Etude historique sur le principe de moindre action, Hermann, Paris. Cassirer, E., 1973, Sostanza e funzione, La Nuova Italia, Firenze. Capecchi, D., Drago, A., 2005, Lagrange e la storia della meccanica, Progedit, Bari Chaitin, G.J., 1966, On the length of programs for computing finite binary sequences, «J. ACM», vol 13, pp. 547-69. Costabel, P., 1969, Leibniz et la dynamique en 1692. Textes et commentaires, Hermann, Paris. D'Agostino, S., 2000, A History of the Ideas of Theoretical Physics, Essays on the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Physics, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht. Descartes, R., 2005, Lettera a Mersenne dell'11 ottobre 1638 in Tutte le lettere 1619-1650, a cura di G. Belgioioso, Bompiani, Milano, pp. 878-899. Descartes, R., 1983, La Diottrica e Le Meteore, in Opere scientifiche, volume secondo, a cura di E. Lojacono, UTET, Torino, pp. 175-508. Drago, A., 2003, La riforma della dinamica secondo G. W. Leibniz, Hevelius Edizioni, Benevento. Einstein, A., Infeld, L., 1948, L'evoluzione della fisica, Einaudi, Torino. Ford, J., 1983, «How random is a coin toss?», Physics Today, 36, 40. 45 Israel, G., cit. Complessità e riduzionismo 90 Galilei, G., 1998, Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi, a cura di O. Besomi e M. Helbing, Antenore, Padova, vol. I, Testo. Galilei, G., 1968, Opere, Barbera, Firenze, vol. VI, 187-188. Hadamard, J., 1968, Les surfaces à courbures opposées a leur lignes géodésiques, in OEuvres, CNRS, Paris, vol 2, pp. 729-75. Hall, A.R., 1989, Philosophers at war. The Quarrel between Newton and Leibniz, Cambridge U. P., Cambridge. Ianniello, M. G., 1995, Il contributo di Boltzmann alla teoria dei fenomeni di elasticità «con memoria», «Giornale di Fisica», XXXVI, AprileGiugno, pp. 121-150 Israel, G., 2005, Some critical observations on the science of complexity, in P. Freguglia et al. (a cura di), The Science of Complexity: chimera or reality?, Società Editrice Esculapio, Bologna, pp. 150-70. Kant, I, 1959, Primi principi metafisici della scienza della natura, Cappelli, Bologna. Koyré, A., 1972, Studi newtoniani, Einaudi, Torino. Koyré, A., 1970, Dal cosmo chiuso all'universo infinito, Feltrinelli, Milano. Landau, L.D., 1994, «Sul problema della turbolenza» (in russo), Dokl. Akad. Nauk. SSSR, vol 44, 8, pp. 339-42. Laplace, P.S., 1909, Exposition du système du monde, in OEuvres, GauthierVillars, Paris. Laplace, P.S., 1814, Essai philosophique sur les probabilités, Courcier, Paris. Lorenz, E., 1963, Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow, «J. Atmos. Sci.» 20, 130. Poincaré, J. H., 1916–54, Sur le problème des trois corps et les équations de la dynamique, in OEuvres, Gauthier-Villars, vol. VII, pp. 262-479. Pomian, K., 1991, (a cura di), Sul Determinismo, Il Saggiatore, Milano. Popper, K.R., 1984, Poscritto alla Logica della scoperta scientifica, II. L'universo aperto. Un argomento per l'Indeterminismo, Il Saggiatore, Milano. Ruelle, D., 1992, Caso e caos, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino. Sinai, Ya. G., 1992, L'aléatoire du non-aléatoire in: A. Daham-Dalmedico, J.L. Chabert e K. Chemla (a cura di), Chaos et determinisme, Editions du Seuil, Paris. Solomonoff, R.J., 1964, «A formal theory of inductive inference», Inform. and Control, vol 7, pp. 1-22, 224-54; Kolmogorov, A.N., 1965, «Tre approcci alla definizione del concetto di quantità di informazione», Probl. Peredachi Inform., vol 1, pp. 3-11 Rossi: Dai modelli riduzionistici della realtà fisica alla complessità 91 Thom, R., 1986, Introduction a P. S. Laplace, Essai philosophique sur la proabilité, Bourgois, Paris. Truesdell, C., 1968, Essays in the History of Mechanics, Springer Verlag, Berlin. Volterra, V., 1931, Lecons sur la theorie mathematique de la lutte pur la vie, Gauthier-Villars, Paris. Volterra, V., 1965, Theory of Functionals and of Integro-Differential Equations, Dover, New York. Vulpiani, A., 1994, Determinismo e caos, La Nuova Italia Scientifica, Roma. © 2012 Roberto Serra "Complex System Biology", in Complessità e riduzionismo, pp. 91-98 Published by Isonomia, Rivista online di Filosofia – Epistemologica – ISSN 2037-4348 Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo http://isonomia.uniurb.it/epistemologica 93 Complex Systems Biology Roberto Serra Modena and Reggio Emilia University ECLT (Euroopean Centre for Living Technology), Venice [email protected] 1. Introduction The term "Complex Systems Biology" was introduced a few years ago [Kaneko, 2006] and, although not yet of widespread use, it seems particularly well suited to indicate an approach to biology which is well rooted in complex systems science. Although broad generalizations are always dangerous, it is safe to state that mainstream biology has been largely dominated by a gene-centric view in the last decades, due to the success of molecular biology. So the one gene one trait approch, which has often proved to be effective, has been extended to cover even complex traits. This simplifying view has been appropriately criticized, and the movement called systems biology has taken off. Systems biology [Noble, 2006] emphasizes the presence of several feedback loops in biological systems, which severely limit the range of validity of explanations based upon linear causal chains (e.g. gene → behaviour). Mathematical modelling is one the favourite tools of systems biologists to analyze the possible effects of competing negative and positive feedback loops which can be observed at several levels (from molecules to organelles, cells, tissues, organs, organisms, ecosystems). Systems biology is by now a well-established field, as it can be inferred by the rapid growth in number of conferences and journals devoted to it, as well as by the existence of several grants and funded projects. Complessità e riduzionismo 94 Systems biology is mainly focused upon the description of specific biological items, like for example specific organisms, or specific organs in a class of animals, or specific genetic-metabolic circuits. It therefore leaves open the issue of the search for general principles of biological organization, which apply to all living beings or to at least to broad classes. We know indeed that there are some principles of this kind, biological evolution being the most famous one. The theory of cellular organization also qualifies as a general principle. But the main focus of biological research has been that of studying specific cases, with some reluctance to accept (and perhaps a limited interest for) broad generalizations. This may however change, and this is indeed the challenge of complex systems biology: looking for general principles in biological systems, in the spirit of complex systems science which searches for similar features and behaviours in various kinds of systems. The hope to find such general principles appears well founded, and I will show in Section 2 that there are indeed data which provide support to this claim. Besides data, there are also general ideas and models concerning the way in which biological systems work. The strategy, in this case, is that of introducing simplified models of biological organisms or processes, and to look for their generic properties: this term, borrowed from statistical physics, is used for those properties which are shared by a wide class of systems. In order to model these properties, the most effective approach has been so far that of using ensembles of systems, where each member can be different from another one, and to look for those properties which are widespread. This approach was introduced many years ago [Kauffman, 1971] in modelling gene regulatory networks. At that time one had very few information about the way in which the expression of a given gene affects that of other genes, apart from the fact that this influence is real and can be studied in few selected cases (like e.g. the lactose metabolism in E. coli). Today, after many years of triumphs of molecular biology, much more has been discovered, however the possibility of describing a complete map of gene-gene interactions in a moderately complex organism is still out of reach. Therefore the goal of fully describing a network of interacting genes in a real organism could not be (and still cannot be) achieved. But a different approach has proven very fruitful, that of asking what are the typical properties of such a set of interacting genes. Making some plausible hypotheses and introducing some simplifying assumptions, Kauffman was Serra: Complex Systems Biology 95 able to address some important problems. In particular, he drew attention to the fact that a dynamical system of interacting genes displays selforganizing properties which explain some key aspects of life, most notably the existence of a limited number of cellular types in every multicellular organism (these numbers are of the order of a few hundreds, while the number of theoretically possible types, absent interactions, would be much much larger than the number of protons in the universe). In section 3 I will describe the ensemble based approach in the context of gene regulatory networks, and I will show that it can describe some important experimental data. Finally, in section 4 I will discuss some methodological aspects. 2. General principles at work Biologists have been largely concerned with the analysis of specific organisms, and the search for general principles has in a sense lagged behind. This makes sense, since generalizations are hard in biology, however there are also important examples of generic properties (in the sense defined in section 1) of biological systems. I will consider here two properties of this kind, namely power-law distributions and scaling laws, which can be observed by analyzing existing data. In section 3 I will consider another interesting candidate generic property, concerning so-called critical states, whose testing however requires the use of models, besides data. Power-law distributions are widespread in biology: for example, the distribution of the activation level of the genes in a cell belongs to this class [see Kaneko, 2006 and further references quoted therein]. This means that the frequency of occurrence of genes with activation level x, let's call it p(x), is proportional to x-g. Similar laws are found for other important properties, like the abundance of various chemicals in a cell. Power-law distributions differ from the more familiar gaussian distributions in many respects, the most relevant being that there is a higher frequency of occurrence of results which are markedly different from the most frequent ones. These outliers, which are present in an appreciable amount, may have a very profound effect on the performance of the system. It is also very important to observe that power-law distributions of the number of links are frequently observed in biological networks. Let us consider for example protein-protein networks, where the nodes are the various proteins, and there is a link between two such nodes if the two Complessità e riduzionismo 96 corresponding proteins can directly interact, or gene networks, where the nodes are the genes and there is a link from gene A to gene B if the former affects the level of expression of the second. In these cases, as well as in many other cases, the power law concerns the distribution of the number of links per node. The remark concerning the relatively high frequency of outliers applies also here, and this means that there are some nodes with a very high number of links. These much-connected nodes, called hubs, are those which most strongly influence the behavior of the network. Another example of a generic property concerns the relationship between the rate of energy consumption (r) and the mass of an organism (m) [West and Brown, 2005]. We refer here not to single individuals, but to the average values for a given kind of animal (e.g. cow, mouse, hen, etc.). If one plots the logarithm of the rate of oxygen intake versus the logarithm of the mass, one observes a linear relationship, and a linear relationship between the logarithms implies a power-law relationship between the variables, therefore r is proportional to ma (the rate is proportional to the mass raised to the exponent a). Note that although the mathematical relationship is the same in the two cases above, the semantics is very different. In the first example, the powerlaw refers to a single variable, and to the frequency of occurrence of a given value in a population, while in the second case it refers to the relationship between two different variables. What is particularly impressive in the relationship between r and m is that it holds for organisms which are very different from each other (e.g. mammals and birds) and that it spans a very wide range of different masses, from whales to unicellular organisms. Moreover, the same straight line (in a loglog plot) can be extrapolated to even smaller masses, and it can be seen that mithocondria (intracellular organelles) and even the molecular complexes involved lay on the same line. So the "law" seems to hold for an astonishingly high range of mass values. Of course this is not a law strictu sensu, but rather an empirical relationship. It is interesting to observe that an explanation has recently been proposed for this regularity, based on the idea that biological evolution has led different organisms to optimize oxygen use. Indeed, the value of the exponent a, estimated from data, is 3/4, which is surprising, but an elegant proof has been proposed that links the universality of this exponent to the fact that there are three spatial dimensions (and to the hypothesis that evolution works to minimize energy loss). Serra: Complex Systems Biology 97 The two examples discussed above are indeed sufficient to show clearly that there exist generic properties of biological systems, which hold irrespectively of the differences between different organisms. 3. Models of generic properties, the ensemble approach and criticality In order to make the presentation clear I will refer to aspecific example, i.e. to the so-called Random Boolean Network (RBN) model of gene regulatory networks. While all the cells in our body share the same genome, they may be very different like e.g. blood cells, epithelial cells, etc.; this is related to the fact that different genes are expressed in different cell types (although some genes are expressed in all cell types), where "expressed" means that the proteins encoded by that gene are actually produced. The expression of a given gene depends upon a set of regulatory molecules, which are themselves the product of other genes, or whose presence is indirectly affected by the expression of other genes. So genes influence each other's expression, and this can be described as a network of interacting genes. In RBNs [Kauffman, 1993, 1995] the activation of a gene is assumed to take just one of two possible values, active (1) or inactive (0) – a boolean approximation whose validity can be judged a posteriori. Note also that random boolean networks have raised considerable interest, and that many different versions of the same idea exist (for example, continuous-valued or multiple-valued generalizations) but for the sake of definiteness I will consider the basic model, leaving aside the discussion of several variants. The model supposes that the state of each node at time t+1 depends upon the values of its inputs nodes at the preceding time step t. Given that the activations are boolean, the function which determines the new state of a node is a boolean function of the inputs. As it was said in the introduction, we know just some gene-gene interactions, and most of them are unknown. Is there anything meaningful that can be done in this situation? Kauffman taught us that this is indeed the case. He decided to focus not on a single specific network, but to consider the behavior of sets (ensembles) of networks which share some features. For example, we might want to investigate the behavior of networks of 1000 genes, where each gene is influenced exactly by two other genes; to this aim we generate at random a certain number of networks, by drawing at random the connections and also by assigning to every node a random boolean function of its two inputs. There exist 16 such functions, so the number of 2- Complessità e riduzionismo 98 input, 1000 nodes random networks is huge. One can however explore the behavior by sampling this huge set, and in this way Kauffman discovered that RBNs exist in three different dynamical regimes, ordered, critical and chaotic. In ordered networks a perturbation dies quickly out, while in chaotic networks it tends to grow; the behavior of critical networks is intermediate between these two. Depending upon the value of a parameter, the families of networks can be ascribed to these classes. For example, ceteris paribus, highly connected networks are more disordered than poorly connected ones. This is however a property of the set of networks with those parameter values, and single network realizations can behave in a way different prom the typical behaviour of their class. Now let us come back to the search for generic properties. It has been suggested [Langton, 1990, Packard, 1988] that critical states provide an optimal tradeoff between the need for robustness, since a biological system must be able to keep homeostasis, and the need to be able to adapt to changes. If this is the case, and if evolution is able to change the network parameters, then it should have driven organisms towards critical regions in parameter space. This is a very broad and challenging hypothesis, and it can be tested by comparing the results of models of gene regulatory networks with actual data concerning gene expression. The use of data which is required for this purpose is very different from the more common use of the same data to infer information about the interactions among specific genes. In testing the criticality hypothesis it is instead necessary to look for global properties of gene expression data, like their distributions or some information-theoretic measures. Recent results [Serra et al., 2004, 2007, Ramo et al., 2006, Schmulevich et al., 2005] indicate that cells like those of the yeast S. cerevisiae and leukemic human cells seem indeed critical. While the conclusion is not definitive, and many more data and analyses are required, these result point to a new way to look for generic properties, which cannot be read directly in the data but can be inferred from a comparison between patterns in data and in model results. 4. Conclusions It is important to stress that the approach which has been outlined here does not stand in opposition to the classical one of molecular biology, but it Serra: Complex Systems Biology 99 rather complements it. The search for the microscopic features of complex systems is a very fruitful royal road, as it is demonstrated, among others, by the successes of molecular biology and of microphysics. However, the search for the microscopic laws cannot pretend to be the only acceptable way to improve our knowledge. The science of complex systems has shown that there are also "laws" which describe the outcome of the interaction of microscopic entities, which are largely independent from their microfeatures. The search for generic properties has gained widespread acceptance in physics, but is still in its infancy in the biological sciences. However, the examples discussed above show that it may lead to very interesting and promising results. And it is important to observe that these are just a few examples although they are among the most remarkable ones of the possible outcomes of the application of the methods of complex systems biology. Acknowledgments I am indebted to my colleague Marco Villani, with whom I shared a 15 years long research experience in what is now called complex systems biology, to Stuart Kauffman, for some wonderful discussions, and to my Ph.D. students who made excellent work in exploring the properties of RBNs and of other generic models of biological systems. This work has been partly supported by the Italian Ministry for Research, under the MIUR-FISR project 2982/Ric (Mitica). Reference Kaneko, K., 2006, Complex systems biology, Springer, Heidelberg. Kauffman S. A, 1971, Gene regulation networks, «Current topics in Developmental Biology», 6, 145-182. Kauffman S. A., 1993, The origins of order, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Kauffman S. A., 1995, At home in the universe, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Langton, C.G., 1991, Life at the Edge of Chaos in Artificial life II a cura di Langton, C.G., Taylor, C., Farmer, J. D. and Rasmussen, S. (Addison Wesley: SFI studies in the sciences of complexity). Complessità e riduzionismo 100 Noble, D., 2006, The music of life, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Packard, N., 1988, Adaptation toward the edge of chaos in Dynamic Patterns in Complex Systems, a cura di Kelso, J. A.S., Mandell, A. J. e Shlesinger, M. F., World Scientific, Singapore, 1988, p. 293. Ramo, P., Kesseli, Y., and Yli-Harja, O., 2006, Perturbation avalanches and criticality in gene regulatory networks, «Journal of Theoretical Biology». 242 (2006) 164-170. Serra, R., Villani, M. e Semeria, A., Genetic network models and statistical properties of gene expression data in knock-out experiments, «Journal of Theoretical Biology», 227 (2004), 149-157. Serra, R., Villani, M., Graudenzi, A. and Kauffman, S.A., Why a simple model of genetic regulatory networks describes the distribution of avalanches in gene expression data, «Journal of Theoretical Biology» 249 (2007) 449-460. Shmulevich, I., Kauffman, S.A., Aldana, M., Eukaryotic cells are dynamically ordered or critical but not chaotic, « Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America», 102 (2005) 13439-13444. West, G.B. e Brown, J.H., The origin of allometric scaling laws in biology from genomes to ecosystems: towards a quantitative unifying theory of biological structure and organization, «The Journal of Experimental Biology» 208 (2005) 1575-1592. © Giorgio Turchetti "Dai modelli fisici ai sistemi complessi", in Complessità e riduzionismo, pp. 99-115 Published by Isonomia, Rivista online di Filosofia – Epistemologica – ISSN 2037-4348 Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo http://isonomia.uniurb.it/epistemologica 101 Dai modelli fisici ai sistemi complessi Giorgio Turchetti Università degli Studi di Bologna [email protected] 1. Introduzione L'osservazione della natura con l'intento di capire l'origine della varietà di forme e fenomeni in cui si manifesta ha origini remote. All'inizio il rapporto con i fenomeni naturali era dominato da sentimenti quali paura e stupore che conducevano a supporre l'esistenza di entità sfuggenti alla percezione diretta che permeavano gli elementi animandoli. Ecco dunque che la magia rappresenta l'elemento dominante della filosofia naturale primitiva caratterizzata da una unicità degli eventi e dalla impossibilità di capirli e dominarli in quanto frutto della volontà di essenze a noi estranee e non governabili. Con il nascere della civiltà ed il suo progredire il tempo dedicato ai lavori necessari per il sostentamento e la sopravvivenza diminuì e nella ripartizione dei compiti alcuni individui potevano dedicare parte del loro tempo alla osservazione della natura ed alla sua interpretazione in termini non trascendenti. Nella natura, intesa come tutto ciò che ci circonda composto da esseri viventi e da materia inorganica nelle sua varie aggregazioni sulla terra e nel cosmo, ciò che attirò l'attenzione fin dall'inizio furono furono i fenomeni regolari e periodici come i moti della luna, dei pianeti e delle stelle. Nel contempo dopo una spinta iniziale dettata da esigenze pratiche come contare gli oggetti o misurare i campi, la matematica si era sviluppata autonomamente e si rivelò idonea a descrivere in termini quantitativi i moti dei corpi celesti. La terra era al centro dell'universo mentre il moto degli altri corpi celesti risultava da una composizione di moti circolari uniformi. Questa visione geocentrica e Complessità e riduzionismo 102 pitagorica (armonia delle sfere) dell'universo ha prevalso fino agli albori della scienza moderna, anche se una descrizione eliocentrica, basata su validi argomenti, era stata proposta. Per quanto riguarda la struttura della materia i presocratici avevano già proposto i quattro elementi mentre gli atomisti avevano ricondotto tutto ad entità elementari primigenie, il cui aggregarsi e disgregarsi da luogo a tutti gli stati e le molteplici forme della materia. Queste intuizioni si ritrovano nella fisica moderna che contempla quattro stati di aggregazione, che hanno come unico sostrato comune gli atomi. La fisica moderna nasce con Galileo e Newton, la cui dinamica si sviluppa a partire dalle leggi di Keplero che descrivono il moto dei pianeti nel sistema eliocentrico, per potersi poi applicare ad un qualunque sistema materiale. Pertanto nei due secoli successivi si ritenne che un modello meccanico potesse essere sviluppato per un qualunque sistema fisico e quindi per l'universo intero la cui evoluzione doveva essere matematicamente prevedibile. Per i fenomeni termici tuttavia vennero formulate leggi ad hoc come quelle della termodinamica che mostrano come i processi macroscopici siano irreversibili in contrasto con le leggi della meccanica. Si deve a Boltzmann1 il tentativo di ricondurre la termodinamica alla meccanica per un gran numero di particelle dei cui moti disordinati viene data una lettura di carattere statistico. L'aumento della entropia e la irreversibilità seguono dalla ipotesi di caos molecolare ossia che i moti siano così disordinati che si perde rapidamente memoria dello stato iniziale. L'idea di introdurre una misura di probabilità nel contesto della meccanica sembra antitetica con la natura stessa della teoria rivolta fino ad allora allo studio di sistemi con moti regolari, reversibili e prevedibili individualmente su tempi lunghi. Tuttavia l'analisi probabilistica diventa essenziale per lo studio di sistemi caratterizzati da forti instabilità, e da orbite irregolari per i quali la previsione richiede una conoscenza della condizioni iniziali con precisioni fisicamente non raggiungibili. Combinando la evoluzione deterministica della meccanica di Newton o di Hamilton con la descrizione statistica attraverso una opportuna misura invariante di probabilità nello spazio delle fasi, nasce la teoria dei sistemi dinamici2 che consente di descrivere non solo i sistemi ordinati o i sistemi caotici ma anche tutti quelli che vedono coesistere in diverse proporzioni ordine e caos e che presentano una straordinaria varietà di strutture geometriche e proprietà statistiche, tanto da fornire almeno se non proprio 1 Boltzmann (1999). 2 Arnold (2004). Turchetti: Dai modelli fisici ai sistemi complessi 103 un quadro teorico per lo meno metafore utili per la descrizione dei sistemi complessi. Anche se non c'è unanime consenso ci sembra appropriato definire complessi non tanto sistemi caratterizzati da interazioni non lineari tra i suoi componenti e da proprietà emergenti, che rientrano a pieno titolo nel quadro dei sistemi dinamici, ma piuttosto i sistemi viventi o quelli di vita artificiale che ne condividono le proprietà essenziali3. Tra queste possiamo certamente annoverare la capacità di gestire la informazione e di replicarsi, consentendo tramite un meccanismo di mutazione e selezione di dare origine a strutture di crescente ricchezza strutturale e dotate di capacità cognitive sempre più elaborate. Una teoria dei sistemi complessi non esiste ancora, anche se la teoria degli automi sviluppata da Von Neumann4 e la teoria della evoluzione di Darwin5 ne possono fornire alcuni pilastri importanti. Recentemente la teoria delle reti è stata utilizzata con successo per descrivere le proprietà statistiche delle connessioni tra gli elementi costitutivi (nodi) di un sistema complesso6. Le connessioni che non sono né completamente casuali né completamente gerarchiche, consentono una sufficiente robustezza rispetto a malfunzionamenti o danneggiamenti dei nodi unita a un adeguato livello di organizzazione per consentirne un funzionamento efficiente. Nei sistemi fisici il modello base è un insieme di atomi o molecole interagenti, che danno luogo a strutture diverse quali un gas, un liquido o un cristallo, come risultato di proprietà emergenti. Nello stesso modo per i sistemi complessi possiamo proporre un sistema automi interagenti come modello base. Le molteplici forme che il sistema assume anche in questo caso vanno considerate come proprietà emergenti del medesimo sostrato al mutare delle condizioni esterne e frutto delle i replicazioni, ciascuna delle quali introduce piccole ma significative varianti. Questa è la grande differenza tra un sistema fisico ed un sistema complesso: il primo fissate le condizioni esterne ha sempre le medesime proprietà, il secondo invece cambia con il fluire del tempo perché la sua organizzazione interna muta non solo al cambiare di fattori ambientali ma anche con il succedersi delle generazioni. C'è dunque un flusso di informazione che cresce con il tempo e che consente agli automi costituenti ed alla intera struttura di acquisire nuove capacità. Questo aumento di ordine e ricchezza strutturale avviene naturalmente a spese dell'ambiente circostante, in modo che globalmente i la sua entropia cresce in accordo con la seconda legge della termodinamica. In assenza di una 3 Cfr. Turchetti (2003), Turchetti (2007), Giorgini, Turchetti (2007), Parisi (2000). 4 Von Neumann (1963, 316). 5 Darwin (1859). 6 Barabasi (2002). Complessità e riduzionismo 104 teoria formalizzata paragonabile a quella dei sistemi dinamici, per i sistemi complessi si possono fare osservazioni e misure, sia puntuali sui costituenti elementari e sulle loro connessioni, sia globali sull'intero sistema, oppure costruire modelli suscettibili di essere validati attraverso la simulazione. Se di un sistema si riesce infatti a fornire una descrizione sufficientemente dettagliata, è poi possibile osservare come questo si comporti traducendo le regole in algoritmi e costruendo quindi una versione virtuale, anche se semplificata del sistema stesso. Il passaggio più difficile è il confronto tra il sistema simulato ed il sistema vero, che passa necessariamente attraverso la valutazione di una numero limitato di parametri che ne caratterizzino e proprietà. La codifica del progetto è una proprietà cruciale dei sistemi complessi perché questa si realizza con un dispendio di massa ed energia incomparabilmente più piccolo rispetto a quello necessario per realizzare l'intera struttura; nello stesso tempo apportare piccole modifiche ad un progetto è rapido ed economico. In questo processo che comporta la continua introduzione di varianti si aprono molteplici strade e con lo scorrere del tempo si realizza una storia in modo unico e irripetibile. Anche il susseguirsi di eventi fisici caratterizzati da processi irreversibili e dalla presenza di molteplici biforcazioni da origine ad una storia che non si può percorrere a ritroso, né riprodurre qualora fossimo in grado ripartire dalle stesse condizioni iniziali. Tuttavia esiste una differenza profonda tra la storia di un sistema fisico come il globo terrestre e la storia della vita. La prima registra i molteplici cambiamenti che ha subito la superficie del nostro pianeta ove montagne e mari nascono e scompaiono senza un chiaro disegno soggiacente. La storia della vita è caratterizzata da una progressiva crescita della ricchezza strutturale e funzionale e accompagnata da una crescita della complessità progettuale. La rappresentazione di questa storia prende la forma di un albero con le sue ramificazioni che mostra la continua diversificazione delle strutture e la loro evoluzione verso forme sempre più avanzate. La direzione in cui scorre il tempo è ben definita: le strutture affinano le capacità sensoriali mentre cresce la potenza degli organi che elaborano la informazione. Un sistema complesso è anche caratterizzato da un molteplicità di scale, tanto più alta quanto più si sale sulla scala evolutiva. La ragione è che il procedere verso strutture sempre più elaborate avviene utilizzando altre strutture come mattoni per cui l'immagine che si può fornire è quella di una rete di automi a più strati: partendo dal basso una rete con le sue proprietà emergenti diventa il nodo di una rete di secondo livello, cioè un automa di secondo livello che interagisce con altri automi dello stesso tipo e così via. Nei sistemi inorganici, dove non esiste un progetto, si distinguono di norma solo Turchetti: Dai modelli fisici ai sistemi complessi 105 due livelli, quello dei costituenti elementari e quello su scala macroscopica. I sistemi fisici sono riconducibili a poche leggi universali, che governano i costituenti elementari della materia, ma il passaggio dalla descrizione dalla piccola alla grande scala è impervio e consentito soltanto dalla simulazione numerica, quando ci allontaniamo dalle situazioni più semplici caratterizzate da un equilibrio statistico. I limiti che il disegno riduzionista incontra già per i sistemi fisici diventano decisamente più forti nel caso dei sistemi complessi. 2. Il mondo fisico ed i sistemi dinamici Ogni sistema materiale percepibile dai nostri sensi, amplificati dagli strumenti di cui disponiamo è oggetto di studio della Fisica, scienza che ricerca leggi semplici ed universali, per descrivere in linguaggio matematico i risultati di esperimenti riproducibili. La nostra capacità di osservazione e misura è andata continuamente aumentando da Galileo in poi ed oggi siamo in grado osservare gli atomi o le galassie al limite dell'universo. Le grandi macchine acceleratrici, che sono una sorta di supermicroscopi, consentono di osservare il comportamento dei costituenti elementari della materia e una convinzione diffusa è che se si arriva a conoscere le strutture ultime non ulteriormente frazionabili come potrebbero essere le stringhe, il percorso della fisica ha raggiunto il suo termine se nel contempo tutte le interazioni conosciute vengono unificate dando origine alla teoria finale. Questa visione esasperatamente riduzionista, che sottende la ricerca della teoria finale, suppone che noti i principi primi sia solo un esercizio matematico derivare le proprietà di un qualunque sistema fisico. In modo non dissimile Laplace pensava che fosse possibile prevedere l'evoluzione dell'universo a patto di conoscerne le condizioni iniziali, usando le leggi della meccanica che rappresentavano al suo tempo la teoria ultima della fisica. L'intero universo era visto come un gigantesco meccanismo ad orologeria, il cui moto poteva essere seguito nel tempo senza limite alcuno, così come accade per un pendolo od un pianeta che su muove su di una ellissi kepleriana. Oggi sappiamo che la prevedibilità di un generico sistema meccanico è inficiata dalla presenza di moti instabili, per cui l'accuratezza richiesta sulle condizioni iniziali oltrepassa rapidamente quella raggiungibile tramite una qualsiasi misura. La formulazione iniziale della meccanica aveva consentito di riprodurre le leggi di Keplero, che descrivono moti periodici nei quali un errore iniziale si traduce in una crescita lineare della differenza di fase. La quasi coincidenza del sole con il sistema del centro di massa rispetto ad un Complessità e riduzionismo 106 qualsiasi pianeta e il modesto effetto delle interazioni dei pianeti tra loro avevano ricondotto il problema a quello di un moto in un campo centrale, che Newton aveva risolto partendo dalla sua legge di gravitazione universale. Una stella con un pianeta descrive di fatto anch'esso una piccola ellissi rispetto al centro di massa, rivelabile tramite misure spettroscopiche e costituisce un valido metodo per scoprire pianti extrasolari. La meccanica newtoniana si prestava a descrivere non solo il moto dei corpi celesti ma anche di oggetti sulla terra come un pendolo o una palla di cannone. Le soluzioni dei problemi studiati venivano ricondotte al calcolo di opportuni integrali da cui l'appellativo di integrabili. Come per il moto di un pianeta attorno al sole soluzioni risultavano combinazioni di moti periodici e piccole variazioni delle condizioni iniziali comportavano crescite lineari degli errori in fase. I moti disordinati come quelli delle molecole di un gas erano stati trascurati fino al momento in cui Boltzmann aveva scoperto che potevano essere analizzati attraverso una lettura di tipo statistico. Nel frattempo il problema dei tre corpi era rimasto irrisolto e la ragione fu scoperta da Poincaré7, il quale dimostrò la esistenza di orbite, che analizzate tramite una opportuna sezione, mostravano un groviglio inestricabile (intreccio omoclino), vedi figura 1, i cui punti di intersezione erano in corrispondenza con una successione di numeri casuali. Queste orbite sono associate alla presenza di punti di equilibrio instabili e causano una divergenza esponenziale nel tempo quando si parte da due condizioni iniziali vicine. Le condizioni per la genesi del caos sono la divergenza rapida delle orbite ed uno spazio delle fasi di volume finito, perché in questo caso le orbite che si allontanano sono costrette a ripiegarsi formando un groviglio ove il moto appare decisamente casuale. I moti caotici sono apparsi in un contesto, quello della meccanica celeste, in cui l'ordine aveva regnato sovrano. È stato poi provato che un sistema meccanico generico (scelto a caso) presenta equilibri instabili e moti caotici che lo rendono non integrabile. Di qui la necessità di introdurre una analisi di tipo statistico in quanto l'analisi della singola orbita, di cui si suppongano note le condizioni iniziali con infinita precisione, non presenta alcun interesse in quanto una infima perturbazione iniziale conduce molto presto a risultati completamente diversi. Questa fusione del determinismo della meccanica di Newton o di Hamilton con la teoria della probabilità, nata per interpretare i giochi di azzardo ed applicata alle scienze attuariali, condusse alla formulazione della teoria dei sistemi dinamici, teoria che trascende i limiti della meccanica per 7 Poincaré (1892-1899). Turchetti: Dai modelli fisici ai sistemi complessi 107 abbracciare i modelli matematici formulati in qualunque scienza dove sia definibile uno spazio degli stati, una evoluzione deterministica nel tempo ed una misura di probabilità invariante rispetto a questa evoluzione. Oggi spesso si parla, di teoria del caos8, riferendosi appunto allo schema interpretativo di fenomeni in cui piccole variazioni conducono a differenze vistose. In tale contesto si cita l'effetto farfalla che è assolutamente paradossale perché un battito d'ali che comporta un minimo dispendio di energia non può scatenare un uragano la cui energia può superare quella di una deflagrazione nucleare. La teoria dei sistemi dinamici consente di analizzare processi in cui lo stato presente è correlato allo stato futuro solo per un intervallo di tempo molto breve, vale a dire in cui la memoria dello stato si perde molto rapidamente. Pur tuttavia fissate le regole del gioco tutta la storia è codificata nella condizione iniziale, mentre in un processo puramente aleatorio come il lancio di una moneta ogni evento è assolutamente imprevedibile. Il problema pratico si sposta quindi sulla quantità di informazione di cui possiamo disporre. La teoria matematica si fonda sulla ipotesi del continuo per lo spazio degli stati che vengono rappresentati tramite numeri reali, ciascuno dei quali richiede una quantità di informazione infinita Il paradosso del caos deterministico risiede proprio nell'apparato matematico su cui si fonda e sulla ipotesi implicita che la informazione disponibile è sempre infinita. Un sistema dinamico è dunque caratterizzato da uno spazio degli stati E, un flusso St, ed una misura invariante di probabilità μ. flusso che è soluzione della equazione differenziale dx(t) / dt = Φ(x(t)) x(t)= St(x) x(0)=x gode della proprietà di gruppo St' (St)=St+t' mentre la proprietà di invarianza della misura si scrive μ(St(A))= μ(A) per un qualsiasi insieme A dello spazio delle fasi. Si considerano anche sistemi a tempo discreto nei quali l'orbita è una successione discreta di punti x0=x, x1=M(x), ...., x n+1=M(xn) ed M è una mappa che corrisponde ad esempio alla evoluzione su di un periodo se il sistema dato ha una dipendenza periodica dal tempo, oppure alla evoluzione approssimata su un intervallo di tempo ∆t che approssima la evoluzione esatta di un sistema continuo M(x)= x+∆t Φ(x). L'orbita di una mappa si calcola esattamente perché comporta solo la valutazione di una applicazione definita sullo spazio delle fasi ed anche nel caso del calcolo numerico l'unico errore introdotto è solo quello di arrotondamento. Per i 8 Ruelle (2003). Complessità e riduzionismo 108 sistemi a tempo continuo Φ(x) è un campo vettoriale, di cui le traiettorie sono le linee di forza essendo in ogni punto tangenti ad esso. Una funzione che risulti invariante lungo una qualsiasi traiettoria H(x(t))=H(x) definisce una famiglia di superfici H(x)=c ed una raiettoria che ha origine su un punto di una di queste superfici vi appartiene interamente. Se lo spazio delle fasi ha dimensione due l'integrale primo energia per forze è posizionali individua la traiettoria. Detto x=(x,v) il vettore nello spazio delle fasi , Φ=(v, F(x)/m) e V(x) il potenziale tale che V'(x)=-F(x), le equazioni del moto e l'integrale primo sono dx/dt= v dv/dt= F(x)/m H = mv2/2 + V(x) Nel caso dell'oscillatore armonico F=-mω2 x le orbite sono ellissi, che con una semplice trasformazione di scala diventano cerchi su cui il moto è uniforme. In questi sistemi il flusso conserva le aree e la misura invariante μ(A) è definita come l'area di A divisa per l'area di tutto lo spazio delle fasi che potremmo scegliere come H ≤ E. Tutte le orbite chiuse si trasformano in circonferenze, su cui il moto è uniforme, tramite una trasformazione che conserva le aree. Le coordinate naturali son l'angolo φ e l'azione J=R2/2 dove R è il raggio della circonferenza. Questa descrizione si estende ai sistemi integrabili con n>1 gradi di libertà, che si presentano come rotazioni uniformi su n circonferenze. Se n=2 l'orbita nello spazio degli angoli (quadrato di lato 2π con i lati opposti identificati detto toro) data da φ1=ω1 t+φ1(0) e φ2=ω2 t+φ2(0) risulta chiusa se il rapporto ω1/ω2 tra le frequenze è un numero razionale, altrimenti l'orbita non si chiude ma copre densamente tutto lo spazio. Per n>2 la situazione è simile anche se la casistica è più ricca. Quando uno di questi sistemi viene perturbato ,come accade quando accendiamo la interazione tra i pianeti che si muovono su orbite kepleriane, le orbite cambiano e le proprietà aritmetiche delle frequenze giocano un ruolo cruciale in questo cambiamento. Nel caso n=2 ad esempio se le frequenze sono uguali o in rapporto razionale allora in un piano di fase l'orbita diventa simile a quella di un pendolo. Turchetti: Dai modelli fisici ai sistemi complessi 109 Figura 1. Intreccio omoclino nella mappa di Hénon. Tuttavia le orbite che si dipartono dai punto di equilibrio instabile non si incontrano come accade nel pendolo ma si intersecano e danno luogo quindi ad infinite intersezioni successive generando quello che Poincaré chiama intreccio omoclino. In questa regione il moto è caotico in quanto la divergenza delle orbite vicine è esponenziale e le intersezioni si possono mettere in corrispondenza con una successione binaria casuale come quella che caratterizza i lanci di una moneta. La figura 1 mostra il meccanismo dell'intreccio omoclino Figura 2. Isole e invarianza di scala nella standard map. Il quadro che emerge è quello di una compresenza di orbite regolari e di orbite caotiche che si alternano creando strutture geometriche complesse in cui però si riscontra una invarianza approssimata per trasformazioni di scala come accade nei cosiddetti frattali9. Se si ingrandisce un particolare, come mostra la figura 2, si ritrovano strutture simili a quelle che si hanno nello spazio delle fasi iniziale e questo resta vero se l'operazione viene ripetuta un numero di volte arbitrario. 9 Mandelbrot (1982). Complessità e riduzionismo 110 2.2 Indicatori dinamici Quello che matematicamente possiamo descrivere in modo esauriente sono i sistemi regolari o integrabili ed i sistemi completamente caotici. Per i sistemi intermedi ciò non accade ma è possibile trovare degli indicatori locali o globali che specifichino in modo quantitativo la natura di una singola orbita o dell'intero spazio delle fasi. La divergenza di due orbite vicine specifica il carattere locale della dinamica che risulta regolare nel caso di crescita lineare, caotica nel caso di crescita esponenziale. Al tipo di divergenza è legato il tempo di predicibilità Moto regolare || δx(t) || ~ ε(1+t) tpred ~ 1/ε Moto caotico || δx(t) || ~ ε exp(λt) tpred ~ λ-1 log(1/ε) In un sistema caotico il tempo di predicibilità aumenta così lentamente con 1/ε da renderlo totalmente imprevedibile. Una proprietà globale che caratterizza i sistemi caotici è il mescolamento ossia il fatto che i punti di un qualsiasi insieme vengono sparpagliati uniformemente su tutto lo spazio delle fasi. In termini matematici per un sistema a tempo discreto μ(Mn(A)∩B) tende a μ(A) μ(B) con rapidità esponenziale quando n→ ∞. Una formulazione equivalente di questa proprietà è espressa dalla perdita rapida di memoria delle condizioni iniziali. Se con <f(x)> = ∫f(x)dμ(x) indichiamo la media di una funzione definita sullo spazio delle fasi allora <f(xn)g(x)> tende a <f(x)><g(x)> con rapidità esponenziale quando n→ ∞. Se pensiamo a f(xn) e g(x) come variabili aleatorie questo significa che al crescere di n esse diventano indipendenti come conseguenza del fatto che lo diventano xn ed x. In generale la rapidità con cui decadono le correlazioni definite da C(n)= <f(xn)g(x)> - <f(x)><g(x)> misura il grado di caoticità. Per i sistemi regolari in cui la frequenza varia il decadimento delle correlazioni segue una legge di potenza C(n) ~ 1/n. Turchetti: Dai modelli fisici ai sistemi complessi 111 Figura 3. Mescolamento locale e filamentazione. Questo discende dal mescolamento locale, fenomeno noto come filamentazione per i fluidi, vedi figura 3, che si verifica facilmente nel caso di una mappa prototipo x n+1= xn+yn mod 1, yn+1=yn. Quindi per un sistema regolare la divergenza delle orbite || δxn|| è lineare in n mentre le correlazioni decadono come 1/n, per un sistema caotico la divergenza va come eλn mentre le correlazioni decadono come e-λn. Un altro indicatore è dato dallo spettro dei tempi di ricorrenza in un insieme A. Sia τA(x) il tempo di ricorrenza, definito come il minimo valore di n per cui xn torna in A cui appartiene x0=x, e sia <τA> il tempo medio che vale 1/ μ(A) se il sistema è ergodico ossia se l'orbita è densa sullo spazio delle fasi. I tempi di ritorno valutati per tutti i punti di A hanno una distribuzione FA(t)= μ(A>t)/ μ(A) dove A>t è l'insieme di tutti i punti per cui τA(x)/ <τA> è maggiore di t. Lo spettro che otteniamo nel limite μ(A) →0 è dato genericamente da F(t)= e-t se il sistema è caotico (mescolante) mentre per un sistema regolate otteniamo F(t)= c/t2. Per sistemi con componenti regolari e caotiche si dimostra che nelle regioni di confine lo spettro è una combinazione w1 e -t +w2/t 2 dove i coefficienti dipendono dal peso relativo delle due regioni nel dominio A10. Questo risultato è significativo perché mostra che possibile analizzare sistemi di transizione ove orbite regolari e caotiche coesistono determinandone il peso relativo. Per questi sistemi spesso l'unica indagine 10 Hu, Rampioni, Rossi, Turchetti, Vaienti (2004). Complessità e riduzionismo 112 possibile è di tipo numerico e si pone il problema della affidabilità dei suoi risultati. Una risposta in tal senso viene da un altro indicatore la fidelity che è una correlazione tra un'orbita ed un'orbita perturbata ossia F(n)= <f(Mn(x) g(Mnε(x)>-<f(x)><g(x)>. La perturbazione è di norma di tipo stocastico Mε(x) = M(x) + εξ e la media è fatta sia sullo spazio delle fasi sia sul processo stocastico. Si è provato che nel caso di un sistema regolare la fidelity va a zero con una legge esponenziale in n mentre nel caso di un sistema caotico (mescolante) il decadimento è superesponenziale11. Questi risultati analitici, confermati da simulazioni numeriche, sono stati confrontati con quelli ottenuti quando alla perturbazione stocastica si sostituisce la perturbazione dovuta all'arrotondamento numerico, inerente ad ogni calcolo effettuato con stringhe binarie di lunghezza fissata. La differenza sostanziale è che mentre il rumore è incorrelato l'errore di arrotondamento è correlato: per i sistemi regolari si osserva quindi un decadimento molto più lento, a potenza anziché esponenziale12, mentre per sistemi caotici resta praticamente invariato il decadimento superesponenziale. Questo significa che nei calcoli numerici rispetto ad una perturbazione stocastica di pari ampiezza l'errore di arrotondamento ha un effetto molto più debole per un sistema regolare mentre i due sono equivalenti per un sistema caotico. Si noti che in questo caso si confrontano orbita esatta ed orbita perturbata con lo stesso punto iniziale per cui il risultato conferma che le simulazioni numeriche sono affidabili, per l'analisi anche quantitativa di un sistema dinamico, qualunque sia la sua natura. Si potrebbe anche concludere che essendo la precisione di qualsiasi misura di una grandezza fisica finita ed essendo finita la lunghezza di successioni di simboli fisicamente gestibili, i modelli sviluppati su una calcolatore sono addirittura più vicini alla realtà fisica di quanto non siano i modelli matematici basati sui numeri reali, che presuppongono che la quantità di informazione gestibile sia infinita. 3. Sistemi complessi ed informazione Nell'introdurre i sistemi complessi abbiamo sottolineato il ruolo che l'informazione assume in quel contesto ed è quindi opportuno ricordare che una esiste teoria statistica della informazione e quali sono i suoi fondamenti. La teoria indica quale sia la codifica ottimale di un testo senza affrontare il problema della sua struttura grammaticale né tanto meno del suo significato. 11 Zanlungo, Turchetti, Vaienti, Zanlungo (2009). 12 Turchetti, Vaienti, Zanlungo (2010). Turchetti: Dai modelli fisici ai sistemi complessi 113 Le motivazioni che portarono Shannon13 ad affrontare il problema della codifica dei dati e della loro trasmissione venivano non solo dalla ingegneria ma anche dalla neurobiologia e dalle scienze del linguaggio. L'informazione, sia essa quella di un testo letterario o di un genoma, si codifica tramite una successione di simboli, appartenenti ad un alfabeto finito. La frequenza con cui un simbolo compare in una successione di lunghezza n diventa la sua probabilità quando n tende all'infinito. Considerando ad esempio una successione binaria dove 0 e 1 hanno probabilità p0 e p1 il numero di volte che essi compaiono in una successione di lunghezza n diventano n0=p0n e n1=p1n per n grande ed il numero di successioni distinte è N(n)= n!/( n0! n1!). Come in meccanica statistica si introduce una entropia S(n)= log N(n) mentre la entropia di Shannon H è definita dal limite di S(n)/n per n→∞. Si trova che H= p0 log p0 – p1 log p1 dove p0 + p1=1 ed il massimo, che si raggiunge per p0 = p1=1/2, vale log 2. Si definisce compressibilità C= H/Hmax e esiste una codifica ottimale in cui la successione di lunghezza n è sostituita da una successione di lunghezza nC. Nelle teorie fisiche sia a livello classico sia a livello quantistico la informazione non entra mai in modo diretto perché si assume valida l'ipotesi del continuo e quindi implicitamente che sia accessibile una informazione infinita. Tuttavia i sistemi fisici possono gestire solo quantità finite di informazione. Il numero di operazioni eseguite per unità di tempo è proporzionale alla energia mentre il numero di bit registrabili è proporzionale al volume nello spazio delle fasi. Rinunciare al continuo significa rinunciare ai gruppi di continui di simmetria e quindi ai sistemi integrabili. Matematicamente si può simulare l'effetto della precisione finita mantenendo i numeri reali ed introducendo perturbazioni stocastiche la cui ampiezza è pari all'errore con cui il numero è noto. Nei sistemi complessi la informazione gioca un ruolo attivo perché interviene nella codifica del progetto da cui scaturisce un essere vivente. La materia vivente ed i suoi costituenti obbediscono naturalmente alle leggi della fisica, ma al tempo stesso le trascendono. Innanzi tutto non è possibile isolare un essere vivente dall'ambiente esterno, con cui esiste uno scambio continuo di energia,materia ed informazione. Per questa ragione la crescita di entropia si verifica soltanto se lo isoliamo dall'ambiente, ma isolarlo significa togliergli la vita. I processi che avvengono negli esseri viventi sono prossimi ad un equilibrio statistico, ma sono le piccole variazioni a 13 Shannon (1948). Complessità e riduzionismo 114 consentirne l'espletamento di molteplici funzioni. È dunque l'ambiente con la sua variabilità con le sue microfluttuazioni di natura aleatoria che determina la strada che vien presa ad ogni bivio e lungo la quale si costruisce la storia di ciascun individuo. Nello stesso tempo si osserva un elevato livello di organizzazione e sinergia nel modo di operare di sistemi come quello nervoso o immunitario che riscono a fornire risposte efficaci e coerenti agli stimoli esterni. È stato detto che la vita si sviluppa al margine del caos14 per evidenziare che lo sviluppo di azioni coordinate, la armonica cooperazione tra le componenti di un sistema sono condizione necessaria (ma non sufficiente) per la vita. Solo in presenza di piccoli disturbi e di variazioni impreviste delle condizioni ambientali possono avvenire quei cambiamenti impercettibili che ne garantiscono il mantenimento ed il progredire, su scale di tempo più lunghe, verso forme sempre più evolute. Le basi teoriche per lo studio di questi sistemi sono state poste da Von Neumann con la sua teoria degli automi, intesi come unità dotate di una componente fisica, che obbedisce alle leggi della dinamica fisica, e di una componente cognitiva, capace di elaborare la informazione, memorizzarla e di costruire strategie. Lo stesso autore ha poi dimostrato l'esistenza di automi capaci di riprodursi, purché esista una direttiva ed una scorta di componenti15 e che essi possono essere robusti anche se i loro componenti sono suscettibili di malfunzionamenti16. In questi teoremi si ribadisce il ruolo del progetto nella replicazione, prefigurando la codifica nel genoma, e il ruolo della ridondanza nel garantire il buon funzionamento anche in presenza di guasti localizzati. Il passo successive consiste nel capire come un insieme di automi possano operare insieme costituendo a loro volta una unità organizzata. Non è necessario che vi sia una direttiva esterna, perché il semplice fatto di essere insieme interagendo e comunicando può sviluppare nuove proprietà emergenti nell'insieme di automi. L'altro pilastro teorico per i sistemi complessi è costituito dalla teoria delle evoluzione di Darwin: la possibilità di cambiamento e selezione consente lo sviluppo di forme sempre più elaborate. Un aspetto molto studiato recentemente riguarda il tipo di connessioni che si stabiliscono tra i vari componenti. In molteplici sistemi complessi la distribuzione del numero di connessioni segue una legge di potenza: questo significa che non c'è una scala caratteristica e che vi sono pochi nodi molto connessi e molti nodi poco connessi. Se l numero di connessioni è sostituito da un indicatore di rango ecco che si allarga il 14 Kauffman (1993). 15 Von Neumann (1963, General and logical theory of automata, 316). 16 Von Neumann (1963, Probabilistic logic from unreliable components, 329). Turchetti: Dai modelli fisici ai sistemi complessi 115 numero di sistemi che presentano leggi di potenza17. Un precursore è stato Pareto per i sistemi sociali ed in particolare per la distribuzione del reddito in una popolazione. Come nei sistemi dinamici il caos o la casualità conducono a leggi esponenziali mentre la presenza di ordine e gerarchia pur in presenza di relazioni aleatorie portano a leggi di potenza. L'analisi delle reti per i sistemi complessi suggerisce l'esistenza di forme di organizzazione gerarchica presenti anche in un contesto in cui molte relazioni sono di tipo puramente casuale. L'analogia con le legge statistiche trovate per i sistemi dinamici sorge quindi spontanea: le correlazioni o lo spettro dei tempi di ritorno in prossimità dello stato iniziale decadono a potenza quando il sistema ha comportamenti ordinati e persiste anche in presenza di qualche forma di caoticità. Dunque ordine e gerarchia conducono a code persistenti, sintomo di una memoria che non svanisce rapidamente o della presenza di sporadici nodi con cui tanti altri sono in contatto. Lo studio di un sistema complesso può essere affrontato costruendone un modello basato su un sistema di automi interagenti e simulandone il comportamento su di un calcolatore ed analizzandone i risultati dal punto di vista statistico in modo da rivelarne alcune proprietà su grande scala. I contesti in cui i abbiamo sviluppato dei modelli sono quelli della mobilità e del sistema immunitario. Il caso più semplice è quello di veicoli che si muovono su una strada avendo la percezione della posizione di chi precede e rispettando il vincolo di mantenere una distanza di sicurezza per evitare collisioni. Per basse densità il moto è regolare e viene descritto da una equazione delle onde nel limite del continuo ma al crescere della densità nascono delle instabilità che creano arresti e ripartenze, come spesso si sperimenta quando ci si muove in autostrada18. Il moto pedonale richiede un modello bidimensionale, che vede, nella sua versione più semplice, gli automi rappresentati come dischetti rigidi dotati di percezione visiva entro un certo angolo visuale. La vista ha conseguenze importanti tra cui quello di far perdere il terzo principio della dinamica perché non si ha reciprocità nelle azioni in quanto l'automa A può vedere l'automa B, mentre B non vede A. Quinti mentre A viene respinto da B per evitare la collisione non esiste una corrisponde azione su B da parte di A. Il problema dei due automi è riconducibile a quadrature e si determinano per via analitica degli equilibri dinamici semplici. Nel caso di molti automi la perdita del principio di azione e reazione causa un effetto di tipo dissipativo ed è necessario introdurre la 17 Zipf (1949). 18 Helbing (2001). Complessità e riduzionismo 116 memoria degli stati passati ed uno previsione sullo stato futuro per compensarla consentendo al sistema di raggiungere un equilibrio statistico19. Se si introducono due popolazioni di automi si ottengono diverse configurazioni di equilibrio a seconda della natura della loro interazione sociale che può essere repulsiva o attrattiva. Per il sistema immunitario sono stati formulati molteplici modelli in cui intervengono i linfociti T, gli antigeni, la cellule APC ed in cui si stabiliscono precise regole dettate dalla nostra conoscenza sul sistema a livello dei suoi costituenti elementari. In questo caso interviene una molteplicità di automi con caratteristiche diverse perché molteplici sono gli antigeni e i linfociti T, che dopo aver incontrato l'antigene diventano cellule di memoria. La dinamica su un reticolo in cui queste popolazioni si muovono consente di riprodurre alcuni effetti come la risposta secondaria ad un attacco antigenico che è molto più efficace per la presenza di cellule memoria20. Si possono scrivere equazioni di campo medio che governano l'evoluzione del numero di individui in ciascuna popolazione trascurando la loro distribuzione spaziale ed introducendo anche componenti stocastiche per tenere conto delle fluttuazioni interne ed esterne al sistema. Modelli semplici consentono di correlare dati sulle popolazioni cellulari quali i linfociti vergini con dati demografici sulla base di ipotesi quali l'esaurimento di questa popolazione come causa di morte21. Pur validi per descrivere situazioni specifiche e per correlare dati osservativi, attraverso i vincoli stringenti di un quadro matematico i modelli non ci forniscono nuovi principi primi. È semmai vero che i modelli vanno costruiti rispettando i principi generali già acquisiti. Per ora dobbiamo limitarci alla teoria degli automi ed alla teoria della evoluzione per sviluppare modelli a partire dalle proprietà note dei costituenti elementari di un sistema complesso osservato ad una data scala. Non so se sarà possibile andare oltre come livello di conoscenza in un prossimo futuro, però se non ci poniamo come obiettivo la ricerca del vero, dell'assoluto ma soltanto di metodologie che possono fornire descrizioni efficaci della realtà, allora sviluppare modelli può essere già soddisfacente. Se quindi abbassiamo il tiro rispetto alla ricerca della teoria finale cui la fisica aspira, diventa possibile affinare la nostra conoscenza sui sistemi complessi utilizzando la matematica come strumento di sintesi e di conoscenza, perché modellizzare e simulare è comunque la base di ogni processo conoscitivo. 19 Turchetti, Zanlungo (2007). 20 Zanlungo, Turchetti (2007). 21 Luciani et al. (2001). Turchetti: Dai modelli fisici ai sistemi complessi 117 Riferimenti Arnold V. I., 2004, Metodi Matematici della Meccanica Classica Editori Riuniti, Roma. Barabasi A., 2002, Statistical mechanics of complex networks, «Reviews of Modern Physics» 70, 223. Boltzmann L., 1999, Modelli matematici, fisica e filosofia, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino. Darwin, C., 1859, L'origine della specie, BUR Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli, Milano 2009. Giorgini G., Turchetti G., 2007, From Newton-Boltzmann paradigms to complexity: a bridge to bio-systems in The Science of Complexity: chimera or reality? Ed. P. Freguglia, Esculapio, Bologna. Helbing, D., 2001, Traffic and related self driven many particle systems, «Reviews of Modern Physics» 73, 1067-1114. Hu H., Rampioni A., Rossi L., Turchetti T., Vaienti S., 2004, Statistics of Poincaré recurrences for area preserving maps with integrable and ergodic components, «Chaos» 14, 160-171. Kauffman, A., 1993, The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution Oxford University Press, New York, Oxford. Luciani F. et al., 2001, A stochastic model for CD8+ T cells dynamics in human immunosenescence : implications for survival and longevity, «Journal of Theoretical Biology» 213, 587-597. Mandelbrot B., 1982, The Fractal Geometry of Nature, W. H. Freeman & C., New York. Parisi, D., 2000, Una nuova mente, Codice edizioni Hoepli, Torino. Poincaré H., 1892-1899, Les méthodes nouvelles de la mécanique céleste Gauthier-Villars et fils, Paris. Ruelle D., 2003, Caso e caos, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino. Shannon, C. E., 1948, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, «Bell System Technical Journal», vol. 27, pp. 379-423, 623-656, July, October, 1948. Turchetti G., 2003, From Dinamical systems to complex systems ''Determinism Olism and Complexity'' Conferenza Arcidosso 2-8 settembre 2001, Ed. P. Freguglia et al., Kluwer Academic, New York. Turchetti G., 2007, Dynamical modeling of complex systems: a microscopic approach, BIOCOMPLEXITY Ed. G. Castellani, E. Lamberti, C. Franceschi, V. Fortunati, Bologna University Press,Bologna. Turchetti, G., Zanlungo, F., 2007, Dynamics and thermodynamics of a gas of automata, «Europhysics Letters» 78, 58003. Complessità e riduzionismo 118 Turchetti G., Vaienti S. and Zanlungo F., 2010, Relaxation to the asymptotic distribution of global errors due to round off, «Europhysics Letters» 89, 40006-40010. Von Neumann, J., 1963, Collected works, Vol V, Pergamon Press. Zanlungo, F., Turchetti, G., 2007, An automata based microscopic model inspired by the clonal expansion in Mathematical Modeling of Biological Systems II, A. Deutsch et al ed., Birkhhause, Boston, pp. 133-144. Zanlungo Ph. M., Turchetti G., Vaienti S., Zanlungo F., 2009, Error distribution in randomly perturbed orbits, «Chaos» 19, 4, 043118. Zipf, G. K., 1949, Human Behaviour and the Principle of Least-Effort, Addison-Wesley, Cambridge, Massachusetts. © Sergio Chibbaro, Lamberto Rondoni, Angelo Vulpiani "Considerazioni sui fondamenti della Meccanica Quantistica", in Complessità e riduzionismo, pp. 117-131 Published by Isonomia, Rivista online di Filosofia – Epistemologica – ISSN 2037-4348 Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo http://isonomia.uniurb.it/epistemologica 119 Considerazioni sui fondamenti della Meccanica Statistica Sergio Chibbaro Université Pierre et Marie Curie [email protected] Lamberto Rondoni Politecnico di Torino [email protected] Angelo Vulpiani Università di Roma "La Sapienza" [email protected] Alla memoria di Carlo Cercignani A differenza della meccanica quantistica, i cui fondamenti sono sempre stati al centro di un ininterrotto dibattito, gli aspetti concettuali della meccanica statistica non hanno attratto interessi così vasti; tra le eccezioni citiamo il bel libro di Emch e Liu1. In questo breve contributo discuteremo alcuni problemi concettuali della meccanica statistica, in particolare il ruolo del 1 Emch, Liu (2001). Complessità e riduzionismo 120 caos2 e l'emergenza di proprietà collettive che appaiono quando il numero delle particelle del sistema è molto grande3. 1. Dal microscopico al macroscopico I sistemi macroscopici sono composti da un numero molto elevato (dell'ordine del numero di Avogadro NA ≃ 6.02 1023) di particelle che, sotto opportune condizioni4, seguono le leggi di Newton della meccanica classica. In questa decrizione ogni particella è rappresentata dalla sua posizione qi e la sua velocità vi, che evolvono nel tempo secondo le leggi di Newton. In meccanica analitica invece della velocità si preferisce utilizzare l'impulso pi = mvi e le equazioni di evoluzione sono determinate da una funzione del sistema, chiamata Hamiltoniana e solitamente indicata con H5. Lo stato di un sistema di N particelle è rappresentato, al tempo t, da un vettore X(t)≡(q1(t),..., qN(t), p1(t),...,pN(t)) in uno spazio M di dimensione 6N, che contiene gli stati microscopici del sistema e viene chiamato spazio delle fasi. Una traiettoria in M rappresenta il susseguirsi di questi stati allo scorrere del tempo ed è determinata dalle equazioni di Hamilton: dqi dt = ∂H ∂pi , dpi dt = − ∂H ∂qi , (1) con i = 1,...,N. Se la Hamiltoniana, che contiene l'interazione tra le particelle, non dipende esplicitamente dal tempo, allora l' energia è una quantità conservata ed il moto si sviluppa su una ipersuperficie ad energia fissata. Notiamo che le equazioni (1) sono invarianti rispetto ad inversione temporale, cioè rispetto al seguente scambio di variabili: qi → qi , pi → −pi , t → −t . (2) Si immagini di far evolvere il sistema descritto dalle equazioni (1), a partire da una certa condizione iniziale (q1(0), ..., qN(0); p1(0), ..., pN(0)) fino ad un certo tempo t > 0. All'istante t si "inverta il tempo", cioè, lasciando invariate le posizioni q1(t),...,qN(t), si invertano i momenti, sostituendo p1(t),...,pN(t) con -p1(t),..., -pN(t), e si faccia evolvere nuovamente il sistema; questa operazione è l'analogo matematico del proiettare un film all'indietro. Poiché le equazioni di Hamilton sono invarianti rispetto alla trasformazione 2 Castiglione, Falcioni, Lesne, Vulpiani (2008). 3 Ivi, Zanghì (2005). 4 Per esempio in fluidi comuni a temperatura ambiente. 5 Fasano, Marmi (2002). Chibbaro, Rondoni, Vulpiani: Considerazioni sui fondamenti della Meccanica Statistica 121 di inversione temporale (2), l'evoluzione diretta e quella inversa sono ugualmente possibili: il sistema ripercorrerà all'indietro la sua storia e, dopo un tempo t, ritornerà nella stessa posizione iniziale ma con le velocità invertite. A livello microscopico le osservabili del sistema, ovvero le grandezze accessibili a una misura diretta o indiretta, sono rappresentate da funzioni A : M → R definite nello spazio delle fasi, che associano un numero reale A(X) ad ogni stato microscopico X ∈M . A livello macroscopico il sistema è descritto da un piccolo numero di variabili termodinamiche (temperatura, pressione etc); inoltre si hanno comportamenti irreversibili: mescolando un litro di acqua calda (ad esempio a 50 gradi centigradi) uno di acqua fredda (ad esempio a 10 gradi centigradi) si ottengono due litri di acqua tiepida (a 30 gradi centigradi) e mai un litro a 55 gradi centigradi ed un altro a 5 gradi centigradi, nonostastante questo sia compatibile con la conservazione dell' energia. Le equazioni macroscopiche, ad esempio le equazione dell'idrodinamica, riflettono questo comportamento e non sono reversibili. Il problema concettuale e tecnico della meccanica statistica è come conciliare la termodinamica con la dinamica microscopica: data la dinamica microscopica, cioè l'Hamiltoniana del sistema, determinare le proprietà macroscopiche, ad esempio l'equazione di stato. 2.1. L'ipotesi visionaria di Boltzmann È fondamentale notare che la scala dei tempi macroscopici, quelli di osservazione del sistema, è molto più grande della scala dei tempi della dinamica microscopica (1), quelli che dettano i cambiamenti a livello molecolare. Ciò significa che un dato sperimentale è in realtà il risultato di un'unica osservazione durante la quale il sistema passa attraverso un grandissimo numero di stati microscopici diversi. Se il dato si riferisce all'osservabile A(X), esso va quindi confrontato con una media eseguita lungo l'evoluzione del sistema e calcolata su tempi molto lunghi dal punto di vista microscopico: . 0 0 0 1 ( , ) ( ( )) t T t A t T A X t dt T + = ∫ (3) Il calcolo della media temporale A richiede, in linea di principio, sia la conoscenza dello stato microscopico del sistema ad un certo istante, sia la Complessità e riduzionismo 122 determinazione della corrispondente traiettoria nello spazio delle fasi. La richiesta è evidentemente impossibile quindi, se A dipendesse in maniera molto forte dallo stato iniziale del sistema, non si potrebbero fare previsioni di tipo statistico, neanche trascurando la difficoltà di trovare la soluzione del sistema (1). L'ipotesi ergodica di Boltzmann permette di superare questo ostacolo. Essa sostanzialmente afferma che se l'energia del sistema macroscopico è fissata, ogni possibile stato microscopico che abbia quella data energia è equiprobabile ad ogni altro che abbia la stessa energia. Più formalmente si può dire che ogni ipersuperficie di energia fissata è completamente accessibile a qualunque moto con la data energia6. Inoltre, il tempo medio di permanenza di ogni traiettoria in una data regione è proporzionale al volume della regione, e questo permette di introdurre una densità di probabilità Pmc(X) (detta microcanonica). Se le condizioni precedenti, che costituiscono appunto il nucleo dell'ipotesi ergodica, sono soddisfatte, segue che, se T è sufficientemente grande, la media in (3) dipende solo dall'energia del sistema e assume quindi lo stesso valore su tutte le evoluzioni con uguale energia. L'ipotesi ergodica permette di scrivere: A ≡ lim T →∞ 1 T A(X(t))dt = A(X)Pmc(X)dX ≡ A∫t0 t0 +T ∫ (4) La validità della precedente equazione ci libera contemporaneamente dalla necessità di determinare uno stato (iniziale) del sistema e di risolvere le equazioni del moto. La densità di probabilità sulla superficie con energia fissata o, più precisamente, nello strato di energie comprese tra due valori vicini, E ed E + ∆, è: Pmc(X) = 1 Γ∆ (E,V , N ) , se E < H < E + ∆ e nulla altrimenti, ove Γ∆(E,V ,N) = d 3Nqd3N p E < H <E +∆ ∫ , 6 Cfr. Castiglione, Falcioni, Lesne, Vulpiani (2008), Zanghì (2005), Cercignani (1998). Chibbaro, Rondoni, Vulpiani: Considerazioni sui fondamenti della Meccanica Statistica 123 è il volume dello spazio delle fasi contenuto tra le ipersuperfici H = E ed H = E + ∆. A questo punto manca ancora un ultimo aspetto fondamentale: il legame che permette di connettere le proprietà termodinamiche a quelle meccaniche. Questo ponte concettuale (e tecnico) è dato dal "principio di Boltzmann": S = kB lnΓ∆(E,V, N) (5) ove kB è la costante di Boltzmann, kB = R⁄NA e R è la costante dei gas. Questa relazione, che è incisa (con notazione leggermente diversa) sulla tomba di Ludwig Boltzmann a Vienna, costituisce quella che in filosofia della scienza è chiamata la legge ponte, nella terminologia di Nagel7, tra la termodinamica e la meccanica statistica nell' ensemble microcanonico. Aggiungendo la definizione (puramente termodinamica) di temperatura ∂S ∂E = 1 T (6) a partire dalla (5) si può ricavare tutta la termodinamica8. In molti libri di filosofia della scienza, ad esempio nello stesso Nagel9, si trova scritto che la legge ponte tra meccanica e termodinamica è la connessione tra temperatura ed energia cinetica media. Questo a nostro avviso non è corretto. La sua validità è infatti limitata ad una certa classe di sistemi (gas monoatomici), inoltre l'energia cinetica è una grandezza puramente meccanica che non può in alcun modo rendere conto di proprietà fondamentale della temperatura, ed esempio il principio zero della termodinamica10. Al contrario la (5) è del tutto generale e mette in relazione il livello microscopico con quello macroscopico. 7 Nagel (1984). 8 Cercignani (1998). 9 Nagel (1984). 10 Peliti (2003). Complessità e riduzionismo 124 2. Perché la meccanica statistica funziona? Se N ≫ 1 si possono ottenere risultati molto generali ed è possibile introdurre tecniche di calcolo (e metodi di approssimazione) molto potenti che consentono lo studio dettagliato dei sistemi macroscopici11. La meccanica statistica è sicuramente una teoria di grande successo, e di questo nessuno dubita; ma non c'è un completo consenso sul perché funzioni tanto bene. 2.1. Ergodicità, meccanica analitica e caos Una possibile proposta per giustificare il successo della meccanica statistica è la seguente: la dinamica è abbastanza "complicata" (caotica in linguaggio tecnico), quindi il sistema è ergodico e l'insieme microcanonico è dinamicamente giustificato. Una volta assunta la validità dell'insieme microcanonico, si può facilmente introdurre l'insieme canonico in cui l'energia può variare, etc. Rimane da capire se i sistemi siano genericamente ergodici oppure non lo siano. Questo è un problema decisamente difficile che si intreccia con la meccanica analitica. Infatti, se esistessero integrali primi12 oltre all'energia, il sistema risulterebbe sicuramente non ergodico: scegliendo come osservabile A uno degli integrali primi si avrebbe A = A(X(0)) che dipende dalla condizione iniziale X(0) ed è quindi generalmente diverso da A . Nel fondamentale lavoro sul problema dei tre corpi Poincaré ha dimostrato che, in generale (cioè a parte casi patologici o banali), un sistema Hamiltoniano non ammette integrali primi analitici oltre all'energia13. Nel 1923, Fermi generalizzando il teorema di Poincaré argomentò che i sistemi Hamiltoniani in genere sono ergodici. Purtroppo Fermi si sbagliava, questo lo capì lui stesso in un suo importante lavoro numerico (FPU) in collaborazione con Pasta e Ulam14. Un anno prima di questo lavoro, Kolmogorov aveva enunciato un importante teorema, che è ora noto con la sigla KAM, poiché la dimostrazione venne in seguito completata da Arnold e Moser. In modo molto informale si può dire 11 Ivi. 12 Quantità costanti durante l'evoluzione del sistema. 13 Fasano, Marmi (2002). 14 Fermi, Pasta, Ulam (1955); Falcioni, Vulpiani (2001). Chibbaro, Rondoni, Vulpiani: Considerazioni sui fondamenti della Meccanica Statistica 125 che il teorema stabilisce che un sistema esprimibile come un sistema integrabile (in cui il moto è quasi-periodoco) più una debole perturbazione, si comporta "sostanzialmente" come il sistema senza perturbazione15. Il FPU e il teorema KAM mostrano in modo inequivocabile che un generico sistema Hamiltoniano non è ergodico, almeno da un punto di vista strettamente matematico. Tuttavia la connessione tra i risultati rigorosi della matematica e la fisica non è mai semplice e anche dopo oltre mezzo secolo la comprensione della rilevanza del KAM, e più in generale del caos, per la meccanica statistica non può considerarsi ancora completamente risolta16, anche se questi lavori rimangono fondamentali, perché hanno in evidenza la relazione tra non-linearità, caos e meccanica statistica. Per alcuni studiosi è proprio il caos l'ingrediente fondamentale che giustifica la validità della meccanica statististica. Ad esempio Prigogine17 sostiene che la nozione di caos porta a rivedere il concetto di "legge di natura"... e che nei sistemi caotici le traiettorie sono eliminate dalla descrizione probabilistica. E ancora L' irreversibilità o è vera ad ogni livello oppure non è vera mai: non può emergere dal nulla nel passaggio da un livello all' altro. La stessa idea è espressa da Driebe18, in un acceso dibattito con Lebowitz19 sui fondamenti della meccanica statistica: Processi irreversibili sono osservati in sistemi con pochi gradi di libertà... La freccia del tempo non è dovuta a qualche approssimazione fenomenologica ma è una proprietà intrinseca dei sistemi caotici20. 15 Il teorema, si può enunciare come segue: Data una Hamiltoniana H(I,φ) = H0(I) + εH1(I,φ) , con H0(I) sufficientemente regolare e inoltre det ∂ 2H0(I) /∂Ii∂I j ≠ 0, se ε è piccolo allora sulla superficie di energia costante sopravvivono dei tori invarianti (che sono detti tori KAM e che risultano una piccola deformazione di quelli presenti per ε = 0) in un insieme la cui misura tende a 1 quando ε → 0 . 16 Cfr. Castiglione, Falcioni, Lesne, Vulpiani (2008); Falcioni, Vulpiani (2001). 17 Prigogine (1994). 18 Driebe (1994). 19 Lebowitz (1993). 20 Driebe (1994). Complessità e riduzionismo 126 2.2. L'ergodicità non è veramente necessaria Esiste una scuola di pensiero, che ha tra i suoi maggiori esponenti Khinchin e Landau, che considera tutta la problematica sull'ergodicità sostanzialmente irrilevante nel contesto della meccanica statistica, in quanto l'ipotesi ergodica sarebbe di fatto non necessaria per giustificare l'eq. (4) per osservabili fisicamente rilevanti. Questo punto di vista si basa sui fatti seguenti: a. nei sistemi che interessano la meccanica statistica, il numero di gradi di libertà è molto grande; b. la questione interessante per la meccanica statistica è la validità della (4) non per un'osservabile qualunque, bensì per le poche grandezze rilevanti per la termodinamica; c. è fisicamente accettabile ammettere che l'ergodicità sia violata in una regione "piccola" dello spazio delle fasi. Le conclusioni ottenute da Khinchin, originariamente per sistemi di particelle non interagenti, ed estese da Mazur e van der Linden a sistemi di particelle interagenti con potenziali a corto raggio, sono riassunte nel seguente risultato21: nel limite N ≫ 1, per una classe non banale di osservabili A la misura relativa (ovvero la probabilità rispetto alla densità di probabilità microcanonica Pmc) dei punti, sulla ipersuperficie di energia fissata, in cui A è significativamente diverso da A è una quantità piccola22. Possiamo perciò dire che, nel limite N → ∞, la (4) è valida per una classe interessante di funzioni, tranne che in una regione dello spazio delle 21 Khinchin (1949). 22 Se l'osservabile A è esprimibile come somma di N termini, dipendenti ognuna dalle variabili di una sola particella A = f (qi ,pi ) i=1 N ∑ allora per sistemi con Hamiltoniana della forma H = H n (qn ,pn ) n=1 N ∑ + U qn − qn '( ) n,n' ∑ , ove U(r) è un potenziale di interazione a corto raggio, si ha P A − A A ≥ C1N −1/4         ≤ C2N −1/4 , ove C1 e C2 sono costanti O(1). Chibbaro, Rondoni, Vulpiani: Considerazioni sui fondamenti della Meccanica Statistica 127 fasi, che si fa sempre più piccola all'aumentare di N; e questo indipendentemente dai dettagli della dinamica. 3. Who is the winner? Nella sezione precedente abbiamo accennato a due posizioni nettamente diverse. Da una parte abbiamo il punto di vista "tradizionale", risalente a Boltzmann e parzialmente formalizzato da Khinchin, che può essere così riassunto: l'ingrediente che caratterizza la meccanica statistica è l'enorme numero di gradi di libertà23. Dall'altra la scuola "moderna" cresciuta intorno a Prigogine ed i suoi collaboratori, che considera il caos come l'ingrediente fondamentale; per una dettagliata critica si veda il lavoro di Bricmont24. I risultati di Khinchin, pur molto importanti, non sono in grado di rispondere in modo definitivo a tutti i problemi sollevati dalla relazione fra termodinamica e meccanica statistica. Ad esempio, non sono in grado di dire cosa succederebbe a condizioni iniziali microscopiche "atipiche", come quelle dette di non equilibrio, e, nel caso tutto funzioni, cioè che la (4) sia valida, quale sarebbe il tempo T necessario affinché la media (3) si avvicini adeguatamente al valore A . Il caos deterministico è certamente importante e la sua riscoperta ha permesso di riconsiderare alcune idee di fondo sulla rilevanza del determinismo e la descrizione statistica. Tuttavia capire la sua reale importanza per la validità della meccanica statistica, e dell'irreversibilità in particolare, non è cosa facile e si deve far ricorso a simulazioni numeriche25. Prima di discutere brevemente qualche risultato tecnico che permette di districarsi (o almeno orientarsi) tra i diversi approcci, notiamo che i due punti di vista si differenziano nettamente, anche da un punto di vista filosofico. In termini un po' approssimativi, possiamo dire che l'impostazione di Prigogine è un esempio di riduzionismo nella sua forma più semplice: nel passaggio dalla meccanica alla termodinamica non ci sarebbe molto di nuovo. Per Prigogine, infatti, le proprietà statistiche sono contenute nelle proprietà dinamiche, indipendentemente dal numero di gradi di libertà coinvolti. Al contrario, nella scuola tradizionale, si ha un elemento in più: il numero estremamente grande di gradi di libertà. Questo è il fatto 23 Grad (1967). 24 Bricmont (1996). 25 Castiglione, Falcioni, Lesne, Vulpiani (2008); Falcioni, Vulpiani (2001). Complessità e riduzionismo 128 fondamentale che permette l'emergere, nei sistemi macroscopici, di proprietà che sono del tutto assenti in sistemi piccoli. Dettagliati calcoli numerici in sistemi Hamiltoniani mostrano in modo chiaro che il caos non è affatto un ingrediente fondamentale26. Ad esempio in catene di tanti oscillatori non lineari si osserva che il calore specifico misurato con medie temporali è in accordo con le previsioni della meccanica statistica anche quando il sistema non è rigorosamente ergodico. L'idea, apparentemente sensata, che il caos implichi buone proprietà statistiche non supera il controllo numerico e si rivela inconsistente, e questo anche in casi in cui i risultati di Khinchin non sono, matematicamente parlando, validi. Concludiamo discutendo brevemente il problema dell'irreversibilità in cui, a nostro avviso, è essenziale considerare il problema dei livelli di realtà, cioè il grado di accuratezza o approssimazione con il quale si osserva un dato fenomeno. Consideriamo il seguente esperimento concettuale: si versi del profumo in un angolo di una stanza; le molecole del profumo, inizialmente concentrate in una piccola regione, velocemente occuperanno tutta la stanza. Si immagini ora di poter filmare le molecole. Proiettando la pellicola all'indietro, si vedrà un fenomeno "innaturale": tutte le molecole sparse nella stanza si riuniranno in un angolo. Guardando invece una sola molecola nel film a proiettato al contrario, non si evidenzierà niente di anormale. Analogamente, non si nota niente di strano nel film proiettato al contrario se si limita l'osservazione a poche molecole. Solo guardando un numero elevato di molecole, si ha l'impressione di un comportamento innaturale. Quanto precedentemente accennato lascia sperare che sia possibile dimostrare, entro opportuni limiti, l'irreversibilità dei fenomeni macroscopici, che riguardano un grande numero di particelle, a partire dalla dinamica microscopica. Partendo da un fondamentale lavoro di Grad del 1948 si è arrivati a formulare e dimostrare in modo rigoroso quanto intuito da Boltzmann. Tra i tanti che hanno partecipato a questo significativo progresso ricordiamo Carlo Cercignani, che ha dato contributi fondamentali alla meccanica statistica. Consideriamo un gas diluito di particelle interagenti con un potenziale a corto raggio, ad esempio possiamo pensare che le molecole siano sfere rigide di diametro s, la sostanza del lavoro matematico27 può essere riassunta, in modo molto informale, come segue: nel limite di Boltzmann-Grad: 26 Castiglione, Falcioni, Lesne, Vulpiani (2008). 27 Cercignani, Illner, Pulvirenti (1994). Chibbaro, Rondoni, Vulpiani: Considerazioni sui fondamenti della Meccanica Statistica 129 2; 0; costN e Nσ σ→ ∞ → → ove N è il numero di molecole nell' unità di volume e σ è il diametro delle molecole e Nσ2 dà la frequenza di collisione, se la condizione iniziale del sistema è fuori dall' equilibrio termodinamico, dalle equazioni reversibili della meccanica microscopiche si ottengono in modo rigoroso le equazioni irreversibili che descrivono i sistemi macroscopici. Questo risultato è in netto contrasto con quanto sostenuto dalla scuola di Prigogine. A prima vista può sembrare impossibile che qualcosa (l'irreversibilità) che è assente per ogni sistema con N finito possa apparire nel limite N → ∞ . La cosa non è affatto sorprendente: è quello che succede nel caso dei limiti singolari. Per dare un'idea consideriamo l'equazione algebrica εx2 + x −1= 0 se ε = 0 si ha una sola soluzione x = 1, se ε ≠ 0 ci sono due soluzioni: x1,2 = (-1 ± 1 + 4ε 2 )/2ε; se 0 < ε≪ 1 abbiamo x1 = 1 + O(ε) e x2 = -1/ε + O(1). I risultati per 0 < ε ≪ 1 sono drasticamente diversi da quelli ε = 0. Abbiamo quindi che l'irreversibilità può essere vista come una proprietà emergente nel passaggio dal microscopico al macroscopico; ed è originata dal limite N → ∞ , σ → 0 . È impressionante l'accordo dei risultati rigorosi con quanto intuito da Boltzmann28: Nelle equazioni della meccanica non c'è niente di analogo a quanto si ha con la Seconda Legge della termodinamica che può essere ricondotta a termini meccanici solo con assunzioni sulle condizioni iniziali. Come osservazione generale notiamo il fatto che quasi tutte le volte che si tenta un processo di riduzione tra due teorie ci si trova davanti ad un limite singolare in cui un parametro tende a zero29, come esempi possiamo citare il passaggio: 1. dalla meccanica alla termodinamica:1 / N → 0 ; 2. dalla meccanica quantistica alla meccanica classica: ħ / A → 0 , ove ħ è la costante di Planck ed A l' azione classica del sistema; 28 Cercignani, Illner, Pulvirenti (1994). 29 Batterman (2001). Complessità e riduzionismo 130 3. dall'ottica ondulatoria all' ottica geometrica: λ / L → 0 , ove λ ed L sono rispettivamente la lunghezza d'onda e la dimensione tipica del sistema . Una delle poche eccezioni non banali di limite non singolare è il passaggio dalla relatività di Einstein alla meccanica newtoniana; in questo caso il parametro che tende a zero è v⁄c, ove c e v sono rispettivamente la velocità della luce e la velocità tipica del sistema. 4. Osservazioni finali Concludiamo con alcune considerazioni generali su alcuni aspetti che sono, almeno parzialmente, ancora materia di dibattito. 4.1. La termodinamica è stata ridotta alla meccanica? Alla fine di questa breve esposizione è naturale domandarci se c'è stata una vera riduzione della termodinamica alla meccanica. Prima di tentare una risposta ricapitoliamo brevemente lo schema proposto che, a nostro avviso, è sostanzialmente quello immaginato da Boltzmann. Gli ingredienti fondamentali della possibilità di una descrizione termodinamica dei sistemi macroscopici sono: 1. L'ipotesi ergodica (3); 2. La legge ponte, cioè il principio di Boltzmann (5); 3. Il grande numero di gradi di libertà coinvolti (N ≫ 1); 4. La selezione di opportune condizioni iniziali. Abbiamo visto che l'ipotesi ergodica non è strettamente vera, ma assumendo il punto III possiamo dire che è "moralmente vera". I punti III e IV sono fondamentali per far emergere i comportamenti collettivi, quali l'irreversibilità. Tentativamente possiamo dire che, nel linguaggio di Nagel, siamo in presenza di un riduzione del secondo tipo (tra teorie eterogenee). Notiamo che non solo c'è solo bisogno di una legge ponte, ma di qualcosa in più (assunzioni III e IV), solo in questo modo l'emergenza di nuove Chibbaro, Rondoni, Vulpiani: Considerazioni sui fondamenti della Meccanica Statistica 131 proprietà può avvenire. Sembra perciò appropriato parlare di un caso di emergenza debole30. È necessario tuttavia rilevare come la grandezza del lavoro di Boltzmann non risieda tanto nell'aver "ridotto la termodinamica alla meccanica", quanto nell'aver compreso l' impossibilità di ricondurre l'irreversibilità alle sole leggi della meccanica. Lo straordinario contributo di Boltzmann fu proprio che comprese a pieno la natura singolare dell'emergere dell'irreversibilità per la quale sono necessarie le assunzioni III e IV, e trovò una legge, l'equazione (5), che mette in relazione i due livelli di realtà e dunque anche i due linguaggi. Questa relazione ha aperto la via allo sviluppo della moderna meccanica statistica ed è profondamente diversa, e ben più importante, di quella che stabilisce la proporzionalità tra l'energia cinetica delle molecole e la temperatura. Ricordiamo che l'esistenza di una tale relazione era già chiara a Daniel Bernoulli, all'inizio del XVIII secolo, ma non è sufficiente per determinare, in modo coerente e generale, la connessione tra meccanica e termodinamica. 4.2. La meccanica statistica è falsificabile? La domanda può sembrare provocatoria ma ci sembra che meriti una breve discussione. Il problema si potrebbe presentare nel seguente modo: dato un recipiente di volume V contenente N particelle interagenti con un potenziale noto U(|qi qj|)=U(r), assumendo che esista una condizione di equilibrio termico a temperatura T, trovare il calore specifico, l'equazione di stato etc. Ad esempio per gas diluiti si ha la seguente equazione di stato: 2 32 3( ) ( ) ... B p b T b T k T ρ ρ ρ= + + + + (8) dove p è la pressione, ρ = N⁄V è la densità ed i coefficienti del viriale b2,b3,... sono esprimibili in termini di U(r). Una volta effettuati i calcoli si devono confrontare i risultati con l'esperimento. In pratica non è possibile porsi il problema nella forma precedente, infatti anche assumendo che il problema sia classico, il potenziale U(r) non è noto: ha un origine quantistica e deve essere calcolato, almeno il linea di principio, dall' equazione di Schrödinger. È possibile ottenere una buona approssimazione solo in casi molto semplici, nella realtà si deve procedere 30 Bedau, Humphreys (2006). Complessità e riduzionismo 132 in modo completamente diverso31. Si comincia ipotizzando una forma specifica per U(r), ad esempio per i liquidi semplici il potenziale di Lennard-Jones U(r) = 4ε σ r     12 − σ r     6      , (9) che contiene due parametri ε e σ. Una volta calcolati i coefficienti del viriale b2(T),b3(T),... in termini di U(r), dal confronto con i dati sperimentali si determinano i parametri ε e σ. Questo procedimento è chiaramente autoconsistente e quindi la meccanica statistica potrebbe sembrare una teoria non falsificabile, ma questa conclusione non è corretta: la meccanica statistica è in grado di prevedere comportamenti non banali che possono essere controllati sperimentalmente. Possiamo citare la distribuzione di Maxwell-Boltzmann per la velocità delle molecole, l'esistenza delle transizioni di fase e l'universalità dei fenomeni critici. È interessante notare che in tutti i casi appena citati non è necessario conoscere il potenziale: la distribuzione di Maxwell-Boltzmann vale indipendetemente dalla forma di U(r), mentre nei fenomeni critici solo alcune proprietà qualitative (classi di universalità) del potenziale sono rilevanti32. Riferimenti Batterman, R.W., 2001, The Devil in the Details, Oxford University Press. Bedau, M., and Humphreys, P., (Eds), 2006, Emergence: contemporary readings in philosophy and science, Cambridge University Press. Bricmont, J., 1996, Science of chaos or chaos in science?, «Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences», 775, 131. Castiglione P., Falcioni M., Lesne A., and Vulpiani A., 2008, Chaos and Coarse Graining in Statistical Mechanics, Cambridge University Press. Cercignani, C., 1998, Ludwig Boltzmann: the man who trusted, Oxford University Press. Cercignani, C., Illner, R., and Pulvirenti, M., 1994, The Mathematical Theory of Dilute Gases, Springer-Verlag, Berlin. 31 Hansen, McDonald (1986). 32 Peliti (2003). Chibbaro, Rondoni, Vulpiani: Considerazioni sui fondamenti della Meccanica Statistica 133 Driebe, D.J., 1994, Is Boltzmann entropy time's arrow's archers?, «Physics Today», November 1994, pp. 13. Emch, G.G., and Liu, C., 2001, The Logic of Thermostatistical Physics, Springer Verlag, Berlin. Falcioni, M., Vulpiani, A., 2001, Il contributo di Enrico Fermi ai sistemi non lineari"in Conoscere Fermi, Ed. Bernardini e Bonolis SIF, Bologna. Fasano, A., Marmi, S., 2002, Meccanica analitica, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino. Fermi, E., Pasta, J., and Ulam, S., 1955, Studies of Nonlinear Problems, Document LA 1940. Grad, H., 1967, Levels of Description in Statistical Mechanics and Thermodynamics, in Delaware Seminar in the Foundations of Physics, Ed. Bunge, Springer-Verlag, Berlin. Hansen, J.-P., and McDonald, I. R., 1986, Theory of Simple Liquids, Academic Press Inc, London. Khinchin, A.I., 1949, Mathematical Foundations of Statistical Mechanics, Dover Publications Inc., New York. Lebowitz, J.L., 1993, Boltzmann' s entropy and time's arrow, «Physics Today», September 1993, pp. 32. Nagel, E., 1984, La struttura della scienza, Feltrinelli, Milano. Peliti, L., 2003, Appunti di Meccanica Statistica, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino. Prigogine, I., 1994, Les Lois du Chaos, Flammarion, Paris. Zanghì, N., 2005, I fondamenti concettuali dell'approccio statistico in fisica in La Natura delle Cose (a cura di Allori, Dorato, Laudisa e Zanghì), Carocci Editore, Roma, pp. 139.

Presence of Mind: Consciousness and the Sense of Self Christian Coseru The rejection of a permanent self as the 'thinker of thoughts ' and the 'senser of sensations' poses a significant challenge for Buddhist philosophy of mind: if there is no permanent agent (kartii), and if actions (karman) are merely transient events within a continuum of causally interconnected states, how is the phenomenal character of conscious experience and the sense of ownership implicit in first-person agency to be explained? At the same time, the rejection of a permanent locus for experience offers an opportunity to explore the problem of personal identity on phenomenological rather than metaphysical grounds: answering the question of why self-awareness comes bound up with a sense of self (whether owned or merely occurrent) can thus be pursued independently of metaphysical concerns about what a self is and what are its fundamental attributes. It also allows for an analysis of the structure of awareness without assuming that such a structure reflects an external relation of ownership between consciousness and the self. Let us note from the outset that there are substantive disagreements among Buddhist philosophers about how the problem of personal identity should be framed, the kind of evidence that is deemed reliable, and the lines of justification that are worth pursuing: it can be (and has been) framed in both epistemological and ontological terms, drawing on both experiential accounts and metaphysical considerations about what there is, and taking the form of both conceptual analysis Presence of Mind: Consciousness and the Sense of Self 47 and ostensive demonstration. Nonetheless, there is a general consensus that at the most basic level the no-self view is entailed by a reductive analysis of experience. The claim is that phenomenal consciousness is actually a synthesis of five different kinds of activities: bodily, affective, perceptual, dispositional, and self-reflexive. 1 This view of personal identity informs all debates in Indian and Buddhist philosophy of mind and is indispensable to any account of cognition. By replacing the cognizing 'self' or 'I' with a causal chain the outcome of which is momentary cognitive events, Buddhist philosophers treat the cognizing subject as an emergent aspect of the embodied and dynamic functioning of these aggregates. In short, talk of 'self' or 'I' as the agent of experience is just a mistaken, folk-psychological way of using the first person pronoun referentially (that is, as referring to subjects of experience). But if this Buddhist account of personal identity is built, as it is claimed, on phenomenological (thus descriptive) rather than metaphysical grounds, the obvious question arises: is there such a place or locus for experience? And if there is, does it have the sort of character that is amenable to phenomenological analysis? A positive answer would suggest that experience is such that at a minimum, the 'sense of self' must be an ineliminable structural feature of cognitive awareness. In what follows I want to pursue the question of precisely what conception of selfconsciousness can be supported on experiential grounds, and whether such conception is sufficient to account for the ineliminable features of phenomenal consciousness. I. Defining Consciousness It is generally agreed that consciousness is a somewhat slippery term. However, more narrowly defined as 'phenomenal consciousness' it captures at least three essential features or aspects: subjective experience (the notion that what we are primarily conscious of are experiences), subjective knowledge (that feature of our awareness that gives consciousness its distinctive reflexive character), and phenomenal contrast (the phenomenality 48 Problem of the Self Consciousness, Subjectivity and the Other of awareness, absence of which makes consciousness intractable) (cf. Siewert 1998). I will only discuss here the subjective and epistemic aspects of phenomenal consciousness, specifically what I take to be two of its constitutive features: presence and reflexivity. Phenomenal consciousness is what makes present, disclosing at once a world and a minimal sense of self. It is also constitutive of the character of experience. That there is something it is like to be conscious means that experience is what it is by virtue of being present to itself: the smell of roses is all that is needed for an experience to be disclosed as an instance of olfactory self-awareness. As such consciousness marks a specific cognitive event as being for someone or as having what phenomenologists call 'for-meness' (Kriegel and Zahavi 2015). There is no such thing as a generic experience, as if from nowhere and for no one. We do not experience the world and ourselves as though we were a witness in a Cartesian theatre or a voyeur peeping from behind the scene. Rather, awareness makes manifest, enacts, and transforms the world and ourselves as we move through it. We look on in utter amazement at a world that glances back and makes us blush, for the world in question is the world as perceived. To open up to a world is not to be thrust, as a bystander might, onto a stage and asked to play some unfamiliar part. Rather, it is like taking your turn as the play moves along and the plot unravels. As embodied and minded creatures 'we' are always in character, though, of course, not always in the same character. Consciousness does not begin in reflection, when we pause to remember a line or to ponder an idea. Rather, as a reflection it always finds itself, as the conventions of epic poetry tell us, in medias res, in the middle of things. Awareness, and empirical or perceptual awareness in particular, has an intentional character: we always find ourselves in a world, or as Heidegger puts it, in one mood or another, and never simply there, as bare existence. Phenomenal consciousness is important if we are to understand the world we live in and our place in it. Some argue that the phenomenal character of experience is such that our Presence of Mind: Consciousness and the Sense of Self 49 most basic beliefs, call them perceptual beliefs, are not only immediately justified (Pryor 2000, 2004) but in effect are nothing but judgments about experience (Dennett 2005); others that experience has a seeming character, that there is a way things seem to us that is different from our judgments about them (Carman, 2005, 2007; Huemer 2005, 2007). Furthermore, some claim that we cannot have first-personal knowledge of our own mental states without phenomenal experience (Pitt 2004); others that perceptual experience must be conscious in a phenomenal sense in order for us to have access to demonstrative thoughts (Smithes 2011); and still others that phenomenal experience is what makes our beliefs, perceptual or otherwise, reliable (Chalmers, 2003). Lastly, some argue that the phenomenal character of experience and its phenomenal content are in effect inseparable (Chalmers 2004, Coseru 2012). Indian and Buddhist philosophers likewise are split on this issue: some, such as the Vaibhashika and the Sautrantikas offer reductionist accounts of experience, others (Vedanta and Sankhya philosophers) argue that an experience should count as such insofar as it is attributable to a self that owns it, and still others (chiefly the Naiyaykas) that such a self might not admit of qualitative experiences or possess anything like determined awareness. At least in the Indian philosophical context, the main disagreement about phenomenal consciousness is between those who take consciousness to be simple and unanalysable, and those who understand consciousness as a property of certain mental states (typically, states of so-called metacognition or metacognitive awareness).2 Despite significant contributions in this area, we still lack reliable methods for charting the phenomenology of conscious experience. In recent years, a new proposal about the character of phenomenal consciousness has emerged that challenges the received, orthodox view that perceptual phenomenology is the only phenomenology there is. Proponents of this new view argue that conscious thought too possesses a kind of distinct or proprietary phenomenology. Introduced under the rubric of cognitive phenomenology, this proposal is meant to extend, supplement, and even supplant the range and scope of the phenomenal character of experience (Bayne and Montague 50 Problem of the Self Consciousness, Subjectivity and the Other 2011). Cognitive phenomenology or the phenomenology of thought extends the role of phenomenal consciousness beyond the domain of the present at hand to include all mentality. In other words, proponents of cognitive phenomenology do not simply state that thought has phenomenal character in virtue of being associated with some sensory or affective state.3 Rather they claim that thought, much like sensation, has its own proprietary phenomenology or 'what it is like.' My thought "Paris is the capital of France" does not derive its character from association with co-occurrent sensory, affective, or imagistic experiences. That is, there is something it is like to entertain that thought that is not reducible to how I feel about Paris, political geography or the French people. However, while cognitive phenomenology may help extend the boundaries of conscious experience beyond the sensory and affective domains, it does little to augment our still rather rudimentary methodological toolset. Instead of using the language of qualia to capture the character of what it is like to have a certain kind of experience, it uses the language of introspection and self-knowledge to ground the content of thought in an experience of the thought's own determinacy. I am sympathetic to the project of cognitive phenomenology, but, just as with the phenomenology of sense perception, I find it problematic that we are trying to justify the epistemic relevance of phenomenal consciousness rather than explore its structural features. If consciousness is what makes present then arguably it is constitutive of experience. Coming to terms with phenomenal consciousness, then, means resisting the many ways in which it can be substituted for more concrete phenomena like the so-called datum of experience or to judgments about it. II. Presence and Reflexivity Let us begin then with experience. Imagine you are travelling to a distant place, perhaps to attend a conference, and upon arrival you step out of the airport only to find yourself immersed in a strange and unfamiliar world. You look around for clues Presence of Mind: Consciousness and the Sense of Self 51 about how to proceed: directions to a taxi stand, an airport shuttle or the information desk. Before long, and with some luck, you are on your way to your hotel. As airport ramps give way to freeways and freeways to avenues and narrow streets a whole new urban fabric unravels before your eyes. Everywhere, a seething mass of people is going about their daily affairs. You are drawn in, you attend to every gesture and detail of this vast quivering tapestry. As the scene moves along, you find yourself adjusting your gaze to get a better grip. Perhaps you are riding in a shuttle or sharing a taxi with a colleague. Your colleague has been here before, and she knows the place very well. She is a gifted and gregarious storyteller, and on your way into the city you get your first guided tour, punctuated with anecdotes and solicitous advice. You are intrigued, fascinated, but also slightly apprehensive. You wonder what lies ahead for you. As you zoom past imposing landmarks and through crowded thoroughfares, reaching deeper into the heart of the city, it slowly begins to sink in. Like Mary the colour scientist who, upon being released from her black and white room, has her first experience of colour, you are experiencing a world you l have ony indirectly known about. 1his is the world made present. What kind of presence is this? On reflection, one might say that it is a subjective one, a transformation of self-awareness by immersion into an unfamiliar environment. But this horizon of experience where you now find yourself has not come about solely as a result of what the new surroundings afford. What do scenarios like the one just described tell us about the phenomenal character of consciousness? Herein lies the problem: unlike the typical thought experiment, there is no setup; no argument about what could conceivably be the case. Inferential relations, though part of the structure of awareness, are not constitutive of it. Small infants are aware, and so are many animals, despite lacking the complex conceptual schema of metacognitive awareness. To proponents of belief based theories of perception this scenario mig h t seem contrived, even impossible, given assumptions about what empirical awareness can and does deliver. But it should not be. And here is why. In perceiving we do not simply register objects within our 52 Problem of the Self Consciousness, Subjectivity and the Other field of experience. Neither do we stand over against these objects in a type of representational relation. Rather, the perceiving act itself makes present its object, say a red apple, as an event that has duration and takes place within a horizon of experience that is pre-reflectively given. On this account of perception, suited to capture its enactive and sensorimotor contingencies, presence, that is, the sense we have of enduring objects, states, and events, and reflexivity, the notion that our cognitive awareness has a for-me-ness structure, are intrinsic features of experience rather than concepts that frame our thinking about the character of experience. Critics of sensorimotor accounts of perception (e.g. Clark 2006) claim that perception cannot apprehend past and/ or future events, and thus that presence and temporality are not within the purview of perception. Proponents of the view that perception has a horizon structure and is reflexively constituted (Kelly 2008, Noe 2012) argue that what I perceive seems to include not only those elements that are immediately present to awareness but also those that are only intuitively available. The sensorimotor account of perception, thus, advances the phenomenally plausible view that in perception we apprehend whole objects (and events), not merely their perceptible parts, and apprehend them actively as occasioning different types of experience (the red apple affords such experiences as seeing red, picking or tossing). While many agree that this debate about the nature of perception cannot be settled on phenomenologically neutral grounds, few doubt that framing it as an account of the structure of phenomenal consciousness can extend it in a profitable direction. Such a framing, not surprisingly, is also at work in Buddhist Abhidharma accounts: Vasubandhu, for instance, understands presence (smiti) as the capacity to "not allow to be carried off" (iilambana-asampramoca): that is, the capacity to retain the present moment.4 My claim is that a solution to the problem of how best to account for the elements of existence and/ or experience (dharmas), much like contemporary attempts to frame perceptual awareness in terms of its enactive and sensorimotor contingencies, cannot satisfactorily be offered without coming to terms with the Presence of Mind: Consciousness and the Sense of Self 53 reflexivity of phenomenal consciousness. Let us briefly consider the Buddhist analysis of experience. First, the Buddhist rejects the notion of a permanent self as the agent of sensory activity. But this rejection, of course, poses a significant challenge. Indeed, as we noted above, if there is no agent, and if actions are merely transient events arising within na contiuum of causally interconnected states, we are confronted with an explanatory gap: how is the efficacy of causal or, in Buddhist terms, karmic processes to be explained? That is, why is it that some causal chains give rise to the emergent phenomenon of conscious awareness and its implicit sense of self and others do not? It is not surprising therefore that early interpreters of the no-self doctrine in the West (much like Brahmanical critics of the Buddhist no-self view in India) have argued that the denial of self in Buddhism should be understood as targeting common views such as those that associate the self with the psychophysical aggregates, and not the metaphysical notion of self (Bhattacharya 1973: 64). Can Abhidharma reductionism, with its account of primitive atom-like 'qualitons' of experience, and its various accounts of consciousness in terms of life continuum (citta-santana) and repository consciousness (alaya-vijiiana)) provide an adequate conceptual basis for advancing the thesis that mental states have a self-presentational character? That is, does the phenomenal mineness implicit, for instance, in Asanga and Vasubandhu's notion that I-thoughts are occurrent features of afflicted minds (klicma-manas) count as a descriptive account of the structure of experience? Or is it just an instance of failure to secure epistemic access to what there is? Ganeri (2012: 156ff) has recently claimed that it does not count, and has built a strong case for regarding the first-person stance by means of which thoughts are individuated in the mental stream as an instance of constitutively owned rather than deluded I-thoughts. Later Buddhist solutions to this conundrum vary considerably, from the Pudgalavadin's proposal that first-personal agency non- reductively supervenes on the aggregates to reflexivist accounts of consciousness as articulated mainly by Dignaga and Dharmakirti and their successors. It is the reflexivist's proposal 54 Problem of the Self Consciousness, Subjectivity and the Other that interests us here for the promising way in which it accounts for the character of mental states in terms of features that form an integral part of their structure (such as, for instance, the principle of reflexivity which states that essentially consciousness consists in conscious mental states being implicitly self-aware). Proponents of Buddhist reflexivism claim that consciousness is best understood as a continuum of self-aware experiences that are dissociated both in terms of their phenomenal content and their phenomenal character (Dreyfus 2011: 123; Coseru 2012: ch 8). Additional proposals range from memory-based accounts (Thompson 2011) to enactivist and performative accounts of selfawareness (MacKenzie 2011) that argue for some minimal self as the pre-linguistic structure of lived experience. III. Mineness without the Self It is more likely, however, that the early Buddhist tradition is characterized primarily by an attempt to break free both from the speculative notion of an ultimate, immutable and eternal self and, at the same time, from the notion of a concrete psychological or biographical self (Hulin 1978: 43). As I have argued elsewhere (Coseru 2009), the frequent use of indexicals such as 'I' (aha1fl) and 'mine' (mama) should not be taken as indicative of the view that the Buddha accepts the conventional reality of persons. Indeed, later Buddhist traditions develop specific notions, such as that of mindstream, life-continuum mind, and repository consciousness (citta-santiina, bhavanga-citta, and iilaya-vijftiina, respectively) precisely in order to avoid not only the trappings of metaphysical notions of the self but also the view that such notions might have a fixed referent.5 The denial of a permanent self, as well as the refusal to treat persons as referring to anything real and permanent, does not, however, extend to consciousness, whose temporal and horizon structures make possible reflective or introspective thought. The centrality of the no-self doctrine in Buddhist thought is explained on the basis of its pragmatic role in guiding the adept on the path to enlightenment. Furthermore, the no-self doctrine provides a justification for treating endurance, Presence of Mind: Consciousness and the Sense of Self 55 independence, and self-subsistence as neither desirable nor attainable, but rather as what they are: mistaken notions resulting from the habitual tendency to construct a substantive identity from a stream of psychophysical phenomena. Now, how exactly a person without a self lives a good and meaningful life, and makes progress along the path to awakening is, of course, deliciously puzzling. This Buddhist claim that our sense of self is imputed and our attribution of inherent existence to it habitually acquired,6 is not that different, of course, from Hume's claim that a self is never apprehended in the mental series.7 The Buddhist, much like Hume, is a bundle theorist, the first such theorist. The routine misapprehension of the discrete phenomena of experience as a self leads to a dualistic perspective: things appear and are categorized as either objective (thus external, but empirically accessible) or as subjective (thus internal, and immediately accessible to consciousness). Puzzled by this dualistic outlook, we cope by constructing a conception of the self as the permanent locus of experience. What we are left with, then, is the picture of a constantly changing world of sensory phenomena in which there are no independent entities, only textures or clusters of sensory impressions that constitute the content of conscious awareness. In this fluctuating world of minimally sensory awareness entities exist only as aggregated phenomena of experience. But this phenomenality is not simply the experiential counterpart of corresponding physical objects and functions, for what lies outside the sphere of perception is always already constituted by the dynamic structures of our cognitive architecture.8 The world as perceived is brought into existence through the activity of the senses and goes out of existence with the cessation of sensory activity. This phenomenal realm is not an objective world that exists over and above its intersubjective apprehension, for such a world, devoid of any reference to subjects of experience, is not within the purview of empirical awareness. Now, Buddhist Abhidharma philosophers do not deny the reality of the constitutive elements of existence and/ or 56 Problem of the Self Consciousness, Subjectivity and the Other experience (dharmas). Rather, the suggestion is simply that we cannot properly discern between the phenomenal character and content of experience if consciousness is not taken to have a specific kind of structure. That structure or schema is most apparent in the dual nature of empirical awareness: indeed, the body, as an instrument (kara1J.a) of perceptual activity, is both the medium of contact with the world and the world with which it comes in contact. As I have argued elsewhere (Coseru 2012: ch. 3), such a view finds an interesting parallel in Husserl's account of the paradoxical nature of the body as revealed through phenomenological reduction. For Husserl, phenomenological reduction (epoche)-essentially a method of bracketing ontological assumptions about the natural world in order to examine the intentional structures of consciousness-reveals the two-fold appearance of the body, first as a biological entity (Korper) connected to the continuum of life, and second as a medium for the expression of life (Leib). The body is thus the locus of lived experience and, as such, has the capacity for both exploration and receptivity. This intuition about the dual nature of embodied awareness (as locus of lived experience) discloses a world of lived experience whose boundaries are not fixed but constantly shifting in relation to the desires, actions, and attitudes of an agent (Husserl 1970: Part III: A). The world or, better still, the environment that I inhabit is not just a structured domain of causally nested objects and relations but also a meaningful world of experience. The question that both Buddhist philosophers and contemporary philosophers interested in phenomenal consciousness must address is whether intentional experiencesof the sort that disclose a world as pre-reflectively but meaningfully given-presuppose that consciousness itself, as the disclosing medium, is a knowable object. My claim is that we cannot answer this question in the affirmative: consciousness is not diachronically (or inferentially) known by a subsequent instance of cognitive awareness but rather is inherently self-aware, even if only minimally so. Though we may intend a previous moment of conscious awareness in introspection, this retrospective Presence of Mind: Consciousness and the Sense of Self 57 apprehension of consciousness as an object cannot be its essential feature. Presence and reflexivity capture at the most basic level what it is like to be in a world whose boundaries are not fixed but constantly changing as the stream of consciousness follows its course. As one of the earliest proponents of what has come to be known as the active perception theory, Merleau-Ponty writes, "I cannot understand the function of living body,-except by enacting it myself" for "my body appears to me as an attitude with a view to a certain actual or possible task" (Merleau-Ponty 2002: 87, 114). What is the best or most effective way of merging this phenomenological account of temporality and disclosure with the subject of experience, the elusive domain where experience presumably takes place? In a recent take on the debate over whether presence is basic and effortless, a kind of readiness-to-hand, or, on the contrary, something that has to be achieved, making explicit what was hitherto unthought and thus absent, Alva Noe (2012: 10) writes : " ... presence does not come for free. We achieve presence. We act it out... [T]his does not mean that our attitude is that of a stranger in a strange land, and that we must always strive to bring the world into focus." Noe faults existential phenomenologists like Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Hubert Dreyfus for presenting us with a distorted picture of presence . According to one version of this picture, presence stands for deliberate and effortful engagement with the world, and thus for thoughtful as opposed to unthinking attunement. Against the prevailing legacies of intellectualism and empiricism, what is sought is not thematized thought but the unthematized, absorbed coping of the readiness-to-hand of the door knob, the remote control or any other piece of equipment. Noe thinks something has gone amiss here: the problem is not that absence better captures the implicit character of our habitual practices but rather that the ways of presence have not been properly explored. Now, if experience is a kind of presenting, the contents of which become available for interpretation and understanding only on a subsequent move, then Noe is not entirely right that 58 Problem of the Self Consciousness, Subjectivity and the Other presence does not come for free. If, on the other hand, conscious experience is the product of a long and complex process of skill acquisition that opens up to a domain of objects, situations, and events (rather than, say, to a world simpliciter), then there is no pristine encounter and our attitude can never be that "of a stranger in a strange land." Recall the early account I gave of what it might be like to be a traveller to an unfamiliar destination. First of all, no destination, no matter how faraway and exotic, is upon arrival entirely unfamiliar. It cannot be, for the journey itself is an opening toward, and getting accustomed to, the unexpected. Journeying to a distant land is a lot like dwelling in anticipation for the arrival of an unknown guest: it alters the perception of one's surroundings and it invites circumspection. We are strangers in a strange land every time we let this body that is better informed, indeed, than we are about its dispositions and its surroundings fill us in about what is going on. One must choose one's examples carefully if one wants to get presence right. Noe uses the phenomenon of reading to make his case that presence is a kind of achie vement. We don 't pay attention to words and letters when we read. Rather, what makes reading possible is the possession of a complicated set of skills, including but not limited to, such as the capacity to recognize symbols, to interpret , remember and anticipate. Reading takes place in a language the cultural and communicational norms of which affect how and what one reads , and what for. And while the phenomenon of reading provides a good illustration of how Noe wants us to think of presence, it does little to advance the case that we can never be strangers in a strange land, and that experience can never disclose a wholly unfamiliar world . But travelling is not like reading, unless one takes travelling to be a slow progression through the book of life. At most it is like reading in a foreign language one is yet to master fully. There are always blocks and slippages, half-meanings and guesses. Even in one's native tongue reading is not like reading in this high achieving sort of way that Noe has in mind. Ask any poet. Presence of Mind: Consciousness and the Sense of Self 59 IV. Conclusion: Co-constitutive Emergence Can Buddhist reductionism about persons be reconciled with an analysis of the phenomenal character of consciousness? From a philosophical standpoint, the progressive move towards an analysis of consciousness in terms of its ineliminable phenomenological features championed by thinkers like Dignaga, Dharmakirti and their successors, can be conceivably claimed as an effort at effecting precisely such reconciliation. That we must and should identify those irreducible elements of experience (sensations, volitions, dispositions, patterns of habituation, etc) that any analysis of phenomenal consciousness can reveal does not mean, however, that there could be unintended consequences to this process of reductive analysis. Although we may debate whether or not the Buddhist phenomenological project is informed by certain metaphysical assumptions about the nature of reality, specifically the assumption that the entities that populate our world do not endure for any length of time, there is no denying that momentariness is taken not only as a principle of the nature of reality, but also (and more significantly) of cognitive awareness itself. The awareness that arises in conjunction with the activity of a given perception, thought or desire is itself impermanent and momentary: visual awareness and visual object, for instance, are both events within a mental stream of continuing relations. The question that Buddhist philosophers confront is precisely what accounts for the sense of presence that accompanies these cognitive series. In other words, if discrete, episodic cognitive events are all that constitutes the mental domain, how does appropriation and grasping, for instance, occur? I have in mind here specifically the basic mode of givenness of our experience. Some causal account is on offer. But the causal account, it seems, gives only an incomplete picture of the mental, for even as the Sanskrit term for cognitive awareness, vijniina, conveys the sense of differentiation and discernment, it is not exactly clear how such discernment also sorts between the prereflective and reflective aspects of experience. Indeed, consciousness is not merely a faculty for discerning and sorting through the constitutive elements of experience, but 60 Problem of the Self Consciousness, Subjectivity and the Other is itself an event in a series of interdependent causal and conditional factors. Thus, while the generic Buddhist viewpoint is that there is no such thing as a self as the agent of experience, for at least one group of Buddhists, generally associated with the logico-epistemological school of Dignaga and Dharmakirti, an adequate account of phenomenal consciousness cannot dispense with a minimal sense of presence. These Buddhist epistemologists are concerned, much like Brentano, Husserl, and many contemporary philosophers working on phenomenal consciousness, not with how things, including mental states, are judged to be (without any reference to their mode of presentation) but with how things show up to us, with the phenomena of experience just as they appear to us before we set out to reflect and theorize about them. The picture they present roughly corresponds to what some have termed non-reductive "one-level theories of consciousness": that is, theories which propose that consciousness is essentially a matter of having or being an awareness of a world that does not require a prior (representational) awareness of our own mental states.9 If experience is perspectivally given, it has both phenomenal salience and epistemological grounding. Reflexivism, thus, serves as a grounding principle, enabling the intentional and subjective aspects of experience to emerge co-constitutively and simultaneously. Can such a principle provide enough metaphysical support for I-thoughts of the sort "I am in pain," given the requirement of a criterion for individuating such thoughts in the mental stream? Do such self-ascriptions require independent criteria for individuating streams of subjectivity or can they occur solely on the basis of features that are intrinsic to each mental state? If reflexivity has a distinctive character, a specific givenness or for-me-ness, then mis-ascriptions are unintelligible if we assume that thought is transparent with regard to its occurrent for-me-ness. This first-personal givenness of experience is unmistaken. Indeed, mental states do not just arise in a mental stream: rather, they arise as having a distinctive intentional content and phenomenal character. Reflexivism then becomes a statement about the self-presentational character of Presence of Mind: Consciousness and the Sense of Self 61 mental states: there are simply no such generic experiences of seeing or judging a particular state of affairs. Rather, there is experiential or reflexive awareness of occurrent perceptual or conceptual mental states. To postulate a basis for reflexivity outside the structure of experience is to mistakenly assume that experience is an emergent property of something that, while not itself experiential, has the functional organization to support such experiential self-ascriptions. We do strive to bring the world into focus and we do ourselves show up in an effortful way: by walking, turning, and adjusting our posture and gaze. But it is this implicit and non-reflective awareness that lets new elements effortlessly enter our horizon while others fade away. It may seem natural to think of experience in representational terms or in terms of relations of logical entailment. However, all too often such accounts of experience obscure the fact that the operations of representation and logical entailment are not primitive. Experience is not about representing facts or establishing logical and metaphysical truths, but about acquiring, perfecting, and transmitting practical knowledge and skills. NOTES 1. These are the so-called five skandhas, known as the aggregates of existence and/ or experience. For details, see Coseru (2012 ch. 3). 2. Extensive discussions of these classical debates are found in Williams (1998), Garfield (2006), Dreyfus (2007), MacKenzie (2007), Kellner (2010, 2011), Chadha (2011), Arnold (2010), Coseru (2012), and Ganeri (2012). 3. This is a claim principally made by Prinz (2011). 4. For Vasubandhu' s discussion of smiti see the Abhidharmakosabhacya II 24.5 (in Shastri 1970: 187). See also Jaini (2001) and Gethin (1998, 2011) for detailed discussions of the phenomenology of smiti. 5. Extensive critiques of the attempt to find support in the canonical literature for the existence of a higher self, perhaps equated with consciousness, are found in Warder (1970), Collins (1982), Kalupahana (1987), Harvey (1995), and De Silva (2005). Vasubandhu's Pudgala-praticedha-prakaratJa ("Treatise on the Negation of the Person") provides one of most detailed Buddhist critiques of the personalist view. 6. Cf. Sa:q,.yutta Nikaya IV, 102 (Feer 1975-2006); Majjhima Nikaya I, 130 (Chalmers 1994). 62 Problem of the Self Consciousness, Subjectivity and the Other 7. The parallelism between the Buddhist and Humean reductive analyses of the self is explored at some length in Giles (1993), Tillemans (1996), and Kapstein (2001). 8. It is this analysis of the content of experience that leads the abhidharmikas to the notion of 'cognitive aspects' (iikiira), which represent the particular mode of presentation of the contents of one's experience. For an account of the aspectual nature of cognition, specifically of perception, in the Abhidharma literature, see Dhammajoti (2007). 9. See Thomasson (2008). One level-theories of consciousness oppose higher order thought theories, which postulate that conscious of phenomenal states are essentially those states of which we are immediately aware. REFERENCES Arnold, D. 2010. "Self-Awareness (Svasaf!1vitti) and Related Doctrines of Buddhists Following Dinnaga: Philosophical Characterizations of Some of the Main Issues." Journal of Indian Philosophy 38: 3. Bayne, T. and Montague, M . 2011. "Cognitive Phenomenology: An Introduction," in Cognitive Phenomenology, edited by T. Bayne and M. Montague. Oxford : Oxford University Press . Bhattacharya, K. 1973. L'iitman-Brahman dans le bouddhisme ancien. Paris: icole FranAaise d 'Extrime Orient. Carman, T. 2005. "On the Inescapability of Phenomenology." In Smith , D.W . and Thomasson, AL. (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University of Press, 67-89. -- . 2007. "Dennett on Seeming," Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6: 99-106 . Chadha, Monima. 2011. "Self-awareness: Eliminating the Myth of the 'Invisible Subject', " Philosophy East and West 61 (3): 453--467. Chalmers, David J. 2003. "The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief". In Consciousness : New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press. Chalmers, Robert.1994. The Majjhima-Nikaya. Oxford: Pali Text Society. Clark, A. 2006. "That Lonesome Whistle: A Puz zle for the Sensorimotor Model of Perceptual Experience, " Analysis 66(1): 22-25. ---. 2004. "The Representational Character of Experience ". In The Future for Philosophy, edited by Brian Leiter. 153-181. Collins, Steven. 1982. Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravada Buddhism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Coseru, C. 2009. "Mind in Indian Buddhist Philosophy," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition), edited by Edward Presence of Mind: Consciousness and the Sense of Self 63 N. Zalta. http:/ /plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-indian- buddhism/. ___ C. 2012. Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. Dennett, D. 2005. "What Do You Believe Is True Even Though You Cannot Yet Prove It?," Edge World Question Center, ed. by John Brockman. De Silva, Padmasiri. 2005. An Introduction to Buddhist Psychology. 4th ed. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Dreyfus, Georges. 2011. "Self and Subjectivity: A Middle Way Approach." In Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson, and Dan Zahavi, Self, No-Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 114-156. Dhammajoti, K.L. 2007. "iikara and Direct Perception." Pacific World Journal 3 (9): 245-272. Feer, L. 1975-2006. Samyutta Nikaya. Pali Text Society, London: Oxford University Press. Ganeri, Jonardon. 2012. The Self Consciousness, Intentionality, and the First-Person Stance. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2006. "The Conventional Status of Reflexive Awareness: What's at Stake in a Tibetan Debate?" Philosophy East and West 56 (2): 201-228. Giles, J. 1993. "The No-Self Theory: Hume, Buddhism and Personal Identity." Philosophy East and West 43 (2): 175-200. Harvey, Peter. 1995. The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and NirviiJJ.a in Early Buddhism. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press. Huemer, Michael. 2005. Ethical Intuitionism. Palgrave Macrnillian. Hulin, M. 1978. Le Principe de l'ego dans la pens.e indienne classique: La Notion d'aha,rikiira. Publication de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne. Paris: Diffusion E. de Boccard. Husserl, E. 1970. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Translated by David Carr. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. Jaini, Padmanabh S. 2001. "Smrti in the Abhidharma Literature and the Development of Buddhist Accounts of Memory of the Past." In In the Mirror of Memory, edited by Janet Gyatso, 47-60. Albany: SUNY. Kalupahana, D. 1987. The Principles of Buddhist Psychology. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press. Kapstein, Matthew. 2001. Reason's Traces: Identity and Interpretation in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Thought. Somerville, Mass.: Wisdom. 64 Problem of the Self Consciousness, Subjectivity and the Other Kellner, Birgit. 2010. "Self-Awareness (Svasanvedana) in Dinnaga' Pramar;samuccaya nd -v{tti: A Close Reading ." Journal of Indian Philosophy 38: 203-231. ___ .2011. "Self-awareness (SvasaCvedana) and Infinite Regresses: A Comparison of Arguments by Dinnaga and Dharmakirti." Journal of Indian Philosophy 39 (4 5): 411-426. Kelly, S.D. 2008. "Content and Constancy: Phenomenology, Psychology, and the Content of Perception." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76 (3): 682-690. MacKenzie , M. 2011. "Enacting the Self: Buddhist and Enactivist Approaches to the Emergence of the Self." In Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson, and Dan Zahavi, Self, No-Self ? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 239-273 . Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962. Phenomenology of Perception, (tr.) C. Smith. London: Routledge. Noe, A. 2012. Varieties of Experience. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pitt, David. 2004. "The Phenomenology of Cognition, or, What is It Like to Think That P?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69: 1-36. Pryor, James. 2000. "The Skeptic and the Dogmatist". Nous, 34:4, 517549. --. 2004. "What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?" Philosophical Issues 14: 349-378. Siewert, C. 1998. The Significance of Consciousness, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Smithies , Declan, 2011. "What is the Role of Consciousness in Demonstrative Thought?" The Journal of Philosophy, 108.1: 5-34, 2011. Thomasson, Amie. L. 2008. "Phenomenal Consciousness and the Phenomenal World." The Monist, 91 (2): 191-214. Tillemans, T. 1996. "What Would It Be Like to be Selfless? Hinayanist Versions, Mahayanist Versions and Derek Parfit." 'itudes Asiatiques I Asiatische Studien 50 (4): 835-852 . Williams, P. 1998. The Refl exive Nature of Awareness. London: Curzon Pres s. Zahavi, Dan and Uriah Kriegel. 2015. Philosophy of Mind and Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches, edited by D.O. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou and W. Hopp. London: Routledge, forthcoming.

VOLUME 5 NUMÉRO 1 PRINTEMPS/SPRING 2010 LA REVUE DU CREUM LES ATELIERS DE L'ÉTHIQUE IS SN 17 18 -9 97 7 NOTE AUX AUTEURS Un article doit compter de 10 à 20 pages environ, simple interligne (Times New Roman 12). Les notes doivent être placées en fin de texte. L'article doit inclure un résumé d'au plus 200 mots en français et en anglais. Les articles seront évalués de manière anonyme par deux pairs du comité éditorial. Les consignes aux auteurs se retrouvent sur le site de la revue (www.creum.umontreal.ca/ateliers). Tout article ne s'y conformant pas sera automatiquement refusé. GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS Papers should be between 10 and 20 pages, single spaced (Times New Roman 12). Notes should be placed at the end of the text. An abstract in English and French of no more than 200 words must be inserted at the beginning of the text. Articles are anonymously peer-reviewed by members of the editorial committee. Instructions to authors are available on the journal website (www.creum.umontreal.ca/ateliers). Papers not following these will be automatically rejected. Vous êtes libres de reproduire, distribuer et communiquer les textes de cette revue au public selon les conditions suivantes : • Vous devez citer le nom de l'auteur et de la revue • Vous ne pouvez pas utiliser les textes à des fins commerciales • Vous ne pouvez pas modifier, transformer ou adapter les textes Pour tous les détails, veuillez vous référer à l'adresse suivante : http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/legalcode You are free to copy and distribute all texts of this journal under the following conditions: • You must cite the author of the text and the name of the journal • You may not use this work for commercial purposes • You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work For all details please refer to the following address: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/legalcode VOLUME 5 NUMÉRO 1 PRINTEMPS/SPRING 2010 UNE REVUE MULTIDISCIPLINAIRE SUR LES ENJEUX NORMATIFS DES POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES ET DES PRATIQUES SOCIALES. A MULTIDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL ON THE NORMATIVE CHALLENGES OF PUBLIC POLICIES AND SOCIAL PRACTICES. 2 COMITÉ ÉDITORIAL/EDITORIAL COMMITTEE Rédacteur en chef/Editor: Daniel Marc Weinstock, CRÉUM Coordonnateur de rédaction/Administrative Editor: Martin Blanchard, CRÉUM ([email protected]) COMITÉ EXÉCUTIF DE RÉDACTEURS / EXECUTIVE EDITORS COMITÉ D'EXPERTS / BOARD OF REFEREES: Éthique fondamentale : Christine Tappolet, CRÉUM Éthique et politique : Daniel Marc Weinstock, CRÉUM Éthique et santé : Bryn Williams-Jones, CRÉUM Éthique et économie : Peter Dietsch, CRÉUM Charles Blattberg, CRÉUM Rabah Bousbaci, CRÉUM Ryoa Chung, CRÉUM Francis Dupuis-Déri, Université du Québec à Montréal Geneviève Fuji Johnson, Université Simon Fraser Axel Gosseries, Université de Louvain-la-Neuve Béatrice Godard, CRÉUM Joseph Heath, Université de Toronto Mira Johri, CRÉUM Julie Lavigne, Université du Québec à Montréal Robert Leckey, Université McGill Christian Nadeau, CRÉUM Wayne Norman, CRÉUM Luc Tremblay, CRÉUM ISSN 1718-9977 VOLUME 5 NUMÉRO 1 PRINTEMPS/SPRING 2010 TABLE DES MATIÈRES TABLE OF CONTENTS 3 4-22 LA MORALITÉ IMPLICITE DU MARCHÉ .....................................................................................Pierre-Yves Néron DOSSIER : IMAGINATION ET ÉTHIQUE 23-25 INTRODUCTION Les vertus de l'imagination..................................................................Christine Tappolet 26-33 IMAGINING EVIL ............................................................................................................................Adam Morton 34-49 IMAGINING OTHERS ..................................................................................................................Heidi L. Maibom 50-65 L'IMAGINATION ET LES BIAIS DE L'EMPATHIE ..............................................Martin Gibert et Morgane Paris 66-82 FAUSSETÉS IMAGINAIRES................................................................................................................Yvan Tétreault 83-100 LE MÉDECIN-ÉCRIVAIN, L'ÉTHIQUE ET L'IMAGINAIRE .....................................................................Marc Zaffran DOSSIER : L'ÉTHIQUE ET L'IMPACT DES POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES SUR LA SANTÉ 101-104 INTRODUCTION POURQUOI L'ÉTHIQUE DE LA SANTÉ PUBLIQUE DEVRAIT-ELLE S'INTÉRESSER À L'IMPACT DES POLITIQUES PUBLIQUES SUR LA SANTÉ ?...................................................................Michel Désy 105-118 THE POLITICAL ETHICS OF HEALTH .............................................................................................Daniel Weinstock 119-130 ALLERGIES AND ASTHMA: EMPLOYING PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL JUSTICE AS A GUIDE IN PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY DEVELOPMENT .....................................................................................................Jason Behrmann 131-139 AUTONOMY PROMOTION IN A MULTIETHNIC CONTEXT: REFLECTIONS ON SOME NORMATIVE ISSUES ......Michel Désy 140-155 DE L'INCITATION À LA MUTUALISATION : POURQUOI TAXER? ...........................................................Xavier Landes 156-169 MANAGING ANTIMICROBIAL RESISTANCE IN FOOD PRODUCTION: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND POLITICS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH POLICY..............Bryn Williams-Jones et Béatrice Doizé RÉSUMÉ Cet article évalue, du point de vue moral, les justifications possibles pour le recours à la taxation en vue de promouvoir des comportements « sains ». L'objectif est de démontrer qu'un tel instrument recevrait une meilleure justification, c'est-à-dire plus en accord avec des principes égalitariens respectueux de la liberté individuelle, s'ils s'inscrivaient dans une logique de mutualisation. Pour ce faire, les arguments du bien-être individuel et de l'efficience sociale sont discutés afin d'en pointer les fécondités et limites. Au travers de leurs limites, ces arguments introduisent naturellement à une troisième manière d'appréhender le problème, sous l'angle de la mutualisation. Ce principe représente moins une remise en cause radicale des arguments précédents qu'une reformulation du recours à l'efficience sociale et une limitation du champ d'application des appels au bien-être individuel. Il repose sur deux idées. La première est que la référence à une notion de responsabilité, même affadie, est nécessaire. De plus, celle-ci doit être conçue comme partagée entre producteurs et consommateurs ainsi que limitée au domaine financier. La seconde est que la mutualisation ne peut être déconnectée d'intuitions égalitariennes formulées de manière générale. SUMMARY This article assesses, from the moral point of view, the possible justifications in the recourse to taxation for promoting "healthy" behavior. The objective is to demonstrate that such an instrument would receive a better justification, i.e. more in tune with egalitarian principles respectful of individual freedom, if it expressed a logic of mutualisation. In that light, arguments pertaining to individual well-being and social efficiency are discussed in order to point out their effectiveness and limitations. Through their limitations, they naturally introduce a third way to apprehend the problem, in terms of mutualisation. This latter principle is less a radical questioning of precedent arguments than a reformulation of the efficiency notion and a restriction of the scope of claims to individual well-being. It is based on two ideas. The first is that the reference to a notion of responsibility, even a mild one, is necessary. Furthermore, this responsibility should be conceived as being shared between producers and consumers, and should also be limited to the financial domain. The second is that mutualisation cannot be disconnected from general egalitarian intuitions. VOLUME 5 NUMÉRO 1 PRINTEMPS/SPRING 2010 DE L'INCITATION À LA MUTUALISATION : POURQUOI TAXER1 ? XAVIER LANDES CENTRE FOR ETHICS, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO 140 Article : 140 ! 151 Notes : 152 ! 153 Bibliographie : 154 ! 155 Dans la plupart des pays confrontés à des défis de santé publique tels des taux élevés d'accidents cardiovasculaires ou une obésité galopante (notamment infantile), le thème de la taxation des produits de consommation associés à ces « pathologies » (les produits riches en gras, en sel, etc.) est récurrent dans les débats publics2. Accompagnée d'autres recommandations (encadrement de la publicité, campagnes d'information, etc.), elle représente un outil incontournable en vue de la promotion des comportements « sains ». L'Organisation mondiale de la santé s'est saisie de la question à plusieurs reprises3. En 2004, elle recommandait de réorienter les politiques fiscales afin de modifier le prix des biens au travers de trois mécanismes : les taxes, les subventions et l'encadrement des prix. Avant d'aller plus loin, notons que cet article concerne les incitatifs de type monétaire de forme négative (taxation) appliqués aux consommateurs4. Trois raisons justifient ce choix. La première tient dans la popularité du thème. Il n'y a pas une proposition, un rapport ou une discussion sur la « malbouffe » et le tabagisme qui ne l'évoque. La seconde est que la plupart des autres catégories d'intervention sont plus ou moins éloignées de l'incitation, définie comme une action visant à favoriser un comportement sans essayer de modifier les préférences de manière directe5. Par exemple, au travers d'une meilleure éducation des enfants, on n'incite pas, on tente d'altérer la structure, voire la nature, de leurs préférences. En interdisant un produit de consommation, on n'incite pas davantage, car il s'agit ici de prohibition. Troisièmement, se focaliser sur la taxation permet de révéler des tensions à l'oeuvre dans sa justification. Ce texte s'emploie à démontrer que l'incitation ne forme peut-être pas le meilleur argument en faveur de la taxation. En tout cas, elle ne peut se suffire à elle-même. Il est possible d'en défendre le principe en invoquant une justification qui paraît plus solide : la mutualisation des risques et des coûts de santé. L'intention de cet article est de soutenir le principe général d'une taxation de certains choix de vie qui dépasse la simple incitation, au motif que cette dernière ne couvre qu'une partie, pas la plus essentielle, des débats publics. Lorsqu'il est question de santé, surtout de la manière dont les institutions gèrent ces risques sur le mode de la mutualisation, il existe d'autres priorités politiques. En particulier, la résilience du système en tant que structure assurantielle ainsi que les considérations ayant trait aux performances égalitariennes de la société dans son ensemble modifient le domaine de la réflexion. Cette inflexion de perspective est reflétée dans la division tripartite de l'article. La première section se concentre sur l'argument le plus courant en faveur de l'incitation par la taxation, celui du bienêtre individuel. Il s'agit selon cet argument d'altérer le comportement des individus dans le sens de leurs intérêts. Séduisant de prime abord, l'argument peut prendre la forme d'un paternalisme allié à un perfectionnisme qui suscite quelques réserves. La première partie présente certaines de ces réserves qui conduisent néanmoins à accepter, dans des cas précis et sous certaines conditions, le recours à des formes modérées de paternalisme. Cependant, ces cas ne touchant pas directement à la taxation, la fécondité d'une telle démarche ne sera pas approfondie. La seconde section aborde les justifications qui mobilisent la notion d'efficience sociale. L'idée centrale est que si les institutions sont légitimes à tenter de modifier les comportements par la taxation, ce n'est pas tant pour le bien des individus, mais du fait des coûts sociaux que de tels comportements engendrent. En d'autres termes, la société dans son ensemble serait mieux lotie si les individus réduisaient, par exemple, leur consommation de produits riches en gras. En dépit des réserves que l'invocation de l'efficience sociale suscite, il n'en demeure pas moins qu'elle soulève la question essentielle de l'efficacité de tout arrangement social en fonction des objectifs qui sont les siens. Dans cette perspective, la troisième section s'emploie à amender la justification en termes d'efficience en restreignant son champ tout en incluant quelques intuitions égalitariennes. Le but est de démontrer, par l'application de ces dernières, que se limiter à appréhender les taxes sous l'angle de l'incitation n'est pas entièrement satisfaisant sur le plan normatif. Il peut alors être intéressant d'invoquer un argument différent : la taxation comme manifestation de relations assurantielles. Le principe sous-jacent, qui stipule que les individus contractent des obligations réciproques lorsqu'ils font face collectivement à un certain nombre de risques, suscite des réflexions dans deux directions : le degré de responsabilité individuelle et la modulation égalitarienne devant accompagner toute taxation. Pour clore cette introduction, mentionnons que si toute analyse exhaustive sur le sujet doit se pencher sur le degré de responsabilité des producteurs, part essentielle du mécanisme assurantielle, l'article se concentre sur le versant des consommateurs afin de tirer les implications normatives de la préséance du thème de la taxation des 141 L E S A T E L I E R S D E L ' É T H I Q U E ! V . 5 N . 1 ! P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G 2 0 1 0 consommateurs dans les débats. Cela ne doit toutefois pas amoindrir la portée ainsi que l'importance d'une inclusion de l'imputabilité des producteurs quant aux problèmes de santé liés, dans le cas d'espèce, à la malbouffe ou au tabagisme. En ce sens, ce qui suit doit être compris comme une partie, importante certes, mais parcellaire, d'une problématique plus large : les dimensions éthiques du partage de la responsabilité financière dans le domaine des risques de santé. BIEN-ÊTRE INDIVIDUEL L'une des justifications les plus courantes en faveur de la taxation est l'altération des comportements des individus pour leur propre bien. L'argument n'a rien d'exceptionnel en soi. Rares sont les institutions qui ne visent pas à favoriser, handicaper ou dissuader des choix de vie spécifiques. Dans la plupart des cas, la régulation est justifiée par le principe millien de dommage à autrui6. Toutefois, les situations qui nous préoccupent sont à première vue différentes. Leur particularité tient à l'absence, en règle générale, d'un dommage direct à un tiers. Les institutions interviennent donc, non pour restreindre des interférences abusives d'individus dans l'existence d'autrui, mais pour limiter des préjudices qu'ils sont susceptibles de s'infliger. Une telle justification se déploie en deux temps. Elle repose sur l'idée que les institutions possèdent un droit moral à : (1) définir ce qu'est une vie bonne (le présupposé étant qu'elles sont capables d'identifier ce qu'est un comportement « sain ») ; (2) altérer les comportements des individus afin qu'ils se rapprochent de cet idéal. La prémisse (1) correspond à une affirmation de type perfectionniste, tandis que (2) possède une coloration paternaliste. Il est important d'évaluer tout d'abord (1). Perfectionnisme et respect Il est possible d'objecter à cette prémisse que, du fait du « pluralisme des valeurs », en particulier dans les sociétés qui le favorisent (ou ne tentent pas de le supprimer), il est suspect d'ériger un mode de vie particulier (ou des tronçons de celui-ci) en règle de conduite censée valoir pour tous7. Car agir de manière différente revient à prendre position sur la question de ce qu'est une vie bonne. De plus, les institutions rendent alors des plans de vie, qui ont été choisis en pleine connaissance de cause, plus difficiles à réaliser. Une manière de répondre à cette critique est de souligner le caractère objectif des comportements promus8. Il est indéniable que fumer accroît les risques de cancer et que consommer des gras saturés en excès augmente les probabilités d'accidents cardio-vasculaires. Dès lors, la taxation traduit le souci des institutions à l'égard du bien-être des citoyens. Il peut toutefois être objecté qu'il n'est question que de profils statistiques, une multitude d'autres facteurs venant se loger dans la relation de causalité. Comme l'ont démontré les recherches dans le domaine des déterminants sociaux de la santé, l'environnement, les conditions socioéconomiques, le patrimoine génétique ainsi que le statut social jouent un rôle important9. Si fumer ou manger gras n'est pas « bon », c'est plus mauvais pour certains individus que pour d'autres. Dès lors, appliquer des taxes à grande échelle sur une population donnée qui ne partage qu'un facteur, important certes, mais parmi d'autres, peut être considéré comme injustifié, voire représenter une forme d'injustice10. L'objection peut se poursuivre en arguant que la variabilité de l'impact individuel ne se limite pas aux comportements « malsains ». Elle est également vérifiée pour ceux qui sont jugés « sains ». (Dans ce cas, il est tout aussi problématique d'inciter par la subvention que par la taxation.) Par exemple, faire du sport plusieurs fois par semaine est un facteur de risque non négligeable. Des pathologies sont liées aux activités sportives, dont certaines peuvent se révéler, à long terme, handicapantes. Pensons aux effets de la boxe sur le développement de troubles neurologiques ou à l'impact du football européen sur les articulations des membres inférieurs11. Par ailleurs, il semblerait qu'une pratique sportive excédant huit heures par semaine soit corrélée avec la prise de drogues et de médicaments (somnifères et anxiolytiques)12. Enfin, des comportements « sains » combinés à des comportements « malsains » peuvent se révéler plus préjudiciables à terme pour la personne concernée que si elle avait tout simplement conservé les seconds dans les domaines considérés sans chercher à les modifier. En guise d'illustration, faire du sport est considéré comme un bien. Il devrait en découler que faire du sport et fumer est toujours mieux que fumer et s'abstenir de toute activité physique. Même si les données manquent, il est probable qu'un sportif qui fume de manière conséquente ait des probabilités plus élevées d'accident cardiovasculaire qu'un fumeur qui ne se dépense pas. L'intention ici est d'interroger ce qui est considéré, de manière intuitive, tomber dans la catégorie des comportements « sains ». L'image n'est pas aussi nette qu'elle se présente de prime abord13. 142 L E S A T E L I E R S D E L ' É T H I Q U E ! V . 5 N . 1 ! P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G 2 0 1 0 L'impact réel des habitudes et pratiques dépend de nombreux facteurs et de leur interaction. Au final, leur caractère bénéfique ne peut se déterminer qu'en considérant chaque cas individuel comme à la jonction d'un réseau de déterminants (environnementaux, génétiques, socioéconomiques, etc.) et de décisions. Même si des tendances lourdes sont observables, ces interactions varient d'un individu à un autre. La tentation est alors d'empiler les attitudes « saines », aboutissant à faire de l'individu en parfaite santé (c'est-à-dire, qui en cumulerait toutes les caractéristiques) le modèle à promouvoir. De la sorte, l'illusion se diffuse qu'il est possible d'amoindrir l'incidence des effets pervers découlant des contradictions entre comportements « sains » et « malsains » par l'éradication des seconds. Il est évident que le « comportement parfaitement sain » fait sens dans l'absolu. Interdire (ou, au moins, dissuader) de fumer, boire de l'alcool, consommer de la nourriture grasse, riche en sel, en sucre peut apparaître totalement justifié. Néanmoins, le danger se fait jour de légitimer des politiques à coloration hygiéniste14. L'argument en faveur de l'incitation par la taxation pour des motifs relevant du bien-être se fonde sur le postulat que les institutions sont mieux placées que les individus pour identifier une vie bonne, ses constituants et expressions. Deux raisons peuvent donc conduire à rejeter cette prémisse. Premièrement, comme évoquée précédemment, même si elle est vraie sur le plan statistique, en rapport avec certains risques, l'image se trouble lorsqu'on considère l'individu en propre. La spécificité des situations possède un impact notable sur les conditions de santé. À mesure que le degré de précision descriptive quant à la vie « saine » s'accroît, la valeur prescriptive pour l'individu en propre diminue. Sur ce point, Richard Epstein rappelle que, plus que de comportements particuliers, tout est affaire de modération15. La santé serait moins affaire de bons comportements stricto sensu que d'une bonne intensité. Il est toujours possible de dénier ce passage du collectif à l'individuel en arguant que la promotion de la santé ne fait sens qu'au niveau populationnel, comme le soulignent Lawrence Gostin et Kieran Gostin16. Le but ne serait pas d'améliorer la situation des individus en propre, mais de catégories « à risque », ou de la population dans son ensemble. Le problème est que, en dépit de leur effort pour globaliser leur démarche, des auteurs comme Gostin et Gostin ne cessent de revenir à l'individu, traduisant de la sorte le fait incontournable que les politiques populationnelles visent, en dernier ressort, à améliorer le bien-être d'individus en propre. Tout en affirmant que la forme de paternalisme (perfectionniste par nature) qui a leur faveur ne se comprend pas d'autre manière que du fait qu'elle accroît le niveau général de santé, que rien hormis cela ne compte et qu'il convient alors d'envisager des limitations à la liberté individuelle en conséquence, ils invoquent en parallèle le fait qu'une bonne santé rend la vie des individus meilleure et améliore leur autonomie. Cette insistance prouve que l'argument populationnel n'est pas autosuffisant. Le paternalisme de type perfectionniste peine donc à répondre aux objections relatives à l'imposition de comportements sains sur le plan individuel, les contraintes qu'elle implique et, surtout, le manque de considération à l'égard des choix de vie qu'elle traduit. Ce défaut souligne le fait que les politiques publiques de santé, y compris en matière de taxation, ne peuvent faire l'économie de justifications qui se rapportent directement aux individus et respectent leur capacité à déterminer leur plan de vie. Ce qui entraine une seconde critique de nature morale. Il est difficile de contester aux individus la liberté d'adopter des comportements contraires à leur santé sur le long terme, à partir du moment où ils sont en mesure (en termes de capacité et de volonté) d'en assumer la responsabilité. À nouveau, tout est affaire de respect des citoyens appréhendés en tant qu'agents moraux. La critique n'aboutit toutefois pas à dénier aux institutions toute légitimité quant à la mise en place de politiques de santé publique, notamment de prévention. Elle questionne l'appel à des justifications qui peuvent se révéler problématiques en vertu d'un double standard : leur valeur intrinsèque et leurs conséquences. En démocratie, une attente légitime des citoyens vis-à-vis des institutions est qu'elles élaborent des politiques et offrent des raisons les moins controversées possible (considérant le pluralisme moral)17. Inciter des individus à modifier leurs comportements afin qu'ils adhèrent à une conception de la santé libellée en termes perfectionnistes pose quelques difficultés. À nouveau, cela ne signifie pas que le but ne pourrait pas être louable (rendre une gamme de comportements a priori « sains » plus accessibles). Même si l'on devait accepter la maximisation de la santé individuelle comme horizon des politiques publiques, il serait toujours possible de douter du fait que le langage du bien-être individuel puisse représenter la meilleure stratégie de justification possible. En effet, en vertu de la « contrainte d'endossement », le recours à des arguments de surplomb est potentielle143 L E S A T E L I E R S D E L ' É T H I Q U E ! V . 5 N . 1 ! P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G 2 0 1 0 ment contre-productif18. Un choix de vie est d'autant plus résilient qu'il résulte d'un processus interne au cours duquel l'individu se donne des raisons, les siennes, de maintenir ou réviser ses buts. Il s'agit de prendre cette légitimité au sérieux. Dans cette optique, les arguments qui invoquent le bien-être individuel prêtent le flanc à la critique lorsqu'ils s'enracinent dans une vision très précise du bienêtre imposée de l'extérieur sur une population dans son ensemble. Avant de considérer une version plus modérée du paternalisme, une dernière remarque s'impose. Force est de reconnaître que le recours au paternalisme perfectionniste demeure néanmoins valide dans quelques cas : celui des individus dont les capacités cognitives et décisionnelles sont profondément altérées (certaines personnes souffrant de pathologies lourdes ou âgées) ou insuffisamment développées (enfants). Il en va ainsi, car de telles personnes jouissent d'une autonomie partielle, ce qui peut les conduire à prendre des décisions allant à l'encontre de leurs intérêts les plus profonds. L'autorité parentale est justifiée de la sorte. Il en va de même pour les divers régimes de tutelle et curatelle sans que cela ne pose de problème moral particulier quant au fondement même de la démarche. Paternalisme libertarien et architecture du choix Dès lors, il convient de reprendre l'argumentaire présenté plus haut, selon lequel les institutions sont légitimes à (1) définir ce qu'est une vie bonne, le présupposé étant qu'elles sont capables d'identifier un comportement « sain », et (2) altérer certains comportements afin qu'ils se rapprochent de cet idéal. Le problème évoqué lors de la section précédente résidait dans la possibilité de fonder (2) sur (1). Toutefois, il est toujours possible de justifier (2) sans faire appel à (1), comme le font les approches paternalistes plus modérées que celle évoquée plus haut et qui effacent toute référence à un quelconque idéal. Pour ces approches qualifiées de « douces » ou « libertariennes », il n'est plus question de se substituer au jugement individuel quant à ce qui a (ou devrait avoir) de la valeur dans l'existence. De manière modeste, l'intention est, au travers d'une architecture du choix, de pousser les agents à agir dans un sens plus favorable aux intérêts qu'ils ont eux-mêmes identifiés. Cela s'incarne dans le modelage de situations qui inclinent les individus à prendre les meilleures décisions possible au regard de leur propre conception de la vie bonne. Contrairement aux formes perfectionnistes qui partagent cette double caractéristique de « s'imposer du dehors » et de faire de tout défaut individuel un travers moral (une atteinte au « bien », la santé), des versions plus édulcorées du paternalisme se concentrent sur le manque d'information ou les défaillances de la rationalité19. Nombre de biais, notamment cognitifs, affectant la prise de décision, les institutions peuvent se voir attribuer le rôle d'aider les individus à agir dans le sens des intérêts qu'ils évaluent comme étant les meilleurs pour eux sur le long terme. À première vue, le recours aux incitatifs pourrait donc être déconnecté de toute visée perfectionniste puisque les institutions n'ont pour fonction que de faciliter l'adoption de comportements voulus par les agents eux-mêmes (en prenant pour acquis qu'elles se limitent à enregistrer les préférences individuelles telles quelles, sans les distordre dans le sens d'une conception de la vie bonne définie au préalable)20. Si la démarche possède un attrait certain dans le domaine de l'assurance médicale ou de l'épargne de retraite (offre d'une option par défaut dans l'éventail des placements, afin de contrebalancer la complexité du choix entre plusieurs alternatives en matière d'investissement), les implications en termes de taxation ne sont pas évidentes, voire contradictoires si on les replace dans la perspective libertarienne qui les accueille. On pourrait estimer que le modelage des choix passe par le renchérissement du coût des activités nocives pour la santé (taxation des biens riches en sucre et sel) et l'abaissement de celui des activités « saines » (subvention ou crédit d'impôt pour l'inscription dans un club de sport). Ce serait une manière de laisser aux individus le soin de décider par et pour eux-mêmes. Toutefois, cela paraît être en contradiction avec la coloration libertarienne du projet puisque, en taxant certaines activités, leur réalisation devient plus compliquée. Les institutions favorisent alors de facto une ou plusieurs options parmi d'autres. Ce qui est d'autant plus problématique lorsque le choix ne concerne que la personne et son propre bien-être. C'est la raison pour laquelle des auteurs comme Cass Sunstein et Richard Thaler mettent l'accent sur la mise en place d'options par défaut, c'est-à-dire sur le modelage du contexte de décision. De telles mesures sont prometteuses en ce qu'elles manifestent un plus grand respect des individus en tant qu'agents moraux que d'autres formes de perfectionnisme. Un remodelage du contexte est certes opéré en adéquation avec des jugements sur ce qui constitue un mode 144 L E S A T E L I E R S D E L ' É T H I Q U E ! V . 5 N . 1 ! P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G 2 0 1 0 de vie alimentaire sain, mais sans que celui-ci soit imposé, c'est-àdire en laissant une marge de manoeuvre notable aux individus. Certes, des options par défaut sont appliquées (pour les plans d'épargne retraite par exemple), mais les cotisants ont toujours le loisir de choisir un autre mode d'épargne. De plus, on évite, dans la lignée de ce qui vient d'être dit sur la légitimité des politiques publiques, de mettre de l'avant de manière trop explicite une conception particulière de la vie bonne. Maintenant, même si ces mesures peuvent être invoquées à l'appui d'un programme de taxation, elles ne s'y rapportent pas de manière directe. Elles offrent une gamme d'aménagements complémentaires. Elles peuvent utilement renforcer les politiques publiques menées dans le domaine de la santé, en particulier en matière de prévention ou de taxation. Cependant, au final, les mesures proposées par le paternalisme libertarien sortent du cadre de l'application des taxes en vue d'inciter. Il n'est pas nécessaire de creuser plus avant puisque l'argument défendu dans cet article consiste à prendre de la distance avec le principe même de l'incitation. De plus, le paternalisme libertarien paraît rencontrer une importante limite. Il laisse de côté une dimension fondamentale du problème tel qu'il se présente dans les pays où les frais de santé sont mutualisés : l'interdépendance des individus face aux risques. Le fait d'adopter des comportements « malsains » induit certes des coûts personnels (dans le sens où ils sont supportés par celui qui les produit), mais aussi collectifs. Dès lors, il est nécessaire de considérer l'impact des comportements individuels sur autrui et la société dans son ensemble. De prime abord, il n'est plus question d'inciter en vue du bien des individus, ce qui réduit la pertinence du paternalisme sous toutes ses formes, mais de prendre en considération les effets globaux des comportements « malsains ». EFFICIENCE SOCIALE Une manière de procéder à ce changement de perspective est de justifier le recours aux incitatifs par le degré d'efficience d'une politique ou d'un état du monde donné. L'intérêt à évaluer ce type de justification est, outre sa popularité, d'approfondir l'idée selon laquelle les individus sont engagés dans des situations de forte interdépendance quant aux risques qu'ils rencontrent (génèrent, parfois), aux coûts associés et à la manière d'y faire face. L'inclusion d'une notion comme celle de « coût social » exige ainsi d'étendre le champ d'application de la notion millienne de dommage puisque les comportements « malsains » charrient dans leur sillage des préjudices vis-à-vis de soi-même, mais surtout à l'égard d'autrui, une fois prise en considération l'interdépendance induite par les systèmes de santé contemporains. Cette section a pour but non pas d'invalider les appels à l'efficience, mais de les situer et d'en préciser le champ d'application possible. Optimum et externalités L'intervention des institutions (notamment l'usage d'incitatifs) peut se voir justifiée par l'efficience sociale. En sciences économiques, elle renvoie au ratio entre des entrants (moyens de production) et des extrants (produits). Une allocation de ressources ou un arrangement organisationnel est efficient s'il réduit la consommation d'entrants à niveau d'extrants donné ou s'il accroît le volume d'entrants pour un niveau constant d'entrants. L'approche contient en germe le principe d'une maximisation exprimé dans un rapport entre intrants et extrants. De ce point de vue, l'étude de la formulation parétienne est féconde. En effet, elle offre une règle de décision claire qui juge de la désirabilité d'un état du monde en fonction de la condition de chaque partie. Plus précisément, un optimum est une situation dans laquelle la condition de nul agent ne peut être améliorée sans dégrader celle d'un autre, c'est-à-dire que des échanges mutuellement avantageux ne sont plus possibles21. Appliqué à la santé, cela conduit à appréhender les comportements « malsains » comme créateurs de situations sous-optimales. Dès lors, si l'intervention des institutions est légitime, ce n'est pas en vertu de ce que certains comportements imposent à la personne qui les adopte, mais de leurs conséquences sur autrui. Au bout du compte, l'objectif est d'optimiser le fonctionnement global du système au travers d'une amélioration de la situation de chaque agent. De manière claire, les approches parétiennes se veulent neutres, c'est-à-dire dégagées de toute évaluation axiologique puisque c'est la liberté (d'autrui) qui contraint la liberté (du consommateur de produits malsains). Nulle mention n'est faite d'un principe extérieur (comportement sain). Enfin, la taxation n'est pas justifiée par le bien-être de l'individu, lequel reste une affaire privée de vue sur la vie bonne, mais par ce que des choix précis imposent à autrui. Parvenu à ce stade du raisonnement, il est nécessaire d'introduire la notion d'externalité. Rappelons qu'« un effet externe apparaît chaque fois que la décision de production ou de consommation d'un individu a une influence directe sur la production ou la consomma145 L E S A T E L I E R S D E L ' É T H I Q U E ! V . 5 N . 1 ! P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G 2 0 1 0 tion d'autres individus autrement que par l'intermédiaire des prix du marché22 ». Un fumeur, par exemple, produit des externalités négatives pour son entourage immédiat (fumée secondaire, revenu disponible du ménage amoindri, irritabilité, etc.) ainsi que pour la société (frais médicaux en cas de couverture universelle, baisse de la productivité du fait des pauses prises pour fumer et de l'absentéisme induit par une vulnérabilité accrue à toutes sortes de pathologies, etc.). En raison de ces effets externes, l'état social est sous-optimal puisque la condition de tous pourrait être améliorée si les fumeurs arrêtaient de consommer du tabac. De manière similaire, outre les dommages qu'elle s'inflige, la personne qui consomme en excès des produits riches en gras engendre des frais médicaux et d'infrastructure (accessibilité des bâtiments, réaménagement des transports publics, baisse de productivité, etc.)23. Le défi consiste à trouver un moyen d'amoindrir les dommages imposés à autrui (sous la forme d'externalités) afin de se rapprocher d'une situation optimale. Par conséquent, il est légitime que les institutions incitent les individus à modifier leur comportement par la taxation. Le moyen est indirect, par comparaison avec une interdiction, et repose sur l'internalisation des externalités négatives24. Ce schéma présuppose que l'individu ne perçoit pas le coût réel de ses actes (rejoignant ainsi le fondement comportementaliste du paternalisme libertarien). Ce qui explique que, une fois qu'il fera face à l'obligation d'assumer le coût réel de son mode de vie, il le réorientera. Quoi qu'il en soit, si l'incitation demeure une justification possible, elle n'épuise pas la légitimité de la taxation en vertu du principe d'internalisation. En effet, aussi longtemps que l'individu ne modifie pas ses habitudes, les sommes collectées servent à contrebalancer l'inefficience sociale, c'est-à-dire à compenser ceux qui subissent les externalités. Dans le cas des fumeurs, les sommes collectées servent à financer le système de santé. Cela revient à déplacer la charge financière (ou une partie de celle-ci) de la société, c'est-à-dire de l'ensemble des contribuables, aux seuls fumeurs. Au fur et à mesure que l'individu infléchit son comportement, les externalités produites deviennent de moins en moins importantes et, par conséquent, la taxation s'amenuise. Limites de l'efficience En dépit de son attrait, les arguments qui recourent à la notion d'efficience s'exposent à des objections de nature différente selon la conception de l'efficience retenue. Si celle-ci est restreinte à l'optimum, alors deux critiques sont envisageables. Premièrement, l'identification d'un optimum rencontre des obstacles pratiques puisqu'il est possible que les institutions n'aient pas la capacité d'identifier un état du monde qui puisse être considéré comme optimal pour la société. Toutefois, la difficulté à identifier un optimum n'implique pas qu'il soit impossible de l'approximer. Une solution pourrait alors consister à retrancher de l'état actuel du monde l'ensemble des externalités négatives produites au sein d'une société ou, plus localement, dans un secteur. Dit autrement, cela revient à cerner les sources d'inefficience afin de tenter de les corriger. Ainsi, les institutions peuvent avoir à disposition des indications utiles quant aux activités qu'il convient de taxer. Il est également envisageable de tester différents niveaux de taxation afin de déterminer celui qui est optimal (qui maximise les gains par rapport aux coûts). La précédente contre-objection fait naître une critique plus sérieuse, de nature morale. Tenter de définir une situation idéale, ne serait-ce que par l'écrémage des externalités négatives, constitue un raisonnement fallacieux du type de la « solution parfaite » (ou dit du « Nirvana »)25. En recourant à la figure de l'optimum, on estime les institutions capables de se livrer à ce travail d'identification d'un état du monde parfait (et donc de ne pas être victimes des biais cognitifs qui frappent les individus) avant de le comparer à la situation actuelle. Comme le fait remarquer John Rawls, les approches qui se fondent sur la recherche d'un optimum postulent l'existence d'un « spectateur impartial sympathique » qui serait en mesure de calculer des soldes nets d'utilité (ou d'un quelconque autre étalon de mesure)26. Néanmoins, l'existence d'un tel spectateur ainsi que le fait que les institutions puissent remplir ce rôle sont des conditions qui ne peuvent être garanties, ce qui laisse sceptique face à l'ensemble de la démarche. L'un des moyens d'éviter la critique consiste à estimer que le but n'est pas d'identifier puis d'atteindre un optimum, mais d'obtenir des gains d'efficience (c'est-à-dire, dans les cas qui nous intéressent, de 146 L E S A T E L I E R S D E L ' É T H I Q U E ! V . 5 N . 1 ! P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G 2 0 1 0 réduire les coûts que supporte la collectivité). De la sorte, le raisonnement recourt à une seconde conception de l'efficience, plus large que celle recourant à la notion d'optimum. A priori, le fait que plusieurs améliorations soient possibles à partir d'une situation donnée plaide en faveur d'une telle reformulation. En termes techniques, le recours à la taxation ne vise plus la survenance d'un optimum, mais l'atteinte d'une situation Pareto supérieure27. Il n'est plus besoin de postuler l'existence d'une position unique, même de manière purement théorique. Il suffit de prouver que des améliorations sont possibles par la compensation puis la réduction de certains effets externes négatifs. Toutefois, bien que moins exigeante que le raisonnement en termes d'optimum, la recherche d'états préférables s'expose à deux critiques. La première stipule que pour juger de l'atteinte d'un état Pareto supérieur, il est indispensable de bénéficier d'un panorama complet de l'ensemble des coûts et gains tant de la situation initiale que de celle désirée. L'ensemble des externalités, négatives et positives, doit donc être inclus. En guise d'illustration, cet argument a été utilisé dans le cas du tabagisme pour arguer du fait que, tout bien considéré, la consommation de tabac générait des bienfaits supérieurs aux méfaits (les taxes collectées sur la vente de cigarettes, les montants d'épargne retraite non utilisés du fait d'un décès prématuré, etc.). Le fond de l'argument est d'estimer que tout calcul social se doit d'être exhaustif afin de ne pas dissuader une activité qui, au final, pourrait se révéler bénéfique pour la société. L'objection ne porte pas, car dans le cas du tabac les coûts sociaux (frais de santé induits par les pathologies du fumeur, amputation du revenu total en vertu des décès prématurés, etc.) semblent être nettement supérieurs aux gains (économies pour les maisons de retraite, trop-plein cotisé par les fumeurs en assurance de santé avant leur décès, etc.). En ce qui concerne les problèmes liés à une mauvaise alimentation, notamment l'obésité, c'est encore plus évident puisqu'il n'y a peu ou pas de bénéfice à faire prévaloir. La seconde critique, plus féconde, reconnaît la possibilité d'identifier une pluralité de situations Pareto supérieures accessibles grâce à un usage averti de la taxation (en vue de compenser et d'inciter). Toutefois, elle soulève la question de la règle de décision à adopter afin de déterminer les améliorations préférables sur le plan moral. La possibilité d'accroître l'efficience du système est une chose, le degré de désirabilité des diverses options en est une autre. Pour ce faire, il est essentiel d'appliquer des arguments indépendants afin de procéder au meilleur choix possible d'un point de vue normatif28. Paradoxalement, le passage de l'optimalité à l'efficience rend celleci insuffisante en tant que justification de la taxation. Si l'optimum fournissait une règle d'efficience qui incluait une considération de justice, c'est-à-dire l'atteinte d'une situation dans laquelle aucun individu ne peut plus bénéficier d'une meilleure situation sans que cela ne soit préjudiciable à quelqu'un d'autre, l'efficience se limite à identifier une gamme d'améliorations possibles dont les caractéristiques redistributives peuvent fortement diverger. Dit autrement, des considérations de justice, relatives aux performances égalitariennes des politiques publiques (dans le cas d'espèce, de la taxation), sont à inclure. Il n'est pas simplement question de prouver que des ressources pourraient être réallouées à d'autres types de dépenses publiques. Il faut aussi établir que la situation des plus défavorisés, premières victimes des problèmes d'alimentation ou de tabagisme, en serait améliorée. Enfin, force est de reconnaître que le maintien d'un système assurantiel, quel qu'il soit, dépend en grande partie du comportement des assurés. Ce qui implique de coupler des réflexions quant à la division des responsabilités au souci d'égalité. MUTUALISATION, RESPONSABILITÉ ET ÉGALITÉ Une reformulation de la position précédente consiste donc, d'une part, à conserver le système de taxation des choix et habitudes alimentaires à la hauteur approximative des coûts qu'ils génèrent, mais d'autre part, à éviter de recourir à l'efficience stricto sensu et à enlever à la notion d'incitation son statut de but premier. Le mécanisme est conservé, avec un objectif différent. Au lieu de faire référence à un optimum, il est envisageable d'invoquer le fait que l'organisation de nos sociétés, notamment dans le domaine de la santé, repose sur la mutualisation des risques et des dommages subis29. L'enjeu principal réside alors dans le maintien de la capacité des citoyens à s'assurer collectivement contre les risques en matière de santé30. Dans les pays qui possèdent une couverture de santé universelle, l'accès aux soins est garanti à chacun, quel que soit son comportement passé : fumeur, consommateur de hamburgers, etc. S'il apparaît moralement contestable d'exclure ces personnes du système en ne couvrant plus les frais qu'elles occasionnent, il semble néanmoins 147 L E S A T E L I E R S D E L ' É T H I Q U E ! V . 5 N . 1 ! P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G 2 0 1 0 légitime de leur en faire supporter une partie, sous certaines conditions. De la sorte, on marque l'interdépendance entre les participants à un même système assurantiel. En outre, le fait de tenir les individus responsables de leurs choix est une question de respect de leur statut d'agents moraux, comme évoqué précédemment. Cette position pourrait apparaître fondée sur une compréhension forte de l'imputabilité individuelle, au sens où les individus seraient responsables de manière pleine et entière des risques que leurs choix génèrent. Au final, cela reviendrait à leur faire supporter une charge (tant morale que financière) importante31. De plus, si l'on considère que nombre de problèmes de santé liés à une mauvaise alimentation ou au tabagisme sont corrélés positivement à des (ou, pire, découlent de) conditions socioéconomiques telles que le niveau de revenus, la catégorie socioprofessionnelle ou le statut, une telle option aboutirait à sanctionner doublement les personnes les plus défavorisées au sein de la société en raison même d'inégalités fondamentales. Effectivement, il est difficile de soutenir le principe d'une responsabilité totale. Aux raisons précédentes peut s'ajouter la capacité limitée des individus à prévoir toutes les conséquences significatives des actes qu'ils posent. En outre, il est problématique d'assigner une imputabilité financière identique à tous les membres d'une société sans prendre en considération les facteurs qui sont indépendants de leur volonté (conditions socioéconomiques, environnement, patrimoine génétique, situation psychologique, hasard, etc.). Des considérations de justice inclinent donc à modérer la notion de responsabilité mobilisée. Dimension éthique de la responsabilité Il est important de distinguer des degrés de responsabilité. Cet article n'est pas le lieu adéquat pour se livrer à une étude exhaustive de celle-ci ainsi que de son impact sur une théorie de l'égalité appréhendée sous l'angle assurantiel. Toutefois, il est utile de noter que si l'on veut préserver les politiques publiques des formes les plus intrusives de paternalisme, on ne peut faire l'économie d'un système basé, dans ses grandes lignes, sur l'idée que les individus en tant qu'agents moraux doivent être traités avec respect, c'est-à-dire que leurs choix doivent être considérés et estimés en tant qu'émanations de leur libre arbitre. Le problème est que le débat se focalise souvent sur les seuls consommateurs. Ces derniers sont visés par les taxes sur le tabac, les croustilles, boissons gazeuses, etc. Or ils partagent la responsabilité des coûts de santé avec les entreprises qui approvisionnent les marchés. Il est alors primordial de disposer d'une théorie fine de répartition de l'imputabilité qui n'aboutisse pas à placer l'essentiel des torts d'un même côté (offrant le clivage manichéen entre firmes ne faisant que répondre à des « consommateurs-rois » et des entreprises manipulant des clients aliénés). Un tel biais conduit à dédouaner plus que nécessaire l'une des deux parties tout en surdéterminant les responsabilités de l'autre, ce qui tend à cliver les débats et à rendre plus compliquées des solutions négociées32. Par conséquent, il est important, d'une part, d'être attentif à ne pas faire porter tout le poids sur l'une des deux parties et, d'autre part, d'approfondir le concept de responsabilité partagée33. Le concept de responsabilité ne peut être évacué dans des sociétés qui sont fondées sur la mutualisation des risques, car les coûts doivent, au final, être assumés par quelqu'un. Dans une structure mutualiste, ces coûts sont pris en charge par tous, donc par des personnes qui n'ont pas participé à leur survenance34. Si certaines conséquences dommageables résultent du pur hasard et se révèlent, par conséquent, imprévisibles ou difficiles à éviter, d'autres découlent de décisions libres et informées. Par ailleurs, les individus choisissent de consommer des produits fournis par des entreprises qui ont souvent une meilleure connaissance que ces derniers des effets potentiellement néfastes à plus ou moins long terme. En bref, le tabac comme l'alimentation génèrent des coûts qui doivent être mutualisés. Ces derniers résultent autant de l'acte de consommation que de celui de production. La grille d'analyse morale doit pouvoir rendre compte de la complexité des situations ainsi que du degré d'imputabilité des différents agents. Le fait de taxer certains biens ou pratiques permet d'exprimer cette imputabilité, tout en maintenant le principe de mutualisation35. L'argument est renforcé si l'on considère que la principale solution de remplacement réside dans une mutualisation privée des risques. Or, les compagnies sont enclines à discriminer les individus en fonction de divers facteurs (habitudes, environnement, origines socioéconomiques, antécédents familiaux, prédispositions génétiques...) afin de réduire leur exposition au risque et d'améliorer leur rentabilité. Si l'on veut éviter des processus d'identification des « mauvais risques » (c'est-à-dire, au bout du compte, l'exclusion des individus les plus défavorisés du système d'assurance en vertu de leur plus grande vulnérabilité aux risques de santé), la solution consiste en une mutuali148 L E S A T E L I E R S D E L ' É T H I Q U E ! V . 5 N . 1 ! P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G 2 0 1 0 sation globale des coûts alliant responsabilité et pondération de celleci en fonction de critères précis, au premier rang desquels figurent les conditions socioéconomiques des individus. Le partage des responsabilités entre consommateurs et producteurs est un sujet vaste et complexe qui mérite d'être traité à part et de manière exhaustive. Comme cet article se concentre sur le versant des consommateurs (qui monopolise la majorité des débats sur la taxation), la problématique est ici plus restreinte. Elle a trait à la mise en oeuvre la plus juste possible du principe de pondération de la responsabilité, du point de vue des consommateurs. Mener à bien cette réflexion est d'autant plus indispensable que, dans le domaine de la santé, les catégories les moins favorisées sont plus exposées au tabagisme, à la surconsommation de gras saturés et, en conséquence, aux accidents cardiovasculaires que le reste de la population36. De plus, les taxes sur la nourriture ou le tabac sont, en général, régressives, c'est-à-dire qu'elles affectent disproportionnellement les individus en fonction de leurs revenus37. Modulation égalitarienne Les taxes sur les produits riches en gras ou le tabac aboutissent à handicaper davantage les membres les plus défavorisés d'une société. Leur santé étant, en moyenne, plus précaire que celle du reste de la population, ceux qui conservent leur habitude de consommation se retrouvent alors dans une situation pire qu'avant l'imposition des taxes. Non seulement continuent-ils de souffrir d'inégalités et d'une santé moins bonne que le reste de la population, mais ils sont désormais sanctionnés sur le plan économique. En considérant qu'un des principes égalitariens de base stipule que les institutions sont tenues à améliorer la situation des plus défavorisés ou, tout le moins, à ne pas la dégrader, un tel résultat est difficilement justifiable. Une réponse envisageable consiste alors à moduler l'application des taxes. Deux voies s'offrent, dont l'une est plus praticable que l'autre. D'un côté, on pourrait envisager une modulation ex ante, c'est-à-dire faire payer aux consommateurs un prix variable en fonction de leurs ressources, situation socioéconomique, voire de certains facteurs génétiques, etc. Il est évident que cette option, bien qu'idéale, est presque impossible à mettre en oeuvre. Il faudrait collecter un volume de données assez conséquent et le rendre, d'une manière ou d'une autre, accessible de manière immédiate et à un coût nul lors de l'échange marchand. Par ailleurs, la totalité des prix devrait être altérée, avec ce que cela implique en termes de complexité du contrôle de leur mode de fixation dans le respect de normes égalitariennes. De plus, pour un bien donné, une large gamme de prix serait appliquée en fonction des cas particuliers, accroissant de manière substantielle les coûts de mise en vente. Ces contraintes font que l'intérêt est limité de discuter cette possibilité plus avant. De l'autre côté, de tels ajustements peuvent advenir ex post sous des formes variées dont deux méritent d'être mentionnées. La première consiste en une redistribution des sommes collectées en direction des catégories les plus défavorisées, par exemple, au travers de retours d'impôts massifs. Le mécanisme tient dans une compensation, partielle ou totale, des taxes payées afin de ne pas handicaper encore plus les catégories les plus défavorisées. L'effet redistributif peut être accentué en transférant aux ménages, dont les ressources sont inférieures à un certain seuil, davantage que les montants globaux des taxes sur la nourriture qui leur ont été appliquées. Une réserve émerge néanmoins. De telles dispositions peuvent, à terme, inciter à la consommation des produits incriminés. D'autant plus que ceux à l'égard de qui ce système serait le plus souple et généreux (les catégories socioéconomiques les plus défavorisées) bénéficieraient d'un surplus financier du fait de leurs habitudes de consommation. L'incitation fonctionnerait alors à l'envers, si l'on peut dire les choses ainsi. Les institutions feraient face à un problème d'aléa moral dans lequel le fait de bénéficier d'une assurance aurait l'effet de rendre les individus moins sensibles au risque, c'est-à-dire qu'ils n'auraient aucune raison de ne pas consommer de produits riches en gras ou de ne pas fumer. Une seconde option répond à ce défaut. Au lieu de mettre en oeuvre une redistribution directe, elle consiste à financer de nouveaux services et programmes destinés à ces populations ou à accroître les ressources allouées à ceux qui existent déjà. De manière générale, les institutions ont la possibilité de payer pour la fourniture de biens tels que la santé et l'éducation ou de se charger de leur production. Elles se substituent en partie aux individus afin d'allouer une partie des ressources qui leur sont destinées à l'achat de certains biens. Toutes les politiques publiques comportent déjà de telles dispositions. L'apport de la taxe serait de dégager des fonds supplémentaires pour de telles initiatives, tout en manifestant concrètement l'interdépendance des assurés en matière de santé. À l'encontre de cette seconde option, il peut être objecté qu'une taxation, dont les fruits ne seraient pas directement reversés aux plus 149 L E S A T E L I E R S D E L ' É T H I Q U E ! V . 5 N . 1 ! P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G 2 0 1 0 défavorisés, mais servirait à financer des dépenses faites en lieu et place de ces derniers, repose sur le postulat paternaliste de leur incapacité à décider par eux-mêmes du meilleur usage à faire de telles ressources. La proposition tomberait alors sous le coup de critiques évoquées précédemment à propos du paternalisme. Deux caractéristiques démarquent toutefois la présente proposition des approches paternalistes. Premièrement, ces ressources ne sont pas externes au schéma assurantiel. Elles en font intégralement partie. Si le but d'un système assurantiel est d'offrir une couverture mutuelle contre des risques d'une nature donnée, alors le paiement de la taxe s'assimile au paiement d'une prime, variable en fonction du risque pris par les individus (c'est-à-dire en fonction du volume de consommation de certains produits). Au demeurant, comme cette assurance porte sur la santé, alors le financement d'initiatives particulières (afin de compenser les désavantages matériels, inégalités socioéconomiques, voire les biais cognitifs dans ce domaine) se comprend comme un mécanisme collectif de réduction de la vulnérabilité individuelle (soit que les assurés, du fait de leurs comportements, génèrent des risques supérieurs à la moyenne, soit que, du fait de la variabilité d'un risque majeur, sa survenance mette à mal la capacité de poursuivre une existence décente, ou plus simplement viable). Au final, l'abaissement de la moyenne du coût individuel de l'exposition au risque profite aux catégories les plus exposées, mais également à l'ensemble des assurés38. Dans une certaine mesure, l'arrangement assurantiel est mutuellement bénéfique. En résumé, il s'agit de diminuer la vulnérabilité vis-à-vis de risques particuliers (problèmes cardiovasculaires, cancers, etc.), ou de réduire leur impact lorsqu'ils surviennent, au travers de dépenses ciblées (éducation, prévention, suivi médical, soins)39. Cette proposition peut être comprise comme faisant partie intégrante de l'offre assurantielle publique. Elle est bien évidemment obligatoire, mais elle est un moindre mal comparée à une stricte privatisation des risques de santé, en particulier pour les catégories les plus défavorisées, car elle permet de bénéficier d'une offre assurantielle garantie et de ressources plus importantes consacrées au financement de certains services publics. En renfort de cet argument, les institutions peuvent être considérées comme légitimes à administrer certaines ressources puisque, par leur entremise, ce sont les contributeurs du système assurantiel qui expriment la volonté de garantir la pérennité du système par le contrôle de certains risques. Concernant la santé publique, la principale menace, visible pour l'obésité ou le tabagisme, est de voir un type de comportement devenir endémique. Le risque prenant alors une forme systémique (visible lors de pandémies), son impact (c'està-dire son coût) s'accroît en raison d'une élévation de sa fréquence. L'augmentation du coût moyen possède un effet délétère à plusieurs niveaux. Tout d'abord, les ressources nécessaires pour y répondre et compenser les dommages subis s'accroissent, et peuvent rapidement être hors de contrôle. Ensuite, lorsque l'élévation de la moyenne résulte de comportements clairement identifiés et rattachés à des catégories de population précises, la tentation de se retirer d'un système de couverture global se fait plus forte pour ceux qui ne sont pas, ou moins, exposés. L'option d'une privatisation devient alors de plus en plus attrayante, ce qui peut saper la dimension égalitarienne d'une prise en charge partielle des risques des plus défavorisés par ceux qui sont mieux lotis. Dans ce contexte, la gestion directe de certaines ressources par l'État revêt une dimension stratégique importante qui s'incarne dans la mise en place de politiques destinées à réduire des facteurs de risque précisément identifiés, non pas en vertu du bien-être des individus, ou d'un optimum social qu'il conviendrait d'atteindre, mais en raison de la pérennisation d'un système assurantiel à caractère égalitarien. Enfin, le principe d'une intermédiation des dépenses peut se justifier, non par la volonté des institutions de décider en lieu et place des principaux concernés, mais en vertu de la garantie d'un droit fondamental40. De la sorte, les institutions s'assurent que des catégories bien identifiées de la population jouissent d'un accès garanti à des ressources que Rawls qualifie de « biens sociaux premiers ». Une telle justification peut se voir raffermie par l'invocation d'une égalité réelle d'opportunités (en particulier dans le domaine de la santé) ou, plus largement, par l'appel à une conception forte de l'égalité de ressources qui inclut l'environnement de santé dans lequel les individus évoluent41. En dépit de leurs différences, les deux options (transferts directs ou intermédiés) partagent un double but : non pas rendre la vie des individus meilleure, ou atteindre un optimum social, mais fournir aux individus les moyens (ressources) de mener une existence qu'ils puissent juger meilleure et leur offrir une protection contre nombre d'aléas de la vie. Cette double perspective implique de bénéficier d'un système assurantiel stable et pérenne, basé sur des considérations égalitariennes. Les deux formes de redistribution des fruits de la taxation, sous forme monétaire ou en nature, ne sont pas mutuellement exclu150 L E S A T E L I E R S D E L ' É T H I Q U E ! V . 5 N . 1 ! P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G 2 0 1 0 sives et peuvent être combinées. Leur combinaison soulève d'ailleurs la question essentielle de leur juste dosage au sein des politiques publiques, sujet qui dépasse le cadre de cet article. CONCLUSION En résumé, les avantages d'une justification de la taxation en termes de mutualisation excèdent ceux dont peuvent se prévaloir les arguments qui recourent aux notions de bien-être individuel ou d'efficience sociale. Tout d'abord, la mutualisation n'implique pas de manière directe la promotion de comportements « sains ». Elle évite ainsi la tentation de définir ce qu'est une vie bonne et de l'imposer à une population dans son ensemble. Ensuite, son champ est plus restreint, ce qui rend ses prescriptions plus claires et apparentes : maintenir l'effectivité d'un système collectif d'assurance. Dans ces conditions, le thème de l'incitation perd sa priorité. L'objectif est alors de couvrir une partie des frais par l'entremise de l'imposition de taxes qui traduisent la responsabilité des consommateurs (et producteurs) dans la prise de risque, modulée par des considérations égalitariennes (conduisant à utiliser les fonds ainsi collectés dans le sens d'une réduction des inégalités existantes). Si certains individus modifient leur comportement d'une manière qui leur est bénéfique, tant mieux pour eux (ou pour la société). Sur ce point, ils demeurent maîtres de leur destin. Toutefois, les coûts devant toujours être comptabilisés quelque part, il n'est pas aberrant de les faire supporter par les personnes physiques et morales qui les provoquent. Par ailleurs, la manière de réutiliser ces fonds n'a que peu à voir avec une quelconque visée incitative. Il s'agit d'accroître les capacités des individus à être maîtres de leur destin, c'est-à-dire à vivre une existence qu'ils puissent juger meilleure en comparaison de ce qu'elle aurait pu être sans ces ressources. Au final, si l'on considère que les inégalités (principalement de revenus) sont à l'origine d'une bonne part des inégalités de santé, combattre les premières ne pourrait qu'avoir un effet positif sur les secondes. Quoi qu'il en soit, outre le fait d'exprimer un respect plus grand de la liberté individuelle par rapport à l'option perfectionniste, le modèle ébauché semble plus fécond que ses concurrents puisque la priorité est accordée aux conditions de justice du système de santé ainsi qu'aux moyens de préserver sa nature assurantielle et égalitarienne. Dans un contexte marqué par la montée des inégalités et la crise des finances publiques, notamment dans le domaine concerné (déficits croissants, qualité déclinante, etc.), le fait de déplacer le poids de la justification de l'incitation à la mutualisation possède l'avantage additionnel de ne pas perdre de vue la dimension assurantielle de nos institutions42. Des politiques égalitariennes ambitieuses sont donc nécessaires, ce qui est loin d'être une nouveauté. Le fait de redistribuer a posteriori une partie des taxes, d'une manière ou d'une autre, demeure toutefois insuffisant. Concrètement, le transfert de ressources supplémentaires à des individus qui peuvent avoir toutes les peines du monde à modifier leurs habitudes de consommation, en dépit de leur volonté d'agir autrement, n'aboutit qu'à entretenir les inégalités existantes. Le tableau est plus large. Les inégalités en matière de revenus, statut et éducation ont un impact profond sur les habitudes de vie (dont la consommation de tabac et la qualité de l'alimentation) ainsi qu'à plus long terme, sur la qualité de l'existence43. Le problème fondamental paraît être moins lié à la difficulté qu'éprouvent les individus à percevoir ce qu'est un comportement « sain », à un défaut de volonté ou à un manque de bons incitatifs, qu'à des questions d'inégalités fondamentales. Il s'agit de justice. Si l'on souhaite que les individus mènent une existence qu'ils puissent juger meilleure en vertu de leur lumière intérieure, il faut se pencher sur la manière dont l'État justifie et conduit ses politiques, notamment de redistribution et d'assurance. Dans ce contexte, le fait d'enrayer la montée de l'obésité ou la consommation de tabac ne peut se concevoir que dans une perspective globale de lutte contre les inégalités qui dépasse le simple fait d'inciter en vue de promouvoir des comportements « sains ». 151 L E S A T E L I E R S D E L ' É T H I Q U E ! V . 5 N . 1 ! P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G 2 0 1 0 NOTES 1 L'auteur tient à remercier les participants à l'atelier de recherche en éthique et santé publique et à la conférence organisée par la Direction de la santé publique de Montréal ainsi que les évaluateurs anonymes des Ateliers de l'Éthique pour la fécondité de leurs commentaires. 2 En France, un rapport, présenté en juillet 2008 par l'Inspection générale des finances et l'Inspection générale des affaires sociales, préconise la taxation des produits riches en gras, des en-cas, etc. (Hespel & Berthod-Wurmser, 2008) En 2000, au Canada, le gouvernement et sept provinces appliquaient des taxes sur les boissons sucrées, bonbons et en-cas. La même année, 19 États américains possédaient des législations dans le domaine (Jacobson & Brownell, 2000). En élargissant le champ, la plupart des pays taxent le tabac en invoquant des raisons de santé. 3 Voir, entre autres, World Health Organization & Food and Agricultural Organization (2003), World Health Organisation (2006), Branca, Nikogosian & Lobstein (2007) ainsi que le site http://www.who.int/dietphysicalactivity /publications/en/ (consulté le 5 mai 2010). 4 Les incitatifs peuvent être classés en quatre catégories selon, premièrement, qu'ils s'appliquent sur l'offre ou la demande et, deuxièmement, qu'ils prennent une forme positive (subvention) ou négative (taxation). 5 Dans le cas de la taxation, les préférences individuelles restent les mêmes. Par contre, ce qui change est la structure de coûts des différentes options en présence. Par conséquent, en renchérissant le prix de certains biens, la théorie néoclassique postule un déclin de la demande, non pas parce que les individus changent leurs préférences, mais parce qu'ils arbitrent entre plusieurs possibilités de consommation en fonction de leur rentabilité. 6 Mill, 1875, p.6. 7 Berlin, 1969 ; Rawls, 1995. 8 Gostin & Gostin, 2009, p.218. 9 Marmot, 2004. 10 Holm, 2007, p.208. 11 Il est possible de mentionner les malformations congénitales qui mettent en danger la vie du sportif (d'autant plus si sa pratique est intensive). Par exemple, les incidents cardiaques sont à l'origine, en Europe, du décès prématuré ou de la retraite anticipée de plusieurs footballeurs professionnels. 12 Arvers & Choquet, 2003. 13 Dans un autre registre, certaines études établissent une corrélation entre l'arrêt de la consommation de tabac et l'hypertension artérielle ainsi que l'obésité, en particulier chez les femmes (Chou, Grossman & Saffer, 2004 ; Janzon, Hedblad, Berglund & Engström, 2004 ; Janzon, Engström, Hedblad, Berglund & Janzon, 2007). Ces résultats sont contestés. Pour une critique de la première étude, se référer à Gruber & Frakes (2006). 14 De plus, au travers d'une promotion trop appuyée des comportements sains, il y a le risque de stigmatiser les individus qui soit adoptent nombre de ces comportements en pleine connaissance des effets potentiels (leurs choix traduisant le libre exercice de leur volonté), soit souffrent de problèmes connexes (pauvreté, manque de volonté, troubles psychologiques, etc.) les empêchant de réorienter leur mode de vie (auquel cas un blâme moral est ajouté à une situation précaire) (Holm, 2007). 15 Epstein, 2005. 16 Gostin & Gostin, 2009. 17 « (...) political decisions must be, so far as it is possible, independent of any particular conception of the good life, or of what gives value to life. Since the citizens of a society differ in their conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to another (...) » (Dworkin, 1985, p.191). Notre emphase. 18 Dworkin, 2000, pp.216-217. 19 Camerer & Loewenstein 2003 ; Kahneman, 2003. De leur côté, Richard Thaler et Cass Sunstein évoquent les « jugements approximatifs » (rules of thumb) et heuristiques (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, pp.17-39). 20 Just & Payne, 2009, p.S50. 21 Bénicourt & Guerrien, 2008, p.31 ; Gaus, 2008, pp.76-77. 22 Begg, Fischer & Dornbusch, 1996, p.334. L'introduction de la notion d'externalités se justifie par le fait que des marchés livrés à eux-mêmes ne peuvent pas atteindre un optimum en raison des coûts (et bénéfices) externes à l'échange marchand (Redslob, 1992, p.339). Dès lors, si l'on souhaite que les notions d'optimum ou d'efficience fassent sens, il convient d'intégrer l'ensemble des facteurs qui peuvent affecter la mise à l'équilibre, notamment l'impact de certains comportements sur des tiers. 23 Les coûts de l'obésité ont été évalués à 9,6 milliards de dollars pour le Canada (Katzmarzyk & Janssen, 2004 ; Association Médicale Canadienne, 2007, p.6). Pour un argument justifiant la lutte contre l'obésité par des raisons d'efficacité économique, se référer à Suhrcke, McKee, Sauto Arce, Tsolova & Mortensen (2006). Voir également Marshall (2000, p.301), Botterrill (2006, p.7), Colditz & Wang (2008). 24 Le principe de l'internalisation consiste à répercuter tout ou partie des externalités négatives sur la partie qui les a produites en recourant à la taxation (Pigou, 1932). 25 «In practice, those who adopt the nirvana viewpoint seek to discover discrepancies between the ideal and the real and, if discrepancies are found, they deduce that the real is inefficient » (Demsetz, 1969, p.1). 26 Rawls, 1999, p.166. 27 « An allocation of resources is Pareto superior to an alternative allocation if and only if no person is disadvantaged by it and the lot of at least one person is improved. [...] The concepts of Pareto superiority and optimality are analytically connected in the following way: A Pareto-optimal distribution has no distributions Pareto superior to it. » (Coleman, 1998, p.72). 28 Position défendue notamment dans une étude controversée commanditée en 2000 par Philip Morris pour la République tchèque. 152 L E S A T E L I E R S D E L ' É T H I Q U E ! V . 5 N . 1 ! P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G 2 0 1 0 29 Rasmussen, Prescott, Sørensen & Søgaard, 2005. 30 Ce point est soulevé par Rawls et reconnu par nombre d'économistes (Mishan, 1972, p.974 ; Fleurbaey, 1996, p.31 ; Rawls, 1999, pp.161-166). 31 Ewald, 1986 ; Moss, 2002. 32 Des arguments semblables figurent dans le rapport rendu à la ministre française de la santé en 2008 (Hespel & Berthod-Wurmser, 2008, pp.28-34). 33 Cette critique rejoint celle adressée à l'égalitarisme de la chance (Spitz, 2008). 34 Les taxes sur le tabac ou l'alimentation payées par les deux catégories d'acteurs pourraient, par exemple, être fixées de manière paritaire, c'est-à-dire au terme de négociations menées par des représentants des consommateurs, des producteurs et de l'État. 35 Au moins deux débats se chevauchent. Le premier porte sur le partage des responsabilités entre producteurs et consommateurs. Le second concerne, du point de vue des producteurs, la nature de l'entité qui doit être tenue responsable : morale ou physique, la firme ou ses dirigeants. 36 Ripstein, 1994, p.13. 37 Le principe de responsabilité recherché est d'ordre matériel (assumer les conséquences financières de ces actes) et non moral (assumer le blâme, pour une mauvaise alimentation par exemple). Dans le schéma proposé, l'action de taxer ne revient pas à condamner un comportement comme étant « malsain », mais plutôt à signifier l'impact, au sein d'un système de mutualisation des risques (c.-à-d. de leur prise en charge collective), de certaines catégories d'actions. 38 Marmot, 2004. 39 Leicester & Windmeijer, 2006. Dit autrement, moins un ménage possède de ressources, plus ce genre de taxes pèse lourdement sur son budget. Pareil effet s'explique par la proportion plus importante dédiée, dans le cas d'espèce, aux dépenses alimentaires. 40 L'efficience des arrangements coopératifs de nature assurantielle réside dans l'alignement du coût réellement supporté par chaque individu sur la moyenne théorique pour l'ensemble des assurés au travers d'une mise en commun des risques (Moss, 2002, pp.26-32 ; Heath, 2006, pp.322-324). La seule alternative afin d'influer sur la moyenne consiste alors à privatiser la gestion des risques et à exclure certains profils. À nouveau, cela illustre la nécessité d'inclure des considérations égalitariennes afin de juger de la désirabilité de différents états du monde. 41 Le financement de programmes de réduction des risques fait partie intégrante, à côté de la stricte prise en charge des individus en cas de survenance du risque couvert, du principe assurantiel (Stone, 1999, p.29). 42 Thurow, 1974, p.192 ; Okun, 1975, pp.112-113 ; Stone, 1999, p.34. 43 Ce qui est compatible à la fois avec des approches égalitariennes classiques, à l'instar de celles de Rawls ou Dworkin, et avec des théories faisant appel à la notion de capabilités, comme celle de Martha Nussbaum ou d'Amartya Sen (Nussbaum & Sen, 1993 ; Rawls, 1999 ; Dworkin, 2000 ; Sen, 2000). 44 Les récentes dérives inégalitaires au sein des démocraties libérales ont été pointées par de nombreux auteurs (Dworkin, 2000 ; Barry, 2005 ; Krugman, 2008). Ce constat prend un éclairage inquiétant une fois couplé aux travaux de Michael Marmot concernant l'impact du statut sur la santé (Marmot, 2004 ; Organisation mondiale de la santé, 2008). 45 Pour preuve, les personnes à faibles revenus et statut sont plus touchées par les accidents cardiovasculaires que le reste de la population, et ceci dans des proportions importantes. À titre d'exemple, en Suède, entre 1990-1996, les hommes titulaires d'un doctorat et âgés de 64 ans en 1990 avaient approximativement 3 fois moins de chances de décéder sur la période que ceux de la cohorte la moins bien éduquée (Marmot, 2004, p.77). En Angleterre et au pays de Galles, pour la période 1972-1978, l'espérance de vie de la classe sociale la plus élevée s'établissait à 72 ans, de même pour la seconde, un peu plus de 68 pour la troisième et 66 pour la quatrième. Vingt ans plus tard, ces chiffres étaient de 78, 76, 72 et 68. La classe la plus élevée a bénéficié d'un gain net de 4 années par rapport à la moins élevée (Marmot, 2004, p.26). De nombreuses études prouvent la corrélation entre, d'un côté, le statut socioéconomique et, de l'autre, l'obésité ainsi que les accidents cardiovasculaires (Albert, Glynn, Buring & Ridker, 2006; Wang & Zhang, 2006). 153 L E S A T E L I E R S D E L ' É T H I Q U E ! V . 5 N . 1 ! P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G 2 0 1 0 BIBLIOGRAPHIE Albert, Michelle, Glynn, Robert, Buring, Julie & Ridker, Paul, « Impact of Traditional and Novel Risk Factors on the Relationship Between Socioeconomic Status and Incident Cardiovascular Events », Journal of the American Heart Association, 114, 2006, pp.2619-2626 Arvers, Philippe & Choquet, Marie, « Pratiques sportives et consommation d'alcool, tabac, cannabis et autres drogues illicites : Analyse réalisée à partir des données de l'enquête ESPAD 99 », Annales de Médecine Interne, 154, 2003, pp.1S251S34 Association Médicale Canadienne, Des incitations fiscales pour de meilleures conditions de vie, Mémoire présenté par l'Association médicale canadienne au Comité permanent des finances dans le contexte des consultations prébudgétaires de 2007, 2007 Banque Mondiale, Maîtriser l'épidémie : L'État et les aspects économiques de la lutte contre le tabagisme, Washington, Banque Mondiale, 2000 Barry, Brian, Why Social Justice Matters, Cambridge, Polity, 2005 Begg, David, Fischer, Stanley & Dornbusch, Rudiger, Microéconomie, Paris, Ediscience International, 1996 Bénicourt, Emmanuelle & Guerrien, Bernard, La théorie économique néoclassique, Paris, La Découverte, 2008 Berlin, Isaiah, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969 Botterill, Linda, « Constructing an Epidemic ? Obesity and the Regulation of Private Behaviour », Australasian Political Studies Association Conference, University of Newcastle, 25-27 September 2006 Branca, Francesco, Nikogosian, Haik & Lobstein, Tim, Le défi de l'obésité dans la Région européenne de l'OMS et les stratégies de lutte, Copenhague, Organisation Mondiale de la Santé, 2007 Camerer, Colin & Lowenstein, George, « Behavioral Economics: Past, Present, Future » in Camerer, Colin, Lowenstein, George & Rabin, Matthew, Advances in Behavioral Economics, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2003, pp.3-51 Chou, Shin-Yi, Grossman, Michael & Saffer, Henry, « An economic analysis of adult obesity: results from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System », Journal of Health Economics, 23:3, 2004, pp.565-587 Colditz, Graham & Wang, Claire, « Economics Costs of Obesity », in Hu, Frank, Obesity Epidemiology: Methods and Applications, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp.261-271 Coleman, Jules, Markets, Morals, and the Law, New York, Oxford University Press, 1998 Demsetz, Harold, « Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint », Journal of Law and Economics, 12:1, 1969, pp.1-22 Dworkin, Ronald, A Matter of Principle, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985 Dworkin, Ronald, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2000 Epstein, Richard, « What (Not) To Do About Obesity ? A Moderate Aristotelian Answer », Georgetown Law Journal, 93, 2005, pp.1361-1386 Ewald, François, L'État providence, Paris, Grasset, 1986 Fleurbaey, Marc, Théories économiques de la justice, Paris, Economica, 1996 Gaus, Gerald, On Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Belmont, Thomson Wadsworth, 2008 Gostin, Lawrence & Gostin, Kieran, « A broader liberty: J.S. Mill, paternalism and the public's health », Public Health, 123:3, 2009, 214-221 Gruber, Jonathan & Frakes, Michael, « Does falling smoking lead to rising obesity ? », Journal of Health Economics, 25:2, 2006, pp.183-197 Hardin, Russell, Morality within the Limits of Reason, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1988 Hespel, Véronique & Berthod-Wurmser, Marianne, Rapport sur la pertinence et la faisabilité d'une taxation nutritionnelle, Paris, Inspection générale des finances, Inspection générale des affaires sociales, 2008 Holm, Søren, « Obesity interventions and ethics », Obesity Reviews, 8, 2007, pp.207210 Jacobson, Michael & Brownell, Kelly, « Small Taxes on Soft Drinks and Snack Foods to Promote Health », American Journal of Public Health, 90:68, 2000, pp.854857 154 L E S A T E L I E R S D E L ' É T H I Q U E ! V . 5 N . 1 ! P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G 2 0 1 0 Janzon, Ellis, Hedblad, Bo, Berglund, Göran & Engström, Gunnar, « Changes in blood pressure and body weight following smoking cessation in women », Journal of Internal Medecine, 255:2, 2004, pp.266-272 Janzon, Ellis, Engström, Gunnar, Hedblad, Bo, Berglund, Göran, & Janzon, Lars, « Smoking as a determinant of the geographical pattern of cardiac events among women in an urban population », Scandinavian Journal of Public Health, 35:3, 2007, pp.272-277 Just, David & Payne, Collin, « Obesity: Can Behavioral Economics Help ? », Annals of Behavioral Medecine, 38:1, 2009, pp.47-55 Kahneman, Daniel, « Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics », American Economic Review, 93:5, 2003, pp.1449-1475 Katzmarzyk, Peter & Janssen, Ian, « The economic costs associated with physical inactivity and obesity in Canada: an update », Canadian Journal of Applied Physiology, 29, 2004, pp.90-115 Krugman, Paul, The Conscience of a Liberal, New York, Norton, 2008 Leicester, Andrew & Windmeijer, Frank, The 'Fat Tax': Economic Incentives to Reduce Obesity, London, Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2006 Marmot, Michael, The Status Syndrome: How Social Standing Affects Our Health and Longevity, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 2004 Marshall, Tom, « Exploring a fiscal food policy: the case of diet and ischaemic heart disease », British Medical Journal, 320, 2000, pp.301-304 Mill, John Stuart, On Liberty, London, Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1875 Mishan, Edward, « The Futility of Pareto-Efficient Distributions », The American Economic Review, 62:5, 1972, pp.971-976 Moss, David, When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2002 Mytton, Oliver, Gray, Alastair, Rayner, Mike & Rutter, Harry, « Could targeted food taxes improve health ? », Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 61, 2007, pp.689-694 Nussbaum, Martha & Sen, Amartya, The Quality of Life, New York, Oxford University Press, 1993 Okun, Arthur, Equality and Efficiency. The Big Tradeoff, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 1975 Organisation mondiale de la santé, Combler le fossé en une génération : Instaurer l'équité en santé en agissant sur les déterminants sociaux de la santé, Genève, Organisation mondiale de la santé, 2008 Pigou, Arthur Cecil, The Economics of Welfare, London, Macmillan & Company, 1932 Rasmussen, Susanne, Prescott, Eva, Sørensen, Thorkild, & Søgaard, Jes, « The total lifetime health cost savings of smoking cessation to society », The European Journal of Public Health, 15:6, 2005, pp.601-606 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1999 Redslob, Alain, Économie politique 1, Paris, Litec, 1992 Ripstein, Arthur, « Equality, Luck, and Responsibility », Philosophy & Public Affairs, 23:1, 1994, pp.3-23 Sen, Amartya, Repenser l'inégalité, Paris, Seuil, 2000 Stone, Deborah, « Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance As Moral Opportunity », Connecticut Insurance Law Journal, 6:1, 1999, pp.11-46 Suhrcke, Marc, McKee, Martin, Sauto Arce, Régina, Tsolova, Svetla & Mortensen, Jørgen, « Investment in health could be good for Europe's economies », British Medical Journal, 333, 2006, pp.1017-1019 Thaler, Richard & Sunstein, Cass, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness, New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 2008 Thurow, Lester, « Cash Versus In-Kind Transfers », The American Economic Review, 64:2, 1974, pp.190-195 Wang, Youfa & Zhang, Qi, « Are American children and adolescents of low socioeconomic status at increased risk of obesity ? Changes in the association between overweight and family income between 1971 and 2002 », American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, 84:4, 2006, pp.707-716 World Health Organization & Food and Agricultural Organization, Diet, Nutrition and the Prevention of Chronic Diseases, Geneva, World Health Organization, 2003 World Health Organization, What is known about the effectiveness of economic instruments to reduce consumption of foods high in saturated fats and other energy-dense foods for preventing and treating obesity ?, Copenhagen, World Health Organization, 2006 155 L E S A T E L I E R S D E L ' É T H I Q U E ! V . 5 N . 1 ! P R I N T E M P S / S P R I N G 2 0 1

n. 22/23, luglio-ottobre 2003 Antonio Chiocchi Prigionieri della guerra. La geopolitica universalistica Focus on line Supplemento telematico di Società e conflitto Redazione di "Società e conflitto" Luisa Bocciero Antonio Chiocchi (direttore editoriale) Sergio A. Dagradi † Lucio Della Moglie Domenico Limongiello Agostini Petrillo Antonello Petrillo (direttore responsabile) Claudio Toffolo Registrazione Tribunale di Avellino n. 257 del 2 settembre 1989 Direttore di "Focus on line" Antonio Chiocchi Sito web www.cooperweb.it/focusonline Copyright by Società e conflitto 2003 3 Prigionieri della guerra. La geopolitica universalsitica di Antonio Chiocchi Quali campane vuoi che suonino a morto per questi che muoiono come bestie? Wilfred Owen 1. Dalla proiezione del 'politico' alla proiezione del potere Uno dei limiti fondanti della diplomazia americana, fino a tutta la "guerra fredda", è stato il postulato strategico in forza del quale sono messi in piano unicamente obiettivi "massimi" e "totali": l'annientamento politico e militare del nemico. Solo con Kissinger il postulato è stato messo in questione in maniera tagliente1. La tensione assoluta finalizzata al perseguimento di obiettivi "massimi" e "totali", secondo lui, blocca le strategie diplomatiche, condannando ad una situazione di stallo. Soltanto la resa incondizionata del competitore o dell'antagonista, fa ancora acutamente osservare, renderebbe siffatta strategia vincente. Ma uno degli "a priori" del discorso polemologico esclude, sul piano concettuale come su quello operativo, che l'antagonista sia disposto alla capitolazione assoluta, nel corso della competizione. Il "realismo strategico" di Kissinger2, già in questi scarni asserti, valica l'orizzonte assolutistico della tradizione americana culminata con la "guerra fredda". Lo scenario teorico-pratico messo in moto dalla "dottrina Bush"3 opera un arretramento rispetto all'orizzonte definito da Kissinger; anche se tende apertamente a prospettarsi come un suo netto superamento. Nell'epoca kissingeriana, la guerra totale era agibile unicamente in contesti locali; il che la rendeva improduttiva, irrealistica e perdente (vedi Cuba, Vietnam ecc.). Da qui hanno preso origine le ridefinizioni alla diplomazia americana apportate da Kissinger e che hanno caratterizzato più di un decennio di storia delle relazioni internazionali. Dopo la crisi del sistema bipolare, sopravvenuta con la caduta del "muro di Berlino", il nuovo pensiero strategico americano ritiene che la guerra totale sarebbe ora finalmente globalizzabile, attraverso scansioni cronologiche, sequenze geopolitiche e slittamenti topologici. Con la globalizzazione, si sarebbe prodotta una ontologia attiva della guerra totale, finalizzata all'annientamento preventivo del nemico. Il carattere totale e totalitario della nuova ontologia bellica affrancherebbe dai limiti della "guerra fredda", la quale condannava all'attesa della resa senza riserve dell'avversario. Da questo punto di vista, l'atomica su Hiroshima e Nagasaky è stato il primo e, insieme, ultimo atto totale della "guerra fredda". Secondo questo "calcolo strategico", teoricamente e di fatto, il teatro della guerra prevede un solo attore decisionale: gli Usa. Tutti gli altri o sono alleati docili e sottomessi, oppure simulacri viventi, destinati all'annichilimento. Qui non si affaccia, nemmeno lontanamente, l'idea che quanto più la forza viene dispiegata crudamente e intensamente, tanto più provoca un capillare sistema di resistenze e reazioni, articolate nel tempo e nello spazio; come, da ultimo, il "dopoguerra" in Irak ribadisce. La nuda forza non può valere come potere ed il crudo potere non è in grado di sradicare il conflitto. Si rende sempre necessario l'impiego dosato di complesse e flessibili strategie di comunicazione, regolazione, mediazione, recupero e adattamento. Un ordine complesso e una complessa stabilità non sono mai il portato del brutale esercizio della forza; al contrario, la forza, in quanto tale, è causa primordiale del vacillare dell'ordine e del montare strisciante dell'instabilità. Kissinger, per quanto fosse un pensatore e un politico reazionario (nel senso più intenso del termine) e pericolosamente contiguo alla controrivoluzione pura (non per niente, ha assunto Metternich come suo ideale punto di riferimento), non è mai stato un cultore dell'uso intensivo della forza totale, fuori da ogni scala di controllo interno ed esterno. In ciò egli era nettamente superiore ai teorici e ideologi della "guerra fredda"; tanto più risulta inavvicinabile dai teorici della guerra preventiva. Il nuovo pensiero strategico conservatore americano recupera l'armamentario ideologico della "guerra fredda" e tenta di adattarlo alle condizioni della guerra preventiva, quale forma della guerra totale nelle condizioni della globalizzazione. L'asse di scorrimento della diplomazia kissingeriana era il realismo politico; per i teorici ed i politici della 4 - "guerra preventiva", diventa l'irrealismo politico, a misura in cui si persegue la sottomissione del mondo intero alla totalitaria volontà di dominio degli Usa. Questo regresso epistemico, teorico, concettuale e politico è già costato molto sangue all'umanità; molto altro ancora ne costerà. Ma fino a che punto la forza è fuori dal diritto ed il diritto è completamente estraneo alla forza? Sono proprio i teorici della guerra preventiva come guerra totale a costringerci a riformulare questo antico interrogativo. Classicamente, il rapporto tra forza e diritto è posizionato come relazione tra mezzo e fine: nel senso precipuo che la forza è ritenuto il mezzo conforme al trionfo del diritto. Da questa catena relazionale primaria ne consegue un'altra, non meno rilevante: se la forza è un mezzo subordinato al diritto, il diritto è, a sua volta, mezzo conforme al supremo fine di garantire l'esistenza della società. Il diritto è, quindi, da intendere costitutivamente come una tecnica di controllo sociale, in quanto tale inestirpabile dall'ordigno statuale, in cui trova la sua più organica attuazione. Questo è concettualmente vero almeno dal percorso che ci conduce da Jhering a Kelsen e oltre4. Dal diritto consegue sempre una coercizione riconducibile al potere statuale; sempre dal diritto il potere statuale trae linfa vitale per la sua riproduzione formale e materiale. Il diritto ha un'immanente struttura coercitiva, allo stesso modo con cui lo Stato ha un'intrinseca struttura normativa. La sanzione (della norma), evidentemente, non è assimilabile alla coazione fisica. La forza rimane, pur sempre, un elemento esterno al diritto: lo ripristina o insedia; dopodiché le è estranea. Possiamo, però, dire, come ben colto da Kelsen, Olivecrona e Ross, che il diritto organizza la forza5. Intorno all'immanente struttura coercitiva del diritto si organizza il potere normativo dello Stato: forza organizzata delle norme e monopolio della forza fisica costituiscono i due versanti indisgiungibili dell'autorità statuale. Dietro il monopolio della violenza legittima c'è sempre la forza organizzata delle norme; per contro, la prospettiva normativa del diritto rimane sempre la riproduzione del potere coercitivo dello Stato. Organizzazione della forza a mezzo del diritto significa che la norma crea una disciplina regolamentata di tipo coattivo, a cui tutti debbono conformarsi e sottostare. Più che sostituirla, come ancora riteneva Kelsen, il diritto fa un complesso uso disciplinatore e regolatore della forza. Grazie alle fondamentali ricerche di Foucault, ormai, sappiamo che accanto alla coazione fisica esiste una non meno invasiva tipologia di forza: la costrizione normativa, regolata e disciplinata da istituzioni ad hoc, la quale tende a spacciarsi come neutra, impersonale, fredda e avalutativa. Non si dà una frattura irricomponibile tra l'organizzazione della forza operata dal diritto e l'impiego della forza fisica deciso dalle strutture coercitive dello Stato. Non è affatto vero che l'evoluzione verso "superiori" forme di società comporti la soccombenza della forza fisica a favore della forza del diritto. Nelle società complesse e globali, al contrario, la connessione tra norma e forza si fa più cogente e perversa. L'uso della forza non è contemplabile come alternativo all'uso della ragione. In tutta l'epoca moderna e fino a quasi tutto il XX secolo, l'impiego della forza è stato sempre regolato dalle ragioni della sovranità dello Stato-nazione. Il diritto, come organizzazione della forza, ha funzionato tanto come codice di controllo sociale all'interno, quanto come "regolatore attivo" della guerra nelle "relazioni esterne". Il "diritto di guerra" è una figura antica; allo stesso modo con cui antica è la figura del Leviatano statuale. Di "leggi della guerra" parlano apertamente Platone (Repubblica) e Cicerone (De Officiis), tanto per fare due illustri esempi. Ed è proprio con Cicerone che il concetto di "guerra giusta" (bellum iustum) riceve il suo vero battesimo teorico (De Officiis, I, XI, 36). Qui, secondo il lessico e la costellazione teorico-politica dei romani, la guerra giusta si struttura e dispiega, senza infingimenti, come guerra di conquista. Non a caso, i teorici della guerra preventiva guardano con particolare favore alla Roma imperiale. Senonché la pax romana non dipendeva dal potere imperiale (imperium), bensì era il prolungamento (con i mezzi della guerra) del patrocinio e della protezione del mondo sviluppati e potenziati a livello del 'politico'; "compiti" di cui Roma si sentiva l'esclusivo ed esclusivista titolare. L'imperium romano si stabiliva esattamente in proporzione delle capacità effettive di Roma di assicurare le funzioni di patrocinio e protezione: il potere imperiale era una funzione della pax romana. Per i romani, la conquista non si configurava, dunque, come una mera proiezione di potere; bensì costituiva una categoria del 'politico'. 5 L 'ontologia bellica della guerra preventiva capovolge la relazione causale romana: situa l'imperium come origine della protezione e del patrocinio. Per i romani, la conquista è in funzione della protezione; per la teoria-prassi della guerra preventiva, è in funzione dell'imperium. Il potere cessa di essere un'articolazione plasmata dalle leggi e dalle categorie del 'politico'; diviene il metaspazio del 'politico' senza più alcuna mediazione e articolazione. L'imperium che si fa mondo è la risultante estrema e drammatica di questa ontologia: la proiezione spaziale della potenza, vero e proprio fulcro della controrivoluzione operata dal pensiero militare statunitense, è la strategia ritenuta meglio adeguata a questo tipo di necessità. Il potere imperiale americano si incardina preminentemente, se non in linea esclusiva, sulla propria potenza tecnologico-militare. Parlavamo innanzi di controrivoluzione proprio a fronte dell'evidente scardinamento e capovolgimento delle categorie del 'politico' qui operati, manovrando intensamente e rimodulando con asprezza i codici di potenza del potere. "Colpire a distanza" e "proiettare a distanza" la potenza di fuoco del potere: ecco le due variabili strategiche della "dottrina Bush", ampiamente esplicitate dall'amministrazione medesima, del resto. E dunque, diversamente da quella romana, la pax americana è paralisi del 'politico', ora direttamente infeudato sotto l'imperium. Con l'ulteriore e non lieve differenza che qui l'imperium non è, come nel caso di Roma, possesso, organizzazione, amministrazione e controllo del mondo. La proiezione a distanza della potenza fa qui tutt'uno con la proiezione degli Usa come mondo. Con tutta evidenza, profittando dei processi di globalizzazione, la proiezione del potere salta la fase intermedia dell'organizzazione dell'imperium. L'amministrazione americana intende dominare un mondo ancora non interamente organizzato e non interamente amministrato dagli Usa. Deflagrano, con ciò, le regole classiche del 'politico' che è, sì, sempre comando sullo spazio/tempo, ma sempre secondo i codici di espansione delle sfere della sovranità6. Qui, invece, l'imperium americano intende far corrispondere alla estensione del proprio comando sullo spazio/tempo il restringimento della legittimazione attiva alla sovranità, imputata unicamente agli Usa. Da questo estremo lembo, la prospettiva amico/nemico del decisionismo schmittiano è trasfigurata e viene preannunciata una situazione permanente di guerra totale. Spezzate e dissolte tutte le catene causali e gerarchiche tra 'politico' e 'potere' ancora presenti in Schmitt, non ci troviamo più affacciati sul precipizio della "guerra civile mondiale"; bensì siamo sospinti nell'abisso delle proiezioni della guerra planetaria. In un lungo salto mortale, trascorriamo dalla pax romana alla guerra americana. Una geopolitica universalistica rende il mondo prigioniero della guerra. 2. Dalla costituzione senza sovrano al sovrano senza costituzione Rifacendoci ad alcune dotte e mirabili pagine di S. Mazzarino, possiamo concludere che il mondo delle monarchie assolute del Cinque e Seicento abbia trasmesso "in retaggio" alla storiografia moderna la problematica del conflitto e/o della conciliazione possibile tra costituzione e potere7. E non v'è dubbio, come lo stesso Mazzarino insegna, che questo sia stato uno dei temi prediletti del "pensiero storico" classico. D'altronde, il rapporto/conflitto tra costituzione e potere delinea l'orizzonte entro cui matura la stessa "prospettiva tucididea"8. Al suo più alto livello di sviluppo, la guerra comporta lo sconvolgimento della contemporaneità. È da qui che Tucidide conclude che la guerra spinta alla massima tensione si rivela come una sciagura per l'umanità. Da qui, inoltre, si ingenera una sorta di circolo infernale che fa di ogni guerra subentrante una sventura ancora più grande della precedente. La guerra estrema qui non è "levatrice" dell'umanità; bensì l'affossa. Ciò è tanto più vero oggi, nell'epoca del big-bang nucleare e della proliferazione delle armi di distruzione di massa. Ma ancora: il circolo della guerra assoluta mostra, con tutta chiarezza, le degenerazioni estreme del potere ed il progressivo sgretolarsi degli apparati costituzionali. Per Tucidide, di conseguenza, la catastrofe estrema è rappresentata dalla guerra del Peloponneso: una guerra fra greci che sconvolse l'equilibrio e l'immagine del mondo antico. Certo, nella concezione di "sviluppo" approntata da Tucidide non mancano motivi "reazionari". Alla concezione ottimistica di Erodoto egli affianca ed oppone una visione della storia pessimistica, se non catastrofica che nel "progresso" individua le ragioni della decadenza. E tuttavia, pur a 6 fronte di questi evidenti limiti, la "prospettiva tucididea" ha il merito notevole di inquadrare il "fenomeno guerra" in tutta la sua drammatica intensità storica ed al massimo di vigenza del suo potenziale politico distruttivo. In una prospettiva tucididea rovesciata, C. Schmitt dirà: la guerra concentra la "manifestazione estrema" della relazione amico/nemico ed, in questo senso, è il "presupposto" del 'politico' 9. Essa, in quanto tensione all'assoluto, si fa regolatrice della relazione tra potere e costituzione. Diversamente che in Tucidide, la guerra (totale) non rompe l'equilibrio delle forze, ma consente di mantenerlo ed estenderlo. Consolida, così, la potenza, trasformando il potere nel custode della costituzione. Perciò, in Schmitt, la crisi e/o il vuoto di potere lascia la costituzione senza sovrano. Nondimeno, la prospettiva tucididea rovesciata di C. Schmitt non soddisfa il nuovo pensiero strategico americano: mentre il primo è impegnato nel tentativo titanico di costituzionalizzare il potere assoluto e la forza estrema (che lo porrà al servizio del Leviatano nazista), il secondo coniuga direttamente il potere assoluto e la forza estrema come gli unici agenti della costituzionalizzazione della materialità storica e sociale. La costituzione non corre più il rischio di rimanere senza sovrano, insomma. Meglio ancora: il sovrano diviene l'artefice e l'architetto della costituzione materiale. Siamo qui in una situazione di assenza della costituzione formale, dalla quale il sovrano tende a divincolarsi definitivamente. Ma, differentemente dalle monarchie del Cinque e Seicento, il nuovo sovrano assoluto (gli Usa) non si preoccupa di conferire legittimazione politica e sociale alla propria autorità, con adeguate e articolate strategie di potere. La sovranità è ora declinata come potestas senza auctoritas. Registriamo, sul punto, una polarità contraddittoria: per un verso, ci si allontana dalla tradizione politica europea; dall'altro, si rimane preda della pulsione sintomatica della politica vetereuropea: la concezione del potere come "bene di possesso"10. Qui è il possesso di potere che fa la forza, stabilendo le regole e la posta di un gioco politico che tende, in permanenza, a fare a meno della costituzione formale. Uno dei più caratteristici paradigmi schmittiani si trova ad essere perfettamente capovolto: la situazione a cui tende il potere assoluto degli Usa è quella del sovrano senza costituzione. Ritorniamo, anche se per altra via, al nesso cruciale sussistente tra diritto e forza. Maggiore è la forza, maggiore il diritto: non è il diritto che qui organizza la forza; bensì la forza si presenta come diritto, assumendo le sembianze del potere assoluto. E qui il potere assoluto si avvale della facoltà (assoluta) di dichiarare preventivamente e unilateralmente la guerra. Il "diritto di fare la guerra" (jus ad bellum), dall'epoca moderna a quella contemporanea, è attribuito al potere sovrano; qui, invece, è la sovranità senza auctoritas (ovvero, gli Usa: "sovrano senza costituzione") ad autoinvestirsi di tale prerogativa. Vale a dire: per l'unilateralismo americano, la guerra si qualifica come giusta, anche se non è il diritto a sancirne la giustizia. Reperiamo qui una frattura non lieve tra jus ad bellum e bellum justum, con la conseguenza inevitabile che sono destinati a franare tutti i vincoli della "giustizia in guerra" (jus in bellum)11. Non ci si può, perciò, meravigliare delle atrocità della guerra; in particolare, l'accanimento dei mezzi e degli strumenti di distruzione sulla popolazione civile. Ora e qui, il regno della forza si costituzionalizza non più attraverso lo Stato sovrano (Machiavelli, Hobbes e Locke); bensì lo Stato privo di auctoritas costituzionalizza la (propria) forza, con la quale regola le relazioni internazionali. Sembra di assistere ad un ritorno ferino allo "stato di natura" hobbesiano o alla "grande selva" vichiana. Ma così non è. Interviene qualcosa di più terrificante. La regolazione statuale dello "stato di natura" è, in Hobbes, inizio e, insieme, razionalizzazione del ciclo politico, depurato dalle ragioni dilanianti della sedizione. In Vico, la "grande selva" è termine e inizio del ciclo politico, permanentemente in bilico tra i "corsi" e i "ricorsi" della civilizzazione e della "civile felicità". In tutte e due i casi, pur differenti, la possibilità di costituzionalizzare il conflitto è una regolarità del ciclo politico. Qui no; tale possibilità è espunta, perché il ciclo politico è soppresso in quanto rete articolata di decisione e mediazione. L'orizzonte del 'politico' viene squarciato all'indietro; si ritorna al regno della forza che, già per i greci dell'epoca arcaica12, è un "mondo a parte", con regole sue proprie, antecedenti e non fungibili con quelle proprie del 'politico'. A differenza della prospettiva tucididea rovesciata assunta dal decisionismo schmittiano, il nuovo pensiero strategico americano assume un'angolazione pre-tucididea. Diversamente che in Tucidide, qui la forza precede e travalica il 'politico'. Na- 7 sce da qui una geopolitica universalistica che ricomprende in sé il 'politico', dopo averlo sbranato. L'angolazione è qui pre-tucididea, anche per un'ulteriore ed evidente circostanza. Risulta, difatti, sradicato uno dei momenti fondanti del 'politico': la conoscenza politica finalizzata all'arte del governo politico dei conflitti. Quella apportata dal nuovo pensiero strategico americano è una controrivoluzione assoluta, perché disloca lo stato di guerra perpetuo, in contrapposizione belligerante con tutte le utopie e le rivoluzioni che, dall'antichità alla contemporaneità, hanno cercato di far girare in avanti la ruota della storia, spesso tragicamente e non di rado fallendo i loro intenti. L'imperium americano non si limita, con la forza, a violare il diritto. Ne registra, piuttosto, la crisi irreversibile (in primis: crisi del diritto internazionale). È, questo, un rovescio ed un esito, oltre che una concausa, della crisi altrettanto incontenibile del 'politico', soprattutto delle sue matrici europee13. Per la fuoriuscita dalla crisi del diritto e del 'politico', gli Usa propongono soluzioni regressive incardinate sui codici della forza e del potere; e lo abbiamo visto. Sino a che, per questa crisi doppia, non verranno allestite vie d'uscita "progressive", la soluzione americana risulterà vincente, per questa motivazione ulteriore, ma non secondaria. Finora, i competitori e gli antagonisti degli Usa si sono limitati all'istanza di ripristino delle regole revocate dall'unilateralismo americano, senza soffermarsi adeguatamente su una circostanza decisiva. Questa: è stato tanto più facile vulnerare quelle regole, quanto più esse già risultavano largamente inefficaci, per effetto della loro crisi organica. I diritti degli Stati membri della società internazionale, di cui l'Onu è involucro giuridico e materiale, sono da anni in sofferenza, divorati come sono da asimmetrie decisionali e distributive. Nella comunità delle nazioni regolata dall'Onu, i princìpi di giustizia, equità, univocità e responsabilità non trovano universale applicazione. Con il crollo del duopolio Usa/Urss, il fenomeno si è accentuato in maniera inquietante. La fine dell'ordine bipolare del mondo è, sì, stata "occasione per un nuovo inizio", ma non nella positiva direzione auspicata e sperata da J. Habermas14; anzi. Del resto, la crisi di rappresentatività e legittimità dell'Onu parte da lontano; nel caso della seconda "guerra del Golfo", è stata spinta verso il vertice superiore. L'Onu medesima ha contribuito a questa caduta di rappresentatività e legittimità, con scelte e politiche non sempre cristalline e, per lo più, condizionate, se non determinate, dai membri più potenti della comunità internazionale. L'edificio della società internazionale era da tempo scricchiolante, perché logore e usurate erano le sue fondamenta. In un "teatro" in cui i diritti dei paesi forti valgono sempre di più di quelli dei paesi deboli15 ed in cui le "opportunità di vita" sono distribuite in maniera sempre più diseguale tra aree prospere ed aree povere del mondo, è destinato a venire progressivamente meno il fondamento comune della società internazionale. Il bellicismo unilateralista americano interviene al culmine di questa crisi e tenta di volgerla a proprio completo favore. L'Onu è, ormai, da gran tempo un edificio pericolante. Difficile ripararlo; e quand'anche vi si riuscisse, non sarebbe una risposta all'altezza dei tempi. Nell'epoca dei poteri globali, ciò che si richiede è: a) scrivere i diritti cosmopolitici nel solco della differenza; b) pensare la geopolitica del pianeta in chiave cosmopolitica. Insomma, l'esigenza è quella di attraversare in avanti l'orizzonte planetario della crisi del 'politico' e del diritto. Solo a questo livello, si potrà competere, ad "armi pari", con la teoria-prassi della guerra preventiva. 3. Fuori dai dilemmi L'analisi critica che precede rimane, tuttavia, monca di un elemento di indagine essenziale. È vero: l'unilateralismo americano costituisce una rottura formale e materiale dello spazio del 'politico' (e del giuridico) di ascendenza europea. Non per questo, tale spazio aveva ed ha avuto un effettivo carattere egualitario ed universalistico. Che il diritto internazionale, dallo Jus publicum europaeum alla nascita delle Nazioni Unite, abbia costituito e preservato l'unità del mondo corrisponde ad una flagrante contraffazione storica: una classica falsa coscienza (ideologica), stratificata come luogo comune scientifico e simbolico. È, piuttosto, vero il contrario: il diritto internazionale, fin dagli albori, ha teso a costituire l'unità dell'Occidente come unità del mondo. Con una logica espansiva, l'Occidente si è costituito come mondo civile; con una logica restrittiva, ha assimilato il mondo a se stesso. Per effet- 8 to della contestualità delle due logiche, il diritto era e rimaneva prerogativa e titolarità esclusiva del (presunto) mondo civile. Ciò ha fatto sì che l'Occidente fosse, sin dall'inizio, uno spazio/tempo parziale, affetto dalla sindrome della discrezionalità giuridico-politica e del dispotismo culturale16. A ben guardare, vanno rilevati retaggi culturali e incrostazioni ideologiche che rimontano ad epoche ancora più lontane. Occorre risalire fino alla cultura greca che percepisce e costruisce il "barbaro" come nemico (hostis), a cui non vengono riconosciuti diritti. Continuando, è necessario, su questa linea genealogica, ricollegarsi non soltanto alla tradizione giuridica romana, ma anche rilevare il ruolo giocato dalla scolastica e dalla neo-scolastica nel mettere in codice il paradigma della "guerra giusta", secondo una sequenza concettuale che parte da S. Agostino e perviene a S. Tommaso, ricomincia da Vitoria e si chiude con Caetano e de Soto17. Niente meglio delle Crociate e, dopo il 1492, del massacro dei nativi americani esemplifica il carattere terribile e violento del paradigma della "guerra giusta". Il diritto internazionale, così come l'abbiamo conosciuto, ha sancito la divisione e la dominazione del mondo, dalla parte delle superpotenze e dei loro più fedeli alleati. Ecco perché è stato colpito a cuore dalla globalizzazione. Con essa, quella divisione risulta anacronistica, per le stesse finalità del dominio e gli interessi dei dominanti. Il mondo evocato e mantenuto in piedi dall'Onu rimane spazio/tempo planetario scisso, in cui vigeva il multilateralismo dei dominanti. La globalizzazione esige e insedia, invece, uno spazio/tempo ricomposto, per quanto multiverso e polidimensionale. In esso l'esercizio del potere e del dominio è di natura aggregativa e non già divisoria18. Nel senso che il pianeta va ora, per intero, ricondotto a codici di dominio globali e, dunque, non è più possibile frazionarlo a blocchi. Risiedono qui le ragioni fondamentali del crollo dell'impero sovietico e, insieme, la "base oggettiva" della "dottrina Bush". Lo spazio/tempo politico e giuridico della globalizzazione non lascia niente fuori dei propri ambiti: tutto incorpora e tutto tende a regolare, secondo i propri codici di riproduzione. Le coppie binarie che attraversano, dalla guerra giusta al decisionismo politico novecentesco, la tradizione politico-giuridica europea perdono di vigenza. Di questa lunga tradizione, l'Onu costituisce l'ultima forma di espressione cogente. Possiamo dire: il passaggio alla globalizzazione dispiegata converte l'Onu, da figura genealogica, a persistenza archeologica. Qui la genealogia del diritto internazionale occidentale si compie, trascorrendo in archeologia. Su questa archeologia interviene la "mano pesante" dell'unilateralismo americano, trattandola come un residuo e dissolvendola. V'è della lucidità controrivoluzionaria in ciò: l'impiego della globalizzazione, per un tentativo titanico e cruento di fondare il comando politico, camminando avanti, volgendo la testa all'indietro. Non meraviglia che ciò, in un colpo solo, spazzi via, con le tradizioni dello Jus publicum europaeum, tutti i diritti progressivamente sedimentati nel lungo arco storico che va dalla "Magna Charta" alla "gloriosa rivoluzione" inglese, dalla rivoluzione americana a quella francese, dalla democrazia rappresentativa al Welfare State. Rincorrere all'indietro l'unilateralismo americano, per cercare di frenarlo e imbrigliarlo, è fatica vana. Occorre, piuttosto, accettare la sfida: camminare in avanti, volgendo le spalle al passato. In questo movimento difficile e complesso risiedono le speranze e le possibilità effettive di sottrarsi al dilemma della guerra globale. Non rimanere prigionieri della guerra, può solo significare collocarsi al culmine dello spazio/tempo della globalizzazione, per cercarne le aperture, pensando al "radicalmente nuovo". Il passato ed il presente del cambiamento, in quanto tali, sono morti e appaiono indifendibili: la loro energia si è esaurita. Sono recuperabili soltanto "lavorando" ad una discontinuità positiva. Una discontinuità negativa, in ogni caso, ha fatto irruzione, qualunque sia la nostra intenzionalità, la nostra pratica e la nostra progettualità. Si tratta di non rassegnarsi al segno mortuario della negatività irrompente. Nelle stesse faglie da cui fa irruzione il "negativo" si trincerano gli embrioni del "positivo" ed è da questo livello estremo e, insieme, necessario e possibile, che l'avversario può essere sconfitto. Da questa soglia il passato ed il presente ritornano a palpitare e a parlare linguaggi vitali. L'Angelo della Storia non può più camminare con le spalle al futuro, abbacinato e annichilito dalla ferocia degli umani, capaci di trasformare in inferno i mondi vitali. Ora o ha la capacità di camminare con le spalle al passato, senza smettere di vedere la barbarie del presente, oppure si consegna alla disperazione cosmica. Il tempo è maturo, per uscire fuori, una buona volta, dai dilemmi del 'politico' (moderno e contemporaneo). 9 - (giugno-luglio 2003) Note 1 Sulla complessa opera di ridefinizione della politica estera americana operata da H. Kissinger, rimane tuttora valido L. Garruccio, L'era di Kissinger, Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1975. 2 I lavori principali con cui Kissinger fissa il suo "orizzonte teorico" sono: Nuclear and Foreign Policy, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1957; The Necessity for Choice. Prospects of American Foreign Policy, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1961. Cfr., sul punto, L. Garruccio, op. cit., pp. 18-42. 3 Per la discussione del tema, rinviamo al precedente Editoriale n. 21 di "Focus on line". 4 Sull'argomento, utile la rassegna critica di A. Catania, Il diritto tra forza e consenso, Napoli, ESI, 1987; in part., pp. 45 ss. 5 Sulle concordanze e distinzioni presenti, sull'argomento, nelle posizioni di Kelsen, Olivecrona e Ross, cfr. A. Catania, op. cit, pp. 48-74. 6 Per una discussione più ampia del tema, si rinvia al già citato Editoriale n. 21 di "Focus on line". 7 Cfr. S. Mazzarino, Il pensiero storico classico, 3 voll., Bari, Laterza, 1973-74; in part., Tomo II.2, pp. 263-264. 8 Sul punto, è ancora decisivo Mazzarino, op. cit.; in part., Tomo I, pp. 274-285. Su Tucidide "pensatore politico" è rilevante, perlomeno, un altro contributo "classico": W. Jager, Paidea. La formazione dell'uomo greco, 2 voll., Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1967; in part., I, pp. 641-688. Per una "presa di visione" diretta, cfr. Tucidide, La guerra del Peloponneso, Milano, Rizzoli, 1985. Per quanto duramente critico del realismo di Tucidide, lo stesso M. Walzer fa propria l'analisi della scala esponenziale della guerra, pervenendo alla conclusione (non solo morale, ma anche politica) che la "guerra è un crimine" e, per questo, non va mai iniziata. Il che, per Walzer, non vuole significare che non sia giusto opporsi ad una "guerra di aggressione", ma solo indicare che la responsabilità della guerra incombe sul capo di chi la comincia (Guerre giuste e guerre ingiuste, Napoli, Liguori, Napoli, 19979, passim). Ovviamente, le "azioni" della guerra rientrano sempre nella sfera delle responsabilità di chi le compie, indipendentemente dallo status di "aggressore" o "aggredito". Il guaio è che qui il paradigma della "guerra giusta", conservandosi nella sua intangibilità, diviene la "base teorica" per giustificare la "guerra preventiva", camuffata come "risposta giusta" ad un'aggressione (nonostante l'aggressione non si sia ancora esercitata). Non a caso, Walzer diviene il principale ispiratore del "Documento" di 60 intellettuali americani, con cui si giustifica e legittima la guerra dell'amministrazione americana contro "l'asse del male". 9 Le opere di Schmitt rimarchevoli, sull'argomento, sono: a) Le categorie del 'politico', Bologna, Il Mulino, 1972; b) Teoria del partigiano, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 1981. Sul rapporto tra 'politico' e guerra, con notazioni critiche alla posizione schmittiana, sia consentito rinviare ad A. Chiocchi: a) Rivoluzione e conflitto. Categorie politiche, Avellino, Associazione culturale Relazioni, 1995, in part. il cap. 1; b) La soglia difficile. Prospettive e figure della crisi all'ingresso del Novecento, Mercogliano (Av), Associazione culturale Relazioni, 1998, in part. i capp. 5-6. 10 In tema, rimane tuttora calzante la sferzante critica di N. Luhmann, Potere e codice politico, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1982; Id., Teoria politica nello stato del benessere, Milano, Angeli, 1983. 11 Sul conflitto tra jus ad bellum e jus in bellum, cfr. M. Walzer, Guerre giuste e guerre ingiuste, cit.(autore che, come abbiamo visto, pure riconosce legittimità teorica e storica alla nozione di "guerra giusta"); in part., pp. 39-73, 175-371; Tecla Mazzarese, Etica e diritti: tra etica e retorica, "Ragion Pratica", n. 7, 1999 (una versione elettronica del testo è disponibile sul sito di Jura gentium). 12 Sulla questione, cfr. W. Jager, Paidea. La formazione dell'uomo greco, cit. Ha riportato l'attenzione su questo cruciale "momento realista" della paidea greca M. Walzer, op. cit, p. 20. 13 Il tema è stato discusso nel precedente e citato Editoriale n. 21 di "Focus on line". 10 14 Cfr. J. Habermas, Dopo l'utopia, Venezia, Marsilio, 1992, pp. 10-11 ss. 15 Sulla questione cfr., estesamente, D. Zolo, Chi dice umanità. Guerra, diritto e ordine globale, Torino, Einaudi, 2001. Per Zolo, correttamente, quella della "asimmetria dei poteri" costituisce il non emendabile vizio d'origine dell'Onu. Del resto, il medesimo e non sospetto H. Morgenthau, sostenitore insigne delll'approccio "realista" nelle "relazioni internazionali", non ha esitato ad equiparare l'Onu ad una moderna "Santa Alleanza". Il problema è stato sollevato con forza da P. Ingrao, Il potere delle armi e le armi del potere (intervista), "Liberazione", 2 giugno, 2002. Sulla problematica della guerra e del "nuovo ordine" internazionale, tutta la variegata produzione intellettuale di Zolo di questi ultimi anni costituisce uno degli ineludibili punti di riferimento. Ricordiamo, a titolo esemplificativo: a) Cosmopolis. La prospettiva del governo mondiale, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1995; b) I signori della pace. Una critica del globalismo giuridico, Carocci, Roma, 1998; c) Universalismo imperiale e pacifismo "secessionista", "La Rivista del Manifesto", n. 32, 2002; d) Dalla guerra moderna alla guerra globale, in AA.VV., Not in My name. Guerra e diritto (a cura di Linda Bimbi), Roma, Editori Riuniti, 2003. Tutti i contributi che trovano posto nell'ultimo libro citato risultano particolarmente interessanti; ai fini dell'esplorazione che stiamo qui cercando di proporre, rilevano soprattutto quelli di M. Klare, R. Falk, F. Rigaux, P. Shiner, A. Di Blase, G. Palmisano, R. La Valle, S. Senese, L. Ferrajoli. Ovviamente, la pista di indagine che stiamo cercando di approntare, pur avendone tenuto debitamente conto, non concorda con quelle presenti nei testi innanzi richiamati: la responsabilità di "errori di analisi" e "conclusioni infondate" è soltanto di chi scrive. 16 Cfr., da ultimo, le considerazioni di D. Zolo, Universalismo imperiale e pacifismo "secessionista", cit. Per una critica dei processi di civilizzazione, sia concesso rinviare ad A. Chiocchi, Civiltà ed emarginazione. Per la critica della civilizzazione, Mercogliano (Av), Associazione culturale Relazioni, 1998. 17 Per una sintetica, ma approfondita ricognizione critica, cfr. F. Rigaux, La dottrina della guerra giusta, in AA. VV., Not in My Name, cit. 18 Per l'inquadramento di questo processo, secondo prospettive di analisi non concordanti, ma nemmeno antinomiche, cfr. M. Hardt-A. Negri, Impero, Milano, Rizzoli, 2002 (ma 2000); G. Galli, Spazi politici, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2001; G. Chiesa, La guerra infinita, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2002.

A Liberal Realist Answer to Debunking Skepticism: The Empirical Case for Realism Abstract: Debunking skeptics claim that our moral beliefs are formed by processes unsuited to identifying objective facts, such as emotions inculcated by our genes and culture; therefore, they say, even if there are objective moral facts, we probably don't know them. I argue that the debunking skeptics cannot explain the pervasive trend toward liberalization of values over human history, and that the best explanation is the realist's: humanity is becoming increasingly liberal because liberalism is the objectively correct moral stance. 1. Debunking Arguments for Moral Anti-Realism 1.1. Three Skeptical Accounts of Moral Belief Can we ever know what is objectively right or wrong, good or bad? Moral realists answer yes. Anti-realists answer no: they believe that either there are no objective moral truths, or we have no knowledge of these truths. Anti-realists have often defended their position by appealing to one or another debunking explanation for moral beliefs. According to debunking explanations, our moral beliefs are chiefly or entirely produced by psychological mechanisms that are not suited to arriving at objective truths; hence, even if such truths exist, we probably don't know them. In principle, indefinitely many kinds of debunking theories are possible. For instance, if it turned out that your moral beliefs were implanted in your mind by a capricious hypnotist, those beliefs would thereby be 'debunked'. In practice, however, the debunking explanations seriously advanced have generally been of just three sorts. First, some hold that the moral beliefs of an individual are entirely a function of that individual's particular emotions and desires, understood as purely non-cognitive states. Thus, David Hume states that "morality is determined by sentiment" and that "to have the sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character."1 Second, some say that our moral beliefs are chiefly or entirely the product of our particular culture. For example, those raised in strongly Christian or Islamic communities today often judge homosexuality to be morally wrong. But if they had been born in ancient Greece, they would more likely have accepted homosexuality.2 Furthermore, many theorists deny that our culture reflects any objective evaluative facts; it is just the set of practices that we happen to have adopted, no better or worse, objectively speaking, than any other set of practices.3 Third, in recent years, evolutionary explanations of moral attitudes have grown in popularity. For example, on the assumption that our genes influence our moral beliefs4 (perhaps indirectly, perhaps through our emotions), we can understand why most Hume 1975, p. 289; 1992, p. 471, emphasis in original.1 See for example, Plato 1977.2 Benedict 1934.3 Dawkins 1989, ch. 12; Wright 1995, ch. 10; Ruse 1998, pp. 218–22.4 1 people believe in a strong moral obligation to care for one's own children, but no parallel obligation to care for unrelated persons: in our evolutionary past, ancestors who accepted such an obligation tended to leave behind more surviving offspring than those who denied any such obligation. Enthusiasts for evolutionary psychology claim that there are many other cases in which common moral attitudes are most naturally explained by natural selection. Perhaps the most plausible debunking theory is a combination of the above three accounts: perhaps moral judgments are caused by emotions, desires, or other noncognitive states, and these non-cognitive states, in turn, are products of both genes and culture. Some recent work in psychology has lent credibility to this hypothesis. Psychologist Jonathan Haidt has done research suggesting that moral judgments are largely a product of gut reactions and that moral reasoning often functions merely as post-hoc rationalization. The dramatic differences in moral beliefs across societies5 surely lend credence to the claim that moral beliefs are largely caused by one's culture. That there is also a large genetic component is at least suggested by the recent research finding that the heritability of political orientation is approximately 0.53.6 1.2. Why the Debunking Theories Engender Skepticism Debunking accounts of moral belief could not show that there are no objective moral facts. What they might show, however, is that if there are objective moral facts, our belief-forming mechanisms are ill-suited to identifying them. Suppose that our moral beliefs are solely or chiefly produced by emotions. Emotions are typically not reliable guides to objective facts. Given the plausible assumption that knowledge requires a reliable belief-forming mechanism, this supposition would tend to suggest that our moral beliefs do not constitute knowledge of any objective facts; hence, that either there aren't objective moral facts, or there are but we don't know them.7 But suppose one thought that emotions, or at least some emotions, are actually evaluative representations. For example, perhaps to feel anger is, among other things,8 to feel that an injustice has been done. (This view differs from Hume's in the order of explanation: this view explains the nature of emotions in part by reference to moral propositions, whereas Hume proposes to explain moral "propositions" by reference to emotions.) On this view, it would not be strange that emotions should be reliable guides Haidt 2001.5 Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005, p. 162. "Political orientation" refers to a composite of6 responses to questions about various political controversies. The data show that genetically identical twins are much more similar in political orientation than are fraternal twins raised in the same home. Because political beliefs are strongly dependent on moral beliefs (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009), this suggests that moral beliefs too have a substantial genetic influence. Does this argument require a process reliabilist analysis of knowledge? No, because the7 argument only assumes that reliability is one necessary condition for knowledge. This is compatible with, e.g., a defeasibility account of knowledge, where the unreliability of a beliefforming process counts as a defeater (for exposition of the defeasibility account, see Klein 1971). A related view is that desires are evaluative representations; see Oddie 2005. The same8 points apply to this view as to the view about emotions. 2 to evaluative facts even though they are poor guides to non-evaluative facts. For this reason, it will not suffice merely to observe that emotions are typically (in descriptive matters) poor guides to objective facts. We must rather consider the causes of our relevant emotions (the emotions that are plausible sources of moral beliefs) and ask whether these causes make it plausible to hold the resulting emotions to be reliable guides to the objective evaluative facts, if such facts exist. Thus, proponents of the first kind of debunking explanation for morality are naturally driven to elaborate their theory by appeal to one or both of the other debunking explanations: perhaps our moral emotions are caused by our culture or our genes. If so, there is no good reason to suppose that our moral beliefs will reflect the objective moral facts, even if such facts exist. Begin with the case of culture: there is so much variation in moral beliefs across cultures that culture, in general, cannot be a reliable guide to objective moral truths. Furthermore, there is no independent reason to think that our culture in particular should have the correct moral beliefs. Here, by "independent," I mean independent of our moral beliefs – of course, if one assumes the general correctness of one's current moral beliefs, one can go on to argue that one's own culture is peculiarly attuned to moral reality; but to the extent that one's moral beliefs are the product of that culture, this sort of bootstrapping reasoning seems illegitimate. Consider next the case of beliefs explained by natural selection. What nature selects for is reproductive success. If correctly identifying the objective moral truths does not contribute to reproductive success, then there is no reason why evolutionary processes should have endowed us with the capacity to identify those truths. And there seems to be no reason independent of our current moral beliefs to suppose that knowing the objective moral facts would have contributed to reproductive success. Indeed, because moral properties seem to have no causal impact on the physical world, it is hard to see how moral reliability could impact reproductive success.9 The debunking explanations for morality thus engender skepticism as to the reliability of our moral belief-forming mechanisms, on the assumption that there are objective moral facts. This in turn leads us to doubt that our moral beliefs could constitute knowledge of objective facts. 2. A Modest Liberal Realism 2.1. Three Realist Accounts of the Source of Morality Most moral realists would dispute the anti-realists' characterization of the source of moral beliefs. The realist need not, and of course should not, maintain that no moral beliefs are caused by emotions, culture, or genes. We need not make that claim, since realism is not the view that all moral beliefs constitute knowledge of objective facts; realism holds only that some moral beliefs constitute knowledge of objective facts. Therefore, it need only be held that some moral beliefs derive from reliable beliefforming mechanisms. Realists have advanced at least three accounts of the nature of these reliable mechanisms. First, some have held that we have empirical knowledge of moral facts, Street 2006, pp. 129-31. For a reply to this sort of argument, see Huemer 2005, pp. 218-19.9 3 through observation or inference to the best explanation. Second, some have held that10 there is a dedicated moral sense, that is, a faculty that functions specifically to cognize moral facts (or evaluative facts more generally) and nothing else. I shall not discuss11 these first two views further, however, because I find them improbable. The third account, by far the dominant one among intuitionists over the last century, is a rationalistic intuitionism. This account holds that our moral knowledge is of12 a kind with our other a priori knowledge, such as our knowledge of mathematics and of necessary truths of metaphysics. Obviously, the nature of this other a priori knowledge is a matter of controversy. Fortunately, we need not settle that controversy here. Rationalist intuitionism simply needs the assumption that there is some substantive, a priori (non-evaluative) knowledge. Knowledge requires a reliable belief-forming mechanism (that was a presupposition of the debunking arguments of section 1), so there must be a reliable mechanism that produces these non-evaluative a priori beliefs. Whatever that mechanism is, the rationalist intuitionist maintains, that mechanism is also capable of producing some moral beliefs. This is why it is plausible to think that some moral beliefs might be sufficiently reliable to qualify as knowledge. There are some who deny the existence of a priori knowledge altogether. Others13 admit only analytic a priori knowledge, which is supposed to be explicable purely in terms of one's understanding of the meanings of words. This would make rationalistic14 intuitionism very implausible. I think, however, that these views have been refuted elsewhere. Here, I shall simply assume that these empiricist views are wrong. The aim15 of this paper is not to debate rationalism versus empiricism. Rather, the target of this paper is the theorist who thinks there is something specially problematic about objective moral knowledge, such that, even if synthetic a priori knowledge in general is possible, our knowledge of morality would not be an example thereof. This is precisely the sort of position supported by the debunking arguments discussed in section 1. Those arguments do not appeal to some general empiricist doctrine; rather, they purport to show something specifically about how moral beliefs are formed, something that would not apply to other allegedly a priori beliefs (mathematical beliefs, for example, are not usefully explained by emotion, culture, or genes). 2.2. Liberal Realism I am not only a realist but a liberal realist: I think that the objectively correct values are liberal values. When I speak of liberalism, I intend, not any precise ethical theory, but rather a certain very broad ethical orientation. Liberalism (i) recognizes the moral equality of persons, (ii) promotes respect for the dignity of the individual, and (iii) opposes gratuitous coercion and violence. So understood, nearly every ethicist today is a liberal. But while this broad orientation is mostly uncontroversial today, this does not On moral perception, see McGrath 2004; Moore 1992, p. 2517. On explanation, see10 Sturgeon 1985; Railton 1998. For objections to these views, see Huemer 2005, section 4.4. Reid 1983, pp. 319-23; Butler 1964. This view appears to be Street's (2006) main target,11 though she does not name it as such. Prichard 1957, pp. 7-8; Ross, 1988, pp. 29-30; Huemer 2005, pp. 99-102, 215-16.12 Quine 1951.13 Ayer 1952; Mackie 1977, pp. 38-40.14 Bealer 1992; BonJour 1998.15 4 render the category of liberalism uninteresting, for, as we shall see below, human history was in fact dominated by highly illiberal views. The three aspects of liberalism named above are not simply three unrelated moral commitments. They are not like, for example, the commitments of "schliberalism", which is the conjunctive ethical theory that (a) fetuses have rights, (b) pleasure is good, and (c) breaking promises is permissible. Schliberalism is just a concatenation of unrelated views. By contrast, liberalism is a coherent ethical perspective. The idea that individuals should be treated with dignity fits together with the idea that individuals are moral equals, and that one should eschew violence and coercion against the individual. This point is of some import, since it helps to explain why it is a priori plausible to think that, if there are objective values, liberalism might be the objectively correct ethical orientation. This is not to deny that there might be other reasonable candidates for correct ethical orientations; it is only to say that liberalism ought to be counted high on the list of initially plausible candidates. 2.3. Modest Realism There are more and less extreme forms of realism. My realist view is relatively modest, in at least three respects. First, I do not hold that all or most moral beliefs constitute knowledge; indeed, it may be that only a small minority of moral beliefs constitute genuine knowledge of the objective moral facts. Second, though I deny that culture and genes provide a complete explanation for our moral beliefs, I do not doubt that culture and genes play an important role in explaining moral beliefs. Even if we have rational, ethical intuitions that are sometimes reliable, these intuitions are not anything close to the whole explanation for our moral beliefs. Third, though I insist that moral knowledge is possible, I do not claim that it is easy. Some moral knowledge might require careful reflection and skill in judgment. Some might emerge from a long and difficult process. Our society may need to accumulate its moral wisdom over a period of centuries, and a great deal of moral knowledge may yet elude us. All of this is compatible with the claim that moral knowledge rests ultimately on intuition. 3. The Phenomenon of Moral Progress I shall contend that certain empirical facts are difficult to explain on any of the debunking theories mentioned in section 1, and that by contrast, the modest, liberal realist can offer a plausible account of the data. Roughly, the data in question concern the development of moral values over the course of human history. 3.1. War and Murder In most societies throughout history, killing has been far more common than it is in our society today. The trend toward lower rates of violence is visible on the scale of decades, centuries, and millennia, it is consistent across countries, and it applies to both murder and warfare. These facts have been extensively documented elsewhere. Here, I will just16 Pinker 2011.16 5 mention one striking fact: in primitive societies, it is estimated that between ten and thirty percent of all deaths come at the hands of other humans, with most of these being deaths of men in war. Figure 1 shows estimates for the percentage of deaths due to war in seven contemporary primitive societies studied by anthropologists. Figure 2 shows17 estimated deaths due to war and murder in sixteen prehistoric primitive societies; these estimates are based upon sixteen archeological sites where human remains were found and examined for signs of death at the hands of other humans. In each figure, the18 death rate for Europe and the United States in the twentieth century is shown at the bottom for comparison. [ Insert Figure 1 ] [ Insert Figure 2 ] There are many factors that may have contributed to the decline in violence. But19 there is one that is of particular interest here: there has been a dramatic shift in human values over history. In primitive societies, including our own society in earlier20 centuries, physical combat was often regarded as glorious, honorable, and manly. Those who conquered others through violence were honored: Alexander "the Great" was so called because of his successful campaigns of violence in Asia and Northeast Africa. Likewise, Peter "the Great" earned his honorific through his successful attacks on other European nations. Today, such leaders would more likely be reviled as criminal aggressors. Consider these sentiments from prominent thinkers of the past:21 You say it is the good cause that hallows even war? I say to you: it is the good war that hallows every cause. (Friedrich Nietzsche, 1885) If war made men brutal, at least it made them strong; it called out the qualities best fitted to survive in the struggle for existence. [...] War, with all its horrors, could purify as well as debase [....] (Henry Adams, 1891) Would not the end of war be the end of humanity? War is life itself. Nothing exists in nature, is born, grows or multiplies except by combat. (Emile Zola, 1959) Murder has shown a marked decline over the centuries. In Europe, the murder rate has declined from about 35 per 100,000 population per year in 1300 A.D. to about 3 per Keeley 1996, pp. 196.17 Bowles 2009, p. 1295; Keeley 1996, p. 197. The two "Central California" entries refer to18 distinct sites in central California. For discussion of a variety of possible factors, see Pinker 2011.19 For discussion, see Mueller 2004; Huemer 2013.20 Nietzsche 2003, part 1, section 10, p. 35 (originally published 1883-1885); Adams 1891,21 p. 277 (discussing the war of 1812 and explaining the advantages of war over embargo); Zola quoted in Joll and Martel 2007, p. 275. 6 100,000 today. Again, many factors may have contributed to the decline – among them22 the changing attitudes toward murder. Men of the past perceived many more things as reasons for killing. Consider that in 1804, former American Treasury Secretary23 Alexander Hamilton died in a duel with sitting Vice President Aaron Burr. The duel was fought to settle a dispute over some disparaging remarks Hamilton had allegedly made about Burr. Such behavior on the part of respected men would be unthinkable today.24 3.2. Torture and Execution Governments of the past executed citizens at the drop of a hat, and in quite gruesome ways at that. In the middle ages, capital offences included sodomy, gossip, stealing cabbages, picking up sticks on the Sabbath, talking back to one's parents, and of course witchcraft. Execution methods included burning at the stake, drawing and quartering,25 boiling, and sawing. The last of these methods is depicted in figure 3.26 [ Insert Figure 3 ] Torture was accepted as a method of investigation. For instance, a suspected witch might be tortured until she (i) confessed to witchcraft, and (ii) named the other witches that she presumably knew about. The other accused witches could then be tortured to verify their guilt. Here I shall forebear from describing the medieval torture techniques, as their mere contemplation is more than should be asked of a reader in a civilized society. The good news is that over the past four hundred years, torture has been abolished throughout Europe and most of the world. 3.3. Slavery Slavery has been accepted in many societies throughout human history and was often endorsed by the moral authorities of the day. Aristotle, considered by many the27 greatest philosopher of all time, saw no problem with waging war to capture slaves: But the art of acquiring slaves, I mean of justly acquiring them, differs both from the art of the master and the art of the slave, being a species of hunting or war.28 The Bible, long considered by many a font of moral wisdom, advised readers on just how severely one may beat one's slaves: Spierenburg 2008, pp. 3-4; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2013.22 On the acceptance of killing in primitive societies, see Oesterdiekhoff 2011, pp. 169-70;23 on honor-motivated killings in medieval Europe, see Spierenburg 2008, pp. 7-8. Library of Congress 2011.24 Pinker 2011, p. 149.25 From a fifteenth century print, reproduced in Held 1987, p. 47.26 Bradley and Cartledge 2011; Eltis and Engerman 2011.27 Aristotle 1941, 1255b37-40.28 7 If a man beats his male or female slave with a rod and the slave dies as a direct result, he must be punished, but he is not to be punished if the slave gets up after a day or two, since the slave is his property.29 If such passages were written today, the author would have to be insane. Obviously, these passages came across very differently in the societies for which they were originally written. Over the past two hundred years, the world saw a wave of abolitions, with the result that today, slavery is illegal in every country in the world. Figure 4 shows when slavery was abolished in 49 selected countries.30 [ Insert Figure 4 ] 3.4. Racism and Sexism Contemporary political activists sometimes decry the racism and sexism of our society. But again, for anyone with broadly liberal values, a look at our past provokes first shock, then gratitude that we no longer live in such bigoted times. In earlier decades, even in democratic societies, women were literally prohibited from voting, due in part to their supposed inferiority. That situation started to change around 1920 (see figure 5).31 Though it remains true today that many desirable professions are disproportionately occupied by men, in earlier ages, women were completely barred from most professions. [ Insert Figure 5 ] Even after slavery was abolished, Americans continued for decades to impose policies that were severely and explicitly racist. Black citizens were expected to ride at the back of the bus, use separate drinking fountains and restrooms, and attend separate schools – all to prevent contamination of whites by blacks. These laws ended in the United States in the 1960's. Since that time, attitudes have shifted dramatically: if32 someone today were to advocate the sort of laws that actually existed fifty years ago, listeners would assume the speaker needed to have his head examined. If the advocate were a politician, his career would be instantly ended. 3.5. Democratization Throughout human history, the vast majority of governments have been dictatorial. In the year 1800, there were, by modern standards, no genuine democracies. Since then, democracy has spread to about half of all the world's countries and appears poised to Exodus 21: 20-21.29 Data source: Wikipedia 2014a.30 Data source: Wikipedia 2014b. Dates used are the first year women could vote in any31 election in a given country. For an account of the American civil rights movement, see Williams 1987.32 8 take over the globe (see figure 6). In about the last twenty years, democracy has spread33 to about as many countries as it had reached during the previous two hundred years. [ Insert Figure 6 ] 3.6. Decolonization Throughout most of human history, building an empire through conquering other peoples has been viewed as a great achievement for a leader. The twentieth century witnessed two of history's greatest empires: the British Empire and the French Empire. Both of these empires also collapsed in the last century, as nearly all the conquered peoples regained independence. In some cases, independence was gained through bloody warfare; in others, as in that of India, it was gained through non-violent protest movements.34 The latter phenomenon is striking. What if, during the reign of Alexander of Macedon, the Persians had sought independence through non-violent protests, using civil disobedience, general strikes, and so forth? Why didn't the people conquered by Genghis Khan think of holding sit-ins and protest marches? If there had been a Gandhi in the time of Khan, he would most likely have been swiftly executed by the conqueror whose moral legitimacy he'd sought to call into question. The British Empire collapsed not because the British lacked the power to defend it, but because – to a much greater degree than earlier conquerors – the British had a conscience. 3.7. Summary There has been enormous moral progress over human history. This progress is not just a matter of changing practices but of changing moral beliefs. Modern humans are far more liberal than those of earlier ages; mainstream illiberal views of earlier centuries are shocking and absurd to modern readers. The trend toward liberalization is consistent across many issues. War, murder, slavery, democracy, women's suffrage, racial segregation, torture, execution, colonization: on all these issues we have seen dramatic attitude shifts, all in the liberal direction. It is difficult to think of any issue on which attitudes have moved in the other direction. This trend has been ongoing for millennia, accelerating in the last two centuries, and even the last fifty years, and it affects virtually every country on Earth. That is a very striking empirical fact – indeed, it is among the most important trends in human history. How are we to explain all this? 4. The Failure of Debunking Accounts 4.1. A Darwinian Trilemma There is one trivial sense in which an evolutionary account of ethics must be correct: human beings evolved, and therefore, however our capacity for moral judgment works, Data source: Center for Systemic Peace 2011. I count as democracies all countries with33 scores of 6 or higher on the polity2 variable in the Polity IV dataset. Note that the dataset includes only countries with populations of at least 500,000, and data are sparse before 1900. For an account of the Indian independence movement, see Sarkar 1988.34 9 that capacity is a product of evolution, as are all of our capacities. This thesis of "an evolutionary origin for ethics" poses no threat to moral realism, because the thesis would be true regardless of whether our moral judgments were reliable indicators of moral truth, just as the analogous thesis is true of our judgments in all other areas. The kind of evolutionary thesis that is supposed to pose a problem for realism holds that our specific moral values are adaptations. For example, the tendency to judge that adultery is wrong might have been selected for because that moral judgment promoted reproductive fitness among our ancestors. This would cast doubt on the reliability of that moral judgment. Recall that realism is committed only to the view that some moral beliefs constitute knowledge, whereas anti-realists hold that no moral belief constitutes knowledge of an objective fact. Thus, to support anti-realism using a debunking account of moral beliefs, the anti-realist must hold that all moral beliefs either are adaptations, or have some other source that we should not expect to be reliably truth-directed. In particular, then, the anti-realist who pursues this strategy would have to give a debunking account of liberal moral beliefs, as well as of illiberal ones. Since we are here considering evolutionary debunking accounts, the question is now whether an evolutionary account of liberalism is plausible. In explaining the rise of liberalism, adaptationists face a trilemma: either (i) they hold that liberal values are adaptive, (ii) they hold that liberal values are not adaptive, or (iii) they hold that liberal values are adaptive in modern societies but were not adaptive in earlier times. On the first horn, the adaptationist might appear to be able to explain the current prevalence of liberal values. But they could not explain why liberal values are relatively recent, and why these values have been spreading and strengthening over human history. Human beings existed in primitive societies for hundreds of thousands of years before recorded history, and all of recorded history occupies only a few thousand years, which is a brief time in evolutionary terms. It therefore strains credibility that the adaptive set of values should have evolved during the brief period of recorded history, having failed to evolve during the preceding two hundred thousand years that humans existed or the millions of years during which our primate ancestors existed. On the second horn of the trilemma, the adaptationist can explain why most human beings throughout most of history have held illiberal values. This, however, poses no threat to the liberal realist; indeed, the liberal realist ought to enthusiastically embrace the evolutionary debunking of illiberal beliefs, since it lends support to the contention that modern, liberal values are more trustworthy than the values of the past. The adaptationist could not, however, explain modern, liberal values. Thus, the modest liberal realist's position would be undamaged, or indeed strengthened, by the putatively debunking skeptical argument. Only on the third horn could the adaptationist possibly account both for the illiberal beliefs of the past and the liberal beliefs of the present. Perhaps as conditions in society have changed, liberal values have become increasingly adaptive, thus leading to their spread across the world. This theory, however, is extremely implausible empirically. One problem is that the shift in values has been far too rapid to be explained by biological evolution. The Jim Crow laws in the United States were abolished only in the 1960's; before that, explicit racism was perfectly socially acceptable. It is not the case that there was a gene for racism that was selected out of the gene pool in the 1960's. 10 Another problem is that an adaptationist account of liberalization would have to work via the supposition that those with liberal values have in recent times had greater reproductive success than their ideological opponents. But there is no reason to believe this. There is no reason to think, for example, that in the 1960's racists started having fewer children than non-racists and thus failed to pass on their racist genes, or that during the last two hundred years, people who supported democracy started having more children than those who supported dictatorship. 4.2. Changes in Gene Expression For the reasons given, the idea of accounting for ethical liberalization through genetic change is unpromising. The same genes, however, can sometimes be expressed differently in different environments. Thus, there is a theoretical possibility that moral beliefs are adaptations, and yet that changes in prevailing moral beliefs could be brought about by environmental changes in the absence of genetic change. Here is one hypothesis: perhaps we have a gene (or set of genes) with both of the following properties: (i) it inclines one toward illiberal beliefs if resources are scarce and survival uncertain, but (ii) it inclines one toward liberal beliefs if one is well-off and secure. In that case, as a society advanced economically and its members became more prosperous and secure, the values of those members would become increasingly liberal. While this hypothesis is logically possible and would neatly solve the adaptationist's problem, there doesn't seem to be any reason to believe it (notice that whatever psychological changes we observed over history, one could always hypothesize that there is a gene that happens to cause each type of psychological trait, in the social circumstances in which it was in fact prevalent). To begin with, it is not clear, on a theoretical level, why such a gene or set of genes should have been selected; it is not clear why liberal values would promote reproductive success for a well-off and secure person, but not for one who is poor and insecure. In addition, in humanity's illiberal past, those who were wealthy and secure (aristocrats) were typically not at all liberal; they were the ones oppressing the rest of their societies. Here is another hypothesis: perhaps there is a gene that inclines one toward illiberal beliefs if one's society as a whole is primitive and poor, but inclines toward liberal beliefs if one's society is advanced and prosperous. This hypothesis, however, is even harder to motivate theoretically. Again, it is unclear why such a gene would be especially advantageous, as compared with a gene that causes one to be liberal in all conditions, or illiberal in all conditions. Even if such a gene would be advantageous, there has not been sufficient opportunity for it to be selected, since for almost all of the history of the species human beings have lived in poor, primitive societies. Humanity has not had enough experience with shifting between poor and prosperous, or primitive and advanced societies, for evolution to have designed special instructions governing what to do in an advanced, prosperous society. If evolution wholly controlled our moral values, the values it gave us would have been the ones that were adaptive in poor, primitive societies, and we would most likely continue using those same values when we reached the unprecedented situation of living in advanced, prosperous societies. 4.3. Debunking Cultural Accounts The proponent of cultural explanations for moral values would seem to be in a better 11 position to accommodate the phenomenon of moral liberalization. Culture, after all, is capable of changing much more rapidly than biology. And it is mainly a shift in culture that would explain why a given individual today is much more liberal than most people in the past. We do not all independently figure out that slavery is wrong as we grow up. We are taught that slavery is wrong; that is now part of our culture. But to say this really takes us almost no distance toward explaining the phenomenon that is of interest. The interesting question is, why has our culture evolved in the way that it has? Often, in explaining human behavior, culture is taken as given, with no further explanation needed. Perhaps cultures simply change over time in unpredictable ways, so that there is no point in asking for an explanation of why a culture incorporates certain values, or why it has changed in a certain way. But in the present case, this would be not only an unsatisfying but a deeply implausible attitude to adopt. The liberalization of human values over time does not look like a random process. It looks very nonrandom, for three reasons. First, the development with which we are concerned comprises a set of changes in attitudes on multiple different issues – slavery, war, torture, women's suffrage, and so on – that all fit together; all are consistent with a certain coherent ethical standpoint. Second, the change has been proceeding in the same direction for centuries. Third, the changes have affected nearly all societies across the globe. This is not a "random walk"; this calls out for an explanation. Perhaps we can provide piecemeal explanations for liberalization with respect to different issues and different countries. For example, why was slavery abolished in the United States? Abraham Lincoln prosecuted the American Civil War for the purpose of preserving the union. During the war, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, freeing most of the slaves, as a measure to help the Union win the war: the Proclamation increased the morale of Union troops and induced some slaves in Confederate states to escape from their masters, which weakened the South. As the Union defeated the Confederacy, the Proclamation became enforceable. In some sense, this is a correct explanation for why most of the slaves in the U.S. were freed (the rest being freed later by the Thirteenth Amendment). But we should also find this unsatisfying, because slavery was not just abolished in the United States. Starting from a point when slavery was widely accepted, it came to be abolished in every country in the world over the past few centuries. Are we to believe it is coincidence that in all these countries some concatenation of events leading to abolition transpired, like those that occurred in the United States? Surely there is some further explanation; surely something could be said about why slavery in general was not a stable practice in modern times. Of course, there are other kinds of explanation for the abolition of slavery. For example, perhaps slavery was best suited to an older, more agriculturally centered economy but was ill-suited to modern, industrial economies. Thus, as industrialization spread across the globe, slavery became less advantageous, and perhaps this led to its abolition. This explanation is of course speculative. Moreover, it again requires that we accept a great coincidence. For it is not just that slavery was abolished. It is that liberalism triumphed on many different issues over the past few centuries. Are we to believe it is coincidence that, at the same time that slavery was becoming economically inefficient, some other trend was leading women's suffrage to become more popular (perhaps women's suffrage also becomes more economically advantageous in industrial 12 societies?), another trend was causing democracy to spread across the world, another was causing war to seem less glorious, another made torture seem less beneficial, and so on? Again, it is important to note that this is not just a series of unrelated changes; they are all changes in line with a certain coherent ethical perspective. It would be difficult to state how all these changes cohere without using moral or quasi-moral concepts: all the changes fit together, in one way or another, with the value of equal respect for the dignity of persons. I of course cannot anticipate every possible explanation for the shift in values over time. What I will do at this point, then, is simply to present my own realistic account, leaving it to the anti-realists attempt to devise a better explanation. 5. A Realist Account of Moral Progress Why was slavery abolished? Because slavery was unjust. Why has democracy spread to ever more countries over the past two centuries? Because democracy is better than other systems of government. Why have human beings become increasingly reluctant to go to war? Because war is horrible. Why has liberalism in general triumphed in human history? Because liberalism is correct. These, I suggest, are the most simple and natural explanations. But how could such explanations be correct? The explananda in these cases are partly social and psychological, and partly physical; for instance, the decline in the prevalence of war involves changes in the sorts of physical events that tend to happen to human bodies. But moral properties and relations – injustice, betterness, horribleness – have no causal powers, certainly not on the physical world. Therefore, they could not have any role in explaining any physical facts, could they? In the remainder of this35 section, I aim to explain both why these moral explanations are plausible and how they are possible. 5.1. The Pattern of Intellectual Progress in History Critics of moral realism have often appealed to the argument from cultural variation: it is said that the truth of moral realism predicts that there should be broad agreement on moral values across the world; since in fact there is a great deal of disagreement, this constitutes evidence against realism. The critics are partly right. If there were objective values, and humans had some way of accessing them, we would expect a certain amount of agreement. How much agreement should we expect, and what patterns should we expect to see in the points of agreement and disagreement? The most obvious way of addressing this question is to look at other areas of inquiry, such as mathematics, physics, cosmology, geology, psychology, and biology. These are all areas in which there are objective facts to which human beings have some (more or less imperfect) means of cognitive access. In these areas, we observe the following: First, we find no universal agreement across cultures. Rather, in primitive cultures, we find a wide variety of beliefs at variance with those of our own society. For example, in our society, the Earth is thought to have been formed as a result of gravitational Concerns of this sort are raised by Harman (1977, pp. 6-9) and Street (2006, pp. 129-31).35 13 accretion from a solar nebula. But according to an ancient Egyptian account, the Earth was the offspring of a mating between Sky and Moisture. In our society, it is thought36 that the continents were formed by plate tectonics. But according to the Iroquois of North America, the continents were formed as a result of a muskrat piling mud on the back of a turtle. Even our own society in earlier centuries had radically different views37 from those we hold today. Today, we believe that most diseases are caused by microscopic bacteria and viruses. But in the middle ages, it was thought that diseases were caused by imbalances of the four bodily humors, namely, black bile, yellow bile, blood, and phlegm. Today, it is thought that there are about a hundred elements,38 beginning with hydrogen, helium, lithium, and so on. But in ancient Greece, it was thought that there were four elements, and they were earth, air, fire, and water.39 Second, our beliefs have changed in certain ways over time. They have become more subtle, complex, and technical. This is illustrated by the above examples. This process is long and often arduous, but punctuated by occasional "scientific revolutions" in which opinions shift rapidly on a particular question. Third, different societies around the world tend to converge on certain accounts, once they are exposed to these theories and the evidence for them. No Egyptian today, for example, holds that the Earth was created by sexual reproduction between Sky and Moisture. Again, this convergence has been a gradual process which remains incomplete. For example, even in modern, Western societies, there remain lay people who believe that the Earth was created by Jehovah in the year 4004 B.C. What we can40 say, however, is that that view is on the wrong side of history. The view that the Earth was created 4.5 billion years ago by accretion from the solar nebula is the dominant theory, held by virtually all of our society's experts in the subject. And this is not specific to a particular society; thus, for example, astronomers in Japan, Egypt, France, and Venezuela can all agree on this. 5.2. The Pattern of Moral Progress What, then, about ethics? If ethics is a genuine field of objective knowledge, we should expect to find a similar pattern. And so we do: First, we should not expect cross-cultural agreement among primitive societies. Just as primitive cultures diverge (both from each other and from our own culture) in their descriptive beliefs about the world, we should not be surprised to learn that they diverge in their moral beliefs. Second, however, we should expect ethical beliefs to develop over time, to become more subtle, complex, and technical as societies advance. A perusal of the ethics literature bears this out. With all due respect to the great philosophers of the past, recent work by, say, Judith Thomson, is considerably more complex, more subtle, and more Lindberg 1992, p. 9.36 Duane 1998, p. 16.37 Lindberg 1992, pp. 116-17, 332-3.38 Lindberg 1992, pp. 31, 40.39 Newport 2012.40 14 technical than, say, Plato's discussion of the good.41 Third, we should expect convergence across societies over time – not immediately, but perhaps over the course of centuries or millennia. This expectation is borne out by the trends discussed in section 3 above: over the long term, societies across the world are converging on a liberal value system. Notice that this prediction is not tied to any specific theory of how moral knowledge is gained. Convergence is observed in a priori fields such as mathematics, in experimental sciences such as physics, and in (partly) historical sciences such as astronomy. As long as human beings possess some reliable belief-forming mechanism, whether the mechanism be a priori or empirical, it should be possible eventually to attain convergence on approximately true theories. Thus, if liberalism is the (approximate) moral truth, we should expect eventual convergence on liberal values. 5.3. Overcoming Cultural and Evolutionary Bias Some moral beliefs give the distinct appearance of culturally induced biases – for example, the idea that members of one's own social group are better or more important than those of other social groups; that it is good if one's own society conquers others, but bad if another society conquers one's own; or that those who disagree with one's own religious or cultural beliefs are corrupt and should be punished and forced to convert. And some moral beliefs give a distinct appearance of evolutionarily designed bias – for example, the idea that one's own offspring are more important than other people, the idea that sexual promiscuity is good for a male but bad for a female, and again the42 idea that killing others to seize their territory or resources is good. Liberal moral beliefs, however, do not belong to either class: they do not have the appearance, prima facie, of biases induced either by one's culture or by one's genes. In most cases, they have the opposite appearance of rejecting biases induced by culture or genes. Notably, the idea of the moral equality of all persons stands opposed to precisely those biases that human cultures have traditionally inculcated and that evolutionary psychology would lead us to expect. The prevalence of the idea that one's own social group is superior to others is perfectly understandable in terms of both cultural and biological evolution, as is the idea that violence is justified in the struggle for dominance. By contrast, the liberal rejection of those ideas looks like a product of rational reflection and an overcoming of the cultural and biological biases. Not all of our biases have as yet been overcome, but those that remain appear to be softening. Consider, for example, the idea that adultery – especially on the part of a woman – is a terrible crime. On a purely intellectual level, it is not obvious today what great harm is caused by consensual (on the part of the participants) sexual relations between a woman and a person who is not her husband. But in terms of evolutionary psychology, the feeling is easily explained: sexual infidelity creates a risk of causing the woman to become pregnant with the offspring of the partner who is not her husband, which in turn prevents the woman, for a certain time, from becoming pregnant with her husband's offspring. It may also result in the husband's devoting great resources to See for example, Thomson 1986. 41 For an evolutionary explanation, see Dawkins 1989, ch. 9.42 15 raising the other man's offspring, resources that could have been spent raising a child of his own. In evolutionary psychology, the key factor in explaining human attitudes toward any given event is how that event would have affected the individual's expected reproductive success, in the environment in which humans evolved. For the reasons just given, in the environment of our ancestors, which lacked effective contraceptives, sexual infidelity on the part of a woman would have caused a very large decline her husband's expected reproductive success. Thus, we can understand why a tendency to feel extremely negative reactions toward such infidelity would have had evolutionary survival value. This evolutionarily-induced sentiment remains with us to a certain degree today; as a result, adultery is still regarded as seriously wrong in our society. But consider the change over history: today, adultery is considered grounds for divorce; but in traditional Judeo-Christian and Islamic doctrine, adultery was considered grounds for execution.43 The change in attitudes here is another example of the liberalization of values. To the extent that evolutionary psychology explains the traditional hatred for adultery, the liberalization of attitudes about adultery suggests a move away from our biological programming. Or consider the idea that members of one's own social group are more important than others. Again, on a purely intellectual level, the idea is puzzling. But its prevalence can be understood in terms of cultural evolution: in human history, social groups that inculcated this value of in-group loyalty tended to promote their own survival and expansion at the expense of other groups that did not do so. Thus, we should find the value prevalent in surviving societies.44 This culturally-induced bias, too, remains with us to some degree today. But again, notice the change over time. Today, many believe that they should place the interests of their own compatriots ahead of the interests of foreigners – for instance, that one should rather give to charities helping the poor of one's own country than to those helping the world's poor. But in earlier centuries, people believed that violently attacking other countries to slaughter or enslave their people was a justified and – if successful – glorious practice. To the extent that cultural evolution explains the traditional suspicion of foreigners, the modern liberalization of attitudes toward foreigners represents a shift away from our earlier cultural biases. 5.4. How We Know Moral Truths In this section, I address an argument for moral skepticism. I begin in subsection 5.4.1 by setting out the skeptic's argument, which I will answer in subsections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3. 5.4.1. Skeptical Doubts About Cultural Beliefs Do we really know, for example, that slavery is wrong, or do we merely (correctly) believe that it is? For our belief to count as knowledge, it seems (and I shall grant the skeptic this premise), the belief must have been formed by a reliable process, one that systematically tends to lead to true beliefs. Most of us believe that slavery is wrong Leviticus 20:10; Quran 4:15; Sahih Bukhari 83:37.43 This of course is not the only explanation; a biological explanation is also possible.44 16 because that idea is part of our culture. If we had been born two hundred years ago in the American South, most of us would have believed that slavery was acceptable. It isn't that we reason from "my society disapproves of slavery" to "slavery is wrong." It is rather that our culture influences how things seem to us. If we'd lived in a slaverypracticing society, slavery just would have seemed a lot less bad to us. But that suggests that our belief-forming mechanism is unreliable. Perhaps appearances in general are usually reliable, but appearances that are heavily dependent on one's particular culture are not. If our belief-forming mechanism is "believe moral appearances caused by cultural conditioning," that mechanism would have led to proslavery beliefs in most societies throughout history, in addition to many other false beliefs. So, even if we are right in condemning slavery, it seems that we do not know that slavery is wrong. 5.4.2. How I Know Scientific Truths by Trusting My Culture Before directly addressing the moral skeptic's argument, it is worth considering the parallel reasoning as applied to certain non-evaluative beliefs. In any normal context, if someone asks me, "Do you know how old the Earth is?", the proper answer for me to give is "yes": I know that the Earth is about 4.5 billion years old. But I did not observe any of the physical evidence on which that estimate is based. Truth be told, I could not even tell you how the age of the Earth was calculated. I am relying on the testimony of my society's recognized experts. But in most places and times throughout history, such reliance would have led one to falsehoods more often than to truths. If my beliefforming mechanism is "Believe what the accepted experts in your society say," this mechanism would have led me, in earlier times, to think that the Earth was only a few thousand years old; that the material world was constituted by the four elements of earth, air, fire, and water; that diseases were caused by imbalances of the four bodily humors; and so on. If I'd been born in another society, it would have led me to think that the Earth was produced by a mating of Sky and Moisture. So, even if I am right in placing the Earth's age at 4.5 billion years, it seems that I do not actually know that this is the Earth's age, since my belief forming process is unreliable. This skeptical argument could be applied to most of my beliefs about the world (that is, my beliefs about the things outside of my range of experience). How should we respond to the argument? To begin with, I think we have to say: our culture is special. Granted, throughout history, many people have wrongly taken their own cultures to be special; it might nonetheless be true that some cultures are really special. What is special about our culture is that it possesses modern science, which is a reliable way of learning about the world. It was the methods of modern science that generated the "4.5 billion years" estimate for the Earth's age. This is utterly different from how the beliefs of other cultures were arrived at, such as the belief that Earth was produced by intercourse between Sky and Moisture. In assessing the reliability of my belief-forming mechanism, when my belief is formed as a result of the influence of my culture, should we take into account the reliability of the mechanism by which my culture arrived at its beliefs? I think the answer is yes. Here is the argument: intuitively, it is correct to say that I know how old the Earth is. But if the reliability of my belief-forming mechanism is assessed by reference to the reliability of cultural beliefs in general, then my belief about the age of the Earth would have to be judged as unreliably formed and therefore not a case of knowledge. 17 Therefore, it must be that the reliability of my belief-forming method is not to be assessed by reference to the reliability of cultural beliefs in general. There must be something that enables this belief to count as being formed by a more reliable method than the beliefs that make up the mythologies of other cultures. Presumably, that something has to do with the reliability of modern science. Perhaps, for example, my belief-forming method should be construed as something like "relying on accepted scientific beliefs, in a society that has an advanced scientific practice." There are of course other ways of characterizing the belief-forming process; the important point is that the reliability of modern science should be implicated in the account of why my belief-forming process is reliable in this case, even though I did not myself perform any scientific investigations, because (a certain subset of) my society did perform scientific investigations to arrive at the belief about the age of the Earth, which they in turn transmitted to me. 5.4.3. How I Know Moral Truths by Trusting My Culture Now return to the case of moral beliefs. Why does my belief in the wrongness of slavery count as a belief "formed by a reliable process"? What I want to say here is analogous to what I have suggested in regard to the belief about the age of the Earth. My intuition is influenced by my culture, but this does not disqualify it as a reliable source of moral guidance, because there was a reliable process by which my culture arrived at its current anti-slavery stance. Of course, the process by which our culture developed its liberal values is not the same as the process by which scientists arrived at their estimate of the Earth's age; liberalism did not triumph through scientific investigation. What matters is simply that there is some reliable process by which our values developed. To explain the nature of that process, I must first mention some background assumptions: a. First, I assume that human beings possess a general capacity for a priori knowledge, sometimes called "reason," "the understanding," or "the intellect." No very specific assumptions about this capacity are needed, beyond that it is capable of producing a priori knowledge. b. Ethics is among the subject matters to which that capacity can be applied. In other words, we can, at least sometimes, form a priori ethical beliefs through the same general mechanism by which we form other a priori beliefs. (a) and (b) are standard assumptions of rationalist intuitionism. Note that they have not been devised ad hoc to help in the explanation of liberal progress over human history. Rather, these assumptions have seemed plausible to many moral realists, from Plato to W. D. Ross. But while I endorse assumptions (a) and (b), I also think they provide a very incomplete picture of human moral thought. To better fill out the picture, we must include three more observations: c. Human beings also undergo non-rational influences on our moral belief-formation. Among these influences are emotions and desires, possibly including emotions and desires that are genetically programmed as a result of natural selection, and others that are explained by the cultural practices with which one was raised. None of these 18 factors strictly determines our moral beliefs, but each influences those beliefs. d. Because of the strong influence of culture, it is very difficult, and hence rare, for an individual to embrace a moral position that is radically at odds with the values of his own society, even if that proposition is objectively true. It is, however, much easier, and hence more common, for an individual to embrace a position that is slightly at variance with the values of his society. In other words, it is easier in thought to move a small distance from one's culture than to move a great distance. For example, a person who lived in medieval Europe, when gruesome execution methods were applied for a variety of (what we today would call) minor offenses, would have found it much easier to take seriously the proposition that execution should only be used as a punishment for egregious crimes, than to take seriously the proposition that no one should ever be executed. This would be the case even if the truth is that no one should ever be executed. e. Individuals differ in their moral sensitivity and in their susceptibility to non-rational influences on belief-formation. In other words, some people are more biased than others, and some people are better at apprehending moral truths than others. Again, none of these are ad hoc postulates; each is independently motivated. Assumptions (c) and (d) are independently supported by empirical evidence. Assumption (e) is a natural concomitant of moral realism: in every other area of cognitive performance, individuals show varying aptitudes. Some are better at mathematics than others; some are better at writing than others; some are better at remembering historical facts than others. If moral judgment is a form of cognition, then it would be amazing if some people were not better at moral judgment than others. It would likewise be extremely surprising if individuals did not differ in their susceptibility to various kinds of bias. Here is how the liberalization of values comes about. In primitive times, human beings begin with very badly misguided moral beliefs. This parallels the widespread and severe error that primitive societies begin with in all other areas of inquiry. In the case of morals in particular, we have non-rational emotions and desires influencing our beliefs and hence leading us astray – the very sort of influences that the debunking skeptics advert to in their effort to impugn all moral beliefs. Individual members of society will differ in their ability to notice these moral errors. At any given point in history, there will typically be some individuals who see some of the moral errors of their society. If, however, the prevailing norms are very far from the moral truth, then it is likely that these individuals will not see all the way to the actual moral truth. Rather, they will likely embrace a position that is closer to the moral truth than their society's prevailing norms, but that remains not too far from the prevailing norms. These individuals are not devoid of cultural or biological biases; they merely are somewhat less influenced by those biases than other members of their society. Consider, for example, the case of John Locke, whose Letter Concerning Toleration is a classic in the literature of religious toleration. Locke was a great moral reformer, because he saw that it was wrong to persecute members of other religions. Yet he could not see his way to embracing tolerance for atheists; that was simply too far from the norms of his culture. Thus, after explaining the arguments for religious toleration, he writes, "Lastly, those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon 19 an atheist."45 Frequently, those who see errors in their society's prevailing norms will attempt to bring about reform. The reformers cause others who did not initially do so to question the misguided norms. Reformers are often effective, for at least two reasons. First, they tend to be more rational than their opponents who favor the status quo. This is because only those with an above-average tendency to form beliefs rationally, and a belowaverage level of bias, will see through the errors in prevailing cultural norms. As a result, in the ensuing debate, the reformers will tend to come across better than their conservative opponents. Second, the reformers will tend to be disproportionately influential members of society. They are more likely, for example, to be authors, professors, other intellectuals, or business or political leaders, as opposed to members of less influential professions. This is because the ability to see through errors in prevailing social norms will be strongly correlated with one's degree of intelligence and reflectiveness, which itself is correlated with belonging to relatively socially influential professions. For example, a talented writer who wants to promote greater tolerance for homosexuality will have more influence on society than a steel worker who wants attitudes toward homosexuality to stay the same. That is an extreme example, but it illustrates the point that people who desire social reform tend to have much more influential social positions than the average member of society. Thus, when society has incorrect values, there is a systematic tendency for forces to arise that push society in the direction of more correct values. Once society has moved some distance in the right direction, a new generation of reformers may arise, realizing that society's values still are not correct, and hence working to push society further along. For example, once Lockean toleration for all theistic religions was accepted, it was then possible for people to see that toleration for atheists should also be accepted. Over the long term, beneficial change can accumulate so that, perhaps after several centuries, a society has moved from horrific values to quite decent ones. This is the sort of process through which our society has arrived at its current set of liberal values. Notice that for this process to work, no great cognitive virtue is required of any individual. It is not necessary that anyone eliminate cultural or biological influences on their thinking, and no one need be capable of seeing the moral truth entirely on their own. What is necessary is only that, at a given point in time, there be some individuals who are capable of seeing certain moral issues a bit more accurately than most of their contemporaries. It is even compatible with the story I have told that almost everyone's moral beliefs be almost entirely determined by genes and culture – but not quite everyone, not quite entirely. Thus, empirical evidence showing that moral beliefs are very often strongly influenced by genes and culture does not undermine my account. The process of moral development is not at its end; no doubt further progress will be forthcoming in future generations. So I do not claim that we now know the precise or complete moral truth. I do claim, however, that we have a mechanism that systematically produces moral progress. Our current practices are, reliably, better than our past practices. As a result, while we perhaps do not quite know how we ought to Locke 1990, p. 64.45 20 act, we know at least some ways that we should not act. We should not hold slaves, for example. Or torture suspects to extract confessions. Or attack people to steal their land. Our condemnation of these sorts of practices is the product of a reliable belief-forming process. 5.5. How Moral Truth Explains We may now return to the explanatory challenge raised at the start of section 5: since moral facts do not produce physical effects, how can a moral explanation for any observable phenomenon ever be correct? How, for example, can the injustice of slavery explain its abolition? In the philosophy of science literature, there are a variety of competing accounts of explanation. On one account, to explain a phenomenon is to identify its cause. This46 seems to be the view presupposed in the literature on moral explanations, and on this view, it is indeed hard to see how a moral fact can explain any observable phenomenon. However, on another account of explanation, to explain a phenomenon is to show how the phenomenon could be inferred (either deductively or probabilistically) on the basis of lawlike regularities together with a specification of initial conditions. This latter47 account of explanation is much friendlier to moral explanations. When I say that slavery was abolished because it was unjust, I am not claiming that the injustice seeped out of the practice and started pushing matter around in various ways (not even the matter in people's brains), leading to a situation where the law books in every country contained anti-slavery provisions. Rather, the line of explanation goes something like this: 1. There is a systematic tendency for human moral beliefs to become more accurate over time. 2. Slavery is seriously unjust. 3. Therefore, it was probable that slavery would in time come to be generally regarded as seriously unjust. 4. Human beings tend to abolish practices that are generally regarded as seriously unjust. 5. Therefore, it was probable that people would in time abolish slavery. Thus, the way in which the injustice of slavery explains its demise is not that the injustice caused the demise. It is that the injustice of slavery, when combined with certain lawlike generalizations about the workings of human beings and human society (propositions 1 and 4), renders the abolition of slavery predictable.48 One might worry that this view only relocates the problem. The above explanation takes for granted in step 1 that society has a systematic tendency to develop more Salmon 1984.46 Hempel 1965; for discussion of the probabilistic case, see pp. 381-93.47 For another account of explanation, see Huemer 2009, section 3. The moral explanation48 here exhibited also satisfies that account, since it cites facts explanatorily prior to the abolition of slavery which raised the probability that slavery would be abolished. This "probabilityraising" is not a causal process; to say that A raises the probability of B is to say that P(B|A) > P(B|~A), where the sort of probability in question is logical probability. 21 accurate moral beliefs over time. My argument for that, in turn, took for granted that human beings have a capacity (albeit a highly fallible one) to apprehend moral truths. But, it might be said, the real problem is how human beings could have a faculty directed at the truth, in an area in which the facts are causally inert. If moral facts don't cause anything (not even our beliefs about them), how could we be at all reliable at identifying them – how could there be a faculty that was any better than chance at identifying moral truths? But this just raises the general problem of a priori knowledge. It is true of a priori knowledge in general that the facts to which it pertains do not cause anything, not even our beliefs about them. For instance, facts about abstract, mathematical objects do not cause anything to happen – this premise, at any rate, is as plausible as the premise that moral facts do not cause anything to happen. Similarly, necessary truths of metaphysics49 do not cause anything to happen. Yet we have knowledge of both mathematical and metaphysical truths.50 The most satisfying reply to the skeptic would be to give a general account of how a priori knowledge works. But that is a very large project and certainly beyond the scope of this paper. A more modest but reasonable reply to the skeptic would be to appeal to the following observations: 1. We have reliable processes for forming some non-moral, a priori beliefs, such as mathematical beliefs and beliefs about certain necessary metaphysical truths. 2. If moral facts lack causal powers, then mathematical facts and necessary truths of metaphysics also lack causal powers. 3. Therefore, if moral facts lack causal powers, then our having a reliable beliefforming process does not require the facts about which we form beliefs to have causal powers. We thus are left with no good reason to deny that there can be reliable moral beliefforming processes. 6. Conclusion This paper has had two goals. The first is to show that debunking arguments fail to refute moral realism. They fail because they rely on general theories about the source of our moral beliefs that are just not credible. These debunking accounts of the source of moral beliefs lack credibility because they afford no explanation for the most important fact about the history of moral thought: the gradual spread of liberalism across the world over the course of human history. Evolutionary theories cannot account for this fact because the spread of liberalism has been too rapid for biological evolution, and because the spread of liberalism in any case has had no empirical And why should we accept either premise? Here is one thought: the only sort of thing that49 can cause a change to occur at a particular time is another change that occurs at a particular time. In the realm of necessary truths, nothing ever changes; hence, no necessary fact can cause any change to occur at any time. Thus, for example, a necessary fact could not cause someone to adopt a belief in that fact. Shafer-Landau (2012, p. 30) argues similarly.50 22 connection to liberals' somehow reproducing more than non-liberals. Purely cultural accounts of the source of morals leave us at a loss to explain why the culture itself has moved in a given direction over time. At first glance, it may seem that many explanations are possible – for instance, perhaps changing technologies or changing forms of economic organization have somehow necessitated different values. But the list of potential explanations dwindles as we try to take into account the entire phenomenon: it is not just, for example, that slavery was abolished in the United States. It is not even just that slavery was abolished in every country in the world. It is that societies around the world have been liberalizing with respect to many different issues – slavery, war, torture, execution, democracy, women's suffrage, segregation, and so on – and this has been going on for centuries. It is very difficult to come up with explanations for this broad phenomenon that don't require us to posit large coincidences. My second goal has been to suggest that we actually have positive evidence for a version of moral realism – a modest, rationalistic, liberal realism. This view holds that human beings have some limited access to objective values, by the same cognitive faculty or process that produces non-moral a priori knowledge; that the objectively correct values are in fact liberal values; but that culture, genes, and other forces may produce biases that pull us away from the purely rational (and liberal) moral beliefs. Given this view, the trend toward liberalization can be explained. At any given point in history, there will be some individuals who are less biased and more morally sensitive than average (but not entirely unbiased). These individuals will push society toward what they, the sensitive individuals, consider morally correct, which will generally mean pushing society at least a little bit closer to the moral truth. Over the long term, beneficial changes accumulate and society's value system approximates the moral truth. Since liberalism is the correct moral stance, this means that society becomes more liberal over time. This, I suggest, is the best explanation on offer for the trend toward liberalization. Until a better explanation appears, therefore, the empirical evidence supports liberal realism. References Adams, Henry. 1891. History of the United States of America during the Second Administration of Thomas Jefferson, vol. 2. London: G.P. Putnam's Sons. Alford, John R., Carolyn L. Funk, and John R. Hibbing. 2005. "Are Political Orientations Genetically Transmitted?", American Political Science Review 99: 153-67. Aristotle. 1941. The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon. New York: Random House. Ayer, A. J. 1952. Language, Truth, and Logic. New York: Dover. Bealer, George. 1992. "The Incoherence of Empiricism," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 66, supplement: 99-138. Benedict, Ruth. 1934. "Anthropology and the Abnormal," Journal of General Psychology 10: 59-82. BonJour, Laurence. 1998. In Defense of Pure Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bowles, Samuel. 2009. "Did Warfare Among Ancestral Hunter-Gatherers Affect the Evolution of Human Social Behaviors?" Science 324 (2009): 1293-8. Bradley, Keith and Paul Cartledge, eds. 2011. The Cambridge World History of Slavery, vol. 23 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Butler, Joseph. [1729] 1964. Butler's Sermons and Dissertation on Virtue. London: G. Bell & Sons. Center for Systemic Peace. 2011. "Polity IV Annual Time-Series 1800-2010" (dataset from Polity IV project), <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm>. Accessed 24 January, 2012. Dawkins, Richard. 1989. The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Duane, O. B. 1998. Native American Myths And Legends. London: Brockhampton Press. Eltis, David and Stanley L. Engerman. 2011. The Cambridge World History of Slavery, vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Evans-Pritchard, E. E. 1956. Nuer Religion. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Graham, Jesse, Jonathan Haidt, and Brian A. Nosek. 2009. "Liberals and Conservatives Rely on Different Sets of Moral Foundations," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 96: 1029-1046. Haidt, Jonathan. 2001. "The Emotional Dog and its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment," Psychological Review 108: 814-834. Harman, Gilbert. 1977. The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. Held, Robert. 1987. Inquisition, Inquisicion: A Bilingual Guide to the Exhibition of Torture Instruments From the Middle Ages to the Industrial Era Presented in Various European Cities. Florence: Dorset Press. Hempel, Carl. 1965. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: Free Press. Huemer, Michael. 2005. Ethical Intuitionism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Huemer, Michael. 2009. "Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic," British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60: 1-31. Huemer, Michael. 2013. "The Evolution of Values," public lecture, TEDx Denver, June 15, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lrZ2DJzbYYo>. Accessed March 22, 2014. Hume, David. [1751] 1975. Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Clarendon Hume, David. [1739] 1992. Treatise of Human Nature. Reprint, Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus. Joll, James and Gordon Martel. 2007. Origins of the First World War, 3rd ed. New York : Pearson Longman. Keeley, Lawrence. 1996. War before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage. New York: Oxford University Press. Klein, Peter. 1971. "A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge," Journal of Philosophy 68: 471-82. Library of Congress. 2011. "Today in History: July 11," <http://memory.loc.gov/ ammem/today/jul11.html>, accessed March 21, 2014. Lindberg, David C. 1992. The Beginnings of Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, 600 B.C. to A.D. 1450. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press. Locke, John. [1689] 1990. A Letter Concerning Toleration. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus. Mackie, John L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. New York: Penguin. 24 McGrath, Sarah. 2004. "Moral Knowledge by Perception," pp. 209-28 in Philosophical Perspectives 18: Ethics, edited by John Hawthorne. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell. Moore, Michael S. 1992. "Moral Reality Revisited," Michigan Law Review 90: 2424-533. Mueller, John E. 2004. The Remnants of War. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Newport, Frank. 2012. "In U.S., 46% Hold Creationist View of Human Origins," Gallup, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/155003/Hold-Creationist-View-HumanOrigins.aspx>, accessed March 21, 2014. Nietzsche, Friedrich. 2003. Thus Spake Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, tr. Thomas Wayne. New York: Algora Publishing. Oddie, Graham. 2005. Value, Reality, and Desire. Oxford: Clarendon. Oesterdiekhoff, Georg. 2011. The Steps of Man Toward Civilization. Norderstedt, Germany: Books on Demand. Pinker, Steven. 2011. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New York: Viking. Plato. 1977. Symposium, pp. 121-87 in The Portable Plato, ed. Scott Buchanan. New York: Penguin. Prichard, H. A. 1957. Moral Obligation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Quine, W. V. 1951. "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Philosophical Review 60: 20-43. Railton, Peter. 1998. "Moral Explanation and Moral Objectivity," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58: 175-82. Reid, Thomas. 1983. Inquiry and Essays, edited by Ronald Beanblossom and Keith Lehrer. Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett. Ross, W. D. [1930] 1988. The Right and the Good. Reprint, Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett. Ruse, Michael. 1998. Taking Darwin Seriously. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus. Salmon, Wesley. 1984. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Sarkar, Sumit. 1988. Modern India 1885-1947. New York: Saint Martin's Press. Shafer-Landau, Russ. 2012. "Evolutionary Debunking, Moral Realism and Moral Knowledge," Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7: 1-37. Spierenburg, Pieter, 2008. A History of Murder: Personal Violence in Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present. Malden, Mass.: Polity. Street, Sharon. 2006. "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value," Philosophical Studies 127: 109-66. Sturgeon, Nicholas. 1985. "Moral Explanations"in Morality, Reason and Truth, edited by David Copp and David Zimmerman. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Allanheld. Thomson, Judith. 1986. Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2013. "Intentional Homicide, Count and Rate per 100,000 Population (1995 2011)," <www.unodc.org/documents/dataand-analysis/statistics/crime/Homicide_statistics2013.xls>, accessed March 22, 2014. Wikipedia. 2014a. "Abolition of Slavery Timeline," <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Abolition_of_slavery_timeline>, accessed March 21, 2014. Wikipedia. 2014b. "Women's Suffrage," <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Women's_suffrage>, accessed March 21, 2014. Williams, Juan. 1987. Eyes on the Prize. New York: Viking Penguin. Wright, Robert. 1995. The Moral Animal. New York: Random House.

PB July 2020 49Reviews Portraits of God: Word Pictures of the Deity from the Earliest Times Through Today Louis Baldwin McFarland, 960 NC Hwy 88 W, Jefferson NC 28640 (Box 611). Website: https://mcfarlandbooks.com. 2011. 192 pp. $19.99. pb. isbn 9780786467204. he chapter 'The Projected Self-Image' (107– 8) in the book under review adds a brilliantly sarcastic insight into one of the 'extreme leftist offshoots of Hegel' (107). We are speaking here of Ludwig Feuerbach, who was 'an early proponent of scientific humanism [and] whose thinking formed something of a bridge between Hegel and Karl Marx and [who] was a harbinger of Sigmund Freud' (107). To find Feuerbach in this book was a pleasant surprise. Baldwin, in this witty book, has presented to us humorous portraits of God, and more wonders follow. While Feuerbach saw God as 'the epitome, [and] not the embodiment, of human love' (108); Sigmund Freud, according to Baldwin might 'have implicitly agreed with Jesus Christ that the overweening love of self is the root of all evil, although he [Freud] might not have honored the copyright' (132). 'The Father Fantastic' (130–2), which discusses Freud on God, touches upon the issue of theodicy: 'What is real in this world [according to Baldwin's study of Freud], in the world we know at first hand, is evil-the pain and other suffering from which there is no escape except by chance' (131). Again, for this reviewer, this chapter on Freud is surprising in this sort of a book. Baldwin is analytical, but he never loses sight of the idea of God that every one of us has constructed in our minds. He also deals, though inadequately, with the Upanishadic Brahman (14–7). Karen Armstrong does a good job of writing on God in her books, so does Neil McGregor in his Living with the Gods: On Beliefs and People (2018), but Baldwin's book is not merely supplementary to Armstrong's works or McGregor's book; it is essential reading for both philosophers and theologians. One glaring omission in this book is Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's work on the rhizomic nature of the Buddhist 'mandala'. Had Baldwin added this to his 'human portraits' of God, this book would have been truly a sourcebook on anthropomorphic reflections on God. Baldwin's book is vast in scope, and yet, it is written so clearly that it will appeal to even those who do not agree with the existence of anything transcendent. Subhasis Chattopadhyay Heroic Shāktism: The Cult of Durgā in Ancient Indian Kingship Bihani Sarkar Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. Website: https://global.oup.com. 2017. 295 pp. £75. hb. isbn 9780197266106. Bihani Sarkar's monograph is one of those re-ligious monographs written by someone who knows the languages of the yesteryears, knows a lot of ancillary materials, but has actually no personal experience with the Mother in her various forms. The names of these forms, Sarkar can rattle off since her next postdoctoral funding depends on her being able to publish or perish to languish in the backwaters of the tenure-hopefuls in the UK. Now that the covid-19 pandemic has begun in the UK, perhaps she is rooting for a plum post as a savant on the Mother Goddess in some hallowed and sanitised hall of some bleak college ruled by an inflexible, iterative, and tautological structuralist like herself. Chapters 3 and 7 show Sarkar at her archival, plodding, and non-syncretic best. In 'Taking Over Skanda' (97–114), Sarkar shows her huge deficits as being part of any faith community except the sort that armchair scholars of religion have been doing throughout the last century. She reduces Lord Shiva to nothing more than a detritus who is so ephemeral that it would surprise a nonHindu reader to find that actually Shiva is offered worship within Advaita Vedanta, in its Kashmiri Shaivite form, and within other living traditions of Hinduism. These, apart from the way Shiva is seen by the Virashaivas and Lingayats of contemporary South India. They would be horrified to know that both Devi Durga and Lord Shiva are all T

Philosophers' Imprint volume 19, no. 29july 2019 LEARNING AND VALUE CHANGE J. Dmitri Gallow University of Pittsburgh Department of Philosophy © 2019, J. Dmitri Gallow This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License <www.philosophersimprint.org/019029/> Abstract Accuracy-first accounts of rational learning attempt to vindicate the intuitive idea that, while rationally-formed belief need not be true, it is nevertheless likely to be true. To this end, they attempt to show that the Bayesian's rational learning norms are a consequence of the rational pursuit of accuracy. Existing accounts fall short of this goal, for they presuppose evidential norms which are not and cannot be vindicated in terms of the single-minded pursuit of accuracy. I propose an alternative account, according to which learning experiences rationalize changes in the way you value accuracy, which in turn rationalizes changes in belief. I show that this account is capable of vindicating the Bayesian's rational learning norms in terms of the single-minded pursuit of accuracy, so long as accuracy is rationally valued. 1. Introduction Daniel the Democrat is relentlessly partisan. If there is a Republican scandal, no matter the details, Daniel is outraged. If there is a Democratic scandal, no matter the details, Daniel is defensive. This isn't because Daniel regards the actions of either Democrats or Republicans as providing evidence about which actions are permissible-he doesn't think that the fact that a Democrat or a Republican lied, embezzled, cheated on their spouse, or what-have-you, makes it any more or less likely that those particular actions are permissible. Nevertheless, if there is a Democratic scandal, he is disposed to believe that the Democrats' actions were permissible. And if there is a Republican scandal, he is disposed to believe that the Republicans' actions were impermissible. And Daniel is disposed to react in this way no matter the details of those scandals. Meanwhile, Melissa the Moderate is disposed to react to political scandals with the same outrage or lack thereof, whether the offenders are Democrats or Republicans. She sometimes believes that Democrats have acted wrongly, and sometimes believes that Republicans have acted wrongly. j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change Whatever we think about Daniel's conclusions, that shouldn't stop us from saying that Daniel himself is irrational. There is little to admire in his belief-forming practices. And whatever we think about Melissa's conclusions, this shouldn't keep us from saying this about her: her belief-formation practices are more rational than Daniel's. Nevertheless, it could turn out-and let us suppose that it does turn out-that the Democrats really haven't done anything impermissible, and all of the Republicans' scandals truly were outrageous. In that case, Daniel's belief-forming practices would have led him to all and only true moral beliefs about American scandals. That they did, but they are no more rational for it. One can stubbornly stumble into true opinions, but this does not on its own make those opinions rationally held. Likewise, one can be misled into holding false opinions, but their falsehood on its own does nothing to impugn their rationality. So true belief need not be rational, nor rational belief true. On this, most of us are agreed.1 Nevertheless, there is a long tradition in epistemology of insisting that there is still some intimate connection between rational belief and true belief-in particular, that rational beliefs are likely to be true, whereas irrational beliefs are not. While Daniel the Democrat stumbled onto truth, he was more likely to end up with false opinions; and while Melissa the Moderate happened upon falsehood, she was more likely to find herself with true opinions. Such talk is too Delphic twice over. In the first place, the claims themselves are difficult to interpret-which probability measures underlie these likelihood claims? And why should we care about those probability measures? There are, after all, surely other probability mea1. You may disagree; for you may think that belief is rational if and only if it is knowledge. False beliefs cannot be knowledge, and so false beliefs cannot be rational. If you think this, you should still accept that there is some important difference between what I call false but rational belief and what I call false and irrational belief. Perhaps you call the former beliefs 'blameless' or 'reasonable' to distinguish them from the latter. If so, then you think that reasonable belief need not be true, nor true belief reasonable. And you face the question of what connection, if any, there is between reasonable belief and truth. Your question and mine are not so different. Perhaps they can receive the same answer. sures which give high probability to Daniel's opinions being true. In the second place, the claims are insufficiently motivated-why should we think that Daniel's opinions are not likely to be true? The two concerns are related; if the claim about likelihood is just a claim about objective chances, for instance, then we might think that Democrats are objectively less likely to engage in scandalous behavior than Republicans, in which case, Daniel's belief forming practices are quite likely to lead to truth. Over the last two or so decades, authors writing under the banner of 'accuracy-first epistemology' have begun to put some meat on the bones of this too-Delphic view of the relationship between rationality and truth.2 According to accuracy-firsters, what it is to be epistemically rational is, roughly, to pursue accuracy in a manner that would be prudentially rational, were you concerned only with the accuracy of your beliefs. Accuracy-first epistemologists therefore presuppose a form of epistemic consequentialism according to which the sole epistemic good is nearness to truth, or accuracy. Their goal is to derive all other epistemic norms from 1) the axiological claim that beliefs are epistemically valuable to the extent that they are accurate; and 2) general consequentialist deontic norms like 'acts are rational if they maximize expected value' and 'it is irrational to take an act that is guaranteed to be worse than another available act'. The particular epistemic norms I will be focused on here are the Bayesian's rational learning norms (probabilism and conditionalization, to be introduced in §2 below). These norms allow the Bayesian to explain why Daniel is irrational-for Daniel violates the Bayesian's rational learning norms. The accuracy-firsters I will be concerned with here like the Bayesian's explanation of Daniel's irrationality, and they wish to show that the Bayesian's rational learning norms follow from the claims that 1) accuracy is the sole epistemic virtue, inaccuracy the sole epistemic vice; and 2) general consequential2. In addition to the authors discussed below, see Joyce (1998, 2009), Bronfman (2014), Schoenfield (2015, 2016, 2017a, and 2017b), Easwaran (2013, 2016), and Fitelson et al. (ms). philosophers' imprint 2 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change ist deontic norms like 'it is rational to adopt beliefs which maximize expected epistemic value'. According to accuracy-first epistemologists, then, what's wrong with Daniel is that he is either not valuing accuracy properly (in a specific technical sense to be explained below), or else he is adopting opinions which are, by his own lights, less likely to be accurate than some other set of opinions he could hold. What makes Melissa's more rational is that she values accuracy properly and pursues the beliefs which are, by her own lights, most likely to be true. (Or at least, we can tell a vindicatory story along these lines about Melissa's beliefs, but not Daniel's.) According to these accuracy-firsters, this is the connection between rational opinion and truth: epistemically rational opinions are those adopted by agents who properly value and rationally seek the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth (§3). My goal here will be to persuade you that the existing accuracy-first justifications of the Bayesian's rational learning norms presuppose substantive evidential norms which are not themselves explained in terms of the rational pursuit of accuracy; indeed, these evidential norms cannot be so explained, given the other commitments of accuracy-first epistemology (§4). For this reason, alternative approaches are needed, and I have one to offer (§5). To preview: on existing accuracy-first approaches, the degree to which you take accuracy at various possibilities into account changes after a learning experience. Once you learn E, you will no longer take accuracy at non-E possibilities into account when deciding which doxastic states are best. However, on standard approaches, this change is the result of a rational response to evidence. On existing approaches, first, you rationally respond to learning that E by becoming certain that E. Then, once you've done so, you will end up not taking accuracy at non-E possibilities into account at all, since you are certain that those possibilities are not actual. In contrast, the approach developed here reverses the order of explanation. First, learning that E makes it rational for you to stop valuing accuracy at nonE possibilities, and, for this reason, to stop taking accuracy at those possibilities into account when deciding which doxastic state is best. Changes in your beliefs are then a rational response to these new epistemic values. In a slogan: learning rationalizes epistemic value change. 2. Bayesianism The Bayesian has a diagnosis of what's gone wrong with Daniel. Their diagnosis is this: either Daniel's opinions are not probabilistically coherent, or Daniel is not a conditionalizer. But being probabilistically coherent and being a conditionalizer are both requirements of rationality. So Daniel is not rational. The remainder of this section will spell out this diagnosis in a bit more detail. Readers already familiar with the Bayesian's rational learning norms should feel free to skip ahead to §3; readers who are additionally familiar with the accuracy-first literature should feel free to skip ahead to §4. 2.1 Probabilism At any given time, t, you will hold opinions about some propositions. Given a set of doxastically possible worlds, W (these are possibilities, considered as actual, which cannot be ruled out a priori), we can represent the propositions about which you are opinionated at t with sets of possibilities A ⊆ W (intuitively, the set of possibilities at which A is the case). And we can gather together all of the propositions about which you are opinionated at t into a single set At, which we may call your time t agenda. For technical reasons, I'll assume throughout that the set of worlds W is finite. The particular kind of opinions the Bayesian is concerned with are degrees of belief, degrees of confidence, or credences. We can represent your time t degrees of confidence with a credence function, ct. This is a function from At to [0, 1]. ct(A) represents how confident you are that the actual world is one of the doxastically possible worlds in the set A. I'll call a triple < W , At, ct >-consisting of a set of doxastically possible worlds W , a time t agenda At, and a time t credence function ct-a credal state. probabilism is the claim that, at all times, your degrees of belief philosophers' imprint 3 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change ought to be probabilities. That is: for all times t, your opinions should be representable with a credal state < W , At, pt > such that pt(W) = 1 and, for any disjoint A, B ∈ At, pt(A ∪ B) = pt(A) + pt(B). (A word on notation: throughout, I'll use 'p' as a name for a credence function when I am assuming that that credence function is a probability, and I'll use 'c' when I am not making this assumption.) 2.2 Conditionalization Given a credence function c, we may define c(A | E) df= c(AE)/c(E) to be your credence that A, given that, or conditional on, E. As I will understand it, conditionalization is the claim that you should take your conditional credences to be your guide for belief-revision. In particular, you should be disposed to, upon receiving the total evidence E, revise your beliefs by adopting a new credence function which is your old credence function conditionalized on E. A bit of notation: I'll use 'ct,E' to stand for the credence function that you are disposed to adopt at t, upon possessing the total evidence E. (I will suppress the time-indices when they are irrelevant.) Then, conditionalization is the following thesis. Conditionalization For all times t, and all propositions A, E such that E could be your total evidence at t, ct,E(A) ! = ct(A | E) (I place an exclamation mark above the equality to indicate that the claim expressed is normative-conditionalization does not say that you will be disposed to conditionalize on your total evidence, merely that you should be.) This, then, is the Bayesian's theory of rational learning: your opinions should be representable with a probability function, and you should be disposed to conditionalize those opinions on your total evidence. In brief, the Bayesian's theory of rational learning is that you should be a probabilistic conditionalizer. Daniel is not rational, according to the Bayesian, because he is not a probabilistic conditionalizer. To see this, suppose-for reductio-that Daniel's opinions are probabilistic and that he is disposed to update by conditionalization. If Daniel learns that a Democrat has φ-ed, he is disposed to be very confident that φ-ing is not wrong. Thus, if c is Daniel's current credence function, then 1. ca Democrat has φ-ed(φ-ing is wrong) is low. And, if he learns that a Republican has φ-ed, he is disposed to be very confident that φ-ing is wrong. So 2. ca Republican has φ-ed(φ-ing is wrong) is high. Yet, he thinks that whether φ-ing is wrong is independent of whether a Democrat or a Republican has φ-ed. So, 3. c(φ-ing is wrong | a Democrat has φ-ed) = c(φ-ing is wrong), and 4. c(φ-ing is wrong | a Republican has φ-ed) = c(φ-ing is wrong). So, by (1), (2), and our assumption that Daniel is a conditionalizer, 5. c(φ-ing is wrong | a Democrat has φ-ed) is low, and 6. c(φ-ing is wrong | a Republican has φ-ed) is high. And, by (3), (4), (5), and (6), 7. c(φ-ing is wrong) is low, and 8. c(φ-ing is wrong) is high. which is not possible if c is a probability function (in fact, it's not possible if c is a function). So Daniel is not a probabilistic conditionalizer. The accuracy-firsters I will be concerned with here like the Bayesian's story about why Daniel is irrational. Their goal is to show that the Bayesian's norms follow from i) the axiological claim that accuracy is the sole epistemic value; ii) a claim about how to properly value accurracy; and iii) consequentialist deontic norms like 'credences are rational iff they maximize expected epistemic value'. Before getting to philosophers' imprint 4 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change the existing attempts to vindicate conditionalization in terms of the single-minded pursuit of accuracy, let me first say a bit more about (i), (ii), and (iii) above. (Again, readers already familiar with accuracy-first epistemology should feel free to skip ahead to §4.) 3. Epistemic Value I'll use 'V(c, w)' to stand for the epistemic value of a credence function c, under the indicative supposition that the world w ∈ W is actual. According to accuracy-firsters, V(c, w) is entirely a function of the accuracy of c in world w. For instance, one popular measure of the accuracy of the credence function c in world wi is the Brier measure,3 B(c, wi) df = − ∑ wj∈W (δij − c(wj))2 Here, 'δi,j' is the Kronecker delta function, which is 1 if i = j and is 0 otherwise. Thus, δi,j represents the truth-value of the singleton proposition {wj} at the world wi. One thing to note about B is that, according to it, the epistemic value of a credence function is entirely a matter of the credence it places in various propositions-in particular, the credence it places in the singleton propositions-and the truth-value of those propositions. It is in this sense that B evaluates credences solely in terms of their accuracy. You don't need to know, for instance, what your evidence is at a world wi in order to know the epistemic value of a credence function c at that world, according to B. Another thing to note about B is that it only pays attention to your credence in the singleton propositions, {wj}. Your credences in propositions more coarse-grained than this don't enter into its calculation of epistemic value at all. If we are presupposing that c is a probability function, then this makes sense-for, if c is a probability function (and 3. Throughout, I will abuse notation by writing things like 'c(wj)' when I mean 'c({wj})'. A p(A) c(A) ∅ 0 1 {w1} 1/2 1/2 {w2} 1/2 1/2 W 1 0 Table 1: A probabilistic credence p and a non-probabilistic credence c which agree on the singleton propositions {w1} and {w2}. the number of worlds is finite), then c's credence in every proposition is determined by its credence in the singletons. However, one goal of accuracy-first epistemology is to vindicate the norm of probabilism by appeal to considerations of accuracy, and not merely take it for granted. If this is our goal, then the Brier measure of accuracy will not suit our purposes. Take a simple case in which there are two possible worlds, W = {w1, w2}, and therefore four propositions: ∅, {w1}, {w2}, and W itself. Then, compare the probabilistic p and the non-probabilistic c whose credences in those propositions are as displayed in table 1. p and c will have exactly the same epistemic value at all possible worlds according to B. And if B does not distinguish between p and c, then we could hardly hope to use the epistemic values of B to mount a defense of p over c. The solution is to consider, not just c's credence in the singleton propositions, but also its credence in all other propositions A ∈ A . I will call the straightforward generalization of B the quadratic measure of accuracy, Q. Q(c, w) df= − ∑ A∈A ( χA(w)− c(A) )2 Here 'χA(w)' is the characteristic function for the proposition A, which philosophers' imprint 5 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change takes the value 1 if A is true at w and takes the value 0 if A is false at w. It therefore represents the truth-value of the proposition A in the world w. There are other ways of measuring accuracy. Rather than looking at the square of the difference between your credence and truth-value, we could look at the absolute value of this difference, A; we could look at the Euclidean distance between your credence and truth-value, E ; or we could look at a logarithmic measure of the distance between your credence and truth-value, L. A(c, w) df= − ∑ A∈A | χA(w)− c(A) | E(c, w) df= − √ ∑ A∈A (χA(w)− c(A))2 L(c, w) df= ∑ A∈A log [ | (1 − χA(w))− c(A) | ] We may use 'Vc(c∗)' to represent how epistemically valuable the credence function c∗ is, from the standpoint of the credence function c. Accuracy-firsters like Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010a) say that, if your credence function is a probability, p, then you should evaluate a credence function c by looking at its expected epistemic value, where the expectation is taken with respect to p. This follows from general consequentialist norms which say that the choiceworthiness of an act is given by its expected value.4 If we understand credence functions as 4. In the final analysis, it should be either causal expected value or evidential expected value which guides your evaluation of other credence functions. In cases where there's no act-state dependence, these are both equivalent to the expectation presented in the body. There are interesting issues that crop up when we consider cases of act-state dependence, but I won't be engaging with them here. See Berker (2013), Caie (2013), Greaves (2013), Carr (2017), Konek and Levinstein (forthcoming), and Pettigrew (forthcoming) for more discussion. epistemic acts, then this norm tells us that the epistemic choiceworthiness of credence functions is given by their expected epistemic value. So, if p is probabilistic, then Vp(c) ! = ∑ w∈W V(c, w) * p(w) (3.1) (3.1) says that, if your opinions are probabilistic, then you ought to evaluate credence functions according to their expected epistemic value. Let's say that an epistemic value function is proper iff, when evaluating credences according to that function, every probability function views itself as more valuable than every other credence function.5 Propriety An epistemic value function V is proper iff, for every probability function p and every credence function c = p, Vp(c) < Vp(p) Propriety looms large in the accuracy-first vindication of Bayesianism. If we assume (3.1)-as I will continue to do for the remainder of the paper-then Predd et al. (2009)'s accuracy-first vindication of probabilism requires only the assumption that the measure of accuracy is proper (along with the condition that the measure is continuous). As we'll see below, Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010a)'s accuracy-first vindication of conditionalization requires only the assumption that accuracy is valued properly. Both the quadratic Q and the logarithmic L are proper measures 5. This property is often called 'strict propriety' and distinguished from weak propriety. V is weakly proper iff no probability function p views another credence function c as more epistemically valuable than it is. That is, for all p, c: Vp(c) 6 Vp(p). philosophers' imprint 6 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change of accuracy. However, neither the Brier B,6 the absolute value A, nor the Euclidean E are proper measures of accuracy. But each of these are somewhat plausible measures of the distance between a credence function and truth-value. Why shouldn't we value accuracy in the ways prescribed by B, A, or E? There are two arguments of which I am aware.7 (Note: Pettigrew (2016) has an interesting argument for the quadratic accuracy measure in particular. As we'll see below, Levinstein (2012) argues for the logarithmic measure in particular. These are arguments for particular measures of accuracy which happen to be proper; however, they are not directly arguments for the property of propriety itself.) One argument against improper measures of accuracy, deriving from Oddie (1997), appeals to epistemic conservativism. That argument goes like this. P1. For any probability function, there is some evidence you could have which would make it epistemically permissible to hold that probability function. P2. If another credence function has at least as high an expected epistemic value as your own, then it is permissible to adopt that credence function, even without receiving any additional evidence. P3. It is impermissible to change your credence function without receiving any evidence. C. So, epistemic value must be proper. Premise 1 could be justified by an appeal to a radical subjectivism, according to which any probability function is permissible in the absence of evidence. Alternatively, it could be justified by noting that, for any probability function, you could have only the evidence that the the objective chances are given by that probability function.8 Premise 2 is just 6. In figure 1, the probabilistic p expects the non-probabilistic c to be exactly as Brier accurate as p itself is (it is impossible for their Brier accuracies to differ). 7. See Pettigrew (2012a) 8. For an objection to this justification of premise 1, see Hájek (2008); for a a statement of epistemic consequentialism. Premise 3 is the premise of epistemic conservativism. Another defense, deriving from Joyce (2009) and Gibbard (2008), justifies propriety by an appeal to immodesty-which, in this context, is the thesis that rationality requires you to regard your own credences as more epistemically valuable than any other potential credences. This argument uses premise 1 from the argument from epistemic conservativism, and adds the additional premise of immodesty to conclude that epistemic value must be proper.9 P1. For any probability function, there is some evidence you could have which would make it epistemically permissible to hold that probability function. P4. Rationality requires you to regard your own credences as more epistemically valuable than any other potential credences C. So, epistemic value must be proper. (By the way, we'll see in §5.3 that a view like the one sketched here demonstrates that both of these arguments are invalid.) With this machinery, accuracy-firsters go to work vindicating the central norms of Bayesianism. For instance, Predd et al. (2009) show that, so long as accuracy is properly (and continuously) measured, every non-probabilistic credence function will be accuracy dominated by a probabilistic credence function, and no probabilistic credence function is likewise accuracy dominated. That is to say: if you violate the Bayesian's norm of probabilism, then there will be some other, probabilistic, set of credences you could adopt which are guaranteed to be more accurate than your own, no matter which state of the world is actual. Assuming that being dominated in accuracy in this way is irrational, it follows that violating the Bayesian's norm of probabilism is irrational. Because my focus here is on rational learning, and not synchronic response, see Pettigrew (2016). 9. See Pettigrew (2012b). philosophers' imprint 7 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change rational requirements, I won't dedicate any more attention to the accuracy-first vindication of probabilism.10 In the next section, I'll consider two attempts to justify diachronic belief-revision norms like conditionalization in terms of the rational pursuit of accuracy and accuracy alone. Before getting to those vindications, let me comment on some accuracy-first vindications of conditionalization which I will not be discussing. Greaves and Wallace (2006) offer an interestingly different argument than the one I will be discussing below. While Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010b) are attempting to justify the norm which I have called 'conditionalization', Greaves and Wallace are attempting to justify a subtly different norm which we may call 'plan conditionalization'. While the norm I am calling 'conditionalization' says that it is a rational requirement to be disposed to conditionalize on whatever total evidence you might receive, plan conditionalization says that it is a rational requirement to plan to conditionalize on, or to adopt the strategy of conditionalizing on, whatever total evidence you might receive. We should carefully distinguish dispositions from plans or strategies. An addict may have plans to refuse cigarettes when they are offered and still be disposed to accept cigarettes when they offered. You may be disposed to alert the authorities upon discovering an ominous clown living in the sewers, even if it had never occurred to you to plan for such a contingency. In Kavka (1983)'s toxin puzzle, it may be rational, before midnight, to plan to drink the toxin, even if it is not rational to be disposed to drink the toxin when morning arrives. Similarly, even if Greaves and Wallace (2006) are able to show that it is rational to plan to conditionalize on whatever total evidence you may receive, this will not on its own demonstrate that you should be disposed to conditionalize on your total evidence once the evidence is in, unless we rely upon a norm saying that you must be disposed to honor 10. The interested reader may consult Joyce (1998, 2009) and Predd et al. (2009); an excellent summary and extension of these arguments is provided in Pettigrew (2016). all rationally-formed plans, whether or not they continue to maximize expected value when the time comes. Not only is such a norm probably false, but it is difficult to see how to justify such a norm to someone concerned with accuracy and accuracy alone; and who doesn't give a damn about plans except insofar as they contribute to the pursuit of accuracy. For that reason, if the vindication of Greaves and Wallace (2006) is to be used as a vindication of the norm to be disposed to actually revise your degrees of belief by conditionalization when you acquire evidence, as opposed to a vindication of the norm to simply plan to do so, then the objections raised below will apply to their vindication, mutatis mutandis.11 (Parenthetically, the approach of Greaves and Wallace additionally faces other objections, which I detail in Gallow (ms). As I explain there, if you think that you might learn something, but might also learn nothing, then the framework provided by Greaves and Wallace will advise you to plan to not respond to any evidence which you may receive.)12 There is also a recent approach to vindicating conditionalization in Briggs and Pettigrew (forthcoming) which I won't have the space to discuss here. 4. Conditionalization and Accuracy In this section, I will consider two separate attempts to show that diachronic norms of belief revision, like conditionalization, follow from the rational pursuit of accuracy-the first in §4.1, and second in §4.2. I will try to persuade you that neither attempt meets with success, because both rely upon substantive evidential norms which are not, and may not be, justified in terms of the single-minded pursuit of accuracy. 11. It is worth noting that Pettigrew (2016) is far less sanguine about the prospects for defending conditionalization than Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010a), and endorses instead Greaves and Wallace's vindication of plan conditionalization. See Pettigrew (2016, p. 208). 12. In this connection, see also Hild (1998), Bronfman (2014), and Schoenfield (2017a). philosophers' imprint 8 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change 4.1 Take One Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010a) first attempt to vindicate conditionalization by appealing to a norm stating that, if your credences are given by the probability p, then you should be disposed, upon acquiring the total evidence E, to adopt a new credence function with maximal expected epistemic value within those possibilities not ruled out by E. That is, if your epistemic values are given by V and your credences are given by p, then the credence pE you are disposed to adopt upon receiveing total evidence E should be whatever credence function c has maximal expected epistemic value within E possibilities-that is, whichever function c maximizes ∑w∈E p(w) * V(c, w).13 pE ! = arg maxc { ∑ w∈E p(w) * V(c, w) } (4.1) It is important to note that, in (4.1), the function in brackets-the function to be maximized-does not consider the probabilisticallyweighted epistemic value of c in all worlds in W . Rather, it only looks at the probabilistically-weighted epistemic value of c in those worlds compatible with the potential evidence E. Why only the worlds compatible with E? Well, because these are the only possibilities which have not been ruled out by your evidence. The following proposition shows that, if your epistemic values are proper, then the norm (4.1) entails conditionalization. Proposition 1 (generalized from Leitgeb and Pettigrew 2010a). If V is 13. A word on notation: 'arg maxx { f (x)}' denotes the value of x which maximizes the function f (x). proper, then, for any probability p and any E, arg maxc { ∑ w∈E p(w) * V(c, w) } = p(− | E) (See the appendix for a proof.) For the norm (4.1) says that you should be disposed, upon acquiring the total evidence E, to adopt whichever credence function maximizes expected epistemic value within E; and Proposition 1 tells us that, if epistemic value is proper, then the credence function which maximizes expected epistemic value within E is your current credence function conditionalized on E. It follows that, if V is proper, then you should be disposed to conditionalize on whatever evidence you receive, if V is proper, then pE ! = p(− | E) Assuming that we are persuaded that we should value accuracy and accuracy alone, and that we should measure accuracy properly, it follows that we should be disposed to conditionalize on our evidence. This argument is compelling. If successful, it elucidates the connection between responding rationally to your evidence and the rational pursuit of accuracy. If we think that conditionalization is a requirement of rationality, then this argument shows why meeting that requirement means that your beliefs are more likely to be accurate. By the lights of your prior credence function, they are more likely to be accurate (amongst the possibilities consistent with your evidence) than any other credences you could have adopted. But wait-by what right do we exclude the worlds inconsistent with our evidence from consideration when deciding which posterior credence function to adopt? The general decision-theoretic norm of maximizing expected value tells us to choose a credence function c which philosophers' imprint 9 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change maximizes this function: ∑ w∈W V(c, w) * p(w) It emphatically does not tell us to choose a credence function c which maximizes this other function: ∑ w∈E V(c, w) * p(w) Here's a tempting thought-one that tempted me for far too long:14 we are only taking the expectation over worlds in E because we have learned that the worlds in E are the only live possibilities. This appears to be how Leitgeb and Pettigrew are thinking about things when they describe the learning event in the following way: between t and a later time t′, [you obtain] evidence that restricts the set of worlds that are epistemically possible for [you] to the set E ⊂ W (p. 249) On this approach, learning goes in two stages: first, upon receiving evidence E, you eliminate worlds which are incompatible with E from the set of doxastically possible worlds W . Second, you use your prior credence distribution over the remaining worlds to pick a posterior credence distribution, according to the norm (4.1). Two comments on this approach. Firstly, at stage two, your prior credence distribution over the remaining worlds will not be a probability distribution so long as you were not already certain of E. So ∑w∈E V(c, w) * p(w) will not, contrary to my earlier loose talk, be an expectation. But the usual reasons for taking functions like this to mea14. Thanks to Michael Caie for shaking me from my dogmatic slumber on this point. sure the choice-worthiness of options (the representation theorems, for instance) rely upon p being a probability and the function therefore being an expectation. So, at the very least, something needs to be said about why this new mathematical function should be taken to measure the choice-worthiness of credence functions.15 Secondly, due to stage one, this approach does not ultimately justify conditionalization to someone concerned with accuracy and accuracy alone. Why should you stop regarding the worlds outside of E as epistemically possible, and thereby completely discount the accuracy of your credences at worlds outside of E? The natural answer to that question is: 'because those worlds are incompatible with your evidence.' This answer relies upon a norm like 'do not value accuracy at a world if it is incompatible with your evidence'. But this is a distinctively evidential norm. And we have done nothing to explain why someone who pursues accuracy alone, and cares not at all about evidence per se except insofar as it helps them attain their goal of accuracy, will have reason to abide by this evidential norm. So, if our goal was to derive conditionalization from nothing more than the imperative to rationally pursue accuracy, then we have failed. In fact, things are worse than this. Not only have we not provided an accuracy-based justification of the evidential norm to remove worlds incompatible with your evidence, but if accuracy is measured properly, no such justification can be given. For suppose that you have the prior probabilistic credal state < W , A , p >, and you are evaluating a credal state < WE, AE, cE > which has removed worlds incompatible with the evidence E. How should you evaluate the credence function cE? The accuracy-firster's answer is: you should evaluate it by its expected accuracy-this is just the norm (3.1). And if we evaluate cE in this way, and if V is proper, then it is epistemically worse than your prior credence function. That is, Vp(cE) < Vp(p). This is just what it means for the epistemic value function V to be proper. So, 15. See Carr (2017). philosophers' imprint 10 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change from the standpoint of your prior credence function, removing worlds incompatible with your evidence is expected to make you less accurate. Valuing credence functions with a proper accuracy measure and evaluating credence functions according to their expected accuracy requires you to reason dogmatically. 'Yes, I have evidence that the actual world is in E. But I expect that responding to that evidence by removing ¬E worlds from W will make my beliefs less accurate. Accuracy is the only thing I value. I don't care at all about, e.g., meeting the constraints placed upon me by my evidence, except insofar as doing so conduces to greater accuracy. And I ought to attempt to maximize expected epistemic value. So I ought to ignore this evidence, and maintain my current credences.' So I don't see how stage 1 of Leitgeb and Pettigrew's two stage approach to rational learning could be justified to someone concerned with accuracy and accuracy alone. But perhaps I was wrong to think of Leitgeb and Pettigrew as relying on a norm like 'do not treat a world as epistemically possible if it is incompatible with your evidence'. Perhaps we should instead understand the account along the following lines: what it is to acquire evidence E just is for worlds outside of E to be removed from your credal state. Such changes are not to be rationally evaluated, for they are not rationally evaluable. It is a brute psychological fact about you that, upon having a certain experience, some worlds are removed from your credal state. Conditionalization, then, tells you how to be disposed to adopt new credences once this arational psychological change has taken place. While this understanding still must contend with the first concern raised above, it avoids the second. I don't have anything further to say about this idea beyond what has already been said about similar ideas in the work of Richard Jeffrey (1965)-viz., it is patently epistemically irrational to respond to a winter snowfall by eliminating all worlds in which climate change is not a hoax perpetrated by the Chinese. But, if we deny that the elimination of worlds from your credal state is ever rationally evaluable, then we must deny that this particular elimination of worlds from your credal state is irrational. And I'm inclined to regard that as a reductio of an epistemological view. To sum up: Leitgeb and Pettigrew's justification of conditionalization either relies upon a substantive evidential norm which is not, and may not be, justified to someone who is concerned with the pursuit of accuracy and accuracy alone, or else it is committed to the arationality of patently irrational belief changes. 4.2 Take Two (4.1) is not the only norm that Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010a) propose for how you should be disposed to respond to acquiring the total evidence E. They additionally suggest that, upon acquiring the total evidence E, you should be disposed to adopt a new credence function c which maximizes expected accuracy subject to the evidential constraint that E be given credence 1 and ¬E be given credence 0. Call the set of credence functions which give credence 1 to E and credence o to ¬E 'E'. Then, Leitgeb and Pettigrew endorse the following norm:16 pE ! = arg maxc ∈ E { Vp(c) } (4.2) (3.1) = arg maxc ∈ E { ∑ w∈W p(w) * V(c, w) } That is to say: you should be disposed, upon learning that E, to pick a new credence function from the set E of credence functions meeting 16. The discussion to follow will make it appear that the norms (4.1) and (4.2) are inconsistent. However, Leitgeb and Pettigrew believe that the norms are consistent. This is in part because they think that there is a difference between learning that E and undergoing a learning experience which makes it rational to give credence 1 to E and credence 0 to ¬E. The former involves eliminating worlds inconsistent with E from W , while the latter does not. In the body, I will ignore this distinction (in part because it doesn't make a difference for anything I wish to say about the norms and in part because I'm disinclined to think it's a distinction which makes a difference with respect to how you ought to update your credences). philosophers' imprint 11 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change the evidential constraints. And, amongst the c ∈ E, you should be disposed to pick the one which you regard as best. Given (3.1), this means that you should be disposed to pick the one which maximizes expected epistemic value. Any justification of conditionalization appealing to this norm is susceptible to precisely the same objection we raised in the previous subsection. Why, if we care for accuracy and accuracy alone, should we care about having a credence function within E? Of course, if we care about meeting the constraints placed upon us by our evidence, we should care about this. Granted. But, as things stand, we have not said anything about why someone who cares about accuracy alone, and cares not at all about evidence per se, should want to select a new credence from E. And again, if V is proper, there appears to be little we can say about this. For, from the standpoint of your prior credence function, p, all the credence functions in E are expected to be less accurate than p itself, so long as p is not already in E. Again, if you care about accuracy and accuracy alone, if you measure it properly, and you abide by the consequentialist deontic norm (3.1), then you will reason dogmatically and refuse to learn from experience. So, like the norm (4.1), the norm (4.2) may not be justified in terms of the single-minded pursuit of accuracy. In addition, if we measure accuracy with the Brier accuracy measure, B, (as Leitgeb and Pettigrew, 2010b, argue we should) then the norm (4.2) will not vindicate conditionalization. For the (probabilistic) credence function in E which maximizes expected B-value from the standpoint of p is not p conditionalized on E. Rather, it is the function p(− || E), where, for every A ∈ A , p(A || E) df= p(AE) + #A ∩ E #E * [1 − p(E)] (Here '#A ∩ E' is the cardinality of the set A ∩ E, and likewise for '#E'.) To have a name, let's call 'p(A || E)' your credence in A LP conditionalized on E. When you conditionalize on E, you first set the credence of all worlds outside of E to zero, and then re-normalize in a way that preserves the ratios between your credences. When you LP conditionalize on E, you first set the credence of all worlds outside of E to zero, and then re-normalize in a way that preserves the differences between your credences. Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010a) offer a proof of the following proposition.17 Proposition 2 (Leitgeb and Pettigrew 2010a). Where E is the set of credence functions giving credence 1 to E and credence 0 to ¬E and P is the set of probability functions, arg maxc∈E,P { ∑ w∈W p(w) * B(c, w) } = p(A || E) If we help ourselves to probabilism and assume that accuracy is to be valued with B, then it follows from (4.2) and Proposition 2 that we should be disposed, upon acquiring the total evidence E, to LP conditionalize on E. pE ! = p(− || E) (4.3) (4.3) is not defensible. To co-opt an example from Levinstein (2012): suppose that I've hidden a prize behind either the left door or the right door, though you don't know which. To begin with, you are 60% confident that the prize is behind the left door and 40% confident that it is behind the right door. Incidentally, you are also 5% confident that ghosts exist. But you don't see any relation between these propositions. You think that whether the prize is behind the left or right door is independent of whether or not ghosts exist. Then, I reveal that the prize 17. Proposition 2 is an immediate corollary of Theorem 5 from Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010a). philosophers' imprint 12 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change [ L R G 3% 2% ¬G 57% 38% ] −→ [ L R G 0% 32% ¬G 0% 68% ] Figure 1: The right-hand-side distribution is the result of LP conditionalizing the left-hand-side distribution on the proposition R. (Notice that the difference between your credence in R ∩ ¬G and your credence in R ∩ G has been preserved.) is behind the right door. If you then LP conditionalize on the proposition that the prize is behind the right door, you will update your credences as shown in figure 1. (There, 'L' is the proposition that the prize is behind the left door, 'R' the proposition that it is behind the right, and 'G' the proposition that ghosts exist.) So, if you update on this new information with LP conditionalization, your credence that ghosts exist will more than sextuple. You'll end up 32% confident that ghosts exist. There are other problems with LP conditionalization. For instance, suppose that you think there are two ways ghosts could exist, G1 and G2, and, conditional on ghosts existing, you divide your credence equally between these two possibilities-but all else is the same as before. Then, you'll end up even more confident that ghosts exist- 42%. (See figure 2.) Simply by recognizing more ghost possibilities, the information that the prize is behind the right door ends up confirming that ghosts exist to a greater degree. Twisting the knife any further shouldn't be necessary. Updating with LP conditionalization cannot be seriously defended as a rational requirement. Levinstein contends that the problem lies, not with the norm (4.2), but rather with the Brier measure of accuracy, B. Instead, Levinstein suggests using the following measure of accuracy: L′(c, w) df= ln[c(w)]  L R G1 1.5% 1% G2 1.5% 1% ¬(G1∨G2) 57% 38%  −→  L R G1 0% 21% G2 0% 21% ¬(G1∨G2) 0% 58%  Figure 2: The right-hand-side distribution is the result of LP conditionalizing the left-hand-side distribution on the proposition R. (Note that this is not what I earlier called 'the logarithmic measure'.) Levinstein shows that, if you measure accuracy with L′, and you abide by both probabilism and the norm (4.2), then you will be disposed to conditionalize on whatever evidence you receive. That is, Levinstein shows that arg maxc∈E,P { ∑ w∈W p(w) * ln[c(w)] } = p(− | E) (4.4) So, Levinstein concludes, if you value accuracy in accordance with L′ and you abide by probabilism and the norm (4.2), then you will be a conditionalizer.18 But wait-why do we keep assuming probabilism, by requiring that the credence functions from which we are choosing lie in the set P of probability functions? To see why, for both Leitgeb and Pettigrew and Levinstein, this restriction is crucial, recall the reason I gave in §3 for rejecting accuracy measures which only consider the credence given 18. I am fudging things here a bit. The expected L′-value of p(− | E) will be undefined, since p(− | E) gives credence 0 to all worlds in ¬E, and ln[0] is not defined. More carefully, the claim should be that, as x approaches 1, the credence which maximizes expected L′-value, subject to the constraint that c(E) = x and c(¬E) = 1 − x, approaches p(− | E). philosophers' imprint 13 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change to singleton propositions. I noted that those measures say nothing at all about your credences in the more coarse-grained propositions, and so do not distinguish between probabilistic and non-probabilistic credence functions (recall table 1). But both B and L′ are measures of accuracy which only consider the credence given to singleton propositions. So, even if it were the case that p(− | E) were among the credence functions which maximized expected L′-value, subject to the evidential constraints, it would not uniquely maximize expected L′-value, subject to the evidential constraints, since any other credence function which agreed with p(− | E) about the credence assigned to the individual worlds would have precisely the same expected L′-value as it. This observation should not bother us if we already have an accuracy-based justification for ignoring all non-probability functions. However, that justification relied upon the claim that non-probability functions are accuracy-dominated and probability functions are not. This will not be true if accuracy is measured with L′. For every probability function is at least weakly L′-dominated by a non-probability function.19 In fact, every probability function is at least weakly L′dominated by precisely the same non-probability function. This is the function c†, which gives credence 1 to every proposition. Because it is maximally confident in every proposition, I like to call c† 'the credulous function'. For every world w ∈ W , L′(c†, w) = ln[c†(w)] = ln[1] = 0. And 0 is as high as accuracy goes, according to the measure L′. A probability function can only hope to get an L′-value of 0 if it gives all its probability to a single world. But then, while the probability function will do just as well as the credulous function at that world, the credulous function will do better at all other worlds. So the credulous function will weakly L′-dominate probability functions which place all their probability in a single possibility. And it will strongly L′-dominate any probability function which spreads its proba19. c weakly L′-dominates p iff, for all worlds w ∈ W , L′(p, w) 6 L′(c, w) and, for some world w ∈ W , L′(p, w) < L′(c, w). And c strongly L′-dominates p iff, for all worlds w ∈ W , L′(p, w) < L′(c, w). bility amongst multiple possibilities, since those probabilities will have a negative L′-value at every possible world.20 So, returning to Levinstein's vindication of conditionalization: we should be seriously bothered if p(− | E) is merely one among a collection of credence functions which maximize expected L′-value, subject to the evidential constraints. For, if we measure accuracy with L′, then we no longer have accuracy-based reasons to rule out nonprobability functions. But things are worse than this. It is not even true that p(− | E) is among the credence functions which maximize expected L′-value, subject to the evidential constraints. The set of credence functions which maximize expected L′-value, subject to the constraint that c(E) = 1 and c(¬E) = 0, are those functions which give credence 1 to every singleton proposition, and additionally give credence 1 to E and credence 0 to ¬E. All such functions meet the evidential constraints and have an expected L′-value of 0, which is, again, as good as L′-value gets. We could instead measure accuracy with a proper logarithmic measure like L, where, recall: L(c, w) df= ∑ A∈A ln [ | (1 − χA(w))− c(A) | ] L is both proper and continuous. And, as we saw above, if a measure of accuracy is both proper and continuous, then all non-probability functions will be accuracy-dominated, and no probability function will be accuracy-dominated (by the theorem of Predd et al. 2009). So we may vindicate probabilism with L. However, L does not afford a vindica20. L′ is often used in statistical applications, where it is taken for granted that the available credence functions are all probabilities. Since it is true that L′p(p∗) < L′p(p), for any probabilities p = p∗, the rule is, in these applications, often called 'proper'. This use of 'proper' is, however, importantly different from the definition used by accuracy-firsters, since probabilism is one of the norms they seek to establish, and not one they are willing to take for granted. philosophers' imprint 14 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change tion of conditionalization via the norm (4.2). To see why, note that, given (3.1), Lp(c) = ∑ A∈A p(A) * ln[c(A)] + (1 − p(A)) * ln[1 − c(A)] If you wish to maximize Lp(c), then you must choose values c(A) for each A ∈ A . And, for each A ∈ A , your choice of c(A) must be the one which maximizes p(A) * ln[c(A)] + (1 − p(A)) * ln[1 − c(A)] For every A, the unique value of c(A) which does this is p(A) (that's just what it is for L to be proper). Now, if we impose the constraint that c(E) = 1 and c(¬E) = 0, this will leave you no leeway with respect to your choice of c(E) and c(¬E). So those choices will be taken out of your hands. However, the constraint that c(E) = 1 and c(¬E) = 0 does not in any way constrain your choice of c(A) for any A = E,¬E. So, for all other propositions, c(A) = p(A) will be the only choice which maximizes expected L-value. This means that, if you value accuracy according to L and you follow the norm (4.2), then you will meet the constraints imposed by your evidence by changing your credence in the propositions E and ¬E, but leaving your credence in all other propositions unchanged. Of course, this will not be a probability function, which is to say: the norm (4.2), together with the proper accuracy measure L, is inconsistent with probabilism (and therefore, inconsistent with a norm telling you to avoid accuracy domination). So we had better not accept both (4.2) and adopt L as our epistemic values.21 Even if we require your credences to be a probability function by 21. For exactly the same reason, we had better not accept (4.2) and adopt Q as our epistemic values, either. stipulating that c(A) = ∑w∈A c(w) and measuring accuracy with L′′, where L′′(c, wi) df = ∑ wj∈W ln[ | (1 − δij)− c(wj) | ] the norm (4.2) will still not vindicate conditionalization. And what it does vindicate is no more defensible than LP conditionalization. Return to Levinstein's example: you are 60% confident that the prize is behind the left door, and 40% confident it is behind the right. Independently, you are 95% confident that there are no ghosts (that is, you have the credences shown on the left-hand-side of figure 1). If you then learn that the prize is behind the right door and you adopt a credence function with maximal L′′-value, subject to the constraint that ∑w∈R c(w) = 1 and ∑w/∈R c(w) = 0, then you will end up with precisely the same posterior credence function as you would if you LP conditionalized on the proposition R-that is, you end up with the posterior credence distribution shown on the right-hand-side of figure 1.22,23 To sum up: Leitgeb and Pettigrew's attempts to vindicate apparently evidential norms in terms of the rational pursuit of accuracy presuppose substantive evidential norms which are not themselves justified by the rational pursuit of accuracy, and which cannot be justified by the rational pursuit of accuracy so long as accuracy is prop22. Proof sketch: Let x = c(R∩ G) and y = c(R∩¬G). The evidential constraints require your credence in L ∩ G and L ∩ ¬G to both be 0, so you have no choice about these credences, and you are attempting to choose values of x and y which maximize expected L′′-value subject to the constraint that x + y = 1. The constraint allows us to substitute 1− x in for y. When we do so (and when we ignore the L′′-value of your credence in L ∩ G and L ∩ ¬G, which are fixed by the evidential constraints anyhow), the expected L′′-value of a choice of x becomes 0.64 ln[x] + 1.36 ln[1 − x], which is maximized at x = 0.32. (To make this proof less sketch, we should include limits in the manner suggested in footnote 18.) 23. See Theorem 15.1.4 from Pettigrew (2016). philosophers' imprint 15 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change erly measured. Moreover, their second attempt does not vindicate the norm of conditionalization, but rather the indefensible LP conditionalization. And this consequence of the second attempt may not be mitigated by moving to an alternative measure of accuracy, as Levinstein (2012) suggests. If we wish to understand rational belief as belief formed in the rational pursuit of truth, we should consider alternative approaches. 5. An Alternative Approach I have a suggestion. To get you in the mood for the suggestion, allow me to provide, at a very general level, an explanation of why the approach of Leitgeb and Pettigrew ran into the kind of objections I raised above. What Leitgeb and Pettigrew have provided is a model of rational belief. The model consists of a credal state, an epistemic value function, and a dynamical law which says that credences will move in the direction of highest expected accuracy. However, because the epistemic value function is proper, rational belief will always be in equilibrium (so long as we accept probabilism). If we think that rational belief may change as the result of a learning experience, then there must be some exogenously imposed change to some component of this model. There are three options for where this exogenous change could originate: the credal state, the dynamics, or the epistemic value function. In their first attempted vindication of conditionalization (§4.1), Leitgeb and Pettigrew choose to exogenously alter the credal state by removing worlds from W . If we take this tack, then we face a choice: either we say that the exogenous change to the credal state is rationally evaluable or we say that it is not. If we say that it is not, then we incur counterintuitive consequences like the arationality of becoming certain that Peru will invade China after seeing a bag blowing in the wind. If we say that it is, then we will not have succeeded in our project of explaining the rationality of changes in credal states as the result of the rational pursuit of accuracy; there will be some changes in credal states whose rationality is not explained, and could not be explained, by the single-minded pursuit of accuracy. Alternatively, there could be an exogenous change in the dynamics. We could say that, while most of the time, rational believers attempt to maximize the accuracy of their beliefs, sometimes, they attempt to meet the constraints imposed by their evidence-even when this will lead to them adopting beliefs which they expect to be less accurate than their current beliefs. This is the route which Leitgeb and Pettigrew take in their attempted vindication of LP conditionalization, and the route which Levinstein takes in his attempted vindication of conditionalization (§4.2). We saw that these attempts resulted in indefensible recommendations. But place that concern to the side. To take this route is to abandon the project of accounting for rational learning in terms of the rational pursuit of accuracy. It is to say that epistemic rationality requires you to follow evidential norms even when following those norms conflicts with the imperative to maximize expected accuracy. Perhaps, at the end of the day, this is what we ought to say. Perhaps, if there is sense to be made of the idea that Melissa's method of belief revision is more likely to lead to accurate beliefs than Daniel's, it is not that Daniel's methods are, by his own lights, expected to lead to less accurate beliefs than he otherwise could have adopted, and Melissa's are, by her own lights, expected to lead to the most accurate beliefs possible. Perhaps. But before we give up on the accuracy-firster's attempt to flesh out the attractive and intuitive idea that rational responses to evidence are more likely to be accurate than irrational responses to evidence, let's consider the final option: an exogenous change to the epistemic value function. 5.1 Epistemic Value Change Note that an expected accuracy maximizer will not in general take accuracy at all worlds into account equally. If you are an expected accuracy maximizer and you have the probability function p, then you will evaluate the credence function c by considering the epistemic value of c philosophers' imprint 16 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change at each world w, V(c, w), and weighting that value by your credence that w is actual. These weights, p(w), provide some measure of the degree to which you take accuracy at world w into account when you evaluate the credence function c. After a learning experience, then, once you have an updated probability, p′, you will take accuracy at some worlds into account more, and take accuracy at some worlds into account less, than you did previously. You will now weight accuracy at world w by p′(w), rather than p(w). So, when you learn that E, you will entirely ignore accuracy at non-E possibilities when evaluating credences. On the standard way of thinking about things, this evaluative change is the result of a change in credence. It is only after you have rationally responded to a learning experience by becoming certain that E that you stop taking accuracy at non-E possibilities into account. The essence of my suggestion is to reverse the order of explanation. It's not that you should stop taking accuracy at non-E possibilities into account because you should be certain that E. Rather, you should be certain that E because you should stop taking accuracy at non-E possibilities into account in your evaluation of credence functions. In general, new experiences can rationalize shifts in value. The right kind of experience can, e.g., rationalize shifts in your aesthetic, moral, and prudential values. The taste of Vegemite can rationalize valuing or disvaluing foods containing Vegemite, and seeing a Jackson Pollock can rationalize valuing or disvaluing abstract art. Such changes in value can be rational or irrational, depending on the nature of the experience. It would, for instance, be irrational to value abstract art less after a resplendent experience with a Jackson Pollock. And these changes in value may render certain changes in behavior rational or irrational. It would be irrational to avoid Vegemite after, and entirely because of, a pleasant experience eating Vegemite on toast. On the proposal I am putting forward, just as some experiences may rationalize a change in your aesthetic, moral, or prudential values, so too may some experiences-in particular, learning experiences- rationalize a change in your epistemic values. An experience which carries the evidence that I have hands rationalizes no longer valuing accuracy at possibilities at which I don't have hands (the 'handless possibilities'). And, importantly, on the current proposal, this change in my epistemic values is not the result of any change in my degrees of belief. I don't stop valuing accuracy at the handless possibilities because I've become certain that I have hands. Rather, I stop valuing accuracy at the handless possibilities because I've learned that I don't have hands. On the current proposal, learning experiences rationalize changes in epistemic value; and changes in epistemic value rationalize changes in credence. One common objection I have encountered is the following: on the current proposal, what reason could you have for not caring about accuracy at the non-E possibilities? On existing accuracy-first approaches, you stop taking accuracy at non-E possibilities into account because you are certain that those possibilities aren't actual. But if you're not certain that those possibilities aren't actual-if, instead, you think it's quite likely that those possibilities are actual-then what reason could you have to stop valuing accuracy at those possibilities? My response: the reason for not valuing accuracy at the non-E possibilities, in spite of the fact that you think the non-E possibilities are likely, is that you have learned that those possibilities are not actual. And that you've learned E is a sufficient reason to not value accuracy at non-E possibilities, whatever your prior degrees of belief in E happened to be. Another common objection is that I have provided no story about why experience rationalizes certain changes in epistemic value and not others. This is true, but a precisely analogous objection applies to existing accuracy-first accounts of rational learning. They have provided no story about what evidence experience provides. Whatever we decide about the relationship between accuracy and belief revision, it is incumbent upon the Bayesian to tell us which evidence propositions are provided by an experience. However, I see no reason why such a story should favor existing accuracy-first accounts of rational learning over my alternative. Take, for instance, the view that your total evidence is philosophers' imprint 17 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change just the strongest proposition known.24 On my proposal, to say this is to endorse the following norm: if you know that E, then it is rational to care only about accuracy in those possibilities in which E is true. This highlights an important feature of the present proposal: though it claims that the rationality of your degrees of belief is entirely a matter of whether you are rationally pursuing accuracy- though it denies that there are any evidential norms directly governing credence-it is consistent with there being substantive evidential norms governing the rational evaluation of credences. That is: while it says that evidence constrains how you may rationally value accuracy, it doesn't say that evidence directly constrains the rationality of your credences themselves. Even if the rationality of your epistemic values is in part a function of your evidence, the rationality of your credences may remain entirely a function of their expected epistemic value. If rational epistemic value is a function solely of the accuracy of credences, then, even if evidence rationalizes certain ways of valuing accuracy, we may still say that whether your credences are rational is entirely a function of their expected accuracy. That's the proposal, in broad outline. In §5.2, I'll show that there is a natural way of implementing the proposal on which, if you rationally pursue accuracy and accuracy alone, you will be disposed to conditionalize on whatever evidence you receive. In §5.3, we will see that an account such as this shows that the arguments for propriety we encountered back in §3 are invalid. 5.2 Epistemic Value Change and Conditionalization Suppose that you have a probabilistic credence function p and that you value accuracy with a proper epistemic value function V . Then, suppose that you undergo a learning experience which makes it rational for you to care not at all about how accurate your credences are at the worlds w /∈ E, but which rationalizes no other change in your 24. See Williamson (2000) epistemic values. Then, it will become rational for you to adopt a new credence function VE, where VE(c, w) = { V(c, w) if w ∈ E κw if w /∈ E (5.1) and κw is any constant. To say that, at worlds w /∈ E, VE(c, w) is a constant is just to say that, at worlds inconsistent with your evidence, you value accurate credences just as much as you value inaccurate credences. Which is just to say that, at those worlds inconsistent with your evidence, you do not value accuracy at all. The credence function which will maximize expected epistemic value for you, once your epistemic values have shifted to VE, will be the c which maximizes VE,p(c) = ∑ w∈W p(w) * VE(c, w) = ∑ w∈E p(w) * V(c, w) + ∑ w/∈E p(w) * κw The term ∑w/∈E p(w) * κw is just a constant, independent of our choice of c. So the choice of c which maximizes VE,p(c) will be whichever c maximizes ∑ w∈E p(w) * V(c, w) And Proposition 1 assures us that, since V was proper, the unique c which maximizes this will be p(− | E). That is: once you stop valuing accuracy at non-E possibilities, you will no longer see your prior crephilosophers' imprint 18 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change dence function p as maximizing expected accuracy. Instead, you will see p conditionalized on E as maximizing expected accuracy. Assuming that it is rational to adopt credences which maximize expected accuracy, it is rational to conditionalize on E once you've stopped valuing accuracy at the non-E possibilities (and your epistemic values have not changed in any other way). 5.3 Propriety and Epistemic Value Change Note that, if we change the value function in this way, it will no longer be proper. There are probability functions which place positive credence in possibilities incompatible with E-like, e.g., your prior credence function. These probabilities will see some other credence as having higher expected VE-value than they do. So VE is not proper. Is this a problem? If so, it is not because of the arguments which have been advanced for propriety. Consider first the argument from epistemic conservativism: P1. For any probability function, there is some evidence you could have which would make it epistemically permissible to hold that probability function. P2. If another credence function has at least as high an expected epistemic value as your own, then it is permissible to adopt that credence function, even without receiving any additional evidence. P3. It is impermissible to change your credence function without receiving any evidence. C. So, epistemic value must be proper. I see no reason why any of these premises should be inconsistent with the picture of rational learning I have sketched here. We can accept P1 if we think that any credence function is rational in the absence of evidence-nothing I've said has ruled that out. Moreover, this picture of rational learning entails the epistemic consequentialism of P2. And nothing in the present account is inconsistent with P3. On the present proposal, your epistemic value function will never be proper so long as you have evidence. Nevertheless, so long as your ur-prior epistemic value function V-the epistemic value function you held in the absence of any evidence-was proper, every rational probabilistic credence function will, at all times, see itself as uniquely maximizing expected accuracy. So, on the current proposal, the only thing which will prompt a change in credence is the acquisition of evidence. So long as you don't receive any evidence, holding onto your current credences will maximize expected accuracy. Nevertheless, your epistemic value function will not be proper. So we can accept both P1 and P2, as well as the epistemic conservativism of P3, without accepting the conclusion. So the argument is invalid. The reason the argument is invalid is that it has presupposed that your epistemic value function will remain fixed for all time; that your epistemic values may not change as a result of a learning experience. And this is exactly the assumption which we are calling into question here. Precisely the same assumption lies behind the immodesty argument for propriety. Recall, that argument utilizes P1 above, and adds the additional premise: P4. Rationality requires you to expect your own credences to be more epistemically valuable than any other potential credences. But nothing we've said here is in any conflict with this premise either. If you update your epistemic values in the way I've proposed, then you will, at all times, expect your credences to be more valuable than any others. Again, the argument presupposes that your epistemic value function is fixed for all time. If you deny this assumption, neither of these arguments give you any reason to opt for proper measures of accuracy. Of course, neither do those arguments give any reason to suspect that your ur-prior epistemic values-the epistemic values you adopt prior to receiving any evidence-should be proper. This is true, and it is a problem for the current proposal, since the propriety of the ur-prior epistemic values was crucial to its vindication of conditionalization. Fortunately, there are other arguments for particular proper measures philosophers' imprint 19 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change of accuracy which the current proposal does not reveal to be invalid. For instance, Pettigrew (2016) provides an argument for the quadratic accuracy measure Q which could easily be co-opted and retrofitted to argue that your ur-prior measure of accuracy must be Q. And since Q is proper, Proposition 1 assures us that, if your ur-prior epistemic values are given by Q and, upon receiving evidence, you update your epistemic values in line with (5.1), then the pursuit of maximum expected epistemic value will compel you to conditionalize on your evidence. 6. In Summation Existing accuracy-first approaches to rational learning wish to tell the following story about what's wrong with Daniel and what's right with Melissa: what's wrong with Daniel is that Daniel is either failing to value accuracy properly (that is, with a proper measure of accuracy), or else he is not pursuing accuracy rationally (that is, in a prudentially rational manner). And what's right with Melissa is that she is valuing accuracy properly and pursuing accuracy rationally. I've argued that the existing approaches cannot ultimately say these things. Their account of rational learning must presuppose substantive rational norms which do not follow from, and in fact are incompatible with, the imperative to value accuracy properly and pursue accuracy rationally. On the alternative picture I have sketched, we are able to say the following: what's wrong with Daniel is that he is either failing to value accuracy in a rational way, or else he is not pursuing accuracy rationally. What's right with Melissa is that she is both valuing and pursuing accuracy rationally. What's true in the idea that Daniel's beliefs are not likely to be accurate is that he ought to expect that those beliefs will be less accurate than other beliefs he could have held instead. That is, he ought to respond to his experience by coming to value accuracy in such a way that those beliefs are expected to be less accurate than other ones he could have held instead. What's true in the idea that Melissa's beliefs are likely to be accurate is that she ought to expect them to be more accurate than any other beliefs she could have held instead.25 Appendix A. Technicalities Proposition 1. (generalized from Leitgeb and Pettigrew 2010a) If V is proper, then, for any probability p and any E, p(− | E) = arg maxc ∑ w∈E V(c, w) * p(w) Proof. p(− | E) is a probability function. Since V is proper, p(− | E) maximizes expected V-value, where the expectation is taken relative to itself. So ∑ w∈W V(c, w) * p(w | E) = ∑ w∈E V(c, w) * p(w | E) is maximized when c = p(− | E). If p(− | E) maximizes this function, then it will also maximize the function if we multiply it by the factor p(E). So p(− | E) will also maximize p(E) * ∑ w∈E V(c, w) * p(w | E) = ∑ w∈E V(c, w) * p(w | E) * p(E) = ∑ w∈E V(c, w) * p(w) 25. I am indebted to Boris Babic, Adam Bjorndahl, Michael Caie, Daniel Drucker, Melissa Fusco, Konstantin Genin, Kevin Kelly, Zoë Johnson King, Harvey Lederman, Teddy Seidenfeld, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful conversation on this material. philosophers' imprint 20 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change References Selim Berker. Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions. Philosophical Review, 122(3):337–393, 2013. Glenn W. Brier. Verification of Forecasts Expressed in Terms of Probability. Monthy Weather Review, 78(1):1–3, January 1950. R. A. Briggs and Richard Pettigrew. An Accuracy-Dominance Argument for Conditionalization. Noûs, forthcoming. Aaron Bronfman. Conditionalization and not Knowing that One Knows. Erkenntnis, 79(4):871–892, 2014. Michael Caie. Rational Probabilistic Incoherence. Philosophical Review, 122(4):527–575, 2013. Jennifer Carr. Epistemic Utility Theory and the Aim of Belief. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 95(3):511–534, 2017. Kenny Easwaran. Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization- and Conglomerability and Reflection. Philosophy of Science, 80:119– 142, 2013. Kenny Easwaran. Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probability. Noûs, 50(4):816–853, 2016. Branden Fitelson, Kenny Easwaran, and David McCarthy. Coherence. ms. J. Dmitri Gallow. Updating for Externalists. ms. Allan Gibbard. Rational Credence and the Value of Truth. In Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne, editors, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, volume 2, pages 143–64. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008. Hilary Greaves. Epistemic Utility Theory. Mind, 122(488):915–952, 2013. Hilary Greaves and David Wallace. Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility. Mind, 115 (495):607–632, 2006. Alan Hájek. Arguments For-Or Against-Probabilism? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 59(4):793–819, 2008. Matthias Hild. Auto-Epistemology and Updating. Philosophical Studies, 92:321–361, 1998. Richard Jeffrey. The Logic of Decision. McGraw-Hill, New York, 1965. James M. Joyce. A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism. Philosophy of Science, 65(4):575–603, 1998. James M. Joyce. Accuracy and coherence: Prospects for an alethic epistemology of partial belief. In F. Huber and C. Schmidt-Petri, editors, Degrees of Belief, pages 263–97. Springer, Dordrecht, 2009. Gregory S. Kavka. The Toxin Puzzle. Analysis, 43(1):33–36, 1983. Jason Konek and Benjamin Anders Levinstein. The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory. Mind, forthcoming. Hannes Leitgeb and Richard Pettigrew. An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy. Philosophy of Science, 77(2):236–272, 2010a. Hannes Leitgeb and Richard Pettigrew. An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy. Philosophy of Science, 77(2):201– 235, 2010b. Benjamin Anders Levinstein. Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating. Philosophy of Science, 79(3):413–424, 2012. Graham Oddie. Conditionalization, Cogency, and Cognitive Value. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 48:533–41, 1997. Richard Pettigrew. Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle. Philosophical Review, 121(2):241–275, 2012a. Richard Pettigrew. An improper introduction to epistemic utility theory. In Henk W. de Regt, Stephan Hartmann, and Samir Okasha, editors, EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009, pages 287–301. Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht, 2012b. ISBN 978-94-007-2404-4. Richard Pettigrew. Accuracy and the Laws of Credence. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016. Richard Pettigrew. Making things right: the true consequences of decision theory in epistemology. In K. Ahlstrom-Vij and J. Dunn, editors, Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, forthcoming. Joel Predd, Robert Seiringer, Elliot H. Lieb, Daniel N. Osherson, H. Vincent Poor, and Sanjeev R. Kulkarni. Probabilistic Coherence and Proper Scoring Rules. IEEE Transations on Information Theory, 55(10): 4786–4792, 2009. philosophers' imprint 21 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019) j. dmitri gallow Learning and Value Change Miriam Schoenfield. Bridging Rationality and Accuracy. Journal of Philosophy, 112(12):633–657, 2015. Miriam Schoenfield. An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2016. Miriam Schoenfield. Conditionalization does not (in general) Maximize Expected Accuracy. Mind, 126(504):1155–1187, 2017a. Miriam Schoenfield. The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences. Noûs, 51(4):667–685, 2017b. Timothy Williamson. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000. philosophers' imprint 22 vol. 19, no. 29 (july 2019)

Faith and Philosophy10 Peter van Inwagen's essay, "Causation and the Mental," offers a striking solution to Jaegwon Kim's puzzle for non-reductive materialists about mental events/states and mental causation: the solution, reminiscent of van Inwagen's solution in Material Beings to certain puzzles surrounding constitution/composition, is that there are no such things as events or causation, and a fortiori no such things as mental events or mental causation, and hence nothing that can raise any puzzle. (More precisely, the claim is that causation, and a fortiori, mental causation, is never instantiated.) This is no ad hoc reply, but rather a consequence of van Inwagen's very general ontological claim that everything is either a substance or a relation; thus, there are no events and no causation, since the latter is a relation that holds between events if it holds at all. (Van Inwagen does not deny that there are true causal explanations, but the truth of these, he argues, does not require that there are any events.) Van Inwagen has demonstrated one advantage of denying the existence of events, namely that doing so allows one to avoid a certain puzzle one might otherwise have to confront. I suppose that could be taken as a reason to deny the existence of events. Even if it is such a reason, it has to be weighed against all the difficulties involved in such a denial. In any case, van Inwagen's ambitions are more modest: he is merely noting that Kim's puzzle presupposes an ontology that one need not endorse, and that van Inwagen rejects on independent grounds. The volume is rounded out by two other pieces: an excellent editorial introduction and a moving and informative appreciation of Plantinga's philosophical contributions, delivered by his long-time friend and colleague, Nicholas Wolterstorff. The former provides an overarching framework for the volume, and the latter drives home the significance of Plantinga's achievements, especially for those of us who weren't around in the "balmy days of positivism." All in all, this high-caliber volume is a fitting tribute to one of our greatest philosophers. Metaphysics and the Tri-Personal God, by William Hasker. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. 269 pages. $99.00 (cloth). DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER, Western Washington University William Hasker writes: "The 'three-in-oneness' problem of the Trinity is really hard" (162). I couldn't agree more. Appropriately for a treatise on that problem, Hasker divides his attempt at a solution into three parts: Trinitarian Foundations, Trinitarian Options, and Trinitarian Construction. Throughout, Hasker pushes something he calls "Social Trinitarianism." Part I selectively skims the Fathers on the Trinity, focusing on pp. 10–112 FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY Vol. 32 No. 1 January 2015 doi: All rights reserved BOOK REVIEWS 11 Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, and a couple of other "pro-Nicenes." Part II critiques Barth, Rahner, Moltmann, Zizioulas, Leftow, van Inwagen, Brower and Rea, Craig, Swinburne, and Yandell. Notably, in Chapters 15 and 16, Hasker affirms absolute identity as the only relation whereby anyone can count anything. I expect that most readers of this journal will be most interested in Part III, where Hasker develops his own syncretistic metaphysics of the Trinity, drawing mainly on Leftow and Craig. Chapter 21, on methodology, tells us that he aims to theorize about "the divine three-in-oneness" so that he can "bring us a step closer to comprehending that mysterious reality" (167). Such theorizing requires some constraints, however, chiefly "accepting the language of trinitarian belief with its limitations," "in particular its analogical character" (170). This implies, he says, that we should "exercise restraint in our attempts to formalize this language" and in our use of it "in the construction of systematic deductive arguments" (170). Hasker is right. It is wise to treat analogical trinitarian discourse as analogical, and so it is wise to exercise restraint with respect to it in these ways. However, we must not forget a corollary to this sage piece of advice: it is foolish to treat non-analogical trinitarian discourse as analogical, including the statements of a metaphysical theory aimed at solving the three-in-one-ness problem. Imagine meeting a metaphysician who insists that we count only by absolute identity and who gives a metaphysical theory aimed at solving the three-in-one-ness problem. Suppose we find among its statements these three: there is exactly one divine being, there are exactly three divine persons, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and there is exactly one way to be divine. I would think that, no matter what other learned erudition and metaphysical bells and whistles attends the theory, we should construct a systematic deductive argument to show that these statements entail a contradiction. If the author complains that we're taking them strictly and literally when she intended them analogically, we should counsel her to find another job, one more suitable to her aspirations, e.g., trinitarian narrative, poetry, or liturgy, all worthy tasks. Metaphysicians have a different task to perform and a different standard to live up to in its performance: to state the cold, sober truth, and to do so strictly and literally, in a rigorous, scrupulously well-defined fashion. Chapter 22, ostensibly about monotheism, summarizes some of Larry Hurtado's views regarding the early church's "binitarian practice." Chapter 23 insists that each Person is God, where "is God" is used as an adjective to predicate divinity or deity, not identity. Chapter 24 says that each Person is a person, where by "x is a person" Hasker means "x is a center or subject of consciousness, knowledge, will, love, and action" (193, 196–198; see also 22n15, 256, and Chapter 3 passim). Chapter 25 describes the communion of the Persons while Chapter 26 defends the eternal generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit. Hasker recognizes that communion, generation, and procession cannot suffice for the needed "oneness" in an adequate solution to the three-in-oneness problem. For Faith and Philosophy12 that, we discover in Chapter 27, we need Hasker's core view, which we might naturally call Core. "the three Persons share a single concrete nature, a single trope of deity" (227). Since, according to Hasker, it is "highly plausible" to "equate" the divine nature/trope with the "divine mind/soul" (236, 243), and since on page 257 he adds "a single mental substance" to the equation as well, he "models" (257) his core view in these words, although the label is mine: Support. The divine nature/trope or divine mind/soul or single mental substance "support[s] simultaneously three distinct lives, the lives belonging to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit" (236, my emphasis). He defends Support's "conceptual coherence" with split-brain and multiple personality data (231–236). As Chapter 28 begins, Hasker expresses satisfaction with his "strong case" for the coherence of his first model, but he shouldn't. That's because, among other things, few of his peers, if any, will understand what he means by "support." At some level, he is aware of the problem since he seeks "a more precise account of the relationship between the persons and the divine nature than is provided by the loosely defined 'support' relation" (237). However, the problem is more acute than Hasker acknowledges since nowhere does he define it. He says only that "the term is used in the ordinary sense in which we can say that the human body/mind/ soul . . . 'supports' the continuing conscious life of a human being" (228). This is no definition, not even a "loose" one; nor is there any such thing as "the ordinary sense" of the term "supports" that is used to say that "the human body/mind/soul supports the continuing conscious life of a human being." Thus, the primary explanatory relation posited by the first model is an explanatory surd. Fortunately, he ditches "the support relation," replacing it with the transitive, asymmetrical, irreflexive constitution relation (245), which he initially defines in such a way that x constitutes y only if x is spatially coincident with y and it is possible for x to exist without y, two implications he wants to avoid for theological reasons, along with another. The final definition, which the reader must piece together for herself (241–243), is this: x constitutes y at time t if and only if (i) x is absolutely distinct from y; (ii) x and y have all their parts in common at t; (iii) x is in G-favorable circumstances at t; (iv) necessarily, for any x, if x is of primary kind F at t and x is in Gfavorable circumstances at t, then there is a y such that y is of primary kind G at t and y has all of its parts in common with x at t; BOOK REVIEWS 13 (v) it is (conceptually, but not necessarily metaphysically) possible for x to exist at t but for there to be no y at t that has all of its parts in common with x. Hasker tells us that (ii) "should suffice to secure the needed 'closeness' between x and y" that had been secured by spatial coincidence in the initial definition, and that "if, as is commonly thought, souls are metaphysically simple, then neither x nor y will have 'proper parts'; what they share, then, will be only their single 'improper part,' which is the soul in its entirety" (243). Hasker clarifies two concepts in his definition: primary kind and Gfavorable circumstances. The primary kind of a thing, he says, supplies the answer to the question, "What most fundamentally is it"? Hasker has no theory of primary kinds but, quoting Lynne Rudder Baker, on whom he relies heavily, he says that "If x constitutes y, then y has whole classes of causal properties that x would not have had if x had not constituted anything" (240). For example, "a cat has innumerable causal properties that would not be possessed by a heap of cat tissue, were that heap not to constitute a cat" (240). The G-favorable circumstances are "precisely the circumstances in which an object [x] of primary kind F must find itself at a given time in order to constitute an object of kind G at that time," where the circumstances may include features either intrinsic or extrinsic to x (241). For example, if x is of the primary kind mass of cat tissue and y is of the primary kind felis catus and x constitutes y, then x "does so in virtue of certain circumstances in which x finds itself; lacking those circumstances, x might [conceptually "might"] exist without constituting anything" (241). Hasker then applies his definition to the subject matter of the book. For F in the schema, he tells us to substitute divine mind/soul or concrete divine nature/trope or single mental substance; for G, substitute divine trinitarian person; and for G-favorable circumstances, substitute "when [the divine mind/ soul or concrete divine nature/trope or single mental substance] sustains simultaneously three divine life-streams, each life-stream including cognitive, affective, and volitional states" (243, his emphasis). He continues: "Since in fact [the divine mind/soul or concrete divine nature/trope or single mental substance] does sustain three life-streams simultaneously, there are exactly three divine persons" (243, my emphasis). Thus we have Hasker's second model, which we might label Sustain. The divine mind/soul or concrete divine nature/trope or single mental substance constitutes each of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit when it "sustains simultaneously three divine life-streams, each life-stream including cognitive, affective, and volitional states." Hasker beams: "all is as it should be" (243). But clearly: not all is as it should be. Among other things, "sustains" is at least as undefined as "supports," and so the critical G-favorable circumstances under which the divine mind/soul, etc. is supposed to constitute each of the Persons are simply unintelligible. Faith and Philosophy14 We might well wonder where God is in all this. Chapter 29 answers with a "grammar of the Trinity" that specifies "three different and distinctive uses of this word ["God"] in the vicinity of trinitarian doctrine" (246): (i) to refer to "Yahweh, the God of the Old Testament, who was known to Jesus as Father" (246–247), (ii) to predicate divinity or deity of each of the Persons (247–249), and (iii) to refer to "the Trinity as a whole" (249–250), which, according to Hasker, is absolutely identical with either a composite object distinct from the Persons who are its proper parts (144, 198, 243), or a maximally tight-knit "community of persons" (196, 249, 258). Chapter 30 summarizes the book in three pages. Aside from my concerns about the intelligibility of "supports" and "sustains," I have several other concerns. For example, what is it, exactly, that does the constituting? The options on offer-(i) divine mind/soul, (ii) concrete divine nature or trope, and (iii) single mental substance-do not fall into the same category, despite Hasker's "equation," and the models may well have different implications, some welcome, some not, depending on which we opt for. Another example: for each option, when it satisfies Hasker's conditions for constituting something else, how is it, exactly, that the result is a person, as opposed to, say, a personality? A third: even if the result is a person, what is it about the constituter in virtue of which a constituted Person is divine? For, on the one hand, if the constituter is itself omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, uncreated, etc., and if it is distinct from each of the constituted Persons, each of whom is distinct from the other and also omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, uncreated, etc., don't we have four divine beings on our inventory? On the other hand, if the constituter is itself neither omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, nor uncreated, etc., then, even if it does "support" or "sustain" a stream of "cognitive, affective, and volitional states," thereby resulting in a constituted Person, in virtue of what, exactly, is that Person omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, uncreated, etc.? A fourth concern: if one constituted divine Person is absolutely distinct from a second constituted divine Person, then there are at least two divine Persons. But if there are at least two divine Persons, why aren't there at least two divine beings? So what if there's just one trope of divinity. On Hasker's view, we don't count divine beings by tropes; we count them by absolute identity. Thus, wouldn't a count of two divine persons also be a count of two divine beings? A fifth concern: why aren't there three numerically distinct Persons that are qualitatively indistinguishable? What is it about (a) the constituting mind/soul/nature/trope/substance, or (b) the three distinct life-streams of "cognitive, affective, and volitional states," or (c) the former's supporting or sustaining the latter, in virtue of which each constituted Person is qualitatively different from each other constituted Person? Presumably, the answer lies in some qualitative difference in the distinct life-streams of mental states, which pushes the question back a step: why aren't there three numerically distinct life-streams of qualitatively indistinguishable BOOK REVIEWS 15 mental states? What is it about (a), (b), and (c) in virtue of which each lifestream is qualitatively distinguished from each other life-stream? Unfortunately, space does not permit me to pursue these concerns. Rather, let me draw the reader's attention to another concern, one that begins with a simple question: what is monotheism? Whatever else we might say in answer to this question, surely we can agree on this much: 1. Monotheism implies that there is only one god. There are not two Gods, three Gods, or four Gods. There is just one God, exactly one. In this connection, note that "God" is used as a count noun by monotheists, a use screechingly absent from Hasker's list of three permitted uses (246–250), a use only grudgingly acknowledged in a footnote as "consistent" with his three (251n6). Christians should be clear with Hasker: There are not three Gods. There is only one God. Two statements more integral to the doctrine of the Trinity cannot be found and both use "God" as a count noun. We might pause to inquire into the nature of this being exactly one of which exists, according to monotheism. The monotheist will answer that a God-with an honorific capital "G" befitting its referent-is the kind of thing that instantiates the divine nature. As is well known, monotheists disagree about what properties that nature involves, but let's suppose Hasker is right: it involves omnipotence or almightiness, omniscience, moral perfection, uncreatedness, etc. (247, 256). Thus, given our supposition, a God is omnipotent or almighty, omniscient, morally perfect, uncreated, etc. Back to the main thread, a little logic tells us two things: 2. Necessarily, if there is only one God, then there is at least one God. 3. Necessarily, if there is at least one God, then there is a God. It follows that 4. Monotheism implies that there is a God (from 1–3). Some Christians hesitate when they see or hear "a God" in discussions such as ours. That's unfortunate. For, like it or not, monotheists-and Christians too, for every Christian is a monotheist-have a God on their hands, and a magnificent God at that, a God worthy of our total devotion. So much for monotheism; now let's turn to Hasker. According to Hasker, "it is entirely unacceptable to describe each-or indeed any-of the trinitarian Persons as 'a God'" (190). That's because- given his philosophical commitments, which are optional for trinitarians- if he deemed it acceptable, then he would have to say: "If each Person is 'a God,' and each is distinct from each other Person, then we have at least three Gods" (190). So, to avoid three Gods, Hasker insists that 5. The Father is not a God, the Son is not a God, and the Holy Spirit is not a God. But, according to Hasker, Faith and Philosophy16 6. God is not a person, since God-whether a composite or community of the Persons-is not a subject of consciousness, knowledge, will, love, and action, and so fails to satisfy Hasker's definition of "x is a person." Furthermore, since nothing can instantiate the divine nature, and thereby know, will, love, act, and exhibit consciousness unless it is a person, it follows that 7. Necessarily, for any x, if x is a God, then x is a person. Therefore, on Hasker's view, 8. God is not a God (from 6 and 7), and thus 9. Neither the Father, nor the Son, nor the Holy Spirit, nor God is a God (from 5 and 8). But we Christians affirm that 10. Necessarily, if there is a God, then the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, or God is a God. That's because, by our lights, no one else could possibly fit the bill; not Beelzebub, not Balaam, not Beelzebul, not Barabbas, not anyone. It follows that, on Hasker's view, 11. It is false that there is a God (from 9 and 10). Thus, we arrive at the denial of monotheism (from 4 and 11). How will Hasker respond to this argument? Well, if the past reliably indicates the future, he will first denunciate me for defining "monotheism" so that it is incompatible with the doctrine of the Trinity (as he does on page 198). But I've done no such thing, not least because I haven't defined anything. I have stated that monotheism implies that there is only one God-a statement Hasker says he believes: "If it can't be maintained that there is only one God, then the claim to be monotheistic will have to be given up" (195)-and I have deduced that there is a God from that statement by deploying two logical truths (2 and 3). Moreover, I have accurately represented the relevant portion of Hasker's trinitarianism (5 and 6) and I have expressed a necessary truth and the mind of Christians (7 and 10); otherwise, I have drawn demonstrably valid inferences in the logical system that Hasker himself endorses. Second, he will declare me a unitarian (as he does on page 198). But I have said nothing that implies that "God is a single person," a claim Hasker misattributes to me four times (145, 197, 198, 230), as though a monotheistic once or even a trinitarian thrice were not enough. By my lights, a freighter filled with philosophy sits between the trinitarian "God is a person" and the unitarian "God is a single person," philosophy that's optional for Christians, and so we must not simply assume that anyone who affirms the former must affirm the latter. BOOK REVIEWS 17 Third, he will decry my "tendency to treat classic theological texts and expressions as if they were formulas in symbolic logic" (as he does on page 197). Here, I'm afraid, Hasker has some explaining to do. For in the study of mine to which he refers, I treat Bill Craig's work on the Trinity. As for my "formulas in symbolic logic," I plead guilty as charged. My only defense is that I thought we were doing analytic theology. On a more serious note, we can access the substantive issue on pages 196–198-which is whether or not God is a person and thus can, inter alia, perform intentional acts-through a little argument: 12. God = the Trinity. 13. The Trinity never performs intentional acts. 14. So, God never performs intentional acts. (from 12 and 13) Hasker bristles at (14), but how can he deny it? After all, he repeatedly affirms (12), where what, by his lights, is rigidly designated by the singular terms flanking "=" fails to answer to his own definition of "x is a person." Moreover, the argument is formally valid given Leibniz's Law, which he also affirms. That leaves (13). What should we say about it? Hasker tells us that we should say two things: (i) The Trinity performs intentional acts in the way in which "groups of agents . . . are said to perform intentional acts in virtue of such acts being performed by their members," and (ii) The Trinity performs intentional acts, alright; but when we use those words, we use them analogically, not strictly and literally (197). As for (i), we might well ask: should we say "groups of agents perform intentional acts in virtue of such acts being performed by their members" because that sentence is true, strictly and literally? If Hasker answers "yes," then we rightly expect him to illuminate us on how it is, exactly, that a group of agents, whether a composite or community, performs an intentional act, strictly and literally, in virtue of its members performing it, despite the fact that, strictly and literally, it fails to satisfy his definition of "x is a person," and so, strictly and literally, it cannot intend anything. And, of course, we need more than that. For in the case of God (= the Trinity), we also rightly expect Hasker to illuminate us on how, exactly, a group of persons, whether a composite or community, can, strictly and literally, perceive, know, desire, love, and be conscious, even though, strictly and literally, it is not the subject of perception, knowledge, desire, love and consciousness. Hasker, however, attempts no such illumination. I take this to be sufficient evidence of the fact that he forsakes any account of the truth of (i), spoken strictly and literally. So either (i) is off the table, or it collapses into (ii). As for (ii), he says that, although "groups of agents . . . are said to perform intentional acts," they do not strictly and literally perform intentional Faith and Philosophy18 acts; rather a group of agents is merely "regarded in some contexts, and spoken of, as if it were a single person," and so a group of agents is merely "regarded in some contexts, and spoken of, as if it" performed intentional acts, as if it had properties that only persons can have (249). The same goes for the Trinity-that is, God. "[T]he Trinity [= God], while not literally a person, can nevertheless be regarded in some contexts, and spoken of, as if it were a single person," and so the Trinity, that is, God, while strictly and literally incapable of performing intentional acts and strictly and literally incapable of perceiving, knowing, desiring, loving, and being conscious, can nevertheless be regarded in some contexts, and spoken of, as if it were capable of performing intentional acts, as if it were the subject of perception, knowledge, desire, love and consciousness. (249). Let's dwell on this for a moment. According to Hasker, when we speak strictly and literally, as metaphysicians aim to speak, God never created anything; nor does God know anything, will anything, or love anyone; nor is God conscious. Indeed, Hasker goes so far as to assert-with italicized passion-that "God cannot refer to himself [sic?], or be referred to ('strictly and literally') by others, using personal pronouns" (231). So, God is not a person even in Peter van Inwagen's minimal sense of the term (122n4). God lacks a point of view. I propose that we find a pithy way to capture Hasker's position on this matter. Let "x is a Chalmers zombie" mean, by definition, "x lacks consciousness"; and let "x is a Nagel zombie" mean, by definition, "x lacks a point of view." Then Hasker's God is a Chalmers-Nagel zombie. But at least a Chalmers-Nagel zombie can perceive, believe, desire, will, and act. Not so Hasker's God. Hasker's God is much, much worse off mentally than a Chalmers-Nagel zombie. Let "x is a Hasker zombie" mean, by definition, "x is a Chalmers-Nagel zombie and x otherwise lacks mentality." Then it is more accurate to say that Hasker's God is a Hasker zombie. Not a Hollywood zombie, not a Haitian zombie. A Hasker zombie. So God is a Hasker zombie. Nevertheless, Hasker reassures us, it is still "more accurate" to speak as if God is a person, as if it can perform intentional acts, as if it knows, wills, loves, exhibits consciousness, and has a point of view. For, after all, writes Hasker, consider the alternative: "Would it be more accurate to describe the Trinity [= God] as powerless? When in fact the three Persons together exercise a single, transcendent power that can never be in conflict with itself? Or that the Trinity [= God] is ignorant, when each of the three Persons knows everything that exists to be known?" (249) Good question: would it? Hasker wants us to answer "No, it would not; it would be more accurate to describe God as omnipotent and omniscient than powerless and ignorant." But, as we've seen, on his view, God [= the Trinity] really is a Hasker zombie, in which case it would be much more accurate to describe God as powerless and ignorant than as omnipotent and omniscient. How could Hasker be so wrong about the implications of his view? My hypothesis is that he does not have in mind accuracy simpliciter, where a BOOK REVIEWS 19 statement is accurate simpliciter if and only if what it claims to be the case really is the case. My hypothesis is that he has in mind another sort of accuracy, what we might call "as-ifery accuracy." If my hypothesis is correct, then we need to know, exactly, what this quality is and we need a metric for non-arbitrarily assigning more or less of it to statements. Only then can we begin to understand how it can be that it is more as-ifery accurate to describe God as omnipotent and omniscient instead of powerless and ignorant when we know for a fact that it is more accurate simpliciter to describe God as powerless and ignorant instead of omnipotent and omniscient. Christian analytic theology is a wonderful enterprise. For, among other things, Christian analytic theologians allow us to see more starkly than ever what is at stake in our different attempts to understand the great doctrines of the Church. This is certainly true of William Hasker's metaphysics of the Trinity. As I come away from my study of his book, two questions loom large for me. First, are we Christian analytic theologians going to follow the one we profess as our Lord and stand up and count ourselves as full-blooded monotheists, insisting that our metaphysics, logic, and philosophy more generally get in line with our profession? Yes, it is difficult to define "monotheism"; but we don't need a definition to know that whatever else monotheism involves, it implies that there is only one God, and so it implies that there is a God. Second, is it morally permissible for Christian analytic theologians-or Christian intellectuals and leaders more generally-to adopt as-ifery in their most fundamental theorizing about the nature of God? We might approach the second question through reflection on the Church's mission, no small part of which is expressed by the Great Commission. In this connection, let me phrase the question in a conspicuously evangelical way: can we Christians in good faith evangelize with "God loves you and offers a wonderful plan for your life" when we think it would be more accurate simpliciter to say "God does not love you and offers no plan for your life, much less a wonderful one. But don't take it personally. God can't love or offer anything to anyone"? Beyond the Control of God? Six Views on the Problem of God and Abstract Objects, ed. Paul M. Gould. New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014. 209 pages. $25.99 (paperback). R. T. MULLINS, University of Notre Dame Are you the sort of philosopher who prefers desert landscapes, or lush forests? Would you gladly live in a world that contained the Platonic heavens, or would you rather decry the heavens and do without? Where does pp. 19–112 FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY Vol. 32 No. 1 January 2015 doi: All rights reserved

Consciousness, Attention, and Justification* Introduction Compare a subject who enjoys conscious visual experience of a ball, and a hypothetical blindsighted subject who does not have conscious visual experience of a ball, but who nevertheless registers the presence of a ball in unconscious perceptual processing. Across a range of cases, both subjects reliably form accurate judgments about whether a ball is present. Does the sighted subject have more reason to believe a ball is there? Or, in the terms we will use throughout this paper, does the sighted subject have more reason to believe that a ball is there? If the sighted subject does, the justificatory difference is presumably due to the conscious character of her experience, since the conscious and the unconscious perception are so similar in their other features.1 This position on the blindsight case is endorsed by phenomenal approaches in the epistemology of perception. According to phenomenal approaches, conscious perceptual experiences provide justification at least in part in virtue of their phenomenal character (Johnston 2006, Smithies 2011-a).2 This view goes beyond holding, against Davidson (1986), that experiences justify beliefs. To say that experiences justify beliefs is not yet to say that they provide justification in virtue of their phenomenal character. They might instead provide justification solely in virtue of further properties which can be had in the absence of phenomenology (see Lyons 2009 and arguably Burge 2003). To see the appeal of the phenomenal approach, it might help to put yourself in the shoes of the blindsighted subject, and in particular to suppose that your vision is restored. Wouldn't your epistemic position likewise seem to improve? Some readers may remain unmoved, but even they may want to assess which version of the view they oppose is the most plausible. Rather than attempting to settle the dispute here, we start from a point dialectically downstream. * Thanks to audiences at the ANU, Arché, Brown, Cornell, Edinburgh, Fribourg, Geneva, Harvard, Haverford, Miami, the Northern Institute of Philosophy, and Urbana-Champaign. Thanks also to David Bennett, Ned Block, David Chalmers, Don Dulany, Martine NidaRümelin, Declan Smithies, Daniel Stoljar, Scott Sturgeon, Jonathan Vogel, Sebastian Watzl, Ralph Wedgwood, Elia Zardini, and an anonymous referee. 1 One might protest that there are further differences between the sighted subject and the blindsighted subject which explain the epistemic difference between them. For example, one might resist the idea that there is such a thing as unconscious perception, and explain the epistemic privilege of the sighted subject simply in terms of the fact that she sees a ball (for discussion of whether there is unconscious perception, see Merikle 2001 and Dretske 2006). To respond to this suggestion, we may compare the blindsighted subject with someone who has a perfect hallucination that a ball is present, with no indication that anything is amiss. Provided that such a subject has more justification than a blindsighted sighted subject to believe that a ball is present, consciousness without seeing does have an epistemic role to play after all. 2 The crucial point is not just that they have some phenomenal character or the other, instead different experiences will justify different propositions in part in virtue of differences between their phenomenal characters. The point isn't merely that the "lights must be on" in the subject. susanna siegel 7/2/12 11:03 AM Formatted: Style-1, Level 1, Indent: First line: 0" 2 Assuming that some phenomenal states play a constitutive role in justifying perceptual beliefs, which phenomenal states play this role? We can refine this question by making a further comparison. When you imagined the sighted subject, you might well have imagined the sighted subject attending to the ball, in the way you are focusing your visual attention to this text right now. Think of attention here as a way of highlighting what you are experiencing. But now consider a distracted subject who enjoys conscious visual experience of a ball, without attending to the ball. Does the inattentive subject have any reason (or equivalently, any justification) to believe that a ball is there? According to the Attention Needed approach, she does not – roughly speaking, only consciousness inside attention supplies justification, so the distracted subject is epistemically on a par with a blindsighted subject with respect to the presence of the ball. According to the Attention Optional approach, she might well do – roughly speaking, consciousness outside attention sometimes supplies justification, so the distracted subject may have more justification than the blindsighted subject to believe the ball is present. (We will further clarify what kind of attention figures in these positions in section 1).3 We have formulated the Attention Needed and Attention Optional views with respect to propositional justification, which is a matter of what one has reason to believe proposition, whether or not one has taken advantage of one's position so as to form what is known as a doxastically justified or equivalently, well-founded belief. To get the distinction in view, compare Holmes and Watson, who may both have reason to believe that the butler did it, even though only Holmes has taken proper advantage of the evidence in forming his belief that butler did it, whereas Watson has formed the same belief, but on the basis of the wrong reasons, or no reasons at all. We will talk interchangeably about having reason from experience, experience providing reason, and experience providing propositional justification for beliefs. Our aim in this paper is to articulate and motivate the Attention Optional view, and to defend it from a range of robust objections. Our defense is neither complete nor conclusive. But it is worth exploring how viable the position is because of its wide ramifications. Perhaps its most important ramifications concern debates about "internalism" and "externalism" in epistemology. It is natural to think that, if one privileges the role of consciousness in epistemology with respect to what justifies perceptual beliefs, one will be as "internalist" as one could be. To privilege consciousness is after all to privilege the conscious point of view of the subject, and the conscious point of view of the subject might easily be presumed to be "internal" 3 We have formulated the debate as a dispute among those who agree that conscious experiences supply justification in virtue of their phenomenal character. However, a related question can be raised by those who allow unconscious perception to be a source of justification. Assuming that some blindsighted subjects are capable of perceptual attention, as is argued by Kentridge 2008--is unconscious perception a source of justification only when it is itself attentive? We set that question aside in what follows, on the grounds that the presuppositions of the question---that unconscious perception sometimes justifies, that there is attentive unconscious perception---are more controversial than those of our own. 3 both in the sense of being mental and in the sense of being cognitively accessible to the subject.4 The Attention Optional view complicates this picture in ways we describe at the end. Other ramifications bear on internalist views in epistemology that fall under the headings of "dogmatism" (Pryor 2000, 2004) and "phenomenal conservatism" (Huemer 2001, 2007). According to these positions, consciousness suffices for justification---roughly, if one has an experience with the content that p, then one has justification from the experience to believe that p. However, if attention is necessary for an experience to justify a belief, although not necessary for consciousness, we will then have cases in which one does have an experience with the content that p, although one fails to gain justification from the experience to believe that p. Here we have a new objection to views on which consciousness suffices for justification that isn't addressed by extant responses to them.5 The debate between the Attention Optional and Attention Necessary views brings this objection into focus. Finally, in evaluating the Attention Optional view, we explore the epistemic significance of change blindness and inattentional blindness, psychological phenomena in which perceivers strikingly fail to notice large-scale changes in scenes (such as a swap of one interlocutor for another) or unexpected stimuli (such as a person in a gorilla suit).6 Most discussions of inattentional blindness and change blindness concern the scope of conscious awareness. Are we conscious only of that to which we attend? Why do some blatant changes in the visual scene escape our notice? Is having a sense of being conscious of a rich range of detail in a scene always a "grand illusion"? The experiments designed to probe these questions (by Rensink 1997 or Simons and Chabris 1999) are among the most widely discussed in vision science, but their bearing on the epistemology of perception has been discussed much less.7 In this paper we focus on a central epistemological question raised by these findings: what is the rational role of consciousness outside attention, if there is any? The Attention Optional view assumes there is such a thing as a largely or wholly inattentive conscious experience. In section 1 of the paper, we clarify and defend this assumption. In section 2, after presenting some considerations favoring the Attention Optional view, we address a series of epistemological challenges. At the end, we return to the wider implications of the Attention Optional view. 1. Does Consciousness Require Attention? 4 For further discussion of different versions of internalism, see Conee and Feldman 2001, Pryor 2001, Wedgwood 2002. 5 The views of Pryor and Huemer are typically stated with the caveat that an experience provides justification only in the absence of defeating evidence. So their proponent might say that, when you have an experience of something while failing to attend to it, you have defeating evidence. However, one arguably can fail to attend while lacking evidence that one fails to attend. For more on the question of defeat, see the end of section 2. 6 For discussion of the aesthetic significance of these phenomena, see Silins ms1. 7 Earlier discussion of the role of attention in epistemology include Campbell 2002/2011, Mole 2008/2011, Smithies 2011a/2011b, Roessler 2011, and Dickie 2011. These discussions focus primarily on the epistemic role of attentive experiences, not on the epistemic role of inattentive experiences. 4 1.1. Formulations Are you conscious only of that to which you attend? According to what we call the Highlight view, the answer is No -you sometimes experience more entities than those to which you attend (be they objects, properties, or other entities still). According what we call the Searchlight view, the answer is Yes -just as you might see only those things illuminated by a searchlight, you experience only those entities to which you attend. The simplest version of these positions would employ a binary notion of attention, according to which one either attends to something or one doesn't, where this is not a matter of degree. However, attention seems to come in degrees. To get a handle on the difference between degrees of attention, consider the conception of attention as a kind of highlighting, and consider how you might highlight words on a page in different colors of varying degrees of salience, ranging say from bright red to pale yellow. Degrees of attention co-vary with the degrees of salience of what one attends to.8 We are mainly interested in what happens in the low range. It has proven difficult to differentiate experimentally between low levels of attention and complete absence of attention.9 For convenience, we will speak of "consciousness outside attention" and "inattentive experiences" as shorthand for conscious states (experiences) that are largely or wholly inattentive. The theses of interest to us can all be formulated in terms of experiences that are inattentive in this sense. They are in particular as follows: Spotlight View: One is conscious of x only if one attends to x to more than a low degree. Highlight View: One is sometimes conscious of x even if one either does not attend to x at all, or attends to x only to a low degree. Attention Needed: One has reason from an experience to believe that x is F only if one attends to x to more than a low degree. Attention Optional: One sometimes has reason from an experience to believe that x is F even if one either does not attend to x at all, or attends to x only to a low degree. It is prima facie plausible that there is consciousness outside attention, in the sense we have in mind. For example, you might feel stiffness in your knees while jogging but not attend to it, being distracted by the music you are listening to. It might be hard here to rule out the possibility that you attended to a low degree to the stiffness in your knees, but we are not trying to rule out such a possibility. Or you might hear a drill in the background for a period of time without noticing it, then attend to the sound and realize you have been hearing it all along (Block 1995). Finally, while rummaging through the fridge, distracted by inner ruminations but looking for mustard, you might pass the mustard by even though you were looking straight at it. Later on, even though you did not attend to it, you might still (accurately) remember having seen it (Soltis 1966, Dretske 1969, Martin 1992, Smithies 2011-a). 8 Thanks to Declan Smithies for discussion of this point. 9 Koch and Tsuchiya (2006) address this difficulty. 5 1.2. Motivations: Why the Searchlight View should not be taken for granted The classic inattentional blindness experiments such as those by Simons and Chabris 1999 or Most et al 2001 are often thought to provide decisive support for the Searchlight view. But there are reasons to doubt that these cases ultimately provide much support. The studies involve subjects who fail to report seeing a surprising stimulus that appears while they are performing an attentionally demanding task. Some subjects even deny seeing the anomalous stimulus when asked about it afterward. In the case of Simons and Chabris 1999, a significant proportion of subjects asked to count passes of a basketball failed to report seeing a gorilla who wandered into the scene of players. In the case of Most et al 2001, a significant proportion of subjects asked to track white or black shapes bouncing around a screen failed to report seeing a cross which traveled across the screen, even when the cross was red. The searchlight view explains why the subjects did not report the unexpected stimulus with three key claims. First, since the subjects' attention was occupied by the difficult task to be performed, the subjects did not attend to the surprising stimulus (if they did attend to the stimulus, the Searchlight view would be of no use in explaining the failure to report). Second, since the subjects did not attend to the stimulus, they did not experience the stimulus. Finally, since the subjects did not experience the stimulus, they did not report the stimulus. The absence of report is explained by an absence of experience, which is in turn explained by the absence of attention. This explanation is not more plausible than several other alternatives. A first alternative is that attention to x is necessary for one to report x, even though attention is not necessary for one to experience x (see Block 1995 and 2007 for discussion). On this approach, even if a subject did inattentively experience the gorilla or the red cross (even as being a gorilla or as being a red cross), we should still expect them to fail to report. On this line of thought, attention is necessary for you to form a belief which takes your experience at face value---the story still allows that you might have a memory about something you did not at the time register in belief, as you might in the case of the missing mustard. Another alternative is that subjects who did not attend to the gorilla or the red cross experienced the region containing them as being continuous in color or texture with the background. On this line of thought, they did inattentively experience the region where the surprising stimulus is located, but did not experience the actual contents of the region, but instead "filled in" the region in their experience. No surprise then if the subject fails to report a gorilla or a red cross. In order for the case for the Searchlight view to succeed, such rival explanations must be blocked. These explanations would underwrite the Highlight View.10 2. What is the rational role of inattentive experiences? 2.1. The Case for the Attention Optional view Suppose you walk into your kitchen and see a pomegranate on the counter. If you 10 For further discussion of these and other options available to the Highlight theorist, see Schwitzgebel 2007, Stazicker 2011, or Smithies 2011a. 6 know what pomegranates look like, then normally you would form the belief that there is a pomegranate on the counter. Of course, under some conditions, you would not form this belief, even if you had the same experience in which the pomegranate looks the way pomegranates typically look. You might not recognize it as a pomegranate, for instance, perhaps because you don't have the concept of pomegranates. Or you might have the concept and be good at recognizing pomegranates, but fail to form the belief because you unreasonably think you are hallucinating or seeing incorrectly. We could see any of these situations as cases in which you have an epistemic asset your visual experience that you don't use in forming a belief that a pomegranate is on the counter. The Attention Needed and Attention Optional views can agree that normally, when you attend to a pomegranate on the counter, if you lack doubts about the reliability of your experience, and have the requisite concepts and the capacity to recognize pomegranates, you take the experience at face value and form a belief on the basis of your experience that a pomegranate is on the counter. If you lack the pomegranate concept, or can't recognize them, or unreasonably doubt the reliability of your experience, your experience will be an unused epistemic asset: something that contributes to your justification for believing that a pomegranate is on the counter, but which you don't use because of your doubts or your cognitive limitations. The Attention Optional view allows for a different kind of unused epistemic asset. A subject with an inattentive experience of a pomegranate might have the concept of pomegranates, and a capacity to recognize them, and even believe that her experience is reliable, but still fail to use the inattentive part of her experience. Here it differs from the Attention Needed view, which says that you only ever have reason from experience when the experience is attentive, and disallows your inattentive experiences to count as unused epistemic asset of this kind. The two views can agree that normally, when your experience is attentive, if you have the relevant concepts and recognitional dispositions and you believe you experience is reliable, you will use the experience as a basis for a perceptual belief. But they differ on what happens to the status of that experience as an epistemic asset, when the experience is inattentive but the rest of the conditions just listed are met. There are several important precedents for the scenarios allowed by the Attention Optional view, which we will present in increasing proximity to the perceptual case. Given how closely analogous these cases are to and the scenarios allowed by the Attention Optional view, we take them to provide some support for the Attention Optional view. First, in the case of belief and inference, you can easily have reason to believe that p, without having noticed or taken advantage of the position you are in. For instance, if I have a justified belief that I have an appointment with x alone at noon, a justified belief that I have an appointment with y alone at noon, and a justified belief that x≠y, then I'll have reason to believe that I have conflicting appointments, whether or not I have noticed the conflict. Indeed, that is why I kick myself once I see x and y together at my door---I failed to take advantage of the good epistemic position I was in. This is a case of inferential blindness, a cognitive analogue of what is allowed by the Attention Optional view. Given that inferential blindness is possible and indeed 7 common in the case of belief, we should expect analogous scenarios to be possible in the case of experience. There is already precedent for unnoticed justification from experience in humdrum cases of "change blindness" of the sort discussed by Dretske 2004 and 2006. Suppose you have mocked your friend Moe's moustache for years, and then one day Moe comes up to you asks, "do I look different?". Even though you will most likely say "yes", having just received a clue that he looks different, you still could easily have scanned his face and failed to notice that he shaved off his moustache. In such cases you fail to notice quite large-scale differences in a person's appearance. Does your experience give you reason to believe that Moe shaved? First consider what your experience was like. Either you experienced the region under Moe's nose or you did not. We take the option that there was simply a gap in your experience to be absurd – you might well even have attended to the region, thereby satisfying the demands of the view that attention is necessary for consciousness. If you experienced the region under his nose, either you experienced it accurately or inaccurately. If you experienced it inaccurately, your experience would have "filled in" the appearance of a moustache under his nose. The filling-in view suggests that at least sometimes, we will experience the disappearance of the objects we expected to see, upon finding that those objects are not there. Since this suggestion seems dubious, we take it you had an accurate experience of the now hairless region under his nose. When Moe points out to you that he shaved off his moustache, you may legitimately kick yourself for having failed to notice the difference. In such a case, we take it you kick yourself because you had reason from your experience to believe that Moe has no moustache, even though you failed to take advantage of the resource you had in forming a belief that his moustache is gone. Such examples of change blindness are ones in which your experience gives you reason to believe that p, even though you fail to take advantage of your experience so as to form a justified belief that p. Given that such cases are possible, we should expect cases of consciousness outside attention to likewise sometimes give you reason to believe that p, even if you fail to notice that your consciousness outside attention gives you reason to believe that p, and even if you otherwise failed to take advantage of the resource you have. In the cases discussed so far, a source gives you non-immediate justification, in the sense that the source provides justification only when combined with your having reason to hold other beliefs. For instance, to have reason from your experience to believe that Moe shaved, your experience of the moustacheless upper lip has to combine with your reasons to believe that Moe had a moustache. In response, one might demand an example in which an experience gives one immediate justification, in a way that does not depend on your justification for other beliefs. After all, we should agree that an experience can give one non-immediate justification to believe many things, without one's actually forming all the beliefs which are justified by the experience. My experience of the size of a doorway might justify me in believing that a Mack Truck wouldn't fit through, that a Boeing wouldn't fit through, that an Airbus wouldn't fit through, and so on, even if I don't form all of those beliefs. Be that as it may, we can simply adapt the Moe example to make the point. Simply consider a belief about the color of skin under Moe's nose. (And if you think there are no good candidates for immediate justification, the original example of the belief that Moe has shaved his moustache should work well enough). 8 The cases just described parallel the predictions of the Attention Optional view. The similarity between what the view allows and what occurs in the cases of inferential blindness and of change blindness gives us some reason to believe the view. As a final consideration in favor of the Attention Optional view, compare a blindsighted subject who registers the presence of a ball, and a corresponding sighted yet distracted subject who experiences the presence of a ball. If you are inclined to judge that the sighted subject has more justification to believe that a ball is present, despite being distracted, you already see some appeal to the Attention Optional view.11 2.2 Challenges to the Attention Optional view We now turn to some powerful objections to the Attention Optional view which use the inattentional blindness experiment by Most et al as a point of focus. In the experiment, subjects are asked to count the number of times white boxes bounce off the edges of a screen, while a red cross passes along the middle of the screen. We assume for the sake of argument that the subject experiences the red cross without attending to it, and moreover experiences the red cross as a red cross without attending to it.12 In principle the discussion could easily be set up in other ways. For example, if the subject experiences the region where the red cross is located, but simply as being uniform in color with the rest of the background, we could then frame the discussion around whether the subject has justification to believe that the region is grey. Indeed, our discussion could be set around any example where the proponent of the Attention Optional view thinks we get justification from an inattentive experience. The red cross example is simply vivid and convenient. A proponent of the Attention Optional view says that the subject has reason to believe that a red cross is on the screen, despite her lack of attention to the red cross. A first challenge to this position starts from the fact that the subject would not report experiencing a red cross, and might indeed deny experiencing a red cross. You might yourself have been experiencing a red cross to your lower right a moment ago. The challenge is then that forming a belief that a red cross is on the screen might seem to be no more than a stab in the dark, even from the point of view of the subject. On this line of thought, the Attention Optional position extends justification too far beyond what is inside the subject's point of view, wrongly counting beliefs as justified when they are no better than unjustified guesses. In response, we appeal to the distinction between having reason to believe P, and using what reason one has for P to believe P. Insofar as Holmes and Watson each have good evidence that the butler did it, they each have reason to believe that the butler did it. Still, if only Holmes 11 For a defense of this claim, see Smithies (2011a and 2011b). For defense of a contrary claim, see Roessler (2011: 287-9). To defend Attention Optional, one might conjoin a case for the Highlight view with a case for the strong "dogmatist" claim that, if one has an experience with the content that p, then one has prima facie justification to believe that p (endorsed by philosophers such as Pryor and Huemer). Since the dogmatist claim is so controversial, we set that line of argument aside. 12 We assume that, in order for an experience of a red cross to supply justification to believe that a red cross is present, one must experience the red cross as a red cross. It won't be enough to experience a cross that in fact is red, but misperceive it as being orange. 9 has properly based his belief on the basis of the evidence, whereas Watson has bypassed the evidence and formed a belief solely due to prejudice, only Holmes will have a well-founded belief that the butler did it. If the Most et al. subject formed a belief that a red cross is on the screen without attending to the cross, her belief might well fail to be well-founded. But this does not mean that she fails to have reason from her experience for the belief. Attention might merely be a standard conduit through which we exploit the reasons we acquire from experience, so as to form a sellfounded belief. (Is attention actually required to form a well-founded belief on the basis of experience? More on that soon.) Attention can play this role, without being a necessary condition for one to have reason from one's experience in the first place. A second challenge draws on the idea that attention inevitably alters your experience. According to this position, rather than being a mere pointer, the "index finger of the mind", attention always transforms the course of your experience, and these transformations would always get in the way of your having reason from an inattentive experience for a belief. Here is one way to develop this line of thought: Usability: An experience E gives you reason to believe that a is F only if you can form a well-founded belief that a is F on the basis of E. WF-Attention Needed: If at time t you form a well-founded belief that a is F on the basis of an experience E, then at t you have E and attend to a. Attention Alters Appearance: If you have an inattentive experience E of a, and then attend to a, then you no longer have E.13 Conclusion 1: You can't form a well-founded belief that a is F on the basis of an inattentive experience of a. Conclusion 2: No inattentive experience ever gives you reason to believe that a is F. On this line of thought, since you must use attention to form a belief on the basis of an experience, and you form a belief on the basis of an experience only if you have the experience during the time of the belief formation, you cannot use inattentive experiences to form wellfounded beliefs. On the assumption that Usability is correct, inattentive experiences do not even so much as provide propositional justification. We scrutinize Usability more closely in what follows, examining both the case for it and the case against it. But first, let us focus on WFAttention Needed.14 13 Cf Carrasco (2004) which discusses cases in which apparent contrast among the stripes on a patch (called a Gabor patch) varies with changes in attention. The principle says that this type of result generalizes to all changes in attention. 14 Smithies 2011b defends WF-Attention Needed. He writes that experiences plays a role in "formatting the contents of experience in such a way as to make them available for use in conceptual thought. In particular, attention to an object is necessary for converting the contents of experience into the contents of justified belief (26)." Similarly, Mole (2008) suggests that "it is only after attention is paid that this awareness gives one a conceptually structured representation of the sort that improves one's epistemic position vis a vis the stimuli in a change blindness experiment" (96-7). 10 Whether or not attention is typically a conduit by which we form well-founded perceptual beliefs, we doubt that attention is a strictly necessary condition for well-founded perceptual beliefs. Here is a range of problem cases for that claim. Consider a distracted subject navigating the environment, such as a distracted driver, or a walker lost in thought. Such a subject can still adjust their behavior in response to the environment in a way that is not merely instinctive, operating the brake, the clutch, the defrosting system, the steering wheel, and so on. Further, they arguably can do so while remaining distracted from the environment, without their attention being captured by the obstacles that they are successfully avoiding, or by the equipment that they are manipulating. Despite being superficially automatic, such behavior is far from being a mere reflex, and has a strong claim to being rational. In addition, the subject would satisfy the central diagnostics for having various beliefs about her immediate situation, such as the belief that the car is running and operating as it should be. They are disposed to endorse this proposition if asked, and they are acting in a way that would be advisable, given their desire to continue driving, if the proposition is true. In such a case, their inattentive experience is feeding into well-founded perceptual beliefs.15 Second, consider George, who has a sponge-like mind akin to a Google Street View camera. As George navigates his environment, he soaks up information about the background of his experience, outside of the foreground he attends to, and he can reliably answer questions about the background later. If you ask him what is at 204 Cayuga Street or at 538 Merrill Street, he can tell you, having recorded this information from his experience. We take it that such a subject's beliefs can be justified. (Notice that both reliabilist theories and broadly internalist theories can agree on this point. George's inattentive experiences are reliable, as well as constituting part of his point of view on the world.) A difficulty for this line of argument is that, even if it works against the current version of WF-Attention Needed, it does not address a version of the claim restricted to minds like ours. And a version of WF-Attention Needed restricted in such a way could be enough to get to the conclusion that in minds like ours, inattentive experiences do not provide reason for beliefs. For what we take to be the strongest line of objection to WF-Attention Needed, reconsider the classic putative examples of consciousness without a (high degree of) attention. When I have an experience of cufflinks without attending to them or noticing them, but later remember that I had an experience of cufflinks, that is a case in which I end up forming a wellfounded belief on the basis of an experience. However, here I form a well-founded belief at t on the basis of an experience I do not have at t. The example is thus a counterexample to WFAttention Needed. In response to such examples, one might propose relaxing WF-Attention Needed, so that one need not have an experience at the time at which one forms a belief on its basis. However, if the claim is relaxed in this way, it is then no longer clear why one could not form a belief on the basis of an experience that has been destroyed due to its alteration by attention. Even if the experience is no longer around, that need not stand in the way of one's forming a well-founded 15 Some superficially similar cases might be psychologically different. A distracted driver might have no conscious experience at all, yet still make adjustments in response to unconscious perceptual inputs, in the manner of a zombie. Here we are taking for granted that the driver has an inattentive experience, and arguing that it can rationally guide behavior. 11 belief on its basis. To get a valid argument against the Attention Optional view, the original, stronger version of WF-Attention Needed is required. And that stronger version of the claim is false. Our doubt that attention is necessary for well-founded belief does raise a worry about our overall position. If attention isn't necessary for well-founded belief, how are we to explain why many subjects fail to report the unexpected objects in cases of "inattentional blindness"?16 Our picture allows that you can form a justified belief that something is present without the intervention of attention, and thus our position allows that you can form a belief on the basis of an inattentive experience. But then why should inattention to the red cross stand in the way of forming a belief that one is there, and thus reporting that one is there? One simple suggestion we mentioned earlier was that "attention is the gateway to reporting" – one reports only those perceived entities one attends to, and those subjects who failed to report the red cross failed to do so because they failed to attend to the red cross. The simple suggestion is not available to our approach, however, once we allow that subjects form well-founded beliefs about what is present without attention. In reply, we can explain why some experiences are not reported by appealing to the irrelevance of attended objects to the task the subject is performing. In the case of the red cross, the presence of the red cross is irrelevant to the action of counting bounces of white shapes. It is thus natural to expect subjects who experience the red cross without attending to it to be less likely to report the red cross. We can allow for a close connection between attention and the likelihood for the formation of well-founded beliefs without saying that attention is necessary for the formation of a well-founded belief.17 For all we have said so far, it might be that the Most et al subject simply cannot form a well-founded belief that a red cross is present without attending to the red cross. A third challenge departs from this idea, and foregrounds the thesis that we must always be able to use the reasons we have: Can't: The Most et al subject cannot form a well-founded belief that a red cross is present on the basis of her inattentive experience of the red cross. Usability: An experience E gives you reason to believe that p only if you can form a well-founded belief that p on the basis of E. 16 Recall that we did not have to assume that subjects ever have an inattentive experience of the red cross as such. We could work equally well with the assumption that subjects at most experience the region where the cross is located as uniform with the rest of the background. The question would then be whether their inattentive experience of that location provides them with propositional justification to believe that it is grey. 17 Even if irrelevance of objects to a task helps explain why experiences of those objects go unreported, relevance to a task is no guarantee for an object to be attended. In studies reported by Fischer (1980), test pilots in flight simulators unwittingly fly planes into large obstacles that they fail to notice on the simulated runway. And a further possibility is that in the inattentional blindness studies, some subjects report objects without attending to them. For further discussion, see Silins ms2. 12 Conclusion: The Most et al subject does not have reason to believe that the red cross is present on the basis of her inattentive experience of the red cross.18 The term "can" is notoriously slippery, and much depends here on how it is read. If a subject sometimes "can" do something just by having a suitable idealization who does it, then (Can't) might turn out to be false. An idealized version of oneself, someone with a greater ability to take in the richness of one's experience in judgment, is able to form a justified belief about which colored shapes are present on the basis of the Most et al experience. To give the argument the best chance, we will start by working with interpretations of "can" on which the (Can't) thesis is true. To evaluate the argument, we now turn to the question of how one might defend the Usability thesis. A first defense of Usability draws on a version of the principle "ought implies can". PJ Implies O: You have propositional justification from an experience E to believe that p only if you ought to believe that p on the basis of E. Ought Implies Can: If you ought to believe that p on the basis of an experience E, then you can form a well-founded belief that p on the basis of E. Conclusion (=Usability): An experience E gives you reason to believe that p only if you can form a well-founded belief that p on the basis of E. This argument is open to the complaint that propositional justification is better understood in terms of permissions rather than obligations (if indeed in normative terms at all). On this line of thought, if one has a visual experience of something's being red, and has reason to believe that something is red on the basis of the experience, one need not be under any obligation to believe that it is red. In favor of this line of thought, consider how demanding it would be to have to follow through and believe every proposition for which one has good evidence. As venerable and venerated as the Ought Implies Can principle might be, then, it might not support Usability even if it is true.19 Another way of defending the Usability thesis sets normativity aside, through the claim that well-founded belief is more fundamental than propositional justification. One might maintain that what it is to have propositional justification from a source is to have a route to a well-founded belief through that source (Turri 2010). It presumably then follows that one has propositional justification from a source only if one can form a well-founded belief using the source. We set aside how one might defend such a view about the priority of well-founded belief. If it is developed in terms of non-idealized senses of "can", counterexamples to the view quickly arise. 18 See Smithies 2011a for discussion of a related argument. 19 For further discussion of the relation between evidence and obligation, see Leite 2007 and Schoenfield (ms). 13 We start with an example from Pryor (2001). If John was taught the wrong rules of statistical inference, and is incapable of thinking of better ones on his own, John can be blameless in believing that p without having reason to believe that p. Now, when John lacks reason to believe that p, he either has reason to believe that not-p or has justification to withhold judgment that p---we take it at least one of the attitudes is epistemically justified for him in this example. Given his ignorance and inability, however, John is not capable of forming any doxastically justified attitude with respect to the proposition that p, be it the attitude of disbelief or the attitude of withholding judgment. He is not capable of taking up any of these attitudes for the right reasons, and so it is beyond him to have a well-founded attitude here. The upshot is that he has propositional justification for an attitude even though he can't form that attitude in a justified way. The case is not a direct counterexample to (Usability), since that principle is formulated in terms of the attitude of perceptual belief, but we take the principle to be sound only if it holds equally well for doxastic attitudes generally. For further examples in a similar vein, consider the extraordinary range of delusions that people can have. In the Capgras delusion, one believes that one's spouse has been replaced by an imposter. In the Cotard delusion, one believes that one is dead. We take it that in many cases of delusion a subject has an unjustified belief that p, with no ability to form a justified attitude with respect to the proposition that p, due to the delusion. The structure of the cases is this. In order to be a case in which blamelessness fails to suffice for justification, the subject needs to be blameless in believing that p, while lacking reason to believe that p. However, the subject does have reason to take up a different attitude towards the proposition that p. For example, in the delusion cases, the subject has ample evidence and reason to believe that she or her spouse is alive. Or, if you think some sort of defeat of ordinary evidence has taken place, at a minimum the subject has justification to suspend judgment with respect to those questions. Now, if one is blameless in believing that p, one can do no better than one does---if one can do better, presumably one is at least partially blameworthy for what one does. So the deluded subject ends up having reason to take up an attitude on the basis of her evidence, without being able to form a justified attitude on the basis of her evidence. To deny that such cases are possible is to commit oneself to the claim that cognitive blamelessness is sufficient for epistemic justification. We assume that such a view is wrong. In response to the sorts of cases described above, one might insist that there are readings of "can" on which (Usability) and related claims come out true, for instance if one is allowed to abstract away from the cognitive limitations of a subject so as to consider her idealized counterpart (cf. Turri 2010). Perhaps the argument against the Attention Optional view can be run with such a version of (Usability). In reply, the objection faces a challenge: on any reading that makes (Usability) come out true, (Can't) seems to come out false. For instance, suppose we idealize the subject so that the subject can take advantage of whatever sources of propositional justification she has. (Can't) comes out false on this approach, since such an idealized counterpart of the Most et al subject can take up her experience in judgment. In response to the challenge, one might try to draw more fine-grained distinctions among idealizations, perhaps distinguishing between idealizations that abstract away from limits on how much one can attend to, and idealizations that abstract away from a compulsion one has to 14 believe specific proposition. On this line of thought, different notions of propositional justification correspond to different kinds of idealization, so that one notion applies to the Most et al subject, and the other doesn't. Taking the suggestion to an extreme, a third kind of idealization abstracts away from the Capgras delusion, a fourth abstracts away from the Cotard delusion, with different notions of propositional justification corresponding to each of these as well. But it does not seem theoretically fruitful to proliferate notions of propositional justification in this way. Among other things it would complicate epistemic accounting when we compare strength of justification across propositions. It seems more fruitful to consider a more generic idealization from inability to use what epistemic resources one has. But this sort of generic idealization, which promises to make (Usability) come out true, will make (Can't) false. Ultimately we doubt that there is any reading of "can" on which (Usability) comes out true. Consider cases in which a source of justification cannot be used without being destroyed, where evidence is like vanishing ink.20 If my mind is like a still pool, and I am conscious but not presently forming any beliefs, I presumably have reason to believe that I am not forming any beliefs. Still, starting to form a belief would destroy the state of mind that gives me reason to believe I am not forming any beliefs, so that I am unable to form a well-founded belief on its basis. Similarly, suppose I know that [if I do not believe that I am in brain state B, then I am in brain state B].21 If I also know that I do not believe that I am in brain state B, here I would seem to have reason to believe that I am in brain state B, thanks to my knowledge of the validity of the following simple argument and my knowledge of its premises: I do not believe I am in brain state B. If I do not believe I am in brain state B, then I am in brain state B. I am in brain state B. If I attempt to exploit the epistemic position I am in, and form a belief that I am in brain state B, I will lose my reason to believe that I am in brain state B, since I will presumably lose my belief in the first premise of the argument. No matter what idealized version of me we consider, I won't be able to use the propositional justification I have. Besides the arguments we have considered so far against the Attention Optional view, two further objections remain. First, it is arguably routine for us to experience much more than we are capable of attending to, so that we routinely fail to exploit the position we are in, according to the Attention Optional view. Are we then routinely guilty of unjustified propositional attitudes? In reply, one can have reason to believe that p, fail to believe that p, and still not have any unjustified attitude with respect to its being the case that p----one might fail to have any attitude at all with respect to its being the case that p. Although one might always have justification either to believe that p, disbelieve that p, or to suspend judgment with respect to p (after considering p), one does not always take up at least 20 Discussion with Declan Smithies was helpful here. 21 We base this example on a biconditional discussed by Conee 1987, Sorensen 1987, and Christensen 2010. 15 one of these attitudes with respect to a given proposition. In the Most et al case, subjects who do not report a red cross may have no attitude towards whether a red cross is present---the question does not arise. In daily life more generally, the Attention Optional view does not predict that we are rampantly guilty of unjustified suspensions of judgment, since we do not even suspend judgment with respect to those propositions the view allows us to have reason to believe. The second objection asks us to consider a subject in the Most et al case who does suspend judgment with respect to whether a red cross a present. Attention Optional seems to predict that the subject is unjustified in suspending judgment, since that would be appear to be a case of disrespecting perceptual evidence. Wouldn't it be implausible to say that her suspension of judgment is unjustified?22 A first line of response maintains that the subject is unjustified in suspending judgment. Recall the case in which you had reason to believe you had conflicting appointments, even though you did not notice the conflict. If you suspended judgment about whether you have conflicting appointments, you should kick yourself when you notice they conflict – your suspension of judgment was not justified. Likewise, in the case of change blindness, if you suspend judgment about whether Moe's appearance has changed, you should kick yourself when you notice that he has---your suspension of judgment was not justified. Given the similarity of these examples to ones in which one has reason from inattentive experiences, there is a case for saying that suspensions of judgment is unjustified in the case of inattentive experiences. An opposing line of response accommodates the intuition that withholding judgment on whether a red cross appeared on the screen is epistemically appropriate, on the grounds that while the inattentive experience of the red cross provides defeasible propositional justification, that justification is defeated by evidence that you don't reliably form beliefs about unattended parts of the scene.23 Deciding between these options is difficult, as it requires a principled way to distinguish between cases in which propositional justification is defeated, making it epistemically appropriate to suspend judgment, and cases in which propositional justification is sustained but un-usable as a basis for any doxastic attitude at all. A similar pair of options arises in one of the problems under the heading of "the problem of the speckled hen". Suppose you have a look at a many-speckled hen passing through the yard (say with 19 speckles), with enough time for you to attend to each of its speckles, although not for you to count them. And suppose your experience 22 We focus on a subject who withholds judgment at the time of experiencing the red cross. (It is plain that if the subject forgets her experience, she is justified in withholding judgment after she ceases to have it). 23 A further option would be to endorse a version of the "epistemically permissive" thesis that more than one doxastic attitude to a proposition can be justified for one at a time. On this line of thought, even though the Attention Optional view states that one has justification to believe that a red cross present, the proponent of the view could still also coherently hold that one also has justification to withhold judgment about whether a red cross is present. (See White 2005 for relevant discussion). 16 takes a stand on exactly how many speckles the hen has.24 Is enough in place for you to have reason to believe that it has 19 speckles? Given that the requirements of the Attention Needed view have been met, that view faces the same question. A principled account of how to distinguish between the cases where perceptual or attentional limitations defeat propositional justification provided by experience, and cases where those same limitations simply make that justification un-usable would apply to both the speckled hen case and the case of inattentive experience. We lean toward the view that the subject has unusable rather than defeated justification, on the grounds that if such justification were always defeated, it's not clear how it could be there to begin with. Conclusion According to a traditional approach in epistemology, only "internal" factors supply justification. One might have thought that, as much as relevant glosses by epistemologists of the term "internal" might vary, conscious states will be "internal" on every relevant sense of the term. The distinction between the Attention Optional and Attention Needed views call this assumption into question. Given that conscious experiences do (at least partially) constitute the conscious point of the view of the subject, there is at least one good sense of "internal" on which the Attention Optional view assigns a justificatory role to internal states, insofar as conscious states are "internal" simply in virtue of being conscious. However, we hope to have brought out several surprising ways in which one can privilege the conscious point of the view of the subject while still giving an important justificatory role to factors that are in other senses "external". One novel sense in which the Attention Optional view assigns a role to "external" factors is by assigning a justificatory role to conscious states which are external . . . to attention! Compare two subjects participating in the Most et al shape-tracking task, where each attends to the same white shapes moving in the same ways. One inattentively experiences a red cross, the other inattentively experiences only a black background. Their overall conscious point of view is different, even though what they are given in attention is the same. According to the Attention Optional view, the subject who is conscious of the red cross might have reason to believe that a red cross is present while the other subject does not. The epistemic difference stems from the difference between their conscious points of view on the world, and it obtains despite the fact that their attentive point of view on the world is the same. Here the conscious experience of the red cross is "external" inasmuch as it is inattentive. Indeed, our discussion brings out a sense of "external" on which being mental, conscious, and accessible are consistent with being "external". Suppose a distracted driver forms a wellfounded belief on the basis of being conscious of a curve in the road, without having attended to it. The experience of the curve might have been accessible to the driver, even if the driver in fact did not access it. Still, there is a sense in which the justifier deserves the name "external", given that it is outside of attention. 24 For dispute, see Tye 2009. As Smithies forthcoming points out, even if Tye and others are right, the problem could be set up in terms of the representation of highly determinate colors or shapes rather than in terms of numerosity. 17 There are further affinities between the view we have developed and standard externalist views. In some cases of consciousness outside attention, a subject will have a certain experience, yet fail to be in a position to know or even justifiedly believe that she is having that experience. Her experience will then be "inaccessible" to her in an important sense. One might have thought that a conscious source of justification will always be both mental and accessible, but the Attention Optional position entails that this thought is wrong. One upshot is a new divergence between "internalists" who privilege mentality, and "internalists" who privilege accessibility, in what might have been thought to be the uncontroversial case of conscious sources of justification. The Most et al case also raises the question of whether one must be able to take advantage of the epistemic position one is in. Here an experience might give one propositional justification to hold a belief even if one is incapable of forming a well-founded belief on the basis of the experience. One important further issue concerns the sorts of mismatches a view allows between how much justification one has and how much justification one seems to have. Familiar externalist views such as reliabilism are notorious for allowing that one may have less justification for an ordinary belief than one seems to have, for example if one is radically deceived by an evil demon. The Attention Optional view suggests there are cases in which one has more justification for an ordinary belief than one seems to have, for example in the Most et al case. Although the dispute between Attention Needed and Attention Optional view puts a new kind of pressure on internalism to specify the kinds of internal states that matter, it is not an inhouse dispute among internalists. Both positions assume that conscious states can play a rational role in justifying beliefs, and in principle this idea could be incorporated into reliabilist theories as well as internalist ones. After all, neither view provides a sufficient condition for a conscious state to provide justification, and both allow that various further facts about the etiology of states might matter. Both views are friendly to forms of reliabilism that carve out a rational role for conscious experience, as well as to views which exclude one's having perceptual justification in cases of hallucination or illusion, however reliable one's perceptual states might be. On the basis of comparing a blind-sighted subject with a sighted subject, one might accept the slogan that justification is provided by one's conscious point of view. We hope to have brought out how little is settled by this slogan, and how much there is to be debated in its vicinity. References Block, N. 1995. "A Confusion About a Function of Consciousness," Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18: 227-47. ----2007. "Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience", Brain and Behavioural Sciences, 30: 481-99. Burge, T., 2003. 'Perceptual Entitlement', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67: 50348. 18 Carrasco, M., Ling, S. & Read, S. 2004. "Attention alters appearance" Nature Neuroscience 7(3):308–313. Christensen, D. 2010. "Higher-Order Evidence" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81.1: 185-215. Conee, E. 1987. "Evident, but Rationally Unacceptable," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65: 316 – 326. Conee, E. and R. Feldman 2001. "Internalism Defended". Reprinted in E. Conee and R. Feldman, Eds. Evidentialism. Oxford University Press, 2004. Davidson, D. 1986. 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge,' Truth And Interpretation, Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Ernest LePore (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 307-19. Dickie, I. 2011. "Visual Attention Fixes Demonstrative Reference by Eliminating Referential Luck". In Mole, Smithies, and Wu, Eds. Attention: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. Dretske, F. 1969. Seeing and Knowing. London. ----------2004. "Change Blindness" Philosophical Studies120: 1-18. ----------2006. "Perception without Awareness" in Gendler and Hawthorne eds. Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ----------2007. "Entitlement: Epistemic Rights Without Epistemic Duties?" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(3): 591-606. E. Fischer, R.F. Haines and T.A. Price 1980. "Cognitive Issues in Head-Up Displays", NASA Technical Paper 1711. Huemer, M. 2001. Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Rowman and Littlefield. ---------2007. Compassionate phenomenal conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55. Johnston, M. 2006. "Better than mere knowledge? The function of sensory awareness." In T. Gendler & J Hawthorne (eds.). Perceptual Experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Koch, C. and Tsuchiya, N. 2006. "Attention and consciousness: Two distinct brain processes." Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(1): 16-22. 19 Leite, A. 1987. "Epistemic Instrumentalism and Reason for Belief" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75(2). 456-64. Lyons, J. 2009. Perception and Basic Beliefs. New York: Oxford University Press. Martin, M. 1992. "Perception, Concepts, and Memory," The Philosophical Review 101.4: 74563. ----------------2001. "Out of the Past: Episodic Recall as Retained Acquaintance". In C. Hoerl and T. McCormack (Eds.), Time and Memory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 257-84. Merikle, P, Smilek, D and Eastwood, J. "Perception without Awareness: Perspectives from Cognitive Psychology". Cognition 79: 1-2, 115-34. Mole, C. 2008. "Attention and Consciousness" Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (4): 86-104. ----------2011. Attention is Cognitive Unison. New York: Oxford University Press. Most, S. B., Simons, D. J., Scholl, B. J., Jimenez, R., Clifford, E. & Chabris, C. F. 2001. "How not to be seen: The contribution of similarity and selective ignoring to sustained inattentional blindness." Psychological Science 12:9 – 17. Most, S. B., Scholl, B. J., Clifford, E., & Simons, D. J. 2005. "What you see is what you set: Sustained inattentional blindness and the capture of awareness." Psychological Review, 112(1), 217 242. 2005: O'Regan, K. 1992. "Solving the 'real' mysteries of visual perception: The world as an outside memory." Canadian Journal of Psychology 46(3):461 – 88. Pryor, J. 2000. The skeptic and the dogmatist. Noûs 34 (4): 517–549. ------------2001. "Highlights of Recent Epistemology" British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52:95-12. ------------2004. "What's Wrong with Moore's Argument?" Philosophical Issues, 14. Rensink, R. A., O'Regan, J. K. & Clark, J. J. 1997. "To see or not to see: The need for attention to perceive changes in scenes." Psychological Science 8:368 – 73. Roessler, J. 2011. "Perceptual Attention and the Space of Reasons". In Mole, Smithies, and Wu, Eds. Attention: Psychological and Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. 20 Schwitzgebel, E. 2007. "Do You Have Constant Tactile Experience of Your Feet in Your Shoes? Or is Experience Limited to What's in Attention?" Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (3): 535. Schoenfield, M., 2012. "Imprecision in Normative Domains". PhD. Dissertation, MIT. Silins, N. (ms1) "The Scope of Aesthetic Experience" ----- (ms) "Consciousness and Distraction" Simons, D. and Chabris, C. 1999. "Gorillas in our Midst: Sustained Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events", Perception 28: 1059-74. Smithies, D. 2011a. "Attention is Rational Access Consciousness", in Mole, C. Smithies, D. and Wu, W. (eds.) Attention: Philosophical and Psychological Essays. New York: Oxford University Press. Smithies, D. 2011b "What is the role of consciousness in demonstrative thought?" Journal of Philosophy 108:1, 5-34. Smithies, D. (forthcoming). "Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency" Australasian Journal of Philosophy. Sorensen, R. 1987. "Anti-Expertise, Instability, and Rational Choice," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65: 301 – 315. Soltis, J.F. 1966. Seeing, Knowing and Believing. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. Stazicker, J. 2011. "Attention, Visual Consciousness, and Indeterminacy", Mind and Language 26: 156-84. Treisch, et al 2003. "What You See is What You Need" Journal of Vision Vol 3(1). Turri, J. 2010. "On the Relation Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80: 312-326. Tye, M. 2009. "A New Look at the Speckled Hen". Analysis 69: 258-63. Wedgwood, R. 2002. Internalism Explained. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65:349-369. White, Roger (2005). "Epistemic Permissiveness," Philosophical Perspectives 19 (WileyBlackwell Publishers), pp. 445-

Experiencing photographs qua photographs: what's so special about them? Jiri Benovsky Abstract Merely rhetorically, and answering in the negative, Kendall Walton has asked: "Isn't photography just another method people have of making pictures, one that merely uses different tools and materials – cameras, photosensitive paper, darkroom equipment, rather than canvas, paint, and brushes? And don't the results differ only contingently and in degree, not fundamentally, from pictures of other kinds?" Contra Walton and others, I wish to defend in this article a resounding "Yes" as being the correct answer to these questions. It is a widely shared view that photographs are somehow special and that they fundamentally differ from hand-made pictures like paintings, both from a phenomenological point of view (in the way we experience them), and an epistemic point of view (since they are supposed to have a different – greater – epistemic value than paintings, giving us a privileged access to the world). In what follows, I shall reject almost the totality of these claims, and as a consequence there will remain little difference left between photographs and paintings. As we shall see, 'photographs are always partly paintings' – a claim that is true not only of retouched digital photographs but of all photographs, including traditional ones made using photosensitive film and development techniques. Keywords photography, painting, phenomenology, metaphysics, digital photography, perception 2 1. Introduction Merely rhetorically, and answering in the negative, Kendall Walton (1997, p.67-68) has asked: "Isn't photography just another method people have of making pictures, one that merely uses different tools and materials – cameras, photosensitive paper, darkroom equipment, rather than canvas, paint, and brushes? And don't the results differ only contingently and in degree, not fundamentally, from pictures of other kinds?" Contra Walton and others, I wish to defend in this article a resounding "Yes" as being the correct answer to these questions. It is a widely shared view that photographs are somehow special and that they fundamentally differ from hand-made pictures like paintings, both from a phenomenological point of view (in the way we experience them), and an epistemic point of view (since they are supposed to have a different – greater – epistemic value than paintings, giving us a privileged access to the world). In what follows, I shall reject almost the totality of these claims, and as a consequence there will remain little difference left between photographs and paintings. As we shall see, 'photographs are always partly paintings' – a claim that is true not only of retouched digital photographs but of all photographs, including traditional ones made using photosensitive film and development techniques. 2. Perception of Pictures Let me start with something that has nothing to do with photography, but that concerns ordinary perception. Suppose you see a bottle of beer on a table in front of you, and forget about sceptical scenarios (hallucinations, Descartes' evil demons, and the like). According to many standard ontologies, you see the bottle of beer because there is a bottle of beer in front of you, and your perception is somehow caused by the bottle (along with other factors concerning light, your eyes, your optic nerve, and so on). Eliminativism is a metaphysical theory that comes in many different varieties1 but all of them have in common the claim that entities like bottles of beer do not exist. According to eliminativism, there only are fundamental components arranged bottle-of-beer-wise. The nature of these fundamental components is subject to controversy and varies from one version of eliminativism to another (particles, properties, or other) – for our current purposes let us simply call them "atoms". The central claim of eliminativism is then that atoms arranged bottle-of-beer-wise can do all the metaphysical work bottles of beer can do, and consequently bottles of beer can be eliminated from our ontology without any loss of explanatory power. For instance, bottles of beer can be bought and sold, they can be used as weights on a paperback book on a windy day, or they can occupy a rather well-delimited spatio-temporal region in your fridge – but atoms arranged bottle-of-beer-wise can do all of that too. No need then to postulate extra entities – namely, bottles of beer – in one's ontology. 3 Furthermore, eliminativists typically claim that their view is not contrary to common sense and that it actually is a rather intuitive one. This is where an objection concerning ordinary perception comes into the picture. Indeed, on the one hand eliminativists say that there are no bottles of beer, but on the other hand they want to say that we see them even when we are not under an evil demon's influence or hallucinating – a seeming contradiction. The correct reply to this worry, nicely put by Merricks (2001, p.8-9), is the simple but significant claim that our experience is the same whether there is a bottle of beer in front of us or whether there are atoms arranged bottle-of-beer-wise. Thus, the phenomenal character of our experience is neutral with respect to the eliminativist's metaphysical claim. Our experience is caused, in short, by light reflected by a bottle of beer, and since atoms arranged bottle-of-beer-wise reflect light in the same way bottles of beer do, our experience is qualitatively the same in both cases. The fact that we have non-hallucinatory perceptions as of bottles of beer thus cannot be used as an argument against eliminativism. The general idea here is that our sensory experiences can be accounted for in terms of more basic and genuinely fundamental (and existing) entities – atoms arranged x-wise – and so there is no need to postulate a further entity – x. In this article, I am not interested in eliminativism, but I am interested in what the situation described above teaches us about phenomenology. What it teaches us is that phenomenology comes apart from epistemology or metaphysics. Whether we know that there are (or aren't) bottles of beer or whether there are any (or not) just does not matter for what our experience is like. Beliefs we have about what there is and how things are, are irrelevant to what we see (perceive, in general) in a purely qualitative and phenomenal sense. The eliminativist's response to the objection above illustrates this point nicely, I think. Beliefs do not intervene in what we see. Now we can talk about photographs. A first, simple, and perhaps even trivial, claim I want to put on the table is the following: photographs and paintings are both pictures, and are both experienced in the particular way in which pictures are, but there is no significant difference in our visual experience when we look at a photograph or at a painting. What we see is simply a picture. Whether a picture is a sharp photograph or a hyper-realistic painting, or whether it is a digitally manipulated heavily retouched2 photograph or an impressionist painting, our visual experience is the same – indeed, these cases can sometimes be for the viewer visually (that is, phenomenally) indistinguishable. The point here is not to say that we can make mistakes – although we can – and take a photograph to be a painting, or a painting to be a photograph, rather what I want to highlight here is the fact that our visual experiences qua phenomenal visual experiences are of the same kind: they are visual experiences of pictures. This simple fact shows us that, here again, our phenomenology 4 comes apart from what we know about the picture (especially, the way it was produced) or from the way the picture is (its metaphysical nature). What I want to do here is to clearly distinguish between phenomenological issues on the one hand, and epistemic and metaphysical ones on the other. This is not always the case, as for instance Robert Hopkins and Mikael Pettersson, independently and recently, put it : [Traditional3] photographs have an epistemic status that 'handmade' pictures such as drawings, paintings, and etchings do not. Both photographs and handmade pictures can be sources of knowledge, but photographs offer us a way of finding out about the world that is more secure than that offered by handmade pictures [...]. [T]his epistemological difference is accompanied by a difference in phenomenology: we experience photographs differently from other pictures. They seem to put us in a relation to their objects that is somehow more intimate, more direct, than that in which we stand to the objects handmade pictures depict. [...] What we see in traditional photographs is, of necessity, true to how things were when the photograph was taken. [...] It is this that explains traditional photography's special epistemic status and the special experience it instils. (Hopkins (forthcoming)) [...] more than whether photographs actually provide epistemic access to what they are of, it is viewers' beliefs that they do so that matter for the phenomenology of photography. (Pettersson (2011, p.191)) The link between phenomenology and epistemology is obvious in both citations. Both Hopkins and Pettersson mention the influence one's beliefs allegedly have on one's phenomenal experience when perceiving a photograph. But, as I tried to show above, it is a mistake to 'mix' the two issues in this way. What we see (that is, what the phenomenal character of our visual experience is like) is one thing, and what we believe to be the case about what we see is another. Perhaps I am insisting too much on the trivial, and perhaps I am not interpreting the citations above in a charitable way. But perhaps once we do make the conceptual distinction between phenomenology, epistemology and metaphysics more precisely, we have a better starting point for the discussion concerning the alleged differences between photographs and paintings – namely, we learn that it is not a phenomenological affair, but an epistemic and metaphysical one, which are the claims I will turn my attention to in what follows. 5 3. Photographs and Reality The difference between paintings and photographs is that, typically, in the case of photographs, when we know that we are looking at a photograph, we have a piece of knowledge about a metaphysical truth that we don't have in the case of paintings. More precisely, the relevant epistemic situation is that we know how the picture was produced, and this gives us access to a simple but important metaphysical truth: there was something. This is a claim that is widely shared by virtually everyone, including Walton, Hopkins, Pettersson, and many others. Indeed, given the way photographs are made, it is necessary that, so to speak, at the beginning of the causal process that leads to the existence of a photograph there has been something that has been photographed – in short, something that reflected light which was then recorded by a camera. Now, what I want to insist on is how poor and weak this claim is. Let us start by having a look at these three photographs I took of a bottle of beer: 6 Photo 1 : a photograph of a bottle of beer, f/29, 1sec, 28mm Photo 2 : a photograph of a bottle of beer, f/3, 1/160, 16mm 7 These three photographs are photographs of the same subject, in the same light conditions, taken at (almost) the same time – they are photographs of 'the same metaphysical reality'. All three photographs are such that we have the piece of knowledge about the metaphysical truth that everyone agrees on: there was something. The weakness of this claim is most obviously apparent in Photo1 where the 'something' is unrecognizable (due to a long exposure and a shaking hand), but Photo2 and Photo3 illustrate the claim I want to make as well, namely, the claim that in the case of a photograph, when we know that we are looking at a photograph, we know that there was something that has been photographed but we do not know how this something was. Sometimes, we do not even know what this something was, as in the case of Photo1, but this is only a matter of degree: it is because we know so little about how it was that we are not even able to see what it was. Always, we do not know how the something was, for the simple reason, illustrated by Photo2 and Photo3, that the entities that have been photographed are never pictorially represented (depicted, shown, visually given to us, ...) as they are 'in the world'. Indeed, as a matter of necessity, in any normal process of creation of a photograph, there are steps where some features of the entities represented are altered or even 'erased' and replaced by other apparent features. All three photographs above, for instance, 'misrepresent' the colors of what they are photographs of, since they are black and white; Photo2 'misrepresents' the entities located in the background by representing them as being blurred, due to a shallow Photo 3 : a photograph of a bottle of beer, f/8, 1/80, 36mm 8 depth of field; both Photo2 and Photo3 'misrepresent' the shape of the bottle (as is most apparent in the case of Photo2, but Photo3 is actually deformed as well) due to the choice of a particular focal length; also, all photographs always represent what they are photographs of only from a certain angle; and so on. An important thing to note is that all of these 'misrepresentations' are due only to a normal use of traditional and standard photographic techniques: aperture, shutter speed, angle of view, focus, focal length. Photo2, for instance, is thus no less normal than Photo3, and Photo1, relevantly, is no less normal than the other two – it would simply be entirely arbitrary to claim the contrary. No 'special effects' have been used here, only standard settings on a standard camera4. Now, what we see here is that even normal photographs, using standard settings and photographic techniques, tell us in principle very little about the 'true properties' of what they are photographs of. The shape of the bottle, for instance, is 'misrepresented' in all three photographs above (and similarly for colors, sharpness, etc.). Thus, again, since we know that we are looking at photographs and not at paintings, we know that there was something that was photographed, but we do not know how it was – for instance, by looking at the photograph of the bottle, we do not see what was its true shape. We can perhaps guess it, or even calculate it if we knew all of the settings, the distance at which the photograph was taken, and if we knew the equations that allow such a calculation, but even if something like this were at least partly possible, this would not be a normal way to interact with photographs (and it would definitely not work very well in the case of colors or of a blurred background). A photograph does not give us the world. It gives us a pictorial representation which in normal and standard cases misrepresents the world, in a more-or-less interesting way. A photograph tells us that there was a world, and in some cases (but not always – see Photo1) partly tells us how the world approximately was. The latter is often true of paintings as well, and only the former metaphysical claim constitutes a principled difference between paintings and photographs, since it can (but does not have to) be false in the case of paintings. 4. Photographs and Photographers Perhaps then, as many have claimed5, the difference between photographs and paintings comes not from the resulting picture, but from the way it was produced, in the sense that photographs are made mechanically without human intervention, while paintings are necessarily subject to human intentions, beliefs, and interventions? In Benovsky (2011), I argued at length that this is incorrect, so let me here only quickly focus on the main point: it is not possible not to take decisions when one takes a photograph. Any time a photograph is made, a decision has to be made at the very least about aperture, shutter speed, focal length, exposure, and usually, many other settings. These decisions can be either 9 purposefully, consciously, and manually taken by the photographer herself, or they can be taken by the engineers who programmed the automatic mode of the camera which a Sunday snapshooter can use in order to avoid taking these decisions by herself – but in any case, human decisions and human interventions are unavoidable. These decisions make a big difference to the resulting picture, as Photo1, Photo2, and Photo3 illustrate. Indeed, the differences between these three pictures are entirely due to my decisions. Big aperture can be chosen to create a shallow depth of field, resulting in a blurred background. Long exposure time can be used to produce photographs like Photo1. A wide angle lens (short focal length) can be chosen to produce deformations like in Photo2. And so on. These tools, as well as many others, are the standard tools the photographer is meant to use to produce a picture accordingly to how she wants to represent the metaphysical reality in front of the camera, and not to how the reality is. In the same way painters can (and often do) give us a pictorial representation of the world accordingly to how they want us to see it, photographers use the various settings and techniques at their disposal to make us see the world the way they want to show it. Keeping this in mind, we see here again how weak the epistemic and metaphysical claim is. Indeed, in the case of photographs the claim "There was something" is necessarily true, while it is only contingent in the case of paintings, but that's about the only principled difference between these two types of pictures, and as we have seen above it is not a big one. In both cases, the entities that are pictorially represented are only given to us after some human decisions have been made to represent them in such-and-such a way. 5. Photographs and (Post-)Production Furthermore, both digital and traditional photographs require a certain amount of 'postproduction steps' where either a RAW file is converted into a final image file or a negative is developed to produce a final picture on photographic paper. These manipulations, digital or chemical, are necessary to any process of production of a photograph – without them no photograph would simply exist. Indeed, after the shutter has been pressed, there only is a negative or a RAW file, but these are not photographs – yet. Additional steps need to be taken in order to make a photograph come into existence. These steps can be done quickly inside the body of a camera (like in a Polaroid camera, or in most compact automatic digital cameras), or manually later (in a darkroom, or on a computer), but this practical difference does not constitute a principled difference. However these steps are taken, they have to be taken, and here again they involve human decisions (as before, either the photographer's own or somebody else's). Minimally, these are decisions about contrast, colors, and brightness – which are decisions that have to be taken in order to produce any photograph at all – but they can also 10 be decisions concerning more sophisticated techniques in order to produce a particular effect (like a sepia effect, for instance), or to chemically or digitally manipulate the negative or the RAW file to produce a retouched photograph. Such retouches can be small and light, or they can be heavy instruments used by the photographer to finish her work – that is, to achieve better her goal of showing us the world the way she wants us to see it. Partly then, these manipulations are necessary – they are an essential part of any normal process of creation of a photograph. Partly, they are contingent and the photographer can choose to take such additional steps or she can choose not to. How much of such steps can be taken before the resulting picture ceases to be a photograph and becomes a painting is a vague matter – an issue I discuss in detail in Benovsky (manuscript) – but way before we reach that limit, we are in a position to see that the mere existence of any normal photograph requires some amount of post-production techniques and human decisions, and that in most normal and standard cases the amount of chemical or digital manipulation goes well beyond these minimal necessary steps. As before, we see here again how human intervention plays a crucial role in the coming into existence of photographs and in the way the resulting picture is – namely, in a way that tells us not how the world is, but rather how the photographer wants us to see it. 6. Photographs are always partly Paintings What stems from the preceding sections, I hope, is a clear picture of the nature of photographs and of the way we produce them, experience them, and interact with them, which is such that the following claim is now obvious: photographs are always partly paintings. The photographer deals with a metaphysical reality in front of her camera (and the difference between her and a painter concerns the fact that this is necessary for her and only contingent for the painter), and uses the various photographic tools and techniques at her disposal to create a pictorial representation of that reality. These tools are such that they require her to take important decisions. Thus, even if she wanted to, she could never 'just' represent reality – rather, she always necessarily has to misrepresent it, and by taking suchand-such a decision rather than another, she then shows us the world, again, not as it is but as she decided to show it. Photo1, Photo2, and Photo3 are examples of such decision-taking processes. Thus, not only photographs are always partly paintings, but photographers are always partly painters – even those who limit themselves to the strict (and necessary) minimum when it comes to post-production. What all of this shows us is how small the principled difference between photographs and paintings is6. Of course, they are pictures produced using different tools (in a narrow sense, a painting is made using paint and is, in this sense, trivially different from a photograph), and 11 the epistemic and metaphysical claim "(We know that) there was something" is only contingent in the case of paintings. Furthermore, when it comes to paintings, a change in the reality will only make a difference for the painting if it also makes a difference in how the painter sees the reality, while in the case of photographs, a change in the reality will make a difference for the photograph even if, say, it goes unnoticed by the photographer – provided that the change is big enough to be visually noticeable on the resulting picture. Despite these differences, we have seen that, first, there is no phenomenological difference between these two types of pictures – that is, there is no difference in the qualitative experiences we have of them – and, second, the metaphysical claim is a weak one. The weakness of this claim, I suppose, will become more and more obvious and significant with the evolution of digital photography, where the easiness with which digital manipulation during production and post-production stages will make photographers become even more painters than they already are7. Jiri Benovsky [email protected] Jiri Benovsky is a 'Scientific Collaborator' at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. His interest in the philosophy of photography comes from the fact that he is both a philosopher (see www.jiribenovsky.org) and a photographer (see www.benovsky.com). References : BAZIN, A. 1960. The ontology of the photographic image. transl. by Hugh Gray. Film Quarterly 13:4. BENOVSKY, J. 2011. Three kinds of realism about photographs. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 25:4. BENOVSKY, J. manuscript. The Limits of Photography. CAVELL, S. 1971. The World Viewed. New York: The Viking Press. HELLER, M. 2008. The Donkey Problem. Philosophical Studies 140(1):83-101. HOPKINS, R. forthcoming. Factive pictorial experience : What's special about photographs? Noûs. MERRICKS, T. 2001. Objects and Persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press. PETTERSSON, M. 2011. Depictive Traces: On the Phenomenology of Photography. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 69:2, pp. 185-196. 12 SCRUTON, R. 1981. Photography and Representation. Critical Inquiry 7:3. VAN INWAGEN, P. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. WALTON, K. L. 1997. On Pictures and Photographs: Objections Answered. In Allen and Smith (eds.), Film Theory and Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 1 See for instance Van Inwagen (1990), Heller (2008), or Merricks (2001). 2 I will have more to say about digital manipulation below. 3 In Hopkins' view, digital photographs are different in this respect – they are closer to paintings than traditional photographs made by using photosensitive film. In my view, which I will develop below, I will treat both types of photographs in the same way. I insist on equal treatment also in Benovsky (2011) and Benovsky (manuscript). 4 Namely, the Canon EOS 7D, the lens used here being the Canon EF-S 10-22. The fact that this is a digital camera is irrelevant here, since the very same settings (and results) are standard on traditional film cameras as well. 5 "[...] the relation between a photograph and its subject is a causal relation. If a is the cause of b, then the existence of b is sufficient for the existence of a." Scruton (1981, p.588, my italics). "[...] photographs are things, whose state – i.e. the configuration of marks on their surfaces – depends, as Walton points out, belief-independently and counterfactually on visible features of what they are photographs of." Pettersson (2011, p.190, my italics) "[...] by a mechanical reproduction in the making of which man plays no part. The solution is not to be found in the result achieved but in the way of achieving it. [...] For the first time, between the originating object and its reproduction there intervenes only the instrumentality of a nonliving agent. For the first time an image of the world is formed automatically, without the creative intervention of man." (Bazin (1960, p.7) "Traditional photography, in contrast [with hand-made pictures], involves a causal chain free from the influence of people's beliefs and experiences [...]." (Hopkins (forthcoming)) "Photography overcame subjectivity in a way undreamed of by painting, one which does not so much defeat the act of painting as escape it altogether: by automatism, by removing the human agent from the act of reproduction." Stanley Cavell, (1971, p.23, my italics) 6 To make it clear: the claim here is not that photographs and paintings are the same thing, and that they can be identified. The claim is that the difference between them is smaller than what we might have thought. 7 I would like to thank Rob Hopkins, Lynda Gaudemard, Mikael Pettersson, Gianfranco Soldati, and an anonymous referee of this journal for interesting discussions and comments that helped me think about the issues I raise in this paper.

Metafísica y Persona Filosofía, conocimiento y vida Año 6-Número 12 Julio-Diciembre 2014 Contenido Artículos Las personas como particulares básicos en la metafísica descriptiva de Strawson Luis Estrada 11 La persona como horizonte interior en la filosofía de Manuel Mindán Antonio Piñas y Héctor Arévalo 37 El universo personal de Emmanuel Mounier Carlos Ramos Rosete 49 Aproximación a la noción de Bien Común en Tomás de Aquino Emilio Baños 69 Sören Kierkegaard. La melancolía como fundamento de la existencia estética Alejandro Peña 95 Ética de lo impersonal y gestión de la vida en Roberto Esposito Ángel Octavio Álvarez 145 Il valore dei sensi nel rapporto tra ragione e realtá Francesco A. Laviola 163 Las disertaciones de Clavijero y su supuesta disputa en contra de los ilustrados europeos Virginia Aspe Armella 185 El imperalismo metodológico del cientificismo Jorge Peña Vial 211 La persona como horizonte interior en la filosofía de Manuel Mindán Person as Inner Horizon in the Philosophy of Manuel Mindán Antonio Piñas Mesa Universidad CEU-San Pablo [email protected] Héctor Arévalo Benito Universidad Técnica Particular de Loja [email protected] Resumen Las personas somos absolutamente diferentes de las cosas, no cabe ninguna duda al respecto. No obstante, sí debemos diferenciar nítidamente entre los individuos y el concepto de "persona". Así pues, la persona posee un "horizonte interior", absolutamente novedoso y que le caracteriza como ser en aproximación a la Verdad y a la Libertad, las cuales no sólo son específicas del propio humano, sino que le son necesarias en cuanto remedios contra la desolación y la tiranía. Asimismo, una sociedad puede ser tiránica en varios sentidos, pero Manuel Mindán sostiene que, para que no lo sea, el individuo entendido como "persona" debe primar siempre sobre el grupo gregario y cerrado. Palabras clave: Manuel Mindán, persona, "horizonte interior", sociedad gregaria, "nostrismo", individualismo, totalitarismo Abstract People and things are quite different, but we must distinguish clearly between individuals and the concept of "person". So, the person possesses an "inner horizon", completely new, and characterizes him as being on approach to Truth and Freedom -which are specific to the human itself-, while both are needed as remedies against desolation and tyranny. Likewise, a society can be tyrannical, in several senses. However, Manuel Mindán believes that the individual understood as a "person" must always prevail over the gregarious and closed group. Keywords: Manuel Mindán, Person, "Inner Horizon", gregarious society, "nostrismo", Individualism, totalitarianism Recepción del original: 15/09/14 Aceptación definitiva: 08/12/14 37 38 La persona como horizonte interior en la filosofía de Manuel Mindán 1. Breve reseña biográfica e intelectual de un filósofo español Manuel Mindán Manero nació en diciembre de 1902 en Calanda, municipio del Bajo Aragón, en la provincia de Teruel. Allí mismo había nacido dos años antes Luis Buñuel, figura española del cine surrealista, a quien Mindán conocerá. Ambos son hijos ilustres de Calanda. Mindán, además, será nombrado Hijo Predilecto en 1993. Esta localidad es la cuna de quien será el maestro universitario y de Enseñanza media de varias generaciones de españoles. Fue maestro por vocación y, al mismo tiempo, consagró su vida a la filosofía, convirtiéndose en uno de los pensadores españoles del siglo XX. José Luis Abellán, quien nos dice que su vocación hacia la filosofía se debe al influjo del P. Mindán, le denomina "patriarca de la filosofía española".1 Gozó de una larga e intensa vida, a pesar de su siempre delicada salud, pues muere en Madrid, la ciudad a la que se traslada para estudiar y en la que más tiempo ejercerá su magisterio, el 19 de septiembre de 2006, habiendo cumplido 103 años. A muy temprana edad descubre su vocación religiosa, inicia la carrera eclesiástica en los seminarios de Belchite y en la Universidad Pontificia de Zaragoza, y es ordenado sacerdote en 1926. En 1929 obtiene el doctorado eclesiástico e inicia su larga andadura en las aulas, compaginando su trabajo con el estudio de la licenciatura en historia en la Universidad de Zaragoza, que finaliza en 1932, año en el que será nombrado profesor ayudante de José Gaos, discípulo de Ortega, quien, al marcharse a la Universidad Central de Madrid, le nombrará encargado de curso en las cátedras de Introducción a la filosofía e Historia de la pedagogía.2 En 1933 gana la oposición a cátedra impartiendo docencia en el Instituto de Enseñanza Media "Luis Vives" de Valencia, donde permanecerá por breve tiempo, tras el que se muda a Madrid para estudiar filosofía. Allí contará entre sus maestros a García Morente, Ortega y Zubiri. En 1936, iniciada la contienda bélica, obtiene la licenciatura. En la Central tuvo ocasión de compartir amistad con J. Marías, A. Rodríguez Huéscar y L.E. Palacios. Entre sus experiencias cuenta también el haber sufrido 20 meses de encarcelamiento durante el enfrentamiento fratricida del 36. Finalizada la Guerra Civil, oposita de nuevo a cátedra, ahora de Filosofía, siendo el número uno de su promoción. Desde 1941 y hasta 1972, año de su jubilación, impartirá docencia en el Instituto "Ramiro de Maeztu". No obstante, no 1 Abellán, J.L., El País, miércoles, 20 de septiembre de 2006. 2 Quien desee conocer de forma más detallada la vida de M. Mindán puede leer el artículo que con ocasión de su fallecimiento escribió Pérez López, F., "En memoria de Manuel Mindán. Testimonio de un siglo", Isegoría, 36, enero-junio de 2007, pp. 361-374. 39 Metafísica y Persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida Año 6-Julio-Diciembre 2014-Número 12 abandonará la docencia porque, gracias a su amistad con Rafael Gambra, será profesor en el CEU de Madrid. Allí causaba admiración el que, con más de 80 años, seguía dando sus clases de pie, sin sentarse nunca, y siendo muy respetado por sus alumnos.3 Fuente de su fortaleza era la fidelidad a la vocación que para él significaba "convertir el trabajo en juego o la profesión en afición constante". El trabajo vocacional –nos dirá– no cansa nunca, ni en la extrema vejez.4 También ejercerá como docente en el ámbito universitario en las cátedras de Historia de la filosofía, Metafísica y Teoría del conocimiento. Ante él pasarán grandes figuras del pensamiento español contemporáneo como M. Yela, Pinillos, Millán Puelles y J. L. Abellán. Su trabajo en la Universidad Central de Madrid quedó truncado después de la guerra, pues, según Abellán, las instancias franquistas nunca le vieron con buenos ojos, hasta el punto que tuvo que abandonar su puesto.5 También es destacable su colaboración en el CSIC, dentro del Instituto "Luis Vives", del que fue secretario J. Zaragüeta, así como en la Sociedad Española de Filosofía, de la que llegará a ser presidente. También fue cofundador de la Revista de Filosofía en 1942, siendo director de la misma hasta 1972. Aunque su formación en filosofía es de orientación tomista, progresó hacia planteamientos más integradores del pensamiento contemporáneo, "persuadido de que tal hubiera sido el proceder del Aquinate que, de haber conocido la evolución posterior del pensamiento filosófico, hubiera incorporado aquellos progresos a su síntesis intelectual originaria".6 Abellán subraya que Mindán siempre mantuvo una actitud abierta y liberal, que le llevó a mantener buenas relaciones con el exilio. Gonzalo Díaz destaca entre sus influencias filosóficas la fenomenología y filosofía de la cultura y de los valores, así como la filosofía existencial. Pero la gran preocupación de M. Mindán ha sido la antropología, centrándose en el estudio de las actividades humanas. De hecho, José Luis Abellán 3 Gambra Gutiérrez, A., "Mi agradecimiento a un querido profesor", en González Manteiga, M.T. (Coord.), Libro homenaje a D. Manuel Mindán Manero en su centenario, Zaragoza: Real y Excma. Sociedad Económica Aragonesa de Amigos del País, 2002, p. 134. 4 Mindán Manero, M., Reflexiones sobre el hombre, la vida, el tiempo, el amor y la libertad, Zaragoza: Sociedad Cooperativa de Artes Gráficas Librería General, 2002, p. 34. 5 Abellán, J.L., El País, miércoles, 20 de septiembre de 2006. 6 Díaz Díaz, G., Hombres y documentos de la filosofía española, Madrid: CSIC, 2003, p. 524. 40 La persona como horizonte interior en la filosofía de Manuel Mindán lo incluye también en la órbita del personalismo. Asimismo, Garrido7 también lo incluye en esta misma línea, en un epígrafe titulado "El pensamiento cristiano: neoescolástica y personalismo", afirmando de Mindán que era un "sacerdote liberal", al tiempo que "un representante del personalismo cristiano en un sentido no radical del término". La sintonía de Mindán con el personalismo queda atestiguada si nos atenemos a la caracterización de personalismo aportada por Manuel Maceiras y Carlos Díaz. Éstos entienden por personalismo la corriente filosófica articulada por Maritain, pero cuya figura aglutinadora fue Mounier. Estos autores primordiales guardan las siguientes características: aceptación de la existencia abierta a la trascendencia; respeto a la persona humana en todas sus dimensiones; reflexión sobre ambos puntos; inserción sociopolítica comprometida.8 Tal y como podemos comprobar en el desarrollo del presente artículo, estos rasgos aparecen en la vida y obra de nuestro autor. Quizá alguien pueda poner en duda la inserción sociopolítica, al compararlo con otros autores del personalismo. No obstante, el compromiso de Mindán con la educación, hasta los últimos años de su vida, es una muestra innegable de entrega a la sociedad que le tocó vivir. Así pues, como señala Garrido,9 el marco en el que se inscriben los planteamientos de Mindán es el contexto del pensamiento cristiano europeo surgido hacia 1933, que, en España, tuvo un periodo marcado por la neoescolástica, en los años cuarenta, hasta que apareció un personalismo cristiano,10 en los años cincuenta. En este último periodo podemos inscribir al filósofo de Calanda. Su entronque en el árbol del personalismo se hallaría en la rama fenomenológica-tomista, la misma en la que se situó el personalismo de Karol Wojtyla. Muestra de su profundización en esta línea del pensamiento contemporáneo es el análisis que desarrollamos a continuación, en el que quedan descritos los rasgos acerca de la persona que, de forma crítica y original, subraya nuestro filósofo español. 7 Garrido, M., "El pensamiento español dentro y fuera de España de 1936 a 1960", en Garrido, M.; Orringer, N.R.; Valdés, L.M y Valdés, M.M., El legado filosófico español e hispanoamericano del siglo XX, Madrid: Cátedra, 2009, pp. 317-348, 336. Se trata del epígrafe 8 del capítulo mencionado, pp. 334-336. 8 Díaz, C. y Maceiras, M., Introducción al personalismo actual, Madrid: Gredos, 1975, p. 9. 9 Garrido, M., "El pensamiento español...", p. 334. 10 Garrido, M., "El pensamiento español...", p. 335. 41 Metafísica y Persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida Año 6-Julio-Diciembre 2014-Número 12 2. Aspectos filosóficos, sociales y religiosos de la persona humana según Manuel Mindán Para Manuel Mindán,11 si comparamos a la persona con las cosas, éstas existen como dormidas, aunque hay un ser despierto entre ellas, gracias al cual gozan de presencia y se manifiestan: la persona. En consecuencia, somos testigos del ser de las cosas, es decir, somos un ser frente a las cosas. Esto significa que nunca podremos estar perdidos entre ellas, pues no somos una cosa más entre las cosas, sino un ser abierto a ellas en un horizonte12 nuevo: un horizonte interior. Esta capacidad de ser testigos ya la propuso Aristóteles: somos un animal que tiene logos. Sin embargo, dirá Mindán, esta definición debe ser entendida lejos de consideraciones estrictamente discursivas, ya que, en ocasiones, el de Estagira también habló del ser humano como un animal que tiene nous, y "ya sabemos que nous es la palabra con la cual [Aristóteles] define también a Dios".13 Nous será la palabra griega que, para Mindán, más se aproxime a nuestro concepto de espíritu; para su justificación, se remontará a la definición de persona de Boecio –rationalis naturae individua substantia: "la sustancia individual de naturaleza racional"–,14 interpretando "racional" como condición espiritual de un ser,15 pudiendo así sumar a esta concepción la que Aristóteles propuso de nous. En este sentido, en consecuencia, nos hablará Mindán de la persona como una naturaleza espiritual, la cual considera que no es sólo un espíritu encarnado en un cuerpo, sino que es cuerpo y espíritu. Según el filósofo de Calanda, no sólo debemos entender lo espiritual como aquello intrínsecamente independiente de la materia en su ser y obrar –en su definición negativa–, sino que debemos definirlo también, positivamente, por sus manifestaciones operativas: el entendimiento –o facultad aprehensiva del ser–, y la voluntad –es decir, la facultad de establecer sus propios actos. El primero nos otorga la capacidad de llegar a la Verdad; la segunda, de acceder a la Libertad. Llegados a este punto, se puede asegurar que, para Mindán, el hecho de que la persona sea 11 Mindán Manero, M., La persona humana. Aspectos filosófico, social y religioso, Salamanca: Anaya, 1962. Para el análisis del personalismo de Mindán en este libro de doce capítulos, nos hemos centrado específicamente en los planteamientos de los capítulos I ("El concepto de la persona"), III ("Persona y valor"), V ("Persona y libertad"), VII ("Persona y personalidad"), VIII ("Persona y sociedad") y X ("Persona y trabajo"). 12 Mindán Manero, M., La persona humana, p. 15. 13 Mindán Manero, M., La persona humana, p. 14. 14 Mindán Manero, M., La persona humana, p. 8. 15 Mindán Manero, M., La persona humana, p. 13. 42 La persona como horizonte interior en la filosofía de Manuel Mindán una sustancia de naturaleza espiritual, implicará necesariamente que es capaz de verdad y libertad.16 Por esto podemos afirmar que hablar de naturaleza espiritual de la persona implica poseer cierta nitidez en los contornos de los objetos, ya que es ahora, con la capacidad de verdad, cuando a las cosas el hombre las deja surgir en sí, en lo que son, en su propia objetividad; y así, con el ejercicio de la verdad, aparece la actitud estrictamente especulativa del hombre: la aprehensión del ser de las cosas implica ser capaces de superar la forma instintiva de enfrentarse a los objetos, yendo más allá de ellos. De este modo, con nuestra naturaleza espiritual, dejamos de representarnos el mundo circundante como objetos que quedan indistintos en una presencia nebulosa, envuelta todavía en las sombras de la pura animalidad, y comenzamos a ser capaces de buscar la verdad, para conquistar el reino del ser y llegar a ser capaces de formarnos un horizonte interior. Pues no son las personas las que están dormidas, sino las cosas. Esto en primer lugar. Pero no debemos olvidar que también somos seres con voluntad, y que tenemos una facultad apetitiva o tendencial, que complementa a la intelectual. Veamos qué más hallamos en este horizonte espiritual. 3. Persona y Voluntad Si seguimos reconociendo la naturaleza espiritual de la persona, veremos que al entendimiento que conoce sigue la voluntad que quiere –nihil volitum quin praecognitum–,17 porque, así como a través de la facultad aprehensiva la persona conquistaba el reino del ser (trayéndolo a sí para formar su propio horizonte), mediante la facultad apetitiva, que es la voluntad, la persona se proyecta hacia afuera metamorfoseándose ora en amor, ora en acción. Es decir, tanto el conocimiento intelectual como el querer de la voluntad –la escuela orteguiana habló de raciovitalismo; Carlos Díaz, del hombre raciocordial–, dignifican la naturaleza espiritual, que es la persona: el formarse ésta su propio horizonte al superar los intereses pragmáticos de la vida animal, constituiría el gran logro del conocimiento intelectual de la verdad; al mismo tiempo, el llegar a querer lo que merece ser querido, prescindiendo de los intereses pragmáticos-biológicos del sujeto, sería la consecuencia directa del desarrollo de la función volitiva de la persona. 16 Mindán Manero, M., La persona humana, p. 14. 17 Mindán Manero, M., La persona humana, p. 22 y ss. 43 Metafísica y Persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida Año 6-Julio-Diciembre 2014-Número 12 Para comprender con cierta profundidad estas dos funciones, es necesario señalar que, así como el papel del entendimiento en la persona se mueve partiendo de la región de los principios, el papel de la voluntad en la persona, por otra parte, se dirige al reino de los fines. Y para llegar adecuadamente a ellos, Mindán expondrá en su filosofía sobre la persona que la voluntad es la que debe ir escogiendo los medios que la lleven al fin. De esta manera, estaríamos fundamentando la segunda característica crucial de la persona: la capacidad electiva o libertad, la cual nos hace escoger adecuadamente para dirigirnos al reino de los fines. De esta forma, si bien el conocimiento intelectual de la verdad implicaría la facultad reflexiva –o autoconciencia, llegará a decir–, sólo mediante la capacidad electiva o libertad, la persona se hace dueña de sí misma, al dominar los propios actos. Así, si bien antes hablábamos de nihil volitum quin praecognitum, ahora debemos afirmar que, sin embargo, la libertad es una propiedad que no puede faltar a la persona,18 pues gracias a ella ésta puede discernir su vocación, tener iniciativa creadora (técnico-artística), así como entrar en el reino de lo moral, todo lo cual es necesario a la persona para establecer el proyecto de su vida.19 En definitiva, según Mindán, este realizar los valores espirituales –el conocimiento de la verdad, el ejercicio de la libertad– de la naturaleza espiritual que somos, hace que trascendamos el dominio de la mera naturaleza y entremos en el reino de la cultura, es decir, del hombre en cuanto ser progresivo que tiene historia y es capaz de educación. Y por este camino, afirma Mindán, el hombre entrará en relación con Dios. A continuación, trataremos de explicitar la concepción de Mindán sobre la voluntad y de cómo en ella también radican la convivencia personal, la vida del amor y la sociabilidad humana. 4. La fugacidad espacio-temporal, el individuo y la Persona: sobre el instante y la eternidad Pero si la contraposición cosa-persona es obvia –o debiera serlo; y aún más en nuestros días–, quizá la oposición individuo-persona no lo sea tanto. Para Mindán, fenomenológicamente, el individuo aparece como una unidad de base somática, concepción frente a la cual antepondrá la persona como unidad de sentido espiritual –en los términos en que acabamos de exponer 18 Quizá sea una buena razón para justificar en nuestros días los estudios meramente teóricos –desde la física hasta la metafísica–: el conocimiento, base de la libertad. 19 Mindán Manero, M., La persona humana, p. 24. 44 La persona como horizonte interior en la filosofía de Manuel Mindán más arriba–. Así, el individuo es el resultante de fuerzas naturales y en relación con sus causas determinantes, y esto arrojaría como consecuencia que, precisamente por ello, no tenga en sí propiamente valor moral; la persona, por el contrario, es el resultado de la confluencia de actos libres en relación con fines, lo cual permite a la persona ser moralmente valiosa y digna de respeto.20 El individuo no puede ejercer su libertad, pues es resultante de causas que lo determinan; sin embargo, lo que la persona es, es resultado de una confluencia de actos libres, ordenados y elegidos libremente con relación a un fin. El individuo es el ser anónimo de la masa, pues es el átomo (in-dividuum) en una multitud o conjunto; en oposición, la persona se destaca de la masa21 en una originalidad auténticamente humana. Así, Mindán contrapondrá las carencias del átomo en una multitud –el individuo, que representa lo fugaz en la especie, lo que es sustituible–, al sentido de lo auténticamente humano: la persona, pues, ya que es el único ser que puede pervivir en su individualidad y escapar a esa fugacidad espacio-temporal del individuo, al ser capaz de atar a cada instante del tiempo un punto de eternidad con la realización en aquel instante de un valor imperecedero.22 5. Persona y sociedad. Rechazo del totalitarismo y del individualismo En consonancia con lo anterior, una sociedad nunca estará formada por meros individuos –sobre todo si éstos están sometidos a la fugacidad. Esto es inconcebible para Mindán. La sociedad, propiamente dicha, no puede estar constituida sino por personas.23 Así, si en un primer momento se constató el lugar de la persona con relación a las cosas –una relación frente a ellas, dijimos; valga la redundancia para aclarar esta relación: de oposición frente a los ob-yectum–, al describir ahora la relación persona-sociedad propondrá sobre ésta que no debe ni puede ser relación de oposición, sino relación de implicación y mutua exigencia: se trata de una búsqueda del bien común de y para personas, es decir, de la realización de un valor imperecedero. Y con el fin de que suceda efectivamente esta relación de implicación entre personas, 20 Mindán Manero, M., La persona humana, p. 122. 21 Repárese en que este concepto que proviene de la Física es aplicable tanto a "cosas" (objetos) como a "individuos". No obstante, y para comprender adecuadamente al P. Mindán, hay que hacer alusión aquí al concepto orteguiano de "hombre masa" como signo de existencia no auténtica. 22 Mindán Manero, M., La persona humana, p. 129. A lo cual, matiza: "Claro que la persona como tal no podría hacerse eterna y universalmente valiosa sin la sustantividad que le presta su perfecta individualidad ontológica". 23 Mindán Manero, M., La persona humana, cap. VIII. 45 Metafísica y Persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida Año 6-Julio-Diciembre 2014-Número 12 Mindán dirá que la sociedad debe estar organizada según normas en orden a un fin común –el bien común–, para que así no puedan existir sino relaciones personales: entre persona y persona (y no de individuo a individuo). De esta forma, en este tipo de sociedad se darán también relaciones sociales: las cuales, matiza Mindán, no son directamente relaciones de persona a persona, sino de persona a bien común. Como vemos, el bien común es el eje principal para la mencionada realización. En esta relación entre persona y sociedad, sin embargo, siempre se dan roces y conflictos, con respecto a los cuales surge la siguiente cuestión: ¿es la persona para la sociedad o es la sociedad para la persona? Al responderse la pregunta, Mindán describirá dos tipos de sociedades opuestas. Así, si optamos por resolver la cuestión por el primer cuerno del aparente dilema, entonces la persona debe estar subordinada al Estado de un modo total y absoluto (totalitarismo estatal); pero si nos inclinamos por el segundo, deberíamos aceptar tajantemente que la sociedad civil no tiene otro fin que procurar el bien de los individuos (individualismo liberal). a. El totalitarismo estatal Así pues, vemos claramente cómo Mindán afirma que ambos serían igual de nocivos. En el primer sistema, deberíamos sacrificarnos, si el caso lo requiere; es decir, en un sistema gregario todo lo que la persona es y tiene lo debe a la sociedad en la que nace y se desarrolla. Mindán está en absoluto desacuerdo con esta concepción, que negaría claramente las capacidades de verdad y de libertad que anteriormente ha explicitado como características de nuestra naturaleza espiritual, al no reconocer que [la persona] es una unidad espiritual con destino quizá superior al de la misma sociedad civil. Nunca hay que olvidar que la persona tiene un destino que la sociedad no puede tener y que trasciende los fines y las relaciones sociales; es decir, posee proyecciones personales. Mindán nos recuerda, al respecto, que para León XIII "la naturaleza no ha formado la sociedad para que el hombre se acomode a ella como su fin, sino para que en ella y por ella encuentre las ayudas convenientes para su propia perfección".24 Y es que, en definitiva, la persona, para Manuel Mindán, tiene un destino que la sociedad no puede tener y que trasciende los fines y las relaciones sociales, pues la sociedad no puede sojuzgar a las personas hasta el punto de hacerlas desviar de su fin trascendente. En conclusión, para Mindán, las personas, aunque pueden ser consideradas como partes de una sociedad, sin 24 León XIII, Sapientae Christianae. 10 de enero 1890. 46 La persona como horizonte interior en la filosofía de Manuel Mindán embargo, son unidades totales ontológicamente más perfectas que el todo social. Y para demostrarlo recurrirá, si hace falta, a Vázquez de Menchaca, con el fin de criticar y desmontar la comparación que suele hacerse entre la sociedad y un organismo viviente. En este aspecto, sí podríamos decir que Mindán no está del lado de Aristóteles. b. El individualismo liberal En el segundo de los sistemas debemos contar con el mismo grado de nocividad que existe en el primero, pues en esta otra forma extremista de vida, la sociedad civil no tendría otro fin que procurar el bien de los individuos, es decir, no existirá bien común distinto de la suma de bienes particulares de éstos. Se podría decir que se acerca peligrosamente a la fórmula –de reminiscencias utilitaristas–: "cuantos más individuos felices, mejor". No le importa a esta concepción el bien común –nos parece que sugiere Mindán–, sino cierta "apariencia general de felicidad", con lo cual se despojaría de todo sentido y valor la sociedad. Y no sólo a la sociedad, sino a la persona, pues estaríamos tratando a ésta como individuo con sus intereses y sus manifestaciones biológicas, pero sin tener en cuenta que la persona sólo puede desarrollarse y comportarse como tal dentro de la sociedad. Es decir, que para Mindán la sociedad es el complemento natural de la persona y no viceversa. El peligro del individualismo liberal es que olvida la importancia clave de la sociedad para la persona, en el sentido de que ésta tiende a la sociedad por instinto natural, por buscar complemente a sus limitaciones y por la exigencia comunicativa de la interior riqueza personal –el horizonte interior que se abre en nosotros–. Lo que el individualismo olvida es que la sociedad es algo que surge o que se da para que la persona pueda realizarse como tal y para que pueda conseguir su perfección como persona. En definitiva, la sociedad existe para que la persona pueda ser y vivir como tal, pues a nadie se le ocurriría decir que las personas existen para que pueda existir la sociedad. Ante esta relación de la persona con la sociedad –sociedad sin la cual la persona no puede vivir, pero a la cual tampoco se debe someter–, nos parece que nos encontramos ante una apuesta clara en Mindán por un personalismo. Para Mindán, el totalitarismo estatal negaría, entonces, la dignidad de la persona, unidad espiritual con destino quizá superior al de la misma sociedad; y, por su parte, el individualismo liberal abominaría y expulsaría a la dignidad inscrita en el seno de la persona, que sólo puede desarrollarse y comportarse como tal dentro de la sociedad. Descubrimos así que, según Mindán, 47 Metafísica y Persona. Filosofía, conocimiento y vida Año 6-Julio-Diciembre 2014-Número 12 la dignidad de la persona se desarrollaría necesariamente en el seno de la sociedad, y, al mismo tiempo, que, por su misma índole personal, la persona acaba yendo más allá de las limitaciones impuestas por la sociedad. 6. Conclusiones. La lucha por la dignidad de la persona, remedio contra la desolación en el individuo y los sistemas despóticos La crítica mindaniana al individualismo y al gregarismo advierte que la defensa del valor y la dignidad de la persona no ha de entenderse en el sentido del liberalismo individualista que subordina la sociedad al uso egoísta del individuo. En este punto, Mindán reparará en el sintagma "uso egoísta", y afirmará que lo que fundamentalmente distingue al individualismo frente al personalismo es que éste debe entenderse como una autonomía de la persona frente a la sociedad, autonomía que se justifica y compensa por su ordenación a un fin más alto y por su apertura generosa hacia las demás personas que pertenecen a la sociedad. Éste es el núcleo de su planteamiento. Pero no cabe confundir la autonomía de la persona con el individualismo, el cual exagera la autonomía del individuo al considerarlo un fin en sí mismo y exaltar la preponderación del yo. El individualismo, advierte Mindán, "proclama la manifestación sin trabas de la libertad, sin pensar que [...] no es más que espontaneidad animal en lucha por la vida". Y esta lucha no puede darse, porque la persona humana está más allá de estas limitaciones animales; además, no debe darse porque la paz social es necesaria para el desenvolvimiento de la verdadera libertad personal. Así, afirma que, si bien el individualismo se funda en la preponderancia del individuo concreto sobre el grupo –del yo sobre los demás, dirá–, el personalismo es el cultivo de todas y cada una de las personas para que todas puedan cumplir su destino y realizar su vocación. Y sobre ésta debe cada persona descubrir la suya: la vocación es la capacidad o suficiencia que Dios da a cada persona para una profesión, la cual suele ir acompañada de una inclinación y gusto por ejercerla; es decir, se trata de un destino no impuesto sino propuesto a la libertad humana.25 En resumidas cuentas, la defensa del personalismo en Mindán se funda, principalmente, en lo que hemos venido describiendo hasta ahora, es decir: 25 Jiménez García, A., "Homenaje al padre Mindán en Calanda al cumplir cien años", en Anales del Seminario de Historia de la Filosofía, Madrid: UCM, 20, 2003, pp. 339-349; la nota proviene de la p. 345. 48 La persona como horizonte interior en la filosofía de Manuel Mindán en el amor y respeto a todas las personas, planteamiento personalista el de Mindán, el cual trabaja para que todas tengan una vida digna de acuerdo con su alta condición. De este modo, de esta defensa del personalismo por parte de Mindán se deduce una auténtica y radical propuesta filosófica: el que no ayuda y no sacrifica su bienestar, así como el que no da a la sociedad más de lo que recibe, en realidad, cree que sólo él y, quizá, unos cuantos elegidos como él–y, al respecto, es interesante reparar en el neologismo mindaniano, el nostrismo, entendido como mera suma de egoísmos– tiene esa "alta condición". El que así piensa no cree en la igualdad, sino en la desigualdad; el que así piensa incurre en una negación de la capacidad de verdad de toda persona y de su ejercicio en consecuencia de la libertad; el que así piensa cree en un bien común abstracto, en el que es inversamente proporcional la cantidad de abstracción de la idea a la cantidad de personas concretas, vivas y reales, a las que sé que debería ayudar. En el fondo, para Mindán la idea de bien del nostrismo no se corresponde con el bien común de las personas que componen la sociedad. Quienes así piensan creen que sólo ellos son los válidos. En realidad, este tipo de larvadas actitudes individualistas (nostristas) constituyen un individualismo plural, es decir, "de grupo" (entiéndase un conjunto de individuos egoístas, en el que sumamos un individualismo singular a otro, casi matemáticamente, hasta llegar a un conjunto), nos llevan a que un grupo de individuos absorba la sociedad. Esto –dirá Mindán utilizando el lenguaje de la Lógica–, va en contra de una sociedad que, en realidad, pertenece y está configurada y confeccionada por todas (universal) las personas, no por una (singular) ni por un grupo (pluralidad). Así, los dos últimos intentos son catastróficos: no sólo el individualismo, sino también este último intento nostrista. Podríamos decir incluso –por nuestra parte– que semejante nostrismo puede tacharse de dogmatismo, aristocratismo, autoritarismo e, incluso, despotismo. Y es que, en definitiva, el nostrismo para Mindán implica un olvido de la finitud y de la indigencia humana. Dédalo –aquel que incluso, dado el caso, despojara de sus alas a los propios buitres– también voló arrogantemente contra el Sol. Y es que no debemos olvidar que, tal y como afirma Manuel Mindán, se trata de un nosotros compuesto de personas, y no de un (falso) plural nostrismo egoísta que, en realidad, derretirá nuestras alas en esa travesía conjunta que debemos recorrer, como personas, hacia la luz.

Story Size Abstract: The shortest stories are zero words long. T here is no maximum length. Take a strip of paper with 'once upon a time there' written on one side and 'was a story that began' on the other. Twisting the paper and fastening the ends produces John Barth's Frame-Tale, which prefixes a token of 'once upon a time there was a story that began' to itself.1 According to its author, Frame-Tale is "... the shortest story in the English language (ten words); on the other hand, it's endless."2 This paper argues Frame-Tale is neither the shortest nor the longest story: zero is the minimum story length, and there is no maximum. One clarification. This paper contributes nothing original, even pedagogically, to mathematics or its philosophy, and its contributions to the philosophy of literature are merely marginal. The purpose of the paper is not to use examples from literature to cast light on philosophical problems. On the contrary, the purpose of the paper is the opposite: to use mathematical and philosophical ideas for the creation of literature. Frame-Tale is an example of the fascinating fiction which may be created in this way, but, I shall argue, it falls far short of exhausting the possibilities in the area. The application of mathematics to the elaboration of novel literary forms has been extensively explored by the Oulipo, a collective writing mainly in French, but to my knowledge they've overlooked the possibility of exploiting transfinite numbers.3 The infinite as a theme in literature has been well explored by Jorge Luis Borges. I've taken his advice when he says "It is a laborious madness and an impoverishing one, the madness of composing vast books – setting out in five hundred pages an idea that can be perfectly related orally in five minutes. The better way to go about it is to pretend those books already exist, and offer a summary, a commentary, on them."4 There are many microfictions shorter than ten words. Augusto Monterroso's story The Dinosaur, for example, consists of the eight words: 'When he awoke, the dinosaur was still there.'5 Ernest Hemingway is purported to have written a story of just six words: 'Baby's shoes: brand new, never worn.'6 And Forrest Ackerman's story Cosmic Report Card: Earth consists of a single letter: 'F'.7 According to its author Cosmic Report Card: Earth is "... what must be the world's shortest science fiction story – one letter of the alphabet for which I got paid a hundred dollars."8 2 But the shortest stories are less than one letter long.9 Metamicrofiction, for example, is a short story which consists of no letters and exactly zero words.10 Just as Frame-Tale is an infinitely long story about an infinitely long story, Metamicrofiction is a zero word story about a zero word story.11 Since Metamicrofiction consists of no words, letters or other symbols at all, no story is shorter. (Metamicrofiction does have one word in its title. But one can imagine the publication of an untitled sequel, with a similar theme.12) So zero is the minimum story length. It might be objected that Metamicrofiction and its sequel are not stories, since they lack, for example, traditional plot and characterization. But Frame-Tale also lacks traditional plot and characterization. And insofar as Frame-Tale is a traditional narrative whose protagonist is a story which heroically persists despite the odds against it (it isn't), Metamicrofiction is a traditional narrative whose protagonist is a story which tragically ceases despite the odds in its favour (it isn't either). So insofar as Frame-Tale is a story, Metamicrofiction is a story as well. Some definitions of story exclude Frame-Tale and Metamicrofiction simply because of their lengths. Aristotle's, for example, defines a story as the imitation of a whole and complete action, which has a beginning, middle, and ending, as well as an appropriate length.13 Frame-Tale is excluded because it has no beginning nor end and is inappropriately long, whereas Metamicrofiction is excluded since, as well as having no beginning nor end it has no middle, it is inappropriately short. But this tells more against Aristotle's definition than it does against the stories. Other definitions of story exclude Frame-Tale and Metamicrofiction because they are metafictions, and not because they are microfictions. Most definitions require a causal connection between the events of the story, which excludes Frame-Tale and Metamicrofiction because they don't feature causation in any obvious way.14 This is an important difference between Frame-Tale, Metamicrofiction and other stories. But whether it warrants withholding the word 'stories' is a verbal question that there is no need to resolve.15 There are many novels longer than ten words. Marcel Proust's A la recherche du temps perdu, which consists of approximately nine million six hundred and nine thousand characters including spaces, is often estimated to be the longest.16 Someone reading Frame-Tale at the same time per character as someone reading A la recherche du temps perdu would complete about two hundred and eight thousand eight hundred 3 and ninety-one rotations in the time taken to complete A la recherche du temps perdu. Nevertheless, the reader of Frame-Tale will still have more to read after the reader of A la recherche du temps perdu has finished. Some poetry is much longer than A la recherche du temps perdu. Raymond Queneau's A Hundred Thousand Billion Poems, for example, consists of ten fourteen line poems with identical rhyme schemes.17 Cutting between the lines allows them to be recombined into a total of ten to the power of fourteen or one hundred thousand billion poems. Queneau estimated that "... someone reading the book 24 hours a day would need 190,258,751 years to finish it", implying a reading speed of one poem per minute, except for rest on leap days.18 Nevertheless, even if someone finished reading A Hundred Thousand Billion Poems at this speed, someone reading Frame-Tale at the same speed would still have more to read before and after. Michèle Métail is composing a poem called Compléments de noms, inspired by the long German word 'donaudampfschifffahrtsgesellschaftskäpitan'.19 The first few lines run: le capitaine de la compagnie des voyages en bateau à vapeur du danube la femme du capitaine de la compagnie des voyages en bateau à vapeur la fille de la femme du capitaine de la compagnie des voyages en bateau ... and so on, where each line is succeeded by one dropping the last possessive phrase and prefixing a new one. The poem is reputed to be more than twenty thousand lines long, but is intended to be infinite.20 Whereas Queneau's instructions suffice to determine which poems are part of A Hundred Thousand Billion Poems, Métail's instructions underdetermine which line of Compléments de noms is next, so Métail's intention for Compléments de noms to be infinite is unrealised, and the poem is incomplete. (It might also be worried that Compléments de noms cannot be infinite, since each line requires new vocabulary, but the vocabulary of French is finite. However, Métail sidesteps this worry by adopting vocabulary from other languages, and one may expect the growth of vocabulary in all languages to outstrip the growth of the poem.21) Nevertheless, there are novels and poems which are infinitely long. Take, for example, ω, which is a verse novel consisting of the following sentences: I write I write I write 4 I write I write I write ... and so on, where each successive line prefixes 'I write' to its predecessor.22 These instructions, like Queneau's for A Hundred Thousand Billion Poems, suffice to determine the next line of ω. So like Frame-Tale, ω is endless. Nevertheless, ω and Frame-Tale are not comparable with respect to length. Since ω and Frame-Tale are both endless, someone who reads a line of ω in the same time as someone who reads one rotation of Frame-Tale will continue reading for as long. But since Frame-Tale is beginningless, whereas ω is not, someone who reads one line of ω in the same time as someone who reads one rotation of Frame-Tale won't have been reading for as long. The reader of Frame-Tale will already have been reading from eternity when the reader of ω has just begun. In other words, if ω and Frame-Tale were comparable with respect to length, then it would be possible for us to compare their lengths by beginning reading at the same time and at the same speed, and discovering whether one of us reads for longer than the other. But although neither of us would read for longer than the other – since neither of us would ever stop reading if we maintained constant speed – we cannot begin reading at the same time, because Frame-Tale has no beginning to begin from – to read it at constant speed, one has to have always been already reading it. Reordering ω so that the lines in which 'I' occurs an even number of times appear first, in descending order according to the number of times which 'I' appears, and the lines in which 'I' occurs an odd number of times appear second, in ascending order according to the number of times which 'I' appears, produces ω* + ω, a novel which is equal in length to Frame-Tale.23 Like Frame-Tale, ω* + ω has no beginning, since before every line there is either a shorter line in which 'I' occurs an odd number of times or a longer line in which 'I' occurs an even number of times.24 Frame-Tale and ω* + ω are equal and comparable in length, since someone who reads a line of ω* + ω in the same time as someone who reads one rotation of Frame-Tale will continue reading for as long, since ω* + ω and Frame-Tale are both endless, but will also have been reading for as long, since ω* + ω and Frame-Tale are also both beginningless. In other words, if you and I read ω* + ω and Frame-Tale at the same constant speed, then we will both continue reading for ever, but we will both also have always been already reading it. Taking 'I write I write' from ω* + ω and placing it at the end produces ω* + ω + 1, a novel which is one sentence longer than ω* + ω, and so longer than Frame5 Tale. ω* + ω + 1 is longer than ω* + ω because every sentence in which 'I' occurs an odd number of times in ω* + ω corresponds to the same sentence in ω* + ω + 1, and every sentence of ω* + ω in which 'I' occurs an even number of times corresponds to a sentence in which 'I' occurs twice more in ω* + ω + 1, but no sentence in ω* + ω corresponds to the final sentence of ω* + ω + 1. In other words, ω* + ω + 1 is longer than ω* + ω since if you and I read and have always been reading ω* + ω + 1 and ω* + ω at the same constant speed, so that every time I read a line of ω* + ω you read a line of ω* + ω + 1, then although I will always have more lines to read, every line of ω* + ω will eventually be read by me, whereas the last line of ω* + ω + 1, 'I write I write', will never be read by you. Since it would take forever to read the lines of ω* + ω + 1 which precede 'I write I write', there would be no time left to read the last line. So Frame-Tale is not the longest story. It might be objected that ω, ω* + ω, and ω* + ω + 1 can't be read and written in full. But similar objections can be raised about Frame-Tale and A Hundred Thousand Billion Poems: Frame-Tale can be written but not read in full and the one hundred thousand billion poems in A Hundred Thousand Billion Poems all have some chance of being read, but most never will be. Likewise, flipping a coin until it lands tails and then writing and reading 'I write' as many times as it landed heads gives every sentence in ω, ω* + ω, and ω* + ω + 1 a chance of being read. It doesn't matter that most of them never will be.25 It might also be objected that whereas it's possible in principle to read A Hundred Thousand Billion Poems in a finite but long period of time, it's impossible even in principle to read Frame-Tale, ω, ω* + ω, or ω* + ω + 1 in a finite period of time. But it is possible in principle to read ω in a finite period of time: if one reads the first sentence in half a minute, the second sentence in a quarter of a minute, the third sentence in an eighth of a minute, ... and so on, then one will be finished before a minute. Of course, it's not possible to read, say, the sixth sentence in less than a second but, like finishing A Hundred Thousand Billion Poems before death, this is a mere impracticability. Likewise, it is possible in principle to read Frame-Tale in a finite period of time: if one reads two rotations in a quarter of a minute each, before reading one in an eighth of a minute as well as after reading one in an eighth of a minute, before reading 6 one in a sixteenth of a minute as well as after reading one in a sixteenth of a minute, ... and so on, then one will be finished reading before a minute. It may be thought one can't have finished Frame-Tale in less than a minute, since one must have broken off after the last rotation. But there was no last rotation, since after every rotation in the last half minute, there was another which was half as long. Similarly, one needn't have begun reading in medias res, because there was no first rotation either: before every rotation in the first half minute, there was another which was half as long.26 It's possible in principle to read ω* + ω in the same finite period of time: if one reads two rotations in a quarter of a minute each, before reading one in an eighth of a minute as well as after reading one in an eighth of a minute, ... and so on, then one will be finished reading before a minute. And if ω* + ω + 1 is read at the same speed, it will be finished in almost the same finite amount of time, with only the addition of the time taken to read the final sentence. (Some of the novels mentioned below may have more elements than there are times, so whether it's possible to read one of these novels depends on whether it's possible for time to have more moments than the novel has elements.) Let us say that a novel is well-ordered if and only if all of its abridgements have a first part (and let us say that an abridgement of a novel is any collection of the parts of the novel in their usual order, including the whole novel, but excluding the collection of none of its parts).27 ω, for example, is a well-ordered novel, since every abridgement of ω has a first part: its shortest sentence. But ω* + ω, on the other hand, isn't a wellordered novel, since ω* + ω is an abridgement of itself with no first sentence. FrameTale, likewise, is not well-ordered, because it has no beginning.28 Every two well-ordered novels are comparable in length, because the first part of the first novel corresponds to the first part of the second novel, and the first part of the rest of the parts (if any) of the first novel corresponds to the first part of the rest of the parts (if any) of the second novel, and so on. If every part of the first corresponds in this way to a part of the second and vice versa, then the novels are the same length, whereas if some part of the first corresponds to no part of the second, then the first is longer, and vice versa.29 Taking 'I write I write' from ω and placing it at the end, for example, produces ω + 1, a novel which is one sentence longer than ω. ω + 1 is one sentence longer than ω, because each sentence of ω corresponds to a sentence of ω + 1, but the 7 last sentence of ω + 1 does not correspond to any sentence of ω: 'I write' in ω corresponds to 'I write' in ω + 1, 'I write I write' in ω corresponds to 'I write I write I write' in ω + 1, 'I write I write I write' in ω corresponds to 'I write I write I write I write' in ω + 1, ... and so on, but 'I write I write' in ω + 1 does not correspond to any sentence in ω. Taking the second and fourth sentences from ω and adding them to the end produces ω + 2, a novel two sentences longer than ω. Taking the second, fourth and sixth sentences produces ω + 3, a novel three sentences longer, taking the second, fourth, sixth and eighth produces ω + 4, ... and so on. Taking every second sentence from ω and adding them to the end produces ω + ω or ω.2, which is twice as long as ω. But even ω.2 is not the longest novel: taking it's second sentence and adding it to the end produces ω.2 + 1, a novel one sentence longer still.30 In general, for any novel in this series, its sequel is produced, if it has no last sentence, by taking the second sentence from the beginning and adding it to the end or, if it has a last sentence, by counting backwards to find the number of sentences before one with no immediate predecessor, and then counting forwards by twice that number to find the sentence to take to the end. Counting back from the end of ω + 4, for example, one finds four sentences before one with no immediate predecessor, so one takes the eighth sentence from ω + 4 to the end to produce ω + 5.31 The novel ω.2, although it is longer than ω, ω + 1, ω + 2, ..., and so on, is not the sequel of any of them; it is produced by collating all its prequels. In general, for an endless sequence of sequels of ω, in which all prequels of all novels in that sequence are included, the next novel is produced by first taking the sentences not preceded by a sentence with no immediate predecessor except the first in every novel, and then all sentences which are preceded by a sentence with no immediate predecessor except the first in any novel, as well as the second sentence with no immediate predecessor.32 The next novel after the endless series ω, ω + 1, ω + 2, ..., for example, is the novel consisting of all the sentences with an odd number of occurrences of 'I', since these occur in all of ω, ω + 1, ω + 2, ... without being preceded by a sentence with no immediate predecessor except the first, followed by all the sentences with an even number of occurrences of 'I', since all of these except 'I write I write' are preceded by 'I write I write' in ω, ω + 1, ω + 2, ..., and since 'I write I write' has no immediate predecessor (and is not the first sentence with no immediate predecessor). 8 These two processes produce the following series of longer and longer novels, of which ω is merely the shortest: ω, ω + 1, ω + 2, ..., ω.2, ω.2 + 1, ..., ω.3, ..., ω2, ..., ω3, ..., ωω, ... Though the sentences of ω may be stretched into novels of greater and greater length, there is a sense in which all these novels, as well as ω* + ω and ω* + ω + 1, all have the same size, because they were all produced by reordering the sentences in ω, and so all contain the same number of sentences.33 Taking each novel in this series as the chapters of a larger novel produces ω1, which encompasses all of them. ω1 is longer than any chapter of ω1, because if the first sentence of the chapter corresponds to the first chapter of ω1, then the succeeding sentences of the chapter correspond to succeeding chapters of ω1, but a succeeding chapter of ω1 does not correspond to any sentence. Every sentence in chapter ω, for example, corresponds to a chapter preceding ω.2, since 'I write' corresponds to ω, 'I write I write' to ω + 1, 'I write I write I write' to ω + 1, ... and so on, but no sentence of ω corresponds to chapter ω.2 itself. Not only is ω1 longer than any of its chapters, it is also larger than any of its chapters, since ω1 has more chapters than any of its chapters has sentences. For suppose ω1 had the same number of chapters as its chapters have sentences. Then it would be possible to reorder the sentences of ω so that each sentence corresponds to a chapter of ω1. But if it were possible to reorder ω so that each sentence corresponded to a chapter of ω1, then since ω1 encompasses as its chapters all novels stretched from the sentences of ω, this reordering would be a chapter of ω1 which is also the length of ω1. But we have already showed that ω1 is longer than any of its chapters.34 Taking the second chapter from ω1 and adding it to the end produces ω1 + 1, taking every second chapter of the chapters from ω1 preceding ω.2 produces ω1 + ω, ... and so on. In general, applying the two procedures mentioned above to chapters instead of sentences produces the following series of longer and longer novels: ω1, ω1 + 1, ..., ω1 + ω, ..., ω1.2, ..., ω12, ..., ω1ω, ..., ω1ω1, ... Though the chapters of ω1 may be stretched into novels of greater and greater lengths, all these novels are the same size, because they are all composed of the same number of chapters, which are all composed of the same number of sentences. Taking all the preceding novels as the volumes of a larger novel produces ω2, which encompasses all of them. ω2 is longer than any volume of ω1, because if the first chapter of that volume corresponds to the first volume of ω2, then the succeeding 9 chapters of that volume correspond to succeeding volumes of ω2, but a succeeding volume of ω2 does not correspond to any chapter. Every chapter in volume ω1, for example, corresponds to a volume preceding ω1, since ω corresponds to ω, ω + 1 to ω + 1, ... and so on until ω.2, which corresponds to ω.2, ..., and so on, but no chapter of ω1 corresponds to volume ω1 itself. ω2 is not only longer than any of its volumes, but also larger than any of its volumes, since ω2 has more volumes than any of its volumes has chapters, for the same reason ω1 has more chapters than any of its chapters have sentences. Reordering the volumes of ω2 produces longer novels of the same size, which with preceding novels can be gathered into ω3, which is also longer and larger than any of them. And reordering ω3 produces longer novels, which with preceding novels can be gathered into ω4, ..., leading to ever larger novels ω5, ω6, ... ωω, ωω+1, ..., ωω.2, ..., and so on. In general, by applying the first procedure mentioned above to the direct parts of a novel one produces a sequel to that novel which is one part longer. By applying the second procedure mentioned above to the direct parts of an endless sequence of sequels of those novels, which includes all prequels of all novels in that sequence, one produces the next novel in the series. And by concatenating together all the novels in one of these series into a single novel one produces the first novel of the next series, which is not only longer but also larger than all of them. It might be thought that it's possible to collate all novels composed in this way into a single novel which encompasses them all, and so is longer than all the novels. But this is not possible. For suppose it were possible to gather all novels composed in this way into a single novel which encompasses them all, and so is longer than all of them. Then by taking this novel's second element and adding it to the end, it would be possible to compose an even longer novel. But since this novel was composed in the same way, this would contradict the supposition we had gathered all novels composed in this way into a single novel which is longer than them all.35 So there is no longest story. In every novel considered so far, the elements possess a specific order, and reordering the elements produces a different novel. But for some novels, the elements possess no specific order, and reordering the elements simply produces a different version of the same novel. Bryan Johnson's The Unfortunates, for example, is published in a box, so the unbound sections, except the first and last, can be read in any order.36 Likewise, 10 Marc Saporta's Composition No. 1 consists of a box of unbound pages, which should be shuffled and read in random order.37 Abstracting from the order of sentences in ω produces 0א, a novel in which the sentences can be read in any order.38 has no determinate length, but since it has the same number of sentences 0א as ω, it has the same size as ω, and as every other novel produced by reordering the sentences of ω. Abstracting from the order of chapters in ω1 produces 1א, which has the same size as ω1 and every other novel produced by reordering the chapters of ω1. Abstracting from the order of volumes in ω2 produces 2א, which has the same size as ω2 and every other novel produced by reordering the volumes of ω2. ... And so on.39 But abstracting from the order of the elements in the novels discussed so far is not the only way to produce novels larger than 0א. Taking all subsets of sentences in in no particular order, as the paragraphs, in no particular order, of a new novel ,0א produces 20א2 .0א is larger than 0א, because 20א has more paragraphs than 0א has sentences. For suppose the number of paragraphs in 20א were the same as the number of sentences in 0א. Then it would be possible to head each paragraph of 20א with a sentence of 0א. But this is not possible. For suppose every paragraph in 20א were headed with a sentence of 0א. Then take the paragraph consisting of all and only the sentences of 0א not contained in the paragraphs they head. This paragraph could not be headed by a sentence it contains, since it contains only sentences heading paragraphs not containing them. Nor could it be headed by a sentence it does not contain, since it contains all sentences heading paragraphs not containing them. So this paragraph could not be headed by any sentence, which contradicts our supposition.40 Since 20א is larger than 0א, and since 0א is the same size as ω, 20א is larger than ω. So if we can choose a chapter of 20א to be the first, and then choose another chapter to be next, and then the next, ... and then choose a chapter to be next after all these chapters, ... and so on until the chapters of 20א are well-ordered, then 20א will be longer than ω and so at least as long as ω1.41 Since ω1 is the same size as 1א, it would follow that 20א is also at least as large as ω1 and 1א. But whether 20א is exactly the same size as depends on the continuum hypothesis, a famously unresolved question.42 1א Regardless of whether 20א is comparable in size with 1א or any larger novel mentioned so far, 20א cannot be the largest novel, since a larger novel is produced by 11 taking every subset of the paragraphs in 20א, in no particular order, as the chapters, in no particular order, of a new novel. This novel has more chapters than 20א has paragraphs, since if its chapters numbered the same or less than the number of paragraphs in 20א, it would be possible to head all of them with a paragraph from 20א. But this is not possible. For suppose all its chapters were headed with a paragraph of 20א. Then take the chapter consisting of all and only the paragraphs of 20א which aren't contained in the chapters they head. This chapter couldn't be headed by a paragraph it contains, since it contains only paragraphs heading chapters which don't contain them. But nor could it be headed by a paragraph it does not contain, since it contains all paragraphs heading chapters which don't contain them. So this chapter could not be headed by any paragraph.43 It might be thought that there's a single novel which has every novel as one of its chapters, and so is the largest novel. But there cannot be such a novel. For consider the novel which has as its volumes every subset of these chapters. This second novel must have more volumes than the first has chapters, since if its volumes numbered the same or less than chapters in the first, it would be possible to preface every volume of the second with a chapter of the first. But this isn't possible. For suppose all its volumes were prefaced by a chapter. Then take the volume consisting of all and only the chapters not contained in the volumes they preface. This volume couldn't be headed by a chapter it contains, since it contains only chapters prefacing volumes which don't contain them. But nor could it be prefaced by a chapter it does not contain, since it contains all chapters prefacing volumes which don't contain them. So this volume could not be prefaced by any chapter.44 So there is no largest story.45 1 John Barth, Lost in the Funhouse (New York: Doubleday, 1968), pp. 1-2. As well as the issues discussed in this paper, Frame-Tale raises some interesting questions in the philosophy of language. See my paper "A Never-Ending Story" in Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14(40) (2014), pp. 111-120 for some discussion of these issues. 2 Lost in the Funhouse, p. vii. 3 For accounts of the Oulipo's works see especially Warren Motte (ed.), Oulipo: A Primer of Potential Literature (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), Oulipo 12 Laboratory (London: Atlas Press, 1995), Harry Mathews and Alistair Brotchie (eds.), Oulipo Compendium (London: Atlas Press, 1998), and "The State of Constraint: New Work by Oulipo", McSweeney's 22 (2006). 4 Jorge Luis Borges, "The Garden of Forking Paths" in Collected Fictions, trans. Andrew Hurley (London: Allen Lane, 1999), p. 67. 5 Augusto Montessori, Complete Works and Other Stories, trans. Edith Grossman (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), p. 42. 6 Wired Magazine 14 (November 2006). Amihud Gilead discusses these examples in "How Few Words Can a Short Story Have?" Philosophy and Literature 32 (2008), pp. 119-129. The attribution of the story to Hemingway is dubious: see Frederick A. Wright, "The Short Story Just Got Shorter: Hemingway, Narrative, and the Six-Word Urban Legend", Journal of Popular Culture 47(2) (2014), pp. 327-340. 7 Forrest Ackerman, "Cosmic Report Card: Earth", Vertex Magazine 1 (January 1973). See also "Going for the Limit" in Oulipo Compendium, pp. 177-178, which mentions "A poem comprising of a single letter: T" amongst twenty-five other possibilities. 8 Forest Ackerman, "Through Time and Space with Forry Ackerman", Mimosa 16 (1994), pp. 4-6. 9 Zero word poems are discussed briefly in Oulipo Compendium, p. 251. Paul Fournel's "Suburbia", trans. Harry Mathews in Oulipo Laboratory, pp. 37-60 purports to be a zero word novel. Craig Dworkin, No Medium, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2013) discusses similar examples in several media. And see also Dennis Upper, "The Unsuccessful Self-Treatment of a Case of "Writer's Block"", Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis 7(3) (1974), p. 497. For discussion of related examples in music, see Andrew Kania, "Silent Music", Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68(4) (2010), pp. 343-353. 10 Journal of Microliterature (July 2012). It might be objected that Metamicrofiction is not about itself (and so mistitled) because it has no words. But so long as it exists, it is capable of being about something, and so capable of being about itself. 11 This interpretation of Metamicrofiction is supported by its title, according to which it is about a short fiction – since it is about a short fiction, and it is a short fiction, it is reasonable to conclude that it is the short fiction it is about. 13 12 Jorge Luis Borges and Adolfo Bioy Casares describe the publication of an untitled zero word story in "A List and Analysis of the Sundry Books of F. J. C. Loomis", Chronicles of Bustos Domecq, trans. Norman Thomas Di Giovanni (New York: Dutton, 1979), pp. 49-55. See also "", Philosofict 1 (March, 2013). 13 Aristotle, Selections, trans. Terence Irwin and Gail Fine (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1995), pp. 544-547. Aristotle's uses 'muthos' for story or plot. See Selections, p. 544. 14 See, for example, Noël Carroll, "The Narrative Connection" in Beyond Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) and Gregory Currie, Narratives and Narrators (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Carroll distinguishes a narrative, which involves causation, from a story, which is merely a sequence of events. It's not obvious to me whether Frame-Tale or Metamicrofiction are stories even in this sense. 15 Kendall Walton distinguishes between the standard features of a category – those features which are necessary for a work to have in order to belong to the category – and the variable features of a category – those features which are neither necessary for a work to have to belong to the category nor sufficient for the a work not to belong to the category. Walton admits that which features of a category are standard is vague. In the case of stories, it is vague whether it is a standard feature of a story that it has a beginning middle and end, or is of an appropriate magnitude, or has traditional plot and characterization, so Frame-Tale and Metamicrofiction are borderline cases of the category of stories. See Kendall Walton, "Categories of Art", Philosophical Review 79(3) 1970, p. 339. 16 Marcel Proust, A la recherche du temps perdu (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1913-27). The character count is given in Guinness World Records (London: Guinness World Records, 2011), p. 163. 17 Raymond Queneau, "A Hundred Thousand Billion Poems", trans. Stanley Chapman in Oulipo Compendium, pp. 15-33. 18 Oulipo Compendium, p. 14. 19 Michèle Métail, "L'infini moins quarante annuities", Le cahier du refuge 214 (September 2012) and Michèle Métail, 2888 Donauverse aus einem unendlichen Gedicht (Vienna: Edition Korrespondenzen, 2006). Similar examples are discussed by Izzy Grinspan in "Verse by the Yard", Poetry Foundation (April, 2008). 20 Daniel Levin Becker, Many Subtle Channels: In Praise of Potential Literature (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2012), p. 200. Métail writes "Il me dit « c'est très 14 bien, mais il n'y en a pas assez ». Qu'à cela ne tienne, le poème sera donc infini!", "L'infini moins quarante annuities", p. 5. 21 "L'infini moins quarante annuities", p. 6. 22 The opening lines of ω resemble the opening lines of Georges Perec's Species of Spaces, trans. John Sturrock (London: Penguin, 1997). Although the title resembles that of Perec's W, or the memory of childhood, trans. David Bellos (London: Harvill, 1988), ω is named after the ordinal number which it's like. An accessible introduction to ordinal numbers is in Bertrand Russell's Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1919), pp. 89-96. 23 ω* + ω is named for its likeness to the series of negative and positive integers. See Bertrand Russell, Principles of Mathematics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), p. 320. 24 Roy Sorenson writes "...there are palindromes of every finite length. Therefore, there are infinitely many palindromes. Yet no palindrome is infinitely long. After all, a palindrome must read the same way backwards. If the sentence went on forever, where would one begin the reversal?" ("A Plenum of Palindromes for Lewis Carroll", Mind 109 (2000), p. 20). But ω* + ω illustrates that if it had no beginning as well as no end, a palindrome could be infinitely long. 25 By stipulating that the first half of a blank line abbreviates 'I write', the first half of the second half abbreviates 'I write I write', the first half of the third half abbreviates 'I write I write I write'... and so on, ω can also be abbreviated into a single line. See Roy Sorenson, "Blanks: Signs of Omission", American Philosophical Quarterly 36(4) (1999), p. 310. ω* + ω and ω* + ω + 1 can be abbreviated via similar stipulations. If space is continuous, then some stories of size 20א, but no greater, may also be abbreviated in similar ways. And whether stories of size larger than 20א can be abbreviated in this way in principle depends on whether there can in principle be more than 20א spaces in which to abbreviate them. 26 Reading ω, Frame-Tale, ω* + ω and ω* + ω + 1 in this fashion involves the performance of a super task. See James Thomson, "Tasks and Supertasks", Analysis 15(1) (1954), pp. 1-13, which argues for the in principle impossibility of these tasks, and Paul Benacerraf, "Tasks, Super-Tasks, and the Modern Eleatics", Journal of Philosophy 59(24) (1962) pp. 765-784, which argues – correctly I think – for their in principle possibility. 15 27 Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, pp. 92-93. 28 Frame-Tale's order is cyclical, see Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, pp. 40-41. 29 For detailed explanation see Karel Hrbacek and Thomas Jech, Introduction to Set Theory, 3rd Edition, (New York: Marcel Dekker, 1999), pp. 104-106. 30 Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, pp. 90-92. 31 This is a variation of Cantor's first principle of generation. See Georg Cantor, Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers, trans. Philip Jourdain (London: Open Court, 1915), p. 169. 32 This is a variation of Cantor's second principle of generation. See Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers, p. 169. 33 Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, p. 92. 34 Introduction to Set Theory, pp. 103-110 and pp. 129-132. 35 This is a manifestation of the Burali-Forti Paradox. See Principles of Mathematics, p. 324 and Abraham Fraenkel, Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Azriel Levy, Foundations of Set Theory, 2nd Edition (Amsterdam: Elsevier 1973), p. 8. 36 Bryan Stanley Johnson, The Unfortunates (London: Secker & Warburg, 1969). 37 Marc Saporta, Composition No. 1, trans Richard Howard (London, Visual Editions, 2011). 38 Though the title resembles that of Borges' "The Aleph" in Collected Fictions, pp. is named for the cardinal number to which it's similar. See Introduction to 0א ,274-85 Mathematical Philosophy, p. 83. 39 Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, p. 92. 40 This is an application of Cantor's diagonalisation argument. See Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, pp. 85-86. 41 This argument depends on the axiom of choice. See Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy p. 92, pp. 122-124. 42 See Introduction to Set Theory, p. 101. 43 A possible world is sometimes defined as a complete and consistent novel – a novel in which all the sentences are compatible with each other, but are jointly incompatible with any sentence not in the novel. A common criticism of this definition is that since in an ordinary language there are only 0א sentences, it follows that there will be at most 20א possible worlds (since that is the number of sets of the 0א sentences). This 16 objection is not undermined by the point that there is a novel with more chapters than there are paragraphs in 20א, since the number of these chapters exceeds the number of complete and consistent novels only by containing many repetitions of the same 0א sentences, and so the different chapters do not correspond to distinct possibilities. See Richard Jeffrey, The Logic of Decision (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 208 and David Lewis, Counterfactuals (Harvard: Harvard University Press), p. 90 and On The Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 143-144 for the definition and criticism respectively. For a surprising connection between the philosophy of possible worlds and the Oulipo, see Jacques Roubaud, On The Plurality of Worlds of Lewis, trans. Rosmarie Waldrop (Normal: Dalkey Archive Press, 1995). 44 This is a manifestation of Cantor's Paradox. See Principles of Mathematics, pp. 362-368. 45 I would like to thank David Bourget, David Chalmers, Alex Sandgren and WengHong Tang, as well as Sam Baron, Daniel Levin Becker, Derek Baker, Mark D'Cruz, John Paul Foenander, Daniel Friedrich, Axel Gelfert, John Holbo, Cliff Kerr, June Mahadevan, Daniel Nolan, Shaun Oon, Angela Mendelovici, Michael Pelczar, Andrew Hao-Yen Shih, Neil Sinhababu, Sarindranath Tagore, Liling Tan, David Wall, Zach Weber, Cecilia Wee, Brenton Welford, Zi Wei Yap, anonymous referees for Philosophical Papers and audiences at the Australasian Association of Philosophy conference at the University of Victoria Wellington, the University of Sydney, and Humboldt University Berlin for help with this paper.

EQUILIBRIUM IN NASH'S MIND 1 Equilibrium in Nash's mind Vasil D. Penchev, [email protected] Bulgarian Academy of Sciences: Institute of Philosophy and Sociology: Dept. of Logical Systems and Models Abstract Donald Capps (2009: 145) suggested the hypothesis that "the Nash equilibrium is descriptive of the normal brain, whereas the game theory formulated by John van Neumann, which Nash's theory challenges, is descriptive of the schizophrenic brain". The paper offers arguments in its favor. They are from psychiatry, game theory, set theory, philosophy and theology. The Nash equilibrium corresponds to wholeness, stable emergent properties as well as to representing actual infinity on a material, limited and finite organ as a human brain. Keywords: disintegration, game theory, information processing, Nash equilibrium, schizophrenia EQUILIBRIUM IN NASH'S MIND 2 1 INTRODUCTION The philosophical relation of common sense and schizophrenia has a natural focus in the personality and creativity of John Nash (1928 – 2015), Nobel Prize in economics (1994), diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia (1959). One of his fundamental ideas refers to a new interpretation of equilibrium in game theory and philosophy of mathematics as noncompetitive in noncooperative games or even as a way for any competition of gamers or factors to be prevented. It is directly opposed to that of John von Neumann, one of the founders of mathematical game theory and its application in economics. A few early papers of Nash (1950; 1950a; 1951) prove a generalization (Park, 2011) of Neumann's approach (Neumann, Morgenstern, 1953; Israel & Gasca, 2009; Nash et al., 1996). The quotability of "Nash equilibrium" grows exponentially (Mccain, & Mccain, 2010). Nash obtained the Nobel Prize in economics (Milnor, 1995). The essence of Nash's equilibrium consists in the aims to be divided between the players disjunctively therefore achieving a more stable equilibrium (Marsili & Zhang, 1997). On the contrary, they share the aim(s) in Neumann's approach being always in direct competition conditioning instability and trends to disintegration. The Nash equilibrium can be seen as "strategic" (Crawford, 2002). The prevention of rival is the best strategy of gamers who mean the strategies of all the rest for gain. If all gamers mean these strategies, they turn out to be in a stable state, that of Nash equilibrium. On the contrary, the gamers in Neumann's approach neglect the others' strategies therefore addressing one and the same purpose. Thus, the collective gain of all gamers in Nash's approach is much bigger, but the individual gain of the single winner is bigger in Neumann's approach. Furthermore, the Nash gamers should be gifted with the ability to know or forecast the strategies of all the rest. If the gamers are human beings as in economic models, this is natural and selfobvious. However, if they are not, the Neumann approach seems to be more relevant. Nevertheless, all thermodynamic approaches, including quantum mechanics considered as a special kind of generalized thermodynamic theory, admit the option of Nash equilibrium though the agents have not consciousness and might not "know" or "mean" the strategies of the others. The condition sine qua non in statistic thermodynamics is their duality of agents and a whole, the system of all agents, which should be in equilibrium as far as the system exists. One may conclude that Nash equilibrium is relevant to describe any ensemble if it is presupposed as a system. On the contrary, if it is a random collection existing as a whole occasionally destroyable or re-configurable at any time, the Neumann approach seems to be the relevant one. EQUILIBRIUM IN NASH'S MIND 3 The paper is organized as follows: Section II considers the link between the Nash equilibrium and schizophrenia in comparison with Neumann's approach to equilibrium. Section III discusses the connection between the concepts of information and Nash equilibrium addressing the schizophrenia models. The last section summarizes the research. II THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA Donald Capps (2009: 145) suggested the hypothesis that "the Nash equilibrium is descriptive of the normal brain, whereas the game theory formulated by John van Neumann, which Nash's theory challenges, is descriptive of the schizophrenic brain". The paper offers arguments in its favor. They are from psychiatry, game theory, set theory, philosophy and theology. Indeed, the brain, mind and consciousness are natural to be considered as systems even as a system. Thus, equilibrium seems to be presupposed necessarily and the Nash equilibrium as well. One does not need their separated functions or parts to be considered as conscious gamers able to mean the others' strategies or cooperating with each other. Only the wholeness of both brain and mind seems to be enough to be postulated as usual. Any violation of that wholeness would be a form of mental disorder, and the Neumann approach would be more relevant if that is the case. Schizophrenia is featured by a series of instabilities and trends to disintegration in: – "Common sense" (McEvoy et al., 1996; Stanghellini, 2000; Blankenburg & Mishara, 2001; Stanghellini & Ballerini, 2007; Revsbech, Sass & Parnas, 2012) – Imagination and perception (Sheiner, 1968; Frith, 1987; Simons et al., 2006; Brébion et al., 2008; Gawęda, Moritz & Kokoszka, 2012; Giacobbe, Stukas & Farhall, 2013) – The self (Hemsley, 1998; Stanghellini & Ballerini 2007). – The perception of the others (Sheiner, 1968; Stanghellini & Ballerini, 2007; Benedetti, 2009; Giacobbe, Stukas & Farhall, 2013) – Time perception (Lyon, Lyon & Magnusson, 1994; Bonnot et al., 2011; Parsons et al., 2013; Peterburs, 2013; Gómez, 2014) – Choice and rationality (Cromwell et al., 1961; Frith, 1987; Haggard et al., 2004; Revsbech, Sass & Parnas, 2012) – Understanding metaphors (Kircher et al., 2007; Mo, 2008; Elvevag, 2011) The enumeration can be continued, but all those cases can be described as the severe competition of mental functions with a single winner and the suppression of the defeating functions too important for integrity and psychic health. The Japanese psychiatrists even renamed schizophrenia (Sato, 2006; Sartorius et al., 2014) to "Togo Shitcho Sho" ("Integration dysregulation disorder"). EQUILIBRIUM IN NASH'S MIND 4 III INFORMATION MODELS OF SCHIZOPHRENIA AND THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM Choice, mental time, and information processing (Usher & McClelland, 2001; Wittmann & Paulus, 2008; Takahashi, 2009) are unified in Hick's law (Hick, 1952; Hyman, 1953; Beh, Roberts & Prichard-Levy, 1994) Fitt's law (Fitts, 1954; Fitts & Peterson, 1964) and their generalizations (Krinchik, 1969; Beggs et al., 1972; Kirkby, 1974; Gignac & Vernon, 2004; Seow, 2005). The model of brain based on computer has been suggested yet by John von Neumann (1958). There exist even computer models of schizophrenic patients (Hoffman et al., 2011). Turing machines (i.e. usual computers), which number is bigger than modeled mental, functions can represent a normal brain in the Nash equilibrium vs only a single one, or which number is less than the number of modeled mental functions, in Neumann's approach. The difference between Nash's approach and Neumann's might be visualized even on a single bit, which is the elementary unit of information, after one adds the concept or even quantity about the relation or "game" between the two alternatives of a bit. Then each of the two alternatives "searches" for that strategy, which would increase the probability to be chosen. Then the result would hesitate arbitrarily about the equal probability (i.e. 50% for each alternative) in Neumann's approach. One can say that both alternatives share a single dimension. On the contrary, the result would be just the equal probability (i.e. the standard definition of a bit) in Nash's approach, and as if the two alternatives are separated in dimensions therefore implying their unity as the whole of a bit. In fact, the concept of information interpreted as the measure of wholeness or completeness corresponds to the latter. The former does not need an absolutely different of wholeness: that of a non-cooperative and thus competitive game, in which both alternatives ("players") are involved one-time or randomly and the same refers to their "wholeness" existing only during the time of the game. On the contrary, the healthy brain, mind, and consciousness should have stable wholeness, and the Nash model would be more relevant. The relevance of the other model, that of Neumann would witness to disintegration as schizophrenia would be defined in general. IV CONCLUSIONS The Nash equilibrium corresponds to wholeness, stable emergent properties as well as to representing actual infinity on a material, limited and finite organ as a human brain. Though the concept was introduced by Nash in relation to game theory therefore presupposing the players as human beings able to choose consciously their strategies in competition, it can be easily generalized to any theory allowing for thermodynamic approach. The main requirement is for the investigated ensemble to be consider as a system rather than as occasional collection existing EQUILIBRIUM IN NASH'S MIND 5 only for the game and thus constituted ad hock. The brain, mind, and consciousness satisfy obviously that condition and consequently the application of the 'Nash equilibrium' to both "normal" and schizophrenic brain. Furthermore, the trends to disintegration of the latter might be represented as decreasing relevance as to Nash's approach to equilibrium on behalf that of Neumann. Thus the thesis of Donald Capps that the Nash equilibrium describes the "normal" brain while that of Neumann, the schizophrenic brain can be supported by a series of arguments. The concept of information even the level of its unit, a single bit, unifies both approaches. A bit "in tension" might be introduced to demonstrated a dynamic and unstable equilibrium corresponding to Neumann's approach. Then the standard definition of a bit supposing a gap and thus stability between the two alternatives refers to that of Nash. EQUILIBRIUM IN NASH'S MIND 6 REFERENCES: Beggs, W. D. A. et al. (1972). Can Hick's law and Fitts' law be combined? Acta Psychologica, 36(5), 348-357. doi: 10.1016/0001-6918(72)90031-5. Beh, H. C., Roberts, R. D. & Prichard-Levy, A. (1994). The relationship between intelligence and choice reaction time within the framework of an extended model of Hick's law: A preliminary report. Personality and Individual Differences, 16(6), 891-897. doi: 10.1016/0191-8869(94)90233-X. Benedetti, F. (2009). Functional and structural brain correlates of theory of mind and empathy deficits in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research, 114(1-3), 154-160. doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2009.06.021. Blankenburg, W. & Mishara, A. L. (2001). First Steps Toward a Psychopathology of "Common Sense". Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, 8(4), 303-315. doi: 10.1353/ppp.2002.0014 Bonnot, O. et al. (2011). Are impairments of time perception in schizophrenia a neglected phenomenon? Journal of Physiology-Paris, 105(4-6), 164-169. doi: 10.1016/j.jphysparis.2011.07.006. Brébion, G. et al. (2008). Visual Hallucinations in Schizophrenia: Confusion Between Imagination and Perception, Neuropsychology, 22(3), 383–389. doi: 10.1037/08944105.22.3.383. Capps, D. (2011). John Nash, Game Theory, and the Schizophrenic Brain. Journal of Religion and Health, 50(1), 145-162. doi: 10.1007/s10943-009-9291-5. Crawford, V. P. (2002). John Nash and the analysis of strategic behavior. Economics Letters, 75(3), 377-382. doi: 10.1016/S0165-1765(01)00624-3. Cromwell, R. L. et al. (1961). Reaction time, locus of control, choice behavior, and descriptions of parental behavior in schizophrenic and normal subjects. Journal of Personality, 29(4), 363-379. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1961.tb01668.x. Elvevag, B. et al. (2011). Metaphor interpretation and use: a window into semantics in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia research, 133(1-3), 205-211. doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2011.07.009. Fitts, P. M. (1954). The information capacity of the human motor system in controlling the amplitude of movement. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 47(6), 381-391. doi: 1.10.1037/h0055392. Fitts, P. M. & Peterson, J. R. (1964). Information capacity of discrete motor responses. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 67(2), 103-112. doi: 10.1037/h0045689. Frith, C. D. (1987). The positive and negative symptoms of schizophrenia reflect impairments in EQUILIBRIUM IN NASH'S MIND 7 the perception and initiation of action. Psychological Medicine, 17(3), 631-648. doi: 10.1017/S0033291700025873. Gawęda, Ł., Moritz, S. & Kokoszka, A. (2012). Impaired discrimination between imagined and performed actions in schizophrenia. Psychiatry Research, 195(1-2), 1-8. doi: 10.1016/j.psychres.2011.07.035. Giacobbe, M. R., Stukas, A. A. & Farhall, J. (2013). The Effects of Imagined Versus Actual Contact With a Person With a Diagnosis of Schizophrenia. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 35(3): 265-271. doi: 10.1080/01973533.2013.785403. Gignac, G. E. & Vernon, P. A. (2004). Reaction time and the dominant and non-dominant hands: an extension of Hick's Law. Personality and Individual Differences, 36(3), 733-739. doi: 10.1016/S0191-8869(03)00133-8. Gómez, J. et al. (2014). Time perception networks and cognition in schizophrenia: A review and a proposal. Psychiatry Research, 220(3), 737-744. doi: 10.1016/j.psychres.2014.07.048. Haggard, P. et al. (2004). Anomalous control: when 'free-will' is not conscious. Consciousness and cognition, 13(3), 646-654. doi 10.1016/j.concog.2004.06.001. Hemsley, D. R. (1998). The disruption of the 'sense of self' in schizophrenia: potential links with disturbances of information processing. The British journal of medical psychology, 71(2), 115-124. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8341.1998.tb01373.x. Hick, W. E. (1952). On the rate of gain of information. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 4(1), 11-26. doi: 10.1037/h0045304. Hoffman, R. E. et al. (2011). Using Computational Patients to Evaluate Illness Mechanisms in Schizophrenia. Biological Psychiatry, 69(10), 997-1005. doi: 10.1016/j.biopsych.2010.12.036. Hyman, R. (1953). Stimulus information as a determinant of reaction time. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 45(3), 188-196. doi: 10.1037/h0056940. Israel, G. & Gasca, A. M. (2009) The world as a mathematical game: John von Neumann and twentieth century science. Basel : Birkhauser. Kircher, T. T. J. et al. (2007). Neural correlates of metaphor processing in schizophrenia. NeuroImage, 34(1): 281-289. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.08.044. Kirkby, C. (1974). Hick's law revisited. Acta Psychologica, 38(4), 277-282. doi:10.1016/00016918(74)90012-2 Krinchik, E. P. (1969). The probability of a signal as a determinant of reaction time. Acta Psychologica, 30(1), 27-36. doi:10.1590/S0100-879X2003000700011. Lyon, M., Lyon, N. & Magnusson, M. S. (1994). The importance of temporal structure in analyzing schizophrenic behavior: some theoretical and diagnostic implications. Schizophrenia research, 13(1), 45-56. doi:10.1016/0920-9964(94)90059-0. EQUILIBRIUM IN NASH'S MIND 8 McEvoy, J. P. et al. (1996). Common sense, insight, and neuropsychological test performance in schizophrenia patients. Schizophrenia bulletin, 22(4), 635-641. doi: 10.10170S1355617707070154. Marsili, M. & Zhang, Y. (1997). Fluctuations around Nash equilibria in game. Physica A: Statistical and Theoretical Physics, 245 (1-2), 181-188. doi: 10.1016/S0378-4371(97)00289-6. Mccain, K. W. & Mccain, R. A. (2010). Influence & incorporation: John Forbes Nash and the "Nash Equilibrium". Proceedings of the American Society for Information Science and Technology, 47(1), 1-2. doi: 10.1002/meet.14504701311. Milnor, J. (1995). A nobel prize for John Nash. The Mathematical Intelligencer, 17(3), 11-17. doi: 10.1007/BF03024364. Moh, S. et al. (2008). Comprehension of metaphor and irony in schizophrenia during remission: The role of theory of mind and IQ. Psychiatry Research, 157(1), 21-29. doi: 10.1016/j.psychres.2006.04.002. Nash, J. F. (1950). Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 36(1), 48-49. doi: 10.1073/pnas.36.1.48. Nash, J. F. (1950a). The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 18(2): 155-162. doi: 10.2307/1907266. Nash, J. (1951) "Non-Cooperative Games," Annals of Mathematics, second Series, 54(2): 286295. doi: 10.2307/1969529. Nash, J. F. et al. (1996). The work of John Nash in game theory. Journal of Economic Theory, 69(1), 153-185. doi: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0042. Neumann, J. & Morgenstern, O. (1953) Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton: University Press. Neumann, J. (1958) The computer and the brain. New Haven: Yale University Press. Park, S. (2011). A history of the Nash equilibrium theorem in the fixed point theory. 数理解析研 究所講究録 / 京都大学数理解析研究所 [編], 1755(8): 76-89. doi: 10.1165/2010/234706. Parsons, B. D. et al. (2013). Lengthened temporal integration in schizophrenia. Neuropsychologia, 51(2): 372-376. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.11.008. Peterburs, J. et al. (2013). Impaired Representation of Time in Schizophrenia Is Linked to Positive Symptoms and Cognitive Demand. PLoS ONE, 8(6): e67615. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0067615. Revsbech, R., Sass, L. A. & Parnas, J. S. (2012). Rationality and schizophrenia testing EQUILIBRIUM IN NASH'S MIND 9 schizophrenic rationality in the light of "loss of common sense". European psychiatry 27(Suppl. 1): 1. doi: doi:10.1016/S0924-9338(12)75462-7. Sartorius, N. et al. (2014). Name Change for Schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 40(2), 255258. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbt231. Sato, M. (2006). Renaming schizophrenia: a Japanese perspective. World psychiatry: official journal of the World Psychiatric Association (WPA), 5(1), 53-5. Seow, S. (2005). Information Theoretic Models of HCI: A Comparison of the Hick-Hyman Law and Fitts' Law. Human-Computer Interaction, 20(3), 315-352. doi: 10.1207/s15327051hci2003_3. Sheiner, S. (1968) Intensity of casual relationships in schizophrenia: Living in imagination. The American Journal of Psychoanalysis, 28(1-2): 156-161. doi: 10.1007/BF01873634. Simons, J. S. et al. (2006). Discriminating imagined from perceived information engages brain areas implicated in schizophrenia. NeuroImage, 32(2), 696-703. doi: 10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.04.209. Stanghellini, G. (2000). At issue: Vulnerability to schizophrenia and lack of common sense. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 26(4): 775-87. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511759031.006. Stanghellini, G. & Ballerini, M. (2007). Values in Persons with Schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 33(1), 131–141. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbl036. Takahashi, T. (2009) Theoretical Frameworks for Neuroeconomics of Intertemporal Choice. Journal of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Economics, 2(2), 75-90. doi: 10.2139/ssrn.1879746. Usher, M. & McClelland, J. L. (2001). The Time Course of Perceptual Choice: The Leaky, Competing Accumulator Model. Psychological Review, 108(3), 550-592. doi: 10.1037//0033-295X.108.3.550. Wittmann, M. & Paulus, M. P. (2008). Decision making, impulsivity and time perception. Trends in cognitive sciences, 12(1), 7-12. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2007.10.004.

Прегледни рад УДК: 341.231.14:342.726-057.36 DOI: 10.7251/BPG1701069P HUMAN TRAFFICKING: A THREAT TO STATE SECURITY AND HUMAN SECURITY Duško Peulić, M.A.1 Abstract: The study observes the core of both trafficking in persons and security offering a preliminary understanding the interconnection between the two concepts which is indeed a precondition of the more thorough contemplation of this security problem. Noteworthy is also the further elaboration of the risk that link between violence and modern-day slavery represents having in mind society and the individual. This informal economy violates the principle of morality and is understood to be one of the most offensive crimes. Its elementary features are psychological and/ or physical torture, coercing into engaging in the violation of the law and established social norms as well as transporting and harboring. The consequence of all of this is the material gain, whereas the victim appears as Machiavellian means the gain will justify. Trafficking emerges in different forms, the most discernible of which are forced labor and sexual exploitation that is among the hardest forms of desecrating human soul. Unfortunately, it is a common phenomenon that many people (some independent estimates mention a figure of several million) around the world, women and children, in particular, every year become victims of this violence. Tough living conditions, as well as uncertain economic future, are among fundamental causes infecting healthy society. If a well-organised criminal network or a 'hidden economy' succeeds to impose the rule of conduct, then human trafficking finds fertile soil in which to grow. Having been lured the victims later realize where they are, but many never return to their families, and that terrible fate should make society do what can be done and help them. Key words: Human, state, trafficking, security, smuggling. 1 Email: [email protected] 70 71 Peulić D. (2017). Human trafficking: a threat to state security and human security, Bezbjednost, policija, građani, 13(1), 69–79. INTRODUCTORY NOTE Defining human trafficking, Hart points to what determines the notion as the contemporary slavery as many are deprived of freedom and forced to toil (Hart, 2009: 4). That is the crucial difference between these victims and human smuggling, which refers to people who, attempting to reach better economic opportunities, voluntarily pay others for their services. The importance of the issue calls for a wider explanation of the very concept of security and how, in this context, it relates to the individual and the state. After September 11, 2001, political debates drew more attention to the vulnerability of protection of people as one of the global problems burdening scene of international affairs more than ever before. Fischer and Green suggest that security incorporates foreseeable well-balanced conditions that enable pursuing interests or goals without factors adversely impacting the pursuit (Fischer and Green, 2004: 21). However, attempts to determine the more precise meaning of the term are rare, even though during the time of the Iron Curtain security, in a somewhat narrower sense, became a dominant issue in political circles both in the East and West. After the attack on the Unites States at the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, both human and the state security emerge as crucial issues on the international political scene. On the other hand, one may ask whether, in circumstances without this and similar threats, people would feel any more secure? Threats of the real world emerge in a variety of forms, including climate change, a proliferation of means of destruction as well as illegal migration or trafficking of persons for instance. HUMAN SECURITY AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING According to the conventional legal theory, the fundamental character of security refers primarily to the perception of and apprehending the vulnerability of an individual. Arguments supporting such an interpretation also challenge the attitude that the very nature of the term implies first security of the state and then personal freedom. The latter definition of how internationally recognized standards understand national security seems to be somewhat narrow; namely, comprehending national security should include both international and internal factors influencing the concept. Potential ambiguity is that the difference between personal and human safety is not always precisely determined. For instance, international organizations' documents and constitutions of states identify individual security as the protection of the body and of emotional or behavioral features that are personal in nature. 70 71 Peulić D. (2017). Human trafficking: a threat to state security and human security, Bezbjednost, policija, građani, 13(1), 69–79. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights points unambiguously to this type.2 Contrary to these general points, the notion [of human security] is a more comprehensive concept transcending the traditional explanation of personal safety. It relates to protection from the constant threat of starvation, a wide variety of infectious diseases, tyranny, or anything that adversely affects existence. Human freedom is the personification of protection against the material, health, and social difficulties and it embraces political safeness too. In other words, it intrinsically defends dignity and right of collectivity. A closer look at the meaning of human security in the light of human trafficking would not be possible without an explanation of who the victims are, elucidation of guilt and who should be accountable to enforce the law. It is an issue which frequently appears in the contemporary political discourses on illegal migration and trafficking, particularly of women and children endangering their rights and even lives. Striking and horrible is the story about nine-year-old Prjua and her seven-year-old brother Ajay who lived in a Mumbai suburb in India with alcoholic parents. The only amusement these children could find was at the nearby Asha Deep Day Centre where they could play with other kids. Prjua and Ajay were happy, but after a while, these children stopped going to the center and have never come back; their father sold both of his children for only thirty dollars and lost them forever.3 Poverty and poor living conditions often form distinctive features of societies in transition. Exhausted socio-economic resources in these circumstances create unhealthy community relations in which human trafficking mercilessly deprives people of inherent values and rights. The ruthless methods of criminal activity bring about horrible consequences that feature lives of modern-day slaves and represent the gist of the threat. Having in mind sexual exploitation and a variety of related diseases trafficking is only one of many features of multifaceted instability. Wylie suggests that:'... the root causes of the trafficking of women and children lie in insecure lives. People vulnerable to being trafficked are people whose lives have been made insecure by harsh economic conditions and state breakdown. The experience of being trafficked from start to finish involves a violation of personal security, from the initial deceptive relationship to the physical violence used to enforce compliance with exploitation. These insecurities are only compounded in the country of destination where the trafficked persons, aware of their illegal status and liability to deportation, fear both their traffickers and the state authorities...'(Wylie, 2006: 14). Human exploitation in this form brings about a threat to the material, social, and statutory security and endangers political 2 United nations, The Universal declaration of Human Rights, Available at: http://www. un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ Article 3: 'Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.' 3 Trafficking Stories, Stop the Traffick, Available at: http://www.stopthetraffik.org/ downloads/trafficking_stories.pdf, p. 2 72 73 Peulić D. (2017). Human trafficking: a threat to state security and human security, Bezbjednost, policija, građani, 13(1), 69–79. freedom as well as freedom of the community as a whole. That is why these factors which produce fear in victims of human trafficking deserve somewhat wider elaboration: – An explanation of the material nature of insecurity points at first to the lack of means of providing material needs, low economic productivity and different forms of segregation. Economic instability could also encompass joblessness, as unemployment is indeed an influential factor in depriving humans of life privileges, of health care or welfare. – Conditions in which women, for instance, have no opportunities others in the community enjoy persuasively illustrate social imbalance. Gender discrimination appears in employment, legal protection and education but extreme social uncertainty is a part of different sorts of cruelty such as sexual violence or domestic brutality. – Cultural instability and societal vulnerability permeate one another through distortions of societal behavior. In some communities, common practices (in many other societies unacceptable) are pre-arranged marriages violating commonly accepted norms defining who can marry whom and when. Frequently, rigid criteria making it almost impossible for young women and even children forced into prostitution to return to normal life. Standards of reintegration in those societies do not acknowledge the right of a desecrated soul to become a part of the family again and that in turn only makes the circumstances worse. Hardly measurable is the pressure trafficked women, or what some would call slaves of sexual industry, live with. – One of the important points (perhaps the most important) is indeed political instability creating to some extent favorable conditions for human trafficking. Some formerly communist countries in Eastern Europe during the very often turbulent transition to democracy and controversial identity reformulation were suitable settings for the contemporary slave trade. – Moreover, emotional trauma, physical or sexual violence causes, shatters the sense of security in helpless trafficking victims. Alongside the absence of appropriate legal aid, access to law enforcement agencies or the fear of repatriation, what peculiarly affects trafficked persons is that the law in some countries does not accept testimonies of these people as reliable, but applies the so-called corroborative evidence rule.4 Goodey, emphasizing the latter type of insecurity, writes that the settings complexity gradually increased, and points out reasons for this. He suggests that frequently people suffering from modern-day slavery are unfamiliar with how to reveal a violation of their rights, exploitation or simply for different reasons they cannot report the abuse. One of the causes can be fear of 4 'Corroborate-to support or strengthen (a statement, opinion, idea, etc.) by fresh information or proof: Someone who saw the accident corroborated the driver's statement.' See: Longman Dictionary of English Language and Culture (1992)1st ed., Longman Group UK Limited, Harlow-Essex, pp. 286 72 73 Peulić D. (2017). Human trafficking: a threat to state security and human security, Bezbjednost, policija, građani, 13(1), 69–79. retaliation or fear of encountering traffickers who might be covertly operating within the law enforcement agencies or judicial system. Goodey further writes that these factors explain why policy may not be a match for confronting human trafficking (Goodey, 2008: 425). Women as sexual commodities are today seen in the hidden economy as an efficient means of generating profit. Many disagree on the definition of the human, but many do agree that the sexual attraction of a female figure being used in underground trade and abuse of a woman's body insult female dignity. It certainly should account for societal caution and interest, having in mind human security. Another cause for alarm is that the sex industry permanently develops new modes of functioning thanks primarily to technological advancement. The Internet in globalization has evolved into an efficient mechanism different 'employment agencies' use to lure victims. A variety of sites offer dating, escort services, pornography and sex tourism and organized crime groups aggressively appear in conflict situations, seeing them as ideal sources of the human commodity. It brings about a mounting pressure on the values on which society rests and strengthens the feeling of being exposed to physical and emotional suffering. Illustrative is violence understood but not straightly expressed as well as one with nothing implied which involves torment and forced sexual intercourse that traffickers use as a mechanism of compliance (Kaye, 2003: 6). TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS AND STATE SECURITY Kaye writes that violence in the form of torture and rape is violence against the fundaments of family existence; however, it is a much wider notion that, in particular setting and different forms, affects one of national core interests-security. What happens today is partial identifying the concept with realist theory, which defines things as they really are. Its advocates understand realism as fundamentally opposite to the idealist conception that ethical principles are either incorporated into international relations or that foreign policy solutions depend on multipartite factors diminishing the state's independence. In the main, the interests of all the state subjects are what policymakers define as lasting, necessary and shared objectives within the sovereign state structure. The primary interest of collectivity is the very existence of the fundamental political entity, sources of material development and human values. Policy makers are highly critical and cautious about these elements of collective security. On the other hand, international relations theory defines security as a disseminating praxis whose primary determination provides a safe setting for who or what the praxis protects which is usually political community (Stem, 74 75 Peulić D. (2017). Human trafficking: a threat to state security and human security, Bezbjednost, policija, građani, 13(1), 69–79. 2005: 24). The somewhat broader definition does not say what 'secure' in this context means or what side uncertainty might come from. Nonetheless, in most cases, state security is conceived of as an attribute applied either to the source of disorder in the internal affairs of a sovereign country or determinants beyond its boundaries. Again, security perceived in this way as well as its implicit relationship to the interior structure of common objectives of the state have distinct characteristics of the theory arguing that the truth does not depend on how an individual or group explain it. In other words, realism points out how things happen irrespective of subjective observations. Contemporary realist theory preserves the gist of its original reasoning that sovereignty of the state is a guarantor of national independence and the ethics of societal unity; on the other hand, anarchists do not recognize the approach and argue that moral and political community organization are possible only in stateless societies. Conceptions appearing in philosophical debates are that the state, disorder, coercion and security are all features of international relations. In these conditions, the core unit of international relations struggles to survive, and McSweeney points to conceptions of general collective safety and mutual dependence between fundamental units in international affairs at the regional level of security. He suggests that this ideological thinking at the turn of the 20th/21st centuries questioned the traditionally understood nationstate, the moral requirement, and potential to protect its existence. The late 1980s and fall of the Iron Curtain unequivocally showed the ground of the entity is not that stable, considering both the internal and external factors undermining its authority. McSweeney further points to some of these factors and stresses that mainly military, economic and cultural factors collide in different ways with both the state and the society; times change, but the very nature of what is likely to destabilize security does not (McSweeney, 1999: 4). Factors diminishing the role, the state wants to have, range from the illegal trade of arms, biological and even nuclear materials to drug and human trafficking. Financially supported by a global web of criminal organizations the latter does represent a grave threat to the foundations of the state. Given that these criminal networks are always behind widespread illegal commerce in weapons or drugs, and given that trafficking in persons presents a danger to the elementary principles of order and law, the state becomes indeed vulnerable in these conditions. Shelley writes that the victims of trafficking and illegal migration undermine the home security of the state as well as traffickers who along with them [victims] move different bacteria, parasites or viruses that incapacitate the unfortunate (Shelley, 2010: 66). In such psychological tension modern slavery undermines both individual and collective identity as well as social cohesion in the broadest sense of the term. Over the last ten years, humans have appeared as a very lucrative commodity and this illegal trade has spread worldwide. Most disturbing is that the percentage of toddlers as victims increases every year. It is very hard to find a country that does not 74 75 Peulić D. (2017). Human trafficking: a threat to state security and human security, Bezbjednost, policija, građani, 13(1), 69–79. confront this problem, bearing in mind that the underground economy buys and sells more than half a million of modern-day slaves annually. Talking about proportions of the growing criminal industry and the threat it represents former US President George W. Bush warned that absence of societal action translates as a moral deficiency. Pointed to in his speech were the efforts the U.S. Federal Government make to help other countries fight human trafficking. For that purpose almost $300 million had been provided for different programs around the world. He further said that his administration helped countries oppose exploitation, train and equip police units, and free the victims helping them so return to the society through different programs.5 The severity of the issue shown in this speech, be it sexual exploitation or forced labor, indicates that the threat reached the level at which every societal negligence becomes impermissible. The very nature of the crime expects governments to coordinate policies against the financial functioning of criminal networks and how trafficking gangs organize operations. It certainly involves appropriate changes in legislation which would enable law enforcement to develop more efficient strategies, data sharing, intelligence services assistance and the release of information that would help seize gangs' profit. Viewed in this light, the efforts of the international community to reach adequate measures have played a significant role. In 1997 the ministerial conference under the EU presidency adopted the Hague Declaration, which concentrated on several critical points, some of which are assisting law enforcement to combat trafficking, nuclear and chemical materials or delegating authority to the European Drugs Unit to address trafficking in human beings, as well as combat drug cartels. Struggling against an underground economy is not easy. Bringing about chaos is a favorable climate for traffickers to work in as it creates both fear in victims and societal insecurity appearing as a means of pressure. The criminal justice system has not found its closer interpretation yet but deems it a symbol of cruelty and inhumanity used to realize doctrinal, religious, or militant goals. There have been attempts to define the modus operandi of the pressure as a proper counteraction to injustice or tyranny, spiritual value or unforgivable sin. On the other hand, it [the pressure] has turned into an efficient instrument against a vulnerable opponent. Trafficking in persons frequently finds fertile soil in state instability to reinforce its functioning, both structurally and financially. However, it undermines the functioning of the political entity, which perceives the threat as what endangers its existence and rightly attempts to develop the ability to oppose the risk; it is not the only prospect as trafficking in human beings is indeed understood to have different features of crime. The question which imposes itself is what these sources of danger to the security of the state have in common? In the paper on the 5 'G. W. Bush Announces Initiatives To Combat Human Trafficking', You Tube, (08:48-09:09/23:48), Available from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gi9mCTxkDh8 76 77 Peulić D. (2017). Human trafficking: a threat to state security and human security, Bezbjednost, policija, građani, 13(1), 69–79. link between national security and human trafficking in the U.S. Glaser and Rizer write: 'It could be argued that on some level most, if not all, crimes have a negative effect on a peoples' way of life. However, there are a few crimes that are so corrosive to a society that they start to bring down the collective rather than just individuals. Indeed, the crime of murder could hardly be seen as a national security crime, yet genocide the systematic killing of whole groups of people certainly would be. The same is true with a single case of involuntary servitude or forced prostitution. Standing alone, these crimes do not constitute a breakdown of national security, but taken as a whole, in the context of human trafficking, these crimes indeed represent a breach of national security' (Glaser and Rizer, 2011: 75,76). It just confirms inherent similarities between social instability and different criminal networks do exist in circumstances in which the former, largely, depends on the latter procuring material means and protecting trafficking operations. Noteworthy is the overall structure of the underground economy as a factor reinforcing, in a variety of ways, stability of trade in humans. That is really what crucially undermines the very foundations of international order. The interconnection between violence and the illegal flow of human trafficking at least partially makes up approaches focusing on nature (be it politically conflicting or societal transformation-oriented) of human groupings. Other approaches point out the importance of clarifying the pattern of the conflict, whereas the third factor appears in the study of crime. Preconditions for a close association between the political and the unlawful are global movements drawing ideas from nationalist schools of thought, racial or cultural values or spiritual tenets. They [movements] broadly emerge in the context in which collusion between trafficking and criminal networks could potentially come into being due to similar moral standards. The United Nations identify this as a very discernible and malignant tissue in which objectives of the [illegal] organization as a whole ranging from trafficking in narcotics, different materials to human trafficking for instance influence its conduct. The concept of the unholy alliance in the scholarly literature on international relations is what offers an insight into how global human trafficking and trans-state crime set and share objectives. INSTEAD OF THE CONCLUSION Trafficking in persons or modern-day slavery exists as a threat to the security of an individual, that of political entities as well as regional and international security. However, noteworthy is to mention that possible amelioration of the problem largely intertwines with how state policy treats the issue. Illegal networks of criminals force victims in this lucrative industry, into providing sexual services for payment, begging or forced labor. On the 76 77 Peulić D. (2017). Human trafficking: a threat to state security and human security, Bezbjednost, policija, građani, 13(1), 69–79. one hand, traffickers reap financial benefits from the parallel economy while defying the state's authority and influence on the other. These are threats that, in different forms, endanger overall stability. Influence of the power of nonstate organizations who maintain the underground trade does not weaken through opposing them as if these factors are external threats. Concepts focusing on only defense of the national need to undergo at least partial change and include individual security. As Patrick Hayden writes ignoring the safety of a person is not acceptable, and both philosophical theory and praxis should point out the importance of the concept as even the unparalleled strategies often materialize themselves through more suffering of those they protect (Hayden, 2005: 67). The issue does not solely concern agencies enforcing the law as the overall solution indeed requires analysis of the complex setting of human security apart from the state's freedom from danger. Parallel economies rob both an individual and the society of ethics and its foundational principles and modern-day slavery, in particular, denies core values that are essentially necessary for human security and that of the state. Neither of them in the current turbulent circumstances are secure; rooting out evil is pretty complex in nature, but there is no alternative. BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Fischer, J. R. and Green, G. (2004). 'Origins and Development of Security', Introduction to Security, Burlington-Massachusetts, Elsevier. 2. 'G. W. Bush Announces Initiatives To Combat Human Trafficking', You Tube, (08:48-09:09/23:48), Available from: http://www.youtube. com/watch?v=Gi9mCTxkDh8 3. Glaser, R. S. and Rizer, A. (2011). 'Breach: The National Security Implications of Human Trafficking,' Widener Law Review, Vol. 17, Issue 1 4. Goodey, J. (2008). 'Human Trafficking: Sketchy Data and Policy Responses', Criminology and Criminal Justice, Vol. 8, No. 4 5. Hayden, P. (2005). 'War, Peace and the Transformation of Security,' Cosmopolitan Global Politics, Aldershot and Burlington, Ashgate Publishing Limited. 6. Hart, J. (2009). 'What is Human Trafficking?', Human Trafficking, New York, The Rosen Publishing Group. 7. Kaye, M. (2003). 'Tackling Trafficking in Countries of Destination', The Migration-Trafficking Nexus: Combating Trafficking Through the Protection of Migrants' Human Rights, London, A n t i S l a v e r y ternational. 8. Longman Dictionary of English Language and Culture (1992).1st ed., Harlow-Essex, Longman Group UK Limited. 9. McSweeney, B. (1999). 'Introduction', Security, Identity and Interests: A 78 79 Peulić D. (2017). Human trafficking: a threat to state security and human security, Bezbjednost, policija, građani, 13(1), 69–79. Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 10. Shelley, L. (2010). 'The Diverse Consequences of Human Trafficking', Human Trafficking: A Global Perspective, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 11. Stern, M. (2005). 'Theorizing Security and Identity', Naming Security – Constructing Identity: 'Mayan Women' in Guatemala on the Eve of 'Peace', Manchester, Manchester University Press 12. Trafficking Stories, Stop the Traffick, Available at: http://www.stopthetraffik.org/downloads/trafficking_stories.pdf 13. United Nations, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Available at: http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ 14. Wylie, G. (2006). 'Securing States or Securing People? Human Trafficking and Security Dilemmas', Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review, Vol. 95, No. 377 ТРГОВИНА ЉУДИМА: ПРИЈЕТЊА ПО БЕЗБЈЕДНОСТ ДРЖАВЕ И ЉУДИ Душко Пеулић, мр6 Апстракт: Студија посматра суштину трговине људима и безбједности и нуди уводно слово њихове међусобне повезаности што је заиста предуслов детаљнијег разматрања овог безбједносног проблема. Вриједнo помена је такође даљe рашчлањење ризика који представља однос између насиља и ропства модерног доба, имајући на уму друштво и појединца. Ta неформална економија врши насиље над начелом морала и чини једно од најагресивнијих кривичних дјела. Њене су основне карактеристике психолошко и/или физичко наношење бола, присиљавање на кршење закона и утврђених друштвених норми, транспорт и скривање. У коначници свега овога је материјална добит, док жртва постаје Макијавелијево средство које ће та добит оправдати. Ова трговина се појављује у различитим облицима, од којих су најупечатљивији присилни рад и сексуално израбљивање, што се убраја међу најтеже облике обешчашћивања људске душе. Нажалост, општа је појава да многи (неке независне процјене помињу бројку од неколико милиона) у свијету, нарочито дјеца и жене, сваке године постану жртве ове пошасти. Међу основним узроцима 6 Email: [email protected] 78 79 Peulić D. (2017). Human trafficking: a threat to state security and human security, Bezbjednost, policija, građani, 13(1), 69–79. заразе здравог друштва су свакако тешки животни услови и неизвјесна привредна будућност. Ако добро организована криминална мрежа или 'скривена економија' успије да наметне правило понашања, тиме трговина људима налази плодно тло на коме ће се развијати. Након намамљивања, жртве (касније) схватају свој положај, али се многе никад не врате породицама. Нужно је да та страшна судбина примора друштво да уради што се да урадити и помогне унесрећенима. Кључне ријечи: Људско, држава, трговина, безбједност, кријумчарење.

The Vicissitudes of Mathematical Reason in the 20th Century Paolo Mancosu, The Adventure of Reason. Interplay Between Philosophy of Mathematics and Mathematical Logic, 1900 – 1940, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010, Hardback, $81.52, 618 pages. The nature of reason is a central theme of philosophy since its inception, and has provoked controversies ever since. In The Adventure of Reason (henceforth Adventure) Mancosu deals with a part of reason that, for the majority of time, has managed to stay outside most of the troubles that affected general reason during the course of history. More precisely, Adventure deals with reason restricted to the realms of mathematics, logic, and the sciences. As Mancosu reveals in the preface, the book's title is borrowed from Oskar Becker (1889 – 1964), a now largely forgotten German phenomenological philosopher of science and mathematics. Becker, who had been a student of Husserl and Heidegger, took the concept of an „adventurous reason" from Goethe, who used it to distinguish his „intuitive science", in which 'intuition' played a pre-eminent role, from the Newtonian science favored by Kant and other philosophers of the enlightenment. For Becker „the adventure of reason" was more than just a „beautiful image" (as it seems to be for Mancosu). As this review will describe, 'intuition' in a vaguely Goethian sense played an important role in the evolution of reason in the early decades of the 20th century, among many philosophers and scientists belonging to the German Kulturkreis. In order to address the vicissitudes of mathematical reason in the first half of the 20th century Mancosu concentrates on the interplay between philosophy of mathematics and mathematical logic that shaped the contemporary conceptual landscape to which logic, mathematics, the sciences, and philosophy belong. Adventure has five parts: I. History of logic (with Richard Zach and Calixto Badesa) II. Foundation of Mathematics III. Phenomenology and the Exact Sciences (with Thomas Ryckman) IV. Quine and Tarski on Nominalism V. Tarski and the Vienna Circle on Truth and Logical Consequence 2 Adventure is a compilation of texts all of which have been published elsewhere in the last ten years or so. They greatly vary in style and character: some chapters offer authoritative surveys, others may be characterized as miscellanea dealing with details of the history of mathematics, while still others intend to contribute to contemporary philosophical debates concerning logic and epistemology. Nevertheless, Mancosu contends, „the essays are closely linked by the fact that the subject matter is homogeneous and were written with a single major aim, namely that of reaching a deeper understanding of the interaction between developments in mathematical logic and the foundations of mathematics and logic from 1900 -1940." The reader may decide for himself, whether he accepts this argument as convincing or not. Part I (Chapter 1) History of Logic, written jointly with Richard Zach and Calixto Badesa, offers a fairly standard account of the development of mathematical logic in the first third of the 20th century. Without too much historiographical baggage and philosophical interpretation the authors offer eight "itineraries" starting with a succinct discussion of the basic meta-axiomatic concepts such as consistency, completeness, categoricity and so on, as they were developed by members of the Italian school around the turn of the century. Then, a brief overview of Russell's mathematical logic is described, beginning with Principles of Mathematics and progressing to the Principia Mathematica. Next follows Zermelo's formalization of set theory and the beginnings of model theory in Löwenheim's Theory of Relatives. The subsequent sections are dedicated to the logic of the Hilbert school (Hilbert, Bernays, Ackermann, Gentzen, and others). As is well known Hilbert's program of the logical foundations of mathematics failed in the light of Gödel's incompleteness theorems. These are also addressed in Part I, albeit briefly. Another itinerary then concentrates on the topics of intuititionism and explores manyvalued logics beginning with Brouwer and ultimately progressing to Gödel's clarification of the relation between classical and intuititionist logic, asserting that all arithmetic propositions provable from the classical axioms can be translated into ones that are theorems of intuitionist logic. The chapter concludes with a presentation of some early results of Huntington, Post and others concerning what, in modern terms, may be called model theory, culminating in Tarski's theory of truth. Some readers may be disappointed that there is no 'American' itinerary that addresses the contributions of the American pragmatists Peirce and C.I. Lewis. Part II (Chapter 2 – Chapter 8) Foundations of Mathematics on the foundations of mathematics consists of seven short chapters that are predominately concerned with 3 history of mathematics. One group, Chapter 2 – Chapter 4, deals with the evolution of Hilbert's metamathematical programme in the decade between 1910 and 1920. This sections place particular focus on the growing influence of Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica in Göttingen. Mancosu points out that one of the reasons for this development was the work of the logician and philosopher Heinrich Behmann. In 1914 Behmann gave a lecture on the Principia, later he wrote a dissertation (under Hilbert) that made intense use of some of Russell and Whitehead's results. The second group of miscellanea contained within Part II, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, deals with questions concerning the constructivity of mathematical proofs. Chapter 5 addresses a conjecture of Felix Kaufmann according to which all proofs of classical mathematics, which do not use the axiom of choice, were already "constructive". Behmann claimed to have a proof, but eventually Gödel provided an elementary counter-example. Chapter 6 (written jointly with Mathieu Marion) discusses Wittgenstein's efforts to render constructive a (nonconstructive) proof of Euler of the existence of infinitely many primes. The collection of pieces of this part is completed by a short report that describes the reception of Gödel's incompleteness theorems immediately after their announcement at the conference in Königsberg in September 1930. It is concludes with review of the edition of the last two volumes IV and V of Gödel's Collected Works. PART III (Chapter 9 – Chapter 12) Phenomenology and the Exact Sciences, written partly in collaboration with Thomas Ryckman, could have been philosophically the most interesting piece of Adventure. For reasons to be explained in the following, it suffers from some shortcomings, however. In Part III the authors go beyond the boundaries of the standard Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy by treating Husserlian phenomenology as an important source for philosophy of science and mathematics in 20th century. For many contemporary analytic philosophers, phenomenology and the sciences belong to different intellectual worlds. This starkly contrasts with the assessment of the founding generation of the phenomenological movement. For instance, Husserl contended that transcendental phenomenology provided the only truly scientific foundation of mathematics and the exact sciences. The alleged affinity between phenomenology and the sciences was more than wishful thinking from the side of philosophers. A significant number of eminent logicians, mathematicians, and scientists, e.g. Gödel, Heyting, Weyl, and Fritz London (cf. Gavroglu 1995), took a version of phenomenology serious during at least at one point of their careers and many of them considered it as an important philosophical inspiration for their work. However, the 4 majority of analytic philosophers dismissed claims that phenomenology could be a scientific philosophy and many of them ignored phenomenology altogether. Hence Mancosu's and Ryckman's attempts to overcome this state of affairs will be warmly welcomed by many readers. As the main witness for the relevance of phenomenology for science and philosophy of science Hermann Weyl is called in. Chapter 9 is dedicated to a discussion of Weyl's contributions to the Hilbert and Brouwer debate on the foundations of mathematics that took place in the 1920s. Mancosu distinguishes four different phases. The first is characterized by Weyl's attempt of rendering precise the vague idea of a „definite property", which played an important role in Zermelo's axiomatization of set theory. The second phase concentrates on Weyl's position put forward in Das Kontinuum. There he directly attacked set theory and emphasized the essential difference between the setthoretically constructed real numbers and the intuitive continuum of inner temporal experiences. When, a few years later, he became acquainted with Brouwer's radically antiHilbertian intuitionism he moved closer to Brouwer's theories but eventually sought to find a constructivist middle position between Hilbert and Brouwer. The extant correspondence between Weyl and the German phenomenologist and philosopher of mathematics Oskar Becker was published with detailed commentaries and interpretations some years ago in (Mancosu and Ryckman 2002, 2005). In Adventure these articles are republished as Chapters 10 and 11 – regrettably without the letters themselves. Chapter 12 deals with the correspondence between Oskar Becker and his fellow-phenomenologist Dietrich Mahnke (1884 – 1939). Its thirteen letters have been published in Peckhaus (2005) but, regrettably, are not included in Adventure. A more serious shortcoming of this part of Adventure concerns the fact that the authors fail to adequately address the cultural and philosophical background of the protagonists largely in the dark. For instance, Becker's thesis that every culture had its own concepts of numbers is directly taken from Oswald Spengler's Decline of the West, Spengler being at that time one of the leading figures of „a politics of cultural despair" (Fritz Stern 1974) in Germany. Becker's claim that the applicability of mathematics is an „undeserved luck" is far from being a personal opinion but rather an expression of a wide-spread irrationalist Zeitgeist. Indeed, Becker is a telling example for the very strange vicissitudes of reason of the past century: In the 1920s we find him discussing subtle issues of philosophy of geometry and science with Reichenbach and Weyl, some years later he put forward a „paraexistential philosophy" as an 'improvement' of Heidegger's in that his 5 „paraexistentialism" provided a more adequate grounding for central concepts of National Socialism (cf. Sluga 1995, Hogrebe 2009). Mancosu and Ryckman don't deal with the influence of this Weimar culture. Worse still, they also present the phenomenological background of the protagonists only in a rudimentary way. This may render the reading of this part of Adventure difficult to those readers who are accostumed only to the analytical way of doing philosophy of science. For instance, it can hardly be assumed that, say, eidetic intuition (Wesenserschauung) is a household term among contemporary philosophers and logicians. Perhaps a remedy for this shortcoming, which would have fitted well the multiauthored character of some chapters of Adventure would have been a re-publication of Mahnke's succinct First Introduction to Phenomenology, especially that of Formal Mathematics (Mahnke 1923 (1977)). For a thorougher presentation of Weyl's phenomenological involvement the reader may wish to consult the recent book of Mancosu's co-author Ryckman (2005, Chapter 5 and 6). Within Part IV (Chapter 13 and Chapter 14) Quine and Tarski on Nominalism we return to the mainstream of analytic philosophy and history of logic and science. The two chapters contained within this part aim to elucidate some of the nominalist episodes in the philosophical careers of Quine, Tarski, and Carnap, which took place when they met at Princeton in the 1940s. The protagonists conceived nominalism as sort of an intellectual experiment designed to find out how far one could pursue the program of elimination of the „unthingly" without sacrificing science. This program was structured in two stages. The first consisted in identifying a nominalist system of mathematics; the second stage was to provide a reconstruction of science on that base. A few years later Quine (and Carnap) gave up their flirtation with nominalism, arriving at a more tolerant attitude with respect to ontological matters, as expressed in Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology (Carnap 1950). Mancosu points out the nominalism of Quine, Tarski, and Carnap was motivated mainly by their antipathy against an overly generous metaphysics inherited from the doctrines of the Vienna Circle and less by epistemological qualms related to Benacerraf's dilemma as is the case for contemporary nominalism. PART V (Chapter 15 – Chapter 18) Tarski and the Vienna Circle on Truth and Logical Consequence deals with two central notions of 20th century logic and philosophy of science, namely, truth and logical consequence. Its protagonist is Tarski. Tarski's semantic conception of truth made its first public appearance on the International Congress for Unity of Science 1935 in Paris. His proposals found a mixed reception among the members of the Vienna Circle. While Carnap whole-heartedly welcomed Tarskian semantics, others, 6 such as Neurath, suspected that the concept of truth would reintroduce „metaphysics" through the backdoor of formalization. The (unpublished) correspondence between Neurath and Carnap provides evidence that this was not a minor quarrel the dispute about semantics almost led to the collapse of their friendship. As Mancosu points out, albeit Tarski is rightly to be considered as the founding father of formal semantic it would be too simple to identify his concepts of truth and other basic semantic notion with those of modern semantics. Mancosu argues that Tarski's notion of logical consequence is at odds with the modern one, since it is characterized as a „fixed domain" conception of logical consequence. His argumentation is based on a step-by-step commentary on an hitherto unpublished lecture of Tarski's „On the Completeness and Categoricity of Deductive Systems" (1940) that is added as an appendix of Adventure. Let us take stock. Mancosu's Adventure offers a rich panorama of ideas, theories, and arguments that have constituted the complex fabric of mathematical reason as it was woven by many great minds in the last century. It touches upon a bewildering manifold of issues. Nevertheless, in my opinion, Adventure ignores or at least undervalues an important aspect of mathematical reason, namely the one that connects it more closely with the world. In other words, the discussions of the problem of the applicability of mathematical knowledge to the world in Adventure leave something to desire. Even logicians and philosophers of mathematics with strong logicist inclinations such as Frege and Carnap required that a fully satisfying logicist foundation of mathematics had to explain the applicability of mathematics. A formal deduction of the axioms of mathematics from the laws of logic did not suffice. As Frege put it: "It is applicability alone which raises arithmetic above the game to the status of a science. Thus, applicability is an essential part." (Frege 1903, p. 100). Similarly, Carnap insisted on an integral philosophy of mathematics that should explain its applicability (cf. Syntax, 327). Whether they really lived up to this imperative in their philosophies, is, of course, a matter of dispute. In any case, an account of mathematics that conceived the applicability of mathematics as an „undeserved luck" (Becker) would hardly satisfied them. Carnap's and Frege's logicist projects are not alone in their emphasis on the applicability of mathematics for modern mathematical reason. They share it with an other important 20th century current of philosophy of science, logic and mathematics that regrettably is not treated at all in Adventure, to wit, the Neokantianism of the Marburg school. For instance, early in 20th century Ernst Cassirer contended in Kant und die moderne Mathematik: 7 "If one is allowed to express the relation between philosophy and science in a blunt and paradoxical way, one may say: The eye of philosophy must be directed neither on mathematics nor on physics; it is to be directed solely on the connection of the two realms." (Cassirer 1907, 48) For him, a philosophy of mathematics that conceived mathematical knowledge as an abstract edifice separated from applications in the exact sciences seriously misunderstood the role of mathematical reason in the context of general reason. Cassirer was seriously engaged in finding for a common root from which both physics and mathematics sprang he believed to have found it in the method of introducing ideal elements. Cassirer and, more generally, the Neokantian contributions to philosophy of mathematics, logic and the sciences do not show up in Mancosu's narration of the adventures of (mathematical) Reason, and the philosophical problem of the applicability of mathematics receives only an insufficient treatment in his account. Despite of this and the somewhat meagre presentation of the phenomenological background of some of the protagonists and their general cultural background in Part III Adventure offers to the reader a rich and variegated panorama of some of the key episodes of the evolution of mathematical reason in the early 20h century. References Cassirer, Ernst. 1907. Kant und die moderne Mathematik, Kant-Studien 12: 149. Feist, Robert. 2004. Husserl and the Sciences (ed.), Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press. Frege, Gottlob., 1903 (1962). Grundgesetze der Arithmetik, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. Gavroglu, Kostas. 1995. Fritz London. A Scientific Biography, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hogrebe, Wolfgang. 2008. Die Selbstverstrickung des Philosophen Oskar Becker, in Hans Jörg Sandkühler (Hrg.), Philosophie im Nationalsozialismus, 157 190. Meiner: Hamburg. Mahnke, Dietrich. 1923 (1977). From Hilbert to Husserl: First Introduction to Phenomenology, Especially that of Formal Mathematics. Translated by D. Boyer. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 8: 71 – 84. Mancosu, Paolo, Thomas Ryckman. 2002. The Correspondence between Hermann Weyl and Oskar Becker, Philosophia Mathematica 10: 130 – 202. 8 Ryckman, Thomas. 2005. The Reign of Relativity: Philosophy of Physics 1915 – 1925. Oxford. Oxford University Press. Sluga, Hans. 1994. Heidegger's Crisis, Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany, Cambridge/ Massachusetts. Harvard University Press. Stern, Fritz. 1974. The Politics of Cultural Despair. A Study in the Rise of the Germanic Ideology, Berkeley, Los Angeles. The University of California Press. Thomas Mormann, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, University of the Basque Country UPVEPU, Donostia-San Sebastian, Spain, [email protected]

A Method for Evaluation of Arguments from Analogy Un método para evaluar argumentos por analogía Bo R. Meinertsen Department of Philosophy, Tongji University, Shanghai, China [email protected] Received: 10-09-2015. Accepted: 28-12-2015. Abstract: It is a common view that arguments from analogy can only be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. However, while this reflects an important insight, I propose instead a relatively simple method for their evaluation based on just (i) their general form and (ii) four core questions. One clear advantage of this proposal is that it does not depend on any substantial (and controversial) view of similarity, unlike some influential alternative methods, such as Walton's. Following some initial clarification of the notion of analogy and similarity, I demonstrate the strength of this method by analysing and evaluating three prominent arguments from analogy. Keywords: Analogy, similarity, arguments from analogy, general form, evaluation. Resumen: Es una visión común que los argumentos por analogía solo pueden ser evaluados sobre la base del caso a caso. No obstante, y a pesar de que esto refleja un elemento importante, propongo un método simple para su evaluación basado en (i) su forma general y (ii) cuatro preguntas medulares. Siguiendo algunas clarificaciones iniciales sobre la noción de analogía y similaridad, demuestro la fuerza de este método analizando y evaluando tres argumementos por analogía prominentes. Palabras clave: Analogía, similaridad, argumentos por analogía, forma general, evaluation. 1. Introduction In both ordinary and academic thought and talk, a very common type of argument is arguments from analogy. It is natural, therefore, that such arCOGENCY Vol. 7, N0. 2 (109-123), Summer 2015 ISSN 0718-8285 110 guments are considered important to critical thinking and its textbooks. McKay (2000), Salmon (2012) and Kelley (2013), for instance, each devotes a chapter to them.1 However, there is no consensus on how such arguments should be evaluated, so it is an open question how to tell whether or not a particular argument from analogy is cogent or not, good or bad. In this paper, I shall put forward a simple method for answering this question. Note that, other things being equal, the virtue of simplicity is particularly attractive for a subject area like critical thinking, which is highly orientated towards applications and practice. This includes, of course, the popular teaching of it to students from majors other than philosophy: often their focus has to be on the most applicable and simple parts of critical thinking in general and arguments from analogy in particular. In order to put forward such a method, we need two things. Firstly, we need to possess a proper understanding of what I shall call the "general form" of arguments from analogy. For only when we can put a given argument from analogy in its general form are we able to explicate it sufficiently to evaluate it. Secondly, we need to know the basic questions or parameters for its evaluation given its general form (that is, roughly, a method for evaluating it given this general form). I shall propose such a general form and a total of four evaluation questions, based in particular on work by McKay (2000) and Divers (1997). Putting an argument from analogy into this general form and answering the four evaluation questions jointly provide a method for how to evaluate an argument from analogy. 2. Analogy and Similarity As pointed out by Juthe (2005), a considerable proportion of reasoning using analogy actually is not in the form of arguments. A lot of use of analogies instead consists in attempts at describing phenomena and enhancing our understanding of them; in particular, phenomena that are unfamiliar to us. But as Juthe himself, I shall focus on reasoning with analogies that involve "arguments from analogy". However, for this we first need to briefly 1 Their importance is by no means universally recognised, however: Fisher (2004), for example, does not even seem to mention them (though Fisher (2011) does). COGENCY Vol. 7, N0. 2 (109-123), Summer 2015 ISSN 0718-8285 111 expound the notion of analogy in itself. At the heart of this notion is the concept of similarity. To call something "an analogy" or "analogous" is to say that it is similar to something else, in a respect that is understood in the context in which it is claimed. To say that two cases are analogous or that one is an analogy of the other is thus to make a certain comparison between the two cases. The first case we shall call the theme; the second case, which is claimed to be analogous to the theme, we shall call the analogue. The analogy is the relationship of similarity between the two.2 In the so-called "descriptive" use of analogies, they are used merely to describe the theme. Consider an interesting example of the descriptive use of analogy (McKay, 2000, p. 102): "The galaxies are receding from each other like raisins in a pudding that is spreading out over the floor." Using this analogy makes the claims there is a similarity between the galaxies receding from another (the theme) and the raisins receding from another in a pudding spreading out over the floor (the analogue). It is this feature of similarity that is the most basic feature of an analogy. Indeed, the descriptive use of analogy is a special case of a simile – a very common figure of speech in which something is likened to something else, usually preceded by the word "as" or, as in this example, "like", e.g. "He was cold as ice" and "Love is like a rollercoaster".3 While the descriptive use of analogy in itself does not play any very important role in arguments in our sense, it is very useful in general thought and talk. For it provides a helpful way of making vivid something that is difficult to visualise. Raisins spreading in a pudding on the floor is easy to picture, but galaxies spreading from one another certainly is not, and similarly in other cases of the descriptive use of analogy. A descriptive use of analogy often suggests that there are more than one respect of similarity between the theme and the analogue, or more precisely, more than one property shared by the theme and the analogue. This is a general feature of analogies – and points to a general problem with them: their scope. It is often not very clear how many features the theme and the 2 The word "analogy" is commonly also used for the analogue itself, but it is useful to have a specific term for it ("analogue"). 3 Not to be confused with metaphors, which do not assert similarity, but attribute a property or make a claim of identity in a non-literal sense without the use of "like" or "as", e.g. "His eyes were burning with anger" and "She is a rising star". A Method for Evaluation of Arguments from Analogy / B. r. Meinertsen 112 analogue are supposed to share. Raisins in a pudding spreading out over the floor recede from each other derivatively on the spreading out of the pudding; specifically, as parts of the spreading out of the material they are embedded in. But it is not clear if the analogy suggests that this is also the way galaxies recede from each other. This uncertainty about the scope of analogy is reflected in a general indeterminacy in the evaluation of arguments from analogy. It is arguably one of the main reasons why these arguments have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, as is often held. One way round this predicament is per haps to provide a definition or theory of similarity that fits in with the evaluation of ar guments from analogy. A lot of effort in the literature on is devoted to this: see, for instance, Walton (2012). The method I am proposing here, howev er, does not require any particular substantial of similarity. Accordingly, in the following section, I shall attempt to apply one and the same "general" method to three different examples of arguments from analogy, all the while being as quiet as possible about similarity. 3. Evaluation of Arguments from Analogy In an argument from analogy, the analogy is used to draw the conclusion that a thing or case has a certain property because it is similar to another case which has that property. Specifically, it is held that a certain case A, the analogue, is similar to another case T, the theme; that A has the property G; and that therefore T has property G too. Accordingly, a more precise rendering of the form of arguments from analogy on this construal is this: The General Form of Arguments from Analogy (P1) A (the analogue) and T (the theme) are similar (analogous) in that they both have properties F1,..., Fn. (P2) A has the additional property G. \ T has the property G.4 4 This is very much a "traditional" formulation of the form of arguments from analogy, which found one of its classic expressions in Thomas Reid"s Essays on the Intellectual COGENCY Vol. 7, N0. 2 (109-123), Summer 2015 ISSN 0718-8285 113 Consider now an example of an argument from analogy: Case 1: The balance of payments is a measure of economic health, not a cause of it; restricting imports to reduce that deficit is like sticking the thermometer in ice water to bring down a feverish temperature.5 Here the conclusion, which is merely implied, is that one should not restrict imports in order to reduce the payment deficit. To understand this argument, let us first say that trying to reduce a feverish temperature by sticking the thermometer in ice water is trying to change bodily health by manipulating one of its indicators (temperature). The author implies that (i) one cannot reduce a feverish temperature in this way and – arguably – also that one should not try to do so. Let us further say that trying to reduce a payment deficit by restricting imports is likewise trying to change economic health by manipulating one of its indicators (a payment deficit). The author implies that (ii) one cannot reduce a payment deficit that way either and – arguably again – also that one should not try to do it. Thus, the example instantiates the general form of arguments from analogy as follows: (1) Bodily health and economic health are similar in that they both have properties F1,..., Fn. (2) Bodily health has the additional property of "not being changeable by manipulation of its indicators" and one should not try to do this (such that one cannot reduce a feverish temperature by sticking a thermometer in ice water and should not try to do this). \ Economic health has the property of "not being changeable by manipuPowers of Man (Essay 1, Ch. 4). An influential similar formulation among contemporary authors is Walton's "argumentation scheme" for arguments from analogy (Walton et al., pp. 56, 315). 5 Michael Kinsley, "Keep Trade Free", The New Republic, vol. 188 (1983), p. 111, quoted in McKay (2000, p. 110). A Method for Evaluation of Arguments from Analogy / B. r. Meinertsen 114 lation of its indicators" and one should not try to do this (such that one cannot reduce a payment deficit by restricting imports and should not try to do this). The clarification of the argument obtained by putting it in general form like this will enable us to formulate the core questions required for evaluation of arguments from analogy. What should these questions "ask to", i.e. concern? They should not concern whether or not arguments from analogy are deductively valid, since, I shall assume, arguments from analogy are deductively invalid.6 Rather, they should concern how "reasonable" the argument is. "Reasonable" means "agreeable to reason", a notion that I shall not attempt to elucidate here (it suffices for our purposes to take it as primitive). An argument from analogy can be more or less reasonable. The more reasonable it is, the better it is; and conversely, the less reasonable it is, the worse it is. Unfortunately, there are not any straightforward criteria for when an argument from analogy is reasonable. We can, however, as pointed out by Divers (1997), ask the following four questions when trying to evaluate an argument from analogy, and this will get us a long way: Divers' Four Core Questions for Arguments from Analogy (Q1) Which two cases, A and T, are claimed to be similar (analogous)? (Q2) (i) What (property or) properties F1,..., Fn are supposed to make A and T similar (and from which further similarity is inferred) and (ii) is this supposition reasonable? (Q3) What property G is attributed to T in the conclusion? (Q4) (i) What kind of connection is supposed to exist between F1,..., Fn and G and (ii) is this supposition reasonable? These questions are endorsed from Divers (ibid.), though the evaluative additions (Q2ii) and (Q4ii) are my own. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 6 This is not an uncontroversial assumption (cf. e.g. Shecaira, 2013), but one that need not concern us in this paper. COGENCY Vol. 7, N0. 2 (109-123), Summer 2015 ISSN 0718-8285 115 give any independent account of them. For our present purposes, they are simply to be taken at face value and justified by the work they are brought to do below. They are my version of Walton's "critical questions" for arguments from analogy: as Walton points out, any argumentation scheme (my "general form") has associated with it a set of such "critical" questions which can be used in the evaluation of the type of argument represented by the scheme (Walton et al 2008, pp. 15ff). Walton's own set of critical questions for his argumentation scheme for arguments from analogy (ibid., p. 315) mainly concerns the notion of similarity (specifically, 2 of the 3 questions constituting the set). In line with his emphasis on this notion, he puts forward models of similarity using so-called "stories" or "scripts" from artificial intelligence (Walton 2012; Walton 2013, pp. 34-38). As mentioned above, the method I propose here attempts to sidestep specific views of similarity. I believe this is one of its advantages – especially for the purposes of teaching arguments from analogy in critical thinking – but this is not something I shall discuss in the present paper. Of Divers' four questions, it is (Q2) and Q(4) that are critical; (Q1) and (Q3) are only needed for specification of the parameters A, T and G. Is it reasonable to postulate the property or properties identified in the answer to (Q2), and is it reasonable to postulate the kind of connection identified in the answer to (Q4)? If, and only if, the answers to both of these questions are affirmative, we shall say that the argument from analogy in case as a whole is "reasonable". If, on the contrary, the answer to one or both of them is "no", we might choose to say that the argument from analogy is a fallacy of false analogy. To see these questions at work, let us answer each of them for Case 1: (1) It is easy to determine that the two things that are claimed to be analogous are bodily health (A) and economic health (T), thereby answering (Q1). (2) By contrast, it is not as easy to answer (Q2). For in Case 1, as in many other arguments from analogy, the (property or) properties which are supposed to make the theme and the analogue similar are not made explicit. Fortunately, however, we can normally infer which (property or) properA Method for Evaluation of Arguments from Analogy / B. r. Meinertsen 116 ties the proponent of the argument is tacitly assuming to be involved. Thus, in this example, it seems clear that both the state of the economy involved and the state of the body involved are claimed to be cases of "health". So A (bodily health) and T (economic health) are assumed to share "healthrelated" properties such as "being more or less wholesome," "depending for its wholesomeness on the functioning of its parts", and so on. Is this supposition reasonable? Yes, intuitively, just like we often talk of the "health" of complex systems other than bodies, including computers, cars, families, teams, societies etc., and assume they share "health-related" properties with bodies, it seems to be a reasonable assumption that both the state of the body and the state of the economy share the mentioned features. (3) Like the first question, (Q3) can be answered trivially. The property G attributed to T (economic health) in the conclusion is, as stated explicitly in the general form for the argument, simply the property of "not being changeable by manipulation of its indicators". (4) The final question, (Q4), however, is more difficult. The connection between the shared (property or) properties F1,..., Fn and the property G attributed to economic health in the conclusion is probably assumed by the proponent of the argument to be similar if not identical to the connection between these properties and G for the analogue (bodily health). If so, it is arguably some kind of law-like connection which determines connections between properties and what is and what is not possible. Is this supposition reasonable? Yes, it is. For it is it plausible that there is a law-like connection which rules out that it is possible for a state to have the properties of "being more or less wholesome," "depending for its wholesomeness on the functioning of its parts" etc. (F1,..., Fn) and simultaneously to lack the negative property of "not being changeable by manipulation of its indicators" (G). We certainly have strong evidence based on observations of bodily health that such a connection holds for it. There is a question of which sense of "possible" is afoot here, but this we need not go into. For whichever it is, it seems very plausible that if the theme, here economic health, also has F1,..., Fn – and, as mentioned, that seems COGENCY Vol. 7, N0. 2 (109-123), Summer 2015 ISSN 0718-8285 117 a reasonable assumption – then it too has G. In short, this argument from analogy is reasonable. Let us consider a second case of an argument from analogy, and employ again our method of the general form and the four core questions. The following is from an essay by C.S. Lewis: Case 2: You can get a large audience together for a strip-tease act – that is, to watch a girl undress on the stage. Now suppose that you came to a country where you could fill a theatre simply by bringing a covered plate onto the stage and then slowly lifting the cover so as to let everyone else see, just before the lights went out, that it contained a mutton chop or a bit of bacon, would you not think that in that country something had gone wrong with the appetite for food? (1952, p. 75) The analogue (A) here is mutton chop/appetite for food and the theme (T) is strip-tease shows/appetite for sex. Of course, this analogue is imagined only, but this does not matter for our purposes.7 The example instantiates the general form like this: (P1) Appetite for food (mutton chop) and appetite for sex (strip-tease shows) are similar in that they both have properties F1,..., Fn. (P2) Appetite for food has the additional property of having gone wrong (having become unhealthy) when it attracts a large audience who pay to have it peeked by watching unveiling of its objects on stage. \ Appetite for sex has the property of having gone wrong when it attracts a large audience who pay to have it peeked by watching unveiling of its objects on stage. 7 Since the analogue is imagined only, we might say, using the terminology of Govier (2012), that this is an example of an a priori argument from analogy, as opposed to the inductive argument from analogy of Case 1. A Method for Evaluation of Arguments from Analogy / B. r. Meinertsen 118 Consider next the four core questions: (1) It is easy to determine that the two things that are claimed to be analogous are unveiled mutton chop/appetite for food (A) and strip-tease shows/ appetite for sex (T). (2) The property or properties that are supposed to make A and T similar are that, roughly, people will gather (and pay) to have this appetite stimulated/peeked by "teasing" presentation of its object on stage (which of course is merely imagined in case of the food appetites). In my view, this (imagined) similarity does not seem reasonable. There are similarities between appetite for food and appetite for sex, such as both of them having a physiological underpinning, but one of the major dissimilarities is that it is entirely normal (in a certain cross-cultural sense) for a huge part of the appetite (drive) for sex to be directed at other objects than the biological act of sex it self – indeed, on some views, such as perhaps those of Freud, more or less everything. By contrast, this is arguably not the case for appetite for food: it is mainly only directed at food itself, and derivatively only at its closely related antecedents, such as anticipating eating or cooking. Thus, the analogy is not plausible. (3) Like in our previous example, it is easy to answer (Q3). The property attributed to T in the conclusion is the property of having gone wrong. (4) Finally, we come to (Q4). The connection between F1,..., Fn and the property of having gone wrong may be that F1,..., Fn concern natural appetites whose satisfaction are incompatible with the "wrong" behaviour mentioned by Lewis, or something along those lines. Recall in any case that a good evaluation in the answer to each of (Q4) and (Q2) is a necessary condition for the argument in case being reasonable, and since we already demonstrated that this is not the case for (Q2), we do not need to attend very carefully to (Q4). Thus we can conclude that Lewis's argument from analogy is not reasonable. In a more formal manner of speaking, it is "fallacious". The fact that an argument from analogy can fail as an argument is, like COGENCY Vol. 7, N0. 2 (109-123), Summer 2015 ISSN 0718-8285 119 the general problem with the scope of analogies mentioned above, related to the notion of similarity ("being analogous to"). Everything is similar to everything else in indefinitely many respects. For that reason, in a sense, anything can be said to be an analogy of any entity! To avoid this trivialisation of analogies – and to avoid committing the fallacy of false analogy – it is important to be aware of which properties are singled out and claimed to be shared by the theme and the analogue. They should be non-trivial properties and they should be properties that concern important aspects of each. The properties which we found reasonable in our analysis of Case 1 – "being more or less wholesome," "depending for its wholesomeness on the functioning of its parts", and so on – are good examples of such properties. What such properties are varies from case to case. But we can say something general about what they are not. They are not properties such as "being an entity", "being self-identical", "being coloured if green", and other properties which necessarily applies to any object whatsoever. For since they apply to any object, the similarity that comes from sharing them is precisely not non-trivial. But clearly, as our method of evaluation shows, no such trivial properties are involved in Case 2. Nonetheless, one might have had a knee-jerk reaction to this argument as being weak anyway, holding that the element of disanalogy uncovered in the answer to (Q2) simply is too obvious. Consider, therefore, an argument from analogy where it in any case is not obvious whether the analogy is implausible or not. The following passage from a classic work by Viktor Frankl is our example of this: Case 3: A man's suffering is similar to the behaviour of a gas. If a certain quantity of gas is pumped into an empty chamber, it will fill the chamber evenly, no matter how big the chamber. Thus suffering completely fills the human soul and conscious mind, no matter whether the suffering is great or little. Therefore the "size" of human suffering is [...] relative. (1946, p. 55) The analogue A here is the size of a certain quantity of gas and the theme T the "size" of human suffering. Frankl seems to be implicitly assuming some A Method for Evaluation of Arguments from Analogy / B. r. Meinertsen 120 kind of equivalence between the alleged fact that suffering completely fills the human soul and conscious mind and its "size" being relative. If so, on a charitable reading of the quoted passage, he is also implicitly assuming some (very similar) kind of equivalence between the alleged fact that a gas fills an empty chamber and its size being relative. These assumptions are problematic, but fortunately not something we need to go into here. Suffice is to say that, given these assumptions, we should not really separate the passage's explicit conclusion of suffering's "size" being relative from the claim of its completely filling the human soul and conscious mind. Let us do this in the comparatively informal manner of the following formulation of the general form of the argument: (1) The behaviour of a gas and human suffering are similar in that they both have properties F1,..., Fn. (2) A quantity of gas (big or small) has the additional property that when pumped into a chamber, it fills it evenly, no matter how big the chamber; that is, its size is relative. \ Human suffering has the property that that it completely fills the human soul and conscious mind, whether the suffering is great or small; that is, its size is relative. Let us next answer the four core questions for this argument: (1) As already mentioned, the two things that are claimed to be analogous are the size of a certain quantity of gas (A) and the "size" of human suffering (T). (2) The property or properties that are supposed to make A and T similar in this case are that, roughly, a gas occupying a chamber is similar to human suffering "occupying" the conscious mind. Is it plausible to postulate this property? Well, that depends on how we consider the highly metaphorical claim that there is the involved similarity. We of course commonly employ analogies and metaphors (the differCOGENCY Vol. 7, N0. 2 (109-123), Summer 2015 ISSN 0718-8285 121 ence between analogies and metaphors does not matter to our purposes here) in our thought and talk about mental matters, e.g. when we claim there is a gap – analogous to a spatial gap – between thinking about doing something and actually doing it, and we often do this as a matter of course (Johnson and Lakoff 2003). But this takes place with common (and "dead") metaphors, and it is one thing to use such common metaphors, it is quite another to use a highly speculative and controversial one as Frankl does here.8 Thus, without a lot of independent justification, I would argue that positing this similarity and hence the involved property is implausible. (3) Like in our previous examples, it is straightforward to answer (Q3). The property attributed to T in the conclusion is stated explicitly there: Human suffering has the property that its "size" is relative in the sense that it completely fills the human soul and conscious mind, whether the suffering is great or small. (4) Finally, we come to (Q4). However, since we have already seen that the similarity, or property, allegedly shared by A and T is not plausible, we have sufficient reason to conclude that this argument from analogy is not reasonable. The answer to (Q4), whatever it may be, is thus not needed in this case either. In Frankl's case, like in Lewis's, the failure of the argument is thus already exposed in the answer to (Q2), halfway through the four core questions. By contrast, in our example of a "reasonable" argument from analogy – Case 1 above – we need to go through every one of the questions. In future research, I intend to investigate if this asymmetric pattern can be generalized to all arguments from analogy susceptible to the simple method of evaluation advocated in the present paper. 8 It may be that the "size" of suffering is relative in the sense at issue – a view which Frankl argues for in various ways – and if so, it is reasonable to liken it to the adduced fact about a gas. But whether or not this controversial view is correct is a matter independent of the evaluation of the present argument from analogy in itself. A Method for Evaluation of Arguments from Analogy / B. r. Meinertsen 122 4. Conclusion If what I have argued in this paper is correct, my proposed method for evaluation of arguments from analogy is able to do useful work. This method consists only of the general form of these arguments along with four "critical questions". Importantly, it is simpler than other methods that rely on a substantial notion of similarity, such as Walton's. As we saw, it is true that the notion of similarity is central to the notion of analogy, and my method of course mentions the former. But, perhaps ironically, it does not require any particular view of this notion. Since it is thus not burdened by having to carry on its shoulders an accompanying definition, model or theory of similarity, it is simple and flexible. This makes it fit in well with the common view that arguments from analogy should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Of course, further theoretical work is needed to compare in detail my method with Walton's and others' similarity-orientated theories. In addition, other, more applied, research incorporating education science is required to argue for my specific view that my method is superior in the context of teaching of arguments from analogy in critical thinking. But at this point, I hope some initial proof of my method's pudding has been shown by the use of it in the present paper.9 Works Cited Divers. John. Reason and Argument. Unpublished MS, University of Leeds, 1997. Fisher, Alec. The Logic of Real Arguments (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Fisher, Alec. Critical Thinking: An Introduction (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Frankl, Viktor. Man's Search for Meaning. Boston: Beacon Press, 1992. Govier, Trudy. A Practical Study of Argument (7th ed.). Boston: Cengage Learning, 2012. 9 For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper or for stimulating discussions about arguments from analogy, I am grateful to John Divers, Roger White, Mike Wilby and the anonymous reviewers for Cogency. COGENCY Vol. 7, N0. 2 (109-123), Summer 2015 ISSN 0718-8285 123 Johnson, M. & Lakoff, G. Metaphors We Live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. Juthe, André. "Arguments by Analogy". Argumentation, 19 (2005): 1-27. Kelley, David. The Art of Reasoning: An Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking (4th ed.). New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013. Lewis, Clive. Mere Christianity. London: Macmillan, 1952. McKay, Thomas. Reasons, Explanations and Decisions. Belmont: Wadsworth, 2000. Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, many editions. Salmon, Merrilee. Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking (6th ed.). Boston: Cengage Learning, 2012. Shecaira, Fábio. "Analogical Arguments in Ethics and Law: A Defence of Deductivism". Informal Logic, 33 (2012): 406-37. Walton, Douglas. "Story Similarity in Arguments from Analogy". Informal Logic, 32 (2012): 190-218. Walton, Douglas. "Argumentation Schemes for Argument from Analogy". In Ribeiro, H. (Ed.), Systematic Approaches to Argument by Analogy (pp. 23-40). Dordrecht: Springer, 2013. Walton, D., Reed, C. & Macagno, F. Argumentation Schemes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. A Method for Evaluation of Arguments from Analogy / B. r. Meinertsen

The Reception of WJ in Spain and Unamuno's Reading of VRE by Jaime Nubiola and Izaskun Martínez The Reception of WJ in Spain and Unamuno's Reading of Varieties by Jaime Nubiola and Izaskun Martínez "I am inflamed at the idea of seeing & knowing Spain." -Henry to William James, 10 July 1877 William James sailed on the steamer Spain from New York to Europe on 10 October 1873, but he did not visit Spain or spend time in any other Spanish-speaking country in his life. James had particularly close ties to the philosophical communities in England, Italy, France, and Germany, but his personal links with Spain were much weaker. In those times Spain was not only an isolated and declining country. There was also a war between Spain and the United States in 1898 about Spanish dominance in Cuba and the Philippines. Despite the strong sociological and cultural contrast between the two countries, James's thought and books were soon received in Spain by prominent scholars such as Miguel de Unamuno (1864-1936), José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955), and Eugenio d'Ors (1881-1954). In fact, it is possible to assert that, contrary to the superficial impression, there is a deep affinity between the central questions of American pragmatism and the topics and problems addressed by the most relevant Hispanic thinkers of the twentieth century. Amongst them probably the best and the earliest Spanish reader of James was Miguel de Unamuno, a leading intellectual in the Hispanic cultural world of the past century. Unamuno is most well known for his Life of Don Quixote and Sancho. Our aim in this article, after providing the general framework of the reception of William James in Spain, is to trace the reception of The Varieties of Religious Experience through Unamuno's reading of this book. 1. The Reception of William James in Spain Without any doubt, a sign of the warm reception of William James in Spain is the early translation of a fair number of his books. The first translation of James into Spanish appeared as early as 1900. It was a two-volume translation of The Principles of Psychology (1890) by Domingo Barnés (1870-1943), published by the Editorial Jorro of Madrid. A second edition appeared in 1909. Barnés was a well known Spanish educator of his time, member of the famous Institución Libre de Enseñanza, and expert in psychology and sociology. Besides the Principles, Barnés translated a dozen books by contemporary authors such as John Dewey, Henry Bergson, and others. The second James translation into Spanish was the work Talks to Teachers on Psychology and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals (1899), which appeared in 1904. The translator was Carlos M. Soldevila. Three years later, the first translation of The Varieties of Religious Experience into Spanish was done by Miguel Domenge Mir. It was published in three volumes under the title Fases del sentimiento religioso. Estudio sobre la naturaleza humana (Barcelona, Carbonell y Esteva, 1907-08). This probably had a very small print run, because very few copies remain in Spanish libraries today. Roughly eighty years later, a new translation circulated widely, translated by José Francisco Yvars in 1986, which has been reprinted five times. This edition includes a foreword by the well known Spanish philosopher José Luis L. Aranguren, in which he writes that the year 1901-02 of William James's Gifford Lectures, "was a milestone in the history of psychology, and, therefore, in the history of religious psychology and in the consideration of religion by learned people."1 The fourth translation of James into Spanish was The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy in 1909, under the title of La vida eterna y la fe, reprinted in 1922 as La voluntad de creer y otros ensayos de filosofía popular. The translator was Santos Rubiano (1871-1930), an army doctor who was a pioneer in the application of the methods and concepts of modern psychology in the Spanish army. A veteran of the Philippines and North African wars, he was trained as a psychologist at Cornell University in the United States in 1916, funded by the Spanish Ministry of Public Education. In that year Rubiano translated Psychology: The Briefer Course, which had a second edition in 1930. After the opening page there is a photographic reproduction of a hand-written text from William James dated 22 March 1908. The text is the following: 22.III. 08 ... and am very glad to authorize you as my official translator. Believe me, dear Doctor, with sincere and grateful regards, yours very truly.Wm James2 Rubiano includes a lively "biographical-critical foreword" in his translation of The Briefer Course. He writes that this book "does not speak the professor alone, but the genius and the believer," and that James "was able to make from his own personality his own method of teaching, and [that] in his personality it was possible to find not only the philosopher but the good man."3 Besides these two works, Rubiano translated Pragmatism into Spanish in 1923, and in 1924 The Meaning of Truth as well as a new translation of Talks to Teachers. In the 1930s the interest in James seems to have faded in the Hispanic world. Nevertheless, publishers in Argentina and Mexico in the following two decades produced reprints of old translations as well as some new translations. Among them are the translation of Some Problems of Philosophy by Juan Adolfo Vázquez in Tucumán, Argentina, in 1944, and a new translation of Pragmatism by Vicente P. Quintero in 1945, which includes a preliminary note by Jorge Luis Borges. In that text Borges described James as an "admirable writer" to the point that he was able to make attractive 1. J. L. L. Aranguren. "Prólogo," in William James. Las variedades de la experiencia religiosa. Barcelona, Ediciones Península, 1986, p. 5. 2. W. James. Compendio de psicología. Translation of Santos Rubiano. Madrid, Editorial Daniel Jorro, 1916, 2nd edition, 1930. 3. S. Rubiano. "William James. Bosquejo biográfico. Nota crítica sobre su ideario psicológico," p. xiii in Compendio de psicología.Streams of William James • Volume 5 • Issue 2 • Summer 2003 Page 1 The Reception of WJ in Spain and Unamuno's Reading of VRE by Jaime Nubiola and Izaskun Martínez such a reasonable way of thinking as the pragmatism of the first two decades of our century, with "halfway solutions" and "quiet hypotheses."4 Years later, for unknown reasons, Borges refused to include that foreword in his compilation of prefaces. In this same period in Spain, Luis Rodríguez Aranda translated Pragmatism in 1954 and The Meaning of Truth in 1957. With the revival of pragmatism in the last decade there has been a new impulse to translate James into Spanish. In 1992 two manuscripts by James on substance and phenomenon that appeared originally in Ralph Barton Perry's The Thought and Character of William James were translated,5 and in 1998, on the occasion of the centennial of Human Immortality, a translation of this work by Angel Cagigas was published (Jaén, Editorial del Lunar). The most recent James publication in Spain has been a new translation of Pragmatism by Ramón del Castillo in the year 2000, including a foreword and editorial notes.6 As a summary of this enumeration we can say that over this century most of William James's books have been translated into Spanish. Only A Pluralistic Universe (1909) and Essays in Radical Empiricism (1912) are still awaiting a Spanish translator. Turning now to the secondary bibliography on William James available in Spanish, we may arrange it in two groups. First are the books and papers in Spanish written by Hispanic authors. Second are the translation into Spanish of books and papers from foreign authors. A thorough study is still required, but we can say in advance that probably the second group is bigger than the first. This fact may be interpreted as a sign of the relatively low interest in James in the Spanish speaking countries and at the same time as a sign of the lack of real scholarship and of original production on American pragmatism. Among the early translations of secondary bibliography, we mention Emile Boutroux's William James (A. Colin, Paris, 1911), which was reviewed by Eugenio d'Ors in the journal Arxius de l'Institut de Ciències (I/1, 1911, pp. 150153); this was translated in 1921 into Spanish in Montevideo and published with a foreword by d'Ors (Editorial Claudio García, 1921). A paper by Emile Boutroux on William James's pedagogical ideas was published in the Boletín de la Institución Libre de Enseñanza (n. 617, 1911, pp. 222-231). Other later relevant translations are Ralph Barton Perry's The Thought and Character of William James (briefer version) by Eduardo Prieto in 19737 and Jacques Barzun's A Stroll with William James in 1986, in which the affinity between William James and the Spanish thinkers Unamuno and Ortega, "both fighting positivism," are mentioned.8 Coming now to the original production on James in Spanish speaking countries, in 1961 Pelayo H. Fernández studied in detail how Miguel de Unamuno read William James, his frequent quotations of James, and his marginal notes in the works by James in his library. Fernández's conclusion was that Unamuno's pragmatism was "original with respect to that of the American, from whom he absorbed only complementary features." However, in our opinion, the abundance of facts that Pelayo Fernández lists bears witness to a great influence and a great similarity between the two thinkers on many issues and problems. In any case, Fernández's doctoral dissertation and the subsequent monograph is the starting point-and it has been for us-for everybody interested in the reception of James in Spain, especially through Unamuno.9 In the case of José Ortega y Gasset, John Graham published a careful study in which, after noting Ortega's hostility to American pragmatism, he reveals "many basic connections, similarities and points of identity, so that concrete influence and dependence seem more plausible than 'coincidence' between Ortega and James."10 Graham gives evidence that Ortega read James early in his career, and that Ortega was aware of James's radical empiricism as having anticipated the central notion central in his own "ratiovitalism." His evidence for James's influences on Ortega through German sources themselves influenced by James is especially convincing.11 In contrast to Ortega, Eugenio d'Ors, whom we mention above, is perhaps the Hispanic philosopher most conscious of his personal connection with American pragmatism. By 1907 he had defined himself as a pragmatist, driven by the same desires as moved his American counterparts, whom he hoped to outstrip by recognizing an aesthetic dimension of human action that could not be reduced to the merely utilitarian.12 Forty years later, in 1947, in his El secreto de la filosofía, which crowned his philosophical career, he generously acknowledged what he owed to the American tradition. In Latin America the connection with American pragmatism can be traced back to the hostile reactions of the philosophers Coriolano Alberini (1886-1960) from Argentina and Carlos Vaz Ferreira (1871-1958) from Uruguay against the pragmatism of William James and F. C. S. Schiller. The latter disagreed because of the spiritualism of these pragmatists, the former on the grounds of pragmatism being a threat to the traditional Catholic religious background. The 4. J.L. Borges. "Nota preliminar," in W. James, Pragmatismo. Un nombre nuevo para algunos viejos modos de pensar. Buenos Aires, Emecé Editores, 1945, p. 10. 5. R.B. Perry. The Thought and Character of William James, Volume One, Little, Brown, Boston, 1935, pp. 525-528 and pp. 578-580. Translation of Sebastián M. Pascual Sastre in "Manuscritos sobre la sustancia y el fenómeno," Taula, 17-18 (1992), pp. 101-109. 6. W. James. Pragmatismo. Un nuevo nombre para viejas formas de pensar. Traducción, notas y prólogo de Ramón del Castillo. Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2000. 7. R. B. Perry. El pensamiento y la personalidad de William James. Translation of Eduardo J. Prieto. Buenos Aires, Editorial Paidós, 1973. 8. J. Barzun. Un paseo con William James. Translation of Juan José Utrilla. México, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1986, p. 228. 9. P. H. Fernández. Miguel de Unamuno y William James. Un paralelo pragmático. Salamanca, CIADA, 1961. 10. J. T. Graham. A Pragmatist Philosophy of Life in Ortega y Gasset. Columbia, MI, University of Missouri Press, 1994, p. 145. 11. A. Donoso. "Review of Graham's A Pragmatist Philosophy of Life in Ortega y Gasset", Hispania 78 (1995), p. 499. 12. E. d'Ors. Glosari de Xenius. Barcelona, Tallers Gráfics Montserrat, 1915, vol. II, pp. 373-375; and El secreto de la filosofía. Barcelona, Iberia, 1947, p. 12.Streams of William James • Volume 5 • Issue 2 • Summer 2003 Page 2 The Reception of WJ in Spain and Unamuno's Reading of VRE by Jaime Nubiola and Izaskun Martínez contrast between both readings has made an open reception of William James difficult, particularly his Varieties of Religious Experience. 2. Unamuno's Reading of The Varieties of Religious Experience Miguel de Unamuno y Jugo was born in the Basque city of Bilbao in 1864. He studied Philosophy and Arts in Madrid, and stayed almost all his life in Salamanca, where he held a chair in Greek Philology. For two periods (1901-14 and 1930-36) he was the rector of the University of Salamanca. Unamuno was a philosopher-poet of great learning, "who sought to save Spain with rationalized religiousness."13 He was deeply religious, but far from Catholic orthodoxy, as he had lost his faith in his youth. All his works were characterized by a strong philosophical struggle to reconcile reason with religion. After his son's death in 1897, Unamuno sought to reconquer his childhood faith, oscillating between retreating to orthodox Catholicism, converting to liberal Protestantism, or yielding to scepticism. As Orringer writes, "obsessed with mortality, Unamuno achieved philosophical maturity with a blend of liberal Protestant theology and the philosophies of James and Kierkegaard in his conception of 'the tragic sense of life'- the theme of his essays, novels, dramas, poetry and journalism."14 Unamuno is one of the most representative writers of the group known as the "Generación del 98" (from the year of Spain's defeat in the war with the United States over Cuba and the Philippines), a group deeply concerned with the future of Spain in the contemporary world. Unamuno's option was to "españolizar Europa" ["to hispanicize Europe"] in order to overcome the isolation of Spain. Unamuno's main philosophical works are Vida de Don Quijote y Sancho [Life of Don Quixote and Sancho] (1905), Del sentimiento trágico de la vida en los hombres y en los pueblos [The Tragic Sense of Life] (1911-12), and La agonía del Cristianismo [The Agony of Christianity] (1931). He died of a stroke in Salamanca on the last day of 1936. As we have said, Unamuno had a great wealth of learning, and he also had a very well-stocked library of literature, philosophy and humanities in all languages, preserved now in the Casa-Museo Miguel de Unamuno in the University of Salamanca. That library contained over 100 volumes of prose, poetry and fiction by Americans, ranging from such nineteenth-century classics authors as Emerson and Thoreau to contemporary authors such as Pound and Wharton.15 Relevant for our present research are three works by William James that are kept in that library: The Will to Believe (1897), The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), and Pragmatism (1907). The copy of the Varieties corresponds to the first edition; there are hand-written pencil annotations by Unamuno in the margins of 32 pages of that volume. In Unamuno's works, over a span of forty years, there are 32 quotations from William James: 19 from The Will to Believe, 7 from The Principles of Psychology, 5 from Varieties and 2 from Pragmatism. His first quotation of the Varieties, a translation of Mrs. Annie Besant's quotation in page 27 of Varieties, corresponds to the year 1904; his last quotation in 1913 in his The Tragic Sense of Life is a remembrance of God as producer of immortality for the great majority of men, Kant, James, and Unamuno himself included.16 In Unamuno's copy the conclusion James draws in the Varieties is marked with six vertical lines and one horizontal: "Religion, in fact, for the great majority of our own race means immortality, and nothing else. God is the producer of immortality."17 The exploration of Unamuno's library and of his texts reveals himself as an avid reader of James. Unamuno feels himself congenial with James, whom he likes to describe as "the pragmatist, another hopeless Christian", and as "such a serious man, of so sincere spirit and so deeply religious."18 As we said before, Fernández's conclusion was that Unamuno's pragmatism was "original with respect to that of the American, from whom he absorbed only complementary features." However, in our opinion, it would be more accurate to say that there is not only a great similarity between the two thinkers on many issues and problems, but that James had a permanent impact on Unamuno's intellectual development. Very recently, Pedro Cerezo has studied more precisely the real scope of James's influence. According to Cerezo, for Unamuno the reading of William James in the first decade of the century was a turning point in the evolution of his mind, taking Unamuno away from metaphysical pessimism and turning his attention both to practical reason as well as to action that is able to give better orientation and a stronger sense to life.19 -Jaime Nubiola <[email protected]> is professor of philosophy at the University of Navarra, Spain. Izaskun Martínez <[email protected]> is a graduate student at the Universidad de Navarra, Spain. We are grateful to Ruth Breeze for her help with the English text and to Felicitas Kraemer, Ruth Anna Putnam, and Eugene Taylor for their suggestions and comments. 13. N. A. Orringer. "Unamuno y Jugo, Miguel de (1864-1936)," in E. Craig (ed.). Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London, Routledge, 1998, vol. 9, p. 519. 14. N. A. Orringer. "Unamuno y Jugo, Miguel de (1864-1936)," p. 519. 15. Cf. M. Thomas Inge. "Unanumo's Correspondence with North Americans: A Checklist." Hispania 53 (1970), p. 277. For a catalogue of that library, see M. J. Valdés and M. Elena. An Unamuno Source Book: A Catalogue of Readings and Acquisitions with an Introductory Essay on Unamuno's Dialectical Enquiry, Toronto, U of Toronto P, 1973. 16. Cf. M. Unamuno. Del sentimiento trágico de la vida. Madrid, Renacimiento, 1911-12, pp. 10-11. 17. W. James. The Varieties of Religious Experience. The Works of William James, vol. XIII Cambridge, Harvard UP, 1985, p. 412. 18. M. de Unamuno. Ensayos, Bernardo G. de Cándamo, ed., Madrid, Aguilar, 1951, 3a ed., vol I, p. 978 and p. 809. 19. Pedro Cerezo. Las máscaras de lo trágico. Filosofía y tragedia en Miguel de Unamuno. Madrid, Trotta, 1996, pp. 278-289.Streams of William James • Volume 5 • Issue 2 • Summer 2003 Page

JUAN PABLO II: PORTADOR DE ESPERANZA ANTE EL DOLOR Y EL SUFRIMIENTO John Paull II: Provider of hope in pain and suffering Recibido: 6 de enero de 2014 / aprobado: 26 de agosto de 2014 Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez* Resumen El Santo Papa Juan Pablo II centrado en la pregunta por el hombre y la defensa de su dignidad, se preocupó por dejar una sólida y significativa enseñanza sobre esta realidad del ser humano. Padeció el dolor y el sufrimiento en muchos momentos de su vida y, como filósofo, teólogo y pastor, manifestó esta gran preocupación en casi todas sus encíclicas, en las que buscó transmitir, a lo largo de su pontificado, la fe de la Iglesia católica y recogió las enseñanzas de la Sagrada Escritura y la Sagrada Tradición. A través de una revisión de las encíclicas que escribió, se ilustra cómo el Santo Padre evidencia, ante todo, un profundo interés de que el hombre de hoy se entienda principalmente a sí mismo y de esta manera, comprenda el dinamismo del dolor, para que, antes que desesperar en los momentos difíciles, viva la esperanza y pueda llenar de sentido su vida entera. Palabras clave: Dolor; sufrimiento; Juan Pablo II; encíclica; vida humana. Perseitas | Vol. 3 | No. 1 | pp. 66-82 | enero-junio | 2015 | ISSN: 2346-1780 | Medellín-Colombia * Biólogo de la Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, Colombia. Filósofo de la Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, Medellín, Colombia. Miembro de Sodalitium Christianae Vitae, Cali, Colombia, y profesor de ética en la Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Cali, Colombia. Correo electrónico: [email protected] Forma de citar este artículo en APA: Rosas Jiménez, C. A. (2015). Juan Pablo II: portador de esperanza ante el dolor y el sufrimiento. Revista Perseitas, 3 (1), pp. 66-82. 67 Juan Pablo II: Portador de esperanza ante el dolor y el sufrimiento John Paull II: Provider of hope in pain and suffering Perseitas | Vol. 3 | No. 1 | enero-junio| 2015 Abstract Saint Pope John Paul II focused on the question about Man and the defense of his dignity, he made an effort to establish a solid and meaningful teaching on the reality of the human being. He knew pain and suffered in many moments of his life, and as a philosopher, theologian and pastor, showed his preoccupation in most of his encyclicals in which he tried to transmit, throughout his pontificate, the faith of the Catholic Church gathering the teaching of the Holy Scriptures and the Holy Tradition. Through a revision of the encyclicals that he wrote, we show how the Holy Father evidences, above all, a deep interest that the man of today understands himself and in this way, comprehends the dynamics of pain, in order to not despair in difficult times but live in hope and thus fill his life with meaning. Keywords: Pain, suffering; John Paul II; encyclicals; human life. 68 Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez Perseitas | Vol. 3 | No. 1 | enero-junio | 2015 Introducción El Santo Papa Juan Pablo II fue una persona que pasó por múltiples dificultades durante su vida y vivió en carne propia el dolor y el sufrimiento, perdió a su madre cuando era niño y a su hermano y a su padre cuando estaba muy joven, y padeció los rigores de las injusticias de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. El Papa sale al encuentro de un asunto que diariamente se preguntan y se han preguntado hombres y mujeres a lo largo de la historia y en todas las culturas, al que buscan encontrarle sentido desesperadamente. Efectivamente, el Papa Juan Pablo II no sólo escribió ese brillante documento, la Salvifici doloris, sino que, en su pontificado dejó consignadas sus ideas que dan abundante luz al respecto en varios documentos. En este trabajo se presentan los temas principales sobre el dolor y el sufrimiento que no deja de citar en 10 de las 14 encíclicas que escribió. De esta manera, se evidenciará su gran preocupación por transmitir la enseñanza de la Iglesia católica sobre el hombre mismo hasta convertirse en portador de esperanza en los momentos más difíciles marcados por el dolor y el sufrimiento. El dolor hace parte de la existencia humana La realidad del dolor es muy compleja y la medicina, desde sus inicios, ha buscado los medios no sólo para prevenir y curar enfermedades, sino para aliviar e incluso erradicar el dolor. Ejemplo de ello son las asociaciones interdisciplinarias que se han creado en diferentes países para dichos estudios, tales como la Asociación internacional para el estudio del dolor, la Sociedad española del dolor, la Asociación mexicana para el estudio y el tratamiento del dolor, la Asociación argentina para el estudio del dolor, la Asociación colombiana para el estudio del dolor, la Asociación chilena para el estudio del dolor y la Federación latinoamericana de asociaciones para el estudio del dolor, por mencionar algunas en países de habla hispana, a las que se suman la American Academy of Pain Medicine y la American Pain Society en los Estados Unidos de América, entre otras. 69 Juan Pablo II: Portador de esperanza ante el dolor y el sufrimiento John Paull II: Provider of hope in pain and suffering Perseitas | Vol. 3 | No. 1 | enero-junio| 2015 Para la Sociedad internacional dedicada a su estudio, es una experiencia desagradable, sensorial y emocional, asociada con una lesión real o potencial, que se describe como daño. Sin embargo, cuando el dolor se cronifica, supone para el enfermo, la familia y la parte de la comunidad más cercana, un importante elemento perturbador desde el punto de vista físico, moral, social y económico; pierde su sentido protector y se convierte en protagonista de la enfermedad que le dio origen o, al menos, en elemento básico y provoca un estado que se denomina sufrimiento que no se limita a una experiencia sensorial (Suardíaz, 2005). Son abundantes las explicaciones sobre el dolor, desde los ámbitos de la medicina y la bioética1; sin embargo, se pretende elucidar el origen del problema del dolor, desde el punto de vista teológico, como lo explica San Juan Pablo II en sus encíclicas. Partiendo del hecho de que Dios es bueno por su propia naturaleza, podemos decir con el Papa que "la concepción de Dios, como ser necesariamente perfectísimo, excluye ciertamente de Dios todo dolor derivado de limitaciones o heridas" (Juan Pablo II, 1986, n. 39). Sin embargo, como mencionan los obispos latinoamericanos reunidos en Puebla (1979a): El hombre, ya desde el comienzo, rechazó el amor de su Dios. No tuvo interés por la comunión con Él. Quiso construir un reino en este mundo prescindiendo de Dios. En vez de adorar al Dios verdadero, adoró ídolos: las obras de sus manos, las cosas del mundo; se adoró a sí mismo. Por eso, el hombre se desgarró interiormente. Entraron en el mundo el mal, la muerte y la violencia, el odio y el miedo. Se destruyó la convivencia fraterna. Roto así por el pecado el eje primordial que sujeta al hombre al dominio amoroso del Padre, brotaron todas las esclavitudes (n. 185-186). 1 Ver Molina, J. (2011). El sufrimiento humano como experiencia personal y profesional. Bioética Mayoagosto, 4-9. Orellana, C. (2007). La actitud médica ante el dolor ajeno. Persona y bioética, 11 (2), 146-155. Martínez, D.M. (2006). El manejo del dolor; aspectos bioéticos. Revista digital universitaria. Universidad Autónoma de México, 7 (4), 2-7. Salazar, R. (2009). Humanización y bioética en le medicina del dolor y el cuidado paliativo, las malas noticias frente al paciente y a su familia. En: Dolor y cáncer. Asociación colombiana para el estudio del dolor, Bogotá. p. 243-250. Sánchez, B. (2003). Abordajes teóricos para comprender el dolor humano. Aquichan, 3 (3), 32-41, Soler, E. y Montaner, C. (2004). Consideraciones bioéticas en el tratamiento del dolor. Persona y bioética, 20-21, 49-64, entre otros. 70 Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez Perseitas | Vol. 3 | No. 1 | enero-junio | 2015 Por el pecado entró el dolor en el mundo y es por eso que hoy vemos al hombre sumergido en "tanto horror y tanto sufrimiento" (Juan Pablo II, 1988, n. 24), y poco a poco se ha ido constituyendo una sociedad que presenta un «vasto panorama de dolor y sufrimiento (n. 6)2. Todas esas esclavitudes de las que hablan los obispos en Puebla tienen diferentes rostros en el hombre concreto. Los gestos y los símbolos de las distintas tradiciones y costumbres culturales y populares se convierten en momentos y formas de encuentro con las que, en los diversos países y culturas, se manifiestan el cuidado del que sufre o está necesitado, la cercanía al anciano o al moribundo y la participación del dolor de quien está de luto (Juan Pablo II, 1995, n. 85). El ser humano no sólo ha logrado compartir su dolor sino que se ha planteado el interrogante sobre el origen y el fin del dolor, que hoy como ayer, dice el Papa Juan Pablo II, conmueve íntimamente los corazones3. Se hace necesario un gran esfuerzo en la formación integral de la persona. El Papa sugiere, por tanto, que la labor educativa debe tener en cuenta también el sufrimiento y la muerte, y se debe ayudar a cada uno a comprender, en la realidad concreta y difícil, su misterio profundo (1995, p. 97); nos invita también a revisar el concepto de desarrollo porque se limita a satisfacer los deseos materiales mediante el crecimiento de los bienes, sin prestar atención al sufrimiento (Juan Pablo II, 1988, n. 10). 2 Juan Pablo II agrega en su encíclica Laborem Exercens (1981): "Pero nacen también temores y amenazas relacionadas con esta dimensión fundamental de la existencia humana, de la que la vida del hombre está hecha cada día, de la que deriva la propia dignidad específica y en la que a la vez está contenida la medida incesante de la fatiga humana, del sufrimiento y también del daño y de la injusticia que invaden profundamente la vida social dentro de cada Nación y a escala internacional" (n. 1). 3 En su encíclica Veritatis Splendor (1993) también añadió los interrogantes que conmueven al hombre: "los enigmas recónditos de la condición humana que, hoy como ayer, conmueven íntimamente los corazones: ¿Qué es el hombre?¿Cuál es el sentido y el fin de nuestra vida?¿Qué es el bien y qué el pecado?¿Cuál es el origen y el fin del dolor?¿Cuál es el camino para conseguir la verdadera felicidad?¿Qué es la muerte, el juicio y la retribución después de la muerte?¿Cuál es, finalmente, ese misterio último e inefable que abarca nuestra existencia, del que procedemos y hacia el que nos dirigimos?" (n. 30). 71 Juan Pablo II: Portador de esperanza ante el dolor y el sufrimiento John Paull II: Provider of hope in pain and suffering Perseitas | Vol. 3 | No. 1 | enero-junio| 2015 La experiencia de dolor intenso y prolongado genera en el hombre un sentimiento de angustia e, incluso, de desesperación. Desde el punto de vista psicológico, hay quienes hablan de un itinerario con unas etapas bien definidas por las que atraviesa el paciente (Kübler-Ross, 2005); desde el punto de vista teológico, el Papa señala el caso "emblemático" de los apóstoles, Quienes durante la vida pública del Maestro, no obstante su amor por él y la generosidad de la respuesta a su llamada, se mostraron incapaces de comprender sus palabras y fueron reacios a seguirle en el camino del sufrimiento y de la humillación (Juan Pablo II, 1990, n. 87). Los apóstoles también flaquearon ya que "el problema del dolor acosa sobre todo a la fe y la pone a prueba (Juan Pablo II, 1995, n. 31). El enfermo, abatido por su propia fragilidad, se somete a una dura prueba para el equilibrio, a veces ya inestable, de la vida familiar y personal (1995, n. 15), "no ve en el sufrimiento ningún significado o valor, y es más, lo considera el mal por excelencia, que debe eliminar a toda costa"4. Al verse en un callejón sin salida, en un contexto social y cultural que hace más difícil afrontar y soportar el sufrimiento, se agudiza la tentación de resolver el problema del sufrimiento, buscando eliminarlo de raíz, anticipando la muerte en el momento considerado como más oportuno5 (1995, n. 15). Con este panorama se inicia un realce de la muerte como la solución para este problema. Sin embargo, lo paradójico es que la muerte, considerada absurda cuando interrumpe por sorpresa una vida todavía abierta a un futuro rico de posibles experiencias interesantes, se convierte, en este contexto del dolor 4 El Santo Padre insiste más adelante en la misma encíclica en este tema (1995): «En efecto, cuando prevalece la tendencia a apreciar la vida sólo en la medida en que da placer y bienestar, el sufrimiento aparece como una amenaza insoportable, de la que es preciso librarse a toda costa» (n. 64). 5 El Papa Juan Pablo II agrega que: "En semejante contexto el sufrimiento, elemento inevitable de la existencia humana, aunque también factor de posible crecimiento personal, es «censurado», rechazado como inútil, más aún, combatido como mal que debe evitarse siempre y de cualquier modo. Cuando no es posible evitarlo y la perspectiva de un bienestar al menos futuro se desvanece, entonces parece que la vida ha perdido ya todo sentido y aumenta en el hombre la tentación de reivindicar el derecho a su supresión" (1995, n. 23); y añade que "las opciones contra la vida proceden, a veces, de situaciones difíciles o incluso dramáticas de profundo sufrimiento, soledad, falta total de perspectivas económicas, depresión y angustia por el futuro" (1995, n. 18). 72 Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez Perseitas | Vol. 3 | No. 1 | enero-junio | 2015 y sufrimiento, en una «liberación reivindicada» cuando se considera que la existencia ya no tiene ningún sentido por estar sumergida en el dolor e inexorablemente condenada a un sufrimiento posterior más agudo (1995, n. 64). El Papa Wojtyla sostiene que encontramos una trágica expresión de todo esto en la difusión de la eutanasia6, encubierta y subrepticia, practicada abiertamente o incluso legalizada y resalta que más que por una presunta piedad ante el dolor del paciente, es justificada a veces por razones utilitarias para evitar gastos innecesarios demasiado costosos para la sociedad (1995, n. 15). La Iglesia católica ante el dolor y el sufrimiento humano La Iglesia católica ha dedicado tiempo y esfuerzo por aclarar la situación de dolor y sufrimiento del hombre; filósofos y teólogos, incluidos los pastores, han aportado en esta reflexión. La Iglesia ofrece no sólo la doctrina social y, en general, sus enseñanzas sobre la persona redimida por Cristo, sino también su compromiso concreto de ayuda para combatir la marginación y el sufrimiento (Juan Pablo II, 1991, n. 26). Busca dejar claro también que la ciencia puede y debe estar al servicio del hombre, puesto que mediante sistemas y aparatos extremadamente sofisticados, la ciencia y la práctica médica son capaces no sólo de resolver casos antes sin solución y de mitigar o eliminar el dolor, sino también de sostener y prolongar la vida, incluso en situaciones de extrema debilidad (Juan Pablo II, 1995, n. 64). El Papa Juan Pablo II aclara que en el ámbito de la medicina moderna han cobrado auge los llamados cuidados paliativos, destinados a hacer más soportable el sufrimiento en la fase final de la enfermedad y, al mismo tiempo, asegurar al paciente un adecuado acompañamiento humano. Recuerda, además, que el Papa Pío XII afirmó que es lícito suprimir el dolor por medio de narcóticos, a pesar de tener como consecuencia limitar la conciencia y abreviar la vida, si no hay otros medios y si, en tales circunstancias, ello no impide el cumplimiento de otros deberes religiosos y morales (1995, n. 65). 6 El Santo Padre recuerda el significado de la eutanasia: "Por eutanasia en sentido verdadero y propio se debe entender una acción o una omisión que por su naturaleza y en la intención causa la muerte, con el fin de eliminar cualquier dolor" (1995, 65a). 73 Juan Pablo II: Portador de esperanza ante el dolor y el sufrimiento John Paull II: Provider of hope in pain and suffering Perseitas | Vol. 3 | No. 1 | enero-junio| 2015 Esta preocupación por el que sufre y por el más necesitado ha estado presente en la Iglesia católica desde sus inicios. Hoy, por ejemplo, la Iglesia se muestra cercana a aquellos esposos que, con gran ansia y sufrimiento, acogen a sus hijos gravemente afectados de incapacidades, así como agradece a todas las familias que, por medio de la adopción, amparan a quienes han sido abandonados por sus padres, debido a formas de minusvalidez o enfermedades (1995, n. 63). Por otro lado, el Santo Padre afirma que se deben poner en práctica formas discretas y eficaces de acompañamiento de la vida naciente, con una especial cercanía a aquellas madres que, incluso sin el apoyo del padre, no tienen miedo de traer al mundo su hijo y educarlo, así como debe prestarse una atención análoga a la vida que se encuentra en la marginación o en el sufrimiento, especialmente en sus fases finales (1995, n. 87). La Iglesia busca salir al encuentro de la realidad del dolor en la vida del hombre, pero, para comprenderla mejor, necesita la cooperación de todos. Es por ello que el Santo Papa en su encíclica Evangelium vitae, sostiene que pertenece a la misión educativa de los padres enseñar y testimoniar a los hijos el verdadero sentido del sufrimiento y de la muerte y añade que podrán llevar a cabo esta tarea en la medida en que estén atentos a cada sufrimiento que encuentren a su alrededor y, principalmente, si saben desarrollar actitudes de cercanía, asistencia y participación hacia los enfermos y ancianos dentro del ámbito familiar (1995, n. 92). También hace un llamado a los entes sanitarios, tales como clínicas, hospitales y casas de salud, cuya función debe revisarse, ya que: Su verdadera identidad no es sólo la de estructuras en las que se atiende a los enfermos y moribundos, sino ante todo la de ambientes en los que el sufrimiento, el dolor y la muerte son considerados e interpretados en su significado humano y específicamente cristiano. De modo especial esta identidad debe ser clara y eficaz en los institutos regidos por religiosos o relacionados de alguna manera con la Iglesia (1995, n. 88). 74 Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez Perseitas | Vol. 3 | No. 1 | enero-junio | 2015 El dolor tiene sentido Múltiples caminos se podrían recorrer para encontrar el sentido del dolor y del sufrimiento humano; sin embargo, el camino de la fe es aquel que puede dar abundantes luces y cimientos sólidos para comprender mejor dicha realidad. El Papa dice que la luz de la fe no sólo ayuda a encontrar soluciones sino que hace humanamente soportables, incluso las situaciones de sufrimiento, para que el hombre no se pierda en ellas y no olvide su dignidad y vocación (Juan Pablo II, 1991, n. 59). Desde lo profundo de su dolor, el hombre puede detenerse a contemplar la obra de Dios en la formación milagrosa de su cuerpo en el seno materno y encontrar en ello un motivo de confianza y manifestación de la certeza de la existencia de un proyecto divino sobre su vida (Juan Pablo II, 1995, n. 44). Con esta visión de fe se lee para comprender la Sagrada Escritura, que alude a un Padre que siente compasión por el hombre y comprende su dolor y, en definitiva, este inescrutable e indecible dolor de padre engendrará, sobre todo, la admirable economía del amor redentor en Jesucristo (Juan Pablo II, 1986, n. 39). Cuando el hombre dirige su peregrinar terreno por el camino de la fe, encuentra el horizonte de su propia salvación, realizada por Cristo a través del sufrimiento y de su muerte de cruz (Juan Pablo II, 1981, n. 27). El Papa busca que se entienda que la salvación ha venido por medio del sufrimiento: "Se tiene así una nueva humanidad, que en Jesucristo por medio del sufrimiento de la cruz ha vuelto al amor, traicionado por Adán con su pecado" (Juan Pablo II, 1986, p. 40); y recuerda que a Cristo, en cuanto hombre que sufre realmente y de modo terrible en el Huerto de los Olivos y en el Calvario, que se dirige al Padre, a aquel Padre, cuyo amor ha predicado a los hombres, cuya misericordia ha testimoniado con todas sus obras, no le es ahorrado el tremendo sufrimiento de la muerte en cruz (Juan Pablo II, 1980, n. 7). No hay que olvidar que en Cristo el sufrimiento iba más allá del sufrimiento físico en la cruz. Dice el Papa que en Cristo sufre Dios rechazado por la propia criatura: "No creen en mí" (Juan Pablo II, 1986, n. 41). Justamente, en la víspe75 Juan Pablo II: Portador de esperanza ante el dolor y el sufrimiento John Paull II: Provider of hope in pain and suffering Perseitas | Vol. 3 | No. 1 | enero-junio| 2015 ra de su pasión, el Señor Jesús habla del pecado de los que "no creen en él". En estas palabras suyas, llenas de dolor, hay un eco lejano de aquel pecado, que en su forma originaria se inserta oscuramente en el misterio mismo de la creación (1986, n. 33). En este punto de la reflexión se hace la siguiente pregunta: si Dios mismo hecho hombre-que no sólo ha asumido el dolor sino un gran sufrimiento-(1986 , n. 16), ha optado por él ¿cómo podemos decir nosotros que el dolor no tiene sentido? Esta transformación del dolor y el sufrimiento en nuestra propia salvación es posible gracias a la acción del Espíritu Santo. Si el pecado ha engendrado el sufrimiento, el dolor de Dios en Cristo crucificado recibe su plena expresión humana por medio del Espíritu Santo (1986, n. 41), quien actuó de manera especial en esta autodonación absoluta del Hijo del hombre para transformar el sufrimiento en amor redentor (1986, n. 40). Es el Espíritu de la verdad el que permite que la conciencia humana participe en aquel dolor, y es así como el sufrimiento de la conciencia es particularmente profundo y también salvífico (1986, n. 45)7. El dolor vivido en Cristo marca un sendero en la vida cotidiana El Papa Juan Pablo II en su encíclica Evangelium vitae expone que el sufrimiento de la vida del hombre, comprendido a la luz del misterio de la vida de Cristo, llega a ser fuente de bien y nos inserta más profundamente en su misión salvadora en favor de toda la Iglesia. Dice el Papa: Vivir para el Señor significa también reconocer que el sufrimiento, aun siendo en sí mismo un mal y una prueba, puede siempre llegar a ser fuente de bien. Llega a serlo si se vive con amor y por amor, participando, por don gratuito de Dios y por libre decisión personal, en el sufrimiento mismo de Cristo crucificado. De este modo, quien vive su sufrimiento en el Señor se configura más plenamente a Él y se asocia más íntimamente a su obra redentora en favor de la Iglesia y de la humanidad. Esta es la experiencia del Apóstol, que toda persona que sufre está también llamada a revivir: "Me alegro por los padecimientos que soporto por vosotros, y completo en mi carne lo que falta a las tribulaciones de Cristo, en favor de su Cuerpo, que es la Iglesia (Col 1, 24) (Juan Pablo II, 1995, n. 67). 7 El Santo Padre precisa que "en el amor recibido y dado [...] incluso el sufrimiento y la muerte tienen un sentido y, aun permaneciendo el misterio que los envuelve, pueden llegar a ser acontecimientos de salvación" (1995, n. 81). 76 Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez Perseitas | Vol. 3 | No. 1 | enero-junio | 2015 Los miembros del cuerpo místico de Cristo participamos de su sacrificio, cuando el sufrimiento es aceptado y ofrecido a Dios con amor, porque es Cristo mismo quien nos llama (Juan Pablo II, 1990, n. 78). En efecto, Cristo nos habla. El Santo Padre enunciaba en su primera encíclica que es Él, el Hijo de Dios vivo, quien habla a los hombres también como Hombre; que es su misma vida la que habla, su humanidad, su fidelidad a la verdad, su amor que abarca a todos y habla además su muerte en Cruz, esto es, la insondable profundidad de su sufrimiento y de su abandono (Juan Pablo II, 1979b, n. 7). El contenido de la vida cotidiana de la Iglesia lo constituyen, por tanto, la muerte en Cruz y Resurrección de Cristo (1979, 7b). De esta manera, el dolor unido al trabajo señala el camino de la vida humana sobre la tierra (Juan Pablo II, 1981, n. 27). Es allí, dice el Santo Padre, cuando se soporta la fatiga del trabajo en unión con Cristo crucificado por nosotros, donde el hombre colabora en cierto modo con el Hijo de Dios en la redención de la humanidad; se muestra así como verdadero discípulo de Jesús y lleva la cruz de cada día en la actividad a la que ha sido llamado a realizar (1981, n. 27). De acuerdo con lo mencionado por el Papa en su encíclica Centesimus annus (1991), si se une el propio sufrimiento por la verdad y por la libertad al de Cristo en la cruz, el hombre puede también hacer el milagro de la paz y ponerse en condiciones de acertar con el sendero a veces estrecho entre la mezquindad que cede al mal y la violencia que, creyendo ilusoriamente combatirlo, lo agrava (n. 25). Este sendero que tenemos que recorrer no es, de ninguna manera, el sendero ancho porque el Espíritu dice a través del escritor sagrado: "mas ¡qué estrecha la entrada y qué angosto el camino que lleva a la Vida!; y pocos son los que lo encuentran" (Mt 7, 14). Es estrecho el camino porque no faltan las situaciones de particular pobreza, angustia o exasperación, en las que la prueba de la supervivencia, el dolor hasta el límite de lo soportable y las violencias sufridas, hacen que las opciones por la defensa y promoción de la vida sean exigentes, a veces incluso, hasta el heroísmo (Juan Pablo II, 1995, n. 11). 77 Juan Pablo II: Portador de esperanza ante el dolor y el sufrimiento John Paull II: Provider of hope in pain and suffering Perseitas | Vol. 3 | No. 1 | enero-junio| 2015 El dolor humano tiene potencialmente una carga positiva, por ello "puede ser digno de elogio quien acepta voluntariamente sufrir renunciando a tratamientos contra el dolor para conservar la plena lucidez y participar, si es creyente, de manera consciente en la pasión del Señor" (1995, n. 65). No obstante, para ahondar en la experiencia del dolor y el sufrimiento también es necesario acudir a la oración. Ante un momento difícil, un accidente o una enfermedad, muchas personas aconsejan rezar o tener momentos de meditación y reflexión sobre la situación en la que se encuentran. El Papa dice que la familia celebra el Evangelio de la vida con la oración cotidiana, individual y familiar: con ella alaba y da gracias al Señor por el don de la vida e implora luz y fuerza para afrontar los momentos de dificultad y de sufrimiento, sin perder nunca la esperanza (1995, n. 93). A la oración, es necesario unir el sacrificio, dice el Santo Padre, y por eso recomienda a quienes ejercen su ministerio pastoral entre los enfermos, que los instruyan sobre el valor del sufrimiento, animándoles a ofrecerlo a Dios por los misioneros; pues, con tal ofrecimiento, los enfermos se hacen también misioneros (Juan Pablo II, 1990, n. 78). La liturgia también tiene una relación con el sufrimiento, pues en la medida en que se enriquece, gracias a un nuevo y genuino descubrimiento del significado de los ritos y a su adecuada valoración, las celebraciones litúrgicas, sobre todo las sacramentales, serán capaces de expresar la verdad plena, entre otras cosas, sobre el sufrimiento y la muerte para ayudar a vivir estas realidades como participación en el misterio pascual de Cristo muerto y resucitado (Juan Pablo II, 1995, n. 84). El dolor en la entrega generosa El dolor y el sufrimiento están inmersos en el dinamismo de encuentro y de comunión del hombre, pues, como dice el Papa, tienen un sentido y un valor cuando se viven en estrecha relación con el amor recibido y entregado (Juan Pablo II, 1995, cfr. 97d y 81d). Volviendo la mirada al Señor Jesús se ve que con su estilo de vida y con sus acciones, ha demostrado cómo está presente 78 Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez Perseitas | Vol. 3 | No. 1 | enero-junio | 2015 en el mundo en el que vivimos el amor, el amor operante, el amor que se dirige al hombre y abraza todo lo que forma su humanidad; amor que se hace notar particularmente en el contacto con el sufrimiento, la injusticia, la pobreza; en contacto con toda la condición humana histórica, que, de distintos modos, manifiesta la limitación y la fragilidad del hombre, bien sea física o moral (Juan Pablo II, 1980, n. 3). Sostiene el Papa que la verdadera compasión nos hace solidarios con el dolor de los demás (Juan Pablo II, 1995, n. 66). La compasión es ese amor de Cristo que se ha mencionado y está motivada por el mismo Cristo quien nos recuerda qué hacer, pidiendo ser amado y servido en los hermanos probados por cualquier tipo de sufrimiento: hambrientos, sedientos, forasteros, desnudos, enfermos, encarcelados; todo lo que se hace a uno de ellos se hace a Cristo mismo (Mt 25, 31-46) (1995, n. 43). El amor verdadero se prueba no sólo cuando linda con el sufrimiento, sino cuando las experiencias dolorosas están insertadas en la entrega generosa, cuando la entrega cuesta: "En el hombre la misericordia implica dolor y compasión por las miserias del prójimo" (Juan Pablo II, 1986, n. 39). Pero, asumir el dolor no es ni una carga imposible de cargar ni una experiencia tortuosa para el hombre, pues, el Papa Juan Pablo II explica magistralmente que el deseo que brota del corazón del hombre ante el supremo encuentro con el sufrimiento y la muerte, especialmente cuando siente la tentación de caer en la desesperación y casi de abatirse en ella, es sobre todo aspiración de compañía, de solidaridad y de apoyo en la prueba, es petición de ayuda para seguir esperando, cuando todas las esperanzas humanas se desvanecen (Juan Pablo II, 1995, n. 67). Es la cercanía con Cristo y el deseo de vivir como Él y en Él, lo que suscita ese ardiente deseo muy profundo de querer compartir sus sufrimientos, de compartir su misma muerte, "porque ninguno de nosotros vive para sí mismo; como tampoco muere nadie para sí mismo; si vivimos, para el Señor vivimos; y si morimos, para el Señor morimos. Así que ya vivamos ya muramos del Señor somos" (Rm 14, 7-8). 79 Juan Pablo II: Portador de esperanza ante el dolor y el sufrimiento John Paull II: Provider of hope in pain and suffering Perseitas | Vol. 3 | No. 1 | enero-junio| 2015 Sufrió el hijo, sufrió la madre Para quien se descubre hijo de una madre y se deja tocar por esta realidad en lo profundo de su corazón, le es más fácil entender que aunque una madre no sufra físicamente sufre al ver sufrir a sus hijos. Ya se ha citado el sufrimiento de Jesús, y su madre María, que estuvo siempre muy unida a Él, tuvo que vivir su maternidad desde el signo del sufrimiento (Juan Pablo II, 1995, n. 103). Ella muy bien lo sabía y aquel anuncio de Simeón parece como un segundo anuncio a María, dado que le indica la concreta dimensión histórica en la que el hijo cumplirá su misión, es decir, en la incomprensión y en el dolor (Juan Pablo II, 1987, n. 16). El Papa dice que si, por un lado, este anuncio confirma su fe en el cumplimiento de las promesas divinas de la salvación, por otro, le revela también que deberá vivir en el sufrimiento su obediencia de fe al lado del Salvador que sufre, y que su maternidad será oscura y dolorosa (1987, n. 16). No sólo es el Señor Jesús, el mismo Dios hecho carne, quien señala que el camino de la santidad es el camino de la Cruz, sino que ahora es su madre. Parecería injusto pensar que el hijo de Dios, quien habiendo sufrido tanto, hiciera sufrir a su madre, a quien, como dice el Papa, dejaba con tan grande dolor (1987, n. 23); sin embargo, al meditar detalladamente en toda la vida de María, se convierte ella misma, toda su persona, en el testimonio más eximio y en la corroboración más clara de que el camino para alcanzar nuestra reconciliación es vivir en Cristo, asumiendo el horizonte esperanzador de la Comunión divina de amor, pero también la dimensión de abajamiento a lo largo del camino al Calvario, hasta morir como Cristo en la cruz, para luego resucitar a una nueva vida. Conclusiones El hecho de que el Papa Juan Pablo II haya dedicado un documento pontificio, la carta apostólica Salvifici doloris, para hablar exclusivamente sobre el tema del dolor, demuestra su preocupación por ayudar a sentar las bases de la reflexión. En este trabajo se ha querido evidenciar que, además de este documento, en diez de sus catorce encíclicas estuvo presente esta intención por hacer aportes en esta línea. El Santo Padre manifiesta su preocupación 80 Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez Perseitas | Vol. 3 | No. 1 | enero-junio | 2015 por el ser humano, para que el hombre de hoy se entienda a sí mismo y de esta manera entienda el dinamismo del dolor y para que no sólo no se desespere en esos momentos difíciles, sino que encuentre la posibilidad de participar de la misión reconciliadora del Señor Jesús y llenar su vida entera de sentido. Las palabras del Santo Padre están teñidas de esperanza, pareciera que en todo momento nos exhortara a que, aunque en algunos momentos digamos como el Señor Jesús en el Huerto de los Olivos: "¡Abbá, Padre!; todo es posible para ti; aparta de mí esta copa" (Mc 14, 36), logremos terminar la frase con el mismo Señor Jesús, diciendo: "pero no sea lo que yo quiero, sino lo que quieras tú" (Mc 14, 36), para cosechar los frutos de esta respuesta como los cosechó el Señor. No será un camino fácil y como dice la carta a los Hebreos: "Necesitáis paciencia en el sufrimiento para cumplir la voluntad de Dios y conseguir así lo prometido" (Hb 10, 36). La tribulación siempre se tratará de una experiencia personal. Por ello, está la necesidad de conocernos muy bien a nosotros mismos. Nunca nadie podrá hacer que sufra o padezca exactamente lo que otra persona padece; y de esta manera, los frutos que se puedan obtener estarán de acuerdo con la actitud con la que cada uno asuma la experiencia del dolor, ya que en cada caso se producirán resonancias internas y personalizadas (Figari, 2005). Sin embargo, paralela a esta experiencia personal, el Papa siempre se preocupó por destacar la dimensión eclesial del sufrimiento, no sólo como comunidad de bautizados acá en la Tierra, sino como parte del cuerpo cuya cabeza es Cristo. Juan Pablo II abre un horizonte hacia la comprensión del sentido que tienen el dolor y el sufrimiento para la Iglesia católica, sobre todo en la repercusión que tiene para nuestra lucha por la santidad, porque es muy estrecha la relación entre el sufrimiento y el combate espiritual. La insistencia en la oración y en la intercesión de la Virgen María son elementos fundamentales en este caminar. En efecto, el dolor más profundo es el dolor de la lucha espiritual, 81 Juan Pablo II: Portador de esperanza ante el dolor y el sufrimiento John Paull II: Provider of hope in pain and suffering Perseitas | Vol. 3 | No. 1 | enero-junio| 2015 pues "ocurre que en no pocos casos la persona experimenta mayor dificultad para asumir esa lucha, y por ello las resonancias del dolor y lo que implica se agitan en su interior con mayor intensidad" (Figari, 2005, p. 17). Por esta razón, aprender a sobrellevar y comprender el sentido del dolor físico, ayuda a forjar una actitud para asumir con radicalidad y fortaleza las exigencias que se presentan en nuestro combate espiritual, en nuestra lucha contra el hombre viejo y en la búsqueda de la santidad. De esta manera, quien se conoce y sabe que su objetivo final es la santidad, comprenderá el valor real del sufrimiento, lo que transmitió San Juan Pablo II con sus enseñanzas y con el testimonio de su vida misma, especialmente en sus últimos años de vida. Referencias Figari, L. F. (2005). Dolor y alegría. Reflexiones de Viernes Santo. Lima: Editorial Vida y Espiritualidad. Juan Pablo II. (1979). Redemptor Hominis. Bogotá: Ediciones Paulinas. Juan Pablo II. (1980). Dives in Misericordia. Bogotá: Ediciones Paulinas. Juan Pablo II. (1981). Laborem Exercens. Bogotá: Ediciones Paulinas. Juan Pablo II. (1986). Dominum et Vivificantem. Bogotá: Ediciones Paulinas. Juan Pablo II. (1987). Redemptoris Mater. Bogotá: Ediciones Paulinas. Juan Pablo II. (1988). Sollicitudo Rei Socialis. Bogotá: Ediciones Paulinas. Juan Pablo II. (1990). Redemptoris Missio. Bogotá: Ediciones Paulinas. Juan Pablo II. (1991). Centesimus Annus. Bogotá: Ediciones Paulinas. Juan Pablo II. (1993). Veritatis Splendor. Bogotá: Ediciones Paulinas. Juan Pablo II. (1995). Evangelium Vitae. Bogotá: Ediciones Paulinas. 82 Carlos Alberto Rosas Jiménez Perseitas | Vol. 3 | No. 1 | enero-junio | 2015 Kübler-Ross (2005). En: Suardíaz J. (2005) Aspectos bioéticos y antropológicos del dolor, sufrimiento y la muerte. (5). (3). Recuperado de: www. cbioetica.org Tercera Conferencia Episcopal de Obispos Latinoamericanos. (1979a). Puebla. Bogotá: Ediciones Paulinas. Suardíaz J. (2005) Aspectos bioéticos y antropológicos del dolor, sufrimiento y la muerte. (5). (3). Recuperado de: www.cbioetica.org

THE THRESHOLD OF THE INVISIBLE SAID, CONRAD, AND IMPERIALISM Russell Ford "Writing is precisely the very possibility of change, the space that can serve as a springboard for subversive thought, the precursory movement of a transformation of social and cultural struggles."1 In The Concept of Mind, Gilbert Ryle writes at length about what he calls "the systematic elusiveness of the I."2 Always one step ahead, the agent of conscious, intentional action perpetually outstrips its own grasp. He concludes his description of this phenomenon by noting that "there is no mystery about this constancy [with which the I eludes conscious grasp], but I mention it because it seems to endow 'I'with a mystifying uniqueness and adhesiveness. 'Now' has something of the same besetting feeling."3 The "now" and the "I," the moment and the agent of deliberate action, of creation, slip from an apprehension that could only ever be their reiteration. Imagine this essential frustration as Conrad penned his novella, Heart of Darkness, that now famous work whose historical contingency seems lost beneath its canonic sta tus . All of the careful ly wrought-perhaps overly-wrought-lines,4 the archetypal characters, the slow envelopment of its brooding themes-all of these elements emerged in time, out of nothing, across the space of a blank page, as ink traced out across parchment; a perpetually dislocated act of expression. Amidst the almost suffocating purposiveness of Marlow and his tale-recounted now by another-each moment, each mark imagined thus seems to hold back and refuse to decidedly yield to the fullness of the narrative. The necessity of this withholding, the indecision that marks the materiality of the written, is itself the expression of a question. In Conrad's novella, this question obtains expression through the peculiar constitution of Marlow, and specifically through the hesitations and interruptions that Marlow succumbs to in the course of the tale. "Marlow" is the name that Conrad gives to that space of narrative creation-the "now" of writing-that eludes encapsulation or semantic mastery. Marlow is an agent of syntax, of the multiplicity of interpretations birthed by the perpetually tardy bestowal of meaning, as evidenced by his implication not only within the narrative of Heart of Darkness, but also in the earlier story "Youth," and the subsequent novels Lord Jim and Chance.5 Marlow, with all of his complications, is certainly not a necessary component to the story of any of these works. One could imagine them without Marlow, related directly, perhaps, in the first person and therefore stripped of the apparently needless complication of Marlow's (and hence Conrad's) indirectness. Marlow's persistency is, therefore, a sign, perhaps a cipher, of another expression that subtends the narratives of the works that he imposes upon. As Edward Said recognizes, it is one of Conrad's chief virtues as a writer that his works are troubled by the space of the imminent catastrophe of writing, the space of the "now" within which a work of literature takes form without the writer ever being able to foresee its successful completion.6 All of the narrative displacements of Heart of Darkness bear witness to this impossibility of narrative appropriating its own determinacy. The name "Marlow" does not designate a character; it hides or masks a figure, a constellation of indissociable elements that expresses neither a subjective "I" nor an objective "now." In Marlow, Conrad gives expression to an I that is immediately invested by the non-subjective forces of worldly relations, both personal and otherwise, and to a now that takes in more than this man writing, this ink, and this paper, is added a now that includes the non-objective, historical and contingent meanings acquired by these objects and others. This expression in no way implies an intentional decision on the part of the author but rather amounts to a denial of the very possibility of such a decision. Like PHILOSOPHY TODAY WINTER 2006 463 Marlow, Conrad himself is an expression for his readers of the historically determinate world that gave shape to his writing. To try to read the truth of one from the expression of the other can only ever give rise to a circular argument; just as Marlow is generated by an act of writing that Conrad is constitutively unable to master, so Conrad is himself caught within the trajectory of a society for which he becomes an exemplary sign of the historical situation that orients but never encompasses that trajectory.7 Near the end of Culture and Imperialism Said is prospecting for a theoretical enunciation of the conceptual transformations that have proliferated at the limits formed by the trajectory of imperialist culture. Among the theorists and theories that he surveys, he finds "mysteriously suggestive" Deleuze and Guattari's reconceptualization of the subversion of the very terms of cultural struggle in the nomadic activity of the "war machine."8 The particular virtue of the war machine is its power to disarticulate and refashion the meaningful content of existing societal forms, thereby not merely challenging the dominance of these infused and formed meanings by revealing them as historical and therefore found meanings, but also implicitly subverting the societal form itself. The war machine does not constitute a new societal form that would then challenge or replace the dominant society that it resists; to do so would be to accept the definitions supplied by the inverse side of that society's culture. In order to escape the bounds of this dialectical game (whose result is only ever the reimposition of a normalizing force of society), the war machine parodies the societal form by creating illicit combinations of cultural forces and objects that are nonetheless permitted by virtue of their places of inclusion within the defining limit of a society.9 While this parody is lived by exiles, refugees, and migrants-whose numbers, Said notes with regret, have only continued to increase-its effect of "deterritorialization," its ability to recast societal norms and thereby to juxtapose ideological or hegemonic norms with new societal combinations, stripping the former of their necessary veneer of uniqueness, is particularly effective in fiction. Narrative fiction, whose very structure lends itself to the duplication of societal structures, permits not only the rearrangement of the artifacts of those structures, but also the refashioning of a society's conceptual underpinnings-those very concepts being what give shape to that society's culture. One of the trajectories for such a conceptual transformation is through what Deleuze and Guattari elsewhere call "conceptual personae."10 These "true agents of enunciation"11 are the inscription of the necessary parody created by a writer whose task, in Conrad's words, "is, by the power of the written word, to make you hear, to make you feel-it is, before all, to make you see. That-and no more, and it is everything;"12 the task of a writer who wrestles with and gives voice to the elusiveness of the moment of expression. On the one hand, this differentiates conceptual personae from characters.13 The latter are recognizable, comprehensible, and are therefore the aftereffect of enunciation; even the hero of a Bildungsroman acquires his education at the direction of the writer as teacher imbued with prescient knowledge.14 The impossibility of mastering or overtaking the moment of expression ensures that its agent effects a transformation of the writer; the text becomes the trajectory of a thinking through of what in it comes to expression. On the other hand, what comes to expression should not be mistaken for equally comprehensible "psychosocial types," as though they were merely culturally determined concretions of the zeitgeist. These types articulate the three intertwined moments described by Deleuze and Guattari in terms of territory, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization. For instance, Dickens's character Oliver Twist, that exemplary orphan who by definition is both within and outside of his society, with his refrain of "Please sir, I want some more," deterritorializes not only the gruel but also the entire territory of the institutionalized orphanage, organized according to the material needs of the orphans as determined by industrialized society, and reterritorializes its elements within a moral or political territory organized by human relationships.15 Conceptual personae, however, "show thought's territories, its absolute deterritorializations and reterritorializations."16 Such expression, as Deleuze and Guattari emphasize, is impossible without psychosocial types whose societal disposition lends them to the parodic dislocation of thought of thought (the orphan amidst the inPHILOSOPHY TODAY 464 dustrialization of England in the mid-nineteenth century), however, these very types can give rise to a dis-figurement of societal functions rather than to a figuration of thought's conceptual movements.17 A conceptual persona is this dis-figuration of a society, an interruption of the cultural determinants that define its form, whose absolute incompletion effects its determination of a "problem" that threatens to overturn the very presuppositions that allow a society to achieve a distinctive form.18To claim that Marlow is a conceptual persona is to follow Said's diagnosis and to discern in Conrad's writing a movement that threatens the very structure of imperialist society precisely by remaining complicit in its historical limitations. Said writes that Heart of Darkness cannot just be a straightforward recital of Marlow's adventures: it is also a dramatization of Marlow himself, the former wanderer in colonial regions, telling his story to a group of British listeners at a particular time and in a specific place. . . . Although the almost oppressive force of Marlow's narrative leaves us with a quite accurate sense that there is no way out of the sovereign historical force of imperialism, and that it has the power of a system representing as well as speaking for everything within its dominion, Conrad shows us that what Marlow does is contingent, acted out for a set of like-minded British hearers, and limited to that situation.19 This limitation that constitutes the structure of the novel and that renders it such a potent artifact of imperial culture must be pushed to the point of overwhelming or subsuming the very character of Marlow, who exemplifies the type of "the former wanderer in colonial regions." Conrad's character, this wanderer who is nonetheless a relentless narrator, is himself structured, delimited by Conrad's pen, a delimitation that forms as much of a structural feature of the text as its setting, and is no less rich in conflicting tendencies.20 Moreover, the presence of the unnamed narrator who tells the story of Marlow's tale indicates that, like a Russian doll, every narrator is nested within another, and each narrator is an emergent set of traits within a narrative that the art of writers like Conrad put on display in such a way that its frozen dynamism betrays the very historical contingency that the content of the tale would obscure.21 Culture and Darkness Said discerns in imperialism a "sovereign historical force," a force that dominates and determines its own past, erasing its contingencies and replacing them with a necessary march of particular ideals into actuality. With the attainment of sovereignty an imperial society deploys a set of distinctive artifacts-elements of its culture-that simultaneously delimit its particular identity and enforce this identity upon other societies as a norm. The aesthetic character of these cultural elements allows Said his initial point of purchase on the problem of imperialism. Said's book Culture and Imperialism is not simply a sequel to Orientalism, it expands the scope of the investigation conducted in the latter through a more rigorous determination of the concept of "culture." This determination is shown to hinge upon a consideration of narrative literature which, finally, opens upon the political power of narration itself. In this investigation of the peculiar physiognomy of the intertwined narratives of imperialism and the multiple forces that work against imperialism, Said accords a distinctive role to Heart of Darkness. Conrad's novella is not merely a test case for Said; Heart of Darkness reveals, if only obliquely, the constitutive conceptual apparatus by which narration works to disrupt imperialism and, indeed, any inclinations to totality whatsoever. The relation between the concepts of imperialism, culture, the narrative novel and, ultimately, narration itself form the theoretical ground of Said's reading of Conrad. One of the central claims made by Said about narration, and about Conrad's narrative in particular, is that its form-rather than its content-is what gives it its effective force at the level of culture. Therefore the form of Conrad's novella itself must be considered with specific attention to the situatedness of the narrative, the work of interruption, and to the doublings that suffuse the text-all the way down to the bare repetition of Kurtz's final words. Whereas in Orientalism, Said was concerned with the historical depiction of the Middle East in the cultural and political imagiSAID, CONRAD, AND IMPERIALISM 465 nation of Western Europe, in Culture and Imperialism the investigation shifts to a more global and pervasive concern. The reason for this shift is twofold. On the one hand is Said's perception of a more basic and pervasive pattern that lay beneath the Orientalism of Western Europe. Rather than constituting a unique development, this phenomenon is one whose characteristic symptoms-the emphasis on the "mystery" of different cultures, the insistence upon a divine or even (rational) human obligation to "beneficially" transform this foreign culture, the importance of physical violence for ensuring the untroubled legislation of reason-all are repeated in the encounters between Western Europe and other societies. Orientalism is therefore one species of the more general diagnosis of imperialism. On the other hand, another complex of symptoms is coupled with imperialism, this one more difficult to diagnose because of the idiosyncratic character that dominates each of its manifestations. Where imperialism alights one finds the active opposition of a society, an opposition that assumes the form both of opposing political parties and of the assertion of national identity.22 While this is by now a familiar complex, Said emphasizes that what is often overlooked is the fact that resistance to imperialism is never subsequent to its exercise. Resistance is equiprimordial with imperialism and, as such, not only cannot be misconstrued as re-active, but must also be recognized as possessing an equal claim to societal determination. The concept of "culture" is what permits the diagnosis of this encounter between two equally primary forces of social incorporation. On the one hand, Said writes, "culture . . . means all those practices, like the arts of description, communication, and representation, that have relative autonomy from the economic, social, and political realms and that often exist in aesthetic forms, one of whose principal aims is pleasure."23 This aspect of culture thus denotes both the art of depicting what is other than and resists a certain society, and also the art of rendering a coherent account of society. The novel is a privileged form of this art because, for Said, it is the appropriate form of expression for an encounter with the strange. This is no historical accident-the rise of the novel and the growth of imperial power are not accidental to each other-but rather forms a reflection of the ability to at least appear to domesticate the foreign. Insofar as a person or place or event can be given a name or description-a name or description whose very comprehensibility depends upon its application to multiple things, some of which have yet to be perceived-that thing becomes recognizable and familiar. And so one can describe narrative as the temporally linear appropriation ("proper rendering") not merely of the unknown, but of what initially appears as something resisting appropriation. Narrative then is simultaneously a legitimation of a form of expression over what resists it-its most familiar aspect -but it is also a form of resistance and contestation-the obverse side of its familiarity. While this is apparent in the somewhat misleadingly-named "counter-narratives" of previously colonized peoples, Said emphasizes that it is already present, if not apparent, in the active struggle of normalizing expression to domesticate the strange. It is in this always already struggling aspect of narrative that Said locates the second set of characteristics that determine the concept of "culture:" it is inherently "refining" and "elevating."24 Because culture is carried in a narrative that aims at the reduction of the strange to the familiar, it necessarily refines or hones the expression of the society that it expresses in order thereby to elevate that society into a privileged position that would legitimate its pretensions to normativity. Again, there are two aspects of this activity of narration that result from its immediate and constant contestation. On the one hand, it becomes a source of identity for those who would belong to the society that it expresses. The refinement and corresponding elevation of the narrative's expression transform it into something like a symbol of the virtues of the expression's society. At the same time, however, the narrative is also "combative" insofar as the identity it constitutes is constituted out of an immediate opposition to the resistance of the strange. As Said notes, the refinement of expression into a symbol indicates that that very expression is competing, not with the strange, but with other expressions that it cannot recognize. The result of this double refinement of the concept of culture-a refinement permitted by the analysis of narrative that shows it to be both constitutive and challenged-is that culture itPHILOSOPHY TODAY 466 self comes to mark the limits of expressive communities. In the narrative that is judged to be "great" because of its ability to render the strange or atypical in a comprehensible manner, that strangeness is struggled with at the same time that the apparent victory of expression-its depiction of the strange-becomes a token of what makes that society superior.25 Culture thus becomes what Said calls a "theater of ideologies." Because it is constituted largely through the narrative expression of the strange, culture dramatizes the values that determine its expression not only through their focused and skillful deployment, but also in contrast to the competing values that organize the expressive society that persists beneath the caricature of "the strange." Thus defined, culture reveals a connection between seemingly idle aesthetic pleasure and the sort of ideology characteristic of imperialism. Art is the eminent mark of a society's prestige only when it is forgotten that this symbol becomes what it is only in its contestation. Culture is the limit of society and its peculiar fate in imperialist societies is, to a greater or lesser degree, to stage and to indicate the very contest of values that imperialism would deny. Such a contest is staged in various ways and to different degrees by different narratives, and thus the connection of aesthetics and politics will not be able to be generalized. What Said then seeks, in Culture and Imperialism, is the dramatization of a series of narratives, a dramatization that emphasizes a narrative not as the overwhelming expression of an existing culture that takes place in the passive milieu of the strange, but as the inherently resisted and contested expression that marks the limit of two societies and determines the nature of the culture of each. The Essence of Dreams Said turns to Heart of Darkness not simply as an exemplary narrative of imperialism, but as an exemplary narrative of the narratives of imperialism: what is at issue is the very form of Conrad's novella. In his analysis of this form, Said emphasizes three relations decisive for the constitution of this form: the relation of Africa and England, of Kurtz and Marlow, and of narrative expression and interruption. Each of these relations contribute to the circular dynamic of the narrative, and this ultimately is what makes Conrad's novella so valuable for Said: in its circularity, the narrative refuses to abandon or deny the limit where culture is staged. There is no exit from either Conrad's or Marlow's narratives; in fact, each eventually rejoins the other, leaving both the reader and the narrator adrift at the edge of the heart of empire. However, if the momentum of the narrative is circular, and persists in refusing the gesture of imperialism even as it is unable to avoid continually posing the question of its legitimacy, it may be that this bare repetition is productive. Said's discussion of the novella is premised upon a well-known quote from Marlow that occurs near the end of the first part of the story when Marlow interrupts himself to express the difficulty of conveying the meaning behind the words of his tale. At this point in his narrative, Marlow has arrived at the Central Station and is delayed there by the sinking of the ship that he was to take further up the river. While there, he allows the manager to believe that he has influence in Europe so that his passage will be expedited. What strikes Marlow-so forcefully that he breaks off his story-is that he is willing to allow the untruth about his standing in Europe to persist because it may help Kurtz who, he emphasizes, he has yet to meet and remains for him only a name. "Do you see him? Do you see the story? Do you see anything?" Marlow asks his listeners on the Nellie, "It seems to me I am trying to tell you a dream-making a vain attempt, because no relation of a dream can convey the dream-sensation, that commingling of absurdity, surprise, and bewilderment in a tremor of struggling revolt, that notion of being captured by the incredible which is of the very essence of dreams." After another pause comes the lines that Said cites: "No, it is impossible; it is impossible to convey the life-sensation of any given epoch of one's existence-that which makes its truth, its meaning-its subtle and penetrating essence. It is impossible. We live, as we dream-alone."26 Despite the impossibility of expression, however, the temporal momentum is enough to guarantee that Marlow's stuttering expression has force and, for Said, the numerous interruptions of the narrative itself, as well as the digressions of Marlow's story, are drawn along by the very form of the trajectory being recounted. SAID, CONRAD, AND IMPERIALISM 467 The conflict between this unproductive failure of expression-the essential solipsism of language-and the forceful progression of the story is further highlighted by the situation in which the story is narrated. This story of determined progress is told to a group of retired sailors on a ship at anchor at the mouth of the Thames. The inertia of the Nellie forms a sharp contrast with the momentum of Marlow's story, just as Marlow is himself sharply contrasted with his listeners. These listeners are in fact not even named, they are merely designated by their respective societal and economic roles: the Director, the Lawyer, the Accountant-whereas Marlow, who carries his name, is set apart as the only one "who still "followed the sea""27-a phrase whose obliquity already indicates the difference between Marlow's persona and the clearly identified psychosocial types of his shipmates. For Said these contrasts are a product of Conrad's own expatriate status-he was an émigré from Poland-by which he was able to take stock of the very formation of imperial colonialization. Whereas the first travelers to foreign societies were characterized by an independent air, the incorporation of the colonies into the economic and social life of the colonial powers necessarily led to a standardization of overseas trade and a domestication of seafaring. This transformation is made explicit by Conrad in "Youth," a novella that precedes Heart of Darkness by one year, in which we again find Marlow himself dramatizing this transformation: narrating the story of his first voyage to the East but punctuating this narrative with the refrain "Pass the bottle"-the bottle simultaneously a product of the regularized trade that voyages such as Marlow's helped create, and also an instrument for the effacement of the contingency that gave such early sea voyages their character of individuality and adventure. Said finds a parallel effacement in Marlow's narrative in Heart of Darkness. On the one hand there are a series of juxtapositions in the narrative: Africa and England, the Congo and the Thames, Kurtz and Marlow, the "wild and gorgeous apparition of a woman"28 and the Intended. Marlow's first words-"And this also . . . has been one of the dark places on the earth."29-begin a recollection for his listeners of the time when England marked the limit of the Roman Empire. This has the effect not only of linking England and Africa, of obliterating any a priori distinction between them, but also of indicating the force of time and a notion of history as narrative that is dependent on no narrator. It is on the basis of this first juxtaposition that we can locate the second, that of Marlow and Kurtz. As the episode at the Central Station shows-although there are other indications as well-Marlow finds himself in some way allied to Kurtz before they have even met. At the same time, Conrad's novella constantly troubles this kinship by reinforcing each character with the quality of solitude. Indeed, this near-monomania is what links the two, as well as what prevents their accord-allowing each the distance to critique the judgment of the other-and makes both of them avatars of imperial society. Their mutual relation to the strange is then thematized by perhaps the most singular juxtaposition of the novella: that of the "wild and gorgeous apparition of a woman" and the Intended. On the one hand, the former's relationship with Kurtz is rendered with Kafkaesque ambiguity-never is the reader sure what passes between them and, on the other hand, her relationship to Marlow-who feels a combination of allure and fear-is the classic figuration of the feminine lure of the Orient. The Intended is an almost inverse figure, her relationship to both Marlow and Kurtz clear and direct, but premised in one case on a verbal lie, and in the other upon a faith that the lie only sustains. These juxtapositions, highlighted from out of the "ironic distance" that the émigré Conrad preserves in Heart of Darkness as well as his other works, gives rise to what Said calls two possible arguments or visions of a post-colonial world. One argument would legitimate and solidify the position of imperialist culture, drawing a line from the now civilized and enlightened England, to Marlow's relentless journey upriver and Kurtz's civilizing plans (both of which fail to bring change only because, as the manager of the Central Station tells Marlow, "the time was not yet ripe for vigorous action"),30 to the dangerous but seductive "apparition of a woman" that entices and entreats the colonizers, and, finally, to the Intended who incarnates the heart of the empire and sustains its faith. This first argument leads to a consolidation if not an outright legitimation of imperialism. According to its figuration PHILOSOPHY TODAY 468 of the political aesthetic, any resistant society is subjected to what Said calls "rhetorical slaughter." This excess leads, in turn, to a sympathy for counter-imperialist insurgencies; insurgencies that merely end up repeating its gestures because they borrow their narrative form from imperialism. In this repetition, opposition dissolves as the conflict becomes one simply of authority rather than ideology. But this first argument is coupled with and troubled by another that Conrad seems no less insistent upon. For Said, the key to this other interpretation is the specificity with which Conrad dates his narratives, placing them within a particular historically situated society and, in the case of "Youth" and Heart of Darkness, linking the narrative to the particular position of the narrator within a colonial society. The effect of this second argument is to broach the possibility of a narrative, and a society, that is organized in a fundamentally different way than imperialist narratives and their societies. Said writes that this "is a profoundly secular perspective, and it is beholden neither to notions about historical destiny and the essentialism that destiny always seems to entail, nor to historical indifference and resignation."31 And in Conrad we find the possibility of such a narrative in the resonance between the irruptions of the unexpressable that stutter Marlow's narrative, in the persisting lack of coincidence between Kurtz and Marlow, in the almost contradictory figures of the feminine, and, finally, in "the horror," the doubled refrain that betrays the lie of imperialist ambition, and the lie at the heart of its essence, serving both to absurdly caricature the "apparition of a woman" and to betray the falsity of the Intended. The irreducibility of these two arguments constitutes Conrad's greatness and also his impotence for Said. Greatness because, in the midst of a flourishing system of global imperialism, Conrad was able to extricate himself from it and to pose its essence and activities as a question. Impotence because this posing could offer no alternative, could not even offer an outright condemnation of imperialism. Quoting Arendt's The Origins of Totalitarianism, Said describes Conrad as a writer who, entering "the maelstrom of an unending process of expansion, will, as it were, cease to be what he was and obey the laws of the process, identify himself with anonymous forces that he is supposed to serve in order to keep the whole process in motion, he will think of himself as mere function, and eventually consider such functionality, such an incarnation of the dynamic trend, his highest possible achievement."32 Heart of Darkness, then, is not merely an element of imperialist culture, it is a staging of that culture itself, a staging of the limit of a society that, as its limit, necessarily bears within itself what is strange and irreducible to that culture. However, what remains decisive for Said, again following Arendt, is Conrad's inability to put forward a counterproposal to the machinations of imperialism. At the limit of imperialist culture, Conrad nevertheless remains implicated by it. Said's reading of Heart of Darkness is premised upon both its narrative form and its symbolic content, both of which betray and contest its imperialist origin. However, in Said's reading the content ultimately supersedes the narrative form as the site of contestation. This is to forget, or at least minimize, what Said has already said about narrative and the novel: that they are the particular forms of the encounter of colonial society with the strange. Not only is the strange appropriated by the expression of the novel's narrative, but this narrative itself structures and is structured by the strange. In other words, narrative itself is staged at the limits of imperialism, as the tell-tale mark of its culture. Toward the end of Culture and Imperialism, Said turns to this question of the relationship of narrative form to imperial society when he writes, "The question is, Where? And where too, we might ask, is there a place for that astonishingly harmonious vision of time intersecting with the timeless."33 This intersection is the very thing that draws Said to Conrad: the intersection of Conrad's specific life with the timeless and monolithic constructs of imperialism. What frustrates Said in his reading of Conrad is the latter's seeming inability to resolutely takes sides against the forceful, homogenizing force of imperialism. However, it may be that by looking at the representations and expressions of both imperialism and the strange within Conrad's narrative, Said misses the way that the very form or style of Heart of Darkness works against imperialism. Indeed, is this not the very lesson that the inconceivability of the two arguments of the SAID, CONRAD, AND IMPERIALISM 469 novella teaches us? Far from being misleading, Said's reading, by juxtaposing the conflicting expressions at work in the novella, leads to the very heart of the problem: the resistance of the novella to its very form. While this resistance is extensive-and Said catalogs a number of its elements34-three are decisive. The first is the situatedness of the narrative: not only who is telling it, but also how, and the extent to which Conrad sets up, with a great deal of care, the situation on the Nellie. The second is the work of interruption in the main body of the text, both where it occurs and also how it fundamentally alters the momentum of the narration. Finally, the third formal element of resistance in the novella is the refrain of Kurtz's final words, a refrain that shatters the relentless itinerary of Marlow and opens the narration onto the final, almost spectral pages. Attention to these formal rebellions provide some evidence for claiming that by breaking the narrative form Conrad is in fact able to break with imperialist culture. The Empire Beneath a Spectral Moon The narrative of Heart of Darkness is initially situated and determined in two ways: by the positioning of the Nellie and her passengers, and by the narrator's opening description of Marlow. As Said points out, with the exception of Marlow, the characters arranged on the deck of the Nellie are seamen who have left off the adventurous days of their youth and entered into the more direct and placid economic service of the Empire. They are, however, out for a cruise-presided over by the Director of Companies-rather than for any business purposes. At dusk, they arrive at the mouth of the Thames where they are forced to weigh anchor and wait for the tide to turn. The Nellie thus sits with her bow to the sea as Conrad emphasizes when he writes that the Director "stood in the bows looking to seaward. . . . It was difficult to realize his work was not out there in the luminous estuary, but behind him, within the brooding gloom."35 Marlow is sitting in the stern of the boat-the narrator notes that he had "a straight back, an ascetic aspect, and, with his arms dropped, the palms of hands outwards, resembled an idol."36-and he is joined there by the rest of the ship's complement as the story opens. There a silence takes over, matching the stillness of the ship at anchor, as the sun sinks and the narrator reflects on the "change" that came over the Thames; a change that reflects its memories, the ships and figures that have issued forth and returned from it. Just before the sun sets, he concludes "What greatness had not floated on the ebb of that river into the mystery of an unknown earth! . . . The dreams of men, the seed of commonwealths, the germs of empires."37 Only when the sun has gone down does Marlow begin to speak. Conrad's precision in describing the situation on the Nellie shows its importance for the narrative that emerges-and the fact that the story never leaves the ship is essential. The ship is at anchor with its stern in the West and its bow facing East. All of the people on board retreat to its stern as the sun sets, following its apparent descent, remaining in its light as long as possible, and moving as far as possible from the East, toward which the yacht is nonetheless faced. This situation is a staging of the Orientalist attitude: at the limit of the known, the imperialist draws back from the mystery of the East that nonetheless remains seductive and beckoning. The use of the tide to figure this double movement is significant-as is the role of the sea in Conrad's work, where for his sailors it represents the perpetually unknown-marking both the separation of the colonizer and the colonized (a separation ultimately minimized or erased by the establishment of regular trade routes) and the indeterminate limit that binds them together. At anchor in the ebb of the tide, Conrad has placed the narrative of Heart of Darkness precisely at the limit of imperial culture. Moreover, in doing so, he has created an aesthetic object that literally undercuts the very society of which it is an esteemed symbol. When Marlow speaks the sun has set behind him, making him no more than a shadow to his audience. He faces East, down the length of the yacht, which is also the traditional facing of the statue of a deity in a shrine-and Marlow is explicitly likened to an idol by the narrator, who describes him as having "the pose of a Buddha preaching in European clothes and without a lotus-flower."38-because this facing connotes the rebirth that occurs with the rising of the sun in the East. Marlow's speech, then, not only flows against the ebbing of the tide, but emerges from the archaic heart of imperialPHILOSOPHY TODAY 470 ism-and this is further reinforced by the first words that he speaks, which concern England's status as a colonial holding of the Roman Empire. Moreover, the narrative is a remembrance, giving the scene the air of a memorial rather than a temple. The narrative itself is therefore constituted by a series of opposing movements: Marlow's voice and the tide, remembrance and the present, and, finally, imperialism and the strange-all of which are presided over by a gathering darkness. These oppositions are emphasized by Conrad when the narrator remarks, following Marlow's insistence on the "idea" that alone redeems the brutality of imperialism, that the Nellie's passengers "were fated, before the ebb began to run, to hear about one of Marlow's inconclusive experiences."39 The contradictory elements of the rhetorical staging of Heart of Darkness do more work than the content of the book; or, rather, the content remains determined by this rhetorical form: set at the limits of imperialism, the narrative itself is an allegory of the irreconcilability of imperialism with itself. The very form of Conrad's novella opens the limit of culture to its obverse side in a very distinctive way: a way that permits that side to abandon the very form of the limit that constitutes the culture proper to imperialism. Following Marlow's first words the narrator contrasts him with others who "follow the sea:" "The yarns of seamen have a direct simplicity, the whole meaning of which lies within the shell of a cracked nut. But Marlow was not typical (if his propensity to spin yarns be excepted), and to him the meaning of an episode was not inside like a kernel but outside, enveloping the tale which brought it out only as a glow brings out a haze, in the likeness of one of these misty halos that sometimes are made visible by the spectral illumination of moonshine."40 The setting of the Nellie is ideal for such an episode: Marlow's narrative flows out from the West but, undercut by the flowing of the tide and faced with the immensity of the sea, it directly illuminates nothing. Later, speaking of the Company politics that he finds himself embroiled in, Marlow remarks that "The essentials of this affair lay deep under the surface, beyond my reach, and beyond my power of meddling."41 Illuminating nothing, Marlow's narrative instead serves only, paradoxically, to obliquely indicate a haze or a fog, a region of indeterminacy coupled to both the narrative and to the Nellie (as well as to Marlow's unnamed ship as he travels up the Congo). Producing a haze from the reflected light of the moon, a light that shines only in the darkness: this is the essential character of Marlow's narrative and Conrad's indictment of any attempt successfully to mediate the "civilizing idea" at the heart of imperialism with its barbaric acts. Indeed, this may be the greatest achievement of the novella: it refutes the possibility of any justifiable mediation between the "idea" of civilization and its concrete atrocities. Following Marlow's introductory remarks on the colonial history of England, during which he breaks off his narrative twice, he begins the narration of his trip up the Congo River in search of Kurtz. Conrad takes great care to situate this narrative within a larger context. While the story of Marlow's journey up the Congo is often cited for its exemplary status as a figuration of imperialist aggression, Said's analysis has indicated the way for a reading that renders the narrative deeply ambiguous even at the level of description.42 The same is true of the narrative taken formally. Throughout the narrative there is a sub-current of critical self-reflection that rises in intensity and reaches its most extreme pitch when Marlow encounters Kurtz, although its reverberations organize the conclusion of Marlow's story as he relates his actions upon returning to England. However, in addition to this influx that undercuts the progression of Marlow's story, there are four distinct moments when this counter-tendency overwhelms the momentum of the narrative. The first of these-actually a stuttering of three silences-occurs as Marlow is talking with the brickmaker at the Central Station who offers a rambling account of Kurtz. Here Marlow breaks off over the seeming insufficiency of words to convey the figure of Kurtz, or even bear the weight of the story-although his frustration may also be read in terms of the inability of his listeners to hear the story itself. Moreover, not only is it the insufficiency of words that seems to definitively undercut the story, but the narrative has ceased to be anything but words, Marlow and the rest of the Nellie having fallen into complete darkness: the narrator "listen[ing] on the watch for the SAID, CONRAD, AND IMPERIALISM 471 sentence, for the word, that would give me the clue to the faint uneasiness inspired by this narrative that seemed to shape itself without human lips in the heavy night-air of the river."43 The second interruption comes during Marlow's lengthy description of the river above the Central Station. He speaks of having to occupy himself with mundane tasks of navigation with the result that "the reality . . . fades. The inner truth is hidden,"44 and he extends this comment to the daily activities of those listening to him on the Nellie. Rather than merely breaking off, Marlow is here interrupted and told to be "civil" by one of these listeners-an indication that Marlow's audience is indeed attentive to the way that the narrative, while seemingly applying familiar expressions to the strange, is at the same time rendering strange what is apparently the most mundane. The third interruption follows the attack on Marlow's ship that convinces him that Kurtz is dead and that Marlow would never have a chance to speak with him-although he later learns that Kurtz ordered the attack-and he realizes that speaking with Kurtz has become the reason for his journey. "The point was in he [Kurtz] being a gifted creature, and that of all his gifts the one that stood out preeminently, that carried with it a sense of real presence, was his ability to talk, his words-the gift of expression, the bewildering, the illuminating, the most exalted and the most contemptible, the pulsating stream of light, or the deceitful flow from the heart of an impenetrable darkness."45 At this point, someone on the Nellie lets out a sigh and Marlow again speaks of the "absurdity" of trying to express the essence of what happened. Hesitating in his account, Marlow strikes a match and lights his pipe, revealing his face for the first time as it is caught in the flickering light. Having already rendered Marlow as a purely linguistic being, this flickering disclosure of his face, coupled to the words that give the novella its title, emphasizes the ultimate impotence of language to establish meaning-a si tuat ion that Marlow characterizes with the word "absurd." Finally, just after this interruption, Marlow breaks off again, this time as he is drowned by the multiplicity of voices that compose the story-faltering specifically over "the girl," the Intended, toward whom, in his faltering, Marlow adopts the attitude of Kurtz, stuttering "she is out of it-completely. They-the women I mean-are out of it-should be out of it. We must help them to stay in that beautiful world of their own, lest ours gets worse."46 Following the chain of narrative breaks that terminates here, this statement by Marlow, repeating and even almost channeling Kurtz, repeats the alibi and the lie that allows for the perseverance of imperialism even in the face of its atrocities: the idea of another world. It is this idea that determines Kurtz's final words which, in turn, determine Marlow's meeting with the Intended. "The horror. The horror." In their repetition, these words constitute a refrain that simultaneously condenses the strange that constitutes the obverse side of the limit of imperial culture, and the idea of civilization that not only determines and coordinates this limit, but promises its mediation. When he hears them, Marlow takes them up-"it is not my own extremity I remember best. . . . No! It is his extremity that I seem to have lived through."47 Returning to England he is assailed by various personages that strip away the trappings of Kurtz, again leaving only the idea. Later, Marlow remarks that "All that had been Kurtz's had passed out of my hands: his soul, his body, his station, his plans, his ivory, his career. There remained only his memory and his Intended."48-a memory and a promise that will, in Conrad's narrative, prove irreconcilable. Marlow visits the Intended at dusk and in their conversation, composed largely of her filling the gaps where Marlow's voice breaks off, the light inexorably fades with an insistence that Conrad's text makes clear. The Intended insists upon the bright nobility of the civilizing idea that Kurtz carried when he left and Marlow, anxious to leave as soon as he arrives, allows her to persist in her dreamy imaginings. But then he is caught: she asks to hear Kurtz's dying words. It is here that the narrative ends-the novella is not merely a tale of a river journey-because it is here that Marlow is forced to render up a decisive response to the contradictions that form his narrative. "I pulled myself together and spoke slowly. "The last word he spoke was-your name."49 The Intended is exultant, finding her almost messianic idea of Kurtz confirmed; and Marlow remarks to himself, "I could not tell her. It would PHILOSOPHY TODAY 472 have been too dark-too dark altogether."50 Here, finally, in the refrain of Kurtz's final words, Conrad gives a doubly paradoxical expression to the irreducible contradiction of imperialist culture. On the one hand, the idea of justice, the civilizing idea that guides imperial action, cannot be named, cannot become actual, even as it is sure of its own power (and because of this surety). On the other hand, the action of the idea is utterly unknown to itself, to the extent that it finds no words for its deeds. Conclusion Toward the end of Culture and Imperialism, Said formulates the irreconcilability of imperial culture as that between "the logic of daring" that formulates the civilizing idea of imperialism, and "the massive dislocations, waste, misery, and horrors endured in our century's migrations and mutilated lives."51 The form and structure of Marlow's narrative show that Conrad too, in Heart of Darkness, caught sight of this disjunction. But to claim that he was prevented from offering a counter-idea to imperialism implies that there is ultimately a program that will set justice to work in the world. Conrad is not silent on the question of justice-on the contrary, Marlow gives an answer in the lie that completes Kurtz's final words. The idea of justice is to be allowed to endure, blind to the misdeeds of its errant minions, and these minions are to be opposed, precisely in the name of justice. Justice is the name of the agency of ethical transformation, and therefore it necessarily cannot be recuperated within the concretion of its acts. However, what Said's discussion of Heart of Darkness rightly discerns is that aesthetics is a contested and contesting aspect of culture, a uniquely political dimension given its ability to stage, and thereby parody, the errant trajectories of sovereignty.52 The structure of Conrad's novella summons its readers to the very idea of justice. If the content of Heart of Darkness gives rise to a narrative of anti-imperialism, to a reversal of the limit of culture, its form does something else; it goes further, and with more audacity. When, in the closing pages of Culture and Imperialism, Said turns briefly to the notion of "deterritorialization" as an intellectual practice of repeating the gestures of imperialism amidst new ecologies that permit inventive transformations rather than formulaic mediations, what draws him is precisely the inability to provide a program for such an activity. "Nomadic" practices are never prescribed, they follow no orthodoxy-for who in good conscience could wish the life of a nomad onto another or themselves? Writing of Nietzsche's relation to the conceptual persona of Zarathustra, Pierre Klossowski states that the former, "after having given voice to the triumph of Zarathustra, will remain behind in a position sacrificed in the course of a victorious retreat."53 Although Marlow will return in two other significant novels by Conrad, Lord Jim and Chance, in each case he does so only to reemphasize the expression of a facet of the culture that he exemplifies in Heart of Darkness. Creating an elaborately detailed stage for this limit itself, Conrad's novella insists upon the repetition of the limit, the continual struggle for and against justice, not as a negative consequence of not being able to formulate a non-imperial system, but as the positive consequence of resisting forcing such expressions into formulation. It is Said's greatest gift to those who live on to have provided an articulation of the very essence of Conrad's problem. Far from occluding issues of race and colonialism behind a structure of literary theory, Said's concept of culture permits the exhibition of writing as the theater of the limits of society, a proscenium for its fears, prejudices, unvoiced hopes and tenebrous desires. At the tip of Conrad's pen, restlessly circumscribed by the repeatedly fractured "Marlow," is the element of cultural limitation whose limitless repetition Said emphasizes and, in so doing, passes on as a task. "The ultimate aim of literature," Deleuze writes, echoing and amplifying Said, "is to set free . . . this creation of a health or this invention of a people, that is, a possibility of life."54 SAID, CONRAD, AND IMPERIALISM 473 ENDNOTES PHILOSOPHY TODAY 474 1. Hélène Cixous, "The Laugh of the Medusa," in Literary Debate: Texts and Contexts, ed. Denis Hollier and Jeffrey Mehlman, (New York: The New Press, 1999), 411. 2. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 195–98. 3. Ibid., 198. Note that Ryle's insight here is certainly compatible with his behaviorism, but it does not compel acceptance of that theory. The point here in fact concerns the very problem that behaviorism and other theories of the mind attempt to resolve. 4. One of Conrad's earlier critics, F. R. Leavis, writes of Heart of Darkness in his The Great Tradition: George Eliot, Henry James, Joseph Conrad (New York: G. W. Stewart, 1948), that "the same vocabulary, the same adjectival insistence upon inexpressible and incomprehensible mystery, is applied to the evocation of human profundities and spiritual horrors; to magnifying a thrilled sense of the unspeakable potentialities of the human soul. The actual effect is not to magnify but to muffle." For Leavis this "adjectival insistence" detracts from the power of the chain of specific and concrete events that constitutes the narrative. Such a criticism presumes that the force of Conrad's novel is exhausted in its mere evocativeness. However, the very extensiveness of the expressive obfuscation cited by Leavis is actually an argument for its essentiality to the work. Albert J. Guerard, in his Conrad the Novelist (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), takes what Leavis regards as an error to be in fact the constitution of a second series of events, parallel to those specific and concrete events emphasized by Leavis, that recount a psychological journey. There is, of course, a third option that characterizes Edward Said's reading: namely that Conrad's narrative is neither psychological nor concrete but cultural, staging the uncertainties and inconsistencies that Conrad diagnoses in his own imperialist society through a series of worldly events. 5. "Youth" was originally published in 1898 in Blackwood's Magazine, and then again in a book, together with Heart of Darkness and The End of the Tether, in 1902. Lord Jim was published in 1900; Chance appeared in 1913. 6. This imminent catastrophe of writing is discussed by Maurice Blanchot in The Space of Literature, trans. Ann Smock, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982), as well as The Writing of the Disaster, trans. Ann Smock, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995). Speaking of what he calls "the essential solitude," Blanchot writes, "The writer seems to be the master of his pen; he can become capable of great mastery over words and over what he wants to make them express. But his mastery only succeeds in putting him, keeping him in contact with the fundamental passivity where the word, no longer anything but its appearance – the shadow of a word – never can be mastered or even grasped" (The Space of Literature, 25). 7. One of the most significant events in Conrad scholarship was Chinua Achebe's 1975 lecture at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst in which he claimed that Heart of Darkness proved that Conrad was "a bloody racist." Achebe's lecture was published first in The Massachusetts Review in 1977, and then, slightly amended, in Achebe's Hopes and Impediments: Selected Essays 1965–1987 (London: Heinemann, 1988), and again in the third edition of the Norton Critical Edition of Heart of Darkness, ed. Robert Kimbrough, (New York: Norton, 1988). The root of Achebe's criticism lies in his diagnosis of a pervasive psychological need for the Western psyche to use Africa and Africans as a sort of foil for its own narrative of enlightened progress. Conrad then can be faulted for failing to discern, criticize, and reject the racism that pervades Marlow's description of the Africans that he encountered in his journey. However, Achebe's biographical criticism of Conrad rests upon the presupposition that all literature is tasked with the duty to provide an unambiguous moral norm. He writes that Conrad "neglects to hint, clearly and adequately, at an alternative frame of reference by which we may judge the actions and opinions of his characters." However, this begs the question as to whether the absence of such a frame of reference is in fact due to "neglect" or whether it is intrinsic to Conrad's work. Although Achebe asserts that "it would not have been beyond Conrad's power to make that provision [the interjection of a stable frame of moral reference within the story] if he had thought it necessary," the rejoinder could be made that precisely the exercise of that power would have stripped Heart of Darkness of its ability to mirror and stage the very concrete injustices of his culture. For an extensive discussion of Achebe's criticism, including differences among the versions, see Joseph Conrad: Heart of Darkness, ed. Nicolas Tredell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 71– 103. 8. Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, (New York: Knopf, 1993), 331. Deleuze and Guattari's principal discussion of the war machine is found in A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), "1227: Treatise on Nomadology – The War Machine," 351–432. SAID, CONRAD, AND IMPERIALISM 475 9. The war machine thus operates upon the "materiality" of things, the inevitable gap between the thing and its historical meaning that practical reason ceaselessly works to efface, but that perpetually threatens to overturn this effacement in its temporal endurance. This commonality explains the conjunction of Said's discussion of Deleuze and Guattari with his discussion of Theodor Adorno's Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, trans. E. F. N. Jephcott (New York: Verso, 1974). Adorno concludes an aphorism entitled "Gaps" by remarking: "Thought waits to be woken one day by the memory of what has been missed, and to be transformed into teaching" (81). 10. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 61– 83. 11. Ibid., 65. 12. Conrad, Joseph, The Nigger of the "Narcissus," ed. Robert Kimbrough (New York: Norton, 1971). 13. "The difference between conceptual personae and aesthetic figures consists first of all in this: the former are the powers of concepts, and the latter are the powers of affects and percepts. . . . The great aesthetic figures of thought and the novel but also of painting, sculpture, and music produce affects that surpass ordinary affections and perceptions, just as concepts go beyond everyday opinions" (Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 65). 14. The most notable example of this being Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. In Hegel's Phenomenology: The Sociality of Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), Terry Pinkard writes: "Thus the Phenomenology serves as the Bildung (the education, formation, and cultivation) of its intended readership into coming to terms with what is entailed in their form of life and what kinds of alternatives are available to them" (17). 15. Charles Dickens, Oliver Twist, ed. Fred Kaplan (New York: Norton, 1993), 28. 16. Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 69, (emphasis in the original). 17. Ibid., 70. 18. According to Deleuze and Guattari, problems and concepts are codeterminants in philosophical thinking. Concepts are formed in response to problems which themselves become intelligible only through their determination by the concepts that articulate them. Significantly, this codetermination is a product of the impossibility of attaining to a completely original and presuppositionless beginning from which thought might commence. Philosophical or conceptual thinking begins in the midst of a world that is always already underway and that therefore only attains to sense according to a conceptual determination whose trajectory is apparent only in a retrospective look that reveals the problem that gave rise to the particular solution instantiated by the constellation of concepts. 19. Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, (New York: Knopf, 1993), 23–24. 20. Said writes: "Marlow, for example is never straightforward. He alternates between garrulity and stunning eloquence, and rarely resists making peculiar things seem more peculiar by surprisingly misstating them, or rendering them vague and contradictory" (ibid., 29). Ian Watt, in his Conrad in the Nineteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), characterizes Conrad's technique as "delayed decoding," which mirrors the gap between an experience and the ability to make sense of that experience. 21. "With Conrad, then, we are in a world being made and unmade more or less all the time" (Said, Culture and Imperialism, 29). 22. Ibid., xii. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid., xiii. 25. Ibid. 26. Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, ed. Robert Kimbrough (New York: Norton, 1988), 30. 27. Ibid., 9. 28. Ibid., 60. 29. Ibid., 9. 30. Ibid., 61. 31. Said, Culture and Imperialism, 28. 32. Ibid., 24–25; the quote from Arendt comes from her description of Cecil Rhodes, the fervent British imperialist of the Nineteenth Century whose ideas of colonizing Africa for the betterment of the human race make him an often cited source for Conrad's Kurtz. Cf. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, 1973), 215. 33. Ibid., 331. 34. Ibid., 29. 35. Conrad, Heart of Darkness, 7. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid., 8. 38. Ibid., 10. 39. Ibid., 11. 40. Ibid., 9. 41. Ibid., 40. 42. One example of the former type of reading that sees in Heart of Darkness a narrative that symbolizes imperialist aggression is found in Eloise Knapp Hay, The Political Novels of Joseph Conrad (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963). Significantly, Hay's reading emphasizes the distinction between Conrad, the narrator, and Marlow. Elmhurst College, Elmhurst, IL 60126–3296 PHILOSOPHY TODAY 476 43. Conrad, Heart of Darkness, 30. 44. Ibid., 36. 45. Ibid., 48. 46. Ibid., 49. 47. Ibid., 69. 48. Ibid., 71. 49. Ibid., 75. 50. Ibid., 76. 51. Said, Culture and Imperialism, 332. 52. Much of Jacques Derrida's later work is concerned with what he calls "the democracy to come" and the question of sovereignty. Specifically, Derrida is interested in the compatibility of democracy and sovereignty. This question is explored most thoroughly in Rogues, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). 53. Pierre Klossowski, "Nietzsche, Polytheism, and Parody," trans. Russell Ford, Bulletin for the Société Américaine de Philosophie de Langue Française 14 (Fall 2004): 80. 54. Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 4.

'Not My People': Jewish-Christian Ethics and Divine Reversals in Response to Injustice JOSHUA BLANCHARD Oakland University Department of Philosophy Draft-please cite version in The Lost Sheep in Philosophy of Religion §1 INTRODUCTION In the Hebrew Scriptures, several of the consequences for disobedience to God are familiar-destruction of holy sites, slavery, exile from the land, and death. However, there is a particular consequence that is less familiar to casual readers and of special interest in this paper. Disobedience to God sometimes, though not always, results in stark, devastating reversals in God's very relationship and experiential availability to the people whom God otherwise purportedly favors (e.g., in the sense of election). This is a curious form of punishment that not only threatens the very spiritual identity of the victims of the reversal, but-at least for a time-cuts off their only plausible route to experience of and reconciliation with God. This paper examines the category of divine reversal in the Hebrew Scriptures (and its continuation in the New Testament) and suggests some applications for understanding the contemporary relationship between social and religious groups and God, in particular as these relationships involve moral problems. I use two main examples: first, the relationship between the Jewish people and Eretz Yisrael [Land of Israel]; and second, the relationship between the Church, gender, and sexuality. These are highly contentious topics, but that is why I have selected them. For purposes of illustration and argument, it is essential that I assume that the conservative wings of the Synagogue and the Church are correct in their positions on these topics. This assumption is crucial, because one main aim of my reflection is to show that even if such positions are theologically or morally correct in the abstract, this does not settle the question of how God will relate to the issues and groups in question. Sometimes, the justification for these divine reversals is precisely the relational effects that the injustices have on the victim groups' own actual and potential relationship to God. Whether and how the victims of the self-identified people of God will themselves experience God is imperiled by the injustices that they endure. As the Apostle Paul adapts the Hebrew Scriptures in his letter to the congregation in Rome, "The name of God is blasphemed among the Gentiles because of you" (Romans 2:24; cf. Isaiah 52:5). Moreover, some of Jesus' own harshest words are reserved for anyone who is responsible for what otherwise would be considered the failings of others: "It would be better for you if a millstone were hung around your neck and you were thrown into the sea" (Luke 17:2). To spoil the ending, insofar as the self-identified people of God commit positive injustices against others, and even insofar as they are culpable for failing to prevent such injustices from occurring, devotees of the Hebrew Scriptures-so, devout Jews and Christians alike-ought to take seriously the possibility that God will, in ways that might seem shocking and offensive, side with those who suffer the injustices and even, in a sense, sanctify their practices. Such divine reversals pose a special problem for Jewish and Christian ethics, which must grapple with the possibility that God will seem, from the point of view of the Synagogue or Church, to adopt inconsistent moral positions across time. The phenomenon of divine reversal generally complicates our understanding of the relationship between the will of God and Jewish/Christian ethics. §2 THREE KINDS OF DIVINE REVERSAL It is worth setting aside certain kinds of reversal that are not of interest to me in this paper. First, consider the reversal characteristic of a change of mind. Perhaps the most famous (for some, notorious) instance of an apparent divine change of mind in the Hebrew Scriptures is in Genesis. The LORD saw how great was man's wickedness on earth, and how every plan devised by his mind was nothing but evil all the time. And the LORD regretted that He had made man on earth, and His heart was saddened. The LORD said, "I will blot out from the earth the men whom I created-men together with beasts, creeping things, and birds of the sky; for I regret that I made them" (6:5-7). Although regret is a kind of reversal, it is not what I have in mind here. In regret, there is a change of belief or attitude, a wishing that one had not done something. A second kind of reversal is the violation of human expectations. In both the Hebrew Scriptures and the New Testament, there is a prominent theme of tension between divine and human values. This is a kind of reversal-human beings expect that p, but God asserts or makes it the case that ~p-but it is, once again, not what I have in mind in this paper. Both of these kinds of reversal overlap but are not identical to divine reversal in the sense of this paper. The sort of reversal I have in mind is a non-regretful reversal of God's own commitments and pronouncements, but especially as they pertain to God's relationship with God's ostensibly chosen people. A few salient passages can illustrate what I have in mind when I talk about reversals in God's relationships. On the one hand, a Pslamist writes, "For the LORD will not forsake his people; He will not abandon His very own" (Psalm 94:14). Yet, God declares in the prophet Amos that, due to their transgressions, the same people "shall wander from sea to sea and from north to east to seek the word of the LORD, but they shall not find it" (Amos 8:12). Such reversals sometimes go in the other direction, extending to groups that are otherwise enemies of God's chosen people. Babylon, for example, is sometimes favored for divine purposes, so much so that its own actions are identified with divine action. "I will strengthen the arms of the king of Babylon and put My sword in his hand," God declares in Ezekiel 30:24. In Jeremiah 21:5, in response to a plea from Jerusalem for divine help, God promises instead to "battle against [Jerusalem] with an outstretched mighty arm," implicitly identifying God's arm with the forces of Babylon, which would lay siege to the city. To understand the potential offense of this kind of reversal for those who self-identify as belonging to God, we must contemplate what it would be like for synagogues or churches to be told that they are-at least for a time-not God's people; that even were they to seek out God's presence in earnest, God would not respond to them; and that the successes, oftentimes violent, of the groups that they perceive to be enemies are actually actions of their God. Part of what is interesting about divine reversals is that they seem to involve God acting or speaking in ways that are contrary to what would prima facie make sense, given other things that God has done or done. Given God's promises to never forsake Israel, for example, it would prima facie make sense that, even when Israel commits injustices, God would patiently remain with Israel-and, certainly, would still respond to those who "seek the word of the LORD." Given that Israel and not Babylon is God's chosen nation, it would prima facie make sense for God to defend Israel from Babylon-and, certainly, to do so when Israel cries for God's help. §3 TWO EXAMPLES 3.1 The Jewish people and Eretz Yisrael The term "Zionism" is a matter of considerable controversy in contemporary politics, and so it is necessary to spend a moment clarifying how I will be using the term. "Zionism" is probably most commonly used to refer to a distinctly nationalistic and even secular ideology, whose core tenants involve the establishment and maintenance of a recognizably Jewish state on largely political and humanistic grounds. However, I will be using "Zionism" in the sense of the distinctly religious Zionism that involves the combination of Orthodox Judaism with the basic commitments of a more secular Zionism. Religious Zionism says, in essence, that the land that currently constitutes the nation-state of Israel is part of what was promised to the Jewish people by God (Eretz Yisrael), and, crucially, that it is rightfully theirs on this basis. Even if the other political and moral arguments for Zionism were not cogent, God's promises would still, on this view, be sufficient grounds for the Zionist project. One of the main differences between secular and religious Zionism, then, has to do with the justifications given for the core view. But there are significant differences in practical upshot as well. For instance, a religious Zionist will, for obvious reasons, be considerably more likely to advocate for explicitly expansionist national ambitions, on the grounds of the Biblical texts foundational to the view. Whatever one thinks about the plausibility of religious Zionism, it is natural to think that the central question about it is or would be over the factual question: does God really promise Eretz Israel to the Jewish people? Although it is natural to think that this is the central question for anyone wondering about religious Zionism, it is worth asking why this is so. It seems to me that the naturalness of the question stems from the fact that if God really does promise Eretz Israel to the Jewish people, then this is morally significant for us here and now. The moral significance can be easily seen by reflecting on God's nature. If God is both omniscient and necessarily good, then if God approvingly promises that x shall belong to S, it would seem to follow that it would be good for S to possess x. More vividly, suppose you are arguing with someone over whether some bit of property is yours or theirs, and they demonstrably show that God has declared that it is theirs (perhaps by successfully beckoning God's voice, or by producing a compelling passage from a text you both recognize as authoritative). Putting it mildly, your opponent has produced very good evidence for their claim.1 Here is where the sort of divine reversal prominent in the Hebrew Scriptures complicates matters. The fact that God has in some sense delivered Eretz Israel to the Jewish people is in fact not a sufficient condition for their rightful possession of it.2 Those living in fidelity to the Jewish tradition must regard it as possible that God may (temporarily) reverse fulfillment even of God's most central promises: this certainly includes the promise of land. In the Hebrew Scriptures, when God's people do not meet certain conditions, God seems to allow the very thing promised (the land) to be taken away. Interestingly, this is never taken to mean that God's promises are no longer true; it suggests, rather, that God's promises are reliable yet somehow conditional. So, it can simultaneously be the case that God promises x to S and God takes x away from S. It can even be the case that God gives x to S*, where S and S* are different groups of people (e.g., Israel and Babylon). This has dramatic consequences for religious debates over the Israel-Palestine conflict. Suppose two interlocutors are debating the question whether Israel has a right to this or that part of the land, or whether Israel is behaving justly. A religious Zionist may be inclined to offer religious arguments in favor of God's having promised the land to the Jewish people, and these arguments will seem especially cogent if the religious Zionist's interlocutor is at least committed to an overlapping, if not identical, theological framework. However, the possibility of divine reversal should worry the religious Zionist, because the possibility of reversal places a wedge between God's purported promises and questions of rights and justice. The religious 1 Of course, within Jewish tradition, such evidence is in fact defeasible and, if the debated proposition is one of halacha (Jewish law), possibly even irrelevant. See one of the most famous and foundational texts from the Babylonian Talmud, Bava Metzia 59a-b. 2 Of course, it is also not a necessary condition, provided that there can be secular grounds for rightful possession of land. But this is less surprising than the sufficiency claim. Zionist's interlocutor may cogently say, "Perhaps God has indeed promised Eretz Yisrael to the Jewish people, but that in no ways guarantees even so much as rightful possession or justice here and now." Now, I take no stand in this paper as to whether religious Zionism, political Zionism, some form of anti-Zionism, etc., is correct with respect to the Israel-Palestine conflict. That would not only be beyond the scope of this paper, but well beyond the scope of my own expertise. The point here is simply to emphasize that a prominent theme in the Hebrew Scriptures-divine reversal in the sense specified in the previous section-should give pause to anyone offering typical arguments in favor of religious Zionism. Intuitively, "with God on our side" we have nothing to worry about, but the possibility of divine reversal makes conceptual room for God's being on our side-yet against us for the time being, because of what we have done. 3.2 The Church, Gender, and Sexuality Some of the intra-Christian debate about gender and sexuality structurally resembles the debate about religious Zionism. Whatever one thinks about the plausibility of conservative Christian views on traditional gender norms and sexual life, it is natural to think that the central question about it for Christians is or would be over the factual question: does God really command a traditional sexual ethic? Divine reversal in the New Testament is presented in a different mode than in the Hebrew Scriptures.3 Whereas God's relationship to human beings is largely presented via 3 See Yoram Hazony, The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture. While I disagree with Hazony's apparently hellenized (and, hence, apparently dejudaized) reading of the New Testament, I agree with his characterization of the Hebrew Scriptures as offering philosophical arguments in narrative form, and of the New Testament as something more in the genre of proclamation. sweeping narratives in the Hebrew Scriptures, the New Testament relies much more heavily on explicit didactic teaching. To illustrate the concept of divine reversal as it might apply to the New Testament and contemporary debates around Christian views of gender and sexuality, it is useful to draw on a somewhat fraught comparison between how conservative Christians view LGBTQ individuals and how the religious leaders of Jesus' day viewed tax collectors, prostitutes, and other "sinners". Even suggesting a comparison between LGBTQ individuals, on the one hand, and the New Testament's categories of sexual and other sinners, on the other, risks immediate offense. So, one must be careful to bear in mind the narrow purpose of the comparison. Remember that I am assuming for the sake of argument that the conservative position on contemporary issues of gender and sexuality is correct. My aim here is to develop a challenge that arises from within that perspective, just as my aim in the previous subsection was to develop a challenge that arises from within a religious Zionist perspective. The point here is not to say that LGBTQ individuals really are in the same category-morally, spiritually, or otherwise-as the New Testament's various "sinners". The point is that, from the standpoint of the conservative Christian position on gender and sexual ethics, the comparison would hold. So, from an intra-Christian point of view, it is natural to think that the central question for anyone wondering about the conservative Christian gender and sexual ethic is whether God really wills it. As with religious Zionism, the naturalness of this thought stems from the fact that if God really does will a conservative ethic, then this is morally significant for us here and now. As before, the moral significance seems obvious from reflection on God's nature. If God is both omniscient and necessarily good, then if God approvingly wills that p, it would seem to follow that it would be good if p. Suppose you are arguing with someone over whether some gender self-identification or sexual choice is right for a person, and they demonstrate that God has declared that it is not (perhaps by successfully beckoning God's voice, or by producing a compelling passage from a text you both recognize as authoritative). As before, it seems that your opponent has produced very good evidence for their claim. But God's favoring of a particular gender or sexual ethic does not settle the question of who is rightly related to God on this issue. With all of this in mind, consider the following pronouncement of Jesus, from the Gospel of Matthew: Truly I tell you, the tax collectors and the prostitutes are going into the kingdom of God ahead of you. For John came to you in the way of righteousness and you did not believe him, but the tax collectors and the prostitutes believed him; and even after you saw it, you did not change your minds and believe him (21:31-32). Jesus speaks these words to an audience that is presumed by the text to be on the right side of moral questions regarding tax collection and prostitution. In this case, it seems that what makes the difference is belief in the preaching of John the Baptist, not correctness on moral questions regarding tax collection and prostitution. But the general theme of surprising results with respect to who enters "the kingdom of heaven" is persistent in Jesus' teaching. Notice that Jesus even accuses the religious leaders of positively blocking entrance into the Kingdom of God, despite their being correct on matters of doctrine and morals. In a passage form the Gospel of Matthew, these two statements are put virtually one after the other in the text: Jesus said to the crowds and to his disciples, "The scribes and the Pharisees sit on Moses' seat; therefore, do whatever they teach you and follow it; but do not do as they do, for they do not practice what they teach. They tie up heavy burdens, hard to bear, and lay them on the shoulders of others; but they themselves are unwilling to lift a finger to move them. ... "But woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! For you lock people out of the kingdom of heaven. For you do not go in yourselves, and when others are going in, you stop them" (23:1-4, 13). Much can be said about these passages, of course, and the point of this paper is not to engage in New Testament exegesis. The point is to simply issue a kind of warning or challenge regarding the relationship between being right about some moral or other matters, on the one hand, and being in right relationship to God with respect to that issue, on the other. The New Testament continues the theme in the Hebrew Scriptures of divine reversal when it comes to who is favored vis-à-vis moral questions, including those of gender and sexual ethics. Applying this to the case at hand, Christians should acknowledge that it can simultaneously be the case that the conservative Christian gender and sexual ethic is formally correct, yet it still be the case that the piety of those who follow the ethics is regarded by God as worthless, and that those who do not follow the ethic "are going into the Kingdom of God" before those who do. Moreover, a devout Christian should worry that holding to and even teaching the correct ethic is compatible with "lock[ing] people out of the kingdom of heaven." This latter, haunting concept suggests that a person's distance from God and God's will may be attributable to someone other than themselves; indeed, it may be attributable to oppressions and burdens that they face precisely from those who are correct about God and God's will! This has dramatic consequences for religious debates over gender and sexual ethics. Suppose two interlocutors are debating the question whether non-conforming gender identities are compatible with God's will, or whether the Church oppresses people with nonheterosexual sexual orientations. A conservative Christian may be inclined to offer religious arguments in favor of God's willing a conservative ethic, and these arguments will seem especially cogent if the conservative Christian's interlocutor is at least committed to an overlapping, if not identical, theological framework. However, the possibility of divine reversal should worry the conservative Christian, because the possibility of reversal places a wedge between God's purported will and questions of gender and sexual obligations. The conservative Christian's interlocutor may cogently say, "Perhaps God has indeed willed a conservative ethic, but that in no ways guarantees that those living and speaking according to the ethic are closer to God than those who are not." Now, I take no stand in this paper as to whether a conservative, liberal, or some other position is correct with respect to Christian approaches to gender and sexuality. The point here is simply to emphasize that a prominent theme in both the Hebrew Scriptures and New Testament should give pause to anyone offering typical arguments in favor of a conservative gender and sexual ethic. Intuitively, God's will is an ethical trump card, but the possibility of divine reversal makes conceptual room for somehow holding all the right cards-yet, in the end, being on the losing end of the issue. §4 LESSONS FOR APPLIED ETHICS FROM A JEWISH-CHRISTIAN POINT OF VIEW It is natural for devout Jewish and Christian theists to think that debates in applied ethics are or would be settled by successful appeals to timeless divine commands. Although the traditional framework of divine command theory can justify this thought via God's commands constituting what is good or right, one need not be a divine command theorist to have it. Even if God is not the origin or ground of moral truths, God's goodness and knowledge guarantee that God's commands and moral assertions are consistent with moral truth. If God wills some morally evaluable p, then it must be good that p. But the possibility of divine reversal means that someone may both be right that God wills that p yet wrong that those who are living and speaking in accordance with the truth that p are in that respect in right relation to God. Israel's injustices sometimes made God reject their sacrifices-even though such sacrifices were offered in accordance with the Torah. The often-times impeccable piety of the religious leaders of Jesus' day did not yield the prima facie appropriate hierarchies in the eyes of God. The first lesson to learn, then, is that correctness about doctrine and morals can be pulled apart from divine favor, even divine favor with respect to those very matters that one is correct about. A second lesson is that just as religious epistemology should be informed by a view of the purposes of knowledge, religious ethics should be informed by a view of the purposes of action.4 As many authors have pointed out, for example, a conservative Christian gender and sexual ethic is plausibly motivated by many underlying ends-faithfulness, imaging God, protecting children, and so on-that may nevertheless be harmed in a conservative context and pursued in a non-conservative context. It may very well be that, even if the conservative position is correct on these matters, its correctness is nevertheless not more important in practical situations than the values that undergird it. Hence, although it may seem paradoxical from the conservative point of view, God may in some contexts bless, sanctify, or otherwise favor what the conservative opposes. Third, more work needs to be done on what it means that God might command or promise something at time t, and then seem to temporarily reverse matters at time t+1. As another example of divine reversal, consider this peculiar proclamation from the prophet Jeremiah: [W]hen I freed your fathers from the land of Egypt, I did not speak with them or command them concerning burnt offerings or sacrifice. But this is what I commanded them: Do My bidding, that I may be your God and you may be My people; walk only in the way that I enjoin upon you, that it may go well with you (7:22-23). This passage is surprising, because God is said to have commanded burnt offerings and sacrifices at precisely the time in question.5 Nevertheless, it appears in the context of a familiar theme from the Hebrew Scriptures, that there is a hierarchy of divine ethical concern, with 4 On how the purposes of religious knowledge should shape religious epistemology, see especially Paul Moser, The Elusive God. 5 There is scholarly debate about whether this passage represents a separate textual/intellectual tradition from that which produced the text that clearly do involve burnt offerings and sacrifices at the time of the Exodus (cf. Leviticus 7:37-38). However, this would not explain why the compilers and editors of the Hebrew Scriptures maintained this text as-is. justice, care for strangers, orphans, and widows, at the top, and concerns about sacrifices and cultic practices generally below those.6 §5 OBJECTIONS AND CONCERNS But this still doesn't bear on the truth-and isn't that what debates over Zionism and Christian ethics are ultimately all about? First, that is not what these debates are all about. We should care about the truth, but we should also care about the fundamental values that undergird the importance of seeking the truth on any particular matter. For all I've said, at the end of the day, the conservative Jewish position on religious Zionism and the conservative Christian position on gender and sexual ethics could be true. But this is not a problem for anything I've said in this paper, because my point has been that the possibility of divine reversal should worry even those who have things right by their own lights. Second, the questions of this paper to some extent do bear on the truth. For instance, even if, in some ultimate sense, God wills a particular, narrow model of human gender or sexual life, it may be that, for the time being, God not only permits but sanctifies alternative models that serve the underlying values at issue. Both examples in this paper challenge positions favored by conservative wings of Judaism and Christianity, respectively. Do "liberals" in these traditions face these challenges equally? I see no reason why liberal Jews and Christians-provided that they are theistic realists-should not be equally concerned that being factually correct in their liberalism is insufficient for God's really being on their side. Religious Zionism and conservative Christian perspectives on gender and sexuality just happen to be presently contentious topics where the issues of this paper arise in a direct and straightforward manner. For any debate where someone thinks that God is on their side, the chief lesson of this paper is that this does not 6 Hence, when Jesus cites Hosea 6:6 ("I desire goodness, not sacrifice; obedience to God, rather than burn offerings") at Matthew 9:13 to the same end, he is speaking squarely within the Jewish prophetic tradition. Cf. Yohanan ben Zakkai's use of the passage in Avot of Rabbi Nathan, ch. 4. settle the debate in their favor. If they are committing injustice, for example, in a way that directly implicates the debate, then devout Jews and Christians should see divine reversal as a real possibility. Divine reversals really just amount to conditional promises or commitments, typically in the context of covenant. When God promises the land to the Jewish people, for instance, the promise comes with conditions of behavior. Even if translated into the languages of covenant and conditional promises, acknowledgement of the possibility of divine reversal would radically reshape debate on issues like the two discussed in §3. In a debate about possession of Eretz Yisrael, for instance, "God has promised this to me" is far more decisive than "God has promised this to me provided that I practice justice, care for the stranger, ...". So, I'm somewhat amenable to the incorporation of the ideas of this paper into the standard language of covenant and promise rather than the somewhat more idiosyncratic notion of divine reversal. However, I'm still partial to the choice to conceptualize the phenomenon in terms of divine reversal. In a Jewish and Christian context, ethical debates have an upshot with respect to where and how one stands in relation to God and God's will. The language of covenant and promise undersells the dramatic nature of one's failure totally reversing one's relationship to God. §6 CONCLUSION In summary, Jews and Christians seeking to engage in applied ethical debate in which reference to God's will is fair game and, moreover, to do so in fidelity to a conception of God founded in traditional sources, must take seriously the fact that the prima facie warrant provided by even a successful appeal to God's will may be defeated by one's own failing to live in ways that reflect the values that undergird the very idea that one is right about. This fact is, or should be, especially salient in cases where one stands in an oppressive relationship to those whose lives one is speaking about.

Teleological Essentialism David Rose Shaun Nichols [Forthcoming in Cognitive Science] Psychological essentialism is the view that people think that members of certain categories, like skunk, share an essence. The essence is not directly observable, but it is the true nature shared among category members and it is responsible for similarities among members of a category. That we represent categories in terms of essences is a substantive psychological thesis, one that is supported by decades of research in psychology (see e.g., Gelman, 2003; Keil, 1989; Medin and Ortony, 1989). What do we associate with the essence of a category? The standard account of essentialism holds that the essence is represented with a "placeholder" (e.g., Gelman, 2003; Medin and Ortony, 1989). This view- placeholder essentialism-suggests that "a person believes that there is some causal essence that holds a category together, without knowing just what that essence is" (Gelman, 2004, p. 405). This view traces at least as far back to Locke (1671/1959) who maintained that "[Essence is] the very being of anything, whereby it is what it is. And thus the real, internal but generally...unknown constitution of things, whereon their discoverable qualities depend, may be called their essence" and is explicitly endorsed by Gelman (2003) and Keil (1989). Placeholder essentialism doesn't suggest that we can never elaborate the placeholder. Indeed, Gelman (2003) suggests that, though rare, at least one way the placeholder can be elaborated is with the acquisition of relevant scientific knowledge. Gelman (2003) maintains that we might, for instance, come to fill out the placeholder of "gold" once we acquire scientific knowledge that the atomic weight of gold is 79. This view-what we call scientific essentialism-is associated with Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975). One of Kripke's (1980) leading suggestions was that: "[C]onsiderations... about an object having essential properties, can only be regarded correctly, in my view, if we recognize the distinction between a prioricity and necessity. One might very well discover essence empirically." (p. 110). That is, there are some a posteriori necessary truths and so science sometimes uncovers essences. One important example, due to Putnam (1975), is that the empirical discovery that water is composed of H2O revealed that the essence of water is H20. So, according to scientific essentialism, such essences are sometimes uncovered by science. The placeholder can thus be elaborated, replaced, with the acquisition of relevant scientific knowledge. Scientific essentialism can fill the placeholder. But there is reason to doubt that the placeholder is elaborated by a scientific essence. For instance, Malt (1994) finds that people say that tea is 91% H20 but not water and that pool water is 81.6% H20 and is water. So a liquid, such as tea can have more H20 than another liquid, such as pool water, yet not be categorized as water. This is not at all what we would expect if the scientific essence fills the placeholder. What then might fill in the placeholder? Our proposal is that people tacitly regard essences in terms of a telos. Teleological thinking begins in childhood, with children maintaining that lions are for "going to the zoo," that clouds are "for raining" (Bloom, 2007, p. 150), that "mountains exist to give animals a place to climb," and that rocks are pointy "so that animals won't sit on them and smash them" (Kelemen, 1999, pgs. 1444–45; see also Piaget, 2017). These childhood tendencies toward teleological thinking aren't simply outgrown. Rather they extend into adults. For instance, college-educated adults think that "the 2 sun radiates heat because warmth nurtures life," that "fungi grow in forests to help decomposition," and that "lightening occurs to release electricity" (Kelemen and Rosset, 2009). Perhaps even more surprisingly, teleological thinking isn't supplanted by the acquisition of scientific knowledge: even professional physicists display a tendency to endorse inappropriate teleological explanations (Kelemen et al., 2013). Teleological thinking also plays a core role in our judgments about both existence and persistence. Rose and Schaffer (2017) found that people tended to say that a collection of parts forms a whole when those parts serve a collective purpose. For example, they found that when an agent superglues some mice together, and the plurality of mice serve the function of detecting bombs, participants were significantly more inclined to think that the arrangement of mice composed a larger object in comparison to a case where mice were superglued together but had no function. And Rose (2015) and Rose, Schaffer and Tobia (forthcoming) found that we tend to think that something persists through part alterations provided it preserves its purpose. To take just one example, Rose, Schaffer and Tobia (forthcoming) found that participants who read about a gardening tool that underwent changes which resulted in the thing either still working or not working as a gardening tool were significantly more inclined to think the original thing still existed when it worked as a gardening tool. These findings indicate a robust role for teleological thinking in commonsense. This raises the intriguing possibility that teleology is also central to our essentialist inclinations. In particular, people might be inclined to associate the essence with a kind of telos. If so, then perhaps the placeholder for an essence is elaborated by a telos. That would then suggest that the standard view of the elaboration of the placeholder-scientific essentialism-be replaced by an Aristotelian conception of essence. For Aristotle, the essence is what defines the category. More importantly for our purposes, for at least many categories, the essence is given by the telos. With respect to, for instance, living things, the essence of a category is the same as the end or telos of the creature. This is made vivid in the following: Advancing bit by bit in this same direction it becomes apparent that even in plants features conducive to an end occur-leaves, for example, grow in order to provide shade for the fruit. If then it is both by nature and for an end that the swallow makes its nest and the spider its web, and plants grow leaves for the sake of the fruit and send their roots down rather than up for the sake of nourishment, it is plain that this kind of cause is operative in things which come to be and are by nature. And since nature is twofold, as matter and as form, the form is the end, and since all other things are for sake of the end, the form must be the cause in the sense of that for the sake of which. (Phys. 199a20–32) The key point, for present purposes, is that what matters for Aristotle is the final cause- the end-not an entity that produces the end. This view-what we call teleological essentialism-is in sharp contrast to the standard view of the elaboration of the placeholder, that placeholders are elaborated by scientific essences, endorsed by many psychologists. Our question is whether manipulating a thing's telos affects categorization judgments. And our strategy for addressing this was to use the same procedures typically used in the essentialism literature and simply vary the original thing's telos. But how do we determine whether telos plays a role in essentialist thinking? One option would be to stipulate the telos of a thing, vary whether it preserves or changes its telos and see whether that affects categorization judgments. Our approach, however, was to simply ask people what they associate with the telos of a thing. In a pilot study, we asked people, for instance, "What is the true purpose of bees?" and 3 "What is the true purpose of spiders?" and gave them an open-ended response. The results indicated that 82% of participants thought that the true purpose of bees is to either make honey, pollinate flowers or both. And 77% of participants thought that the true purpose of spiders is to either spin webs, catch and eat insect or both. The results from our pilot study will thus serve as a guide for varying telos. Accordingly, in study 1 we utilize cases-inspired by work from Keil (1989)-where a bee undergoes superficial transformation. Scientists remove its wings, antenna, lengthen its legs and so forth. The original thing, then, ends up looking like a spider. In addition to the superficial transformation, we varied whether the thing preserved or changed its telos. In study 2, we utilize a different approach: transformation of the insides of a thing while holding superficial similarity fixed. To accomplish this, participants were told that a bee had its insides replaced with the insides of a spider. Yet the thing still looks like a bee. We then varied whether the thing preserved or changed its telos. In our third study, we investigated the role of "nature/nurture". Here we told participants that a newborn bee was placed in a cage full of spiders and again varied whether the thing preserved or changed its telos. In our fourth study, we utilized the same cases as used in study 1, but added the additional variation that the thing after the special operation had its eggs fertilized by a bee or spider. The key question here is whether preservation or change of telos will guide people's judgments about what will hatch from the eggs. Finally, in study 5 we test whether teleological essentialist judgments generate category judgments. In addition to investigating whether the placeholder for an essence is elaborated by a telos, we had another goal. Different approaches to investigating essentialism sometimes turn up conflicting results. For instance, studies investigating essentialist judgments in the context of a thing that undergoes superficial transformations-e.g., a racoon that is made to look like a skunk-sometimes turn up results that conflict with those in studies investigating the role of nature/nurture- e.g., a baby cow that is raised by pigs-in essentialist judgments. But if we are right that the placeholder for an essence is elaborated by a telos, then we should expect that these different ways of investigating essentialism will turn up converging results. In short: teleological essentialism should yield unification. 1. Study 1: Superficial Transformation Two-hundred and fifty participants (aged 18-68 years, mean age = 30 years; 115 females; 97% reporting English as a native language) were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and tested in Qualtrics. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions [marked by brackets]: Some very talented and skilled scientists, Suzy and Andy, decide that they are going to perform a special operation on a bee. They removed its wings and antennae, lengthened its legs and added a new pair of legs. They also inserted into the back of it something for making webs and trained the animal so that it would eat insects. Here is an image of the bee that they perform the special operation on: 4 After the special operation, it looked like this: [Telos Changed: After running some tests, they found that the thing after the special operation didn't pollinate flowers or make honey. Instead, it only spun webs to catch insects and eat them./Telos Preserved: After running some tests, they found that the thing after the special operation didn't spin webs to catch insects and eat them. Instead, it only pollinated flowers and made honey.] After reading one of the two cases, participants responded to two comprehension questions: Comprehension Check: Suzy and Andy performed a special operation on a bee. (Yes/No) Comprehension Check: The thing after the special operation only spins webs to catch insects and eat them. (Yes/No) They were then asked the key test question: Category: To what extent do you think that the thing after the special operation is a bee or spider? (1=it is definitely a bee, 7=it is definitely a spider) In order to ensure that our manipulation was effective, we included a question about whether the thing retained the true purpose of bees: Purpose: To what extent do you think that the thing after the special operation retains the true purpose of bees? (1=it definitely does not retain the true purpose of bees 7=it definitely retains the true purpose of bees) Twenty-one participants failed one or more of the comprehension checks and were excluded from analysis. Data was analyzed for the remaining 229 participants. Independent samples t-test indicated two things. First our purpose manipulation was highly effective, Telos Preserved (M=5.58, SD=1.82, 95% CI [5.23, 5.92]), Telos Changed (M=1.69, SD=1.27, 95% CI [1.45, 1.91]), t(227)=-18.91, p<.001, d=2.48. Second, our manipulation of whether the bee preserved or 5 changed its purpose produced a very large effect on categorization judgments, with participants agreeing that the thing was a spider when its telos was changed (M=5.73, SD=1.54, 95% CI [5.44, 5.99]) and with participants agreeing that the thing was a bee when its telos was preserved (M=2.57, SD=1.69, 95% CI [2.25, 2.88]), t(227)=14.720, p<.001, d=1.96 (see Figure 1). Follow-up one sample t-tests indicated that categorization judgments were significantly below the neutral midpoint in Telos Preserved, t(107)=-8.73, p<.001, and significantly above the neutral midpoint in Telos Changed, t(120)=12.31, p<.001. Figure 1: Distributions in Categorization Judgments for Telos Changed and Preserved The findings from study 1 indicate that despite superficial dissimilarity, preservation or change of telos had a massive effect on categorization judgments. Even though the thing looks like a spider, participants were significantly more inclined to categorize the thing as a bee when it preserved its telos: pollinating flowers and making honey. When it changed its telos and instead spun webs to catch and eat insects, participants categorized the thing as a spider. And our manipulation check indicated that our manipulation was indeed tapping into people's view that the telos of bees is to make honey and pollinate flowers. Thus, in subsequent studies we will omit the manipulation check. Another important test of our tendency to essentialize categories comes from studies investigating categorization judgments in the context of a thing having its insides altered. For instance, Gelman and Wellman (1991) gave children a case involving a dog that either had its outsides altered (e.g., fur removed) or its insides altered (e.g., blood and bones removed) and asked whether the thing after the change is still a dog. Participants were significantly more inclined to think that the thing was no longer a dog when its insides had been altered. But what if the insides of a thing weren't simply removed but rather replaced with the insides of some other thing? Our question is thus whether preservation or change of telos will continue to affect categorization judgments even when the insides of a thing have been replaced with the insides of some other thing. Study 1 involved only superficial transformation, not transformation of internal parts. In study 2, we address whether preservation or change of telos has an effect even when internal parts are replaced. Moreover, in study 1, there was superficial dissimilarity between the things. In study 2, we thus hold fixed superficial similarity: the thing continues to look like a bee despite having its insides replaced with the insides of a spider. 6 2. Study 2: Transforming Insides We again recruited two-hundred and fifty participants (aged 18-63 years, mean age = 33 years; 97 females; 98% reporting English as a native language) from Amazon Mechanical Turk who were tested in Qualtrics. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions [marked by brackets]: Some very talented and skilled scientists, Suzy and Andy, decide that they are going to perform a special operation on a bee. They decide to remove the insides of the bee and replace them with the insides from a spider. Here is an image of the bee that they perform the special operation on: After the special operation, the insides were changed but it still looked like this: [Telos Changed: After running some tests, they found that the thing after the special operation didn't pollinate flowers or make honey. Instead, it only spun webs to catch insects and eat them./Telos Preserved: After running some tests, they found that the thing after the special operation didn't spin webs to catch insects and eat them. Instead, it only pollinated flowers and made honey.] Participants were then asked the same two comprehension questions as in study 1 and also asked the same test question about categorization. Twenty participants failed one or more of the comprehension questions and were excluded from the analysis. As in study 1, our manipulation of whether the bee preserved or changed its telos produced a very large effect on categorization judgments, with participants agreeing that the thing was a spider when its telos was changed (M=5.00, SD=1.55, 95% CI [4.72, 5.28]) and with participants agreeing that the thing was a bee when its telos was preserved (M=1.97, SD=1.26, 95% CI[1.74, 2.19]), t(228)=16.55, p<.001, d=2.15 (see Figure 2). Follow-up one sample t-tests indicated that categorization judgments were significantly below the neutral midpoint in Telos Preserved, t(120)=-17.658, p<.001, and significantly above the neutral midpoint in Telos Changed, t(118)=7.01, p<.001. 7 Figure 2: Distributions in Categorization Judgments for Telos Changed and Preserved Despite superficial similarity and despite the bee having its insides replaced with the insides of a spider, preservation or change of telos continued to have a very large effect on categorization judgments. People were significantly more inclined to think the thing was a bee when it made honey and pollinated flowers, despite having the insides of a spider. And despite looking like a bee, people were significantly more inclined to think the thing was a spider when it spun webs to catch and eat insects. Thus, studies 1 and 2 indicate that preservation or change of telos plays a role in categorization judgments even when things have superficial similarity or dissimilarity and even when things have their insides replaced. Study 3 investigates whether preservation and change of telos would continue to affect categorization judgments when a bee is raised by spiders. Work by Gelman (2003; see also Keil, 1989) suggest that people tend to default to innate potential in categorization. Thus, children will say that a baby kangaroo raised by goats will end up having a pouch and hopping (Gelman and Wellman, 1991). But if, for instance, a newborn bee is raised by spiders and either preserves its original telos or changes its telos, this might override inferences about innate potential in categorization judgments. 3. Study 3: Inheritance As in the first two studies, we again recruited 250 participants (aged 18-71 years, mean age = 37 years; 116 females; 98% reporting English as a native language) who were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (marked in brackets]: Some very talented and skilled scientists, Suzy and Andy, decide that they are going to perform a special experiment with a newborn bee. After an egg hatches, they place the newborn bee in a cage full of spiders. [Telos Changed: After two weeks, Suzy and Andy found that the thing that was placed in the cage full of spiders didn't pollinate flowers or make honey. Instead, it only spun webs to catch insects and eat them./Telos Preserved: After two weeks, Suzy and Andy found that the thing that was placed in the cage full of spiders didn't spin webs to catch insects and eat them. Instead, it only pollinated flowers and made honey.] They were then asked two comprehension questions: 8 Comprehension Check: Suzy and Andy performed special experiment with a bee. Comprehension Check: The thing that was placed in the cage full of spiders only spins webs to catch insects and eat them. Then they were asked the key test statement: Category: To what extent do you think that the thing placed in the cage full of spiders, after two weeks, is a bee or spider? (1=it is definitely a bee, 7=it is definitely a spider) Twenty-four participants failed one or more of the comprehension questions and were excluded from the analysis. Yet again, our manipulation of whether the bee preserved or changed its purpose produced a very large effect on categorization judgments. Participants agreed that the thing was a spider when its telos was changed (M=4.52, SD=2.28, 95% CI [4.09, 4.94]) and participants agreed that the thing was a bee when its telos was preserved (M=1.48, SD=1.24, 95% CI [1.25, 1.70]), t(224)=12.42, p<.001, d=1.66 (see Figure 3). Follow-up one sample t-tests indicated that categorization judgments were significantly below the neutral midpoint in Telos Preserved, t(112)=-21.54, p<.001, and significantly above the neutral midpoint in Telos Changed, t(112)=2.43, p<.05. Figure 3: Distributions in Categorization Judgments for Telos Changed and Preserved Preservation or change of telos played an important role in categorization judgments. Though some work suggests that innate potential plays a key role in categorization, nobody has investigated whether this might be overridden by information about whether the thing preserves or changes its telos. Our findings here indicate that continuity of telos may indeed be more heavily weighted, overriding innate potential: a newborn bee, raised by spiders, that ends up spinning webs and catching insects is categorized as a spider. Our claim is that telos plays a key role in the kind of categorization we see in essentialist research. Our results show that people rely on the telos to make judgments about persistence through (1) outer transformations, (2) inner transformations and (3) acquired characteristics. But one issue is that these results might be explained by people using an enriched prototype for bees and spiders in making categorization judgments, where the prototype includes teleological features. If that's right, then perhaps 9 essentialism isn't guiding people's categorization judgments in these cases. This would be interesting in its own right since it would suggest that telos is part-indeed, perhaps even the central part-of the prototype. That said, our strategy for assessing essentialism follows that of Keil (1989) and Gelman (2003). And across all these ways of probing for evidence of essentialism, we find evidence that telos plays a central role. The fact that we find that telos plays a crucial role in categorization judgments utilizing the same procedures that are used to provide evidence of essentialist thinking lends credence to our claim that we are indeed tapping into essentialists judgments. But there is a more pointed test of essentialist thinking. Suppose the essence of being a bee is understood as some hidden factor within each bee that causes observable features of bees. A natural candidate for this hidden factor might be DNA. If a queen bee were then to lay eggs, we might naturally think that bees would hatch from the eggs. And it would seem that the best explanation of this wouldn't be that we are using something like a prototype. Instead it would seem that this judgment would be based on an inference that the essence would be transmitted via unobservable features-e.g., DNA-and thereby give rise to further bees. This raises the possibility that if people associate an essence with a telos then we should expect them to think that a telos can be transmitted to offspring. If that's right, then even if a bee undergoes superficial transformation, then provided it preserves its telos, people should judge that its offspring will be bees. Thus, we explore next whether telos predicts judgments of inherited characteristics. 4. Study 4: Offspring We recruited 350 participants (aged 18-69 years, mean age = 29 years; 156 females; 97% reporting English as a native language) who were assigned to one of two conditions (Telos Preserved, Telos Changed), which were the same as in study 1 except that we indicated that the bee was a queen bee. After answering the same comprehension questions and answering the same categorization question as in study 1, participants were given one of two cases (marked by brackets): After the special operation, the scientists now want to know what the thing's offspring will be like. So they devise a special technique to have its eggs fertilized by a [bee/spider]. After reading that the thing had its eggs fertilized by a bee or spider, participants were then asked: Offspring. To what extent do you think that things that will hatch from the eggs will be bees or spiders? (1=they will definitely be bees, 7=they will definitely be spiders) Thirty people were removed for failing one or more comprehension questions. Data was analyzed for the remaining 320 participants. First, we replicated the findings from study 1 on category judgments, with participants agreeing that the thing was a spider when its telos was changed (M=5.34, SD=1.82, 95% CI [5.07, 5.62]) and with participants agreeing that the thing was a bee when its telos was preserved (M=2.63, SD=1.99, 95% CI [2.31, 2.94]), t(318)=12.679, p<.001, d=1.42. Second, and more importantly, a two-way ANOVA indicated a main effect of telos for the parent, Telos Preserved (M=2.79, SD=1.69) and Telos Changed (M=3.98, SD=1.98), F(1, 316)=35.13, p<.001, ηp2=.100, and a main effect of whether a bee (M=2.76, SD=1.88) or spider (M=4.03, SD=1.78) fertilized the eggs, F(1, 316)=41.10, p<.001, ηp2=.115. There was no interaction between telos of the parent and whether the parent's eggs were fertilized by a bee or spider. Follow-up t-tests indicated that when the eggs were fertilized by a bee, participants were more likely to think that spiders would hatch from the eggs when the telos of the original bee was changed to conform to the telos of a spider (M=3.41, SD=1.96, 95% CI [2.98, 3.83]) than when the telos was 10 preserved (M=2.10, SD=1.55, 95% CI [1.76, 2.44]) , t(158)=4.74, p<.001, d=.74 (see Figure 4). And when the eggs were fertilized by a spider, participants were more likely to think that spiders would hatch from the eggs when the telos of the original bee was changed to conform to the telos of a spider (M=4.51, SD=1.87, 95% CI [4.11, 4.91]) than when the telos was preserved (M=3.51, SD=1.53, 95% CI [3.16, 3.85]) t(158)=3.63, p<.001, d=.59 (see Figure 4). Figure 4: Distributions in Offspring Judgments for Telos Changed and Preserved The key finding here-that in both the bee-fertilized condition and the spider-fertilized condition, participants were more likely to say the offspring would now be a spider when the telos of the original bee was changed to conform to the telos of a spider- casts doubt on the claim that people are using an enriched prototype for bees and spiders in making categorization judgments. Instead, these results suggest that people associate a telos with an essence. People think that a telos can be transmitted to offspring. When the telos changes, people are more likely to think the offspring will be members of the species that has that telos. And the most plausible explanation of this is that people operate with an 11 Aristotelian conception of essences. That is, they are teleological essentialist in that the associate the essence of a thing with a telos. Our findings here suggest that people are not operating with an enriched prototype that centrally features teleological considerations in making category judgments. But a stronger test of the claim that people do indeed associate the essence of a thing with a telos involves testing whether teleological essentialist judgments generate category judgments. We investigate this in our final study. 5. Study 5: Teleological Essentialism and Generation We recruited 120 participants (aged 18-62 years, mean age = 31 years; 49 females; 97% reporting English as a native language) who were assigned to one of two conditions (Telos Preserved, Telos Removed), which were the same as in study 1. Participants answered the same two comprehension questions used in study 1. They then made category judgments, using the same probe as in study 1, and were also ask: Essence: The thing after the changes no longer has the true essence of the original bee. (1strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) The essence probe was based on a similar probe used by De Frietas et al., 2017 (see also Newman, Bloom et al., 2014; Newman et al., 2015). The presentation of both the category and essence probes was randomized. Two participants missed one or more comprehension questions and so data was analyzed for the remaining 118 participants. Preservation (M=3.03, SD=1.76, 95% CI [2.57, 3.48]) or loss (M=4.97, SD=2.00, 95% CI [4.46, 5.47]) of telos again has a significant effect on category judgments, t(117)=5.58, p<.001, d=1.03 (see Figure 5). Similarly, preservation (M=3.38, SD=2.05, 95% CI [2.85, 3.90]) or loss (M=5.57, SD=1.53, 95% CI [5.18, 5.93]) of telos has a significant effect on essence judgements, (117)=6.63, p<.001, d=1.21 (see Figure 5). 12 Figure 5: Distributions in Categorization and Essence Judgments for Telos Changed and Preserved To determine whether essence judgments generate category judgements, we tested for mediation. We found that a regression model with Telos as a predictor of Category was significant, t(118)=-5.58, β=- .458, p<.001, a regression model with Telos as a predictor of Essence was significant, t(118)=-6.63, β=- .523, p<.001, a regression model with Essence as a predictor of Category was significant, t(118)=9.61, β=.664, p<.001, but that in a multiple regression model with both Telos and Essence as predictors of Category, the effect of Telos on Category was no longer significant, t(118)=-1.91, β=-.153, p=.059..1 1 Iacobucci et al. (2007) suggest that testing mediation using structural equation modeling is always superior to running a series of regressions. So we conducted a causal search on the data using Greedy Equivalence Search (GES). Roughly, GES operates by considering the possible models available given the different variables. GES begins by assigning an information score to the null model (i.e., a disconnected graph). GES then considers various possible arrows ("edges") between the different variables. It begins by adding the edge that yields the greatest improvement in the information score (if there is such an edge) and repeats the process until additional edges would not further improve the information score. GES then considers deletions that would yield the greatest improvement in the information score (if there is such an edge), repeating this procedure until no further deletions will improve the score. In all cases, the orientation of the edges is given by edge-orientation rules in Meek (1997). Chickering (2002) shows that, given enough data, GES will return the true causal model of the data. GES is often interpreted as returning the best fitting causal model, given the data. This model returned by the search fits the data well 13 Figure 6: Standardized regression coefficients for the relationship between Telos and Category mediated by Essence. We thus take these results, coupled with our findings from study 4, as providing strong evidence against the claim that people are operating with an enriched prototype that centrally features teleological considerations in making category judgments. Our findings indicate the people associate the essence of a thing with a telos. 5. Conclusion We found that people operate with a teleological view of essences. People tend to categorize a thing on the basis of whether it preserves or changes its telos. This arises despite superficial similarity or dissimilarity, inside replacement, acquired characteristics and inheritance. Whereas studies of essentialism that utilize these various approaches sometimes turn up conflicting results, we found that manipulating telos generated a unified pattern of results. And we found evidence that teleological considerations affect essentialists judgments which in turn drive categorization judgments. Our results cohere with and extend a wide range of research indicating that teleology plays an important role in judgments of whether some collection of parts compose a further object (Rose and Schaffer, 2017) and in judgments of whether some object persists through part alterations (Rose, 2015; Rose, Schaffer and Tobia, forthcoming). The current results extend the role of teleology to our conception of the essences of things. In light of our results, we propose that the idea that the placeholder for essences is sometimes elaborated by scientific essences should be replaced with the view that the placeholder for an essence is elaborated by a telos. This elaboration is neither rare nor exceptional. It may even be the case that teleological essentialism is in place from the start or that the placeholder is very short lived, elaborated and replaced by tele from a very early age. Kelemen's (1999) finding that, for instance, children claim that "mountain exist to give animals a place to climb" might, at least, suggest that essences are associated with tele rather than mere placeholders from an early age. The extent of the life of the placeholder is a further empirical X2(1)=3.63, p>.05, BIC=-1.14. Following Iacobucci et al. (2007) and Rose & Nichols (2013), we also tested an alternative model with category judgments mediating the effect of telos on essence judgments. This model is a poor fit of the data, X2(1)=13.51, p<.001, BIC=8.73. For further details and some applications of GES, see Chickering 2002; Rose et al. 2011; Rose & Nichols 2013; Rose and Nichols, forthcoming; Rose 2017; and Turri et al. 2016. 14 question. For present purposes, our claim is simply that if there is a placeholder that gets elaborated, the elaboration is in terms of teleological essentialism, not scientific essentialism. It might be objected that our findings only indicate that behavior, not telos, plays a key role in categorization judgments (see e.g., Hampton et al., 2007). All of our cases involve the thing engaging in some behavior (e.g., spinning webs). So it could be that behavior, and not telos, is having a major impact on essentialist judgments. If that's right, then perhaps essence isn't elaborated by a kind of telos. Instead it may be the case that our results only show that people operate with an enriched prototype where behavior plays a central role. We doubt that it is simply behavior and not telos guiding people's essentialist judgments. Instead, telic relevant behavior, such as spinning webs, is evidence for the possession of a telos. As we saw above, Aristotle maintains that it is by nature and for an end (i.e., a telos) that a spider makes its web (Phys. 199a, 30). Aristotle also allows that tele can be unfulfilled. A spider could be externally prevented from spinning webs, which would frustrate its end. However, on Aristotle's view, it wouldn't thereby cease to be a spider, provided it still possessed the telos (NE. 1.5, 1.7). In concert with Aristotle's view, it is easy to imagine a case where a spider is prevented from spinning webs but nonetheless possessed the spider telos. And it is natural to think that it would still be a spider. We also think our current results begin to speak to the idea that telos and not behavior is playing a role in essentialist judgments. In our pilot study, we asked people, for instance, "What is the true purpose of spiders?". And the vast majority of people said that the true purpose of spiders is to either make spin webs, catch insects and eat them or both. It seems that people naturally identify telic relevant behavior as evidence of telos. Moreover, in our fourth study, preservation and change in the original thing's telos had a major impact on people's predictions about what would hatch from some eggs. There was no behavior to guide these judgments. The eggs hadn't even hatched. Instead, it seems that people expect the telos to be transmitted and that this, and not behavior, is what guides people's predictions in this case. That said, we take it that it is a further empirical question whether telos or behavior plays a central role in these kinds of judgments. And we hope for further work on this matter. One further important objection to our findings, is that, as Hampton et al. (2007) have shown, "essentialist categorization is highly dependent on the parameters of the task" (p. 1797). It could thus be that the kind of teleological essentialist judgments we find are highly dependent on the specific tasks we have utilized. But there is reason for thinking that our findings are not simply due to features of our tasks. Teleology, using very different tasks and measures, has been found to play a central role in judgments of both object composition and persistence (Rose, 2015; Rose and Schaffer, 2017; Rose Schaffer and Tobia, forthcoming). Moreover, these various studies have varied a range of additional features, alongside teleological considerations, and in every single case teleology emerges as playing a major role both in judgments of object composition and persistence. For instance, teleological considerations play a major role in persistence judgments even if a thing undergoes minor (e.g., denting) or major (e.g., smashed) changes (Rose, 2015); teleological considerations play a major role in personal identity judgments, even when moral considerations-such as whether the person becomes good or bad (see e.g., Strohminger and Nichols, 2014)-are made salient (Taylor, Kalbach and Rose, 2019); teleological considerations play a major role in judgments of object composition, even when varying whether the parts are fused, in contact or scattered (Rose and Schaffer, 2017); and teleological thinking also emerges early and persists through adulthood, even being retained despite professional training in physics (e.g., Kelemen, 1999; Kelemen et al., 2013). We thus suspect that the role of teleology in essentialist judgments isn't simply incidental to the tasks used here but instead reflect a deep, robust feature of human cognition. 15 Our view might also bear on recent theoretical work on essentialism. Based on several recent papers, George Newman and Joshua Knobe argue that there are two kinds of essentialism that fall under a broader General Essentialism (Newman & Knobe forthcoming). On their view, there is the Lockean kind of essentialism that applies to natural kinds, and there is a Platonic kind of essentialism that applies to kinds like scientist or punk rocker, which are value-laden. According to Newman and Knobe, what these two kinds of essentialism have in common is that "people appear to believe that what binds together the different features of the category is the fact that they are all ways of embodying the same deeper value" (Newman and Knobe, forthcoming, p. 2; see also e.g., Knobe et al., 2013; Tobia et. al. forthcoming). General Essentialism is thus the view that the essence of essentialism is that there is some abstract structure that people both posit and draw on to explain how category members are related. Lockean and Platonic essentialism are two forms that this abstract structure can take (Newman and Knobe, forthcoming, p. 3). The results from our studies suggest an alternative. It might be that what unifies natural kinds (like spider) and value-laden kinds (like scientist) is that in both cases, essences are tele. This would provide a different, and perhaps even more unified, form of general essentialism. Indeed, it may even provide a more compelling developmental account of essentialist thinking. Our findings indicate that people operate with an Aristotelian view of essences when it comes to natural kinds. It remains to be seen whether a similar approach will work for value-laden kinds. But there is reason to be optimistic that there is a deep and general way in which the way essences guide our judgments is best captured by teleological essentialism. Finally, we conclude by nothing that there are a number of further questions to be addressed. To mention just one, there is a question concerning the connection between teleological properties and other properties of a thing. We hope that future work will investigate this as well as the range of new questions that arise in light of teleological essentialism.2 References Barnes, J. (1984). The Complete Works of Aristotle, Volumes I and II, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Bloom, P. (2007). Religion is Natural. Developmental Science, 10, 147–151. Chickering, D. (2002). Optimal Structure Identification with Greedy Search. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 3, 507–54. De Freitas, J., Tobia, K. P., Newman, G. E., & Knobe, J. (2017). Normative judgments and individual essence. Cognitive Science, 41, 382-402. Gelman, S.A., & Wellman, H.M. (1991) Insides and essences: early understandings of the nonobvious. Cognition, 38, 213–244 2 We would like to thank David Danks, Joshua Knobe, Jonathan Schaffer, John Turri and Jonathan Weinberg for helpful feedback on earlier versions of this paper. We would also like to thank Rachana Kamtekar for helpful discussion of Aristotle. 16 Gelman, S. (2003). The essential child . New York: Oxford University Press. Gelman, S. A. (2004). Psychological essentialism in children. Trends in cognitive sciences, 8(9), 404-409. Hampton, J.A., Estes, Z., & Simmons, S. (2007) Metamorphosis: Essence, Appearance and Behavior in the Categorization of Natural Kinds. Memory & Cognition, 35, 1785-1800. Iacobucci, D., Saldanha, N., and Deng, X. (2007). A Mediation on Mediation: Evidence That Structural Equation Models Perform Better Than Regressions. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 17(2), 140-154. Keil, F. C. (1989). Concepts, kinds, and cognitive development . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kelemen, D. (1999). Why are Rocks Pointy? Children's Preference for Teleological Explanations of the Natural World. Developmental Psychology, 35, 1440–1452. Kelemen, D., & Rosset, E. (2009). The Human Function Compunction: Teleological Explanation in Adults. Cognition, 111, 138–143. Kelemen, D., Rottman, J. & Seston, R. (2013). Professional Physical Scientists Display Tenacious Teleological Tendencies: Purpose-Based Reasoning as a Cognitive Default. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142, 1074–1083. Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Locke, J. (1959). An essay concerning human understanding, vol. 2. New York: Dover (originally published in 1671). Malt, B. C. (1994). Water is not H2O. Cognitive psychology, 27(1), 41-70. Medin , D. L. , & Ortony , A. ( 1989 ). Psychological essentialism . In S. Vosniadou & A. Ortony (eds), Similarity and analogical reasoning , 179– 195. New York: Cambridge University Press. Meek, C. (1997). Graphical Models: Selecting Causal and Statistical Models. PhD Thesis, Carnegie Mellon University. Newman, G. E., Bloom, P., & Knobe, J. (2014). Value judgments and the true self. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40, 203–216. Newman, G. E., De Freitas, J., & Knobe, J. (2015). Beliefs about the true self explain asymmetries based on moral judgment. Cognitive Science, 39, 96–125. Newman, G., E., & Knobe, J. (forthcoming). The essence of essentialism. Mind and Language. Piaget, J. (2017). The child's conception of physical causality. Routledge. Putnam, H. (1975). The Meaning of 'Meaning', Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7, 215– 271. Rose, D., & Schaffer, J. (2017). Folk mereology is teleological. Noûs, 51(2), 238-270. Rose, D., Schaffer, J., & Tobia, K. (forthcoming). Folk teleology drives persistence judgments. Synthese. Rose, D. (2015). Persistence through function preservation. Synthese, 192(1), 97-146. 17 Rose, D., Livengood, J., Sytsma, J., & Machery, E. (2011). Deep Trouble for the Deep Self. Philosophical Psychology, 25, 629–46. Rose, D. (2017). Folk Intuitions of Actual Causation: A Two-Pronged Debunking Explanation. Philosophical Studies, 174, 1323–61. Rose, D., & Nichols, S. (2013). The Lesson of Bypassing. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 4, 599– 619. Rose, D., & Nichols, S. (forthcoming). From punishment to universalism. Mind and Language. Strohminger, N., & Nichols, S. (2014). The essential moral self. Cognition, 131(1), 159-171. Taylor, M., Kalbach, C., & Rose, D. (2019). Teleology and personal identity. Unpublished manuscript. Tobia, K. P., Newman, G.E., & Knobe, J. (forthcoming). Water is and is not H2O. Mind and Language. Turri, J., Buckwalter, W. and Rose, D. (2016), Actionability Judgments Cause Knowledge Judgments. Thought, 5, 212–22.

For Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Colour, (eds.) D. Brown & F. Macpherson, (Routledge). COLOUR, SCEPTICISM AND EPISTEMOLOGY Duncan Pritchard & Christopher Ranalli University of Edinburgh & National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) 1. INTRODUCTION Colours provide a paradigm example of how one can introduce sceptical challenges to our ordinary beliefs about the world. These sceptical challenges come in at least three forms: the Pyrrhonian challenge, the traditional problem of the external world, and the problem of acquaintance. The task of this paper is to examine each of these challenges in turn. 2. COLOUR AND THE PYRRHONIAN CHALLENGE The Pyrrhonian sceptical challenge that is posed by colours can be expressed as both a first-order epistemological challenge and also as a higher-order epistemological challenge. This section will examine both forms of the Pyrrhonian challenge. Note that in saying that the challenge is 'epistemological', we are drawing attention to the fact that the problem concerns not the truthvalue of the claim that there are things in the world that are coloured, but instead our epistemic support for that claim. Suppose that you are looking at a ripe lemon. One question you might ask is this: although the lemon looks yellow, is the lemon really yellow? For we are familiar with a thing looking one way while in fact being another way. When we ask whether the lemon really is yellow (whether the object really is coloured), we are asking more than whether that's how it appears to us, but whether that's how it is anyway, independent of its appearance.1 Sextus Empiricus expresses this point as follows: 2 When we question whether the underlying object is such as it appears, we grant the fact that it appears, and our doubt does not concern the appearance itself, but the account given of the appearance. (PH I: 19–20) So, the question does not concern whether we are right about how the lemon looks: that it looks yellow. The question is whether the lemon is yellow. Crucially, for our discussion, the question is more specifically: do we have epistemic support which favours the lemon really being yellow versus any alternative explanation? Colour provides a useful example of the following sceptical 'modes' employed by Pyrrhonian sceptics: M1. Members of the same species can have different colour experiences of the same object. M2. Members of different species can have different colour experiences of the object. The first challenge is that members of the same species can have conflicting colours experiences of the same object. For example, two people might be looking at the same apple, and one will have an experience as of the apple being red, while the other will have an experience as of the apple being green (e.g., due to colour blindness). The second challenge reminds us that different species might have conflicting colour experiences from ourselves. So, while human beings might perceive a number of objects as having such-and-such colour, different non-human animals might perceive the same objects as having a different colour. The template-Pyrrhonian challenge for colour can be put as follows, where 'o' is the target object, and 'S' and 'S*' pick out distinct subjects: (1) o looks colour C to S (2) It's not the case that o looks colour C to S* The Pyrrhonist then derives the following epistemological claim from this case of conflicting colour experiences: (C1) Our epistemic support does not favour o being C versus its not being C (and vice versa). Finally, the Pyrrhonist infers that: (C2) We should neither affirm that o is C nor that it's not the case that o is C. The conclusion of the argument is thus a basis for suspending judgement about colours, in keeping with the ultimate aim of all Pyrrhonian sceptical challenges. This is, the Pyrrhonian goal is to counter what they regard as dogmatism in our judgements by offering a countervailing argument (isosthenia) which would engender a neutral attitude (epoche) and eventually lead to a tranquil and untroubled state of mind (ataraxia). 3 One might what wonder what underlies the inference from the case of conflicting colour experiences to the epistemological claim that our epistemic support fails to favour the object o being colour C versus its failing to be C. One thought is that the Pyrrhonist is drawing our attention to the compelling idea that the epistemic support that S has in favour of o being C and the epistemic support that S* has in favour of o not being C is the same (i.e., it is the same strength of epistemic support), and therefore provides at least as much epistemic support for their target beliefs. The idea that this epistemic phenomenon demands a suspension of judgement effectively appeals to what is known in the epistemological literature as an underdetermination principle. Here is a plausible rendering of the principle in play here, which we will call Pyrrhonian Underdetermination: Pyrrhonian Underdetermination If S knows that p and q describe incompatible scenarios, and yet S lacks an epistemic basis which favours p over q, then S should suspend judgement that p. Underdetermination principles are widely endorsed in epistemology, though they are usually formulated in terms of the how one cannot have rationally grounded belief in the target proposition, rather than in terms of the suspension of judgement.2 Even so, this Pyrrhonian version of the principle is no less plausible than its contemporary counterparts. Consider the simple case of a proposition and its negation. If one recognises that one has no epistemic basis which favours p over not-p-i.e., no more reason to think that p is true than to think that not-p is true-then surely it follows that one should suspend judgement that p. What goes for the case of contradictions, where the incompatibility is manifest, obviously also applies to known to be incompatible propositions more generally. It follows that if the Pyrrhonian is right that in the domain of colour we lack an epistemic basis to prefer our colour judgements over known to be incompatible alternatives, then we ought to suspend those judgements. We should note that the Pyrrhonist conclusion is prima facie at odds with our ordinary epistemic practices in the following sense: the Pyrrhonist recommends that we revise our epistemic practices to fit with the Pyrrhonist's conclusion (e.g., suspending judgement). So, one might think that we are prone to disagree on occasions about whether an object is a certain colour or not. For example, I might judge, in otherwise normal conditions, that the apple in front of me is red, while a person I trust, in otherwise normal conditions, judges that the apple is not red. In such a case, we might just disagree, maintaining that our respective (though conflicting) colour experiences provides us with epistemic support for our respective (though conflicting) judgements, that one of us is correct, while the other is not. The problem here, however, is that we presumably don't want to say that the apple is both red and not red. And we don't want to say 4 that the apple is not red because it's not any colour at all. So, the problem that our (imagined) disagreement suggests is that, in order to avoid dogmatism-a dogmatic presumption that our judgement is true and the conflicting judgement is false because it is our judgement-we ought instead to suspend judgment.3 A related, though distinct, Pyrrhonian challenge can arise at a higher-order level from our reflection on colours and disagreement. On the one hand, post-Newtonian science suggests that particles are not coloured, so that it's hard to see how a composition of particles is coloured. In short, colours do not form part of the scientific world picture. On the other hand, our visual experiences and ordinary beliefs about physical objects suggest that objects are coloured. When I look at a red apple, for example, I take it that the apple is red-that this is no mere illusion that I'm suffering-such that legitimate disagreement can occur between others and me. So, there is a tension between the scientific picture, which suggests that physical objects aren't coloured, and the picture suggested by ordinary visual experience, that physical objects are coloured. Notice here that there seems to be a disagreement between the two pictures, and the Pyrrhonist will recommend that we suspend judgement because of the conflict of the two pictures. 3. COLOUR AND THE TRADITIONAL PROBLEM OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD In his Principles of Human Knowledge, George Berkeley famously challenges the indirect realist theory of perception, according to which we perceive ordinary macro-physical objects in virtue of perceiving mind-dependent "ideas" of them. "Ideas" are mind-dependent entities, which are taken to have representational properties. The indirect realist maintains that we indirectly perceive ordinary physical objects by directly perceiving "ideas" which represent them. Contemporary vision science seems to be sympathetic to the view that colour properties are not properties of external physical objects, but rather internal psychological properties: There may be light of different wavelengths independent of an observer, but there is no colour independent of an observer, because colour is a psychological phenomenon that arises only within an observer. (Palmer 1999, 97) Berkeley would agree. And not only does Berkeley think that colours are mind-dependent psychological properties, but he also claims that other alleged external physical properties, such as shape and weight, are mind-dependent psychological properties: 5 For can there be a more delicate and precise strain of abstraction than to distinguish the existence of perceptible things from their being perceived, so as to conceive them existing unperceived? Light and colours, heat and cold, extension and shapes, in a word the things we see and feel- what are they but so many sensations, notions, ideas, or sense impressions? And can any of these be separated, even in thought, from perception? [...] Therefore, because I can't possibly see or feel a thing without having an actual sensation of it, I also can't possibly conceive of a perceptible thing distinct from the sensation or perception of it. (Berkeley Principles, section 5) Berkeley's criticism here is that since we cannot conceive of colour as independent of our various perceptions of colour, so that we cannot conceive of colour as existing unperceived. Berkeley then argues that what goes for colour goes for other properties as well, such as extension and weight, what we would otherwise consider paradigm examples of mind-independent properties. This is the first step of the traditional problem of the external world, that what we directly perceive are only mind-dependent properties. The second step is to counter the indirect realist's thesis that our mind-dependent ideas, such as our idea of colour, for example, can represent the mindindependent colour properties. Against this suggestion, Berkeley maintains that our minddependent ideas cannot represent mind-independent properties: [...] the only thing an idea can resemble is another idea; a colour or shape can't be like anything but another colour or shape. Attend a little to your own thoughts and you will find that you can't conceive of any likeness except between your ideas. (Berkeley Principles, section 8) So Berkeley is arguing that we cannot conceive of our ideas of colour representing mindindependent properties, concluding that we can only conceive of our ideas of colour resembling other ideas of colour, among other mind-dependent properties. This second step forces the indirect realist into a "veil of perception" conception of our relation to the world. For how could we know anything at all about mind-independent things if we only directly perceive our own mind-dependent ideas? Berkeley's argument is that it doesn't help to reply that our minddependent ideas represent mind-independent things, since reflection reveals that we cannot even conceive of this possibility.4 The conclusion, then, is that if there are mind-independent things, we don't know anything about them. All we are in a position to know about are our minddependent ideas. There are at least four responses to this argument. The first is the sceptical realist response, that although there are mind-independent things, we cannot know anything about them. Applied to colour, the view is that although there are mind-independent colour properties, we cannot know anything about them. The second is the idealist response, which says that all that exists are mind-dependent things, and thus our knowledge doesn't extend to anything more than minddependent things. Applied to colour, the idealist maintains that there are no unperceived colour properties. The other two responses are less revisionary than the first two. The indirect realist 6 might maintain that it doesn't follow from the fact that we only directly perceive mind-dependent ideas that we cannot know anything about mind-independent things. The indirect realist here will reject Berkeley's Likeness Principle, that only mind-dependent ideas can represent mind-dependent ideas.5 Applied to colour, the indirect realist will maintain that colour is a mind-dependent, psychological property, but dispute the claim that what's true of colour is true of other properties. Finally, the naïve realist will insist that we can directly perceive mind-independent things, as opposed to merely mind-dependent ideas. This is consistent with allowing that colour is a mind-dependent psychological property, of course, and to this extent there may not be a practical difference between naïve realism and indirect realism when it comes to our perception of colours. Where the two views come apart is rather on whether in general we only directly perceive mind-dependent ideas. In order to explore the prospects of naïve realism and indirect realism further, it will be useful to examine our third sceptical challenge arising from the nature of colour, which is the problem of acquaintance. 4. COLOUR AND THE PROBLEM OF ACQUAINTANCE The traditional problem of the external world can arise from the split between the primary qualities of objects and the secondary qualities of objects. Recall that the idea is that a property like being the colour red is too differential in subjects' experiences to be among the primary qualities. The epistemological problem that arises from this is that if visual experience can so easily lead us to think that the redness of an object is a mind-independent property (a property that some objects have anyway, independently of our perception of them), then we might wonder whether all of the properties we ascribe to objects, on the basis of sensory experience, are like colour, in being mind-dependent. This would lead us to abandon a commonsense commitment to naïve realism, and thereby endorse (at most) indirect realism. The crux of the epistemological worry here is how we can know that colour is merely a special case of our visual experience being misleading, rather than a vivid instance of our ordinary epistemological predicament. A related epistemological worry arises from the thought that our knowledge of the world is not simply propositional knowledge, or what Bertrand Russell (1912) called our "knowledge of truths", but also acquaintance knowledge, our knowledge of things rather than facts about those things. For example, I know many true propositions about the colour red, but I also seem to know what the colour red is visually like. That is, in addition to knowing many true propositions about redness, I also know what redness is like. And this latter knowledge doesn't seem to be 7 something that could be transmitted to someone by surveying all the true propositions about red. To foster intuitions, suppose that, although I've never seen anything that is red, I come upon a grand list of all the true propositions about the colour red. I grasp all of these propositions, and I thereby have complete propositional knowledge of red. But surely I'm lacking some knowledge of red, so the thought goes, because I've never seen anything red. The knowledge that I'm lacking, then, cannot be knowledge of a proposition (if I were, then the list wouldn't be complete after all!) and is thereby some other type of knowledge.6 With the prima facie distinction between propositional knowledge and acquaintance knowledge in hand, consider the brain-in-a-vat (BIV) thought-experiment, in which you are a disembodied brain, living in a vat of fluid, where you are hooked up to a complex computer system, stimulating your brain so as to cause all of your sensory experiences. Naturally, the BIV doesn't know anything about the outside world, since it's stuck inside it's own personal sensorium, ignorant of what lies beyond the confines of that sensorium. Indeed, it's ignorant that it is a BIV, since it appears to itself to be a fully embodied human being. Moreover, the BIV isn't acquainted with the objects and properties in the world. Instead, it suffers systematic hallucinations. So, not only does the BIV lack propositional knowledge of the world, it also lacks acquaintance knowledge of the world. Compare that case-call it "the bad case"-with our case, "the good case". In our case, we perceive the world around us. Intuitively, we're acquainted with the colours of objects in the world, and not suffering systematic hallucinations as of being acquainted with them. We're not stuck in our own personal sensoriums, ignorant of anything independent of that sensorium. However, as Mark Johnston (1996) argues, as far as acquaintance knowledge of the world goes, it's hard to see how agents in the good case are any better off than the agents in the bad case with respect to acquaintance knowledge of the world: The case of the brain in the vat shows that our experience does not discriminate between many different kinds of external features so long as their effects on our sensibility are isomorphic in certain ways. Therefore, despite the seductive offer that perception makes, we cannot take our perceptual experiences to reveal the natures of external things. For no perceptual experience could at the same time reveal two things so intrinsically unalike as life in Boise and the inner workings of the vat computer. Conclusion: perceptual experience does not reveal the nature of its causes. In other words, it does not acquaint us with the external features causally responsible for our experience but only with their effects in us. (Johnston 1996, 188) So, according to Johnston: Perceptual experience in no way acquaints the brain [...] with the nature of the external causes of that experience. In this respect, perceptual experience is unsatisfyingly like Morse code reception; both involve interpretable effects at the end of an information-bearing process or signal. But the intrinsic natures of the originators of the signal are not manifest in the signal. This is a depressing 8 comparison. Perception represents itself as (or is at least spontaneously taken by its possessors as) a mode of access to the perceptible natures of things; a mode of acquaintance with their perceptible properties. (Johnston 1996, 188) The sceptical predicament Johnston is pointing to here is that even if we have propositional knowledge of the colour of the tomato in front of us, without acquaintance knowledge of the colour of the tomato we will be lacking a kind of knowledge of the colour that is valuable to possess.7 To illicit intuitions, consider the following suggestion from Johnston: Once my eyes were covered with bandages for five days. Part of what I longed for in longing to see again was not simply more information by which to negotiate my environment, nor simply more visual sensations. I longed for the cognitive contact with external features which vision seems to provide. It is depressing to conclude that what I longed for-acquaintance with visible properties-can never be had, even with the bandages off. (Johnston 1996, 189) We noted that colours seem to be mind-independent properties objects. Now if colours turn out to be mind-dependent properties, then a rich variety of our knowledge turns out to be very different than we pre-theoretically thought. For it seems to us that our knowledge that the tomato before us is red, say, is knowledge of the tomato, and how it would be independently of being perceived. A related worry arises with acquaintance knowledge. Even if colours are mindindependent properties, the worry here is that we cannot come to know what the colours of things are like for ourselves. Instead, we can only acquire a "schematic and bloodless" knowledge of the colours of things because it includes no acquaintance with properties and hence no acquaintance with the natures of things and hence no real acquaintance with things." (Johnston 1996, 190) Johnston's argument can be summarised along the following lines: (1) The sensory experience in the good case has the same nature as the sensory experience in the bad case. (2) The sensory experience in the bad case does not acquaint the agent with colour properties in the world. Therefore, (C1) The sensory experience in the good case does not acquaint the agent with the colour properties in the world. Therefore, (C2) The sensory experience in the good case does not put us in a position to acquire acquaintance knowledge of the colour properties in the world. How might one respond to this argument? A certain kind of naïve realism about the nature of sensory experience, known as disjunctivism, would reject the first premise.8 This premise expresses what Michael Martin (2004) calls the common kind assumption: the thesis that the nature of our 9 sensory experiences in the good case and the bad case are the same.9 The common kind assumption motivates the thought that if the nature of the experience in the bad case does not put the agent in a position to acquire acquaintance knowledge of the colours of things, then how could the nature of the experience in the good case⎯being the same⎯put the agent in a position to acquire acquaintance knowledge? According to disjunctivism, however, there is no sound philosophical basis for the common kind assumption. That the good case and the bad case share the negative epistemological property of being in some sense indistinguishable does not suffice to ensure that there is a common metaphysical core to the perceptual experiences in both cases (i.e., that they are essentially the same perceptual experiences). In particular, it is open to one to argue that the very nature of one's perceptual experiences in the good case is very different from how it is the bad case, to the extent that one has a direct acquaintance with a coloured object in the good case (the kind of direct acquaintance with a coloured object that is manifestly lacking in the bad case). If one is unpersuaded by the philosophical heroism of disjunctivism, then one might instead respond to the argument by seeking to undermine the move from premise (1) and (2) to the sub-conclusion (3). On this view, if the colour experience in the good case has the colour itself as a non-deviant cause, then the colour experience can acquaint the agent with the colour. According to this proposal, then, from the fact that the colour experience in the bad case does not acquaint the agent with the real colour of the object, so that she suffers a mere hallucination as of being acquainted with that colour, it does not follow that, in the good case, the colour experience does not acquaint her with the real colour of the object. However, the proponent of this line of response runs into the following objection: Barring a pre-established harmony no such causal process will preserve and transmit information so as to secure a nature-revealing match between how some feature of the cause, say the greyness of my dog's coat, is and the way I am caused to represent that feature as being. To see involves having the natures of visible properties revealed by a causal process, but this is just what no causal process actually does. (Johnston 1996, 191) The objection is that causation between the colour experience and the mind-independent colour of the object is not sufficient for visual acquaintance with the colour. The argument for this view is that one's visual representation of the colour might have the mind-independent colour as its cause, rendering the colour experience veridical, but being a veridical representation of the colour isn't sufficient for being acquainted with the colour. The reason is that the nature of the visual experience⎯in both the good case and the bad case⎯is fixed by one's internal mental states. Ipso facto, if it's fixed by one's internal mental states, then it's not fixed by the properties in the world. 10 5. CONCLUDING REMARKS In the last section we saw how Johnston replies to a broadly causal response to the problem that he poses. If one is persuaded by Johnston's argument in this regard, then that puts the ball back into the court of disjunctivism, which is the other response to this difficulty that we encountered. Disjunctivism is a radical proposal, and we want to close by noting that if this proposal can be made sensible, then it may be able to offer a unified response to all three of the sceptical challenges raised by colour that we have looked at. We have just seen how disjunctivism applies to the problem of acquaintance, and we noted in §3 how naïve realism (of which disjunctivism is one variety) can be one way of responding to the traditional sceptical problem regarding the external world, so that leaves the Pyrrhonian challenge. Recall that this proceeded by appeal to an underdetermination principle which essentially demanded that if one lacks an epistemic basis which favours scenario p over a (known to be incompatible) scenario q, then one should suspend judgement that p. If one further grants that the kinds of error-scenarios described by the Pyrrhonians motivate the thought that our epistemic support doesn't favour the scenario that an object has the colour that we take it to be as opposed to not having that colour, then it follows that we should suspend all our judgements about colour. It is precisely this last move that the disjunctivist will object to. In particular, she will argue that it is not the underdetermination principle that is in play which is the joker in the pack here, but rather the idea that the epistemic support one has for one's colour judgements is underdetermined in this fashion. According to disjunctivism, after all, what one has direct access to in the good case is very different from what one has direct access to in the bad case. Disjunctivism may thus potentially offer a route out of this problem too. That said, as we have indicated above, such a proposal is itself highly controversial, so this is far from being a cost-free solution to the sceptical difficulties that we have explored here.10 11 REFERENCES Brogaard, B. (2010). 'Color', Oxford Bibliographies: Philosophy. [DOI: 10.1093/obo/97801953965770021]. Brueckner, A. (1994). 'The Structure of the Skeptical Argument', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 827-35. Byrne, A. (2004). 'How Hard are the Sceptical Paradoxes?', Noûs 38, 299-325. Cohen, S. (1998). 'Two Kinds of Sceptical Argument', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58, 143-59. Dicker, G. (2011). Berkeley's Idealism: A Critical Examination, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hinton, J. M. (1967a). 'Visual Experiences', Mind 76, 217–27. ⎯⎯ (1967b). 'Experiences', Philosophical Quarterly 17, 1–13. ⎯⎯ (1973). Experiences: An Inquiry into Some Ambiguities, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Johnston, M. (1996). 'Is the External World Invisible?', Philosophical Issues 7, 185-98. Maund, B. (2012). 'Color', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (ed.) E. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/color/. Martin, M. G. F. (1997). 'The Reality of Appearances', Thought and Ontology, (ed.) M. Sainsbury, 77-96, Milan: Franco Angeli. ⎯⎯ (1998). 'Setting Things Before the Mind', Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, (ed.) A. O'Hear, 157-79, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ⎯⎯ (2002). 'The Transparency of Experience', Mind and Language 17, 376-425. ⎯⎯ (2003). 'Particular Thoughts and Singular Thought', Thought and Language, (ed.) A. O'Hear, 173-214, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ⎯⎯ (2004). 'The Limits of Self-Awareness', Philosophical Studies 120, 37-89. ⎯⎯ (2006). 'On Being Alienated', Perceptual Experience, (eds.) T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne, 354-410, Oxford: Oxford University Press. McDowell, J. (1995). 'Knowledge and the Internal', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55, 87793. Palmer, S. E. (1999) Vision Science: Photons to Phenomenology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Pritchard, D. H. (2005a). Epistemic Luck, Oxford: Oxford University Press. ⎯⎯ (2005b). 'The Structure of Sceptical Arguments', Philosophical Quarterly 55, 37-52. ⎯⎯ (2009). 'Defusing Epistemic Relativism', Synthese 166, 397-412. ⎯⎯ (2010). 'Epistemic Relativism, Epistemic Incommensurability and Wittgensteinian Epistemology', The Blackwell Companion to Relativism, (ed.) S. Hales, 266-85, Oxford: Blackwell. -- (2012). Epistemological Disjunctivism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. ⎯⎯ (2015). Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Pritchard, D. H., & Ranalli, C. (2013). 'Rorty, Williams and Davidson: Skepticism and Metaepistemology', Humanities 2, 351-68. ⎯⎯ (Forthcominga). 'On Metaepistemological Scepticism', Traditional Epistemic Internalism, (eds.) M. Bergmann & B. Coppenger, Oxford: Oxford University Press. ⎯⎯ (Forthcomingb). 'Skepticism and Disjunctivism', Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present, (eds.) D. Machuca & B. Reed, London: Continuum. Russell, B. (1912). The Problems of Philosophy, London: Williams and Norgate. Snowdon, P. (1980–81). 'Perception, Vision and Causation', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (new series) 81, 175–92. ⎯⎯ (1990-91). 'The Objects of Perceptual Experience', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (suppl. vol.) 64, 121–50. Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Pyrrhoniae Hypotyposes, [PH]). 12 Vogel, J. (2004). 'Skeptical Arguments', Philosophical Issues 14, 426-455. Williams, B. (1978). Descartes: The Project of Pure Inquiry, Sussex: Harvester Press. Yalçin, Ü. (1992). 'Sceptical Arguments from Underdetermination', Philosophical Studies 68, 1-34. 13 NOTES 1 See Williams (1978) for a classic discussion of this point, in the context of Cartesian radical scepticism. 2 For some of the main contemporary discussions of underdetermination-style principles and their role in radical sceptical arguments, see Yalçin (1992), Brueckner (1994), Cohen (1998), Byrne (2004), Vogel (2004), and Pritchard (2005a, part one; 2005b). For a recent overview of some of the main issues with regard to underdetermination-style principles, particular with regard to their role in radical sceptical arguments, see Pritchard (2015). 3 Of course, one could maintain that this consequence is not so bad, because perhaps o is both C and not C. Thus, an epistemic relativist might maintains that S and S* are both correct: o is C and it's not the case that o is C. The epistemic relativist will explain how this is possible along the following lines: relative to S's epistemic support E, it's true that E provides sufficient epistemic support for o's being C, while relative to S*'s epistemic support E*, it's true that E* provides sufficient epistemic support for o's not being C. For more on epistemic relativism, and a critique of the view, see Pritchard (2009; 2010). 4 A related response from Hume is specifically epistemological. Rather than it being impossible to conceive of mind-dependent ideas representing mind-independent properties, Hume's suggestion is that we need to have justification to believe that the following general principle is true: if S has an idea as of p, then it is likely that p. Hume, however, thinks that this principle cannot be justified without circularity. 5 For work on Berkeley's Likeness Principle, see Dicker (2011, ch. 7). 6 For a famous contemporary discussion of this issue, in the context of the viability or otherwise of physicalism, see Jackson (1982). 7 In particular, Johnston tells us that: "[t]he originally unbelievable conclusion now follows: we cannot see colour, because our visual experiences as of the colours of things do not reveal to us what the colours of the external causes of our experience are like." (Johnston 1996, 191) 8 For some key defences of disjunctivism, see Hinton (1967a; 1967b; 1973), Snowdon (1980-81; 1990-91), and Martin (1997; 1998; 2002; 2004; 2006). Note that this disjunctivism is very different from the specifically epistemological disjunctivism that has most prominently been defended by McDowell (e.g., 1995), and recently further developed by Pritchard (2012). For more on both types of disjunctivism, and how they both relate to epistemological scepticism, see Pritchard & Ranalli (forthcomingb). 9 Martin characterises the common kind assumption as follows: "The Common Kind Assumption: whatever kind of mental event occurs when one is veridically perceiving some scene, such as the street scene outside my window, that kind of event can occur whether or not one is perceiving." (Martin 2004, 40) 10 Thanks to XXXX.

Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! Paweł Grabarczyk Dyrektywalna teoria znaczenia w interpretacji behawioralnej. 1. Wstęp Nie ulega wątpliwości, że przedstawiona w latach trzydziestych ubiegłego wieku przez Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza Dyrektywalna Teoria Znaczenia 1 (w dalszej części artykułu posługiwał się będę często skrótem DTZ), nie spotkała się z entuzjastycznym przyjęciem filozofów języka. Poświęcone jej opracowania są prawie wyłącznie pracami o charakterze historycznym i można odnieść wrażenie, że jest ona raczej jednym z zamkniętych rozdziałów w historii namysłu nad znaczeniem wyrażeń, niż teorią, którą warto by się było zajmować. Powodów takiego stanu rzeczy jest zapewne kilka. Po pierwsze, oryginalne sformułowanie dyrektywalnej teorii znaczenia zniechęca zawiłością i nieco archaicznym językiem. 2 Po drugie, teoria ta wydaje się nazbyt restrykcyjna – opisując język w terminach składni i pragmatyki programowo pomija aspekt semantyczny, co spowodowane jest nieaktualną już dziś obawą przed paradoksami, do których mogłoby doprowadzić powołanie się na pojęcia takie jak „prawda", czy „odniesienie". Po trzecie, w wyniku dostrzeżonych usterek została zarzucona przez samego autora, i to dość szybko po jej opublikowaniu. Nie miała więc szans na to, żeby okrzepnąć i obrosnąć w zastrzeżenia i objaśnienia, które obroniłyby ją przed nasuwającymi się zarzutami. Mimo to, wydaje mi się, że warto do DTZ wrócić i przyjrzeć się możliwościom, jakie daje. Jej podstawowa idea, czyli to, że znacznie wyrażeń daje się wyprowadzić ze zbioru zinternalizowanych przez użytkowników reguł uznawania zdań, jest oryginalna i inspirująca. Moim celem w tym artykule nie jest jednak ani egzegeza tekstu Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza, ani nawet racjonalna rekonstrukcja DTZ. Chodzi mi raczej o wskazanie drogi rozwoju dla tej teorii i naprawienie niektórych z jej usterek, tak aby w przyszłości mogła okazać się przydatna dla współczesnej filozofii języka. 1 Teoria ta przedstawiona została w Ajdukiewicz (1931) i Ajdukiewicz (1933). Uwagi rozjaśniające niektóre kwestie znaleźć też można w Ajdukiewicz (1953). 2 Dla przykładu, wspomniane dalej macierze języka konstruowane są w oparciu o mało dziś popularną notację Łukasiewicza. Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! Z powodu braku miejsca nie będę szczegółowo przedstawiał DTZ w jej oryginalnym sformułowaniu. Czytelników zainteresowanych szczegółami tej wersji odsyłam do: Maciaszka (2007), Zmyślonego (2009) i Nowaczyka (2006). Jednakże, jako że moim zamiarem jest między innymi wprowadzenie do DTZ nowego typu dyrektyw, przedstawię teraz trzy oryginalne rodzaje dyrektyw wprowadzone przez Ajdukiewicza. 2. Pierwotna wersja DTZ Dyrektywami znaczeniowymi nazywa Ajdukiewicz reguły języka, które oddane być mogą przez schemat o następującej postaci: Jeżeli u zna język L, to jeśli u znajduje się w sytuacji S, u uzna zdanie Z. Gdzie u oznacza użytkownika języka, L język, S pewną sytuację, a Z pewne konkretne zdanie języka L. Pasujące do tego schematu dyrektywy są zatem regułami, których pogwałcenie oznacza wyłączenie mówiącego z grona osób ten język znających. Inaczej mówiąc, przestrzeganie dyrektyw rozumieć należy jako warunek konieczny znajomości języka, do którego są one przypisane. Różnice pomiędzy typami wprowadzonych dyrektyw przedstawić teraz możemy różnicując sytuację S w powyższym schemacie. Jeżeli sytuacją S jest jakieś inne zdanie (lub zbiór zdań), powiedzmy Z', a zatem, gdy dyrektywa nakazuje uznanie zdania Z w sytuacji, w której użytkownik języka uznał wcześniej zdanie Z', to ten rodzaj dyrektyw nazwiemy dyrektywami dedukcyjnymi. Jeżeli motywem uznania zdania Z jest pewna dana empiryczna, to odpowiednią dyrektywę nazwiemy dyrektywą empiryczną, a jeśli motyw jest dla uznania zdania zupełnie nieistotny, a więc dyrektywa nakazuje je po prostu uznać w każdych możliwych okolicznościach, to mamy do czynienia z dyrektywą aksjomatyczną. Zilustrujmy to przykładami: Dyrektywy aksjomatyczne nakazują uznanie pewnych zdań niezależnie od okoliczności, na przykład: Paweł Grabarczyk jest identyczny z Pawłem Grabarczykiem. Dyrektywy dedukcyjne nakazują uznanie pewnego zdania w wyniku przyjęcia innego zdania. Przykładem niech będzie dowolne podstawienie reguły modus ponens, na przykład Jeżeli liczba dyrektyw w DTZ jest nieparzysta, to nie jest podzielna przez 2, a liczba dyrektyw w DTZ jest nieparzysta; A zatem: liczba dyrektyw w DTZ jest niepodzielna przez 2. Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! Dyrektywy empiryczne nakazują uznanie pewnego zdania w obliczu określonej danej empirycznej. Słynny przykładem, jakim posługuje się Ajdukiewicz (1933: 156) jest reguła nakazująca uznanie zdania Boli w sytuacji, w której ktoś dotyka obnażonego nerwu zębowego użytkownika języka. Warto zwrócić uwagę na to, że we wszystkich tych przypadkach mówi się o uznaniu, a nie wypowiedzeniu zdania. Nikt nie oczekuje, zatem, od użytkowników języka ciągłego emitowania zdań w podanych w dyrektywach sytuacjach. Testowanie dyrektywy znaczeniowej rozumieć należy w ten sposób, że użytkownik reaguje odpowiednio na pytanie zadane przez kogoś, kto testuje jego kompetencję językową. Nie należy też mylić uznania, o którym tu mowa z prawdziwością zdań, co, szczególnie w przypadku dyrektyw aksjomatycznych, natychmiast się nasuwa. DTZ zachowuje swój asemantyczny charakter, odwołując się jedynie do reakcji użytkowników (którzy, teoretycznie, mogliby się systematycznie mylić). Warto również pamiętać o tym, że DTZ nie postuluje znajomości reguł przez użytkownika – jego zadaniem jest postępowanie zgodnie z dyrektywami, a nie na przykład zdolność do ich werbalizowania. Ten pragmatystyczny punkt wyjścia pozwala Ajdukiewiczowi na podanie definicji znaczenia wyrażeń, która nie odwołuje się do żadnych pojęć semantycznych, dalsza część DTZ jest już bowiem konstrukcją czysto syntaktyczną. W uproszczeniu jeżeli wyobrazimy sobie listę wszystkich dyrektyw danego języka, to synonimiczne będą w tym języku te wyrażenia, które można wzajemnie zastąpić we wszystkich dyrektywach, tak, że zmieni się co najwyżej kolejność zdań na liście (ale nic nie przybędzie i nic nie wypadnie). Jeżeli teraz rozłożymy wszystkie znajdujące się na liście dyrektyw zdania na składowe, docierając w ten sposób do wyrażeń elementarnych języka, to, zachowując kolejność odpowiadającą procedurze rozkładania zdań, możemy utworzyć coś, co Ajdukiewicz nazywa macierzami języka. Znaczeniem danego wyrażenia będzie wtedy zbiór wszystkich tych miejsc, które zajmuje ono w macierzy swojego języka (zbiór miejsc zajmowanych przez wyrażenie jest zatem zrelatywizowany do macierzy, w której się znajduje, co odpowiada intuicyjnej idei zrelatywizowania znaczenia do konkretnego języka). 3 3 Raz jeszcze chciałbym podkreślić, że jest to omówienie niezwykle skrótowe. Wyczerpujące, czy choćby nawet zadowalające przedstawienie tych kwestii wymagałoby oddzielnego artykułu. Jednocześnie, znajomość szczegółów teorii dyrektywalnej, takich jak sposób budowania macierzy nie jest do zrozumienia niniejszego artykułu wymagana, ponieważ przedstawiane dalej modyfikacje DTZ nie dotyczą budowy macierzy. Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! Tak pomyślana teoria ma kilka niezaprzeczalnych zalet. Po pierwsze, wychodzi ona od niezwykle intuicyjnych i rzadko kwestionowanych założeń: opanowanie języka oznacza nabycie zdolności do działania zgodnie z pewnymi regułami (nawet, jeśli użytkownik nie jest w stanie reguł tych podać), a część z tych reguł odgrywa rolę kluczową, co przejawia się w tym, że działanie wbrew nim owocuje wykluczeniem działającego ze społeczności użytkowników języka. Po drugie, pozwala ona na redukcję semantycznego pojęcia znaczenia (a także pojęcia przekładu, o czym z powodu wprowadzonych uproszczeń nie piszę) do kombinacji pojęć syntaktycznych (zbiór miejsc wyrażenia w macierzy języka) i pragmatycznych (uznawanie zdań). Po trzecie, mimo upływu lat, teoria ta nie posiada żadnego odpowiednika we współczesnej filozofii języka, choć część z idei w niej zawartych została później przez innych badaczy podjęta (oprócz dwóch teorii wspomnianych przeze mnie poniżej warto odnotować podobieństwo do teorii znaczenia Davidsona. Dokładne omówienie tej kwestii znajdzie czytelnik w: Maciaszek (2007) i Marsonet (1997)). 3. Kontrprzykład Tarskiego i języki zamknięte. Nie da się jednak ukryć, że mimo tych zalet DTZ posiada sporo mankamentów. Najbardziej znanym, jest trudność wskazana Ajdukiewiczowi przez Alfreda Tarskiego, Tarski podał Ajdukiewiczowi oparty o bardzo prosty język zawierający jedynie dyrektywy aksjomatyczne kontrprzykład, który dowodził, że DTZ dopuszcza przypadek, w którym dwa wyrażenia o odmiennym odniesieniu mają na gruncie DTZ to samo znaczenie, zob. Ajdukiewicz (1964: 397). Przykład ten jest jednak z paru powodów wysoce kontrowersyjny i ostatecznie nie wydaje się być bardzo poważnym zarzutem. Po pierwsze, nic nie zmusza nas do tego, by przyjmować zasadę determinacji odniesienia wyrażenia przez jego znaczenie. Dysponując (wprowadzonym wiele lat po sformułowaniu DTZ) rozróżnieniem na znaczenie wąskie i szerokie, możemy uznać, że DTZ dotyczy jedynie znaczenia wąskiego, o którym dobrze wiadomo, że zasady determinacji odniesienia przez znaczenie nie spełnia, zob. Putnam (1975). Po drugie (bronił się w ten sposób sam Ajdukiewicz), trudno byłoby sobie wyobrazić coś podobnego w języku, w którym funkcjonują dyrektywy empiryczne (a zatem we właściwym języku, dla którego stworzona została teoria dyrektywalna). Musiałby to być przypadek, w którym nie umiejąc podać żadnej różnicy między obiektami, bylibyśmy jednocześnie zobligowani przez reguły języka do zastrzegania, że mimo to są różne. Po trzecie, kontrprzykład Tarskiego (i podobne) daje się zablokować przez drobną modyfikację Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! DTZ – w miejsce wzajemnego zastępowania wyrażeń w dyrektywach wystarczy posłużyć się zwykłym zastępowaniem (bez wymogu wzajemności), zob. Buszkowski (2010) i zmodyfikować definicję synonimiczności następująco: Wyrażenia A i B są synonimiczne na gruncie języka L wtw gdy zastąpienie jednego drugim w każdej dyrektywie, da w efekcie istniejącą dyrektywę języka tego samego typu. (zob. też Nowaczyk (2006)). Inną znaną trudnością DTZ jest to, że sformułowana ona została dla tzw. języków zamkniętych. Językami zamkniętymi nazywa Ajdukiewicz takie języki, w przypadku których każde nowo wprowadzone wyrażenie ma już w nich synonim. Jest to, oczywiście, idealizacja, ale jak się okazuje, dość kłopotliwa. Problemem jest nie tylko to, że języków takich nie ma, okazuje się, że nie da się ich nawet zbudować w sposób sztuczny, zob. Buszkowski (2010). Cena za rezygnację z tej idealizacji jest jednak dość wysoka. Ponieważ znaczenie wyrażeń zdefiniowane zostało jako zbiór miejsc, które wyrażenie zajmuje w macierzy języka, a macierz ta zmienia się za każdym razem, gdy tylko wprowadzimy do języka nowe wyrażenie 4 , to znaczenie wszystkich wyrażeń w języku zmienia się w momencie, w którym wprowadzimy do niego nowe wyrażenie. Problemowi temu można jednak starać się zaradzić na różne sposoby, łącznie z pogodzeniem się z tą nieintuicyjną konsekwencją i uznaniem, że teoria znaczenia zrelatywizowana jest zawsze do pewnego konkretnego etapu rozwoju języka. 5 Na dodatek, nie należy tracić z oczu tego, że jest to jedynie nieintuicyjna konsekwencja, która zawsze może okazać się ceną wartą zapłacenia za inne zalety teorii. Poza tymi dwoma problemami DTZ rodzi jeszcze sporo drobniejszych, ale nie mniej dotkliwych trudności. Wymieńmy niektóre z nich. W odróżnieniu od macierzy języka, których budowa opisana jest przez Ajdukiewicza bardzo dokładnie, o samych dyrektywach, ich rodzajach i charakterystyce dowiadujemy się zdecydowanie zbyt mało. Czy podana lista rodzajów dyrektyw jest listą wyczerpującą? Być może teoria języka naturalnego powinna uwzględniać więcej typów reguł? 4 Ponieważ musi ono zostać wprowadzone za pomocą dyrektyw, które zostaną rozłożone na wyrażenia elementarne i dopisane do macierzy. 5 Z powodu braku miejsca nie przedstawiam szczegółów tych rozwiązań. Czytelnik znajdzie je w Maciaszek (2007) i Jedynak (2003). Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! Nie jest również jasne, kiedy możemy w ogóle powiedzieć o danym wyrażeniu, że posiada znaczenie czy wystarczy, że występuje w jakiejś dyrektywie? Trudno jest też powiedzieć, jak mamy rozumieć zastrzeżenie, że dyrektywy podane są dla wszystkich wyrażeń języka. Jest to spodziewane w przypadku predykatów, ale co z innymi kategoriami wyrażeń – wyrażeniami złożonymi, zdaniami, nazwami własnymi? Czy mamy przyjąć, że dla każdego zdania istnieje dyrektywa, która reguluje jego użycie? Na dodatek, kluczowa, jeżeli tylko chcemy uczynić z DTZ narzędzie do badania języków naturalnych, kategoria dyrektyw empirycznych prowokuje wiele pytań. Po pierwsze – czy mamy uznać, że wyrażenia znajdujące się w tych dyrektywach odnoszą się do danych empirycznych? Czym właściwie są te dane empiryczne? Dowiadujemy się jedynie tego, że mają swoje nazwy w metajęzyku, w którym opisane są macierze języka, ale do czego się te nazwy w metajęzyku odnoszą? Do sytuacji, przedmiotów, zdarzeń? Może do reprezentacji w umyśle użytkowników języka? Poszukiwanie odpowiedzi na te pytania rozpocznę od przywołania dwóch teorii, które stanowiły dla mnie najważniejszą inspirację do wprowadzenia większości z przedstawionych poniżej modyfikacji DTZ. 4. Quine i problem dyrektyw empirycznych. Pierwszą z tych teorii jest behawioralna teoria znaczenia Quine'a. 6 Zbieżności pomiędzy nią a DTZ nietrudno zauważyć. Przedstawiając swój słynny eksperyment myślowy z przekładem radykalnym Quine stwierdza, że badający język tubylców lingwista radykalny kolekcjonuje dane, którymi jest zapis potwierdzanych przez obserwowanych użytkowników języka zdań. Co więcej, lingwista ten grupuje swoje znaleziska tworząc trzy kategorie zdań. Są to, po pierwsze – zdania, które potwierdzane są przez tubylców niezależnie od okoliczności, po drugie, zdania, które tubylcy potwierdzają zawsze wtedy, gdy potwierdzili już wcześniej inne zdana i po trzecie, zdania które potwierdzają w obecności pewnego bodźca empirycznego. Jak widać jest to struktura niezwykle podobna do podziału na dyrektywy aksjomatyczne, dedukcyjne i empiryczne. Między propozycjami Ajdukiewicza i Quine'a zachodzi jednak pewna poważna różnica. Zamiast o sytuacjach, czy przeżyciach Quine mówi o bodźcach. Na dodatek, są to bodźce rozumiane w sposób dość niestandardowy – bodźcem nie jest zdarzenie, 6 Choć propozycja Quine'a była przez niego modyfikowana, jej zasadnicze idee, do których odwołuję się w tym artykule, znalazły się już w Quine (1960). Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! które wywołuje w nas jakąś reakcję, ale samo pobudzenie receptorów w organizmie. Proponuję zatrzymać się przy tej różnicy, ponieważ wiąże się ona z jedną z zasygnalizowanych niejasności teorii dyrektywalnej. Zastanówmy się, co właściwie jest składnikiem dyrektyw empirycznych? Jak wspomniałem, mówi się tam o pewnej danej empirycznej, czy wrażeniowej. Czym właściwie ów empiryczny składnik jest? Zacznijmy od jego kategorii ontologicznej. Na pierwszy rzut oka wydaje się, że najlepiej do tej roli nadają się zdarzenia, ponieważ same przedmioty, jeśli tylko nie oddziałują na użytkownika języka (na przykład nie są w ogóle obecne w jego polu percepcji), nie wymuszają na nas uznawania żadnych zdań. Ale jaka jest właściwie rozpiętość czasowa tych zdarzeń? Metaforycznie, ale, jak mi się wydaje, dość trafnie, moglibyśmy tę główną trudność związaną z odniesieniem empirycznego składnika dyrektyw oddać, mówiąc, że chodzi o to, jak drobno mamy to doświadczenie podzielić. Na jednym krańcu skali znajduje się tu pojedyncze, elementarne zdarzenie a na drugim niezwykle skomplikowana sytuacja złożona ze wszystkich zdarzeń, które są w danej chwili w polu percepcji użytkownika języka. Weźmy słynny przykład Quine'a – załóżmy, że lingwista badający język tubylców ustalił, że w obecności danej empirycznej, jaką jest pojawienie się królika, reguły rekonstruowanego języka nakazują uznanie zdania Gavagai, Co mielibyśmy tu wpisać do macierzy w charakterze danej empirycznej – zdarzenie, jakim jest zjawienie się królika w polu widzenia, ciąg zdarzeń, jakim jest zjawienie się królika w polu widzenia i jego pozostawanie w tym polu, czy może coś większego – jakiś wycinek całej sytuacji, jaką jest „natknięcie się na królika w dżungli"? Pojedyncze zdarzenia wydają się najczęściej zbyt drobne, wygląda więc na to, że powinniśmy brać pod uwagę raczej ich sekwencje, albo też zbiory zdarzeń (czyli sytuacje). Co gorsza, nawet jeżeli na coś się już zdecydujemy, to jest to tylko początek kłopotów, ponieważ w odróżnieniu od przedmiotów, które, jak zauważyliśmy, na składowe dyrektyw empirycznych raczej się nie nadają, zdarzenia, ciągi zdarzeń i sytuacje mają o wiele mniej zrozumiałe warunki tożsamości. Czy to samo zdarzenie albo ta sama sytuacja może pojawić się wielokrotnie? Wydaje się, że raczej nie, zamiast zdarzeń i sytuacji musimy zatem w dyrektywach umieścić raczej nazwy typów zdarzeń, względnie nazwy typów sytuacji. Nie bardzo jednak wiadomo, w jaki sposób mielibyśmy te typy w metajęzyku wyróżniać. Skoro zdarzenia i sytuacje przysparzają nam tylu trudności, to może lepiej byłoby skupić się Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! na przeżyciach psychicznych? 7 Być może dyrektywy empiryczne powinny po prostu nakazywać uznanie danego zdania w obliczu tego, a nie innego przeżycia? Postawiwszy sprawę w ten sposób od razu widzimy jednak, że grożą nam tutaj te same trudności, co przed chwilą – trudno jest właściwie powiedzieć, jakie są warunki tożsamości przeżyć – czy można mieć, na przykład, kilka razy to samo wyobrażenie (w odróżnieniu od takiego samego wyobrażenia, albo wyobrażenia tego samego przedmiotu)? Dlatego też sądzę, że optymalnym rozwiązaniem będzie dla nas przyjęcie bodźców w sensie Quine'a jako składników dyrektyw empirycznych. Pytania o ich warunki tożsamości nie wprowadzają nas w zakłopotanie – zawsze potrafimy powiedzieć, czy pobudzony był ten sam receptor (albo zbiór receptorów), co ostatnio. Co więcej, ponieważ nie jest pewne, jak dużą część receptorów mamy wziąć w danej chwili pod uwagę, zawsze możemy po prostu wziąć pod uwagę wszystkie z nich, czyli tak zwany „bodziec całościowy", nie ulega bowiem wątpliwości, że jest on o wiele lepiej poznanym i łatwiejszym do opisania obiektem, niż „sytuacja całościowa". Skoro przy rozwiązywaniu trudności związanych z dyrektywami empirycznymi jesteśmy, to warto wspomnieć o innym kłopocie, który komplikuje mocno obraz przedstawiany pierwotnie przez DTZ. Użytkownik języka może nie potwierdzić wymaganego zdania, ponieważ jest, dajmy na to, przekonany o tym, że zmysły go w danej chwili zawodzą. Na przykład, będąc przekonanym, że właśnie zakropiono mi specjalne krople, które zmieniają sposób, w jaki postrzegam kolory albo, że znajduję się w pomieszczeniu oświetlonym w jakiś bardzo nietypowy sposób, mogę nie uznawać zdania „to jest czerwone" w obecności czerwonego bodźca. Zauważmy, że nie możemy tego problemu rozwiązać odwołując się do stanu faktycznego (czy to pomieszczenia, czy to moich oczu), ponieważ nie potwierdzę tego zdania również wtedy, gdy fałszywie będę przekonany o tym, że okoliczności są nietypowe. Ajdukiewicz dostrzegał ten problem, ale proponowane przez niego rozwiązanie można, w najlepszym razie, uznać za prowizoryczne. Wprowadził on jedynie dodatkowe zastrzeżenie, że użytkownik musi być przekonany o tym, że „sytuacja jest normalna", zob. Ajdukiewicz (1934: 156). To prowizoryczne rozwiązanie prowokuje zbyt wiele pytań: do czego właściwie przekonanie to się sprowadza? Czy jest ono jedynie skrótem koniunkcji konkretnych przekonań, które przypisujemy użytkownikowi? Jeżeli tak, to czy potrafimy skrót ten 7 Rozwiązanie to preferował Ajdukiewicz. Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! rozwinąć i dopisać do dyrektyw? Wyjściem z tej sytuacji jest przyjęcie, że przekonanie o normalności sytuacji sprowadza się do jakiegoś, zapewne dość licznego, zbioru przekonań niezwerbalizowanych. Należałoby to rozumieć tak, że osoba, która interpretuje jakieś dane doświadczenia, nie myśli w danym momencie o wszystkich szczegółach, które upewniają ją o normalności sytuacji, ale są one jej dostępne w postaci sieci przekonań, które ma, ale których niepytana, nie przywołuje. W jaki jednak sposób mielibyśmy taki niezwerbalizowany zbiór przekonań reprezentować w dyrektywach? To jeszcze nie koniec trudności. Aby dyrektywy działały, tak jak powinny, testowany użytkownik języka musi żywić przekonania nie tylko na temat stanu swojego organizmu i otoczenia, ale i intencji rozmówcy. Jeżeli uzna, że padł właśnie ofiarą żartu lub prowokacji, może nie potwierdzić zdań wymienianych w dyrektywie, ale nie będzie to przecież oznaczało nieznajomości języka. Co więcej, choć zastrzeżenia te nasunęły się nam przy okazji omawiania dyrektyw empirycznych, to dotyczą one również dyrektyw aksjomatycznych i dedukcyjnych. Zdanie, którego uznanie nakazuje jakaś dyrektywa aksjomatyczna mógłbym odrzucić dlatego, że jestem przekonany o tym, że ktoś ze mnie kpi (pytając o coś tak oczywistego) albo gdybym uznał, że mój rozmówca porozumiewa się jakimś szyfrem, który zmienia znaczenie słów, albo też gdybym był na przykład przekonany, że podano mi środek, który sprawia, że wszystko wydaje mi się pewne i oczywiste. Zastrzeżenia Ajdukiewicza w postaci wspomnianego już założenia o normalności sytuacji, czy tego, że użytkownik języka działać musi na serio i w dobrej wierze (zob. Ajdukiewicz (1934: 150-151)) są tak ogólnikowe, że trudno je uznać za pełnoprawny składnik teorii, która w pozostałych aspektach jest bardzo drobiazgowa i jednoznaczna. Sądzę, że odwołując się do proponowanego przeze mnie behawioralnej interpretacji dyrektyw możemy te trudności przezwyciężyć. Wystarczy tylko przyjąć, że częścią kompetencji językowej, którą testuje dyrektywa, jest zdolność rozpoznania „normalnego" oświetlenia, czy stanu naszego organizmu. Nie jest to jednakże jakaś dodatkowa analiza danych zmysłowych, wymagająca zaangażowania przekonań, czy rozumowań – całościowy bodziec, a więc w przypadku naszego przykładu, pobudzenie wywołane kolorową plamą w tym, a nie innym oświetleniu i pytaniem o odpowiednim brzmieniu ma wywoływać reakcję potwierdzenia zdania. Zauważmy teraz, że integralnym składnikiem bodźca całościowego jest samo zdanie, które ma Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! zostać potwierdzone. 8 Chodzi tu o coś tak oczywistego, że mogłoby umknąć naszej uwadze – gdy na przykład mówimy, że dyrektywa aksjomatyczna nakazuje uznanie zdania niezależnie od bodźca to nie możemy zapominać o tym, że użytkownik słyszy jednak pewne zdanie, które ma potwierdzić – to jest, rzecz jasna, rodzaj bodźca, który do niego dociera i nie można go zamienić na nic innego. A zatem, również w dyrektywach aksjomatycznych istnieje specyficzne dla nich pobudzenie receptorów. Rozpoznanie, że jest to zdanie, które ma sprawdzić, czy kierujemy się dyrektywą, a więc zorientowanie się, że sprawdza się właśnie naszą podstawową kompetencję językową (a nie na przykład z nas żartuje), jest częścią tej kompetencji językowej (tak samo, jak rozpoznanie, że coś jest ironią lub groźbą). Jeśli będziemy o tym pamiętać, to, na przekór Ajdukiewiczowi, moglibyśmy powiedzieć, że użytkownik powinien rozpoznawać występujące w dyrektywach bodźce całościowe jako wysoce nietypowe 9 w typowych sytuacjach nikt nie prosi go o potwierdzanie zdań tożsamościowych albo potwierdzanie zdania "to jest czerwone" w obliczu czerwonego bodźca. Robi to tylko w dość specyficznych okolicznościach gdy chce rozwiać wątpliwość co do zdolności komunikacyjnych rozmówcy. Zdania występujące w dyrektywach (albo pary zdań z bodźcami) odznaczają się tym, że nauczeni jesteśmy je rozpoznawać i reagować na nie odruchowo, bez analizy, czy angażowania jakichkolwiek przekonań. 5. Sellars i dyrektywy imperatywne. Drugą teorią, którą chciałbym w charakterze inspiracji przywołać jest teoria Sellarsa wyłożona w Sellars (1954). Sposób, w jaki rozumie on w tym artykule język niezwykle przypomina podejście Ajdukiewicza. Punkt wyjścia jest właściwie identyczny – Sellars zwraca uwagę na to, że język można rozumieć jako zestaw reguł, podobnych do gry, czy dyscypliny sportowej. 10 Nawet jeśli część z reguł można naginać, to istnieje taki ich podzbiór, który stanowi warunek konieczny grania w daną grę. Znaczeniem wyrażenia (które, w zależności od stopnia złożenia może być analogonem posunięcia w grze albo pionka) jest rola, jaką odgrywa w grze, rola, którą wyczerpuje zestaw reguł, które go dotyczą. Sellars korzysta z 8 Zwraca na to uwagę również Maciaszek, zob. Maciaszek (2007: 200). 9 Uwaga ta nie stoi w sprzeczności z tym, co powiedziałem parę zdań wcześniej – częścią tego nietypowego bodźca całościowego może być „typowe oświetlenie". Nietypowe jest właśnie zadanie zbyt oczywistego pytania przy typowym oświetleniu. 10 Sellars posługuje się głównie przykładami gry w szachy a sama idea zaczerpnięta jest, rzecz jasna, od Wittgensteina. Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! behawioralnego języka, co stanowi dla nas znaczne ułatwienie, jako że zdecydowaliśmy się na bodźce w roli danych empirycznych. 11 Podążając za metaforą gry, proponuje on wprowadzenie czterech kategorii reguł językowych: Reguły wolne – są to reguły, które nakazują potwierdzanie danego zdania niezależnie od bodźców. Reguły wejścia 12 chodzi tu o reguły, które informują nas o tym, w jakich pozajęzykowych okolicznościach należy uznać dane zdanie. Reguły pomocnicze – które instruują nas, jakie zdanie należy uznać, jeżeli wcześniej uznało się jakieś inne zdanie. Reguły wyjścia – reguły, które w wyniku uznania jakiegoś zdania wymagają od użytkownika pewnego zachowania. Nie potrzeba chyba podkreślać tego, że mamy tu do czynienia ze znajomą konstrukcją. Pierwsze trzy rodzaje reguł odpowiadają kolejno: dyrektywom aksjomatycznym, empirycznym i dedukcyjnym. Ostatni typ reguł nie ma w koncepcji Ajdukiewicza odpowiednika, dlatego też warto rozważyć wprowadzenie do DTZ jakiejś jego wersji. Wydaje się, że brak tego rodzaju dyrektyw, nazwijmy je dyrektywami imperatywnymi, jest swego rodzaju niedopatrzeniem. Nie ulega bowiem wątpliwości, że istnieją w języku reguły, które nakazują wykonanie jakiejś czynności w wyniku usłyszenia i uznania danej komendy. Człowiek, który akceptuje zdanie „Stop!", ale nie zatrzymuje się nawet na chwilę może oczekiwać, że jego rozmówcy uznają, że nie zna znaczenia tego słowa. Zauważmy, że korzystamy w tym miejscu z asemantyczności DTZ. Fakt, iż zdania rozkazujące nie mają wartości logicznej nie oznacza, że użytkownicy nie mogą ich akceptować, czy uznawać – byłoby tak tylko wtedy, gdybyśmy przez potwierdzenie, czy uznanie rozumieli przyjęcie, czy uznanie za prawdę, a tak nie jest. „Uznanie", czy „potwierdzenie" na które się w DTZ powołujemy, rozumieć można jako niesemantyczny substytut pojęcia „rozumienia". W typowych przypadkach różnica pomiędzy uznaniem zdania a jego zrozumieniem polega choćby na tym, że istnieją zdania, które rozumiem, ale ich nie uznaję (ponieważ, na przykład, nie zgadzam się z nimi). Różnica ta, z oczywistych powodów znika w przypadku zdań, z 11 Choć wydaje się, że Sellars mówi raczej o bodźcach w znaczeniu „zewnętrznej przyczyny pobudzenia", niż samego pobudzenia. 12 Sformułowanie to może nasuwać informatyczne skojarzenia, ale jest to jedynie przypadek (choć samo to powiązanie nie jest całkowicie nietrafne). W angielskim oryginale występuje termin „entry", a nie „input", a wejście rozumie się tu w sensie „wejścia do gry językowej". Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! którymi nie można się nie zgodzić, a właśnie takie zdania występują w dyrektywach. Jak zatem mogłaby wyglądać taka dyrektywa, nakazująca działanie w przypadku uznania zdania „Stop!"? Wzorując się na Sellarsie, najwygodniej będzie ją chyba uznać za przeciwieństwo dyrektywy empirycznej. Jedyną trudnością może być to, że w odróżnieniu od dyrektyw empirycznych nie możemy odnieść się tu do stanu receptorów – nie na tym wykonanie rozkazu polega, że odbieramy ten, a nie inny bodziec. 13 Sądzę, że, chcąc pozostać w zgodzie z przyjętym modelem behawioralnym, jako drugi człon dyrektywy najwygodniej będzie nam przyjąć na przykład reakcję motoryczną. 14 Ponieważ podciągnięcie wszystkich rozkazów pod taki schemat dyrektyw byłoby nadmiernym uproszczeniem, wygodnie będzie również wprowadzić nieco bardziej złożoną wersję dyrektyw imperatywnych – takich, w których podjęte działanie motywowane jest nie tylko uznanym zdaniem, ale i, równolegle, pewną daną doświadczenia. Przykładem takiej dyrektywy byłaby komenda „łap!" połączona z rzuceniem piłki. 6. Sensowność wyrażeń. Przejdźmy teraz do problemu sensowności wyrażeń. Jak wspomniałem, DTZ podaje definicję synonimiczności, dzięki czemu, przez abstrakcję, jesteśmy w następnej kolejności w stanie podać właściwą definicję znaczenia. Kłopot w tym, że teoria ta nie daje nam żadnych wskazówek co do tego, co sprawia, że dane wyrażenie w ogóle posiada jakiekolwiek znaczenie. Inaczej mówiąc – jak odróżnić można na jej gruncie wyrażenia nonsensowne od sensownych? Choć Ajdukiewicz nie zajął się w ogóle tym problemem, to sądzę, że rozszerzenie DTZ o to użyteczne rozróżnienie jest możliwe. Wystarczy, że wyciągniemy ostateczne wnioski z idei, która za DTZ stoi, a mianowicie, że znaczeniem wyrażenia jest sieć powiązań z pozostałymi wyrażeniami języka. Jeśli tak jest, to za brak znaczenia uznać możemy po prostu kompletny brak powiązań danego wyrażenia z innymi wyrażeniami. Na pierwszy rzut oka wydaje się, że jest to kryterium nieużyteczne, ponieważ takich wyrażeń w języku po prostu nie ma, a to dlatego, że niektóre z dyrektyw aksjomatycznych dotyczą wszystkich wyrażeń w języku. Na przykład, zasada tożsamości każe uznać wszystkie zdania o postaci x=x, a zatem, jeżeli naszym kandydatem na nonsens będzie na przykład, by posłużyć 13 Chyba, że rozkazem tym jest na przykład „Patrz!", ale tutaj też wykonaniem jest raczej ruch głowy, czy powiek, niż samo odebranie bodźca. 14 Ostateczna wersja schematów dyrektyw podana jest na końcu artykułu. Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! się klasycznym przykładem Wittgensteina, wyrażenie „tralalala", to można by zaprotestować, że przecież występuje ono w powiązaniu ze znakiem identyczności w regule aksjomatycznej „tralalala = tralalala". Możemy temu zaradzić, wykorzystując dodatkowe rozróżnienie, które Ajdukiewicz stosował – a mianowicie podział na występowanie wyrażenia w dyrektywie w sposób istotny i nieistotny: Wyrażenie występuje w dyrektywie D w sposób istotny wtw gdy nie jest tak, że może być zastąpione dowolnym innym wyrażeniem, a powstała w ten sposób dyrektywa D' będzie nadal dyrektywą języka. Zgodnie z tą definicją wyrażenie „tralalala" występuje we wspomnianej dyrektywie aksjomatycznej w sposób nieistotny. Do podania definicji sensowności będą nam potrzebne jeszcze dwa inne pojęcia wprowadzone przez Ajdukiewicza: Wyrażenie A pozostaje w bezpośrednim związku znaczeniowym z wyrażeniem B wtw gdy oba występują w obrębie tej samej dyrektywy. Wyrażenie A pozostaje z wyrażeniem B w pośrednim związku znaczeniowym, wtw gdy istnieje co najmniej trójelementowy ciąg wyrażeń, w którym A jest wyrażeniem pierwszym, a B ostatnim i w którym wszystkie sąsiadujące wyrażenia są ze sobą powiązane bezpośrednio. Możemy teraz, za Ajdukiewiczem, wprowadzić jeszcze jedno pojęcie pojęcie języka spójnego: Język L jest spójny wtw gdy wszystkie jego wyrażenia są ze sobą powiązane pośrednio lub bezpośrednio. Mając te pojęcia pomocnicze, możemy teraz pozwolić sobie na podanie ogólnej definicji wyrażenia posiadającego znaczenie, której w teorii Ajdukiewicza brakowało: Wyrażenie posiada znaczenie wtw gdy jest pośrednio lub bezpośrednio powiązane ze wszystkimi pozostałymi wyrażeniami spójnego języka za pomocą dyrektyw, w których Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! występuje w sposób istotny. Korzystając z przedstawionych rozróżnień pojęciowych, możemy dodatkowo wprowadzić węższe pojęcie sensowności, bliższe tradycji empirystycznej: Wyrażenie ma znaczenie empiryczne, wtw gdy ma znaczenie, a ponadto występuje w sposób istotny w przynajmniej jednej dyrektywie empirycznej. 15 Tak zdefiniowane „znaczenie empiryczne" może być rozumiane jako odpowiednik „znaczenia bodźcowego" Quine'a. Wolę jednak traktować „znaczenie empiryczne" jako osobne pojęcie (a nie na przykład eksplikację pojęcia znaczenia bodźcowego), ponieważ tak zdefiniowane na gruncie DTZ pojęcie jest niezależne od naszej decyzji o uznaniu empirycznego składnika dyrektyw za bodźce całościowe. Aby dopełnić obrazu możemy teraz wzbogacić DTZ o relację posiadania tego samego znaczenia empirycznego. Jak nietrudno się domyślić, będzie ono analogiczne do zwykłej synonimiczności: Dwa terminy mają to samo znaczenie empiryczne wtw gdy zamiana jednego na drugi w dowolnej dyrektywie empirycznej, nie zmieni charakteru tej dyrektywy. 16 Różnica pomiędzy tak zdefiniowaną tożsamością znaczenia empirycznego, a zwykłą synonimicznością polega na tym, że nie każde dwa wyrażenia o tym samym znaczeniu empirycznym są synonimiczne, choć każde dwa synonimiczne wyrażenia mają to samo znaczenie empiryczne. Dla przykładu, wyrażenia „bydło" i „wielość sztuk bydła" nie są synonimiczne, ale mają to samo znaczenie empiryczne. 17 7. Znaczenie zdań i nazw własnych Następnym problemem DTZ, którym chciałbym się teraz zająć jest pytanie o znaczenie w 15 Co ciekawe, Ajdukiewicz posługuje się w artykule Język i znaczenie tym określeniem, ale w ogóle go nie precyzuje, zob. Ajdukiewicz (1934: 156-157). 16 Określenie „charakter dyrektywy" może wydawać się nieco nieprecyzyjne, ale chodzi tu po prostu o to, że zamiana wyrażenia na inne nie sprawia, że dana dyrektywa przestaje być dyrektywą języka lub też staje się dyrektywą innego typu. 17 Oddzielnym ciekawym zagadnieniem jest to, czy na gruncie DTZ można w ogóle mówić o Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! przypadku różnych kategorii wyrażeń – czy DTZ równie dobrze radzi sobie z podaniem znaczenia wyrażeń dowolnego typu (predykatów, nazw własnych, zdań)? Niekontrowersyjnym przypadkiem są z pewnością predykaty – język zawiera ich skończoną ilość, dają się one intuicyjnie powiązać z danymi empirycznymi, czy aksjomatami (które mogłyby wysławiać jakieś analityczne zależności pomiędzy nimi). A co z nazwami własnymi? Ajdukiewicz nie podjął tego zagadnienia, a odpowiedź na to pytanie nie wynika jednoznacznie z założeń teorii dyrektywalnej. Można zatem powiedzieć, że mamy w tej kwestii wolną rękę. Sądzę, że najwygodniejszym rozwiązaniem będzie przyjęcie, że dyrektywy nie regulują ich znaczenia. Argumentów za takim rozwiązaniem jest co najmniej kilka. Po pierwsze, to, czy nazwy własne posiadają jakiekolwiek znaczenie jest kwestią sporną i wielu filozofom, w tym mi, bliżej jest dziś do koncepcji, które im tego znaczenia odmawiają (nie trzeba być przy tym zwolennikiem przyczynowej teorii odniesienia, choć to, oczywiście, pomaga). Po drugie, kwestią równie sporną jest decyzja co do tego, czy nazwy własne są w ogóle częścią jakiegoś konkretnego języka – zauważmy choćby, że powiedzenie, że używana na gruncie języka angielskiego nazwa „Ajdukiewicz" jest przekładem polskiej nazwy „Ajdukiewicz" pozostaje niezgodne ze zwykłym użyciem języka. Nawet w przypadkach, w których nie są to ciągi równokształtne, mówimy często o transliteracji, nie o przekładzie. Po trzecie – zauważmy, że w odróżnieniu od predykatów, trudno byłoby podać przykład dyrektywy, w której występuje (w sposób istotny) nazwa własna. Weźmy klasyczny, pochodzący od Fregego przykład czy zdanie w rodzaju Arystoteles jest nauczycielem Aleksandra rzeczywiście chcielibyśmy podnieść do rangi reguły języka? Wydaje się, że naturalniej byłoby jednak powiedzieć, że ktoś, kto odrzuca to zdanie, ma po prostu błędne przekonania na temat Arystotelesa. 18 Przejdźmy teraz do pytania o znaczenie zdań. Kwestii tej Ajdukiewicz również nie podjął, ale odpowiedź na nie nietrudno sformułować DTZ nie daje żadnych wskazówek co do tego, w jaki sposób użytkownik interpretuje znaczenie większości zdań. W dyrektywach znajduje się jedynie pewien podzbiór zdań danego języka, nie możemy zatem powoływać się na „miejsce, które zdanie zajmuje w macierzy języka". Większości zdań tam po prostu nie ma. Aby rozwiązać ten problem należy przede wszystkim uświadomić sobie, że kryje się za nim synonimiczności wyrażeń różniących się od siebie składniowo. 18 Wielu przykładów tego typu dostarczają, rzecz jasna, rozważania Saula Kripkego, zob. Kripke (1972). Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! założenie, że teoria znaczenia, która nie podaje sposobu, w jaki znaczenie zdań powstaje ze znaczeń ich składowych nie spełnia jednej (być może nawet najistotniejszej) ze swoich ról , zob. Maciaszek (2007: 325). Założenie to nie jest jednak samo w sobie oczywiste. Wydaje się, że Ajdukiewicz reprezentował tradycyjny punkt widzenia, zgodnie z którym najważniejszą zagadką do wyjaśnienia jest znaczenie wyrażeń elementarnych, bo w objaśnieniu, w jaki sposób ze znaczeń tych powstają znaczenia zdań pomóc nam mogą inne teorie, takie jak choćby logika, czy gramatyka (szczególnie w którejś z nietradycyjnych odmian, na przykład gramatyka kategorialna, której podwaliny Ajdukiewicz w końcu stworzył). Mam wrażenie, że pewne drobne modyfikacje DTZ pozwolą nam jednak coś na temat znaczenia zdań powiedzieć. Na początek rozgraniczmy trzy poziomy wyrażeń: zdania złożone, zdania elementarne i wyrażenia elementarne (rozumiane jako składniki zdań, które nie są zdaniami i nie dają się już rozłożyć na mniejsze elementy należące do słownika języka). Jak już wiemy DTZ podaje nam znaczenie tych ostatnich – jest nim zbiór miejsc zajmowanych przez te wyrażenia w macierzy języka. Z wcześniejszych ustaleń wiemy również, że wyrażeniami tymi nie są nazwy własne. Będą to zatem przede wszystkim predykaty zeroi więcej argumentowe. Zacznijmy od predykatów zeroargumentowych – w większości języków naturalnych jest to dość niewielka klasa wyrażeń, ale warto o niej wspomnieć z dwóch powodów. Po pierwsze – do tej właśnie klasy należy jedyny przykład dyrektywy empirycznej, który podaje Ajdukiewicz (wspomniane już zdanie Boli). Po drugie, wychodząc od tej grupy wyrażeń łatwo będzie nam objaśnić sposób, w jaki możemy wyprowadzić znaczenie zdań z DTZ (a ściślej, podać przy jej udziale). Zauważmy, że w przypadku predykatów zeroargumentowych nie ma żadnej różnicy pomiędzy znaczeniem wyrażenia elementarnego i zdania elementarnego zbudowanego z tego wyrażenia. Nawet na zupełnie intuicyjnym poziomie (którego nie należy tracić z oczu, ponieważ owo intuicyjne pojęcie znaczenia chcemy wyeksplikować) trudno byłoby podać uchwytną różnicę pomiędzy znaczeniem terminu „grzmi" i zdania „Grzmi". Gdyby w języku nie było żadnych innych predykatów, poza zeroargumentowymi, problem znaczenia zdań byłby już na tym etapie rozwiązany. Teoria dyrektywalna podawałaby nam znaczenie zdań elementarnych (jako równoznacznych z terminami elementarnymi), a dalszą część pracy wykonywałyby już wspólnie gramatyka z logiką. 19 Bazując na tym rozwiązaniu spróbujmy zbudować coś 19 Mówiąc to, pozwalamy sobie na dość istotne uproszczenie – jak wiadomo, teorie te nie sprawdzają się najlepiej w kontekstach nieekstensjonalnych, takich jak zdania o przekonaniach, czy Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! analogicznego dla predykatów jednoi więcej argumentowych. Sądzę, że rozwiązaniem najmniej inwazyjnym w stosunku do oryginalnej wersji DTZ będzie przyjęcie następującej reguły: Znaczenie predykatu jedno lub więcej argumentowego nie różni się od znaczenia elementarnego zdania zbudowanego z tego predykatu i zmiennych wolnych. Intuicyjny sens tej zasady jest następujący – skoro DTZ podaje nam znaczenie słowa „śpi", to podaje nam też znaczenie zdania „Coś śpi". Skoro podaje nam znaczenie wyrażenia „spogląda na", to podaje nam również znaczenie zdania „Coś spogląda na coś". Podaje, ponieważ nie ma pomiędzy tymi znaczeniami różnicy. Podobnie, jak w przypadku zdań zbudowanych z predykatów zeroargumentowych, dalszą pracę wykonują dla nas zewnętrzne teorie – to one informują nas, w jaki sposób interpretować należy różne sposoby, na jakie związane mogą zostać w tych zdaniach zmienne, to one dają nam wgląd w to, w jaki sposób interpretować mamy zdania złożone ze zdań elementarnych, spójników i operatorów. Pokażmy to na przykładzie. Weźmy pod uwagę przykładowe zdanie Antoni spogląda na tęczę. Rozszyfrowanie jego znaczenia odbywałoby się w następujących krokach. Najpierw gramatyka informuje nas o strukturze tego zdania. Dowiadujemy się zatem, że zdanie to głosi trzy rzeczy: jest ktoś taki, jak Antoni, jest coś, co jest tęczą i to pierwsze spogląda na to drugie. Zdanie informujące nas o tym, że jest ktoś taki, jak Antoni, nie niesie ze sobą żadnego znaczenia a jedynie ustanawia łańcuch komunikacyjny pomiędzy nami a Antonim. Sposób, w jaki się to dzieje wyjaśnić może nam przyczynowa teoria odniesienia. Pozostałe dwa zdania objaśnia nam DTZ – to z niej dowiadujemy się, co to znaczy, że coś jest tęczą (jest to znaczenie słowa tęcza, czyli wszystkie miejsca, które to słowo zajmuje w macierzy języka) i co to znaczy, że coś na coś spogląda (jest to znaczenie wyrażenia „spoglądać na"). 8. Schematy dyrektyw Podsumujmy teraz zaproponowane modyfikacje DTZ. Po pierwsze, jako składnik dyrektyw empirycznych proponuję wprowadzenie bodźca całościowego. Po drugie, do istniejących już modalności a przecież nie możemy kontekstów tych po prostu pominąć. Z tego, że jest to problem do rozwiązania, nie wynika jednak, że jest to problem do rozwiązania dla teorii znaczenia. Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! w DTZ trzech typów dyrektyw proponuję dodanie dyrektyw imperatywnych (w wersji prostej i złożonej), które nakazują pewne działanie (które rozumiem jako reakcję motoryczną) w wyniku uznania pewnego zdania (oraz, ewentualnie, odebrania jakiegoś bodźca). Po trzecie, proponuję wprowadzenie definicji brakujących w DTZ pojęć posiadania znaczenia i posiadania znaczenia empirycznego. Po czwarte – sugeruję sposób, w jaki możemy przy udziale DTZ wyprowadzać znaczenie zdań ze znaczeń wyrażeń elementarnych. Na zakończenie uporządkujmy rozważania przedstawiając schematy pięciu wspomnianych typów dyrektyw (trzech pierwotnych i dwóch imperatywnych), zmodyfikowane zgodnie z zastrzeżeniami, które pojawiły się nam po drodze. Wszystkie dyrektywy wpisujemy w schemat Bodziec-Reakcja. Przez bodźce rozumiemy bodźce całościowe (BC), czyli pobudzenia wszystkich receptorów w danej chwili. Dla wygody w bodźcach tych wyróżniamy część językową i pozajęzykową. Jest to rozróżnienie czysto konwencjonalne, ponieważ na poziomie fizjologicznym żadnej różnicy tu nie ma – słowa muszą być tak samo słyszane, czy widziane, jak to, czego nie uważamy za słowa, a jedynie za dźwięki lub kształty. Rozróżnienie to jest jednak dla celów teoretycznych przydatne, dlatego też, przez część językową bodźca rozumieć należy wyizolowane postrzeżenie (reprezentowane przez P[Z]) realizacji dźwiękowej, czy graficznej danego zdania. Reakcją na bodziec może być reakcja motoryczna (reprezentowana w poniższej tabeli przez RM) lub uznanie danego zdania (na przykład Z, co reprezentujemy za pomocą oznaczenia U[Z]). Zapis konkretnych schematów rozumieć zaś należy następująco: W przypadku dyrektyw aksjomatycznych, bodźcem całościowym może być dowolny bodziec, którego częścią jest postrzeżenie pewnego zdania; reakcją może być dowolna reakcja motoryczna, jeśli tylko powiązana ona będzie z uznaniem tego zdania. W przypadku dyrektyw dedukcyjnych, bodźcem jest dowolne pobudzenie receptorów, którego częścią jest postrzeżenie ciągu zdań Z'; Z. Reakcja motoryczna, podobnie jak w przypadku dyrektyw aksjomatycznych może być zupełnie dowolna, byleby spełniony był warunek, że uznawszy zdanie Z' użytkownik języka uznaje również zdanie Z. W dyrektywach empirycznych pojawia się dodatkowo odwołanie do konkretnej części pozajęzykowej bodźca – ma to być jakieś określone pobudzenie receptorów – w poniższej tabeli reprezentuję je jako BC-P[Z]. Oznaczenie to rozumieć należy jako bodziec całościowy z wyłączeniem części językowej. Dyrektywy te nakazują, by w obecności pewnego konkretnego pobudzenia, którego częścią jest postrzeżenie pewnego zdania Z, użytkownik Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! uznał zdanie Z, niezależnie od towarzyszącej temu reakcji motorycznej. Ostatnią kategorią są dyrektywy imperatywne proste, które nie precyzują, jak wyglądać ma pozajęzykowa część bodźca całościowego – mówią jedynie, że w sytuacji, w której częścią aktualnego bodźca jest postrzeżenie pewnego zdania, to, jeśli użytkownik zdanie to uznaje, nastąpi pewna konkretna reakcja motoryczna. Dyrektywy imperatywne złożone różnią się od prostych tym, że precyzują również pozajęzykową część bodźca całościowego. Zastrzeżenie, że reakcja motoryczna nastąpić ma dopiero po uznaniu zdania wyklucza sytuację, w której ktoś na przykład uparcie odmawia wykonania poleceń – uznanie takiego zachowania za manifestację braków w kompetencji językowej byłoby oczywistym błędem. Dyrektywa Bodziec Reakcja Część pozajęzykowa Część językowa Aksjomatyczna P[Z] U[Z] Dedukcyjna P[Z'; Z] U[Z'] →U[Z] Empiryczna BC-P[Z] P[Z] U[Z] Imperatywna prosta P[Z] U[Z] →RM Imperatywna złożona BC-P[Z] P[Z] U[Z] →RM Jest to robocza wersja tekstu, który ukaże się w: Współczesna filozofia języka. Inspiracje i kierunki rozwoju, Piotr Stalmaszczyk (red.). Może się ona różnić od wersji opublikowanej! Literatura cytowana Ajdukiewicz, K. [1931] 1985. „O znaczeniu wyrażeń", [w:] Język i poznanie, t. 1, Warszawa PWN, 102-136. Ajdukiewicz, K. [1933] 1985. „Język i znaczenie", [w:] Język i poznanie, t. 1, Warszawa PWN, 145174. Ajdukiewicz, K. [1953] 1985. „W sprawie artykułu prof. A. Shaffa o moich poglądach filozoficznych", [w:] Język i poznanie, t. 1, Warszawa PWN, 1-136. Ajdukiewicz, K. [1964] 1985. „Zagadnienie empiryzmu a koncepcja ", [w:] Język i poznanie, t. 2, Warszawa PWN, 388-400. Buszkowski, W. 2010. „O równoznaczności wyrażeń w ujęciu Ajdukiewicza", [w:] J. Grad, J. Sójka, A. Zaporowski (red.), Nauka Kultura Społeczeństwo. Księga jubileuszowa dedykowana Profesor Krystynie Zamiarze, Poznań, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu im. Adama Mickiewicza. Jedynak, A. 2003. Ajdukiewicz, Warszawa, Państwowe Wydawnictwo Wiedza Powszechna. Kripke, J. [1972] 1988. Nazywanie i konieczność, tłum. B. Chwedeńczuk, Warszawa, Instytut Wydawniczy PAX. Maciaszek, J. 2007. Holizm Znaczeniowy Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza, Wydawnictwo WSHE w Łodzi. Marsonet, M. 1997. „Davidson, Ajdukiewicz and conceptual schemes", Axiomathes, t. 8, nr 1-3, 261280 Nowaczyk, A. 2006. „Dyrektywalna teoria znaczenia czyli dramat Filozofa" [w:] Poławianie sensu w filozoficznej głębi, Łódź, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego., 176-185. Putnam H., [1975] 1998. „Znaczenie wyrazu 'znaczenie'" [w:] Wiele twarzy realizmu i inne eseje, tłum. Adam Grobler, Warszawa, PWN, 93-184 Quine, W. V O., [1960] 1999. Słowo i przedmiot, tłum. C. Cieśliński, Warszawa, Fundacja Aletheia. Sellars, W. [1954] 1999. „Some Reflections On Language Games", [w:] Science, Perception and Reality, Atascadero California, Ridgeview Publishing Company, 321-358. Zmyślony, I. 2009. „Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza pojęcie aparatury pojęciowej", Filozofia Nauki 2009/1, 85-

BARRY SMITH ADOLF REINACH E LA FONDAZIONE DELLA FENOMENOLOGIA REALISTICA Prima parte: Nomi e o ggetti -1: 1. Casi standard e non standard La teoria degli atti linguistid proposta da Reinach in Die aprio- .rische Grundlctge der burgerlichen Rechts 1 si basa su una indagine sistematica delle strutture ontologiche presenti nei molteplici diversi usi del linguaggio .. Una delle piu originali caratteristiche dell'analisi di Reinach consiste nel dimostrare come la struttura ontologica del~ l'atto del promettere o del comandare, ad esempio, possa essere variamente modificata, producc;ndo diversi tipi di esempi non-standard delle corrispondenti varieta di atti linguistici. II presente saggio e un tentativo di estendere questa idea di casi standard e casi modificati di strutture ontologiche all'ambito del giudizio e della conoscenza. Molto di do che segue deriva dagli stessi scritti di Reinach sulla teoria del giudizio; non si tratta, pero, di un'interpretazione del suo pensiero, piuttosto di un'estensione delle sue idee in una direzione che mostrera almeno cosi si spera come esse non abbiano soltanto un interesse storico. Si presupporra quanto segue: 1) che ci siano alcune situazionichiave nelle quali la conoscenza e ottenuta o assicurata: principalmente situazioni nelle quali oggetti e stati di cose sono dati direttamente nella percezione; 2) che queste situazioni-chiave siano circondate da una periferia formata da do che puo essere definita deformazione standard: casi modificati, derivati e non-standard. Questi si presentano quando le cose procedono in modo sbagliato nei casi ~' La seconda parte di questo saggio sara pubblicata nel prossimo fascicolo (n. 15). . 1 A. REINACH, Die apriorische Grundlagen des biirgerlichen Rechts, in" Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phanomenologische Forschung", 1913 (I), pp. 685-847. 230 Barry Smith standard oppure quando si manifesta una maggiore complessita, per esempio come risultato dell'intervento di inferenza, memoria o testimonianza di altri; 3) che possono accedere in circostanze molto pare ticolari, anche casi isolati di deformazioni non-standard i quali proc vengono in modo irregolare da un caso standard rilevante. Aristotele distingueva, naturalmente, fra. casi non-standard regolari, che deviano dal loro tipo secondo una modalita determinata da una legge (come la donna devia dal ti po uomo secondo una regola) e casi non-standard irregolari, che si allontanano dal loro tipo prevalente in modi del tutto acddentali (come ad esempio nel caso di un uomo con sei dita) 2• La stessa distinzione e proposta anche da Reinach in riferimento alla sua ontologia delle forme giuridiche ed egli e stato capace a questo proposito di riallacciarsi ad una particolare tradizione giuridica tedesca la quale, interamente nello spirito di Aristotele, ha investigato accuratamente le caratteristiche delle molteplici differenti estensioni di casi non-standard di tipi di azioni 3• Si puo dire che una simile distinzione sia stata accettata anche in molti recenti studi americani di epistemologia, sebbene sia piu difficile scoprire ora !'influenza di Aristotele 4• CiO e determinate dal fatto che tali indagini si sono concentrate prevalentemente sulla scoperta di casi irregolari non-standard sugli esempi di fantascienza del tipo descritto al precedente punto 3 come mezzi per chiamare in causa assunti intorno alla conoscenza e alla credenza che erano stati finora dati per scontati. II presente saggio vuole essere sia un complemento che un correttivo delle indagini ora indicate; il suo scopo e la descrizione di quegli atti semplici e diretti del percepire, del giudicare e dell'asserire e degli atti cognitivi del giudizio ad essi associati nei quali siamo rivolti ad oggetti o a stati di fatto del mondo reale. Lo scopo non e quello di fornire uria teoria ontologica generale di casi e di tipi, ma piuttosto semplicemente indicate alcune tracce per 2 Cfr. P. THOM, Stiff Cheese for Women, in " Philosophical Forum ", ,1978 (8), pp. 94-107. • 3 Cfr. B. SMITH and K. MULLIGAN, Pieces of a Theory, in Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic and FD1'mal Ontology, a cura cli B. SMITH, Munich 1982, . Philosophia, pp. 15-109 e anche la breve discussione di Beling * nella biografia di Reinach scritta da Schumann e Smith, pubblicata in Speech Act and Sachverhalt. Reinach and the Foundations of Realist Phenomenology, a cura di K. MULLIGAN, Dordrecht-Boston-Lancaster 1986, Nijhoff. 4 Si veda ad esempio la Parte II del libro: Theories of Mind, Action, Knowledge, Memory, Perception, and Reference, a cura di S. DAVID, Berlin and New York, 1983, in particolare il saggio di A. I. GoLDMANN. ~"'" l . i :: Adolf Reinach e la fondazione delta fenomenologia realistica 231 mezzo delle quali possono essere distinti i casi standard e non-standard di tipi cognitivi specifici, sottolineando il carattere provvisorio delle distinzioni che seguono: 1. i casi standard sono prima di tutto prototipici 5; questi * sono i casi che vengono in mente quando riflettiamo sui significati dei termini come 'giudizio', 'dubbio' e cos1 via; essi sono percio sia piu semplici che piu familiari rispetto ai correlativi casi non-standard; 2. i casi standard pretedono quelli non-standard nel senso che appartengono ai primi stadi dello sviluppo cognitivo; le capacita assocjate ai casi non-standard (per esempio al dissimulate) normalmente presuppongono capacita associate a casi standard; 3. i casi standard della specie che qui ci interessa sono associati tipicamente ai processi di acquisizione di conoscenze del mondo reale; casi non-standard sono associati a punti di arrivo conoscitivi senza sviluppi o a processi che non hanno niente a che vedere ( direttamente) con l'acquisizione di conoscenze (come quelli che riguardano per esempio il leggere racconti di fantasia). La distinzione fra casi standard e non-standard nella sfera degli atti e stati cognitivi non riguarda percio semplicemente la psicologia dello sviluppo. In realta lo stato privilegiato di casi standard di tipi cognitivi ruota per la maggior parte intorno al fatto che tali casi hanno aflinita particolarmente strette con alcuni processi tipicamente o idealmente piu sofisticati di acquisizione di conoscenze del mondo, quelli che sono raggruppati sotto l' etichetta di 'scienza'. I casi standard sono privilegiati dal fatto che, come vedremo, essi soddisfano essenzialmente leggi essenziali, quelle descritte per la prima volta da Husserl nelle Logische Untersuchungen. Piu precisamente esse soddisfano -* sia riguardo alla loro struttura interna che riguardo alle relazioni con gli altri oggetti alcune necessita espresse al condizionale, per esempio nella forma: se un caso del tipo K esiste come dato di fatto empirico, allora esiste come necessita nel caso del tipo K'. Intere famiglie di tali necessita condizionate sono indicate da Reinach nella sua teoria degli atti linguistici; per esempio, se accade come dato di fatto empirico i1 caso del tipo promessa, allora necessariamente cominciano ad esistere stati permanenti di richiesta e di obbligo. 5 Probabilmente nel senso usato da E. RosCH e altri in Basic Obiects in Natural Categories, in "Cognitive Psychology", 1976 (8), pp. 382-439. 232 Barry Smith Principi di tale forma giocano un ruolo importante nei lavori correnti di linguistica, nei quali essi esprimono cio che e stato chiamai:o universale implicazionale (un termine introdotto da Jakobson) 6• Parte * del nostro compito nel presente saggio sara quello di delineare principi simili ottenuti nella sf era delle conoscenze. Il saggio di * Reinach, Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils, servira da guida in cio che segue. Esso contiene le linee di fondo di una teoria delle strutture ontologiche nelle quali non solo gli stati di fatto ma anche gli atti cognitivi ad essi associati, le condizioni della coscienza e gli oggetti rilevanti del mondo sono legati insieme in modi differenti, una teoria, doe, delle interconnessioni strutturali fra 1) . gli atti del giudizio del soggetto conoscente, 2) i suoi stati o le sue condizioni di credenza, 3) gli oggetti o gli stati di case con i quali egli giunge a contatto nella conoscenza, dove il termine 'oggetto' comprende non solo. cio che. permane (sostanze, cose) ma anche per esempio stati, processi ed even ti. Per * Reinach, come per Wittgenstein, gli oggetti che possono essere nominati sono in antitesi con gli stati di cose che rendono i giudizi veri o falsi. 2. Nomi che designano Il nostro compito principale sara, allora, quello di esaminare le relazioni (vere) che i giudizi hanno sia con gli stati di cose che li rendono veri, sia con i vari eventi,.cose e condizioni ad essi associati. Per Reinach, pero, cosi come per Husserl e Brentano prima di lui, tali relazioni propriamente cognitive sono stabilite sulla base di relazioni piu immediate e piu primitive che riguardano atti diretti non verso stati di cose, ma verso oggetti. Per comprendere le posizioni di Reinach sul giudizio avremo bisogno di soffermarci su questo livello piu fondamentale. Cominceremo con l'esaminare la sua trattazione degli atti diretti verso oggetti attraverso la mediazione del linguaggio. Supponiamo, dice Reinach, che io enumeri le montagne della Germania, sia nominandole a qualcuno o recitandole a me stesso. Nel fare cio pronuncio un gran 6 Si confronti per esempio E. HoLENSTEIN, Roman Jakobson's Approach to Language: Phenomenological Structuralism, Bloomington and London 1980, Indiana University Press. Adolf Reinach e la fondazione delta fenomenologia realistica 233 numero di nomi, forse molto velocemente l'uno dopo l'altro, ma do implica molto piu che una mera emissione di voce; nel pronunciare le parole intendo ~ich meine) qu~lche cosa, prec~samente le montagne che i noini des1gnano [ ... ] chmnque pronuncia parole in modo comprensibile, intende con esse o attraverso esse qualche cosa d'altro (323/65) 7• Normalmente, e ovvio, usiamo i nomi non. isolatamente o in successione ma piuttosto in espressioni di altro tipo. La considerazione del caso piuttosto artificioso della lista d permettera, pero, di mettere in risalto alcuni esiti che si riferiscono all'intenzionalita del linguaggio e che troppo spesso sono tralasciati nelle trattazioni piu usuali basate sulle proposizioni. Le considerazioni di Reinach, infatti, relative a cio che e implicito nella lettura di una lista, sembrano da un lato costituire una descrizione ragionevole di un fenomeno che e a noi tutti familiare. Tuttavia ad un'indagine piu accurata risulta che l'idea secondo la quale nel leggere semplicemente una lista dovremmo riuscire a tendere verso gli oggetti -. verso le montagne sparse per la Germania sembra qualche cosa di magico. Il soggetto che esegue l'operazione puo essere incapace di fornire da parte sua un contributo autonomo e reale nel raggiungimento di questa direzionalita. Egli puo essere diretto, nel procedere lungo la lista di nomi, verso le montagne della Germania di cui non ha mai sentito parlare. Lo stesso Reinach si avvicina alla comprensione del modo in cui questo atto e compiuto quando sottolinea il fatto che gli atti del Meinen ( significare o intendere) debbono « essere connessi con il pronunciare parole» (345/66). E in un certo senso il linguaggio, come vedremo, che compie il lavoro *di fornire quella 'spontanea direzionalita' che e qui in questione. 3. La teoria presentativa dei nomi Come accade, allora, che i nomi diano una direzionalita oggettiva agli atti dell'intendere (Meinen) del tipo indicato? Come sono connessi i nomi agli oggetti che designano, quando figurano in varieta standard dell'uso linguistico? Inizialmente la questione puo es sere 7 Questo brano e quelli che seguono nelle citazioni sono tratti da Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils, in Gesammelte Schriften, Halle 1921, Niemeyer; tra parentesi si trova ii riferimento alla pagina della edizione tedesca e quella della traduzione inglese di B. SMITH in Part and Moments, op. cit. (N. d. T.). 234 Barry Smith illuminata forse se riflettiamo su un'osservazione di Wittgenstein secondo la quale « la possibilita della proposizione si fonda sul principio della rappresentazione di oggetti da parte di segni » 8• Ma che cosa e questa 'rappresentanza' (Vertretung)? Suppo11iamo che la persona X sia Vertreter, rappresentante, di qualche altra persona Y e che si dichiari tale 9• Una volta persuasi noi stessi della validita delle credenziali di X, tendiamo poi del tutto giustamente ad accettarla sulla parola, a porci in relazione con lei senza preoccuparci troppo di chi sia rappresentante. Sembra che qualche cosa di analogo avvenga anche quando abbiamo a che fare con i nomi. Una volta stabilito che le credenziali per una data lista, come una lista di nomi di montagne sono in ordine, tendiamo in seguito a trattare, volenti o nolenti, i nomi come guide verso gli oggetti corrispondenti, senza preoccuparci di accertare la natura precisa o l'attendibilita della direzionalita in ciascun caso particolare. E per questa ragione che, quando leggiamo una lista di nomi, non abbiamo bisogno normalmente di interessarci in modo speciale degli oggetti consecutivamente indicati. E do che vale per le liste, vale anche per i nomi presi individualmente. C'e un senso in cui ii nome e qualche cosa che vale come sostituto dell'oggetto nominato, serve come rappresentante di esso. Due tipi di questioni possono essere sollevate circa la relazione nome-oggetto: l'una sull'origine della relazione in ogni caso dato come si stabilisce la relazione? e l'altra sulla sua intrinseca natura in che cosa consiste la relazione? La distinzione fra casi *standard e non-standard dovrebbe giocare un ruolo nelle risposte ad _ entrambe le domande, anche se ci interesseremo qui soltanto della seconda 10• Notiamo in primo luogo che un essere umano .puo essere un rappresentante soltanto se esiste una persona o qualcuno rispetto a cui egli puo svolgere la funzione di rappresentante. Se viene meno chi impersona ii ruolo principale, non esiste phi neppure chi lo rap8 La possibilita della proposizione e basata sul principio * della rappresentazione di oggetti attraverso segni: Tractatus, 4.0312. 9 Si veda la discussione sulla natura della rappresentazione legale nel par. 7 <lei saggio di A. REINACH, Die apriorische Grundlage der burgerlichlichen Rechts, op. cit. 10 L'origine della relazione di rappresentazione, almeno . per certi tipi di oggetti, normalmente si trova nelle azioni sociali presenti nel battesimo, azioni alle quali prende parte lo * stesso battezzato . anche se passivamente. Gli oggetti possono pero assumere i loro nomi in absentia e attraverso vari tipi *di procedure istituzionali piu o meno legittime, o del tutto casualmente. Adolf Reinach e la fondazione delta fenomenologia realistica 235 presenta ( 0 meglio cessa di funzionate nella sua .capacita di rap_Presentdnte) 11 • Sembra pero che un nome poss a cõp1er~ la .sua f~nz10ne di nome (standard) non semplicemente nel caso m cm es1sta I oggetto che esso nomina: puo continuare a svolgere le funzioni del suo oggetto anche quando quest'ultimo ha c~ssato. di esister~. In realta .alcune specie di oggetti, come .gli .avvemm~nt1 temporah, per esemp10 qattaglie 0 disastri naturah, ntevono m generale ,un ñ:ne . s~lo dop~ che sono accaduti. La relazione nome-portatore e perc10 distmta (ne1 casi standard) almeno in questo che ii nome e l'oggetto stanno in una relazione esistenziale da una sola parte, che si puo cos! esprimere: (Pl) un nome puo esistere solo se I' oggetto che es so designa esiste 0 .~ esistito in passato. La relazione in questione vale da 'una sola parte' e non e 'reciproca' dal momento che ii principio (Pl) consente l'inverso. Un oggetto puo perfettamente esistere o essere esistito senza essere nominato. I1 termine 'dipendenza' e qui usato nel senso della terza Ricerca Logica (Husserl parla anche di 'fondazione' [Fundierung]) 12• Relazioni di dipendenza esistenziale sia da una sola parte che reciproche, mediate o immediate svolgeranno un tuolo considerevole in cio che segue. Uno degli aspetti positivi dell'approccio qui adottato e in realta la utilizzabilita, per un vasto campo di fenomeni apparentemente eterogenei, dell'unico schema della teoria delle relazioni di dipendenza o di fondazione di oggetti reali. II principio (Pl}, riguardo alla sua estensione, sembra veramente valere per i casi normali della * relazione nome-oggetto. Ma vale anche per altre varieta di espressioni. Ad un livello phi avanzato della nostra ricerca troveremo che ci sono sensi per i quali perfino alcune specie di verbi, in dati contesti, stanno per i loro oggetti. Qui sara sufliciente notate, pero, che la categoria degli usi del linguaggio che soddisfano 11 Una breve riflessione mostrera che e cosi anche quando egli o quelli con i quali egli tratta non si rendono conto del fatto che ii suo principio ha cessato di esistere. 12 Si confronti per esempio K. MULLIGAN, P. SIMONS, B. SMITH, TruthMakers, in "Philosophy and Phenomenological R~s~arc~'', 1981 (44), P?* 287-321 e altri saggi di Mulligan, Smith e lavori collett1v1 qw menz1onati. Sia ~usserl che Reinach applicano la teoria delle relazioni di dipendenza nella loro ricerca. Non applicano, pero, esplicitamente la te~ria alle relazi~ni fr~ lii;g1;1aggio . e oggetti nel modo suggerito dal presente sagg10: ~na espress1o?e lmg.msttc~ ( o m realta ogni atto mentale) puo *stare al massimo m una rel~z1~>ne ~ c~es~stenzfl' con iI suo oggetto* si veda B. SMITH, Acta cum fundamentts tn re, m Dialectlca", 1984 (38) pp. 157-178 ed anche K. MULLIGAN and B. SMITH, A Relational Theory of the' Act, che sara pubblicato in "Topoi" (numero speciale dedicato a Husserl). 236 Barry Smith (Pl) include anche quelle varieta di espressioni che hanno un riferimento, create in situ da chi parlando associa alcune espressioni occasionali ( questo, quello, questo cappello, quella tazza) con un oggett~ che e presente percettivamente a lui o a chi lo ascolta. Anche in questo caso abbiamo una relazione di dipendenza da una sola parte fra espressione e oggetto e si vedra che do che diremo in seguito intorno agli usi dei nomi si applica pure ad espressioni di tale tipo. La famiglia dei casi non-standard della relazione nome-oggetto e molto grande. Include, in qualche modo paradossalmente, quei casi in cui un nome richiama l'attenzione di chi lo usa sulla sua funzione di rappresentante, per esempio quando e usato come simbolo in un rito religioso. Infatti normalmente nell'uso dei nomi avviene che essi svolgano solo un ruolo obliquo: non piu rapidamente siamo diretti verso di essi con consapevolezza di quanto essi indichino i loro oggetti. Cio accade anche quando, attraverso un errore di pronuncia, intendiamo riferirci ad un oggetto pur avendo usato il nome di un altro. Tali casi possono capitare, pero, quando c'e qualche conoscenza indipendente dell'oggetto in questione o qualche riferimento ad esso da parte del soggetto. Una varieta piu problematica di casi non-standard e fornita dai cosiddetti nomi vuoti come 'Pagaso' o 'Sherlock Holmes'. Dal punto di vista della teoria rappresentativa questi sono semplici parti del linguaggio che fungono da nomi allo stesso modo che una espressione insincera delle parole 'prometto' o 'mi scuso' puo presentarsi come un atto avente un valore di pura convenienza sociale del promettere o dello scusarsi in ~cuni contesti. Un nome vuoto, secondo iI presente punto di vista, e piuttosto come una :firma falsificata o una banconota: e un nome solo in un senso modi:ficato. Lo stesso Reinach sembra assumere su tale questione la tesi di Meinong secondo la quale nomi vuoti sono in realta nomi standard di cosiddetti oggetti non esistenti 13• 4. Che cosa e un nome? Come possono, allora, home ed oggetto riferirsi nei casi standard agli atti mentali del signi:ficare e dell'intendere con i quali sono associati? Questo e un problema complesso e uno sviluppo pie13 Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils, op .. cit., p. 340 sgg.; tr. inglese, p. 85 sgg. I ~ l Adolf Reinach e la fondazione delta fenomenologia r~alistica 237 namente adeguato di esso implicherebbe sia per le specie che per i casi individuali un'analisi del nome come segno :fisico (come struttura fonologica o grafologica) e del nome come segno inteso e capita da chi parla e da chi ascolta. Inoltre implicherebbe una considerazione del modo in cui lo stesso nome puo essere * usato sia in un'espressione linguistica sonora che in un discorso silenzioso. Per amore di semplicita, pero, ignorero questi aspetti complessi e trattero un po' liberamente dei nomi in quanto sono usati. I ril}evi sopra esposti sulla dipendenza da una sola parte del name e dell'oggetto saranno precisati com:e segue: non ii name, rria ii nome in quanta e usato (normalmente) in alcuni casi particolari di espressione, e tale che non puo esistere a meno che ii suo oggetto esista o sia esistito nel passato; Come si riferisce, allora, ii nome in quanta usato all'atto in cui e usato per signi:ficare o intendere un oggetto? Un atto del significare (Meinen) deve essere linguisticamente espresso. Ugualmente, pero, .un nome usato, se deve essere piu che un semplice insieme di segni gra:fici o fonici, deve essere associato con un atto del significare. Anche qui ci sono relazioni di dipendenza esistenziale come quelle preced'enti. Piu precisamente c'e una relazione di dipendenza da due parti fra ii nome e ii Meinen e l'intera struttura della dipendenza mediata fra atto, nome e oggettd puo essere descritta press'a poco nel modo seguente: atto de! significare : I I nome 1-' __ _, usato Diagramma 1 I oggetto In tale schema gli elementi rappresentano oggetti. I segmenti continui indicano che l'oggetto esiste indipendentemente (non richiede nessun altro oggetto per esistere) 14 • La Hnea che unisce i lati tratteg14 I1 diagramma dovrebbe chiaramente essere adattato nel caso in cui l'oggetto nominato e di per se stesso un'entita indipendente. 1 L-. . 238 Barry Smith giati rappresenta le relazioni di dipendenza reciproca * nei due sensi 15 • Strutture separate non connesse ne direttamente ne indirettamente da linee di dipendenza rappresentano oggetti separati. Alcune strutture si comportano esattamente come gli ovoidi <lei diagrammi di Venn o di Eulero. Gli oggetti rappresentati dai riquadri comuni, pero, possono sovrapporsi o stare l'uno rispetto all'altro in una relazione di parte (appropriata) con ii tutto. Preso isolatamente, percio, ii diagramma precedente non ci dice nulla sulle relazioni mereologiche fra gli oggetti iscritti nei rispettivi riquadri. Questo diagramma e naturalmente molto semplificato: infatti per esempio un atto del Meinen stara normalmente in relazione di . dipendenza con altri atti contigui e stati del relativo soggetto, e tutti gli oggetti rappresentati avranno una loro struttura interna che qui non 'e indicata. Queste semplificazioni saranno pero eliminate in quakhe misura nel corso della nostra discussione. 5. La presentazione Non e soltanto quella specie di direzionalita che implica cio che Husserl chiama uso 'non riempito' o 'puramente segnico' del linguaggio che d permette di raggiungere gli oggetti del mondo. Possiamo essere diretti agli oggetti in modo tale che gli oggetti stessi siano presenti a noi come, ovviamente, nei casi degli atti di percezione. Chiaramente tale rappresentazione diretta e indispensabile per la conoscenza, almeno per quanto riguarda la conoscenza di 'realia'; una coscienza, la cui direzionalita verso gli oggetti reali e stata ristretta al semplice intendimento di nomi, potrebbe avere in verita qualche sorta di conoscenza di questi oggetti, ma allora sembra che tale conoscenza debba essere capace di essere convertita nei termini di una conoscenza che non sia semplicemente segnica. ' Le varie specie di atti nei quali gli oggetti sono presentati -* come opposti all'essere semplicemente significati vengono chiamate da Reinach Vorstellungen, un termine qui tradotto con 'presentazioni' 16• 15 Per maggiori dettagli relativi a questi tipi di diagrammi, si confronti B. SMITH and K. MULLIGAN, Pieces of Teory, op. cit., par. 6. 16 I1 termine e stato usato naturalmente anche da molti altri filosofi dell' area austroctedesca, sebbene non sempre nello: stesso senso; percio e stato . molto spesso impegnato per tradurre il termine 'idea' tipico dell'empirismo inglese. Adolf Reinach e la fondazione delta fenomenologia realistica 239 Come abbiamo visto, un atto del significare dipende in modo medzato dal suo oggetto (dr. diagramma 1). Un attq *di presentazione, d'altra parte, e caratterizzato da una dipendenza immediata: essa riguarda il suo oggetto nel senso phi forte possibile. Vediamo e ascoltiamo, per lo meno nei casi normali, le case in se stesse e non immagini, figure, dati sensibili intermedi e siamo posti in contatto con le cose stesse nei nostri atti di percezione in modo tale che non dobbiamo chiatnare in aiuto intermediari linguistici. La prossimita, relativa al suo oggetto, di un atto di presentazione e manifestata nel fatto che, come Reinach indica, * Ogni cosa che e presentata e tale che possiamo rivolgerci ad essa ' con un interesse specifico, che si distingue rispetto a cio che la circonda, che d attrae con i suoi tratti specifici. Nella 5fera del significato, al contrario, non c'e possibilita di tali trasformazioni (324/67). Dato che un atto di presentazione e esso stesso d~pendente dal suo soggetto ( dal relativo organismo percipiente) questo atto puo essere considerato come una relazione fra ilsoggetto in questione e l'oggetto ivi presentato, press'a poco come segue: : I I atto di i------11 presenta1 zione soggetto oggetto l -------' Diagramma 2 17 17 Inoltre ne Husserl ne Reinach applicarono la teoria della dipendenza alle relazioni fra atti e oggetti. Per la teoria relazionale degli atti che ,e inserita nel presente saggio si rimanda di nuovo a B. SMITH, Acta cum fundamentis in re, op. cit .. Inoltre nella spiegazione di Reinach dell'opposizione fra Meinen e ~orstellen c'e piu di quanto sia contenuto nei diagrammi 1. e 2 (diagrammi che, st deve ticotdare, indicano soltanto relazioni fra cose reali processi o eventi). Ci~ perche, . secondo Reinach, il contrasto fra i1 Meinen p~ntuale e linguistico e i1 .v orstellen perdurante e non linguistico e assolutamente generale: i due modi dell'essere * diretti possono essere. distinti non soltanto nel nostro accesso cognitivo ai realia, ma anche per esempfo nell'accesso agli oggetti non-reali come i numeri *e i valori (si confronti ad es. p. 343/88). 240 Barry Smith Ci sono anche casi gia m:enzionati precedentemente nei quali l'uso intenzionale di un nome o phi comunemente di un'espressione indicativa come 'questo' o 'quello' e connesso in una singola coscienza con una presentazione dell'oggetto significato. Cio e rappresentato in una struttura del tipo seguente: presentazione no me usato Diagramma 3 oggetto Ognuno di questi significati (Meinen) indicativi e fondato SU uria presentazione ad essi associata: utilizza questa presentazione per ottenere la sua direzionaHta oggettuale (come accade quando, guardando il cielo, io dico: "quell'uccello vola alto"). Un uso normale (e non anaforico) di un'espressione come 'quell'ucc~llo' non ha bisogno semplicemente di un complemento grammaticale (in modo tale da produrre una espressione che sia una proposizione ), deve essere anche completato da qualche sorta di fenomeno etero-grammaticale, normalmente da atti di percezione da parte sia di chi parla che di chi ascolta. Qualche cosa e presentato in modo sbagliato oppure sono 1n atto condizioni contestuali molto speciali, se dico "quell'uccello vola alto" in assenza di una percezione ad esso associata, sia da parte mia che da parte del mio interlocutore 18 • Questo ultimo esempio dovrebbe metterci in guardia sul fatto che diagrammi indicanti dipendenza del tipo qui illustrato servono non 18 E. HussERL, Logische Untersuchungen, IV, 311. Si confronti K. MULLIGAN e B. SMITH, A Husserlian Theory of Indexicality, in corso di pubblicazione in "Grazer Studien''.. * , Adolf Reinach e la fondazione delta fenomenologia realistica 241 come mezzi di spiegazione di strutture di casi standard, ma anche per ottenere una supervisione di differenti tipi di casi destinati ,ad essere non-standard: abbiamo bisogno soltanto di immaginare che elementi specifid indicati in un diagramma dato debbono essere eliminati 0 in qualche modo cambiati. II caso ora menzionato e quello che risulta quando immaginiamo che manca una appropriata presentazione. Un altro caso simile e prodotto quando immaginiamo che l'oggetto viene meno (come quando dico "quell'uccello vola alto" ma sono stato ingannato da un gioco di luce e non c'e nessun uccello) e ulteriori casi si danno quando immaginiamo vari differenti tipi di disaccordo fra gli elementi implicati. (Fine delta primd parte) Uraduzione dall'inglese di Angela Ales Bello) BARRY SMITH ADOLF REINACH E LA FONDAZIONE DELLA FENOMENOLOGIA REALISTICA Seconda parte: Giudizi e stati di case* 6. Che cosa e un Sachverhalt? Lo stesso Reinach e riluttante a rispondere a questa domanda. Egli fa un elenco di alcune caratteristiche degli stati di cose (Sach~ verhalte): essi consistono in do che e creduto e affermato in un giudizio, che sta in relazione di fondamento e conseguenza, che possiede modalita e che sta in relazione di positivita e negativita contraddittorie (341/86) 19 e sostiene che queste determinazioni sono sufficienti, doe ogni entita alla quale puo essere applicata questa definizione e uno stato di cose. Reinach chiaramente pensa che siano sufficienti nel senso che attraverso esse il lettore e sufficientemente informato circa il significato dello stato di cose. Riconosce, pero, che non si tratta a rigore di una definizione del termine 'stato di cose '. Ritiene, tuttavia, che: e discutibile se sia possibile dare definizioni di tali formazioni oggettuali cosf primitive come gli stati di cose, la cosa, il processo e se, nel caso che siano possibili, potremmo ottenere qualche cosa con il loro aiuto (341/86). * * La prima parte di questo saggio e stata pubblkata nel fascicolo prece dente (n. 14). . . 19 Meinong offre una simile spiegazione de! suo uso di Objektive nel suo Ober Annahmen, Leipzig 1910, Barth, seconda edizione (tr. inglese: On Assumption, a cura di J. Heanue, University of California Press 1983, Berkeley, p. 63 e segg:, p. 71). 486 Barry Smith Tuttavia, in assenza di una determinazione positiva della natura dei Sachverhalte e delle connessioni fra Sachverhalte e oggetti o 'materiale fattuale' ( unterliegende sachliche T atbestandsmaterial), Reinach non puo essete affatto sicuro che, le caratteristiche degli stati di cose che elenca siano o possano essere soddisfatti simultaneamente da qualche entit~ 20 • Ci 'e offerta una spiegazione, piu convincente, n:ia essa e nei termini di un platonismo che Reinach ha ereditato da Husserl e Meinong. Cosl'., per esempio, Reinach ci dice che i Sachverhalte costituiscono un 'ambito' speciale distinto da quello degli oggetti e ascrive ai Sachverhalte un'esistenza eterna: gli oggetti (realia) sono contingenti, ma i Sachverhalte sono immutabili ( un punto di vista che e esattamente opposto a quello sostenuto da Wittgenstein nel Tracta tus ). Egli e percio capace di considerate i Sachverhalte come il luogo dell'esistenza del passato e del futuro, di concepirli come garanti della verita dei nostri giudizi presenti intorno agli oggetti che hanno cessato di esistere o debbono ancora venire all'esistenza 21 • Ci sono, tuttavia, alcuni passi in Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils che dimostrano certamente l'influenza su Reinach di un altro mentore: Johannes Daubert; questa influenza suggerisce un approccio differente, ontologicamente piu moderato, ai Sachverhalte tale da permettere di collocarli all'interno del mondo reale, materiale. , Cosl'. Reinach ci dice, in relazione ai Sachverhalte desunti da "questa rosa *e rossa". "ii rosso inerisce a questa rosa", "questa rosa forma ii sostrato di questo rosso ", che e i1 medesimo materiale fattuale che si trova alla base di ciascuno stato di cose, ma ciascuno esprime la situazione fattuale in forme e direzioni diverse (336/79). E similmente: la rosa rossa esiste, la rosa e rossa, uno specilico rosso inerisce a questa rosa, la rosa non e bianca, gialla ecc. La rosa rossa, questo ' complesso unitario che forma la cosa, e i1 materiale fattuale che soggiace a ciascuno ed ognuno di questi stati di cose (340/85) 20 Si veda K. MuLLIGAN, « Wie die Sachen sich zueinander verhalten » insid~ and outside the Tractatus, in "Teoria", numero speciale su Wittgenstein a cura di B. F. McGUINNESS e A. GARGANI, 1985 (5), pp. 145-174. 21 L'opinione Secondo la quale i Sachverbalte hanno 'un'esistenza eterna e negata da Matty nella sua teoria del contenuto di giudizio, una teoria che .e sotto altri, aspetti molto simile a quella di Reinach. Si confronti B. SMITH; Adolf Reinach e la fondazione della fenomenologi'a realistica 487 Tali .stati di cose, allora, sono in qualche modo fondati su un certo materiale fattuale ( un complesso di rosa e di colore particolare) e le differenze fra essi hanno a che fare con i modi in cui questo materiale e "compreso" (gefasst}. :E questo modo di intendere gli "stati di cose" che elaboreremo in seguito. Naturalmente, quando Reinach stesso dice che un certo complesso di oggetti "soggiace" a stati di cose, non avrebbe potuto avere in mente l'idea che gli oggetti sono tali che lo stato di cose sia fondato o dipenda da essi nello stesso senso della teoria delle relazioni di dipendenza di Husserl. Solo entita , esistenti contingenti possono, infatti, stare in relazioni di fondazione 22 e ii ritenere i Sachverhalte entita contingenti sarebbe in contrasto con ii platonismo di Reinach. All'interno di questa impostazione platonica sembra che Reinach sia incapace, in realta, di fornire una spiegazione soddisfacente della relazione fra oggetti e stati di cose. Allora perche e attratto dall'idea platonica? CiO si giustifica in primo luogo con il fatto che egl( ha formulato la sua concezione di stati di cose come un mezzo per risolvere in uno spirito husserliano il problema dello psicologismo. La teoria degli stati di cose fu formulata per stabilire una fondazione della logica per spiegare la necessita di leggi logiche in modo da permettere anche la loro applicabilita agli atti conoscitivi umanL E Reinach percio sostenne che, per garantire la necessita delle leggi logiche, fosse necessario conferire ai Sachverhalte uno statuto speciale extramondano lo stesso che e stato garantito alle proposizioni <la Bolzano e da Frege. L'applicabilita della logica agli atti conoscitivi umani sarebbe stata garantita allora dal mostrare come gli atti e gli stati mentali possono riferirsi, in modi diversi, ai Sachverhalte cosi concepiti. Reinach ha adottato, pero, una posizione platonica anche perche riteneva come Meinong e Marty che per sostenere la teoria della corrispondenza della verita alla sua piena generalita sia necessario supporre che ciascuna specie di giudizio sia correlata con Brentano and Marty: An Inquiry into Being and Truth in Mind Meaning and k!etaphysics. The .Philosophy and Theory of Language ~f Anton' Marty, a cura di K. MULLIGAN, m corso di stampa. ' 22 Dire che una relazione di fondazione si stahilisce fra a e b , significa dire, nel caso piu semplice possibile, che a e necessariamente tale che non puo esistere a i;ieno che b esista. L'esistenza di a e in qualche modo legata a quella di b. Chiaramente se ne a ne b esistono necessariamente , allora tale relazione non si ' ' ' puo ottenere. 488 Barry Smith una approprfota specie di stati di cose che la rendano vera 23• Ed ora, mentre e possibile concepire uno stato di cose positivo, ad esempio questa rosa e rossa, come una sorta di complesso reale, non 1e possibile fare altrettanto per gli stati di cose negativi del tipo questa rosa non e gialla o l'unicorno non esiste, poiche l'ultima proposizione non puo essere considerata come appartenente al mondo reale delle cose, dei problemi e degli eventi. Sia il Tractatus di Wittgenstein, che considera soltanto stati di cose positivi, che la critica di Ingarden mossa alla teoria di Reinach in Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, nella quale si ritiene che gli stati di cose negativi godano di uno stato inferiore (puramente intenzionale), mostrano che e possibile sviluppare una teoria corrispondente all'interno di un quadro di riferimento non platonico 24 • II nostro compito qui, pero, e quello pili modesto di spiegare le strutture delle varieta piu semplici e piu chiare degli stati di cose positivi e degli atti cognitivi e degli stati ad essi connessi. E vedremo che e possibile sviluppare una concezione non platonica di tali stati di cose facendo uso dell'idea di Reinach (336/79) secondo la quale i Sachverhalte sono entita che comprendono oggetti reali dati "in modi differenti e in direzioni differenti". I dettagli. di questa posizione saranno brevemente esposti in seguito. A questo punto abbiamo bisogno di indicare la tesi secondo la quale gli stati di cose stanno in relazione di fondazione rispetto agli oggetti che essi comprendono. 7. Giudizio e credenza Che cosa si puo dire, ora, sulle relazioni propriamente cognitive del giudizio e della credenza relazioni che sono dirette non verso oggetti, ma verso stati di cose? Come sono costruite queste relazioni in base alle *differenti specie degli oggetti-guida trattati nella prima parte di questo saggio? Qui risultera che i fenomeni che hanno la funzione di indici giocano un ruolo importante perche sono essi che mediano fra un accesso diretto agli oggetti che si da in una presenta23 Sulla trattazione di Meinong della teoria della corrispondenza si veda 11 suo Uber Annahmen, op. cit., in particolare il cap. 3. Per quanto riguarda Marty, si confronti B. SMITH, op. cit. *. 24 B. SMITH, An Essay in Formal Ontology, in "Grazer Philosophisr:he Studien'', 1978 (6), pp. 39-62, e K. MULLIGAN, B. SIMONS e B. SMITH, op. cit. ~ u ',... . 'f I t I Adolf Reinach e la fondazione delta fenomenologia realistica 489 zione e l'accesso indiretto agli oggetti per mezzo degli stati di cose, situazione che e caratteristica della conoscenza in senso stretto. Per rendere conto pienamente di tali questioni, pero, non dobbiamo considerate solo: 1) il significato dell'intendere un oggetto attraverso un nome, 2) la presentazione di un oggetto nella percezione, 3) il signi:ficato di indice di un oggetto che risulta quandμ il signi:ficato e la presentazione operano in connessione reciproca, ma anche altre tre specie di relazioni: 4) l'apprensione che il caso si presenta in un modo determinato, 5) la convinzione che il caso si presenta in un modo determinato, 6) l'asserzione che il caso si presenta in un modo determinato. Difficolta del tutto speciali, pero, sono sollevate da queste ultime relazioni. Poiche, come apparira subito chiaro, le strutture implicite sono connesse in modo tale che e difficile interessarsi di una senza trattare simultaneamente tutte le altre. 8. L'apprensione (il vedere che) 25 L'apprensione e simile ad una lettura dello stato di cose che muova dalla realta percepita in super:ficie. « Se si parla di do che e visibile, udibile, odorabile dice Reinach i1 corrispondente stato di cose non sara esso stesso visto, ascoltato o odorato, ma piuttosto appreso » (347 /87). L'apprendere e come il Meinen per il fatto che sotto il pro:filo temporale 1e di natura del tutto puntuale e non amm~tte alcuna gradazione della certezza, di quel tipo di certezza che conduce ,~all~ convinzione al dul:>bio (344/90}. L'apprensione, per9, non e simile al Meinen perche non e ad essa essenziale l' es sere espressa • 25 Quando Reinach parla di apprensione {Er/assen), qualche volta sembra mtet;dere. q?esto fenomeno in conformita con la sua concezione platonica degh statl d1 cose come un tipo speciale di intuizione. Dal momento che nella p~esei;te trattazioi;ie non si sosterra affatto questo aspetto platonico della filosofia ~1 Remach, i;ion ~1 sara nessun imp~dimento, pero, all'identificazione dell'apprens10ne con gh attl del tutto comum del vedere che ( e naturalmente con i corrispondenti fenomeni nelle altre modalita sensoriali). (\ 490 Barry Smith linguisticamente. La teoria di Reinach implica, infatti, che none l'atto dell'apprensione che e portato ad espressione nel linguaggio, ma la situazione di credenza o di convinzione che e fondata su esso. Un'apprensione non ha bisogno di chiamare in aiuto il linguaggio, perche in ogni caso ha la corrispondenza al suo oggetto attraverso una pre* sentazione. In verita possiamo stabilire il principio (P2): se si da un caso della specie apprensione ( vedere .che ), allora necessariamente si danno anche uno o phi casi della serie presentazione (vedere). La dipendenza in questione e da una sola parte; la maggioranza delle * nostre presentazioni non e accompagnata da atti di apprensione in quanto la presentazione manifesta una struttura di manifestazione/sfondo e solo cio che appartiene alla proiezione di ogni presentazione data puo servire come oggetto di un atto di apprensione. L'apprensione, possiamo dire ora, e l'atto centrale con il quale ci riferiamo allo stato di case relativo alla totalita di do che accade ed e di fatto. Ci sono anche atti derivati con i quali siamo posti in relazione, atti non fondati interamente e direttamente sulla presentazione di oggetti soggiacenti ma piuttosto, per esempio, sulla memoria. Di questo ti po e, infatti, do che Reinach chiama il "semplice venire alla mente" dello stato di cose: Posso ricordarmi l'essere rosso di una rosa, senza avere bisogno di percepire la rosa stessa. Proprio come l'apprensione di uno stato di cose riposa su una genuina presentificazione (Vergegenwartigung) della cosa, cos! questo richiamare alla mente lo stato delle cose riposa su un semplice portare alla mente quella stessa cosa (343/88). * C'e dunque una varieta di modi per richiamare alla mente lo stato di cose quando e implicata la mediazione essenziale del linguaggio, come accade, per esempio, nell'uso della testimonianza scritta e orale. Ad essa puo mancare anche la connessione mediata alla realta, connessione che e garantita dalla memoria. E allora, naturalmente, il vedere che in modo mediato, che e presente ad esempio nella lettura e nella comprensione di un articolo di giornale, e essenzialmente differente dall'apprensione immediata che comporta l'ascoltare che e avvenuta un'esplosione oil vedere che la pesca che ho davanti 'e rossa. 11 riportare alla mente gli stati di cose, entro certi limiti, puo essere un fatto che accade quasi ad libitum: ad una . cosa data come un . complesso materiale fattuale (zum demselben Dingtatbestand) appartiene una molteplicita di stati Adolf Reinach e la fondazione della fenomenologia realistica 491 di c?se suss,istenti. Nella presentifica.zione di una rosa posso present1ficare 1 essere rosso della rosa, d non essere giallo di quella stessa rosa e cos! via (343/88). E naturalmente questa liberta di presentificare stati di cose si estende ulteriormente, per esempio, a quel genere di atti che ci sono familiari nelle esperienze di finzione ( esperienze che implicano anche l'uso di espressioni simili ai nomi per i quali non c'e un relato situato a destra dell'atto risultante ). 9. La convinzione L'originale della convinzione, nei casi standard, e descritta da Reinach nel modo seguente: Immagin!amo che sorga una disputa fra me ed un'altra persona a propos1to del colore di un oggetto. Mi avvicino ad esso e vedo che e ~OSSO. Mi .e, dato all?ra l'essere rõso. dell'oggetto e appena esso v1ene a dat1ta, nasce m me la convmz1one o la credenza che l'oggetto e rosso (317 /59). ~ome egli sostiene, la convinzione, che e immediatamente fondata In u~ atto di appr:nsione: puo durãe anche quando le apprensioni relative confermant1 non s1 possono p1u ottenere. :E anche necessariamente tale. che. p~o trovare diretta e immediata espressione, doe si ~onfigura lmgmst1camente in un'asserzione (317 /59; si veda anche 11 § 12 sotto ). * . "?siamo i termini "credenza" e "cohvinzione" in modo interscam- ?1ãtle, come traduzioni del vocabolo "Uberzeugung = di Reinach. Egli 1mp1ega questo ter~ine per designate qualche cosa che descrive come "attuale ", legato a fenomeni come la congettura e il dubbio e in contrasto con le disposizioni che sono puramente latenti 26 • Reinach percio 26 I1 ter1!1ine 'atti~udine' e usato da Ryle per descrivere fenomeni come credere~ dubitare ecc. m .molt~ delle sue note al saggio di iReinach ( conservate a1 . margme Cdella sua cop1a de1 Gesammelte Schriften ora nella biblioteca del mneacre * ollege di Oxf rd* cf * 75) Sf ' * sti h d 11 .. *. . . 0 ' r. P* * . ortunatamente una delle caratterite~ri= e e. ~icer~he della ~?sofia analitica nel 'Campo della semantica e della teori dfg1t1vahe quella di .mtendere con questo termine fenomeni che nella a emac sono tenut1 accuratamente separati. . 492 Barry Smith distingue fra stati di credenza e do che rimane quando tali stati passano per "lasciare dietro [ ... ] una conoscenza inattuale :', per esempio in alcuni tipi di memoria (355 /97). Lo stato o la condizione di credenza e attuale nel senso che possiamo essere immediatamente consapevoli di esscrnella riflessione ogni volta che esiste. Non e attuale, pero, 11el senso che implicherebbe il poter essere identificato per esempio con sequenze di atti mentali (320/63). Infatti, per produrre una teoria che sia adeguata alle varie dimensioni della struttura nella coscienza, e necessario distinguere almeno tre differenti categorie 27 : 1) eventi ( che sono per loro natura puntuali), per esempio un atto del giudicare o del decidere; 2) processi ( che durano ma in modo tale che le loro fasi successive non sono omogenee ), per esempio il processo del considerate e dell'osservare; 3 ) stati o condizioni ( che durano ma in modo tale che le loro fasi successive sono omogenee) la categoria n. 3 puo essere divisa in casi attuali e non-attuali. Qui, pero, ci interessiamo piu specificamente di quel genere di convinzione o credenza che si sviluppa sulla base dell' apprensione degli stati di cose. Come abbiamo visto, tale convinzione puo perdurare oltre l'apprensione nella quale e fondata; in realta essa puo durare perfino quando lo stato delle cose *in questione non c'e piu. Come l'apprensione e I'atto centrale nel quale d poniamo in relazione con gli stati di cose nei casi standard, cosi la convinzione fondata nell' apprensione e la condizione centrale nella quale si continua ad essere posti in relazione per un susseguente periodo phi o meno lungo. . La convinzione, nel caso standard, e fondata sull'apprensione. Si potrebbe percio supporre che saremmo in grado di concepire la convinzione e l'apprensione come connesse ad una relazione di dipendenza da una sola parte proprio del ti po che unisce l' apprensione e la presentazione con l'unica differenza che la convinzione e una condi- ' zione durevole (stato, Zustand, hexis), mentre l'apprensione e un atto puntuale. 21 R. !NGARDEN Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, Tiibingen, 1964-65, Niemeyer, in due ~olumi, il secondo in due parti; si confronti in particolare i1 vol. 1. • . .ril Adolf Reinach e la fondazione delta fenomenologia realistica 493 Una riflessione ulteriore suggerisce, pero, che un atto che potrebbe essere presumibilmente descritto come un atto di apprensione, ii quale non da immediatamente luogo ad una convinzione del corrispondente contenuto, avrebbe tutti i segni ,di un caso non-standard (si pensi ad una supposta promessa che non da luogo immediatamente ad una richiesta e ad una obbligazione reciprocamente correlate). Per quale ragione dovrebbe sembrarmi di apprendere che stia piovendo, ad esempio, e tuttavia non crederci, neppure momentaneamente? Cio suggerisce il principio: (P3) Un atto di apprensione e necessariamente tale che non puo esistere a meno che una convinzione connessa, che si riferisce ad uno o allo stesso rapporto di cose, non venga ad esistere * con il compimento dell'atto in questione. CiO dato, abbiamo anche: (P4) Uno stato di convinzione e necessariamente tale che non puo esistere a meno che un ,atto associato di apprensione esista o sia esistito. Ne consegue che la convinzione, e piu precisamente quel tipo di convinzione normale che e qui in questione, sta con l'apprensione in una relazione di reciproca fondazione. Potremmo ritenere l'atto di apprensione come simile al passaggio dalla rappresentazione alla convinzione. L'apprensione e anche, secondo quanto proporremo, fondata da una sola parte sull'apprensione dello Stato di COSe 28 , e questa e a SUa volta .Secondo la giustificazione che verra fornita in seguito -*fondata sugli oggetti corrispondenti. Inoltre, come la convinzione e la rappresentazione, l'apprensione e fondata sul soggetto che rileva. Cio conduce ;d una struttura che puo essere cosi descritta: 28 E ancora i1 platonismo di Reinach che lo conduce a tale posizione. 494 Barry Smith asserz1one (cfr. § 12) I x I -----<1 convinzione I I I L ___ I ___ J r-- ---, I soggetto atto di I I apprensione l_ __ r_J presentazione Diagramma 4 29 stato di cose Possiamo leggere il diagramma nel modo seguente: soggetto e oggetti esistono indipendentemente; materiale fattuale (oggetti) 29 I1 lettore notera che l'asserzione, la convinzione, l'apprensione e Ja ~resen- tazione sono tali che oltre l'unita che deriva ad esse dal fatto che me!1s~oñ ad un singolo soggetto sono unite anche per se stesse dalle relaz1oni di fondazione. I1 soggetto come garante dell'unita della coscienza e a ,qi;iest<;> p~nto ridondante e, in verita, la .posizi~ne <:j.ui pr~sentata ~arebbe ~ompaub1le, ip. lmea di principio, con una teona degh *attl e. de1 prõess1 mentali, senza un ~e, come e sostenuta dal primo Husserl e da W1ttgenstem. Per ~sere presa senamente: pero tale teoria * dovrebbe stabilire che si possa fare mteramente a meno di un principio unificante ab ex_tra, come un'ai;im.a o un sogge~to, .forne~do uñ spiegazione precisa e dettaghata de~e relaz10~, fondamentali es1stent1 fra ~Ii atti men tali e gli stati delle molte diverse vaneta e fra queste e (per esemp10) le aziorti corporee. i/ f I Adolf Reinach e la fondazione delta fenomenologia realistica 495 l'atto dell'asserzione e fondato per un lato sul soggetto, sul suo stato di convinzione e sullo stato di cose ad esso pertinente 30; lo stato della convinzione e pero fondato da un lato sul soggetto e sullo stato di cose, e in modo reciproco, sull'atto dell'apprensione; l'atto dell'apprensione e fondato da una sola parte sul soggetto, sullo stato di cose o sulla rappresentazione e in modo reciproco sullo stato di convinzione al quale da luogo;. la presentazione e fondata da una sola parte sul soggetto e sull'oggetto percepito; lo stato di cose e fondato da una sola parte sugli oggetti che esso comprende. Ci sono diversi itinerari che attraversano questo diagramma. Quando e stata stabilita una convinzione, allora essa continua ad essere riferita (bezogen auf) ad uno e allo stesso stato di cose, ma arrivera normalmente il momento in Cl1i questo riferimento oggettuale non e phi a lungo mediato attraverso una presentazione di uno stato di cose dato. 10. Vasserztone Ritornando ai casi standard dell'accesso cognitivo accesso cognitivo agli stati di cose esistenti attraverso i giudizi che sono veri e il momenta di rivolgerci alle strutture che sono implicate quando la convinzione diretta allo stato di *case diventa espressa in una asserzione. L'asserzione si riferisce all'apprensione nella sfera delgiudizio allo stesso modo che il Meinen si riferisce alla presentazione nella sfera degli atti diretti all'oggetto. Un atto di apprensione si distingue per il fatto che lo stato .di cose correlato e « in senso pieno, la per me, mentre in una asserzione lo stato di cose, e, al contrario, puramente significato » (344/89). Una asserzione, per cosi dire, guadagna la sua direzionalita agli oggetti, e percio anche agli stati di cose, soltanto attraverso mediazioni linguistiche. Le asserzioni sono "prodotte ", dice Reinach, esse sono messe insieme con parole. Cosf un'asserzione « e totalmente differente da ogni [ ... ] condizione, e deve es sere piuttosto caratterizzata come un atto spontaneo » ( 320 / 62 ). 30 Se. esiste come co_ntenuto di un fatto empirico un caso del tipo asserzione, ~ora e~1st~:mo necessariamente anche casi del genere soggetto consapevole, stato dz convznzzone e stato di case. 496 Barry Smith Anche se l'apprensione e l'asserzione avesser~ luogo simultaneamente, avremmo a che fare con due atti distinti, uno che implica il Meinen, e l'altro la presentazione. Dal punto di vista delle strutture di dipendenza implicate, l'apprensione viene per prima. Questa da origine alla convinzione, sulla base della . quale puo essere a sua volta costruita un'asserzione. Infatti un'asserzione deve essere costruita, secondo Reinach, sulla base di una condizione di credenza negli stati .di cose pertinenti. Quando manca tale convinzione, non abbiamo asserzione ma qualche altro fenomeno derivato. Reinach espone cos1 la cosa: Non e possibile alcuna asserzione che non sia accompagnata da una soggiacente convinzione tale che sia l'asserzione che la credenza si riferiscono a qualche cosa di strettamente identico. Al contrario, non e necessario che ogni convinzione o credenza fondi un'asserzione ed e anche escluso che un'asserzione soggiaccia ad una convinzione (320/62). Questa convinzione deve inoltre essere positiva: Appartiene all' essenza dell' asserzione (posizione di asserzione) che cio che e asserito. sia creduto; se si mostra nella sfera della convinzione una non-credenza, allora deve essere trasformata in una credenza nello stato di cose contraddittorio, prima che si possa tirare fuori da essa un'asserzione (355 /97). Perfino un' ãserzione negativa deve essere fondata su una convinzione positiva (altrimenti none un'asserzione ma qualche altro fenomeno derivato ). Questo e stato riconosduto anche da Frege, la cui Begriffsschrift riconosce solo un momento (positivo) di forza assertoria. Riguardo alle strutture di un'asserzione, Reinach ci dice che possiamo distinguere « il momenta specifico dell'asserzione da una parte dado che costituisce il significato o l'intenzione dall'altra » (330/72). « E il momento dell'asserzione che rende il giudizio negativo un giudizio in quanto tale» al pari del giudizio positivo (362/105). Il momento dell'asserzione nello schema di Reinach e percio equivalente alla "forza assertoria" di Frege. L'asserzione e costituita sia dal momento dell' asserzione che dal significato to tale ( Gesamtmeic nen) 31 , essendo il primo basato sul secondo. Questo significato totale puo anche essere regolato, ad esempio, dal momento del chiedere (356/98). 31 Per quanto riguarda il significato di cio che Ryle chiama 'memento di pensiero' si veda la 1sua nota a p. 72 e seguenti del testo di Reinach. Adolf Reinach e la fondazione della fenomenologia realistica 497 II momento dell'asserzione mantiene attraverso la componente del significato la sua relazione con gli stati di cose pertinenti il suo "punto d'appoggio nei fatti" per usare l'espressione *di Ryle 32• Mantiene perdo la sua relazione con gli oggetti pertinenti attraverso i segni usati per fare le asserzioni. Nel caso piu semplice possibile do da luogo ad una struttura simile a quella che segue (il lettore puo supporre che l'asserzione in questione sia fatta da qualcuno che ha in mente, o in vista, qualche col po particolare ): GesamtMeinen mom en to di asserzione convinzione etc. (cfr Dia- ' gramma4) 32 Ibidem. Meinen -, I Meinen I _ _j Meinen nome usato x I nome *I us a to ± I nome usato 'Maria' Diagramma 5 stato di cose oggetto 'Giovanni' I I -0~::::1 'colpo' --T-1 I oggetto 'Maria' 498 Barry Smith Come e stato gia osservato a proposito del Diagramma 1, gli oggeiti racchiusi nei riquadri separati sono essi stessi separati. Normalmente e chiaro dalla natura degli oggetti rappresentati se essi possano sovrapporsi o meno (o stare in altre relazioni mereologiche). Cos! nel Diagramma 3, per esempio, l'atto di rappresentazione e il nome usato sono chiaramente separati l'uno dall'altro. Nell'ultimo caso, pero, il nostro diagramma contiene due importanti ambiguita, non cos! facilmente risolte. Alla base del diagramma c'*e !'idea secondo la quale il Gesamtmeinen sia separato dalle rispettive designazioni di nomi, e quindi tali designazioni siano atti veri e propri. Questa ultima prospettiva che considera l'asserzione proprio come un dato complesso, formato in modo determinato, di designazioni di nomi regolati da una forza assertoria e chiaramente, in un certo senso, piu economico. Tuttavia da tale prospettiva consegue che si esclude ogni concezione dell'atto di asserzione come evento puntuale in senso temporale, dal momento che gli atti separati del designare che allora sarebbero le sue parti si succedono l'un l'altro nel tempo. Che un atto di asserzione sia puntuale *e qualche cosa che Reinach ritiene certo (cfr. 320/62) e sembra chiaro che e almeno fenomenologicamente impossibile interromperlo. Per questa ragione, allora, preferiamo considerare l'asserzione come separata dagli atti di intendere i nomi ( e naturalmente le espressioni di altro ti po per dirla brevemente) sui quali essa e fondata. Anche questa interpretazione d pone pero di fronte al problema: quando ha luogo l'asserzione? Con l'esecuzione del primo atto del significare (Meinen) o dell'ultimo? Non cercheremo qui la risposta. Notiamo soltanto che lo stesso problema sorge quando si ascolta una melodia: sentiamo gia la melodia quando ascoltiamo la prima nota? Oppure solo quando abbiamo afferrato tutte le note? La seconda ambiguita, parallela alla prima, riguarda la questione relativa al Sachverhalt, se debba essere ritenuto separato dai rispettivi oggetti fondanti o tale da escluderli come parti. Naturalmente, date le convenzioni del nostro diagramma, possiamo lasciare in sospeso tale questione, notando soltanto ancora una volta che si pone un problema esattamente parallelo riguardo alla melodia che ascoltiamo. La melodia comprende le sue note come parti? 0 phittosto, come sostiene Ehrenfels, e una forma (Gestalt) speciale in senso qualitativo, fondata sulle note ma separata da esse? 33 Un'analisi 33 Una trattazione phi dettagliata di questa posizione si trova in K. MULLIGAN Adolf Reinach e la fondazione delta fenomenologia realistica 499 anche approssimativa di questo problema ci fara percorrere, . pero, una lunga strada verso una concezione positiva adeguata dello stato di cose. Lo stesso Reinach afferma chiaramente che il Sachverhalt e costruito da elementi. Egli indica, per esempio, che « gli stati di cose, come questi che si costituiscono in asserzioni, non possono aggregarsi come se fossero composti di elementi arbitrari: essi sono piuttosto soggetti di leggi definite di costituzione » ( 367/111). Sarebbe errato, pero, dedurre da brani come questo che lo stesso Reinach identifichi gli elementi in questione con gli oggetti del mondo reale. Al contrario se i Sachverhalte avessero parti reali, erediterebbero da queste parti i caratteri di esistenza nel tempo ( o almeno del possesso di una storia) e cio e incompatibile con il platonismodi Reinach. Gli elementi degli stati di cose (Sachverhaltselemente) di' cui parla l;leinach sono sostituti categoriali particolari di oggetti del mondo 34• Essendoci liberati da questo aspetto platonico della filosofia di Reinach, pero, non c'e nulla che ci impedisca di intendere gli elementi degli stati di cose come oggetti esistenti in realta e di ti.rare fuori, all'interno di questa prospettiva piu modesta, le implicazioni dell'idea secondo la quale i Sachverhalte 'possano in qualche modo "comprendere i loro oggetti". 11. Come sono connessi gli oggetti in un Sachverhalt? Per rispondere a questa domanda dobbiamo prima di tutto considerare piu dettagliatamente la relazione fra Sachverhalte e asserzioni corrispondenti. E possibile distinguere a questo riguardo due posizioni principali. L'una considera gli stati di cose come dipendenti dalle asserzioni, dando una priori ta alle strutture l6giche ( o logico-grammaticali) delle proposizioni usate per esprimere le asserzioni stesse. Le strutture logiche sono, per cosf dire, lette nei Sachverhalte che sono ridotti allo stato di semplici correlati intenzionali di atti di giudizio. e B. SMITH, Mach und Ehrenfels: Ober Gestaltqualitaten und das Problem der Abhangigkeit, in Leben und Werk von Christian von Ehrenfels, a cura di R. Fabian, Amsterdam 1986, Rodopi; traduzione inglese Mach and Ehrenfels: T.he Foundations of Gestalt Theory, in Foundation of Gestalt Theory, a cura di B. SMITH, Miinich, Philosophia, in corso di stampa . • 34 Si veda L. VANDERVORT BRETTLER, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, Dissertation, McGill University 1973, p. 62, 119 e segg. 500 Barry Smith L'altra posizione titiene le asserzioni, in un senso che deve essere ph! dettagliatamente spiegato, come dipendenti dai corrispondenti stati di cose e percio ritiene prioritarie le strutture ontologiche come opposte a quelle logiche. Cio da luogo ad una prospettiva secondo la quale le parti dell' asserzione ( e percio anche, in modo derivato, gli elementi delle proposizioni usate) hanno differenti funzioni corrispondenti ai diversi modi in cui sono connessi gli elementi dei correlativi stati di cose 35 • II lavoro di Reinach contiene forse la trattazione piu sofisticata della seconda prospettiva 36 e anche dopo aver tolto gli elementi platonizzanti della sua posizione possiamo imparare molto dalle sue analisi relativamente a cio che da tale posizione potrebbe conseguire. Gli atti del significare che sono implicati nel formulate una asserzione, ci dice Reinach, non « appaiono uno accanto all'altro, senza relazioni reciproche allo stesso modo in cui le successive esperienze dell'ascoltare le note di una melod.ia » (356/98). Per Reinach, pero, e l'unita del Sachverhalt che contrasta con la costruzione di un atto di asserzione e rende possibile quel peculiare tipo di unita che un tale atto implica. Naturalmente, cio non significa che ogni occasione ottiene la sua unita dal corrispondente Sachverhalt. Alcune asserzioni per esempio le asserzioni matematiche o quelle false o metafisiche possono non corrispondere direttamente ad alcun Sachverhalt. Piuttosto, si puo dire, le forme della unita ottenibili per noi nel formulate asserzioni sono derivate dalle forme ,di unita manifestate da semplici Sachverhalte con i quali veniamo a contatto nei casi normali di accesso cognitivo. Questa e in parte una questione che 35 La parte preponderante degli scritti di filosofia analitica riguardo alla semantica ha adottato la prima di queste due posizioni ritenendo normalmente che in virtu di essa un dato giudizio e vero avendo come termine .di riferimento 'modelli' teoreticamente posti la cui relazione con gli oggetti soggiacenti e raramente, se mai lo e, investigata. Si puo dire che il Tractatus di Wittgenstein ha proposto un punto di vista neutrale, a meta strada fra i due estremi, sec~ndo i quali ne Saltz ne Sachverhalt hanno una priorita, sebbene la semplificazione risultante implichi che ne la struttura logica ne quella ontologica siano trattate in modo proposizionale. Una recente indagine nel campo della semantica, come quella proposta soprattutto dalla cosiddetta 'semantica situazionale' di Barwise e Perry, si e orientata in qualche modo verso la seconda posizione qui descritta, quella realistica, sebbene, dal momento che essa continua a trattare i correlati esterni delle proposizioni e dei giudizi con strumenti posti teoreticamente in modo ontologico relativamente rigido, non* si possa dire che si . sia liberata interamente dalle tendenze logicistiche del vecchio tipo di semantica. 36 Si dovra aspettare una parola definitiva su questo argomento fino alla trascrizione integrale dei manoscritti di Daubert sul giudizio e sul Sachverhalt. Adolf R(finach e la fondazione delta fenomenologia realistica 501 riguarda la psicologia evolutiva:' conosciamo, nella nostra infanzia, non semplicemente diversi tipi di oggetti semplici, ma anche diverse varieta di semplici Sachverhalte e impariamo ad associarli con semplici asserzioni traendole da un repertorio relativamente limitato di modelli di proposizioni economiche 37 • A questo livello, allora, c'e una relazione direttamente contrastante fra Sachverhalt ed espressione. In un secondo momento impariamo a formulare asserzioni 1ndipendentemente dall'esperienza diretta ed anche ad estendere le for.me .di proposizioni che abbiamo appreso in modi che esdudono la possibilita di corrispon denti stati di cose. Qui ci interessa, pero, soltanto un aspetto del contrasto fra asserzioni semplici e derivate. Nell'interpretazione dei Sachverhalte da parte della tradizione analitica si assume normalmente: 1) che c'e una divisione fra le asserzioni logicamente semplici e quelle logicamente complesse e 2) che questa divisione almeno per quelle asserzioni che sono vere da luogo ad una separazione di elementi esattamente corrispondenti fra gli stati di cose atomici e quelli molecolari. Altrove 38 sono state avanzate critiche ad entrambi questi assunti da un punto di vista realistico. Per i nostri scopi presenti, pero, non sara dannoso se assumiamo che espressioni come ' e ', ' quindi' e 'non', quando sono applicate a proposizioni, riflettono akune corrispondentl forme di unita presenti in stati di cose complessi. Le costanti logiche non hanno funzione di presentazione. Questa tesi, caratteristica del Tractatus, e espressa da Reinach nel modo seguente: Parole come 'e', 'ma', 'anche', 'quindi', 'non' e cos! via, sono com- , prese nel corso della espressione che rende comprensibili le proposizioni senza poter dire che esse siano giudicate dagli atti dei correlati oggettuali significanti quali, ad esempio, le parole 'Socrate' e 'albero '. E indubbio che, quando pronuncio una di queste parole comprensibilm:nte nel contesto di una proposizione, allora c'e piu che la pronuncia stessa; [ ... ] ma e anche indubitabile che non c'e nes~un tendere verso qualche. cosa di oggettivo nel senso prima dehneato. Che cosa sarebbe, infatti, questa oggettualita che corrisponderebbe ad 'anche' o a 'ma'? (358/101). 37 Si veda la discussione <lei modelli degli eventi canonici in D. L. SLOBIN The Origin of Grammatical Encoding of Events in "Sintax and Semantic"' 1983 (15), pp. 409-422. ' ' • 38 Si veda K. M~LLIG~N, P. SIMOÑ e B. S1:1rTH, op. cit., dove la discussioñ ~el~a semphcita logic.a e oñõogica non e formulata specificamente in termiru di Sachverhalt ma in termini di entita che sono funzioni di v*erita in generale. 502 Barry Smith Parole come' e ', 'quindi' e 'non' esprimono piuttosto alcune funzioni, per esempio la funzione del combinare due o piu stati di cose per formare un complesso unitario (359 n/101 n). Per veder.e precisamente che cosa cio implichi, abbiamo bisogno di considerare le strutture degli stati di case atomici, stati di case che corrispondono ad asserzioni espresse da proposizioni che rion contengano costanti logiche 39 • Dimostrero che ii primo genere di unita, che 1e manifestato dai Sachverhalte atomici, e l'unita delle relazioni di fondazione. Se Giovanni ha mal di testa, allora quel processo che e il mal di testa di Giovanni sta in una singola relazione di fondazione da una sola parte con la sostanza che e Giovanni. Se Maria bada Giovanni, allora il processo che * consiste nel badare da parte di Maria risiede in due relazioni di fondazione, una verso Giovanni e una verso Maria. II proseguire in questo processo da luogo, ovviamente, ad una tassonomia di possibili forme di Sachverhalte atomici 40 • . In uno stato di cose gli oggetti si legano gli uni agli altri come anelli di una catena. Ogni stato di case atomico ,e do che possiamo chiamare una catena integrale nel senso che la rappresentazione delle associazioni c tale che, se la disposizione viene meno, allora 1) ne consegue una dispersione in pezzi sconnessi, oppure 2) la risultante non e ben strutturata in quanto contiene disposizioni dipendenti non connesse con i loro corrispondenti elementi fondamentali. Nessuno stato di case puo darsi in uno dei tre casi: 1) un Sachverhalt puo mancare di unita nel senso che ci sono elementi non connessi gli uni agli altri da relazioni dipendenti, sia mediate che immediate (per esempio lo stato di cose, se ce n'e uno, che renderebbe vero il giudizio: "Giovanni salta e Maria ha l'emicrania") 41 ; 2) un Sachverhalt puo possedere unita tutti i suoi elementi sono connessi ma e una unita del tipo che risulta quando due o piu Sachverhalte distinti ma sovrapponentisi si susseguono in un insieme unitario ("Giovanni ha fame e hail mal di testa"); 3) un Sachverhalt 39 Queste strutture sono state difficilmente investigate; perfino l'immenso lavoro di Ingarden sulla ontologia realistica, Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, si concentra sulla distinzione fra differenti tipi *di Sachverhalte (ad esempi~ fra quelli autonomi e quelli intenzionali) senza rendere conto del modo in cut i Sachverhalte siano costituiti nei casi piii semplici. 40 11 problema di estendere questa tassonomia in modo sistematico e in tal maniera di includere arbitrariamente grandi complessi di elementi che stanno l'un l'altro in relazioni di dipendenza da tre parti, quattro parti, n-parti appartiene effettivamente alla teoria dei grafici direzionali. 41 Si veda ad esempio il *diagramma in K. MULLIGAN *e B. SMITH, op. cit., p. 90; qui il diagramma rilevante e un grafico sconnesso. i* t' I' Adolf Reinach e la fondazione delta fenomenologia realistica 503 puo contenere 'elementi inessenziali ', elementi che possonp essere tolti senza detrimento per do che rimane. Lo stato di cose della categoria 1) e 2) corrisponde a Sachverhalte logicamente complessi, come questi sono normalmente intesi ( sebbene sia raramente riconosciuto il fatto che siano due i tipi ontologicamente distinti da complessita logica). Gli stati di cose del gruppo 3) sono discussi da Reinach in dettaglio: Quando la costruzione di uno stato di cose e iniziata non puo esser.:: interrotta o * completata arbitrariamente, ma richiede elementi determinati, prescritti non in base al contenuto ma alla form'l, in modo analogo ai rapporti presenti nella costruzione di una melodia. Quando uno stato di cose comincia con la "la rosa e ", non ruo essere arbitrariamente interrotto a questo punto, ma deve intervenire a completamento quakhe elemento forse nella forma di un predicato e, a quel punto, deve essere un elemento necessario per lo stato di cose [ ... ].Al contrario, nel giudizio: "!'automobile e partita velocemente", 'velocemente' non e un elemento necessario, anzi non e essenziale *per la costituzione finale dello stato di cose (367 /111) 42• 12. Complesso e Sachverhalt La nostra tassonomia di Sachverhalte atomici e non atomici in termini di relazioni fondamentali fra oggetti non va abbastanza lontano, pero, da fornire una spiegazione positiva della natura specifica del Sachver.halt. Ognuna delle forme indicate, infatti, potrebbe servire ugualmente bene a rappresentare un oggetto complesso corrisponden te: la somma mereologica (se ce n'e una) di Giovanni e del suo mal di testa, o di Maria, Giovanni e di un particolare processo del baciare. In realta, qualcuno come Reinach che ammette anche Sachverhalte di un solo elemento, corrispondenti per esempio a fatti metereologici 43 , non ha altra possibilita che riconoscere qualche tratto o tratti .addi42 C'e un po' di confusione in questo brano, ad esempio fra Sachverhalt e giudizio. Piu specificatamente Reinach sembra non avere una chiara idea della relazione fra lo stato di cose come correlato dell'apprensione e lo stato. di cose. come correlato di asserzione. Da una parte queste "debbono essere strettaritente identiche" (320/62), ma dall'altra egli ammette che in un'asserzione proprio lo stesso stato di cose che si presentava a noi globalmente nella nostra. convinzione apprendente di esso, ora acquista [ ... ] una particolare modificazione della sua forma, diventando articolato in elementi che •si * costituiscono successivamente (356/98). 43 "Sta piovendo, ecc. ", p. 346 e segg./117 e segg. 504 Barry Smith zionali, peculiari del Sachverhalt, dal momento che altrimenti non avrebbe mezzi per distinguere, nel caso di un solo elemento, fra Sachverhalt e oggetto corrispondente 44 • Possiamo avere qualche idea relativamente a questo tratto addizionale * se paragoniamo gli elementi del Sachverhalt: Giovanni colpisce Maria nel Diagramma 6, con i corrispondenti elementi della proposizione usata per l'asserzione in questione. Gli oggetti (Giovanni, Maria e il colpo) sono omogenei: ognuno e interamente singolare. Da parte dell'asserzione, pero, c'e sotto questo aspetto una eterogeneita fra le espressioni singolari "Giovanni" e "Maria" e l' espressione generale "colpisce". * Potrebbe essere eliminata questa eterogeneita? Cioe, potremmo immaginare che il "colpisce" sia sostituito da una espressione della stessa categoria grammaticale che e stata in qualche modo spogliata della sua generalita una espressione che si riferirebbe a quell'evento individuale che e il colpo specifico di Giovanni proprio come i nomi propri "Giovanni" e "Maria" si riferiscono ai rispettivi portatori? Non battezzeremmo questo evento pet mezzo di do che potremmo chiamare un verbo proprio (una espressione che starebbe ai verbi normali come i nomi propri stanno ad espressioni come "un uomo", "l'uomo", ecc.)? Cio si concretizzerebbe in proposizioni del ti po "David gustaveggio ", "Giovanni guglielmeggio Maria" e cosf via 45, proposizioni che sarebbero isomorfe ai corrispondenti stati di cose e complessi proprio nel senso della teoria della raffigurazione del Tra.ctatus. La complessita del Sachverhalt consisterebbe interamente in questo: che gli oggetti particolari menzionati nella proposizione stanno in relazioni fondamentali stabilite appositamente dalla grammatica logica 46 • 44 Nel suo Diario clel 1914-16, Wittgenstein devia dalla sua linea di indagine per sottolineare che Sachverhalt e T atsachen devono essere distinti dagli oggetti complessi corrispondenti; si veda P. M. SIMONS, The Old Problems of Complex and Fact, in "Teoria" (numero speciale su Wittgenstein, op. cit., pp. 205-225, e K. MULLIGAN, Wie die Sache sich zueinander verhalten, op. cit. Nel Tractatus, pero, 'e meno ovvio che Wittgenstein fosse preoccupato di tracciare tale distinzione. . 45 Tali proposizioni *suonano strane dal momento che le espressioni corrispoñenti devon? essere conne.sse normal?1eñe ~ situ~ioni continue e 1:1on ~ event! e process!. E soltanto rispetto a s1tuaz1oru contmue che un comp1to d1 * ri-locazione deve essere compiuto. * 46 Una grammatica di tipo appropriata potrebbe ,essere quella proposta da D. PERLMUTTER, Relational Grammar, in Current Approaches to Syntax (Syntax and Semantics 13), a cura di E. A. Moravcsik e J. R. Wirth, New York 1980,. Academic Press, pp. 195-229. * i,. 1: f Adolf Reinach e la fondazione della fenomenologia realistica II nostro problema puo essere enunciato di nuovo come segue: che cosa e che corrisponde, da parte del Sachverhdt, alla distinzione fra "Giovanni guglielmeggio Maria" e "Giovanni colpf Maria" dal lato dell'asserzione? Si consideri la differenza parallela fra "Giovanni bacia Maria" e "un uomo bacia Maria". Quando dico "Giovanni bacia Marfa", allora il mio uso di "Giovanni" sembra,' per cosf dire, rife- '•tirsi all'uomo intero, a quell'intero specifico oggetto conosciuto da me come Giovanni. Quando, d'altra parte, dico "un uomo bacia Maria", allora sembra che mi riferisca a Giovanni, ammesso che sia cosf, solo come un rappresentante della specie uomo: e come se facessi appello soltanto ad un "torso" concettualmente ristretto di Giovanni, dal quale e stato tolto tutto cio che e specifico. Questa oggetto concettualmente ristretto e in qualche modo una versione rimpicciolita dell' oggetto considerato in natura. Quando concetti come uomo, cavallo, malditesta possono essere applicati correttamente ad un oggetto, do accade perche c'e qualche parte o momenta dell'oggetto in questione che esiste autonomamente e a cui l'espressione concettuale corrisponde direttamente. E in virtu di tali parti o momenti chiamate "parti logiche" da Brentano e da Husserl 47 che i concetti dati possono essere applicati correttamente. Essi servono come fundamenta in re dei concetti in questione. II suggerimento ora e che tali parti logiche possano servire come Sachverhaltselemente corrispondenti alle espressioni generali, siano esse verbi o nomi. Sachverhalte corrispondenti a giudizi singolari consisterebbero in tali parti logiche legate ad oggetti comuni da relazioni di fondazione. Sachverhalte cosf concepiti, avrebbero, per cosf dire, esattamente la quantita di contenuto adatta a renderli truth makers (fadtori di verita) <lei corrispondenti giudizi. Tuttavia essi esisterebbero autonomamente e non come semplici correlati intenzionali di atti che usano proposizioni. E sufficiente, pero, intendere la struttura ontologica del Sachverhalt esclusivamente in termini di relazioni fondatnentali fra oggetti e parti logiche? 0 ci sono tratti addizionali o gruppi di tratti peculiari degli stati di cose che non sono stati finora considerati? Lo stesso Reinach suggerisce due di questi tratti: il numero e il tempo. Rispetto al primo e sufficiente qui attirare l' attenzione sul suggerimento di Reinach secondo ii quale sarebbe possibile sostituire la imperfetta 47 * Si veda K. MULLIGAN e B. SMITH; Franz Brentano and the Ontology of Mind, in "Philosophy and Phenomenological Research", 1985 ( 45). 506 Barry Smith teoria di Frege basata sul concetto con quella basata sul Sachverhalt, per vedere i numeri come formazioni che sono al loro posto nel contesto di un Sachverhalt 48 • Riguardo al secondo, ricorderemo soltanto l'idea di Reinach, gia menzionata, nel senso che i Sachverhalte sono il luogo del passato e del futuro. Una versione piu sottile di questa idea e stata proposta da Kevin Mulligan sotto forma della tesi secondo la quale possiamo stabilire una connotazione veramente caratteristica dello stato di case se badiamo al tempo, che ha a che fare con le relazioni fra eventi autonomi e soggetti che usano proposizioni, se consideriamo i fenomeni relativi all'aspetto, i quali hanno a che fare con la "costituzione temporale interna" degli eventi stessi. Differenze di aspetto sono riscontrabili, per esempio, nelle oppo, sizioni quali quelle fra "Giovanni corre '', "Giovanni stava correndo '', "Giovanni cesso di correre", "Maria si sedette improvvisamente", "Maria si stava sedendo improvvisamente'', "Maria stava ancora seduta", "Maria sedeva ancora". Allo stesso modo si puo considerare quel materiale fattuale che e "Giovanni sta baciando Maria" in una data occasione. Potremmo supporre che questo sia formato da tre oggetti: Giovanni, Maria e un certo processo del baciare che si estende temporalmente. Abbiamo gia vista che questo materiale fattuale puo essere compreso nei Sachverhalte in modi diversi, riflettendo diversi tipi di comprensione concettuale. Ma lo stesso fatto materiale puo essere variamente compreso anche lungo un'altra dimen* sione, quella dell'aspetto, e rendera percio vere una serie di proposizioni differenti (proposizioni che possiamo concepire come articolate da differenti osservatori av~nti tutti simultaneamente un accesso percettivo agli oggetti in questione). Questa materiale fattuale puo essere compreso, per esempio, nel modo seguente: Giovanni sta baciando Maria, Giovanni ha appena cominciato a baciare Maria, Giovanni sta ancora baciando Maria, Giovanni bacia ripetutamente Maria, e cos! via. Le differenze qui illustrate sono reali: gli stati di case in questione non sono identici. Tuttavia queste differenze sembrano non cor" rispondere, nel caso dato, ad alcune differenze di comprensione e neppure a differenze presenti negli oggetti stessi. 4S Si rimanda al resoconto della conf erenza di Marburg di Reinach nella biografia curata da Schuhmann ~ !Smith gia citata. s~ confronti anc?e il. pas~o SU Frege in Ober Phiinomenolog(e (Gesammelte Schrtften, p. 391), m CU1 Remach sostiene che simili idee potrebbero essere applicate anche ai quantificatori 'tutd ', 'qualche ', 'soltanto' ecc. (1. V. BRETTLER, The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach, op. cit., contiene una trattazione piu dettagliata di questo argomento). Adolf Reinach e la fondazione delta fenomenologia realistica 507 13. Epilogo Reinach e Wittgenstein Ci sono molti tratti della teoria di Reinach relativa ai Sachverhalte che ricordano la teoria di Wittgenstein del Tractatus. Sia l'uno che l'altro ritengono la relazione nome-oggetto come il punto di contatto fra chi giudica e il mondo. Entrambi pongono 1a nozione di stato di case al centro della loro filosofia e concepiscono lo stato di cose non come una proposizione astratta o un contenuto di giudizio, ma piuttosto come il correlato ontologico di un atto del giudizio, come do che e nel mondo, in virtu di cui la proposizione usata e vera o falsa. Reinach e Wittgenstein condividono anche il riconoscimento di due ulteriori livelli, oltre il livello dello stato di cose: uno linguistico e uno psicologico, relativo ai pensieri e agli atti di giudizio. Naturalmente Wittgenstein va considerevolmente oltre Reinach nell'utilizzazione della teoria dei Sachverhalte come mezzi per gettare luce sulle strutture logiche delle proposizioni ad essi associate. Suggerisce, pero, che cio avviene al prezzo di una semplificazione ontologica, o idealizzazione, a tutt'e tre i livelli, semplificazione di un tipo che e interamente assente dalla trattazione di Reinach. (Traduzione dall'inglese di Angela Ales Bello)

[email protected] ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6180-457X Desert, Control, and Moral Responsibility Douglas W. Portmore1 I follow Strawson (GHIJ) and others in thinking that a subject is morally responsible for having φ-ed if and only if she's the appropriate target of reactive aTitudes in virtue of having φ-ed. But, of course, there are different sorts of aTitudes that one could appropriately have in reaction to a subject's φ-ing. Consequently, there are different types, or faces, of moral responsibility. On one type, the relevant reactive aTitudes paradigmatically include shame in the case of blaming oneself and disdain in the case of blaming others. Such aTitudes are appropriate in reaction to a subject's φ-ing whenever she has, in φ-ing, revealed that her values, commitments, and/or character traits are flawed in some way. To illustrate, take the case of The Misogynistic Professor. He calls on several men but on no women during his three-hour-long seminar even though there were numerous occasions when just as many women had their hands raised. And let's assume that this behavior reveals that the professor's character is indeed misogynistic. It is, then, appropriate for the professor to be ashamed of, and for others to have disdain for, his misogynistic character. For, in having these reactive aTitudes, they are (and he is) aTributing a flawed character to him (or himself), thereby blaming him (or himself) in what's known as the aTributability sense. But there are other sorts of reactive aTitudes that are appropriate in the case of The Misogynistic Professor. For, in behaving misogynistically, the professor not only reveals his flawed character but also violates certain legitimate demands. As a consequence, he seems liable to sanction, at least to the sort of sanction that comes from the disapproval of his own conscience. Thus, it seems appropriate for the professor to be held to account for having violated these legitimate demands. And he can hold himself accountable by feeling guilt while 1 School of Historical, Philosophical, and Religious Studies, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA. 2 others can hold him accountable by resenting him and/or being indignant with him. And this is to blame him in what's known as the accountability sense. So, there seem to be at least two types, or faces, of moral responsibility and, hence, at least two types of blameworthiness (WATSON GHHI).2 For one, a subject is blameworthy in the a2ributability sense for having φ-ed if and only if she is the appropriate target of reactive aTitudes such as shame and disdain in virtue of having φ-ed and thereby having revealed her flawed values, commitments, and/or character traits. For another, a subject is blameworthy in the accountability sense for having φ-ed if and only if she is the appropriate target of reactive aTitudes such as guilt, resentment, and indignation in virtue of having φ-ed and thereby having violated some legitimate demand.3 These two types of blameworthiness differ not only in the sorts of reactive aTitudes that they take to be paradigmatically relevant, but also in their control conditions.4 For, as noted by Gary Watson (GHHI), it seems that avoidability is a requirement for a subject's being blameworthy in the accountability sense but not for her being blameworthy in the aTributability sense. He says, "the pressure for some kind of...principle of avoidability comes entirely...from accountability and its corresponding notion of blame" (GHHI, p. JJH). For whereas it seems appropriate for the professor to be ashamed of his character whether he could have avoided developing that sort of character or not, it seems appropriate for him to feel guilty for having developed such a character only if he could have avoided doing so. In this paper, I take it for granted both that there are these two types of blameworthiness and that avoidability is necessary for only accountability blameworthiness. My task, then, will be to explain why avoidability is necessary for accountability blameworthiness but not for aTributability blameworthiness. I'll argue that what explains this is both the fact that these two types of blameworthiness make different sorts of reactive aTitudes fiTing and that only one of these two types of aTitudes requires having been able to refrain from φ-ing in order for them to be fiTing. 2 Some think that there are more than two. For instance, David Shoemaker (JmGn) argues that there are three distinct types: aTributability, answerability, and accountability. 3 See CARLSSON FORTHCOMING, NELKIN JmGn, and WATSON GHHI. 4 For a defense of the view that these are the relevant reactive aTitudes for each type of blameworthiness, see CARLSSON FORTHCOMING. 3 !. Accountability, A0ributability, and Avoidability A subject is accountable for having φ-ed if and only if she can appropriately be held to account for having φ-ed and, thus, appropriately held liable to reward or sanction in virtue of her having φ-ed. The reward or sanction needn't come from the law, society, or common opinion, but it must at least come from the approval or disapproval of her own conscience-see MILL GsIG, chap. V. Thus, a subject is blameworthy in the accountability sense for having φ-ed if and only if it would be appropriate for her to feel guilty for having φ-ed. Yet, guilt is inherently unpleasant, and no one deserves to suffer any unpleasantness unless they had the opportunity to avoid it. So, if the appropriateness of one's feeling guilty depends on one's deserving to suffer its associated unpleasantness, then a subject can be blameworthy in the accountability sense for having φ-ed only if she could have refrained from φ-ing. And, so, we get the following argument for why avoidability is necessary for accountability. I call it the Guilt Argument. (GG) A subject is blameworthy in the accountability sense for having φ-ed only if it's appropriate for her to feel guilty in virtue of having φ-ed. [Analytic] (GJ) Given both that guilt is inherently unpleasant and that no one deserves to experience any unpleasantness unless they had the opportunity to avoid it, it's appropriate for a subject to feel guilty in virtue of having φ-ed only if she could have refrained from φ-ing. [Assumption] (Gx) Therefore, a subject is blameworthy in the accountability sense for having φ-ed only if she could have refrained from φ-ing. [From GG–GJ] Now, it may seem strange that I've formulated this argument only in terms of guilt and not also in terms of other relevant reactive aTitudes, such as resentment and indignation. But although blameworthiness in the accountability sense can make all three of these reactive aTitudes appropriate, it's only guilt that is inherently unpleasant for its target. One can be the target of resentment and/or indignation without experiencing any unpleasantness. For one can 4 be unaware of the fact that one's the target of resentment and/or indignation. Or, alternatively, one can be aware of this fact but not care about it and, so, suffer no unpleasantness as a result. By contrast, it's impossible to be the target of guilt and be unaware of it. To be the target of guilt, one must feel guilty. And to feel guilty is to be aware of it. Moreover, it's impossible to feel guilty without suffering any unpleasantness. For guilt is inherently unpleasant.5 If the feeling one is experiencing isn't unpleasant, it can't be guilt. Thus, given that the Guilt Argument relies on the assumption that no one deserves to suffer any unpleasantness unless they had the opportunity to avoid it, guilt is the only one of these three aTitudes that's relevant. For it's the only one that's necessarily unpleasant for its target. It may also seem strange that the above argument focuses solely on blame rather than on both praise and blame. After all, moral responsibility concerns praiseworthiness just as much as it does blameworthiness. But I make blameworthiness my exclusive focus only so as to simplify our discussion. Indeed, I believe that the above argument would be just as plausible if I were to make the following substitutions throughout: (G) 'pleasant/ness' for 'unpleasant/ness', (J) 'praiseworthy' for 'blameworthy', and (x) 'pride' (or whatever the positive analogue of guilt is) for 'guilt'. But although I could easily discuss and defend such an argument along with the Guilt Argument, I don't see any benefit to doing so. It seems that this would just lengthen our discussion without providing any additional insights. So, I leave it as exercise for the reader to think about how I could make analogous, and equally plausible, claims about pride, pleasantness, and praiseworthiness. Lastly, it may seem strange that I've relied on the Guilt Argument to explain why avoidability is necessary for accountability when I deny that avoidability is necessary for aTributability. For just as guilt is inherently unpleasant, so is shame. And, thus, it may seem that the Guilt Argument is no more plausible than the following analogous argument for why avoidability is necessary for aTributability. I call it the Shame Argument. 5 I'm not alone in thinking that guilt is inherently unpleasant. See, for instance, CARLSSON JmG{ (p. HG), CLARKE JmGI (p. GJJ), MORRIS GH{I (p. GmG), ROSEN JmGn (p. I{, n. I), and WOLF JmGG. 5 (SG) A subject is blameworthy in the aTributability sense for having φ-ed only if it's appropriate for her to feel shame in virtue of having φ-ed. [Analytic] (SJ) Given both that shame is inherently unpleasant and that no one deserves to experience any unpleasantness unless they had the opportunity to avoid it, it's appropriate for a subject to feel shame in virtue of having φ-ed only if she could have refrained from φ-ing. [Assumption] (Sx) Therefore, a subject is blameworthy in the aTributability sense for having φ-ed only if she could have refrained from φ-ing. [From SG–SJ] Given that the point of this paper is to explain why avoidability is necessary for accountability blameworthiness but not for aTributability blameworthiness, I must hold that, while the Guilt Argument is sound, the Shame Argument is unsound. And since both arguments are clearly valid and since both GG and SG are analytically true, I'll need to argue that, while GJ is true, SJ is false.6 To do so, I'll need to get clear on what specific notion of appropriateness is at work in these two arguments. For there seem to be various different notions of appropriateness that could be at work, depending on what the relevant norm is. Here, then, are three possible candidates for being the relevant norm of appropriateness. • The Norm of Fairness: Some treatment is fair and, therefore, appropriate in the sense governed by this norm if and only if it doesn't entail treating differently those who are alike in all the relevant respects. • The Norm of Desert: Some subject morally deserves X such that it's appropriate that she gets X in the sense governed by this norm if and only if, as a maTer of justice and in virtue of her possessed characteristics or prior activities, she merits X in the sense that entails that it would, in some respect, be non-instrumentally good that she gets X. 6 This set up of the problem involving both the Guilt Argument and the Shame Argument is inspired by the same sort of set up found in CARLSSON FORTHCOMING. 6 • The Norm of Fi2ingness: Some aTitude is fiTing and, therefore, appropriate in the sense governed by this norm if and only if its representations are accurate.7 Let's consider each in turn, starting with the norm of fairness. We may think that "it is unfair to impose sanctions upon people unless they have a reasonable opportunity to avoid incurring them" (WATSON GHHI, p. Jx{). And we may additionally think that in having an unpleasant feeling like guilt or shame one imposes a sanction upon oneself. And if both of these thoughts are correct, it will be appropriate (in the sense that's governed by the norm of fairness) for one to feel guilt or shame in virtue of having φ-ed only if one could have refrained from φing. So, if the norm of appropriateness that's being appealed to in the above two arguments is the norm of fairness, both GJ and SJ are going to be true. But we should reject this line of reasoning. First, to have an unpleasant feeling such as guilt is not to impose a sanction upon oneself. To impose guilt upon oneself, one would need to be able to voluntarily choose to have this feeling. But although we can feel guilty in response to reasons, we cannot voluntarily choose whether to feel guilty-that is, we cannot feel guilty simply by intending to feel guilty. Thus, guilt is not something we impose upon ourselves and, so, can't be something that we unfairly impose upon ourselves. Second, it seems mistaken to think that the relevant notion of appropriateness is the one governed by the norm of fairness. For if this were correct, whether it would be appropriate for us to blame someone would depend on whether we would also be blaming those who are alike in the relevant respects. But it seems that whether it's appropriate for us to blame, say, Hitler for certain German atrocities has nothing to do with whether we also blame Pol Pot for certain Cambodian atrocities. It might be unfair for us to blame Hitler and not Pol Pot, but that wouldn't make it any less appropriate for us to blame Hitler-at least, not in the sense that's relevant to the above two arguments. For it seems that whether it is, in the relevant sense, 7 AdmiTedly, there are different interpretations of the notions of desert, fairness, and fiTingness. For instance, some deny that desert has any axiological implications. And some take desert to be just a kind of fiTingness. But whether you agree with my labels for these norms is not what's important. What's important is that there are these different norms of appropriateness. 7 appropriate for us to blame Hitler depends solely on whether he's blameworthy and not at all on whether we would be treating him or others unfairly in doing so. Perhaps, then, the above arguments are appealing to the norm of desert. If so, we should accept that it's appropriate for someone to feel guilt or shame for having φ-ed only if she could have refrained from φ-ing. For, as we've seen, both guilt and shame are inherently unpleasant and no one deserves to suffer any unpleasantness unless they had the opportunity to avoid it. So, if the relevant notion of appropriateness were the one governed by desert, GJ and SJ would both be true. But this isn't the relevant notion of appropriateness. For one can blame someone by having reactive aTitudes such as shame or disdain. And it seems that someone could be worthy of such blame without deserving to be the target of such aTitudes. Of course, we need to be careful here, for sometimes 'deserve' is used as a synonym for 'fiTing' rather than as I'm using it: as a word referring exclusively to what's morally deserved. And it's only when 'desert' is being used to refer to what's morally deserved that the claim that a subject deserves X entails that it would, in some respect, be non-instrumentally good that she gets X.8 So, I concede that it would be felicitous to claim, say, that Southwest Airlines deserves a five-star customer-approval rating given its exceptional customer satisfaction. Yet, even if Southwest Airlines deserves a five-star rating in some sense, it doesn't morally deserve this rating. After all, it is not, in any respect, non-instrumentally good that Southwest Airlines gets this rating. If it's good, it's only instrumentally good. For there is nothing inherently morally good in Southwest Airlines' geTing a customer-approval rating that accurately reflects the satisfaction of its customers. So, even if someone who is worthy of shame and/or disdain is necessarily deserving of these reactive aTitudes in the sense of its being fiTing for them to be the target of such aTitudes (just as it's fiTing for Southwest Airlines to receive a five-star customer-approval rating), it isn't noninstrumentally good for them to be the target of such aTitudes. So, they don't morally deserve to be the target of such aTitudes. And since the norm of desert refers to moral desert and not 8 Others who think that the claim that a subject deserves X entails that it would, in some respect, be noninstrumentally good that she or he get X include Carlsson (FORTHCOMING), Clarke (JmGx), and McKenna (JmGJ). But Nelkin disagrees with this-see her JmGI. 8 fiTingness, we should reject the idea that the norm of appropriateness at work in the above two arguments is the norm of desert. This leaves us with the norm of fiTingness. And for an aTitude to be fiTing is for it to accurately represent the way things are. Thus, it's important to note that many aTitudes have a representational component in addition to their affective and motivational components.9 And it's the aTitude's representational component that sets its fiTingness conditions, such that an aTitude is fiTing if and only if its representations are accurate.10 In this sense, the fear of X is appropriate if and only if X poses a threat, for the fear of X (at least, typically) represents X as posing a threat.11 So, in order to determine which of GJ and SJ are true, we'll need to determine which representations are constitutive of feeling guilt and which representations are constitutive of feeling shame. For it's only if shame and guilt have different constitutive representations, that GJ will be true while SJ is false. So, in the next section, I'll investigate which representations are constitutive of each of these two aTitudes. 9 I'm not commiTed to the view that all aTitudes (or that all emotions) necessarily have some sort of representational content. For instance, it may be, for all that I claim here, that anger needn't have any representational content. But I will insist that each of the following are essentially representational: guilt, pride, shame, disdain, resentment, and indignation. So, my view is compatible with the sort of view offered in D'ARMS AND JACOBSON Jmmx, where they distinguish between natural emotional kinds such as anger and what they call cognitive sharpenings. Cognitive sharpenings are a proper subset of instances of some natural emotional kind that are identified by their essential representational content. For instance, resentment is, on their view, a cognitive sharpening of anger that's identified as a species of anger that represents the world as being one in which the subject has been wronged. I should note, however, that they provisionally suggest that guilt is a natural emotional kind and not a cognitive sharpening, contrary to what I'll claim here (see Jmmx, p. Gxs). 10 Perhaps, this is too quick. For it doesn't seem appropriate for a worm to fear a bird unless the worm is capable of representing the bird as a threat to itself. So, I should probably qualify the above as follows: it's appropriate for a subject to form an aTitude only if she has the option both to form this aTitude and to form the representations essential to it. Of course, I'm not commiTed to fear having some essential representational content; it could, as D'Arms and Jacobson suggest (Jmmx), be a natural emotional kind. But if it is, it's fiTing when, and only when, it has some representational content and that representational content is accurate. 11 The idea that it would be fiTing/unfiTing for a subject to φ is distinct from the idea that it would be fortunate/unfortunate that she φs. Consequently, we must allow that it could be fiTing, say, to fear an animal even if this would be unfortunate given that the animal would then sense this fear and become even more of a threat as a result. Despite its being unfortunate to have this fear, it would, nevertheless, be fiTing so long as it correctly represents its object as a threat. In general, aTitudes represent their objects as being a certain way and are, therefore, fiTing (that is, correct) to the extent that their representations are accurate. By contrast, an aTitude is fortunate if and only if good consequences would result from one's having that aTitude. For more on this distinction, see CHAPPELL JmGJ. 9 4. Fi0ing Guilt, Fi0ing Shame, and Avoidability It seems to me that, in feeling guilty for having φ-ed, one represents the unpleasantness of this feeling as something that one deserves to experience in virtue of having violated a legitimate demand in φ-ing-that is, one represents this unpleasantness as something that it is morally and non-instrumentally good for one to be experiencing given that one has violated this demand (PORTMORE JmGH).12 Note, then, that guilt isn't just any unpleasant feeling associated with certain motivational tendencies. To feel guilt, one must additionally represent the unpleasantness of this feeling as something that one deserves to experience in virtue of one's having violated a legitimate demand.13 Thus, a woman with ToureTe's may feel bad for having involuntarily uTered some obscenity, but this feeling won't amount to guilt unless she experiences its unpleasantness as at least partially deserved. What's more, she could both feel bad about having uTered the obscenity and experience this unpleasantness as at least partially deserved (perhaps, because she wrongly believes that people with her affliction deserve to suffer) and still not count as feeling guilt. For it will be guilt that she's feeling only if she represents its associated unpleasantness as something that she deserves in virtue of her having failed to live up to some legitimate demand (MORRIS GH{I, pp. IG & Gm). Of course, none of this is to suggest that it's impossible to feel guilty unless one believes that one deserves to experience the unpleasantness of this feeling in virtue of having violated a legitimate demand. Clearly, one can feel guilty without having this belief just as one can fear a large hairy spider without believing that it poses a threat. For although fearing something implicates what I'll call the "thought" that it poses a threat, one needn't believe that it poses a 12 Likewise, it seems to me that when one resents, or is indignant with, a subject for having φ-ed, one represents the world as being one in which that subject deserves to suffer the unpleasantness of feeling guilty in virtue of her having violated a legitimate demand in φ-ing. Of course, in the case of resentment, one will additionally represent the world as being one in which one was a victim of this violation. 13 Here, I concur with Darwall and Mill: "Mill calls guilt a kind of 'internal sanction', but it is important to appreciate that guilt is not merely painful, or the (painful) fear of further (external) sanctions (MILL GHHs: Ch. III). It is the painful sense of having done wrong, having violated a legitimate demand that comes, not just from someone else, say God, but also that one implicitly makes of oneself, through blaming oneself in feeling guilt" (DARWALL JmGx, p. GI). 10 threat to have this thought.14 Having the thought that it's dangerous necessitates only experiencing it as dangerous. And to experience it as dangerous is just for it to strike one as dangerous in the same way that the lines in a Müller-Lyer illusion can strike one as unequal even while at the same time believing that they're equal.15 Likewise, to have the thought that one deserves to experience the unpleasantness of guilt in virtue of having failed to live up to some legitimate demand, one needn't believe this. Rather, one need only have it strike one as being so. Thus, I'll be using the word 'thought' as a term of art such that one has the thought that p if and only if one represents the world as being such that p-that is, represents the world as being such that p in the same way that one can believe that the lines in a Müller-Lyer illusion are equal while representing them to oneself as unequal.16 But I take no stand on what exactly it is to have such a representation other than to say both that it's not a belief and that it's the sort of thing that we're having when the lines in a Müller-Lyer illusion strike as unequal. I will, though, assume that a representation that p (what I'm calling the thought that p) is accurate if and only if p. Thus, the thought that those lines are unequal-a thought that we have only while under the force of the illusion-is inaccurate because the lines are in fact equal.17 14 Here, I follow CLARKE JmGI and ROSEN JmGn in distinguishing thoughts from beliefs such that having the laTer, but not the former, necessitates assenting to the aTitude's representational content. 15 For more on this idea, see both CLARKE JmGI (pp. GJJ–GJx) and ROSEN JmGn (pp. {G–{J). 16 Thus, my view is compatible with the possibility of experiencing recalcitrant guilt-that is, with the possibility of experiencing guilt while at the same time believing that one doesn't deserve to feel its unpleasant affect. But although this is possible, it is, on my view, no more possible for a subject to feel guilt without it seeming to her that she deserves to suffer its unpleasant affect than it is for a subject to feel resentment without it seeming to her that she's been wronged. And, contrary to D'Arms and Jacobson (Jmmx, p. Gx), I contend that there is no difficulty or instability in a subject's continuing to resent someone while believing that that someone didn't wrong her. Take, for instance, this real-life example. My wife once dreamed that I cheated on her. That morning, it was clear to me that she resented me. Initially, she denied it. But when I explained how she was treating me as if I had wronged her, she admiTed that she had this dream and that, although she knew that I hadn't wrong her, it still seemed to her as if I had. Consequently, it was recalcitrant resentment that she was feeling. And this recalcitrant resentment continued stably for as long as it continued to seem to her that I had wronged her. 17 Note, then, that I'm not saying that an aTitude is fiTing if and only if it wouldn't be morally bad to have such an aTitude. That would be to commit what Justin D'Arms and Dan Jacobson (Jmmm) call the moralistic fallacy. For fiTingness is a maTer of accurate representation rather than moral goodness. And, thus, a reaction can be fiTing even if morally bad. For instance, amusement can be the fiTing response to a funny joke in that it accurately represents that joke as amusing even if that response would be morally bad given both that it's a cruel joke and that any visible or audible expression of amusement in response to it would cause harm to others. 11 It's because the unpleasantness of guilt strikes us as being at least partially deserved that we experience it quite differently than we do, say, the unpleasantness of a headache. Unlike the unpleasantness of a headache, the unpleasantness of guilt strikes us as something that it would, in some respect, be morally problematic to be rid of.18 After all, to say that a subject deserves X is to say that, as a maTer of justice and in virtue of her possessed characteristics or prior activities, she merits X in the sense that entails that it would, in some respect, be noninstrumentally good that she gets X. Thus, taking a pill to alleviate one's appropriate guilt seems morally problematic in a way that taking a pill to alleviate one's headache does not. For whereas there is nothing non-instrumentally bad about ridding oneself of a headache, there does seem to be something non-instrumentally bad about ridding oneself of one's appropriate guilt.19 And this difference isn't just due to the fact that guilt, but not a headache, can be appropriate. For fear can be appropriate and yet there is nothing non-instrumentally bad about taking a pill to get rid of one's appropriate fear.20 Note that the thought implicated by guilt is not the thought that the wrongdoer deserves to suffer in general.21 Rather, the thought is only that she deserves to suffer the specific 18 This thought is connected to several of Herbert Morris's thoughts: "the man who feels guilty often seeks pain and somehow sees it as appropriate because of his guilt; indeed, the feelings of guilt may disappear and the man may connect their disappearance with the pain he has experienced. When we think of what it is to feel guilty then, we think not only of painful feelings but of something that is owed; and pain is somehow connected with paying what one owes" (GH{I, pp. sH–Hm). Thus, "what is sought out is the pain of feeling guilty as punishment for wrongdoing" (GH{I, p. Gm). 19 Clearly, one reason that it would often be morally problematic to take a pill to alleviate one's guilt is that experiencing guilt can often be instrumentally valuable in making one less likely to commit future wrongs. Likewise, shame can be instrumentally valuable in helping one to regulate one's conduct. But it seems to me that it would be morally problematic to take a pill to alleviate one's guilt even if experiencing that guilt would be of no instrumental value. It would be morally problematic in that one deserves to feel bad for violating a legitimate demand and it is morally and non-instrumentally good for people to get what they deserve. In this respect, then, guilt seems unlike shame. 20 Appropriate grief is a bit more complicated. There does seem to be something morally problematic about taking a pill to get rid of one's appropriate grief. But I suspect that this is because it may count as disrespectful to the one lost and/or as a form of denial that hinders one's ability to heal from that loss. In any case, the fact that there is nothing problematic about taking a pill to rid oneself of one's appropriate fear in instances where having that fear would be of no instrumental value shows that the mere appropriateness of a feeling doesn't determine whether it's something that it would be morally problematic to get rid of. 21 Many find this idea unacceptable. For instance, T. M. Scanlon rejects the idea that "it is good that people who have done wrong should suffer" (JmGx, p. GmJ). Likewise, R. Jay Wallace rejects the "problematic thought that 12 unpleasantness involved in having this feeling (that is, the feeling of guilt) and that she deserves this in virtue of having failed to live up to some legitimate demand. To illustrate, suppose that my wife is accountable for having mistreated me. It would, then, be fiTing for me to want her to feel at least some guilt for having mistreated me, and to want this even if such feelings would be of no instrumental value. Nevertheless, it would not be fiTing for me to want her to feel lonely. Nor would it be fiTing for me to want her to suffer more than she deserves to suffer.22 And, importantly, the thought that my wife deserves to feel guilty for her mistreatment of me implies only that it would, in some respect, be non-instrumentally good that she feels this way, not that her feeling this way would be overall good. Thus, the implication is only that the world in which she feels guilty for having accountably mistreated me is, other things being equal, noninstrumentally beTer than the world in which she likewise feels guilty for having nonaccountably mistreated me.23 wrongdoers positively deserve to suffer" (GHH, p. Gms). But rejecting this idea doesn't entail rejecting the idea that someone accountable for some wrongdoing deserves to suffer the unpleasantness of feeling guilt for having commiTed that wrongdoing. Indeed, Scanlon now accepts that wrongdoers deserve to feel guilt for their wrongdoing-see SCANLON Jmms, p. Gss. So, even if we reject the idea that wrongdoers deserve to suffer generally, we shouldn't necessarily reject the idea that wrongdoers deserve to suffer the specific unpleasantness of feeling guilt for their wrongdoing-see, for instance, MCKENNA JmGJ (chaps. I–{). 22 Why think that she deserves to feel bad at all? Here's my argument: (PG) Given that she's accountable for having mistreated me, it's appropriate to want her to feel guilty for having mistreated me and to want her to have this experience even if her having it wouldn't be instrumentally valuable. (PJ) If it's appropriate to want X even if X wouldn't be instrumentally valuable, then X must be non-instrumentally valuable. (CG) Thus, her feeling guilty for having mistreated me is non-instrumentally valuable. (Px) What most plausibly accounts for CG is that she deserves to feel guilty for having mistreated me. (CJ) Therefore, she deserves to feel guilty for having mistreated me. And, in defense of Px, I would add, first, that what explains the non-instrumental value of her feeling guilt for having mistreated me is not that her having this experience is itself non-instrumentally valuable. It isn't. After all, her having this experience wouldn't be non-instrumentally valuable if she weren't accountable for her mistreatment of me. Second, the fact that it is fi2ing for her to feel guilt for having mistreated me is not what explains why her feeling guilty is non-instrumentally valuable. For, in general, there's nothing non-instrumentally valuable about having a fiTing aTitude. There's nothing, for instance, non-instrumentally valuable about fearing that which poses a threat even though it is fiTing to fear that which poses a threat. Thus, it seems that what explains the fact that her feeling guilt is non-instrumentally valuable is both that she deserves to feel guilt and that it is, in general, non-instrumentally valuable that people get what they deserve. 23 If you think that there's nothing non-instrumentally good about her feeling guilty for having accountably mistreated me, then you would have to think (implausibly) that the world in which she feels guilty for having accountably mistreated me is, other things being equal, no beTer than the world in which she likewise feels guilty for having non-accountably mistreated me. 13 This, then, is a very minimal claim about desert; it claims only that feeling appropriate guilt is, other things being equal, less non-instrumentally bad than feeling inappropriate guilt.24 And, yet, even this rather minimal claim is quite explanatorily useful. First, it explains why there is essentially something morally problematic about someone's taking a pill to alleviate her fiTing guilt, whereas there need be nothing morally problematic about someone's taking a pill to alleviate her fiTing fear. Second, it explains why there is nothing morally problematic in our preferring the guilty feeling guilt to the innocent feeling guilt. Third, it explains the way in which feeling guilty for having φ-ed differs from other ways of feeling bad about having φ-ed (such as shame and embarrassment): only feeling guilt necessitates the thought that one deserves to feel this way. Fourth, it explains why there is nothing morally problematic in our expressing our resentment and indignation in the hopes of geTing the guilty to feel guilt. And, thus, it explains why we are appropriately angered and frustrated when the guilty respond to such expressions with only a sincere promise to do beTer next time, and without any hint of guilt or remorse. And, fifth, it explains why the sorts of excuses that exculpate us from blame (e.g., ignorance and a lack of control) are precisely those that diminish the degree to which we are deserving of the unpleasantness of guilt. It seems, then, that the thought that's constitutive of a subject's feeling guilty for having φ-ed is the thought that she deserves to experience the unpleasantness of this feeling in the recognition that she has violated a legitimate demand in φ-ing. Call this the desert view. One reason to accept this view is that it is explanatorily useful in the five ways described above. But another reason is that, additionally, it helps us to explain why, after a sufficient amount of selfreproach, it ceases to be appropriate to feel guilt anymore.25 For, on this view, the relevant 24 Note that my very minimal claim about desert is even more minimal than what others consider to be a relatively minimal claim about desert-see, for instance, Carlsson's claim that "if an agent deserves some harm, it will be noninstrumentally good that this harm occurs" (JmG{, p. HH). These others are commiTed to the view that the world in which my wife feels guilty for having accountably mistreated me is, other things being equal, beTer than the world in which she doesn't feel guilty for having accountably mistreated me. On this view, her feeling guilty is not just, in some respect, non-instrumentally good, but is, overall, non-instrumentally good. I'm not commiTed to this stronger claim. 25 As Morris notes: "feelings of guilt may disappear and the man [who used to feel guilty] may connect their disappearance with the pain he has experienced" (GH{I, p. Hm). The idea, I take it, is that punishment (even selfpunishment in form of guilty feelings) can undercut the appropriateness of feeling further guilt, for if we've suffered 14 thought is that one deserves to suffer the unpleasantness of this feeling, and this thought ceases to be true after a sufficient amount of self-reproach has occurred. After all, one deserves to suffer only so much self-reproach for having violated a legitimate demand. So, after a sufficient amount of self-reproach has occurred, one will cease to deserve to feel guilt anymore. And, consequently, it will cease to be appropriate for one to continue to feel guilt. So, where one has yet to suffer a sufficient amount of guilt, the thought constitutive of guilt-that is, "I deserve to suffer the unpleasantness of this feeling in virtue of having violated a legitimate demand"-will be true.26 But, where one has already suffered a sufficient amount of guilt, this thought will be false. Thus, the desert view nicely explains why the appropriateness of one's feeling guilt depends (in part) on whether one has already suffered a sufficient amount of self-reproach. To beTer understand the merits of the desert view, it will be helpful to contrast it with the following potential rivals: (G) the quality-of-will view, according to which the thought implicated by guilt is that one manifested ill will in having φ-ed, (J) the blameworthy view, according to which the thought implicated by guilt is that one is blameworthy for having φ-ed, and (x) the wrong-doing view, according to which the thought implicated by guilt is that one was wrong to have φ-ed. I'll take each in turn, and then, at the end, consider the possibility of combining one or more of these views with the desert view. Consider, first, the quality-of-will view. For one, it seems possible to feel guilt for having φ-ed without having the thought that one manifested ill will in having φ-ed-that is, without it even seeming to one that one φ-ed out of ill will. For instance, a woman could feel guilt (although inappropriately so) for running over a boy who unexpectedly darted in front of her enough for our wrongdoing, it is no longer appropriate for us to continue to suffer (GH{I, p. IJ). As Brad Cokelet has pointed out to me, once you have suffered enough guilt, the wronged party may forgive you and rightly tell you that you shouldn't feel guilty anymore. Of course, even if you've already suffered a sufficient amount of guilt, that doesn't mean that those who you've wronged must forgive you, nor does it mean that you don't still owe it to them to make amends and express your contrition. Also, there may be some transgressions that are sufficiently serious that it never ceases to be appropriate to feel guilty about them-perhaps, it ceases only to be appropriate to feel guilty with the same intensity and/or frequency. 26 Note that the presence of the indexical 'this' in this proposition is what allows for the fact that the thought given in quotes can be true when entertained at a time prior to one's having suffered a sufficient amount of self-reproach and then false when entertained at later a time-a time after which one has suffered a sufficient amount of selfreproach. 15 car without it seeming to her that her conduct manifested ill will. After all, the woman didn't even have time to consider the boy before her car plowed into him. So, it won't seem to her that she bore him any ill will. Still, it could be guilt that she's feeling so long as it strikes her both that it is legitimate for others to demand that she not have killed the boy and that she deserves to suffer the unpleasantness of guilt in virtue of having violated this seemingly legitimate demand. Of course, it won't be fiTing for her to feel guilt since these representations are clearly inaccurate, for, as we'll assume, it was impossible for her to have stopped in time. But it will strike her this way given that the mechanisms that she has for producing such mental states were trained, and/or evolved, under a range of contexts that differ significantly from the unusual one in which she now finds herself. For another, if the quality-of-will view were right, there would be no reason to think that it would, after a sufficient amount of self-reproach, cease to be appropriate for one to feel guilty for having φ-ed out of ill will. For no maTer how much one has already reproached oneself for having done so, it will never cease to be true that one φ-ed out of ill will. And, so, it will never, on this view, cease to be appropriate to feel guilty for having done so. Yet, intuitively, it seems that, after a sufficient amount of self-reproach, one should cease to rebuke oneself. Next, consider the blameworthy view. Here, too, it seems possible for one to feel guilty for having φ-ed without having the thought that one was blameworthy for having φ-ed. For it seems that one needn't have the concept of blameworthiness to feel guilt. And this makes sense of our thought that children can feel guilt even if they lack the rather sophisticated concept of blameworthiness. This is because, as anyone with much experience with children knows, children have the considerably less sophisticated concepts of merit, desert, demands, and goodness, which is all the conceptual apparatus that, on the desert view, they need. Thus, it seems that what's needed to feel guilt is not the sophisticated concept of blameworthiness, but the less sophisticated concepts of merit, desert, demands, and goodness. And, again, we see that, like the quality-of-will view, the blameworthy view has trouble explaining why, after a sufficient amount of self-reproach, it ceases to be appropriate to feel guilt. For, again, the relevant thought-that is, "I was blameworthy for having φ-ed"-never ceases to be true. And, so, we must on this view counterintuitively hold that no maTer how 16 much one has already reproached oneself for one's previous failure, it never ceases to be appropriate to continue to feel guilty for having φ-ed. Lastly, consider the wrong-doing view. Here, too, it seems that one can feel guilty for having φ-ed without thinking that one has done wrong in having φ-ed. To illustrate, imagine that Huck Finn (Mark Twain's famous fictional character) had, contrary to the actual story, turned his friend Jim over to the authorities for being a runaway slave. In such a case, it seems possible for Huck to feel guilty for having turned his friend in even if it doesn't strike him as wrong to have done so.27 This is because whereas guilt seems to track the violation of any legitimate demand (be it moral or non-moral and be it overridden or not), moral wrongness seems to track only the violation of some non-overridden moral demand. So, even if, as Huck supposes, it wasn't wrong for him to turn Jim in, he did violate a legitimate demand of friendship in doing so. Thus, so long as it strikes him that he deserves to feel bad for having turned Jim over to the authorities in virtue of his thereby violating Jim's demand for the protection of friendship, it could be guilt that he's feeling. And, so, we should reject the wrongdoing view, for it incorrectly assumes that we must have the thought of having done wrong to feel guilt. What's more, we should reject the wrong-doing view, because, like the other two potential rivals, it fails to account for the fact that, after a sufficient amount of self-reproach, it ceases to be appropriate to feel guilt anymore. And it fails for the exact same reason that the other two failed: the thought in question-in this case: "I was wrong to have φ-ed"-is not one that ceases to be true after one has suffered a sufficient amount of self-reproach. Of course, even if, unlike me, you think that some of these other thoughts (e.g., the thought that one was wrong to have φ-ed) are constitutive of one's feeling guilt for having φ-ed, this shouldn't cause you to reject my claim that at least one of the thoughts constitutive of feeling guilt is that one deserves to feel the unpleasantness that's inherent to it. For, in that case, you should just amend the desert view and hold something like the following view: the thought 27 Someone might claim that, as some level, it must strike Finn as if turning Jim over to the authorities is wrong. But consider the mafioso who has turned state witness. As T. M. Scanlon (JmGx, ss) points out, it seems that he may blame himself for violating the code of omertà and, consequently feel guilty, and, yet, it needn't strike him as if testifying against his criminal co-conspirators is wrong. 17 constitutive of feeling guilt for having φ-ed is the thought that one deserves to suffer the unpleasantness of this feeling in the recognition that one has done wrong (or has done something blameworthy or has manifested a poor quality of will) in φ-ing. For my purposes, all that maTers is that the idea that one deserves to suffer the unpleasantness of this feeling in virtue of having violated a legitimate demand is at least part of the thought (or one of the thoughts) that's constitutive of feeling guilt. But what about shame? Shame is also unpleasant. But unlike guilt one needn't feel that one deserves to experience its associated unpleasantness in order to have this feeling. And this is why one can appropriately be ashamed of things over which one had no control. For whether it is appropriate for a subject to be ashamed of having φ-ed depends only on whether her having φ-ed reveals some flaw in her values, commitments, and/or character traits. Whether she could have avoided φ-ing is irrelevant, because whether she could have avoided φ-ing or not, it still reveals that she is flawed. Thus, we can appropriately be ashamed of our racist thoughts and feelings even if they come to us unbidden and unwanted. So long as they accurately reflect the fact that we're racist, it's appropriate for us to feel ashamed of having had such thoughts and feelings given what they reveal about us. And this points to another difference between shame and guilt. Unlike guilt, the thought of having violated a legitimate demand is not constitutive of shame. Rather, what's constitutive of shame is the thought that one fails to meet some standard in a way that could potentially result in a loss of honor, respect, or esteem. And the failure to meet such a standard could result in a loss of honor, respect, or esteem even if it would be illegitimate to demand that one meets it. And this is why someone can appropriately be ashamed of, say, having racist implicit aTitudes even if it's illegitimate to demand that one not have such implicit aTitudes given that there was nothing one could have done to avoid acquiring them through one's childhood experiences. Thus, the thought that's constitutive of being ashamed of X seems to be the thought that X reveals that one is substandard in a way that could potentially result in a loss of honor, respect, or esteem. Now, although I think that this is the thought that's constitutive of shame, I'm not going to try to defend it in all its details. For my purposes, the only two claims about shame that I need to insist upon are that (G) shame is inherently unpleasant and that (J) no thought that's 18 constitutive of shame necessitates that one must have been able to avoid that which one is appropriately ashamed of. Of course, my account of shame's constitutive thought certainly allows that one can be appropriately ashamed of things that one couldn't have avoided. But it doesn't maTer whether my account is correct so long as the correct account also allows for this. And it seems to me that it is widely recognized that one can be appropriately ashamed of things that one couldn't have avoided.28 And this means that whether an account of the thought that's constitutive of shame is plausible or not is going to depend in large part on whether it allows that one can be appropriately ashamed of things that one couldn't have avoided. So, it seems that we can safely assume that no thought constitutive of shame requires that one must have been able to avoid that which one is appropriately ashamed of. And that means that SJ is false. For SJ holds that, given both that shame is inherently unpleasant and that no one deserves to experience any unpleasantness unless they had the opportunity to avoid it, it's appropriate (that is, fiTing) for a subject to feel shame in virtue of having φ-ed only if she could have refrained from φ-ing. But, as we've just seen, that's false. Yet, GJ is true. For GJ holds that, given both that guilt is inherently unpleasant and that no one deserves to experience any unpleasantness unless they had the opportunity to avoid it, it's appropriate (that is, fiTing) for a subject to feel guilty in virtue of having φ-ed only if she could have refrained from φ-ing. And, given both that an aTitude is fiTing only if the thoughts constitutive of it are true and that the thought that's constitutive of guilt is the thought that one deserves to experience the unpleasantness of guilt in virtue of having violated a legitimate demand in φ-ing, it follows that GJ is true. So, although many aTitudes-including, guilt, grief, and shame-are inherently painful such that no one deserves to suffer them unless they could have avoided them, this doesn't mean that they're never fiTing. Whether they're fiTing just depends on whether they accurately represent the way things are. So, to illustrate, even if you don't deserve to suffer the unpleasantness of grief in virtue of the death of your loved one, it can still be fiTing for you to grieve in virtue of that death, for your grief may well accurately represent that death as being a 28 See, for instance, PRINZ & NICHOLS JmGm. 19 significant loss to you. Likewise, it can be fiTing for you to experience shame in virtue of your implicit aTitudes even if you were powerless to avoid acquiring them. This shame will be fiTing so long as it accurately represents you as being substandard in a way that could potentially result in a loss of honor, respect, or esteem. But, by contrast, it can never be fiTing for you to feel guilt for having φ-ed unless you could have refrained from φ-ing. For the thought that's constitutive of your feeling guilt is, I've argued, the thought that you deserve to experience the unpleasantness of this feeling in virtue of having violated a legitimate demand. And no one deserves to experience any unpleasantness unless they had the opportunity to avoid it. So, you don't deserve to feel guilt for your implicit aTitudes unless you could have avoided them. I've argued, then, that what explains why avoidability is required for accountability blameworthiness but not for aTributability blameworthiness is that, whereas the former requires that guilt be appropriate, the laTer requires that shame be appropriate. And I've argued that, given the different thoughts that are constitutive of these two aTitudes, only appropriate guilt requires avoidability. Thus, the Guilt Argument is sound, and the Shame Argument is unsound. For GJ is true, and SJ is false. <. Objections I've argued that what explains why avoidability is required for accountability but not for aTributability is the fact that these two types of responsibility make different sorts of reactive aTitudes fiTing. Whereas accountability blameworthiness makes guilt fiTing, aTributability blameworthiness makes shame fiTing. And I've argued that whereas feeling guilty for having φ-ed is fiTing if and only if one deserves to suffer the unpleasantness of this feeling in virtue of having thereby violated a legitimate demand, being ashamed of X is fiTing if and only if X reveals that one is substandard in a way that could potentially result in a loss of honor, respect, or esteem. This explains why avoidability is required for accountability blameworthiness but not for aTributability blameworthiness. For although one can't deserve to suffer in virtue of having φ-ed unless one could have refrained from φ-ing, the fact that one has φ-ed could reveal that one is substandard even if one couldn't have refrained from φ-ing. This is, I think, a plausible explanation, but I will now consider three potential objections to it. 20 @.B If guilt and shame have different constitutive thoughts, then how could pride be the positive analogue of both guilt and shame? It's essential to the explanation that I've provided that guilt and shame have different constitutive thoughts. But one may object that if guilt and shame had different constitutive thoughts, pride wouldn't be the positive analogue of both aTitudes. And it is quite common to suppose that pride is the positive analogue of both guilt and shame. But I don't think that pride-at least, not pride generally-is the positive analogue of guilt. To see why, consider that the thought that's constitutive of being proud of X is the thought that X reveals that one is particularly good (or exceptional) in a way that could potentially result in a gain of honor, respect, or esteem. But if that's right, then pride is too broad to be the positive analogue of guilt. For if pride were the positive analogue of guilt, it would be appropriate to feel guilty about the negative analogue of anything that we could appropriately take pride in. But that's not the case. For instance, it's appropriate to take pride in one's exceptional innate intelligence, but not to feel guilty for lacking such intelligence. Likewise, it's appropriate to take pride in one's exceptional innate physical prowess, but not to feel guilty for lacking such prowess. It seems that one can appropriately feel guilty only for something that one did or failed to do, and, thus, not for one's innate characteristics. Of course, one could appropriately feel guilty for having employed one's innate characteristics in the service of evil ends, but it's inappropriate to feel guilty about merely possessing the characteristics. So, if some sort of pride is the positive analogue of guilt, it must be the sort that can be taken only in one's good deeds. And, to keep this specific sort of pride distinct from pride more generally, I'm going to call it deontic pride. Given that we can appropriately take deontic pride only in our good deeds, it seems that that the thought constitutive of it is the thought that one deserves to experience the pleasantness of this feeling in virtue of having responded in some particularly good (or exceptional) way. Thus, in taking deontic pride in having performed some act, one needn't have the thought that this deed reveals that there is something particularly good (or exceptional) about oneself, but only that there is something particularly good (or exceptional) about one's deeds. So, this objection fails. We should not think that guilt and shame both have pride as their positive analogue. At best, the positive analogue of shame is general pride, whereas the positive 21 analogue of guilt is a specific sort of pride: namely, deontic pride. At worst, the positive analogue of guilt is some other aTitude entirely: perhaps, being gratified that one has φ-ed. But even if the positive analogue of guilt is deontic pride, the objection fails. For deontic pride and general pride have different constitutive thoughts, and, so, we have every reason to think that guilt and shame will as well. @.G Perhaps, guilt and shame have different appropriateness conditions. In arguing for my favored explanation, I've assumed that, when it comes to moral responsibility and the appropriateness of reactive aTitudes, the relevant norm of appropriateness is going to be the same regardless of which specific reactive aTitudes we're focused on. But not everyone agrees. For instance, Andreas Brekke Carlsson (FORTHCOMING) has argued "that accountability blame and aTributability blame are governed by different notions of appropriateness: an agent S is accountability blameworthy for X only if S deserves to feel guilty; an agent S is aTributability blameworthy for X only if it is fi2ing that S feels shame for X." This allows him to accept GJ while denying SJ, and it allows him to do so without holding, as I do, that the thought that's constitutive of a subject's feeling guilty for having φ-ed is one that can be true only if she could have refrained from φ-ing. But Carlsson's view is problematic for at least two reasons. First, Carlsson's view leaves unexplained why guilt and shame are governed by different norms of appropriateness. For why is it that the appropriateness of guilt is governed by the norm of desert when the appropriateness of every other aTitude-hope, fear, envy, grief, shame, disgust, surprise, contempt, amusement, etc.-seems to be governed by the norm of fiTingness? After all, it seems that guilt has a representational component just as much as these other aTitudes do. And, thus, just as these other aTitudes can be accurate or inaccurate in their representations of the world, so can guilt. Indeed, Carlsson concedes this. But, unlike myself, he doesn't hold that the thought that's constitutive of a subject's feeling guilty for having φ-ed is one that can be true only if she could have refrained from φ-ing. So, in order to explain why avoidability is necessary for accountability but not aTributability, Carlsson has to assume that whereas one is blameworthy in the aTributability sense only if shame is fi2ing, one is blameworthy in the accountability sense only if guilt is deserved (irrespective of whether it's fiTing). But in doing this Carlsson is 22 forced to accept a less unified view of moral responsibility. For whereas I hold that a subject is morally responsible for having φ-ed if and only if she's the fi2ing target of reactive aTitudes in virtue of having φ-ed, Carlsson must hold that a subject is morally responsible for having φ-ed if and only if she either deserves to be the target or is the fi2ing target of reactive aTitudes in virtue of having φ-ed, and he has to hold that whether its desert or fiTingness that's relevant depends on which reactive aTitudes are at issue. Yet, why think that moral responsibility concerns not only the fiTingness of reactive aTitudes, but also whether one deserves to experience their pleasant or unpleasant affect? And this disunification seems to come at a cost, a cost that we needn't bear. For if I'm right, we can account for the fact that avoidability is necessary for accountability but not for aTributability simply by appealing to the different sorts of reactive aTitudes that the two make fiTing and the different constitutive thoughts associated with these different sorts of reactive aTitudes. Second, since Carlsson admits that guilt has representational content and can, therefore, be fiTing or unfiTing, he must allow for the possibility that guilt is like fear in that it can be fiTing even if its subject doesn't deserve to suffer its unpleasant affect. But although fear can be both fiTing and undeserved, I don't believe that guilt can. In this respect, guilt seems unlike fear. For although it seems that there are many instances in which it is fiTing for me to feel fear even though I don't deserve to suffer any unpleasantness, there don't seem to be any instances in which it is fiTing for me to feel guilt even though I don't deserve suffer any unpleasantness. It seems that if it's fiTing for me to feel guilt, it must be because I deserve to suffer its unpleasant affect. @.@ What explains why guilt ceases to be appropriate after one has suffered a sufficient amount of self-reproach is just the general fact that a2itudes cease to be appropriate after a period of time, such as the period of time it takes to suffer a sufficient amount of self-reproach. I've assumed that the thought constitutive of feeling guilt must be able to explain why guilt ceases to be appropriate after one has suffered a sufficient amount of self-reproach, but it may be objected that it's just a general feature of aTitudes that they cease to be appropriate after a sufficient amount of time and that this has nothing to do with their constitutive thoughts. 23 I admit that there does seem to be a sense of appropriateness in which the passage of time can make it appropriate to "move on" and to, consequently, feel aTitudes such as guilt, grief, and anger less intensely and/or less frequently.29 But I believe that the relevant sense of appropriateness is not the one governed by the norm of fiTingness. For it seems that it never ceases to be fiTing to feel guilt, grief, or anger (or to feel them any less intensely) simply as a result of the passage of time. Rather, it ceases to be fiTing to feel such an aTitude only if the world changes in such a way that the aTitude in question no longer accurately represents the world as it once did. Thus, I think that guilt can cease to be fiTing only if the world changes from being one in which the subject deserves to suffer more of the unpleasantness of guilt to being one in which she doesn't deserve this. For given what I take to be the thought that's constitutive of guilt, this thought will be true in the former but not the laTer. But why, then, does it seem that guilt, grief, and anger cease to be appropriate in some sense after the passage of time? Why does it seem that I should eventually just get over it and move on? Consider, for instance, that if I'm just as angry now in JmGs as I was back in GH{ when my mom wrongly punished me for something that my friend did, something is certainly amiss. Likewise, if, in JmGs, I'm still grieving as much about my high-school buddy's death as I did right after it happened in GHsn, then, again, something seems amiss. Yet, these aTitudes don't seem any less fiTing now than they were then. After all, their representations seem just as accurate now as they did then. For instance, my righteous anger for having been wrongly punished by my mom represents what my mom did as an injustice, and that this is no less true now than it was then. Likewise, the grief that I originally felt over the loss of my friend represents his death as being the loss of someone whom I deeply cared about. But this is no less true now than it was then. And if my intense grief in GHsn accurately represented the fact that I had lost a dear friend, why would it not be just as fiTing to experience intense grief now? Yet, it seems inappropriate for me to grieve now as intensely as I did back then. But that, I'll argue, is not because it's any less fiTing for me to feel intense grief, but because the relevant sense of appropriateness is one that's not governed by the norm of fiTingness. I take the norm of 29 For two very interesting discussions of how, after the passage of time, it can be appropriate to feel aTitudes such as guilt, grief, and anger less intensely and/or less frequently, see MARUŠIĆ FORTHCOMING and MOLLER MANUSCRIPT. 24 appropriateness that accounts for why it is no longer appropriate for me to feel intense grief over the loss of my high school buddy to be the following. • The Norm of (Coherence) Rationality: Some aTitude is (coherence) rational and, therefore, appropriate in the sense governed by this norm if and only if it coheres well with one's other mental states. So, whereas an aTitude is fiTing if and only if it accurately represents the way the world is, an aTitude is rational in the coherence sense of rationality (and, hereafter, I'll often leave this qualification implicit) if and only if it coheres well with one's other mental states. So, whereas fiTingness is beholden to a mind-independent reality, rationality isn't. Rationality (at least, coherence rationality) is beholden only to one's mind and its internal states. To illustrate, take belief. The belief that p represents the world as being one in which p is true. Thus, the belief that p is fiTing if and only if p. So, if the number of atoms in the universe is some prime number, then it's fiTing for you to believe that this is so. Nevertheless, it may not be rational for you to believe this. For whether it's rational to believe that the number of atoms in the universe is some prime number depends, not on what the world is like, but on what your other mental states are like. Thus, even if the number of atoms in the universe is some non-prime number, you would be rationally required to believe that it's some prime number if you had the following beliefs: (G) God created the universe, (J) God loves prime numbers, and (x) if the being who created the universe loves prime numbers, the number of atoms in the universe is going to be some prime number. The same holds for other aTitudes. So, whether it's rational for me to feel guilt, grief, or anger depends on what my other mental states are like and not on whether they accurately represent the way the world is. Take grief, for instance. Whether it is, at present, rational for me to grieve over the death of my high-school buddy depends, not on whether this grief would accurately reflect the fact that his death represents the loss of someone whom I deeply cared about, but on what other mental states I have at present. Specifically, it depends on what my occurrent hopes, wishes, desires, memories, and beliefs are. Thus, it would be irrational for me 25 to be at present grieving over his loss if all my occurrent hopes, wishes, desires, memories, and beliefs were focused upon others.30 Indeed, if all my occurrent mental states revolve around happy events involving living people and none of them revolve around anyone who has passed away, it would be quite irrational for me to be grieving. Moreover, even if I did irrationally grieve, it's unclear how this grief could constitute grief over the death of my high-school buddy given that none of my occurrent mental states take him as their focus. By contrast, consider that during the days immediately following his death my mind was often consumed with thoughts of him: wishing he were still around, remembering the good times that we had had together, missing the jokes he would tell in the locker room after practice, thinking about how much I will miss him, and wanting there to be something I could say to his family to help console them, etc. But, as time passed, my memories of him have faded, my desires and thoughts have shifted away from him and towards those who I currently interact with regularly, and my hopes and plans for the future no longer include him, but include only others (Nussbaum JmmG, p. sm). Consequently, although my grieving over his death would be no less fiTing now than it was then, it would be a lot less rational given the way my desires, thoughts, and other mental states have shifted their focus away from him. So, I believe that this objection also fails. Although I concede that with the passage of time it often ceases to be rational to feel guilt, grief, and anger with the same intensity and frequency that one initially felt, this is not because it becomes any less fiTing to have these aTitudes. Rather, with the passage of time, past events often tend to occupy less of one's mental aTention. And, as one's mind shifts to more recent events, it becomes less and less rational (and, thus, less and less appropriate in the associated sense) to feel the way that one once did about these past events. For the rationality of an aTitude is simply a function of how well it coheres with the rest of one's mental states. And, so, what explains why guilt ceases to be appropriate 30 Of course, I will still have the non-occurrent belief that his death is bad and constitutes a significant loss for me. But I tend to think that this non-occurrent belief doesn't put much rational pressure on me to grieve just as the mere fact that there are certainly some logical inconsistencies among all my many non-occurrent beliefs puts liTle to no rational pressure on me to revise my beliefs. Such rational pressure arises only after, say, some philosophical inquiry brings the inconsistency to the forefront of my conscious mind in the form a set of jointly inconsistent occurrent beliefs. 26 after one has already suffered a sufficient amount of self-reproach has nothing to do with the passage of time or with one's other mental states and everything to do with the thought that's constitutive of guilt: the thought that one deserves to suffer the unpleasantness of guilt. After all, someone might be perfectly rational in feeling guilt even though she has already suffered enough. For someone may mistakenly feel that she deserves to suffer more than she does. And, so, her conscious mind could very well be preoccupied with thoughts about some past misdeed such that it is perfectly rational for her to feel guilt. But it won't be fiTing for her to feel guilt unless she still deserves to suffer more of the unpleasantness of guilt.31 It seems, then, that none of these objections succeed and so we have no good reason to reject the explanation that I've provided. We should accept, then, that the explanation for why avoidability is required for accountability blameworthiness but not for aTributability blameworthiness is that whereas accountability blameworthiness makes guilt fiTing, aTributability blameworthiness makes shame fiTing. And whereas it can be fiTing to feel guilty for having φ-ed only if one could have refrained from φ-ing, it can be fiTing to feel shame for having φ-ed even if one couldn't have refrained from φ-ing.32 Conflict of Interest Statement On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest. References 31 Again, I want to allow that some transgressions may be sufficiently serious that there will never come a point at which one has suffered enough such that any further guilty feelings would be unfiTing-perhaps, what's unfiTing is only that one continues to feel guilty with the same intensity and/or frequency. But it does seem to me that if I've already punished myself with guilt for, say, the candy bar that I stole as a teenager, it is unfiTing for me to feel any more guilt about it, although it could be perfectly rational for me to feel this way when I have certain recollections about it. 32 For helpful comments and discussions, I thank Andreas Brekke Carlsson, Brad Cokelet, Josh Glasgow, Pat Greenspan, Berislav Marušić, Shyam Nair, David Shoemaker, Sergio Tenenbaum, an anonymous referee, and the organizers and participants of the JmGs Bled Philosophy Conference on Ethical Issues. 27 Carlsson, A. B. (FORTHCOMING). "Shame and ATributability." Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility. Downloaded on September J, JmGs, from hTps://www.academia.edu/xIGxx{/Shame_and_ATributability. ---. (JmG{). "Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt." Journal of Ethics JG: sH–GGn. Chappell, R. Y. (JmGJ). "FiTingness: The Sole Normative Primitive." The Philosophical Quarterly IJ: Is–{m. Clarke, R. (JmGI). "Moral Responsibility, Guilt, and Retributivism." Journal of Ethics Jm: GJG–Gx{. ---. (JmGx). "Some Theses on Desert." Philosophical Explorations GI: Gnx–GI. Darwall, S. (JmGx). "Morality's Distinctiveness." In S. Darwall (ed.) Morality, Authority, and Law: Essays in Second-Personal Ethics I, pp. x–GH. Oxford: Oxford University Press. D'Arms, J. and D. Jacobson (Jmmx). "The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotion (or, AntiQuasijudgmentalism)." Philosophy nJ (Supp): GJ{–Gn. ---. (Jmmm). "The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of the Emotions." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research IG: In–Hm. Marušić, B. (FORTHCOMING). "Do Reasons Expire? – An Essay on Grief." Philosophers' Imprint. McKenna, M. (JmGJ). Conversation and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mill, J. S. (GHHG). [GsIG]. Utilitarianism. Reprinted in J. M. Robson (ed.), Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. Gm, pp. Jmx–nH. London: Routledge. Moller, D. (MANUSCRIPT). "Rationality and the Function of the Emotions." Morris, H. (GH{I). On Guilt and Innocence: Essays in Legal Philosophy and Moral Psychology. Berkeley: University of California Press. Nelkin, D. K. (JmGI). "Accountability and Desert." The Journal of Ethics Jm: G{x–GsH. ---. (JmGn). "Psychopaths, Incorrigible Racists, and the Faces of Responsibility." Ethics GJn: xn{–xHm. 28 Nussbaum, M. (JmmG). Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Portmore, D. W. (JmGH). Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options. New York: Oxford University Press. Prinz, J. J. and S. Nichols. (JmGm). "Moral emotions." In J. M. Doris (ed.) The Moral Psychology Handbook, pp. GGG–GI. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rosen, G. (JmGn). "The Alethic Conception of Moral Responsibility." In R. Clarke, M. McKenna, and A. M. Smith (eds.) The Nature of Moral Responsibility: New Essays, pp. In–s{, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Scanlon, T. M. (JmGx). "Giving Desert Its Due." Philosophical Explorations GI: GmG–GGI. ---. (Jmms). Moral Dimensions. Meaning, Permissibility and Blame. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Shoemaker, D. (JmGn). Responsibility from the Margins. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strawson, P. F. (GHIJ). "Freedom and Resentment," Proceedings of the British Academy. s: G–Jn. Reprinted in P. F. Strawson (Jmms) Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays. London: Routledge. Wallace, R. J. (GHH). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Watson, G. (GHHI). "Two Faces of Responsibility." Philosophical Topics J: JJ{–Js. Wolf, S. (JmGG). "Blame Italian Style." In R. J. Wallace, R. Kumar, and S. R. Freeman (eds.), Reasons and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon, pp. xxJ–x{. New York: Oxford University Press.

The Underrepresentation of Women in Prestigious Ethics Journals Meena Krishnamurthy Shen-yi Liao Monique Deveaux Maggie Dalecki <1> 1. Introduction Philosophy has a gender problem. "The gender problem" is, however, a bit of a misnomer, for it is not a single problem. Rather, it is a multifaceted set of problems that relate to the general underrepresentation of women in philosophy-in the historical canon, in the professoriate class and at conferences <2>, and in upper-level undergraduate classrooms <3>. Our paper investigates one specific aspect of the gender problem that has received relatively little investigation: the underrepresentation of articles by women in top journals. We focus on journal publishing not because we think it is somehow the driving cause of women's underrepresentation in the philosophy professoriate-a problem that surely has many contributing causes, from chilly professional climates and implicit bias in hiring and assessment of research, to job demands that are disadvantageous to women with caregiving responsibilities. Rather, we focus on the issue of journal publishing because we think that if women are underrepresented in top philosophy journals, then this, in and of itself, is a significant aspect of the gender underrepresentation problem. Moreover, it is one that could be expected to have significant implications for women's professional success in the discipline: journals constitute an important currency of academic prestige, and are of the utmost importance for tenure and promotion assessments. There has been some recent discussion among philosophers of women's representation in prestigious journals, especially prestigious ethics journals, that suggests a gender discrepancy <4>. Eric Schwitzgebel and Carolyn Dicey Jennings report that women authored only 13% of articles (32 out of 249) in "top five" generalist journals in 2014-15 <5>. Kathryn Norlock found that between 2009-14, women authors accounted for 17.5% of published papers in the Journal of Moral Philosophy, and for 20% of published papers in Ethics <6>. Similar numbers have been reported previously. In her study of 7 leading philosophy journals, Sally Haslanger found that women represented 22% of authors of articles in Ethics, and a mere 13% in Philosophy and Public Affairs, in the period from 2002-2007 <7>. Thom Brooks, the editor of the Journal of Moral Philosophy at the time, reported in the APA Newsletter that the average number of women-authored papers in this journal between 2003-2009 was 22% <8>. And Henry S. Richardson, the editor of Ethics, reported that in 2007-2008 women-authored papers in Ethics were at 17% and in 2008-2009 were at 15% <9>. While this descriptive data suggests the existence of a gender discrepancy in prestigious ethics journals - our area of focus - it does not suffice to answer the question of whether women are underrepresented in prestigious ethics journals relative to their numbers in the discipline. To establish whether these percentages of women-authored 2 publications reflect a gendered discrepancy, we need to compare the data about womenauthored papers with the proportion of women philosophers specializing in ethics. While previous discussions by Haslanger, Healy, Norlock, and Schwitzgebel and Jennings certainly suggest that women authors are underrepresented in prestigious ethics philosophy journals, only this comparative information can help us to establish conclusively whether there is a gender problem specific to journal publishing. We are drawn to examine specifically whether a gender problem exists in relation to ethics journals because, as we discuss later, conventional wisdom has it that women are disproportionately likely to specialize in ethics <10>. (We use "ethics" as an inclusive term for diverse subfields of moral, social, and political philosophy. Section 2 explains our operationalization of the term.) If it turns out that women authors are underrepresented in prestigious ethics journals, a field in which they tend to specialize, then the gender problem in philosophy publishing may be more widespread and pernicious than we thought. The main goal in this study is, therefore, to determine whether women are underrepresented in prestigious ethics journals relative to their representation in the field of ethics. Our study proceeds in three steps. Step one: we estimate the percentage of women who specialize in ethics. Step two: we estimate the percentage of articles in prestigious ethics journals that are authored by women. Step three: we examine whether there is any difference between the percentage of women who specialize in ethics and the percentage of articles in prestigious ethics journals that are authored by women. We conclude that, overall, women who specialize in ethics are underrepresented in prestigious ethics journals. 2. Step One: Estimating the Percentage of Women Who Specialize in Ethics We used the faculty lists compiled for the Philosophical Gourmet Report (PGR) for the top 50 departments in the period of 2004-2014 to estimate the percentage of women who specialized in ethics. In part, this sampling choice was pragmatic: instead of having to go to many different department websites, the PGR faculty list already has the information in one place. In part, this sampling choice also reflects our sociological recognition that, unfortunately, the philosophical profession is prone to prestige bias: people who work in "top" departments are more likely to publish in "prestigious" journals. As such, if we still found women at these departments to be underrepresented in prestigious journals, that would further strengthen our belief in the existence of underrepresentation more broadly. That is, if women in the most highly-ranked departments are not publishing in the most prestigious journals at a proportionate rate, it seems likely that women outside of this enclave are also not doing so. We coded for gender on the basis of individuals' first names. Where first names were gender ambiguous, we coded for gender on the basis of information found on the individual's departmental webpages and CVs. We looked for photographs and pronouns used by the individuals to describe themselves. 3 We coded for AOS in ethics in a sense that includes diverse subfields of moral, social, and political philosophy. We counted people as specializing in ethics when they listed any of the following as an AOS or a research interest or when they published mostly in any of the following areas: Ethics; Normative Ethics; Social Philosophy; Political Philosophy; Metaethics; Moral Psychology; Feminist Ethics; Bioethics; Environmental Ethics; Naturalistic Ethics; Applied Ethics; Ethical Theory; Academic Ethics; Ethics of Technology; Business Ethics; 19th Century Ethics; Medical Ethics; History of Ethics; Foundations of Ethics; Philosophy of Law; Moral Philosophy; Ancient Ethics; Kantian Ethics; History of Political Philosophy; Aristotelian Ethics. We determined AOS by searching individuals' departmental and/or personal webpages. AOS was interpreted broadly to include not only what was explicitly listed as "area of specialization" but also what was sometimes listed as "research interests," when no AOS was listed. In rare cases where no area of specialization or no research interests were listed, we deduced whether or not to count individuals as having an AOS of ethics based on the publications listed on their CVs online. All Specializations Ethics Specializations 2004-2005 (181/947) 19.1% (86/354) 24.3% 2006-2008 (190/982) 19.3% (95/366) 26.0% 2009-2010 (222/1001) 22.2% (108/380) 28.4% 2011-2012 (225/994) 22.6% (108/377) 28.6% 2013-2014 (237/992) 23.9% (106/363) 29.2% Table 1. Women in philosophy, 2004-2014. The results are summarized in Table 1. In section 4, we use this information on gender and specializations to investigate whether women are underrepresented in ethics journals. Moreover, this information is valuable in itself as a snapshot of the profession, even when we acknowledge its limitation as a sample from only the "PGR Top 50" departments. For example, it allows us to assess the conventional wisdom that, within philosophy, women tend to specialize in ethics more than other areas. On one disambiguation of this conventional wisdom, this means that the gender proportion of philosophers who specialize in ethics is not the same as philosophers who do not specialize in ethics. We can then use the data to assess whether the conventional wisdom, at least on this disambiguation, is true or not. On a weighted average over the period surveyed, in a given year there are roughly 100 women and 266 men who specialize in ethics <11>. By contrast, on a weighted average over the period surveyed, in a given year there are roughly 109 women and 508 men who do not specialize in ethics. There is a significant difference in the gender proportion of philosophers who specialize in ethics versus philosophers who do not specialize in ethics: X2(1) = 12.795, p < 0.001, effect size Cramer's V = 0.114. 3. Step Two: Estimating the Percentage of Women-Authored Articles in Ethics Journals 4 To estimate the representation of women in prestigious ethics journals, we examined the table of contents of four prominent ethics journals-Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs (PPA), Journal of Political Philosophy (JPP), and Journal of Moral Philosophy (JMP)-in the period of 2004-2014. We counted all articles, review essays, discussions, debates, survey articles, and introductions as "publications". We also coded publications for gender on the basis of the author's first name. When first names were gender ambiguous, we coded for gender on the basis of information found on individuals' departmental webpages and CVs. We looked at photographs and pronouns used by the individuals to describe themselves. We counted all articles that had at least one woman author as a woman-authored article. (We recognize that this likely overestimates the number of women authors in ethics journals and we discuss its implication in section 5.) Ethics PPA JPP JMP 2004 (2/25) 8.0% (2/14) 14.3% (8/22) 36.4% (6/18) 33.3% 2005 (6/22) 27.3% (2/16) 12.5% (6/23) 26.1% (7/18) 38.9% 2006 (4/22) 18.2% (3/16) 18.8% (6/27) 22.2% (3/19) 15.8% 2007 (7/23) 30.4% (1/15) 6.7% (6/24) 25.0% (5/26) 19.2% 2008 (4/25) 16.0% (6/16) 37.5% (4/24) 16.7% (4/19) 21.1% 2009 (4/22) 18.2% (4/13) 30.8% (8/24) 33.3% (3/27) 11.1% 2010 (6/25) 24.0% (3/12) 25.0% (6/24) 25.0% (5/25) 20.0% 2011 (4/21) 19.0% (4/12) 33.3% (4/23) 17.4% (7/28) 25.0% 2012 (3/23) 13.0% (1/10) 10.0% (9/23) 39.1% (3/24) 12.5% 2013 (5/24) 20.8% (4/12) 33.3% (7/23) 30.4% (10/40) 25.0% 2014 (4/31) 12.9% (1/11) 9.1% (10/23) 43.5% (7/29) 24.1% Total (49/263) 18.6% (31/147) 21.1% (74/260) 28.5% (60/273) 22.0% Table 2. Women-authored articles in prestigious ethics journals, 2004–2014. The results are summarized in Table 2. In section 4, we use this information on gender and publications to investigate whether women are underrepresented in ethics journals. 4. Step Three: Examining Underrepresentation of Women Ethicists in Ethics Journals We used the data from section 2 and section 3 to compare the percentage of articles that are authored by women with the percentage of women who specialize in ethics. For all statistical analyses in this section, we treated each year as a data point for comparisons <12>. In our analysis, we used paired-sample t-tests (reported as t statistics) primarily, and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests (reported as T statistics) as a secondary robustness check <13>. % of women in philosophy % of women-authored articles in prestigious ethics journals All In Ethics Aggregated Ethics PPA JPP JMP 2004 19.1% 24.3% 22.8% 8.0% 14.3% 36.4% 33.3% 2005 19.1% 24.3% 26.6% 27.3% 12.5% 26.1% 38.9% 2006 19.3% 26.0% 19.0% 18.2% 18.8% 22.2% 15.8% 2007 19.3% 26.0% 21.6% 30.4% 6.7% 25.0% 19.2% 2008 19.3% 26.0% 21.4% 16.0% 37.5% 16.7% 21.1% 2009 22.2% 28.4% 22.1% 18.2% 30.8% 33.3% 11.1% 2010 22.2% 28.4% 23.3% 24.0% 25.0% 25.0% 20.0% 2011 22.6% 28.6% 22.6% 19.0% 33.3% 17.4% 25.0% 2012 22.6% 28.6% 20.0% 13.0% 10.0% 39.1% 12.5% 2013 23.9% 29.2% 26.3% 20.8% 33.3% 30.4% 25.0% 5 2014 23.9% 29.2% 23.4% 12.9% 9.1% 43.5% 24.1% Table 3. Side-by-side view of percentages of women in philosophy and percentages of women-authored articles in prestigious ethics journals. Highlighted in gray is the key comparison, between the percentages of women specializing in ethics and the percentages of women-authored articles in prestigious ethics journals. The main goal in this study is to determine whether women are underrepresented in prestigious ethics journals relative to their representation in the field of ethics. The key analysis thus compares the mean proportion of women specializing in ethics in the 20042014 period, 27.1% (SD = 2.0%), with the mean proportion of women-authored articles in prestigious ethics journals in the 2004-2014 period, 22.6% (SD = 2.3%). We found a statistically significant difference between the proportion of women-authored articles in prestigious ethics journals and the proportion of women specializing in ethics: t(10) = 5.067, p < 0.001; T = 2, p = 0.003. Women who specialize in ethics are indeed underrepresented in prestigious ethics journals. Just for context, we also compared the mean proportion of women in philosophy with all specializations in the 2004-2014 period, 21.2% (SD = 1.9%), with the mean proportion of women-authored articles in prestigious ethics journals in the 2004-2014 period. We did not find a statistically significant difference: t(10) = 1.739, p = 0.113; T = 19, p = 0.240. To further explore the dataset, we examined each of the four journals separately <14>. First, we looked at Ethics. The mean of proportion of women-authored articles in Ethics in the 2004-2014 period is 18.9% (SD = 6.6%) <15>. We found a statistically significant difference between the proportion of women-authored articles in Ethics and the proportion of women specializing in ethics: t(10) = -3.903, p < 0.001; T = 4, p = 0.007. Second, we looked at Philosophy and Public Affairs. The mean of proportion of womenauthored articles in PPA in the 2004-2014 period is 21.0% (SD = 11.3%). We did not find a statistically significant difference between the proportion of women-authored articles in PPA and the proportion of women specializing in ethics: t(10) = -1.875, p = 0.090; T = 15, p = 0.123. Third, we looked at Journal of Political Philosophy. The mean of proportion of womenauthored articles in JPP in the 2004-2014 period is 28.7% (SD = 8.7%). We did not find a statistically significant difference between the proportion of women-authored articles in JPP and the proportion of women specializing in ethics: t(10) = 0.579, p = 0.575; T = 26, p = 0.577. Fourth, we looked at Journal of Moral Philosophy. The mean of proportion of womenauthored articles in JMP in the 2004-2014 period is 22.4% (SD = 8.3%). We did not find a statistically significant difference between the proportion of women-authored articles in JMP and the proportion of women specializing in ethics: t(10) = -1.683, p = 0.123; T = 16, p = 0.147. 5. General Discussion 6 5.1. The Underrepresentation of Women in Prestigious Ethics Journals Our study began with the question of whether women are underrepresented in prestigious ethics journals relative to their representation in the field of ethics. Our central finding is that, yes, overall, women are underrepresented in prestigious ethics journals. We also explored whether underrepresentation appeared in any particular prestigious ethics journal. We did find that underrepresentation occurred in Ethics, which is perhaps the most prestigious of the journals we surveyed. But we did not find that underrepresentation occurred in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Journal of Political Philosophy, or Journal of Moral Philosophy. Two familiar adages about statistical inference are worth emphasizing in this context. First, a statistically nonsignificant result is not itself evidence for the null hypothesis <16>. So, in this context, one should not interpret the nonsignificant results as indicating appropriate gender representation in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Journal of Political Philosophy, or Journal of Moral Philosophy. Second, the difference between statistically significant and nonsignificant may not be statistically significant: in comparing various results, it is a mistake to do so via their statistical significance versus nonsignificance as if there were a sharp difference between the two <17>. So, in this context, while the underrepresentation was statistically significant for Ethics but not for Philosophy and Public Affairs and Journal of Moral Philosophy, there is no statistical difference between the three journals. However, there is a statistically significant difference between the proportions of women-authored articles in Ethics and in Journal of Political Philosophy. We wanted to present these exploratory analyses to acknowledge the complexity of this phenomenon. Honest examinations of real-world phenomena rarely offer a cut-and-dry picture, especially given standard concerns about variation and sampling. Given how few articles each journal publishes per year, it is to be expected that there is considerable variation from year to year within any given journal. It is, for this reason, more difficult to draw any firm conclusions on the basis of the disaggregated data about particular journals. Nevertheless, we do want to emphasize the central finding: women are undoubtedly underrepresented in prestigious ethics journals as a whole. In establishing the central finding, it is also worth emphasizing our overall conservative approach in this investigation. For example, in estimating the percentage of womenauthored publications, we counted publications as woman-authored as long as there was one woman author. This likely overestimated the proportion of women authors in prestigious ethics journals. Thus, women are likely to be even more underrepresented than our findings suggest. For another example, our use of the PGR faculty list sample in estimating the percentage of women who specialize in ethics is also conservative. Over the periods investigated, we found percentages that range from 24.3% to 29.2%. For comparison, Schwitzgebel and Jennings estimated the percentage of women specializing in value theory to be 34% <18>. Furthermore, given the existence of prestige bias, women faculty in the top 50 departments are even more likely than those outside to 7 publish in prestigious journals. This again makes it the case that women authors are perhaps even more underrepresented across the field than our findings suggest. 5.2. Potential Explanations and Questions for Future Research Our goal was to establish the existence of a phenomenon, namely, that of women underrepresentation in prestigious ethics journals. That leaves open the question of what causes this phenomenon. We now outline some questions that we hope will be addressed in future studies on this topic. First, might some of the gendered discrepancy be caused by certain prestigious journals in Anglo American analytic philosophy defining ethics too narrowly? By comparison, we used a very broad definition of what counts as ethics in our study; insofar as the editors of some prestigious journals do not share our broad criteria, they may consider scholarship by women we are counting as ethics faculty/researchers as ineligible for publication in their journals. This is certainly concerning. Of particular concern is that prestigious ethics journals may view feminist social criticism and feminist political philosophy, which is largely authored by women, as falling outside the scope of their publications. This would not be surprising, as feminist scholarship in other fields in philosophy, such as epistemology, has notably been sidelined from the leading journals <19>. If this is also the case for feminist ethics and feminist social/political philosophy, then this could contribute to the underrepresentation of women authors in prestigious ethics journals, such as Ethics. Second, what role might professional status play in women's underrepresentation? Women's success with publishing in prestigious ethics journals may depend in part on their professional status: women in continuing positions may be more likely to publish in prestigious ethics journals to a degree proportionate to their numbers in their field. This is something that future studies should delve more deeply into, in order to get a clearer sense of whether very junior members of our profession possibly face structural barriers to publishing in prestigious journals. Our study did not differentiate between assistant, associate, and full professors in determining the relative success of women in journal publishing, but only counted those in tenure/tenure-track positions. Yet, this could potentially be significant, since there is substantial evidence that women philosophers are clustered in the assistant and associate professor ranks, while being dramatically underrepresented among full professors <20>. A possible confounding factor here is the status or standing of (tenured and tenure-track) women authors' home departments, since women are less likely to become full professors in the most prestigious philosophy programs <21>. The prospect that professional status and the standing of one's department may impact one's success in publishing in prestigious ethics journals may strike some readers as surprising or even scandalous, given that the four journals we studied have blind review processes in place. However, as editors and reviewers of journal articles will be well aware, there are numerous ways in which the identity and institution of authors may be revealed in the review process. It seems possible that such identification (e.g., by an 8 associate or assigning editor) could work against women authors: in Haslanger's study, for example, 84.5% of men versus only 72.5% of women reported that their most influential publication was published through submission to a peer-reviewed journal <22>. It is possible that informal identification of authors could also disadvantage philosophers from less prestigious institutions - including those from non-English speaking universities that are not well known outside their own countries. Of possible significance here is the fact that at least some of the journals we studied have a system of desk-rejection in place. Where the author's name and institution is known by the editor(s) vetting articles for review or else desk-rejection, implicit bias and favoritism can come into play. For example, it has been claimed that Philosophy and Public Affairs publishes a preponderance of articles by philosophers at Oxford, Harvard, and Princeton <23>, potentially reflecting the academic links of its editorial members. Third, what role might article type play in causing underrepresentation? Our study is not fine-grained enough to tell us whether women might be represented differently in relation to different types of journal publications. It does not control for different types of journal publications, nor for invited versus non-invited articles. The common view is that women tend to publish more in invited venues than other venues. It is held that women are better at maintaining relationships and have a tendency to work through informal networks, which in turn leads to a greater number of invited publications. While this may be the commonly held view, it has not been thoroughly investigated. Fourth, what role might negative experiences with the review process itself, actual or anticipated, play in the underrepresentation of women? Are women philosophers simply opting not to send their work to the most prestigious journals <24>? Do they opt out more often than men? If so, why? Liam Kofi Bright suggests that, at least, in the field of science and, perhaps, more generally, women do opt out - or publish less than men - because "women concentrate on producing high quality papers in response to an expectation that their work will receive greater scrutiny. Whether or not this expectation is accurate, producing such work is time consuming, so women then produce fewer papers overall" <25>. There is evidence supporting this hypothesis in the field of economics: a recent study found that among the top four economics journals, womenauthored papers consistently received more critical reviews, resulting in significantly protracted review processes, delayed publication, and thus "lower research outputs" at a critical time in their careers <26>. Determining whether women opt out of submitting to top ethics journals for fear of excessively negative reviews, desk-rejection, or a protracted resubmission process is, however, difficult. This is chiefly because the journals that we surveyed do not collect submission data <27>. So, an authors' survey or questionnaire might have to be used to more fully determine whether women have the tendency to opt out of prestigious ethics journals. Among other things, this question of "opting out" would presumably need to be considered in tandem with the question (discussed above) of whether the editors and reviewers of top ethics journals view feminist ethics and feminist social and political philosophy as unfitting subject matter for these journals, and also whether reviewers chosen take a similarly dim view of these topics. There is certainly evidence that mainstream prestigious ethics journals do not publish much feminist work: Haslanger's study of leading philosophy journals between 2002-2007 9 found that Philosophy & Public Affairs published only 4 feminist philosophy articles (out of 78), and Ethics published a mere 3 (out of 105 articles) <28>. We need to know whether this is because of editorial decisions, or feminist philosophers opting not to submit their work, or both. The goal of this study was to determine whether women were underrepresented in prestigious ethics journals, as a whole. We have shown that they were. This finding raises many questions, some of which are about what leads to this underrepresentation. We hope that this preliminary work will stimulate a broader discussion of women's underrepresentation in prestigious ethics journals, and how it relates to other aspects of the gender problem in philosophy. End Notes <1> The authors are equal contributors. Krishnamurthy conceived of and designed the study, Dalecki collected the data, Liao analyzed the data, Deveaux related the findings to other studies of women in ethics, and everyone wrote the paper. <2> Paxton et al 2012; Jennings 2016; Schwitzgebel, "2015; "Gendered Conference Campaign," Feminist Philosophers, 2009. <3> Paxton, 2012. <4> Healy 2015; Krishnamurthy 2014; Krishnamurthy 2017; Schwitzgebel and Jennings 2017. <5> Schwitzgebel and Jennings 2017. <6> Norlock 2014. <7> Haslanger 2008. <8> Brooks 2010, 16. <9> Richardson 2010, 19. More recently, Richardson (2016, 2) has noted that there has been a "marked" rise in manuscripts submitted to Ethics in recent years "on issues of gender, sexual ethics and sexual orientation, and race," but that, given the low acceptance rate of the journal generally, this rise "has as yet resulted in only a modest increase in number of articles we have published in these areas." One might infer from this purported increase (Richardson does not provide data here) that the journal has seen an uptick in the publication of articles by women, but our own survey does not bear this out. <10> Schwitzgebel and Jennings, 2017; Haslanger 2009, 3. We also examine one disambiguation of this conventional wisdom later. <11> The averages are weighted by year such that, for example, the numbers from the 10 (three-year) 2006-2008 period is given 1.5 times the weight of the numbers from the (two-year) 2014-2015 period. We chose to use a difference-of-proportions test with the weighted averages rather than, say, a regression analysis because the year-to-year numbers are not independent, especially since in any given year there are likely to be relatively few cases of faculty turnovers. <12> It is a conceptually difficult question whether the samples being compared are independent or not. On the one hand, they are estimating quite different things: the proportion of women-authored articles and the proportion of women in the profession, especially for the ethics specializations. On the other hand, there is obviously a relationship between those two things. This conceptual difficulty ramifies into a difficulty for choosing appropriate statistical tests for our substantive hypotheses. In this paper, we chose to treat the samples as dependent and thus used paired-sample t-tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the respective proportions being estimated for the analyses. <13> We do this because our sample violates the normality assumption of paired-sample t-test. Although t-tests are generally relatively robust to violations of assumptions, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test-as its nonparametric equivalent-offers a helpful check on the robustness of the results. For both tests, we report the two-sided p-values and adopt the conventional statistical significance level of α = 0.05. <14> Since there are four comparisons investigated, we used a Bonferroni correction to set the threshold for statistical significance at p = 0.0125 in order to maintain the conventional statistical significance level of α = 0.05. We report uncorrected p-values in text. <15> Attentive readers will notice small discrepancies between the percentages reported here and the percentages reported in the "Total" row in Table 2. These discrepancies arise because, as noted, each year is treated as a data point for the analysis. Hence, the percentages reported here represent averages of the yearly proportion of women-authored articles in a journal. In contrast, the percentages reported in the "Total" row in Table 2 represent the proportion of women-authored articles in a journal for the entire 2004-2014 period. These small discrepancies are due to the fact that the total number of articles published in a journal does not stay exactly the same year after year. Although these discrepancies are small, and do not affect our analyses, we report both for completeness. <16> Hoenig and Heisey 2001. <17> Gelman and Stern 2006. <18> Schwitzgebel and Jennings 2017. <19> See for example Rooney 2010. <20> Schwitzgebel and Jennings 2017. <21> In their study, Schwitzgebel and Jennings (2017) found that "women were 11 considerably less likely to have full professor rank in PGR-ranked PhD departments than assistant or associate rank"; see also Haslanger 2008, 322. <22> Based on 1072 author replies to this question; see Haslanger 2009, 4. <23> Leiter 2015. <24> See also Haslanger 2008, 215. <25> Bright, Forthcoming. <26> Hengel 2016. Interestingly, this study also found that article abstracts by women in the leading 4 economics journals were better written than abstracts by male authors, which she suggests is because "referees apply higher standards to female-authored papers" (Hengel 2016, 29). <27> We emailed the editors of all of the prestigious ethics journals surveyed here to see if they collected submission data. None of them did at the time of asking. <28> Haslanger 2008, 220. References Bright, Liam Kofi . Decision Theoretic Model of the Productivity Gap. Erkenntnis. Forthcoming. Brooks, Thom. 2010. The View from the Journal of Moral Philosophy. APA Newsletter. Fall 2010, 10 (1). Gelman, Andrew and Hal Stern. 2006. The Difference Between 'Significant' and 'Not Significant' is not Itself Statistically Significant. The American Statistician 60 (4): 328– 331. 2009. Gendered Conference Campaign. Feminist Philosophers. December 10. https://feministphilosophers.wordpress.com/gendered-conference-campaign/ (accessed February 28, 2017). Haslanger, Sally. 2008. Changing the Ideology and Culture of Philosophy: Not by Reason (Alone). Hypatia 23 (2): 210-223. Haslanger, Sally. 2009. Preliminary Report of the Survey on Publishing in Philosophy. The Committee on the Status of Women in the Profession. APA Committee on the Status of Women. December. http://www.mit.edu/~shaslang/papers/HaslangerPRSPP.pdf (accessed February 28, 2017) Healy, Kieran . 2015. Gender and Citation in Four General-Interest Philosophy Journals, 1993-2013. Feb. 25. https://kieranhealy.org/blog/archives/2015/02/25/gender-and- 12 citation-in-four-general-interest-philosophy-journals-1993-2013/ (accessed February 28, 2017). Hengel, Erin. 2016. Publishing While Female: Gender Differences in Peer Review Scrutiny. Unpublished Manuscript. http://www.erinhengel.com/research/publishing_female.pdf. (accessed February 28, 2017) Hoenig John M. and Dennis M. Heisey. 2001. The Abuse of Power: The Pervasive Fallacy of Power Calculations for Data Analysis. The American Statistician 55(1): 1–6. Jennings, Carolyn Dicey. 2016. Women in Philosophy 2004-2014: Which Programs Do Best? New Apps, May 21. http://www.newappsblog.com/2016/05/women-in-philosophy2004-2014-which-programs-do-best.html#more (accessed February 28, 2017). Paxton, Molly, Figdor, Carrie and Valerie Tiberius. 2012. Quantifying the Gender Gap: An Empirical Study of the Underrepresentation of Women in Philosophy. Hypatia 27(4): 949-957. Krishnamurthy, Meena. 2014. Thoughts on the Gender Ratios of Papers Published in Ethics and the Journal of Moral Philosophy. Philosop-her. August 25. Krishnamurthy, Meena. 2017. Proportionate Representation of Women in Elite Ethics Journals: To Quota or Not to Quota? Public Affairs Quarterly. Forthcoming. Leiter, Brian. 2015. Editorial practices at Philosophy & Public Affairs. March 23. http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2015/03/editorial-practices-at-philosophy-publicaffairs.html (accessed February 28, 2017). Norlock, Kathryn. 2014. Gender Ratios of Papers Published in Ethics and the Journal of Moral Philosophy. New Apps, August 19. http://www.newappsblog.com/2014/08/genderratios-of-papers-published-in-ethics-and-the-journal-of-moral-philosophy.html (accessed February 28, 2017). Richardson, Henry S. 2010. The Triply Anonymous Review Process at Ethics. APA Newsletter, 10 (1). Richardson, Henry S. 2016. Editorial: Changes at the Journal. Ethics 127 (1): 1-5. Rooney, Phyllis. 2010. The Marginalization of Feminist Epistemology and What that Reveals about Epistemology 'Proper'. In Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Power in Knowledge, ed. Heidi Grasswick. New York: Springer, pp. 3-24. Schwitzgebel, Eric. 2015. "Percentage of Women at APA Meetings, 1955, 1975, 1995, 2015." The Splintered Mind, November 17. http://schwitzsplinters.blogspot.com/2015/11/percentage-of-women-at-apa-meetings.html (accessed February 28, 2017). 13 Schwitzgebel, Eric and Carolyn Dicey Jennings. 2017. Women in Philosophy: Quantitative Analyses of Specialization, Prevalence, Visibility, and Generational Change. Public Affairs Quarterly. Forthcoming.

[email protected] Reclaiming Liberalism Edited by David F. Hardwick * Leslie Marsh PALGRAVE STUDIES IN CLASSICAL LIBERALISM SERIES EDITORS: DAVID F. HARDWICK * LESLIE MARSH [email protected] Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism Series Editors David F. Hardwick Department of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine The University of British Columbia Vancouver, BC, Canada Leslie Marsh Department of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine The University of British Columbia Vancouver, BC, Canada [email protected] This series offers a forum to writers concerned that the central presuppositions of the liberal tradition have been severely corroded, neglected, or misappropriated by overly rationalistic and constructivist approaches. The hardest-won achievement of the liberal tradition has been the wrestling of epistemic independence from overwhelming concentrations of power, monopolies and capricious zealotries. The very precondition of knowledge is the exploitation of the epistemic virtues accorded by society's situated and distributed manifold of spontaneous orders, the DNA of the modern civil condition. With the confluence of interest in situated and distributed liberalism emanating from the Scottish tradition, Austrian and behavioral economics, non-Cartesian philosophy and moral psychology, the editors are soliciting proposals that speak to this multidisciplinary constituency. Sole or joint authorship submissions are welcome as are edited collections, broadly theoretical or topical in nature. More information about this series at http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/15722 [email protected] David F. Hardwick • Leslie Marsh Editors Reclaiming Liberalism [email protected] ISSN 2662-6470 ISSN 2662-6489 (electronic) Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism ISBN 978-3-030-28759-7 ISBN 978-3-030-28760-3 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28760-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Editors David F. Hardwick Department of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine The University of British Columbia Vancouver, BC, Canada Leslie Marsh Department of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine The University of British Columbia Vancouver, BC, Canada [email protected] Francisco Goya: Plate 43 from 'Los Caprichos': The sleep of reason produces monsters (El sueño de la razon produce monstruos), 1799 Made available by the Metropolitan Museum of Art under Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication [email protected] To Virginia Baldwin: in appreciation of decades of interest and support (DH) In memory of my grandparents, Sara and Samuel Fine, whose families the Bolsheviks wanted to banish and the Nazis wanted to snuff out (LM) [email protected] ix Each passing decade of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has been accompanied by proclamations of liberalism's decline. Despite this, it is not at all clear whether the Owl of Minerva can be said to have taken flight. The "reclaiming" of the title of this collection is perhaps more a timely re-excavation of classical liberalism from the accumulated conceptual hubris and downright illiteracy that has come to obscure its central presupposition, which is, the wresting of epistemic independence from overwhelming concentrations of power, monopolies, and capricious zealotries, whether they be of a state, religious, or corporate in character. Unfortunately, much of what goes by the label of "liberal" is overly rationalistic and constructivist and, as such, stirs an authoritarian impulse in its implementation. This collection offers a variety of disciplinary perspectives on liberalism, from a contemporary focus and some with a distinctly historical hue. Collectively these chapters will, in all probability, be deemed contentious. Classical liberals are a fractious lot, and though there will be internecine squabbles, no one viewpoint seeks to inhibit another's perspective. Hayek's profound and paradoxical insight that knowledge becomes less incomplete only if it becomes more dispersed has informed our institutional design and operational management within the International Academy of Pathology and The University of British Columbia Preface [email protected] x Preface Department of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine. Since we subscribe to Hayek's adage that "exclusive concentration on a specialty has a peculiarly baneful effect: it will not merely prevent us from being attractive company or good citizens but may impair our competence in our proper field", we make no apology for not staying within our academic silos. Epistemic humility and open inquiry are central virtues for the classical liberal and this has proved the most successful way to approach the truth for the greater good. We thus thought that Aldous Huxley's comment1 on Goya's caption "El sueño de la razon produce monstrous", as per the frontispiece, resonates deeply with the spirit of this project: It is a caption that admits of more than one interpretation. When reason sleeps, the absurd and loathsome creatures of superstition wake and are active, goading their victim to an ignoble frenzy. But this is not all. Reason may also dream without sleeping, may intoxicate itself, as it did during the French Revolution, with the daydreams of inevitable progress, of liberty, equality, and fraternity imposed by violence, of human self-sufficiency and the ending of sorrow ... by political rearrangements and a better technology. Vancouver, BC, Canada David F. Hardwick Leslie Marsh Note 1. Aldous Huxley, "Variations on Goya," On Art and Artists, Morris Philipson, ed. (London: Chatto and Windus, 1960), pp. 218–19. [email protected] xi We wish to thank the following for their community service: Corey Abel, Peter Barnes, Eugene Callahan, Gilles Campagnolo, Nicholas Capaldi, Lars Feld, Steven Gerencser, Ignacio Herrera-Anchustegui, Stefan Kolev, Peter Lewin, Drew Maciag, Terry Nardin, Noel O'Sullivan, and Viktor Vanberg. We'd also like to thank the Palgrave team for their diligent and friendly support: Ruth Noble, Clara Heathcock, and last, but by no means least, Laura Pacey, who so carefully and enthusiastically gestated this series. Project Manager, Sarulatha Krishnamurthy's patient technical support, is also much appreciated. Nothing we do could be done without the unwavering support of Charles Ramey and Shannon Selin. Acknowledgments [email protected] xiii Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism 1 David P. Ellerman Democracy, Liberalism, and Discretion: The Political Puzzle of the Administrative State 41 Stephen Turner Ordoliberalism as the Operationalisation of Liberal Politics 63 Mikayla Novak Liberalism, Through a Glass Darkly 91 David F. Hardwick and Leslie Marsh Liberalism and the Modern Quest for Freedom 125 David D. Corey Liberalism for the Twenty-First Century: From Markets to Civil Society, from Economics to Human Beings 163 Gus diZerega Contents [email protected] xiv Contents Origins of the Rule of Law 179 Andrew David Irvine Burke's Liberalism: Prejudice, Habit, Affections, and the Remaking of the Social Contract 219 Lauren K. Hall Democratic Peace Theory, Montesquieu, and Public Choice 247 Sarah M. Burns and Chad Van Schoelandt "China's Hayek" and the Horrors of Totalitarianism: The Liberal Lessons in Gu Zhun's Thought 281 Chor-yung Cheung Author Index 313 Subject Index 317 [email protected] 1© The Author(s) 2020 D. F. Hardwick, L. Marsh (eds.), Reclaiming Liberalism, Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-28760-3_1 Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism David P. Ellerman Helping Others Versus Self-Help: Implications of Classical Liberalism Classical liberalism expresses a skepticism about governmental organizations being able to "do good" for people. Instead an important role of government is to set up and maintain the conditions for people to be empowered and enabled to do good for themselves, for example, in establishing and enforcing the private property prerequisites for the functioning of a market economy as emphasized in the economic way of thinking (e.g., Heyne et al. 2006, pp. 36–38). The reasons for the general ineffectiveness of the government to directly do good for people are not unique to government; the reasons apply as well to other external organizations that are also tasked to "do good" such D. P. Ellerman (*) University of California, Riverside, Riverside, CA, USA University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia e-mail: [email protected] [email protected] 2 as philanthropic, development aid, or other helping organizations in general.1 As John Dewey (1859–1952) put it: The best kind of help to others, whenever possible, is indirect, and consists in such modifications of the conditions of life, of the general level of subsistence, as enables them independently to help themselves (Dewey and Tufts 1908, p. 390). The aim of a helping organization (including government) should not be to "do good" in any direct sense. The goal should be to increase people's autonomy, organizational efficacy, and effective social agency so they can do good for themselves-individually or, more likely, jointly in their own organizations. That is how the virtues of individual self-regarding activity in the marketplace generalize to the virtues of collective activity by people in their own organizations. The classical liberal normative framework that emphasizes this autonomy and self-efficacy is perhaps best stated by James M. Buchanan (1919–2013): The justificatory foundation for a liberal social order lies, in my understanding, in the normative premise that individuals are the ultimate sovereigns in matters of social organization, that individuals are the beings who are entitled to choose the organizational-institutional structures under which they will live. In accordance with this premise, the legitimacy of social-organizational structures is to be judged against the voluntary agreement of those who are to live or are living under the arrangements that are judged. The central premise of individuals as sovereigns does allow for delegation of decision-making authority to agents, so long as it remains understood that individuals remain as principals. The premise denies legitimacy to all social-organizational arrangements that negate the role of individuals as either sovereigns or as principals (Buchanan 1999, p. 288). It should be particularly noted that Buchanan goes beyond the common image of the sovereign individual acting in the marketplace to the individual acting in an organization which allows "for delegation of decisionmaking authority." Then the legitimacy of the "social-organizational arrangements" depends on the individuals being principals in their organizations. D. P. Ellerman [email protected] 3 What Is Denied Legitimacy in the Classical Liberal Social Order? Coercive Institutions The first broad category of institutions ruled out in the liberal social order are those that are involuntarily imposed without "the voluntary agreement of those who are to live" under the arrangements. The examples are standard fare in liberal thought such as (involuntary) slavery or (involuntary) non-democratic government (Fig. 1). Fundamentally, there are only two ways of co-ordinating the economic activities of millions. One is central direction involving the use of coercion-the technique of the army and of the modern totalitarian state. The other is voluntary co-operation of individuals-the technique of the market place (Friedman 1962, p. 13). But Buchanan's strictures go beyond these war-horse examples to rule out the legitimacy of voluntary arrangements where the individuals do not remain principals. Since that institutional territory is little explored, if not little known, I will explore the intellectual history of such arrangements in some detail. The voluntary contractual arrangements where individuals do not remain principals are those that alienate (rather than Fig. 1 The conventional framing of coercion versus consent Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism [email protected] 4 delegate) decision-making authority. The contractually established decisionmaking ruler or ruling body rules in its own name and is not empowered only as a delegate or representative of the individuals under its authority. These alienation contracts can be divided into the individual and the collective cases. Individual Alienation Contracts: The Voluntary Slavery Contract Today "slavery" is usually discussed as if it were intrinsically involuntary so that "'[v]oluntary slavery' is impossible, much as a spherical cube or a living corpse is impossible" (Palmer 2009, p. 457). But in fact from Antiquity onward, the sophisticated defense of slavery have always been based on implicit or explicit voluntary contracts. For western jurisprudence, the story starts with Roman law as codified in the Institutes of Justinian: Slaves either are born or become so. They are born so when their mother is a slave; they become so either by the law of nations, that is, by captivity, or by the civil law, as when a free person, above the age of twenty, suffers himself to be sold, that he may share the price given for him (Institutes Lib. I, Tit. III, sec. 4). In addition to the third means of outright contractual slavery, the other two means were also seen as having aspects of contract. A person born of a slave mother and raised using the master's food, clothing, and shelter was considered as being in a perpetual servitude contract to trade a lifetime of labor for these and future provisions. In the alienable natural rights tradition, Samuel Pufendorf (1632–94) gave that contractual interpretation: Whereas, therefore, the Master afforded such Infant Nourishment, long before his Service could be of any Use to him; and whereas all the following Services of his Life could not much exceed the Value of his Maintenance, he is not to leave his Master's Service without his Consent. But 'tis manifest, That since these Bondmen came into a State of Servitude not by any D. P. Ellerman [email protected] 5 Fault of their own, there can be no Pretence that they should be otherwise dealt withal, than as if they were in the Condition of perpetual hired Servants. (Pufendorf 2003 (1673), pp. 186–87). Manumission was an early repayment or cancellation of that debt. And Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), for example, clearly saw a "covenant" in the ancient practice of enslaving prisoners of war: And this dominion is then acquired to the victor when the vanquished, to avoid the present stroke of death, covenants either in express words or by other sufficient signs of the will that, so long as his life and the liberty of his body is allowed him, the victor shall have the use thereof at his pleasure. ... It is not, therefore, the victory that gives the right of dominion over the vanquished but his own covenant (Hobbes 1958 (1651), Bk. II, chapter 20). Thus all of the three legal means of becoming a slave in Roman law had explicit or implicit contractual interpretations. John Locke's (1632–1704) Two Treatises of Government (1690) is one of the classics of liberal thought. Locke would not condone a contract which gave the master the power of life or death over the slave: For a Man, not having the Power of his own Life, cannot, by Compact or his own Consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the Absolute, Arbitrary Power of another, to take away his Life, when he pleases (Second Treatise, §23). This is the fount and source of what is sometimes taken as a "liberal doctrine of inalienable rights" (Tomasi 2012, p. 51). But after taking this edifying stand, Locke pirouettes in the next section and accepts a slavery contract that has some rights on both sides. Locke is only ruling out a voluntary version of the old Roman slavery where the master could take the life of the slave with impunity. But once the contract was put on a more civilized footing, Locke accepted the contract and renamed it "drudgery": For, if once Compact enter between them, and make an agreement for a limited Power on the one side, and Obedience on the other, the State of Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism [email protected] 6 War and Slavery ceases, as long as the Compact endures.... I confess, we find among the Jews, as well as other Nations, that Men did sell themselves; but, 'tis plain, this was only to Drudgery, not to Slavery. For, it is evident, the Person sold was not under an Absolute, Arbitrary, Despotical Power (Second Treatise, §24). Locke is here setting an intellectual pattern, repeated many times later, of taking a high moral stand against an extreme form of contractual slavery, but then turning around and accepting a civilized form on contractual slavery (e.g., rights on both sides at least in the law books) usually with some more palatable linguistic designation such as drudgery, perpetual servitude, or perpetual hired servant. Moreover, Locke agreed with Hobbes on the practice of enslaving the war captives as a quid pro quo plea-bargained exchange of slavery instead of death and based on the ongoing consent of the captive: Indeed having, by his fault, forfeited his own Life, by some Act that deserves Death; he, to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he has him in his Power) delay to take it, and make use of him to his own Service, and he does him no injury by it. For, whenever he finds the hardship of his Slavery out-weigh the value of his Life, 'tis in his Power, by resisting the Will of his Master, to draw on himself the Death he desires (Second Treatise, §23). In Locke's constitution for the Carolinas, he seemed to have justified slavery by interpreting the slaves purchased by the slave traders on the African coast as the captives in internal wars who had accepted the plea bargain of a lifetime of slavery instead of death.2 Thereafter, the title was transferred by commercial contracts. If the slave later decides to renege on the plea-bargain contract and to take the other option, then "by resisting the Will of his Master, (he may) draw on himself the Death he desires." Another basis for liberal jurisprudence is English common law. William Blackstone (1723–1780), in his codification of English common law, stuck to Locke's choreography. Blackstone rules out a slavery where "an absolute and unlimited power is given to the master over the life and fortune of the slave." Such a slave would be free "the instant he lands in D. P. Ellerman [email protected] 7 England." After such an edifying stand on high moral ground, Blackstone pirouettes and adds: Yet, with regard to any right which the master may have lawfully acquired to the perpetual service of John or Thomas, this will remain exactly in the same state as before: for this is no more than the same state of subjection for life, which every apprentice submits to for the space of seven years, or sometimes for a longer term (Blackstone 1959, section on "Master and Servant"). Another source of liberal thought is Montesquieu (1689–1755). On the question of voluntary slavery, he employed the same Lockean choreography in his treatment of inalienability and that treatment was paraphrased in modern times by the dean of high liberalism, John Rawls (1921–2002). Montesquieu begins with the usual repudiation of the selfsale contract in an extreme form: To sell one's freedom is so repugnant to all reason as can scarcely be supposed in any man. If liberty may be rated with respect to the buyer, it is beyond all price to the seller (Montesquieu 1912 (1748), Vol. I, Bk. XV, Chap. II). Rawls paraphrases this argument from Montesquieu to argue that in the original position, the grounds upon which the parties are moved to guarantee these liberties, together with the constraints of the reasonable, explain why the basic liberties are, so to speak, beyond all price to persons so conceived. (Rawls 1996, p. 366) After the "beyond all price" passage paraphrased by Rawls, Montesquieu goes on to note: "I mean slavery in a strict sense, as it formerly existed among the Romans, and exists at present in our colonies" (Montesquieu 1912 (1748), Vol. I, Bk. XV, Chap. II). Then Montesquieu performs his volte-face by noting that this would not exclude a civilized or "mild" form of the contract. Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism [email protected] 8 This is the true and rational origin of that mild law of slavery which obtains in some countries; and mild it ought to be, as founded on the free choice a man makes of a master, for his own benefit; which forms a mutual convention between two parties (Montesquieu 1912 (1748), Vol. I, Bk. XV, Chap. V). And then Rawls goes on to follow the same choreography in his treatment of inalienability: This explanation of why the basic liberties are inalienable does not exclude the possibility that even in a well-ordered society some citizens may want to circumscribe or alienate one or more of their basic liberties. ... Unless these possibilities affect the agreement of the parties in the original position (and I hold that they do not), they are irrelevant to the inalienability of the basic liberties (Rawls 1996, pp. 366–67 and fn. 82). Of course, no one thinks that John Rawls would personally endorse a voluntary slavery contract, but the question is his theories, not his personal views. And in his treatment of inalienability, he repeated the pattern and even some of the language ("beyond all price") of a "liberal doctrine of inalienable rights" descending from Locke, Blackstone, and Montesquieu that did explicitly endorse a civilized form of voluntary contractual slavery, drudgery, or perpetual servitude.3 Below we will outline the genuine theory of inalienable rights that descends from the Reformation inalienability of conscience through the Scottish and German Enlightenments and English Dissenters, and that was transferred "from a religious on to a juridical plane" (Lincoln 1971, p. 2) by the abolitionist and democratic movements.4 Rawls' Harvard colleague, Robert Nozick (1938–2002), was notoriously explicit in accepting the (re)validation of the voluntary slavery contract.5 He accepted that a free society should allow people to jointly alienate their political sovereignty to a "dominant protective association" (Nozick 1974, p. 15): The comparable question about an individual is whether a free system will allow him to sell himself into slavery. I believe that it would (Nozick 1974, p. 331). D. P. Ellerman [email protected] 9 Nozick is reported to have had second thoughts in his later life precisely on the question of inalienability, but Nozick never developed a theory of inalienability that would overturn his earlier position.6 The contractual defense of slavery was also used in the debate over slavery in ante-bellum America. The proslavery position is usually presented as being based on illiberal racist or paternalistic arguments. Considerable attention is lavished on illiberal paternalistic writers such as George Fitzhugh,7 while consent-based contractarian defenders of slavery are passed over in silence. For example, Rev. Samuel Seabury (1801–1872) gave a sophisticated liberal-contractarian defense of ante-bellum slavery in the tradition of alienable natural rights theory: From all which it appears that, wherever slavery exists as a settled condition or institution of society, the bond which unites master and servant is of a moral nature; founded in right, not in might; .... Let the origin of the relation have been what it may, yet when once it can plead such prescription of time as to have received a fixed and determinate character, it must be assumed to be founded in the consent of the parties, and to be, to all intents and purposes, a compact or covenant, of the same kind with that which lies at the foundation of all human society (Seabury 1969 (1861), p. 144). "Contract!" methinks I hear them exclaim; "look at the poor fugitive from his master's service! He bound by contract! A good joke, truly." But ask these same men what binds them to society? Are they slaves to their rulers? O no! They are bound together by the COMPACT on which society is founded. Very good; but did you ever sign this compact? Did your fathers every sign it? "No; it is a tacit and implied contract." (Seabury 1969 (1861), p. 153). Yet this voluntary contractual defense of slavery has largely gone down the memory hole in the liberal intellectual history of the slavery debates. For instance, McKitrick (1963) collects essays of fifteen proslavery writers, Faust (1981) collects seven proslavery essays, and Finkelman (2003) collects seventeen proslavery writers, but none of them include a single writer who argues to allow slavery on a contractual basis such as Seabury- not to mention Grotius, Pufendorf, Hobbes, Locke, Blackstone, Molina, Suarez, Montesquieu, and a host of others.8 Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism [email protected] 10 The intellectual history of civilized voluntary slavery contracts concludes with modern economic theory. Often the discussion of slavery is colored with excesses and attributes that were unnecessary to slavery as an economic institution. The economic essence of the contract is the lifetime ownership of labor services by the master, not the ownership of persons or souls or the like. Even the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus noted that "a slave should be treated as a 'laborer hired for life'" (Sabine 1958, p. 150). James Mill explained: The only difference is, in the mode of purchasing. The owner of the slave purchases, at once, the whole of the labour, which the man can ever perform: he, who pays wages, purchases only so much of a man's labour as he can perform in a day, or any other stipulated time (Mill 1826, Chapter I, section II). And ante-bellum slavery apologists made a similar point: Our property in man is a right and title to human labor. And where is it that this right and title does not exist on the part of those who have money to buy it? The only difference in any two cases is the tenure (Bryan 1858, p. 10; quoted in Philmore 1982, p. 43). One of the most elementary points in the solely economic way of thinking is that the prohibition of a voluntary exchange between a willing buyer and willing seller (in the absence of externalities) precludes allocative efficiency. For instance, efficiency requires full futures markets in all goods and services including human labor. Any attempt to truncate future labor contracts at, say, T years could violate market efficiency since there might today be willing buyers and sellers of labor to be performed T + 1 years in the future. Hence market efficiency requires full future markets in labor-which allows the perpetual servitude contract. One will not find this point in the textbooks on the economic way of thinking, but the Johns Hopkins University economist Carl Christ made the point quite explicit in no less a forum than Congressional testimony: Now it is time to state the conditions under which private property and free contract will lead to an optimal allocation of resources .... The institution of private property and free contract as we know it is modified to D. P. Ellerman [email protected] 11 permit individuals to sell or mortgage their persons in return for present and/or future benefits (Christ 1975, p. 334). In spite of the efficiency losses, the voluntary contract to capitalize all of one's labor is now abolished: Since slavery was abolished, human earning power is forbidden by law to be capitalized. A man is not even free to sell himself; he must rent himself at a wage (Samuelson 1976, p. 52). 9 Individual Alienation Contracts: The Coverture Marriage Contract Another historical example of a personal alienation contract is the coverture marriage contract that "identified" the legal personality of the wife with that of the husband: By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything; and is therefore called in our law-French, a feme covert, and is said to be under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture (Blackstone 1959 (1765), section on husband and wife). The baron–femme relationship established by the coverture marriage contract exemplified the identity fiction in past domestic law. A female was to pass from the cover of her father to the cover of her husband (the origin of today's vestiges where the bride's father "gives away" the bride to the groom and the bride takes the groom's family name)-always a "femme covert" instead of the anomalous "femme sole." The identity fiction for the baron–femme relation was that "the husband and wife are one person in law" with the implicit or explicit rider, "and that one person is the husband." A wife could own property and make contracts, but only in the name of her husband. Obedience counted as "fulfilling" the Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism [email protected] 12 contract to have the wife's legal personality subsumed under and identified with that of the husband. Collective Alienation Contracts: The Hobbesian Pactum Subjectionis Democracy is not merely "government based on the consent of the governed," since that consent might be to a pact of subjection or pactum subjectionis, wherein people alienate (not delegate) their decision-making sovereignty to a ruler. The political constitution of subjection (which turns a citizen into a subject) finds its classic expression in Hobbes, but the idea of an implicit or explicit non-democratic constitution again goes back to Antiquity. Again we may begin the intellectual history with Roman law. The sovereignty of the Roman emperor was usually seen as being founded on a contract of rulership enacted by the Roman people. The Roman jurist Ulpian gave the classic and oft-quoted statement of this view in the Institutes of Justinian (1948): Whatever has pleased the prince has the force of law, since the Roman people by the lex regia enacted concerning his imperium, have yielded up to him all their power and authority.10 The American constitutional scholar Edward S. Corwin noted the questions that arose in the Middle Ages about the nature of this pact: During the Middle Ages the question was much debated whether the lex regia effected an absolute alienation (translatio) of the legislative power to the Emperor, or was a revocable delegation (cessio). The champions of popular sovereignty at the end of this period, like Marsiglio of Padua in his Defensor Pacis, took the latter view (Corwin 1955, p. 4, fn. 8). It is precisely this question of translatio or concessio-alienation or delegation of the right of government in the contract-that is the key question, not consent versus coercion. Consent is on both sides of that alienation (translatio) versus delegation (concessio) framing of the quesD. P. Ellerman [email protected] 13 tion-and thus the later Buchanan moved beyond the calculus of consent (1962) to the additional requirement that people remain the principals who only delegate their decision-making authority. The alienation version of the contract became a sophisticated tacit contract defense of non-democratic government wherever the latter existed as a settled condition. And the delegation version of the contract became the foundation for democratic theory. The German legal thinker Otto von Gierke (1841–1921) was quite clear about the alienation-versus-delegation question: This dispute also reaches far back into the Middle Ages. It first took a strictly juristic form in the dispute ... as to the legal nature of the ancient "translatio imperii" from the Roman people to the Princeps. One school explained this as a definitive and irrevocable alienation of power, the other as a mere concession of its use and exercise. ... On the one hand from the people's abdication the most absolute sovereignty of the prince might be deduced, .... On the other hand the assumption of a mere "concessio imperii" led to the doctrine of popular sovereignty (Gierke 1966, pp. 93–94). A state of government which had been settled for many years was seen as being legitimated by the tacit consent of the people. Thomas Aquinas (1225–74) expressed the canonical medieval view: Aquinas had laid it down in his Summary of Theology that, although the consent of the people is essential in order to establish a legitimate political society, the act of instituting a ruler always involves the citizens in alienating-rather than merely delegating-their original sovereign authority (Skinner 1978, Vol. I, p. 62). In about 1310, according to Gierke, "Engelbert of Volkersdorf is the first to declare in a general way that all regna et principatus originated in a pactum subjectionis which satisfied a natural want and instinct" (1958, p. 146). Indeed, at least by the late Middle Ages, there was developed a doctrine which taught that the State had a rightful beginning in a Contract of Subjection to which the People was party .... Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism [email protected] 14 Indeed that the legal title to all Rulership lies in the voluntary and contractual submission of the Ruled could therefore be propounded as a philosophic axiom (Gierke 1958, pp. 38–40). That idea passed over into the alienable natural law tradition. After noting that an individual could sell himself into slavery under Hebrew and Roman law, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) extends the possibility to the political level: Now if an individual may do so, why may not a whole people, for the benefit of better government and more certain protection, completely transfer their sovereign rights to one or more persons, without reserving any portion to themselves? (Grotius 1901 (1625), p. 63). Thomas Hobbes made the best-known attempt to found nondemocratic government on the consent of the governed. Without an overarching power to hold people in awe, life would be a constant war of all against all. To prevent this state of chaos and strife, men should join together and voluntarily alienate and transfer the right of selfgovernment to a person or body of persons as the sovereign. This pactum subjectionis would be a covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man, I authorize and give up my right of governing myself to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that you give up your right to him and authorize all his actions in like manner (Hobbes 1958 (1651), p. 142). The consent-based contractarian tradition is brought fully up to date in Robert Nozick's contemporary libertarian defense of the contract to alienate one's right of self-determination to a "dominant protective association." In view of this history of apologetics for autocracy based on consent, the conventional distinction between coercion and government based on the "consent of the governed" was not the key to democratic theory. The real debate was within the sphere of consent and was between the alienation (translatio) and delegation (concessio) versions of the basic social or political D. P. Ellerman [email protected] 15 constitution. Late medieval thinkers such as Marsilius of Padua (1275–1342) and Bartolus of Saxoferrato (1314–57) laid some of the foundations for democratic theory in the distinction between consent that establishes a relation of delegation versus consent to an alienation of authority: The theory of popular sovereignty developed by Marsiglio (Marsilius) and Bartolus was destined to play a major role in shaping the most radical version of early modern constitutionalism. Already they are prepared to argue that sovereignty lies with the people, that they only delegate and never alienate it, and thus that no legitimate ruler can ever enjoy a higher status than that of an official appointed by, and capable of being dismissed by, his own subjects (Skinner 1978, Vol. I, p. 65). As Marsilius put it: The aforesaid whole body of citizens or the weightier part thereof is the legislator regardless of whether it makes the law directly by itself or entrusts the making of it to some person or persons, who are not and cannot be the legislator in the absolute sense, but only in a relative sense and for a particular time and in accordance with the authority of the primary legislator (Marsilius 1980 (1324), p. 45). According to Bartolus, the citizens "constitute their own princeps," so any authority held by their rulers and magistrates "is only delegated to them (concessum est) by the sovereign body of the people" (Skinner 1978, Vol. I, p. 62). Quentin Skinner, writing in the civic republican tradition, continually emphasized the alienation-versus-delegation theme in his two volumes, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (1978). Yet other modern intellectual historians, such as Jonathan Israel (e.g., 2010) writing in more the conventional liberal tradition, have covered the same history of democratic thought and yet ignore the alienation-versus-delegation theme11 in favor of the emphasis on the consent of the governed as if that were sufficient to entail democratic government.12 This is in spite of Gierke pointing out that at least by the late Middle Ages, it was "propounded as a philosophic axiom" that "the legal title to all Rulership lies in the voluntary and contractual submission of the Ruled." Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism [email protected] 16 This highlights the importance of James Buchanan, in his mature work, of seeing classical liberalism as requiring social-organizational arrangements that are not only voluntary but have people remaining as sovereigns or as principals only delegating their decision-making authority. That establishes a theoretical bond between classical liberalism and democracy: To Plato there are natural slaves and natural masters, with the consequences that follow for social organization, be it economic or political. To Adam Smith, by contrast, who is in this as in other aspects the archetype classical liberal, the philosopher and the porter are natural equals with observed differences readily explainable by culture and choice (Buchanan 2005, p. 67). This natural equality means the sovereigns-or-principals principle would apply to all and thus would rule out governance arrangements based on a voluntary contract of alienation of governance rights: The postulate of natural equality carries with it the requirement that genuine classical liberals adhere to democratic principles of governance; political equality as a necessary norm makes us all small 'd' democrats (Buchanan 2005, p. 69). This implication of Buchanan's version of democratic classical liberalism exposes a fault line that runs through today's classical liberal and libertarian thinkers. For instance, it would rule out the non-democratic governance contract to be agreed to "for the benefit of better government and more certain protection" by voluntarily moving to a charter city, a startup city, a shareholder state, or a seastead city-all of which are widely supported by free-market thinkers along classical liberal, libertarian, or Austrian lines: (I)f one starts a private town, on land whose acquisition did not and does not violate the Lockean proviso (of non-aggression), persons who chose to move there or later remain there would have no right to a say in how the town was run, unless it was granted to them by the decision procedures for the town which the owner had established (Nozick 1974, p. 270). D. P. Ellerman [email protected] 17 The libertarian bottom line is that government must be based on consent which includes the possibility of exit when consent is withdrawn. Libertarianism is, of course, not against democratic government; the point is that democracy is only one choice among other consent-based rule-of-law governments. The point is that there should be a "democratizing choice of law, governance, and regulation"13 which includes wellregulated non-democratic enclaves like old Hong Kong and new Dubai. Libertarian models of consent-based non-democratic municipal or state governments include the notion of "free cities" or "startup cities," proprietary cities, Patri Friedman's floating seastead cities, Paul Romer's charter cities, or "shareholder states" (Tyler Cowen's phrase) all of which see the resident-subjects as having agreed to a pactum subjectionis as evidenced by their voluntary decision to move to and remain in the city or state (assuming free exit). The philosophical defense of charter/startup cities (e.g., Freiman 2013) also applies the solely economic way of thinking to the piecemeal voluntary alienation of decision-making in the selling of votes: Under normal conditions voluntary economic exchange is ex ante mutually beneficial. A trade is not consummated unless both parties expect to benefit. I will exchange a quarter for an apple only if I value the apple more than the quarter and an apple seller will exchange an apple for my quarter only if she values the quarter more than the apple. The same analysis applies to votes. I'll sell my vote for n dollars only if I value n dollars more than my vote and the buyer will buy my vote for n dollars only if she values my vote more than n dollars. All things equal, vote markets leave both buyers and sellers better off (Freiman 2014, p. 3).14 Inalienable Rights: Minimum Constraints on the Economic Way of Thinking The Self-Sale Contract and the Pactum Subjectionis We have seen that the debate about slavery and non-democratic government was not a simple consent-versus-coercion debate. From Antiquity down to the present, there were consent-based arguments for slavery and Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism [email protected] 18 autocracy as being founded on certain explicit or implicit contracts. The abolitionist and democratic movements needed to answer not just the worst but the "best" arguments based on explicit or implicit voluntary contracts. In contrast to the faux "liberal doctrine of inalienable rights" developed by Locke, Blackstone, and Montesquieu, the abolitionist and democratic movements developed arguments that there was something inherently invalid in the voluntary alienation contracts-even there might be mutual benefits, and thus that the rights which these contracts pretended to alienate were in fact inalienable. The theory of inalienable rights gives minimum constraints on the economic-way-of-thinking arguments applied to personal alienation contracts such as the voluntary self-sale contract and the collective pact of subjection (and, one might add, the coverture marriage contract) which are already abolished. The key is that in consenting to such an alienation contract, a person is agreeing to, in effect, take on the legal role of a non-adult, indeed, a nonperson or thing. Yet all the consent in the world would not in fact turn an adult into a minor or person of diminished capacity, not to mention, turn a person into a thing. The most the person could do was obey the master, sovereign, or employer-and the authorities would "count" that as fulfilling the contract. Then all the legal rights and obligations would be assigned according to the "contract" (as if the person in fact had diminished or no capacity). But since the person remained a de facto fully capacitated adult person with only the legal-contractual role of a non-person, the contract was impossible and invalid. A system of positive law that accepted such contracts was only a legalized fraud on an institutional scale. Applying this argument requires prior analysis to tell when a contract puts a person in the legal role of a non-person. Having the role of a nonperson is not necessarily explicit in the contract and it has nothing to do with the payment in the contract, the incompleteness of the contract, or the like. Persons and things can be distinguished on the basis of decisionmaking and responsibility. For instance, a genuine thing such as a tool like a shovel can be alienated or transferred from person A to B. Person A, the owner of the tool, can indeed give up making decisions about the use of the tool and person B can take over making those decisions. Person A does not have the responsibility for the consequences of the employment of the tool by person B. Person B makes the decisions about using D. P. Ellerman [email protected] 19 the tool and has the de facto responsibility for the results of that use. Thus a contract to sell or rent a tool such as a shovel from A to B can actually be fulfilled. The decision-making and responsibility for employing the tool can in fact be transferred or alienated from A to B. But now replace the tool by person A himself or herself. Suppose that the contract was for person A to sell or rent himself or herself to person B-as if a person was a transferable or alienable instrument that could be "employed" by another person like a shovel might be employed by others. The pactum subjectionis is a collective version of such a contract but it is easier to understand the individualistic version. The contract could be perfectly voluntary. For whatever reason and compensation, person A is willing to take on the legal role of a talking instrument (to use Aristotle's phrase). But the person A cannot in fact transfer decision-making or responsibility over his or her own actions to B. The point is not that a person should not or ought not do it or that the person is not paid enough; the point is that a person cannot in fact make such a voluntary transfer. At most, person A can agree to cooperate with B by doing what B says-even if B's instructions are quite complete. But that is no alienation or transference of decision-making or responsibility. Person A is still inexorably involved in ratifying B's decisions and person A inextricably shares the de facto responsibility for the results of A's and B's joint activity-as everyone recognizes in the case of a hired criminal. Yet a legal system could "validate" such a (non-criminous) contract and could "count" obedience to the master or sovereign as "fulfilling" the contract and then rights are structured as if it were actually fulfilled, that is, as if the person were actually of diminished or no capacity. But such an institutionalized fraud always has one revealing moment when anyone can see the legal fiction behind the system. That is when the legalized "thing" would commit a crime. Then the "thing" would be suddenly metamorphosed-in the eyes of the law-back into being a person to be held legally responsible for the crime. For instance, an ante-bellum Alabama court asserted that slaves are rational beings, they are capable of committing crimes; and in reference to acts which are crimes, are regarded as persons. Because they are slaves, they are ... incapable of performing civil acts, and, in reference to all such, they are things, not persons (Catterall 1926, p. 247). Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism [email protected] 20 Since there was no legal theory that slaves physically became things in their "civil acts," the fiction involved in treating the slaves as "things" was clear. And this is a question of the facts about human nature, facts that are unchanged by consent or contract. If the slave had acquired that legal role in a voluntary contract, it would not change the fact that the contractual slave remained a de facto person with the law only "counting" the contractual slave's non-criminous obedience as "fulfilling" the contract to play the legal role of a non-responsible entity, a non-person or thing. The Self-Rental Contract The surprising and controversial result is that the inalienability argument applies as well to the self-rental contract-that is, today's employment contract-as to the self-sale contract or pact of subjection.15 I can certainly voluntarily agree to a contract to be "employed" by an "employer" on a longor short-term basis, but I cannot in fact "transfer" my own actions for the long or short term. The factual inalienability of responsible human action and decision-making is independent of the duration of the contract. That factual inalienability is also independent of the compensation paid in the contract-which is why this inalienability analysis has nothing to do with exploitation theories of either the Marxian variety (extracting more labor time than is embodied in the wages) or neoclassical variety (paying wages less than the value of the marginal productivity of labor). Where the legal system "validates" such contracts, it must fictitiously "count" one's inextricably co-responsible cooperation with the "employer" as fulfilling the employment contract-unless, of course, the employer and employee commit a crime together. The servant in work then morphs into the co-responsible partner in crime: All who participate in a crime with a guilty intent are liable to punishment. A master and servant who so participate in a crime are liable criminally, not because they are master and servant, but because they jointly carried out a criminal venture and are both criminous (Batt 1967, p. 612). When the "venture" being "jointly carried out" by the employer and employee is not criminous, then the facts about human responsibility are unchanged. But then the fiction takes over. The joint venture or partnerD. P. Ellerman [email protected] 21 ship is transformed into the employer's sole venture. The employee is legally transformed from being a co-responsible partner to being only an input supplier sharing no legal responsibility for either the input liabilities or the produced outputs of the employer's business. Some Intellectual History of Inalienable Rights Where has this key insight-that a person cannot voluntarily fit the legal role of a non-person (e.g., the de facto inalienability of responsible agency)- erupted in the history of thought? The Ancients did not see this matter clearly. For Aristotle, slavery was based on "fact"; some adults were seen as being inherently of diminished capacity if not as "talking instruments" marked for slavery "from the hour of their birth." Treating them as slaves was no more inappropriate for Aristotle than treating a donkey as a non-person. The Stoics held the radically different view that no one was a slave by their nature; slavery was an external condition juxtaposed to the internal freedom of the soul. After being essentially lost during the Middle Ages, the Stoic doctrine that the "inner part cannot be delivered into bondage" (Davis 1966, p. 77) re-emerged in the Reformation doctrine of liberty of conscience. Secular authorities who try to compel belief can only secure external conformity: Besides, the blind, wretched folk do not see how utterly hopeless and impossible a thing they are attempting. For no matter how much they fret and fume, they cannot do more than make people obey them by word or deed; the heart they cannot constrain, though they wear themselves out trying. For the proverb is true, "Thoughts are free." Why then would they constrain people to believe from the heart, when they see that it is impossible? (Luther 1942 (1523), p. 316). Martin Luther was explicit about the de facto element; it was "impossible" to "constrain people to believe from the heart.": Furthermore, every man is responsible for his own faith, and he must see it for himself that he believes rightly. As little as another can go to hell or heaven for me, so little can he believe or disbelieve for me; and as little as he can open or shut heaven or hell for me, so little can he drive me to faith Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism [email protected] 22 or unbelief. Since, then, belief or unbelief is a matter of every one's conscience, and since this is no lessening of the secular power, the latter should be content and attend to its own affairs and permit men to believe one thing or another, as they are able and willing, and constrain no one by force (ibid.). Although an atheist and a Jew, it was perhaps Benedict de Spinoza (1632–1677) who first translated the Protestant doctrine of the inalienability of conscience into the political notion of a right that could not be ceded "even with consent." In Spinoza's 1670 Theologico-Political Treatise, he spelled out the essentials of the inalienable rights argument: However, we have shown already (Chapter XVII) that no man's mind can possibly lie wholly at the disposition of another, for no one can willingly transfer his natural right of free reason and judgment, or be compelled so to do. For this reason government which attempts to control minds is accounted tyrannical, and it is considered an abuse of sovereignty and a usurpation of the rights of subjects, to seek to prescribe what shall be accepted as true, or rejected as false, or what opinions should actuate men in their worship of God. All these questions fall within a man's natural right, which he cannot abdicate even with consent (Spinoza 1951, p. 257). But it was Francis Hutcheson (1694–1746), the predecessor of Adam Smith in the chair in moral philosophy in Glasgow and one of the leading moral philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, who (independently?) arrived at the same idea in the form that was to later enter the political lexicon through the American Declaration of Independence. Although intimated in earlier works (1725), the inalienability argument is best developed in Hutcheson's influential A System of Moral Philosophy: Our rights are either alienable, or unalienable. The former are known by these two characters jointly, that the translation of them to others can be made effectually, and that some interest of society, or individuals consistently with it, may frequently require such translations. Thus our right to our goods and labours is naturally alienable. But where either the translation cannot be made with any effect, or where no good in human life requires it, the right is unalienable, and cannot be justly claimed by any other but the person originally possessing it (Hutcheson 1755, p. 261). D. P. Ellerman [email protected] 23 Hutcheson appeals to the inalienability argument in addition to utility. He contrasts de facto alienable goods where "the translation of them to others can be made effectually" (like the aforementioned shovel) with factually inalienable faculties where "the translation cannot be made with any effect." This was not just some outpouring of moral emotions that one should not alienate this or that basic right. Hutcheson actually set forth a theory which could have legs of its own far beyond Hutcheson's (not to mention Luther's) intent. He based the theory on what in fact could or could not be transferred or alienated from one person to another. Hutcheson goes on to show how the "right of private judgment" is inalienable: Thus no man can really change his sentiments, judgments, and inward affections, at the pleasure of another; nor can it tend to any good to make him profess what is contrary to his heart. The right of private judgment is therefore unalienable (Hutcheson 1755, pp. 261–62). Democratic theory carried over this theory from the inalienability of conscience to a critique of the Hobbesian pactum subjectionis, the contract to alienate and transfer the right of self-determination as if it were a property right that could be transferred from a people to a sovereign: There is, at least, one right that cannot be ceded or abandoned: the right to personality. Arguing upon this principle the most influential writers on politics in the seventeenth century rejected the conclusions drawn by Hobbes. They charged the great logician with a contradiction in terms. If a man could give up his personality he would cease being a moral being. ... This fundamental right, the right to personality, includes in a sense all the others. To maintain and to develop his personality is a universal right. It ... cannot, therefore, be transferred from one individual to another. ... There is no pactum subjectionis, no act of submission by which man can give up the state of a free agent and enslave himself (Cassirer 1963, p. 175). Few have seen these connections as clearly as Staughton Lynd in his Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism (1969). When commenting on Hutcheson's theory, Lynd noted that when "rights were termed 'unalienable' in this sense, it did not mean that they could not be transferred without consent, but that their nature made them untransferrable" Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism [email protected] 24 (Lynd 1969, p. 45).16 The crucial link was to go from the de facto inalienable liberty of conscience to a theory of inalienable rights based on the same idea: Like the mind's quest for religious truth from which it was derived, selfdetermination was not a claim to ownership which might be both acquired and surrendered, but an inextricable aspect of the activity of being human. (Lynd 1969, pp. 56–57) In the American Declaration of Independence, "Jefferson took his division of rights into alienable and unalienable from Hutcheson, who made the distinction popular and important" (Wills 1979, p. 213). But the theory behind the notion of inalienable rights was lost in the transition from the Scottish Enlightenment to the slave-holding society of ante-bellum America. The phraseology of "inalienable rights" is a staple in our political culture, for example, our 4th of July rhetoric, but the original theory of inalienability has been largely ignored or forgotten (Fig. 2).17 Fig. 2 Reframing that separates non-democratic and democratic classical liberalism D. P. Ellerman [email protected] 25 The Implications for Today's SocialOrganizational Structures After this long "detour" through intellectual history, we must return to the main theme of how the virtues of individual self-regarding activity in the marketplace might generalize to the virtues of collective activity by people in their own organizations. We have taken James M. Buchanan's description of the normative basis for classical liberalism as the framework to apply to the theme. We have also noted that Buchanan's mature thought moved beyond the mere calculus of consent in the solely economic way of thinking to the stronger requirement that people always remain sovereign or principals who only delegate decision-making authority. And we have noted how Buchanan's strictures implied democratic self-governance in contrast to the currents of right-libertarianism and Austrian thought that accept the consent of the governed to nondemocratic governance, for example, startup cities. In many modern discussions of associative and deliberative democracy (e.g., in the tradition of Tocqueville), there is a curious "dog that didn't bark." The emphasis is rightly on the associative activities of citizens who come together for discussion, dialogue, deliberation, and responsible action to address problems that they cannot resolve at the level of the individual or the family. People create many associations for collective action: church groups, charities, issue-oriented non-profits, unions, social clubs, hobby groups, political parties, and ad hoc special-purpose groups. People might participate after-hours in these various Tocquevillean associations to try to accomplish together what they cannot accomplish individually. But that list of non-governmental associations leaves out the one organization that dominates most people's lives outside the family, namely, the workplace.18 That lacuna corresponds to the curious classification of non-governmental organizations into the second sector of private workplace organizations and the third sector of "non-profit" organizations. Of course, some people work for themselves or in small family firms so those workplaces are only a marginal extension of family life. But most people work in larger organizations requiring the concerted associated Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism [email protected] 26 activities of many non-family members. These work organizations provide the primary sites, outside the family, where people acquire mental habits and social skills and where they engage in effective collective activities. Almost all workplaces are organized on the basis of the employment contract. In common usage, to have an income-producing job is to be "employed." Indeed, Ronald Coase (1910–2013) identifies the nature of the firm with the "legal relationship normally called that of 'master and servant' or 'employer and employee'" (1937, p. 403).19 In the employment contract, the employees are not Buchanan's principals; they do not delegate decision-making authority to the employer. The employer is not the representative or delegate of the employees; the employer does not manage the organization in the name of those who are managed. The employees are not directly or indirectly part of the decisionmaking group; the employees have alienated and transferred to the employer the discretionary decision-making rights over their activities within the scope of the employment contract. In short, the employment contract is the limited pactum subjectionis of the workplace. The form of workplace organization that would satisfy the strictures of Buchanan's liberalism is one where all the people working in a firm are the members or workplace citizens. That requires re-constituting the corporation as a democratic organization; the workplace citizens are the principals who only delegate decision-making authority to the managers. Two Earlier Liberal Philosophers John Stuart Mill To see the context and corroboration for Buchanan's normative framework, we might consider the work of two earlier liberal philosophers, John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) and John Dewey. Mill argued that social institutions should be judged in large part by the degree to which they "promote the general mental advancement of the community, including under that phrase advancement in intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency" (Mill 1972, Chapter 6). D. P. Ellerman [email protected] 27 Mill saw government by discussion as an "agency of national education" and mentioned "the practice of the dicastery and the ecclesia" in ancient Athens as institutions that developed the active political capabilities of the citizens. In his Principles of Political Economy, Mill considered how the form of work would affect those capabilities and how the workplace association could become a school for the civic virtues if it progressed beyond the employment relation: But if public spirit, generous sentiments, or true justice and equality are desired, association, not isolation, of interests, is the school in which these excellences are nurtured. The aim of improvement should be not solely to place human beings in a condition in which they will be able to do without one another, but to enable them to work with or for one another in relations not involving dependence (Mill 1899, Book IV, Chapter VII). Previously those who lived by labor and were not individually selfemployed would have to work "for a master," that is, would not be a principal in their work activity:20 But the civilizing and improving influences of association, ..., may be obtained without dividing the producers into two parties with hostile interests and feelings, the many who do the work being mere servants under the command of the one who supplies the funds, and having no interest of their own in the enterprise except to earn their wages with as little labor as possible (Mill 1899, Book IV, Chapter VII). One halfway house in this direction would be various forms of association between capital and labor: The form of association, however, which if mankind continue to improve, must be expected in the end to predominate, is not that which can exist between a capitalist as chief, and workpeople without a voice in the management, but the association of the labourers themselves on terms of equality, collectively owning the capital with which they carry on their operations, and working under managers elected and removable by themselves (Mill 1899, Book IV, Chapter VII). Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism [email protected] 28 Under this form of cooperation, Mill sees an increase in the productivity of work since the workers then have the enterprise as "their principle and their interest.": It is scarcely possible to rate too highly this material benefit, which yet is as nothing compared with the moral revolution in society that would accompany it: the healing of the standing feud between capital and labour; the transformation of human life, from a conflict of classes struggling for opposite interests, to a friendly rivalry in the pursuit of a good common to all; the elevation of the dignity of labour; a new sense of security and independence in the labouring class; and the conversion of each human being's daily occupation into a school of the social sympathies and the practical intelligence (Mill 1899, Book IV, Chapter VII). What Mill sees as happening in the democratic workplace echoes what he earlier found in Tocqueville's description of the educational effect of the New England township. In Tocqueville's words: Nevertheless local assemblies of citizens constitute the strength of free nations. Town-meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people's reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it. A nation may establish a system of free government, but without the spirit of municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty (Tocqueville 1961, Chap. V, p. 55). As Mill expanded on the point: In this system of municipal self-government, coeval with the first settlement of the American colonies...our author (Tocqueville) beholds the principal instrument of that political education of the people, which alone enables a popular government to maintain itself, or renders it desirable that it should. It is a fundamental principle in his political philosophy, as it has long been in ours, that only by the habit of superintending their local interests can that diffusion of intelligence and mental activity, as applied to their joint concerns, take place among the mass of the people, which can qualify them to superintend with steadiness or consistency the proceedings of their government, or to exercise any power in national affairs except by fits, and as tools in the hands of others (Mill 1961 (1835), p. xvii). D. P. Ellerman [email protected] 29 John Dewey A century later, John Dewey emphasized the formative implications of people's daily activity in an industrial society: For illustration, I do not need to do more than point to the moral, emotional and intellectual effect upon both employers and laborers of the existing industrial system. ... I suppose that every one who reflects upon the subject admits that it is impossible that the ways in which activities are carried on for the greater part of the waking hours of the day, and the way in which the share of individuals are involved in the management of affairs in such a matter as gaining a livelihood and attaining material and social security, can not but be a highly important factor in shaping personal dispositions; in short, forming character and intelligence (Dewey in: Ratner 1939, pp. 716–17). Do these primary sites for outside-the-family socialization and development foster the virtues of associative democracy? While "democratic social organization make provision for this direct participation in control: in the economic region, control remains external and autocratic" (Dewey 1916, p. 260), [c]ontrol of industry is from the top downwards, not from the bottom upwards. The greater number of persons engaged in shops and factories are "subordinates." They are used to receiving orders from their superiors and acting as passive organs of transmission and execution. They have no active part in making plans or forming policies-the function comparable to the legislative in government-nor in adjudicating disputes which arise. In short their mental habits are unfit for accepting the intellectual responsibilities involved in political self-government (Dewey and Tufts 1932, pp. 392–393). From his earliest writings in 1888 to his mature years, Dewey's liberalism saw democracy as a norm applicable to all spheres of human activity, not just to the political sphere: (Democracy) is but a name for the fact that human nature is developed only when its elements take part in directing things which are common, Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism [email protected] 30 things for the sake of which man and women form groups-families, industrial companies, governments, churches, scientific associations and so on. The principle holds as much of one form of association, say in industry and commerce, as it does in government (Dewey 1948, p. 209). It should not be too much of a surprise that the normative framework of James M. Buchanan's classical liberalism has the same implications for Tocqueville's "science of associations" in this regard as Mill and Dewey21 even though the full implications were not explicitly drawn.22 Re-constitutionalizing the Corporation People are involved in effective collective action all day long in their work associations. But today the structure of most companies of any size- namely, the employment relation with the "employer" being the absentee "owners" on the stock market-institutionalizes irresponsibility by disconnecting the far-flung shareholders from the social and environmental impact of their "corporate governance."23 Or viewed the other way around, that employment structure prevents the local managers and staff in widely held companies from being the principals to use the main outsidethe-family organizational involvement to address local problems. That institutionalized irresponsibility in turn increases the need for a stronger third sector to address the resulting social problems. There have been a few social commentators who have pointed out the institutionalized irresponsibility of the absentee-owned joint stock corporation. In his 1961 book aptly entitled The Responsible Company, George Goyder quoted a striking passage from Lord Eustace Percy's Riddell Lectures in 1944: Here is the most urgent challenge to political invention ever offered to the jurist and the statesman. The human association which in fact produces and distributes wealth, the association of workmen, managers, technicians and directors, is not an association recognised by the law. The association which the law does recognise-the association of shareholders, creditors and directors-is incapable of production and is not expected by the law to D. P. Ellerman [email protected] 31 perform these functions. We have to give law to the real association, and to withdraw meaningless privilege from the imaginary one (Percy 1944, p. 38; quoted in Goyder 1961, p. 57). This elemental solution re-constitutionalizes the corporation so that the "human association which in fact produces and distributes wealth" is recognized in law as the legal corporation where the ownership/membership in the company would be assigned to the "workmen, managers, technicians and directors" who work in the company. Conclusion That would change everything-including essentially abolishing much of the distinction between the second sector and the third sector. The natural site of collective action for people to address their own community problems would be where people are involved in effective collective action all day long: their work organization. When firms are organized as workplace democracies, then that is the natural generalization of sovereign individuals acting in the marketplace-so ably described in the classical liberal economic way of thinking-to associated individuals acting as the principals in their own organizations. Notes 1. The phrase "external organization" does not apply to associations where people join together to apply their collective efficacy to address some problems of their own; it applies to organizations, particularly those with a paid staff, tasked to help others. The aim of a helping agency should be to do itself out of a job-which is rather difficult for a professionally staffed organization of any type. See Ellerman (2005) for a development of this theme along with a philosophical analysis of why it is so difficult for such external helping organizations to actually "help people help themselves." 2. See Laslett (1960), notes on §24, pp. 325–26. Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism [email protected] 32 3. Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone are not arbitrary choices. When discussing Adam Smith's classical liberalism, Frank Knight noted: "Interestingly enough, the political and legal theory had been stated in a series of classics, well in advance of the formulation of the economic theory by Smith. The leading names are, of course, Locke, Montesquieu, and Blackstone" (Knight 1947, p. 27, fn. 4). 4. For more of this development, see Ellerman (1992 or 2010). 5. It is a re-validation since in the decade prior to the Civil War, there was explicit legislation in six states "to permit a free Negro to become a slave voluntarily" (Gray 1958, p. 527; quoted in Philmore 1982, p. 47). For instance in Louisiana, legislation was passed in 1859 "which would enable free persons of color to voluntarily select masters and become slaves for life" (Sterkx 1972, p. 149). 6. David Boaz (2011) reports that Tom Palmer said that David Schmidtz said at a Cato Institute forum in 2002 that: Nozick told him that his alleged "apostasy" was mainly about rejecting the idea that to have a right is necessarily to have the right to alienate it, a thesis that he had reconsidered, on the basis of which reconsideration he concluded that some rights had to be inalienable. That represents, not a movement away from libertarianism, but a shift toward the mainstream of libertarian thought. In his own book on libertarian theory, Palmer traces the "mainstream of libertarian thought" (2009, p. 457) about inalienable rights back to Locke's treatment. 7. See, for example, Genovese (1971), Wish (1960), or Fitzhugh (1960). 8. For a more complete story, see Philmore (1982) or Ellerman (2010). 9. This may seem an unusual use of "rent" but "hiring a car" in the U. K. and "renting a car" in the U.S. are the same thing. As Paul Samuelson (1915–2009) goes on to explain: One can even say that wages are the rentals paid for the use of a man's personal services for a day or a week or a year. This may seem a strange use of terms, but on second thought, one recognizes that every agreement to hire labor is really for some limited period of time. By outright purchase, you might avoid ever renting any kind of land. But in our society, labor is one of the few productive factors that cannot legally be bought outright. Labor can only be rented, and the wage rate is really a rental (1976, p. 569). D. P. Ellerman [email protected] 33 10. Institutes, Lib. I, Tit. II, 6; Quoted in: Corwin (1955, p. 4). 11. Often the liberal literature just fudges or ignores the alienation-versusdelegation distinction by describing either type of contract as "giving up rights" to the government or as establishing "hierarchy." 12. Again, this follows the intellectual pattern set by Locke who had no genuine inalienable rights theory to counter Hobbes so he ignored Hobbes and took Robert Filmer (1588–1653) as his foil since Filmer's patriarchal theory (1680) did not require the consent of the governed anymore that the father's governance over his children requires the consent of the children. 13. This phrase was used without apparent irony in an earlier version of the free cities website. In the current version of the startup cities site, the phrase is "democratizing access to law and governance." Even though the subjects have no vote, the startup cities nevertheless have "democratic accountability by giving people the ability to raise their voice through the power of exit." 14. See also: http://bleedingheartlibertarians.com/2014/03/vote-markets/. As James Tobin grudgingly noted: "Any good second year graduate student in economics could write a short examination paper proving that voluntary transactions in votes would increase the welfare of the sellers as well as the buyers" (Tobin 1970, p. 269; quoted in: Ellerman 1992, p. 100). 15. This has generated a minor industry of thinkers who develop ad hoc arguments against the perpetual service contract (e.g., the rule against perpetuities supposedly rules out all "till death do us part" contracts) but not against the time-limited person rental contract. These arguments are dealt with from a Nozickian perspective by J. Philmore who concludes with what libertarians would take as a reductio ad absurdum: "Any thorough and decisive critique of voluntary slavery or constitutional nondemocratic government would carry over to the employment contract-which is the voluntary contractual basis for the free market free enterprise system" (1982, p. 55). 16. The fact that the inalienability of conscience was rooted in the aspects of personhood that do not change with consent or contract was expressed with great clarity by the New Light minister Elisha Williams in 1744: No action is a religious action without understanding and choice in the agent. Whence it follows, the rights of conscience are sacred and equal in all, and strictly speaking unalienable. This right of judging Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism [email protected] 34 every one for himself in matters of religion result from the nature of man, and is so inseperably connected therewith, that a man can no more part with it than he can with his power of thinking: and it is equally reasonable for him to attempt to strip himself of the power of reasoning, as to attempt the vesting of another with this right. And whoever invades this right of another, be he pope or Caesar, may with equal reason assume the other's power of thinking, and so level him with the brutal creation. A man may alienate some branches of his property and give up his right in them to others; but he cannot transfer the right of conscience, unless he could destroy his rational and moral powers (Williams 1998, p. 62). See also Smith (2013, pp. 88–94) on inalienability which includes references to Williams. 17. These and related "forgotten" ideas are developed at book length with a focus on economic theory in Ellerman (1992) which was published in a series co-edited by the late neo-Austrian economist, Don Lavoie, who described the theory in his acceptance letter as follows: The book's radical re-interpretation of property and contract is, I think, among the most powerful critiques of mainstream economics ever developed. It undermines the neoclassical way of thinking about property by articulating a theory of inalienable rights, and constructs out of this perspective a 'labor theory of property' which is as different from Marx's labor theory of value as it is from neoclassicism. It traces roots of such ideas in some fascinating and largely forgotten strands of the history of economics. It draws attention to the question of 'responsibility' which neoclassicism has utterly lost sight of. ...It constitutes a better case for its economic democracy viewpoint than anything else in the literature (Lavoie 1991, pp. 1–2). 18. Cornuelle (1991) is a welcome exception to the rule. 19. The older name of the relation was the "master-servant" relation but, aside from a few law books on agency law that use the "master-servant" language as technical terms (e.g., Batt 1967), that usage was slowly replaced in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century with the Newspeak terms of "employer" and "employee." 20. Kant considered working for a master in the master-servant relation as being so subordinating as to disqualify one for a civic personality. D. P. Ellerman [email protected] 35 Apprentices to merchants or tradesmen, servants who are not employed by the state, minors (naturaliter vel civiliter), women in general and all those who are obligated to depend for their living (i.e., food and protection) on the offices of others (excluding the state)- all of these people have no civil personality,.... (Kant 1991 (1797), p. 126, Section 46). 21. Note how the implications of Buchanan's principals principle gives essentially the same results as Dewey's democratic "principle (that) holds as much of one form of association, say in industry and commerce, as it does in government." 22. This is much like Jefferson and the Founding Fathers who enunciated the principle of inalienable rights, but did not apply it to the peculiar institution of their time. 23. As was noted long ago (for example, Scitovsky 1951), there is no reason for the entrepreneur or family firm to take profits as the sole maximizing goal (although costs, of course, have to be covered for long-term sustainability). But with scattered absentee owners, profit seems to be the only thing that they can agree on in general. Hence profit maximization has been canonized as "the goal" of the firm when in fact it is only an artifact of a particular organizational form. References Batt, Francis. 1967. The Law of Master and Servant. London: Pitman. Blackstone, William. 1959 (1765). Ehrlich's Blackstone. New York: Capricorn Books. Boaz, David. 2011. Misunderstanding Nozick, Again, Cato at Liberty (June 20, 2011). http://www.cato.org/blog/misunderstanding-nozick-again. Retrieved May 15, 2014. Bryan, Edward B. 1858. Letters to the Southern People. Charleston: Press of Walker, Evans & Co. Buchanan, James M. 1999. The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty: The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan Vol. 1. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. _____. 2005. Why I, Too, Am Not a Conservative: The Normative Vision of Classical Liberalism. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock. 1962. The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism [email protected] 36 Cassirer, Ernst. 1963. The Myth of the State. New Haven: Yale University Press. Catterall, Helen T. 1926. Judicial Cases Concerning Slavery and the Negro. Washington, DC: Carnegie Institute. Christ, Carl F. 1975. The Competitive Market and Optimal Allocative Efficiency. In: Competing Philosophies in American Political Economics. John Elliott and John Cownie eds., pp. 332–338. Pacific Palisades: Goodyear. Coase, R. H. 1937. The Nature of the Firm. Economica IV (Nov. 1937): 386–405. Cornuelle, Richard C. 1991. New Work for Invisible Hands. Times Literary Supplement (5 April 1991): 1–4. Corwin, Edward S. 1955. The 'Higher Law' Background of American Constitutional Law. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Davis, David Brion. 1966. The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Dewey, John. 1916. Democracy and Education. New York: Free Press. _____. 1948. Reconstruction in Philosophy (Enlarged edition). Boston: Beacon Press. Dewey, John and James Tufts. 1908. Ethics. New York: Henry Holt. _____. 1932. Ethics. Revised ed., New York: Henry Holt. Ellerman, David. 1992. Property & Contract in Economics: The Case for Economic Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. _____. 2005. Helping People Help Themselves: From the World Bank to an Alternative Philosophy of Development Assistance. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. _____. 2010. Inalienable Rights: A Litmus Test for Liberal Theories of Justice. Law and Philosophy. 29 (5 September): 571–599. Faust, Drew Gilpin, ed. 1981. The Ideology of Slavery: Proslavery Thought in the Antebellum South, 1830–1860. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. Filmer, Robert. 1680. Patriarcha; of the Natural Power of Kings. London: Richard Chiswell. Finkelman, Paul. 2003. Defending Slavery: Proslavery Thought in the Old South: A Brief History with Documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's. Fitzhugh, George. 1960 (1857). Cannibals All! or, Slaves Without Masters. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Freiman, Christopher. 2013. Cosmopolitanism Within Borders: On Behalf of Charter Cities. Journal of Applied Philosophy. 30 (1): 40–52. _____. 2014. Vote Markets. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4): 759–74. Friedman, Milton. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. D. P. Ellerman [email protected] 37 Genovese, Eugene. 1971. The World the Slaveholders Made. New York: Vintage Books. Gierke, Otto von. 1958. Political Theories of the Middle Age. F. W. Maitland (trans.), Boston: Beacon Press. _____. 1966. The Development of Political Theory. B. Freyd (trans.), New York: Howard Fertig. Goyder, George. 1961. The Responsible Company. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Gray, Lewis Cecil. 1958. History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860. Gloucester: Peter Smith. Grotius, Hugo. 1901 (1625). The Rights of War and Peace. A. C. Campbell (trans.), Washington: M. Walter Dunne. Heyne, Paul, Peter Boettke and David Prychitko. 2006. The Economic Way of Thinking. Eleventh edition. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall. Hobbes, Thomas. 1958 (1651). Leviathan. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. Hutcheson, Francis. 1725. An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue. London. _____. 1755. A System of Moral Philosophy. London. Israel, Jonathan. 2010. A Revolution of the Mind: Radical Enlightenment and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Justinian. 1948. The Institutes of Justinian. T. C. Sandars (trans.), London: Longmans, Green & Co. Kant, Immanuel. 1991 (1797). The Metaphysics of Morals. Mary Gregor (trans.), New York: Cambridge University Press. Knight, Frank. 1947. Freedom and Reform. New York: Harper & Row. Laslett, Peter. 1960. Introduction with Notes. In: John Locke: Two Treatises of Government. Peter Laslett (ed.), New York: New American Library. Lavoie, Don. 1991. Letter to Publishing Assistant Jane Betar (Private Comm. April 24). 2 pages. Lincoln, Anthony. 1971. Some Political & Social Ideas of English Dissent 1763–1800. New York: Octagon Books. Locke, John. 1960 (1690). Two Treatises of Government. New York: New American Library. Luther, Martin. 1942 (1523). Concerning Secular Authority. In Readings in Political Philosophy. Francis W. Coker ed., New York: Macmillan, pp. 306–329. Lynd, Staughton. 1969. Intellectual Origins of American Radicalism. New York: Vintage Books. Marsilius of Padua. 1980 (1324). Defensor Pacis. Alan Gewirth (trans.), Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism [email protected] 38 McKitrick, Eric. ed. 1963. Slavery Defended: the views of the Old South. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. Mill, James. 1826. Elements of Political Economy. London. Mill, John Stuart. 1899. Principles of Political Economy. New York: Colonial Press. _____. 1961 (1835). Introduction: An appraisal of Volume I of Democracy in America. In: Democracy in America, New York: Schocken, pp. v–xlix. _____. 1972 (1861). Considerations of Representative Government. In: J. S. Mill: Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Considerations on Representative Government. H. B. Acton ed., London: J. M. Dent and Sons, pp. 187–428. Montesquieu. 1912 (1748). The Spirit of the Laws. T. Nugent (trans.), New York: Appleton. Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books. Palmer, Tom G. 2009. Realizing Freedom: Libertarian Theory, History, and Practice. Washington DC: Cato Institute. Percy, Eustace. 1944. The Unknown State: 16th Riddell Memorial Lectures. London: Oxford University Press. Philmore, J. 1982. The Libertarian Case for Slavery: A Note on Nozick. Philosophical Forum. XIV (Fall 1982): 43–58. Pufendorf, Samuel. 2003 (1673). The Whole Duty of Man, According to the Law of Nature. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Ratner, Joseph, ed. 1939. Intelligence in the Modern World: John Dewey's Philosophy. New York: Modern Library. Rawls, John. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Sabine, George H. 1958. A History of Political Theory. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Samuelson, Paul A. 1976. Economics. Tenth edition. New York: McGraw-Hill. Scitovsky, Tibor. 1951. Welfare and Competition. Chicago: Irwin. Seabury, Samuel. 1969 (1861). American Slavery Justified by the Law of Nature. Miami: Mnemosyne Publishing Company. Skinner, Quentin. 1978. The foundations of modern political thought. Volumes I and II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, George H. 2013. The System of Liberty: Themes in the History of Classical Liberalism. New York: Cato Institute, Cambridge University Press. Spinoza, Benedict de. 1951 (1670). Theologico-Political Treatise. R. H. M. Elwes (trans.), New York: Dover Publications. Sterkx, H. E. 1972. The Free Negro in Ante-Bellum Louisiana. Cranbury: Associated University Presses. D. P. Ellerman [email protected] 39 Tobin, James. 1970. On Limiting the Domain of Inequality. Journal of Law and Economics. 13 (2 October): 263–277. Tocqueville, Alexis de. 1961. Democracy in America Vol. I. Henry Reeve (trans.), New York: Schocken. Tomasi, John. 2012. Free Market Fairness. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Williams, Elisha. 1998 (1744). The Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants. In Political Sermons of the American Founding Era, 1730–1805 Vol. I. Ellis Sandoz ed., Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, pp. 55–118. Wills, Garry. 1979. Inventing America. New York: Vintage Books. Wish, Harvey, ed. 1960. Ante-bellum. New York: Capricorn Books. Reclaiming Democratic Classical Liberalism

Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift vol. 49, nr 3–4, s 236–261 ©2014 universitetsforlaget ISSN 0029-1943 The Terrorist Attacks in Norway, July 22nd 2011 – Some Kantian Reflections – Helga Varden Associate professor in the Departments of Philosophy and Women and Gender Studies, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign. Email: [email protected] English abstract p. 283 This paper provides a Kantian interpretation of core issues involved in the trial following the terrorist attacks that struck Norway on July 22nd 2011. Why did the wrongdoer's mind strike us as so endlessly disturbed? Is the Norwegian legal system able to deal with cases involving extreme violence, including as committed by psychologically impaired mass murderers? Introduction1 The unthinkable happened on July 22nd 2011: a Norwegian citizen bombed a building («Høyblokka») in Oslo's Government Quarter and opened fire on hundreds of people gathered on the small island of Utøya in a lake just outside of Oslo. The 950 kg bomb was placed in a car in front of Høyblokka. When it went off, at least 250 persons were inside the targeted building and 75 more were in the immediate vicinity of the car. The perpetrator – Anders Behring Breivik (hereafter: ABB) – intended the bomb to kill as many people as possible. He succeeded in killing eight and seriously injuring nine more. Roughly 200 more suffered less serious injuries. After detonating the bomb, ABB traveled to Utøya, where a total of 564 people – mostly teenagers and young adults – were gathered for the annual meeting of the Labor Party's youth division ("Arbeidernes Ungdomsfylking,» or «AUF»). ABB, posing as a police officer in a fake uniform transported himself and his weapons to Utøya by the AUF-ferry. Once on the island, ABB shot and killed (by individual gunshots) 67 people of whom only seven were over the age of 25. Fifty-six were under the age of 21; 33 were under the age of 18; and 14 were only 14 or 15 years old. Two more people fell to their deaths as they attempted to escape. ABB shot and injured an NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 236 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM the terrorist attacks in norway, july 22nd 2011 * 237 additional 33 people, and many more were injured trying to escape or save others.2 When the police arrived in Utøya 80 minutes after ABB, he surrendered without resistance. In his testimony during the ten-week trial (May-June, 2012), ABB admitted to all the actions listed above and described, in detail, his reasons, his plans, and his actions. His ultranationalist manifesto, 2083 – A European Declaration of Independence also conveys much of this information. This manifesto, ABB claims, was written at the request of a secret order called «Knights Templar,» to serve as the program for a new, revolutionary contrajihadist European network, similar in its decentralized, one-cell structure to Al-Qaeda. This mix of personal notes from his life and his terrorist agenda includes extensive quoted or plagiarized material from other sources, such as Theodore Kaczynski's Unabomber's Manifesto. The manifesto describes the supposed problems of «cultural Marxism» and «multiculturalism,» such as the «colonization» of Europe by Muslims. Additionally, it describes the planned attacks, predicts likely responses to the attacks, and envisions Europe's and Norway's futures, where, for example, the «proper,» «traditional» male and female roles (currently «perverted» by feminism) would be reestablished and Norway would yet again be «pure.» The attacks were directed at the Labor Party, in power at the time and the most influential political party in Norway since World War II. By attacking Høyblokka (where the office of the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice were located) and Utøya (where the future leaders of the Labor Party were gathered), ABB saw himself attacking the heart of the Labor Party – and, so, the center of the «cultural Marxism» that «corrupts» Norway from within. Moreover, to injure the Labor Party as much as possible and make the assault spectacular (maximize the «propaganda effect»), ABB aimed to kill as many as possible. Because of delays encountered while electronically distributing his manifesto to newspapers and politicians, as well as traffic delays on the morning of the attack, it was late afternoon by the time ABB arrived at Høyblokka. Many had already left for the day, and there were fewer people on the streets than he had planned for. During the trial, ABB claimed that if he had succeeded in killing more people at Høyblokka, he would have abandoned the second stage of the plan (Utøya). He also maintained that his original goal had been to arrive at Utøya before that day's main speaker, Gro Harlem Brundtland, departed. Brundtland is nicknamed «Mother Norway» ("landsmoder»), in part because she is considered the most influential Prime Minister in postwar Norway. ABB planned to film himself decapitating Brundtland while reading an ultranationalist statement and make the video available on the Internet. Because of the delays, however, Brundtland left Utøya two hours before he arrived. Additionally, ABB had initially planned to use the cold water around the island of Utøya as a «weapon of mass destruction» against anyone who tried to swim to the mainland. This strategy failed; many who fled were strong swimmers, and people on the mainland learned what was happening and sped towards the island in their private boats to save these swimmers. According to ABB, he let himself be captured by the police because it was the best strategy for the next, «propaganda» stage of his revolutionary plan. Upon capture, ABB immediately claimed to have acted under emergency right, since NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 237 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM 238 * helga varden he was protecting himself and Norway from complete «cultural destruction.» At trial, ABB explained that he had expected to be tortured and killed after capture, either by the police, by lynch mobs, or by prison guards and inmates after a treason conviction. Despite some familiarity with the concept of emergency right, ABB didn't seem aware that torture and killing of prisoners by the police are illegal, or that Norway has no death penalty.3 Once the Norwegian people understood what had happened, however, their immediate reaction to the tragedy was not violence but, simply, grief. The youth at Utøya came from all over Norway, and Norway's size (a population of 5 million) entailed that many knew or were related to the family or friends of at least one of the victims. After the attacks, the media and the public also tried, with varying degrees of success, to give the many people who were personally affected space for their grief, with ABB-free editions of newspapers and news programs. In addition, spontaneous and planned public gatherings allowed people to grieve together, in smaller communities and as a nation. At «rose marches,» people carrying roses (the political symbol for the Labor Party) walked together in the streets before gathering in public squares to share their grief – crying, holding each other, listening to speeches, and singing. Various public figures – members of the royal family, government officials, former and active politicians, religious leaders, artists, and so on – helped create these public spaces for people to grieve together. These figures also grieved publicly for those killed, for the bereaved, for their own losses, for those they knew who were suffering, and for the nation. For the first time in history, the King (Harald) cried during a public speech (his first after the attacks), and the royal family, the Prime Minister, and various public figures cried as they hugged survivors and victims' loved ones. And of course, to Norwegians, it would have been strange indeed if they hadn't cried. During the first couple of weeks after the attacks, little attention was paid to the perpetrator. It was simply a period of grief, as it should be. After this immediate period of mourning was over, however, the public's focus naturally shifted to include ABB. Though Norwegians were bewildered and disoriented in the grief-stricken aftermath of the attacks, their bewilderment dramatically increased over the next few months as the phenomenon of ABB was revealed. In fact, most people appeared deeply perplexed during the trial, because it was difficult to understand what we were witnessing. My aim in this paper is to apply Kant's moral philosophy to some of these perplexing issues, and thereby contribute to the public discussion of the case. In my view, only by better understanding what happened – the kind of violence the attacks exposed us to; the ethical, legal, and political principles upheld during the trial; the question of which principles we should uphold in the future – will it be possible to heal and move on as a nation, where that includes taking on the challenging task of considering possible legal and political reforms. After a brief sketch of the trial itself (section 1), I proceed (section 2) to present a Kantian suggestion of why the wrongdoer's mind struck us as so profoundly disturbed.4 The Kantian perspective, I argue in section 3, also helps us understand why it was so important to respond to the violence through the legal system and to treat ABB so respectfully before, during, and after the trial. Finally, in section 4, I address the controNFT-2014-3-4.book Page 238 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM the terrorist attacks in norway, july 22nd 2011 * 239 versial issue now facing Norway as we move forward: how capable is the Norwegian legal system to deal with cases involving extreme violence, including the violence committed by psychologically impaired, deeply disturbed mass murderers? 1. The Trial The confusions surrounding the trial were many and complex, so let me first sketch them. The first confusion began when the Court ("Oslo Tingrett») obtained the psychiatric evaluation of ABB (standard legal procedure). The Court first authorized a team of two leading psychiatrists to evaluate the legal sanity of ABB during the attacks. Their work, begun in August of 2011, yielded a psychiatric report in November, according to which ABB had been in a psychotic state when performing the actions. ABB, the report says, has normal cognitive and intellectual capacities, but suffered a mental breakdown in 2006 from which he has never recovered. In 2006, ABB moved back into his mother's home; withdrew from society, family, and friends; and occupied himself primarily with the computer game «World of Warcraft.» Later, his focus shifted to composing his extremist religiouspolitical manifesto and, later still, to planning and preparing for the attacks. During this period, the report maintains, ABB became a paranoid schizophrenic with grandiose and bizarre (logically or factually impossible) delusions. For example, he viewed himself as a crusader engaged in a great war between good and evil (a grandiose delusion); as someone with the right to decide who should live and who should die (another grandiose delusion); and as a participant at a meeting of a (non-existent) organization, «The Knights Templar,» where he was authorized to write a religious-political manifesto to unify the revolutionary war efforts of the organization (a bizarre delusion). According to Norwegian law, a paranoid schizophrenic with grandiose delusions is psychotic (mentally ill), and must receive forced mental health treatment instead of punishment. A commission of experts on psychiatry and psychology ("Den Rettsmedisinske Kommisjonen,» hereafter «the Commission») subsequently evaluated the report (also standard legal procedure), and unanimously approved it with only minor comments. This psychiatric report created public uproar and deeply offended ABB, who claimed that it was filled with «200 lies». The Court ultimately responded by appointing a second team of psychiatrists to evaluate ABB. They completed their work between February and March of 2012. Their report, issued in April, maintains that ABB was not suffering from paranoid schizophrenia with grandiose and bizarre delusions and was not psychotic during the attacks. According to this report, ABB's descriptions of Europe should be understood in the context of his extreme political views. Since such descriptions are common among extremists of his type, they do not qualify as delusional. Moreover, this report argues that ABB was not delusional (psychotic), but rather that he exaggerated, fantasized, or lied (and still does) in his various descriptions of the Knights Templar organization. He is, they argue, an aggressive, extreme political activist suffering from a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD), namely, a dissocial personality disorder involving self-absorption and the consequent inability to be empathetic and respond appropriately to other persons' points of view. NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 239 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM 240 * helga varden An aggressive NPD and extreme political views do not make one legally insane, and hence, this report concludes, ABB is punishable. The majority of the Norwegian people seemed relieved by this second report and supported it. ABB was likewise happy about its basic claim that he was legally sane. Once the Commission completed its official evaluation of the second report, new confusion arose. No one – not the Court, the lawyers, the media, nor anyone else – could figure out whether or not the Commission actually had approved it.5 Absent a decision about which report the Court should use, the ten-week trial began in May of 2012 with both psychiatric teams present in the courtroom. In their opening statements, the prosecutors explained that they would defend the claim that the defendant was legally insane during the attacks (in accordance with the first report), whereas the defense attorney declared that he would challenge this and argue for his client's legal sanity (in accordance with both the second report and ABB's wishes). The first week of the trial was devoted to ABB's own statement and follow-up questions from the prosecutors, defense attorney, and the judges. Lars Gule, a Norwegian philosopher and expert witness on extremist political ideologies, described feeling as if «the gates of hell» were opened when ABB spoke, especially when he recounted the killings at Utøya. The newspaper reported that even the public officials, all of whom were well prepared psychologically for ABB's testimony, looked pained as they kept their emotions in check while the worst details were given. ABB, in contrast, was largely dispassionate. He became spirited only while describing his planning and the attacks themelves. Though passionate when explaining his extremist political ideology, he withdrew or became angry or annoyed when questioned about his childhood, upbringing, or psychological state rather than his ideology or the preparation and execution of the attacks. Sometimes he laughed – either sarcastically at the prosecutors or witnesses, or self-consciously when he realized he had said something particularly stupid. ABB had tears in his eyes only twice: on the first day, when clips were shown from the propaganda film he made to broadcast his manifesto, and later when his mother was referenced for the first time. Otherwise, he showed no signs of regret, remorse, or any other emotions appropriate to the circumstances. He never had to fight to control his emotions when describing what he had done, facing his victims, or listening to the testimony of his victims' loved ones. Not once was there reason to think that he understood, in the ordinary moral sense of the word, what he had done. He repeatedly described his actions as «gruesome, but necessary,» which, with his gestures, communicated his conviction that his actions revealed psychological strength. When questioned about his apparent inability to experience empathy, he maintained that he had trained himself not to feel emotions (by «dehumanizing others»), and explained that he could not allow himself to experience empathy because then he would «break down.» When further questioned about whether he could deliberately choose to feel empathy, he refused to answer. As the trial developed, it became evident that most (if not all) of us couldn't understand what we were observing. It wasn't so strange, as it turned out, that there were two conflicting psychiatric evaluations of ABB. No one seemed capable of convincingly exNFT-2014-3-4.book Page 240 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM the terrorist attacks in norway, july 22nd 2011 * 241 plaining what we were seeing, despite the many bombastic statements about ABB's psychological profile made during the trial, by psychiatrists, psychologists, reporters, philosophers, legal scholars, and historians, among others. In any case, once ABB toned down the grandiosity of his account, he and the prosecution disagreed over only four significant factual points,6 while he and his own defense lawyer disagreed over two. The only point of discrepancy between ABB's descriptions of the events and those of the survivors concerned some survivors' claims that ABB expressed thrill (e.g., yelled «wohoo!») while he was shooting at the youth at Utøya. Neither the defense nor the prosecution noted this difference in their final proceedings. In their closing statement, the prosecutors explained that they were not certain regarding the issue of legal sanity, but found it correct to uphold their original claim (following the first psychiatric report) that ABB had been in a psychotic state during the attacks. The trial and the second psychiatric report provided insufficient reason, they argued, to think that ABB was «merely» an extreme political activist with an NPD.7 Nevertheless, ABB's two acts of terror, the prosecutors continued, should be understood as punishable according to the Penal Code's §§147a, 148, and 223.8 Hence, the prosecution contended that if the Court ruled that ABB was legally sane during the attacks, then he should be punished with the legal maximum in Norway for any crime: 21 years in prison under the category of «forvaring» ("safekeeping»). «Forvaring» means that even after having served a sentence, a prisoner cannot be released unless psychiatrists deem him or her no longer a danger to society.9 The prosecution further argued that when doubt exists in a legal proceeding, Norwegian law requires that the doubt benefit the defendant. Since it is worse to sentence a mentally ill individual to prison than to force a mentally healthy individual to receive mental health treatment, the latter option should be chosen. Still, they concluded, since ABB was legally insane when performing his actions (psychotic), he should be admitted to forced treatment in a mental health facility according to Penal Code §39. Also the defense expressed a lack of complete confidence regarding the issue of ABB's legal sanity, but continued by explaining that he and his team still found it correct to deem ABB legally sane. In addition, the defense formally presented (but did not defend) ABB's claim that he was not guilty in the charges against him, and presented as plausible ABB's claim that he decided to carry out the attack at Utøya only after hearing about the Høyblokka-bomb's ineffectiveness on the radio. The defense also defended ABB's view that he should be given the mildest possible punishment (prison) if found guilty, and not «forvaring» (safekeeping), as there was good reason to believe that he would now politically protest by means of the pen only. Most of the defense attorney's closing statement focused, however, on ABB's claim that he was legally sane during the attacks.10 The defense argued that since the two psychiatric reports were inconsistent, the Court stood free to disregard them. Moreover, he emphasized the human right to assume responsibility for one's actions and maintained that being forced to receive mental health treatment when healthy is just as bad as being forced into prison when mentally ill. The defense then endorsed the second report's claim that ABB was suffering NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 241 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM 242 * helga varden from a lack of empathy (of the kind associated with NPD) in combination with extreme political views, rather than delusions. The evidence for this claim was the absence of a significant history of violence (for ABB) and ABB's decision not to kill three people at Utøya whom he identified as innocents rather than as «political targets.»11 The defense also argued that the evidence supported the second report's claim that ABB mistakenly believed in a colonizing war between Europeans and Muslims (as is common in these extremist political milieus) and that ABB had exaggerated, fantasized, or lied about the existence of the Knights Templar. The defense also emphasized mistaken beliefs that ABB had corrected, such as his misapprehension about torture in Norwegian prisons. The defense further argued that ABB's behavior showed that he clearly knew it was wrong «in our culture» to kill. ABB «chose to kill» because the end (the revolution) legitimated the means (the killings), a classic line of reasoning of terrorists. Additionally, several professionals who had evaluated ABB in the period after his surrender (such as the psychiatrist who evaluated his risk of suicide and the experienced prison guards who were around him) did not observe any signs of psychosis (and so did not treat him as a pychotic). Finally, the defense supported the second report's claim that ABB's withdrawal in 2006 was not caused by a mental breakdown, since during this withdrawn period ABB was still able to make a lot of money (legally and illegally), participate in online political forums and the World of Warcraft community, and manage his relationships with family and friends, all while keeping his terrorist project a secret. The final verdict came down on August 24, 2012: the Court deemed ABB legally sane during the attacks and sentenced him to 21 years of «forvaring,» specifying that he must spend a minimum of 10 years in prison. Undoubtedly, most were relieved that the Court followed the second report's determination of legal sanity, and that the sentence was for «forvaring.» Even those who agreed with the prosecution that ABB should be deemed legally insane found that the trial had settled this issue legitimately. It was clear, however, that most people didn't fully understand their own responses or exactly what had happened in the trial. Many also experienced significant frustration over the fact that ABB might one day be free, whether they were personally and directly affected by his crimes or not. Many were uncomfortable with the attention ABB had received throughout the trial, which allowed him to express his «propaganda» and offensive thoughts. Some were puzzled by the respect ABB was accorded, not only in light of his horrendous acts of violence, but also his at times offensive courtroom behavior. Still, both during and after the trial most people, including victims and victims' loved ones expressed deep gratitude for the way most of those involved in the trial conducted themselves, in particular the judges, the prosecutors, the defense, and much of the media. Clearly, too, many expressed admiration for the incredible courage the victims displayed in helping each other during the attacks and in facing and testifying against ABB during the trial. Finally, most found it hard to find ways to capture the seemingly bottomless tragedy of it all, a tragedy compassing ABB and his family and friends. In the following sections, I use Kantian philosophical theory to provide a unified account of these varied responses to the trial, in the hope of contribNFT-2014-3-4.book Page 242 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM the terrorist attacks in norway, july 22nd 2011 * 243 uting to the continuous, public discussion surrounding it. I'll begin with the central question of ABB's legal sanity. 2. Mental vs. Moral Illness The two psychiatric reports disagree, as we saw above, about whether ABB was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia with grandiose and bizarre delusions (the first report, which the prosecution found most persuasive) or from a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD) in combination with aggressive, extreme political views (the second report, which the defense favored). I will argue that people who suffer from mental illness cannot be punished because their conditions make it impossible for them, by their own devices, to correct their mistaken beliefs and so to act as persons responsible for their actions. I then distinguish mental illness from personality disorders (such as NPD) by characterizing the latter as conditions that subjectively challenge (but do not make impossible) one's ability to act morally, or «as a person.» When a person gives in to the challenges associated with such a personality disorder, we may say, that he becomes morally ill.12 Understanding ABB as suffering from a condition posing subjective, constitutional challenges to his ability to act morally (as a person) can explain two things: (1) why we both hold him legally responsible for his actions (since he can assume responsibility for his mistaken beliefs) and (2) why a normal prison sentence would be insufficient to deal with the danger he poses as long as he does not take on the job of learning how to regain control over his psychological condition. I also argue that if we set aside questions about the possible mental state of ABB at the time of the crime, his aggressive NPD explains not only his racist and sexist beliefs, but his particular way of envisioning the future of Norway. Finally, if we assume that this is also the correct diagnosis of ABB at the time of the crime, then, I maintain, the «forvaring» (safekeeping) clause in the prison sentence was appropriate. 2.1 Mental Illness and Legal Insanity How is it that we can understand those suffering from paranoid schizophrenia with delusions mentally ill in such a way that they cannot be responsible and punished for their wrongful actions? The paranoid schizophrenic with grandiose delusions is mentally ill in the sense that she cannot understand what is really going on; she fundamentally misperceives factual reality without having the ability to correct her mistaken beliefs about the world. Such a person cannot assume responsibility for her actions, since it is impossible for her to perceive the world as it actually is and so her actions as they actually are. The first psychiatric team believed ABB was suffering from this condition because of the way in which he explained himself and his actions when they first encountered him just after the attacks; his behavior then, they argue, only makes sense on the assumption of grandiose and bizarre delusions (rather than correctible, mistaken beliefs). The most worrisome of these, I take it, were not the grandiose delusions, since ABB was often willing to tone these down, but the bizarre ones, including ABB's claims about the existence of the «Knights Templar» organization and his meeting with its leaders – a description shown by the police to be false. The first psychiatric team maintained that ABB genuinely believed this when they first met him, and since he didn't budge on this NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 243 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM 244 * helga varden point during cross-examination, the prosecution found that they had to follow the first report, despite their significant doubts about its correctness. 2.2 Moral Illness and Legal Sanity ABB's behavior in the courtroom corresponds to that of a person suffering from an aggressive narcissistic personality disorder (NPD), which was the diagnosis of the second report, and the one supported by the defense and affirmed by the Court. In fact, such a diagnosis explains much of what was so terrifying about ABB's behavior in the courtroom. ABB's detailed descriptions (and very accurate memory) of his extreme violence were deeply frightening, as was his lack of empathy, sadness, compassion, or any emotional or cognitive struggle while describing his actions or when confronting his victims and their loved ones.13 Yet we must wonder what it is about people with an aggressive NPD that makes them less able to experience various morally appropriate emotions, such as affection, empathy, and compassion. How is it that they are legally responsible for their actions even if they cannot easily experience these morally appropriate emotions? In what follows, I elaborate on the idea that suffering from an NPD should be understood as suffering from a condition that constitutionally, subjectively challenges one's ability to have the kind of focus and moral, affectionate emotions constitutive of being a person. If not dealt with and kept under control, such a condition can spiral into deeply morally disturbed ways of being, as happened in this case. I argue that, because those suffering from these conditions can correct their beliefs (at all times) and so are making choices to set aside societal norms as they commit their wrongful actions, they are legally responsible for them. This explanation of the moral responsibility associated with aggressive NPD also explains how the account makes sense of the «forvaring» clause. Having an NPD is commonly understood to involve extreme self-absorption: it is a psychological condition characterized by an excessive sense of self-importance, a lack of empathy, and a radical preoccupation with oneself and one's own concerns. Surprisingly, then, my Kantian analysis attributes this kind of moral disorder to the lack of a healthy sense of self. That is why it's a personality disorder: this condition subjectively, constitutionally challenges a human being's ability to be a person.14 According to Kant, having a healthy moral self involves being capable of setting and pursuing ends of one's own, in a manner determined by one's own reason. When one acts in this way, one's actions are compatible with everyone else acting in the same, reciprocally respectful way at all times, whether in the pursuit of one's individual ends or ends adopted jointly with others. There are, however, various conditions or aspects of such a healthy self that come prior to it and enable it to flourish through the choices it makes. The absence of these prior elements requires a person to concentrate too much on constructing the self itself – of creating a sense of self, a sense of existing – instead of concentrating on ends to be pursued in the world (on one's own or together with others). The person with an NPD has only partially developed some of these prior features of a healthy self, which makes her so easily preoccupied with herself. The healthy way to respond to the fact that one's reactions and preoccupations seem a little off as compared to those of othNFT-2014-3-4.book Page 244 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM the terrorist attacks in norway, july 22nd 2011 * 245 ers – the fact that others seem more stable and at ease with themselves, including when they are emotionally upset – is, of course, to get some of the missing bits in place. This is the work of therapy, and for most it requires some psychological or psychiatric guidance. A person who does not compensate for his inabilities with this kind of work has an unstable basis in himself and thus a constant need to turn the focus onto himself. He may try to flee away from interactions and his own self altogether through drugs, alcohol, dangerous activities, intense entertainment, and the like. In addition, such a person turns aggressive when he makes others to pay attention to him and make him their primary project. The preoccupation with himself constantly challenges or makes unstable his ability to love, respect, and care for others in the right way, in a way consistent with others having ends of their own too.15 Normative yet psychological features enable us to be healthy, functioning emotional persons. These personal and social features include our unreflective personal and social identities (who we are), and they concern how we are fundamentally grounded in the world, how we feel safe in the world as the persons we are. These ways that we spontaneously, naturally, or automatically perceive or emotionally orient ourselves in the world as a normative space are unreflective, in contrast to how we reflectively think about or act in the world. For example, many of my moral emotions (what I love, grieve, take pride in, am ashamed of, etc.) are linked to my identity as a Norwegian woman with a particular family and set of friends. These parts of me are not things I've simply chosen, but features of me that I've either been given (nationality, family) and have affection for or found myself affectionately drawn to (close friends). Such unreflective identities give us a sense of being in a good world in which we have a good place, a place that is ours and that is affirmed by others. Insofar as these identifies are healthy, they are part of what makes us feel existentially secure, so that we can confidently and playfully set and pursue our projects. They compose the assumed, unreflective background that gives us the confidence to act as persons in the world. Just as we are oriented toward the countries and people in the world that are part of who we are – those we love and deeply care for – the people of those countries and the people we love are similarly oriented toward us. We all assume such a background as we go about our lives in the world in good ways. Morally healthy persons (for our purposes here: those who are not suffering from NPDs) always already (unreflectively) assume that they are being seen and paid attention to even if they are not the explicit objects of others' attention. They relate to the world as a safe place where they can interact with others as the people they are. As a result, their confidence to act in the is not conditional on others explicitly focusing on them or being about them. In contrast, morally challenged persons (again, here: persons with NPDs) do not always or easily (unreflectively) assume that they are seen and taken into account when they are not explicitly the object of others' attention. Nor do they always assume that the world is a safe place – a world that is theirs to enjoy, where they should challenge themselves and pursue their projects. Instead, they experience the world as an uneasy, unsafe place that forgets, ignores, or attacks them; they readily feel unimportant or disregarded, though these feels have no factual basis. As a result, NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 245 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM 246 * helga varden these people are morally challenged in the sense that their basic orientation in the world is not one of carefree, healthy engagement, but one that makes it hard for them not to make their own selves their main project, instead of other projects. Persons struggling with NPDs are self-absorbed because they lack a sufficient self; without this stable foundation they get preoccupied with themselves, and require the affirming attention of others. Those who have aggressive versions of this moral disorder need to ensure that others focus on (are oriented towards) them at all times. Unless they are drawing the world's attention, they get an unnerving sense that they do not exist at all – and so they turn aggressive. Moreover, this fundamental self-absorption makes such persons struggle with other-directed moral emotions, such as affection, empathy, sympathy, and compassion. Such emotions presuppose that one is fundamentally also other-oriented. The person who lets her self-absorption develop unrestrainedly – by being unwilling to figure out why she keeps ending up in troubles in her relationships with others or by not wanting to figure out how to get it all under control – will not see her own lack of other-directedness as a problem. Instead, she will tell a story according to which it is the world, and not her, that is the problem. The person who gives up in these ways is no longer only morally challenged, but morally ill. Such lack of emotional orientation towards others is not something one can simply think oneself in or out of; it is not changeable by such reflective means. Our capacity for reflection makes it possible for someone to take up the fight against the personality disorder – to get or keep it under control – since it makes it possible for us to recognize it and relate to it rationally. Much of the repairing or healing work itself is unreflective in nature, however, and it is enabled by therapists, psychologists, and psychiatrists.16 If we reconsider ABB at this point, we may note four things. First, during the trial it became clear that ABB is aware that he doesn't have moral emotions like empathy in the way others do. Second, during the trial he also remarked that if he did open up to these emotions again, he would be destroyed by what he had done and that this is why he's chosen not to be open to them. Third, ABB claimed that he is different from other people with regard to such emotions because he trained himself not to experience them; he argued that his inability to experience these emotions reflects his psychological strength. Relatedly, he didn't (and doesn't) understand that such moral emotions are not something about which one can simply choose; that one cannot simply choose to keep them at a distance or have them. What he understood as his psychological training of «dehumanizing» others was in reality giving in to or furthering his condition. His inability to experience these emotions is therefore not a reflection of how strong he is, but of how morally ill he has become. Fourth, viewing ABB as morally sick makes intelligible otherwise inexplicable aspects of his killing spree on the island. ABB was elated and expressed joy when he threatened, terrified, and killed the people on the island because having such power over them – having their sole attention – fed the void his lack of self creates. It supplied a sense of being alive, of intensely existing. Being morally challenged in this way – being subjectively, constitutionally encumbered in one's ability to act and interact as a NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 246 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM the terrorist attacks in norway, july 22nd 2011 * 247 person – makes personal, including intimate human love, a complex moral emotion, difficult. Although persons suffering from an NPD can love in the sense of being passionately oriented toward the world and beings in it, their self-absorption gives them trouble loving persons as persons and being loved themselves as persons, that is, as beings who pursue ends of their own. Someone who is not self-absorbed wants to be loved by people who also flourish through their own, independent projects in the world. Being drawn to a different person as a person, therefore, requires that one has a sufficiently stable, confident self. The person suffering from an NPD faces the constant risk of losing confidence in herself, and she is threatened both by the lack of explicit attention from the other and by the very process of affirming the other. Focusing on the other person makes her feel as if she loses herself. Loving such a self-absorbed person therefore becomes a draining emotional experience. Moreover, when self-absorption turns aggressive, the failure to affirm the other's difference becomes a drive to destroy the other's difference and independent sense of self. The person suffering from aggressive NPB will assert his sense of self and make others stay focused on him through any available means, including threats, coercion, and violence. Although we are morally committed to treating morally ill persons respectfully (what the Kantian account would call practical or moral love) those who are aggressive towards others are unlovable in this sense: being affectionately or emotionally open to them is self-destructive. One can and should love them morally (respect them), but not affectionately (be emotionally open to them). A similar distinction holds when we move from the intimate, personal self to the social aspect of the self, such as one's love for one's country. The love a morally healthy person has for her country presupposes that the country is a country for persons, where everyone sets and pursues ends of their own, in the ways that makes life meaningful for them. Insofar as her country is not yet this, she will also be angry at and ashamed of her country – making it in part exactly her job to improve it; it's her county. The morally challenged or sick person, in contrast, may passionately love her country, but not in a way that presupposes the country as essentially being, again, a country by and for persons; instead her love of country is what Kant calls pathological love, in that she views the country as something whose purpose is simply to affirm her sense of self. It is revealing, then, that ABB has never had an intimate, loving relationship of any kind as an adult, and even his long-term friendships from childhood were not particularly developed, mature, or deep. In addition, during the trial, he appeared to have emotive reactions revealing affective love only twice, namely, when his propaganda film was shown and when his mother was mentioned for the first time.17 At all other times, he reacted with anger or withdrawal to anything said about him or his private life and childhood. Moreover, his love for the Norway he fantasized and his mother cannot be understood as expressions of a mature, healthy love of country and of persons. Rather, it is a pathological love fundamentally at odds with our human nature and morality (practical reason). First, take his love for his (now late) mother. This loving relation was, as far as we can tell, fundamentally asymmetrical. His mother never challenged how he lived in her home, he did NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 247 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM 248 * helga varden not provide any care for her even though she was frail and sick (she passed away in the year after the trial), and he yelled at her when she didn't «respect his space.» Second, consider his love of country. «His country» is not an ideal of our current country – a state constitutionally committed to respecting all citizens as free and equal – but a fantasy, fascist, totalitarian version of it, where a similarly asymmetrical love is realized. In his «ideal» Norway, ABB himself would be adored by all Norwegian citizens. In this imaginary society his (and every «real» man's) manhood would be affirmed by all women, including in the intimate personal spheres. Women would live up to what he considers the true, traditional gender ideal: lacking an independent sense of self, women would instead obtain their sense of self through affirming their men and their projects. Any woman who would not love him and other men in this way should and would be punished, according to ABB's logic. Moreover, not only would his manhood be affirmed in these ways, but he himself would be affirmed as the leader of this great nation: he is the as-of-yet unrecognized but true patriarch of Norway, its real «landsfader» ("Father Norway»). Rather than confront the instabilities in his psychological constitution, ABB let them develop into a full-fledged, aggressive self-absorption, which is of course incompatible with genuinely loving anyone, including himself, as a person. His conceptions of manhood and ethnicity are therefore based on the partial or full denial, or even destruction, of certain other persons as persons. Presumably any human beings who can interact with others as persons would be in danger in ABB's Norway since they would necessarily yield resistance to him and his vision. No one quite knows why some persons suffer from NPDs, let alone the aggressive kind. Most, however, believe that they are frequently intertwined with psychologically abusive, disturbed, or challenged childhoods. This certainly seems true in the case of ABB, though it is not a complete explanation. People with much worse childhoods than his do not end up struggling with NPDs or become morally ill. The backstory of ABB's life is sad, but not tragic. He grew up in one of the richest parts of Oslo, yet came from a home of limited means. He had one sibling and a somewhat psychologically unstable mother on welfare: his father abandoned the family early on.18 His teenage years and young adult life involved a series of failures: dropping out of high school; failing in politics after attempting to rise in the ranks in the populist Norwegian rightwing, libertarian political party ("Fremskrittspartiet»); and proving inadequate as a contributor to public debate when newspapers wouldn't publish his political writings. These particular failings parallel central theses in his «manifesto,» which recasts these failures as consequences of the world's perverted values. The manifesto envisions a changed social world, a world he has changed through his choices. In this new world – which he posits as the original, real world – gender roles and «true Norwegianness» are changed so that his greatness is realizable and recognized. This world affirms him instead of rejects him. The manifesto expresses limitless self-absorption and fantasizes an aggressive, morally disturbed world in which ABB is lovingly adored as a great man (by whatever woman he would share an intimate life with and generally, by all women) and as a great leader (by all Norwegians): a fantasy of being truly seen and therefore really existing NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 248 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM the terrorist attacks in norway, july 22nd 2011 * 249 for the first time. For his fantasy to come true, ABB first had to eliminate everyone tied to the current social and political reality of Norway. This project would, if necessary, involve imprisoning or killing all morally healthy Norwegians, as they would not affirm him. The bombings, shootings, and planned beheading were a logical beginning of his revolution: by killing the current and future leadership of the Labor Party as well as «mother» Norway (Brundtland), he would take the first symbolic step toward ridding Norway of its multicultural, Marxist, feminist corruption and replacing it with the «true» Norwegian values and Norway's true patriarch: himself. As we have seen, persons suffering from NPDs struggle to experience the other-directed emotions constitutive of being a person, and they are more likely to fail in their efforts to develop full, healthy ethical characters. Those who have lost this struggle, which NPD makes harder, and become self-and other-destructive (aggressive) in their actions are what I have called morally ill. The morally challenged and the morally sick are nonetheless ethically and legally responsible for their actions. They either already know or can obtain knowledge about why their moral emotions and ways of acting are importantly different than those of other people – why they keep getting into related trouble or underperform by normal standards – and they have the subjective, including emotional resources available to correct their mistaken beliefs. Hence they have a duty to obtain insight into their own condition so that they can resist, control, or overcome it. They remain ethically and legally responsible for their beliefs (including the mistaken ones) and for the actions they base on these mistaken beliefs. The ABB case illustrates this responsibility, at least it does right now. During the trial, ABB explained that he knows that his emotional life is not quite like that of others, and especially with regard to feelings like empathy. Yet he didn't deny that he has known these feelings to some extent in his life, and his spontaneous expressions of sadness when his mother was mentioned for the first time and when his affection for his country was stimulated also affirm the assumption that although impaired, the capacity for such emotional orientation is not completely absent.19 The trial also showed, many times, that ABB can correct mistaken beliefs – as the defense attorney pointed out.20 During the trial his defense attorney (who knew him very well by the time of the trial) affirmed that ABB sometimes lies (and so knows the difference between truth and lies). In fact, assuming that ABB lies explains each of the four factual points where ABB refused to yield during cross-examinations: 1) the existence of Knights Templar; 2) the beginning of the planning of the attacks and the writing of the manifesto; 3) the truth of the first psychiatric team's report of their conversations with ABB after the attacks; and 4) the question of whether ABB would have proceeded to Utøya if he'd succeeded in killing more people at Høyblokka. Given ABB's aim, namely to continue a «propaganda stage» from within the prison, lying about all four makes strategic sense: 1.) Lying about the existence of Knights Templar presents ABB to other disturbed minds as a great leader of a movement of historical proportions; 2.) Lying about when he began writing of the manifesto (claiming an earlier origin) upholds his self-image as a strong leader with tremendous self-control and planning skills; 3.) Lying about the first report conceals both the NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 249 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM 250 * helga varden extent of his narcissism and the possibility that he is legally insane; 4.) Lying about having already decided to complete both steps of the plan forestalls the moral outrage at the Utøya killings expressed even by very extremist rightwing milieus; after all, killing children with automatic guns is neither courageous nor easily construed as the first stage of a great moral revolution. In fact, during the trial when ABB was pushed on this point, his main response was not to say that it was OK to kill children; instead he kept trying to resist the descriptions of the «children» by saying they «looked older» and by upholding the mantra that they were «gruesome, but necessary» actions. ABB was willing to correct all the other «grandiose» and «bizarre» statements that were included in the first psychiatric report and things about which he was factually mistaken were also correctible by him. At least by the time of the trial, therefor, ABB knew that his emotional life is not quite like that of others (and somewhat changed from earlier stages of his life) and had the ability to correct mistaken beliefs. He seems also to have had this ability to at least some extent right after the killings (when he corrected beliefs about torture in prison, for example). He was and is terribly mistaken in some of his views, but he has the ability to correct them. If he could also self-correct at the time of the crimes and preparations for them, he is responsible for his choice not to investigate the truth of these beliefs, since he had the abilities needed to enable him to do so. If second report is correct and hence ABB's described accurately how he reasoned at the time of the killings, ABB is responsible for each time he decided to kill yet another person on the island. He told us, chillingly, that as he left the ferry he thought that it was «now or never,» that now he had to either go through with it or not – and he chose to go through with it. Again, assuming there were no delusions here and his account is accurate, he made a choice each time he decided to pull that trigger – and he is responsible for having done so; he could have done otherwise, as indeed he showed himself capable of doing four times (when he decided he wouldn't kill three individuals and chose to surrender when the police arrived).21 Let me end this section by explaining why the defense was mistaken to argue that because ABB is likely to use the pen rather than violent aggression to express his political views in the future, ABB should be given a normal prison sentence instead of «forvaring.» This part of the defense's argument contradicts the second psychiatric report, which maintains that ABB is still aggressive and dangerous and which I believe is correct. Let me focus first on the dangerous dimension of ABB's current psychology. If my analysis of ABB's psychological status is correct, then there is no reason to think that he will not act in the same way again. Furthermore, ABB revealed further the aggressive element at play in his being through his expressions of thrill and joy. Finding joy in the execution of terrible crimes only makes sense on two possible assumptions: either ABB was in a psychotic state (the first report, which ABB and the defense deny) or ABB obtains an immensely elated sense of self (thrill) by experiencing total destructive power over other persons (the second report). Other manifestations of aggressive self-absorption demonstrate similarly aggressive forms of NPD over which the perpetrators have lost control: men who feel empowered, important, profoundly justiNFT-2014-3-4.book Page 250 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM the terrorist attacks in norway, july 22nd 2011 * 251 fied, or thrilled by abusing their families (their girlfriends, wives, children, etc.), or people who obtain pleasure and excitement by torturing or killing people of different sexual identities or orientations. Such people are not «merely» suffering from NPD, and they are no longer merely morally challenged or unstable. Rather, they are dangerous and aggressive; they are morally ill. For this reason, the appropriate legal sentence also for them is «forvaring»; they cannot simply be released into society again once their sentence is served. It follows from the above that only trained professionals can establish that it is safe to release people suffering from NPDs, professionals who not only can help people learn how to deal with their NPDs and how to get them under control, but who can also evaluate the success of the treatment. Given the disagreement among trained professionals in Norway concerning this issue and the utter confusion surrounding the Commission's handling of the case, it seems that we do not currently have available the kind of psychiatric expertise that the legal-political system of punishment requires to function properly. Proper functioning would include, presumably, requiring prisoners voluntarily (as no one can be forced to do the kind of psychological work required) to undergo therapy appropriate to their conditions before they are considered for release – and having available the kind of treatment needed for such a system to function. Currently, there therefore seems to be both a lack of professional understanding of these kinds of cases (reflected in the two psychiatric reports and the Commission's handling of the cases) and the corresponding psychiatric and psychological treatment system such criminals need. 3. Upholding Our Humanity through Legal Procedures Most Norwegians are grateful for the respectful way public officials and witnesses participated in the trial, and yet it remains puzzling to many exactly why treating ABB respectfully was so important. After all, not only did he commit some of the worst crimes possible, but his behavior in the courtroom itself was morally disturbing (his fascist morning salutes) and profoundly offensive (his condescending laughter at the officials or the victims). It is also puzzling why most who disagreed with the final decision concerning ABB's legal sanity still considered the verdict legitimate. I address these two puzzles in this section by, once again, drawing upon Kant's moral philosophy, though here with a special emphasis on his philosophy of right. In particular, I draw upon Kant's conceptions of respect for humanity, the role of public officials, the purpose of punishment, and «wrongdoing in the highest degree.» The starting point for Kant's liberal theory of justice is that commitment to justice requires us to subject our interactions to universal laws of freedom. Moreover, as equals, we do not have a right to put ourselves up as judges over each other's lives and actions. In addition, we neither do nor can know which punishments people objectively deserve when they act wrongfully (since we cannot access their first personal perspectives). Consequently, any individual who decides to punish another for her wrongful actions thereby wrongfully subjects that person to her individual choice rather than to universal laws of freedom. For Kant, therefore, rightful punishment requires a public authority, or an artificial, institutional person NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 251 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM 252 * helga varden that represents our general, united will and thereby enables rightful punishment within the legal-political framework of a liberal state. As public officials, the judges (and jury, if there is one) constitute the court acting on behalf of all of us, including the wrongdoer, in order to determine guilt and decide on punishment. As a result, the punishment does not result from the choice of any private individual, but from a legal, public institution that is set up so as to enable a representation of an «us» – all of us, including the wrongdoer. Not only is this the best we can do, but it is what we have a duty to do insofar as we are committed to the normative ideals of our liberal states, or our states as constitutionally bound to regard each citizen as having a right to be subject only to universal laws of freedom and not each other's arbitrary choices. Thus, the public authority is entrusted to act on our behalf by applying the relevant laws to determine a particular case. The court's reasonable and respectful adherence to the law at all times and reflected in the behavior of all of its officers, enabled us all to relate to the case and to ABB in a way consistent with our deepest moral commitments of justice, in spite of ABB's own flagrant disrespect for these ideals (with regard to himself, his terrible treatment of himself, and everyone else). Situations like this one have, in other words, no morally uncomplicated way out. On any plausible liberal theory of right, no person has a right to kill the innocent, and everyone acts within her rights when she stops a person from doing so, even when that requires employing lethal force. If any of the young people on Utøya who tried to stop ABB had succeeded, they would not have wronged ABB in so doing, even though, in a just state, no one but the police has a right to use coercion. In this case, since the police were de facto unavailable (as the one police officer on the island was among the first to be killed), the young people could have considered themselves «deputized» (to temporarily act as police officers) to use force to stop the killer.22 Most liberal theories make sense of such self-defensive uses of violence. Kant suggests, however, is that it remains fundamentally the case that no private individual has a right to use coercion unilaterally against another. Moreover, performing any action that is generally wrong, such as killing someone always comes at a moral cost, even when we do not wrong anyone in particular. That is to say, if the young people had succeeded in killing ABB (as deputized agents of a just state), they would not have wronged him, but their action would have come at a significant moral cost, even though it resulted from a situation forced upon them. On Kant's account, we experience the undertaking of such violent actions in non-ideal conditions as fundamentally inconsistent with what our commitment to justice ideally requires of us. We experience ourselves, Kant says, as «do[ing] wrong in the highest degree» (MM, 6: 307f)23 when we use violence against one another, including, of course when we subject another, aggressing person to lethal violence.24 In this case, anyone committed to justice would want to stop ABB before he managed to kill anyone and to bring him, as we say, «to justice» – which, as explained above, ideally means bringing him to trial, where the court will decide what should be done (whether he should be punished or forced to receive mental health treatment). Following that, the police and other public officers (prison guards or high-security mental health workNFT-2014-3-4.book Page 252 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM the terrorist attacks in norway, july 22nd 2011 * 253 ers) enforce this decision on behalf of all of us. This is the process we ideally want when we seek to bring perpetrators to justice. In the counterfactual case in which people had managed to stop ABB by killing him, they would experience having killed him as coming at a moral cost because such lethal violence conflicts with our own commitment to humanity or to regarding persons as having inviolable worth. Killing ABB on Utøya, although legally justified, would have involved one person deciding to end another person's life, which is something we do not view ourselves as having the moral authority to do with regard to one another.25 These are the reasons why, then, on Kant's account, it was so important to subject ABB to justice in the public court system, where everyone involved – except the accused – affirmed the rules and norms of respect constitutive of the courtroom. That behavior made it possible for us all to uphold our commitment to humanity and to interacting rightfully at all times. In other words, by so interacting with ABB, we upheld the humanity in him that he himself proved so utterly incapable of upholding. We also treated him in accordance with the laws that govern all our interactions through the authority of public representatives of the people, namely, court officials whose actions themselves are delineated by the law. The public officials lived up to the authority entrusted to them by ensuring that the law was followed at all times; they were not there as private persons but as public representatives of all of us who were authorized to evaluate the wrongdoer's actions on everyone's, including ABB's, behalf. The witnesses, in turn, helped the public authority perform their task by truthfully and respectfully telling them the facts. As each surviving witness and each bereaved family member took the stand, their ability to uphold the ideals of humanity and enable the courtroom to function – despite the way ABB so brutally violated those ideals for them personally – filled us with the deepest respect and gratitude. Those of us who have not had a similar experience have no certainty that we would be able to behave as they did; we only know that they showed us both how to do it and the importance of doing it. The witnesses and the public officials at trial enabled us all to uphold our own commitment to our humanity and to the public, legal institutions that ABB had so violently attacked. The way the trial was conducted was important, then, because, we experienced a public authority that functioned as a representative of us all, composed of public persons who reasoned and acted in ways determined by the public laws, whose aim was to protect each citizen's rights without subjecting them to private opinions of right and wrong. The legal system enabled us to determine rightful use of force, either punishment or forced mental health treatment, in response to ABB's violent transgressions of the laws. Moreover, this case illustrates how important the role of the public authority is when we face situations where crucial facts are uncertain, which in this case, was whether ABB was legally sane during the attacks. We lacked the facts to settle this question, and the Court-appointed experts disagreed. These non-ideal circumstances also make the ideal solution – the public rule of law – the most pragmatic solution. Given the difficult or non-ideal circumstances concerning our knowledge of ABB's legal sanity, all we could do was to ensure that the best (psychiatric and legal) expert judgments NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 253 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM 254 * helga varden were employed to investigate the issue, and then entrust the court, as our final public representatives, to determine the correct application of the law in this particular case. This Kantian account of why we need to bring people to justice by subjecting them to the public rule of law and the way this case proceeded explains why even those who disagreed with the court's ruling on ABB's legal sanity considered the verdict legitimate. 4. The Difference between Retributive Punishment and Forvaring In this section, I take the controversial stand that the current Penal Code in Norway is unable to deal with particularly heinous crimes, which undermines the legal system's ability to restore justice after certain serious crimes have been committed – something revealed also in this case. I argue that the legal system must be able to guarantee its citizens that if they are subjected to terrible crimes and they remain committed to the legal system in their responses to these crimes, then once the trial is over, their exposure to the violator must be over too. Currently, the Norwegian legal system is unable to do this, and so it is unable to guarantee victims the necessary space to grieve and heal. Despite all its merits, the legal proceedings could not bring the full, right kind of closure to the case. Many Norwegian citizens, including victims of these crimes, continue to find it morally offensive that the punishment for ABB's crimes is only 21 years (even though the clause of «forvaring» makes it practically unlikely that he will ever be free again). In my view, Norwegians are rightfully offended about this. A maximum limit of 21 years in prison for any imaginable crime makes little sense. The current Norwegian Penal Code likely grew out of theories popular in the 60s and 70s, theories according to which crime is the result of lamentable socio-economic conditions and the aim is always to restore the criminals fully to society. Of course, poor socio-economic conditions contribute to crime and typically our aim should be to see punishment as leading to restoring people as members of the community. Assuming that ABB is legally sane, it is quite possible that his lack of a healthy sense of self (his NPD) is due at least partially to his less than ideal childhood. Conceivably, Norwegian child protective services should have intervened early in ABB's life in order to protect his rights, in which case we all failed him at that point.26 The relationship between problematic childhoods – which we all, through the public authority, have a responsibility to do something about – and personality disorders may provide us with yet another reason to eschew the death penalty27 and offer ABB therapy. After all, perhaps only by such interventions do we take into account the complex stories behind crimes that involve the failures of the state and society to protect vulnerable children. Nevertheless, it remains the case that to have an NPD is not to be incapable of legal responsibility.28 Such crimes involve many choices. Even this extreme situation, if we go by ABB's own report of his stream of consciousness as he undertook the killings, involved many decisions – and ABB was and is responsible for these choices. Kant is famous for defending a retributive theory of punishment, according to which the automatic, corresponding punishment for choosing to kill another innocent person should be death (or, in my considered Kantian view, life in prison).29 To me, the inabilNFT-2014-3-4.book Page 254 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM the terrorist attacks in norway, july 22nd 2011 * 255 ity of the current legal system to bring full closure to this case should cause us to revisit this currently unpopular line of reasoning with regard to punishment. The retributive argument is simple: If you kill another innocent person, the life you took is not equivalent to 21 years of your own life. You are equals, and both of your lives are invaluable. There is no price tag on another's life; if you murder an innocent person, then your life as a free person should be over too. Perhaps there are reasons to equate one life sentence to 21 years, but we have to justify the equation, not simply assume it. It is simply incorrect that 21 years of imprisonment is a life-sentence (one that lasts the rest of one's life, or what traditionally was called «livstid» or «lifetime» sentence in Norwegian). Regardless of whether a lifetime in prison is best understood as equivalent to 21 years, I believe that the way in which the current Norwegian Penal Code limits punishment for any crime to 21 years in prison is unjustifiable. However heinous a crime one commits and however many people it affects, one cannot be sentenced in a single trial to more than 21 years. Assuming good behavior and no «forvaring» condition on the sentence, one has the right to be considered for release after completing 2/3 of one's sentence, or 14-15 years. This is, in my view, deeply problematic and morally offensive as it cannot be reconciled with each person's equal right to freedom. One way to illustrate the problem goes like this: ABB killed 77 people, and each killing becomes equivalent to 1/77th of 21 years, or 0.273 years or a little over three months, according to the current Norwegian Penal Code. If we include the number of other people who were physically harmed by ABB, the punishment for each killing becomes even less, and so even more absurd. If we consider the fact that ABB also undertook terror attacks against the state (so against all of us, or public crimes), then the punishment he received for each crime becomes even less, and even more absurd still. Again, this sentence fails to treat each citizen as having inviolable worth equal to that of any and all other human beings. Instead, the current Penal Code in Norway weighs each of ABB's victims' value as 1/nth, where «n» is the number of victims involved in the trial. The resulting punishment cannot, in principle, match the wrongdoing, which, I believe, is one reason why so many are rightly upset with the legal system's inability to bring proper closure to this case – to bring ABB to justice for his crimes. Hence, even if a life sentence may, for some reason, be deemed 21 years, then for each life one takes, one should get one life sentence. It should not be legally neutral whether one kills one, two, or many – each life should count as one when we measure punishment.30Of course, one might agree with this principle, but maintain that ABB is punished for each crime by paying for all of them concurrently (at the same time) rather than consecutively (one life sentence after another). I find this analysis unconvincing. Concurrent sentences may be plausible in some cases, as in lesser crimes or in non-bodily crimes, such as thefts. When we are dealing with intentional killing of other people and especially where each particular person is killed intentionally and particularly heinously (as in this case), there seems to be no good reason to appeal to the logic of concurrent sentencing. Yet perhaps consecutive or concurrent sentencing is simply inappropriate for some crimes, like the one we are dealing with NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 255 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM 256 * helga varden here. Some crimes are such that the idea of the criminal once again becoming one of us (our community) as an equal again is morally perverted or absurd. For some crimes – like those committed by ABB – the idea of a terminate sentence of any kind is in itself a moral perversion or absurdity; we cannot even envision what such an appropriate punishment could possibly be. All we do know is that the moral idea of becoming equal members of society again is impossible; it simply makes no sense, and this is why most Norwegians remain profoundly upset about this aspect of the trial. Some crimes are so heinous and vast in their impact that once the trial is over, unchosen exposure to the criminal in question must also end, and end for good. These kinds of crimes threaten to undo or unground people by robbing them either of their loved ones or of their trust in the world exactly because they are healthy human beings. The victims (first and foremost those who were directly attacked and their loved ones, and then all of us, as Norwegians) have a right to the silence and peace required to heal and return to life. The legal system doesn't function well if it cannot guarantee the kind of peace victims of such heinous crimes need, to find their way forward again. The current system upholds principles according to which victims have a duty of justice to face or interact with the perpetrator once again, as a free person; perhaps on the street or in the grocery store as a free citizen – possibly in 15 years time. But any determinate number of years to be served in prison is wrong, since there cannot be an «after the sentence is served» in these cases. The state cannot presume that its citizens have such a duty of justice to prepare for interaction as equals in society again. Sometimes interaction must be over for good, and this is one of those times. Those who were subjected to ABB's violence should have been able to know that after the trial they would never have to be exposed to or interact with him ever again. Whether or not they will interact should be a question over which they have control (such as choosing to visit him in prison, say, as part of the healing process).31 We all should remain committed to ABB being treated respectfully in prison, but it should not be the case that his victims are required to start mentally preparing for having to face him again, even relatively soon, as a free man in society. That the legal system cannot guarantee this, I believe, is a profound failure.32 It may be objected at this point that realistically ABB will never again be a free citizen, since the Penal Code has the category of «forvaring» exactly to ensure justice by preventing morally ill people like ABB from being released. I believe this argument is mistaken. The category of «forvaring» is the correct one to use to secure society against persons whose unwillingness to deal with their aggressive personality disorders makes it impossible to release them safely back into society. In legal systems that are committed to the principle that mentally ill people should not be punished for illegal violent actions, it seems correct to have a legal category that ensures that morally ill persons who have committed violent crimes have access to mental health services to control the aggressive aspects of their personality disorders. In fact, my impression is that the «forvaring» clause is increasingly applied exactly in cases where the crimes are impossible to explain except on the basis of some basic moral illness, such as in cases of domestic abuse of spouses and children. The account NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 256 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM the terrorist attacks in norway, july 22nd 2011 * 257 above is correct, it can explain why these people are legally responsible and yet should have access to the mental health services they need to deal with their problems. Still, the legal clause of forvaring deals with the moral illness, not with the question of retribution for the crime committed and for which they are legally responsible. Although the category of forvaring should be used in cases involving aggressive NPDs, it should not be a replacement for punishment, the means by which we restore rightful relations. The category of «safekeeping» addresses the moral illness involved, but cannot remedy an insufficiently retributive sentence that fails to express proper respect for the victims and their rights. The «forvaring» clause and the prison sentence are two categories that do independent work.33 Conclusion One of the most terrifying aspects of Adolf Eichmann was the banality of his thinking regarding his wrongdoing, as Hannah Arendt argues in her Eichmann in Jerusalem.34 Any plausible account of him, she maintained, had to account for the fact that he was, by any reasonable standard, a most mediocre man who seemed unable to think properly and so to know the difference between right and wrong. In his mind, he was simply following orders and obeying the law as he built a career for himself. Even though Eichmann was «perfectly incapable of telling right from wrong» (Arendt 26, cf. 287) and found himself «under circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for him to know or to feel that he was doing wrong» (Arendt 1992: 276), it was right that he was punished, Arendt maintained, because he «carried out, and therefore actively supported, a policy of mass murder.» (Arendt 1992: 279) Eichmann had to hang because, despite his lack of wrongful intent, «no one, that is, no member of the human race, can be expected to want to share the earth» with him (ibid.). Although it's obvious that someone who has acted as horrifically as Eichmann does not «have a right to live» in a profound sense, something about Arendt's account, as many have argued before me, doesn't add up. If you don't know what you're doing, you can't distinguish right from wrong, and you live in circumstances where the «culture» around you can't help you, then why is justice still done when you are subjected to the death penalty? Something doesn't seem quite right in the argument, including the interpretation of Eichmann's character. The account above can be seen as one attempt at giving a more nuanced account of these kinds of criminals, one that can explain why people like Eichmann and ABB, whose crimes are not motivated by self-interest and whose actual intent is, in their minds, not wrong, still remain responsible for their crimes. More specifically, I have suggested that part of what is so terrifying about ABB is also that, like Eichmann, he is a most mediocre person. Any interpretation of what we saw that ascribes to him impressive powers of any kind is irreconcilable with the facts. ABB's simple reasoning from mistaken beliefs is also banal through and through. I only differ from Arendt in offering a somewhat more complex account of this banality. To start, one difference is my emphasis on the way that ABB's and Eichmann's banal reasonings are matched by equally simple emotional lives. A second main difference is my suggestion that a lack of self (their moral illness) explains their lack of proper engagement with their beliefs NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 257 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM 258 * helga varden and the shockingly simple nature of their emotional lives. ABB is driven by the sense of being seen, of being alive that he gets from having a leading active role in his presumed political project. The information Arendt gives us about Eichmann suggests something similar. The main difference seems to be that Eichmann didn't share ABB's elation at committing the direct, physical destruction of other human beings, or this aggressive element of ABB's NPD. Otherwise, Eichmann and ABB both appear to lack a healthy sense of self and hence are utterly self-absorbed. This self-absorption explains why Eichmann, in Arendt's account , finds it so very difficult to «think from the standpoint of someone else» (Arendt 1992: 49), feels so easily «elated» when he tells the story about himself in terms of «stock phrases,» wants to get caught (so that he got to tell his story in court), and keeps writing his biography (during his years in Argentina and in prison in Israel). Both Eichmann and ABB lack adequate interpersonal emotions; feel elated when they describe their projects by stock phrases (the core one being variations of «obeying the law» for Eichmann and a core role in «protecting Norwegian culture from destruction» by «gruesome, but necessary» actions for ABB); wanted to get caught so that they could tell their stories in court; and they found it tremendously important to write the history (biographies) about their «great» lives. And, of course, both took themselves to be key elements of great moral-political projects of German and Norwegian self-realization. Eichmann took himself to be the «expert» on the Jewish question and ABB took himself to be the leader of both the European contrajihadist movement and Norway. Given these analogies, I have argued, in contrast to Arendt, that both Eichmann and ABB had the ability to correct the mistaken beliefs upon which their actions rested, and this is why they both have been legally responsible for their actions. Neither has a history of no interpersonal emotions ever present (revealing no capacity for such emotions) and both had many facts within reach that simply didn't fit the stories they were telling themselves. For example, when asked at trial if he would kill his own father if told to do so by his leaders, Eichmann replied that he certainly would if the case had been proven against his father. He was then asked if the case against the Jews he sent to the concentration camps had been proven, and he had (of course) no answer. Similarly, when asked what was possibly heroic about shooting defenseless children, ABB also didn't have an answer, but only awkwardly said that they didn't really look that young. Moreover, both courts proved that Eichman and ABB were able to correct mistaken beliefs. One might argue that self-correction was harder in Eichmann's case, since so many around him supported what he did, whereas ABB had much resistance in the culture surrounding him. However, not only did Eichmann's own physical reactions resist what he was doing (the violence in the concentration camps made him physically ill), but he was surrounded continuously by desperate people. He chose to act on what made him feel important and set aside everything in his reality that resisted that choice. For that decision he is responsible just as ABB was responsible for identifying the «true» culture as being the extremist culture he could find via the web. The trials gave both men opportunities to start relating to what they have done in a NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 258 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM the terrorist attacks in norway, july 22nd 2011 * 259 truthful way, one that tracks reality as it actually is, not as it might be described to make one feel smarter than everyone else and a part of a big project and not in a way that block challenges to what one is doing. Eichmann failed to seize this opportunity and so went to the gallows repeating his stock phrases, and ABB also failed to start this process in court. Their failures, however, do not lessen our duty to hold them and ourselves to this standard of truthfulness and respect for each person, the standard of humanity. If the analysis in this paper is correct, then if ABB ever starts this process, the standard of humanity involves the principle of forvaring and we must give him access to the mental health care he will need to do the seemingly impossible: find a way to live with what he has done. Noter 1 Thanks to Ingrid Albrecht, Lucy Allais, Marcia Baron, Jennifer K. Oleman, Sarah Broadie, Hugh Chandler, Antony Duff, Barbara Herman, Paul Hurley, Ernst Horgen, Arnt Myrstad, Martha C. Nussbaum, Leonard Randall, Barbara Sattler, Martin Sticker, David Sussman, Julie Tannenbaum, Nicolaus Tideman, Jens Timmermann, Ekow N. Yankah, Shelley Weinberg, Kirstin Wilcox, the Department of Philosophy at Pomona College, the Kant reading group at the University of St. Andrews; and Kjersti Fjørtoft and Jonas Jakobsen at Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift for having helped me in various ways in writing this paper. Which is not to say that they agree with my analysis or to deny in any way that the mistakes remain only mine. Thanks also to the Department of Philosophy and the Center for Advanced Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; the University of St. Andrew's Centre for Ethics, Philosophy and Public Affairs; and the Brady Scholars Program in Ethics and Civic Life at Northwestern University for having funded this research project. 2 See http://www.nrk.no/contentfile/file/ 1.8025126!tiltalen227.pdf for a redacted version of the charges against ABB. 3 ABB might have thought this because after World War II, there was a death penalty for treason and it was applied to some of the leading «Nasjonal Samling» (NS) leaders after the war. (NS was the fascist, nationalist political party led by Vidkun Quisling in Norway before and during the war.) 4 I have included these more descriptive parts in the paper so as to enable non-Norwegians to follow the analysis and engage the arguments. 5 The Commission originally asked for a clarification from the psychiatrists, but even after it was provided, the Commission's view was unclear. During the trial, when the Court questioned members of the Commission, it became apparent that in asking for the additional clarification from the second team of psychiatrists, the Commission had not «approved» the second report and that the Commission regarded the second report as weaker than the first. 6 First, there was disagreement over the existence of and his meetings with the leaders of the Knights Templar organization; when confronted with what appeared to be overwhelming evidence that the organization has never existed, ABB simply disagreed. Second, the prosecution argued that ABB lied when he claimed to have begun preparing for his attacks in 2002, since there is no evidence for (and much evidence against) this. On the basis of the first psychiatric report, reports from family and friends, and police interviews with ABB, the prosecution concluded that the writing of the manifesto began around 2007 and that the planning of the actual attacks started in 2009. Third, the prosecution maintained that ABB himself lied when he accused first team of psychiatrists of telling «200 lies» in their report of his statements during August 2011, because they had no reason (and very many reasons not) to lie. Fourth, the prosecution maintained that the evidence does not support ABB's claim that if he had succeeded in killing NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 259 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM 260 * helga varden more people at Høyblokka he would not have proceeded to Utøya. The defense agreed with the prosecution on the second and third points, and with ABB on the first and fourth. 7 The prosecutors emphasized that though in doubt they were more convinced by the first psychiatric report because it had evaluated ABB closer to the actual event, the Commission regarded it as the stronger report, and overall, it fit better with how friends and family had described ABB's withdrawal starting in 2006. 8 The Penal Code's §147 has never before applied in a Norwegian trial. Penal Code §147a outlaws acts of terror intended to undermine a central function in society, by, for example, incapacitating government activity or public works, or creating serious fear among the population. The prosecution argued that ABB's acts of terror also employed methods outlawed in Penal Code §148 (which forbids setting explosions that could lead to the loss of human life or the extensive destruction of others' property) and Penal Code §223 (which concerns intentional killing under «sharpened conditions,» conditions that make the killing especially heinous). 9 For the prosecution's procedure, see: http:// nrk.no/227/dag-for-dag/rettssaken---aktoratetsprosedyre-1.8213456 10For the defender's procedure, see: http://nrk.no/ 227/dag-for-dag/forsvarets-sluttprosedyre1.8216158 11These were the captain of the ferry, a 10-year old boy, and a young man whom he identified (presumably due to his «preppy» appearance) as «belonging to them,» meaning ABB's ultranationalist «kind.» 12 I am grateful to David Sussman for having suggested this phrase to me and for patiently discussing many of the issues in this section with me. 13 One question that keeps puzzling me (a non-expert on psychology/psychiatry) is whether someone suffering from a psychosis actually can have such clear memories of the crimes as ABB does and also not struggle (emotionally or cognitively) when facts disputing their sense of reality are presented. 14My account is inspired by recent work in Kantian moral psychology, especially that of Ingrid Albrecht, Lucy Allais, Barbara Herman, and David Sussman. 15 We all, of course, have some of these tendencies, and some of us have more than others because of having been subjected to abusive behavior. Hence, at times, we all need to pay extra attention to ourselves to heal wounds or care a little especially for bits that have been badly trampled on. These normal features of a fragile human life differ from the experience of someone who is struggling with an NPD. Such a person does not only experience herself as sometimes more vulnerable or defensive, but as generally struggling to experience appropriate moral emotions. The all-encompassing nature of the struggle is why its existential challenges are so significant and difficult to face. 16 In my view, these ideas reflect the relationship Kant envisions between morality and human nature, as in the Religion within the Boundaries of mere Reason (6: 26-9). According to Kant, the predisposition to good in human nature has three elements to it: The first (to «animality») concerns our basic, unreflective social nature; the second (to «humanity») concerns our susceptibility to how others conceive of us (which requires simple comparative uses of reason); and the third (to «personality») concerns our susceptibility to morality and its demands (which requires reflective, practical uses of reason). In the analysis in the paper, the first idea informs the way in which I describe a healthy self as being personally and socially identified ("animality»), the second informs the idea of how a health self assumes being seen by others ("humanity»), and the third informs the idea of how reflection enables us to both correct beliefs and behavior ("personality»). Going into these exegetical aspects of Kant is obviously impossible, but notice that my analysis can be supported by any theory that has such a three-fold combination of unreflective and reflective elements of our basic emotional life. 17We never saw how he would interact with his friends since they needed him to leave the room when they testified; his mother naturally never testified. 18When he was a little boy (4 years old) the Norwegian child services were alerted and undertook psychiatric evaluations of him; the relevant court sessions were conducted behind closed doors for confidentiality reasons. 19Hence, this account is compatible with maintaining that some types of psychopaths completely lack the capacity for other-directed emotions of any kind (see, for example, Jeffrie G. Murphy's article «Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy,» Ethics, Vol 82:4, 1972: 284-98 for such an analysis of psychopathy; see especially NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 260 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM the terrorist attacks in norway, july 22nd 2011 * 261 pp. 294ff.); my claim here is simply that ABB is not one of these. 20 I'm especially grateful to Duff, Herman, and Yankah for making me clarify this point. 21 It may be impossible for anyone today to actually settle the issue of ABB's legal sanity at the time of the actions since obtaining this knowledge would require access to ABB's mind both at the time of the crimes and during the interviews, which is impossible. In addition, the original interviews were not recorded electronically. 22For such a deputy interpretation, see Sussman's «On the Supposed Duty of Truthfulness: Kant on Lying in Self-Defense,» in The Philosophy of Deception, ed. Clancy Martin (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009, 225-43). 23Kant, Immanuel The Metaphysics of Morals, transl. and ed. by M. Gregor (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996). 24On this reading of Kant, to kill someone is to do a generally wrong action – it involves, in «Kantianese,» acting on a rule (maxim) that cannot hold as a universal law. Hence, choosing that action (killing) makes the option of interacting under universal laws impossible. This is why the action of killing the killer is experienced as coming at a moral cost even though it does not wrong the killer. I defend this approach in «Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door... One more Time: Kant's Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis,» The Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol. 41, No. 4, Winter 2010: 403-421. A main alternative reading of Kant on this point could argue that since one is forced into the situation where killing the other is the only option, killing the other is not to do wrong in the highest degree and does not come at a moral cost. 25 In fact, this may be a reason to think that Kant is wrong in thinking we can have the death penalty. Perhaps the death penalty, though morally appropriate in the sense of fitting the crimes, requires people to do something that no morally healthy human being can do or can feel authorized to do (namely, execute another, now defenseless person). Hence the death penalty may be both morally necessary and morally impossible. I am grateful to David Sussman for helping me clarify my thoughts on this issue. 26 The extent to which this is indeed the case depends upon psychiatric evaluations of ABB conducted at the time, but the public does not – as it should not – have access to such confidential documents. 27 At this point in time, it seems over-determined that imposing the death penalty in a well-functioning legal system is simply unjustifiable, but going into this issue here would take me too far afield. 28 If my analysis is correct, then it is not the case that serious violent crimes of this kind will go away even in very affluent societies (like Norway). And, indeed, current research does not indicate that Norway – now the richest welfare state in the world – has fewer people struggling with personality disorders than other countries. Its high levels of domestic abuse equal those of other countries. 29See note 25 for explication of why I believe that the death penalty should be taken off the Kantian table. 30 The prosecutors' closing argument is that the actual punishment will be the same regardless of whether or not ABB is charged only with Penal Code paragraph 147a (public crime, or a crime against the state) or also with Penal Codes 148 (a public crime) and 223 (77 counts of private crimes, or crimes against private citizens). It seems to me, however, that he should be charged with all of these charges as well as with x number of counts of each one (one or two counts of 147, one or two counts of 148, and finally 77 counts of murder under «sharpened conditions»). Each of these counts should carry a life sentence and he should be charged for each count of physical injury. 31As pointed out to me by Broadie and Yankah, a full account of this probably engages the historical category of being banished from societies, but for reasons of space I set aside this question here. 32 I'm most grateful to Duff, Herman, and Sussman for helping me clarify my thoughts on punishment here. 33 One may object that Norway has never had to deal with mass murderers post-WWII and we should not change the system in response to only one case. My claim, however, is that we should change the law not because of this one case, but because the law is incorrect. This case has only made obvious problems that have existed for a long time. 34See both Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (Penguin books, 1992) and Margarethe von Trolla's 2012 film Hannah Arendt about the writing and publication of this book. My revised analysis of Eichmann is also consistent with relevant sections of Bettina Stangneth's Eichmann before Jerusalem: The Unexamined Life of a Mass Murderer (Knopf: New York, 2014). NFT-2014-3-4.book Page 261 Tuesday, November 25, 2014 1:03 PM

Externalizing Psychopathology and the Error-Related Negativity Jason R. Hall, Edward M. Bernat, and Christopher J. Patrick University of Minnesota Abstract Prior research has demonstrated that antisocial behavior, substance-use disorders, and personality dimensions of aggression and impulsivity are indicators of a highly heritable underlying dimension of risk, labeled externalizing. Other work has shown that individual trait constructs within this psychopathology spectrum are associated with reduced self-monitoring, as reflected by amplitude of the error-related negativity (ERN) brain response. In this study of undergraduate subjects, reduced ERN amplitude was associated with higher scores on a self-report measure of the broad externalizing construct that links these various indicators. In addition, the ERN was associated with a response-locked increase in anterior theta (4–7 Hz) oscillation; like the ERN, this theta response to errors was reduced among high-externalizing individuals. These findings suggest that neurobiologically based deficits in endogenous action monitoring may underlie generalized risk for an array of impulse-control problems. Recent research examining patterns of diagnostic co-morbidity in communityepidemiological samples indicates that conduct disorder in children, antisocial behavior in adults, and substance-use disorders-along with personality traits related to behavioral disinhibition-are indicators of a common underlying vulnerability factor, labeled externalizing (Krueger, 1999; Krueger, McGue, & Iacono 2001). Behavior genetic research has revealed that this shared externalizing factor is highly (>80%) heritable (Krueger et al., 2002), suggesting that general vulnerability toward the development of impulse-control problems has a strong neurobiological basis. Clarifying the brain mechanisms that underlie this broad vulnerability will be an important step toward a more complete understanding of this spectrum of high-impact disorders. Prior work has revealed that reduced amplitude of the P300 brain potential is related to the diagnostic (Costa et al., 2000) and personality-trait (Justus, Finn, & Steinmetz, 2001) indicators of externalizing, and recent research has established a direct association between reduced P300 and the broad externalizing factor that links these various indicators (Patrick et al., 2006). The present study was designed to further elucidate the neurobiological underpinnings of the externalizing psychopathology factor by examining its association with a brain measure that has clear functional relevance to impulse-control problems, namely, the error-related negativity (ERN). The adult externalizing construct originally emerged through factor analyses of psychiatric disorders in epidemiological samples (Krueger, 1999). This work revealed that two broad, higher-order psychopathology factors underpin the most commonly occurring mental disorders. One factor, labeled internalizing, is associated with anxiety and unipolar mood disorders; the other factor, labeled externalizing, accounts for the covariance among childhood conduct problems, adult antisocial behavior, and substance-use disorders. Subsequent research suggested that basic personality dimensions such as aggressiveness and lack of behavioral constraint may also be markers of externalizing vulnerability (Krueger, Address correspondence to Jason R. Hall, Department of Psychology, University of Minnesota, Elliott Hall, 75 East River Rd., Minneapolis, MN 55455, e-mail: [email protected]. NIH Public Access Author Manuscript Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 February 13. Published in final edited form as: Psychol Sci. 2007 April ; 18(4): 326–333. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01899.x. N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript 2002; Krueger et al., 2001; Lynam, Leukefeld, & Clayton, 2003). Interestingly, the covariance among these diverse diagnostic and personality indicators is highly heritable (Kendler, Prescott, Myers, & Neale, 2003; Krueger et al., 2002; Young, Stallings, Corley, Krauter, & Hewitt, 2000), suggesting that there is a coherent genetic basis to externalizing. Recent work has also focused on developing a comprehensive quantitative model of the externalizing spectrum; this line of research aims to extend existing nosological frameworks by including a broad range of psychopathological symptoms and normal-range personality traits as indicators of the externalizing construct (Krueger, Markon, Patrick, Benning, & Kramer, in press; Krueger, Markon, Patrick, & Iacono, 2005). This effort has led to the development of the Externalizing Inventory (Krueger et al., in press), a self-report instrument designed to systematically index externalizing vulnerability via empirically derived behavioral and personality-trait indicators. A common behavioral pattern reflected in many manifestations of externalizing is an apparent failure to learn from experience-harmful behaviors are repeated continually despite an awareness of negative consequences for self or others. This raises the possibility that externalizing may involve a deficit in the ability to self-monitor ongoing behavior for errors or situationally inappropriate actions. Prior research suggests that a reliable brain index of this self-monitoring process is the ERN (Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, & Hoormann, 1991; Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer, & Donchin, 1993), a response-locked negative deflection of the brain event-related potential that is observed following errors in laboratory performance tasks. The ERN typically peaks within 100 ms of the commission of an error and has a frontocentral scalp distribution. Evidence indicates that the primary neural generator of the ERN is the anterior cingulate cortex (Dehaene, Posner, & Tucker, 1994), a brain structure that is widely believed to be involved in self-monitoring and behavioral regulation (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000). The ERN is thought to reflect activation of the brain's mechanism for on-line monitoring of its own performance, either through detection of errors (Falkenstein, Hoormann, Christ, & Hohnsbein, 2000) or through response conflict (Carter et al., 1998). The ERN response is maximal when accuracy is emphasized over speed in task instructions and has been linked to several indices of behavioral compensation for errors; for example, greater ERN amplitude is associated with less forceful error responses, higher probability of error correction, and greater slowing of response on trials following errors (Gehring et al., 1993). On the basis of this evidence, Gehring et al. postulated that the ERN provides input to multiple brain systems that act to inhibit or correct errors in progress, as well as prevent future errors via enhanced cognitive control strategies. Interestingly, recent research has revealed that both states and traits related to behavioral disinhibition are associated with reduced amplitude of the ERN response. For instance, with respect to disinhibitory states, ERN amplitude is reduced during acute alcohol intoxication (Ridderinkhof et al., 2002). With regard to trait variables, Dikman and Allen (2000) reported that individuals scoring low (i.e., bottom 3% of a large prescreened sample) on Gough's (1960) socialization scale (reflecting high levels of rebelliousness, aggression, and impulsivity) exhibited reduced ERN amplitude during the punishment-avoidance condition of an experimental task, relative to a reward phase. Similarly, Pailing and Segalowitz (2004) reported that individuals scoring low on a measure of the Big Five personality dimension of Conscientiousness (a construct that reflects tendencies toward dutifulness, responsibility, and reliability) showed reduced ERN amplitude in response to errors that were not relevant to reward contingencies-a result suggesting reduced self-monitoring when explicit incentives were absent. Recent work has also revealed associations between reduced ERN amplitude and other indices of disinhibitory personality, including impulsiveness (Pailing, Segalowitz, Dywan, & Davies, 2002; Potts, George, Martin, & Barratt, 2006) and Eysenck's psychoticism Hall et al. Page 2 Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 February 13. N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript dimension (Santesso, Segalowitz, & Schmidt, 2005). Thus, individuals who are low in socialization or high in psychoticism (traits related to antisocial behavior), who are low in Conscientiousness or high in impulsiveness (traits related to a lack of behavioral selfcontrol), or who are acutely intoxicated with alcohol tend to show diminished neural responses to errors. In contrast, obsessive-compulsive disorder (which is marked by tendencies toward rumination and excessive self-monitoring) is positively associated with ERN amplitude (Gehring, Himle, & Nisenson, 2000). ERN amplitude is associated negatively, rather than positively, with the broad personality factor of negative emotionality (Luu, Collins, & Tucker, 2000), which encompasses traits of aggression and alienation, as well as trait anxiousness (Patrick, Curtin, & Tellegen, 2002). This finding is notable because negative emotionality (in particular, its aggression and alienation facets) shows a reliable positive association with the externalizing construct (Krueger, Caspi, Moffitt, Silva, & McGee, 1996). Collectively, these studies point to a connection between impaired self-monitoring, as evidenced by reduced amplitude of the ERN, and a variety of constructs related to externalizing. This raises the possibility that reduced ERN is in fact related to the broad externalizing vulnerability that links these traits, rather than to the discrete trait indicators themselves. However, a definitive link has yet to be established between ERN response and the broad externalizing factor itself, as opposed to discrete trait indicators of externalizing. Thus, the major aim of the present study was to directly examine the relation between externalizing and ERN response in subjects selected to be either low or high on the broad externalizing factor as indexed by the newly developed Externalizing Inventory. We also examined the relation between externalizing and brain-wave oscillations associated with the ERN that follow the commission of errors. We performed these analyses on the basis of recent evidence that a brief increase in anterior theta (4–7 Hz) wave amplitude underlies the ERN response (Bernat, Williams, & Gehring, 2005; Luu, Tucker, & Makeig, 2004;however, see Yordanova, Falkenstein, Hohnsbein, & Kolev, 2004). An additional benefit of this type of analysis is that it allows the isolation of variance that is unique to the discrete theta-wave response from separate sources of slow-wave activity (e.g., motor response potential, stimulus processing) that might overlap in time with the ERN component. On the basis of prior research, we hypothesized that individuals high in externalizing would show significant reductions in both ERN and anterior theta response relative to individuals low in externalizing. METHOD Subjects Subjects in this study were selected from a larger sample of undergraduate students (N = 1,637) in introductory psychology courses at the University of Minnesota who completed the Externalizing Inventory as a prescreening instrument. Individuals falling within the lowest and highest quartiles of the distribution of scores on this inventory were oversampled to form low-externalizing and high-externalizing groups for inclusion in our primary statistical analyses. In addition, individuals falling within the middle 50% of scores on the Externalizing Inventory were sampled to allow supplementary correlational analyses in which the full distribution of scores was represented. Ninety-five subjects were recruited; 3 individuals were excluded from the analyses because of recording-equipment malfunction. Thus, the final sample for this study consisted of 92 subjects: 36 (12 male) in the highexternalizing group, 28 (9 male) in the low-externalizing group, and 28 (13 male) in the intermediate group. Hall et al. Page 3 Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 February 13. N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript Measures The Externalizing Inventory (Krueger et al., in press) is a 415-item self-report measure of externalizing, developed to assess a broad range of behavioral and personality characteristics associated with the externalizing spectrum of psychopathology. It includes 23 subscales designed to measure facet-level indicators of the externalizing construct, including physicalrelational-destructive aggression, boredom proneness, irresponsibility, problematic impulsivity, drug and alcohol use or problems, theft, fraud, rebelliousness, alienation, and blame externalization. The measure was developed across three waves of data collection in large samples (total N = 1,787) drawn from undergraduate and prison populations. For purposes of large-scale prescreening in the present study, we utilized a subset of the full inventory consisting of the 100 items that possessed the strongest psychometric properties across all three rounds of data collection. Scores on the 100-item measure are highly correlated (r = .98) with scores on the full 415-item Externalizing Inventory. As a check on the construct validity of this 100-item measure, we also administered the following selfreport measures that have conceptual or empirical links to externalizing: the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire–Brief Form (MPQ-BF; Patrick et al., 2002); the Socialization scale (Gough, 1960); the Behavior Report on Rule-Breaking, a self-report measure of adolescent and adult antisocial behaviors composed of items from several other published measures (Clark & Tifft, 1966; Hindelang, Hirschi, & Weis, 1981; Nye & Short, 1957); the Alcohol Dependence Scale (H.A. Skinner & Allen, 1982); and the Short Drug Abuse Screening Test (A. Skinner, 1982). Procedure The experimental task was a modified version of the Eriksen flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) in which subjects made rightor left-hand button-press responses to indicate the middle letter in a five-letter stimulus array. Target characters consisted of the letters S or H; distracting flanker letters were either congruent or incongruent with the center target, resulting in a set of four target arrays that occurred with equal frequency across the task as a whole: "SSSSS," "HHHHH," "SSHSS," and "HHSHH." Subjects were instructed to respond to the target letter S with one hand and the target letter H with the opposite hand. Button-press responses were registered on a response box positioned on the subject's lap. To enhance the difficulty of the task and thereby ensure a sufficient number of errors, we presented nontarget stimulus arrays (in which the center letter was an X, and subjects made no response) on 14% of the trials. On 50% of these no-go trials, the flanking letters were congruent with the center X (i.e., "XXXXX"), and on the other 50%, the flanking letters were incongruent (i.e., "SSXSS" and "HHXHH"). Each stimulus array was presented for 150 ms, followed by a 1,000-ms response window; responses that occurred prior to stimulus offset were not recorded. A fixation point appeared in the center of the screen throughout each intertrial interval (ITI). ITIs varied in duration from 1,500 to 2,500 ms, with a mean of 2,000 ms. Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly and accurately as possible to each target array. They were also instructed that they could self-correct any errors aside from errors of commission on no-go trials. Prior to beginning the task, each subject completed a series of 40 practice trials. The main task consisted of six blocks of 100 trials each, for a total of 600 trials. Short breaks were included between blocks, and during each break, on-screen feedback regarding cumulative accuracy was provided ("Your performance so far: N% correct"). To make the task more difficult and thereby further enhance the frequency of errors, we reversed hand-letter assignment following the completion of each block of trials; initial hand-letter assignment was counterbalanced across subjects. Hall et al. Page 4 Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 February 13. N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript Psychophysiological Data Acquisition and Reduction Electrodes for recording electroencephalographic (EEG) signals were placed at 64 scalp lead sites according to the guidelines of the International 10–20 system. Electrodes were also placed above and below the left eye to monitor ocular activity. Impedances were kept below 10 kΩ. All EEG signals were digitized on-line at 1000 Hz, then epoched off-line from 500 ms before response onset to 1,000 ms after response, rereferenced to linked mastoids, and resampled to 128 Hz. Trial-level EEG data were then corrected for ocular and movement artifacts. A 1-Hz high-pass filter was applied to trial-level data to reduce the effect of slowwave motor potentials that can contaminate response-locked brain potentials. Data were then averaged across trials within condition (correct vs. error trials) for the purpose of ERN and time-frequency analyses. The ERN was defined as the maximum negative-voltage peak, relative to a −250– to −50ms preresponse baseline, that occurred within a window beginning with the onset of an incorrect button-press response and terminating 200 ms after the response. To further investigate the nature of the ERN response, we also performed a principal-components analysis of time-frequency brain-response data to quantify changes in EEG activity occurring at various frequencies across time (for a detailed description of this method, including illustrations of applicability to ERN data, see Bernat et al., 2005). This method is designed to disaggregate brain-wave responses that oscillate at different frequencies, so that these distinct EEG signals can be analyzed separately. RESULTS Questionnaire Data Correlations between the 100-item Externalizing Inventory and self-report criterion measures are presented in Table 1. Evidence of criterion-related validity was demonstrated by robust positive associations between externalizing scores and measures of antisocial behavior (in children and adults), alcohol dependence, and illicit drug abuse (cf. Krueger et al., 2002). In addition, higher externalizing scores were associated with lower scores for constraint and higher scores for negative emotionality on the MPQ-BF (cf. Krueger et al., 1996) and lower scores on socialization. Behavioral Data Mean reaction time (RT) and accuracy data are presented in Table 2. Behavioral data were missing for 2 subjects because of equipment failure; thus, 90 subjects were included in these analyses. There were no differences in accuracy or RT between the highand lowexternalizing groups (Fs < 1); furthermore, correlations between continuous externalizing scores and accuracy, r(88) = −.14, and RT, r(88) = .05, were negligible. Flanker interference effects on task performance were observed, as indicated by a main effect of stimulus type (congruent vs. incongruent) on overall accuracy, F(1, 89) = 5.34, p = .023, prep = .92, , reflecting reduced accuracy on incongruent trials. For RT, there was a Stimulus Type × Response Accuracy (error vs. correct) interaction, F(1, 77) = 45.66, p <.001, prep > . 99, , reflecting longer RTs for incongruent stimuli on correct trials, t(89) = −18.04, p < .001, prep > .99, d = −0.62, and shorter RTs for incongruent stimuli on error trials, t(77) = 3.87, p <.001, prep > .99, d = 0.48. Overall, RTs were longer on error trials than on correct Hall et al. Page 5 Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 February 13. N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript trials, t(89) = −6.93, p <.001, prep > .99, d = −0.63.1 None of these effects interacted with externalizing group (Fs < 1). Brain Response Data ERN Peak Scores-Figure 1a presents average response-locked waveforms recorded at FCz for the highand low-externalizing groups. The ERN is evident as a sharp negative deflection in the error waveform that peaks approximately 50 ms post-response. The scalp topography map in Figure 1b reveals that ERN amplitude was maximal at FCz; this finding is consistent with a medial-frontal source within the brain. Inspection of the scalp distribution illustrated in Figure 1c revealed that externalizing-group differences in ERN amplitude were greatest at frontocentral electrodes. To test for group differences in ERN amplitude at FCz, we conducted a 2 (response accuracy: error vs. correct) × 2 (externalizing group: high vs. low) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). There was a robust main effect of response accuracy, F(1, 62) = 53.29, p < .001, prep >.99, ηp2 = .462, reflecting greater negativity on error than on correct trials. A Response Accuracy × Externalizing Group interaction, F(1, 62) = 8.06, p = .006, prep = .96, ηp2 = . 115, revealed that ERN amplitude was reduced in the high-externalizing group, and that this effect was specific to error trials, as illustrated in Figure 2. This effect was also reflected in the correlation between ERN peak amplitude and continuous externalizing scores across the sample as a whole on error trials, r(90) = .29, p = .006, prep = .96; the effect was nonsignificant for correct trials, r(90) = .08, p = .473, prep = .52. Time-Frequency Component Scores-Results of the time-frequency analysis of averaged error-trial data are presented in Figure 3. As shown in Figure 3a, oscillatory brain responses to errors were characterized primarily by an increase in power within the theta (4– 7 Hz) frequency band that peaked approximately 50 to 75 ms following incorrect responses. Following the methods outlined by Bernat et al. (2005), we further decomposed these data using principal-components analysis. Inspection of the resulting scree plot (Fig. 3b) indicated that a four-component solution best accounted for the observed patterns of covariance in the time-frequency data. The second component (PC-2; see Fig. 3c) reflected the unique variance related to an increase in anterior theta power, which was maximal at approximately 6 Hz. This theta component accounted for nearly 64% of variance in peak ERN amplitude. Furthermore, the peak of this response-locked increase in theta energy coincided in time with the ERN and had a similar frontocentral scalp maximum (see Fig. 3c), strongly suggesting that this component was the time-frequency representation of the ERN. Externalizing-group differences in theta power were maximal at frontocentral electrodes, as illustrated in Figure 3d. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to test for group differences in the magnitude of theta response to errors at FCz. As predicted, theta activity was attenuated in the high-externalizing group, F(1, 62) = 5.52, p = .022, prep = .92, ηp2 = .082. In the sample as a whole, there was a negative correlation between theta power and externalizing, r(90) = −.24, p = .022, prep = .92. DISCUSSION Externalizing is a broad trait-dispositional factor that reflects disinhibitory personality and proneness to an array of impulse-control problems. Previous work has demonstrated that a 1Note that degrees of freedom vary across these tests because not all subjects committed errors in each condition; that is, some subjects did not commit errors in the congruent condition (n = 8), whereas others committed no errors in the incongruent condition (n = 4). Hall et al. Page 6 Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 February 13. N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript number of conceptually related trait constructs are associated with reduced ERN amplitude. In the present study, we found evidence of a link between reduced ERN response and a measure of the broad externalizing factor that unites these more narrowly defined traits. The implication is that constructs that have previously been linked to reduced ERN (e.g., socialization, psychoticism, Conscientiousness, impulsivity) may tap a common underlying neurobiological process that is associated more generally with externalizing vulnerability. What is the nature of this underlying neurobiological process? The ERN has been construed primarily as a reflection of the brain's mechanism for detecting errors in behavior and is most likely centered in the anterior cingulate cortex (Dehaene et al., 1994). This process presumably plays a role in behavioral regulation by signaling other brain regions of the need for enhanced executive control and attentional deployment when errors are made (Gehring et al., 1993). A deficit in this mechanism would have clear functional relevance for externalizing, insofar as impairment in the brain's error-detection network might impede the learning process by which future errors are avoided. The consequence of such an impairment would be a tendency to continually repeat maladaptive or harmful mistakes, especially in the absence of explicit reinforcement contingencies, when such internal sources of response feedback are most critical. Alternatively, it has recently been suggested that the ERN (and the anterior cingulate activity with which it is associated) reflects an internal conflict-monitoring process that is initiated when mutually incompatible response pathways become activated simultaneously (Carter et al., 1998). This perspective is supported by neuroimaging research demonstrating increased anterior cingulate activity during correct responses in tasks that involve a high degree of conflict, such as the continuous-performance task (Carter et al., 1998). The conflict-detection system proposed by Carter et al., rather than detecting errors in performance per se, acts as an early warning system that signals other brain regions of the need for enhanced cognitive control under conditions of heightened response conflict, when errors are most likely to occur. A deficit in such a mechanism might give rise to externalizing tendencies via a decreased sensitivity to subtle response conflict (and subsequent failure to engage cognitive control), rather than a reduced capacity to recognize errors during on-line processing and adapt behavior accordingly. However, it is noteworthy that despite an apparent neural deficit in self-monitoring, high-externalizing subjects were able to maintain a level of task performance that was equivalent to that of the lowexternalizing group for both congruent (low-conflict) and incongruent (high-conflict) stimuli. This may have been the case because the flanker task, which is perceptually and conceptually straightforward, does not place sufficient demands on processing resources for complex executive-control strategies or behavioral adjustments to be required for adequate performance. Given a more complex experimental task, or under real-world conditions, deficits in self-monitoring may have more substantial consequences for performance. Another notable finding from the present study concerns self-monitoring as measured via the anterior theta oscillation. Prior work has suggested that the ERN reflects a brief increase in an ongoing frontal theta oscillation (Bernat et al., 2005), perhaps representing the moment of maximum phase-locking of this brain-wave component, that is, the point at which disparate neural generators of theta activity become maximally synchronized in response to a discrete event. It has previously been suggested that theta activity is associated with a distributed action-regulation system that includes the hippocampus, thalamus, and cingulate cortex (Luu, Tucker, Derryberry, Reed, & Poulsen, 2003). Data from the present study replicated prior findings indicating that the ERN is associated with a phase-locked increase in midline-frontal theta; in addition, this theta response was reduced among highexternalizing subjects. Hall et al. Page 7 Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 February 13. N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript One important question that remains to be addressed in future research concerns the potential moderating impact of motivation on the relation between self-monitoring and externalizing. Recent work has demonstrated that the ERN response is sensitive to experimental manipulations that vary the motivational salience of errors (Hajcak, Moser, Yeung, & Simons, 2005). This raises the possibility that high-externalizing individuals may show reduced ERN primarily in the absence of extrinsic (e.g., monetary) motivation to perform well, which would accord with prior research regarding trait indicators of externalizing and error monitoring under varying motivational conditions (Dikman & Allen, 2000; Pailing & Segalowitz, 2004). Another intriguing question is whether reduced ERN might represent a physiological trait marker or endophenotype of externalizing vulnerability, as P300 reduction does (Patrick et al., 2006). For instance, would reduced ERN manifest itself in the unaffected relatives of high-externalizing individuals, or would this feature be evident only in the context of active psychopathology? Future research in genetically informative (twin) samples will help to address this issue. Furthermore, extension of the present research to clinical samples, including incarcerated offenders exhibiting extreme levels of impulsivity and aggression, should provide further insights into the pathophysiology of externalizing. In conclusion, the present study found that externalizing vulnerability, which represents generalized risk for aggression, antisocial behavior, substance-use problems, and a disinhibited personality style, is related to a brain-based deficit in on-line self-monitoring of behavior. In this context, the externalizing construct provides a useful conceptual framework for interpreting results from previous studies that have demonstrated links between discrete trait markers of the broad externalizing dimension and impaired self-monitoring, as measured by the ERN. Thus, the present findings shed additional light on the neurobiological underpinnings of this important and costly spectrum of psychopathology. Acknowledgments This research was supported by Grants MH65137, MHO72850, MH17069, and AA12164 from the National Institutes of Health and by funds from the Hathaway Endowment at the University of Minnesota. Jason R. Hall conducted this work in partial fulfillment of thesis requirements for his master's degree. Preliminary findings were presented at the 45th Annual Meeting of the Society for Psychophysiological Research, Lisbon, Portugal, September 2005. We thank Benjamin Steffen, Noah Venables, Meredith Cadwallader, William Schoeppner, Jiyon Kim, and Hannah Kamke for their invaluable assistance. References Bernat EM, Williams WJ, Gehring WJ. Decomposing ERP time-frequency energy using PCA. Clinical Neurophysiology. 2005; 116:1314–1334. [PubMed: 15978494] Bush G, Luu P, Posner MI. Cognitive and emotional influences in anterior cingulate cortex. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 2000; 4:215–222. [PubMed: 10827444] Carter CS, Braver TS, Barch DM, Botvinick MM, Noll D, Cohen JD. Anterior cingulate cortex, error detection, and the online monitoring of performance. Science. 1998; 280:747–749. [PubMed: 9563953] Clark JP, Tifft LL. Polygraph and interview validation of self-reported deviant behavior. American Sociological Review. 1966; 31:516–523. [PubMed: 5945544] Costa L, Bauer L, Kuperman S, Porjesz B, O'Connor S, Hesselbrock V, Rohrbaugh J, Begleiter H. Frontal P300 decrements, alcohol dependence, and antisocial personality disorder. Biological Psychiatry. 2000; 47:1064–1071. [PubMed: 10862806] Dehaene S, Posner MI, Tucker DM. Localization of a neural system for error detection and compensation. Psychological Science. 1994; 5:303–305. Dikman ZV, Allen JJB. Error monitoring during reward and avoidance learning in highand lowsocialized individuals. Psychophysiology. 2000; 37:43–54. [PubMed: 10705766] Hall et al. Page 8 Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 February 13. N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript Eriksen B, Eriksen C. Effects of noise letters upon the identification of a target letter in a non-search task. Perception & Psychophysics. 1974; 16:143–149. Falkenstein M, Hohnsbein J, Hoormann J. Effects of crossmodal divided attention on late ERP components: II. Error processing in choice reaction tasks. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology. 1991; 78:447–455. [PubMed: 1712280] Falkenstein M, Hoormann J, Christ S, Hohnsbein J. ERP components on reaction errors and their functional significance: A tutorial. Biological Psychology. 2000; 51:87–107. [PubMed: 10686361] Gehring WJ, Goss B, Coles MGH, Meyer DE, Donchin E. A neural system for error detection and compensation. Psychological Science. 1993; 4:385–390. Gehring WJ, Himle J, Nisenson LG. Action-monitoring dysfunction in obsessive-compulsive disorder. Psychological Science. 2000; 11:1–6. [PubMed: 11228836] Gough HG. Theory and measurement of socialization. Journal of Consulting Psychology. 1960; 24:23–30. Hajcak G, Moser JS, Yeung N, Simons RF. On the ERN/Ne and the significance of errors. Psychophysiology. 2005; 42:151–160. [PubMed: 15787852] Hindelang, MJ.; Hirschi, T.; Weis, JG. Measuring delinquency. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage; 1981. Justus AN, Finn PR, Steinmetz JE. P300, disinhibited personality, and early alcohol problems. Alcoholism: Clinical and Experimental Research. 2001; 25:1457–1466. Kendler KS, Prescott CA, Myers J, Neale MC. The structure of genetic and environmental risk factors for common psychiatric and substance use disorders in men and women. Archives of General Psychiatry. 2003; 60:929–937. [PubMed: 12963675] Krueger RF. The structure of common mental disorders. Archives of General Psychiatry. 1999; 56:921–926. [PubMed: 10530634] Krueger RF. Personality from a realist's perspective: Personality traits, criminal behaviors, and the externalizing spectrum. Journal of Research in Personality. 2002; 36:564–572. Krueger RF, Caspi A, Moffitt TE, Silva PA, McGee R. Personality traits are differentially linked to mental disorders: A multi-trait/multi-diagnosis study of an adolescent birth cohort. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 1996; 105:299–312. [PubMed: 8772001] Krueger RF, Hicks BM, Patrick CJ, Carlson SR, Iacono WG, McGue M. Etiologic connections among substance dependence, antisocial behavior, and personality: Modeling the externalizing spectrum. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 2002; 111:411–424. [PubMed: 12150417] Krueger RF, Markon KE, Patrick CJ, Benning S, Kramer M. Linking antisocial behavior, substance use, and personality: Toward a comprehensive quantitative model of the adult externalizing spectrum. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. in press. Krueger RF, Markon KE, Patrick CJ, Iacono WG. Externalizing psychopathology in adulthood: A dimensional-spectrum conceptualization and its implications for DSM-V. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 2005; 114:537–550. [PubMed: 16351376] Krueger RF, McGue M, Iacono WG. The higher-order structure of common DSM mental disorders: Internalization, externalization, and their connections to personality. Personality and Individual Differences. 2001; 30:1245–1259. Luu P, Collins P, Tucker DM. Mood, personality, and self-monitoring: Negative affect and emotionality in relation to frontal lobe mechanisms of error monitoring. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. 2000; 129:43–60. [PubMed: 10756486] Luu P, Tucker DM, Derryberry D, Reed M, Poulsen C. Electrophysiological responses to errors and feedback in the process of action regulation. Psychological Science. 2003; 14:47–53. [PubMed: 12564753] Luu P, Tucker DM, Makeig S. Frontal-midline theta and the error-related negativity: Neurophysiological mechanisms of action regulation. Clinical Neurophysiology. 2004; 115:1821– 1835. [PubMed: 15261861] Lynam DR, Leukefeld C, Clayton RR. The contribution of personality to the overlap between antisocial behavior and substance use/misuse. Aggressive Behavior. 2003; 29:316–331. Nye FI, Short JF Jr. Scaling delinquent behavior. American Sociological Review. 1957; 22:326–331. Hall et al. Page 9 Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 February 13. N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript Pailing PE, Segalowitz SJ. The error-related negativity as a state and trait measure: Motivation, personality, and ERPs in response to errors. Psychophysiology. 2004; 41:84–95. [PubMed: 14693003] Pailing PE, Segalowitz SJ, Dywan J, Davies PL. Error negativity and response control. Psychophysiology. 2002; 39:198–206. [PubMed: 12212669] Patrick CJ, Bernat E, Malone SM, Iacono WG, Krueger RF, McGue M. P300 amplitude as a marker of externalizing in adolescent males. Psychophysiology. 2006; 43:84–92. [PubMed: 16629688] Patrick CJ, Curtin JJ, Tellegen A. Development and validation of a brief form of the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire. Psychological Assessment. 2002; 14:150–163. [PubMed: 12056077] Potts GF, George MRM, Martin LE, Barratt ES. Reduced punishment sensitivity in neural systems of behavior monitoring in impulsive individuals. Neuroscience Letters. 2006; 397:130–134. [PubMed: 16378683] Ridderinkhof KR, de Vlugt Y, Bramlage A, Spaan M, Elton M, Snel J, Band GPH. Alcohol consumption impairs detection of performance errors in mediofrontal cortex. Science. 2002; 298:2209–2211. [PubMed: 12424384] Santesso DL, Segalowitz SJ, Schmidt LA. ERP correlates of error monitoring in 10-year olds are related to socialization. Biological Psychology. 2005; 70:79–87. [PubMed: 16168252] Skinner A. The Drug Abuse Screening Test. Addictive Behaviors. 1982; 7:363–371. [PubMed: 7183189] Skinner HA, Allen BA. Alcohol dependence syndrome: Measurement and validation. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 1982; 91:199–209. [PubMed: 7096790] Yordanova J, Falkenstein M, Hohnsbein J, Kolev V. Parallel systems of error processing in the brain. NeuroImage. 2004; 22:590–602. [PubMed: 15193587] Young SE, Stallings MC, Corley RP, Krauter KS, Hewitt JK. Genetic and environmental influences on behavioral disinhibition. American Journal of Medical Genetics (Neuropsychiatric Genetics). 2000; 96:684–695. [PubMed: 11054778] Hall et al. Page 10 Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 February 13. N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript Fig. 1. Response-locked brain potential responses to correct and error trials. The graph (a) displays waveforms for correct and error trials for the highand low-externalizing groups separately; 0 ms marks the time of the button-press response. The topographical maps present the scalp distribution of the error-related negativity (ERN), computed using data from all 64 electrodes; the front of the head is at the top of the illustrations. The map in (b) presents the distribution of the grand-average difference waveform for error trials minus correct trials, and the map in (c) presents the distribution of group differences (high-externalizing group minus low-externalizing group) in the amplitude of the difference waveform. Hall et al. Page 11 Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 February 13. N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript Fig. 2. Average peak amplitudes of brain potential responses to correct and error trials at electrode FCz. Results are shown separately for the lowand high-externalizing groups. The data presented are average peak values ±1 SE. Hall et al. Page 12 Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 February 13. N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript Fig. 3. Decomposition of the time-frequency brain responses to errors via principal-component analysis: (a) the grand-average time waveform for error trials and the average timefrequency data surface, (b) the scree plot used to determine the number of components for extraction, (c) results of the four-component solution and scalp topographies of the timefrequency components, and (d) the scalp topography of externalizing-group differences (high-externalizing group minus low-externalizing group) in PC-2 amplitude. Hall et al. Page 13 Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 February 13. N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript Hall et al. Page 14 TABLE 1 Correlations Between Scores on the 100-Item Externalizing Inventory and Criterion Measures Measure n r MPQ Positive Emotionality 80 .04 Negative Emotionality 80 .74 Constraint 80 −.54 Socialization scale 91 −.61 Behavior Report on Rule-Breaking Total 91 .83 Adult 91 .75 Adolescent 91 .76 Alcohol Dependence Scale 91 .64 Short Drug Abuse Screening Test 90 .61 Note. MPQ = Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire. Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 February 13. N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript N IH -PA Author M anuscript Hall et al. Page 15 TABLE 2 Task Performance Measures by Condition and Externalizing Group Reaction time (ms) Accuracy Group and condition Error trials Correct trials Total errors % correct High-externalizing group Congruent 728 (113) 622 (73) 9.0 (8.7) 89.8 (8.0) Incongruent 677 (126) 672 (72) 10.9 (13.6) 88.3 (10.4) Low-externalizing group Congruent 741 (171) 618 (73) 7.1 (8.2) 91.9 (7.8) Incongruent 661 (140) 662 (75) 9.1 (13.4) 90.0 (9.3) Note. Standard deviations are given in parentheses. Psychol Sci. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2008 February 13.

A CONTEXT PRINCIPLE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY Fabrizio Cariani Northwestern University Abstract: Taking a lead from Eva Picardi's work and influence, I investigate the significance of Frege's context principle for the philosophy of language (setting aside its role in Frege's argument for mathematical platonism). I argue that there are some interpretive problems with recent meta-semantic interpretations of the principle. Instead, I offer a somewhat weaker alternative: the context principle is a tool to license certain definitions. Moreover, I claim that it merely lays out one of many possible ways of licensing a definition. This means, among other things, that despite Frege's imperative injunctions, the context principle formulates a permission-not a requirement. Wordcount: 7696 words (including notes, references and front matter). Keywords: context principle, Frege, semantics, meta-semantics, definitions Acknowledgments: I thank Paolo Santorio and Rob Stainton for conversations about this material, as well as Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi and Sebastiano Moruzzi for editing this volume and inviting me to contribute. My biggest debt is to Eva herself: I owe her for the mentorship, the conversations, for helping me track down some of her writings on this subject, but most of all for inspiring me to become, like her, a quietly irreverent philosopher. For several generations of students at the University of Bologna, Eva Picardi's course in the philosophy of language has been a unique portal to a difficult subject matter and an exciting philosophical style. Her lectures on Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein were a treasure trove of bold, and yet seriously scrutinized, ideas about language and how it manages to connect up with reality. As one of these students, I went on to write an undergraduate thesis on Frege's context principle under her attentive and inspiring supervision. This was a fortunate choice, as she was about to devote a good chunk of her subsequent research to the context principle itself 2 (Picardi 2003, 2010, 2016). In the years since, my interests within philosophy of language have shifted somewhat, but I want to use this opportunity to honor Eva's career and life by resuming that conversation. The context principle (CP) is one of two core pieces of Frege's methodological legacy. It is often glossed as the requirement that one should never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but "only in the context of a proposition". It makes a (somewhat uneasy) pair with another methodological injunction associated with Frege: the principle of compositionality, according to which the meaning of a sentence is composed of the meaning of its constituent expressions. There are many important problems concerning the proper interpretation and philosophical significance of these principles, and we will get to some of them in order. But the one that got me thinking about CP after all these years is rather frivolous: there is a striking gap between the prime importance that Frege scholars ascribe to CP1 and the relatively marginal role it appears to occupy in contemporary philosophy of language and natural language semantics. This is not because contemporary research paradigms have turned their back on Frege. On the contrary, he remains hailed as one the major pioneers of the field. Yet, very few of the main research programs in philosophy of language and semantics are explicitly premised on CP. This is in stark asymmetry with the principle of compositionality, which survives as a fundamental tenet in the model-theoretic tradition in semantics (see Szabó 2013 for an overview).2 To put the point in a somewhat tongue-in-cheek way: I have seen scores of papers rejected from journals and conferences because of violations of compositionality, but I have never seen anyone complain about violations of the context principle. I can see the sharpshooters lining up to shoot down these claims, so let me qualify them a bit. It is certainly not right to say that no one cares about the context principle. It has been openly embraced by inferentialists (Brandom 1994, sections 7.1-7.2; 2002 ch. 8) and by so-called radical contextualists (Travis 2009). However, it is not clear that these appeals are faithful to the context principle as Frege understood it. Picardi herself (2010, sections 1 and 2) makes a compelling case that Travis's version of the context principle depends on a richer interpretation of 'context' than what Frege had in mind. Serious doubts have also been raised about the accuracy of Brandom's interpretation (Kleemeier and Weidemann 2008). Even setting these interpretational matters aside, there are two points that are worth emphasizing: (i) The model theoretic tradition in semantics has largely ignored CP. The principle is not mentioned in the dominant textbook in this 3 tradition (Heim & Kratzer, 1998). And while it does put in a surprising cameo in another important textbook (Chierchia & McConnell-Ginet, 1990, section 3.1), it is under an interpretation which is considerably weaker than what Frege seems to have had in mind. (ii) Almost no one, regardless of philosophical preferences, ever invokes CP to argue against other views (it is used by those who use it to elaborate their own positions). This essay proposes an interpretation of the context principle that aims to be as faithful as possible to Frege's writings (spoiler: I don't think we can be entirely faithful) while at the same time being of some value for the modern philosopher of language. My interpretation also aims to explain why the context principle is best used defensively (to articulate one's own views) rather than offensively (to criticize other views). Moreover, I will attempt to do so without relying very much on the role that CP plays in Frege's argument for mathematical Platonism.3 I do not, of course, deny that CP is part of an argument for mathematical Platonism. Nonetheless, nothing in Foundations suggests that CP is only of significance for Platonists. If the principle is to be a valuable piece of the philosopher of language's toolkit, it should have purpose and significance when removed from this metaphysical application. If anything, we ought to generalize to the worst case and ask: can the principle be formulated so as to be compelling even for mild nominalists? This is the plan: section 1 lays down basic background concerning CP. Section 2 advances some constraints on an adequate interpretation of it. In particular, it follows several other interpreters (starting with Dummett 1956 and ending with Picardi 2016) in arguing that the slogan "Words only have meaning in the context of a proposition" cannot, literally speaking, be quite right. It will flow out of this argument that the principle must apply in the first instance to explanations of meaning-a conclusion which much of the literature already embraces. Section 3 entertains and rejects a recent suggestion to the effect that the context principle concerns metasemantic explanations (metasemantic interpretations of CP have recently been discussed by Stainton 2006 and Linnebo 2008). Section 4 defends an alternative: I argue that CP concerns what I will call licensing explanations. These are explanations that are required if a theorist is to accept a definition of a term as successful. In section 5, I use the interpretation of the previous section to reassess some delicate questions about the scope of the context principle. In the concluding section, I will tie up some loose ends. 4 1. A brief history of the context principle Here is a familiar story: at four points in The Foundations of Arithmetic (1884, henceforth Foundations), Frege invokes a mantra connecting word meaning with "the context of a proposition". (I assume, with the rest of the literature, that Frege means 'sentence', and not what contemporary philosophers of language mean by 'proposition'.) The exact formulations of the mantra vary a bit:4 Introduction, p. X: "ask for the meaning of a word in the context of a proposition, not in isolation; [...] If one ignores [this principle], one is almost forced to take as the meanings of words mental pictures or acts of the individual mind". §60 "[...] any word for which we can find no corresponding mental picture appears to have no content. But we ought always to keep before our eyes a complete proposition. Only in the context of a proposition have the words really a meaning (Bedeutung)". §62 "How, then, are numbers to be given to us, if we cannot have any ideas or intuitions of them? Since it is only in the context of a proposition that words have any meaning, our problem becomes this: To define the sense of a proposition in which a number word occurs" §106 "We proposed the fundamental principle that the meaning of a word is not to be explained in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition: only by adhering to this can we, as I believe, avoid a physical view of number without slipping into a psychological view of it." There is an important contrast between the passage from §106, which is explicitly about explanations of meaning, and the passages in §60 and §62, which are ostensibly about when words have meanings. (The passage from the introduction seems to be neutral, since "ask for the meaning..." could be understood either way). Despite these differences in formulation, with the exception of §62, Frege is single-minded about what CP is supposed to do: those who ignore it fall into the 5 murderous embrace of psychologism. They end up taking the meanings of number words to be mental pictures or ideas (call this the defensive use of CP). The passage from §62 departs from this talking point to pursue a more positive thought: numbers can be "given to us" if we fix the meaning of certain sentences involving numerals. There is no doubt that any adequate interpretation of CP needs to make sense of both these roles it plays in the dialectic of Foundations. This is harder to do in the case of the positive use, because we need to simultaneously interpret the principle itself and gain an understanding of what it is for number to be "given to us". For this reason, I generally prioritize the defensive use in shaping my interpretation. When Frege wrote Foundations, he had not yet drawn his celebrated distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung)-its official formulation must, of course, wait until his (1892). Naturally, this raises the question whether by using 'Bedeutung' in the 1884 mantra Frege means to state a principle that concerns (i) the technical semantic notion of reference; (ii) the technical semantic notion of sense; or (iii) the non-technical and undifferentiated notion of meaning. Unfortunately, the essays from the 1890s are of little help in resolving this issue because, by the nineties, Frege stops explicitly appealing to the context principle.5 Faced with this difficulty, interpreters have converged on a reasonable approach: take CP to involve the undifferentiated notion of meaning, but also ask whether the internal logic of Frege's argument suggests an interpretation in terms of sense or one in terms of reference. Frege might have quit invoking the mantra cold turkey, but his followers in the analytic tradition had a different idea. Wittgenstein endorses the mantra in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and in the Philosophical Investigations (1946). Quine, too, reached for an interpretation of CP in Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951, p. 39) and Epistemology Naturalized (1969, p. 72). Among the interpreters, Dummett is most famous for having emphasized the importance of the doctrine within Frege's thinking (this was, remarkably, a four-decades long engagement, see Dummett 1956; 1973; 1981, ch. 19; 1991, chs. 16-17; 1995). Put this all together and you get a cluster of interrelated questions: (Q1) how exactly does CP figure in the Foundations' critique of psychologism. (Q2) did Frege give up CP after Foundations? (Q3) how does CP interact with the Sinn/Bedeutung distinction? 6 (Q4) Is CP compatible with the principle of compositionality? (Q5) Did CP play a similar role in Wittgenstein's philosophy as it did in Frege's philosophy? (Q6) Is CP a separable component of Frege's philosophy of language? (Q7) Is CP something that contemporary theorists should obey? Some of these questions have simple, clear and convincing answers. As I noted, for instance, Picardi (2010) argues convincingly that, due to the ontology of propositions in the Tractatus, the early Wittgenstein's invocation of the context principle could not possibly be in the same spirit as Frege's. Moreover, as far as the later Wittgenstein is concerned, the notion of "context" he employed when he repeated the mantra seems to have been altogether different from Frege's. In particular, Wittgenstein's contexts include extra-linguistic context. There is little chance that this might have been on Frege's mind in the Foundations. Most of the other questions are still open despite extensive debate. In the rest of this essay, I reelaborate some familiar answers to (Q1), (Q3), (Q4) and sketch some answers to (Q6) and (Q7). Before proceeding, let me make some terminological stipulations. First, as is well known, Frege assigns the same semantic profile to proper names ('Michelle Obama') and definite descriptions ('the most famous alumna of Whitney Young High School'). I use the phrase singular terms to cover both. Second: the context principle concerns the meanings of sub-sentential expressions, a category that includes both individual words and phrases like definite descriptions. Despite that, in the following, I use the word word as a substitute for 'sub-sentential expression'. This is in part to improve readability and in part because that's what Frege uses in the passages I quoted above. Finally, Foundations discusses two kinds of singular terms: numerals (e.g. '2') and descriptions formed by means of the cardinality operator ('the number of Jupiter's moons'). I use the phrase numerical terms to cover both of these. 2. How not to interpret the context principle One of the main reasons why there is an interpretive problem about CP is that the literal interpretation of the principle cannot be quite right. Taken literally, the mantra "Only in the context of a proposition does a word have a meaning" seems to mean something like this: 7 Literal: meaning is something that word it has only as part of full sentential contexts. Take it out of sentential contexts and it does not have a meaning. As noted above, you might get specialized versions of this thesis by replacing the undifferentiated notion of "meaning" with technical notions like sense and reference. Here is one possible analogy for this sort of thought: which direction is this arrow pointing to? à This question only makes sense in a broader context: for example, it could be pointing North, or towards the center of the earth, towards the right side of the page, or towards Alpha Centauri. There is no sense to isolating that object, the arrow-token, and trying to figure out where it is pointing. Similarly, there is no sense to isolating a G# note and asking whether it's a dominant. Only in the context of a scale, or a chord, can a note be a dominant. What is common between these cases is that these the relevant properties seem to have some kind of implicit or explicit relationality.6 Maybe word meaning is like that. I don't think this can quite be the point of Frege's version of the context principle. For one thing, this seems obviously false (Linnebo 2009). Consider proper names. There is no theory of proper names on which it's impossible to answer the question "what is the meaning of the name 'Michelle Obama'?". If you think that the meaning is the referent, then that's it. But suppose, you do not. Say that you believe instead that the meaning of the name has two elements, a referent (the woman herself) and a sense (a mode of presentation of the referent). Then that referent and that sense together are the meaning of 'Michelle Obama'. From the contemporary, non-interpretive point of view, the literal interpretation is also incomprehensible: as theorists of meaning and even as ordinary users of the language we can sometimes ask for the meanings of words: there is no reason to suppose that Frege's texts point to a relevantly different practice. The second problem is that the literal interpretation makes no sense of the defensive use of CP in the Foundations (or, for that matter, of the positive use). Recall that Frege's negative aim is that we need not expect to explain the meaning of number words by associating them with perceptually given referents. It is entirely irrelevant to that target to assume that a word e lacks meaning when taken on its own. 8 As Linnebo (2009) puts it, when it comes to the context principle, we must forget the literal reading of the mantra and instead look primarily at how Frege uses it. Furthermore, concerns about reaching for non-literal interpretations ought to be assuaged by noticing (as we did earlier) that the literal interpretation is only encouraged by the formulations in §60 and §62. The other two formulations, in the Introduction and in the summary (§106), are compatible with the denial of the literal interpretation. At the other end of the spectrum, there is a plausible but weak interpretation of CP that cannot quite do the work that CP is supposed to do. It is often said that CP states the primacy, or priority, of sentential meaning over word meaning. Here are a couple of examples drawn from two very different places: The Context Principle, as one relating to sense, amounts to the conceptual priority of thoughts over their constituents: the constituents can be grasped only as potential constituents of complete thoughts. (Dummett, 1991, p. 184). The Context Principle [...] seems to be that (i) the notion of a sentence having a meaning (which Frege identifies with the claim it is used to assert or express) is explanatorily primary, while (ii) what it is for a word or phrase to have a meaning is to be explained in terms of what it is it contributes to the meanings of sentences containing it. (Soames 2014, p. 47) Unfortunately, that claim is about as equivocal as the word "primacy" is underspecified. Perhaps, the relevant sense of primacy is this: Weak context principle (WCP): the meaning of a word e is e's contribution to sentential meaning. For an analogous case, we might say that the tactical objectives of a striker in soccer are that striker's contribution to the team's tactical objectives. Once again, this can be declined into a thesis about reference (the reference of a word is its contribution to the reference of the sentence) and into a thesis about sense (the sense of a word is its contribution to the senses of the sentences it contains). WCP is far from vacuous: if sentential meanings are truth-conditions, then the meaning of a predicate is its contribution to the truth-conditions of a sentence. If the sense of a sentence is a structured proposition, then the sense-variant of WCP 9 requires that the sense of a name be what the name contributes to that structured proposition. Still, the idea is pretty plausible and arguably satisfied by any modern theoretical account of linguistic meaning. I do not doubt that WCP is part of what is involved in the context principle. I doubt, however, that it can capture the whole content of CP. As in the case of the literal interpretation, it is not clear how this formulation accounts for the negative application of CP in Foundations. Suppose you did not think that a word's meaning is to be identified with its contribution to sentence meaning. Why would that force you to identify the meaning of the numeral '3' with a mental picture? No explanation of this is forthcoming because the supposition we are operating under is so open-ended that it provides no guidance. Part of the problem here is that WCP is a constraint that simultaneously operates on word meaning and on sentence meaning. Nothing specifically follows from it about word meaning, unless we make assumptions about sentence meaning. The context principle must have content that goes beyond that of WCP. As for what this extra content is, I think the basic idea is well put in Linnebo (2009): the Context Principle in Foundations concerns in the first instance explanations of meaning. It's not that you can't ask the question: "What is the meaning of a word e?". It's that you can't expect an explanatory answer to that question to be wholly independent of the semantic properties of sentences. 3. Metasemantic Explanation But what kind of explanation is at stake? And what exactly needs explaining? In this section, I discuss the hypothesis that Frege is concerned with metasemantic explanation. Metasemantics, broadly understood, is the study of the facts in virtue of which semantic properties hold. It is the job of a metasemantic theory, for instance, to characterize the facts in virtue of which the word 'koala' has the semantic value that it does. The distinction between semantic and metasemantic inquiry is nicely illustrated by the case of non-verbal signals. Contrast these two dialogues: Semantic inquiry. Q: what is the meaning of a red octagonal street sign with the word 'STOP' written across it? A: cars approaching the sign are required to stop before proceeding through the intersection. 10 Metasemantic inquiry. Q: why does that sign have that meaning? A: Because the traffic authority established (and enforce) this conventional association. Although the label is relatively recent, many classical theories in philosophy of language are metasemantic. This is the case for the sophisticated conventionalism defended by Lewis (1975), according to which the conventions that underlie linguistic meaning are regularities of behavior embedded within a particular structure of mutual expectations. 7 Similarly, Stalnaker (1998) argues that Kripke's causal theory of reference is best viewed as a metasemantic hypothesis. The same is true of Lewis's doctrine of reference magnetism (Lewis 1983)-according to which part of what makes an assignment of meanings to predicates correct is the degree of naturalness of the properties they are to denote. According to the metasemantic interpretation, the context principle constrains explanations of why words have the meanings they have.8 Metasemantic Context Principle (MCP): word e has meaning m in part because a range of sentences involving e are meaningful. According to this thesis, word meaning is grounded in sentence meaning. Numerical terms (like 'the number of registered vehicles in Chicago') mean what they do because a range of sentences involving them are meaningful. In particular, these sentences must involve all the identity statements in which such terms can figure. The metasemantic context principle need not be one's entire metasemantic theory: there might be further facts in virtue of which those core sentences are endowed with meaning. Moreover, presumably, at some point, usage among the members of a linguistic community should show up in the metasemantics. That would constitute and additional layer of the theory. If MCP generalizes beyond numerical terms, say to cover names of concrete objects like 'Michelle Obama', then it claims that the facts in virtue of which 'Michelle Obama' means m include the fact certain sentences have meanings. A further question still is whether the metasemantic context principle should extend to other syntactic categories. Though far from obvious, and clearly in need of defense, MCP is an interesting thesis for the modern philosopher of language to evaluate. It also has some benefits as an interpretation of Frege: under this interpretation, the context principle is not really in tension with the principle of compositionality. Given compositionality, the meanings of complex expressions must depend on-and 11 perhaps be composed of-the meanings of their constituents. But that's compatible with the idea that the facts that ground word meanings are partly determined by sentence meanings. The dependence that is claimed in compositionality and the reverse dependence that is claimed by MCP operate on different levels.9 MCP is a very strong claim about the nature of semantic properties. It would be extremely surprising if Frege thought that such a claim could be stipulated without any kind of justification. I suspect that this is a reason to doubt that MCP could possibly be what Frege had in mind. Of course, the fact that the context principle is presented without justification is an embarrassment for virtually every interpretation. Still, we should be wary of any proposal that requires CP to be much stronger than the argument demands, and, unfortunately, MCP is much too strong for the demands of the argument. The argumentative goal of §§ 58-60 of Foundations is to establish the thesis that it is possible to refer to objects of which we cannot form any sensible images. If MCP were right, it would deliver an explanatory account of how numerical terms in fact do refer to these objects. In other words, at a point where the argument merely demands a proof of concept of sorts, Frege would fire back with an unsupported and sweepingly general metasemantic thesis about how they in fact work. But what other kind of explanation of meaning might we seek? Let me try to approach my view by thinking through a concrete example. Suppose I gather the people of the Earth and declare that 'wowee' is to be a new singular term. I claim that it is to denote the largest star in the universe. Imagine that I have the authority to get a linguistic practice going this way. After my declaration people start using 'wowee' just in the way I said. Imagine further that it is common knowledge between me and my audience that I do not have a particular star in mind which I believe to be the largest in the universe. It seems to me that this scenario largely settles the metasemantic questions. There might or might not be a unique largest star. But if there is, I am successful in referring to it-whether I know that such a star exists or not. In this case, then, we have a semantic fact: (F) 'wowee' refers to the largest star We can ask the metasemantic question: why does (F) hold? And the story stipulates a simple answer: somehow, I have the power to get a linguistic practice going which helps link up that word with things; I have used this power to declare that 'wowee' is to refer to this celestial body. 12 But it is possible to press another question-one that parallels the question Frege is asking in §§ 58-60: how might one know whether my declaration successfully established that 'wowee' has a referent? That requires a different sort of account-in particular it requires an argument to the effect that there is exactly one star with maximal size. This account is not itself part of metasemantics, since it need not have anything to do with the facts in virtue of which 'wowee' refers to the largest star. Suppose that my friend Alexis knows that there is a unique largest star. Alexis is in a position to vouch that my introduction of 'wowee' was successful. But there are many ways for Alexis to have obtained the relevant knowledge. Maybe she derived it from the laws of physics, maybe she was able to measure the sizes of all the stars in the universe, or maybe a very knowledgeable being whispered it in her ear. None of these justifications belong to the metasemantic story. There is typically one correct metasemantic story about why words mean what they do, but there are many ways we might gain the knowledge that the metasemantic fact holds. 4. Licensing Explanations My view is that Frege believed that successful definition of numerical terms required the sort of guarantee that Alexis is able provide in the case of 'wowee'. In fact, this sort requirement shows up explicitly in a famous a passage from Über Sinn und Bedeutung: A logically perfect language (Begriffsschrift) should satisfy the conditions that every expression grammatically well constructed as a proper name out of previously introduced signs shall in fact designate an object, and that no new sign shall be introduced as a proper name without being secured a reference (Bedeutung). In logic, one must be wary of ambiguity of expressions as a source of mistakes. I regard as no less pertinent against apparent proper names that have no reference (Bedeutung). The history of mathematics supplies errors which have arisen in this way. This lends itself to demagogic abuse as easily as ambiguity [...]. 'The will of the people' can serve as an example; for it is easy to establish that there is [...] no generally accepted reference (Bedeutung) for this expression. (p. 41, slightly modified from the Geach translation) Of course, in natural language we don't often go about introducing new terms as one would do in a formal language. But the project of Foundations is 13 neither to describe a human linguistic practice, nor to specify the semantics for a formal language. It is to provide an analytic derivation of the truths of arithmetic based, among other things, on definitions for numerical terms. To be confident that this project is in order, we need a justification similar to the one Alexis provides in the fictional example of 'wowee' and to the one Frege claims we lack in the case of 'the will of the people'. To state the requirement a bit more precisely, this is what we need (here "we" means "mathematical philosophers engaged with the Fregean definition project"). Definitional licensing: we are licensed to claim that a definition of singular term t has provided it with meaning only if we have a guarantee that the object that t purports to refer to exists and is unique. This kind of check-for the existence of referents of defined singular terms-is both standard mathematical practice and implicit in Frege's procedure in Foundations. So far, I have attributed to Frege the view that, to accept a definition as successful, we must provide evidence that its referent exists and is unique. But what does the context principle have to do with all of this? According to my interpretation, the main role of the context principle in the Foundations is to highlight an easy-to-miss way of satisfying this requirement. Specifically, in §§ 5860 Frege is pushing back against this argument: (P1) A definition of numerical term t can be recognized as being correct only if we have a guarantee that the object that t purports to refer to exists and is unique. (P2) But we have such a guarantee only if numbers are sensible objects. (P3) But numbers are not sensible objects. (C) So, a definition of t cannot be recognized as correct. Frege endorses (P1) and (P3), but rejects (C). The context principle is invoked in order to justify rejection (P2) and support the thesis that, once you have secured truth-conditions for a broad enough class of sentences-crucially a class containing all the identities between numerical singular terms-the definitional licensing requirement is satisfied. Summing up, the import of the context principle can be characterized as follows: 14 Licensing Context Principle (LCP): the requirement of definitional licensing concerning a singular term t is satisfied if we have a guarantee that all of the identity statements involving t are meaningful. Once this perspective is adopted, some of the puzzles surrounding CP get immediate answers. For example, we asked at the outset whether the principle applies to the notion of reference. Given the interpretation I am advancing, this is inevitable. This is because among the essential constraints that the definition of term t must satisfy is an argument that it, in some sense, it refers. I add the qualification "in some sense", because if this is a requirement that can be cleared by the sort of strategy suggested by the context principle (i.e. by setting the meanings of certain sentences), this is a notion of reference that even a moderate kind of nominalist could live with. My sympathies here are strongly with Dummett's (1991, ch. 15) contention, echoed by Picardi herself (2016), that the theoretical framework of Foundations lacks the resources to distinguish between a robust realist construal of the reference relation and a more moderate one.10 Among the questions that we are in a position to address is also the vexed matter of whether the context principle is compatible with compositionality. The answer is that it is compatible, for the broadly Dummettian reason that the two principles claim explanatory priority in two different senses. Compositionality is about how semantic values depend on each other, while CP states that sometimes we go about justifying the meaningfulness of a definition or of a linguistic practice by pointing to the semantic properties of certain sentences. Similarly, we can explain how within the context of Foundations Frege can at the same time maintain that he has substantively used the context principle and yet provide an explicit definition of numerical terms. After all, under the present interpretation is simply not a constraint on the form of the definition. 5. The limited scope of the context principle Much of this aligns with some of Dummett's influential views about the role of the context principle. But on one issue, I think the above discussion requires a revision of Dummett's position. Once we adopt the view that the context principle should be mainly interpreted as in LCP, two questions arise concerning its scope. The first question is: does LCP apply to all singular terms? Or could we instead have a tempered version of the principle that only applies to singular terms denoting mathematical and other abstract objects? The other important question is whether 15 LCP applies to expressions across all syntactic categories (e.g., does it apply to predicates, function symbols, quantifiers)? With regards to the first question, we need to disambiguate between two possible ways of hearing the word "apply". Again an analogy is helpful. Imagine a fictional country, the Shire, with these laws: Norm 1. Voting in the Shire requires citizenship in the Shire Norm 2. One has citizenship in the Shire if one has resided in the Shire continuously for five years. The logical structure of these norms is the same as the one I have sketched for the context principle: Norm 1 lays down a requirement and Norm 2 articulates one way of satisfying that requirement. Now, consider Frodo who has resided in the Shire for less than five years: does Norm 2 apply to him? In one sense, the answer is "no": Frodo does not satisfy the condition stipulated in the antecedent of Norms 2. If he meets the requirement for voting in Norm 1's requirement, it is not because he satisfies the condition specified in Norm 2. In another sense, the answer is "yes": Norm 2 applies to Frodo just as much as it applies to anyone else who lives in the shire. You don't need to satisfy the antecedent of the norm for it to apply to you. The case of the context principle is structurally analogous: LCP characterizes a way for us to be satisfied that a certain expression is meaningful. As such, it applies with equal force to every term. If we wanted to introduce the name 'Michelle Obama' in our linguistic practice we can acquire the relevant license by following the path indicated by LCP. But that does not mean that there are no other ways for us to acquire that license. When we look at the variety of singular terms in our language we need not expect that the Licensing requirement is satisfied in the same way for every term. One unexpected implication of my reading of Foundations is that it is consistent to think that the name 'Michelle Obama' is licensed by direct contact with the object. This puts me at odds with mainstream views about the interpretation of the context principle. Here for instance, is Wright: The really fundamental aspect of Frege's notion of object and concept is that they are notions whose proper explanation proceeds through linguistic notions. (Wright 1983, p. 13) This is an intriguing picture, but it comes with the huge interpretive cost that Frege never tries to the defend it, as Wright himself acknowledges (1983, p. 15). 16 My interpretation is also likely at odds with one of the conclusions of Dummett's interpretation: The realist interpretation could be jettisoned without abandoning the context principle itself, but only if that principle, as here understood, can be shown to be coherent; and this remains in grave doubt. And yet it is hard to see how it can be abandoned, so strong is the motivation for it. The alternative is an apprehension of objects, including abstract objects, underlying, but anterior to, an understanding of reference to them or, indeed, a grasp of thought about; and this is a form of realism too coarse to be entertained. (Dummett 1995, p. 19) Strictly speaking, I agree that the context principle is meant to show that "direct apprehension" cannot be the only means of securing meaning for singular terms. But a stronger claim is implied here: that there is something wrong with a mixed picture on which the licensing requirement is sometimes satisfied via the context principle, sometimes via direct apprehension. Something similar should be said about the question whether the context principle applies across syntactic categories. When the semantic theorist claims, for instance, that the semantic value of "smokes" is a function from individuals to truth-value that maps smokers to the true and non-smokers to the false, we need some kind of assurance that such a function exists. In principle, we could provide this assurance through CP-like reasoning. But in practice, we do so by relying on basic assumptions about existence of individuals and truth-values as well as function-existence assumptions. 6. Conclusions To conclude, I want to connect this discussion back to the issues that prompted me to rethink about the context principle and to the main outstanding questions from my earlier list: (Q6) Is CP a separable component of Frege's philosophy of language? (Q7) Is CP something that contemporary theorists should obey? An affirmative answer to (Q6) is possible, but something must be added to the story I just told. Because I limited my interpretation to Foundations, questions 17 about natural language have not really been within our theoretical sights. When we theorize about natural language, the constraints that guided Frege's thoughts on definitions need not apply. Still, you might ask a parallel question to the one that is behind the requirement of definitional licensing: how do I know that some term t of my language refers? And one possible answer might be that this can be known by being able to fix the truth-conditions of certain sentences involving the term- without actually having any causal contact with the referent of the term. As with all these views, it is impossible, and not entirely intellectually honest, to say that one is for, or against, them, in advance of actually spelling out their detail. As for (Q7), I think that the answer is that there is no such thing as obeying the context principle. If my interpretation is correct, the principle is meant to point to a way of satisfying certain requirements-it is not a requirement itself. Still, one may ask if this is a path to satisfying the requirement that any contemporary theories exploit. The answer I provide to this question is the same that would be given by a proponent of the metasemantic interpretation: one cannot simply look at one's favorite semantic model and extrapolate whether the context principle is satisfied. The difference is that the metasemantic interpretations would say that the context principle might show up when we tell the story about what is it in virtue of which singular terms denote what they denote. On my preferred story, the context principle can come to help when we ask how we are entitled to the belief that various terms of our language have denotations and, more generally, meanings. This is typically going to be particularly pressing for names of abstract objects, if there are any, for in that case, the causal route is blocked. 18 Bibliography Boolos, George (1990). "The Standard of Equality of Numbers", in Boolos, G., editor, Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Reprinted in George Boolos, Logic, Logic and Logic , Harvard University Press 1998. Brandom, Robert (1994) Making it Explicit. Harvard University Press (Cambridge, MA). Brandom, Robert (2002) Tales of the Mighty Dead. Harvard University Press (Cambridge, MA). Carnap, Rudolf (1928) Der Logische Aufbau der Welt. Felix Meiner Verlag (English translation The Logical Structure of the World; Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967) Chierchia, Gennaro and McConnell-Ginet, Sally (1990) Meaning and Grammar, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, second edition, 2000. Dummett, Michael (1956), "Nominalism", The Philosophical Review, 65(4), pp. 491505. Dummett, Michael (1973). Frege: Philosophy of Language. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, second edition 1981. Dummett, Michael (1981). The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Dummett, Michael (1991). Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. Dummett, Michael (1995). "The Context Principle: Centre of Frege's Philosophy". In Max, I. and Stelzner, W., editors, Logik und Mathematik: Frege-Kolloquium Jena 1993. de Gruyter, Berlin. 19 Frege, Gottlob (1884). Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. (English translation 1953, Foundations of Arithmetic. Blackwell, Oxford. Transl. by J.L. Austin.) Frege, Gottlob (1892). 'Über Sinn und Bedeutung', in Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 100: 25–50. Translated as 'On Sense and Reference' by M. Black in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, P. Geach and M. Black (eds. and trans.), Oxford: Blackwell, third edition, 1980. Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin (2001). Reason's Proper Study. Clarendon, Oxford. Heim, Irene and Kratzer, Angelika (1998) Semantics in Generative Grammar. Blackwell, Malden, MA. Lewis, David (1975). "Languages and language". In K. Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 3-35. Øystein Linnebo (2009) "Frege's Context Principle and Reference to Natural Numbers", in Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism: What has become of them?, S. Lindström, E. Palmgren, K. Segerberg, V. Stoltenberg-Hansen, (eds.), Springer, 47-68. Pelletier, Francis Jeffry (2001) "Did Frege Believe Frege's Principle?", Journal of Logic Language and Information, 10, pp. 87-114. Picardi, Eva (2002) "Il Principio del Contesto in Frege e Wittgenstein", in C. Penco (ed.) La Svolta Contestuale, McGrawHill, Milano, pp. 1-23, Picardi, Eva (2009) "Wittgenstein and Frege on Proper Names and the Context Principle", in P. Frascolla, D. Marconi and A. Voltolini (eds.) Wittgenstein, Mind, Meaning and Metaphilosophy, Palgrave MacMillan, pp. 167-188. Picardi, Eva (2016) "Michael Dummett's Interpretation of Frege's Context Principle: Some Reflections", in M. Frauchinger (ed.), Justification, Understanding, Truth, and Reality: Themes from Dummett, De Gruyter 2016. Quine, W.V.O. (1951) "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" in From a Logical Point of View, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA. 20 Quine, W.V. O. (1969) Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press. Resnik, Michael (1967). "The Context Principle in Frege's Philosophy". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 27:356–365. Stainton, Rob (2005) "The Context Principle". In K. Brown (ed.) Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics, Second Edition. Oxford: Elsevier, Vol. 3, pp. 108-115. Stainton, Rob (2006) Words and Thoughts. Oxford University Press. Stalnaker, Robert (1998) "Reference and Necessity", in Hale, B. and Wright, C., editors, Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Language, pages 534–554. Blackwell, Oxford. Szabó, Zoltán Gendler (2013) "Compositionality", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013, Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) URL=<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/compositionality/ Travis, Charles (2009) "To Represent As So", in Wittgenstein's Enduring Arguments, E. Zamuner and D.K. Levy (eds), Routledge, London, 4-29. 1 As we will see, Dummett's engagement with the context principle spanned his entire career, but see Pelletier, 2001 for a remarkable catalog of authors. 2 Frege scholars draw a distinction between the principle of compositionality (that the meanings of sentences are composed of the meanings of their parts) and the principle of functionality (the meanings of sentences are functionally determined by the meanings of their parts). When theorists in the model-theoretic semantics traditions talk about 'compositionality' they usually refer to something closer to functionality, since compositionality properly understood requires meanings to have mereological structure. 3 Discussions of the context principle and its relationship to definition by abstraction have been central to the Neo-Fregean program. Key references include Wright (1983), Hale (1987), Boolos (1990), Wright & Hale (2001). This debate goes quite beyond the relatively limited set of questions I intend to ask about the context principle here. 21 4 English translations are mostly Austin's with some touch-ups for clarity and accuracy. 5 That is to say: he stops using the mantra. One of the main fault lines in the secondary literature concerns whether there are passages that could be viewed as later occurrences of CP. Resnik (1967) claims that Frege gave up the context principle; by contrast, Dummett might have contributed the most to an argument that a version of the doctrine survives in his later works. The most plausible view of the matter seems to be this: there is no explicit reliance on the principle but that doesn't mean that he wasn't relying on the same kind of insight (Dummett 1981, ch. 19). Still, this means that the later work is of little help in interpreting the principle. This is because, from this perspective, we must, first, interpret the principle as it occurs in Foundations, and then evaluate whether there are instances of similar reasoning in later works. 6 This relationality seems different from the concept of relational properties that is prevalent in metaphysics. On that usage, a property P is relational just in case an object's having P depends essentially on its standing in certain relations to other objects. For example, being a husband is such a property. The examples in the text, instead, are cases of properties whose applicability to objects presupposes certain other facts. 7 Also metasemantic is the naïve conventionalism mocked by Quine in the introduction to Lewis's "Convention": "When I was a child I pictured out language as settled and passed down by a board of syndics, seated in grave convention along a table in the style of Rembrandt". 8 This interpretation of CP is defended by Linnebo (2010) and, before that, it was critically explored by Stainton (2006). 9 See Linnebo (2009, §6.2). Linnebo imports this equivocation account of the conflict into the metasemantic picture from an analogous diagnosis of equivocation by Dummett (1971, pp. 3-7) and Dummett (1981, p. 547). 10 Picardi also draws attention to an important discussion in Carnap's Aufbau. Carnap (1940, section 40) was happy to take contextual definitions on board, provided that numerical terms were understood as denoting "quasi-objects. "Carnap's (1928) interpretation of Frege's conception of classes captures important features of [Foundations], and indirectly supports Dummett's diagnosis that only a thin conception of reference is appropriate to [Foundations]. I find it difficult to decide which way we should go: [Foundations] seems hospitable both to Carnap's and to Wright's interpretations, for it is semantically underdetermined." (Picardi 2016, p. 54).

A PROGRAMOWA Gumarlski _przewod niczący ro1 Bal (Wrocław) isław Czerniak silarszawa) n Dzie,midok (Gdarisk) Głombik (Katowice) isław Jedynak (Lublin) Ózef Pawlak (toru ) an Such (Poznaó) lo<lzimierz Tyburski (Ioruó) Witkowski (Ioruri) |a Żeg\e (Ioruó) oMITET RED.ĄKCYJNY izef Pawlak redaktor sertl Tomasz Komendzinski Zbigniew Nerczuk sekretarz Włodzimierz Tyburski Toru ski Przegląd FilozoficznJ) pod redakcją Tomasza Komendziriskiego Spis treści Spory o filozoJię o pocieszeniu'.. (wy*iad z prof. Stefanem Swieżawskim prowadzi Zbigniew Nerc2uk............. 7 J,łN WolsŃsKI Dlaczego filozofia jest jaka jest?................ 15 RyszłRp JADcZAK SpÓr między Struvem a Twardowskim o przedmiot, zakres i metode f i lo2of i i . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hłr.rNł Bucznqsx,q.6AREwlcz O fi lozofi i Peirce'a i nowego pragrratyzru................ WokÓł koncęcji Richarda Rorty'ego.....'.... ANDR2EJ SZAHAJ SpÓr o Rorty 'ego.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Peirce, znak i tnetafora Rysz.łnp Mrnrx Problem indukdi w systemie C. S. peirce'a.... bzlsŁAwwĄsIK Wielobieguoowość znaku językowego z perspektywy epistemologiczneJ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Toltłsz KoMENDzTŃsKI Metaforyczny prooes poznawania, wyobrażania i odczuwania zła. Ę62976ieni6 w kontekście koncepcji Paula Ricoeura. Z życia nalłkowego (oprac. Zbignjew Nerczuk) Jubileusz Profesora Lema Gumriskiego.......................... @ ( le5 l l eeE) . . . . . . . . . Zjazly, koaferercje............................ wykłarty' odczyty..... '............ Norcści w}dami%..................... ' '-Uniwersy tet Mikolaj a Kopernika Instytut Filozofii UMK 39 49 103 1 3 1 t45 r46 l4E t52 t52 AD o RAMowA On ń i Er odniczący a l l (VVI'0Cłř1W) tan aw i (W‹'=1rSZflWü) ohda i i (Gdańsk) zęsław ł i (lśatowicss) Stan a ü (Lublin) ó ef lak (TOfllń ( z ń) ł dzimierz i (Toruń) ech i (Toruń) rszul Z leń (TOfllfl) O ITET DA CYJNY Jó ef lak -_ ktor rii [Ryszard_{adczak| í dzinski i uk -ł i r rski ń z l zoƒiczny iń ki go i ci ry filozofię O i ... Wywiad f. t f S ieża ski prowadzi i z ... .... ................................................................ 7 A LEŃsK1 ñ fi st?. ... .... ...................................... 15 [ YSZARD r› z 1<| ór r skimo r iot, zakres i metodę filozofii.. .. .. .. ............................................................................_ 27 AN A UCZYŃSKA-GAREwrcz ñ t i ` i o m mu... ... ........................._ 39 ół epcji i r rt ' ..............................................._ 49 RZEJ HAJ ó 'ego.... .. .. .. ... ... .................................................. 73 ir e, 1' m t f r YSZARD IRER le i cji W stemie . S. P ce'a... .................................. 87 ZDz1sŁAwWASIK i l biegun wość u zykowego z rs ektywyepistemologiczej .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ........................................................................103 MAsz O B ZI SRI ces i , yobrażaniaiodczuwaniazła. ` Rozważania tekś ie koncepcji Paula Ricoeura...................... ,Ĺ'.. 131 ia u owego rac. igniew erczuk) l s ona rnańskiego............................................................... 145 |1>r0f.‹=§á±dr mb; Ryszard Jade-33| (19s1_.1998)................................................_ 146 #3 91 "nl l flfl dy, n ren ..... .... .... ... ... .............................................................143 Wykł dy, . ...... .... ............................................................................-152 woś i y wnicze... .... .... ......................................................................-152 i rsyt t ikołaj ernika t t t ilozofii K O pocieszeniu... (VVywiad z profesorem Stefanem Swieżawskim prowadzi Zbigniew Nerczuk) Jeden z polskich filozofów opublikował kiedyś tekst zatytułowany O udręczeniu jakie daje filozofia, nawiązując tym samym do tytułu traktatu Boecjusza. W tekście tym opisuje trudności związane z uprawianiem dyscypliny bez jednego określonego oblicza, jawiącej się niczym hydra wielością głów. Czy Pan Profesor przeżywał również tego typu rozterki wynikające z różnorodności tego, co nazywane jest filozofią? Dla mnie filozofia od pierwszego dnia była i źródłem radości, i źródłem kłopotów. I tak pozostało do dnia dzisiejszego. Jest bardzo niepokojące dla młodego człowieka, gdy zaczyna lekturę jakiegoś tekstu o określonej orientacji filozoficznej i nie ma możliwości krytycznego spojrzenia na problemy, które tekst ten zawiera, od strony innych ujęć. Sam przeżywałem takie problemy, gdy jako młody człowiek na proseminarium Twardowskiego czytałem Badania dotyczące rozumu ludzkiego Hume'a. Dla mnie jako człowieka wierzącego _ treści zawarte w tej pracy były druzgocące. Moim szczęściem było wtedy to, że miałem kontakt z tekstami Maritaina. Widziałem, że jest to człowiek, który patrzy bardzo poważnie na osiągnięcia filozoficzne średniowiecza. A poza tym we Lwowie zjawił się ojciec Lew Gillet oraz Jan Henryk Rosen, którzy dali mi dobrą radę: „jeśli masz takie problemy jak z Hume°em, to wtedy zabierz się do tekstów o zupełnie innej orientacji". W ten sposób zacząłem czytać dialogi Platona równocześnie z Hume"em, i to była moja recepta, którą stosowałem całe życie. Jak stykałem się z bardzo skrajnym filozofem, czytałem również teksty o zupełnie innej orientacji. Metoda ta ma tę zaletę, że pokazuje wielość dróg, a z biegiem czasu stawało się dla mnie coraz oczywistsze, że w historii filozofii pozorny bezład zmienia się w pluralizm, w którym można przeprowadzać podziały dychotomiczne. I ja te podziały później przeprowadzałem, np. dzieląc koncepcje filozoficzne na te o orientacji realistycznej, czyli zajmujące się 8 Spory o filozofę rzeczywistością, i filozofie zorientowane przede wszystkim na poznawanie rzeczywistości, a w obrębie filozofii realistycznych dokonując podziału na filozofie esencjalne i egzystencj alne. Filozofie układają się więc w takie wyraźnie określone szeregi. To rozwiązanie jest wyrazem wielości dróg, ale jedności prawdy: prawda jest jedna, ale dróg jest nieskończenie wiele. Wydaje mi się, że każdy sposób uprawiania filozofii jest uprawniony, chociaż niejednokrotnie badania filozoficzne są badaniami cząstkowymi, poświęconymi temu, co znajduje się na obrzeżach głównych problemów. Czyli, jak można wnioskować, byłby Pan Profesor skłonny stanąć po stronie Boecjusza i przystać na tytuł jego traktatu O pocieszenia jakie daje filozofia? Tak. Uważam, że prawdziwa filozofia została trochę zdradzona w epoce nowożytnej. Nie znaczy to, że uważam filozofię nowożytną za bezwartościową. Jednak odeszła ona od tej linii, która prawdziwą filozofię wyznacza i która jest linią starożytności i średniowiecza odeszła od owej wielkiej filozofii, która musi być równocześnie mądrością. Jeśli nie jest ona mądrością, to przestaje być filozofią. W tym sensie filozofia jest niewątpliwie pocieszeniem. Na czym polegała ta „zdrada" filozofii nowożytnej? Moim zdaniem filozofia nowożytną zachwiała skalę wartości. Największą wartością filozofii starożytnej była metafizyka. Później akcent przesunął się z jednej strony w problematyce antropologicznej na etykę, a z drugiej strony na epistemologię. Wtedy już nie sama rzeczywistość jest interesująca, ale odpowiedź na pytanie, czy w ogóle możemy i w jaki sposób możemy ową rzeczywistość poznawać. W tym okresie wielka problematyka dotycząca całej rzeczywistości została może nie całkiem usunięta, ale ,,uśpiona". I dlatego mnie z tego powodu filozofia nowożytna nigdy nie fascynowała. Brak w niej tych wielkich problemów, które znajdowałem w filozofii starożytnej i średniowiecznej . Jak rozumiem, nigdy Pan Profesor nie był szczególnym zwolennikiem badań wychodzących od podmiotu. Ja bardzo cenię podmiotowość, postawa Augustyna czy Kartezjusza jest cenna, ale moim zdaniem nie może być ona postawą zasadniczą, lecz tylko uzupełnieniem tamtej postawy obiektywnej. Uważam jednak, że wiek XX jest budzeniem się owej wielkiej filozofii, powolnym nawrotem do wielkich zagadnień. O pocieszeniu... (Wywiad z profesorem S. Swieżawskim...) 9 W takim razie, czym jest według Pana Profesora to, co filozoficzne? Moim zdaniem filozofowie ustawicznie kontrolują swoją odpowiedź na pytanie „Jakie pytania są filozoficzne?". Inwentarz tych pytań stanowi moje filozoficzne credo. Zajmuję się bowiem tym, co dla mnie jest filozoficznie istotne, a nie tym, co za takie jest uważane. Stan ten ciągle się jednak w życiu zmienia, podlega ciągłej ewolucji. Filozofia jest bowiem dla mnie przede wszystkim szeregiem pytań, a nie odpowiedzi. Każda lektura filozoficzna jest więc pewnego rodzaju kontrolą poglądów na temat tego, co filozoficzne. To było dla mnie wielkim zagadnieniem, wtedy gdy pracowałem nad Filozoflą XV wieku, gdy musiałem wiedzieć, czego szukać. Nie szukałem tego, co było desygnatem nazwy „filozofia" w wieku XV, ale szukałem tego, co odpowiadało problemom filozoficznym, które ja dziś uważam za filozoficzne. A te problemy znajdowały się w tekstach medycznych, astronomicznych, teologicznych, w poezji itd., właściwie więc wszędzie, a nie tylko tam, gdzie widniała nazwa ,,filozofia". To była ta wielka trudność, ale równocześnie wielkie bogactwo. Okazało się np., że problematyka antropologiczno-filozoficzna mieści się przede wszystkim w traktatach medycznych, o wiele bardziej niż w komentarzach filozoficznych do Arystotelesa czy gdzie indziej. Jaka jest relacja między filozofią a wiarą? W którym miejscu, jeśli w ogóle, zdaniem Pana Profesora przebiega granica między nastawieniem religijnym a filozoficznym? Dla mnie ta granica jest dość wyraźna. Z chwilą, kiedy wiara jest iinpulsem do refleksji filozoficznej, to znajdujemy się jeszcze w dziedzinie filozofii. Wiara jest jednym z najpotężniejszych impulsów, ponieważ poglądy religijne i przyrodnicze są największymi bodżcami budzącymi refleksję filozoficzną. Ale wydaje mi się, że uciekamy od filozofii, gdy w sferze argumentacji wychodzi się z przesłanek wiary. Filozofia jest wtedy, gdy wychodzi się od przesłanek, które są przyrodzone, tzn. oparte na refleksji nie związanej z religią. Typowym przykładem takiego wielkiego impulsu religijnego, największego w historii filozofii, ale nie niszczącego samej refleksji filozoficznej jest problem istoty i istnienia. To nie jest tak, że lísięga Wyjścia i ,,Jestem, który jestem" jest przesłanką. Dla mnie jest to impuls, który skłania do zastanowienia nad istnieniem. Jest to rodzaj ZF-1Pł0dnienia myśli, w którym filozofia pozostaje filozofią, ale zostaje wzbogacfona, kiedy więc filozofia się kończy, a wiara się zaczyna? Wielka antropologia omasza prowadzi do pewnego etapu, w którym jużmusi milczeć. Monolityczna äntropologia filozoficzna Tomasza prowadzi bowiem do problemu nieśmiertelnosci 1 zmartwychwstania. Problem nieśmiertelności pozostaje jednak problemem 2 TORUNs|<|{; 10 Spory o filozofię filozoficznym, a problem zmartwychwstania problemem religijnymT680 drugiego problemu filozofia już rozwiązać nie może. Filozofia dochodzi do pewnych etapów i tak jak mówi Husserl: ,,Jede grosse Philosophie ist religiös zentriert", czyli każda wielka filozofia jest nastawiona ku problemom, na które już odpowiedzieć nie można. I tu przychodzi wiara. Rozróżiiienie to obowiązywało także w średniowieczu. Sam Tomasz wielokrotnie mówi, że czym innym jest argumentacja oparta na czysto naturalnych założeniach, a czym innym argumentacja skrypturalna. Po której stronie staje Pan Profesor w toczonym przez Gilsona sporze o istnienie „filozofii chrześcijańskiej"? W tej sprawie jestem innego zdania niż moi francuscy mistrzowie, ponieważ Maritain i Gilson byli zwolennikami filozofii chrześcijańskiej. Ja uważam, że ściśle mówiąc filozofia nie jest ani chrześcijańska, ani nie-chrześcijańska, ani buddyjska, ani nie-buddyjska. Filozofia jest przede wszystkim ludzka. Istnieje porządek filozofii, który nie jest ani chrześcijański, ani niechrześcijański oraz sfera religijna, która może być ogromnym impulsem dla rozwoju problematyki filozoficznej. Czy wedle Pana Profesora filozofia może być ideologią w takim znaczeniu, w jakim ideologią stał się marksizm? To jest zupełnie co innego. ldeologia nie jest rzeczą złą, a jest nawet w pewnych grupach społecznych konieczna. Są pewne założenia, które dana grupa społeczna przyjmuje. Staje się totalizmem, kiedy dana grupa chce sobie wedle nich całe życie urządzać i zmusza ludzi do takiego stylu życia. To jest negatywne znaczenie ideologii. Nie wolno traktować ani filozofii, ani teologii, ani wiary jako ideologii, bo to są zupełnie różne rzeczy. Filozofia nigdy nie może być z żadnego nakazu. Musi być z wolnego wyboru. I tak samo wiara. Święty Tomasz wyraźnie mówi, że człowiek, który przyjmuje wiarę chrześcijańską bez przekonania popełnia grzech ciężki. Filozofia jest mądrością, jest szukaniem odpowiedzi w sferze mądrościowej, to znaczy w sferze tego najgłębszego ujmowania rzeczywistości. Dlatego miałem zawsze wątpliwości, czy marksizm jest w ogóle filozofią, ponieważ jest jakimś systemem na pograniczu politologii i socjologii, jakąś właśnie ideologią. Główna część działalności Pana Profesora była poświęcona historii filozofii -CZY Pan Profesor uważa siebie przede wszystkim za historyka filozofii czy filozofa? Jaka jest relacja pomiędzy tymi dziedzinami? Te dwie dziedziny są obecnie bardzo często postrzegane jako odrębne, do tego stopnia, że co delikatniejszy 20 O pocieszeniu... (Wywiad z profesorem S. Swieżawskim...) ll współczesnych badaczy myśli filozoñcznej skłonny byłby się obrazić, gdyby nazwało się go tylko historykiem filozofii. 1 tu leży właśnie największy błąd. Dla mnie historyk filozofii jest wyższy stopniem aniżeli filozof, dlatego że historyk filozofii musi być filozofem. Dzięki studiom historycznym musi ustawicznie korygować swoje poglądy filozoficzne. Dla mnie te 20 lat poświęcone studiom nad filozofią XV wieku było niesłychanie ważną szkołą. Musiałem się ciągle zastanawiać, czy jest to jeszcze filozofia, czy nie, czy jest już nauka szczegółowa, czy nie. Wtedy moja świadomość filozoficzna była ciągle rozwijana. Dlatego jeśli historyk filozofii nie jest filozofem, to wtedy uprawia historię filozofii antykwaryczną i faktograficzną, może co najwyżej produkować mniej czy bardziej ciekawe biograiny filozofów i ich bibliografię, ale nie jest to historia filozofii, która musi być historią problemów. Ja osobiście wierzę bowiem, że zagadnienia są te same, tyle że pojawiają się one ciągle w nowych sytuacjach czasowo-przestrzennych. Czy nie boi się Pan Profesor tego, że postrzeganie historii filozofii z tej osobistej filozoficznej perspektywy może prowadzić do pewnej deformacji badanej myśli, sprzeciwia się pewnemu marzeniu 0 obiektywności historycznej? Ale nie może być inaczej! O wiele lepiej, jeżeli historyk filozofii świadomie to robi, niż żeby robił to podświadomie i nieporządnie. Albo decyduje się na historię tego, co nazywano w danej epoce filozofią _wtedy zajmuje się zupełnie inną problematyką, albo zajmuje się historią problemów, które dziś uważa się za filozoficzne. Powtarzam _ historyk filozofii musi być i filozofem, i historykiem, czyli być obeznany z metodą badań historycznych, a ponadto musi być filologiem. Musi, bo ma ciągle kontakt z tekstami. Te trzy sprawności są absolutnie dla historyka filozofii konieczne. Powtarzam, historyk filozofii jest CZ)/IITIŠ Więcej niż filozof! Wielka szkoda, że pogląd ten jest nie dość popularny w swiecie, nie dość zadomowiony. Dlatego często zdarza się, że filozofowie Upfäwiają tzw. historię filozofii bez właściwej metody historycznej i bez dobrej P0C1StaWy filologicznej. CZY Wtakim razie byłby Pan Profesor skłonny przeprowadzić granicę między mzwazamflllllę które są wartościowe historycznie, a tymi, które są wartościowe fil.0Z0.ficznie? Czy Pan Profesor byłby dla przykładu skłonny nazwać Heideggera Wlelklln historykiem filozofii? Staś? Í_Utaj wielkie wątpliwosci. Wydaje mi się, ze kazdy filozof w jakims sensie upfiavālę historykiem filozofii. Ale jeżeli on to robi bez świadomości tego, co 11'-1, będzie to robił w sposób niewłaściwy. Trzeba być ogromnie ostrożnym, 12 Spory 0 filozofię gdy chodzi o wielkie syntezy, które moim zdaniem są nie historią» ale historiozofią. Czy ona jest w ogóle możliwa? W swoim Zagadnieniu historii filozofii staram się pokazać, że historiozofie są możliwe raczej jako teologie, raczej z aspektu wiary, a właściwie historiozofia nie jest ani historią, ani wizją uzasadnioną _ są to raczej pewne próby syntezy nauk filozoficznych i nauk historyczno-filozoficznych_ które są oczywiście ogromnie potrzebne. W historii filozofii potrzebne są takie pozycje jak Toynbee w historii lub Teilhard de Chardin w zakresie filozofii przyrody. Istnieje więc dla Pana Profesora pewne ograniczenie interpretacyjne, które wyznacza tekst źródłowy? Absolutnie. Wykorzystywanie tekstu źródłowego do projekcji swoich własnych tez uważam za błędne. Wywodzi się Pan Profesor z tradycji Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej. Czy ta opcja wpłynęła w pewien sposób na styl, w jakim prowadził Pan Profesor działalność filozoficzną? Jaka jest Pańska ocena działalności i rezultatów Szkoły Lwowsko-Warszawskiej? Zacznijmy od tego, czego nie przejąłem z tej tradycji. Nie przejąłem pewnego dogmatycznego zespołu autorów czy tekstów, na których należy opierać filozofię. Był to wybór z wyraźnym pominięciem tego, co dla mniej było najbardziej interesujące. To jest bardzo ciekawe, bo przecież Twardowski wyszedł od Brentana, a Brentano był dominikaninem, który zrzucił habit po pierwszym soborze watykańskim, bo nie chciał uznać nieomylności papieża, która rzeczywiście była trudna do uznania. Twardowski wyniósł od Brentana dobre zrozumienie wielu spraw filozofii klasycznej. Brentano był wyszkolony w scholastyce, w filozofii starożytnej. Twardowski równocześnie _ co było bardzo cenne _ wniósł hasło koniecznego racjonalizmu w uprawianiu filozofii. Ten racjonalizm stał się hiperracjonalizmem z biegiem czasu, jakby zabij ającym intelektualizm, ale było to cenne ze względu na to, że usuwało pewne nierozsądne filozofowania w stylu różnychmesjanizmów, których w Polsce było wtedy bardzo dużo. Jego ideałem było to, by filozofia stała się nauką, by w życiu uniwersyteckim spełniała rolę poważnej dyscypliny, a nie takiego półpoetyckiego ñlozofowania, jak w pewnej mierze miało to miejsce u Lutosławskiego. To zwrócenie uwagi na znaczenie i rozumienie każdego słowa, odpowiedzialność za wygłaszane sądy, poprawność językową, to wszystko starałem się w mojej pracy dydaktycznej zachować i kontynuować. I uważam, że tę sprawę Twardowski, a być może jeszcze bardziej Ajdukiewicz przez swą 0 pocieszeniu... (Wywiad z profesorem S. Swieżawskim...) 13 wielką wnikliwość i subtelność matematyzującą _ jako logik i matematyk jeszcze udoskonalał. Jestem ogromnie wdzięczny Bogu, że w takiej szkole byłem, bo bardzo dużo z niej wyniosłem. Ale równocześnie byłem tam traktowany jak outsider, jak człowiek, który właściwie nie należy do tego ścisłego grona. Nigdy nie byłem dopuszczony do ścisłego grona Twardowskiego. Szkoła Twardowskiego była szkołą w pewnym sensie już mającą pewną ideologię, ideologię skrajnego racjonalizmu, chociaż nie był to ateizm ani nawet antyreligijność czy antychrześcijańskość, ale raczej dogmatyczny antykonfesjonizm. Istniało jednak równocześnie głębokie porozumienie pomiędzy mną a Ajdukiewiczem, który był człowiekiem ogromnie zaciekawionym problemami filozoficznyrni. Nie lekceważył wielkiej problematyki, ale uważał, że to są sprawy, których nie można w jakiś sposób hiperracjonalny uprawiać. Dlatego rozmowy z Ajdukiewiczem były dla mnie ogromnie ciekawe, ale i ciężkie. Jest Pan Profesor jednym z największych znawców filozofii św. Tomasza z Akwinu oraz wielkim orędownikiem jego idei. W jakiej mierze aktualna jest filozofia św. Tomasza? Myślę, że Maritain miał rację, gdy pisał, że Tomasz jest ,,świętym profetycznym". Nieszczęściem jest, że zaistniały różne tomizmy, które Tomasza zniekształcały czyniąc z jego filozofii ideologię i filozofię ,,z nakazu". Druga ciekawa rzecz historyczna _ wielkie działy filozofii Tomasza zostały niewykorzystane. Ze względu na charakter epoki, która przyszła z końcem średniowiecza, w wielkim stopniu wykorzystywano szczegółową etykę Tomasza, i to interpretując ją kazuistycznie, co było zupełnie niezgodne z ideą Akwinaty. A te filozoficznie wielkie osiągnięcia Tomasza _ osiągnięcia metafizyczne i antropologiczne leżały odłogiem. Dopiero w XIX wieku zaczęto się nimi zajmować. Wydaje mi Się, że wkroczyliśmy w epokę, w której problem człowieka staje się centralny. Myślę, że to czeka na opracowanie. Antropologia Tomasza nigdy nie była W obiegu duszpasterskim, żyło się antropologią platońską czy raczej neoplatońSką. Nietzsche kiedyś powiedział, że chrześcijaństwo stało się neoplatonizmem dla mas, i rzeczywiście coś takiego się stało. Dlatego wydaje mi się, że ten zastrzyk antropologii Tomaszowej jest bardzo potrzebny. Oczywiście, Tomasz był dzieckiem swojej epoki i niektóre jego tezy są błędne. Nie jest bynajmniej jak, że ze wszystkimi jego tezami się zgadzam. Trzeba być jednak selekcyjnym 1 dostrzegać te szczególnie wartościowe elementy _ antropologię i metafizykę. W metafizyce zdecydowanie najważniejszy jest problem istnienia. A druga Sprawa bardzo zasadnicza to koncepcja człowieka, gdzie osobą ludzką nie jest Sama dusza. Dla Tomasza dusza jest wbrew Orygenesowi połączona z ciałem ad 14 Spory o filozofię mełius animae. Tomasz to ciągle powtarza. Totus homo _ człowiek jest monolitem psychofizycznym, a nie tylko duszą. Czy w naszym świecie _ sondaży, statystyk, oglądalnościi popkultury jest jeszcze miejsce dla filozofii? Czy filozofia jest jeszcze w ogóle człowiekowi XX wieku potrzebna? Filozofia jest nawet bardziej potrzebna dzisiaj niż przedtem, dlatego że bardziej jest potrzebna mądrość jak była potrzebna kiedykolwiek. Właśnie w tym całym rozprzężeniu potrzebna jest ta zapomniana cnota, którą jest największa cnota intelektualna _ mądrość. Mądrość operuje przede wszystkim simplex opprehensio _ to jest istota kontemplacji _ spokojne, dogłębne, możliwie uniwersalne spojrzenie na daną sprawę. Brak takiego spojrzenia, brak zrozumienia kontemplacji przyrodzonej, która jest istotna dla artysty, rzemieślnika, pisarza, wszelkiego organizatora. Bez tej szkoły kontemplacji ,,gonimy w piętkę". Filozofia jest więc potrzebna, ale jaka filozofia? Wmetafizyce filozofia wyzwala się z uwięzienia w czasie i przestrzeni _ dlatego osiągnięcia Platona, Awicenny, Dunsa Szkota czy Leibniza są równie aktualne dziś jak były wtedy. Filozofia ta nie starzeje się i dlatego nawrót do tej wielkiej filozofii jest absolutną koniecznością naszej epoki. Nie tylko jeszcze może ona coś dać, ale to właśnie ona może coś dać. Myślę, że bez tego nie rozwiążemy wielkich problemów naszej epoki. Czy jednak nie ma Pan Profesor pewnego poczucia osamotnienia w tych poglądach? Maritain przemawiając kiedyś na forum UNESCO posłużył się parafrazą rozmowy Abrahama z Panem Bogiem, gdy Abraham „targuje" się z Bogiem na temat Sodomy i Gomory. Maritain mówi tam, że gdyby się znalazło dziesięcioro prawdziwych kontemplatyków na świecie, to prawdopodobnie oni by ten nasz świat uratowali. I myślę, że to jest bardzo głębokie. Matka Teresa z Kalkuty jest z tej rodziny, siostra Madelaine jest z tej rodziny, mała Teresa z Lisieux jest z tej rodziny. To są ci ludzie, którzy „ratują" świat. Tak jak tamci uprawiają tę wielką kontemplację duchową, religijną, mistyczną, tak filozof jest powołany do tego posiewu kontemplacji w sferze przyrodzonej. Jest to dla mnie coś bardzo wielkiego. Sądzę, że Pico della Mirandolamiał rację mówiąc, że człowiek nie jest człowiekiem, jeżeli nie uprawia filozofii. Jeżeli ludzie nie będą mieli kontaktu z autentyczną problematyką filozoficzną i panować będzie lekceważenie dla tych pytań filozoficznych, które dziecko stawia mając cztery czy pięć lat, będzie to cios dla naszej kultury. Myślę, że to jest coś bardzo zasadniczego. Filozofia jest pozornie nieużyteczną, ale jej nieużyteczność jest jednak fundamentalna. Pozorna nieużyteczność jest może największą użytecznością _ na tym polega paradoks.

IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version Staatslexikon der Görres-Gesellschaft 8. Auflage Artikel Materialismus Autor Brüntrup, Godehard Materialismus, Begriffsbestimmung Der M. ist eine philosophische Theorie über den Aufbau der Wirklichkeit als Ganzer. Sie besagt, dass alle Entitäten rein materiell sind. Auch komplexere Entitäten wie Lebewesen sind vollständig aus einfacheren materiellen Entitäten zusammengesetzt. Die Existenz nicht materieller Entitäten (Seele, Gott) wird geleugnet. Der M. ist abzusetzen vom idealistischen Monismus, der die Realität der Materie leugnet, und vom Dualismus, der Materie und Geist als prinzipiell unabhängige Seinsdimensionen ansieht. Geschichte Materialistische Positionen sind in allen Perioden der Philosophiegeschichte vorzufinden. In der vorsokratischen Philosophie vertreten Leukipp und Demokrit schon im 5. vorchristlichen Jht. die Auffassung, dass die Welt aus leerem Raum und atomaren Materieteilchen besteht. Jede Veränderung ist gegründet in der Bewegung dieser kleinsten Bausteine alles Wirklichen. Der gesamte Kosmos ist nur ein mechanisches Wechselspiel der Atome. Es gibt keine Formoder Zielursachen, die in die Entwicklung struktrierend eingreifen. Die unterste Ebene der Atome bestimmt alle höheren Stufen. Auch Lebewesen sind nur speziell im Raum angeordnete Mengen von Atomen. Erlebnisqualitäten wie „rot" oder „süss" sind nur subjektiver Schein. Alle Erkenntnis stammt aus den Wirkungen, welche die Atome auf die Sinnesorgane ausüben. Mit der materialistischen Metaphysik geht eine empiristische Erkenntnistheorie einher. Alle Erkenntnis stammt aus der Sinneserfahrung. Der M. vermochte sich allerdings gegen Ansätze, die idealistisches und rationalistisches Gedankengut verteidigten, in der Antike und im Mittelalter nicht durchzusetzen. Der Einfluss des Platonismus und des Christentums verhinderten dies. Erst mit dem Erstarken der Naturwissenschaften nahm sein Einfluss zu. Eine Blütezeit erlebte der M. im Zeitalter der IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version Staatslexikon der Görres-Gesellschaft 8. Auflage Artikel Materialismus Autor Brüntrup, Godehard Aufklärung. Ein Standardwerk des M. legte D. von Holbach (1732-89) mit seinem „Système de la nature" (1770) vor. Das Buch „L'homme machine" (1748) von J. de La Mettrie machte materialistisches Gedankengut einem breiteren Publikum bekannt. Das Selbstverständnis des Menschen als rein materielle Maschine ist für den M. zentral, da eine mechanistische Sicht der aussermenschlichen Natur die zusätzliche Existenz von menschlichen Geistseelen noch nicht ausschliesst. Der M. versteht hingegen die menschliche Person konsequent als Mechanismus. Dieses materialistische Selbstverständnis des Menschen gewann erst durch die Verbreitung der darwinistischen Abstammungslehre (® Darwinismus) an Bedeutung, weil hier durch die Einbettung in den durch blinden Zufall gesteuerten mechanischen Abstammungszusammenhang jede metaphysisch relevante Sonderstellung des Menschen in der Natur ausgeschlossen wird. Im Ausgang vom Denken G.W.F. Hegels (1770-1831) entwickelte sich der dialektische M. als eine Geschichtsphilosophie. Er wurde von K. Marx (1818-1883) und F. Engels (1820-1895) begründet. Während Hegel die Geschichte als einen Prozess dialektischer Überwindung von Widersprüchen des Geistes ansah, vertraten die dialektischen Materialisten die Auffassung, dass die dialektische Bewegung ein Fortschreiten vom Einfachen zum Komplexen innerhalb einer rein materiellen Wirklichkeit ist. Der Kampf der Gegensätze innerhalb der physischen Welt ist die Grundlage von Entwicklung. Wird diese Theorie auf die sozialen und gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse angewandt, so spricht man auch vom „historischen M.", der ebenfalls auf Marx und Engels zurückgeht. Der historische M. sieht die gesamte menschliche Geschichte als einen durch sozio-ökonomische Widersprüche angetriebenen Prozess. Im 20. Jh. entstanden materialistische Entwürfe in subtil ausgearbeiteter Form in der analytischen Philosophie. Im Zentrum stand dabei das Bemühen, mentale Zustände auf physikalische Zustände zurückzuführen. So gab es den Versuch, alle Aussagen über mentale Zustände in Aussagen über Verhalten zu übersetzen. Ein solcher „logischer Behaviorismus" wurde im frühen 20. Jh. im „Wiener Kreis" (C. G. Hempel, O. Neurath, R. Carnap) vertreten. Vertreter der psychophysischen Identitätstheorie identifizierten mentale Zustände mit Zuständen des Gehirns. Nach dem australischen Philosophen J.J.C. Smart (1920-2012) bezieht sich das Sprechen über mentale Zustände letztlich auf physiologische Zustände. Obwohl die Sprache über mentale Gegebenheiten nicht in eine Sprache über physikalische Gegebenheiten übersetzbar IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version Staatslexikon der Görres-Gesellschaft 8. Auflage Artikel Materialismus Autor Brüntrup, Godehard ist, so bezieht sie sich doch auf identische Zustände. So wie ein Blitz durch wissenschaftliche Analyse als elektrische Entladung bestimmt werden kann, so kann auch bspw. Schmerzempfindung als elektrische Aktivität zwischen Nervenzellen bestimmt werden. Die „eliminative" Form des M. hingegen bestreitet, dass sich unsere alltäglichen Ausdrücke über mentale Gegebenheiten überhaupt in einer wissenschaftlich rekonstruierbaren Weise auf die Realität beziehen, bspw. bei Richard Rorty (1931-2007). Unser Reden über Wünsche und Überzeugungen ist dann allenfalls pragmatisch gerechtfertigt. Weder sind mentale Prädikate in physische Prädikate übersetzbar, noch beziehen sie sich auf dieselben Entitäten, vielmehr soll unser vorwissenschaftliches Reden über Gefühle und Gedanken in Zukunft vollständig durch eine rein neurophysiologisch orientierte Sprache eliminiert werden. Systematik Der Begriff des M. lässt sich nicht a priori bestimmen. Denn dann müsste man rein bergifflich die notwendigen und hinreichenden Bedingungen dafür angeben können, was unter „materiell" überhaupt verstanden wird. Das Verständnis der Materie verändert sich aber mit dem Fortschritt der Wissenschaften. Während Demokrit die Welt noch komplett aus atomaren Materieeinheitem zusammengesetzt sah, werden in der modernen Physik Energie und Felder von materiellen Elementarteilchen unterschieden. Man spricht daher heute statt von M. meistens von „Physikalismus". Der Physikalismus behauptet, dass die Fakten, die von der Physik beschrieben werden, alle anderen Fakten festlegen. Würde man also hypothetisch unsere Welt kopieren wollen, so müsste man nur die physikalische Ebene kopieren, alle anderen Ebenen stellten sich dann von selbst ein. Was aber versteht man genau unter der physikalischen Ebene der Wirklichkeit? Hier tut sich ein bereits von C.G. Hempel (1905-1997) beschriebenes Dilemma auf. Ist es die Wirklichkeit, die nur diejenigen Entitäten enthält, welche die gegenwärtige Physik kennt? Dann wäre der heutige Physikalismus mit höchster Wahrscheinlichkeit unvollständig oder falsch, da die zukünftige Physik revolutionäre Entdeckungen machen wird. Oder ist das Physische die Wirklichkeit, die von einer idealen und bisher noch nicht erreichten Physik beschrieben wird? Da man diese zukünftige Physik IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version Staatslexikon der Görres-Gesellschaft 8. Auflage Artikel Materialismus Autor Brüntrup, Godehard noch nicht kennt, wird der so verstandene Physikalismus inhaltlich weitgehend unbestimmt bleiben. Alternativ könnte man einfach sagen, dass alles, was ganz prinzipiell durch die Methoden der Naturwissenschaft beschreibbar ist, als physisch gelten kann. Die Naturwissenschaft enthält aber nicht nur eine mathematische Begrifflichkeit, sondern auch die Vorstellung eines kausalen Netzwerkes, das alle Entitäten unter der Massgabe universeller Naturgesetze verbindet. Ausserdem nimmt sie an, dass alle Verursachung rein wirkursächlich ist. Es gibt keine Ziele oder Werte, die für den Ablauf der natürlichen Ereignisse in irgendeiner Form bestimmend wären. Der M. könnte also behaupten, dass nichts existiert, was nicht in diesen universellen Zusammenhang mathematisch beschreibbarer wirkursächlicher Naturnotwendigkeit eingebettet ist. So verstanden ist der M. gleichzusetzen mit dem Naturalismus. Der Naturalismus in seiner allgemeinsten Form behauptet, dass alle physischen Ereignisse vollständig auf physische Ursachen zurückgeführt werden können. Weder eine Geistseele noch Gott wirkt auf irgendeine Weise in das natürliche Geschehen ein. Der M. verstanden als Naturalismus beruht also vor allem auf der These der kausalen Geschlossenheit des physischen Bereichs. Kritik Die Annahme, dass es für jedes physische Ereignis eine vollständige physische Ursache gibt, ist aber in der Physik selbst umstritten. Nach einer geläufigen Interpretation der Quantenmechanik ereignen sich viele physische Ereignisse unverursacht. Ebenfalls in der Interpretation der Quantenmechanik nimmt eine wichtige Strömung die Kopenhagener Interpretation an, dass die mathematisch gesetzesartige Beschreibung der Wirklichkeit (Schrödingergleichung) nicht vollständig ist, sondern, dass zusätzlich ein weiterer Prozess wirksam ist. Dieser steht eventuell im Zusammenhang mit der Messung durch einen bewussten Beobachter. Man kann daher feststellen, dass die gegenwärtige Physik sich zumindest bei einigen ihrer Vertreter von einem materialistischen Paradigma entfernt. IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version Staatslexikon der Görres-Gesellschaft 8. Auflage Artikel Materialismus Autor Brüntrup, Godehard Das grundsätzliche Problem des M. besteht aber darin, Dass es ihm nicht gelingt eine überzeugende Erklärung mentaler Phänomene zu liefern. Auch jemand, der über eine lückenlose Kenntnis der Neurophysiologie der Farbwahrnehmung verfügte, aber noch niemals eine Farbe gesehen hätte, könnte aus seiner wissenschaftlichen Kenntnis nicht ableiten, wie es sich anfühlt eine Farbe zu sehen. Bekannt wurde die These von Th. Nagel (*1937), dass auch das vollständige Studium des Gehirns einer Fledermaus uns kein vollständiges Wissen darüber vermitteln könne, wie es sich anfühlt eine Fledermaus zu sein. Zwischen den funktionalen Strukturen auf der physiologischen Ebene und dem intrinsischen Gehalt eines bewussten Erlebnisses tut sich eine Erklärungslücke auf. Wir erfassen das Wesen eines Schmerzes, sobald wir ihn empfinden. Wir brauchen keine neurophysiologische Erklärung, um das Wesen des Schmerz zu erfassen. Wir können uns sogar vorstellen, dass es Wesen gibt, die Schmerzen haben, aber nicht über Gehirne verfügen, die unseren physiologisch ähnlich wären. Wenn wir auf der anderen Seite annehmen, dass wir das Wesen eines neurophysiologischen Zustandes durch seine naturwissenschaftliche Erforschung erfassen können, dann bleibt die beschriebene Kluft unüberbrückbar. Der Zusammenhang von Erleben und materieller Realisierung ist zu unklar, um als Identität aufgefasst werden zu können. Ein Vertreter des M. könnte dagegen argumentieren, dass wir das Wesen des Schmerz nicht durch Erleben erfassen, sondern dass allein die neurophysiologische Analyse das Wesen der Schmerzens offenbart. Diese These ist aber wenig plausibel, da einem Subjekt der Inhalt seiner Empfindungen und Gedanken unmittelbar transparent gegeben ist. Es ergibt keinen Sinn zu behaupten, dass jemand, der Schmerz empfindet, nicht weiss, was Schmerz ist. Der M. steht also vor der bisher unbewältigten Aufgabe, das Auftreten von bewusstem Erleben eines Subjektes in der physikalischen Welt zu erklären. Ein weiteres Problem für den M. besteht darin, den gesamten Bereich des Formalen, der logischen Folgerungen, der mathematischen Ableitungen und des geistigen Bezugs (Intentionalität) auf diesen Wirklichkeitsbereich zu erklären. Die Beziehung zwischen einem Denkakt und seinem geistigen Inhalt ist nicht auf rein physische Relationen zu reduzieren. Das Denken kann sich sowohl auf abstrakte Inhalte ausserhalb von Raum und Zeit (Mathematik) als auch of nicht aktuell existierende, bloss mögliche Gegenstände beziehen. Der ganze Bereich formaler Beziehungen und abstrakter Entitäten der Logik und Mathematik ist IMPORTANT: When citing this article, please refer to the print-version Staatslexikon der Görres-Gesellschaft 8. Auflage Artikel Materialismus Autor Brüntrup, Godehard philosophisch in seiner Objektivität kaum grundzulegen, wenn man mentale Repräsentation nur als Wechselwirkung zwischen Gehirn und physischer Umwelt auffasen will. Bis heute ist daher weder für die Frage des phänomenalen Erlebens noch für die Frage nach den logisch-mathematischen Zusammenhängen und unserer Fähigkeit sie geistig zu erfassen eine rein materialistische Erklärung in einer allgemein überzeugenden Weise gelungen. Literatur G. Brüntrup: Philosophie des Geistes. Eine Einführung in das Leib-Seele-Problem, 2018. C. Gillet / B. Loewer (Hg.): Physicalism and its Discontents, 2001. B. Göcke, Benedikt (Hg.). After Physicalism. 2012. J. Habermas: Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus, 1976. Th. Nagel: What it is Like to be a Bat?, in: PhRev, 83/4 (1974), 435-50. Godehard Brüntrup SJ

International Journal of Academic Multidisciplinary Research (IJAMR) ISSN: 2000-006X Vol. 2 Issue 11, November – 2018, Pages: 61-64 www.ijeais.org/ijamr 61 The Influence of Rewards for Creativity on Employee Creativity Performance 1 Sayed Sami Muzafary, 2 Salim M. Hamza, 3 Deeba Shekaib 1 PhD Scholar, College of Public Administration, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, 1037Louyu Road, Hongshan District, Wuhan 430074, P.R. China [email protected] 2 PhD Scholar, College of Public Administration, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, 1037Louyu Road, Hongshan District, Wuhan 430074, P.R. China [email protected] 3 Assistant Professor, Obstetrics and Gynecology Department, Kabul Medical Science University Kabul Afghanistan [email protected] Abstract: Many scholars and practitioners are concerned with understanding how and when to motivate individuals to be more creative. We argue that the conflicting ideas may be due to differences between findings towards reward conditions and the situation in which rewards has to be offered. Hence, it is vital to portray in this study that motivating employees to be creative is important for many firms. Amount of literature shows that employee performance can be encouraged by extrinsic and intrinsic rewards in their everyday tasks. This paper, therefore, investigates these kinds of rewards and shows its effectiveness in attracting creative performance. It concluded by arguing that, human behaviors are stimulated by extrinsic motivations attained from works, which are capable to fulfill innate parts of individuals. Similarly, a person is intrinsically motivated when he or she found that the work is able to fulfill his or her psychological needs for the significant experience. Keywords: Rewards for Creativity, Employee Creativity Performance 1. INTRODUCTION Researchers and professionals alike concur that creativity is vital for an organizations survival, regardless of whether that creativity presents heavy innovation or minor modifications to the work setting [1]; [2]. Though past scholars have recognized different manners by which managers can advance creative performance between employees, the role of numerous working environment attributes in linking to creativity is either still unclear or the revealed discoveries have been undecided. In spite of the advantages of creativity to the organization, it is hard to energize creativity since employees feel anxious about performing creatively in the work environment [3]. Given that creativity regularly happens by testing existing conditions and disturbing work techniques embraced by others, specialists who continually recommend creative thoughts may give the impression of being disappointed with their present place of employment or the organization and, in this way, quick pressure among individuals. This credibility keeps workers from effectively communicating new or creative thoughts [4]. Interestingly, expressing organizational help through making an innovative atmosphere and manager desire for creative performance will in general increment employee creativity [5]; [6]. In this regard, express organizational rewards for creativity performance can be a conceivable method to improve work environment creativity. The contemporary organization often use rewards practices to enable creative activities among employees[4]. Regardless of the significance of rewards in the organization, earlier scholars have not given a stable view with respect to the role of rewards in persuading employee creativity. The empirical study which looks at the effect of reward on employee creativity has been emphatically ambiguous, announcing positive relations among rewards and creativity sometimes [7]; [8] and negative relations in others [9]; [10]. On the other hand, some researchers have recommended that rewards diminish motivation and, therefore, weaken creativity [11]. Nevertheless, others keep up that rewards not only do not have any harmful impacts on intrinsic motivation regardless improve creativity [5]; [12]. Given this conflicting pattern of results, the present study has started to question the oversimplified rewardadvances (or delays) creativity show with the end goal to think about when (under what conditions) and how (trough what intermediary) reward may prompt higher or lower creativity [13]; [14]; [15]. Moreover, to comprehend the relation among reward and creativity better, scholars have supported and examined the particular kind of rewards (e.g. rewards for creativity or creativity-contingent rewards), that is most important to creativity, in light of the fact that the impacts of various kind of reward and creativity are not equivalent [16]. Thus, in this study, we set out to distinguish the mechanism and limit conditions through which both intrinsic and extrinsic kinds of rewards affect creativity. International Journal of Academic Multidisciplinary Research (IJAMR) ISSN: 2000-006X Vol. 2 Issue 11, November – 2018, Pages: 61-64 www.ijeais.org/ijamr 62 2. REWARDS FOR CREATIVITY AND EMPLOYEE CREATIVITY One conceivable explanation behind the conflicting discoveries seeing the role of rewards as they identify with creativity might be the diffused meaning of the term rewards, implying that this welcomes contrasting interpretations by people. Since organizations request that their individuals accomplish a few unique objectives, (for example, productivity, mistake-free task, and critical thinking), organizational rewards may bring about shifting understandings and invigorate distinctive kinds of work exertion [11]; [1]. Essentially, in pointing out the vagueness of the role of time weight regarding employee creativity, [11] supported the requirement for taking care of "a particular type of time weight that ought to be especially applicable to creativity"[4]. In our exploration setting, we contemplated that it is useful to keep away from the absence of specificity of rewards by concentrating on rewards contingent upon creative performance. [5], discovered that the effect of rewards would in general increment when task performers are obviously informed of the practices that will achieve ensuing rewards. Thus, rewards focused on creativity would demonstrate diverse results contrasted and rewards missing such specificity [15]. In this research, we have constructed our examination with respect to the introduced that it is important to center on rewards for creativity with the end goal to decrease the ambiguity caused by rewards showed in common terms. In looking at the impact of rewards on initiating creativity, we took care of both the intrinsic and extrinsic parts of rewards that reflect two serious dimensions of motivational procedures[17]. 3. INTRINSIC REWARDS FOR CREATIVITY In the work environment, intrinsic rewards come directly from the activity itself and, usually, express feelings of satisfaction, accomplishment, challenge, and individual professional development[18]; [7]. Intrinsic reward is an untouchable honor of acknowledgment, a feeling of accomplishment, or a knowing fulfillment [19]. Intrinsic rewards and going with intrinsic motivation are useful for creative performance. Intrinsic rewards are "satisfying in their own particular right and they give the coordinate satisfaction of essential psychological needs" [17]. Consequently, intrinsic rewards tend to influence the employees' task motivation, bringing about insistent task endeavors [18]. Exactly when individual get intrinsic rewards, they are stimulated to work harder and make quality performance because of intrinsic rewards advance top to the bottom job processing and persistence [17]. In a similar vein, [5] demonstrated that when employees expect that their creativity will be comprehended through different intrinsic rewards they would exhibit a larger amount of creativity in the working environment. 4. EXTRINSIC REWARDS FOR CREATIVITY Extrinsic rewards are outside to the activity, for example, compensation, supplementary advantages, advancements, and get-away or time off as methods for compensation[1]. Extrinsic rewards for creativity including bonus, promotions, and incentive pay work as diverse information that animates subjective and full of feeling changes in employees and coordinates their consideration to creativity[4]. An extrinsic reward is an honor that is sensible or physically which perceive of one's efforts [19]. Extrinsic motivation alludes to the wish to play out an activity to accomplish a result other than the action itself [17]. Rewards that prompt extrinsic motivation between peoples is named as extrinsic rewards[1]. Employees will show creative performance all much of the time when their organization flags that creativity is required and supported by giving motivating forces to the creativity [5]. [8], likewise announced that employees' desire for a reward for higher performance their creativity by stimulating got freedom and performance weight that advance motivation. Furthermore, extrinsic rewards for creativity established the role desire for employees, as indicated by which they would probably perform creatively with the end goal to show role predictable behavior. 5. SELF-DETERMINATION THEORY (DST) Utilizing self-determination theory as a principal driver, we improve an integrative structure for effects of intrinsic rewards on employees' creativity performance via intrinsic motivation. Because SDT accepts that intrinsic motivation, play an essential role in specifying employees' creativity performance [15]. Self-determination is a critical concept that alludes to every individual's capacity to settle on decisions and apply command over their very own life[20]. This capacity assumes a vital job in psychological health and prosperity. Self-determination enables individuals to feel that they have power over their decisions and lives [21]. Self-determination theory proposes that individuals are motivated to develop and change by inherent psychological needs. The theory recognizes three key psychological needs that are accepted to be both inherent and universal, such as relatedness, autonomy, and competency [22]. The notion of intrinsic motivation, or taking part in movements for the intrinsic rewards of the behavior itself, assumes a vital role in self-determination theory [20]. Selfdetermination theory centers essentially around internal sources of motivation, for example, a need to pick up learning or freedom (recognized as intrinsic motivation) [23]. 6. EXPECTANCY THEORY Drawing on expectancy theory, we suggest extrinsic motivation among rewards for creativity and employee creativity performance, because given rewards satisfy two International Journal of Academic Multidisciplinary Research (IJAMR) ISSN: 2000-006X Vol. 2 Issue 11, November – 2018, Pages: 61-64 www.ijeais.org/ijamr 63 conditions such as expectancy and valence of employees task motivation[1]. Thus, extrinsic motivation has mediated the effects of rewards for creativity and employee creativity performance. Expectancy theory identifies three circumstances that outcome in high motivation to play out a work, to be specific, (i) expectancy or the conviction that more important exertion will expand performance, (ii) instrumentality or the faith in the frameworks that check performance and suggested performance-based rewards, and (iii) valence or the esteem allowed by people to specific rewards [24]. The essential thought of expectancy theory depends on the reinforcement viewpoint, which supports the utilitarian perspective of human nature and accepts that outside reinforcement can reinforce any behavior measurement, for example, oblige, length, curiosity, and variability [25]. This viewpoint keeps up that extrinsic rewards lead employee endeavors the desired way and suggest behavior modifications toward creativity when the given rewards are contingent upon creative performance [26]. This midpoint mechanism of reinforcement compares with the instrumentality part of expectancy theory [24], which proposes the closeness of performance-contingent rewards as an essential of motivation to perform. The rewards utilized in the current investigation were contingent upon creative performance, consequently fulfilling the instrumentality of the given rewards. 7. DISCUSSION It is believed that the organization, which is innovative, has a higher chance of survival in any geographical or industrial area at a given time. As [27] portrayed that creativity is crucial for companies if they wish to increase more profit and keeping on expanding successfully. Employee's creativity has a significant impact for growth and survival of the organizations since it spawns new ideas and an extensive assortment of newly produced goods and services [11]. From [28] findings, it shows that workers creativity can generate in case of rewarding narrative performance, and decrease in case of rewarding a predictable performance. In contrast with the principal theoretical opinions and prior empirical results, that intrinsic rewards, and associated intrinsic task motivation are vital for creativity [5]; [29] our findings exhibited that intrinsic rewards for creativity have an influence on employees' creative performance. Likewise, through the intermediation of intrinsic motivation, our study found that intrinsic motivation for creativity totally intermediated the influence of intrinsic rewards for creativity on employee creativity performance. Therefore, intrinsic rewards for creativity seem to enhance employees' creativity performance by improving their intrinsic motivation for creativity [11]; [6]. Moreover, these results are supported by the position of self-determination theory as the principal driver, which improve an integrative structure for effects of intrinsic rewards on employees' creativity performance via intrinsic motivation. Because SDT accepts that intrinsic motivation, play an essential role in specifying employees' creativity performance [15]. Furthermore, intrinsic rewards are an essentially positive indicator of employee creativity performance, as specified our discovery, paying little heed to the worker's impression of the estimation of the intrinsic reward. Regardless of these results, it shows that intrinsic reward establishes a generally powerful indicator of creative performance, by applying a huge direct influence on employees with a contrasting view of the estimation of the reward. In spite of past arguments about extrinsic rewards on how it may influence on motivation and performance, this examination suggested and shown that extrinsic rewards contingent upon creativity are emphatically identified with creativity by the illustration on the idea of instrumentality [15]; [1]. A survey on pay for performance demonstrated that extrinsic rewards work as a significant driver of individuals' required approach and behavior, helpful for different organizational working and adequacy [13]. Likewise study on human resource management announced that extrinsic rewards were positioned second in significance by employees, following employer stability [30]. Although the positive effect of extrinsic rewards on creativity may support the position of the reinforcement and expectancy theory, the finding that extrinsic rewards are equal positively related to extrinsic motivation and employee creativity. Our outcomes demonstrate that intrinsic rewards and extrinsic rewards have a critical direct impact on creativity performance. On the other hand, intrinsic and extrinsic rewards also have a positive indirect impact on creative performance through intrinsic and extrinsic motivation to creativity, proposing that the intermediary psychological condition is vital for both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards towards creativity. 8. CONCLUSION By concluding, it is obvious that human behaviors are stimulated by intrinsic motivations attained from works, which are capable to fulfill innate parts of individuals. Similarly, a person is intrinsically motivated when he or she found that the work is able to fulfill his or her psychological needs for the significant experience. In comparison, extrinsic motivation will stimulate human behavior when the behavior itself is to execute or executed by exterior stipulation of individuals. In this situation, individuals are extrinsically motivated when they experienced an event that will satisfy their self-tangible demand or others. REFERENCES [1] M. A. R. Malik, A. N. Butt, and J. N. Choi, "Rewards and employee creative performance: Moderating effects of creative self-efficacy, reward importance, and locus of control," J. Organ. Behav., vol. 36, no. 1, pp. 59–74, 2015. [2] Y. Gong, T. Kim, and D. Lee, "A Multilevel Model International Journal of Academic Multidisciplinary Research (IJAMR) ISSN: 2000-006X Vol. 2 Issue 11, November – 2018, Pages: 61-64 www.ijeais.org/ijamr 64 of Team Goal Orientation, Information Exchange, and Creativity the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology," Strategy. Manag. J., vol. 56, no. 3, pp. 827–851, 2013. [3] O. Janssen, "Innovative behavior and job involvement at the price of conflict and less astrictory relations with co-workers," J. Occup. Organ. Psychol., vol. 76, no. 76, pp. 347–364, 2003. [4] H. J. Yoon, S. Y. Sung, and J. N. Choi, "Mechanisms Underlying Creative Performance: Employee Perceptions of Intrinsic and Extrinsic Rewards for Creativity," Soc. Behav. Personal. an Int. J., vol. 43, no. 7, pp. 1161–1179, 2015. [5] F. H. Chen, C. X., Williamson, M. G., & Zhou, "Reward system design and group creativity: An experimental investigation," Account. Rev., vol. 87, no. 322, pp. 1885–1911, 2012. [6] H. Zhang, H. K. Kwan, X. Zhang, and L. Z. Wu, "High CorZhang, H., Kwan, H. K., Zhang, X., & Wu, L. Z. (2014). High Core Self-Evaluators Maintain Creativity: A Motivational Model of Abusive Supervision. Journal of Management, 40(4), 1151–1174. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206312460681e SelfEvaluators M," J. Manage., vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 1151– 1174, 2014. [7] R. Eisenberger and K. Byron, Author ' s personal copy Rewards and Creativity, 2nd ed., vol. 2. Elsevier Inc., 2011. [8] R. S. Friedman, "Reinvestigating the effects of promised reward on creativity," Creat. Res. J., vol. 21, no. 2–3, pp. 258–264, 2009. [9] T. M. Amabile, "Motivation and Creativity. Effects of Motivational Orientation on Creative Writers," J. Pers. Soc. Psychol., vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 393–399, 1985. [10] T. M. Amabile, "The social psychology of creativity: A componential conceptualization," J. Pers. Soc. Psychol., vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 357–376, 1983. [11] M. Baer, "Putting Creativity To Work : the Implementation of Creative Ideas in Organizations," Acad. ofManagement J., vol. 55, no. 5, pp. 1102– 1120, 2012. [12] T. Dewett, "Linking intrinsic motivation, risk-taking, and employee creativity in an R&D environment," R D Manag., vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 197–208, 2007. [13] Y. Zhang, L. Long, and J. Zhang, "Pay for performance and employee creativity," Manag. Decis., vol. 53, no. 7, pp. 1378–1397, 2015. [14] M. Baer, G. R. Oldham, and A. Cummings, "Rewarding creativity: When does it really matter?," Leadership. Q., vol. 14, no. 4–5, pp. 569–586, 2003. [15] K. Byron and S. Khazanchi, "Rewards and creative performance: A meta-analytic test of theoretically derived hypotheses," Psychol. Bull., vol. 138, no. 4, pp. 809–830, 2012. [16] R. Eisenberger and L. Rhoades, "Incremental effects of reward on creativity," J. Pers. Soc. Psychol., vol. 81, no. 4, pp. 728–741, 2001. [17] M. Vansteenkiste, W. Lens, and E. L. Deci, "Intrinsic versus extrinsic goal contents in selfdetermination theory: Another look at the quality of academic motivation," Educ. Psychol., vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 19–31, 2006. [18] L. Aletraris, "How satisfied are they and why? A study of job satisfaction, job rewards, gender, and temporary agency workers in Australia," Hum. Relations, vol. 63, no. 8, pp. 1129–1155, 2010. [19] P. A. Obicci, "Influence of Extrinsic and Intrinsic Rewards on Employee Engagement ( Empirical Study in Public Sector of Uganda )," Manag. Stud. Econ. Syst., vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 59–70, 2015. [20] Y. S. and Z. G. Jian Zhang, Ying Zhang, "The different relations of extrinsic, introjected, identified regulation and intrinsic motivation on employees' performance," Manag. Decis., 2016. [21] C. Andrews, "Integrating public service motivation and self-determination theory: A framework," Int. J. Public Sect. Manag., vol. 29, no. 3, pp. 238–254, 2016. [22] M. Ne Gagné and E. L. Deci, "Self-determination theory and work motivation," J. Organ. Behav. J. Organiz. Behav, vol. 26, no. June 2004, pp. 331– 362, 2005. [23] R. M. Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, "Extrinsic rewards and intrinsic motivation in education: Reconsidered once again," Rev. Educ. Res., vol. 71, no. 10.3102=0034654307100100, pp. 1–27, 2001. [24] Vroom V H, "Work and motivation," New York, vol. Wiley, 1964. [25] B. F. Skinner, "The behavior of organisms: An experimental analysis," New York Appleton-CenturyCrofts, 1938. [26] J. Eisenberger, R., Rhoades, L., & Cameron, "Does pay for performance increase or decrease perceived self-determination and intrinsic motivation?," J. Pers. Soc. Psychol., vol. 77, pp. 1026–1040, 1999. [27] M. Selart, T. Nordström, B. Kuvaas, and K. Takemura, "Effects of reward on self-regulation, intrinsic motivation, and creativity," Scand. J. Educ. Res., vol. 52, no. 5, pp. 439–458, 2008. [28] R. Eisenberger, "Rewards, Intrinsic Motivation, and Creativity : A Case Study of o toy poo too," vol. 15, pp. 121–130, 2003. [29] N. Anderson, "Innovation and Creativity in Organizations: A State-of-the-Science Review, Prospective Commentary, and Guiding Framework Neil," Innov. Creat., 2012. [30] Victor, "Employee job satisfaction and engagement: How employees are dealing with uncertainty," A Res. Rep. by Soc. Hum. Resour. Manag., 2012.

Editor Lou Marinoff Reviews Editor Nancy Matchett Associate Editor Dena Hurst Technical Consultant Greg Goode Legal Consultant Thomas Griffith PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE Journal of the APPA Volume 8 Number 1 March 2013 www.appa.edu ISSN 1742-8181 Articles Lizeng Zhang Distinguishing Philosophical Counseling from Psychotherapy Aleksandar Fatic Epicureanism as a Foundation for Philosophical Counseling Sara Ellenbogen Against the Diagnosis of Evil: A Response to M. Scott Peck Matthew Sharpe Camus' Askesis: Reading Camus in Light of the Carnets Reviews The Virtuous Psychiatrist: Character Ethics in Psychiatric Practice Elizabeth Purcell World, Affectivity, Trauma: Heidegger and Post-Cartesian Psychoanalysis Leslie Miller Finding the Truth in a World of Spin Rachel Browne A Mindful Nation Farzaneh Yazdani and Kellie Tune Biographies of Contributors Nemo Veritatem Regit Nobody Governs Truth 1127 Epicureanism as a Foundation for Philosophical Counseling ALEKSANDAR FATIC THE UNIVERSITY OF BELGRADE, SERBIA Abstract: The paper discusses the manner and extent to which Epicurean ethics can serve as a general philosophy of life, capable of supporting philosophical practice in the form of philosophical counseling. Unlike the modern age academic philosophy, the philosophical practice movement portrays the philosopher as a personal or corporate advisor, one who helps people make sense of their experiences and find optimum solutions within the context of their values and general preferences. Philosophical counseling may rest on almost any school of philosophy, ranging - in the Western tradition- from Platonism to the philosophy of language or logic. While any specialist school of philosophy may serve valuable purposes by elucidating specific aspects of one's experiences and directing future action, the more 'generalist' the philosophy used as the basis for counseling is, the broader and more far-reaching its potential impact on the counselee. Epicurean ethics is a prime example of a philosophy of life that is suitable for philosophical counseling today. Its closer examination reveals that, contrary to superficial opinion, it is not opposed to Stoicism and may in fact incorporate Stoicism and its antecedent virtues (including many Christian virtues) in a simple yet comprehensive practical system of directions for modern counseling. Keywords: Epicurean ethics, Stoicism, philosophical practice, counseling, life-plan, pleasure, moderation, virtues, wisdom, conscience. Epicurus: Philosophy as therapy and the role of pleasure The essential 'therapeutic' function of philosophy is perhaps most clearly shown by Epicurean ethics. While in the modern age psychology and psychologists have carved up a legally exclusive niche for themselves as the only 'experts' qualified to provide talk therapy, many counseling experiences, as well as common sense, suggest that psychology, a child of philosophy, merely extrapolates and simplifies a philosophical methodology of therapy, and in many cases falls short of achieving its full effect. Increasingly psychological intervention is geared to treat symptoms and try to effect external behavior change without looking into the causes of the seemingly dysfunctional behavior or trying to elucidate the meanings of the person's problems. Although admittedly there are clearly mental illnesses that require medical intervention, there are many more cases of 'problems of meaning' that cause anxiety, depression, personality and relationship issues. These are today commonly treated by medication, yet many may be properly addressed by philosophy. The legal ban on the use of the term 'therapy' for philosophical counsel marks a de-humanisation of counseling and an arbitrary turf boundary imposed by the zealous keepers of psychology's claim on exclusivity. The now 'heretic' concept of philosophy as therapy, and not as merely complementary to therapy, was in fact essential to the very beginnings of western ethics, which, in Stoicism and Epicureanism (and to some extent in Plato and Aristotle) were what we call today 'philosophy of life': Empty is that philosopher's discourse which offers therapy for no human passion. Just as there is no use in medical expertise if it does not expel the sickness of bodies, so there is no use in philosophy if it does not expel the passions of the soul. (Porphury, Ad Marcellam, in Pötscher, 1969, p. 31). Philosophical Practice, March 2013, 8.1: 1127-1141 ISSN 17428181 online © 2013 APPA 1128 It is the role of ethics as a philosophy of life to 'expel passions of the soul' by providing precepts for a balanced, happy life. Such life must include moderate pleasures and a wisdom that helps virtue to flourish, thus allowing conscience to rest at ease. Perhaps the best formulation of this perception of ethics was Epicurus' 5th Principal Doctrine, which reads: It is impossible to live a pleasant life without living wisely and honorably and justly, and it is impossible to live wisely and honorably and justly without living pleasantly. Whenever any one of these is lacking, when, for instance, the man is not able to live wisely, though he lives honorably and justly, it is impossible for him to live a pleasant life. The 5th Principal Doctrine marks a fundamental distinction between Epicurean ethics, on the one hand, and Plato and Aristotle, on the other. Plato argues that pleasure, though desirable, is not an end in itself (cannot be a telos) and should be sought in proportion with reason. Such a life pursuit ideally results in a 'mixed life', where reason is accorded a higher position in the hierarchy of values (The Republic 581c– 588a). According to Plato, there is something inherently heteronomous in pleasure, something that it is not 'contained in itself'. This heteronomy is reflected in the fact that pleasure 'could not be measured by itself, but needed an external yardstick, such as purity'. In Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle interprets pleasure as the unimpeded activity (energeia) of a natural condition of the soul. While he renounces pure hedonism, Aristotle reconciles his 'rationalism' with a positive role accorded to pleasure by considering that pleasure which arises from intellectual activity the most noble of all pleasures (Nichomachean Ethics 1153a14–15). The point of departure for Epicurus in relation to the highly nuanced views of pleasure held by Plato and Aristotle is that for him every pleasure qua pleasure is a good in itself, and every pain qua pain is an evil. To procure pleasure and prevent pain is thus the ultimate aim of life and the most basic value-matrix on which to base a life-plan. A life plan can be designed either on rationalist, intuitionist, or hedonistic grounds. Epicurus opts for uniting reason and pleasure by making the sustained pleasure of a well integrated person the deciding criterion for a good life-plan: We declare pleasure to be the beginning and end of the blessed life, for we have recognized pleasure as the first and natural good, and from this we start in every choice and avoidance, and this we make our goal, using feeling as the canon by which we judge every good (Epicurus. Letter to Monoeceus, in Bailey, 1926, p. 128). The use of pleasure as therapy to achieve greater fulfillment and satisfaction in life, however, brings one deeper into Epicurean philosophical methodology and casts Epicurus' ethics in a light very similar to the Stoic ethics of asceticism. The main goal of Epicurean quest of pleasure is not a maximum intensity of pleasure. Rather Epicureans insist on a pleasure the threshold of which is "the avoidance of all pain", and a life-plan that minimises the influence of chance on one's happiness: Fortune, I have made advance preparations against you, and barred the passage against every secret entry you try to make. We shall not give ourselves up as captives to you or to any other circumstance. But when necessity leads us out, we shall spit upon life and upon those who emptily plaster themselves in it, and we shall depart from it with a noble song of triumph, crying out at the end: 'We have had a good life' (Metrodorus of Lampsakus. Sententinae Vaticanae, printed in Bailey, 1926, sentence no. 47). Aleksandar Fatic 1129 In order to sustain pleasure throughout one's life, it seems that Epicurus suggests at least two stages that must be passed. First, one must dispense with fear, which prevents one from achieving a freedom of the spirit and a relaxed state of the mind (ataraxia). To do so, one is well advised to apply the four therapeutic instructions known as the Epicurean Tetrapharmakos, which can be paraphrased in the following way: 1. Do not fear gods, for they do not busy themselves with insignificant human affairs; 2. Do not fear death, because it does not bring with itself any threatening new experience; 3. Always be aware that things necessary for happiness (in the minimalist sense of absence of pain and want (aponia) and absence of anxiety (ataraxia)) are easy to procure; 4. Always be aware that the inevitable pains tend to be outweighed by pleasures, that they are usually relatively easy to endure, and even in protracted illness filled with pain, moments of pleasure, if properly conceived, greatly outweigh the moments of intense pain. The last point is elaborated in Principal Doctrine no. 4: Continuous bodily pain does not last long; instead, pain, if extreme, is present a very short time, and even that degree of pain which slightly exceeds bodily pleasure does not last for many days at once. Diseases of long duration allow an excess of bodily pleasure over pain. There is a notable parallel between the Epicurean insistence on the need for 'therapy' to liberate ourselves from fear and the typical situation in modern civilisation that in many urban centres most people are in formal therapy for anxiety, and the prescribing of medication is everyday practice just to keep people 'functional' amidst threats and fears inherent in increasingly complex lives. If one replaces the notion of threat of 'gods' (the prominent sources of internal sanction for prohibited behavior in Antiquity) with conscience, reproach by peers or social stigma (the prominent sources of anxiety today), one gets an almost ready set of recommendations as to how to gear the initial phase of contemporary counseling of almost any counselee. Epicurus joined the rest of the ancient Greek tradition in distinguishing between natural and necessary desires and those that are not natural or necessary. While most other ancient philosophers, including Plato and Aristotle, include the needs of the stomach (the desire for food and drink), as well as the need for shelter and sexual desires, amongst the natural and necessary desires, Epicurus attaches less weight to sexuality and considers the sexual desire to be natural, but not necessary, because it is 'easy to satisfy, but equally easy to refrain from' (Usener, 1887, p. 456). His minimalism is thus structurally (in the types of desires considered absolutely necessary) more pronounced than in the respective treatments of the topic by more 'rationalist' thinkers of the time. According to Epicurus, the only desires that a wise man habitually seeks to satisfy are those that are both natural and necessary. At the same time, the satisfaction of those desires marks the (quite low) threshold of happiness: The flesh cries out not to be hungry, not to be thirsty, not to be cold. If someone is in these states and expects to remain so, he would rival even Zeus in happiness (Sent. Vat. Sentence 33). This is where the most controversial point in Epicurean ethics, the concept of "pleasures of the flesh" as the fundamental desires that guide our action, plays a seemingly twofold role. On the one hand, this aspect Epicureanism as a Foundation for Philosophical Counseling 1130 of Epicureanism has been focused by the critics and used to declare Epicureanism the opposite to Stoicism, as a philosophical doctrine advocating a profligate life style. On the other hand, once the 'desires of the flesh' are considered more carefully, it becomes clear that they signify a minimalism of desire: only those necessary desires of the flash without which life would not be able to be sustained are ones that should be routinely satisfied, and the person - any person - who is not thirsty or hungry and has shelter, has reason to consider themselves as happy as the supreme Greek god. There is a condition attached to this, however: an ability to develop resilience to more challenging needs, which, unlike the needs of the flesh, are difficult to satisfy and thus may become sources of unhappiness and anxiety. Contrary to what critics have pointed out, the "flesh" in Epicureanism is a beacon of ascetic life style rather than indulgence: The wealth demanded by nature both has its bounds and is easy to procure; but that demanded by empty opinions goes off into infinity (Principal Doctrine no 15).1 The concept of 'empty opinion' shows a rationalist aspect of Epicurean ethics: the way to living a life free of stress and deprivation is primarily based on changing perceptions of own needs. Once a minimalism of needs, reduced only to desires that are both natural and necessary, (needs of the flesh), is adopted, it becomes clear that any other perspective leads progressively into potentially insatiable appetites that 'go off into infinity'. In other words: Insatiable is not the stomach, as the many say, but false opinion about the stomach's boundless need to be filled (Sent. Vat. 39). The role of 'empty opinion' (prejudice, false beliefs) is what needs to be addressed by the therapeutic and educational role of philosophy, because these opinions, rather than real needs, cause the unhappiness that seemingly arises from an absence of things one needs or desires: Wherever intense seriousness is present in those natural desires which do not lead to pain if they are unfulfilled, these come about because of empty opinion; and it is not because of their own nature that they are not relaxed, but because of the empty opinion of the person (Principal Doctrine 30). It is easy to see how these Epicurean views are directly relevant to problems arising from the modern rampant fabrication of needs and the resulting mass neurosis. The concept of potentially insatiable desires has even entered modern 'left wing criminology' as that of 'relative deprivation'. People are considered more prone to committing crimes if they do not have what their peers have, regardless of how high the property threshold is, or whether or not they actually need what they do not have. For example, for people living in poor areas this may relate to sufficient food, electricity and clothes, which brings the needs-based account of propensity to commit crime close to intuitive justification. However, in wealthy areas, where most people own a swimming pool, those who do not own one, even though they own everything else they need, fall into the category of 'relatively deprived', and apparently crimes have been committed as a pattern, conforming to this motive of 'deprivation' (see Webber 2007). The above type of empty opinion relates to social prejudice as well as to individual or personal one. Just as the purpose of social reforms is to 'cure' the society from empty opinion about the way it needs to operate, its organisation and the needs it must cater for, the purpose of individual counseling is to identify, with a counselee, a road leading directly to the most optimal satisfaction of her real needs, while dispensing with false opinion about the significance and role of a variety of relationships, commitments and desires that cause instability, confusion and anxiety. This is the cognitive role of counseling that is often neglected, even Aleksandar Fatic 1131 intentionally sabotaged, by psychotherapy, which focuses on the idea that 'behavior change' is required, backed up by the conviction that such change cannot be effected through cognition alone, but must include an element of volitional manipulation. While it may be true that behavior change in itself may not always be possible only based on insight, it is also true that in many cases people have problems of meaning that cause their world to become warped and lose focus, and the resulting dysfunctionality manifests itself as psychological problems. In such, numerous cases, returning 'home' cannot be achieved in reverse order, especially if the intervention is focused on motivational manipulation aimed to effect behavior change only. Behavioral dysfunctionality is often a result of cognitive confusion. The truth about one's life situation needs to be established and clarified with the counselee, and in healthy individuals this alone should lead to behavior change. In any case, behavior change itself may not be the main indicator of success of counseling, but rather the satisfaction with life, the achievement of harmony between inner values and external action - what is commonly called 'quality of life'. This is the meaning of Aristotle's statement that 'the unexamined life is not worth living', and at the same time the main calling of philosophy as a counseling discipline. Conversely, being 'behaviourally functional' does not guarantee being happy, or leading a life that is 'worth living', namely having a high quality of life. This is witnessed by the hundreds of thousands of 'functional' people today who take Prozac every day and perceive their daily routines as prison regimens from which they try to escape through alcohol, drugs, sports, or, in more optimistic cases, through counseling, religion, friendship or writing. The numerous modern therapies for dissatisfaction and identity issues mark the problem: there is a general deficiency in the quality of life, and it is this defficiency that requires counseling. To address this potential void in one's existence from the point of view of meaning and direction has been the calling of philosophy from its beginning. The Epicurean 'naturalist' criterion to determine the right from the wrong, the necessary from the superfluous, and the wisdom that leads to 'happiness' from 'empty opinion' - the concept of pleasure - contrary to common critique, is a highly potent criterion that lends itself easily to a variety of philosophical intervention techniques today. Epicureanism provides for a direct and verifiable criterion of the appropriate action, namely what we could call 'informed satisfaction'. It requires the possession of virtues so that the pleasure arising from the satisfaction of one's optimum of desires is not burdened, and thus lessened, by the pangs of conscience, fear of the future (such as in potential legal reprisals arising from immoderate and illegitimate gain), and open to the cultivation of the more basic into the more sophisticated preferences. Epicurus himself died in agony, however while on his deathbed he claimed that he had lived a happy life, and that the pains of his illness had been greatly outweighed by the 'pleasures of conversation' he had had with his friends. This points to a common sense approach to counseling that is capable of remaining on relatively uncontroversial value grounds for most people (innocent pleasures stated by Epicureanism as the lower threshold of satisfaction with life), while allowing substantial room for being refined into minutely structured value systems such as ascetic or Christian ones. All of these systems may be seen as being in accord with Epicureanism, depending on what types of pleasures are accentuated and how they are specifically determined for each individual. The general principle of satisfaction in Epicureanism reads as follows: He who follows nature and not empty opinions is self-sufficient in all things. For relative to what is sufficient for nature every possession is riches, but relative to unbounded desires even the greatest riches are not riches but poverty (Usener, 1887, p. 202). Epicureanism as a Foundation for Philosophical Counseling 1132 Several Principal Doctrines provide evidence for a further intellectual dimension of Epicurus' ethics, namely the emphasis on an economy of satisfactions so as to make them sustainable throughout the entire life, thus reducing one's exposure to chance. Such pleasures are appropriately termed "peace" by Epicurus, and come very close to the Stoic and Christian ideas about satisfaction (as in the Christian Liturgy Prayer: 'May peace come upon you.'). Principal Doctrines 8, 16 and 20 read: 8: No pleasure is a bad thing in itself, but the things which produce certain pleasures entail disturbances many times greater than the pleasures themselves. 16: Chance seldom interferes with the wise man; his greatest and highest interests have been, are, and will be, directed by reason throughout his whole life. 20: The flesh receives as unlimited the limits of pleasure; and to provide it requires unlimited time. But the mind, intellectually grasping what the end and limit of the flesh is, and banishing the terrors of the future, procures a complete and perfect life, and we have no longer any need of unlimited time. Nevertheless the mind does not shun pleasure, and even when circumstances make death imminent, the mind does not lack enjoyment of the best life. The three maxims suggest clearly that some pleasures of the moment, however innocent they may seem, should be avoided, even at the cost of temporary pain or serious deprivation, if in a more comprehensive calculus they are likely to cause more disturbance in the future than they bring satisfaction in the present. This is a classic utilitarian model of maximising satisfaction while minimising the disturbance connected with some types of satisfaction. This may require the agent to take a more troublesome road or even to submit oneself to pain where pleasure is available instead, in order that one may lead a more peaceful life in the future, as the pleasure of the moment comes at a significant cost in the future. This allows, as the next two maxims imply, for a most sustained life of pleasure and peace, as opposed to 'bursts' of extreme satisfaction that last a short time and usually lead to withdrawal syndromes of various kinds at the lower, and to bursts of corresponding pain, guilt, or punishment, at the higher ebb. Finally, the last maxim shows that for Epicurus the maximisation of pleasure is a life-plan guided by reason. There are no guarantees in such life that pleasure-seeking strategies will succeed, but regardless of the extent to which they succeed or fail the intellectual pleasure of 'knowing the desires of the flesh' and acting accordingly so as to secure them in a most sustainable way throughout one's life, will ensure that one has had a 'good life', or morally justified life, based on the guiding values with all the disclaimers this entails when the requirements of communal virtue and 'justice' are concerned. Only a balanced life, arising from a quest of minimalist desires, amplified by intellectual enjoyment of the development of virtue and being 'just' to one's peers, may be seen as a 'good life', conducted according to a rational life-plan. Indeed, the concept of 'pleasure' in Epicureanism is anything but uncritical indulgence. Only such a balanced and rationally planned life strategy may result in a lasting 'well balanced state of the flesh'. Such a rational life strategy, in its ultimate form, is "ultimately indifferent, like ataraxia, to the actual achievement of naturally desirable objectives. (...) the perfection of the strategy is what happiness and the best life depend upon". Thus "(t)he Epicurean theory of desire and the limits of pleasure (...) has a shape very similar to the Stoic theory of appropriate action" (Algra et al, 2005, p. 666). Aleksandar Fatic 1133 Epicurean ethics in the modern philosophical counseling Understood in the broad sense as a 'philosophy of life', ethics plays a key role in philosophical counseling. Candidates for this type of practical philosophical work are rational, well organised persons, with problems that arise either from unresolved conflicts or from cognitive and emotional confusion. Many such counselees have problems that could be summed up as 'issues with their worldview'. Any exceptionally stressful situation may trigger or, if they are chronic, aggravate these problems, ranging from difficulties at work to divorce to death of a close person or a serious illness. In most situations, whether or not the 'symptoms' or 'behavioral disturbance' that often result from such problems are treated medically or not, it is essential for the sufferer to understand her predicament, to clarify her values and attach value-assessments to her previous choices in order to map a way out of the seeming impasse. Philosophical counseling helps people to find the best solutions according to their own measurements, while respecting their freedom of choice on all levels of decision-making. In doing so, philosophical counselors abide by their own ethics, which prohibits explicit suggestions to the counselees about what specifically they are to do in particular situations, what choices to make, or what value-systems to favour over others. In counseling moral concerns are understood in a broad sense, as including moral obligations to oneself. This way of conceptualising ethical issues allows philosophical counseling to progress in situations when the counselee's own values and initiative are darkened or inhibited, by questioning one's 'constitutional' goals and qualities, moving into the realm of one's duties to oneself or one's rights to enjoy life. Such situations tend to result, in due course, in a discussion of the limits of one's rightful pursuit of one's own preferences, as well as of the best and most sustainable way to achieve one's goals. More often than not, external limitations imposed by the environment make it the counselor's task to help the counselee make sense of the various impossibilities, restrictions or moral boundaries. One of the modern approaches to address such boundaries with counselees is the IDEA method of stoic counsel. The IDEA method is the acronym for four phases of dealing with the problem, namely: 1. I = Identify the real issue behind the counselee's complaints; 2. D = Distinguish the 'internals' from the 'externals', namely the elements of the situation and potential courses of action that are a matter of the counselee's free choice from those that are 'fixed' and imposed externally, acting as restrictions on the counselee's exercise of free choice; 3. E = Exert effort only where acting can change the situation, and 4. A = Accept what cannot be changed (Ferraiolo, 2010). The process of progression through the four phases of the Stoic counsel appreciates the need for argumentation and deliberation in order to 'identify', 'distinguish', 'exert effort' and 'accept the unchangeable'. While all four phases of the process are formally uncontroversial, and will readily be accepted by almost any school or type of psychotherapy, the actual achievement of these recommendations requires contemplation and specifically philosophical reasoning. On a psychological level, in order to cognitively accept and volitionally embrace any direction for new thinking or behavioural change, a degree of 'equilibrium' of emotions is needed. Contrary to what is achieved by the use of psychotropic medication, the lasting equilibrium arises from an elaboration of options and a rational understanding of the limits of the situation one finds oneself in. Just like coping with an emotional loss and the achievement of emotional 'closure' require both a process of grieving and the actual understanding of what has happened to the Epicureanism as a Foundation for Philosophical Counseling 1134 person, why and how it fits in one's perceptual and value schema of life, adopting a change in views or behavior when faced with a problem requires a rational conceptualisation of what has happened (is happening), and the achievement of an emotional equilibrium. Lou Marinoff calls this process of achieving the equilibrium PEACE process, where the explanation for the acronym PEACE is: P: Identifying the problem; E: 'Constructively' expressing one's emotions about the problem; A: Analysis of the available courses of action to address the problem, C: Contemplation of the 'disposition that allows one to choose the best option', and E: Achievement of the emotional equilibrium (Marinoff, 2002, p.168). Marinoff considers the described process to be a 'meta-methodology for philosophical consultants', and indeed it appears capable of serving this purpose. The PEACE method is compatible with the Stoic counsel in that it explains the cognitive process parts of which are at play in the achievement of each of the four stages of the Stoic counsel. The PEACE method is particularly relevant for the Epicurean perspective on the Stoic counsel, because it emphasises the subjective dimension of satisfaction through the concept of equilibrium. Namely, the IDEA method shows in stages how to achieve an understanding of what can and what cannot be changed and how to best economise effort in order to change what can be changed. This rational perspective omits the element of personal emotional benefit: the problem is a problem not only because it causes us 'objective' obstacles (e.g. an obnoxious boss forces us to contemplate how to deal with the possibility of losing the job), but also, and perhaps primarily, because it causes us distress. Some problems, especially those connected with relationships, do not immediately lead to 'objective', external changes, yet they cause deep suffering and anxiety that need to be addressed through the elaboration of context, the meaning of the problem and options to overcome it. After all, by far the most clients in counseling suffer from relationship issues, where the subjective element of suffering prevails over any external consequences. One may stay in a bad marriage and suffer a long time with no external consequences occurring. However, one will have no less of a problem just because the failed marriage does not manifest itself to external observers. The Stoic counsel provides a formal, rational framework of directions to solving outstanding issues, but it omits the subjective element that, according to Epicureans-and, it seems, intuitively to most ordinary people-is essential, namely the element of suffering and the need to overcome it with or without an objective 'solution'. Stoic counsel and Epicurean ethics appear as complementary philosophical perspectives to be cast simultaneously on most 'internal' issues. On the one hand, such problems cannot be effectively resolved, in most cases, by merely behavioural or cognitive intervention, nor by medication: if so treated, the 'anxiety' of which Epicureans speak may retreat temporarily, however the problem itself will not be addressed and all the emotional issues attendant to it will return once the medication or psychological intervention is over. (Unless, of course, one is kept constantly under medication and/or psychotherapy, which, common as it is, provides additional reasons to worry about the intentions and strategic plans of psychology in its therapeutic modality.) In order to achieve a solution, a 'road map' that will bring the person outside the labyrinth of distress and disempowerment, a rational elaboration of the issues is necessary, and this is appropriately achieved by Stoic counsel, which clears the practical ground for action on a minimalist assumption of needs and resources. Aleksandar Fatic 1135 A combination of self-discipline characteristic of Stoicism and the practical common sense enshrined in the IDEA method provides a simple and effective schema to apply philosophical counseling to most cases of distress. However, this schema addresses the cognitive side of the problem alone, and cannot serve, by itself, as a sufficiently complete methodology for counseling. People may adopt the IDEA method, progress through it and successfully reach the necessary conclusions; they may even act accordingly and position themselves 'objectively' outside of, or formally in charge of their initial problem, while remaining emotionally troubled, inhibited, heart-broken. The aim of Epicurean ethics is to address the unhappiness and suffering by both elucidating the sufficiency of a minimalism of needs, which is the common thread with Stoicism, and by accentuating the feelings of pleasure and satisfaction that need to be sought in the process of solving any issue. Epicurean counsel encourages the troubled minds to seek pleasure in the removal of pain arising from every step in the process of cognitively elaborating the problem; it favours the highest form of Epicurean pleasure, the 'pleasure arising from conversations' as inherent in the philosophical dialogue, and directs counselees not only to understand the limitations of their situation and possible courses of action with regard to their initial problem, but also to seek pleasure in new ways that are compatible with the conclusions reached through the philosophical deliberation. Epicureanism emphasises a key practical element of counseling, and that is that people need to be reminded to take pleasure in small things, and to seek opportunities for pleasures that are benign enough to not likely cause chain effects of pain in the future. For example, a marriage counselee (or couple) will be taught by the Stoic counselor that they ought to work on themselves and perform their best as husband or wife, while accepting the limitations of doing so in the context of the aim to preserve the marriage: if the other person does not want the marriage to survive, it may not survive whatever the person who wishes the marriage to continue may or may not do. Consequently, the Stoic counselor will direct the client to moderate the expenditure of effort in situations where it is clear that the other person wishes a divorce, while at the same time directing one's constructive efforts into other areas, where one has more control, such as work, child-rearing, or caring for someone else, such as an elderly parent. However, on an emotional level, this may do little to eliminate the trauma: the person may be strong and sufficiently disciplined to act rationally as per the Stoic advice; however, they may remain deeply unhappy about the loss of mate and failure of the family. Epicurean counsel supplements the Stoic counsel on this crucial level: the Epicurean counselor will likely suggest to the counselee to identify what aspects of the relationship that constitutes the marriage are the most important to them and where one finds the most satisfaction, followed by the examination of possible ways in which this aspect of the relationship may be preserved despite the divorce. Additionally, the Epicurean will ask the counselee to identify other sources of satisfaction, either related or unrelated to the relationship in trouble. The counselor will systematically assist the counselee in identifying those, finding their remaining sources, and enjoying them to the safe maximum within the given situation. The satisfactions of this type may include friendships, hobbies, erotic pleasures with the spouse or with another person, a possible alternative relationship, or any of a number of other things that people focused on their problem may not accord proper priority to. While there are many different paths that lead to the top of the mountain, arguably some are more pleasant and picturesque than others. Epicureanism seeks those paths with a better vista and better fruits to be picked on the way to the same summit. Stoic counsel can serve as a test for the appropriateness of Epicurean counsel in many clients, especially those struggling with emotional issues connected with relationships. I recollect a case of J, a 29 year old female kindergarten teacher, with a recent diagnosis of multiple sclerosis, which was the immediate reason for her to seek counseling. Soon after the first session it became clear that she was perfectly Epicureanism as a Foundation for Philosophical Counseling 1136 capable of coping with her medical condition, which did not manifest itself in major physical complaints, but she had serious emotional issues connected with a difficult relationship with a married man from a completely different religious, cultural and social background, from a small town in Bosnia. She said she was in love with the man, and was prepared to forfeit almost every aspect of her present life away in order to fulfil his expectations: to change faith, leave her job, move from a big city to a small Bosnian rural community, and marry him in an illegal religious ceremony without him divorcing his present wife. She was hurt that he had lied to her about his family situation when they first met, and by his proposal to be his 'second wife', but was essentially willing to go along with all his demands. When probed for deontic ethical principles, she said that she understood that what she was about to do was not something she could wish everybody else to do in a similar situation, and she acknowledged that her choice would likely adversely affect the man's children, wife and her own family. Her argument in favour of her choice was that the relationship with the man gave her such joy that she believed it was justified to 'break the ordinary rules of morality' in order to improve one's quality of emotional life dramatically. This clearly indicated a utilitarian type of reasoning as her dominant ethical 'worldview', and henceforth the counseling process adapted to this. The next approach tried was to explore whether a Stoic way of thinking would be able to stabilise her judgements in line with her utilitarian values. I suggested that she considers very carefully what would in fact improve her quality of life the most, and to pay special attention to the possibility of refraining from extreme affairs so as to avoid being hurt. She seemed very intrigued by the proposition, but returned the next session with a clear: 'not really' answer. When we discussed what caused her such intense excitement in the relationship it became clear that, in addition to being attracted to the extremely challenging and unconventional aspects of the situation, she was most strongly drawn by the man's intense attraction to her. At the same time, she was puzzled and confused by this. At one stage she said: 'I know this situation would be resolved at once if only I could understand his motives. This way I feel as though I am under his spell'. After the 8th session I introduced the aesthetic and hedonistic facet to the discussion: we started addressing the problem by discussing the reasons she was interesting to her partner. It turned out that she knew nothing about the town the man was from, and when faced with information about the way of life there she decided that she was probably far more 'exotic' to him than he was to her. She realised that the man's unwillingness to divorce matched his perception of the relationship with her as an adventure only, and suddenly saw the prospect of being a 'second wife' as an extremely dark one. Still, she seemed unable to make a decision. Faced with the moral issue of being responsible for the conflicts and other family issues the man's children would be subjected to, and with the legal repercussions of possible discovery by the Bosnian authorities of a bigamous religious marriage, which is a crime, she said that she would be willing to take all the risks. However, when we discussed the everyday life in the town she contemplated moving to, the fact that this was a place with one hairdresser, a petrol station and a bar, no house help, and a culture of strong mail dominance, where she would spend most of her days doing housework, would have virtually no time or opportunity for sports, and would have no opportunity for beauty or spa treatments, she reacted unexpectedly strongly: 'No way that I can live that way! He wants to use me to improve his quality of life, but soon he would lose any interest in me because I would become the same as all of the local women'. She made the decision at that session and never returned to counseling. She let me know a month later that she had resolved the problem definitively. Aleksandar Fatic 1137 Although this case may seem trivial, because it belongs to the most numerous category of 'relationship cases' and the motives involved seem extremely mundane, it is interesting from the point of view of methodology of counseling and the outcome. J. was willing to accept the moral responsibility for the partner's children, change of religion, loss of support by her own parents and brother, however, she was totally unwilling to live without certain 'perks' of the big city. Relaxed in a non-judgmental counseling setting, she made substantively the same decision that most moralists would suggest to her. This was the decision that was probably 'objectively' the best for everyone concerned, including the man and his family: she broke up the relationship. However, nobody outside the counseling room knew about the reason she decided this. The reasons were entirely hedonistic. They were based on purely Epicurean grounds: she calculated what mattered to her happiness the most, and decided that the unhappiness she would endure as a result of the decision to proceed with the relationship would far outweigh the joy of it. One could argue that J's decision is not inherently moralistic, because it was not motivated by the consideration of the interests and rights of others, although in its final outcome it is the best and morally most satisfying decision for everybody concerned. This illustrates how Epicurean ethics, while perhaps unable to serve as the ethical criterion for right and wrong in a sufficiently intuitively acceptable sense, may still be a useful counseling strategy to resolve internal conflicts that may or may not lead to results that will be as satisfying to all stake-holders in the situation as any outcome produced by deontic moral reasoning might. In J's case, the deontic moralism was tried and it failed, so there remained little choice of methodology for the counseling. In other cases the choice might exist, but the pursuit of pleasure as the counselee's dominant value may be as valuable, or more so, than a traditionally moralistic approach in helping the client reach the most optimal outcomes, such as J. did. 'External morality' and Epicurean counsel The 'self-sacrificial morality' that has come to dominate modern ethics is based entirely on the internalisation of external expectations and on pressures to limit one's spontaneous desires and needs in the fear that they may disturb external expectations or appear inappropriate. One of the consequences of insistence on duty-bound ethics, on issues of responsibility, respect for others' rights, limiting one's pursuits that may challenge the social status quo or communal peace, has been the gradual entrenchment of a profound feeling of guilt on an individual level. Guilt is connected to fear of social reprisals, and if sufficiently deeply rooted it leads to fear of the internal sanction, of self-reproach and the withdrawal of self-esteem and self-confidence. Through this mechanism the morally oppressive modern western society has generated the epidemic of depressions and mood disorders that keep millions of people at the psychiatrist's couch. The social learning of values, a powerful process of internalisation of social expectations, has turned many members of modern communities into horrified shadows: guilt and fear loom large as the main emotional problems of our age. The dominance of highly imposing external moral demands-some that could be called 'moral absolutism' (Fishkin, 1984), make many people feel deprived. Little normative room is left for the pursuit of 'selfish pleasure'. The fulfillment of external moral obligations, on a subjective level, leads to a 'way of life (...) respected and admired: or at least the minimum features of a respectworthy way of life...' (Hampshire, 1978, p. 11). Such a respectful way of life is free of blame, and thus of internalised and learned guilt. It is appropriate to remember here that Epicurus also considered fear of reproach arising from transgressions of socially imposed values ('fear of gods'-at the time) one of the main reasons for unhappiness, and that Epicureans expended most of their energy arguing to dispel fear of gods and fear of death. Two of the four maxims that constitute the Tetrapharmacos address these two types of fear. Epicureanism as a Foundation for Philosophical Counseling 1138 One may note that as early as in Hellenism the 'external' ethics of virtue (arising from the fulfillment of moral expectations of the community), or arête, preceded the Epicurean ethics of 'the good life' (eudaimonia). Epicurus in fact argued in favour of seeking a good life filled with moderate pleasures in opposition to the already dominant external ethics that placed pressures arising from moral expectations on the individual. The wheel seems to have turned once again since then and the dominant modern ethics is again an 'external' ethics of demands posed on the individual. The exclusively 'external', duty-driven morality's greatest weakness appears to be that it reconciles itself very easily with the possibility of living a perfectly moral life that is at the same time perfectly unhappy. From an Epicurean point of view, there is something fundamentally wrong with this perspective. On the one hand, in the modern, complex circumstances of life that are highly suggestive of guilt and responsibility (external moral pressures), the expectations of the community are entrenched so deeply in everyday life that the achievement of moral justification of actions is a pre-requisite for the achievement of a peace of mind (ataraxia), which, along with the absence of 'disturbances of the flesh' (aponia), was for Epicureans sufficient for happiness. In the modern context, dominated by external moral demands of the individual, a pre-requisite for the achievement of peace is to satisfy an optimum of external demands (Alexander, 2011). On the other hand, to make life valuable in an Epicurean perspective, one needs to develop a way in which the situation of the piece of mind achieved through the fulfillment of the external moral demands is capable of being transformed into positive pleasure, enjoyment of the peace and quiet. This is a key practical aspect of Epicurean ethics. Epicureans distinguished between the static (katastematic) and dynamic (kinetic) pleasures, where, crucially, aponia and ataraxia (lack of disturbance and need on both the physical and mental levels) are katastematic pleasures, however their full appreciation arises from the development of consciousness that such states have been achieved and enjoying them (Cicero. On Moral Ends, 11.3-2; 11.9-10; 16,75). The enjoyment of the two katastematic states is considered by Epicureans to be a dynamic (kinetic) pleasure. This means that it is possible to achieve a state that allows one to be happy, without being aware of one's happiness, namely without consciously enjoying the blessings that one has-a common theme in modern literature, but also a regular issue in modern psychotherapy. This is another key aspect of Epicurean philosophical counsel. While morality (in a broad sense, the quest of arête) provides conditions for the achievement of ataraxia, it is conscious philosophical practice, including both counseling and solo practice, that allows one to develop the 'wisdom' of enjoying one's happy condition of life. Epicureans placed great emphasis on the practice: the Vatican Sentences, and especially the Principal Doctrines, were collections of sayings apparently intended to be memorised and practiced in one's mind until they 'drive out deeply rooted empty opinion' and integrate the skills to enjoy peace of mind and the body into one's habitual models of perceiving and reacting to the world: Then practice these things and all that belongs with them to yourself day and night, and to someone like yourself. Then you will never be disturbed waking or dreaming, and you will live amongst men like a god (Letter to Monoeceus, in Bailey, 1926, p. 135). Epicureans have developed numerous recommendations as to how to assist counselees (or 'students') to achieve the described hedonistic state of mind. In Philodemus's treatise on friendship entitled On Frank Speaking, it is made clear that those who lead others in the achievement of hedonistic skills must first be free of the empty opinions that they purport to expel from others, and must judge critically the timing and circumstances of their intervention: with those who are delicate, the emphasis should be on friendship, Aleksandar Fatic 1139 support and 'mild irony', while with those of 'more robust constitution' a directness that is sometimes 'brutal' is recommended. An inadequate manner of critique risks to inflame (the students being criticised) when they themselves (the teachers) are guilty of the same things, and do not love them or know how to correct them (the students) or indeed have any chance of persuading persons who are much superior to themselves, instead of to someone who is purged and cherishes and is superior and knows how to apply therapy (Philodemus, On Frank Speaking, Fragment 44). These are in fact practical instructions for counselors that link the counseling method with the sensibilities of the counselees, all of which have since been taken over by psychotherapy. Epicurean counsel is thus a model fully equipped with the instruments to provide effective guidance to those in need of amending their lives so as to make them happier and more fulfilling, and such are, in essence, all philosophical counselees. In a proper therapeutic community, such as the Epicurean Garden was conceived to be, the inner circle of teachers could gain intimate knowledge of the characters of each particular student (counselee), and use the numerous possibilities that presented themselves in the course of spending most of their time together to apply the best approach to the particular person in the best of circumstances. Philodemus even suggests that the relationship between the teacher and student (or counselor and counselee, for this is what the 'therapeutic' relationship was explicitly understood to be) implied the understanding that the student was under obligation to regularly confess all of one's mistakes. The therapeutic effect of the confessional has since been constantly recognised not only in the various religions, but also in psychotherapeutic (especially in psychoanalytic) practice. The confessional was highly desirable in the Garden: Heraclides is praised because he supposed the criticisms he would incur as a result of what was going to come to light were less important than the benefit he would get from them, and so informed Epicurus of his mistakes (Philodemus, On Frank Speaking, Fragment 49). Epicurean philosophical counsel, as we have seen, is capable of integrating modern external morality. However, the Epicurean counsel transcends an exclusively external, duty-driven morality in that it provides a further goal, namely the achievement of a piece of mind and an optimum satisfaction of bodily needs (one could call this 'equilibrium') as a basis for what Epicureans see as the meaning of life, and that is joy in the peaceful condition so obtained. To feel this joy is to achieve happiness in its ultimate form, and a prerequisite for the achievement of this ultimate objective is the learning and exercise in developing specific sensibilities for happiness. On physical and cosmological levels Epicureanism is intimately connected with ethics: the idea that the soul is an aggregation of atoms dissipated by death provides a basis for arguing that death does not include any sensations, because the soul that ceases to exist is no longer capable of feeling anything. Epicurean physics is unacceptable to most modern counselees, whose physical and metaphysical ideas are shaped by the long history of very different philosophical and religious views. In this context, Epicureanism as a comprehensive philosophy does not satisfy the necessary criteria of plausibility for a viable comtemporary worldview. However, Epicurean ethics, regardless of its less than plausible physical foundation, is entirely reconcilable with a variety of metaphysical worldviews, including most of the large global religions: seeking a life of moderate satisfaction, a reduction of all unnecessary needs, and learning, within a circle of friends, the skills of appreciating the happiness arising from the absence of pain and disturbance, are all almost universally integrated practical precepts in most of the dominant religions. There is thus some reason for Pierre Gassendi's attempts to reconcile Epicurean ethics with the Christian faith (Gassendi, 1972), though Epicureanism as a Foundation for Philosophical Counseling 1140 admittedly there are aspects of Epicureanism that appear to militate against any substantive morality that is compatible with Christianity. For example, the view that: Injustice is not an evil in itself, but only in consequence of the fear which is associated with the apprehension of being discovered by those appointed to punish such actions (Principal Doctrine 34). Lines like the above appear to discredit Epicureanism as an ethics of the right and wrong. After all, Epicureans did not perceive ethics in this sense at all. However, in a therapeutic sense, which was in fact the main objective of Epicurus' teaching, Epicurean ethics in the form of a philosophy of life remains highly valuable for philosophical counseling. It is particularly well suited to address issues of guilt, fear and anxiety arising from the high external pressures of the modern age. As the example of J, discussed earlier on, shows, it is possible for Epicureanism to be the counseling philosophy of choice (or, as in J's case, the only appropriate method), with a strong 'therapeutic' impact, while reaching almost universally beneficial external outcomes. There is thus a big difference in perspective between a morality of the moral right and wrong and an eudaimonistic morality as a practical counseling or 'therapeutic' method. Epicureanism is not a good candidate for the former, but is an excellent example of the latter. Epicurean ethics provides not only well-tested inroads into problems of emotional deprivation and lack of fulfillment that are endemic in our day and age; it also provides non-medical (and not medicated) instruments for the development of skills necessary for making life meaningful and fulfilling, while retaining Democritus' sentiment that practical wisdom requires us to avoid, whenever possible 'large movements of the soul'. Thus Epicurean teaching appears very useful and flexible within the various contexts of modern philosophical counsel. Note 1. Principal Doctrines are preserved in entirety in Diogenes Laertius, Lives and opinions of eminent philosophers, vol. 2, books 6–10. References Alexander, J.K. (2011). An Outline of a Pragmatic Method for Deciding What to Do. Philosophical Practice, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 777–784. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, (ed. by Lesley Brown), Oxford University Press, Oxford (2009). Bailey, C. (1926). Epicurus: The Extant Remains, Clarendon Press, Oxford. Cicero. On Moral Ends, ed. By Julia Annas, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2001). Diogenes Laertius, Lives and opinions of eminent philosophers, vol. 2, books 6–10, transl. by R.D. Hicks, Harvard University Press, Harvard (1925). Ferraiolo, W. (2010). The IDEA Method: Stoic Counsel. Philosophical Practice, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 627– 633. Fishkin, J.S. (1984). Beyond Subjective Morality. Ethical Reasoning and Political Philosophy. Yale University Press, New Haven. Hampshire, S. (ed.) (1978). Public and Private Morality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Keimpe Algra et al. (eds.) (2005). The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Marinoff, L. (2002). Philosophical Practice. Academic Press, New York. Philodemus. On Frank Criticism, transl. by David Konstan at al., Scholars Press, Atlanta, Georgia (1988). Aleksandar Fatic 1141 Pierre Gassendi. Three Essays on Epicurus. In Craig B. Brush (ed.). The Selected Works of Pierre Gassendi. Johnson Reprint Corporation, New York (1972). Plato, The Republic, (transl. with introduction and notes by Robin Waterfield), Oxford University Press, Oxford (2008). Porphury, Ad Marcellam, (Walter Pötscher, Porphyrios Pros Markellan - Letter to his wife Marcella), E.J. Brill, Leiden, (1969). Usener, H.K. (1887). Epicurea, Teubner, Leipzig. Webber, C. (2007). Re-evaluating Relative Deprivation Theory, Theoretical Criminology, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 95–118. Correspondence: [email protected] 1142 Editor Lou Marinoff Reviews Editor Nancy Matchett Associate Editor Dena Hurst Technical Consultant Greg Goode Legal Consultant Thomas Griffith PHILOSOPHICAL PRACTICE Journal of the APPA Volume 8 Number 1 March 2013 www.appa.edu ISSN 1742-8181 Aims and Scope Philosophical Practice is a scholarly, peer-reviewed journal dedicated to the growing field of applied philosophy. The journal covers substantive issues in the areas of client counseling, group facilitation, and organizational consulting. It provides a forum for discussing professional, ethical, legal, sociological, and political aspects of philosophical practice, as well as juxtapositions of philosophical practice with other professions. Articles may address theories or methodologies of philosophical practice; present or critique case-studies; assess developmental frameworks or research programs; and offer commentary on previous publications. The journal also has an active book review and correspondence section. APPA Mission The American Philosophical Practitioners Association is a non-profit educational corporation that encourages philosophical awareness and advocates leading the examined life. Philosophy can be practiced through client counseling, group facilitation, organizational consulting or educational programs. APPA members apply philosophical systems, insights and methods to the management of human problems and the amelioration of human estates. The APPA is a 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization. APPA Membership The American Philosophical Practitioners Association is a not-for-profit educational corporation. It admits Certified, Affiliate and Adjunct Members solely on the basis of their respective qualifications. It admits Auxiliary Members solely on the basis of their interest in and support of philosophical practice. The APPA does not discriminate with respect to members or clients on the basis of nationality, race, ethnicity, sex, gender, age, religious belief, political persuasion, or other professionally or philosophically irrelevant criteria. Subscriptions, Advertisements, Submissions, Back Issues For information on subscriptions, advertisements and submissions, please see the front pages of this document. For information on back issues, APPA Memberships and Programs, please visit www.appa.edu. Nemo Veritatem Regit Nobody Governs Truth

META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IX (2) / 2017 630 META: RESEARCH IN HERMENEUTICS, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY VOL. IX, NO. 2 / DECEMBER 2017: 630-653, ISSN 2067-3655, www.metajournal.org Overcoming the Disunity of Understanding* Alexander A. Jeuk University of Cincinnati Abstract I argue that embodied understanding and conceptual-representational understanding interact through schematic structure. I demonstrate that common conceptions of these two kinds of understanding, such as developed by Wheeler (2005, 2008) and Dreyfus (2007a, b, 2013), entail a separation between them that gives rise to significant problems. Notably, it becomes unclear how they could interact; a problem that has been pointed out by Dreyfus (2007a, b, 2013) and McDowell (2007) in particular. I propose a Kantian strategy to close the gap between them. I argue that embodied and conceptual-representational understanding are governed by schemata. Since they are governed by schemata, they can interact through a structure that they have in common. Finally, I spell out two different ways to conceive of the schematic interaction between them-a close, grounding relationship and a looser relationship that allows for a minimal interaction, but preserves the autonomy of both forms of understanding. Keywords: Embodied Understanding, Conceptual-Representational Understanding, Embodied Cognition, Kant, Heidegger, Schemata 1. Introduction Proponents of Embodied Cognition as well as contemporary Phenomenologists usually separate between embodied understanding on the one hand and conceptualrepresentational understanding on the other hand (Wheeler 2005; Dreyfus 2007a, b, 2013; Chemero 2009; Hutto and Myin 2013). Whereas embodied understanding is supposed to * I would like to thank the University of Cincinnati and the Charles Phelps Taft Research Center for their generous funding of my research project. I would also like to thank Anthony Chemero, Thomas Polger, Peter LanglandHassan and Friderike Spang for their valuable feedback on my work. Alexander A. Jeuk / Overcoming the Disunity of Understanding 631 constitute what we can call a practically-engaged mode of dealing with the world, conceptual-representational understanding is supposed to constitute what we can call a theoretically-detached mode of thinking (§2).1 The separation between these kinds of understanding is strict. This is apparent from how embodied and conceptualrepresentational understanding are characterized. Whereas embodied understanding is supposed to be governed by embodied and sensorimotor abilities, conceptualrepresentational understanding is linguistic or symbolic. Embodied understanding is context-sensitive, action-oriented and pragmatic; conceptual-representational understanding is general, abstract and disembodied. Accordingly, it seems as if the separation renders these kinds of understanding as autonomous and structurally unrelated to each other (§2.1). I argue in §2.2 that we receive a segmented conception of the mind, in which two autonomous kinds of understanding pull the embodied agent into different directions, if we cannot account for the relationship between these two kinds of understanding. Given such a segmented conception of the mind, it is unclear how conceptual thought can relate to embodied understanding, as is the case when we report an action or make a judgment about a perceived situation (Dreyfus 2007a, b; McDowell 2007). Similarly, if conceptual-representational understanding is not structurally connected to embodied understanding, which is the ground of concernful interactions with the world, it is mysterious how conceptualrepresentational understanding exhibits practical meaning and significance (Heidegger 1962; Dreyfus 1991). Even though the problem of a segmented mind has been addressed by Dreyfus (2007a, b) and McDowell (1994, 2007), we are left without a sufficient account to overcome it. Dreyfus (2007a) admits that he has no explanation of the relationship between these two kinds of understanding (§2.1), and McDowell's (1994, 2007) account is unacceptably intellectualist (§3.1). In §3 I propose the following positive solution to overcome the separation. Like McDowell, I draw on Kant to do so. Yet, unlike McDowell, I refer to Kant's thoughts on spatiotemporal schemata. For Kant, the basic structure of META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IX (2) / 2017 632 experience is that of spatiality and temporality. Kant connects conceptual thought with experience, by arguing that concepts are governed by schemata that determine the possible spatial and temporal forms that objects of experience can have. For instance, the schema of the concept of dog determines all possible forms that dogs can have in space and time and thereby allows the concept to be about the experience of things in space and time. Conceptual thought and experience are able to interact, since both exhibit a common structure: spatiality and temporality (§3.1). I argue in §3.2 that spatiotemporal schemata govern both-embodied and conceptual-representational understanding. Schemata can be conceived of as ontologically and cognitively modest. They are ontologically modest, because most objects of the understanding can be minimally characterized by their spatial and temporal properties. They are cognitively modest, because understanding has to be minimally responsive to the spatial and temporal structure of the world surrounding us; i.e. the spatiotemporal world that contains objects and situations about which embodied and conceptual-representational understanding are. If both kinds of understanding exhibit at a basic level spatiotemporally schematic structure, this schematic ground allows for a structural connection between both of them. In §4 I describe two ways to conceive of this structural connection. We can conceive of it, first, as a grounding relationship, where embodied understanding grounds conceptual-representational understanding (§4.1). Or we can conceive of it, second, as a looser relationship, where schemata allow for "cross-talk" between the two kinds of understanding, yet where the autonomy of each is preserved to a certain degree (§4.2). 2. The separation between embodied and conceptual-representational understanding In contemporary philosophy, a distinction is frequently made between two kinds of understanding-embodied understanding and conceptual-representational understanding. These two kinds of understanding are supposed to roughly correspond to two ways of engaging with the world that we can Alexander A. Jeuk / Overcoming the Disunity of Understanding 633 call 'practically-engaged' and 'theoretically-detached'. In the following I discuss how these distinctions are drawn, what motivates them and which problems they entail. Let us first focus on the phenomenologically inspired work of Michael Wheeler (2005, 2008) and Hubert Dreyfus (2007a, 2007b, 2013). Both differentiate between different modes of engagement based on phenomenological analyses that are inspired by Martin Heidegger's (1962) and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's (2012) work. The first mode of engagement that Dreyfus and Wheeler identify is reflective of our experience of most of our interactions with the world. They call it in accord with Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty 'readiness-tohand' or 'smooth coping' respectively. It is characterized by environmentally immersed, non-reflective and contextual action. This mode of engagement exhibits no experienced distinction between subject and object and is structured by the body. As Wheeler states: (...) smooth coping in the domain of the ready-to-hand has a nonrepresentational phenomenology. Smooth coping involves a form of awareness in which there are no subjects and no objects, only the experience of the ongoing task (e.g. typing). (Wheeler 2008, 338) For instance, if I hammer a nail, I am engaging in a skillful activity in which my awareness of myself is lost in the activity. I am often not only not aware of myself in these engagements, I am also not aware of operating on determinate objects with decontextualized properties. To the contrary, I focus on the activity that is directed towards the end result of my action and the work that is to be achieved. As Heidegger states: That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves [die Werkzeuge selbst]. On the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work-that which is to be produced at the time; and this is accordingly ready-to-hand too. (Heidegger 1962, 99) In this mode of engagement, readiness-to-hand, things show up to me only as things-for-the-sake-of-the-work that I seek to achieve. In our case, hammer and nail show up contextually as things with which I, for instance, hang up a picture. Dreyfus and Wheeler distinguish this mode of engagement, from deliberative, reflective, decontextualized and META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IX (2) / 2017 634 detached modes of engagement. We are involved in these detached modes of engagement, for instance, when we encounter practical problems, reason or do science. Both authors identify these modes of engagement with what Heidegger (1962) called 'un-readiness-to-hand' and 'presence-athand'. In the former, we are disturbed in our smooth coping and search for solutions to the problems that caused the disturbance. In the latter, we take an observer stance towards the world and conceive of it in terms of objects with decontextualized properties. In both of these cases, a 'cognitive distance' is introduced between subject and object which is not present in skillful coping (Wheeler 2008, 383). This introduction of an experiential distinction between object and subject seems to entail for Dreyfus and Wheeler that we conceive of objects in detached modes of engagement in a literally 'objective' way. As Wheeler states: When revealed as present-at-hand (e.g. by detached theoretical reflection) an entity will be experienced in terms of properties that are action-neutral, specifiable without essential reference to the representing agent, and context-independent. Moreover, according to Heidegger, this group of properties will also characterize the contents of the agent's related representational states. (Wheeler 2008, 339, emphasis added) Wheeler and Dreyfus argue that readiness-to-hand is governed by embodied understanding and that un-readiness-tohand and presence-at-hand are governed by (action-oriented or classical) representations (Wheeler) or linguistic concepts (Dreyfus), which exhibit the characteristics of 'conceptual content, mindedness, and rationality' (Dreyfus 2013, 29). The assumption here is that embodied understanding enables engaged-practical modes of engagement with the world and that conceptual-representational understanding enables theoretical-detached modes of engagement with the world, in particular, decontextualized, body-neutral conceptual content. We find similar claims about different modes of engagement and corresponding differences in the underlying kinds of understanding in other embodied conceptions of understanding. For instance, various authors argue for the Alexander A. Jeuk / Overcoming the Disunity of Understanding 635 existence of something like a pre-conceptual background that characterizes most of our engagements with the world. This background is conceived of as a holistic and contextual background structure that allows us to act and interact with our living world. This pre-conceptual background is then contrasted with explicit concept use (Dreyfus 2007a, 2007b, Wheeler 2008; Hutto 2012; Dreyfus and Taylor 2015). Another similar separation is made in Radical Embodied Cognitive Science and closely related versions of Enactivism (Chemero 2009; Kiverstein and Rietveld 2015). One central concept of this project is 'affordance' which is defined by Chemero (2009) as a relation between agents and environments and, in accord with J.J. Gibson, as the embodied, pragmatic meaning of objects. In this sense, affordances grant an understanding of objects for engaged-practical purposes. The explanatory scope of affordances is yet unclear for Chemero (2009). In particular, he deems it an open question to what extent Radical Embodied Cognitive Science will be able to explain, what he calls in accord with Clark and Toribio (1994), 'representation hungry tasks'. As we have seen above, many authors differentiate between different ways of relating to the world. On the one hand, we have a practical-engaged mode that pertains to action and perception. This practical-engaged mode is contextual, holistic, value-laden, body-centric and is governed by embodied understanding (Dreyfus 2007b; Wheeler 2008). On the other hand is a theoretical-detached mode, which is thought to include engaging in decontextualized, general propositional thought (Hurley 1998), distinctly cognitive intentionality (Kelly 2002), doing science, theorizing and using language (Wheeler 2005; Chemero 2009), engaging with the world in a detached, observational fashion (Dreyfus 2007b), deliberative, reflective rationality (Dreyfus 2013), judging, believing or planning (Hutto and Myin 2013), or participating in the space of reasons (Dreyfus and Taylor 2015). This detached-theoretical mode is supposedly governed by conceptual-representational understanding. 2.1. The separation is strict Now we need to ask how strict the separation between embodied and conceptual-representational understanding is. Is META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IX (2) / 2017 636 there continuity between the different kinds of understanding or are they radically separate from each other? The answers to this question differ. For instance, Hutto and Myin (2013) see no connection between the embodied abilities that generate action and perception, and contentful conceptual-representational understanding. Contrary to that, Dreyfus in particular has stressed the continuity between the two kinds of understanding. As Dreyfus claims: Intelligence is founded on and presupposes the more basic way of coping we share with animals. (Dreyfus 2007b, 250) Another expression of Dreyfus's commitment to the continuity between both kinds of understanding is the following. Absorbed bodily coping, its motor intentional content, and the world's interconnected solicitations to act provide the background on the basis of which it becomes possible for the mind with its conceptual content to think about and act upon a categorially unified world. (Dreyfus 2007a, 360–361) Importantly, Dreyfus deems conceptual-representational understanding constitutively dependent upon embodied understanding. Similar remarks have been made recently from a NeoPragmatist perspective by Gallagher: Pragmatists and neo-pragmatists would treat the intentionality of propositional attitudes as derived from a more original form of embodied intentionality, what phenomenologists like Husserl and Merleau-Ponty call "motor intentionality." (Gallagher 2014, 121) Further, in particular proponents of Embodied Cognition support the claim that cognition, action, and perception are integrated with each other (Thompson and Stapleton 2009) or that they are non-separable, interaction-dominant components of one dynamic system (Chemero 2014). If that is the case, i.e. if cognition, action, and perception are integrated and inseparable from each other, it should be entailed that both kinds of understanding are also integrated with each other and inseparable from each other, which again entails a strong form of continuity. And not surprisingly, a standard response by proponents of Embodied Cognition to the question about the relationship Alexander A. Jeuk / Overcoming the Disunity of Understanding 637 between these kinds of understanding is that they are 'somehow' connected and continuous with each other. But there is no concrete philosophical explanation of what the relationship between embodied and conceptual-representational understanding actually is.2 We can see this at the example of Dreyfus's (2007a) account. As we have seen above, Dreyfus claims, with recourse to Heidegger and in particular Merleau-Ponty, that motor intentionality and other embodied abilities enable conceptualrepresentational understanding. Yet, Dreyfus does not provide an explanation of the relationship between the two kinds of understanding. He merely claims that they are connected with each other, without providing an analysis of how our theoreticaldetached engagements with the world characteristically exhibit signs of motor intentionality or embodiment. To the contrary, Dreyfus (2007a, 364) claims that we experience 'context-free, self-sufficient substances with detachable properties' when we engage with the world as theoretically-detached, which he (Dreyfus 2007a, 364) identifies with 'McDowell's world of facts, features and data'. However, it is not clear what it means that decontextualized, self-sufficient substances exhibit signs of embodiment or motor intentionality. Further, Dreyfus states in another passage that 'motor intentional content' cannot in any '"form"' be '"suitable to constitute the contents of conceptual capacities"' (Dreyfus 2007a, 360), which seems to contradict the claims Dreyfus makes about how embodied understanding, in particular motor intentionality, is the basis of conceptual-representational understanding.3 And to further heighten the confusion, Dreyfus concludes that neither he nor Heidegger nor Merleau-Ponty would have been able to provide an account of the relationship between embodied and conceptual-representational understanding: 'It seems that (...) the phenomenologists can't account for what makes it possible for us to step back and observe [the world]' (Dreyfus 2007a, 364, my brackets). Concretely, Dreyfus admits that he cannot account for the relationship between conceptual-representational understanding and embodied understanding. META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IX (2) / 2017 638 2.2. Problems with the separation The lack of an account that explains the relationship between two kinds of understanding is deeply concerning. What is in particular concerning is that the two kinds of understanding, according to how they are standardly described, seem structurally disparate-so disparate even that they are seemingly autonomous from each other. If that were the case, it is deeply mysterious how they could interact. Yet, it is obvious that they do interact. For instance, as McDowell (2007) has repeatedly pointed out, we need to account for how our embodied experience can be the object of verbal reports and how it can inform conceptual judgments. And as Alva Noë (2004, 2012) has pointed out, our embodied understanding itself exhibits such cognitive complexity that it requires a close relationship to conceptual-representational understanding. Further, if these kinds of understanding were separate and autonomous from each other, then it would be puzzling how human thinking and action are so synchronized in everyday behavior. If the two kinds of understanding were separately operating in an embodied agent, it would seem as if she would have to be torn in different directions, by autonomously operating kinds of understanding. Even more, if embodied understanding is that what generates meaning and significance for an agent, as at least Phenomenologists and Phenomenologically-inspired philosophers argue (Heidegger 1962; Merleau-Ponty 2012; Thompson 2007; Ratcliffe 2008; Noë 2012), then we need to address the question how conceptual-representational understanding itself receives meaning, in particular if we do not want to accept classic Intellectualist conceptions of a disembodied intellect.4 Accordingly, we need to account for the relationship between embodied understanding and conceptualrepresentational understanding. In what follows I seek to account for this relationship with the following strategy. First, I suggest that spatiotemporal schemata can function as the ground for an interaction between Alexander A. Jeuk / Overcoming the Disunity of Understanding 639 these kinds of understanding. Second, I describe different ways to conceive of the relationship between the kinds of understanding, given that they are connected through schematic structure. 3. Bridging the separation with schematic structure In the following I suggest that schemata are the means by which embodied understanding and conceptualrepresentational understanding interact. A schema, as I will argue, is an ontologically and cognitively minimal structure that preserves a certain degree of autonomy for both kinds of understanding, yet, allows for their close interaction. The following considerations draw heavily on Immanuel Kant's conception of schemata, developed in the Critique of Pure Reason. I will introduce the conception of a schema based on his work and show how we can make the basic idea work in different ways, without having to accept the wider ramifications of Kant's epistemological and ontological project. In order to do so, I spell out two different ways in which schemata can connect embodied and conceptual-representational understanding. 3.1. Kantian schemata Schemata are a central, though often overlooked aspect of Kantian philosophy (Sherover 1971; Heidegger 1990; Carman 1999; Hanna 2005; van Mazijk 2016). They are the structures that explain, for Kant, how experience and conceptual thought are synthesized. In the following I will discuss schemata in the context of Kant's considerations on the synthesis of experience and conceptual thought. As is well known, Kant insisted that concepts and experience have to interact in order to make sense of either of them. Yet it is less well known that Kant is not satisfied with claiming that concepts and experience interact or that they are synthesized. Kant is concerned with the conditions that make it possible that concepts and experience can interact; i.e. Kant does not merely describe the necessity of the interaction between them, but he seeks to explain it further. This means that Kant is concerned with the structure that is the ground for META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IX (2) / 2017 640 the interaction between concepts and experience, and accordingly with the conditions that make it possible that concepts are about objects of experience. Kant argues that there has to be a common structural ground, a 'homogenous' 'third thing', that has to be definitive of concepts and experience so that they can interact. Now it is clear that there must be a third thing, which must stand in homogeneity [in Gleichartigkeit stehen] with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the other, and makes possible the application of the former to the latter. (Kant 1998, A138 / B177, emphasis and translation in original) Kant's point is that concepts and experience have to exhibit a structural commonality, so that they can interact; or differently put, so that each can non-arbitrarily match with each other. Kant identifies this matching structure, the 'third thing', with schemata. According to Kant, schemata can perform their function as the common ground of both experience and concepts by being 'a priori time-determinations' (Kant 1998, A145 / B184). Whether Kant then actually conceives of them merely as 'a priori time-determinations', i.e. as exhibiting temporal structure, is doubtful. It seems as if schemata not only exhibit temporal structure, but also spatial structure, as we can see from his discussion of the concept of substance. The schema of substance is the persistence of the real in time, i.e., the representation of the real as a substratum of empirical timedetermination in general, which therefore endures while everything else changes. (Kant 1998, A144 / B183) What allows for the concept of substance and the experience of a substance to interact is that both-or rather schemata in the case of concepts-have spatial and temporal structure in common. For instance, the experience of a substance is that of an entity that is a spatially stable thing that does not change in time. The schema of a substance directs the concept of substance to a substance, since it exhibits spatial and temporal structure based on which it determines an experience of x as a substance if x has spatially stable structure that does not change in time. The matching consists in the overlap of the same spatial and temporal structure of the Alexander A. Jeuk / Overcoming the Disunity of Understanding 641 experience and the schema-in the case of substance: spatially stable form that does not change in time. The same considerations apply to empirical concepts too-not only to the concepts of substance, cause, reality, and so forth-Kant's pure concepts of the understanding. The concept of dog is governed by a schema that determines all possible spatiotemporal forms that dogs can exhibit. The concept of a dog signifies a rule in accordance with which my imagination can specify the shape of a four-footed animal in general, without being restricted to any single particular shape that experience offers me or any possible image that I can exhibit in concreto. (Kant 1998, B181, 182 / A 142) At the same time, all the possible ways in which one can experience dogs exhibit a particular spatiotemporal form, i.e. dog-form. Accordingly, my concept of dog is about dogs, and can only be about dogs in the first place, because it is connected through the schema of dog to dogs in the world, since both exhibit matching spatiotemporal form-the particular instantiation of the dog schematas1-t1-particular dog with dog forms1-t1. For instance, the declarative sentence, 'there is a dog on the mat', is about a dog in the world because it is governed by schemata that determine the spatiotemporal forms according to which dogs can appear on mats and it can match an actual appearance of a dog on a mat in space and time. Importantly, what is required for experience and conceptual thought to interact is that both are at the basic level characterized by spatial and temporal attributes. Experience is basically characterized by the invariant structures spatiality and temporality; in Kant's case, the pure forms of intuition space and time. Concepts are basically characterized by the invariant structures spatiality and temporality; in Kant's case, through spatiotemporal schemata. Since both experience and conceptual thought exhibit the same basic structure, spatiality and temporality, they can interact and be synthesized. Kant is quite clear about what is entailed for conceptual understanding if we accept that it is governed by schemata. Concepts cannot constitute an arbitrary, autonomous kind of understanding, but schemata determine the scope, application and meaning of concepts. META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IX (2) / 2017 642 Thus the schemata of the concepts of pure understanding are the true and sole conditions for providing them with a relation to objects [Beziehung auf Objekte], thus with significance [Bedeutung] (...). (Kant 1998, A145-146 / B185, emphasis and translation in original) This is the case, since not only the aboutness relationship between conceptual thought and objects is determined by schemata, but also because that what concepts can mean is completely determined by the possible ways in which an object can appear to me in space and time. As we can see from this, Kant's own approach is quite different from John McDowell's Kant-inspired account (McDowell 1994, 2007), according to which concepts reach into experience, without further mediation by schemata; where neither conceptual thought is constrained by schemata, nor experience is primarily characterized by spatiality and temporality. McDowell breaks with Kant in that he does not provide an analysis of the relationship between experience and conceptual thought by means of a mediating structure, i.e. schemata. Rather, he claims that our experience is readily available for conceptual understanding without providing an account of the mediating structure that could make experience available for conceptual understanding; i.e. without an explanation of the conditions that make it possible that experience and conceptual thought can interact. As McDowell claims: We can equip ourselves with new conceptual capacities, in that sense, by isolating and focusing on-annexing bits of language to-other aspects of the categorially unified content of the experience, aspects that were hitherto not within the scope of our capacities for explicit thought. (McDowell 2007, 347, emphasis added) For McDowell, conceptual thought is simply linguistic and it can reach into experience qua its linguistic structure, which presupposes that the structure of experience exhibits linguistic structure too. Yet, as I have shown above, at least for Kant, what provides experience with "categorically unified content" or the Kantian equivalent thereof, is that experience is structured by the pure forms of intuition space and time, i.e. that experience Alexander A. Jeuk / Overcoming the Disunity of Understanding 643 is itself structured into objects that have a particular spatiotemporal form that differentiates them from other objects and makes them available to be the object about which a schema, and thereby a concept, can be. Since McDowell does not account for such a mediating structure, he not only fails to provide an analysis of the conditions that make the application of concepts to experience possible. He also renders the relationship between experience as well as embodied understanding and conceptual thought intellectualist, since he argues that experience and embodied understanding exhibit conceptual structure. 3.2. Schemata as a bridging structure Importantly, we do not have to accept the particular ontological ramifications of Kantian philosophy in order to see in schemata an attractive option for the explanation of at least a minimal interaction between embodied understanding and conceptual-representational understanding. In the following I will spell out why schemata can be considered to be an ontologically and cognitively non-demanding structure. Then I will show, that, given the ontologically and cognitively nondemanding structure of schemata, we can conceive of embodied understanding as minimally characterized by schematic structure, which gives us the ground for an interaction between the kinds of understanding. Finally, I will spell out different ways of how we can conceive of the schematic relationship between embodied understanding and conceptualrepresentational understanding-ranging from the strong Kantian (and Phenomenological) project, to a minimalist interaction between both kinds of understanding that explains how we can, for instance, make verbal reports about the objects of embodied understanding. Many readers might be skeptical about accepting a Kantian conception of schemata, because they might worry that such a strategy commits them to an acceptance of wider aspects of the Kantian project that they might find not desirable. Yet, we do not have to accept other aspects of Kant's system to adopt his conception of schemata; for instance, his claim that space and time are pure forms of intuition or that there are pure META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IX (2) / 2017 644 concepts of the understanding, i.e. basic categories such as substance or causality. Indeed, the idea of a schema is ontologically modest, since it is formulated about primitive, invariant spatiotemporal properties of objects that characterize these objects in a minimal and essential fashion. There is nothing ontologically obscure about claiming that the objects of our thoughts, such as dogs, have a particular spatiotemporal form and have it essentially. There is further nothing cognitively obscure or demanding about the claim that understanding has to be responsive to the temporal and spatial aspects of the world; for instance, by exhibiting temporal structure itself. Quite to the opposite, it seems difficult to make sense of the responsiveness to a spatial world in temporal change without such a conception of schemata-for instance, based on an explanation formulated over disembodied, symbolic representations. Since there is neither anything cognitively nor ontologically demanding about schemata, we can conceive of embodied understanding as schematic too-which is obviously a necessary condition for the interaction of the kinds of understanding through schemata. I do not purport that I can present an exhaustive argument for the claim that embodied understanding is governed by schematic structure. I merely want to show here that it is a plausible option to conceive of embodied understanding as itself spatiotemporally schematic. If I bring my embodied understanding to bear on an action, for instance, the action of making coffee, I need to have a practical understanding of the behaviors and objects involved in the action. This embodied understanding is itself characterized by an aboutness relation, as in particular Merleau-Ponty (2012) has argued, that is neither cognitive nor merely causal, i.e. a motor intentional aboutness relationship (Carman 1999; Kelly 2002). This intentional relationship is characterized by an interaction of motor abilities (e.g. embodied abilities) of an agent and spatiotemporal objects. As is well known, MerleauPonty conceives of the spatiotemporal nature of objects as determined though a body schematic relationship. As MerleauAlexander A. Jeuk / Overcoming the Disunity of Understanding 645 Ponty (2012, 103) states, "each figure appears perspectivally against the double horizon of external space and bodily space." Independent of how we conceive of this (body) schematic structure exactly, whether it is determined through embodiment (Merleau-Ponty) or without embodiment (Kant), it is essentially of a spatiotemporal nature, as the following example illustrates. Take for instance the action of coffee making-a simple, cognitively non-demanding action governed by embodied understanding. In order to make coffee, I need to understand, non-deliberatively and non-thematically, among many other things, what a coffee machine does and I need to understand how to behave towards it, i.e. I have to understand nonconceptually which buttons I have to press, where I have to insert the coffee, when I have to stop inserting it and so forth. This means, my understanding of which action I have to perform is relative to my understanding of which objects are involved in the action (coffee machine, coffee ground, kitchen cabinet, etc.). And my understanding has to be about these objects-in order to identify a coffee machine as a coffee machine, i.e. as something that in this situation produces coffee for me. What allows for the application of my embodied understanding to objects is schematic structure. The most basic, invariant features of a coffee machine are its spatiotemporal properties. I do not have to be aware of them as such, yet they nevertheless allow me to see a particular physical configuration in space and time as a coffee machine. My understanding of the coffee machine itself is not primarily spatiotemporal. It is about what I can do with the coffee machine and how it can fulfill my concerns. But a spatiotemporal schema allows me to pick out an otherwise insignificant object out of space and time as a thing of which I have a particular concern-fulfilling and action-oriented understanding. Similarly, the structure of my behavior is guided by a spatiotemporal schema in relation to objects. As Stanley and Krakauer (2013) and Stanley and Williamson (2016) have pointed out, action is governed by an understanding of initiation conditions. This means, I need to understand, in META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IX (2) / 2017 646 relation to an environmental situation, when I have to initiate or change my course of behavior in order to produce a result I have concern for. For instance, if I open the lid of my coffee machine I need to understand when to start pouring ground coffee into the filter of the machine and when to stop. Krakauer, Stanley and Williamson argue that this understanding of initiation conditions is housed in mental representations that correspond to facts. Yet, we can equally conceive of this understanding as governed by spatiotemporal schemata. The schema cannot only specify which objects are involved in an action, but it has further an intimate connection to temporality itself, which is necessary to determine stop and initiation conditions of an action. Now that we see that we can conceive of embodied understanding as spatiotemporally schematic too, we can analyze the possible relationships that can hold between embodied understanding and conceptual-representational understanding, based on their schematic structure. 4. Different interactions: ways to connect both kinds of understanding In the following I discuss two different ways we can conceive of the schematic relationship between embodied understanding and conceptual-representational understanding. First, a tight relationship, that grounds conceptualrepresentational understanding in embodied understanding through schemata. Second, a loose relationship, that grants autonomy to both kinds of understanding, yet, lets them interact at various levels through schemata. I cannot spell out the specifics of such a relationship in this paper. Rather, I merely describe which kinds of relationship can in principle follow from the structural connection between the two kinds of understanding that is grounded in schematic structure. The details of such a relationship will have to await further, more detailed deliberations. Alexander A. Jeuk / Overcoming the Disunity of Understanding 647 4.1. Grounding conceptual-representational understanding in embodied understanding We can conceive of the relationship between embodied and conceptual-representational understanding, as Kant conceived of the relationship between experience and conceptual thought. In that case, embodied understanding, as that which contributes to our structure of experience or is at least closely connected to it (O'Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2004; Thompson 2007), is that which governs conceptualrepresentational understanding insofar as it bestows meaning and significance to it. Accordingly, we can conceive of the relationship between the two kinds of understanding as a grounding relationship. Conceiving of the relationship as a close one could be interesting for any author that follows Heidegger (1962) in arguing that the meaning of thought or linguistic expressions requires a grounding in our practical understanding of the world, that itself is grounded in concern or sensorimotor skill. For instance, my concept of a coffee machine receives significance through the significance that coffee machines have for me based on the ways I can relate to them based on my embodied understanding of them. This grounding relation allows then that concepts have pragmatic meaning. 4.2. Preserving autonomy through minimal interaction If we want to grant conceptual-representational understanding a high degree of autonomy and argue for a marked difference between the modes of engagement realized by embodied and conceptual-representational understanding respectively (Wheeler 2005; Dreyfus 2007a), we can obviously also conceive of the relationship between both kinds of understanding in a weaker form; yet still schematically mediated. If both, embodied understanding and conceptualrepresentational understanding are exhibiting schematic structure, both kinds of understanding can be elicited or exerted in the same situation. If I make coffee, my META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IX (2) / 2017 648 spatiotemporally schematic understanding of the situation not only allows me to bring my embodied understanding to bear on the situation, but through a similar or the same schema, my concept of, say, "coffee machine" can be elicited too. This allows then to make verbal reports about the situation at hand and it allows to form conceptual judgments such as "I am making coffee"-an action that is otherwise governed by embodied understanding.5 5. Conclusion I have argued that spatiotemporal schemata are the condition that make it possible that embodied understanding and conceptual-representational understanding can interact. I have shown that the separation that is made between both kinds of understanding by contemporary Phenomenologists (Dreyfus 2007a, b) and proponents of Embodied Cognition (Wheeler 2005, 2008; Chemero 2009) renders the interaction between them puzzling. Concretely, I have argued, in accord with McDowell (1994, 2007), Dreyfus (2007a) and Noë (2004, 2012), that the separation between these kinds of understanding cannot account for how we can produce reports about our actions that are governed by embodied understanding, or how we can make judgments about them. Further, I have argued that the separation can further not account for the seeming interaction between both kinds of understanding in everyday action and, at least from a phenomenological point of view, for how conceptualrepresentational understanding receives meaning and significance through embodied understanding. These problems make it necessary to account for the interaction between both kinds of understanding. I have then argued that spatiotemporal schemata are well-suited to account for this interaction. I have advanced a conception of schemata that is based on Kant's own conception of schemata. I have argued that schemata are basic, ontologically and cognitively modest structures that relate to spatial and temporal properties of objects. I then suggested that schemata underlie both, embodied as well as conceptualrepresentational understanding. If that is the case, both, Alexander A. Jeuk / Overcoming the Disunity of Understanding 649 embodied and conceptual-representational understanding have the same basic structure in common that allows for their interaction. Finally, I have spelled out two different ways in which the two kinds of understanding could interact through schemata. I have described a close interaction relationship, in which conceptual-representational understanding is grounded in embodied understanding-an idea valuable for Phenomenologists and philosophers who conceive of embodied understanding as the primary locus of meaning and significance. I have further depicted another way to conceive of the relationship as a looser one in which both kinds of understanding minimally interact-so that we are able to make reports about our actions or to transform our thoughts into actions-yet, where embodied understanding and conceptualrepresentational understanding are in many ways autonomous from each other and preserve their unique properties and functions. NOTES 1The exception to the rule is Alva Noë (2004, 2012) who has rejected the separation as intellectualist. 2Accounts by McDowell (1994, 2007) and Noë (2004, 2012) are the exceptions to this explanatory shortcoming. I discuss McDowell briefly in § 3.1. A discussion of Noë unfortunately goes beyond the scope of this paper. 3Dreyfus understandably has to make this claim, given his own theoretical presuppositions, to thwart John McDowell's (1994, 2007) claim that experience exhibits conceptuality. However, Dreyfus's claim entails unfortunately a contradiction to his own claims about the continuity between embodied and conceptual-representational understanding. 'To focus on the motor intentional content, then, is not to make some implicit conceptual content explicit-that's the myth-but rather to transform the motor intentional content into conceptual content, thereby making it available for rational analysis but no longer capable of directly motivating action' (Dreyfus 2007a, 360). Worse, Dreyfus's statement, cited in the main text, clearly cuts off embodied understanding from conceptual-representational understanding. 4Importantly, Heidegger, who inspires Dreyfus and Wheeler to sharply separate between both kinds of understanding, does not make the same separation for two reasons. First, Heidegger does not differentiate between embodied understanding and conceptual-representational understanding, or rather, between readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand, the way Dreyfus and Wheeler do. Heidegger nowhere claims that we are experiencing 'context- META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IX (2) / 2017 650 free, self-sufficient substances with detachable properties-McDowell's world of facts, features, and data' when we engage with the world as present-athand, as Dreyfus (2007a, 364) suggests. Rather, he makes clear that presenceat-hand is grounded in readiness-to-hand. As he states, "readiness-to-hand is the way in which entities as they are 'in themselves' are defined ontologicocategorically" (Heidegger 1962, 101). Further, "when we merely stare at something (presence-at-hand), our just-having-it-before-us lies before us as a failure to understand it any more. This grasping which is free of the "as", is a privation of the kind of seeing in which one merely understands (readiness-tohand). It (presence-at-hand) is not more primordial than that kind of seeing (readiness-to-hand), but is derived from it" (Heidegger 1962, 190, brackets added). And Heidegger makes elsewhere plainly clear that presence-at-hand is this deprived form of merely looking at things. The clearest expression of this might be, 'theoretical behavior is just looking, without circumspection' (Heidegger 1962, 99, emphasis added). This means, presence-at-hand is a 'deficient mode of concern' (Heidegger 1962, 103)-in which something that was formerly ready-to-hand is only just present ('Nur-noch-vorhandensein eines Zuhandenen') (Heidegger 2006, 73). Here we can also see the second reason, why Heidegger would reject Dreyfus's and Wheeler's separation between both kinds of understanding. For Heidegger, the difference between readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand is not a division between conceptuality or representational thought on the one hand and sensorimotor or embodied understanding on the other hand. Heidegger nowhere claims that conceptual or representational understanding governs presence-at-hand. As we have seen above, Heidegger uses perceptual and agential vocabulary to describe how we encounter the world as present-at-hand. This makes further sense, if we consider the role of language in Heidegger's care structure in the form of discourse. The care structure, Heidegger's most basic ontological structure after temporality (Heidegger 1962, 329), is co-constituted by understanding, state-of-mind (affect), falling, and discourse (Heidegger 1962, 384-385). Understanding is characterized by its disclosing ability, which presents an object or a situation, together with affect, as mattering to an agent by showing up for which purpose something can be used (Heidegger 1962, 182). Discourse, which is the condition for speaking a language, is not conceived of as detached theoretical linguistic thinking, but as an existential structure that contributes to the structure of understanding and allows for its articulation (Heidegger 1962, 203-204). Discourse, as part of the care structure, is characteristic of both, readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand. Yet, in both cases it is a co-constitutive part of the care structure, but never a self-standing intellectualist device for judgment and representation, as both Dreyfus and Wheeler suggest. 5To explain the relationship between both kinds of understanding in terms of schemata has further explanatory advantages, even if we should only accept a loose relationship. For instance, if conceptual thought is governed by spatiotemporal schemata, we might be able to account for the grounding of demonstratives and the identification of spatiotemporal objects in perceptual judgments. Both these properties of thought relate to spatial and temporal Alexander A. Jeuk / Overcoming the Disunity of Understanding 651 properties of objects and schemata are structures that explain how we can relate to objects in space and time. REFERENCES Carman, T. 1999. 'The Body in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty'. Philosophical Topics 27(2): 205–226. Chemero, A. 2009. Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. Chemero, A. 2014. 'Synergies and Systematicity'. In The Architecture of Cognition: Rethinking Fodor and Pylyshyn's Systematicity Challenge, edited by P. Calvo and J. Symons, 353–370. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. Clark, A. and J. Toribio. 1994. 'Doing without Representing?' Synthese 101(3): 401–31. Dreyfus, H. 1991. Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. Dreyfus, H. 2007a. 'The Return of the Myth of the Mental'. Inquiry 50(4): 352–365. Dreyfus, H. 2007b. 'Why Heideggerian AI Failed and how Fixing it would Require Making it more Heideggerian'. Philosophical Psychology 20(2): 247–268. Dreyfus, H. 2013. 'The Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental'. In Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate, edited by J. K. Schear, 15–40. Abingdon: Routledge. Dreyfus, H. and C. Taylor. 2015. Retrieving Realism. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. Gallagher, S. 2014. 'Pragmatic Interventions into Enactive and Extended Conceptions of Cognition'. Philosophical Issues 24(1): 110–126. Hanna, R. 2005. 'Kant and Nonconceptual Content'. European Journal of Philosophy 13(2): 247–290. META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – IX (2) / 2017 652 Heidegger, M. 1962. Being and Time, translated and edited by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson New York: Harper Collins. Heidegger, M. 1990. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, translated by R. Taft. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Heidegger, M. 2006. Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag. Hurley, S. 1998. Consciousness in Action. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. Hutto, D. 2012. 'Exposing the Background: Deep and Local'. InKnowing without Thinking: Mind, Action, Cognition and the Phenomenon of the Background, edited by Z. Radman, 37–56. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Hutto, D. and E. Myin 2013. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. Kant, I. 1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated and edited by P. Guyer and A. W. Wood. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press. Kelly, S. 2002. 'Merleau-Ponty on the Body'. Ratio 15(4): 376– 391. Kiverstein, J. and E. Rietveld 2015. 'The Primacy of Skilled Intentionality: On Hutto & Satne's the Natural Origins of Content'. Philosophia 43(3): 701–721. van Mazijk, C. 2016. 'Kant and Husserl on the Contents of Perception'. The Southern Journal of Philosophy 54(2): 267– 287. McDowell, J. 1994. Mind and World. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. McDowell, J. 2007. 'What Myth?' Inquiry 50(4): 338–351. Merleau-Ponty, M. 2012. Phenomenology of Perception. Translated and edited by D. Landes. Abingdon: Routledge. Noë, A. 2004. Action in Perception. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. Noë, A. 2012. Varieties of Presence. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. Alexander A. Jeuk / Overcoming the Disunity of Understanding 653 O'Regan, K. and A. Noë 2001. 'A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness'. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24(5): 939–973. Ratcliffe, M. 2008. Feelings of Being: Phenomenology, Psychiatry and the Sense of Reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Sherover, C. 1971. Heidegger, Kant and Time. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Stanley, J. and J. Krakauer 2013. 'Motor Skill Depends on Knowledge of Facts'. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7. Stanley, J. and T. Williamson. 2016. 'Skill'. Nous DOI:10.1111(nous.12144. [Online first publication]. Thompson, E. 2007. Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press. Thompson, E. and M. Stapleton 2009. 'Making Sense of SenseMaking: Reflections on Enactive and Extended Mind Theories'. Topoi 28(1): 23–30. Wheeler, M. 2005. Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press. Wheeler, M. 2008. 'Cognition in Context: Phenomenology, Situated Robotics and the Frame Problem', International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16(3): 323–349. Alexander A. Jeuk: Ph.D., defended in February 2017, graduation in May 2017 at the University of Cincinnati. His research interests comprise Phenomenology, Kantianism, Enactivism and Embodied Cognition. Address: Alexander A. Jeuk University of Cincinnati Department of Philosophy PO BOX 210374 Cincinnati, OH 45221-0374 Email: [email protected]

Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics Volume 2 Issue 1 Volume 2, Issue 1 Article 6 2012 Nature and Grace and the Appearance of Insincerity. Silencing the Catholic Voice Gerard A. O'Shea John Paul II Institute of Marriage and Family Studies, Melbourne, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity ISSN: 1839-0366 COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA Copyright Regulations 1969 WARNING This material has been copied and communicated to you by or on behalf of the University of Notre Dame Australia pursuant to part VB of the Copyright Act 1969 (the Act). The material in this communication may be subject to copyright under the Act. Any further copying or communication of this material by you may be the subject of copyright protection under the Act. Do not remove this notice. This Article is brought to you by ResearchOnline@ND. It has been accepted for inclusion in Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics by an authorized administrator of ResearchOnline@ND. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Recommended Citation O'Shea, Gerard A. (2012) "Nature and Grace and the Appearance of Insincerity. Silencing the Catholic Voice," Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 6. Available at: http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol2/iss1/6 Nature and Grace and the Appearance of Insincerity. Silencing the Catholic Voice Abstract In moving into the Roman world, the first Christians encountered a secular culture whose social, political and cultural characteristics bore a striking resemblance to the contemporary period. Yet these Christians did not feel constrained to present only those aspects of their message that would be acceptable. For most of its history, the presentation of a Christian message in the "public square" has entailed both theological and philosophical perspectives. Today, Catholics seem "self-limited" by an unspoken demand that they argue solely from philosophical and scientific positions in public debates. This approach often fails to present a distinctively Christian viewpoint. As early as 1946, Henri de Lubac pointed out that this side-lining of the Christian view was not solely the result of secularist agitation. Since the sixteenth century, the generally accepted notion that human reality is composed of two separate dimensions – natural and a supernatural – has given the impression that one can speak of a discrete natural order which is unaffected by grace. While this approach still has its defenders, many Catholic intellectuals have pointed to its shortcomings, both theologically and philosophically. When Catholics confine themselves to naturalistic arguments, they deceive no one. Secularists – who argue from their own perspective of "belief " – are able to accuse their Catholic opponents of having a hidden agenda, and of lacking the courage of their convictions by concealing what really motivates them. Any movement away from this situation is likely to be met with derision. Nevertheless, while neither Christians nor Secularists should impose their political views on others, Catholics should feel free to mount the full range of their arguments in public and should reject the notion that they are bound by rules of engagement set by their intellectual opponents. This article is available in Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics: http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/ solidarity/vol2/iss1/6 Nature Or Grace And Appearance Of Insincerity: Silencing the Catholic Voice in Public Life. Gerard O'Shea Introduction Since the time of the "Great Commission", Christians have believed that it is their role to spread the message of Christ. 1 From the vantage point of 2000 years, the task that faced the first disciples can seem very romantic – almost easy compared with the task today. Consider some of these characteristics: 1. A globalised culture where easy communications and relative peace contribute to general prosperity and a tendency to rely on human efforts to meet every challenge; 2 2. A society imbued with a secular vision of happiness acknowledging no need for traditional religions, but with a striking openness to New Age cults; 3. An intellectual class that denigrates Christian revelation as lacking in credibility and encourages people to "think for themselves" – along the lines outlined by the informed intelligentsia; 4. A cult of celebrity and personality – where sports stars and actors become heroes and their exploits capture the popular imagination; 5. A falling birth rate flowing from a devaluing of life itself. This may appear to be a gloomy picture of contemporary society, but not so. It is a description of the Roman Empire – the world into which the apostles were sent to proclaim the message of Christ. The points of similarity are startling. Contemporary engagement with our culture, however, tends to take a different approach. It is framed in language designed to accentuate the "reasonableness" of the message without drawing too much attention to any specifically Christian content. This is not entirely new; St Paul did the same in addressing the Athenian Areopagus. 3 What stands out in that Biblical account, however, is Paul's lack of success in this attempt to meet people on their own terms. Since the Enlightenment, however, Catholics have found themselves increasingly bound by a set of tightening intellectual parameters. Benedict Ashley has pointed out that this partly derives from the empirical presuppositions of many intellectuals who argue in the public forum. "[N]ot only are they sceptical about transcendental realities, as are all Humanists since Kant, but they attempt to show that 'God-language' is 'meaningless' thus rendering discussions with Christians and other theists impossible." 4 This position puts pressure on Catholics – should they engage in no dialogue at all, or should they meet such intellectuals on their own terms? In accepting this implied secular imperative, Catholics have essentially 1 Matthew, 28:18-20 2 Some have argued that the large number of slaves within the Roman Empire and the constant wars are hardly an indication of peace. In response, one only has to look at the state of chaos that pertained after the Empire fell – the widespread local warfare and general lawlessness – to understand the value placed by this society. The "peace" within the Roman Empire (as well as our own) should be seen principally in terms of its capacity to establish "the rule of law". 3 See: Acts of the Apostles, 17:16-34. 4 See: Benedict Ashley, Theologies of the Body. Humanist and Christian. Baintree, Massachuesetts, 1985, p.67 1 O'Shea: Silencing The Catholic Voice Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2012 agreed to argue from a position that they do not believe. It is true that rational argument is a necessary component of debate, but it can never stand coherently by itself. In the words of John Paul II: "Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the contemplation of truth". 5 The implicit insincerity of this stance is unlikely to appeal to uncommitted bystanders, particularly in contemporary society, which puts a high value on "passion" and authenticity. This has been well made in Michael Jensen's recent book Martyrdom and Identity. 6 In simplifying his argument for a wider audience, Jensen makes a series of compelling observations, including the experience of former British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, who was "told by his spin doctor, Alastair Campbell, when he was about to talk about his Christian faith in an interview with Vanity Fair, that 'we don't do God'." 7 The Problem of Nature and Grace: A Clash of Ideas It can seem puzzling at first to understand why Catholics would agree to argue from such a position. Indeed, for some years, many Catholic scholars have seen this approach as problematic and have claimed that it comes from a particular understanding of the way in which the nature and grace relationship has been presented in recent centuries – a view that sees the two as self-contained separated entities. Among others, Cardinal Walter Kasper insists that an integrated view of nature and grace must underpin the idea of a "civilisation of love" promoted by Pope John Paul II: [A] civilisation of love is the model of a culture renewed by Christianity... a model that follows from the relation between nature and grace ... In Jesus Christ, the new Adam, God revealed to man the final meaning of his human existence. 8 Perhaps the most constant contemporary critic of the possibility of two separated orders of nature and grace has been David Schindler.... Whenever the relationship between nature and grace is severed..., then the whole of worldly being falls under the domination of 'knowledge,' and the springs and forces of love immanent in the world are overpowered and finally suffocated by science, technology and cybernetics. The result is ... a world in which power and the profit margin are the sole criteria, where the disinterested, the useless, the purposeless is despised, persecuted and in the end exterminated – a world in which art itself is forced to wear the mask and features of technique. 9 Schindler believes that when nature and grace are held to be separate realities, the message of the Church is itself divided and gives needless credence to the ideology of Secularism.... A true understanding of and challenge to the secularisation of the modern world can begin only when one understands that nature is given as ordered from its depths to religious form – to the form, that is, which, concretely, is the love of the trinitarian God revealed in Jesus Christ, and received into Mary and the Church by the Holy Spirit. ... The claim that would 5 Fides et Ratio, 1998, Preamble. 6 Michael P Jensen, Martyrdom and Identity. The Self On Trial, T.T. Clark International, London, 2010 7 Michael P Jensen, 'Why not use religious arguments in public debates?', ABC Religion and Ethics, Accessed: http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2011/03/15/3164427.htm [10/10/2011] 8 Walter Kasper, 'Nature, Grace and Culture: On the Meaning of Secularisation' in David L. Schindler (Ed), Catholicism and Secularisation in America, OSV, Huntington, Indiana, 1990, p. 49 9 Hans Urs von Balthasar,. Love Alone: The Way of Revelation, Burns Oates, London, 1968, pp. 114-15. 2 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 2 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 6 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol2/iss1/6 make nature neutral of religious form merely succeeds thereby in giving nature the religious form of Liberalism. 10 Schindler claims that the practical application of this would not be to provide an opportunity for evangelisation, but rather the entrenching of the Liberal position of a social justice divorced from any religious input. He does not claim that Catholics should impose some kind of "Theo-centric state" by force of argument. He acknowledges the need for Christians to respect the freedom of those who hold a different view. What he does argue for, however, is the right of Catholics to express their view as Catholics. 11 History of the Nature and Grace Question The manner in which this theory of two separate entities of nature and grace arose and then dominated is multi-faceted and complex, but it is claimed that the most significant developments in this area occurred during the period following the Reformation. Catholic theologians of the time were being challenged to find a middle ground between two claims coming from opposite ends of the spectrum: Calvinist anthropology denigrated human nature, and the Baianist heresy made extravagant claims for it. A good summary of the Calvinist view can be found in the early writings of Karl Barth: man as he lives in historical reality, in independence from God and in his reflection on himself, does not live in this, his true nature; that which is unnatural became his nature. To speak of continuity and fulfilment would actually be to speak of man's final selfdestructive closing off, to canonise his damnation rather than lead him to salvation. Grace, then, cannot be continuation or fulfilment of man, but can only mean discontinuity, paradox, crucifixion. 12 In responding to challenges of this kind, Michael De Bay (1513-1539), a Louvain professor of theology, asserted that humanity, in the state of innocence, had no need of grace. 13 Grace was not to be seen as divine assistance flowing from the goodness of God; it was simply humanity's right. In De Bay's view, human beings in the state of innocence could attain their end in God by purely natural merit. Thereby, the supernatural was reduced to the natural; "grace" was simply part of human make up and not really a gift at all. This failure to acknowledge the gratuity of grace was to provoke a predictable reaction among Catholic authorities and his views were condemned by Pope Pius V in 1567. The Post-Reformation and Baroque Period In trying to steer a path between Calvinism and Baianism, theologians articulating the relationship of nature and grace in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries developed a solution which came to be known as the Duplex Ordo thesis. According to this account, there were two different ends for humanity – a natural and a supernatural. The natural human level was good, but inadequate for achieving union with God and final happiness. The supernatural gift of grace needed to be added to this. Hence, according to this 10 David L Schindler, 'Introduction: Grace and the Form of Nature and Culture' in Schindler, op. cit., p.24 11 See: Ibid, p.22 12 Joseph Ratzinger, 'Gratia praesupponit nautram: The Meaning and Limits of a Scholastic axiom', Dogma und Verkundigung, p. 4 13 See: Henri de Lubac trans. Lancelot Sheppard, Augustinianism and Modern Theology, Geoffrey Chapman, London, 1969, pp.1-14 3 O'Shea: Silencing The Catholic Voice Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2012 view, every human being was created first of all for a natural human happiness to which could later be added a second level of happiness –supernatural beatitude – something totally beyond natural human endowment and accessible only by means of grace. This was a neat solution when viewed in terms of the challenges faced. On the one hand, it did not condemn human nature as totally depraved and unredeemable; on the other, it allowed grace to be seen as a superabundant gift of God. In proposing this thesis, theologians appealed to the works of Cardinal Cajetan (1469-1534), a well regarded sixteenth century Thomist, who had defended Catholic doctrine against Luther. Cajetan asserted that a Duplex Ordo theory was taught by St Thomas Aquinas, with antecedents in Aristotelian philosophy. In explaining this thesis, Cajetan needed to raise the question of whether it was possible for human beings to have a natural desire for God. His answer was no. (Herein lies the root of the Catholic acceptance of arguing only from natural premises when dealing with "natural" human beings.) Cajetan used the definition of nature drawn from Aristotle's physics to maintain that human nature was a reality closed in on itself, having its own intrinsic powers, desires and goals. 14 In other words, human nature was not necessarily made for union with God. Incremental developments in this view can be traced through the works of Ruard Tapper (1487-1559) to Luis de Molina (1535-1600) who proposed another key concept of the Duplex Ordo, the idea of a finis naturalis – a natural end for a natural order. 15 One further step remained, and this was taken by the Jesuit theologian, Franciscon Suarez (1548-1617). Starting from Molina's idea of natural beatitude for a natural order, Suarez asked: ... "Why should not the state of pure nature be prolonged in this way into a natural order, fitted to find its fulfilment in a natural end?" 16 Suarez, then, proposed a theory of "pure nature" – a human nature that was completely devoid of any natural orientation to the grace of God, thus taking Cajetan's speculations into the mainstream of theology. His account of "extrinsic grace" was developed into a systematic account in two books De ultimo fine hominis (1592) and De Gratia (published posthumously in 1619). The final shape given by Suarez to the Duplex Ordo thesis was to remain more or less constant for centuries. The influence of Suarez in his own time and for centuries after is difficult to overstate. As an indication, de Lubac quotes the great French commentator, Bousset: "Suarez, in whom can be heard all the others..." 17 His views became widespread – evident in the works of such luminaries as John of St Thomas, the Salamanca Carmelites, Peter of Godoy, Lessius and Vasques. Even into the twentieth century, Suarez's version of the Duplex Ordo had its defenders – most notably, Charles Boyer and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. Setting Aside the Tradition While it is possible to follow the logic of the Duplex Ordo in terms of the historical climate in which it developed, there are some aspects of its rise that are puzzling. It seems that the adoption of the idea of "pure nature" as describe by Suarez, contradicted the traditional way in which the relationship of nature and grace had been explained. Take for example St 14 See: Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas. Versions of Thomism, Blackwell, Oxford, 2002, p.136; Joseph Ratzinger, 'Gratia praesupponit nautram: The Meaning and Limits of a Scholastic axiom', Dogma und Verkundigung, p. 4 14 See: de Lubac, op. cit. 14 See: Kerr, op. cit., p.136 15 See: de Lubac, op. cit., p.253 16 Ibid., p.253 17 Quoted in Ibid., p.181 4 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 2 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 6 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol2/iss1/6 Augustine's cor inquietum: "for you have made us for yourself and our heart is restless until it rests in you." 18 Augustine himself had stood within the consensus of the Fathers on this point, a consensus which can be articulated in three parts. 19 Firstly, man was created in the image of God, and continues to bear this divine image – human nature was damaged by the Fall, but not corrupted beyond redemption. Second, there is a call to a divine destiny. In the words of St Irenaeus, "He became what we are to empower us to become what He is." 20 Ireaeus also proposed the distinction between image and likeness which most of the Fathers accepted. "Image" was to be seen as the enduring rational nature, while "Likeness" described the presence of divine grace. Thirdly, "divinization" was brought about by adoption into the family of God through identification with Christ. There was no place in this consensus for any type of human being who was not created for a divine end. Nevertheless, Augustine's own historical circumstances provided some difficulties for the way in which he explained the nature and grace relationship. Much of his writing was produced in response to the Pelagian heresy – the view that human beings were capable of imitating the example of Christ by their own moral effort and did not stand in need of additional grace. By contrast, Augustine insisted that not one spark of what was necessary for eternal life remained in man. This insistence on the inadequacy of human nature fed into a denigration of this nature as "the sinful flesh". 21 Perhaps there were good reasons pertaining at this time that would have caused devout Christians to try to avoid emphasising the goodness of creation. G.K. Chesterton makes this case in his biography of St Francis, arguing that it took centuries for the European imagination to be cleansed of the associations which "nature" held for them: It is no metaphor to say that these people needed a new heaven and a new earth; for they had really defiled their own earth and even their own heaven. How could their case be met by looking at the sky, when erotic legends were scrawled in stars across it? ... It was no good telling such people to have a natural religion full of stars and flowers; there was not a flower or even a star that had not been stained. They had to go into the desert where they could find no flowers or even into the caverns where they could see no stars. Into that desert and that cavern the highest human intellect entered for four centuries; and it was the very wisest thing it could do. 22 Only when this purge of the religious imagination was complete, claimed Chesterton, could a St Francis of Assisi speak once again of fire and water, sun, moon and stars as the brothers and sisters of a saint. 23 Only against this background could the Scholastics now renew their exploration of "nature". Invoking St Thomas Aquinas In dealing with the Augustinian legacy, theologians of the Scholastic period needed to reconcile the view that human nature bore the continuing image of God with a widespread popular denigration of that nature as "the sinful flesh". It was Philip the Chancellor 18 St Augustine, Confessions, Penguin Books, Hammond, Middlesex, 1963, Book 1,1 19 This view was convincingly argued by the German scholar, Matthias Scheeben. See: Matthias J. Scheeben trans. Cyril Vollert, Nature and Grace, B. Herder, St Louis, 1954, p.97 20 Against the Heresies pp. 3, 18, 7; 4, 38, 4-9. 21 The language of "sinful flesh" comes originally from St Paul. See: Romans, chapters 7 and 8. 22 G.K Chesterton, St Francis of Assisi, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1924, pp.31-2 23 Ibid, p.37 5 O'Shea: Silencing The Catholic Voice Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2012 (University of Paris, 1218-1230) who began using the terms natural and supernatural to make this distinction. This approach had significant advantages. It ended the confusion between sinfulness and finitude and also the idea that grace was the opposite of sin. Perhaps more importantly, it now became possible to distinguish mentally between the natural and supernatural dimensions of human beings, which in fact were united in the same human person. St Thomas Aquinas further clarified this usage by arguing that supernatural grace humanizes by divinizing. In arguing this point, he taught that... It is necessary that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural power of the created intellect does not enable it to see the essence of God... it is necessary that the power of understanding should be added by divine grace. 24 On first appearances, Aquinas can seem to be arguing for separated orders of nature and grace – the mental distinction between natural and supernatural appears to be an actual separation of two self-contained realities. Passages such as this one, taken in isolation, appear to support the Duplex Ordo thesis. Yet this was not Aquinas's actual position. While he acknowledged that there were aspects of human happiness that were attainable through the powers of human nature, these could never truly satisfy human beings, who were actually created for God: "Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Ps 102... Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness." 25 Expressions of this view are encountered throughout the Summa Theologica. 26 This example is indicative: Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers ... But every knowledge that is according to the mode of created substance, falls short of the vision of the Divine Essence ... Consequently, neither man nor any creature, can attain final happiness by his natural powers. 27 Aquinas did not see nature and super-nature as two separated realities; they were meant to be seen in dynamic relationship. He viewed the severance of human nature from the supernatural as a disorder. Eventually, contrary to Thomas's intentions but nevertheless in his name, Baroque Scholasticism would reify and classify natural and supernatural activities into a twostory world of nature and grace. Duality of Approaches in Catholic Life The Duplex Ordo thesis gradually led to a remarkable duality in Catholic life. While on a philosophical level, nature and grace were explained as completely separate realities, in the devotional and theological life of the Church continued to present it differently: human beings were made for God. Examples taken from the lives of the saints during this period can be multiplied, but some highly significant examples will serve to illustrate the point. St Francis de Sales, in his Introduction to the Devout Life continued to echo Augustine: "Thou hast made me, O Lord, for Thyself, to the end that I may eternally enjoy the immensity of Thy glory." 28 St Alphonsus Ligouri likewise held that humanity's true destiny lay with God, 24 Summa Theologica, 1, q.12, a. 5. 25 ST 1-2, q. 2, a. 8. 26 For example, see ST 1, q. 103, a. 5; 1-2, q. 1, a. 7; q. 9, a. 1; q. 13, a.2; q. 91, a.2 27 ST 1-2, q. 5, a. 5 28 St Francis de Sales trans. John K. Ryan, Introduction To The Devout Life, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1953, p.24 6 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 2 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 6 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol2/iss1/6 as expressed in The Great Means of Salvation and Perfection: "If then, God loves all men, He must in consequence will that all should obtain eternal salvation, which is the one and sovereign good of man, seeing that it is the one end for which he was created." 29 The Progress of the Duplex Ordo Thesis Despite the duality of approaches, historical circumstances were to ensure that the Duplex Ordo thesis would continue to exert a powerful hold among Catholic scholars and St Thomas's carefully crafted synthesis of science, philosophy and theology was set aside. The Duplex Ordo required a different methodology – a separation into natural and supernatural arguments, reflecting the status of the audience. Thereafter, Catholic intellectuals accepted a de facto compartmentalisation of the Christian message. Louis Dupré describes this in his book Passage to Modernity. He refers to the "disintegration of the [Thomist] synthesis into an order of pure nature separate from one of grace..." 30 According to Dupré, this became evident from the middle of the Baroque period: Around 1660, the last comprehensive integration of our culture began to break down into the fragmentary syntheses of a mechanist world picture, a classicist aesthetics and a theological scholasticism. Soon a flat utilitarianism would be ready to serve as midwife to the birth of what Neitzche called modern man's small soul. 31 Why does Dupré identify this moment of history as the watershed? It was at this time that an elite intellectual movement which had its origins in Renaissance Humanism was separating itself from Christianity and preparing the way for the Enlightenment. Benedict Ashley agreed, and he further claimed that this process received its major impetus from the intolerance and persecution of the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Foremost among these was the "Thirty Years War" (1618-1648), which took place in northern and central Europe. 32 This conflict resulted in the absurd settlement summarised in the formula "caius regio, eius religio" – one's religion would be determined by the local ruler. No less ferocious was the Catholic-Calvinist conflict in France, which resulted in the revocation of the Edict of Tolerance in 1685. The spectacle of a religion whose intellectual and spiritual teachings could be subverted by politics and judicially sanctioned violence undermined the credibility of Christianity with many serious thinkers. Much of their experience of Christianity was coloured by the bitter wars that had been fought in its name. In such circumstances, a secular kind of Humanism could be presented as an attractive alternative. The "alliance of throne and altar" had been so complete that in the popular mind the two were seen as inseparable and Christianity could be portrayed as the major contributing cause of the excesses of the Wars of Religion, goading the secular authorities to acts of barbarity in pursuit of political goals. Apologists for the new form of Humanism claimed to retain what was best in Christianity (justice, mercy, compassion etc.) while detaching themselves from the demands of an obscurantist faith whose doctrines resisted testing by the principles of human reason. In this context the Duplex Ordo style of argumentation became very useful. 29 St Alphonsus Ligouri trans. Eugene Grimm, The Great Means of Salvation and Perfection. The Ascetical Works. Volume III, The Redemptorist Fathers, Brooklyn, 1927, p. 88 30 Louis Dupré, Passage to Modernity, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1993, p.174 31 Ibid., p.248 32 Ashley, op. cit., pp.51-90 7 O'Shea: Silencing The Catholic Voice Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2012 Negative movements such as this one, however, are usually inadequate to sustain an intellectual movement beyond a single generation. Another positive factor also worked in its favour the rise of science. It could now be argued that one need not invoke the mysterious hand of God to explain many natural phenomena. As science began to offer plausible accounts for what had previously defied explanation, God became less "necessary". It now seemed possible that the world would eventually yield up all its secrets and there would be no mysteries left to describe. At most, God might be seen as a remote master craftsman who set the world in motion, and left it to run – Deism. Philosophy also kept pace with the demand for new explanations, and figures such as Thomas Hobbes and David Hume offered ways in which it could be undergirded. Under these circumstances, the appeal of the Duplex Ordo becomes obvious. In the context of engagement in intellectual argumentation in the public square, God could be bracketed out of the equation, and then re-introduced for the edification of believers only. This would allow Catholic intellectuals to side-step the charge of obscurantism and make their mark in intellectual debate. Nineteenth Century Examples The immediate impact of the Enlightenment on European Catholic cultural life was "muted" at first. It was not until the French Revolution and the Napoléonic Wars that Enlightenment principles began to be generally applied. The role of the Catholic Church was increasing confined to the religious domain despite the vigorous resistance of the Papacy. In England and Ireland, however, Catholics experienced the Enlightenment differently. Ironically, the accelerated spread of Liberal principles led to a lessening of official Catholic persecution in the British Empire so that by 1829, the Catholic Emancipation Act gave civil rights to Catholics for the first time since the Reformation. It would be simplistic to claim that Liberal principles alone stood behind nineteenth century Catholic emancipation – the ongoing threat of insurrection in Ireland also weighed on British consciousness. Nevertheless, a climate of Liberal tolerance for the views of others, whatever one's personal dislike for them, certainly took hold in the English mind-set. Irish Catholics learned to argue for their rights without reference to religious convictions, not only in Ireland but throughout the Empire. The historian, Patrick O'Farrell, provides evidence of this in Australia throughout the nineteenth century. He notes that by 1825, Father Therry, the Catholic chaplain, had learned not to plead for recognition of Catholic rights on religious principles, but on Liberal ones, calling the Governor "a friend to religious and civil liberty, inimical to tyranny, and oppression." 33 The willingness of Irish Catholics to take this line scandalised other Christians in Australia. From 1836, the Anglican Bishop Broughton undertook a public campaign against Catholicism. While much of this included the standard predictable material – that Catholicism was idolatrous, inquisitorial and so forth – it was also condemned as "socially dangerous in that it was willing, for its own designs, to ally itself with the evil forces of Liberalism." 34 So entrenched was this strategy within Catholicism that by the 1870s, when secularists succeeded in ending support for religious schools, Bishop Patrick Moran, viewing the Australian educational situation from Ireland "found it difficult to accept that such religious discrimination was possible in a liberal and enlightened nineteenth century". 35 33 Patrick O'Farrell, The Catholic Church and Community in Australia. A History, Thomas Nelson, Melbourne, 1977, p. 8 34 Ibid., pp. 49-50 35 Ibid., p. 240 8 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 2 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 6 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol2/iss1/6 Initially, under the leadership of Archbishop Roger Vaughan, the Church in Australia confronted the secularisation of education with reference to Religious principles: We, the Archbishop and Bishops of this colony, with all the weight of our authority, condemn the principle of secularist education, and those schools which are founded on that principle... they contravene the first principles of the Christian religion... they are seed-pots of future immorality, infidelity, and lawlessness, being calculated to debase the standard of human excellence, and to corrupt the political, social and individual life of future citizens. 36 The arrival of Archbishop (later Cardinal) Moran to take up the see of Sydney in 1884 saw a change in policy. Moran believed that it was essential to pursue government funding for Catholic schools, and he was prepared to compromise. Moran conceded the secular assumptions of Australian politics and argued from a Duplex Ordo perspective. He acknowledged that if government assistance were provided for Catholic schools, he should not insist on support for the religious education provided within them. Instead, he sought government funding on the basis that his schools would teach what the state taught. Under Moran's direction, Catholic schools adopted the same syllabus as that of the state schools – plus religion. He invited inspection of Catholic schools by state education officials. Similar instances can be cited from English speaking jurisdictions around the world. 37 Interestingly, Moran failed to convince the governmental authorities with this argument. The Neo-Thomist Revival By the mid-nineteenth century, philosophical study within the Catholic community needed renewal. The dislocating effects of the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars and newly formulated Subjectivist and Secularist challenges to Christian faith had presented significant difficulties for the Church. A serious attempt at restoration was launched in 1879, with the publication of Pope Leo XIII's Aeterni Patris. The philosophy of Thomas Aquinas was declared the "perennial philosophy" of the Catholic Church and this was the stimulus for launching the Neo-Scholastic project. But this did not mean that there was a restoration of the Thomist synthesis of faith and reason. Regarding the nature and grace relationship, it was the Thomism of Suárez that was revived, and given a the opportunity of extending itself even deeper into Catholic life. This so called Leonine Thomism became part of the intellectual training of the Catholic priesthood until the mid-1960's. De Lubac and Surnaturel Eventually, challenges to the Duplex Ordo began to surface. In 1946, a French Jesuit, Henri de Lubac, articulated a full-scale attack in his seminal article, Surnaturel. He developed the theme further in three later works. Augustinianism and Modern Theology and The Mystery of the Supernatural were both published in 1967 followed by A Brief Catechesis on Nature and Grace, in 1981. De Lubac insisted that the current state of alienation between religion and culture could not be attributed solely to the work of rationalist philosophers and enemies of the Church. A large part of the blame must be shared by theologians and philosophers. De 36 Ibid., p. 184. 37 See, for example, the proposals in the Archdiocese of St Paul-Minneapolis, where Archbishop John Ireland (1838-1918), advocated a very similar strategy to that of Moran,. The state was invited to rent existing Catholic schools and also pay staff salaries for the teaching of secular subjects during class time, while religious instruction would be offered on the property after hours. 9 O'Shea: Silencing The Catholic Voice Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2012 Lubac argued that the Duplex Ordo thesis, particularly the theory of pure nature was undermining the Christian message. He observed that it was not traditional and had never received universal acceptance: "These theories, unknown to both the Greek and the Latin Fathers ... were never universally accepted in the West, and were unknown or denied both by the majority of Orthodox theologians and the Christian philosophers of modern Russia." 38 The iron-clad separation attending the study of philosophy and theology, the secularisation of politics, empirical sciences – all reflected the notion of separation between nature and grace. Theology, formerly queen of the sciences, was relegated to splendid isolation. As a consequence, religion was separated from the mainstream of human cultural life. The emphasis in any description of human nature was based on what it could be achieved from its own resources and de Lubac saw this as simply Humanism without proper reference to God. The Necessary Distinction De Lubac did not dispute the fact that the sacred and the profane play different roles; but this distinction is a necessary mental abstraction – an acknowledgement that human thought is incapable of God-like apprehension of everything simultaneously, and must proceed by putting together different aspects of reality by analysis and synthesis. It was not meant to be a description of that actual state of human existence. What de Lubac had to explain was how the gifts of nature and grace could be intrinsically related if they were two separate gifts – otherwise he could be accused of Baianism. To summarise de Lubac's position, we could say that if we insist that grace is merely given to complete an already existing "pure nature", we give the impression that grace is an added optional extra. Rather, the intention of God in creating human nature is to communicate His divine life to beings other than Himself. The gift of sanctifying grace is incomparable. Human nature exists to receive grace – grace does not exist for the sake of human nature; the purpose of nature is to receive grace, even though nature can still function in some attenuated form without it. At first, de Lubac's views were furiously resisted by Neo-Scholastic philosophers, many of whom claimed that they were condemned in Pius XII's 1950 encylical, Humani Generis which had stated: "Others destroy the gratuity of the supernatural order, since God, they say, cannot create intellectual beings without ordering and calling them to the beatific vision." 39 After this, de Lubac was silenced by his Jesuit superiors for ten years. When he returned to his theme of nature and grace in The Mystery of the Supernatural in 1967, de Lubac went out of his way to show deference to Humani Generis: "We may still continue to say... that God could, if he had wished, not have created us at all; and then, in addition, that he need not have called this being which He has given us to see him." 40 The argument around de Lubac's views continues to this day and this can be followed in the works of those who favour his position (David Schindler, Louis Dupré, John Milbank and Nicholas Healey) or those who contest it (Lawrence Feingold, Stephen Long). 41 The contrary 38 Henri De Lubac trans. Bro. Richard Arnandez, F.S.C., A Brief Catechesis on Nature and Grace, Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 1984, pp.24-25. 39 Humani Generis, 1950, para. 26 40 Henri de Lubac trans. Rosemary Sheed, The Mystery of the Supernatural, Geoffrey Chapman, London, 1967, p. 104 41 See: Louis Dupré, op. cit.; Lawrence Feingold, The Natural Desire to See God According to St Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters, Apollinare Studi, Rome, 2001; Nicholas J. Healy, 'Henri de Lubac on Nature and Grace: A Note on Some Recent Contributions to the Debate', Communio, Vol.35, Number 4, 2008, pp.535-564; Stephen A. Long,, 'On the Loss and the Recovery of Nature as a Theonomic Principle: Reflections of the Nature and Grace Controversy', Nova et Vetera, Vol.5, 2007, pp.133-83; John Milbank, The Suspended Middle. Henri 10 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 2 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 6 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol2/iss1/6 argument of contemporary Neo-Scholastics is competently argued on a number of levels and continues to make strong claims for a Duplex Ordo thesis. Nicholas Healey has proposed these key differences between de Lubac's position and that of the contemporary NeoScholastics ... Both sides acknowledge that the beatitude proper to human nature is "twofold," natural and supernatural. De Lubac, of course, stresses the incompleteness or penultimate character of "natural felicity," whereas his interlocutors (Long in particular) emphasize that the "natural end" is truly a final end in its own order, though it is not, they acknowledge, a perfect end. Finally, both sides agree that the supreme ultimate end of human nature-the only end that fully perfects and fulfils human nature in every respect- is the vision of God. 42 In Feingold's own words, "It is ultimately contradictory to suppose that our nature itself- without the addition of a supernatural principle-could be intrinsically determined by a supernatural finality, or have a supernatural finality inscribed upon it." 43 Stephen Long criticises de Lubac for what he calls "a unilateral stress upon certain aspects of St. Thomas's teaching about the natural desire for God led de Lubac to deny the existence of a proportionate natural end as opposed to the supernatural finis ultimus." 44 Healey sums up the position of those who follow de Lubac thus: "Christ reveals the nature of nature as receptive readiness for a surpassing gift. By including a human nature within his Person and mission, Christ reveals the deepest truth of nature's desire and nature's capacity to mediate God's love." 45 But whatever the force of argument brought to bear by either side, the Catholic Church in its magisterial documents has now accepted de Lubac's principal positions – that human beings are made for God, and they have a natural yearning for this destiny; it is not added later as an optional extra. These views have been expressed in Veritatis Splendor, Evangelium Vitae and the Catechism. 46 The most explicit statement comes from the Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church: The likeness with God shows that the essence and existence of man are constitutively related to God in the most profound manner. This is a relationship that exists in itself, it is therefore not something that comes afterwards and is not added from the outside. The whole of man's life is a quest and a search for God. This relationship with God can be ignored or even forgotten or dismissed, but it can never be eliminated.... The human being is a personal being created by God to be in relationship with him; man finds life and selfexpression only in relationship, and tends naturally to God. 47 Cardinal Ratzinger also was (and remains) a critic of the Neo-Scholastic position, stating that he is of the opinion that "Neo-Scholastic rationalism failed which, with reason totally independent from the faith, tried to reconstruct the "pre-ambula fidei" with pure rational de Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatural, William B. Eerdmans, Cambridge, UK, 2005; David L. Schindler ed., Catholicism and Secularisation in America, OSV, Huntington, Indiana, 1990 42 Nicholas Healey, Ibid., p.551 43 Lawrence Feingold, op. cit., p.526 44 Steven A. Long, op. cit., p.135 45 Healey, op. cit. p.564. 46 See: Veritatis Splendor, 1; Evangelium Vitae, 35; Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1993, 356, 358. 47 Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church, 2004, 109 11 O'Shea: Silencing The Catholic Voice Published by ResearchOnline@ND, 2012 certainty. The attempts that presume to do the same will have the same result." 48 In 2010, as Pope Benedict XVI, he became quite explicit about this in an address to the leaders of British society in Westminster Hall: This is why I would suggest that the world of reason and the world of faith the world of secular rationality and the world of religious belief need one another and should not be afraid to enter into a profound and ongoing dialogue, for the good of our civilisation. 49 Witnessing to the Culture Without Forcing Its Hand Yet there persists in the public mind a view of Catholic teaching that bears little resemblance to the Church's actual teaching. If de Lubac is correct, this is at least partially caused by an over-dependence on "natural" arguments in the public forum. The motive for this may be unimpeachable, resting on both the Duplex Ordo theory and a desire to avoid sectarian abuse. The strategy, however, has failed and there is no compelling reason to persist with it simply because the alternative may not be well received by a powerful segment of the audience. It is not "sectarian" to express a point of view from a Religious perspective and allow others to make their own judgements about it. On the contrary, "secular sectarianism" seems to be imposed on Catholics who engage in public debate. Catholics involved in intellectual debate need to recognise that if they continue to present only the rational/ philosophical side of their arguments in public, they also run the risk of being caricatured as "insincere". While it may be expedient when putting a point of view to government authorities to emphasise the rationality of the presentation, it must be remembered that others are watching too. To quote Michael Jensen, "in public debate, victory isn't everything." 50 In the current circumstances, the only acquaintance that many people have with the Church's teaching comes through tuning into the public forum. The argument being mounted may be lost, but the passionate and sincere presentation of the truth may still have a wide effect on others who are following it. Perhaps this might best be viewed through another lens. What might have happened if Jesus himself had adopted a Duplex Ordo strategy? Would his mission have been more effective if he had directed the bulk of his teaching to the Roman authorities and tried to convince them of the reasonableness of his vision for society? Probably not; let us not forget that Christ himself lost his judicial case before Pontius Pilate. The Duplex Ordo has largely failed to win converts. Could it be that philosophical arguments fail to touch the human heart at its deepest level of yearning – at that point of "restlessness" so eloquently articulated by St Augustine; the part that desires to meet its God? 51 It is undeniable that a degree of caution must be exercised in the public forum. Some types of direct political action can give the impression that the Catholic Church is attempting to impose its will by force and this will be counterproductive. It is individual human beings who must be persuaded and it is inappropriate to impose religious practice without consent – a mistake made too often in the past by those seeking to subvert the Christian message for 48 Joseph. Ratzinger, 'Relativism: The Central Problem For Faith Today', Address to the Doctrinal Commissions of the Bishops' Conferences of Latin America, May 1996 49 Benedict XVI, 'Meeting With The Representatives Of British Society, Including The Diplomatic Corps, Politicians, Academics And Business Leaders', Westminster Hall City of Westminster Friday, 17 September 2010, Accessed: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2010/september/documents/hf_benxvi_spe_20100917_societa-civile_en.html [21st October, 2011] 50 Michael P. Jensen,, 'Why not use religious arguments in public debates?', ABC Religion and Ethics Accessed: http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2011/03/15/3164427.htm [10th October, 2011] 51 "You have made us for yourself O Lord, and our hearts are restless until they rest in you." St Augustine, Confessions 1,1,1: PL 32, pp.659-661 12 Solidarity: The Journal of Catholic Social Thought and Secular Ethics, Vol. 2 [2012], Iss. 1, Art. 6 http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/solidarity/vol2/iss1/6 political purposes. Nevertheless, a society which actually discriminates against a politician solely on the basis of holding Catholic views can hardly be considered non-discriminatory either. Conclusion There can be little doubt that any change in current style of argument in the public forum will be met with resistance from many who do not share the same convictions. Yet this situation is artificial, since the absence of religious belief is itself a "belief system". It is not possible at this point to begin an exhaustive study of alternate models of argumentation which proceed from an integrated understanding of nature and grace, but it has been present throughout history. For example, one can point to the method of Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologica – a work in which the best of contemporary philosophical and scientific knowledge was harmonised with revealed doctrines. Likewise, the great Italian educator, Maria Montessori had no difficulty in articulating a highly respected theory of education in which the religious dimension was accorded an honoured place. Perhaps the most prominent exponent of this approach in the contemporary world, however, has been Pope Benedict XVI. As Austen Invereigh has observed of the Pope's Westminster Hall speech: This fruitful exchange which is the direct opposite, of course, of the secularist ambition of excluding or privatising faith as an individual matter of personal belief is the best way, the only way, of overcoming the temptations to sectarianism and fundamentalism, whether of religion or of political creeds; and it is the foundation of authentic pluralism. 52 The challenge remains, however, to encourage Catholic intellectuals to present integrated arguments for their positions, drawing on both nature and grace. Until the full set of reasons for Christian belief is articulated, those listening can rightly claim to be puzzled by the "missing pieces" and perhaps dismissive of Christians who are arguing in a way that so lacks passion and conviction that they are not even willing to tell their whole story. 52 Austen Ivereigh, 'Catholic Humanism Is Superior To Today's Exhausted Secularism.', ABC Religion and Ethics, Accessed: http://www.abc.net.au/religion/articles/2011/10/21/3344756.htm [ 21 st October, 2011] 13 O'Shea: Silencing The Catholic Voice Published by ResearchOnline@ND,

Draft for Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered, edited by C. Kyriacou and K. Wallbridge. Routledge. Skepticism, Fallibilism, and Rational Evaluation Michael Hannon University of Nottingham 1 Introduction According to many historical philosophical figures, knowledge must be based on infallible foundations. These foundations have been characterized in different ways; e.g., as "cognitive impressions" by the ancient Stoics, as "clear and distinct perceptions" by Descartes, and as "the given" element in experience by C. I. Lewis and other twentieth-century philosophers (Reed 2012: 585). In each case, it has been assumed that these foundations are infallible in that they preclude error on the part of the knower. To have knowledge, in other words, we must have justification that guarantees that our belief is true.1 This is infallibilism. It is the view that knowledge demands the highest degree of justification. In contemporary epistemology, it is widely accepted that infallibilist theories of knowledge are "doomed to a skeptical conclusion" (Cohen 1988: 91).2 We humans are fallible creatures that can rarely guarantee the truth of our beliefs; indeed, almost no belief can be rationally supported or justified in a way that removes all possible doubt. By demanding infallibility, we would prevent ourselves from knowing almost anything. This is an unwelcome skeptical result. To avoid skepticism, many contemporary epistemologists endorse a fallibilist view of knowledge. A fallibilist believes that we can know things on the basis of justification that is less than fully conclusive. As Jim Pryor says, "a fallibilist is someone who believes that we can have knowledge on the basis of defeasible justification, justification that does not guarantee that our beliefs are correct" (2000: 518). This view is attractive because it allegedly avoids the skeptical consequences of infallibilist conceptions of knowledge. It is for this reason that fallibilism is typically regarded as the only serious option in epistemology. As Harvey Siegel says, "we are all fallibilists now" (1997: 164).3 1 I will use 'justification' broadly to include the related notions of 'evidence', 'probability', 'warrant', and 'reliability'. 2 Some have denied that infallibilism must lead to skepticism. For example, Fred Dretske (1981), Timothy Williamson (2000), Wayne Davis (2007), and Ram Neta (2011) each defend a version of infallibilism that allegedly has non-skeptical results. If these authors are right, then the step from infallibilism to skepticism is not an inevitable one. In contrast, Brown (2018) argues that infallibilists can avoid skepticism only at the cost of problematic commitments concerning evidence and evidential support. However, my focus in this chapter is not on whether infallibilism leads to skepticism, so I will set this issue aside. 3 Michael Williams agrees: "We are all fallibilists nowadays" (2001: 5). And Stewart Cohen says, "the acceptance of fallibilism in epistemology is virtually universal" (1988: 91). But not all philosophers are fallibilists; for example, Peter Unger (1975) and Laurence BonJour (2010) are willing to accept the skeptical consequences of their infallibilist views. 2 Although fallibilism is almost universally accepted in epistemology, the nature of fallibilist knowledge is still poorly understood. There are at least two reasons for this. First, it is unclear how to formulate fallibilism precisely.4 Second, it is surprisingly difficult to describe the level of fallible justification required for knowledge in a clear and non-arbitrary way.5 Despite this lack of precision, however, it is clear that contemporary fallibilists typically endorse the following two claims: first, knowledge is compatible with our cognitive fallibilities as inquirers; second, we typically meet the level of justification required for knowledge. In other words, fallibilists are not usually skeptics. As Stephen Hetherington writes in his encyclopaedia entry on fallibilism, it is fallibilist epistemologists (which is to say, the majority of epistemologists) who tend not to be skeptics . . . Generally, those epistemologists see themselves as thinking about knowledge and justification in a comparatively realistic way - by recognizing the fallibilist realities of human cognitive capacities, even while accommodating those fallibilities within a theory that allows perpetually fallible people to have knowledge and justified beliefs. (Hetherington 2019) But fallibilism does not necessarily escape skepticism. A theory might be fallibilist while still espousing standards too demanding to be regularly met. In other words, it is coherent to be both a fallibilist and a skeptic. A 'fallibilist skeptic' is someone who endorses the following two theses: first, the level of justification required for knowledge is "less than fully conclusive", so we need not guarantee the truth of our beliefs to have knowledge (i.e. fallibilism); second, many of our ordinary knowledge claims are nevertheless false (i.e. skepticism). This might seem like a puzzling combination of ideas. In contemporary epistemology, fallibilism and skepticism are often depicted as opposing views: we embrace to fallibilism to escape skepticism, and to deny fallibilism is to risk skepticism. However, fallibilism alone does not guarantee that most of our ordinary knowledge claims are true. In this paper, I will defend a version of skepticism that is compatible with fallibilism and supported by recent work in psychology. In particular, I will argue that we often cannot properly trust our ability to rationally evaluate reasons, arguments, and evidence (a fundamental knowledge-seeking faculty). We humans are just too cognitively impaired to achieve even fallible knowledge, at least for many beliefs. High-standards Skepticism Fallibilists often complain that skeptics wrongly impose impossibly high standards for knowledge. The skeptic claims, for instance, that knowledge requires one to be absolutely certain and that 4 See Reed (2002) and Brown (2018) for a discussion. 5 BonJour (2010) makes this objection. See Hetherington (2006) and Hannon (2017) for replies. 3 absolute certainty is impossible or rare (see Unger 1975).6 This view demands that we justify our beliefs to the highest possible degree. I will therefore call it 'high-standards skepticism'. Descartes seems to endorse a version of high-standards skepticism in the Meditations. He writes: Reason now leads me to think I should hold back my assent from opinions which are not completely certain and indubitable just as carefully as I do from those which are patently false. So, for the purpose of rejecting all my opinions, it will be enough if I find in each of them at least some reason for doubt. (Descartes 1998: 59) Scholars often interpret Descartes as endorsing the following idea: the bar for knowledge is set so high as to demand infallibility or absolute certainty. We also find this idea in Descartes' Rules for the Direction of the Mind, where he writes: "All knowledge is certain and evident cognition". Although Descartes was himself not a skeptic, he seems to imply that knowledge requires us to meet a very demanding standard.7 Likewise, the skeptic seems to presuppose an infallibilist principle like this one: if I know that p, then I can eliminate all grounds for doubting it. Put another way, Descartes and the skeptic seem to suggest that knowing p requires one to have evidence or reasons sufficient to rule out all the alternative possibilities to p. This is a version of 'high-standards' skepticism because it requires knowers to justify their belief to the highest possible degree.8 A common response to such skeptical arguments is to treat them as depending on too stringent a conception of knowledge (Reed 2012: 585). That is, we may agree with the skeptic that hardly any belief can be justified to the highest degree. After all, our cognitive faculties are too imperfect to establish the truth of a proposition with 100% certainty. But who cares? So what if nothing meets this incredibly high standard? After all, many things are probably true and it is reasonable for us to believe those things. Indeed, even granting that nothing is certain, why conclude that we have no knowledge? While the skeptic believes that we cannot know what we cannot confirm with 100% certainty, fallibilists have a more moderate view. Absolutely certainty is not required for knowledge. As Baron Reed puts it, "our faculties are still very good . . . they allow us to achieve a more modest sort of cognitive success. Fallibilism, then, takes that modest success to be knowledge" (2012: 585). Duncan Pritchard expresses a similar thought: it doesn't seem at all credible that the bar for knowledge should be set so high as to demand infallibility or absolute certainty (or, for that matter, indubitability). On the contrary, our everyday conception of 6 'Certainty' is ambiguous (cf. Reed 2008). A belief is psychologically certain when one is supremely convinced of its truth. A belief is epistemically certain when it has the highest possible epistemic status. Some infallibilists say that psychological certainty is necessary for knowledge, while others say that epistemic certainty is necessary. 7 I do not actually agree with this interpretation of Descartes, but I set this issue aside. See Pasnau (2017) for a discussion of this point. 8 Stroud (1984) seems to interpret Descartes as endorsing a 'high standards' view. 4 knowledge seems to leave us perfectly happy with the idea that knowledge can be fallible and not absolutely certain (and thus to a degree dubitable) while being bona fide knowledge nonetheless. (2019: 36) I think this reaction is exactly right. If the skeptic sets the bar for knowledge too high, then we should reject that standard (see Hannon 2019a). The epistemic contextualists have adopted this line of reasoning.9 Their solution to skepticism involves two basic elements: first, in ordinary contexts we often meet the reasonable (fallible) epistemic standard for knowledge; second, in skeptical contexts the standards to know are much higher.10 As DeRose puts it, In some contexts, ''S knows that p'' requires for its truth that S have a true belief that p and also be in a very strong epistemic position with respect to p, while in other contexts, an assertion of the very same sentence may require for its truth, in addition to S's having a true belief that p, only that S meet some lower epistemic standard. (2009: 3) A core feature of contextualism is that we need not meet the skeptic's very high epistemic standard to have knowledge in daily life. This is fallibilism. The contextualist is a fallibilist who rejects (or at least confines) the infallible standard assumed by the skeptic. While this response to skepticism is prima facie plausible, it only gains purchase if we satisfy some reasonable epistemic standard that ordinarily suffices for knowledge. After all, the contextualist line is precisely that in everyday contexts our knowledge claims are true because the standards are not too demanding. However, the most challenging skeptical arguments do not simply claim that we fail to meet some extraordinary standard for knowledge. Rather, they claim that we do not meet even ordinary (fallible) standards. I will consider this view in the next section. Hard-hitting Skepticism The contextualist portrays the dispute between the skeptic and the non-skeptic as a difference between using stricter standards and more lax ones. On this interpretation, the skeptic may be accused of merely imposing abnormal requirements on our familiar concept of knowledge. As HansJohann Glock says, "the skeptic . . . is like someone who claims that there are no physicians in London, since by 'physician' he understands someone who can cure any disease within twenty minutes" (2010: 100). 9 See Cohen (1988), DeRose (1995), and Lewis (1996) for early statements of this view. 10 I have not indicated semantic ascent by putting quotation marks around 'know' and 'knowledge'. I state my discussion in the object language for ease of exposition. 5 But this misportrays the skeptic's view. As Bryan Frances writes, "the skeptic isn't complaining that our knowledge doesn't satisfy some super-duper high-octane condition that only a philosopher could love" (2008: 243). Rather, the skeptic is arguing that it is much more difficult than we realized for a belief to qualify as knowledge even by ordinary standards.11 In presenting her argument, the skeptic raises doubts about whether we actually satisfy the very same epistemic standards that we have always thought we satisfied, not some unattainably high standard. Thus, any solution that characterizes the skeptic as "raising the standards" or smuggling in abnormal requirements would mischaracterize the view. What about the skepticism of Descartes' Meditations? As previously mentioned, several philosophers have interpreted the Cartesian skeptic as imposing high standards or presupposing infallibilism.12 But this connection between infallibilism and skepticism may be a red herring. As John Greco (2008: 116), Allan Hazlett (2014: 90), and others have pointed out, the Cartesian skeptical argument does not essentially depend on infallibilism. The Cartesian skeptical argument runs as follows: 1. I know that I have hands only if I can know that I'm not deceived by a demon (about whether I have hands). 2. I can't know that I'm not deceived by a demon (about whether I have hands). 3. Therefore, I don't know that I have hands. None of the motivations for the first or second premise presuppose infallibilism. The Cartesian skeptic is not claiming that you cannot be certain that you're not deceived by a demon, and therefore know very little. That would presuppose infallibilism. The idea behind the Cartesian skeptical argument is, as Hazlett says, "that you've got no way of knowing whether you're deceived, and therefore know very little" (2014: 90). Nevertheless, many people are unwilling to grant the skeptical premise that we don't (or can't) know that we're not deceived. Instead of allowing the skeptic to use claims like "I can't know that I'm not being deceived" as premises in her reasoning, we should instead expect the skeptic to convince us that we can't know this.13 As Greco writes, 11 Feldman (1999; 2001), Klein (2000), Kornblith (2000), Bach (2005), Hazlett (2014), and Pritchard (2019) raise versions of this objection. 12 Unger (1975) and BonJour (2010) also seem to defend versions of high-standards skepticism. 13 Pryor (2000) attempts to formulate a version of skepticism that does not require this controversial premise. 6 Is that premise [that I cannot know that I am not a brain in a vat] initially (or pretheoretically) plausible? It seems to me that it is not. In fact, it seems to me that it is initially obvious that I do know that I am not a brain in a vat. (2008: 111) Whatever we think of this response to the skeptic, there are two important lessons to draw out from the current discussion. First, to portray the skeptic as demanding that we justify our beliefs to the highest degree is to mischaracterize their view. The really worrying form of skepticism is not 'high standards' skepticism but rather what I call 'hard-hitting skepticism'. The hard-hitting skeptic says that our beliefs fail to qualify as knowledge by ordinary standards. The second lesson is this: a common source of resistance to skepticism is the implausibility of farfetched scenarios involving evil demons, brains in vats, and so forth. As Frances (2008) observes, this is one thing that commonly bothers undergraduates in philosophy. They object: why on earth do some philosophers take the BIV [brain in a vat] hypothesis to pose any threat at all to our beliefs, given that those very same philosophers think that there is no real chance that the BIV hypothesis is true? Sure, the BIV hypothesis is formally inconsistent with my belief that I have hands, so if the former is true, then my belief is false. But so what? Why should that bare inconsistency matter so much? The students would understand the fuss over the BIV hypothesis if there were some decent reason to think that the BIV hypothesis was really true. (Frances 2008: 225) A more threatening and significant type of skepticism, then, would meet two conditions. First, it would not characterize the skeptic as demanding infallibility or the highest possible degree of justification. Second, it would not be based on doubts that are "purely philosophical" or "merely academic threats" (Frances 2008: 228). Rather, it would involve what C. S. Peirce calls a "real" doubt. (We don't really doubt the existence of the external world.) In the next section, I will outline a sceptical hypothesis that meets these two criteria and thereby generates a "real" skeptical threat.14 Skepticism and Rational Evaluation This section will outline a type of contingent real-world skepticism that has not received much attention. Unlike 'high-standards' skepticism, this view does not demand infallibility or extraordinarily high justification. Unlike Cartesian skepticism, it does not rely on remote possibilities, such as the possibility that one is a brain in a vat or radically deceived by an evil demon.15 Rather, I 14 Pyrrhonian skepticism in no way depends on the problematic assumptions outlined above. The pyrrhonist did not claim the standards for knowledge were incredibly high, nor did they appeal to far-fetched skeptical scenarios. 15 Here I follow Frances's (2005) strategy to outline what he calls a "live" skeptical hypothesis. Frances says that a hypothesis is live when it satisfies five conditions: (i) it has been through a significant evaluation in the community by experts over many years; (ii) it is judged actually true or as likely to be true as any relevant possibility by a significant 7 will present an empirically informed, scientifically respectable skeptical hypothesis that targets many of our most cherished beliefs. More specifically, I will outline a type of skepticism that targets many beliefs that are the product of reasoning. I am using 'reasoning' quite broadly to refer to cases in which we have evidence and draw conclusions on the basis of rationally evaluating the evidence. Put differently, I am thinking of cases in which we exercise our rational capacities to acquire knowledge. This contrasts with more basic and immediate cases of perceptual knowledge, which require little to no reflection or reasoning. Consider the following example.16 Irena suspects that the death penalty is not an effective tool to reduce the murder rate, but she doesn't have much evidence either way. To become more informed, she decides to look for evidence about the deterrent effects of capital punishment. After searching several reputable websites and reading multiple academic articles, Irena concludes that the evidence strongly indicates that the death penalty does not reduce the murder rate. Irena is intelligent, articulate, and is now able to present reasons for her belief. Moreover, she now believes that the reasons for which she holds her belief are the reasons she is now able to present. This might seem like a reliable way to form beliefs, but we have abundant evidence that this process of reasoning is likely beset by a host of cognitive biases and reasoning errors. For example, the general human tendency to rationalize is more common than we are wont to believe.17 This occurs even when people offer what in fact turn out to be sound arguments. Though they may have successfully hit on a good argument, they are still rationalizing because they would have held the same view with or without good reasons, i.e. on the basis of non-rational considerations. Suppose that Irena has views about the morality of the death penalty that she holds on grounds independently of her views about its deterrent effects. These moral commitments will likely drive her views about the deterrent effects of the death penalty. For instance, Irena will inflate the quality of the studies that present evidence in favour of her moral view and she will be far more critical of (and more likely to downplay the significance of) studies that provide evidence that cut against her moral view. In other words, her views about the death penalty's effectiveness will not be the result of her understanding the relevant data. Quite the opposite: her understanding of the relevant data will be the product of her moral beliefs. Moreover, Irena will be completely unaware of this fact. She will sincerely believe that her reasons for belief are different from her actual reasons. number of experts; (iii) the judgment of those experts has been reached in an epistemically responsible way; (iv) those experts consider there to be several independent sources of evidence for the hypothesis; (v) many of those experts consider the hypothesis to be a live possibility (see Frances 2005: 18-9). 16 This example is adapted from Kornblith (1999: 181-2). 17 For a defense of this view, see Kornblith (1999), Tavris and Aronson (2007), Haidt (2012), Sperber and Mercier (2017). 8 Irena is not a unique case. A vast amount of work in cognitive psychology indicates that we all frequently interpret and filter evidence in ways that fit with our antecedent worldview.18 For example, we selectively expose ourselves to evidence that confirms our pre-existing beliefs and avoid information that conflicts with them. This is known as selective exposure (Nickerson 1998). We also tend to uncritically accept (and better remember) evidence that is favourable to our view, whereas we are far more critical (and forgetful) of counterevidence. We "routinely rationalize the facts, figures, and arguments that [we] cannot effortlessly discount, depreciate, denigrate, or deny" (Lodge and Taber 2013: 59). This general human tendency to accept confirming evidence without much scrutiny and subject disconfirming evidence to highly critical evaluation is known as biased assimilation or confirmation bias (Lord et al. 1979). When this occurs, two people can look at the exact same body of evidence and yet walk away with radically different conclusions about what the evidence shows, thereby drawing undue support for their initial positions.19 In general, our belief-forming processes are often corrupted by an array of normal human cognitive and affective tendencies. Following Aaron Ancell (2019: 411), I will call these "sources of unreason". Sources of unreason include: our prejudices and biases (both implicit and explicit); the tendency of self-interest and group-interest to distort our judgments; stubbornness and dogmatism; bad reasoning; the desire to reduce cognitive dissonance; and psychological comfort. Our reasoning is especially prone to error or bias when it comes to beliefs that matter to us; e.g., our moral, political, and personal beliefs that are partly constitutive of our identity (Haidt 2012). These 'identityconstitutive beliefs' include any belief that reflects one's conception of "who they are, of what sort of people they are, and how they relate to others" (Hogg and Abrams 1988: 2). Moreover, these corrupting motivations are not transparent to us. We believe that the reasons we present are the reasons for which we hold our beliefs, but we are often wrong about this. We think we are motivated by the desire for truth, but our other motives are concealed from our view (Wilson 2002). This raises a general doubt about human reasoning. As Ancell writes, "Our reasoning capacities are beset by an array of built-in cognitive and affective biases that make it very difficult-often practically impossible-for us to think clearly and objectively about issues that affect our interests and arouse our passions" (2019: 418). This would not be so worrying if we were able to introspectively discern our own biases and cognitive shortcomings. However, we are typically 18 See Gilovich (1993) for an overview. 19 These biases are sometimes collectively referred to as "motivated reasoning", which is "the tendency to seek out, interpret, evaluate, and weigh evidence and arguments in ways that are systematically biased toward conclusions that we 'want' to reach for reasons independent of their truth or warrant" (Ancell 2019: 418). See also Kunda (1990); Ditto, Pizarro, and Tannenbaum (2009); Lodge and Taber (2013). 9 introspectively blind to them (Pronin, Lin, and Ross 2002).20 While it might seem to us that we are being impartial and unbiased, we are often "twisting the argument and evidence to make them fit the conclusions we 'want' to reach" (Ancell 2019: 419). We suffer from what psychologists call the illusion of objectivity (Kunda 1990). In addition to the general human tendencies to rationalize, assimilate information in biased ways, and selectively expose ourselves to favourable information, there are many other biases and cognitive errors to which we humans are prone. For instance, hundreds of studies have confirmed the existence of a hindsight bias, which occurs when people who know the outcome of an event judge it to be more probable than people who are ignorant of the outcome (Roese and Vohs 2002). This is known to affect judgments about topics as diverse as terrorist attacks, medical diagnoses, and accounting decisions. In addition, we all have implicit biases where we unconsciously and automatically associate concepts with one another. Such biases are especially pernicious when we associate certain traits (e.g., dangerous) with members of particular social groups.21 Further, there is considerable evidence that many of our most cherished beliefs are shaped by irrelevant influences that do not bear on the truth of what we believe (Vavova 2018). For instance, the fact that you were raised in one community rather than another seems epistemically irrelevant to what you ought to believe about God, morality, or politics. But factors like upbringing are known to guide our convictions on these and other, less charged, topics.22 (While this is not itself a psychological bias, it does further illustrate the vast extent to which our beliefs are not the product of a reliable beliefforming process.) These are just a handful of our many cognitive shortcomings. It would be impossible to provide a comprehensive overview of all the epistemically irrational biases in human reasoning that should be of interest to epistemologists. However, these few examples illustrate a general worry about human reasoning. We fail on a variety of cognitive dimensions and, as a result, we have a distorted sense of the plausibility of our own beliefs. In other words, our epistemic situation is likely much worse than 20 As Ballantyne (2019: 131) writes: "A central idea in psychology is that most biases are not reliably detected by introspection (Nisbett and Wilson 1977; Wilson and Brekke 1994; Kahneman 2003). We typically can't figure out whether we are biased by merely gazing into our minds. Biases normally 'leave no trace' in consciousness. As Timothy Wilson and Nancy Brekke quip, 'Human judgments-even very bad ones-do not smell' (1994: 121). From the inside, biased attitudes seem just like unbiased ones." 21 Jennifer Saul (2013) has argued, compellingly, that implicit biases present a skeptical challenge to the ordinary ways that we assess reasons, arguments, and evidence. While my argument is similar to Saul's, it has wider scope. Saul presents a challenge to beliefs that may be influenced by implicit biases, whereas I raise doubts about our rational capacities more generally. That said, we both agree that (a) the rational evaluation of evidence and arguments is often corrupted by problematic psychological tendencies, (b) this influence operates below the level of consciousness, and (c) this provides a reason for skepticism about such beliefs. 22 Sometimes factors like upbringing will affect our convictions in perfectly rational ways, since they expose us to different experiences and thus different bodies of evidence. However, there are also many cases in which factors like upbringing are epistemically irrelevant. 10 we think. Moreover, these cognitive shortcomings are not rare but rather are the norm. There is plenty of evidence that rationalization is extremely widespread, especially when it comes to beliefs that matter to us; e.g., our political beliefs, moral beliefs, religious beliefs, or any other issue that affects our interests or stirs our emotions (Haidt 2012). Astute observers of human nature anticipated these psychological findings. Francis Bacon wrote, "The human understanding when it has once adopted an opinion (either as being the received opinion or as being agreeable in itself) draws all things else to support and agree with it" (1620: XLVI). Bertrand Russell said, "It is a law of our being that, whenever it is in any way possible, we adopt beliefs as will preserve our self-respect" (2004 [1928]: 51). British essayist William Hazlitt noted, "The narrowness of the heart warps the understanding, and makes us weigh objects in the scales of our self-love, instead of those of truth and justice" (1824: 34). And John Locke remarked on the deplorable state of the human mind in his posthumously published work, Of the Conduct of the Understanding: There are several weaknesses and defects in the understanding, either from the natural temper of the mind or ill habits taken up, which hinder it in its progress to knowledge. Of these there are as many possibly to be found, if the mind were thoroughly studied, as there are diseases of the body, each whereof clogs and disables the understanding to some degree, and therefore deserves to be looked at and cured. (1996 [1706], 187; §12) Although Locke was keenly aware of our intellectual imperfections, he was optimistic about our ability to overcome them. He prescribes that we impartially self-examine our own beliefs to root out "the prejudices imbibed from education, party, reverence, fashion, interest" (1996 [1706] 184 §10). In other words, he thinks that rigorous self-study will help to expose our biases. But this seems overly optimistic. Self-judgment is often clouded by rationalization and prejudice, so attempts to watch for signs of bad reasoning will go undetected and leave us thinking that we've actually tuned them out. As Nathan Ballantyne writes, "The feeling that we've done our best to be unbiased will encourage us to think we are unbiased, but that feeling should not be trusted" (2019: 131-2). A Skeptical Argument These biases and psychological shortcomings pose a significant epistemic threat to our beliefs. When our beliefs are shaped by sources of unreason, this casts doubt on the epistemic quality of those beliefs. This implies a form of skepticism. Consider the following skeptical argument, which I will call skepticism from unreason: 11 1. Many of our beliefs are shaped by sources of unreason. 2. When a belief is shaped by sources of unreason, we should significantly reduce our confidence in it. 3. Therefore, we should significantly reduce our confidence in many of our beliefs. We can also derive a form of skepticism about knowledge: 1. If we have a reason to significantly reduce our confidence in a belief, then that belief does not amount to knowledge. 2. We have a reason to significantly reduce our confidence in many of our beliefs. 3. Therefore, many of our beliefs do not constitute knowledge. This does not yet give us a very worrying skeptical result. While it does show that many of our beliefs do not constitute knowledge, it leaves open the possibility that we can tell when the process of rational evaluation generates justified (or known) beliefs and when it goes awry. To derive a worrying skeptical conclusion, we must not only show that some of our beliefs are shaped by sources of unreason. (We knew that already.) Rather, it must also be true that we are unable to distinguish the beliefs that are shaped by sources of unreason from beliefs that have not been corrupted by our cognitive biases. (If we were able to determine which beliefs are the result of twisting the evidence from those that are the product of even-handed rational evaluation, the skeptical result would be much less threatening.) As mentioned, however, the biasing processes that lead us to rationalize, to selectively filter our evidence, and so forth, typically take place behind the scenes.23 Thus, we often cannot cancel out the threat posed by our psychological shortcomings, for we lack some epistemic feature (e.g., appropriate evidence, reliability, or what not) that would otherwise cancel out this threat. As Ancell writes, we lack reliable means of detecting, avoiding, and correcting for these biases, [so] we cannot plausibly expect that otherwise reasonable people will never be led astray by them. Indeed, we must expect the opposite; the . . . reasoning of sincere and conscientious people will often be warped by their biases, interests, partisan loyalties, and so on. Because such warped views are liable to be unreasonable, it follows that sincere and conscientious people will often hold unreasonable views. (2019: 411) 23 Externalists (e.g., reliabilists) might take this as a point in their favour, since they will claim that we needn't be aware of the reliability of our belief-forming processes. However, externalists are not clearly at an advantage here because the relevant point is that our beliefs are often the result of an unreliable process-not that we lack introspective awareness of when we are rationalizing. 12 All this should lead us to doubt that our reasoning faculties are reliable routes to knowledge. Much empirical research over the past fifty years reveals the disturbingly expansive range to which fallibility enters our cognitive lives.24 This challenges the rational standing of our beliefs. One might try to safeguard much of our knowledge from these empirical findings by arguing as follows: these findings do not undermine the justification for our beliefs but rather they show that we are often more confident than we actually should be, and thus we have irrational credences. However (the objection continues), it is not obvious how irrational credences translate to the justification of beliefs, which are ultimately relevant for knowledge.25 To illustrate, let's assume a simple minded-threshold view where to have a belief is to have a credence above a certain threshold. Given that, a belief should count as justified when it is rational to have a credence above the threshold. Now it could easily be that it is rational to a have a credence above the threshold even when it is not rational to have the exact credence one has. Thus, even if we grant that our credences are rarely rational, it may still be that our beliefs are justified most of the time. The only cases where a bias affects the justificatory status of a belief are cases where the respective bias leads us to cross the threshold. For instance, let's say the threshold is 0.8 and my rational credence is 0.75, but due to a bias, my actual credence is 0.85. Here I end up with an unjustified belief, given the threshold view. The conditions described, however, seem relatively specific, which may lead one to conclude that they are rarely instantiated-or so the objection goes. This objection highlights an important difference between externalist vs. internalist conceptions of justification. According to the above objection, an agent may have an irrational credence that results from an inability to properly evaluate the strength of their evidence; yet the agent may nonetheless achieve a level of justification that suffices for their belief to be knowledge. However, many epistemologists will argue that these various biases make it impossible for one to determine how strong one's justification actually is, and thus one cannot tell whether their justification is good enough for knowledge. For a hardline externalist, what matters might be whether our actual justification is good enough for knowledge. But those with internalist leanings, like myself, will claim that our inability to tell how good our justification actually is provides us with a relevant defeater for knowledge. After all, biases like selective exposure and biased assimilation lead us to draw undue support for our views by filtering and processing the relevant evidence in epistemically problematic ways. As a result, the justification for our beliefs is often the result of twisting the evidence and 24 This may reflect the malaise of our allegedly 'post-truth' era. It is not so much the idea of truth or the existence of various truths that has come under attack, but rather the notion that there can be any such thing as objective inquiry into it (Blackburn 2019). 25 Thanks to Alexander Dinges for raising this objection. 13 arguments to make them fit with conclusions we want to reach. Thus, our evidence is likely worse than we think. Moreover, we cannot tell whether it is good enough to qualify as knowledge. This provides us with a reason to doubt whether our beliefs do qualify as knowledge, in addition to doubting that our credences are rational. While I have argued that our beliefs often are shaped by sources of unreason, my skeptical argument does not actually require our beliefs to have been shaped by any such source. All that is required is that the relevant belief is one that reasonably could have been influenced by a source of unreason and we cannot tell whether this has occurred in the relevant case. When this happens, we have a defeater even for those beliefs that are, in fact, based on good reasons or evidence. To illustrate, recall my example of Irena and the death penalty. In this case, I admitted the possibility that she in fact hit upon good arguments for her resulting belief. Still, the worry is that humans have a general tendency to rationalize and Irena lacks the ability to tell whether she holds her belief about the death penalty's deterrent effects on the basis of good reasons or instead due to her views about the morality of the death penalty.26 These pessimistic facts about reasoning and rationalization go some distance toward making sense of "fallibilist skepticism". This view is skeptical because it provides a real, live hypothesis that targets reasoning as a source of knowledge. It is also falliblist because this new skeptical hypothesis does not merely deny certainty or 'high standards' knowledge. Rather, it generates a reason to deny the entirely modest amount of epistemic warrant we ordinarily expect to know something. Even though many our of beliefs may be true, the justification we have for these beliefs is much less than any of us have supposed in our anti-skeptical moments. In short, the epistemic quality of our position is much worse than we thought. The Scope and Force of Skepticism This view has a narrower scope than some traditional forms of skepticism. The scope of skepticism is determined by the set of proposition it targets, where these proposition are said to be unknowable, unjustified, or those about which we should suspend judgment. Some skeptics target all claims about the external world. Others target our knowledge of the mental lives of others. Still others target only propositions about the future, the past, or religious matters. The type of skepticism I am 26 One might take this as a reason in favor of externalist. For what it's worth, I don't think we should adopt philosophical positions simply because we don't like skeptical conclusions. (That said, in Hannon 2019b I argue that we can reject skepticism because it is impractical in a particular way.) In any case, adopting a version of externalism that allows us to call these beliefs 'justified' or 'knowledge' would still leave untouched my real concern, namely, that we care about being able to tell how good our epistemic position actually is. I find the externalist retreat of little practical value in responding to this concern, even though it may allow us to continue calling certain beliefs 'justified' or 'knowledge'. 14 outlining, by contrast, targets the propositional contents of many beliefs yielded by rational evaluation.27 These beliefs are targeted on the grounds that they are likely corrupted by error and bias, especially when these beliefs are partly constitutive of our identity.28 Not all beliefs that are the product of reasoning will be subject to the concerns I have raised. Suppose, for example, that I come to believe that we have enough milk for the next week on the grounds that we have four litres and we tend to go through about a litre every two days. A belief like this is not (obviously) likely to be shaped by "sources of unreason".29 Many of our beliefs formed through reasoning will be of this form. Still, the literature in psychology makes clear that the extent to which our beliefs are shaped by sources of unreason is indeed quite broad. In addition to pretty much all of our moral, political, philosophical, and religious beliefs, it will also concern other "cherished beliefs" (e.g., related to family members, sports teams, professional employment, etc.), beliefs that are influenced by our implicit biases and prejudices (see Saul 2013 for the extent to which this is troubling), beliefs influenced by 'ingroup' and 'outgroup' bias (the research on 'minimal group paradigms' reveals that even arbitrary distinctions between groups, such as preferences for certain paintings, beliefs about whether hotdogs are sandwiches, or the color of their shirts can trigger a tendency to favor one's own group), or other issues that affect our interests, stir our emotions, or challenge our worldview. Although this version of skepticism has narrower scope than traditional (i.e. radical) skepticism, I believe it packs more punch. Instead of relying on the far-fetched possibility that an evil demon is controlling our minds (or that we are brains in vats, etc.), we have the much more live (and empirically supported) hypothesis that our cognitive biases are leading us astray. It is not just the possibility of cognitive error or bias that is raised; the research in psychology and cognitive science suggests that it is very likely that we are doing these things quite often.30 As a result, this type of skepticism is more likely to engender doubt and to inspire behaviour. This contrasts with the fairly ineffective change in belief and behaviour brought about by traditional forms of skepticism. As Hume observed, the activities of ordinary life were sufficient to dispel traditional skeptical doubts: 27 We can also put this point in terms of distrusting a putative source of knowledge. While the traditional skeptic targets beliefs yielded by sense perception, my skeptic targets those produced by reasoning or rational evaluation. 28 While I have focused on beliefs that are the product of reasoning, the concerns I have raised may also target some perceptual beliefs, beliefs based on memory, and the acceptance of testimony. In the case of perceptual beliefs, it is well known that our 'group identity' can shape our perceptions of reality. This explains why sports fans who cheer for different teams will perceive games differently (see Hastorf and Cantril 1954). In the case of memory, we suffer from 'rosy retrospection' (Mitchell et al. 1997) and hindsight bias (Roese and Vohs 2002). And in the case of beliefs based on testimony, the literature on epistemic injustice provides compelling evidence that we may routinely give too little (or too much) credibility to certain sources of testimony (see Fricker 2007). 29 Thanks to Martin Smith for this point and example. 30 Saul (2013) makes a similar point. 15 Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices for that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium . . . I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my friends; and when after three or four hour's amusement, I wou'd return to these speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into them any farther. (2003: bk.1, pt.4, sec.7) Similarly, C. S. Peirce wrote, "Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts" (1893: CP 5.265). The most forceful and interesting skeptical challenges provide us with doubts that are genuinely compelling - i.e. they present us with good reasons to think we are very likely making errors and they challenge our ability to inquire responsibly.31 Skepticism about rational evaluation does precisely this. Final Thoughts Is this type of skepticism really all that troubling? You might think the doubt cast on our beliefs is fairly localized. Saul considers this objection in her article on skepticism and implicit bias. She writes, It seems, at first, to be like the sort of doubt we experience when we discover how poor we are at probabilistic reasoning. We have extremely good reason to think we're making errors when we make judgments of likelihood. But this sort of doubt doesn't trouble us all that much because we know exactly when we should worry and what we should do about it: if we find ourselves estimating likelihood, we should mistrust our instincts and either follow mechanical procedures we've learned or consult an expert (if not in person, then on the internet). This kind of worry is one that everyone can accept without feeling drawn into anything like skepticism. (Saul 2012: 250) It may seem as though skepticism about rational evaluation is like this. One might argue, for example, that we should not worry about this type of skepticism because it only concerns a small set of our total beliefs. Moreover, one might argue that we are aware of these various biases and cognitive shortcomings (after all, they are well documented in psychology), so we can guard against them. 31 Frances's (2005) work on 'live sceptical scenarios' provides an instructive comparison. However, the reasons he offers for his brand of skepticism strike me as less compelling. As Saul (2013: 254) observes, "The hypotheses in question are things like eliminativism about belief and error theory about colour. And the reasons for thinking that they are still live is that some sensible people who know a great deal endorse (or might endorse) these theories on the grounds of compelling scientific or philosophical reasons." But this falls short of the general doubts about human reasoning that I have outlined. My claim is that we all have very good reason to believe that we are frequently making errors that have their root in motivated reasoning. This is stronger than Frances's claim that a hypothesis is "live", by which he means (roughly) that sensible and knowledgeable people might endorse it on the basis of good reasons. I borrow this point from Saul (2013), who makes a similar observation in the context of her own skeptical argument that is based on implicit biases. 16 There are at least two problems with this reply. First, we should very often be worried about these biases influencing our judgments. As the literature in psychology makes clear, these biases tend to be triggered whenever an issue affects our interests or stirs our emotions. Thus, we should be worried about the rationality of our beliefs in a variety of situations. Second, even though we are aware of the existence of these biases, it is unlikely that we can overcome them. Although a variety of debiasing strategies have been proposed (see Larrick 2004; Lilienfeld et al. 2009; Jolls and Sunstein 2006), Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij (2013) identifies two obstacles with the attempt to debias ourselves. First, we are not motivated to engage in debiasing because we do not view ourselves as biased (which is very common). Second, people who are persuaded to engage in debiasing efforts run the risk of both overcorrection and undercorrection (Wilson 2002). Some may prefer to interpret the evidence from psychology in a less pessimistic way. According to an alternative view, many of our so-called biases are not really irrational at all. Rather, they reflect "bounded rationality" (e.g., Gigerenzer et al. 2001) or "instrumental rationality" (e.g., Kolodny and Brunero 2018). We act in ways that are boundedly rational when we employ cognitive shortcuts and rules that give rise to biases. As fallible beings with limited time and cognitive resources, it is rational for us to use heuristics and shortcuts in order to make the best decisions we can, given our limitations, even though this type of rationality gives rise to biases and errors in judgment. 32 Additionally, many of our seemingly irrational beliefs may be the result of instrumental rationality, since these beliefs play an important role in achieving our goals. For example, it may be instrumentally rational for an individual to dogmatically hold on to certain political beliefs in the face of counterevidence because changing one's mind is a psychologically difficult process that could potentially alienate the believer from their community and sense of self. This line of reasoning is perfectly sensible, but it does little to blunt the force of the skeptic's argument. The skeptic may simply argue that many of our boundedly rational beliefs do not amount to knowledge. Bounded rationality is achieved when we rely on fast and frugal heuristics to help us make sense of the world. In general, this is a good thing because the world is complex and we don't always have the time to make a well-thought-out rational choice about a decision. Nevertheless, the skeptic will insist that she is targeting beliefs that are not sufficiently epistemically justified, even though such beliefs may be the result of a boundedly rational process. A similar point can be made about instrumentally rational beliefs. While it may be instrumentally rational to dogmatically hold on to certain beliefs, it is not epistemically rational to do so. The psychological costs associated with 32 For this objection, see Nick Hughes's forthcoming paper, "Evidence and Bias". 17 giving up such beliefs may be brutal, but this does not make the belief rational in an epistemic sense. Thus, this line of response does nothing to escape the skeptic's clutches. A finally worry about my argument is that it is self-defeating. After all, haven't I attempted to convince you to endorse my skeptical conclusion through rational argument? If so, then shouldn't we doubt whether we know this conclusion? As a skeptic, I am willing to admit that we do not know the conclusion of my argument. It is likely that philosophical argumentation is subject to various epistemic vices and cognitive biases, just as political reasoning, moral thinking, and religious belief are subject to these biases. However, to say that we do not know my conclusion is not to say that we do know that it is false. Rather, we are simply left uncertain (or at least lacking knowledge) as to whether the beliefs that are the product of rational evaluation are known or justified. This is still a skeptical conclusion. Moreover, this claim is compatible with the idea that we have some epistemic justification to believe the conclusion of my argument. I need not argue that beliefs entirely lack justification when they are the product of rational evaluation. That is an especially strong form of skepticism that would run into the self-defeat problem, for the following reason: If rational evaluation is unjustified or unreliable, then the rational evaluation that 'rational evaluation is unjustified or unreliable' would itself be unjustified. But if it were unjustified, then we have good reason not to believe it or trust it. Still, we may throw the epistemic status of these beliefs into doubt without undermining their justification entirely. Thus, we may have some epistemic justification for believing that my conclusion is true, but without knowing that it is true. Perhaps we should simply suspend judgment on the matter. Another way to avoid the self-defeat worry, which I do not pursue, is to suggest that my skepticism about rational evaluation does not apply to itself. 33 This would allow me to escape the self-defeat worry by claiming that my rational evaluation about the unreliability of rational evaluation is not itself unjustified. However, going this route would leave me with the challenge of convincing you that you should take my rational evaluation to be justified. In other words, my skeptical argument would provide a defeater for most beliefs that are the product of rational evaluation, but I would provide a defeater for why this argument applies to the rational evaluation of my argument. This may not be an insurmountable task, for I do not claim that rational evaluation is always or universally an unreliable process. Nevertheless, I have argued that we should very often be worried 33 Adam Elga (2010: 179-82) argues that self-defeat objections can be avoided because, in general, methods can be exempted from self-application. I will not outline the details of his argument here, but the rough idea is that selfexemption is not ad hoc or arbitrary because, unless we exempt our methods from self-application, they can't be coherent-that is, they will give inconsistent recommendations in possible cases. As Elga puts it, "in order to be consistent, a fundamental policy, rule, or method must be dogmatic with respect to its own correctness" (2010: 185). 18 about these biases influencing our judgments; that we do not know exactly when we should worry; and that attempting to overcome these biases is often unhelpful. In summary, I have argued that one of the main lessons from the literature on human psychology is that we should not trust ourselves as inquirers. Many beliefs that we take to be the product of the careful exercise of reason are likely biased and wrong. Put differently, an ordinary but fundamental belief-forming method is much less reliable than we thought. This gives rise to a form of skepticism about our rational capacities. This skeptical argument challenges what Chris Hookway calls "our cognitive instruments", since it is generated by doubts about our ability to engage in rational, unbiased evaluation. Moreover, it is unclear how to develop techniques that will drive out what John Stuart Mill called "the fogs which hide from us our own ignorance" (1984 [1867]: 239).34 Instead of attempting to lift the fog, I have simply attempted to illuminate it. Acknowledgements. Thanks to Alexander Dinges, Nick Hughes, Christos Kyriacou, and Martin Smith for valuable comments on a draft of this paper. Bibliography Abrams, Dominic, and Michael Hogg (1988). Comments on the motivational status of self-esteem in social identity and intergroup discrimination. European journal of social psychology 18 (4): 317-334. Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2013). Why we cannot rely on ourselves for epistemic improvement. Philosophical Issues 23 (1): 276-296. Ancell, Aaron (2019). The Fact of Unreasonable Pluralism. Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5 (4): 410-428. Bach, Kent (2005). The emperor's new 'knows'. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 51-89. Bacon, Francis (1620). The New Organon. Ballantyne, Nathan (2019). Knowing Our Limits. Oxford University Press. Blackburn, Simon (2019). How can we teach objectivity in a post-truth era? New Statesman. Accessed at: https://www.newstatesman.com/culture/2019/02/how-can-we-teach-objectivity-posttruth-era BonJour, Laurence (2010). The myth of knowledge. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):57-83. Brown, Jessica. (2018). Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 34 I thank Nathan Ballantyne (2019: 64) for drawing my attention to this quote from Mill. 19 Brunero, John & Kolodny, Niko (2013). Instrumental Rationality. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Cohen, Stewart (1988). How to be a fallibilist. Philosophical Perspectives 2: 91-123. Davis, Wayne (2007). Knowledge claims and context: loose use. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):395438. DeRose, Keith (1995). Solving the skeptical problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52. Descartes, Rene (1998). Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy, 4th Ed. Hackett. Ditto, Peter H., David A. Pizarro, and David Tannenbaum (2009). Motivated moral reasoning. Psychology of learning and motivation 50: 307-338. Dretske, Fred (1981). The pragmatic dimension of knowledge. Philosophical Studies 40 (3):363-378. Feldman, Richard (2001). Skeptical problems, contextualist solutions. Philosophical Studies 103 (1):61-85. Feldman, Richard (1999). Contextualism and skepticism. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):91-114. Frances, Bryan (2008). Live Skeptical Hypotheses. In John Greco (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 225-245. Frances, Bryan (2005). Scepticism Comes Alive. Oxford University Press. Gigerenzer, G, et al. 2001. Simple Heuristics That Make Us Smart. Oxford University Press Gilovich, Thomas (1993). How We Know What Isn't So. Free Press Greco, John (2008). Skepticism about the External World. In The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism. Oxford University Press. pp. 108-128. Glock, Hans-Johann (2010). The Development of Analytic Philosophy: Wittgenstein and After. In D. Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy. Routledge. Haidt, Jonathan (2012). The Righteous Mind. Penguin. Hannon, Michael (2019a). What's the Point of Knowledge? Oxford University Press. Hannon, Michael (2019b). Skepticism: Impractical, Therefore Implausible. Philosophical Issues 29 (1):143-158. Hannon, Michael (2017). A solution to knowledge's threshold problem. Philosophical Studies 174 (3):607-629. Hastorf, Albert H., & Cantril, Hadley. (1954). They saw a game; a case study. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 49(1): 129-134. Hazlett, Allan (2014). A Critical Introduction to Skepticism. Bloomsbury Academic. Hetherington, S. (2019). Fallibilism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Hetherington, Stephen (2006). Knowledge's Boundary Problem. Synthese 150 (1):41-56. Hughes, Nick. Forthcoming. Evidence and Bias. Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge. 20 Hume, David (2003). A treatise of human nature. Courier Corporation. Jolls, Christine, and Cass R. Sunstein (2006). Debiasing through law. The Journal of Legal Studies 35.1: 199-242. Kahneman, Daniel (2003). A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality. American psychologist 58.9: 697. Klein, Peter D. (2000). Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism. Philosophical Issues 10 (1):108-116. Kornblith, Hilary (2000). The Contextualist Evasion of Epistemology. Noûs 34 (s1):24-32. Kornblith, Hilary (1999). Distrusting reason. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 23 (1):181-196. Kunda, Ziva (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological bulletin 108.3: 480. Larrick, Richard P. (2004) Debiasing. Blackwell handbook of judgment and decision making. Blackwell. pp. 316-338. Lewis, David K. (1996). Elusive knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549-567. Lilienfeld, Scott O., Rachel Ammirati, and Kristin Landfield (2009). Giving debiasing away: Can psychological research on correcting cognitive errors promote human welfare? Perspectives on psychological science 4.4:390-398. Locke. John (1996) [1706]. Some Thoughts Concerning Education and Of the Conduct of the Understanding. Edited by Ruth Grant and Nathan Tarcov. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. Lodge, Milton, and Charles S. Taber (2013). The Rationalizing Voter. Cambridge University Press. Lord, Charles G., Lee Ross, and Mark R. Lepper (1979). Biased assimilation and attitude polarization: The effects of prior theories on subsequently considered evidence. Journal of personality and social psychology 37(11): 2098. Mitchell, Terence R., et al. (1997). Temporal adjustments in the evaluation of events: The "rosy view". Journal of experimental social psychology 33(4): 421-448. Neta, Ram (2011). A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism. Noûs 45 (4):658-695. Nisbett, Richard E., and Timothy D. Wilson (1977). Telling more than we can know: verbal reports on mental processes. Psychological review 84 (3): 231. Pasnau, Robert (2017). After Certainty: A History of Our Epistemic Ideals and Illusions. Oxford University Press. Peirce, Charles S. (1868). Some Consequences of Four Incapacities. Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2: 140-157. Pritchard, Duncan. (2019). Skepticism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. Pronin, Emily, Daniel Y. Lin, and Lee Ross (2002). The bias blind spot: Perceptions of bias in self versus others. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 28.3:369-381. Pryor, James (2000). The skeptic and the dogmatist. Noûs 34 (4): 517-549. Reed, Baron (2012). Fallibilism. Philosophy Compass 7 (9): 585-596. 21 Reed, Baron (2008). Certainty. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Reed, Baron (2002). How to think about fallibilism. Philosophical Studies 107 (2): 143-157. Roese, Neal J., and Kathleen D. Vohs (2012). Hindsight bias. Perspectives on psychological science 7.5: 411-426. Russell, Bertrand (2004) [1928]. Sceptical Essays. Routledge. Saul, Jennifer (2013). Scepticism and Implicit Bias. Disputatio 5 (37): 243-263. Siegel, Harvey (1997). Rationality Redeemed? Routedge. Sperber, Dan and Hugo Mercier (2017). The Enigma of Reason. Harvard University Press. Stroud, Barry (1984). The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. Oxford University Press. Tavris, Carol, and Elliot Aronson (2008). Mistakes were made (but not by me): Why we justify foolish beliefs, bad decisions, and hurtful acts. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. Unger, Peter (1975). Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism. Oxford University Press. Vavova, Katia (2018). Irrelevant Influences. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1): 134152. Williams, Michael (2001). Contextualism, Externalism and Epistemic Standards. Philosophical Studies 103: 1-23. Williamson, Timothy (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press. Wilson, Timothy (2002). Strangers to Ourselves. Harvard University Press Wilson, Timothy, and Nancy Brekke (1994). Mental contamination and mental correction: unwanted influences on judgments and evaluations. Psychological bulletin 116 (1): 117.

www.argument-journal.eu Published online: 12.04.2016 * Ph.D., lecturer at the Department of Urban Studies in the Institute of Cultural Studies, Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznań, Poland. E ‐mail: [email protected]. Derelict architecture: Aesthetics of an unaesthetic space Małgorzata NIESZCZERZEWSKA* ABSTRACT The main focus of this article is the question of the aesthetics of an unaesthetic ruined space. The author also pays particular attention to the ambivalence that exists in contemporary de‐ relict architecture, referred to as 'modern ruins', and tries to show that such locations can be viewed as an 'in ‐between' space. KEYWORDS derelict architecture; ruinophilia; formativity; work of art; time; temporality Vol. 5 (2/2015) pp. 387‐397 e ‐ISSN 2084 –1043 p‐ISSN 2083 –6635 388 Małgorzata NIESZCZERZEWSKA If history no longer moves, then history becomes untimely. Out ‐of ‐time and out ‐of ‐place, temporal depth is erased. As the future and past undergo doubt, a suffocating present closes in. Velocity, the only recognizable form of temporal passing, surges and withdraws but never attains an end. D. Trigg, The aesthetics of decay: Nothingness, nostalgia, and the absence of reason INTRODUCTION Contemporary ruins are very ambivalent places. Julia Hell and Andreas Schön‐ le claim, that images of ruins resonate with other images of destruction and decay. Ruins evoke not only the buildings from which they hail, but a transhis‐ torical iconography of catastrophe and a vast visual archive of ruination as well. Collapsing, derelict buildings always involve reflections about history, the na‐ ture of the event, the meaning of the past and the present, progress and crisis, revolution, apocalypse or dialectic process. Therefore, the aestheticization of ruins is unavoidable (Hell & Schönle, 2010: 1). The architectural ruins always hover in the background of an aesthetic imagination that privileges fragment and allegory, collage and montage, freedom from ornament and reduction of the material (Huyssen, 2010: 19). There is certainly an aesthetic component to decaying buildings that provides an opportunity to enjoy and contemplate them outside of their original context and stumble upon unusual images that do not present themselves in intact structures. Hell and Schönle recall Michael Roth's argument, that only in a secularized world ruins can become objects of contemplation and aesthetization (Hell & Schönle, 2010: 1–5). This argument is confirmed by urban explorers, which very often define industrial ruins as new sanctuaries. Due to their silence, stillness and unaesthetic mess, derelict factories, churches, private houses and hospitals provide new mental and bodily experiences in regulated, controlled and aestheticized city space. BETWEEN RUINOPHILIA AND RUINOPHOBIA In late modern discourse about ruins and ruination of culture three approaches are to be found. First of all, the philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists and other researchers are of the opinion, that contemporary times are character‐ ized by particular ruinophilia. Svetlana Boym points out, that we are fascinated by a ruin as an object, a ruin as a concept, and ruination as a process. In our increasingly digital age, ruins appear as an endangered species and physical em‐ bodiment of modern paradoxes (Boym, 2011: 58). This acknowledgment finds Derelict architecture... 389 a confirmation in many activities of artists, urban explorers and ordinary peo‐ ple. Tim Edensor, one of academics and passionate of ruins states as follows: For me, however mundane they may seem, ruins still contain the promise of the un‐ expected. Since the original uses of ruined buildings has passed, there are limitless possibilities for encounters with the weird, with inscrutable legends inscribed on notice boards and signs, and with peculiar things and curious spaces which allow wide scope for imaginative interpretation [...] ruined space is ripe with transgressive and trans‐ cendent possibilities (Edensor, 2005a: 4). In this case, the ruin gaze is colored by nostalgia, which has some utopian element, but, as Boym claims, no longer directed towards the future (Boym, 2010: 58–59). In modern ruinophilia there is no continuous identity between a ruin and a building from which it hails. The nostalgic is enamoured of distance and not of the referent itself. It is not only a nostalgic desire for use value (Stewart, 2011: 36–39), but something that Edensor calls a 'post‐ ‐industrial nostalgia' which focuses on 'dark urban nightscapes, abandoned parking lots, factories, warehouses and other remnants of post ‐industrial cul‐ ture' and is rather based not on the romantic but 'gothic sensibility' (Eden‐ sor, 2005a: 13). The second, actually opposite approach (first of all characteristic for the economists, some architects, local governments or developers and many city dwellers as well) is characterized by some kind of ruinophobia. Potentially dan‐ gerous character and a common sense of ugliness are the main factors responsi‐ ble for the notion, that derelict places which lack sensual and aesthetic control do not belong to anyone and therefore they lose any positive value and become a part of 'anxious landscapes' (the term borrowed from Antoine Picon [Pi‐ con, 2000]). Post ‐industrial ruins, peculiar 'blots on the landscape', are places, which ordinary people are usually afraid of. These two above ‐mentioned approaches can be derived from Edward Rel‐ ph's theory of peoples' relations with a place. Subjective feelings and emotions cause human beings and places to interact with each other. These relationships do not need to be strong or positive. Sometimes a strong place attachment or identity (topophilia) can be developed, but aversion, distaste or fear of some places may appear as well and then we can talk about topophobia (Seamon & Sowers, 2008; Żmudzińska ‐Nowak, 2010). An average user of abandoned and derelict places would probably share the latter. The material condition of place and its aesthetic values play of course a huge role in this negative recep‐ tion. According to Edensor: The negative notions of industrial ruination infer aesthetic judgements which widely diverge from the tradition of compiling celebratory accounts of non ‐industrial ruins. Highly aestheticized 'picturesque' representations derived from romantic perspectives 390 Małgorzata NIESZCZERZEWSKA have dominated n writings on ruins, but rather than industrial ruins, these accounts have typically focused on classical or archaic ruins (Edensor, 2005a: 10–11). Between these oppositional approaches we can situate a third one: some peculiar perspective of 'not seeing' presented by the most of city inhabitants. Separated from highly designed, themed, regulated and controlled urban space, contemporary ruins serve only as sites which are appropriate for alter‐ native, marginal practices, and not regarded as 'normative' or 'respectable'. A decayed building does not match the aestheticized environment of the cit‐ ies, therefore it quickly becomes invisible in particular way. If we consider these three approaches toward abandoned buildings, we may notice, that the most important factor that decides about the choice of one of them is predominantly a feeling, not an intellectual argument. It might derive from Dylan Trigg's argument about the contemporary 'lack of reason' led principally by some kind of 'irrationalism'. This suggests an anti‐ ‐intellectual emotionalism and vague intuitionism toward the contemporary sites of dereliction. We are told much about the 'feel' of the ruins but little about what they might imply conceptually (Trigg, 2006). Luigi Pareyson for‐ mulating his theory of the 'formativity' states, that in every human activity is inscribed a feeling, what actually means the personal engagement (Pareyson, 2009: 49). If we think of a ruin as a form of architecture and then as a work of art, we may connect it, according to Pareyson, with spirituality: There are works of art, which do express and speak nothing, but their style is enormously persuasive, because it is a spirituality of an author itself. [...] Even the most styled arabesque, the coldest architecture and the most polished contra point, do not express any feeling itself [...], but they content the all civilization, the way of interpreting the world and behavior toward life, the way of living/ thinking/feeling, the whole of collective and personal spirituality that became a style (Pareyson, 2009: 50).1 If we consider the aesthetics of contemporary ruins, we mean actually the aestheticization of decay, demise, abandonment, amorphism and atemporal‐ ity. We speak about the aestheticization of a non ‐place, an alternative and marginal place, an 'in ‐between' space, a place which is threw out, literally and metaphorical, from the space of contemporary city. Thus ruins litter the space of the city. Therefore I decided to consider contemporary ruins in two aesthetic dimensions: between form and deformation, and between multi‐ temporality and atemporality. 1 All quotations from Pareyson, 2009 trans. by M.N. Derelict architecture... 391 BETWEEN FORM AND DEFORMATION According to Edensor, ruins, as the remnants of architecture, do not have one shape but are manifold in form. Because they are fashioned by the era in which they were constructed, their architectural styles and functions differ very much. Their shape also depends upon the strategies mobilized by firms toward them after abandonment: Some are left to linger and decay for decades, turning into heap of rubble over years, while others stay for a while until the first signs of decay take hold and then are de‐ molished, and some are eradicated shortly after abandonment. [...] The rate of decay also depends upon the constituent materials of the building and upon local industrial strategies (Edensor, 2005a: 4). An aesthetic dimension of ruins belongs to a different order than the one observed in postmodern urban realms. They do not resemble an architectural work any longer, but begin to look like a specific, accidental, surrealistic sculp‐ ture as a form that emerges due to a process of decay and collapse. The lack of care about the place causes both the loss of architectural shape and colour, a very important factor for the sensual, aesthetic experience. Subject to many factors, buildings become similar to stone and earth (Simmel, 2006: 173). The way in which a building actually decays also depends on a material, that was used to its creation. It is a huge difference between a ruined architecture made from e.g. limestone or brick or a decayed building created once from a rein‐ forced concrete. Adrian Stokes in The pleasures of limestone affirms the so called 'diseases of a stone', e.g. exfoliation, florescence, stone weathering, which are a beginning of a decaying process (Stokes, 2011: 25). There are particular chemical changes, that belongs to the beauty and liveliness of stone. It is the natural carving that records time in immediate form with the pattern and color of surface: Of all weathering, that of limestone, as a rule, is the most vivid. It is limestone that combines with gases in the air, that is carved by the very breath we breathe out. It is limestone that forms new skins and poetic efflorescence: above all, limestone is sensi‐ tive to the most apparent of sculptural agencies, the rain (Stokes, 2011: 25). Abandoned and forgotten places are threatened by a slow decay, they 'fall inside', and possessed by natural forces are becoming rather an element of nature than a place in the city. Quite different situation can be observed in case of a concrete material, where the building may often not lose its primary form for long years. Rose Macaulay in A note on new ruins points out, that new ruins are for time stark and bare, vegetationless and creatureless, but they smell of mortality (Macaulay, 2011: 27). And they are very quickly covered by 392 Małgorzata NIESZCZERZEWSKA unaesthetic dust, that is a cumbersome residue tainting what it touches and must be eradicated. Dust is always seen as dirt, a 'persistent contamination exuded by death onto the world of the living' (Olalquiaga, 2011: 33). Dust, that always comes from outside, is a fragmented reminder of something that is already gone. Especially, if we consider abandoned buildings made from con‐ crete, which do not lose their shape and form very quickly, we can easily ask the very important question: where does the ruin start, and where does it end? Is well ‐preserved but empty and neglected building already a ruin? Much more useful would be to change the question and ask, if ruin is an object or a process (Hell & Schönle, 2010: 6)? The most important factor of shaping a ruin is a fact, that the architect of a building is a particular man, and the architect of a ruin is time. Pareyson claims, that an artist always subdues the materiality to make it his own. But it can be done only under condition, that the materiality meets an artist half way and gives him an access to its characteristic traits, from which he, due to his efforts, extracts the possibilities of forming (Pareyson, 2009: 58). So we can write, that the aim of forming as an activity of time is a deformation of a building. Forming means first and foremost 'doing'. In this case we talk about 'doing' which is actually creating a 'way of doing'. Time as an artist makes up his work of art in collapsing the building without any preconceived plan. Let us connote the theory of 'formativity' again: Forming makes up his own modus operandi during activity, defines a canon of a work by creating it, understands it by following it and materializing a project. Forming means then 'doing', but such a doing, which, simultaneously, creates a way of do‐ ing while doing (Pareyson, 2009: 71). A ruin is a work of art created by 'doing' without any preconceived method. The artistic production is here an adventure. The activity of time as an artist is, at the same time, searching and finding, trying and success, attempt and fruition. The problem is, when does this work of art end? When can we still talk about a ruin and not a pile of rubble? This simultaneity of an invention and creation cross ‐refers to ruination as a process and not ruin as a completed object. While forming a ruin, time - as an artist - still makes new attempts, as if it wasn't satisfied with its work. Experiments are driven by a presage of discovery of a final shape of ruin. If we consider the ruination as a process, a collapsing and decaying of a building, we can compare it to the process of forming that Pareyson calls 'being in motion'. During the process of creating, a form simultaneously exists and doesn't exist. It doesn't exist, because, as formed, it can appear actually after the process is done. It exists, be‐ cause it is working in an initialized process of forming (Pareyson, 2009: 89). Derelict architecture... 393 A collapsing and decaying architecture changes its shape and structure all the time, it is still forming and is heading for a total deformation. I propose, that in contrast to a construction, composition and integration, which consti‐ tute a creative work of a man as an architect, the process of ruination should be marked by a deconstruction, decomposition and disintegration. Pareyson writes about a dynamic perfection of a work of art, understood as coherence and uncertainty. Such traits could also be found in a ruin. But, in contrast to architecture it was once, this what concentrates it around its center, is not a whole, harmony and proportion, but fragmentation, disharmony and dis‐ proportion. According to a classical work of art, 'adding or taking away an element of a work of art would not only change it, but could rather destroy its integrality, its completeness and entirety' (Pareyson, 2009: 111). Opposite to these words, a decaying building viewed as a work of art created by time in cooperation with nature, is characterized by uncertainty. Its forming is based on destroying the integrality, completeness and entirety of an architectural work. The beauty of derelict architecture, so affirmed by urban explorers and photographers of industrial ruins, comes from its fragmentation, decaying and rottenness. The beauty and perfection of ruin as a work of passing time de‐ pends on its possibility to change and modification. It is a work of art in which everything can be changed, nothing is on its place and the viewer can easily think about reversing the order and coherence. Ruins are uncompleted because years after years they lose their elements, and this is actually the sign of their perfection. Forming of a collapsing and decaying architecture is a process that cannot be separated from the form itself. Two buildings which look the same in their architectural form become probably quite different as ruins after they have been abandoned. Every ruin is unique. Thousands of photographs and films of abandoned architecture whose authors try to show and picture every detail of these sites of dereliction certify, that in the work of art as a whole nothing is detached or less important. There is nothing in ruin that should be neglected, there is no unnecessary and unwanted detail to be found (that is why there are multiple photographs of things being forgotten and abandoned in empty buildings). Pareyson thinks alike, writing that even the smallest hollow seems essential for the aesthetic effect and therefore for the existence of the work of art. [...] This is true, that one cannot understand the whole if one doesn't see particular elements, because the whole manifests itself only through the connection of the fragments (Pareyson, 2009: 125, 128). In contradiction to the controlled and aestheticized architecture, there are numerous objects, forms of matter and fragments in the ruin, that the eye can‐ not identify at first sight. They appear unclassifiable, especially because of their transformation under conditions of decay and collapse (Edensor, 2007a: 221). 394 Małgorzata NIESZCZERZEWSKA In their incompletion, they are already complete. But the seeing eye can easily recognize in fragmented ruins the idea of a whole, even if this whole is just called nothingness. BETWEEN MULTITEMPORALITY AND ATEMPORALITY Ruins reveal an ambivalent sense of time and embody a set of temporal and historical paradoxes (Hell & Schönle, 2010: 5; Dillon, 2011: 11). Decay of a building is a concrete reminder of the passage of time as a new owner of an empty building and the work of time as an architect. According to Sarah Wanenchak, contemporary technology changes our remembrance of the past, our experience of the present, and our imagination of the future by blurring the lines between these three categories, and introducing different forms of understanding and meaning ‐making to all three. We are able then to 'remem‐ ber the future, imagine the present, and experience the past'. The contempo‐ rary, post ‐industrial derelict buildings, are gentle reminders of our own transience. They lead us to questions just as the im‐ agining of the past did: What will our contemporary structures look like in fifty years? In a hundred? Who will remember us? Who will stand in our abandoned spaces and wonder about us? We can imagine these things because they suggest an end without really being an ending - there is always, after all, someone else to look and wonder, comfortingly embodied in ourselves (Wanenchak, 2012). The phenomenon of modern ruinophilia is uniquely suited to call attention to our increasingly atemporal existence, and to outline some of the specific ways in which it manifests itself. The question of atemporality seems very im‐ portant if we consider a contemporary fascination of industrial ruins and their digital images. In the past few years, the popularity of photographing ruins has measurably exploded. First of all because of an ability to find locations via the internet, the omnipresence and inexpensiveness of digital photography, and the plethora of forums and photo sharing sites to distribute images. The interest in the subject has increased exponentially and there are thousands of photographs of abandoned locations uploaded daily to image sharing websites and hundreds of gallery shows (Christopher, 2012). These websites remind some digital data archives, and every archive can be described as atemporal and multitemporal at the same time. The photographs of decaying buildings placed on the Internet exist 'out of time' in peculiar way, although they remind of the time and its 'destroyable' work at the same time. On the other hand, in order to capture these images, photographers must enter the spaces themselves, therefore physical presence is necessary and physical experience is unavoidable. Digital images of ruined and abandoned spaces therefore must be understood Derelict architecture... 395 to have fundamentally physical roots. There were bodies in space, even though the body - the photographer - is usually unseen in the produced image, and this physical, bodily experience of urban explorer took place at the particular real time (photographers entered, saw and captured the ruin during specific days, hours and minutes). Photographers document these physical spaces be‐ cause, in the moment of their experience, there is something remarkable about the spaces themselves (Wanenchak, 2012). Edensor compares large ruins to a labyrinthine structure which permit the making of a multitude of paths, in contradistinction to the largely linear routes through space determined by processes of production. Thus movement through a ruin is determined by whim or contingency in an improvi‐ sational path ‐making, according to what catches the eye or looks as if it might promise surprises or appears pleasurably negotiable (Edensor, 2005a: 87). Labyrinthine structure of ruins bears comparison to the working of memory as well, as it demonstrates how passage through space destroyed by time stimulates memories that are elusive and dependent upon conjectures about the traces of people, places and processes which haunt ruins (Edensor, 2005a: 87; Edensor, 2005b: 834). Therefore it can be acknowledged, that the working of memory can be atemporal and multitemporal at the same time. Movement in contemporary sites of dereliction takes also much more time, and therefore it enables the explorer to fee l time quite different than while 'everyday living in the city'. The ruin, despite its state of decay, somehow outlives us, and therefore our cultural and aesthetic gaze that we turn on derelict architecture is a way of 'loosening ourselves from the grip of punc‐ tual chronologies, setting ourselves adrift in time' (Dillon, 2011: 11). Boym also compares ruins to a labyrinth, but she expresses it quite different. She maintains that a tour of ruin leads us into a labyrinth of ambivalent tem‐ pora l adverbs, such as 'no longer' and 'not yet', 'nevertheless' and 'albeit' (Boym, 2011), that allows us to assign to contemporary ruins an additional, interesting meaning. Wanenchak emphasizes atemporality of contemporary abandoned buildings as follows: Through the experience of the space, explorers and photographers (and blends of the two) break out of a conventional experience of the present and into a space where the artifacts of history feel at once fresh and new, and ancient and decayed. Imagination is a key to the atemporal experience of these places: one can exist in an abandoned, ruined space and see shards of a dead past on which one can construct a live imagin‐ ing - who were the people who lived and worked here? What were their lives like? What were their stories? What happened to them? What happened to them in these spaces? (Wanenchak, 2012). 396 Małgorzata NIESZCZERZEWSKA There is one more interesting approach to the theme of ruins and their tem‐ poral dimension. Hanna K. Göbel in her book The re ‐use of urban ruins (2015) writes, that contemporary urban and lab culture is characterized by the 're ‐use' turn. Nothing should be forgotten, wasted or threw out. The re ‐using and re‐ cycling cultural 'obsession' is applied to architecture as well. Things and build‐ ings in contemporary culture are treated as temporal commodities. Designing social temporalities is a preference to stabilize, curate and market possible, but also contingent state of affairs (Göbel, 2015: 202). That allows us to admit, that abandoned buildings stay - metaphorical and literally - in opposition to this turn. They are atemporal, because they are unuseful. They are multi‐ temporal, because they are the accumulation of many 'asynchronic moments'. Aesthetic and bodily experience is not linear in this case. SUMMARY The presented approaches can be treated as a reflection upon the ambivalence of an aesthetic of contemporary ruins. Abandoned and derelict buildings function both out ‐of ‐time and out ‐of ‐place as well. Their ambivalence situates them somewhere between ruinophilia and ruinophobia in social meaning, between determined forms of buildings from which they hail and a deformed shape of ruins, and between multitemporal and atemporal dimension of an abandoned architecture. Contemporary ruins are distinguished, like other archetypal ar‐ chives (rooms with hundreds of shelves and drawers), by a specific quiescence and motionlessness. Paradoxically, the past of the ruin, with all its varieties and fates focuses itself in the aesthetic here and now. Therefore, urban explorers/ photographers and other artists who are fascinated with modern ruins often name themselves 'archaeologists of the present'. Decaying buildings embody present and recent past, and suggest how is the future to be imagined. For or‐ dinary inhabitants of the city, ruins are, according to Brian Dillon, a part of the long history of the fragment with the future that will live on after us despite the fact that it reminds us of a lost wholeness and perfection (Romany, 2011; Dillon, 2011: 11). BIBLIOGRAPHY Boym, S. (2010). Ruins of the avant ‐garde: From Tatlin's tower to paper architecture (pp. 58– 85). In: J. Hell & A. Schönle (Eds.). Ruins of modernity. Durham–London: Duke Uni‐ versity Press. Boym, S. (2011). Ruinophilia. Appreciation of ruins. Atlas of transformation. Retrieved from: http://monumenttotranformation.org/atlas ‐of ‐transformation/html/r/ruinophilia‐ ‐appreciation ‐of ‐ruins ‐svetlana ‐boym.html (10.05.2015). Derelict architecture... 397 Christopher, M. (2012). Confessions of a ruin pornographer. Retrieved from: http://www. abandonedamerica.us/life ‐as ‐a ‐ruin ‐pornographer (10.05.2015). Dillon, B. (2011). Introduction: A short history of decay. In: B. Dillon (Ed.). Ruins: Docu‐ ments of contemporary art (pp. 10–14). Cambridge: The MIT Press. Edensor, T. (2005a). Industrial ruins: Spaces, aesthetics and materiality. Oxford: Berg. Edensor, T. (2005b). The ghosts of industrial ruins: Ordering and disordering memory in excessive space. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 23, 829–849. Edensor, T. (2007a). Sensing the ruins. Senses and Society, 2, 217–232. Edensor, T. (2007b). Social practices, sensual excess and aesthetic transgression in industrial ruins. In: K. A. Franck & Q. Stevens (Eds.). Loose space: Possibility and diversity in urban life (pp. 234–252). London: Routledge. Göbel, H. K. (2015). The re ‐use of urban ruins: Atmospheric inquiries of the city. New York: Routledge. Hell, J. & Schönle, A. (2010). Introduction. In: J. Hell & A. Schönle (Eds.). Ruins of moder‐ nity (pp. 1–14). Durham–London: Duke University Press. Huyssen, A. (2010). Authentic ruins: Products of modernity. In: J. Hell & A. Schönle (Eds.). Ruins of modernity (pp. 17–27). Durham–London: Duke University Press. Macaulay, R. (2011). A note on new ruins // 1953. In: B. Dillon (Ed.). Ruins: Documents of contemporary art (pp. 27–28). Cambridge: The MIT Press.. Olalquiaga, C. (2011). Dust // 1998. In: B. Dillon (Ed.). Ruins: Documents of contemporary art (pp. 32–35). Cambridge: The MIT Press. Pareyson, L. (2009). Estetyka. Teoria formatywności. (K. Kasia, Trans.). Kraków: Universitas. Picon, A. (2000). Anxious landscapes: From the ruin to rust. (K. Bates, Trans.). Grey Room, 1, 64–83. Retrieved from: http://www.gsd.harvard.edu/images/content/5/3/537796.pdf (10.05.2015). Romany, W. G. (2011). Beauty in decay: The art of urban exploration, Darlington: Carpet Bombing Culture. Seamon, D. & Sowers, J. (2008). Place and placelessness: Edward Relph. In: Ph. Hubbard, R. Kitchen, & G. Vallentine (Eds.). Key texts in human geography: A reader guide (pp. 43– 51). London: Sage. Simmel, G. (2006). Ruina. Próba estetyczna. In: G. Simmel. Most i drzwi. Wybór esejów (pp. 169–176). (M. Łukasiewicz, Trans.). Warszawa: Oficyna Naukowa. Stewart, S. (2011). Separation and restoration // 1996. In: B. Dillon (Ed.). Ruins: Documents of contemporary art (pp. 36–41). Cambridge: The MIT Press. Stokes, A. (2011). The pleasures of limestone // 1934. In: B. Dillon (Ed.). Ruins: Documents of contemporary art (pp. 24–26). Cambridge: The MIT Press. Trigg, D. (2006). The aesthetics of decay: Nothingness, nostalgia and the absence of reason (= New Studies in Aesthetics, 37). New York: Peter Lang Publishing. Wanenchak, S. (2012). The atemporality of 'ruin porn': The carcass & the ghost. Retrieved from: http://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2012/05/16/the ‐atemporality ‐of ‐ruin ‐porn ‐the‐ ‐carcass ‐the ‐ghost/ (10.05.2015). Żmudzińska ‐Nowak, M. (2010). Miejsce. Tożsamość i zmiana. Gliwice: Wydawnictwo Politech‐ niki Śląskiej.